"Stop TTIP!"

A qualitative case study examining the social movement against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) in the European Union.



Rose Ní Chléirigh 28/07/2017

First Reader: Professor Markus Haverland Second Reader: Dr. Koen Stapelbroek

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Summary

Between 2013 and 2016, the EU and the US partook in bilateral negotiations with the aim of concluding The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a free trade agreement that was set to be the largest and most all-encompassing of its kind. This thesis focuses on the opposition that these negotiations faced by EU civil society. Opponents of TTIP viewed the potential deal as a threat to European consumer and environmental standards, and feared that it would undermine the regulatory powers of national governments to the advantage of multi-national corporations. This concern was not uniform across the EU, however, and manifested itself to vastly varying degrees across Member States. This thesis conducts a qualitative multi-case study to assess the possible reasons behind the varying levels of anti-TTIP mobilisation in France, Germany and the UK. Through the use of three theories- resource mobilisation theory, political opportunity structure, and framing- the strength of the self-styled "Stop TTIP" campaign is examined on the national level. The availability of external resources, the positions of political parties, and the way in which TTIP was reported by news outlets are examined as factors that may have contributed to the strength of the campaign in the three countries. The results point toward the importance of resources for the movement, with political factors also playing a role. The role of framing does not appear to have been significant, although further research is needed in this area.

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Chapter One: Introduction

In July 2013, negotiations began between the European Union (EU) and United States (US) over a proposed free trade agreement that was set to be the biggest of its kind in history. Known as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the deal between the world's two largest export markets would have encompassed approximately 50% of global economic output, 30% of global trade, and 20% of global foreign direct investment (Palmer, 2013). However, this was not to be. Over the course of three years, 15 rounds of negotiations took place between the two economic powerhouses before it was deemed a de facto failure by the end of 2016 (Gotev, 2016). Nonetheless, the size and scope of the potential agreement provoked interest and concern from politicians, business groups, and civil society. This thesis examines the levels of concern among the latter group- civil society- by assessing the strength of the social movement that developed in opposition to TTIP. The research is underpinned by theoretical approaches which have been used in previous studies to explain the levels of mobilisations of social movements in contemporary society. In the case of this thesis, these theories are applied to the Stop TTIP campaign, an EU-wide campaign launched by several civil society organisations calling for the cessation of TTIP negotiations.

1.1 TTIP: Why the fuss?

The official aim of TTIP was to improve job creation and boost the economies on both sides of the Atlantic (European Commission, n.d.a.). The intention was not just to eliminate import tariffs between the two blocks, but also to reduce "non-tariff barriers" to trade. The result was an expansive agenda for the agreement's negotiations. "Non-tariff barriers" refers largely to regulation and quality standards that may either restrict market access for firms or increase the cost of doing business (Francois, 2013, p.16). Where there are different standards in place in the EU and the US, companies must either produce two versions of the same product, which naturally incurs costs, or they must simply rule themselves out of trading within both markets (ibid). The most logical way of eliminating such barriers is through harmonisation of standards, and this was the first point of contention for civil society groups that opposed TTIP. These groups feared that the agreement would negatively affect the EU's high standards in environmental protection, food quality, data protection, and public health regulation among others (Mayer, 2015). Concern was expressed about how the EU's precautionary principle, which bans new products until there is a scientific consensus about their safety to public health, could be reconciled with the US policy of

aftercare, whereby products are only banned once proved to be dangerous. For the Stop TTIP campaign, the potential lowering of EU standards in exchange for increased trade was not worth it. A report conducted by the Centre for Economic Policy Research for the European Commission estimated that the EU economy would grow by 0.5% over the space of ten years as a result of a successful TTIP agreement (European Commission, 2013). Civil society campaigners argued that this modest level of projected growth did not warrant an altering of the EU regulatory landscape.

The second point of contention regarding TTIP was its provision for investor protection, known as the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, or ISDS. This involved a framework for the private arbitration of disputes between corporations and countries, and would have provided companies with an avenue for suing governments if treated unfairly. What exactly was encompassed by "unfair treatment", however, was unclear. Proponents of the ISDS maintained that such a provision was vital to provide companies with a safety net when making large-scale investments, thus encouraging them to make such investments. On the other hand, the anti-TTIP movement feared that the mechanism would allow companies to sue governments for passing regulation that affected their profitability. The case of a nuclear power provider taking the German government to court after it decided to phase out nuclear energy in 2011 was an oft-cited example by opponents. Despite its inclusion in many other trade agreements, the anti-TTIP movement vehemently rejected the mechanism, perhaps making the ISDS the single most contentious detail of TTIP negotiations.

A third objection to TTIP was based on complaints of non-transparency surrounding the negotiations. The Stop TTIP campaign claimed that the negotiations were an overly secretive, undemocratic process. While secrecy is the norm in international negotiations, the fact that these were conducted by the supranational European Commission, rather than democratically elected heads of Member States, increased opponents' scepticism towards the trade deal. The Commission addressed these accusations of unaccountability by launching a public online consultation on the ISDS, and by releasing the EU's textual proposals, position papers, and negotiation round reports, an act that was not replicated by their counterparts in the US. According to the Commission, the EU-US trade talks were "the most transparent bilateral negotiations ever conducted" as a result of these actions (European Commission, 2017), but opponents remained dissatisfied.

The opposition to TTIP is reflective of opposition to commercial treaties more generally, and should be contextualised accordingly. The reason why trade agreements inspire protest is a result of what some have called a "globalisation backlash" (Irwin, 2015, p.4), whereby individuals have become sceptical of the enhancements promised by further global integration on matters of trade and commerce. Commercial treaties can lead to "painful economic adjustments" for a country which create both winners and losers (ibid.). While the consensus among economists is that increased trade makes a country richer and more efficient, there is no guarantee that the overall gains will be shared fairly between such winners and losers (Krugman, 2016). The lack of compensation for the so-called "losers of globalisation" have led some to conclude that the impacts of free trade can lead to the widening of the gap between rich and poor within countries, thus accentuating inequality and deepening poverty (Nayyar, 2007). As well as people (or workers), the environment is also seen as a potential loser of commercial treaties, with increased trade prioritised over environmental protection (Klein, 2014). Free trade sceptics perceive the winners of globalisation, on the other hand, as being mostly big corporations, with complaints that some larger international firms have made market structures more oligopolistic than competitive through mergers and acquisitions (Nayyar, 2007). Such sceptics do not (usually) call for an end to trade, but rather demand a more "thoughtful and deliberate approach as to why we need trade and to whom it serves" (Klein, 2014).

Another factor that is thought to contribute to opposition to commercial treaties is the sheer complexity of agreements, especially now that they tend to have implications for a country's internal regulatory policies. Broad support for the abstract of free trade but scepticism of the specifics of an agreement is deemed to be "key aspect of political controversy over free trade" (Irwin, 2015, p.30). It is perhaps sometimes deemed better to reject a treaty outright rather than getting "locked in" to agreements that can be difficult to reverse, especially when these agreements are a condition of membership to a supranational organisation. In this way, the increasing role of supranational organisations in bilateral free trade agreements only serves to further complicate matters. The concern that responsibility for treaties has shifted from elected representatives to "faceless" bureaucrats does little to reassure free trade opponents and feeds into the narrative that those responsible for negotiating them are removed from, or "indifferent to", the ordinary people the agreement may affect (ibid.). This chasm can be perceived as undemocratic and unfair by free trade sceptics, and indeed was one of the arguments that the Stop TTIP campaign was most vocal about making during the European Commission-led TTIP negotiations.

1.2 Research Question

TTIP was negotiated by the European Commission on behalf of all 28 Member States, and so its consequences- be they negative or positive- would have affected businesses and consumers in 28 different European countries. Despite this, the anti-TTIP movement did not enjoy EU-wide support. While issues surrounding TTIP were dominant in the media and on the political agenda of some countries, most notably Austria and Germany, they received only low levels of attention in other countries. The aim of this thesis is to try and better understand why this difference in anti-TTIP sentiment existed, i.e. to examine the determinants of the Stop TTIP campaign's varying strength at the national level. It is acknowledged that the anti-TTIP movement was organised at the European level in the form of "The European Initiative Against TTIP and CETA" which functioned as an umbrella group of EU civil society organisations that were opposed to the agreement. Nonetheless, the purpose of this thesis is to look at how pan-EU campaigns against the actions of supranational institutions manifest themselves on the national, rather than at the supranational level. In this specific case, explanations are sought as to why the anti-TTIP movement was strong in some countries and not in others; why a pan-EU initiative did not receive a pan-EU reaction. In line with this, the following research question is formulated:

Research Question: How can the relative strength of the Stop TTIP campaign be explained?

Although the primary aim of this thesis is to assess the reasons for which the strength of the same social movement varied per country, the structure of the EU and the nature of the TTIP agreement mean that this research naturally touches on some broader issues. First, as the Stop TTIP campaign was orchestrated at the EU level as well as at the national level, the relation between national and supranational protest in this case is strongly intertwined. Although an in-depth study of this relation is outside the scope of this research, its relevance is apparent in some of the indicators used in this thesis: An EU-wide Stop TTIP petition that was directed at the European Commission and organised by a pan-EU initiative, for example, is one of the sources used to assess national mobilisation levels. Second, the content of TTIP cannot be separated from the subject of this thesis. As outlined in Section 1.1 above, the opposition to TTIP encompassed citizens' attitudes towards (aspects of) globalisation, and it is probable that such

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¹ CETA was a similar trade agreement negotiated between the EU and Canada.

undercurrents played a significant role in determining the relevant strength of the anti-TTIP movement in different countries.

1.3 Societal Relevance

TTIP is dead, for now, but this does not make it societally irrelevant. Although negotiations came to a deadlocked while Barack Obama was still the US President in 2016, the failure of talks was cemented only when his protectionist successor, Donald Trump, came to office in early 2017. While there is little indication that President Trump will change his stance on the issue, a president's term is finite. The idea of the EU and US negotiating a free trade agreement in the future is always a possibility, and so it is of societal value to understand what drives the forces that may oppose such an agreement. Understanding what drives civil society to mobilise against public policies is relevant for both activist organisations and policy-makers alike. For civil society organisations that wish to promote certain policies, a knowledge of the factors that lead to successful mobilisation by a country's citizens is vital for garnering public support for their cause. For policy-makers, an understanding of what drives citizens to protest public policies may assist in increased efforts to engage and consult with the public. This is particularly relevant to policies, like trade, that are conducted exclusively at the supranational level of the European Union. Policy-making by the European Commission is often characterised as suffering a "democratic deficit", and this thesis contributes to our understanding of this phenomenon by studying a social movement that challenged the actions of the Commission, albeit through protest at the national level.

1.4 Theoretical Relevance

The theoretical relevance of a research project is measured by its contribution to the scientific discourse on the subject matter. This thesis hopes to meet this criterion by applying a congruence analysis to the Stop TTIP campaign, a research method with a strong theoretical emphasis. One way of improving theoretical relevance is by applying an existing theory to a new empirical domain (Lehnert et al., 2007, p.25). As no study has thus far applied more than one theory to the anti-TTIP movement, this thesis satisfies this suggestion. In fact, only very few studies of social movements actually test theories against one another (e.g. Cress & Snow, 2000), focussing instead on the explanatory leverage of a single theory. Given the high number of dimensions that are encompassed in two of the theories used in this thesis- the resource mobilisation theory and the political opportunity structure- it is hardly surprising that scholars have narrowed their focus in this way. Indeed, determining the significance of different dimensions has been a valuable contribution to our understanding of

each theory, as will be further elaborated in the theoretical framework (Chapter Three). Nonetheless, the explanatory leverage of a theory is best determined by testing it against others, and this is the aim of this thesis. The Stop TTIP campaign is thought to be particularly relevant as an empirical case given its status as a recent transnational movement that operated at both EU and national levels. The aim of this thesis is to better understand the growth of such movements, and to contribute to the scholarly discourse on the success rate of transnational social movements in mobilising adherents at a national level. This research project responds to a call by della Porta and Parks (2016), who studied the strategies of the anti-austerity movement that developed in EU countries as a result of the 2008 financial crisis, and who identified the anti-TTIP movement as an interesting avenue for further scholarly investigation on the nature of social movements within the EU.

1.5 Structure of the Research

The next chapter presents a literature review of social movement scholarship. Chapter Three describes the theories that form the framework for this study and derives three hypotheses from these. The chosen research design is then outlined in Chapter Four, before the dependent and independent variables are operationalised in Chapter Five. Chapter Six analyses the results of the empirical information gathered, and these results are reflected upon in Chapter Seven.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

This chapter gives an overview of the existing literature on social movements, and aims to anchor this research project in its broader scholarly context. Various definitions of social movements are presented, before previous studies that examine global and European social movements are summarised. Finally, the few studies that have explored the anti-TTIP movement are described.

2.1 Definitions

The term "social movement society" has been frequently employed by scholars to describe the European societal landscape since the eruption of so-called "new social movements" in the 1960s (della Porta & Diani, 2006; Meyer & Tarrow, 1997; Neidhardt and Rucht, 2002). These new social movements, which included the environment movement, the women's movement, and the anti-war movemen, signalled a "deep and dramatic transformation" of the continent, and have resulted in social movements and protest actions becoming a permanent fixture of contemporary European democracies (della Porta & Diani, 2006, p.1). Given the centrality of social movements to the research of this thesis, it is important to first elaborate on its meaning and present a definition of the term.

While the primary aim of all social movements is the fostering or halting of change, scholars have elaborated on the concept to include other aspects, including conflictual, temporal and organisational elements. *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (Snow et al., 2006, p.9) defines social movements as "collectivities acting with some degree of organisation and continuity outside of institutional or organisational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending existing institutional authority". Others have offered more detailed definitions, specifying a network of individuals, groups and organisations as the principle actors in social movements (Rucht, 1996; 1999b), or emphasising the necessary role of distinct collective identities and social solidarities among participants (della Porta & Diani, 2006; Rucht, 1999b; Tarrow, 1998). With regards to their action repertoires, the non-institutional nature of collective action employed by social movements is well-elaborated, with some scholars explicitly linking social movements with the willingness to engage in popular protest (Parks, 2015; Rucht, 1999b; Snow et al., 2006).

Perhaps the most important dimension of social movements is organisation. Social movement organizations (SMOs) are defined as "relatively formal organisations that manage the interdependencies of adherents and activists committed to social movements" (Zald & Ash, 1966) and are considered the

fundamental unit of analysis of social movements by some of the most prominent writers in the field (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). As constituent parts of any social movement, it is unsurprising that much of the study on social movements has dealt specifically with these organisations (see e.g. Imig & Tarrow, 2001; Imig, 2002; Kriesi et al., 1992; Parks, 2015). The SMO concept has also been adopted to the transnational level through the conceptualisation of "transnational SMOs". These are described as SMOs operating in more than two states whose "transnational structures [...] provide it with the resources essential for addressing interdependent global problems and allow it greater access to intergovernmental institutions" (Smith, 1997, p.42). In other words, transnational SMOs combine activists from multiple countries around common goals for social change.

2.2 Trends in Social Movement Scholarship

The emergence of a "social movement society" has given way to a large body of literature on SMOs. The focus of these studies follows two main trends. The first is outcome-oriented, aiming to determine the effect of SMOs on public policy (see e.g. Giugni et al., 1999). The rationale for such an approach is clear: if social movements represent an "important force for [...] change" (McAdam et al., 1988, p.727), it makes sense to examine whether they succeed in achieving this change. In a recent example of this impact-centred approach, Louisa Parks (2015) examines whether transnational SMOs influenced EU legislation in a range of areas including GMO regulation and EU regulation on chemicals.

The second trend in social movement research is of a comparative nature, and aims to address why some SMOs are successful in their aims while others are not, as well as why some movements exist in some countries but not in others. The dependent variables in these studies tend to be either the size and strength of mobilisations (Rucht, 1996) or the timing of these mobilisations (Marks & McAdam, 1999). In their comparative analysis of new social movements in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland between 1975 and 1989, Kriesi et al. (1992) measure the number of protests in these countries before categorising the forms of these protests into demonstrative, confrontative, light violence, and heavy violence events. Their findings support the idea that the political context of a given country heavily shapes the pattern of social movement mobilisation. On the other hand, in his comparison of women's and environmental movements in the U.S., France and Western Germany, Rucht (1996) warns against the oversimplification of linking political contexts directly to the mobilisation or outcome of social movements and suggests that social and cultural structures also come into play.

2.3 Social Movements and Globalisation

Acknowledging the increasing interconnectedness between states and the rise of supranationalism in global governance, some social movement researchers have begun to pay attention to the effects of globalisation on this concept. Defined as "the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distinct localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice versa" (Giddens, 1990, p.64), globalisation has nourished the establishment of global social movements by fostering "a consciousness of the global whole" among citizens of different countries (Robertson, 1992, p.8) and a realisation that nation states are not necessary "the only thing to protest against" (Smith, 2004, p.314).

One example of a social movement that is moulded by the consequences of globalisation is the global justice movement (GJM). The GJM emerged at the turn of the century with a wave of mobilisations calling for a "globalisation from below" (della Porta and Diani, 2006) or "another globalisation" (McDonald, 2015) and demonstrated potential for a global and generalised challenge to neoliberal globalisation, or the governance of the world system by market principles. The make-up of the GJM is highly heterogeneous and encompasses a broad array of initiatives that are not necessarily connected to one another (della Porta and Diani, 2006), but the uniting element for all its actors is the critique that the neoliberal economic system has "undermined democratic institutions at the national level while strengthening unaccountable and non-transparent institutions at the global level" (Smith, 2006, p.318). The EU, given its strong supranational institutions, is seen more and more in this light (della Porta & Parks, 2016; Parks, 2015). Indeed, it is sometimes described as an entity which is primarily occupied with furthering neoliberal policies amongst its Member States by prioritising competition and monetary issues at the expense of social demands (Gill, 1998; Hermann, 2007). The EU's focus on the single market, competition policy and economic and monetary integration have, according to some critics, enhanced "free" trade and "free" capital mobility, monetary restraint and budgetary austerity, while its lack of competency to act on social issues means that these come in second place (Hermann, 2007). It is thought that this imbalance between the economic and the social can lead to dissatisfaction and protest by European citizens, who generally have "high expectations" of the state's role in addressing social, as well as economic, issues and who are thus dissatisfied with the EU's strong role in economic issues and minimal role in social ones (ibid.).

Among the few empirical studies on globalisation and social movements is Jackie Smith's 2001 work on the 1999 "Battle of Seattle". By examining the repertoires of collective action adopted by opponents of the World Trade Organisation talks taking place in the city, she attempts to measure the effect of globalisation on popular protest and concludes that a shift from nation states to transnational actors as the targets of mass popular protest is under way. In her view, the demonstration in Seattle marked a "turning point" in global affairs by demonstrating a capacity for mass challenges to international trade agreements and "high levels of popular concern about global human rights, labour rights and environmental protection" (Smith, 2001, p.2). Smith's claim that we are witnessing a shift from the national to the transnational level regarding the target of SMOs is not one that is shared by all social movement writers, however, and della Porta and Kriesi (1999) are less convinced that transnationalism and supranationalism will displace the sovereign nation-state as the dominant arena for political mobilisation. Instead, they claim that the "national political context continues to constitute a crucial filter which conditions the impact of international change on domestic politics" (ibid., p.4). This thesis follows this assumption by examining the actions of the Stop TTIP campaign on the *national*, rather than the supranational level.

2.4 Social Movements and Europeanisation

The Europeanisation hypothesis suggests that, due to the successful creation of a European political space, SMOs have shifted their target of action from national levels of governance to the European level of decision-making. Several empirical studies have investigated this by using protest event analysis to determine whether there has been a rise of EU-focused contentious politics (Graziano & Caiani, 2016; Imig & Tarrow, 1999, 2001). The term "Europrotest" is used to describe all incidents of "contentious claims-making to which the EU or one of its agencies is in some way either the source, the direct target, or an indirect target of protests and the actors come from at least one member-state" (Imig & Tarrow, 2001, p.32). Given that the European Commission is responsible for trade negotiations, it is clear that anti-TTIP protests may be characterised as "Europrotests".

The findings of Imig and Tarrow's (1999, 2001) large-scale study of social movement actions from 1984 to 1997- the only one of its kind- indicate that citizens are rarely motivated to take action against the EU: Only 5% of mobilisations could be categorised as "Europrotests". The dominance of domestic concerns voiced against domestic actors (Member States) appears unshaken by the emergence of a European polity, and Member States continue to be the most frequent targets of social movements (della Porta & Kriesi, 1999; Imig, 2002; Imig & Tarrow, 2001).

However, some other trends are worth noting. Despite amounting to only a tiny share of all protest, EU-

focused events increased rapidly as the EU integration process gained momentum, suggesting that the EU is progressively being recognised by social actors as both the source of concern and the target for social movements. Of the protests that do directly or indirectly target the EU, their form is overwhelmingly domestic in nature: Most protests that tackle EU issues do so from a national level, with the intention of pushing a Member State to take action against European policies (Imig & Tarrow 1999, 2002; Parks, 2015). The significance of this is that Europrotests must not necessarily be transnational in nature: "local and national demonstrations can still be European" if their subject is borne of EU policy (Parks, 2015, p.3).

