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Expatriate Voting Rights and Voting Behaviours

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1   Introduction

The UN estimates that in 1910 roughly 33 million individuals lived in countries other than their own as migrants; by the year 2000 that number reached 175 million. During this period (1910–2000), the population of the world has increased threefold, from 1.6 to 5.3 billion. Migration, by contrast, grew almost six-fold over the course of these 90 years. Strikingly, more than half of the increase in migration occurred in the last three decades of the 20th century, between 1965 and 2000 (Benhabib, 2005). The United Nation Population Fund (2015) estimates that in 2015, 244 million people lived outside their country of origin. This constitutes to roughly 3.3 per cent of the world's population. While some of these migrants are emigrating to different countries by choice, in the hope of better economic and social prospects, there is also a large share of political and religious refugees leaving their countries, seeking safety and security abroad. With the founding of the European Union and the free movement of labour, the possibilities and incentives for economic migration have increased even more.

In these times of mass migration and "global citizens", governments all over the world are tasked with politics of integration and social welfare, to ensure a functioning society and government. Migration, transnational and international, voluntary and forced, legal or not, is at the centre of modern politics. It educes the increasing interconnectedness of politics, economies, and societies (Heisler, 2005). While research into the efficiency and effectiveness of integration and welfare policies are crucial and still heavily debated in politics and academia to this day, this paper will focus on a different, far less researched aspect of migration: political enfranchisement in the country of origin and expatriate voting, with a focus on potential asymmetric behaviours.

Apart from the growing numbers of migrants around the world, there are various other reasons this research has academic and economic importance. In our modern globalized world, where country borders are becoming blurred and the free movement of labour is making it more and more common for people to emigrate, citizenship is getting detached from residence. This development of society has caused the emergence of what can be seen as a new voting population in elections, which has caused politicians to rethink how to campaign in elections and structure their policies. In the recent decades, politicians have started to develop new forms of political agency to integrate the growing expatriate population, which used to only serve their home countries with economic transfers and remittances, as voters into their campaigns and political systems in the form of foreign campaigns, expat ministries abroad or even separate parliamentary seats just for expat voters to be represented in parliament. In a world that is becoming more connected through the emergence of new media and communication technologies, and

where people reinvent the way we think about citizenship, it is crucial for politicians to keep up, be informed and adapt to the changing political opportunities.

In addition, with so many people on the move, out of their free will or not, it is eminent to ensure that these people have a way of expressing their political opinions and possess a tool of accountability for home country politicians. With millions of refugees seeking shelter in different countries around the world, citizens are becoming very dispersed and harder to access for politicians. After a few years, when these people have settled into their new country, or are thinking of going home again, these expatriates will play a large role in domestic elections, should they be entitled and willing to vote. Many of the people leaving their countries, do so with the hope of coming back to improved economic or political conditions eventually. With substantial and ever growing diaspora groups, it is thus not only very relevant for home country politicians to be aware of how to access this diaspora, how their voting behaviour might differ from traditional domestic voters, and what politicians can do to convince them to vote in their favour, but also for host countries to learn how to cope with, navigate and manage the political interest and actions other countries have in residents.

In the days and weeks leading up to the Turkish referendum in April 2017, for example, one could observe how important it was for the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to gain access to his diaspora groups residing all across Europe. Even if this meant, or especially through, creating a minor political crisis in Europe. With the tight election result and the peculiar voting behaviour of expatriate Turks all over Europe we can start to understand the controversial campaign ran by Erdogan.

The motivation for this research can be summed up by Anastasia Bermudez' (2014) statement "…If this practice [expatriate voting] has in the past been restricted to some states and specific categories of citizens, today a majority of countries allow their nationals to vote in home-country elections from abroad. Despite this, we still know very little about three central issues: why states grant voting rights to citizens abroad; what role emigrants play in this; and how external voting affects home and host societies."

This research targets the political impacts of migration and poses the question whether citizens residing outside of a country's borders vote systematically different than those voting from within. To answer this question the development of political enfranchisement for expatriate voters will be analysed for different countries around the globe, to see how various countries have approached and coped with possible heterogeneities in political affiliations between voter groups within countries and abroad. Studying the development of extra-territorial voting will aid with extrapolating possible reasons for differences in

voting behaviours and finally help understand some of the actions of modern politicians on the campaign trail both at home and abroad.

This paper will start by analysing the rise of extra-territorial voting and enfranchisement of expatriates. While giving a general overview on the legal and moral arguments made for and against such policies, the focus will be the determination of differences in voting behaviours. I will highlight the heterogeneity in voting behaviours between domestic and expatriate voters, why these occur, and what role they played during the decisions about political enfranchisement. Following from my findings, one can gain insight into the access politicians have created to their diaspora, so to get an estimate about the plausibility of reaching out to this special voting population. Finally, the paper analyses how much of the collected theory is actually used in the practice of a recent political campaign, based on the Turkish referendum of 2017. The paper concludes with an outlook into the future of expatriate voting and some suggestions for further research.

2 Expatriate Voting Rights and Political Enfranchisement of Expatriates

2.1 Current State and Development

Expatriate voting is not a new phenomenon. The practice of casting votes from outside the national territory dates back to at least as far as the ancient Roman Empire (Bermudez, 2014). In Europe, countries with a longer history of some form of political enfranchisement of expatriate citizens include the UK (1918), Iceland (1949), Finland (1958) and Sweden (1968); these were followed by France (1976), Portugal (1976), Switzerland (1977), Denmark (1980), Luxembourg (1984) and Germany (1985) in the 1970's and 1980's. Since 1990 there has been a new wave of enfranchisement, in which Austria, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania (1990), Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia (1992), Moldova (1993), Spain (1995), Belgium (1999), Czech Republic (2002), Italy (2001) and Hungary (2004) have all introduced schemes of some form of expatriate voting. Of the EU member states, in addition to Ireland, only Cyprus, Greece, Malta and Slovakia have no general system of external voting in place today (Honhan, 2011). In the Netherlands, up until 1983 the Dutch Constitution granted electoral rights to resident Dutch citizens only. From 1983 onwards, however, it was also possible for non-Dutch residents and non-resident nationals to participate in elections (Schrauwen, 2013).

Nowadays most European countries allow for some form of extra-territorial political participation. The picture is not much different on a global scale, as Collyer and Vathi (2007) point out, 115 countries currently allow some form of external voting. The reason for these enfranchisements, the degree to which expatriate citizens can impose their opinions on domestic elections and in what type of elections these

people can vote, varies quite significantly between countries. Politicians have made different experiences and chose different systems through which expats can voice their opinions. While most countries simply add the expatriate votes to the domestic results, various EU member states, such as France, Italy and Portugal have set aside separate parliamentary seats solely for expatriates. This was aimed to emphasise their importance and encourage them to vote in the elections. In Colombia, for example, expatriates are defined as one of five minorities with reserved seats in parliament (Bauböck, 2005).

The impact of the expatriate vote also varies, depending on factors such as accessibility, percentage of expatriates in the total population, demographics and participation rates. How citizens abroad actually cast their vote varies across countries as well. Different channels through which citizens can cast their votes from abroad are employed, some countries, like Israel or Nicaragua require expatriates to travel to their home countries to cast their ballot on Election Day. Other places, like many Latin American Countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Honduras and Venezuela) only require their citizens abroad to visit a consulate or embassy in their country of residence for the voting procedure. Another common method, employed by Canada, the US and most European countries (e.g. Austria, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg) aimed to increase accessibility through absentee ballots cast by mail (Bauböck, 2005).

It is important to mention that this paper will focus on the incentives of the countries staging the election to enfranchise their expatriate citizens, rather than the counties hosting the expatriate voters. In the discussion of expatriate voting there are 5 main stakeholders. Politicians at home and in the host country, as well as citizens at home and in the host country. Lastly the expatriate population is a key interest group in such voting rights. All these groups have different interests and are affected in different ways by this polity, the only player who really has any decision-making power and is the deciding factor in the discussion on expatriate political enfranchisement are home country politicians. These people are the ones dictating the tone and path of the negotiations, designing the system and setting up institutions.

This is a crucial distinction, as the incentives of the players are likely to differ. Country A may want to allow its diaspora to participate in the domestic election, but the new resident countries of these voters might not agree with certain aspects of the election, may it be the content or the electoral rule, and therefore prohibit the construction of polling stations. In the theoretical analysis, it will be assumed that host countries do not block elections for foreign residents. This is a reasonable assumption, as host countries have interfered in foreign elections only twice. In 2005 neither Turkey, nor Canada allowed Iraqi politicians to campaign to voters in their respective countries. In recent years, there was a case of brief threats made by EU countries to prohibit voting stations within their borders, after controversial statements made by

Turkish politicians. This however did not happen, but I will get back to this point in the case study of the Turkish referendum in a later part of this paper.

2.2 Should Expatriates be allowed to vote?

In academia, there are various arguments made in favour and against the enfranchisement of expatriates. While nobody has brought up the argument of differences in voting behaviours, to which I will get to later, many researchers argue along the lines of morality and equality.

The main argument against external voting derives from a traditional republican position, which states that only citizens who are present on the territory and affected by the consequences of their vote should be entitled to the right to vote (Bauböck, 2005; Blais, Massicotte and Yoshinaka; 2001). Collyer et al. (2007) argue that citizens residing abroad may lack information necessary to make a sound choice. There could also be a lack of responsibility and care to exercise the choice wisely, as these voters are not directly affected by their choices. Emigrants, do not share in the politically determined life of the country. They are not subject to its working conditions and practices, they do not in general pay taxes at home and their children are not brought up in its education system. Thus, they are not subject to the authority of government in the same direct and comprehensive way domestic citizens are. It is therefore hard to see their subjection as equivalent to that of residents. Honhan (2011) believes that this should be reflected in their access to political power.

