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SOUTH AFRICA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE (1999-2003): A PAX PRETORIANA?

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SUMMARY

By investigating the potential constraints on a regional power's ambitions, this thesis aims at understanding how the domestic and regional political levels do impact its behavior. To address this question, attention is paid to the South African involvement in the peace process undertaken at the end of the Second Congo War: The Inter-Congolese Dialogue (1999-2003). Sandra Destradi's typology (2010) is used to analytically determine this intercession in the Dialogue. Her classification on the potential strategies regional powers defines the dependent variable of this thesis, i.e. South Africa's intermediate hegemonic strategy in the ICD.

Within a time-frame ranging from 1994 until 1999, two independent variables are analyzed. The domestic level is conceptualized thanks to the South African strategic culture. Understood as the long-term lasting strategic preferences about the role and efficacy of military force in foreign affairs (Johnston, 1995), strategic culture underscores the way policy-makers set their goals and priorities. The regional level is considered through the regional socialization at stake in Southern Africa, and particularly within SADC. Studying the extent to which SA might be 'socialized' – or not – to the norms of SADC highlights the perceptions and relations of the country towards its region. The research design is Causal-Process Tracing (CPT), as it emphasizes the outcome of interest. Indeed, CPT is required is one wants to know not only whether something mattered or made a difference, but how exactly it affected the outcome.

Based on scientific articles, official documents and interviews, the research shows that strategic culture was a strong indicator in shaping SA's involvement in the ICD. What has also been recurring is the self-interested behavior of the country. And a third important conclusion is that socialization was not to discredit, as it showed that, facing such a big player as South Africa, SADC was a weak 'socializer' and did not manage to put forward its own priorities.

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ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CPT	Causal-Process Tracing
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DOD	Department of Defence
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FDI	Foreign Direct Investments
ICD	Inter-Congolese Dialogue
JMC	Joint Military Commission
LA	Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of the Congo
MONUC	United Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OPDS	Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
RCD-Goma	Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma
RCD-ML	Rally for Congolese Democracy-Liberation Movement
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SA	South Africa
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
UDPS	Union for Democracy and Social Progress
UN	United Nations

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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

'Here, when a war stops, another starts right away'. These are the words of Lewis, a 40-year-old Congolese man who has fought over the course of three troubled decades in a place whose very name has changed along the way: from Mobutu's 'Zaïre', to the Kabila's 'Democratic Republic of Congo' today. He would not hesitate to take up arms once more to protect these fertile lands, long coveted by many countries (Tilouine, 2017).

In the wake of the apartheid, huge expectations were put into South Africa (SA) and its leader, Nelson Mandela, to redress the continent. Able to peacefully negotiate its democratic transition with the white colonial rule, the 'pariah' state did not exist anymore, and the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), had its finest hours ahead. Many thought this unprecedented situation would be powerful enough to heal the continent's scars of the independence wars. Conflict resolution, regional development and democratization were among the main tremendous tasks ahead. Would the country be authoritative enough to establish a Pax Pretoriana?[1] In the years that followed, however, this optimism faded, facing the apparent lack of leadership showed by Pretoria towards the region.

It is often claimed that South Africa is a *regional power*, and this assumption constitutes the bedrock of this thesis. Before going further, one first needs to investigate this premise. Nolte's review of the literature on regional powers (2010) highlights three recurring characteristics, which will be briefly applied to South Africa, to determine whether this assumption is correct. First, a regional power should articulate the pretension of a leading position in a region that is geographically, economically, and politically-ideationally delimited. The region of interest in this thesis is Southern Africa, and more precisely the fifteen Southern African Development Community (SADC) members.[2] In 1994, when South Africa became a member of the regional organization, it knew implicitly that it had to take the lead on several regional issues (Flemes, 2007: 20).[3]

Second, it displays material (economic, military and demographic), political and ideological resources. Demographically, SA population, in 1995, was nearly of one-third of the region's total. In the same year, concerning the economic resources, SA economy was 3,4 times larger than the other 11 SADC

[1] Some critics regarded SA's foreign policy as an attempt by Pretoria to export its 'purported' miracle to the continent. Viewing this 'Pax Pretoriana' as arrogant, they pointed out SA's unresolved domestic problems (Landsberg, 2004: 183).