The low levels of social movement activity at the European level may perhaps be explained by the influence of the EU supranational structure on the form of European collective action. Supranational arenas usually involve participation by outside groups in the form of information-gathering, report-writing, and lobbying-resolution-passing, a structure that leaves little room for grassroots mobilisation. The influence of EU integration is reflected in the action repertoires of SMOs which are constrained to "act locally" even if they "think globally" (della Porta & Kriesi, 1999, p.20). The EU organs prefer an orderly, institutional approach, and the high number of interest groups in Brussels show that such institutional participation has trumped more contentious varieties of collective action (Hix & Hoyland, 2011; Marks & McAdam, 1998).

2.5 The Social Movement surrounding TTIP

Given the recency of TTIP, only a handful of studies have tackled the anti-TTIP movement as their core subject (Graziano & Caiani, 2016; Morin et al., 2016; Nichols, 2016). Graziano and Caiani (2016) study the Stop TTIP campaign through a lens of Europeanisation, measuring the effect of the political environment on the levels of mobilisations in Austria, Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the UK respectively. Their findings, like those of other social movement scholars, confirm the predominance of domestication in Europrotests². This thesis partly emulates the methodology of this study by conducting a "protest event analysis" of media sources to determine the intensity of anti-TTIP mobilisation on the national level. However, Graziano and Caiani's work is a more in-depth analysis than the scope of the current research project allows: Whereas this thesis only examines the preferences of political parties in national parliaments as an indicator of the political environment, Graziano and Caiani also look at the role of local and regional government, the national judiciary and trade unions. The reason for this is methodological:

² This study was presented as a paper at a conference in the University of Trento, and has not yet been published.

The aim of this thesis is to analyse three different theories, while Graziano and Caiani focus exclusively on political factors and can thus afford to define them in a much broader sense than is feasible for this research project.

The two studies that treat the anti-TTIP movement on a country-specific level both focus on Germany, suggesting a particular salience of the agreement in that country (Bauer, 2016; Mayer, 2016). Bauer's 2016 investigative study examines a comprehensive dataset of over 1,500 publicly held "TTIP information" events in Germany to assess which actors were involved in organising local events throughout the country, and finds a mix of NGO and political forces to have been responsible. Furthermore, he looks at the strategies of anti-TTIP organisations regarding their online presence and effectiveness, finding them to have engaged in savvy online advertising tactics and awareness raising. The second study, a descriptive work by Hartmut Mayer (2015), places the German anti-TTIP movement in the context of wider Transatlantic issues and describes the Stop TTIP campaign as having "a very unique dynamic that integrated a wide-ranging set of overlapping concerns", most notably regarding cybersecurity and data privacy rights (p.52). Allegations that the U.S. spied on its German allies in 2014 led to a decline in trust in German-American relations, according to the author, and this dispute likely fed into the rise of the Stop TTIP campaign.

Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework

Theories form a fundamental part of academic research. As explanatory tools, their purpose is to structure research agendas by providing scholars with a set of assumptions that may help solve empirical puzzles (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). This chapter outlines the chosen theories for this thesis and derives three hypotheses. The hypotheses are then empirically tested to assess the explanatory leverage of each theory in answering the research question of what explains the relative strength of the Stop TTIP campaign.

3.1 Social Movement Theories

Three theories guide the research of this thesis: the resource mobilisation theory, the political opportunity structure and the theory of framing. The rationale for this theory selection is based on their widespread use by social movement scholars who have sought to answer similar questions to the research question proposed in this thesis, i.e. to explain the strength of social movements. The longest established theory of modern social movement studies, resource mobilisation theory, focuses on the role of agency and organisation to a social movement's success, emphasising the availability and exploitation of resources as central to the explanation for mobilisation (Meyer, 2004). The dominance of the resource mobilisation theory has been overshadowed by the political opportunity structure, which arose as a corrective to the resource mobilisation theory's neglect of political explanations and which focuses on institutional factors over the role of agency. The political opportunity structure maintains that the nature of the political context is crucially important to the emergence and success of social movements, and claims that this explains the success of resource-poor social movements (Tarrow, 1995, p.231). The resource mobilisation theory and the political opportunity structure are both structural theories, with the former focusing on both internal and external socio-economic factors and the latter focusing exclusively on external political factors. Both gloss over the role of grievances in social movements, and so the most recent theory to emerge in this discipline, that of framing, emerged as a constructivist perspective that focuses on the active role played by social movements in defining and constructing social problems; "bringing ideas back in" to social movement scholarship (Oliver & Johnston 2005, p.185). Framing theorists acknowledge the role of structural elements to social movements but believe that these are incomplete. In this way, framing is seen as complementary to the two dominant theories, rather than as a standalone alternative. Nevertheless, it will be examined in its own right for the purpose of this thesis.

3.1.1 Resource Mobilisation Theory

From the perspective of the resource mobilisation theory, social movements can only occur when adequate resources are available (Buechler, 1993; Jenkins, 1983; Kendall, 2011; McCarthy & Zald, 2001). The approach focuses on the ability of social movements to acquire such resources, and to mobilise them effectively to advance their cause (Kendall, 2011). The term "resources" covers a broad array of factors including funding, leadership and legitimacy, and is described in detail in the following subsection. It is argued that differences in the level of discretionary resources available and utilised by different SMOs account for variation in their activity levels, and ultimately in their success (Cress and Snow, 1996; Overby & Ritchie, 1991). Accordingly, grievances are downplayed and are considered of secondary importance: They are a necessary but insufficient factor in explaining the emergence, strength or success of social movements, and are of minor importance compared to changes in the availability and control over resources (Buechler, 1993; Jenkins, 1983).

Types of Resources

What is a resource? In their broadest sense, resources include anything that SMOs need to mobilize and deploy in pursuit of their goals (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Recent literature has devised a more specific taxonomy of resources, dividing them into four categories: moral, material, informational and human (Cress & Snow, 1996, p.1095-1096). Moral resources incorporate the important concept of legitimacy, which may be a result of solidarity support, sympathetic support, and celebrity support (Cress & Snow 1996; Edwards & McCarthy, 2004; Snow, 1979). Material resources include money (funds), office space and equipment. Of these, monetary resources have received the most analytic attention, a fact that is unsurprising given its tangible and fungible nature: Money can be converted into any kind of resource except for moral resources (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p.129). Informational resources (also termed "cultural" or "socio-organisational" resources) refer to "know-how" and include knowledge relevant to conducting collective actions (i.e. how to organise a protest or hold a news conference) and strategic knowledge about efficiently maintaining an SMO (Cress & Snow, 1996; Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). Finally, human resources encompass labour, experience, skills and expertise and include the resource of leadership, often cited as a significant aspect of successful movement organisations (ibid.).

Resources may be derived from both internal and external sources. The only exception to this is the moral resource of legitimacy, which must come from sources outside of the SMO (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004).

Empirical studies have demonstrated that the mobilisation of resources profoundly affects the course and character of SMOs. What is less clear, however, is what resources are (most) significant to a movement's emergence, strength or success: The *type* of resources and ways in which several resources interact are also important, and it is thought that the importance of any resource varies by type of SMO, the class or socioeconomic status of its constituents, and its desired outcomes (Cress & Snow, 1996, p.1105).

The Role of Organisation

The resource mobilisation theory has two central elements: the availability of resources for social movement, and the use of these resources by social movements. The latter element, the use of resources, highlights the key role of organisation in social movements. In fact, it was resource mobilisation theorists who coined the term "social movement organisation (SMO)" and who placed the concept at the heart of social movement studies (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). We see the importance of organisational factors in the definition of "mobilisation" proposed under this theory, which is considered as the "process by which a group secures collective control over the resources needed for collective action" (Jenkins, 1983, p.532). The "process of securing control" over movement-enhancing resources requires organisation, and the resource mobilisation theory believes that strong, professional and formally structured organisations are needed to effectively transfer a societal desire for change (or resistance) into concrete action (Diani, 1992; Jenkins, 1983). The resource mobilisation theory belongs to the family of rational choice theories, maintaining that SMOs rationally participate in collective action based on a calculated decision about the goals of the group (and how realistic it is that they will be obtained), available resources, and costs of mobilisation (Kendall, 2012, p.670). Far from being disorganised, spontaneous or irrational, SMOs are tactical entities that make strategic decisions concerning how best to mobilise their limited resources to promote their cause (Overby & Ritchie, 1991).

Resources and the Stop TTIP campaign

The Stop TTIP campaign was a transnational campaign, made up of over 500 European organisations that gathered under the umbrella alliance of The European Initiative Against TTIP and CETA. While this alliance operated on a pan-EU platform, gathering signatures and encouraging civil action against TTIP, protest demonstrations were organised on the national level by coalitions of national organisations. The focus of this thesis is the strength of the Stop TTIP campaign in different countries, and this strength will be conceptualised as the mobilisation size of protest actions. Given that participation in protest activities

requires individuals who (a) are aware of the cause and (b) empathise with the cause, it is appropriate to examine two particular resources: the informational resource of organisation, and the moral resource of legitimacy.

The organisation and awareness raising of national demonstrations was orchestrated by national coalitions of anti-TTIP organisations, and so it seems appropriate to examine the role of national civil society organisations. The resource of organisation (or "organisational resource") embodies several types of resources at once: Organisational know-how (an informational resource), staff and expert knowledge (human resources), and funding and equipment (material resources) are all necessary for an organisation to be viable (Cress & Snow, 1996). The existence and activity levels of a civil society organisation that was explicitly involved in the Stop TTIP campaign (by spreading leaflets and other forms of information or by fundraising for the campaign) will be used as the indicator of an "organisational resource".

It is also appropriate to examine the role played by the moral resource of legitimacy. This is based on Cress and Snow's (1996) empirical study of campaigns by different homeless groups in the US, which found that moral backing was a necessary resource for the viability of all SMOs under examination. As already outlined, moral resources encompass sympathetic and solidarity support, as well as celebrity endorsement. One measure of sympathetic and solidarity support is that of public opinion, which has been described as one of the "most effective resources" available to an SMO (Overby & Ritchie, 1991, p.331). Scholars have noted that public approval is of particular concern to policy-makers in democratic societies, and it follows that whichever interests are best able to appeal to public opinion (or exploit or manipulate it) will have a significant advantage in the struggle over policy (ibid). This concern has extended to the EU level, and publics have become more questioning of EU policy as EU institutions have gained more powers: Europe's leaders act in a "political environment where actions are constrained by citizens' attitudes" (Hix & Høyland, 2011, p.105). Public ambivalence, on the other hand, is considered a disadvantage to SMOs: Without public support, "social movements are powerless and their actions toothless" (Vliegenthart & Walgrave, 2012, p.389). In line with this, the following hypothesis is derived:

Hypothesis 1: The relative strength of the Stop TTIP campaign can be explained by the availability of organisational and moral resources.

3.1.2 Political Opportunity Structure

The aim of any social movement is to change (or to resist changing) the status quo. Social movements are therefore inherently political, and so it is unsurprising that one of the most widely used approaches in social movement scholarship has a pointedly political focus. The political opportunity structure links the success or failure of social movements to the political context in which they operate, claiming that opportunities (or restraints) for mobilisation are facilitated by a certain constellation of political forces (Eisinger, 1973; Rucht, 1996; Tarrow, 1998). In this way, it views the differences among social movements as inherently context-dependent (Meyer, 2004), paying attention to the exogenous factors that either enhance or inhibit a movement's prospects for mobilisation. Assessing the political environment of social movements allows us to gain an understanding of the biases confronting these movements (Eisinger, 1973). The political opportunity structure maintains that these external biases prove crucial for a social movement's outcomes, outweighing internal structural elements such as resources and movement strategy.

Elite allies

Numerous dimensions of a country's political environment are thought to affect the success of social movements (Meyer & Minkhoff, 2004). These include (1) a polity's formal institutional structures, (2) the nature of political cleavages, alliance structures and the ideological positions of political parties, and (3) a state's propensity for repression (Kriesi et al., 1995; McAdam, 1996; Rucht, 1996). One of the oft-cited criticisms of the political opportunity structure approach is its sheer broadness, with some observers describing it as a "sponge" (Meyer, 2004, p.126) or an "all-encompassing fudge factor" (McAdam et al., 2004, p.25) that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment. This "conceptual plasticity" (McAdam et al. 1996, p.25) is reflected in the fact that there is no definitive list of variables: Political opportunity structure scholars have considerable flexibility to choose the factors they believe will be most appropriate to their case and to determine how such factors should be operationalised, something that Meyer (2004, p.135) describes as "both completely understandable and extremely frustrating". The broadness of this approach has meant that most studies do not test the theory against others, but instead start with the presumption that some element of the political context can be helpful in explaining a case. Thus, while it is conceptualised broadly, the political opportunity structure approach is operationalised narrowly. This thesis chooses one the most frequently used causal variables in empirical research, that is the presence of "elite allies" (which falls under the dimension of alliance structures or informal power

relations, listed as (2) above) (Caruso, 2015; McAdam et al., 1996).

"Elite allies" are defined in this thesis as political parties in parliament who expressed opposition to or reservation of TTIP: Actors who may encourage and influence debate on the matter in the national political arena. As noted by Meyer (2004, p.135), "different [aspects of the political environment] are relevant to different movements". The significance of the elite allies dimension to the Stop TTIP campaign is based on the fact that political parties would have played a crucial role in the final acceptance of TTIP should it have come to completion. This is because TTIP's legal status was that of a "mixed" trade agreement, jointly containing elements of both exclusive EU and Member States' competences (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.). Such a legal basis would have required the final agreement to be ratified by EU Member States' national parliaments (European Parliament, 2016). Furthermore, the relevance of political party positions for social movements is well documented in the political opportunity structure literature. Parties have "one foot in the state and the other in civil society" (Maguire, 1995, p.99), and therefore operate in the same terrain as social movements, often crossing each other's paths. From the political opportunity structure, the following hypothesis is derived:

Hypothesis 2: The relative strength of the Stop TTIP campaign can be explained by the presence of elite allies in the form of political parties in national parliaments.

3.1.3 Framing Processes

The theory of framing belongs to the constructivist school thought, which focuses on ideological considerations and the role of ideas in social science phenomena (Snow & Benford, 1988). Constructivist scholars argue that the success of social movements is just as dependent on the mobilising of ideas and beliefs as it is on resource and political factors. Whereas other theories tend to treat meanings or ideas as a given, constructivism (as the name would suggest) argues that these are instead *constructed*: SMOs are not only the carriers and transmitters of beliefs and ideas, but they are also viewed as bodies that are actively engaged in the *production* of meaning for participants, antagonists and observers of a social movement (ibid.). This production of meaning is known as framing, and its use by SMOs make them key actors in what has been termed "the politics of signification" (Hall, 1982, p.65).

The act of framing implies agency: SMOs purposefully and intentionally assign a certain meaning to reality in such a way that will garner support for their cause from bystanders and mobilise potential adherents

(Snow & Benford, 1988). The term "collective action frames" is thus used to describe "action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of an SMO" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p.614). Framing theory proposes that SMOs engage in "framing tasks" to encourage people to partake in mobilisation, and assumes that the more attention an SMO devotes to these tasks, the more successful it will be in mobilising individuals (Snow & Benford, 1988, p.199).

Core Framing Tasks

Social movement literature identifies three core framing tasks: (1) diagnostic framing, (2) prognostic framing, and (3) motivational framing. *Diagnostic* framing answers two straightforward questions: What is the problem and who is responsible? Thus, it draws attention to the negative aspects of the issue. *Prognostic* framing identifies a specific remedy to the problem sketched by the diagnostic frame, and sets a clear goal for the SMO to work towards (Cress & Snow, 2000). *Motivational* frames persuade and inspire individuals to participate in an SMO's activities and are described as a "call to arms" or "prod to action" (Snow & Benford, 1988, p.199). Motivational frames are inherently hopeful, and provide participants with the belief that their actions can and will make a difference (Gamson & Meyer, 1996).

The task of framing, then, is to define a situation as problematic, but to simultaneously give actors the hope that the problem can be overcome through concerted efforts in the form participation in SMO-led initiatives. The term "framing activities" is an umbrella term for the three framing tasks of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing. In line with this, the following hypothesis is derived:

Hypothesis 3: The Stop TTIP campaign will be successful if its framing activities are successful.

Counter Frames

The effectiveness of a social movement's framing activities in gathering support for its actions may be diluted by the existence of counter-frames: For Nisbet (2009, p.14), a successful public policy effort "depends on generating widespread public support and mobilization while effectively countering the communication efforts of opponents of these efforts". Framing is therefore carried out in a "competitive" environment, whereby people may choose between the alternate frames or even choose to ignore both frames due to conflicting messages (Aklin & Urpelainen, 2013, p.1227). In this way, counter-frames can act to neutralise a social movement's frame, as the availability of conflicting messages creates uncertainty about the merits of the movement's original message.

The Role of the Media

When measuring the success of an SMO's framing activities, scholars have looked to the role of the mass media. The media is considered to play a "crucial role" in defining whether movement actors are taken seriously as agents of possible change (Gamson & Meyer, 1996, p.285). Not only does media spotlight validate an SMO as an important player in a country's political landscape, it can also potentially act as a carrier of SMO frames. To examine the strength of an SMO's framing activities, scholars have looked for evidence of articulate and coherent diagnostic and prognostic frames in media coverage of social movement protest events (see e.g. Cress & Snow, 2000). Framing activities are thought to be successful when media coverage of a social movement and its issues are in line with the frames advanced by an SMO (Vliegenthart & Walgrave, 2012).

3.2 Conclusion

Most studies of social movements have employed a single theory (most often the resource mobilisation theory or the political opportunity structure) as an explanatory tool. Given the broad array of dimensions that make up each of these approaches, such a uni-theoretical focus is understandable. The use of three different theories in this thesis is therefore rather unusual, and it is acknowledged that this inevitably results in the inability to cover a single theory in as much depth as most past studies have done. Nonetheless, the choice to employ this number is defended on the grounds that theory testing is an important process in establishing the strength of different theories and in adding to the academic discourse of a subject. It is hoped that this thesis may act as a preliminary study for future scholars, who might examine each theory in more detail based on this research project's conclusions.

3.3 Summary

Figure 1 summarises the theoretical framework, showing which components of the theories are used to derive hypotheses (H).

Resource Mobilisation Theory:

Availability and exploitation of internal and external socio-economic resources: moral, material, human, informational.

→ Structural theory

H1: The relative strength of the Stop TTIP campaign can be explained by the availability of organisational and moral resources in a given country.

- → Organisational resource = civil society organisations actively involved in movement
- → Moral resources = favourable public opinion

Political Opportunity Structure:

Opportunities and constraints provided by the broader political context. Open v closed opportunities.

→ Structural theory

H2: The relative strength of the Stop TTIP campaign can be explained by the presence of elite allies in the form of political parties in national parliaments.

→ preferences of biggest parties in parliament towards TTIP

Framing Processes:

Role of ideas and reality construction. Core framing tasks include diagnostic, prognostic and motivational

→ Constructivist theory

H3: The relative strength of the Stop TTIP campaign can be explained by the success of its framing activities.

→ Widespread use of anti-TTIP frames in national media will correspond positively with the strength of the Stop TTIP campaign

Figure 1: Theoretical framework

Chapter Four: Research Design

Sound academic investigation relies on a well-considered research design. Nachmias and Nachmias (1992, pp.77-78) describe a research design as a "plan" that guides the investigator in the process of collecting, analysing and interpreting observations. This chapter outlines the chosen research method of this thesis and explains the logic behind its selection before outlining the data collection and analysis methods that are employed in later chapters.

4.1 Research Design Selection: Case Study

A qualitative, explanatory case study has been selected as the preferred research method for this thesis. A case study is an "in-depth investigation of a problem in one or more real life settings over an extended period of time" and is a commonly used scientific method to derive explanations of organisational phenomena (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p.93). The focus of this research project, the Stop TTIP campaign, may be considered an organisational phenomenon, and is therefore an appropriate subject for a case study. Case studies examine a problem within its natural setting, and so are particularly useful when the context of an occurrence is thought to be critical to its understanding. As this thesis focuses on three separate countries, we may assume that context will play a major role in determining the reason for the varying strength of the anti-TTIP movement across the three different EU Member States examined. By studying each country in detail, the aim of the present research is to "retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events" (Yin, 2009, p.2), and such an aim is facilitated by the case study method.