This argument tends to be discarded quickly by emigrants themselves, on the grounds that family, regular visits, property and the hope of an eventual return to their country of origin, result in stakes high enough to exert responsibility in the voting booth (Collyer et al., 2007). Rubio Marin (2006) supports this claim suggesting that "it is now easier than ever to remain connected to home state politics from abroad, and thus easier to understand the set of concrete political options that a country may face." While this might be true, Grace (2007) suggests that it only holds for elections regarding the national government, about which they can easily gather information on the news. Information about local and municipal elections is a lot harder to come by.

The transfer of remittances across borders is another signal of connectedness, as sending countries vastly benefit from their expatriate population. Countries like Turkey have started worker export programmes in the 1960s to address the labour shortage in northern Europe following World War II. The remittances sent back home by these workers played a large role in the Turkish economy in the following years and was to be maintained. To ensure these remittance streams would continue, countries started thinking of

ways to incorporate these expatriates into domestic politics with the aim of securing nationalistic bonds. Grating them the right to vote was one way to do this (Sayari, 1986).

Additionally, Grace (2007) and Ellis & Wall (2007) hint that, while costs of organizing and providing extra-territorial voting are higher than those to organize the elections domestically, voter turnout rates abroad tend to be significantly lower than those domestically. The combination of high costs and low turnouts has caused governments to refrain from expatriate voting completely, limit the access to carefully selected locations with a sizable diaspora, or set minimum requirements for voter registrations. While from a completely democratic standpoint such reasoning should not matter for the integrity of a good democracy, in reality it plays a large role. The factors that cause these low turnout rates for expatriate voters are political, administrative, institutional and financial. The geographical location of the polling station, the access to information and the logistical arrangements for voter registrations might also have an impact. Senegal, for instance, only organizes external voting if the total number of registered voters in one country is 500 or more. Illegal migrants or those opposed by the regime in their home country may also not be prepared to register out of fear of reprisals.

To get an idea of the costs involved of organizing such an election one can briefly look at an example from Australia. The country was thinking of holding a plebiscite on whether or not to legalize same sex marriage in 2016. For this referendum, the consulting firm PwC estimated costs of 525 million Australian dollars domestically alone. In addition, the Swiss Centre for Research on Direct Democracy found that the average turnout for referendums has been steadily declining since the 1990's. While it used to be around 75%, nowadays on average only 43% of the eligible voters actually contribute to policy making ("Why referendums…", 2016).

In the future, with the emergence of E-Voting, costs are likely to play less of a role in the debate. Such systems are trialled in various places at the moment, and are bound to reduce personnel costs for counting and monitoring as well as equipment and logistical costs. It may also make the voting process faster, reduce lines and encourage more people to vote. The threat of foreign intervention or manipulation of the machines must be considered during the discussions of the new technology as well though (Buchsbaum, 2004).

On the contrary, Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights describes democracy, at its simplest, as the rule of the people. Participation in collective self-rule has been proclaimed as a human right: "Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely

chosen representatives". Expatriates who are not enfranchised might feel disconnected, alienated and without a voice, as it can easily happen that their new country of residence does not allow for foreign residents to participate in their elections either. While European Union citizenship makes it possible for all EU citizens to vote, run for, and hold elected office in local elections of their own nationality, this is not the case for third-country nationals. Their entitlement to political rights is still attached to immigrant's national and cultural origins (Benhabib, 2005). Rubio Marin (2000) claims that all residents should have equal rights to representation and participation in the making of laws, since a democratic polity can be regarded as a community of individuals who are subjected to the same political authority and its laws.

The electoral inclusion of citizens living abroad can also be supported by ethnic conceptions of nationhood, not as a territorial state and its inhabitants, but as a community that may be dispersed over several states (Bauböck, 2005). In Central Eastern Europe, there have been attempts to extend voting rights to co-ethnic minorities separated through shifting state borders rather than migration. For example, Romania has offered citizenship to the ethnic majority population of Moldova, whom nationalists consider as part of a greater Romanian nation (Iordachi, 2004).

It is argued that expatriate voting may be especially crucial in post conflict societies. In various Latin American countries, in Portugal, and in Spain extensions of voting rights have occurred in the context of political transition. Authoritarian regimes in Latin America often caused a substantial group of citizens to reside abroad, but remaining committed to democracy in their homelands. When political exile had lasted for several decades it is unrealistic for expatriates to simply return home. In countries where democratic participation had to be newly defined, expats were rewarded for their contributions by access to full political participation (Bauböck, 2005). The international community regards the inclusion of absentee votes by refugees as an essential tool for national reconciliation and the building of functioning democratic political institutions. Unstable post conflict societies such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, East Timor, and Bosnia & Herzegovina require the input of their foreign citizens to ensure the transition to a functioning democracy (Grace, 2007).

3   The Role of Heterogeneous Voting Behaviours

While the above-mentioned arguments seem to have been sufficient to convince politicians to include citizens living abroad in domestic decision making to different extents, there seems to be another, subtler and politically motivated reason causing politicians to be for or against such policies. Since the early days

of the discussion on extra territorial voting, politicians wondered about the consequences of including the foreign population into local politics. The great uncertainty associated with these voters and the high costs of implementing a system to enable people to vote from abroad lead to a slow development in expatriate voting rights. The early expatriate voting systems were mainly introduced for economic reasons and to include specific categories of citizens, such as soldiers and diplomats, serving their countries interests abroad (Lafleur, 2011). Nowadays almost all citizens abroad fulfilling certain criteria such as citizenship, registration or past residence in a certain community, can voice their opinions in the voting booth. While the abovementioned moral arguments for the inclusion of these people are important, office seeking politicians were far more concerned about possible political gains and advantages located abroad, as well as possible unpredictable effects on the elections results.

3.1   The Case of New Zealand

In New Zealand, one of the first countries to employ expatriate voting, politicians started noticing the possible effects of votes from abroad as early as the 1920's, when oversea voting was first introduced to enable military personal fighting in the World Wars to voice their opinions. Since it was very costly and timely to collect and count the overseas votes, their results were only available weeks after the ordinary election. If numerous enough, these ballots could swing the election, overturning election night winners of particular seats and even distort the overall election outcome and coalition formation (Gamlen, 2014a). Atkinson (2003) proposes the 1943 election as a good example for such occurrence. The domestic votes gave the Labour Party 35 out of the 80 parliamentary seats on election night. During the evening and the coming days 73,000 oversea military votes and 80,000 other special votes from abroad still had to be counted. In the end, these votes swung the election into Labours favour, yielding them a majority in the house of 45 to 35 seats.

This result started giving two insights to New Zealand's Politicians. Firstly, politicians started realizing the political impact of expatriate voters through its sheer size. New Zealand's population was around 1.6 million around that time, out of which roughly 200,000 resided abroad, so 12.5% of the entire population. Secondly, and especially important in the combination with the former point, the overseas population was not symmetric to the domestic population with respects to factors such as employment and demographics. As seen in the 1943 General House elections discussed previously, this resulted in heterogeneous political preferences between domestic and overseas voters, out of which the latter seemed to strongly favour New Zealand's Labour Party.

These experiences revolutionized the perception of oversea voters and their role in politician's campaigns in future elections. Great efforts were made to address oversea soldiers. Advertising ran wherever New Zealanders might be stationed, and campaign materials were distributed to hundreds of polling stations set up worldwide (Gamlen, 2014a). In later years, when civilian citizens residing abroad were enfranchised as well in 1956, parties even developed specific campaigns and programs targeted at citizens abroad. In 1999, the ACT (Association of Consumers and Taxpayers) Party launched an aggressive offshore strategy, displaying their political program online, and planning campaign activities during overseas visits of senior representatives. They took 11.28% of the overseas vote opposed to 7.11% of domestic votes. Similarly, the Green Party had party-list candidates campaigning in London and in Sydney, where the largest expat communities resided, for the first time and took a surprising 14.28% of the overseas vote (Smith, 2002; Todd, 2002). This helped the Green party cross the 5% hurdle and secure 7 seats in Parliament. All this occurred at the loss of the projected coalition deal between Labour and the Alliance, who seemed to have a comfortable 63 Seat majority (out of 120), but lost 4 seats, and their majority, through the entrance of the Green Party into Parliament (Main, 1999).

While it is unclear whether these results were caused by the increased political presence of these parties abroad, or due to systematically different political opinions. It might also have been a combination of the two effects. In general, however, it was observed that parties who campaigned the hardest abroad, gained the most, fuelling the chase for oversea votes (Hamer, 2008; O'Sullivan, 2002).

In recent years, political parties in New Zealand have raced each other to capture 'free' overseas votes. Once convinced, these voters have to be retained at the next election through further campaigning. In New Zealand's 2008 election Labour had two candidates campaign in London, one in Melbourne and one who backpacked through Latin America. Additionally, the Labour Party stationed a party list candidate in London for the first time (Gamlen, 2014a). Overall, Levy (2011) hypothesises that politicians based their campaigns on stereotypes and unverified perceptions like "overseas, people are more likely to vote for Left-wing parties, and Green in particular". 2014 has seen the rise of an even more elaborate step to gain oversea votes, the "Expatriate Party of New Zealand". The party has already set up a delegation in London, one of the largest hubs for New Zealand's expatriates, and aims to represent the interests of the increasing diaspora groups at home and extend their voting rights, from the 2017 election onwards (Safi, 2014).