[2] Namely Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

[3] For other illustrations, see the Declaration of the 49th National Conference of the ANC (1994), the Protocol on Trade of the SADC (1996) or Thabo Mbeki's statement at the UN Security Council (1994).

economies combined (Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan, 1998). Whilst it ranks on place 34 globally, South Africa's defence expenditures are nonetheless the highest compared to its sub-regional neighbors, (Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan, 1998). Concerning the ideological resources, Pretoria is, on several accounts and as will be shown throughout this analysis, a very powerful norm 'entrepreneur' (Schoeman, 2000; Geldenhuys, 2006; Nel, 2006). The third characteristic of a regional power is its great influence in regional affairs. Pretoria's poster child behavior has had a powerful impact on a political point of view, increasing its influence in many international forums such as the Non-Aligned Movement, the SADC, the G8, the UN, or the African Union (Flemes, 2007; Bischoff, 2006).

For these reasons, one can consider South Africa as a regional power.[4] Nonetheless, the difficulty of classifying a state as a regional power is related to the fact that this status has to do, not only with *power resources*, but also with *perceptions* about the configuration of global and regional power hierarchies (Nolte, 2010). Indeed, regional powers, trying to reach their regional and international ambitions, have to cope with domestic constraints that may hinder their capacity of action. Being under regional and domestic pressures may affect their behavior, and this assertion is an important driver of the study. Moreover, research concerned with regional power architecture tend to adopt either a narrow actor-centered approach, very state-centric, or a structuralist point of view, focusing on the relative positions of states within the international system. Both have their strengths, and could be complementary in the light they shed on regional powers and their foreign relations.

From this reasoning stems the research question: **How can the domestic and regional political levels impact a regional power's foreign policy strategy?**

To address this question, the domestic level is conceptualized thanks to the South African strategic culture, first independent variable. Defined as the long-term lasting strategic preferences about the role and efficacy of military force in foreign affairs (Johnston, 1995), strategic culture underlines the way policy-makers set their goals and priorities. This variable takes a close look at the state, from the above-mentioned 'actor-centered' approach. The regional level is considered through the regional socialization at stake in Southern Africa, and particularly within SADC. Studying the extent to which SA might be 'socialized' – or not – to the norms of SADC highlights the perceptions and relations of the country towards its region. This second independent variable thus brings a more structuralist angle to the thesis. To narrow down the field of investigation, the case under study is the process that put an end to the Second Congo War: The Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD). Still ongoing today, the DRC has been mired

[4] Each of these characteristics (leadership pretension, resources and influence in international affairs) will be further elaborated throughout the study.

in wars since its independence in 1960. Starting as a provision of the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (LA), the ICD was a 4-year process, ending in 2003. Because of the numerous states and non-state actors involved, the conflict was a real 'African war' and generated a death toll of 3.3 million people (Rogier, 2004). Given that the conflict had regional and transboundary dimensions, it required regional efforts to resolve it in a sustainable way. South Africa's involvement demonstrates the impact regional actors may have in resolving such complex conflicts. To analytically determine this intercession, Sandra Destradi's typology (2010) is used. Her emphasis on the potential strategies regional powers may use in their foreign relations constitutes the theoretical frame defining the dependent variable of this thesis, i.e. SA intermediate hegemonic strategy in the ICD.

Theoretical and Societal Relevance

In 2007, Amitav Acharya wrote that, in the regional architecture literature, further research should be done on the relationship between regions and powerful actors from outside and from within. He also regretted the scant attention paid to the socialization power of regions on powerful actors (Acharya, 2007: 651). This is how this study aims at contributing to the literature: taking into account both externally- and internally-rooted variables, its ultimate purpose is to arrive at a better understanding of the different pressures a regional power may face in its foreign policy. This approach aims at bridging this gap in the literature, and shedding light on different practices to investigate regional powers.

The research design of this thesis, causal-process tracing (CPT) is required if one wants to know not only whether something mattered or made a difference, but *how* exactly it influenced the outcome (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). This bottom-line guides us throughout the study. Indeed, today, Eastern DRC is still at war, showing that no solution has been found yet. Understanding is already acting: digging even deeper in the motives and rationale of each involved country and their strategies aims at a better understanding of this social phenomenon.