A case study is a non-experimental research method that differs from large-N studies on several points: It deals with only a small number of cases; it incorporates a large number and huge diversity of empirical observations per case; and it involves a thorough reflection on the relationship between empirical observations and abstract theories (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p.19). The advantage that comes from the comprehensive and diverse array of empirical observations is that the researcher can derive a "richer, more contextualised, and more authentic interpretation" of the studied phenomenon than most other research methods (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p.93). While the contextualised nature of the result may serve as an advantage in understanding the specific subject at hand, a limitation of the case study approach is its lack of generalisability to other case sites (or its external validity). Another concern related to the use of the case study is the potential "lack of rigour" associated with the method, which sometimes results in a

"sloppy" and unsound piece of research (Yin, 2003, p.10). This can be avoided by using systematic procedures that ensure a scientifically-valid and non-biased set of conclusions.

Blatter and Haverland (2012, pp.23-24) identified three approaches to case study research: Co-variational analysis, which is used to determine whether a certain factor "makes a difference" to the phenomenon at hand; causal-process tracing, which focuses on what factors lead to a concrete outcome; and congruence analysis, which uses the conclusions of data analysis to examine the relevance of different theories, thus contributing to the broader theoretical debate. The latter of these, a congruence analysis, is deemed to be the most suitable approach in answering the research question at hand given that the aim of this thesis is to establish which of the theories outlined in the theoretical framework (Chapter Three) may best explain the relative strength of the Stop TTIP campaign in three countries. Causal inference will thus be based on the level of congruence between the theoretical expectations outlined in the hypotheses and the empirical information gathered. By matching data with expectations, theories are either confirmed, contradicted, or neither.

By establishing which theories hold the greatest explanatory leverage in explaining the relative strength of the Stop TTIP campaign, a congruence analysis permits us to narrow down the focus of future studies, allowing them to be more specific and concrete than this one. The causal-process tracing method may have also been appropriate for this research project, but was decided against. This is because such a method relies on gaining "deep insights into the perceptions and motivations of important actors" (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). Interviews are thought to be particularly helpful channels of gaining such insights, but the wide variety of actors that would have needed to be contacted for this research (activists, politicians, and journalists from three different countries) meant that such data was unlikely to be collected in as comprehensive and detailed a way as would do causal-process tracing justice. Furthermore, the dense description of critical moments that are crucial in the causal-process tracing method means that only one case is usually selected by the researcher. The congruence analysis was deemed more suited to multiple case studies, and so is the preferred method for this thesis which has a country comparison at its core.

4.2 Case Selection

Case studies may take the form of a single or multiple case design (Yin, 2009). In both kinds, the process of case selection is of paramount importance: Unlike the process of random sampling that is often deployed in large-N studies, small-N research should follow an intentional, carefully-considered and transparent logic (Leuffen, 2007). Transparency in case section is important for two reasons. First, it allows the reader to gauge the impact of possible bias on the work. Second, public procedures in social science research allows future researchers to replicate the work if desired, and is one of the cornerstones of "good scientific research" (King et al., 1994, p.8). As the aim of this thesis is to study a campaign that was active in a large number of countries (all 28 EU member states), it is clearly appropriate to adopt a multiple case design. Three countries- France, Germany and the UK- are the chosen cases.

This country choice was based on two main factors. First, the high-levels of media exposure regarding the German anti-TTIP movement suggested that this country was an intrinsic one, and should be included in any study on TTIP opposition. This was cemented by a comment by Karel de Gucht, the EU Trade Commissioner from 2010 to 2014 and the EU's chief TTIP negotiator, who said "I have travelled all around the Member States, from the United Kingdom, to Spain, Poland or Bulgaria. Everybody is interested in TTIP, but nowhere in Europe is the debate as lively as in Germany" (Mayer, 2016, p.52). The two other countries, France and the UK, were chosen for more practical reasons, namely the researcher's ability to read French and English. A positive consequence of this selection of cases is that all three countries share similar characteristics regarding their population and economic power. France, Germany and the UK are the three largest EU Member States in terms of population, with just under 65 million inhabitants in France and the UK respectively, and approximately 80 million in Germany (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015). They also account for the three largest economies in the EU in terms of nominal GDP, and are the fourth (Germany), fifth (the UK) and sixth (France) largest economies in the world (again in terms of nominal GDP) (World Bank, n.d.a.). These two similarities are significant, as it is accepted that larger Member States are more influential in EU affairs. It therefore makes sense to examine the Stop TTIP campaign in three of the Union's biggest countries, rather than focus on smaller Member States.

4.3 Reliability and Validity

When measuring social phenomena, sound scientific research strives to satisfy two fundamental standards; validity and reliability. Both elements aim to link measures to (often ambiguous) constructs, and help to establish the "truthfulness, credibility or believability" of a research project's findings (Neuman, 2014, p.212). It should be acknowledged from the outset that perfect reliability and validity are impossible to achieve. Reliability encompasses the dependability or consistency of the measurement process, and suggests that another researcher should garner the same results if they choose to replicate the study under identical or similar conditions (ibid.). Reliability is achieved in qualitative research by being consistent and transparent when making observations. This thesis improves reliability by using multiple sources —newspaper reports, opinion polls, political literature, think-tank reports, academic articles- to support findings, a method known as triangulation. Furthermore, the rationale for source selection and the process of source analysis is clearly specified throughout.

The second important standard, validity, refers to how well an idea "fits" with reality: Do the analysed measures correspond with what actually occurs in the social world? Internal validity refers to causality: How can it be ensured that what we think causes an effect really does? In the case study at hand, causal inference is based on the level of congruence between the theoretically derived hypotheses and the empirical data. Because only a small number of cases is investigated, the researcher can collect a broad array of observations based on extensive and diverse sources, thus increasing the internal validity of the research. External validity involves the generalisability of findings from the case(s) at hand to other potential case sites, i.e. how valid the findings are to other contexts (Rohlfing, 2012). One way of strengthening external validity is to undertake a multiple rather than a single case study: Examining a phenomenon in more than one case site allows the researcher to draw more general conclusions (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p.35), and this is what this thesis hopes to achieve by examining three different countries. Following this logic, however, one might contest that choosing even more than three cases is desirable. This research project has been limited to three cases for two reasons. First, the primary aim of the thesis is not to generalise, but rather to gain an in-depth understanding of the chosen countries. The second reason is based on practical considerations related to time constraints: Given the need for a comprehensive analysis of a large number of sources in qualitative research, studying more than three cases was deemed unfeasible in the limited timespan afforded for this research project.

4.4 Data Collection Method

Data for this thesis is generated through the qualitative method of desk research. An oft-used research method of social movement scholars is "protest event analysis" which uses media sources to determine the size, popularity and actions of social movements (see e.g. della Porta & Parks, 2016; Imig & Tarrow, 1999, 2001; Imig, 2002). While these studies are aimed at determining the existence or strength of a certain social movement rather than the reasons behind this strength, they demonstrate how valuable media sources are in the study of social movements, especially in the absence of any rigorous international database on the subject. This thesis follows this trend by examining newspaper and other media reports of the Stop TTIP campaign in France, Germany and the UK. Several national and international news outlets are used in the interest of triangulation. Furthermore, press releases and statements by political parties in national parliaments are consulted, along with political manifestos, opinion polls, and annual reports of civil society organisations. Press releases from the Stop TTIP campaign website will be examined as starting points for pertinent dates and events. The (albeit limited) scholarly work that is available on European opposition to TTIP will also be analysed.

Chapter Five: Operationalisation

The theoretical framework of Chapter Three introduced the theories that form the basis of this research and derived three hypotheses. In Chapter Four, the chosen research design that will structure the collection and analysis of data was described, but the exact sources of this data and the details of how it will be analysed have not yet been considered. This chapter addresses this by identifying the variables in each hypothesis and explaining how they will be examined and measured.

5.1 Defining and Measuring Concepts

The resource mobilisation theory, the political opportunity structure, and the theory of framing processes have been used to derive three hypotheses that shape this thesis. While the independent variable differs per hypothesis, the dependent variable- the strength of the Stop TTIP campaign- is the same for all. The following section operationalises this dependent variable.

5.1.2 Dependent Variable: Strength of the Campaign

The strength of the Stop TTIP campaign is measured in this thesis in terms of the *size of mobilisation*. Two indicators are used to measure mobilisation size; petition signing and street demonstrations. The use of more than one indicator mirrors several past studies on social movements, in which mobilisation is considered an aggregate category that can encompass a wide variety of actions including peaceful protest (marches and rallies), sit-ins and riots (see e.g. Graziano & Caiani, 2016; Imig & Tarrow, 1999). In liberal polities, petitions and (permitted) demonstrations are relatively orderly and non-disruptive forms of protest action (Meyer & Minkhoff, 2004). As the societal relevance of this thesis is based on grasping a clearer understanding of citizens' participation in EU affairs through channels that are unconventional (but nonetheless legal), these two indicators are appropriate.

Indicator 1: Petition Signatures

To measure the rates of petition signing, the number of signatures gathered per country by the European Initiative Against TTIP and CETA for the Stop TTIP petition is examined. The data source is the website of the European Initiative Against TTIP and CETA, which provides a detailed breakdown of the number of signatures collected per country (Stop-TTIP, n.d.a.). The petition, compiled between October 2014 and

October 2015, was initially launched by its organisers as a European Citizens' Initiative (ECI). As the Stop TTIP petition was modelled on the rules of an ECI, and as the total number of signatures collected will be compared with previous ECIs, it is important to describe exactly what this initiative involves. A brief background and outline is therefore provided below.

The European Citizens' Initiative

The ECI, established by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, is an "instrument of participatory democracy" designed to increase citizens' input in EU affairs by establishing a formalised procedure for petitions (European Parliament, n.d.). When an ECI petition is signed by at least one million EU citizens, and passes minimum thresholds in at least seven Member States, the matter is discussed at EU level. The subject matter of an ECI must relate to areas where the EU has the power to legislate, and while a successful ECI does not guarantee any (change in) legislation, it does result in "an obligation to consider": After a successful petition is received, a hearing is held in the European Parliament, along with meetings between the organisers of the ECI and the Commission (della Porta & Parks, 2016, p.1483). The Stop TTIP ECI called for a halt to the TTIP negotiations but was quickly rejected as invalid. The European Commission refused to register it on the claim that negotiations are "internal preparatory acts" rather than formal legal acts and therefore fall "outside the framework" of the legislation-oriented ECI³ (European Commission, n.d.a.). In response to this rejection, the "European Initiative Against TTIP and CETA" was founded and decided to continue collecting signatures for their newly-dubbed "self-organised ECI" (Stop-TTIP, n.d.b.), even if this would not receive any formal attention at the EU level.

Indicator 2: Street demonstrations

The second indicator is the size and frequency of street demonstrations per country. This is determined by conducting a "protest event analysis" of newspapers, a well-established research method among social movement scholars (see e.g. Graziano & Caiani, 1992; Imig & Tarrow, 1999 Kriesi, 1992). Both international and national news sources are examined in this analysis to determine how many street demonstrations took place per country, and how many people partook in them.

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³ This claim was rejected by the European Court of Justice in May 2017, which ruled that the European Commission was incorrect in its refusal to register the Stop TTIP ECI (Barbière, 2017).

The selection of news sources is partly based on a much broader and much earlier study by Imig and Tarrow (1999), who use the *Reuters* news agency to compile a database of all protest events that took place in the EU between 1983 and 1997. Their choice appears to be a sound one, given that *Reuters* is the world's largest international multimedia news provider, with journalists based in over 200 locations worldwide (Reuters, n.d.). As this thesis has a far narrower focus, it is possible to include more than one international source. This is done in the interest of corroborating results, thus increasing reliability. *Politico* is chosen as the second international source to be examined in addition to *Reuters*. *Politico* is a Brussels-based newspaper⁴ that targets the "European political elite" by focusing on European politics, policy and government (Politico, n.d.). It is purposely selected for this thesis because of its focus on EU affairs. According to a 2016 ComRes/Burson-Marsteller EU media survey, it is the most read media outlet by EU policy influencers and has a readership of over 1.5 million people a day (ibid.). As TTIP was negotiated and managed at the EU level, it is appropriate to consult a newspaper with an EU focus.

National newspapers will be examined in addition to international news sources. The rationale here is that smaller protests which may not garner international attention may nonetheless be reported in national news. One news portal from each country is examined. These are *Le Monde* for France, *Deutsche Welle* for Germany and *The Independent* for the UK. *Le Monde* has been chosen by other scholars conducting protest event analysis in France (e.g. Kriesi et al., 1992). *Deutsche Welle* is an international broadcaster that publishes daily German news in English on its website. A German-language daily newspaper would no doubt be a more appropriate source, but this is not possible due to the linguistic constraints of the researcher. *The Independent* was chosen for the UK because it is broadly seen as the UK's most centrist newspaper.⁵

Ideally, the selection of national news sources would be based on the most similar previously-conducted study. The 2016 paper by Graziano and Caiani, which studies the Stop TTIP campaign through the lens of political opportunity structure and which employs protest event analysis as a method, is the most similar and most recent study to this thesis. However, the authors unfortunately do not provide a comprehensive

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⁴ There exist two editions of Politico; one in the US and the other in Europe. The European edition has been examined for the purpose of this thesis.

⁵ In the absence of any academic literature on the subject, this is based on a YouGov survey that asked the British public to locate British newspapers on a left-right scale (YouGov, 2017).

description of their data, merely listing "online newspapers, information portals and news section of the websites of the main Stop-TTIP organisations" as their sources, to the neglect of any specifics⁶.

The two factors measured by the protest event analysis of newspapers are the *size* and *frequency* of street demonstrations. The size of a demonstration is determined by the number of participants present, and an estimation of this number is usually made by both the police and the organisers. Newspaper reports of a protest usually quote both estimates but this thesis will only measure the police account, as this tends to be more conservative and is therefore thought to be more reliable. The frequency of street demonstrations is measured by counting the number of dates that a protest occurred, as reported by the selected news sources. For both national and international newspapers, the size and number of reported demonstrations are found by entering the terms "TTIP" "against" and "demonstration" or "protest" in the search function of the news portals' websites.

5.1.3 Independent Variable #1: Resources

In line with the resource mobilisation theory, it is hypothesised that the relative strength of the Stop TTIP campaign can be explained by the availability of organisational and moral resources in a country. Thus, two expectations may be specified; (1) that the Stop TTIP campaign is stronger the greater the role played by organisations, and (2) that the Stop TTIP campaign is stronger the greater the moral legitimacy it enjoys.

Organisational Resources

The aim of examining organisational resources is to identify the potential role played by civil society organisations in the mobilisation of support for the Stop TTIP campaign. The indicator used to measure organisational resources is the *presence* and *activity levels* of individual civil society organisations that operated in a country during the period of the Stop TTIP campaign and that explicitly carried out an anti-TTIP initiative. A civil society organisation is defined as an association that promotes a certain interest or cause, believing it to be for the good of society at large, and actively tries to influence policies on the matter. NGOs, trade unions, faith-based organizations, indigenous peoples movements, and foundations are all considered to be civil society organisations (World Bank, n.d.b.).

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⁶ It should be noted that this paper, presented at the SGEU ECOR Conference, is a "very first draft" and is the authors themselves acknowledge that it is incomplete.

The Stop TTIP campaign, which was led by the European Initiative Against CETA and TTIP at the EU level, was supported by an alliance of more than 500 individual civil society organisations, political parties and trade unions from EU countries (Stop-TTIP, n.d.c.). A list of these organisations is provided on the Stop-TTIP website. This list will be taken as a starting point in determining the organisational landscape of France, Germany and the UK. The names of these organisations, along with the term "TTIP" are searched for in national newspaper archives to establish their level of prominence, with the understanding that the more active the organisation, the higher the chance that it will be mentioned in reporting of protest events. For this, the international newspaper database *LexisNexis* is used. Political parties are excluded from this examination, as they are analysed separately in the study of elite allies, the second independent variable to be addressed in this chapter.

Once the major organisations are identified via a media analysis, a more thorough examination is conducted of the most prominent organisations acting on the national anti-TTIP scene in each country. This will include a study of the organisations' websites and annual reports. Where the funding and staffing levels of the organisation are made available, these will be presented. This method is based on Cress and Snow's (1996) comparative study of homeless SMOs in eight US cities in the early 1990s. The researchers use newspaper accounts of civil society organisations and internally produced documents (by the same organisations) to gauge their levels of activity and effectiveness at furthering the homelessness cause. This is in addition to intense fieldwork conducted over a three-year period (1989-1991), which includes interviewing organisation leaders, attending the organisations' meetings and participating in protest events. Due to time constraints, but also because the Stop TTIP campaign is no longer an ongoing social movement, such an extensive examination would not be possible for this thesis. Therefore, only the document analysis components of Cress and Snow's study are emulated in this research project.

Moral Resources

Moral resources may be defined as the level of legitimacy enjoyed by a social movement, and this legitimacy may manifest itself in the form of favourable public opinion towards a movement's aims. Following this, the indicator used to define moral resources is that of national public opinion towards TTIP

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⁷ In the case of France, the term "TAFTA" will be searched for if the term 'TTIP' garners no results. An acronym for Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement, it was the most widely used term for the agreement in France.

in the three countries under study. The data source used to measure this is the Standard Eurobarometer survey for the years of 2014, 2015 and 2016. The Standard Eurobarometer is a survey conducted on behalf of the European Commission in all EU Member States and in some neighbouring states. It consists of approximately 1,000 face-to-face interviews per country, in which participants are questioned on their attitudes towards a host of issues (European Commission, n.d.c.). These issues range from standard questions about trust in EU institutions and feelings of European citizenship, to "priority issues" which involve topical affairs, usually of an international or EU nature. The results of the survey are published biannually and are available on the website of the European Commission. TTIP was included as a "priority issues" in a total of four Eurobarometer surveys, dating from Autumn 2014 to Spring 2016. In each, respondents were asked whether they were for or against "a free trade agreement between the EU and the USA". The results of this question are examined from all four surveys to gauge public opinion towards TTIP in France, Germany and the UK. The Eurobarometer survey is viewed as a sound source for public opinion researchers (Bouckaert et al., 2005), and is widely used by scholars to compare citizens' attitudes within the European Union (see e.g. Lahav, 2004).

5.1.4 Independent Variable #2: Elite Allies

The hypothesis concerning the political opportunity structure states that the relative strength of the Stop TTIP campaign can be explained by the presence of elite allies in the form of political parties in national parliaments. Thus, it is expected that the Stop TTIP campaign is stronger in a country where a political party (or political parties) is/are supportive of its aim, i.e. opposed to TTIP.

The indicator used to measure the presence of elite allies is the position (or preferences) of national political parties towards TTIP. The position of a political party on a certain issue is defined in this thesis as a public statement made by party members and confirmed by the party executive. The confirmation by the party executive is important in differentiating the official line of a party from a personal stance of one of its members. While this analysis includes all parties represented in national parliaments, significantly more weight is given to parties in government. This is because the ratification of TTIP would have required a parliamentary majority in all three countries under study (European Parliament, 2016), and so government majorities would have been crucial to its passing.

There appears to be no ideal way to identify party preferences on TTIP. Many previous studies that measure political party positions on a certain issue have made use of the Comparative Manifesto Project, an international database of political manifestos from 1945-2016. Unfortunately, this is not an option for this thesis: Data is only available for the UK, as it was the only one of the three countries under study to hold a general election in the 2014-2016 period. In the absence of a comprehensive database, a less rigid method is chosen, encompassing a broader range of sources. The first of these is EUvox, a European-wide voting advice application that was developed by researchers for the 2014 European Parliament elections. The aim of this application was to match citizens' preferences with party positions so that citizens could make an informed and considered decision when voting in the European elections. As part of this project, national experts mapped all national parties running for office on issues of economy, society and attitudes to the European Union. Although no specific mention is made of TTIP, EUvox is helpful in determining the economic ideology of national political parties in France, Germany and the UK. Economic ideology is of notable significance when considering political positions on TTIP. Several authors have characterised the EU trade model as inherently neo-liberal (della Porta and Parks, 2016; Smith, 2004) and others have pointed out the neo-liberal aspects of TTIP specifically (the main one being the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism) (Nichols, 2016). Following this, we can assume that left-wing political parties, which generally have reservations about free market economics, would be more likely to oppose TTIP, whereas right-wing parties would be in favour. By examining their economic ideologies, as mapped by the experts from EUvox, it is possible to estimate whether a country's ruling party (or parties) was (were) opposed to TTIP. The results of this analysis are then triangulated by examining media reports, academic literature and party publications where available. Vote Watch, a database of MEP voting records, is also consulted. By examining how French, German and British MEPs voted during the European Parliament's July 2015 vote on TTIP, it might be possible to ascertain the positions of national political parties on the issue. The vote in question was for a non-binding resolution stating the institution's preferences regarding TTIP. Despite its non-binding nature, it stated the Parliament's red lines on the issue. These were important because the final agreement would have needed the consent of the European Parliament to be ratified.

5.1.4 Independent Variable #3: Framing

According to the third hypothesis, and in line with the theory of framing, the Stop TTIP campaign will be successful if its framing activities are successful. Thus, it is expected that the Stop TTIP campaign is stronger in a country where its anti-TTIP frames are explicitly reflected in the public discourse on the matter.