The claim of differences in voting behaviours is emphasised even more in cases where the decision to enfranchise citizens abroad was not as clear cut as it was in New Zealand. Many governments did not have

such an open conversation with objective reasoning, and later noticing that this policy could be used for political gains. Governments in Mexico, Italy and Belgium show the other side of the story, where the political impact of extra-territorial voting was at the forefront of the negotiations, rather than subtly being picked up by politics after the enfranchisement had already taken place.

3.2   Mexico - Uncertainty and Stereotypes

In Mexico, the issue of extra territorial voting has been negotiated since 1929, but such policy was only put into place almost 80 years later, in 2006. The main reason for this was that the socialist PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), the party in power for 71 years, believed that expatriates would not support it (Calderón Chelius & Martínez Cossío 2003). Migrants also did not display great interest in becoming enfranchised, as fraud and corruption plagued the Mexican political system (Martínez Saldaña, 1998). The government was eventually forced to reconsider, as Mexico wanted to join NAFTA in 1994 and the government required the support from its vast expatriate population. The discussions were sped up through the election of Vincente Fox in 2000, the first non-PRI president, as well as the formation of the left-wing party PRD (Party of Democratic Revolution), which strongly advocated expatriate voting rights, due to its strong ties to emigrant activists in the US. Despite great uncertainty about the consequences of allowing several million new voters to participate in the next election, a law allowing expatriates to vote was passed on April 6th, 2004. At that time, Mexico had a population of 109.7 million, with roughly 10.5 [1]million (9.5%) citizens residing abroad. The majority (10.3 million) of these expatriates emigrated to the US, with the second largest exodus residing in Spain (32,000).

Due to the great uncertainty of the impact of the millions of Mexicans living in the US being allowed to vote in the upcoming elections, political parties were encouraged to establish a series of barriers to dampen the effect. Parties were prohibited from campaigning abroad, voting had to be done by mail and voters had to hold a voter identity card. Voters who did not possess such card, were required to travel back to Mexico. This effectively restricted access to millions of potential voters. Eventually only 40.876 out of more than 10 million emigrants managed to register for voting, which was regarded as a success by the PRI, who still controlled the senate and was most interested in eliminating the impact of potential unfavourable expatriate votes (Lafleur, 2011).

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[1] Data from the year 2005, UN migration Stock database 2015 retrieved from:
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml

In the case of Mexico, we can see that unfavourable stereotypes and great uncertainty limited the interest of Mexican politicians into foreign nationals. These domestic factors combined with little initiative from expatriates themselves halted the discussions on expatriate voting rights for many years, only to be picked up by liberal parties in a changing political climate.

3.3   Italy - The Goal of Political Stability

In Italy, the first discussions on electoral rights for citizens living abroad date back to as early as 1908. The discussion was put on hold until it re-emerged in the Constituent Assembly in 1946, where normative, political and technical concerns halted the debate yet again. Until the 1990s as many as 48 different bills were discussed, until a law granting voting rights to citizens residing abroad was unanimously approved in January of 2001 (Tintori, 2013). Due to Italy's fascist regime (1922-1943), the debate on external voting was plagued by the believe that most Italians abroad were right-wing nationals. This stereotype greatly influenced the position of the parties involved in the discussion and made it impossible to get such legislation approved earlier. Only the right-wing nationalists *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI), later called *Alleanza Nazionale* (AN) were eager to get such legislation passed (Bertonha, 2002; Colucci, 2005). Left-wing parties, on the other hand, were worried that the success of Mussolini's ideas among emigrant communities would damage their electoral performance, if external voting was to be allowed (Colucci, 2002). Additional to the stereotypes about expatriates, the effects of introducing extra territorial voting were very uncertain. The Italian Republic, which has produced 59 governments between 1948 and 2013 (so on average one per year), was seeking political stability. This discouraged the introduction of new uncertainty, in the form of a new voter group, into the system, causing additional disturbances to domestic politics (Tintori, 2013). In 2001 Italy had 3.1 million out of its 56.94 million (5%) citizens residing outside of its borders. The largest foreign communities lived in France (550,000), Germany (498,000) and the US (473,000)[2].

To overcome the stereotypes and estimate the ideology and potential impact of expatriate voters, a registry of citizens residing abroad (AIRE) was set up in 1988. The Italian government also created the domestic Council of Italians Abroad (CGIE), networking between members of parliament, emigrant representatives and domestic actors. In December of 2001 the centre-right *Forza Italia* led by Berlusconi, finally made it possible to create legislation allowing expatriates to vote. The coalition believed that they

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[2] Data from the year 2000, UN migration Stock database 2015 retrieved from:
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml

would be favoured by the expatriate vote and therefore made it as easy as possible for expats to vote. Registration was automatic and ballots were sent to voter's homes directly. In the following elections, the stereotypes about external voting behaviour, fostered by the MSI and AN, turned out to be wrong. Contrary to expectations, the left-wing coalition won most of the Senate and Chamber seats in the extraterritorial constituency in 2006. This was mainly due to the deteriorated view on Berlusconi of voters abroad, as well as the effective mobilisation of voters and trade unions abroad by Prodi's left wing government and institutions (Lafleur, 2011). The turnout of the 2.7 million registered external voters was relatively low with 38.5%, however there appeared to be tipping force towards the Union, aiding Prodi in gaining a senate majority (Mascitelli & Battiston, 2008). Berlusconi later contested the results, claiming were irregularities in the expatriate vote and that the right-wing parties had put forward too many candidates, thereby splitting the centre-right vote.

3.4   Belgium – Stereotypes and Ideologies

In Belgium, expats can vote in domestic elections since 18th December 1998. At that time, Belgium had an expat population of roughly 399,000, with the largest communities in France (136,000), the Netherlands (45,000) and Spain (32,500)[3]. The Belgian population itself was estimated at 10.25 million, so expatriates made up roughly 4% of the population.

There were advocates for such policies already earlier, with the French speaking liberals (PRL) repeatedly proposing legislation that would enfranchise citizens abroad. The party believed that it would benefit from the expat vote due to similar socio-economic profiles. French and Dutch speaking socialist parties feared the expatriate electorate for the identical reason, resulting in the rarely applied and inadequate law of 1998, that granted the right for Belgian citizens living abroad to vote in senate and chamber elections. The political parties that feared the external vote would harm their electoral performance, managed to negotiate harsh restrictions to contain the effect of the expatriate vote. External voting was granted, but the process was made costly, extremely bureaucratic and very restrictive. These restrictions were so effective that only 18 people managed to vote from abroad in the 1999 legislative elections. The law was reformed in 2002 and 2012, once the French speaking liberal party, with their positive believes of the expat vote, was in power. The reform made it easier for citizens abroad to vote and register in the municipality they last lived.

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[3] Data from the year 2000, UN migration Stock database 2015 retrieved from:
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml

This liberalization of expatriate voting rights was noticeable in the 2003 and 2007 elections, when over 100,000 Belgians voted from abroad. Like the scenario observed in New Zealand, liberals and Green Parties benefited most from the inclusion of the expatriate, gaining more support abroad than at home. The fears of the socialist parties also came true, with the parties in Flanders and Wallonia performed worse abroad than at home. This sparked a new round of discussions, with the socialists pleading for restrictions on the expatriate vote, and the liberals favouring an expansion of their voting rights. As of the 26th of August 2016, Belgian expats living in non-EU countries also have the right to vote in European Parliament elections from abroad.

In all three cases, we can see that the perception of local political parties on the ideologies of potential expatriate voters was crucial for the process of enfranchising such voters. It was important for parties to figure out whether they would be favoured or harmed in the event of expatriate voting. Because of this, the believes parties had of the population abroad, while usually based on stereotypes or incomplete data, played an important role on the stands politicians had on expatriate voting rights. The Mexican PRI feared the revenge of emigrants through their vote, if these were to be enfranchised. The Italian AN was convinced it would improve its electoral performance by including expatriates in the election, and the Belgian PRL was sure that emigrants matched the socio-economic profile of their domestic electorate. All these examples highlight the weight of the perceptions political parties have of the emigrant community, in shaping their positions on external voting. Whether these perceptions are true and justified is hard to say, as these perceptions and the position towards the emigrant community influences the latter's believes of the home country politics as well, creating somewhat of self-fulfilling prophecy. What is evident however, is the significant impact these believes had on enfranchisement of diaspora groups (Lafleur, 2011).

3.5   Other Examples

Apart from those three cases, where it was observed that the possibility of an unsymmetrical impact of the expatriate vote on the electoral performance of different parties played a large role in the decision to enfranchise non-resident citizens, there are other cases where politicians changed existing legislation in their favour to mitigate or exploit the effects of the expatriate vote once they realized that overseas voters voted differently than those at home. The post-apartheid government of South Africa, for example, is to this date the only government to take steps to disenfranchise its diaspora again (Collyer & Vathi, 2007). Adam (1999) speculates that the anti-apartheid government, led by Nelson Mandela, saw emigrants as

unpatriotic and racist and thus took away their voting rights in 1998. Mandela's party, the social democratic "African National Congress" (ANC), took such drastic measures to gain an advantage in the upcoming 1999 general election, since the very popular Nelson Mandela did not run for office again in that election, the party wanted to ensure that Thabo Mbeki would be his successor. The ANC ended up with 62.65% of the votes and Mbeki became the 2nd President of South Africa. Nowadays, South African expatriates can only vote in person at an embassy or consulate.