Structure of the Thesis

This analysis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a state-of-the-art review of the existing literature on regional powers, structured around two complementary clusters, actor-centered and structuralist. Based on the literature gap, Chapter 3 highlights the variables that will be used in this thesis, and the theories that support them. For each variable, expectations are drawn, and will be tested thanks to the research design, described in Chapter 4. As mentioned above, causal-process tracing is used, focusing on a particular outcome of interest. This outcome is the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, on which some background is given in Chapter 5. Moreover, the dependent variable of this thesis is specified in this chapter: applying Destradi's typology (2010) to the case, the data shows that South Africa intervention in the DRC is a 'intermediate hegemonic strategy'. In Chapter 6, and keeping this

outcome in mind, Pretoria's strategic culture and regional socialization are analyzed within a time-scope from 1994 to 1999, six expectations are tested, allowing to see to what extent it matches the regional power strategy[5] of this thesis. Chapter 7 answers to the research question and discuss the results, assessing the extent to which South Africa complied to the regional socialization, or acted according to its strategic culture in its involvement in the DRC. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by highlighting some possible ways of generalizing this research, as well as the limitations it encountered.

[5] Strategy, in this thesis, is understood as 'the integration of political, economic, and military aims for the preservation and realization of states' long-term interests, that is, what is commonly named grand strategy', in order to distinguish it from purely military art of using battles to win war (Destradi, 2010: 904).

When analyzing regional powers and regional organizations, one needs to place them in their broader context: theories of regionalism. Regionalism refers to a political commitment to organize the world in terms of regions, and thus involves a specific regional project. Yet, the idea raises conceptual issues: in some definitions, the actors behind this commitment are states, in other it encompasses non-states actors (Hettne, 2005: 545). As regional powers are inherently connected to this 'political commitment', this chapter first highlights how regionalism, and the related theories, evolved. By way of background, a brief overview of the theoretical evolution of regionalism is first presented. Then, it focuses on the subject of the thesis: the literature on regional powers, which is mainly structured around two broad bottom-lines. On the one hand, it seems that authors often see and study regional powers as the nexus between global and regional power hierarchies. On the other hand, many scholars, emphasizing less these power hierarchies, adopt a more actor-centered approach and shed light on the strategies these predominant states use. Based on the literature on regional power, the chapter finally highlights what gaps may be bridged in the scholarship.

I. Background: Theories of regionalism

The earlier debates over regionalism started with the end of the Cold War, the decolonization processes and the impetus of the European Economic Community. In Europe, from the very beginning, integration theories understood regionalism as being more ambitious than trade liberalization through inter-state bargains. Intergovernmentalism, by putting member states and their governments at the center of regional integration[6], did not take into account domestic actors (business associations, trade unions, and regions) (Börzel, 2016).

Neo-functionalism paid more attention to non-state actors. Centered on the significance of political integration for the future of the nation-state, neo-functionalism fostered regional integration (Breslin & Higgott, 2000; Lenz, 2012). Developed by Ernst Haas, this paradigm is an attempt to theorize the strategies of post-war European unity. Putting the emphasis on *spillover effects,* neo-functionalism argued that the creation and deepening of integration in one economic sector would create pressures for further economic integration within and beyond that sector, thus leading to regional integration (Hettne, 2005). Moreover, in the neo-functionalist view, this process is sponsored and enacted by *purposeful*

[6] 'Regional integration' occurs at three levels: economic integration (the formation of transnational economy), social integration (the formation of transnational society) and political integration (the formation of a transnational political system). The study of regional integration is thus concerned with explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign on these matters (Hettne, 2005: 544-545).

actors pursuing their own *self-interests*. A third significant characteristic is that supranational institutions should be driven by those who are endowed with the necessary expertise to understand the complex machinery of the capitalist mode of production (Rosamond, 2000). This 'technocratic' dimension, alongside with the fortuitous interaction of purposeful non-state actors and positive spillover effects is what leads to the creation of regional organizations.