The role of the media plays a significant role in the disseminating of frames, and so the indicator used to gauge the success of the Stop TTIP campaign's framing activities is the presence of anti-TTIP frames in newspaper articles. By reading a sample of national news reports about TTIP, it is examined whether the frames extoled by the Stop TTIP campaign featured in reporting on the issue. This is then checked against the presence of counter frames in the same report. In this way, we can see whether the campaign was successful in getting its frame across to the public.

The step-by-step method of frame analysis used in this thesis is modelled on that of Deana Rohlinger's 2002 study of the abortion debate in the US, in which the respective framing efforts of a pro-choice and a pro-life group are measured through a content analysis of media sources. The first step is frame identification. Establishing the preferred frames of an organisation is done by reading its own publications, noting the nature of the discourse, and then deriving frames from this discourse. The second step is choosing the time window for the media analysis. Rohlinger conducts her study during "critical discourse moments"; times when an issue is particularly salient to an audience and thus provides opportunities for activists to have a better chance of getting media coverage (2002, p.483). Although other scholars also support choosing such critical discourse moments (e.g. Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Ryan, 1991), definitions of what constitutes such moments are generally unclear and left to the discretion of the researcher. Rohlinger, for her part, selects periods when government action is being taken on abortion issues, and this thesis employs a similar approach. The third step is conducting the content analysis itself. This is done by choosing media sources and then by searching for the relevant term in its archives (in this case: "TTIP"). Relevant articles are then examined and coded for frames. A more detailed account of how Rohlinger's frame analysis method is adapted to this thesis is outlined below.

Step 1: Frame identification

This thesis derives frames by examining material published by the social movement organisation in question. Such a process, known as inductive frame analysis, is widely used in previous studies (e.g. Aklin & Urpelainen, 2013; Rohlinger, 2002; Van Gorp & Vercruysse, 2012). By basing the frames on a concrete source, the subjectivity of the frame analysis is decreased. The material provided in the "About Stop TTIP: A Short Introduction" section of The European Initiative Against TTIP and CETA's website is used as the source to identify the preferred frames of the Stop TTIP campaign (Stop-TTIP, n.d.d.). From this, three main frames are identified: the "threat to democracy" frame, the "threat to European standards" frame and the "global injustice" frame. All these frames may be characterised as diagnostic frames, meaning they are focussed on the nature of the problem rather than the solution to it. The phrases or terms associated with each frame are listed in a coding scheme, shown in Table 1.

1. Threat to democracy:	2. Threat to European standards / way of life	3. Global injustice:
1.1 TTIP will benefit big corporations/increase power of multinationals	2.1 Threat to EU consumer rights:	3.1 TTIP will increase inequality between developed countries and developing countries
1.2 Foreign investors will be able to sue states	2.1.2 TTIP will endanger EU food standards/ US food quality standards are lower than the EU's	
1.3 Corporations will have regulatory control	2.1.3 TTIP is a threat to the EU's precautionary principle	
1.4 Secrecy of negotiations/lack of transparency	2.1.4 TTIP would increase genetically modified (GM) technologies in Europe	
1.5 Big business will profit more than citizens		
1.6 TTIP will encourage the privatisation of public services	2.2 Threat to EU labour standards:	
1.7 States will lose regulatory power	2.2.1 TTIP will prompt a race to the bottom	
	2.2.2 TTIP will bring job losses due to increased competition from abroad	
	2.2.3 U.S. labour standards lower than the EU's	
	2.3 Threat to environmental protection:	
	2.3.4 States will lose ability to ban fracking	
	2.4.5 Environmental protection regulation will be more difficult to introduce	

Table 1: Anti-TTIP frames

Source: Stop-TTIP, n.d.d. Short Introduction- Stop TTIP.

Regarding counter-frames, the process of frame identification is not as straightforward. This is because, unlike The European Initiative Against TTIP and CETA, there existed no centralised pro-TTIP organisation at an EU level during the 2014-2016 period. This is most likely because TTIP was already in the negotiation stages during this period, and looked likely to be implemented, so there was no real need for a centralised, concerted effort to push for its completion. Thus, there exists no material published by a pan-EU organisation that had the furthering of TTIP as its singular, specific aim. As a result, it has been decided to formulate counter-frames pragmatically, largely based on counter-claims to the Stop TTIP's frames outlined in Table 1 above. These counter frames are listed in Table 2.

- 1. Jobs and growth: TTIP will be good for business and improve the EU's economy
- 2. Misinformation: The Stop TTIP campaign is misleading and criticism of TTIP is misguided.
- **3. Protection of EU standards:** TTIP does not pose a threat to EU consumer/environmental standards. Standards will be maintained or improved, but will not decline.
- **4. Shaping globalisation:** TTIP presents Europe with an opportunity to shape globalisation by setting high standards for global trade agreements. Europe's place in the world will be strengthened by TTIP.
- **5. No agreement on contentious issues:** Issues for which preferences of the EU and the U.S. diverge will not be included in the final agreement.
- **6. Transparency is not an issue:** The TTIP negotiations are more transparent than other trade negotiations.

Table 2: Counter frames

Step 2: Choosing the time frame

This thesis follows the approach of Rohlinger by defining "critical discourse moments" as times when government action is being taken on an issue. Following this, two moments from the 2014-2016 are chosen. The first is **July 8th 2015**, the date when the European Parliament voted for a non-binding resolution outlining its recommendations for the TTIP negotiations. Despite being non-binding, the European Parliament has the power to veto any final trade agreement that does not meet its preferences. The resolution was thus an outline of what the Parliament would deem acceptable in the final deal. This moment is appropriate as it was the only pan-EU political action that took place in a public forum during the timeframe of this study: Although the negotiation process itself may be deemed a "government action" (carried out by the European Commission), it was carried out in secret and so its content was not made available to the media.

Articles dating from July 8th and shortly afterwards are examined⁸. In the case of there being no report on the event in a newspaper, the search will be widened to include the nearest relevant article, providing it was published in July 2015. Furthermore, the date for which the vote was originally scheduled⁹, **June 9**th **2015**, will also be examined.

The second "critical discourse moment" is **May 1**st **2016**, when the Dutch branch of Greenpeace released a leaked a copy of the TTIP negotiation papers. Known as "TTIPleaks", this is the closest we can come to government action on an issue, in that it was the first time that the progress of the European Commission in the negotiations was made public.

Step 3: Source selection and content analysis

The following national media outlets are included in this study:

France	Germany	UK
Le Monde (CL)	Süddeutsche Zeitung (CL)	The Times
Le Figaro (CR)	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (CR)	The Telegraph (CR)
Les Echos	Die Welt	The Guardian
La Tribune	Die Zeit	The Independent (CL)

Table 3: Media sources

Two criteria steered this selection. The first was to include least at least one right-leaning and one left-leaning newspaper per country. Those that fit this criterion are signalled in Table 3, with (CR) denoting a centre-right source and (CL) a centre-left source (BBC, 2006). This is in line with Rohlinger's (2002) case study, who purposely examined a liberal and conservative news source as part of her analysis to ensure a sense of balance. The second criterion is the circulation of newspapers. Three of the chosen sources represent the most widely-circulated newspapers in the three countries¹⁰ (Kelly et al., 2004). In addition, a weekly newspaper is chosen for France (*La Tribune*) and Germany (*Die Zeit*). This is not done for the UK, as the most widely circulated weekly British newspapers are simply the Sunday versions of the chosen dailies: *The Sunday Independent, The Sunday Times*, and *The Sunday Telegraph*.

 8 Most articles are likely to date from the 9^{th} - 11^{th} of July.

⁹ The vote on TTIP resolution was originally scheduled for the 9th of June, but this was postponed by the Parliament's president to allow MEPs examine the very high number (200+) of amendments tabled that were tabled (von der Burchard et al., 2015)

¹⁰ An exception to this is France, where *Libération* has a greater circulation than Les Echos (Charon, 2004, p.75). Due to the unavailability of data, however, it was not selected.

Editorials and opinion pieces are excluded from this study, as they do not fit the criterion of a news reports but are instead written with the express aim of influencing opinion. Following this, tabloids have also been excluded, as their sensationalist style of reporting is often heavily opinionated.

Articles from all publications are retrieved by entering the term "TTIP" into the search functions of the newspapers' website. The results are then sorted by date, and articles from the two "critical discourse moments" are chosen. There is no limit placed on the number of articles chosen per publication, provided they fit the selection criteria. As a result, there may be more articles from some newspapers than from others. The articles are then coded for frames and counter frames¹¹. Each frame is recorded only once, regardless of how often it appears in the text. The success of framing activities is measured by the number of articles that exclusively contain anti-TTIP frames. If half of the examined articles meet this criterion, framing activities are deemed to have been successful.

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¹¹ German articles are first translated using an online translation function. Once these are coded by the researcher, they are double checked by a German-speaker to ensure accuracy.

Chapter Six: Analysis of Results

Chapter Five described the precise sources used as empirical evidence for this research project. This chapter examines these sources and presents the results. It is structured in two parts. The first part analyses the dependent variable, which is the same in all three countries. Examining the strength of the Stop TTIP Campaign in France, Germany and the UK together gives us the opportunity to place the three countries in the wider EU context. The second part analyses the independent variables on a country-by-country basis, as is the norm in case study designs.

6.1 Dependent Variable: Strength of the Campaign

The *size of mobilisation* is the measure used in this thesis to determine the strength of the Stop TTIP campaign. This is determined by the number of people who signed the Stop TTIP petition, and by the frequency and size of street demonstrations.

Petition Signatures

Although the Stop TTIP petition was deemed invalid by the European Commission before the collection of signatures had even begun, the organisers proceeded to carry it out within the exact rules of the EU's official petition mechanism; the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) (Stop-TTP, n.d.b.). This means that signatures were collected strictly within one year, and signatories had to provide the same information as those who sign an official ECI. The emulation of official ECI rules means that we can compare the number of signatures from the Stop TTIP petition with successful ECI petitions. In total, the Stop TTIP petition gathered 3,284,289 signatures, making it the largest petition that has addressed the EU since 2009, when the ECI came into effect. Only three ECI petitions have successfully reached the one million signatures required, and none of these reached over two million¹² (European Commission, n.d.d.).

A detailed breakdown of signatures for the Stop TTIP petition is displayed in Table 4, where the total number of signatures per country is checked for population. The average percentage of petition signing per total population among all 28 EU Member states was 0.49%. The results show that France, Germany

¹² The three successful ECIs to date are: "Stop Vivisection" (1,173,130 signatures), "One of Us" (1,728,626 signatures), and Right2Water (1,659,543 signatures), which all registered in 2012 (European Commission, n.d.d.).

and the UK all had above average rates of signatures, but to vastly varying degrees. Germany had the second highest rate of signatures in the whole EU (1.92%), and was only narrowly outflanked by Luxembourg (1.95%). The UK had the fourth highest rate of signatures (0.77%) while France had the eighth highest rate (0.54%). Over half of the total signatures collected were from Germany, where the rate of petition signing was almost four times the EU average. For the UK, the rate of petition signing was approximately one and a half times the EU average, whereas the petition signing rate in France was just 5 percentage points above the EU average, and so was not all that remarkable.

Country	Population (2015)	Total signatures	Signatures in % of total population
Austria	8,584,926	142,971	1.67%
Belgium	11,258,434	64,614	0.57%
Bulgaria	7,202,198	34,088	0.47%
Croatia	4,225,316	10,373	0.25%
Cyprus	847,008	1,618	0.19%
Czech	10,538,275	20,132	0.19%
Denmark	5,659,715	21,066	0.37%
Estonia	1,313,271	2,901	0.22%
Finland	5,471,753	37,378	0.68%
France	66,991,000	360,227	0.54%
Germany	82,301,678	1,577,042	1.92%
Greece	10,812,467	44,788	0.41%
Hungary	9,849,000	20,821	0.21%
Ireland	4,625,885	17,055	0.37%
Italy	60,795,612	72,238	0.12%
Latvia	1,986,096	1,371	0.07%
Lithuania	2,921,262	3,133	0.11%
Luxembourg	562,958	10,967	1.95%
Malta	429,344	1,118	0.26%
Netherlands	17,100,475	110,144	0.64%
Poland	38,567,614	44,282	0.11%
Portugal	10,374,822	19,927	0.19%
Romania	19,861,408	25,130	0.13%
Slovakia	5,421,349	10,528	0.19%
Slovenia	2,062,874	11,705	0.57%
Spain	46,468,102	90,868	0.20%
Sweden	10,005,673	25,984	0.26%
UK	65,110,000	501,819	0.77%

Table 4: Signatures per country

Source: Stop-TTIP.org. *The ECI Results in Numbers*. https://stop-ttip.org/the-eci-result-in-numbers/

Street Demonstrations

The results of the protest event analysis conducted using national and international newspapers are provided in Table 5. They show that Germany was the scene of several major street demonstrations against TTIP: Over 365,000 people marched against the agreement over a series of four dates during the 2014-2016 period. Of these four dates, three attracted significant crowds. At least 150,000 people marched in Berlin in October 2015¹³, in what was the largest demonstration to take place against TTIP in one city. Almost a year later, in September 2016, a Germany-wide protest held across six cities attracted a turnout of 180,000. Between these two major demonstrations, in April 2016, protesters used the visit to Hanover of the then US President Barack Obama as another opportunity to march against TTIP, and attracted a 35,000-strong crowd.

The analysis of the French and UK scenes show a much different story. In France, only one event was recorded, drawing around 1,200 people. It should be noted that the main focus of this protest was actually the soon-to-be ratified CETA, a similar trade agreement between the EU and Canada. Reports describe CETA in the headlines, whereas TTIP is mentioned only in the body of the article. In the UK, demonstrations reportedly took place across four different cities on the one day in July 2014. The scale of these is thought to be minute however, given the lack of any estimates of crowd size by either police or organisers. This is supported by the fact that it was not covered by either of the two international newspaper sources. This contrasts to every demonstration that took place in both France and Germany, which were reported in international as well as national news reports.

¹³ While police estimates only will be counted in this thesis, organisers of the Berlin demonstration in October 2015 put the figure at 250,000.

Country	Dates of street protests	Number of protest dates	Cities in which demonstrations took place	Number of cities in which protests took place	Total number of protesters (police estimates)
France	15-Oct-16	1	Paris	1	1,200
Germany	18-Apr-15, 10-Oct-15, 23-Apr-16, 17 -Sept-16	4	Berlin, Hanover, Munich, Hamburg, Leipzig, Stuttgart, Cologne, Frankfurt	8	289,500
UK	12-Jul-14	1	London, Manchester, Edinburgh, Cambridge	4	n/a*

Table 5: Protest event analysis

Source: See Table A in the Appendix for a complete list of sources.

From the two indicators measured in this section, it appears that the Stop TTIP campaign was very strong in Germany. This is confirmed by several additional sources, including academic literature (Mayer, 2016), think-tank reports (Bauer, 2016), and additional media sources (Kanter, 2015; Deckstein et al., 2016), which describe the German campaign as the strongest in the whole of the EU. In the UK, the Stop TTIP campaign is deemed to have been medium. While the number of signatories of the Stop TTIP petition suggests a relatively strong campaign, this is not matched by the results of the protest event analysis. Indeed, it appears that only one small-scale street demonstration took place in the UK during the 2014-2016 period. For France, it appears that the national Stop TTIP campaign was weak. Its rate of petition signing was only marginally above the EU average, and like the UK, it witnessed only one small street demonstration.

Country	Strength of Stop TTIP campaign
France	Weak
Germany	Very strong
UK	Medium

Table 6: Dependent variable per country

6.2 Independent Variables

The three independent variables studied in this thesis are (1) resources (2) elite allies and (3) framing processes.

6.2.1 France

6.2.1.1 Resources

Organisational Resources

In France, 24 civil society organisations were officially affiliated with The European Initiative Against TTIP and CETA, the pan-EU alliance against the agreement (Stop-TTIP, n.d.c.). The results of the media analysis suggest that only three of these were prominent in the French Stop TTIP campaign (see Table B.1 in the Appendix). These were *AITEC*, *Attac*, and *Stop TAFTA*. The activity levels of these three organisations appear to have been low. Two of them, *Attac France* and *Stop TAFTA*, are listed as the organisers of a protest that took place in Paris in September 2016. However, the small-scale of this protest (1,200 demonstrators) and the fact that it was the only demonstration of significance to take place in the country during the entire 2014-2016 period, suggests that their organisational contribution to the Stop TTIP campaign was minimal. Most news sources which mention the three organisations are in the form of opinion pieces co-written by their members, thus disseminating the organisations' views on the matter but not directly contributing to mobilisation efforts. None of the reports describe the leadership of the organisations. Further desk research revealed that the one and only staff member working for the *Stop TAFTA* organisation was co-financed by *Attac* and *AITEC*, which suggests close collaboration between all three organisations. Among the actions carried out by these organisations were the distribution of 300,000 door hangers which read "TTIP or the Climate- we can't have them both" during the COP 21

Climate Agreement in Paris in 2015, and a campaign to pressure members of the French Socialist Party to reveal their positions on TTIP (Aitec, 2016).

Table 7 provides a summary of the French organisational landscape. Overall, it appears that the French Stop TTIP campaign lacked any major organisational resource, with only minimal staffing and budgetary resources.

Names of prominent organisations	Mission/type of organisation	Involved in mobilisation efforts?	Mention of strong leadership?	Funding for TTIP?	Number of staff
AITEC	Movement of international solidarity promoting economic, social and environmental justice in public policy.	X	X	n/a. Overall budget of €300,00 for 2015 and managed to clear its debt of approx. €42,000 due increased donations for its Stop TAFTA campaign	
Attac France	Association that promotes 'another globalisation' by radically contesting the power of finance markets.	✓	X	n/a	n/a
Stop TAFTA	National branch of the pan-EU 'European Initiative Against TTIP and CETA'.	1	Х	Raised €23,911 in donations for its Stop TAFTA campaign.	1 (salary co- financed by AITEC and Attac)

Table 7: Prominent French organisations

Sources: See Table B.3 in the Appendix for a complete list of sources. See Tables B.1 and B.2 in the Appendix for detailed results of the media analysis.

Moral Resources

Analysis of the four Standard Eurobarometer surveys shows that a greater percentage of French respondents were supportive of TTIP than were opposed (Table 8). Support for the agreement, which was expressed by 50% of respondents, remained relatively constant over the 18 months between Autumn 2014 and Spring 2016. Opposition to the agreement accounted for a third of all respondents. This opposition steadily grew over the course of the four surveys, but on a small scale, with a jump of only 5%

in the opposition rate between Autumn 2014 (32%) and Spring 2016 (37%). French public opinion roughly mirrored that of overall public opinion among the 28 EU Member States, with only slightly less support and slightly more opposition to the EU average.

Overall, public opinion towards TTIP in France may be described as favourable to the agreement, with more people supportive of the agreement than against it. This suggests that the French Stop TTIP campaign lacked the moral resource of public opinion.

	% of respondents <i>for</i> TTIP		% of respondents <i>against</i> TTIP	
	FRANCE EU 28		FRANCE	EU 28
Autumn 2014	50%	58%	32%	25%
Spring 2015	53%	56%	33%	28%
Autumn 2015	50%	53%	34%	32%
Spring 2016	50%	51%	37%	34%

Table 8: Eurobarometer (France)

6.2.1.2. Elite Allies

France has a bicameral parliament, comprising of the Senate (Le Sénat) and the National Assembly (L'Assemblée Nationale). Although mixed-agreements such as TTIP must be debated in both houses, the National Assembly has the final say on its approval (European Parliament, 2016, p.5). The composition of this chamber is therefore of most relevance. The French political landscape has long been dominated by two main parties; the left-wing Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste) and the right-wing Republican Party (Les Républicains, known as l'UMP before 2015). During the 2014-2016 period in question, the Socialist Party had a sizeable majority in the National Assembly. Furthermore, the then French president, François Hollande, also hailed from this party, and so the French cabinet consisted primarily of Socialist Party members. Thus, the position of the French government is intertwined with the position of the Socialist Party and should be examined accordingly. The national political experts involved in the EUvox project place the Socialist Party firmly on the economic left (see the 'PS' logo in Figure 2), so we might expect it to oppose TTIP. When triangulated with news reports and publications written by Party members (which are detailed in the following section), this is only partly confirmed. Rather than being outrightly opposed to TTIP from the beginning, the position of the party appears to have been more nuanced, with its ultimately very strong stance against TTIP only gradually emerging after initial inconsistency and hesitancy in forming an official line. This nuance warrants further elaboration, and so a more complete picture of the Socialist Party's position on TTIP is provided below. Because political positions are subject to change, and because this thesis looks at a two year period, it is useful to add a temporal element to this analysis of elite allies. The position of the French Socialist Party is therefore detailed chronologically.




Figure 2: French political parties

Source: EUvox 2014.