Most countries simply add the expat votes to the domestic ones, but, as discussed earlier, a few countries separate them from the domestic electorate and create special districts or parliamentary seats. This system is usually employed to dampen the impact of the expatriate on the overall election outcome and allocation of power. However, it can also be used to exploit favouring political ideologies abroad. Portugal and Croatia are countries known for such systems. In Portugal, this system works well, as it allocates two out of its 20 districts to the expatriate. One for Portuguese citizens living in Europe, and the other for Portuguese non-EU residents. Each of these districts elects two representatives into parliament so that the expatriate is represented by four out of 230 parliamentary seats. In the 2015 election the votes from abroad allocated 3 seats to the reigning "Portugal Ahead" and the remaining seat to the second placed "Socialist Party Portugal". While the seats are allocated in accordance with the domestic opinions, the support for those parties from abroad was asymmetric compared to that domestically. Portugal Ahead collected 39.1% and 48.5% of the Portuguese living in Europe and the rest of the world, respectively, while only having support from 36.9% of the domestic population. The Socialist Party on the other hand was much less popular abroad than at home. The party only gained 29.9% of the votes in Europe and 10.8% in the remaining countries, compared to 32.3% at home. Since only two seats are available per geographical region of the expatriate, two parties can represent them at most. In the 2015 election this meant that the Green party "People – Animal – Nature" could not benefit from the larger support abroad (1.8% compared to 1.4% at home), since the seats will be allocated to the larger parties.

In Croatia (expatriate population of 874,000, 19.7% of the total population[4]), the system is very similar, with the crucial differentiation in the number of seats allocated to the diaspora. Up until the year 2000, the largest Croatian party "Croatian Democratic Union" (HDZ) and its President Franjo Tudjman took advantage of the nationalistic leanings of the Croats residing abroad. He was convinced that the Croatians abroad would predominantly support them, thus allocated 12 out of the total seats (varying between 80

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[4] Total population estimated at 4.426 million in the year 2000 by the World Bank,
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=

and 127) to its emigrant population (Ellis et al, 2007). As turnout abroad tends to be much lower than domestically, Croats abroad were allocated seats disproportionate to their voting weight, and thus gave the incumbent HDZ and advantage in the elections. The HDZ was reassured in their methodology when the following election results confirmed the HDZ's expectations with roughly 90% of the expatriate showing their support for them, compared to 45% at home. In the 1995 election all 12 seats were won by Tudjman's HDZ. Following increasing complaints about the legitimacy of the system, it was reformed in 2000, the number of seats allocated to the expatriate vote is now weighted proportional to the votes cast (Grace, 2007).

3.6   It's a Current Issue

The issue of differences in voting behaviours is still relevant today. It has been observed that politicians in various countries now approach their expatriate populations to test the waters, maintain political ties or directly target them for political campaigns. In 2008 Barack Obama held a speech in Berlin in front of 200.000 people as part of his presidential campaign, while his opponent John McCain was touring through Mexico and Colombia promoting free trade and inspecting the progress in the war on drugs (Applebaum, 2008; Kilercioglu, 2017)

The referendum about the constitutional change in Turkey held on April 16th, 2017, and the French presidential election held on the 23rd of April and the 7th of May 2017 are two other, very recent displays of differences in voting behaviours. While the social-liberal, and later president of France, Emmanuel Macron received 24.01% of the domestic vote in the first round of the election, 55.9% of the 43.000 French citizens that voted in Germany supported Macron. On the contrary, second placed Marine Le Pen received 21.3% of the Vote in France and only 3.4% in Germany. The support for the remaining 3 main candidates Fillon, Melenchon and Hamon did not differ quite as drastically (Fröhlingsdorf, 2017)[5].

The Turkish referendum was a highly publicized and very controversial, partly due to Turkey's significant expatriate population. Out of the country's 78.7 million citizens, roughly 5.5 million reside abroad with the largest populations in Germany (1.7 million), France (300,000) and the Netherlands (200,000)[6]. On

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[5] Data from French Consulate Frankfurt am Main, https://de.ambafrance.org/1er-tour-de-l-election-presidentielle-2017-en-Allemagne

[6] Data from the year 2015, UN migration Stock database 2015 retrieved from:
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml

April 16th, 2017, a total of 51.3% of the total votes supported the referendum. Abroad, Erdogan collected a significantly higher share of the votes, gaining on average 59.1% of the voter's support. The differences in voting behaviours are especially striking when looking at the outcomes of individual countries. While in the end, the expatriate populations in roughly half of the European countries supported the referendum, the results were very polarized. The countries in which the Turkish expatriate supported Erdogan did so with a remarkable majority, in the countries where the expatriate voted "No", they did so there with a significant majority as well. In Germany 63.07% voted "Yes", in the Netherlands 70.94%, in Belgium 74.98%, in France 64.85%, in Denmark 60.63%, in Bosnia & Herzegovina 61.83% and in Kosovo and Macedonia around 57% of the Turks voted Yes. On the other hand, in Spain only 13.32% supported Erdogan's referendum and voted "Yes". In the UK only 20.26%, in Finland 28.45%, in the Czech Republic 12.54%, in Ireland 19.93%, in Hungary 25.75%, in Greece 22.62% and in Italy 37.94% (Degonda, 2017)[7].

4 Explaining the Differences in Voting Behaviours

Having observed these differences in voting behaviours between domestic and expatriate voters, it is time to look at explanations for them. One explanation for the apparent differences in political preferences between domestic and expatriate voters is self-selection. This means that the people who vote from abroad and the people who vote at home are not the same. If we are comparing apples with oranges, we should not be surprised that they yield different preferences at the voting booth. If emigrants are political or religious refugees, for example, this specific political or religious ideology is going to be disproportionately represented abroad, compared to domestic voters. This conclusion builds upon the earlier argument made by Grace (2007) and Bauböck (2005), that it is crucial to involve expatriate refugees in the political process to ensure legitimate democratic transition. If a religious war scares away a certain people into exile, not including these people in the democratic process would yield bias outcomes. Conversely, including these people would mean that the exodus residing abroad has very particular opinions as well. Over time, this heterogeneity might deteriorate, with citizens returning home, but it might also transmit into future generations in the form of de-territorialized identities. These are then being taught by expat interest groups and embodied by expat institutions and initiatives. This process can carry the ideological bias through time and may be signalled through differences in voting behaviours (Martiniello, 2005).

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[7] Data from Eurostat, Electoral Commission of Turkey & dpa

4.1   Self-Selection

While political and religious selection are crucial when considering forced migration, socio-economic and educational selection play a larger role in voluntary migration, such is probably the case with the Turkish guest workers. In our modern globalized world, different social groups have different opportunities. While in some cases the educated middle-upper class is more likely to live and work abroad, in well payed jobs, in other cases the lower economic classes are incentivised to look for better prospects abroad. Countries with high rates of unemployment, such as Spain or Greece are experiencing somewhat of a brain drain, with highly educated and experienced people leaving the country to find work elsewhere. In Spain, unemployment is particularly high for the younger population. Despite good education, Spanish citizens might find themselves forced to search for a job in France, Germany or the UK, as the search at home is frustrating and unrewarding (Sklair, 2012; Zaletel, 2006). These specific economic conditions cause a certain type of people to migrate (i.e. young, well-educated citizens). It should be no surprise then that this select interest group has partisan ideologies, and display particular preferences when allowed to vote, which might be systematically different than those of the voters at home. In other cases, economic migration might occur especially in the lower social classes. Mexican migrants seeking better economic prospects in the US are likely to be lower educated and exhibit different political and economic preferences than those who stayed at home. They migrate not because the next step in their career awaits them abroad, but because of low skilled jobs with better pay awaits them across the border (Kandel & Massey, 2002).

To summarize, there is usually a particular reason why people reside abroad. This reason, may it be political, religious or economic, attracts a certain type of people. These people are likely to have distinct preferences and ideologies, which might be systematically different to those of people at home. These then result in the differences in voting behaviours observed, exploited and feared by politicians at home.

At the same time, there might also be self-selection happening at a later stage. The systematic differences between domestic and expatriate voters due to self-selection into migration are apparent. However, it is quite likely that there is divergence in political affiliations between migrants themselves. Turner (2008) speculates that migrates tend to have greater distrust in their home country institutions, which yields more radical and polarized political positions on the one hand, or greater fear of expressing their opinion on the other hand. The latter could be observed in Mexican elections up until 1980's, were most emigrants were not interested in formally participating in elections, as elections were considered illegitimate and unreliable. This means that the fact that people are residing outside of their electoral districts alone,

causes heterogeneous decision making. Regardless of the economic social, political and cultural affiliations, geographic divergence is estimated to influence voting behaviour.

4.2   Global Ideals and Host Country Influences

Another reason for the observed differences in voting behaviour is given by Martiniello (2005). He believes that today's migrants form communities that come closer to the "world citizen ideal". The new environment encourages them to detach from their ethnic and national bonds, creating a multiplicity of imagined communities (Anderson, 1983). This growing number of people who speak multiple languages, have homes in more than one country and have continuous, regular cross border contacts, may shape a more liberal, global minded community (Portes, Guarnizo & Landolt; 1999). These transnational views might sooner or later translate into transnational political practices, which are bound to differ from inward oriented, nationalistic domestic policy.

Apart from the possibility of emigrants becoming world citizens and encompassing global ideals, their political ideologies might also be reshaped by their host countries. The attitude of the host state towards migrants, the integration of such people, the institutions in place to support foreigners as well as the relationship between host and origin country play a role in shaping the views of these potential voters. While most migrants might not adopt the drastic global-citizen view, nor detaching from all their nationalistic heritage, they are more likely to adopt a trans-state affiliation of a particularistic type, adopting their political affiliations to the host countries ideals (Waldinger & Fitzgerald, 2004)

4.3   Second Order Elections

These previous arguments focused on a potential difference in the nature and ideologies of the expatriate population themselves. Reif (1984) and Reif & Schmitt (1980) provide evidence that people vote differently, depending on the type of election they are asked to contribute to. The authors propose the concept of "Second-Order Elections", in which voters feel that there is less at stake. In their investigation, they compare national elections (first order) to European and municipal elections (second order). The authors find that in second order elections voters are less concerned about wasting their vote or voting for parties that don't actually have a chance to win. More importantly, they observe a lower incentive to actually go and vote as well as a lower motivation to collect and use information about the political arena when preparing for the decision in the voting booth. While the elections discussed in the previous section are all important national elections, there is reason to believe that while domestic citizens see them

important first order elections, expatriate citizens, who are essentially unaffected by the election results, might regard the elections in their home country as second order elections. The difference in the perception of the gravity of the election between the different voter groups can then result in systematically different political preferences between domestic and foreign voters.