However, this first wave of regional scholarship faded because of the neglect of important features of the international system: state-centrism, lack of attention on domestic politics, on ideational questions such as the importance of the 'idea of region' and the need for the presence of a sense of community at a regional level. Moreover, external and exogenous factors play a crucial role in region-building: building collective regional positions vis-à-vis other key actors on policy questions in a global dialogue was not taken into account by neo-functionalists. Yet, it should be recognized that an important intellectual legacy of neo-functionalism is the way it led scholars to think of the wider conditions of dependence and interdependence and the push it gave to the study of international political economy, IPE (Breslin & Higgott, 2000). The study of regionalism did not stop there, as a new wave of regionalism emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. In the frame of the Bretton Woods institutions, it reappeared as a policy choice for developing countries because it proved useful in implementing neoliberal economic policies and attracting Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). This stream earned the title of 'new regionalism', referring to the new appeal of regionalism for countries in the mid 1980s and 1990s, allowing them to integrate fully into the global capital flows (Bowles, 2000).

In a nutshell, new – or 'open' – regionalism is mainly FDI-based, underpinned by an ideology of neoliberalism, where regional agreements are loosely structured unlike the EU or NAFTA, supported by businesses and where differences between developed and developing countries are minimal when creating free trade agreements (Bowles, 2000).

II. Literature review on regional powers

This contextual overview paves the way to the literature on regional powers, the latter being the bedrock of the literature gap. It has repeatedly dealt with the idea that regional powers embody the nexus between the global and the regional power hierarchies.

To understand the meaning of power hierarchy, Douglas Lemke's definition (2002) provides some explanatory leverage: in the hierarchical international system, states are characterized by their levels of power as well as by their evaluations of the international status quo. At the top of the international power hierarchy sits the dominant power, the most powerful state in the system. Following a structuralist

approach, Lemke extends the power transition theory to regional powers. It advocates that, in the international system, hierarchy depends on the distribution of material resources and dominant states are supposed to be interested in maintaining the status quo (Destradi, 2010). Applying this idea to a smaller scale, Lemke theorizes a 'multiple hierarchy model', in which the minor powers, evolving in subsystems, are fighting for the control of the status quos of their 'local hierarchies'.

Mearsheimer and Wight also considered regional powers as competing with greater powers to achieve hegemony[7], as been seen with Lemke. In his book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001), Mearsheimer, fitting into offensive realism, recognizes that hegemony, usually defined as the domination of the entire world, can also be applied more narrowly to describe particular regions, such as Europe or Southern Africa. It is thus possible to distinguish global hegemons, exercising control on the world, and regional hegemons, dominating distinct geographical areas. Mearsheimer further argues that, as it is virtually impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony, the best outcome a great power can hope for is to be a regional hegemon and control another region that is nearby and accessible over land. Consequently, states who achieve regional hegemony will always be in a competition to avoid peers. Likewise, Wight, in *Power politics*, postulates that regional great powers are candidates for the status of middle power in the international system, and thus compete to foster their interests (Wight, 1979:63).

More specific to the South African case, Prys (2008) conceptualizes regional hegemony as profoundly embedded in the international system. She argues that mainstream definitions of regional hegemons neglect the internal workings of such a regional order and aspects such as acceptance, followership and the role of ideas, central to a comprehensive understanding of hegemony. By applying this to the South African foreign policy towards Zimbabwe, she points out that regional hegemons play a dual role at the nexus of regional and global politics, and thus have to accomplish two main tasks: the exclusion of external actors from their 'sphere of influence' as well as the accommodation of the same actors in order to achieve both their global and regional foreign policy goals (Prys, 2008: 6-7). By taking followership of secondary powers as a core condition for success of an emerging power leadership, Prys shares some similarities with scholars, such as Schirm (2010). She further argues that dealing with these several tasks – as an international power, a regional power and acceding to the followers demands – may lead to contradictions in the behavior of the regional hegemon (Prys, 2008).

[7] In this thesis, 'hegemony' and 'hegemon' are central terms. Whilst authors differ significantly in their understanding, I first draw on Burges' definition (2008), for whom the *hegemon* is the actor that seeks to establish a particular order. And *hegemony* is the process, the particular strategy of the hegemon. For further clarification of what this order encompasses, this thesis refers to Destradi's conception (2010).

These authors, by adopting a structuralist approach emphasizing the relative positions of powers in the international system, do not pay a sufficient attention on the methods adopted by regional powers in order to reach hegemony. Thus, one needs to take more of an actor-centered approach[8], or state-centric, to better understand the *strategies* adopted by regional powers in their relations with neighboring states.