Main party in government

The French Socialist Party showed reservations to TTIP before the negotiations had even started. In 2013, the government's Socialist minister for trade, Nicole Bricq, threatened to veto the Commission's mandate to begin negotiations unless a "cultural exception" was adopted (Xavier-Bender, 2015). Such an exception would exclude the audio-visual industry from any final agreement, and France only approved the Commission's mandate once this demand was met ("L'exception culturelle", 2013). Furthermore, the French government called for the negotiating mandate to be published from the beginning, showing

concern about the lack of transparency in the TTIP negotiation process (Fabry, 2015). Despite this seemingly strong-minded start, the Socialist Party and French Government proceeded to adopt a cautious and even evasive approach to the issue throughout 2014, failing to actively engage in a public debate on agreement. This discretion showed that the Party was "not too comfortable with the whole affair" (ibid.), and this discomfort may have stemmed from the fact that it had a fractured, inconsistent position on TTIP until 2015. On the one hand, President Hollande's apparent endorsement of the agreement during a state visit to the US in February 2014 would suggest French support for TTIP. This endorsement was in the form of an op-ed, co-written with Barack Obama, which hailed TTIP as "a major opportunity to build on millions of jobs on both sides of the Atlantic" and which appeared jointly in the Washington Post and Le Monde (Obama & Hollande, 2014). On the other hand, the Socialist Party candidates for the 2014 European Parliament elections wrote a joint opinion piece for Le Monde just two months later, insisting that they were prudent of the risks involved with the trade agreement and vowing to reject it if it crossed any one of their red lines, which included the lowering of EU food and environmental standards and the inclusion of an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism (Berès et al., 2014). In May, the Socialist Party passed a resolution in the Assemblée Nationale calling for more transparency in the negotiations ("Traité transatlantique: l'Assemblée", 2014) and the ISDS witnessed cross-partisan opposition in November, when another resolution opposed "any form of dispute settlement mechanism" and called on the European Commission to revise the relevant chapters of the agreement accordingly (Assemblée Nationale, 2014; Fabry, 2015, p.12). The inconsistency of Hollande's support versus the Socialist candidates' and Assemblée Nationale's reservations is reflected in the total lack of any official statement by either the Socialist Party or the French Government outlining a common position on TTIP in 2014, as well as the comments by the French minister for foreign affairs who said he was "not a priori for or against" the agreement (Fabry, 2015, p.10, "Traité transatlantique: Laurent", 2014).

2015 proved to be a more concrete year regarding the Party's position. In January, the Socialist trade minister vowed that France would "never accept" the agreement if it contained the ISDS (Barbière, 2015), and in June the Socialist Party finally adopted its official stance, which was in the form of unanimous opposition to TTIP (Robert, 2015). In July 2015, all 12 Socialist Party MEPs rebelled against the position of their parliamentary group, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S+D), and voted against the European Parliament's resolution that endorsed the continuance of negotiations by the Commission (Vote Watch, n.d.). Nonetheless, it was not until May 2016 that this unified opposition was more clearly pronounced and properly vocalised, when the Socialist trade minister, Matthias Fekl, told French radio

that TTIP was "a bad deal" and "unacceptable", and when Hollande echoed this by saying that he would reject TTIP "at this stage" (Rankin, 2016). This position was officially stated in a press release on the Socialist Party website, which stated that the President's new stance had the unanimous backing of the Party (Parti-Socialiste, 2016a). Similarly, in August 2016, a press release also confirmed the Socialist Party's official opposition after Hollande once more rejected the agreement, saying he would withhold his support from any agreement reached before the end of Obama's presidency in January 2017, and effectively calling for a halt to the negotiations (Farrell, 2016; Parti-Socialiste, 2016b; Zalan, 2016). To conclude, the governing French Socialist Party, the most important potential ally to the Stop TTIP campaign, held deep seated reservations and scepticism about TTIP from early on, but this was shrouded in hesitation, inconsistency and a kind of "timidness" about publicly declaring its position on the matter (Xavier-Bender, 2015). Nevertheless, this culminated in the categorical rejection of TTIP in 2016.

Other parties

The main opposition party, Les Républicains (formerly *l'UMP*), is described as having been a "discreet defender" of TTIP, despite its opposition to the ISDS (Fabry, 2015). This is in line with EUvox's positioning of the party on the economic-right (see the UMP logo in Figure 2). All of its MEPs voted in favour of the European Parliament's resolution in 2015 (Vote Watch, n.d.), and it condemned Hollande for withholding support for the negotiations in September 2016 (Républicains, 2016). In a press release, it called for the renewal of negotiations but "on a new basis" (ibid.). *Les Républicains* was the only French political party in the Assemblée Nationale that was somewhat in favour of the agreement, with every other party voting against the European Parliament resolution (Vote Watch, n.d.). These include the French Green Party (EELV), the Left Party (FdeG) and far-right National Front (FN).

6.2.1.3 Framing

Two critical discourse moments are examined in this thesis; the European Parliament's 2015 vote and the 2016 leaking of TTIP negotiation documents by Greenpeace ("TTIPleaks"). The two moments are analysed separately below.

Vote in the European Parliament, 2015

Anti-TTIP frames were only present in three out of the seven articles, and in a total of only two newspapers (Table 9). Thus, the majority of articles did not contain any anti-TTIP frames. The total number of identified

anti-TTIP frames was seven. Counter frames were present in two of the seven articles. In the only article to contain both anti-TTIP frames and counter frames (*La Tribune*, 09/07/15), there were twice as many counter frames as anti-TTIP frames. Although there were more anti-TTIP frames than counter frames present overall, their absence from the majority of articles suggests that the Stop TTIP campaign's framing activities were not successful in this instance.

Source (newspaper, date)	Frames Present	Number of frames present	Counter frames present	Number of counter frames present
Les Echos 10/06/15		0		0
Les Echos 09/07/15		0		0
Le Figaro 18/07/15		0	6, 3	2
Le Monde 10/06/15	1.1, 2, 2.1.4	3		0
Le Monde 08/07/15	1.1, 1.4, 2	3		0
La Tribune 11/06/15		0		0
La Tribune 09/07/15	1.1	1	1, 4	2
		TOTAL: 7		TOTAL: 4

Table 9: Framing of the European Parliament's vote on TTIP (France). 14

Source: See Table B.4 in the Appendix for a full list of sources.

TTIPleaks, 2016

Anti-TTIP frames were present in seven out of nine articles, thus appearing in the majority (Table 10). The total number of identified anti-TTIP frames was 20. Counter frames were present in six of the nine articles, but totalled only 10 overall; half that of anti-TTIP frames. Although the majority of articles contained anti-TTIP frames, only two out of the seven articles exclusively contained anti-TTIP frames. Thus, it is concluded

 $^{^{14}}$ See Table 1 and Table 2 in Section 5.1.4 for a full list of frames and their corresponding codes.

that the Stop TTIP campaign's framing activities were not successful in this instance. It must be noted, however, that this outcome is not definitive, and that the results produced here (and also for the same variable regarding Germany and the UK) is a reflection of the chosen sources. While this choice followed a certain logic (see Section 5.1.4), it is probable that choosing different news sources would have resulted in different results. The best this analysis can do is give a rough glimpse of the media framing on TTIP, but it is acknowledged that the validity of such results are far from rock solid.

Source (newspaper, date)	Frames Present	Total number of frames present	Counter frames present	Total number of counter frames present
Les Echos 02/05/16	1.1, 1.7, 2, 2.1.3, 2.3.2	5	2, 3, 5	3
Le Figaro 03/05/16 (A)	1.4, 2	2	3	1
Le Figaro 03/05/16 (B)	1.1, 2, 2.1.3	3	5	1
Le Monde 01/05/16 (A)	2, 2.13	2		0
Le Monde 01/05/16 (B)	1.1, 1.4, 1.7, 2, 2.1.3	5	3	1
Le Monde 03/05/16	1.4	1	1	1
La Tribune 02/05/16 (A)	1.1, 1.7, 2, 2.1.3	4		0
La Tribune 02/05/16 (B)		0	2, 3, 5	3
La Tribune 02/05/16 (C)		0		0
		TOTAL: 20		TOTAL: 10

Table 10: Framing of TTIPleaks (France)

Source: See Table B.5 in the Appendix for a full list of sources.

6.2.2 Germany

6.2.2.1 Resources

Organisational Resources

In Germany, 117 civil society organisations were officially affiliated with The European Initiative Against TTIP and CETA, more than any other country by far (Stop-TTIP, n.d.c.). Of these, the media analysis showed 13 to be notably active. Within this number, the level of prominence varies. Eight organisations are explicitly identified as co-organisers of street demonstrations, while others are simply described as raising concerns about the agreement. Based on a *Politico* report, and confirmed by other sources (e.g. Deckstein et al., 2016), it appears that five civil society organisations played a major role in the German Stop TTIP campaign. These are *Campact, Attac, Mehr Demokratie, Foodwatch Germany* and *BUND* (von der Burchard, 2016a).

Mehr Demokratie was one of the main organisers of the pan-EU Stop-TTIP petition, and so was heavily involved in The European Initiative Against TTIP and CETA which orchestrated the signature-gathering at the EU level, and which was headquartered in Berlin.

Campact, a citizen movement that "promotes progressive politics" (Campact, n.d.), showed particular professionalism in its actions. These included effective social media drives and the use of online maps to efficiently distribute 6.5 million leaflets in towns and cities with information about the position of political parties towards TTIP (Kanter, 2015). For Felix Kolb, one of its executive directors, Campact's use of digital technologies allowed the organisation to "sidestep the mainstream media [yet still] organise tens of thousands of people" (Kanter, 2015). In 2015, it spent over half its total campaign expenditure on its Stop TTIP initiative, which totalled approximately €1,499,000 (Campact, 2016, p.42). Compact's annual revenue jumped to a record €7 million in 2015, in contrast to the total of €2 million generated in 2011 and 2012 (ibid. p.41), and it is believed this jump may be a result of public donations for its anti-TTIP efforts (Von der Burchard, 2016a). This increase in funding allowed the organisation to increase its staff from 22 to 52 over the same period (ibid.). BUND, the German branch of Friends of the Earth, similarly witnessed a sharp rise in its revenue in 2014-2015, coinciding with the launch of its anti-TTIP efforts: It saw its donations increase by 36% compared to the increase of just 2%-6% over the preceding years (ibid.).

Foodwatch, a consumer advocacy organisation which promotes high standards in food production, is an example of the importance of strong and effective leadership in a civil society organisation. Its director,

Thilo Bode, is credited with playing an important role in the Stop TTIP campaign in Germany. His background in consulting and strategic management, as well as his experience as director of Greenpeace Germany and Greenpeace International are apparent in the professionalism of *Foodwatch*'s anti-TTIP actions. In 2015, he released a book entitled "The Free Trade Lie" (*Die Freihanelsüge*) which was a bestseller, selling over 70,000 copies in under two years. Bode's adeptness at fuelling the German anti-TTIP sentiment was acknowledged by his opponents: Friedrich Merz, a senior politician from the CDU (the (co-)ruling centre right party), said that Bode's image as a cautious and careful regulatory watchdog "succeeded [...] in giving the protest movement a veneer of seriousness" (von der Burchard, 2016b). His success was reflected in *Foodwatch*'s increased revenues, which allowed it to increase its staff by 62% during the period of the Stop TTIP campaign (von der Burchard, 2016a).

A summary of the German organisational landscape is provided in Table 11. In sum, the analysis would suggest a strong presence and high levels of activity on the part of civil society organisations in the German Stop TTIP campaign, aided by high revenues and staffing levels. The fact that the European Initiative Against TTIP and CETA was itself headquartered in Berlin is also significant.

Names of prominent organisations	Mission/type of organisation	Involved in mobilisation efforts?	Mention of strong leadership?	Funding for TTIP?	Number of staff
Attac Germany	Movement of international solidarity promoting economic, social and environmental justice in public policy.	✓	X	n/a. Overall expenditure on all projects for 2015: €223,301.	17
Brot für die Welt	Christian charity that promotes food security, education, democracy and human rights in impoverished countries, mostly in the Global South	X	X	n/a. Overall budget of €208 million for all projects in 2015. Most of it spent on development project, not activism. TTIP not a priority campaign	539
BUND	NGO promoting environmentalism and sustainability	✓	X	n/a. Overall expenditure on campaigns and lobbying in 2015: 7.9 million. TTIP was one of their priority campaigns.	n/a
Bundesverband Naturkost Naturwaren	Association that represents the interests of producers of organic food.	✓	X	n/a	n/a
Campact e.V.	Organises campaigns to promote social justice, ecological sustainability and peaceful society.	✓	X	Approx. 1.5 million	52

Deutscher Kulturrat	Leading association of the Federal Cultural associations, advocating for the freedom of art, publication and information.	√	x	n/a. Total expenditure on all projects in 2014: €430,662	6
Deutscher Naturschutzring	Lobbying for environmental policy coordination.	X	X	n/a	13
Foodwatch Germany	Campaigning organisation for safe, healthy and affordable food.	✓	1	n/a. Total expenditure on all campaigns in 2015: €1.5 million	15
Mehr Demokratie	Advocates for direct democracy and public participation.	√	X	€137,185 (out of a total of €227,450 for all campaigns)	n/a.

Table 11: Prominent German organisations

Source of Table 11: See Table C.3 in the Appendix for a complete list of sources. See Tables C.1 and C.2 in the Appendix for detailed results of the media analysis.

Moral Resources

Analysis of the Eurobarometer shows that more German respondents were against TTIP than were supportive of it, and that this trend was consistent between Autumn 2014 and Spring 2016. Furthermore, the results show that opposition levels increased significantly (by 18%) and support levels decreased (by 13%) over the 18 months (Table 12). German public opinion towards TTIP contrasted to the EU 28 average: By Spring 2016, only 26% of German respondents were in favour of the agreement compared the EU average of 51%. At the same time, opposition rates in the country stood at 59%, compared to 34% among the EU 28.

Overall, it appears that the German Stop TTIP campaign had the moral resource of public opinion on its side, with the majority of German respondents against the agreement and therefore sympathetic to the aims and efforts of the anti-TTIP movement.

	% of respondents for TTIP		% respondents <i>against</i> TTIP	
	GERMANY	EU 28	GERMANY	EU 28
Autumn 2014	39%	58%	41%	25%
Spring 2015	31%	56%	51%	28%
Autumn 2015	27%	53%	59%	32%
Spring 2016	26%			34%

Table 12: Eurobarometer (Germany)

6.2.2.2. Elite Allies

Germany has a bicameral parliament, consisting of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. All mixed-agreements must be ratified by the Bundestag, while the Bundesrat has the power to object but is not necessarily required to provide its consent (European Parliament, 2016, p.5). The composition of the Bundestag is therefore of most relevance in determining whether the German Stop TTIP campaign had elite allies. In Germany, it is rare for one political party to win an overall majority, and so coalition governments are the norm. During the 2014-2016 period in question, the country's two largest parties governed together in a "grand coalition". These were the Christian Democrats (*Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands* or *CDU*) and the Social Democrats (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, or *SPD*). The Christian Democrats were the senior coalition partners, with 311 seats, whereas the Social Democrats were the junior coalition partners, with 193 seats. The national political experts involved in the EUvox project place the Christian Democrats on the economic-right (see the CDU-CSU logo in Figure 3) and the Social Democrats on the economic-left (see the SPD logo in Figure 3), so we might expect the former to have been supportive of TTIP and the latter to have been against.

When triangulated with other sources, this estimation holds partly true. The German Stop TTIP campaign operated in a country whose government was divided on the issue, with one coalition partner (the CDU) strongly in favour of TTIP and the other (the SPD) expressing deep-seated reservations on the matter. The following section outlines the positions of both these parties, with particular attention given to the Social Democrats, whose reservation towards the agreement and position in government might have made them a potentially strong ally to the Stop TTIP campaign.




Figure 3: German political parties

Source: EUvox 2014

Parties in government

The CDU, led my Chancellor Angela Merkel, was a keen and outspoken supporter of TTIP, and therefore cannot be considered an elite ally. The party's clear support for the trade deal is evident in the dedicated webpage about TTIP that it set up as part of its main website¹⁵. The CDU maintained that every EU citizen would benefit directly from TTIP, rejected allegations of non-transparency and the potential lowering of EU standards, and defended the controversial arbitration mechanism as necessary and fair (CDU, n.d.). This position is echoed in Chancellor Merkel's 2014 comments, describing the agreement as "of

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¹⁵ The webpage is divided into three headings: "Mythen" (Myths), "Fakten" (Facts) and "Materialien" (Materials). It can be accessed at https://www.cdu.de/ttip/

incalculable value" whose "advantages greatly surpass the alleged disadvantages" ("After Brussels rejection", 2014). Such enthusiasm for TTIP remained stable for the duration of the 2014-2016 period (Tost, 2014; "Ahead of G7", 2015; "New Round of", 2016). Even when it was apparent to some that the TTIP negotiation process was at an impasse in the autumn of 2016, with the French and Austrian governments signalling that the agreement was in deadlock, the German Chancellor insisted that it was "right to keep negotiating" (Medick, 2016; "Merkel speaks out", 2016). Furthermore, all German Christian Democrat MEPs voted in favour of the European Parliament's 2015 resolution approving the continuance of negotiations (Vote Watch, n.d.).

A more nuanced picture emerges for the Social Democratic Party. Its chairperson at the time, Sigmar Gabriel, was also the German Vice Chancellor and Minister for Trade, thus making him a central figure in the German TTIP debate. Overall, the SPD's position on TTIP was not of complete opposition, but rather of sharp criticism of its some of its elements. The Party's agreement to the final draft was based on a set of conditions being met, including the exclusion of the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, as well as the inclusion of safeguards to protect EU health, social and environmental standards (SPD, 2014). It also called for greater transparency in negotiations and more consultation with civil society actors and national parliaments. In September 2014, Gabriel obtained the approval of his party to officially back TTIP, but only within the framework of these red lines (ibid.). Even then, the SPD lacked consensus on the matter: Despite obtaining approval from the party's majority, TTIP was opposed outright by the party's left wing and youth wing (the Young Socialists), who called for the negotiations to be suspended ("After Brussels rejection", 2014). Regarding the investor-state dispute mechanism, Gabriel's opposition soon bowed to external political pressure and he adopted a compromise position, acknowledging that a "complete abandonment of investment protection is [not] a real option" (Scholz, 2014). He proceeded to try and restructure the mechanism, proposing the establishment of a bilateral commercial court with independent, professional judges, rather than private arbitrators. Under this proposal, procedures would be open to the public and include the right to appeal the court's decisions (Pauly et al., 2015). The Social Democratic Party accepted this, as did the EU's Trade Commissioner, who agreed to adopt it. The European Parliament's resolution on the TTIP negotiations in July 2015, which included this new public arbitration mechanism as a condition for the Parliament's overall approval of any final deal, was voted for by most German Social Democratic MEPs, with only three out of the total 27 members rebelling against the party line and voting against it (Vote Watch, n.d.). Nonetheless, the SPD's position was one of only reluctant support, and this continued to wane: In mid-2016, Gabriel's endorsement of the trade

agreement appeared "far from convincing" (Kiesel, 2016). In autumn of that year, his announcement that the negotiations had "de facto failed, even though nobody is really admitting it" showed no signs of dismay ("Germany's Vice Chancellor", 2016; Gotev, 2016). His reasoning for the failure- that "we Europeans did not want to subject ourselves to American demands"- suggests a lack of any real support for the agreement all along (ibid). To conclude, the Social Democratic Party was reluctantly in favour of a heavily revised version of TTIP, and its overall position may be considered as fractured and prone to change.

Other parties

The two other parties that were represented in the Bundestag during the period in question, the Left Party (*die Linke*) and the Green Party (*Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*), were both fundamentally against TTIP and called for the cessation of negotiations from the beginning. Both opposition parties were actively engaged in the Stop TTIP campaign (Bauer, 2016; Stop-TTIP, n.d.c.) and all its respective members voted against the European Parliament's resolution in July 2015 (Vote Watch, n.d.). However, an in-depth study of these parties' anti-TTIP activities (which was not done here) might have been useful and would have perhaps produced a more well-rounded picture of the German political context regarding TTIP. The decision was taken to focus on parties in government (or the largest parties in opposition) given the need for a parliamentary majority to approve any final TTIP treaty. As the German "grand coalition" meant that the two most largest parties were in government, only scant attention was paid to the two smaller opposition parties. It is acknowledged that this oversight may have resulted in an incomplete account of German elite allies, thus negatively affecting the validity of conclusions drawn later.

6.2.2.3 Framing

Vote in the European Parliament, 2015

Anti-TTIP frames were present in half of the total articles (Table 13) and the total number of identified anti-TTIP frames was just four. Counter frames appeared in two of the six articles. Overall, there appeared twice as many anti-TTIP frames as counter frames. Nonetheless, the fact that only half the articles contained any anti-TTIP frames at all, and that only two articles exclusively contained anti-TTIP frames, means that the framing activities of the Stop TTIP campaign cannot be considered successful in this instance.