Heath, McLean, Taylor & Curtice (1999) support this argument finding that the locality of the elections play a role in the approach of voters. The more local the elections were, the more of a first order character they had to the voters, yielding higher turnouts and a higher concern about the results of the elections. Eijk and Franklin (1996) add to the argument of second-order voting, suggesting that voters might use such elections as signals, making them expressive rather than instrumental. In elections voters feel less connected to, voters might vote "for a party that they do not in their hearts support but may instead use their vote to warn their own party to mend its ways" (Eijk et al, 1996). This is how the authors explain the so called "green tide" in 1989. They suggest that voters might not actually have preferred the green parties, but rather voted for them in second order elections to signal their usually favored party to listen to the green message.

4.4   Party Differences and Campaign Factors

In the previous paragraphs, we have seen how governments in the past have seen expatriate voting as a tool and threat to their political success. These politicians were mostly focused on the primary impact of the foreign electorate and their apparent natural differences in political preferences. Throughout time however, once extra-territorial voting tended to be the status quo, politicians have noticed an additional significance of the expatriate vote. Voter turnouts abroad tend to be a lot lower than those domestically, and the mobilization of these voter's functions in a different way. Thus, differences, advantages and disadvantages in the campaigning and access to these outside voters can mechanically create a difference in voting behaviours. This argument is already common in national politics, with smaller parties having fewer resources for their campaigns, thus having a smaller presence. Increasing the campaign field to a global scale greatly magnifies this problem. While in the previous sections we have discussed natural differences in political affiliations between domestic and foreign voters, the access to this foreign electorate can create biases in the election results.

Ellis et al. (2007) argue that larger parties and the party in power tend to have larger networks and more resources at their disposal to launch campaigns in foreign constituencies. Smaller parties often lack the

personnel and the resources to create a presence abroad. This creates somewhat of a monopoly for larger parties abroad. This was noticeable in the Senegalese election of 2000. While the smaller opposition party, led by Abdoulaye Wade, was only able to campaign at home and in neighbouring countries such as Mali and Gambia, the incumbent Abdou Diouf managed to campaign also in places further away such as Morocco (1193), Burkina Faso (2961), Guinea (8455), Côte d'Ivoire (21,563), France (78,572) and Belgium (687)[8]. Despite eventually losing the second round of the presidential elections (41.5% to 58.5%) his campaigning efforts yielded him 55% of the expatriate vote, which accounts to roughly 5% of the total vote.

Even though it is essentially the asymmetric information levels and the information sources of the voters in different geographical regions that are responsible for the differences in the political preferences, politicians had great influence in this happening. Campaign spending and party size by themselves do not create heterogeneous voting behaviours, but they can be used to create asymmetric information levels between voters. Politicians with a further reach can access the less informed voters abroad, who their opponent might not be able to reach. Controlling the information flow and the type of coverage voters have access to can be greatly beneficial in shaping political views of the electorate. This effect is even more significant for expatriate voting populations and politicians trying to reach them, as monetary costs and time investments to access information abroad are significantly higher for expatriates, compared to domestic voters (Lafleur & Chelius, 2011).

In Mexico expatriate voters were initially asked to download their registration form, and then send the filled out form back to their home district together with their voter ID and a proof of residence abroad. There were several complaints about the costs (8$ for shipping, time/energy required to go to the post office) and the discrimination against illiterate less informed potential voters who might not have internet access, sufficient English or literary skills or were uninformed about the registration process (Smith 2008). In combination with the findings by Valle (2004) and a survey conducted by McCann, Cornelius and Leal (2006) who find that 75% of the Mexican emigrants interviewed will spend upmost 1 hour voting only 8-12% of the Mexican population in the US actually followed the 2006 election.

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[8] Estimate of Senegalese citizens residing abroad in 2000, UN migration Stock database 2015 retrieved from: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml

These high costs are likely to limit the search for information, causing less informed and biased voting, as well as low voter turnouts due to limited numbers of voting centres and long waiting lines. These low voter turnouts can become very problematic. Not only because expatriate voting is expensive, and low turnouts therefore make this process inefficient, but also because it yields a very sect, filtered political outcome. A lot of expatriates might be disinterested in home affairs or politics in general. Other people might lack information or time to vote effectively. What is left is a very filtered spectrum of ideologies. While people with lower stakes and interests don't vote due to high costs and low information, the people with more radical political positions and higher stakes in the election will vote, and therefore be overrepresented (Turner, 2008). The claim is further supported by a "habit effect" found by Waldinger and Lim (2009) suggesting that people with a past interest in politics and party affiliation also show greater interest in home country politics once emigrated, making them much more likely to vote and get informed than other expatriates. This means that the overall low turnout enables politicians to be very selective as to whom they want to see at the voting booths, resulting in a more polarized society, were moderate centrist voters refrain from voting and extreme positions are overrepresented. The problem is magnified if these votes turn into direct parliamentary seats as was the case in Croatia (Grace, 2007; Lafleur & Chelius, 2011).

Now, while it was necessary to isolate the different causes of heterogeneous voting behaviours for the sake of explaining and elaborating the phenomenon, it is important to bear in mind that in the complex world of politics and migration it is usually not one factor alone that is responsible for the heterogeneous behaviour. It is much more likely that migrants are influenced by an interplay of the different factors of self-section, asymmetric information, second order elections and reshaped ideologies due to influences of globalization and host countries. The mixture and the weight these individual factors play in the actual political orientation above is greatly dependent on the type of people one is looking at, as can be seen in the examples given previously.

5 A gift or a threat? – Political Attempts to Predict and Control Expatriate Groups

In the recent past, governments have changed their predominantly negative attitudes towards migrants and started seeing them as a valuable source of political influence (Itzigsohn, 2000; Bauböck, 2003). The key to this perceptive change, was on one hand the increasing expatriate populations, and on the other hand the increasing control and connectivity, governments could use to predict and manipulate the

behaviours of foreign voters. Nowadays the discussion on expatriate voting has shifted. Politicians usually don't argue about whether or not they should enfranchise citizens abroad, as most countries have a system of expatriate political participation in place. We do not observe a back and forth between enfranchisement and disenfranchisement, with few exceptions such as South Africa. The status quo nowadays, at least in the western world, is to have some form of expatriate voting system, so the focus has shifted to the access of voters in the form of campaigns, networks and institutions. In the following paragraphs, I will therefore discuss the access of politicians on their diaspora, in the form of institutions, registries and organizations used to predict, inform and approach potential voters abroad.

In the 19th Century only few countries created specific institutions to govern and inform expatriates. While Italy and Mexico were some of the first countries to establish such political bodies, nowadays emigrant institutions, formal state offices dedicated to emigrants and their descendants, have become a regular feature in the political landscape. Over half of the United Nations member states, 110 of the 193, have at least one official department in place, addressing expatriate concerns specifically (Gamlen, 2014b). The purpose of their existence is to deliberately target political, cultural and economic issues in the lives of people residing abroad, as the effectiveness of extra territorial policy hinges on the ability to make migrants loyal and self-disciplining subjects (Brand, 2002; Gamlen 2014b; Martinello, 2005).

Initially, the main focus was to tap into emigrant's resources. But, to maintain the economic connection to subsequent migrant generations, emigrant institutions had to shift focus to cultural and religious issues as well (Lafleur, 2015). These efforts were quite uncoordinated in the beginning. Labour ministries, central banks and consulates all worked on separate programs and services to extract resources and strengthen national ties. Nowadays, states try to work more efficiently by creating official bodies tasked with different programs targeting emigrants. These institutions can come in the form of full or shared ministries like in Armenia, which established the Ministry of Diaspora, set up in 2008 to reinforce identity and contributions of expats to their homeland. Countries like Jamaica have created parliamentary standing committees for diaspora affairs to review bills and propose legislation. As discussed in previous sections, other countries like France, Portugal or Croatia have dedicated seats in the upper or lower house to ensure representation and connectivity to expatriate groups. Seventeen states, including Mexico, Uruguay, Afghanistan and the Philippines, have additionally created formally appointed councils used to advise on legislation targeting and affecting citizens abroad. In addition to such official institutions, private stakeholders, political parties and non-governmental emigrant led organizations have established themselves and are likely to receive subsidies by their respective governments now. (Gamlen, 2014b; Heisler, 1985).

The way emigrants are targeted usually relates to the type of emigrants a country has. Labour exporting countries usually coordinate their expatriate through departments sitting in the ministry of labour, such as Uzbekistan's National Agency for External Labour Migration, established in 2003. If there is no specific type of emigrants emerging from a country, the diaspora department often sits with, or is coordinated by the ministry of foreign affairs. Examples for such institutions are the Albanian Department of Consular Affairs and Diaspora found in 2014 or Uganda's Diaspora Services Department created in 2009. Both these ministries were established to register citizens residing abroad and enlist them in domestic development (Gamlen, 2014b).

Politicians see the issue of maintaining and strengthening ties to expatriates as so important, that they created a conference for diaspora affairs. The first ever "Diaspora Ministerial Conference" was held in Geneva in 2013. It was an opportunity for the 548 participants, representing 143 governments, to share their practices and experiences, so to learn from each other.