In this perspective, Sandra Destradi (2010) develops a conceptual clarification of ideal-typical strategies pursued by regional powers, namely empire, hegemon or leadership. She further differentiates three kinds of hegemony, i.e. hard, intermediate and soft. Each ideal-typical category may be subdivided into several dimensions (ends, means, etc.) to operationalize these concepts for empirical research. Likewise, Andrew Hurrell (2006) adopted a strategic perspective in his study of how 'second-tier states' (China, Russia, India and Brazil) responded to US hegemony. Presenting the potential strategies and options in terms of foreign policy that these states used, he namely argues that a state may see the region as a means of aggregating power and fostering a regional coalition in support of its external negotiations.

More specifically regarding 'hegemony', other authors focused on the different kinds of strategies a regional power may use: discursive, cooperative or consensual hegemonies are just some of the numerous methods adopted to foster their interests. Because hegemony is always contested by challenges from those who are left out of the 'hegemonic project', discursive hegemony questions the strategies that actors employ to present their particular visions as universal (Nabers, 2008). In his article, Nabers postulates that hegemony means nothing more but the discursive struggle between political actors over the assertion of their particular representations of the world. In times of crises, competing political forces will attempt to hegemonize the political space and one predominant interpretation will evolve, which institutes the action that needs to be taken. Therefore, hegemony will be effective and sustainable when foreign elites acknowledge the leader's vision of international order and internalize it as their own (Nabers, 2008).

Another strategy, as developed by Thomas Pedersen (2002), consists of major states, being militarily weak, to seek to maximize or stabilize their influence through non-coercive means, by pushing for the formation of regional institutions. His theory of "cooperative hegemony" postulates that political considerations – namely about power and security – are the main determinants behind regionalism in the formative stage of regional institutionalization. Drawing on the traditional theory of hegemonic stability, developed by Kindleberger (1973) and portraying hegemons as states that impose their will largely by unilateral means and without establishing strong institutions, Pedersen raises the idea that

[8] In this thesis, 'actor-centered approach' refers to a state-centric perspective, where the state's point of view is closely analyzed. Still, when studying their foreign policy considerations and strategies, non-state actors are also included, such as businesses, advocacy coalitions or international organizations.

moderately powerful states lacking in superior resource may want to create regional institutions in order to develop innovative 'soft power' strategies.

Following Pedersen, and also analyzing regional institutionalization, Burges (2008) developed the concept of consensual hegemony which minimizes the coercive aspects associated with domination, focusing instead on a vision that privileges the creation of consensus through the constructive inclusion of potentially competing priorities. In this theory, there is a strict separation between the concepts of 'hegemon' and 'hegemony': by clearly identifying the hegemon as the actor that seeks to establish a particular order, or hegemony, it becomes possible to view a hegemonic project as an inclusive system that does not need to be predicated on an explicit threat (Burges, 2008).

Adler and Barnett (1998), analyzing what leads to regional alliances, revived the concept of 'security communities', initially developed by Karl Deutsch (1957). Studying mainly the pluralistic security communities, defined as "a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change" (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 30), they investigate what brings states to pool their sovereignty to form alliances. They define three tiers of conditions for the development of a security community: (1) the precipitating conditions, such as a desire to reduce mutual fear through security coordination, etc.; (2) factors conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity where the *structure* – power and knowledge – and the *process* – where rules and institutional contexts constrain actors' choices – of the social interactions between states begin to change, and transform their environment; (3) when trust and collective identity are implemented to create the security community. In sum, these dynamic relationships lead to the development of collective identity formation which drives security community formation (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 37-48).

Whether it is in political or security domains, regional powers may use the whole region to foster their economic interests as well. It is the position of Krapohl et al. (2014) who argue that when regional integration is not in conflict with extra-regional economic interests, regional powers will provide regional leadership. Analyzing South Africa within SADC and Brazil within Mercosur, the authors conclude that when the intra-regional economic exchanges are at odds with the extra-regional economic interests, regional powers act as "Rambo's". Consequently, they adopt volatile behaviors making the regional integration – and organizations – in the developing world more fragile (Krapohl et al., 2014).
Based on this section, it is possible to show to what extent this thesis covers gaps in the existing literature. Here, attention has been paid to two 'clusters' of the literature on regional hegemony, two different *practices* to deal with regional powers, and less on *theories*, which has been the point of the contextual section. On the one hand, the aforementioned authors, adopting a structuralist approach, studied how a regional power is positioned within the international system, and has to deal with this

position as an 'intermediary level' between the global and the regional level. Placed into a power hierarchy and trying to attain its goals both at the global and regional level, authors saw this embeddedness either as an issue, leading to competition with other powers (Lemke, 2002; Mearsheimer, 2001; Wight, 1979), or simply as an obstacle to a coherent foreign policy (Prys, 2008).