Source (newspaper, date)	Frames Present	Total number of frames present	Counter frames present	Total number of counter frames present
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 10/06/15		0		0
Süddeutsche Zeitung 09/06/15		0		0
Süddeutsche Zeitung 08/07/15	1	1		0
Die Welt 09/06/15	1.4, 2	2	1	1
Die Zeit 09/06/15		0	1	1
Die Zeit 08/07/15	1	1		0
		TOTAL: 4		TOTAL: 2

Table 13 Framing of the European Parliament's vote (Germany)

Source: See Table C.4 in the Appendix for a full list of sources.

TTIPleaks, 2016

Anti-TTIP frames were present in eight out of the 10 articles, thus appearing in the overwhelming majority (Table 14)¹⁶. The total number of identified anti-TTIP frames was 30. Counter frames, which appeared a total of 19 times overall, were present in six out of 10 articles. Only three out of the ten articles exclusively contained anti-TTIP frames, while one article contained only counter-frames. Thus, the majority of articles were relatively balanced. The framing activities of the Stop TTIP campaign cannot therefore be considered successful.

¹⁶ Three of these articles were replications of a piece by the German news agency, the DPA. While their content is thus almost identical, they are counted separately as three different publications took the decision to publish the DPA version without editing it.

Source (newspaper, date)	Frames Present	Total number of frames present	Counter frames present	Total number of counter frames present
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 02/05/16 (A)	1.4, 2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, 2.3,	5	1	1
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 02/05/16 (B)		0		0
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 03/05/16		0	2,4	2
Süddeutsche Zeitung 01/05/16	1.4, 2.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, 2.3.2	6		0
Süddeutsche Zeitung 02/05/16	1.4, 2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4	4	1, 2, 3, 4	4
Die Welt 01/05/16	1.4, 2.1, 2.13	3	-	0
Die Welt 02/05/16	1.4, 2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4	4	1, 2, 3, 4	4
Die Zeit 01/05/16	1.4, 2.1, 2.13	3		0
Die Zeit 02/05/16	1.4, 2, 2.1.3, 2.14	4	1, 2, 3, 4	4
Die Zeit 03/05/16	2.1.3	1	1, 2, 3, 4	4
		TOTAL: 30		TOTAL: 19

Table 14: Framing of TTIPleaks (Germany)

Source: See Table C.5 in the Appendix for a full list of sources.

6.2.3 The UK

6.2.3.1 Resources

Organisational Resources

In the UK, 33 civil society organisations were officially affiliated with The European Initiative Against TTIP and CETA (Stop-TTIP, n.d.c.). According to the media analysis, four of these were active in the campaign against TTIP. These were Artists Against TTIP, Friends of the Earth, Global Justice Now, and War on Want. Further desk research revealed the involvement of two other organisations that were not officially affiliated with The European Initiative Against TTIP and CETA but played an active role in the British Stop TTIP campaign nonetheless. These were 38 degrees, a civil society organisation, and Unison, the British public services union. An examination of financial reports, where available, show that 38 degrees allocated the most funding to its Stop TTIP campaign, spending over €860,000 during the 2014-2015 period (38 Degrees, 2015, p.12). This was spent on a series of leafleting events and public meetings, and on an advertisement campaign which it claims contributed to a significant rise in awareness about TTIP among the British public (ibid. p.3). All organisations focussed predominantly on awareness raising, producing videos and publications about TTIP and concentrated on the mobilisation of petition signatures rather than street demonstrations. The fact that the UK had the fourth highest rate of petition signing after Luxembourg, Germany and Austria is perhaps a testament to these efforts. Furthermore, War on Want was one of seven organisations to co-found The European Initiative Against TTIP and CETA (War on Want, 2016, p.15) and takes credit for having convinced the Labour Party MEPs to rebel against their European Socialist group and reject the European Parliament's 2015 resolution (ibid.).

A summary of the UK organisational landscape is provided in Table 15. In sum, it appears that the British Stop TTIP campaign had significant organisational resources available to it. The presence of four well-funded civil society organisations (38 degrees, Friends of the Earth, Global Justice Now and War on Want) suggests that a potentially potent organisational framework was indeed in place.

Names of prominent organisations	Mission/type of organisation	Involved in mobilisation efforts?	Mention of strong leadership?	Funding for TTIP?	Number of staff
Artists against TTIP	Group of artists aiming to raise awareness of TTIP amongst British public	X	Х	n/a	n/a
Friends of the Earth	NGO promoting environmentalism and sustainability	X	X	n/a. Overall expenditure on campaigns and lobbying in 2015: €6 million	n/a
Global Justice Now	Campaigns on global justice and development in the Global South	✓	X	€10,000 in funding restricted for TTIP campaigning. Unrestricted funding of over €300,000 may have also been spent on TTIP campaign.	32
War on Want	Anti-poverty charity focusing on the root causes of poverty, inequality and injustice through partnership with social movements and campaigns	✓	X	n/a. Overall expenditure on campaigns in 2015: €1,355,095	21
38 degrees	Civil society organisation that runs public campaigns on issues of social justice	✓	Х	€520,000 in 2015, €339,000 in 2014.	32
UNISON	British public service union	Х	Х	n/a	n/a

Table 15: Prominent British organisations

Source: See Table D.3 in the Appendix for a complete list of sources. See Tables D.1 and D.2 in the Appendix for detailed results of the media analysis.

Moral Resources

The Eurobarometer analysis shows that the majority of the British public were in favour of TTIP. Support fluctuated between 62% and 65% over the course of the 18 months, while opposition was between 19% and 23%. Compared to the EU average, the UK consistently showed a higher level of support for the agreement, with 64% in favour of it in Spring 2016 compared to the EU average of 51%. A breakdown of results is provided in Table 16. Overall, it is clear that the British Stop TTIP campaign lacked the moral resource of public opinion.

	% of respondents <i>for</i> TTIP		% respondents <i>against</i> TTIP		
	UK	EU 28	UK	EU 28	
Autumn 2014	65%	58%	19%	25%	
Spring 2015	63%	56%	20%	28%	
Autumn 2015	62%	53%	23%	32%	
Spring 2016	64%	51%	22%	34%	

Table 16: Eurobarometer (UK)

6.2.3.2. Elite Allies

The UK has a bicameral parliament, consisting of the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Although both Houses must ratify mixed agreements, the House of Lords only has the power to delay, rather than to reject them (European Parliament, 2016, p.11). Following this, the composition of the House of Commons is of most importance in identifying potential elite allies for the British Stop TTIP campaign. The UK's political landscape has long been dominated by two main parties; the Conservative Party and the Labour Party. During the 2014-2016 period under study, the UK had two different governments, owing to a general election in mid-2015. The pre-election government was a coalition between the Conservative Party and a smaller centrist party, the Liberal Democrats, whereas the post-election government consisted solely of the Conservative Party after it won an outright majority. During both governments, the Labour party was by far the largest opposition party. The national experts involved in the EUvox project place the Conservative Party on the economic-right, and the Labour Party on the economic-left (Figure 4). Following this, it might be expected that the governing Conservatives were in favour of TTIP, and therefore not an ally to the Stop TTIP campaign, while the Labour Party was opposed to the agreement. When triangulated with other sources, this appears to hold true for the Conservative Party, while the Labour Party's position was not so straightforward.




Figure 4: British political parties

Source: EUvox, 2014

Government parties

The Conservative Party was overwhelmingly in favour of TTIP from the beginning, with reports that its leader, the British Prime Minister David Cameron, "spearheaded" the TTIP project at the EU level and was one of the EU's "keenest" leaders on the matter (Armitage, 2014; Conservatives, 2015, p.73; Deardon, 2016; Grice, 2015). The Party's 2015 election manifesto stated that the party would "push for freer global trade and conclude the EU trade deal with the USA" (Conservatives, 2015, p.76), and the vast majority of its MEPs voted in favour of the European Parliament's July 2015 resolution, with only one abstention (Vote Watch, n.d.). Prime Minister Cameron's enthusiasm for TTIP is evident in his comment that he wished to "fire rocket-boosters" under the trade deal to speed up negotiations (Armitage, 2014), and in his frequent dismissal of opponents' concerns as "nonsense" (Grice, 2014; Grice & Leftly, 2014; Wintour, 2014). When

many political figures in Europe signalled that the negotiations had broken down in autumn 2016, Cameron rejected this and called for "political courage to get it over the line" (Mason, 2016). Despite such unwavering support from the party's leader, and from most of its members in the House of Commons, there was some vocal criticism of the agreement within the Conservatives. Twenty-five of the party's backbenchers supported an amendment put forward by the opposition's Labour party in May 2016, insisting that the National Health Service be explicitly excluded from TTIP¹⁷. Their support meant the amendment passed, in what was described as an embarrassment for the Prime Minister and his cabinet (Asthana & Stewart, 2016; Wright, 2016). Such a rebellion shows that while the Conservative Party cannot be considered an elite ally to the Stop TTIP campaign, its position on the matter was not totally cohesive. Its junior coalition partners until mid-2015, the Liberal Democrats, also expressed its support for TTIP in its election manifesto. Nonetheless, this support was conditional on "EU standards of consumer, employee and environmental protection" being maintained, and the exclusion of the National Health Service from its provisions (Liberal Democrats, 2015, p.149). Its only MEP voted in favour of the European Parliament's resolution on TTIP in July 2015 (Vote Watch, n.d.).

Opposition parties

The position of the largest opposition party, Labour, may be described as cautiously and conditionally supportive of TTIP. The party's 2015 manifesto expressed support for "the principles behind the negotiations" but only on the condition that the National Health Service be protected from the treaty, and vowed to "hold the European Commission to account on issues of concern, including the impact on public services and the Investor to State Dispute Settlement Mechanism" (Labour, 2015, p.45; Morris, 2014). The Labour Party demonstrated its commitment to this position when it introduced a bill to exempt the National Health Service from TTIP to the House of Commons in November 2014 ("MPs back bill", 2014). Furthermore, seventeen out of its twenty MEPs rebelled against the position of their parliamentary group, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S+D), and voted against the European Parliament's 2015 resolution on TTIP (Vote Watch, n.d.). In autumn 2016, when French President François

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¹⁷ The amendment was to the Queen's Speech, a speech given by the UK's monarch detailing the list of laws that the government hopes to get approved by Parliament over the coming year. The content of the speech is then accepted by a vote in the House of Commons (BBC, 2016). In this case, the Labour Party submitted an amendment to the list, stating that the government's aim of concluding TTIP should be on the condition that the NHS be excluded from any final treaty (Wright, 2016).

Hollande signalled that France would reject the deal as it stood, the Labour Party pledged that it too would reject TTIP and veto if it if they were in government (Labour, 2016).

6.2.3.3 Framing

For the UK, only two articles were found for both critical discourse moments. These are briefly commented on below, but the lack of sufficient data means that the British case cannot be analysed to the same extent as the other countries in this study. The near total absence of news reports about the two events is an interesting observation in itself, and this will be explored further in the discussion of results.

Vote in the European Parliament, 2015

Both anti-TTIP frames and counter frames were present in the two articles found (Table 17). In both articles, there were more anti-TTIP frames than there were counter frames. Perhaps interestingly, the right-wing *Daily Telegraph* newspaper contained three times the number of anti-TTIP frames that the centre-left *Independent* contained. Nevertheless, neither article exclusively contained anti-TTIP frames.

Source (newspaper, date)	Frames Present	Total number of frames present	Counter frames present	Total number of counter frames present
The Independent 10/06/15	1.1, 2	2	1	1
The Telegraph 11/06/15	1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.3	6	1	1
		TOTAL: 8		TOTAL: 2

Table 17: Framing of the European Parliament's vote on TTIP (UK)

Source: See Table D.4 in the Appendix for a full list of sources.

TTIPleaks, 2016

Anti-TTIP frames were present in both articles found for this event (see Table 18). One counter frame appeared in one article, meaning that the other contained exclusively anti-TTIP frames (*The Guardian*, 01/05/16). Both articles had a significant number of anti-TTIP frames, with the total of 12 heavily outweighing the single counter frame.

Source (newspaper, date)	Frames Present	Total number of frames present	Counter frames present	Total number of counter frames present
The Guardian	1.1, 1.3, 2.1.2,	6		0
01/05/16	2.1.3, 2.1.4, 2.3.2			
The Independent	1.1, 1.3, 1.4,	6	1	1
02/05/15	2.1, 2.1.3, 2.3.2		_	_
		TOTAL: 12		TOTAL: 1

Table 18 Framing of TTIPleaks (UK)

Source: See Table D.5 in the Appendix for a full list of sources.

Chapter Seven: Reflection and Conclusion

The previous chapter presented the results of the empirical observations gathered for this research project. This chapter reflects on the findings, assessing the explanatory leverage of the three theories that have shaped this study. Some critical reflections on the research project are then presented, along with suggestions for further research.

7.1 Assessing theories

Three theories of social movements were chosen to guide this research. These were the resource mobilisation theory, the political opportunity structure, and the theory of framing. A multiple case study was conducted, examining the national Stop TTIP campaign in France, Germany and the UK. The empirical information gathered in the previous chapters is now tested against the three hypotheses that were formulated in the theoretical framework to answer the research question:

RQ: What explains the relative strength of the Stop TTIP campaign?

The explanatory leverage of a theory is deemed strong when its correlating hypothesis is congruent with empirical evidence. The dependent variable- the strength of the Stop TTIP campaign- was the same for all hypotheses, and was operationalised as the size of national mobilisations against TTIP. This mobilisation was measured by rates of petition signing and street demonstrations. The three theories are analysed separately below.

7.1.1 Resource Mobilisation Theory

For the resource mobilisation theory, it was hypothesised that the relative strength of the Stop TTIP campaign can be explained by the availability of organisational and moral resources in a given country. Organisational resources were operationalised as the presence and activity levels of civil society organisations regarding anti-TTIP efforts, while moral resources were measured in terms of public opinion towards the agreement. The results of desk research show that the anti-TTIP movement in Germany, the country with the highest level of mobilisation among the three cases (and indeed among all EU Member

States), had both organisational and moral resources available to it. Several prominent, well-funded civil society organisations orchestrated mobilisation efforts with a level of professionalism unmatched in France or the UK. Furthermore, German public opinion was against TTIP from the beginning, and this opposition remained consistent for the duration of the two years under study, thus increasing the legitimacy of the movement. Although the UK did not witness any street demonstrations, the rate of signatures for the Stop TTIP petition was the fourth highest in the EU, and well above the EU average. The role of organisations in this type of mobilisation seems to have been important, with several well-funded organisations running awareness campaigns and collecting signatures. Nonetheless, the British anti-TTIP movement lacked the backing of public opinion, which was strongly in favour of the free trade agreement. The French anti-TTIP movement seems to have lacked both organisational and moral resources: The civil society organisations that were identified did not appear influential, and French public opinion was largely in favour of the agreement. The absence of both resources is reflected in the fact that France saw the lowest level of mobilisation among the three countries.

The findings suggest a correlation between the availability of resources and the strength of a national Stop TTIP campaign. Crucially, it appears that a combination of both organisational and moral resources was necessary for the anti-TTIP movement to achieve high levels of national mobilisation: Although civil society organisations ran well-funded anti-TTIP campaigns in both Germany and the UK, it was only the former, where public opinion was in favour of the movement's goals, that witnessed a strong Stop TTIP campaign. The explanatory strength of the resource mobilisation theory is therefore deemed to be high.

7.1.2 Political Opportunity Structure

Following the political opportunity structure, it was hypothesised that the relative strength of the Stop TTIP campaign can be explained by the presence of elite allies in the form of political parties in national parliaments. The presence of elite allies was operationalised as a political party that was sympathetic to the aims of the Stop TTIP campaign. It was found that the preferences of the main political parties regarding TTIP in each country could not be categorised as simply "for or against", however, and while the centre-right parties in all countries were in favour of the agreement (although to varying degrees), the position of the main socialist parties was less clear-cut. It seems these parties all agreed on the principle of a free trade agreement but had strong, often uncompromising reservations about the specific details such an agreement would entail. None of the socialist parties were in favour of the controversial investor-

state dispute settlement mechanism, and this opposition was expressed by either attempting to make the mechanism more transparent and democratic (the German SPD) or by rejecting it all together (the French and British socialist parties). While such opposition suggests sympathy with the aims of the Stop TTIP campaign, the hesitation of these parties in expressing outright opposition to the agreement made them less than perfect "elite allies".

France and Germany, which both had sympathetic socialist parties in government, had very different levels of mobilisation, and so it is difficult to see any clear pattern regarding the presence of (supposed) elite allies in government. One pattern does emerge, however: Germany, which saw the highest levels of mobilisation, was also the only country in which all opposition parties were (1) left-leaning and (2) loudly and unequivocally against TTIP from the very beginning. Although opposition parties have a lesser weighting than government parties, especially considering that Germany's "grand coalition" meant the government had an extremely large majority, this may have been significant in pushing government parties to publicly address the issue, thus raising public awareness of TTIP and perhaps contributing to mobilisation efforts. Given their general preference for strong state regulation, left wing parties are often against exposing their country to greater international trade, especially when such trade tends to be "free", or what left-wing parties might consider "unregulated". It follows that the attitude of such parties towards trade agreements is often one of suspicion and aversion, something that is confirmed by empirical studies (e.g. Milner & Judkins, 2004). The results of this thesis suggest that the "degree of leftness" is important: Social Democratic parties are closer to the political centre than other more leftleaning parties, and this appears to result in a more nuanced approach to trade agreements in contrast to the unequivocal rejection of TTIP by the more left-wing parties. In sum, it seems that the political opportunity structure may have some leverage in explaining the strength of the Stop TTIP campaign, but in a more complex way than was originally hypothesised. It could be that the greater the presence of vocal left-wing parties in parliament (that is parties that are more to the left of social democratic parties), the greater the political coverage of TTIP in a country more generally, and indeed the greater the attention government parties are forced to give the issue. Such attention is presumably beneficial to social movements, who often struggle to get their cause onto the political agenda, and thus into the public sphere. Further research is needed on this point.

7.1.3 Framing

The third hypothesis was based on the theory of framing and stated that the relative strength of the Stop TTIP campaign can be explained by the success of framing activities. Framing activities were operationalised as the frequency of anti-TTIP frames appearing in newspaper articles about TTIP. The analysis suggests that framing activities were unsuccessful in France and Germany, with inconclusive results for the UK due to a lack of sufficient data. Based on the analysis, it should be concluded that the theory of framing cannot be regarded as an explanatory tool in answering the research question. However, this conclusion is a cautious one. Plagued by data constraints, the methodology employed in measuring this variable may be questionable, something that is explored further in the coming section on limitations of the research. Nevertheless, if we were to ignore the methodological pitfalls and take these results as sound, it would appear that no clear framing of TTIP (either for or against) took place. This is an interesting conclusion in itself, and begs the question of why this might be the case. Perhaps such seemingly balanced reporting was simply a result of the agreement's technical complexity and the unavailability of information regarding the negotiations stages, but further research might look at whether a more deliberate reason can be given for this.

7.1.4 Conclusion

To conclude, the results of the empirical investigation conducted for this thesis suggest that the resource mobilisation theory is a useful explanatory tool in understanding the differing strength of the Stop TTIP campaign in France, Germany and the UK. It is probable that the political opportunity structure can also contribute to our understanding of this phenomenon, although in a more complex way than initially hypothesised. In this way, the resource mobilisation theory and the political opportunity structure may be considered as complimentary to one another, with both providing insightful answers to the research question. The theory of framing, as it was operationalised in this thesis, appears ill-equipped to contribute to our understanding of the strength of the Stop TTIP campaign.

7.2 Limitations and research constraints

The testing of all three theories used in this research project encountered limitations. In the examination of civil society organisations, the source that was taken as the starting point proved to be incomplete: It was discovered that the list of affiliated organisations to the European Initiative Against TTIP and CETA excluded one of the most prominent organisations involved in the British Stop TTIP campaign. It is therefore possible that other prominent organisations have not been accounted for, thus giving an incomplete picture of a country's organisational landscape and damaging the reliability of the findings. Furthermore, organisations had varying levels of transparency when it came to providing detailed financial reports, with only some specifying exactly how much was spent on their TTIP campaign compared to other initiatives.

In the examination of elite allies, the research was constrained by the lack of a standardised measurement of "pro" or "anti" TTIP political parties, making it difficult to assess what exactly was meant by an "elite ally". This proved especially problematic when faced with the "neither for or against" position of some social democratic parties. The overlooking of small opposition parties in the study of the political landscape of all three countries, but particularly in Germany where the parliamentary opposition was united in its resistance to TTIP, has likely led to an incomplete portrayal of the political opportunities. The bias towards examining larger parties is perhaps a natural one, given their superior influence in parliamentary affairs, but has likely resulted in some discrepancies between the results garnered here and the political climate of the period in reality.