While most countries initially created institutions and representation for expatriates out of purely economic reasons, nowadays these institutions are used for political means as well. Most of these organizations aim to form a type of "long distance nationalism" through political, cultural and social remittances (Levitt, 1998). Usually, the establishment of such institutions and networks targeting emigrants was straight forward, as sending states were left in charge of cultural and social affairs. This gave sending countries continuous and easy access to their citizens abroad if they wished.

In Italy, for example, the long history of emigration caused the government to set up an impressive network of organizations and agencies over the years. All of these institutions are linked directly or indirectly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which coordinates them (Schmitter, 1984). This means that nowadays, in places with a significantly large Italian exodus, we find a prevalent network of consulates staffed with social workers to engage in education, training and information provision, as well as a number of specialists dealing with employment issues and social security related questions that emigrants could encounter (Heisler, 1985). Gold and Hart (2013) conclude that such networks help citizens socialize and maintain their cultural affiliations, while developing a tendency of reluctance towards their new country of residence. The authors find, in their study of Israelis abroad, that Jews and Israelis are encouraged to identify with and stay committed to Israel in order to protect the Jewish people, their religion and culture.

When looking at the establishment of emigrant institutions abroad, we observe political behaviour similar to that when the question of political enfranchisement of expatriates was posed. Those who believed that

they could benefit from the expatriate votes supported the establishment of such institutions, while other parties opposed them out of fear of electoral disadvantages. If governments should invest in such institutions was one question, but the bigger debates sparked during the discussion of the type and placement of the institutions.

In 1968 Morocco initiated a five-year plan to export as many Moroccans as possible, to reduce unemployment, educate people abroad and create the largest possible remittance flow into the country. In 1989 the traditional, nationalistic Istiqlal party proposed the creation of a parliamentary council representing emigrants. The pro-regime, centrist parliament saw no political benefit in such institution and therefore rejected the proposal. The parties feared complicating relations with European host nations and importing foreign ideologies. By 1994 about 1.3 out of the 26.8 million Moroccans resided in the EU, roughly 50% of them in France. Nonetheless, in 1990 the Moroccan King Hassan II changed his mind and established his self-titled foundation. In his speech at the opening of the foundation on 30 July 1990, King Hassan II explained he aims "to safeguard these ties and the act of allegiance" (Brand, 2002).

In the following years, the foundation studied the movements of migrants, participated in the negotiation of international accords affecting Moroccans abroad and oversaw the reintegration of citizens upon their return. Between 1994 and 1995 the institution employed 484 teachers to develop language skills and communicate cultural matters to 70,600 emigrant children. Additionally, 63 preachers were sent for Ramadan and 900 children were hosted in vacation camps. The aim was to prevent the alienation and disinterest of future generations in homeland matters. While essentially having economic goals in mind, the communication of culture, religion ethics and language spurred interest in political and social issues domestically as well (Brand, 2002).

Another important task of emigrant institutions is registering and keeping track of citizens abroad. This is an essential task domestic politicians rely on, so to benefit from expatriate voting. Expat ministries collect data on demographics to estimate the number of eligible voters and predict ideologies. Australia is a country known for its vast computerized national electoral register used for elections on all government levels. While this registry combines domestic and expatriate voters in one database, other countries, like the US, keep them separate. The US has different registries for every state and level of government. While this may yield additional information, it also makes the analysis and interpretation of these registries harder and more time consuming (Thompson, 2007).

Data on registrations and party affiliations are also collected. Local authorities can then use this data to trace expatriates back to their voting districts and predict possible election impacts. Data on host country infrastructure is also collected, so that election centres can be set up in the most efficient and desirable location possible. As keeping registries and databases up to data, especially since emigrants are likely to move around, is a hard task. Thus, the host countries are usually involved in the data collection and facilitation process as well. In the US, for example, the Pew Hispanic Center is a non-partisan organization collecting political data, especially focused on migrants (Ellis et al., 2007; Grace, 2007).

The purpose of expatriate institutions in host countries might also be, to provide information to the foreign electorate. These government bodies are tasked with translating and reformatting policy to the needs and believes of the expatriate. This task is especially crucial when other sources of information are limited. In the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996, for example, the domestic authorities suppressed the media, making reliable information scarce for expatriates. These were mainly influenced by the international press, which had a more global agenda than the nationalistic domestic press. One must be careful when consulting expatriate institutions for information as well though, as these are likely to represent interest groups or specific ideologies too (Ellis et al., 2007; Gamlen, 2014b).

Throughout time politicians have realized the growing importance of expatriate groups. While economic ties used to be the main reasons for governments to aim for strong ties to diaspora groups, politicians started realizing the political power expatriate groups hold as they started having an effect on elections in the 1990's and 2000's. The apparent benefits of strong ties to the homelands, caused politicians to invest heavily in programs and institutions that would shape the lives of expatriates, giving homeland officials the chance to analyse and control the behaviours and believes of the new voting populations.

6   What's the Big Deal? – Tracing the Theory in the Real World

Having discussed the presence of differences in voting behaviours of expatriate voters, the political relevance of the growing expatriate electorate and efforts made to maintain and strengthen ties of these voters to the homelands, it is now time to look at the methodologies used by politicians to approach these voters. Since this is uncharted academic territory, findings will be extrapolated from the recent Turkish referendum campaign.

The aim of the Turkish referendum was a constitutional reform, adding 18 amendments to the Turkish constitution. The reform would turn the parliamentary system into a presidential one, increase the seats in parliament from 550 to 600 and give the president more power over the legal apparatus of the country

by having more control over the appointment of Supreme Court justices. With so much on the line, incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had to carefully plot his campaign and analyse his possibilities. The expatriate vote had become a priority in Turkish politics ever since Erdogan's AKP came to power (Koinova, 2017). When looking at his campaign, it is very apparent that this time again, Erdogan considered the expatriate vote as crucial to his success. The results on April 16 would prove him right.

Erdogan ended up winning the referendum with 51.3% of the total vote, but before it could get to that, a highly debated, tenacious and internationally publicised campaign had to be fought. Erdogan knew that at least 40% of the domestic voters, conservative and religious, would support him no matter what ("The Vote that will…", 2017). Experiences from the two 2015 general elections signalled Erdogan and his party (AKP) that he was even more favourable abroad. In Germany 60% of the 570,000 voting Turkish citizens supported the AKP in that election. There are two main reasons why the AKP was so successful abroad, and Erdogan believed he would be again for his 2017 referendum: First, the integration of Turkish guest workers sent to work in European factories in neighbouring states was relatively unsuccessful. German politicians, for example, seemed to maintain the narrative that the Turks would eventually return home, doing rather little to integrate them ("Old faultlines", 2016). The Turkish community themselves had long faced similar accusations, of not showing enough initiative to fuse with the German community, but rather live in a parallel society (Kilercioglu, 2017; Becker, Böll, Friedmann, Müller, Neukirch, Schmid, & Schult, 2017). The second reason from the AKP's strong reliance on expatriates, partly due to the previous point, is that the Turkish government could install an extensive network of influence into the Turkish communities residing abroad. The religiously conservative AKP established special agencies dedicated to the needs of the Turkish expatriates. The "Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities" and its subgroup, the "Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs" (DiTiB) are the two most influential ones. These organizations were a direct arm of the Turkish government, which finances 900 out of the 2000 Turkish mosques in Germany and exports the rabbis straight from Ankara ("Old faultlines", 2016; Koinova, 2017).

With polls at home forecasting a relatively tight referendum, it was pivotal for Erdogan and his party to look beyond the country's borders and secure the support from the large Turkish diaspora in this election as well. Around 7% of the voting population resides outside of the Turkish borders (Kilercioglu, 2017). Most Turkish expatriates reside in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. Despite it being legally prohibited for Turkish politicians to campaign abroad, a plan had to be created to address and convince the Turkish exodus if the election was to be won (Gold, Merey & Say; 2017).

The best way Erdogan saw to address his potential expatriate voters was through emotions, cultural and religious issues, appealing to loyalty and patriotism. Through the emergence of the parallel community in various host countries and with the establishment of government controlled emigrant institutions, the AKP knew that the cultural ties to Turkey had remained, and through these cultural ties politics can being smuggled in. Scientists (Beyer, 2017) believe that these cultural ties are transgenerational, so even newer generations could be targeted. Culture is a carrier of emotion and emotions also navigate our mind. Also, identity is tied to language and people who live in parallel communities and, especially in their homes, speak their mother tongue, are likely to stand for the associated values as well. The Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan appealed to feelings, to influence the result of the referendum. He portrayed the Turkish nation as large and argued for the greatness of Islam. He spread the myth that Europe doesn't want Turkey and thereby the only path remaining for the Turkish people is that under a nationalist, illiberal leader. Numerous German-Turks are descendants of poor Anatolian immigrants, they feel left behind by the German elite. The rural Anatolian voters are also Erdogan's strongest supporters at home (Becker et al., 2017; Beyer, 2017).

These conditions were very fertile ground for the launch of a far-reaching campaign abroad. Erdogan targeted especially those countries with the largest communities. He organized rallies, had broadcasts of his speeches, and made sure that the domestic news always had something to say about him or his referendum (Koinova, 2017). This approach build on Rubio-Marin's (2006) theory that since expatriates are often subject to prejudice and stereotypes, nationalistic rhetoric makes these people feel empowered due to the longing for communal experiences and national belonging.