On the other hand, the second cluster focuses on an actor-centered perspective to uncover the strategies regional powers may use to achieve their foreign policy goals. While Destradi (2010) and Hurrell (2006) provided more general accounts of the different methods used by regional powers in foreign policy, authors like Nabers (2010), Perdersen (2002) and Burges (2008) focused on different kinds of hegemony while Adler and Barnett (1998) and Krapohl et al. (2014) studied more specific aspects of foreign policy for regional powers.

Needless to say, both approaches have their strengths. By putting the emphasis on the relations and relative positions of states, structuralist methods highlight the fact that regional powers, evolving in their environment, influence the interactions taking place at the regional level, and thereby can also contribute in a significant way to shaping the global order. And, because regional hegemons are not just 'benevolent' leading states, actor-centered approaches are best-suited to actually understanding the rationale of this hegemonic behavior and analyze its strategies (Destradi, 2010).

Still, as Destradi (2010) noted, structuralist approaches neglect the problem of regional powers' strategies, but more actor-centered theorizations on regional hegemony tend to focus on one particular strategy, leading to only a partial conceptualization of regional powers. Since both approaches have their advantages, this research comprises these two practices. Combining both angles to understand what might have shaped South Africa's behavior to assure security in the case of the DRC war, I will seek to understand a state's behavior thanks to a comprehensive analysis of the nexus between its *regional* and *domestic* ambitions – seeking inspiration from structuralist approaches – and to see to what extent it shaped the chosen soft power *strategy*, adopting a more actor-centered approach. Based on this reasoning, the following research question has thus been elaborated: **How can the domestic and regional political levels impact a regional power's foreign policy strategy?**

The theories described in the next chapter will help to encompass the different dimensions just mentioned and to answer the research question.

CHAPTER 3 – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Regional powers, as explained above, have to deal with their regional – and international – ambitions, as well as taking into account the domestic constraints that may hamper such endeavor. As Acharya (2007) puts it, regional architecture entails a confrontation between regions and powerful actors from outside and from within. Consequently, it involves identifying conditions that lead *regions* to challenge external influence and understanding what may be the *internal* driving forces of such a process. Besides, Acharya (2007) suggests further research to include how regions *socialize* powerful actors on their own terms.

This is the stance that this study takes. Based on the preceding literature gap, the theoretical framework has been constructed in order to analyze factors – both at regional and domestic levels – that shape the regional power's choice in foreign affairs. These dimensions are conceptualized as follows. Adopting an actor perspective, the first independent variable, 'strategic culture', specifies the influence from the domestic level. The impact of regional stage is studied thanks to regional socialization, from a structuralist angle. Concerning the dependent variable of this thesis, it is considered thanks to Sandra Destradi's (2010) typology of the regional powers strategies. The path that it highlights will lead to the dependent variable of the causal model, i.e. the choice for a strategy over another. Applied to South Africa's behavior in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, this procedure shows that the dependent variable of this thesis is an intermediate hegemonic strategy.

Destradi's work has been chosen to characterize the dependent variable because it is innovative in the gaps it bridges within the literature. She clearly positions herself as adopting an actor-centered approach, because of the scant attention paid to the strategies of regional powers (Destradi, 2010: 906). Her innovation is to develop a wide-ranging conceptualization of ideal-typical strategies that these regional powers might pursue in their relations with neighboring states. Moreover, this far-reaching theory encompasses concepts elaborated by other scholars. The characteristics of 'consensual hegemony', elaborated by Burges (see below) are close to what Destradi understands as leadership, or her emphasis on 'followers' as a condition for successful leadership, as Schirm (2010) theorized. Both examples show that her theoretically-informed typology takes into account other approaches, within a single frame of analysis.