Further limitations arose in the methodological approach employed for the framing theory. First, the selection of news sources, no matter how justified, will always suffer from a degree of bias on the part of the researcher, and so the results may have been different if different sources were chosen. Second, only one of the "critical discourse moments" chosen for the evaluation of frames in media sources provided adequate levels of data. The reporting of the second, the vote in the European Parliament, was more focused on the political turmoil of the event rather than on the details of the TTIP agreement itself, and so a great many articles lacked any TTIP-related frames at all. Moreover, the quantitative nature of the content analysis of newspapers, which recorded only the occurrence of a frame in each article, left little room for nuance. A more in-depth discourse analysis that measured the strength of each frame, rather than simply its occurrence, would have perhaps been more appropriate. Finally, the execution of the data

gathering process was done by a single researcher, which may pose questions of reliability. Given the subjective nature of framing, a second researcher would have ideally also coded all articles to increase the reliability of results.

On a broader level, the researching of social movements in general is one that poses significant limitations. Because they (mostly) take place outside of institutions, their actions (or strength) falls outside of conventional data-gathering and data-recording instruments for measuring collective action, such as election results or official strikes by workers. The lack of hard data only increased the risk of bias and shortcomings in researching such a phenomenon.

On a purely practical level, a linguistic barrier on the part of the researcher also acted as a limitation in this thesis, and a knowledge of German would have been helpful. Although this was eased by the abundance of literature detailing the German case published through English, it was nonetheless a challenge to navigate the anti-TTIP scene in Germany without fluency of the language, and it is possible that some aspects have not been accounted for.

7.3 Suggestions for further research

The aim of this research project was to test three theories against each other to assess which one might best explain the relative strength of the Stop TIPP campaign. As outlined in the theoretical framework, the two most prominent theories of social movement scholarship- the resource mobilisation theory and the political opportunity structure- each encompass so many different dimensions that most scholars have focussed on just one of these approaches. Indeed, this broadness of scope has acted as a limitation to the current research project, which should be taken as preliminary study from which future researchers take direction. The main recommendation, then, is that further studies examine only one independent variable, and that this is done in much greater depth. For this, a co-variational approach is suggested as such a design is often employed to find out whether a specific feature of social reality makes a difference to a particular outcome (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p.35). Cases would be selected based on differences in the independent variable, rather than the dependent variable. For example, if a study were to examine the role of opposition parties in parliament, EU Member States with vocal opposition parties (the "treated" group) would be examined alongside Member States without vocal opposition parties (the control group). For causality to be inferred in such a study, the chosen cases would have to be as similar

as possible to each other in features other than the independent variable, so it would likely involve a study of exclusively large Member States, exclusively small Member States, or exclusively "new" Member States (i.e. those that joined the EU in 2004 or later). Suggestions of specific factors that might be employed as the independent variable of any such future study are outlined below:

Anti-Americanism

The results of the analysis of moral resources raised interesting questions about public opinion. The overwhelming opposition to TTIP among Germans is striking given that Germany has such an exportdependent economy. Further research might compare the levels of anti-American sentiment in Germany with other countries to determine whether German opposition was more a result of a broad aversion to the US rather than to the details of the trade agreement itself. The fact that little noise has been made (thus far) about the EU's negotiations with Japan regarding a similar free trade agreement lends credence to the idea that an anti-American sentiment was indeed at play ("Japan shows the world", 2016). The reason for such a sentiment might stem from economic attitudes such as dissatisfaction with free market capitalism and globalisation, and from anxiety about the influence of multinational companies (Berendse, 2003). The US is often seen as epitomising these concepts, with one scholar noting that "americanization today is almost the perfect synonym for the general concept of "globalization", differing only in having a slightly more sinister face" (Ceasar, 2003, p.5). Another refers to the "Washington Consensus" as the "motor of neoliberal globalisation" (Parmar, 2006, p. 176). The positioning of the US as the forerunner of what some critics deem to be an unfettered capitalist agenda could mean a clash with European values regarding free market regulation, consumer rights, the welfare state, income inequality and environmental protection. It is possible that fear and suspicion towards the US festers accordingly, although future research should explore this and other possibilities in greater depth.

Opposition parties

The results of the political opportunity structure suggest that opposition parties in parliament that were strongly against TTIP may have played a role in shaping the political debate on the issue. A deeper look at the political activities of these parties, particularly those on the left, and their contribution to the anti-TTIP movement might contribute to a more robust definition of "elite allies", and lead to a better understanding of the political opportunities they present for social movements.

Media coverage

Although the framing theory did not prove to hold much explanatory leverage for this thesis, some interesting observations have been noted. The most striking of these is the near-total lack of media coverage of TTIP in British newspapers. The reason for this is unclear. It might be that TTIP was not viewed as a subject worthy of controversy in the UK due to the country's liberal market economy and "domestic deregulatory agenda" (Lowe, 2015) which makes it closer to US economic values than other countries in Europe. Indeed, the UK and US are often said to enjoy a "special relationship", and so it is possible that the lack of media coverage merely reflected a lack of political appetite to criticise ongoing treaty negotiations with such a close ally. Media coverage might also have been scant due to certain characteristics of the British economy. For example, one of the aims of TTIP was to establish regulatory coherence in financial service on either side of the Atlantic, with the purpose of creating a larger and more efficient market place for EU and US financial firms (European Commission, 2014). Given the importance of financial services to the UK economy (CEPR, 2013), this might have been a consideration, but further exploration is needed on this issue. More generally, an in-depth study of TTIP media exposure in different countries might shed light on the role of the media in contributing to the public debate on the issue and examine how this might relate to mobilisation levels. A detailed analysis of opinion pieces, which were excluded from this study, would also be useful in gauging the power of mainstream media in shaping public (dis-)satisfaction towards TTIP.

To conclude, it is hoped that this thesis can act as a starting point to guide further research that is much more specific than the scope of this study allowed. In this way, we may gain a greater understanding of the factors that prompted such different responses among EU Member States to what would have been the world's biggest ever free trade agreement. In doing so, we might gain insights into what determines national protest dynamics towards supranational affairs more generally, thus building on our understanding of transnational collective action within the truly unique polity of the European Union.

Appendix

Table A: Protest Event Analysis including sources (Section 6.1).

Table A	. I TOLCSE EVE	_	g sources (Section 6.1).
Country	Date	City/Cities and number of	Source(s)
Country	Date	participants	Source(s)
		participants	
			Le Monde:
			http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2016/10/15/mobilisati
F	15/10/16	D:- (4 200)	on-en-france-contre-l-accord-de-libre-echange-ceta-avec-le-
France	15/10/16	Paris (1,200)	<u>canada_5014374_3234.html</u>
			Politico: http://www.politico.eu/article/opponents-of-eu-trade-
			deals-with-us-canada-rally-in-france/
		Berlin (1,500)	deale with as canada rany in mansey
		Frankfurt (n/a)	Deutsche Welle: http://www.dw.com/en/german-activists-turn-
	10/01/15	Hamburg (n/a)	out-in-force-to-protest-ttip-trade-deal/a-18391723
Germany	18/04/15	Leipzig (n/a)	
		Munich (3,000)	Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/trade-protests-
		Stuttgart (n/a)	germany-idUSL5N0XF0AM20150418
			Politico: http://www.politico.eu/article/germany-mobilizes-
	10/10/15		against-eu-u-s-trade-deal-merkel-ttip-ceta/
Germany		Berlin (150,000)	
			Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-germany-ttip-
			protests-idUSKCN0S40L720151010
			Deutsche Welle: http://www.dw.com/en/ttip-protest-in-hanover-
			ahead-of-obama-visit/a-19209730
	23/04/16	Hamayan	
Germany		Hanover (35,000)	Politico: http://www.politico.eu/article/protesters-slam-ttip-in-germany-ahead-of-obama-visit/
		(33,000)	germany-aneau-or-obama-visit/
			Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-usa-trade-
			idUSKCN0XK09Q
		Berlin	
		Cologne	Deutsche Welle: http://www.dw.com/en/germans-stage-anti-
Germany	17/09/16	Frankfurt	ttip-ceta-rallies/a-19558588
Germany	1//05/10	Hamburg	
		Stuttgart	Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-usa-ttip-
		(180,000 in total)	idUSKCN11N0H6
		Birmingham	
	12/07/14	Cambridge	
UK		Edinburgh	DDC Nove, http://www.hho.com/rows/cu/ul/20504000/wir
		London Manchester	BBC News: http://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-29584889/ttip-hundreds-join-protest-over-trade-deal
			indindreds-join-protest-over-trade-dear
		(n/a)	

FRANCE

 Table B.1: Organisational Resources in France: Media Analysis (Section 6.2.1.1).

	French organisations affiliated with the Stop TTIP campaign	Reported in Media
1	AITEC (Association Internationale de Techniciens, Experts et Chercheurs)	✓
2	Alliance Écologiste Indépendante	X
3	Attac France	✓
4	Bio Consom'Acteurs PACA-France	Х
5	Collectif CARMEN	Х
7	Collectif Causse Méjean – Gaz de Schiste NON	Х
8	collectif citoyen les Engraineurs	Х
9	Collectif d'action contre l'accord général pour le commerce de Loupian	X
10	Collectif Roosevelt	X
11	Confédération paysanne	X
12	Convention Vie et Nature (CVN)	Х
13	CORRA Collectif pour le respect de l'Animal	Х
14	Ensemble!	Х
15	Europe Ecologie les Verts	PP*
16	Foodwatch France	X
17	France Nature Environnement	Х
18	Hervé Le Meur	Х
19	Les Jeunes Écologistes	Х
20	Non au Grand Marché Transatlantique – Stop TAFTA	✓
21	Nouvelle Donne	X
22	Saveurs au Naturel	Х
23	Syndicat Français des Artistes-interprètes	X
24	TTIP-CETA NonMerci	X

PP*: This organisation is a political party (PP) and has therefore been omitted from the search.

Table B.2 Detailed breakdown of media analysis for France (Section 6.2.1.1).

AITEC

Member of AITEC co-wrote 3 opinion pieces in Le Monde:

- 1) Le Monde: http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/02/22/au-nom-du-climat-renover-les-regles-du-commerce-mondial_4869807_3232.html?xtmc=aitec_tafta&xtcr=1
- 2) Le Monde: http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2015/06/09/pour-une-doctrine-commerciale-europeenne-plus-juste-et-solidaire_4650267_3232.html?xtmc=aitec_tafta&xtcr=2
- 3) Le Monde: http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2014/05/23/tafta-les-investissements-etrangers-n-assurent-pas-le-developpement_4424338_3232.html?xtmc=aitec&xtcr=8

Attac France

Member of Attac France co-wrote opinion pieces in Le Monde:

- 1) Le Monde: http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/02/22/au-nom-du-climat-renover-les-regles-du-commerce-mondial_4869807_3232.html?xtmc=aitec_tafta&xtcr
- 2) Le Monde: http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2015/10/22/traite-transatlantique-un-systeme-d-arbitrage-toujours-aussi-anti-democratique 4795136 3232.html?xtmc=attac ttip&xtcr=3
- 3) Le Monde: http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/02/22/au-nom-du-climat-renover-les-regles-du-commerce-mondial_4869807_3232.html?xtmc=attac_ttip&xtcr=5
- 4) Le Monde: http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2015/02/06/climat-ou-ttip-il-faudrait-choisir 4571457 3232.html?xtmc=attac ttip&xtcr=7

News report listing Attac as one of the organisers of the protest:

Le Monde: http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2016/10/15/mobilisation-en-france-contre-l-accord-de-libre-echange-ceta-avec-le-canada_5014374_3234.html?xtmc=attac_ttip&xtcr=2

Described as being active on social media and contributing to campaign

Le Monde: http://www.lemonde.fr/economie-mondiale/article/2014/10/11/la-galaxie-heteroclite-des-anti-ttip 4504604 1656941.html?xtmc=attac ttip&xtcr=4

Non au Grand Marché Transatlantique – Stop TAFTA

News report listing Stop TAFTA as one of the organisers of a protest:

Le Monde: http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2016/10/15/mobilisation-en-france-contre-l-accord-de-libre-echange-ceta-avec-le-canada_5014374_3234.html?xtmc=attac_ttip&xtcr=2

 Table B.3 Summary of prominent French organisations including sources (Section 6.2.1.1).

Names of prominent organisations	Funding for TTIP?	Number of staff	Sources
AITEC (Association Internationale de Techniciens, Experts et Chercheurs)	n/a. Overall budget of €300,00 for 2015 and managed to clear its debt of approx. €42,000 due increased donations for its Stop TAFTA campaign	3	Aitec. (2016). Assemblée générale de l'Aitec. Retreived from http://aitec.reseau- ipam.org/IMG/pdf/pv_ag_aitec_28_janvier_2016.pdf
Attac France	n/a	n/a	
Stop TAFTA	Raised €23,911 in donations for its Stop TAFTA campaign.	1 (salary co- financed by AITEC and Attac)	Stop-TAFTA. (n.d.). Site Officiel du collectif national unitaire stop TAFT. Retrieved from https://www.collectifstoptafta.org/ Aitec. (2016). Assemblée générale de l'Aitec. Retreived from http://aitec.reseau-ipam.org/IMG/pdf/pv ag aitec 28 janvier 2016.pdf

Table B.4 Framing, France: European Parliament Vote. List of articles with complete sources (Section 6.2.1.3).

Newspaper and date	Complete source
Les Echos 10/06/15	Honore, R. (2015, June 10). Le Traité transatlantique sème la discorde au Parlement européen. <i>Les Echos</i> . Retrieved from https://www.lesechos.fr/10/06/2015/lesechos.fr/021125506926_le-traite-transatlantique-seme-la-discorde-au-parlement-europeen.htm
Les Echos 09/07/15	Hiault, R. (2015, July 9). TTIP: feu vert sous condition des eurodéputés. <i>Les Echos</i> . Retrieved from https://www.lesechos.fr/09/07/2015/LesEchos/21976-031-ECH_ttipfeu-vert-sous-condition-des-eurodeputes.htm?texte=TTIP
Le Figaro 18/07/15	Cheyvialle, A. (2015, July 18). Europe-États-Unis: l'accord de libre-échange relancé; Cecilia Malmström, la commissaire au Commerce, espère un accord politique d'ici à l'été prochain. Le Figaro. Retrieved from http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2015/07/17/20002-20150717ARTFIG00214-europe-etats-unis-l-accord-de-libre-echange-relance.php
Le Monde 10/06/15	Gatinois, C. (2015, June 10). Traité transatlantique : le Parlement européen se divise et reporte son vote. Le Monde. Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2015/06/10/traite-transatlantique-le-parlement-europeen-se-divise-et-reporte-son-vote_4650809_3234.html
Le Monde 08/07/15	Le Parlement européen apporte son soutien sous condition au traité transatlantique. (2015, July 8). Le Monde. Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/economie-mondiale/article/2015/07/08/le-parlement-europeen-apporte-son-soutien-au-traite-transatlantique_4675909_1656941.html
La Tribune 11/06/15	Robert, A. (2015, June 11). Le TTIP exacerbe les fractures de la grande coalition au Parlement européen. La Tribune. Retrieved from http://www.latribune.fr/economie/union-europeenne/le-ttip-exacerbe-les-fractures-de-la-grande-coalition-au-parlement-europeen-482832.html
La Tribune 09/07/15	Le soutien conditionnel du Parlement européen au TTIP agace l'opposition. (2015, July 9). La Tribune. Retrieved from http://www.latribune.fr/economie/international/le-soutien-conditionnel-du-parlement-europeen-au-ttip-agace-l-opposition-490687.html

Table B.5 Framing, France: TTIPleaks. List of articles with complete sources (Section 6.2.1.3).

Newspaper and	Complete Source	
Date	Complete Source	
Les EchosGreenpeace dévoile les dessous du Tafta. (2016, May 2). Les Echos. Retriev02/05/16https://www.lesechos.fr/02/05/2016/lesechos.fr/021895304351 greenpedevoile-les-dessous-du-tafta.htm?texte=TTIP		
Le Figaro 03/05/16 (A)	Cheyvialle, A. (2016, May 3). Traité transatlantique : les documents de Greenpeace sèment l'embarras; L'ONG met en ligne les négociations entre Washington et Bruxelles. <i>Le Figaro</i> . Retrieved from http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2016/05/02/20002-20160502ARTFIG00299-traite-transatlantique-les-documents-de-greenpeace-sement-l-embarras.php	
Le Figaro 03/05/16 (B)	Malhère, M. (2016, May 3). Traité transatlantique : Ces sujets qui irritant la société civile. Le Figaro. Retrieved from http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2016/05/02/20002-20160502ARTFIG00298-traite-transatlantique-ces-sujets-qui-irritent-la-societe-civile.php	
Le Monde 01/05/16 (A)	Ducourtieux, C. & Vaudano, C. (2016, May 1). Tafta: des documents confidentiels révèlent l'avancée des négociations. <i>Le Monde.</i> Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2016/05/01/tafta-des-documents-confidentiels-revelent-l-avancee-des-negociations_4911732_3234.html	
Le Monde 01/05/16 (B)	Ducourtieux, C. & Vaudano, M. (2016, May 1). Tafta: ce que révèlent les documents confidentiels sur la négociation transatlantique. <i>Le Monde.</i> Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2016/05/01/tafta-ce-que-revelent-les-documents-confidentiels-sur-la-negociation-transatlantique_4911738_3234.html	
Le Monde 03/05/16	Lemaître, F. (2016, May 3). L'émoi allemand après les révélations sur le TTIP. <i>Le Monde</i> . Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2016/05/03/l-emoi-allemand-apres-les-revelations-sur-le-ttip_4912650_3234.html	
La Tribune 02/05/16 (A)	TTIP/Tafta: Greenpeace pointe le risque de l'oubli du principe de precaution. (2016, May 2). La Tribune. Retrieved from http://www.latribune.fr/economie/international/greenpeace-promet-d-importantes-revelations-sur-le-futur-traite-transatlantique-568371.html	
La Tribune 02/05/16 (B)	TTIP: Bruxelles regrette des "malentendus" après la fuite des documents. (2016, May 2). La Tribune. Retrieved from http://www.latribune.fr/economie/international/ttip-bruxelles-regrette-des-malentendus-apres-la-fuite-de-documents-568506.html	
La Tribune 02/05/16 (C)	Raffin, N. (2016, May 2). TTIP/Tafta; vin, finance, auto les négociations sont loin d'être terminées. <i>La Tribune</i> . Retrieved from http://www.latribune.fr/economie/union-europeenne/ttip-tafta-vin-finance-auto-les-negociations-sont-loin-d-etre-terminees-568726.html	

GERMANY

 Table C.1 Organisational Resources in Germany: Media Analysis (Section 6.2.2.1).