Apart from informing the foreign electorate about his plans and convincing them that this referendum would bring positive change to the country, Erdogan, and the apparatus of the Turkish government at his disposal, did their best to supress the voice of the opposition's campaign and create an unlevelled playing field. Author Moritz Rinke compares has a fitting analogy for the situation. "You could compare it to a soccer game in which the government's team is playing with 11 players and the opponents only have only have three. They're also not allowed to practice, and then they have to play barefoot and without a sponsor." (Cords, 2017).

This methodology works along the lines of Lafleur & Chelius (2011) arguments that politicians can manipulate voting behaviour through biased media access and availability. A study on the media presence of Erdogan campaign found that 90% of the airtime on the 17 national television stations in turkey was devoted to the "Yes" campaign of the AKP. High traffic transportation routes, like that from the Sabiha

Gokcen airport outside Istanbul, were decorated with dozens of building sized banners of Erdogan or his Prime Minister Binali Yildirim. There were no banners of the opposition parties to be found (Boffey, 2017; "The Vote that will...", 2017).

Additionally to dominating and controlling the media, Erdogan chose the timing of the referendum in the wake of the coup attempt of 2016. The coup stirred vast nationalist support behind Erdogan and the state of emergency called out by the Turkish government gave Erdogan the power to supress his opposition even more. Any opposition to the AKP's plans to reshape the Turkish state was labelled an enemy of the state. In the months leading up to the vote, nearly 150,000 people were arrested on the grounds of treason or terrorist plots. People like Selahattin Demirtas, co-leader of the pro-Kurdish HDP, who were regarded as an enemy of the AKP as they were rising to become one of the main voices for the "No" campaign, were held captive or locked away. On November 4th 2016 Demirtas was arrested on terror charges and now faces 142 years in prison ("The Vote that will...", 2017; Cords, 2017).

These communication methods are in line with Eldersveld's (1956) findings that in elections, face to face contact is crucial and the most effective way to convince voters of your cause, but even more for motivating apathetic voters to change their minds and vote for you.

A third method, and partly attributed to the rather authoritarian and undemocratic methods used in the Turkish campaigns, was to creation of conflicts and controversies between Turkey and host states of Turkish citizens like Germany, Austria or the Netherlands. The purpose for this methodology was to stir up emotions and divide emigrants and their host countries. Senior members of the AKP have sought to give speeches at rallies in these countries to gather support for a "Yes" campaign. This has resulted in serious diplomatic tensions. Various host country politicians opposed the idea of Turkish campaigns on their soil as they believed that the referendum would turn Turkey into an authoritarian state, and therefore did not want to provide a platform for campaigns favouring such views. The Austrian chancellor Christian Kern advocated an EU wide ban on such electoral campaigns (Kilercioglu, 2017). The problem was, however, that "the European Union established rules regulating the free movement of people and goods among countries but did not establish clear rules on the free movement of political thoughts." (Kasap, Cetin & Sarioglu, 2017). The AKP saw reason to take to such drastic measures as scholars in the past have found that expatriate citizens are more likely to support unconstitutional parties and projects (Honohan, 2011).

Noticing that his plan was working and the citizens residing abroad were getting fired up, Erdogan escalated the conflicts even more by blatantly attacking and insulting foreign leaders and government officials (Koinova, 2017). Almost 40,000 pro-Erdogan demonstrators gathered in Cologne to show their support at an event organized by a lobby group of Erdogan's Justice and Development party. Forced to act on the rough tone of president Erdogan and other AKP members, German government officials started cancelling and prohibiting campaign events. These retaliations, paired with the general uncertainty resulting in uncoordinated attempts to combat the Turkish propaganda only played in Erdogan's favour to divide Turkish citizens and host countries, as well as fire up nationalistic ideals on the campaign trail ("Old faultlines", 2016). All this peaked on March 12th 2017, when the Dutch government, who had its own election coming up 3 days later, prohibited Turkish officials to hold a campaign rally in Rotterdam, blockaded the consulate and escorted Turkish officials out of the country back to Germany. These actions, and the rhetoric that followed, immediately translated into success for the yes campaign, going from 42.4%[9] to 44.5%[10] in the polls (Tharoor, 2017; Martin, 2017).

This result builds on and supports various academic claims discussed earlier. Waldinger et al. (2004) have found that International tension provides motivation to tighten up nationalistic loyalties to the homeland. The authors argue that the relationships between homeland and host county play a large role in the formation of ideologies and the motivations to vote. It has also been suggested by academics that expatriates tend show strong demonstrations of solidarity following significant events in the homelands. Mobilizations following natural disasters or political events are a means to reactivate feelings of belonging and challenge de-territorialized identities (Collyer, 2008).

An additional factor that played into Erdogan's favour was the poor voter turnout in expatriate communities. In Germany, every second eligible voter did not want to vote and refrained from participating in the election. The voter turnout in Germany was 46%, the picture is similar in France, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, different percentages but the same tendency (Gumrukcu, 2017; Becker et al., 2017). Through his suppression of information and opposition campaigns, and with targeted campaign events, Erdogan was able to motivate his supporters to vote, while undecided, uninformed and less motivated citizens, who might have supported the opposition, were not targeted and therefore refrained from voting. Erdogan was essentially cherry-picking whom he wanted at the polls and who not.

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[9] Poll of 8120 participants conducted by AKAM (3-9 March)

[10] Poll of 2032 participants conducted by AKAM (18-22 March); A poll by Politic's conducted with 2753 participants on the 13th of March even showed the "Yes" campaign leading with 55.7%

This tactic, which is partly a characteristic of expatriate voters who generally show less interest in home country elections, was exploited and reinforced by Erdogan's campaign and is one of the reasons for the strong polarization of the referendum results between different diaspora communities.

While there were many reasons behind the actions taken by the Erdogan campaign, the methodology used fits very well to the framework discussed in earlier parts of this paper. His campaign links very well with the theory on expatriate voting discussed and seems to employ very targeted strategies, addressing various criterions mentioned by scholars that might affect voting behaviours. This highly specialized and thought-out campaign highlights the significance expatriate populations can have, what drastic measures can be used to address and convince them, and how important the issue will be in the future.

7 Conclusion and Outlook – The Future of Expatriate Voting

The aim of this paper was to dive into the world of expatriate voting, show the different positions countries can have on the issue and the various paths they can go down on the road to enfranchisement of expatriates. We have seen that while ethical and moral arguments dictate the academic discussion on expatriate voting, real life politics is a lot more pragmatic. Politicians faced great uncertainty about the impacts of the new electorate in terms of interest, campaigning, and most importantly political affiliations. This caused the enfranchisement to be slow and controversial, as possible political gains or losses were at the forefront of the negotiations, rather than the objective implementation of a non-partisan framework allowing citizens abroad to vote. In the previous parts of this paper it was found that many countries experienced the heterogeneity of voting behaviours between domestic and expatriate citizens. Nowadays, academics have started seeing the relevance of the topic and typically finds differences in voting behaviours and political affiliations between the two voter groups. While research into the topic is still quite limited, academics have moved from asking themselves about the presence of differences in voting behaviours to figuring out why they exist and put forwards various explanations for the phenomenon. It seems that in the recent years politicians have done the same and started working on strategies to adapt to the new political playing field. This is made very apparent by the controversial campaign conducted by Recep Tayyip Erdogan to win his constitutional referendum in April 2017. His methodology and approaches link very well with the current stands of academic knowledge of the topic of expatriate voting.

As later experiences show, the political opposition of some parties was somewhat justified, with various expatriate populations allocating their votes disproportionate to those of the domestic populations, due to various reasons such as selection bias, information asymmetry, different attitudes towards the elections or changing world views and ideals. This different environment expatriate people vote in, in terms of the bubble they live in away from their cultural roots, with their ideas and attitudes towards their homeland, their information level and their interests in home country issues, has made these diaspora groups very interesting for certain political groups. This has resulted in the increasing attention of politics in expatriate groups, which has caused the rise of various instruments and institutions put in place by home country governments to monitor, analyse, inform and shape expatriates in their new host countries to their liking. This exploitation of foreign voter groups for political gains, with the help of propaganda techniques and nationalistic rhetoric, as could be seen in the Turkish referendum of April 2017, causes political damage between countries, but still most host countries remain relatively passive and unsure how to go forwards. The various political forces and ideals in play make proper integrational work very hard and alienates expatriate voter groups between the fronts of home and host country politics.

With these new political forces in play, the outlook for expatriate politics is uncertain, but glim. It seems that we have reached a tipping point in international relations and political freedom. With growing expatriate populations, increasing globalization and interconnectedness of countries and economies, it dawns that the controversial Turkish campaign may only be the beginning. Other politicians may seek to imitate the Turkish campaigns and cause similar political controversies for their own gains. In traditional democratic theory, it is argued that everybody should have the right to participate in government. For this to be effective, informed decision making by the people is required. If the enfranchisement of expatriate citizens by countries is not conducted with the aim of expanding democracy, but rather used as a political tool to oppress, manipulate or exploit certain voter characteristics and essentially have political gains as the aims of such actions conflicts are bound to arise. Tensions and polarization within countries and between countries are likely to increase due to conflicting ethics and morals. This is not to say that every election will take on the harsh tones of the Turkish referendum. In 2017, the elections in France and the Netherlands both had a lot on the line, but the campaigns remained relatively calm and inwards oriented. So, while many political parties will stick to the traditional campaigns and electoral debates, it is likely that more autocratic countries and political strongmen facing tough elections revert to employing similar tactics to the Turkish "Yes" campaign. Other politicians will have watched the events and actions in Turkey and across Europe very carefully. With increasing diaspora populations, the outliers of political campaigns creating international tensions and controversies are likely to become more

frequent and numerous, as the potential political impact of diaspora groups increases. The Russian election of 2018, for example, could be the next.