When it comes to explaining South Africa's choice for a given regional power strategy over another, *strategic culture* and *regional socialization* constitute the independent variables of this study. To see to what extent both processes may influence the South African strategy in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, this study will analyze South Africa post-apartheid foreign policy until the starting point of the ICD,

that is, within a time-frame ranging from 1994 to 1999.

Scholarship has repeatedly attempted to define *strategic culture*.[9] In this research, Johnston's definition (1995) is of great relevance, because he developed a rigorous conceptualization of strategic culture. It is understood as "an integrated system of symbols which acts to establish pervasive and long-term lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs" (Johnston, 1995:46). By 'symbols', Johnston focuses on ideational causal variables, such as official documents, analogies and metaphors (McDonough, 2011), which gives concrete content for the analysis. This understanding of strategic culture is rooted in the constructivist tradition, with a particular attention to identity formation and interests, all socially constructed (Wendt, 1992). Besides, it shows to what extent strategic culture is insightful in uncovering the domestic constraints that may influence a choice for a particular strategy. Indeed, strategic culture puts a strong emphasis on reconciling political ends with limited means: countries that do not possess unlimited resources oblige officials to set goals and priorities in an environment of resource scarcity and political constraints (McDonough, 2011; Lantis, 2002; Glenn, 2009). By shedding light on what frames the 'milieu in which the strategy is debated' (Lantis, 2002), strategic culture is, in my view, the best independent determinant of strategic policy patterns at a domestic level, and will be the object of the second section.

In the words of Van Nieuwskerk (2004), South Africa changes and is changed by the region. To grasp the potential regional pressures on South African foreign policy, regional socialization[10] provides relevant insights. First, if one studies strategic culture, socialization must also be analyzed, as both concepts are inherently linked: strategic culture *stems* from socialization.[11] The former is said to be stable thanks to its ties to the identity conceptions of a community and is constantly reproduced by the actors within the community, in other words, thanks to a socialization process (Meyer, 2011; Snyder, 1977:9). Second, as Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) argue, altering substantive beliefs is a strong generator of consent among states, and scholars may tend to put it aside, in order to study the manipulation of material incentives. Studying the extent to which institutional environments may shape strategic action, and more precisely by focusing on the socialization power that regional institutions may

[9] The concept of strategic culture falls within broader conceptual debates where terms like 'political culture', 'politico-military culture' compete (see Duffield, 1999; Lantis, 2002; Berger, 1993). Yet, because our emphasis is neither only on the political nor on the military determinants of such a culture, the chosen concept takes a more neutral stance by shedding light on ideational, political and military determinants.

[10] In this research, socialization means "getting new actors to adopt the rules and norms of a community on a long-term basis without the use of force or coercion" (Acharya, 2011: 8).

[11] Although strategic culture stems from socialization, it should be underlined that here, the socialization process occurs at the *domestic* level, from the country's culture, history and policy-makers. This should not be confused with the second independent variable of this thesis, the *regional* socialization.

have on countries, will thus be the point of the third section.[12]

While strategic culture is mainly conceptualized in terms of coercive means and about the necessity to wage war, regional socialization aims at changing minds without the use of force, in order to get others to accept novel understandings of world politics (Johnston, 2001). Whereas strategic culture is internally-rooted and accentuates domestic spurs, regional socialization stresses potential regional power relationships, from an externally-rooted perspective.

These two independent variables – strategic culture spelling the actor-perspective out, and regional socialization illustrating a structuralist practice – thus constitute complementary angles to shed light on South African foreign policy.

I. Regional powers and their strategies – the dependent variable

This section presents the three kinds of strategies that a regional power may use – empire, hegemony, and leadership – to finally shed light on the consecutive steps that determine a regional power strategy. This will typify the dependent variable, the strategic choice of a country in a particular situation.

Destradi's ideal-typical strategies follow a continuum, ranging from a highly aggressive and coercive strategy, imperial, to a very cooperative one, aimed at reaching common goals, the leadership strategy. In-between, the hegemon, whose strategy aims at reaching personal goals, is declined into three sub-categories: hard, intermediate and soft hegemony (Destradi, 2010).