	List of German organisations affiliated with the Stop TTIP campaign	Coverage in Media
1	Aktion ./. arbeitsunrecht e.V - Intitiative für Demokratie in Wirtschaft & Betrieb	X
2	Aktion Freiheit statt Angst	Х
3	Aktionsgemeinschaft Artenschutz	Х
4	Aktionsgemeinschaft für Arbeitnehmerfragen in der EvangLuth. Kirche in Beyern	Х
5	Arbeitsgemeinschaft Bäuerliche Landwirtschaft	Х
6	Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Evangelischen Jugend in Deutschland e.V. (aej)	Х
7	Ärzte/innen und Wissenschaftler/innen gegen TTIP	Х
8	AStA Universität Hamburg	Х
9	Attac Germany	1
10	Baum e.V.	Х
11	Bayerischer Lehrer- und Lehrerinnenverband (BLLV) e.V.	Х
12	Bayernpartei	PP*
13	Berlin 21	Х
14	Berliner Wasserrat	Х
15	Berliner Wassertisch	
16	Brot für die Welt	
17	Bewegung für soziale Dreigliederung e.V.	
18	BUND (Friends of the Earth Germany)	
19	Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz	
20	Bundesverband Deutscher Milchviehhalter BDM e.V.	
21	Bundesverband Naturkost Naturwaren	1
22	Campact e.V.	✓
23	Christliche Initiative Romero (CIR)	Х
24	Clubkombinat Hamburg e.V	Х
25	Dachverband der Kritischen Aktionärinnen und Aktionäre e.V.	Х
26	Dachverband Entwicklungspolitik Baden-Württemberg, DEAB e.V.	Х
27	DED-Freundeskreis	Х
28	Deutsche Orchestervereinigung e.V.	Х
29	Deutsche Umweltstiftung	Х
30	Deutscher Berufs- und Erwerbsimkerbund	Х
31	Deutscher Kulturrat	✓
32	Deutscher Naturschutzring	✓
33	Deutscher Übersetzerverband	Х

34	Die Bürger Lobby e.V.	Х	
35	Die Linke	PP*	
36	Digitalcourage	Χ	
37	Digitale Gesellschaft	Х	
38	EcoMujer e.V.	Х	
39	Eine Welt Forum Aachen e.V.	Х	
40	ethecon – Stiftung Ethik & Ökonomie	Х	
11	fair-ein e.V.	Х	
42	FairBindung e.V.	Х	
43	FIAN Deutschland	Х	
14	Foodwatch Germany	1	
15	Forschungs- und Dokumentationszentrum Chile-Lateinamerika e.V.	Х	
16	Forum Bildungspolitik in Bayern	Х	
17	Forum Fairer Handel	1	
	Forum InformatikerInnen für Frieden und gesellschaftliche Verantwortung (FifF)		
18	e.V.	Х	
19	Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung	✓	
0	FREIE WÄHLER	PP*	
51	freier zusammenschluss von studentInnenschaften	Χ	
52	Gegen Gasbohren	Χ	
3	Gemeinwohl-Ökonomie Berlin-Brandenburg		
54	Gen-ethisches Netzwerk		
55	Germanwatch		
56	Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft	Х	
57	Global Marshall Plan	Χ	
58	Greenpeace Germany	✓	
59	Grüne Jugend	PP*	
60	Grüne Liga	Х	
51	Holz von Hier	Х	
52	Humanistische Union	Х	
53	IBD Initiative Bürger für Demokratie	Х	
54	Informationsstelle Südliches Afrika e.V	Х	
55	INKOTA Netzwerk	Х	
66	INTHEGA – Interessengemeinschaft der Städte mit Theatergastspielen e.V.	Х	
57	Kampagne Meine Landwirtschaft	Х	
8	Katholische Arbeitnehmer Bewegung Deutschlands (KAB)	Х	
59	Katholische Landjugendbewegung	Х	
70	Kein Patent auf Leben!	X	
71	Klima-Allianz Deutschland	X	
72	Kooperation für den Frieden	X	

73	KulturNetz Kassel e.V.	Х		
74	Künstlergemeinschaft Neuwagenmühle e.V.			
75	LAG Soziokultur Schleswig-Holstein e.V.	Х		
76	Landesarbeitsgemeinschaft Soziokultureller Zentren in Sachsen-Anhalt	Х		
77	Landesnaturschutzverband Baden-Württemberg	Х		
78	Landesvereinigung kulturelle Kinder- und Jugendbildung Sachsen-Anhalt	Х		
79	Leben.Lernen.Leipzig e.V.	Х		
30	Lobbycontrol	Х		
81	Marxistische linke e.V.	Х		
82	Mehr Demokratie e.V.	✓		
83	MENSCHENRECHTE 3000 e.V.	Х		
34	Menschliche Welt	Х		
35	Motorradclub Kuhle Wampe	Х		
86	NABU	Х		
87	Naturfreunde Deutschland	Х		
88	Naturland	Х		
39	Zukunftsfähigkeit	Х		
90	Netzfrauen	Х		
91	Neue Richtervereinigung	Х		
92	Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei			
93	Omnibus für direkte Demokratie	Х		
94	Paritätische Gesamtverband	Х		
95	Pestizid Aktions-Netzwerk e.V.			
96	Philippinenbüro			
97	Piratenpartei			
98	Powershift	Х		
99	PROVIEH Verein gegen Tierquälerische Massentierhltung e.V.	Х		
100	Rettet den Regenwald	Х		
101	Slow Food Germany	Х		
102	SÜDWIND-Institut	Х		
103	Tier & Mensch	Х		
104	TTIPUnfairhandelbar	Х		
105	Umweltinstitut München	Х		
106	Unabhängiges Institut für Umweltfragen	Х		
107	Unite - Demokratische Jugend	Х		
108	Unternehmensgrün	Х		
109	Ver.di	✓		
110	Verband Deutscher Grundstücksnutzer (VDGN)	Х		
111	Verein zur Hilfe umweltbedingt Erkrankter e.V.	Х		

112	Verein zur Unterstützung nordamerikanischer Indianer	Х
113	Vereinigung für Ökologische Ökonomie e.V.	
114	WEED	Х
115	Weltfriedensdienst e.V.	Х
116	Weltladen-Dachverband	Х
117	Werkstatt Ökonomie e.V.	Х

Table C.2 Detailed breakdown of media analysis for Germany (Section 6.2.2.1).

Attac Germany

Listed as one of main organisers of protest:

- 1) Deutsche Welle: http://www.dw.com/en/germans-stage-anti-ttip-ceta-rallies/a-19558588
- 2) EurActiv: https://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/thousands-across-europe-protest-against-ttip/

Quoted as organisation that is against TTIP

- 1) Deutsche Welle: http://www.dw.com/en/who-wins-who-loses/a-17785394
- 2) Deutsche Welle: http://www.dw.com/en/mood-good-but-no-results-in-eu-and-us-trade-talks/a-17231060
- 3) Deutsche Welle: http://www.dw.com/en/eu-court-slams-eu-commission-for-blocking-anti-ttip-movement/a-38790547

Quoted as welcoming decision by ECJ regarding Commission's incorrect rejection of Stop TTIP ECI:

Deutsche Welle: http://www.dw.com/en/eu-court-slams-eu-commission-for-blocking-anti-ttip-movement/a-38790547

Coverage of their annual report which criticises TTIP

- 1) EurActiv: http://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/german-ngo-says-ttip-will-undermine-global-food-security/
- 2) EurActiv: https://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/mass-protest-against-ttip-and-ceta-to-take-place-in-berlin/

BUND

Quoted as welcoming decision by ECJ regarding Commission's incorrect rejection of Stop TTIP ECI:

Deutsche Welle: http://www.dw.com/en/eu-court-slams-eu-commission-for-blocking-anti-ttip-movement/a-38790547

Quoted as urging political parties to state their position on TTIP before state elections:

EurActiv: https://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/rhineland-cdu-accused-of-deceiving-voters-over-ttip/

Listed as co-organiser of protest:

EurActiv: https://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/mass-protest-against-ttip-and-ceta-to-take-place-in-berlin/

Listed as prominent opponent to TTIP:

- 1) Deutsche Welle: http://www.dw.com/en/growing-protest-against-ttip-and-ceta-trade-agreements-in-germany/a-19496077
- 2) Die Welt: https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article158334544/Die-Freihandelsgegner-schlachten-ihre-goldene-Gans.html

Bundesverband Naturkost Naturwaren

Reported as participants in protest (handing out organic apples to protesters) in Zeit

Die Zeit: http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2015-10/ttip-demonstration-berlin-freihandelsabkommen

Campact e.V.

Described as having spearheaded anti-TTIP protest in Germany:

Politico: http://www.politico.eu/article/anti-trade-campaigners-slaughter-their-golden-goose-ttip-why-ngos-germany/

Listed as participant in protest:

EurActiv: https://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/environmental-and-social-protection-to-bediscussed-at-next-ttip-negotiations/

Quoted as urging political parties to state their position on TTIP before state elections:

EurActiv: https://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/rhineland-cdu-accused-of-deceiving-voters-over-ttip/

Deutscher Kulturrat

Listed as co-organisers of protest

- 1) Der Tagesspiegel: http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/umstrittene-freihandelsabkommen-grossdemonstrationen-gegen-ttip-und-ceta-am-samstag/14544832.html
- 2) EurActiv: https://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/mass-protest-against-ttip-and-ceta-to-take-place-in-berlin/

Calls for protest against TTIP on World Day of Cultural Diversity

Deutsche Welle: http://www.dw.com/en/chlorine-concerts-and-butter-books-ttip-tests-germanys-cultural-values/a-18462804

Deutscher Naturschutzring

Described as anti-TTIP

1) Die Tageszeitung: http://www.taz.de/!5338827/

Foodwatch Germany

Described as instrumental to campaign, emphasis is on leadership of organisation

- 1) Politico: http://www.politico.eu/article/the-man-who-killed-ttip-thilo-bode-foodwatch-germany-free-trade/
- 2) Die Welt: https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article158334544/Die-Freihandelsgegner-schlachten-ihre-goldene-Gans.html

Listed as co-organisers of protest

1) EurActiv: https://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/mass-protest-against-ttip-and-ceta-to-take-place-in-berlin/

Mehr Demokratie

Described as one of main organisations involved:

1) Die Welt: https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article158334544/Die-Freihandelsgegner-schlachten-ihregoldene-Gans.html

Table C.3 Summary of prominent German organisations including sources (Section 6.2.2.1).

Names of prominent organisations	Funding for TTIP?	Number of staff	Source(s)
Attac Germany	n/a. Overall expenditure on all projects for 2015: €223,301.	17	Finances: Attac. (2015). Haushalt-Beschluss Zusammenfassun. Retrieved from: http://www.attac.de/was-ist-attac/strukturen/finanzen/ Staff: Aitec. (n.d.). Mitarbeiter innen im Attac Bundesbüro. Retrieved from http://www.attac.de/was-ist-attac/strukturen/attac-netzwerk/bundesbuero/buero/
Brot für die Welt* (participated in demo but not involved in funding/organising→ perhaps only mentioned due to its high profile)	n/a. Overall budget of €208 million for all projects in 2015. Most of it spent on development project, not activism. TTIP not a priority campaign	539	Brot für die Welt. (2015). <i>Jahresbericht 2015</i> . Retrieved from: https://www.brot-fuer-die- welt.de/fileadmin/mediapool/40_Ueber- uns/BfdW_Jahresbericht2015.pdf
BUND	n/a. Overall expenditure on campaigns	n/a	BUND. (n.d.). Ausgaben des BUND 2015. Retrieved from: https://www.bund.net/ueber- uns/transparenz/finanzen/ausgaben/

	and lobbying in 2015: 7.9 million. TTIP was one of their priority campaigns.	,	
Bundesverband Naturkost Naturwaren	n/a	n/a	
Campact e.V.	Approx. 1.5 million	52	Campact. (2016). <i>Der Campact Report 2016</i> . Retrieved from https://blog.campact.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/CampactTransparenzbericht2015.pdf
Deutscher Kulturrat	n/a. Total expenditure on all projects in 2014: €430,662	6	Deutscher Kulturrat. (n.d.). <i>Kulturrat Transparent</i> . Retrieved from: https://www.kulturrat.de/kulturrat-transparent/
Deutscher Naturschutzring	n/a	13	Deutscher Naturschutzring. (n.d.). <i>Team</i> . Retrieved from: https://www.dnr.de/der-dnr/organisation/team/
Foodwatch Germany	n/a. Total expenditure on all campaigns in 2015: €1.5 million	15	Finance: Foodwatch. (n.d.). Wie Foodwatch sich finanziert. Retrieved from: http://www.foodwatch.org/de/ueber-foodwatch/finanzen-transparenz/ Staff: Foodwatch. (n.d.). Das Foodwatch Team. Retrieved from http://www.foodwatch.org/de/ueber-foodwatch/der-verein/team/
Mehr Demokratie	€137,185 (out of a total of €227,450 for all campaigns)	n/a.	Mehr Demokratie. (n.d.). Finanzüberblick 201 Retrieved from: https://www.mehr-demokratie.de/finanzen-2015.html

Table C.4 Framing, Germany: European Parliament's vote. List of articles with complete sources (Section 6.2.2.3).

Newspaper and Date	Complete Source	
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 10/06/15	Streit über TTIP im EU-Parlament eskaliert. (2015, June 10). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/europaeische-union/freihandelsabkommen-ttip-streit-im-eu-parlament-eskaliert-13639276.html	
Süddeutsche Zeitung 09/06/15	EU-Parlament streicht auch TTIP-Debatte. (2015, June 9). Süddeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/freihandelsabkommen-eu-parlament-verschiebt-ttip-abstimmung-1.2513948	
Süddeutsche Zeitung 08/07/15	EU-Parlament stimmt für TTIP - unter Bedingungen. (2015, July 8). Süddeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/freihandelsabkommen-eu-parlament-stimmt-fuer-ttip-unter-bedingungen-1.2557247	
Die Welt 09/06/15	Tauber, A. (2015, June 9). EU-Parlament verschiebt Abstimmung über TTIP. <i>Die Welt</i> . Retrieved from https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article142226439/EU-Parlament-verschiebt-Abstimmung-ueber-TTIP.html	
Die Zeit 09/06/15	Schulz sagt TTIP-Abstimmung im EU-Parlament ab. (2015, June 9). <i>Die Zeit</i> . Retrieved from http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2015-06/ttip-martin-schulz-eu-parlament	
Die Zeit 08/07/15	EU-Parlament einigt sich auf Position zu TTIP. (2015, July 8). <i>Die Zeit</i> . Retrieved from http://www.zeit.de/politik/2015-07/ttip-freihandelsabkommen-usa-eu-befuerwortung	

Table C.5 Framing, Germany: TTIPleaks. List of articles with complete sources (Section 6.2.2.3).

Newspaper and date	Complete Source	
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 02/05/16 (A)	Greenpeace enthüllt geheime TTIP-Dokumente. (2016, May 2). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/ttip-und-freihandel/freihandel-greenpeace-enthuellt-geheime-ttip-dokumente-14210735.html	
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 02/05/16 (B)	Von Petersdorff-Campen, W. (2015, May 2). Das sind die Streitpunkte bei TTIP. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/ttip-und-freihandel/uneinigkeit-zwischen-eu-und-amerika-um-ttip-14209956.html	
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 03/05/16	EU-Kommission befürchtet Scheitern von TTIP. (2016, May 3). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/ttip-und-freihandel/freihandel-eu-kommission-befuerchtet-scheitern-von-ttip-14212805.html	
Süddeutsche Zeitung 01/05/16 (A)	Hagelüken, A. & Mühlauer, A. (2016, May 1). Geheime TTIP-Papiere enthüllt. Süddeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/geheime-ttip-papiere-enthuellt-1.2975097	
Süddeutsche Zeitung 02/05/16 (B)	TTIP: Greenpeace enthüllt geheime US-Papiere. (2016, May 2). Süddeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/news/wirtschaft/handel-ttip-greenpeace-enthuellt-geheime-us-papiere-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-160501-99-793968	
Die Welt 01/05/16	Geheime TTIP-Papiere beweisen Druck der USA auf EU. (2016, May 1). <i>Die Welt</i> . Retrieved from https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article154933930/Geheime-TTIP-Papiere-beweisen-Druck-der-USA-auf-EU.html	
Die Welt 02/05/16	Bundesregierung hält an TTIP fest. (2016, May 2). <i>Die Welt</i> . Retrieved from https://www.welt.de/newsticker/dpa_nt/infoline_nt/thema_nt/article1549428 https://www.welt.de/nt/infoline_nt/thema_nt/th	
Die Zeit 01/05/16	USA setzen EU bei TTIP extrem unter Druck. (2016, May 1). <i>Die Zeit</i> . Retrieved from http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2016-05/ttip-freihandel-eu-usa-dokumente	
Die Zeit 02/05/16	TTIP: Greenpeace enthüllt geheime US-Papiere. (2016, May 2). <i>Die Zelt</i> . Retrieved from http://www.zeit.de/news/2016-05/01/international-geheime-ttip-papiere-enthuellt-usa-ueben-druck-auf-eu-aus-01202405	
Die Zeit 03/05/16	EU-Kommission hält TTIP-Scheitern für möglich. (2016, May 3). <i>Die Zeit</i> . Retrieved from http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2016-05/ttip-eu-kommission-usa-barack-obama-greenpeace	

THE UK

 Table D.1 Organisational Resources in the UK: Media Analysis (Section 6.2.3.1).

	List of UK organisations affiliated with the Stop TTIP campaign	Coverage in Media
1	Artists against TTIP	✓
2	Bring Back British Rail	Х
3	CAWN - The Central America Women's Network	X
4	EcoNexus	X
5	Friends of the Earth England, Wales & Northern Ireland	✓
6	Friends of the Earth Scotland	Х
7	Global Justice Now (formerly WDM)	✓
8	GMB	Х
9	GPEW Green Party England and Wales	Х
10	Gun Control Network	PP*
11	Health Poverty Action	Х
12	Highland and Islands Against Fracking	Х
13	Jubilee Debt Campaign	Х
14	NASUWT	Х
15	National Justice and Peace Network	X
16	National Union of Teachers	X
17	People and Planet	X
18	Power For The People	Х
19	Public and Commercial Services Union	X
20	Scottish Secondary Teachers' Association	X
21	SEAD - Scottish Education and Action for Development	X
22	Soil Association	X
23	StopTTIP UK	X
24	Student Stop AIDS Campaign	X
25	The Educational Institute of Scotland	Х
26	The Gaia Foundation	Х
27	Trade Justice Movement	Х
28	UK National Hazards Campaign	X
29	UNISON	X
30	Unite the Union	X
31	University and College Union	Х
32	War on Want	/
33	We Own It	Х
34	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (UK)	Х

Table D.2 Organisational Resources: Detailed breakdown of media analysis for the UK (Section 6.2.3.1).

Artists Against TTIP

Video featured in the Guardian

The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/business/video/2015/jun/09/why-artists-are-saying-no-to-ttip-video

Friends of the Earth

Giving evidence to parliamentary inquiry on TTIP's potential environmental effects

The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jan/09/mps-investigate-ttip-trade-deals-impact-on-environmental-protections

Global Justice Now

Listed as organisation that opposes TTIP

- 1) The Independent: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/ttip-campaigners-and-trade-unions-applaud-tory-eurosceptics-for-joining-jeremy-corbyn-in-opposing-a7038141.html
- 2) The Independent: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/ttip-trade-deal-new-what-is-tisa-privatisation-pact-secret-threat-to-democracy-a7216296.html

War on Want

Listed as organisation that opposes TTIP

- 1) The Independent: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/ttip-campaigners-and-trade-unions-applaud-tory-eurosceptics-for-joining-jeremy-corbyn-in-opposing-a7038141.html
- 2) The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/aug/03/ttip-what-why-angry-transatlantic-trade-investment-partnership-guide
- 3) The Guardian:) https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/sep/01/eu-us-trade-deal-uk-economy-ttip-negotiations

 Table D.3 Summary of prominent British organisations including sources (Section 6.2.2.1).

Names of prominent organisations	Funding for TTIP?	Number of staff	Source
Artists against	n/a	n/a	
Friends of the Earth	n/a. Overall expenditure on campaigns and lobbying in 2015: €6 million	n/a	Friends of the Earth. (2016). Report and accounts for the year ended 31 May 2016. Retrieved from https://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/%20friends-earth-trust-annual-accounts-2015-2016-103172.pdf
Global Justice Now	€10,000 in funding restricted for TTIP campaigning. Unrestricted funding of over €300,000 may have also been spent on TTIP campaign.	32	Finance: Global Justice Now. (2015). Report and financial statements year ended 31 December 2015. Retrievd from http://www.globaljustice.org.uk/sites/default/files/files/pageuploads/gjn_org_accounts_31-12-15.pdf Staff: Global Justice Now. (n.d.). People at Global Justice Now. Retrieved from http://www.globaljustice.org.uk/people-global-justice-now
War on Want	n/a. Overall expenditure on campaigns in 2015: €1,355,095		Finance: War on Want. (2016). Report and accounts for the year ended 31 March 2016. Retrieved from http://www.waronwant.org/resources/annual-report-and-accounts-2015-2016-0 Staff: War on Want. (n.d.). Staff. Retrieved from http://www.waronwant.org/staff
38 degrees	€520,000 in 2015, €339,000 in 2014.		Finance: 38 Degrees. (2016). Report and financial statements for the year ended 30 September 2016. Retrieved from https://files.38degrees.org.uk/items/files/ 000/000/097/original/38_Degrees_final_accounts_2016 %281%29.pdf Staff: 38 Degrees. (n.d.). Our People. Retrieved from https://home.38degrees.org.uk/about/our-people/
UNISON	n/a	n/a	

Table D.4 Framing, the UK. European Parliament Vote. List of articles with complete sources (Section 6.2.3.3).

Newspaper and Date	Complete source
The Independent 10/06/15	Sheffield, H. (2015, June 10). TTIP vote postponed as European Parliament descends into panic over trade deal. <i>The Independent</i> . Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/ttip-vote-postponed-aseuropean-parliament-descends-into-panic-over-trade-deal-10310965.html
The Telegraph 11/06/15	Fraser, I. (2015, June 11). What is TTIP and why is it so controversial? <i>The Telegraph</i> . Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/11664750/What-is-TTIP-and-why-is-it-so-controversial.html

Table D.5 Framing, the UK. TTIPleaks. List of articles with complete sources (Section 6.2.3.3).

Newspaper and Date	Complete source
The Guardian 01/05/16	Nelson, A. (2016, May 1). Leaked TTIP documents cast doubt on EU-US trade deal. <i>The Guardian</i> . Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/01/leaked-ttip-documents-cast-doubt-on-eu-us-trade-deal
The Independent 02/05/15	Griffin, A. (2016, May 2). TTIP leaked documents could spell the end of controversial trade deal, say campaigners. <i>The Independent</i> . Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ttip-leak-could-spell-the-end-of-controversial-trade-deal-say-campaigners-a7009896.html

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https://www.welt.de/newsticker/dpa_nt/infoline_nt/thema_nt/article154942823/Bundesregierung-haelt-an-TTIP-fest.html

After Brussels rejection, TTIP fight could go to ECJ. (2014, September 19). *Deutsche Welle*. Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/after-brussels-rejection-ttip-fight-could-go-to-ecj/a-17935965

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