It can hardly be beneficial for international relations, economic and political activity for countries to have to endure political conflicts with other countries frequently, just for the sake of political advantages envisioned by specific political parties. Economic sanctions resulting as retaliation for political manoeuvres or tensions between people within countries due to controversial or hurtful comments made by politicians are symptoms of the problems caused by the appropriation of expatriate voting rights for political gains. Knowing about the increasing importance of expatriates and having experienced the harm such foreign campaigns can do to different aspects of communal well-being, it is important for governments to learn from these events and act to prevent an escalation of such political behaviour. If we do not want to see other countries encouraged by the actions taken by Turkish officials in their campaign, clear rules and guidelines need to be established, addressing the campaigns of foreign government officials. Such actions are crucial to maintain harmony between domestic and foreign citizens within countries, secure integrational work that has already been achieved, as well as that which is still aimed to be achieved in the future and ensure the integrity of democratic procedures. Other negative externalities of the recent developments are unnecessary disturbances in economic activities, at home, abroad and in the global economy. With the interconnectedness of the global economy, local problems can easily escalate to become global problems. Firms and people unconcerned and unaffected by the political effects of the campaigns and politics done by foreign officials get drawn into the procedure, as more and more aspects of people's lives are subject to campaigns, vote collection and ideological persuasion.

Levelling the playing field for different political parties may also be eminent in making the electoral procedure and campaigns fairer and more democratic. The suppression of media outlets and selective spread of information goes against the western ideal of democracy and makes informed, unbiased decision making impossible. It hinders the involvement of the people in the government. The feedback and control mechanism that the voters are supposed to have on politicians is averted, reducing the accountability politicians have to their people. Hard-fought and belligerent campaigns drive wedges between countries, create long lasting conflicts, result in retaliation and makes it harder to work on global projects such as fighting climate change or finding plausible solutions for the refugee crisis.

Thus far, one actor has been dominating the discussion on expatriate campaigns, the politicians of the sending countries. The other stakeholders in extraterritorial campaigns and elections have mainly been passive bystanders. Host countries usually refrain from interfering in other countries elections for the sake

of keeping international harmony. Citizens in the respective countries also do little to get involved. In some countries, such as Italy and Mexico, we have observed lobby groups for certain rights or political representations who have made their voice heard, but with little organization and endurance. If a sustainable future for political campaigns and an efficient political inclusion of expatriates in the respective origin countries is to be achieved, all stakeholders need to become active and enter the discussion. If the origin country politicians can continue to dictate the course of future political campaigns, without guidelines and consequences, we should not be surprised to see future campaigns acting only in politician's self-interests for political gains, without regards for international relations and host country politics. Short run gains are likely to be traded off against long term goals and stability.

One group that could act and mobilize against future escalation of political campaigns abroad are the targeted expatriate voters. If these diaspora groups can unite and mobilize against hard fought, provocative campaigns from their origin country's politicians and thereby show solidarity towards their host countries and present themselves as a united people, the incentives for politicians to take on the most drastic measures might decrease. A healthy democracy holds its politicians accountable and has its citizens voice their concerns and get involved in the decision making. If expatriates want to be integrated and be represented equally to domestic citizens in their home countries, they should signal that they not merely tool of the politicians exploited to their liking, but rather attentive citizens who care about the political rule and nature of their homelands.

In theory, this argument is very nice, as the different players from one specific country solve the problem by themselves and host countries with different interests and priorities, which are likely to complicate the debate, do not have to get involved. In reality however, it is very hard for expatriate populations to evoke change and actually influence the behaviours of their political representatives. This is mainly due to problems of organization and influence, but also has to do with the nature of expatriates themselves. The lack of information and interest among large parts of expatriate groups makes it hard to organize and take a stance. Additionally, expatriates are influenced by various political institutions in different parts of their lives, placed there by the origin government to target and control diaspora groups to the best of their ability, usually form early on in their lives. This makes it very hard for people to disconnect from culture, and political ideas embedded and reinforced from early on. It is hard to disentangle emotional and cultural ideals from political propaganda.

Emotions are a determinant of political affiliations. If politicians are able to influence these emotions through religious institutions, schools or cultural platforms, it becomes very hard for emigrants to remove

this bias, inform themselves, let alone organize themselves against their own government. Expatriate populations will be put in a very hard and uncomfortable position between the fronts of host and origin country governments, with no good outcome for them. Host countries might criticise them for the lack of integration, while home countries can easily alienate opposition groups and portray them as unpatriotic traitors. This is likely to encourage them to remain passive all together. Home country governments may also not be discouraged, hoping to at least collect the votes of their die-hard supporters, or they may even be encouraged to escalate the campaigns even more, to reconnect with their diaspora.

Host countries are much more likely to be able to actually make a change and influence the campaigns of other countries on their soil. Politicians should design rules and a framework for foreign political campaigns within their borders. This measure is necessary not only to be prepared for foreign campaign that escalates, but also to send a signal to foreign politicians. If policies countering unwanted foreign campaigns are in place, actions taken by the host countries will not create such large controversies and limit retaliation, as the actions and outcomes were foreseeable by the campaigning country and the global community. If no rules are in place, any measure taken by politicians in the moment when foreign campaigns are to be limited, will be controversial and heavily debated. Now is the right time to learn from past events, prepare for the future and prevent a repletion and escalation of the situation. Creating a framework for foreign campaigns could also create the positive externality of protecting expatriate voters from misinformation and levelling the playing field for other political parties.

The framework created could be designed by every country individually, depending on their preferences and expatriate groups. What really matters, is that the topic is discussed and that some guidelines are put in place, which local municipalities, politicians and ambassadors can use to aid their decision making when they need to. Foreign politicians need to know that there are limits and consequences to certain actions. Such frameworks could also be designed and negotiated on an international level, by, for example, the EU or the UN. This would allow an exchange between the different stakeholders involved, rather than one sided policy making. It would also allow for politicians to coordinate and create more equality across countries, meaning that politicians have the same access and options when campaigning to expat communities in different countries. The threat of retaliation might also be limited, as no country would be singled out.

While it is important to design those rules for foreign politicians campaigning on abroad, it might also be wise for politicians to create a framework for themselves when campaigning abroad. This would make the political process more transparent and controllable from within the country.

I am not advocating a complete abolishment of foreign campaigns, as foreign voters are essential for the democracy in their origin country, but it seems to be essential for countries to establish guidelines and regulations about foreign campaigning to reduce the conflict potential. Countries need to be guided in the campaigns done by themselves and done by foreign officials on their turf and abroad. Establishing such rules on a larger, more official and far-reaching level may be even more effective in reaching a consensus. Political stages such as the EU can help in facilitating such negotiations and help countries to converge and find a common ground. Individual countries taking action might result in retaliation, political disadvantages and isolationism. Following the outcry of Austria's chancellor Christian Kern, rules regarding the movement of political ideas need to be established if an escalation of foreign campaigns is to be prevented. These actions are to be taken by host countries, uniting for the greater good of global economic and political stability and peace.

8 Extensions and Further Research

Based on the outlook discussed in the previous section and the hypothesis formulated it would be worthwhile to collect more evidence and insights into different aspects of the topic. This could aid decision makers create a well thought-out, research based solution to the aforementioned problems.

In the future, academics could try to employ empirical tests on the differences in voting behaviour. During my scan of the existing literature it was quite apparent to me that little research had gone into the investigation of differences in voting behaviours. In most articles, scholars were hinting at such phenomena, but rarely mentioned it explicitly. The little attention this topic has gotten is theoretical, and purely based on election results. These however are influenced by numerous factors and are hardly comparable across time. It would thus be relevant for future research to conduct some empirical studies on the degree of heterogeneity.

On the same note, it is also worth looking at systematic differences in the heterogeneity of voting behaviours of the expatriate population across different geographical regions. Are German expats different from their domestic counterparts in the same way as Brazilian expats are? This could become a crucial point in future politics, being aware of similarities and differences among diaspora groups.

Future academics could also aim to answer the question whether the enfranchisement of expatriate voters influenced the voting behaviours of domestic voters. It could well be the case that since political focus has shifted away from home, domestic voters have a different attitude towards politics now. With

politics gaining more and more of an international character domestic citizens might be affected by the changing issues that are discussed in politics and the declining importance of their vote.

The effect of enfranchisement of expatriates on host country politics and dynamics has also seen rather little scholarly attention. During the various foreign campaigns countries have experienced over the past year's questions on integration and solidarity have been raised, but the true impact of imposing dual loyalties upon expatriate citizens has not yet been understood. With the increasing expat groups residing outside of their home countries, and their increasing political weight, it is not only important to understand their impact on domestic politics and elections, but also the affect they have on the politics in their new country of residence. Do the issues discussed in politics change? Do they affect the way domestic voters vote?

It may also be interesting to investigate the behaviour of the different classes of expatriates. This research takes the term "expatriate" in its broadest form, and does not really differentiate between economic, religious or political refugees, guest workers or just citizens having a temporary job aboard. It will be important for future politics and a better understanding of the problem and political impact of expatriate votes, to investigate the specific behaviours and effects of the different groups of emigrants. It is likely, in terms of self-selection bias, that the reason for migration weighs into the political behaviour, and that these are different across groups. Additionally, one could investigate the presence of thresholds. When do expatriates start to become interesting for politicians abroad? When do they start to have a significant impact on the elections?

The type of election held is also an area future scholar attention should be dedicated to. Do expatriates behave differently in parliamentary elections than in municipal or presidential ones? Do they behave not only differently in different types of elections, but does their behaviour diverge in a particular fashion, contrasting that of domestic voters. This would impact the political approach and good evidence for such phenomena would help politicians shape their campaigns as exact as possible to address expatriates as efficiently and effectively as possible.

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