The empire is a state which uses its material power to secure security for itself, in a unilateral pursuit of its own national interest. What will distinguish the empire from the hegemon is the *means* that an imperial state will use: coercion and imposition. While coercion implies threat that the target may, or may not accept, imposition is stronger and means that the target is so weak that it has no option but to comply with the preferences of the stronger state (Krasner, in Destradi, 2010). If the state does not use intimidation, it will lose its dominant position. Consequently, as its power is resting on aggressive threats, the empire is rarely *legitimate* because of its lack of consensus in subordinate states.

Hegemony is a more difficult term to grasp, as it has been used in the literature to describe both empire and leadership. In this case, the discriminating elements are the *means* through which power is exercised

[12] I draw here inspiration from Eising's study (2002), advocating that EU institutional settings shape strategic action, because policy learning makes member state's preferences change in EU negotiations.

– which differentiates the hegemon from the empire – and the *ends* of the strategy, which distinguishes a leading strategy from a hegemonic one. Two essential features define the concept. On the one hand, the hegemon is inherently self-interested, and aims at satisfying its personal ends, presented to secondary states as common goals. On the other hand, hegemons mainly operate by using a combination of material incentives and ideational power instruments (Destradi, 2010). However, as it remains a multifaceted concept and to make it suitable for empirical analysis, Destradi underlines the need to further specify the different forms of hegemony. She thus develops three sub-types: (1) *hard* hegemony, that can be conceived as a system of domination based on coercion, but exercised in a subtler way, resting on economic threats like the denial of the access to the hegemon's market; (2) *intermediate* hegemony, which underlines the material incentives provision – like side-payments – and rewards to subordinate states, but also on shared norms and values with the subordinate states and (3) the *soft* version of hegemony, relying on modifying the norms and values of secondary states, is almost similar to the leadership strategy, even though the *ends* are still the interests of the hegemon (Destradi, 2010: 918-921).

As just mentioned, when it comes to leadership, the discriminating factor is the *ends*. While the hegemon seeks its self-interests, a leader is defined by the pursuit of common objectives and by the commonality of interests between him and the followers. In this case, there is a real interaction between them. This strategy echoes to the 'consensual hegemony' of Burges, minimizing the coercive aspects associated with domination, focusing instead on a vision that privileges the creation of consensus through the shaping of common positive outcomes (Burges, 2008: 81).

Two kinds of leadership are underlined, depending on who initiated it: it may either be a *leader-initiated* or *follower-initiated* leadership. In the case of a leader-initiated leadership, the leader's strategy is based on its engagement in a socialization process with the aim of creating shared norms and values, and generating a true leadership. In this context, Destradi argues that soft hegemony and leadership can represent two different strategies of an ongoing process: it starts when the hegemony initiates a socialization process with the aim of realizing its own objectives, but in a second stage it leads to a commonality of ends and interests with the subordinate states, thereby transforming them into followers (Destradi, 2010: 924-925).

At the end of the argument, Destradi offers a comprehensive table of the main features of empire, hegemony and leadership. Although there are eight principal characteristics, when testing these concepts for the research, she advises to reduce the number of variables to two principal ones: the *ends* and the *means*. The former is helpful to distinguish the leading strategy, from hegemony and empire, while the latter, by analyzing the use of coercive, material or discursive instruments, allows for a differentiation

between imperial strategy, or the different kinds of hegemony. For further discrimination, one can also study the legitimacy the analyzed state benefits, or the reactions and behavior of subordinate states (Destradi, 2010).

Logically, the following procedure will be used to define the dependent variable, and will be applied to the case:

1. a. Based on this theory postulating that the *goals* are determinant in a regional power strategy, one could expect that if the regional power pursues as goals its self-interest, it is either an imperial or a hegemonic strategy.
   b. If the regional power wants to establish common goals with subordinate states, it is a leadership strategy.
2. If the regional power, seeking to share common goals with other states, leads itself the process, it is a leader-initiated strategy. If not, it is a follower-initiated leadership.
3. a. If this theory claiming that the *means* are determinant in a regional power strategy applies, and if the regional power follows its self-interest and uses coercion, it is either an imperial or a hard hegemonic strategy.
   b. If the self-interested regional power does not use coercion, it is either an intermediate or soft hegemon.
4. If expectation 3a applies and the regional power uses military intervention, then it is an empire. If not, it is a hard hegemony.
5. If expectation 3b applies, and the regional power uses material incentives, then it is an intermediate hegemony. If not, it is a soft hegemony.

II. Strategic culture – first independent variable

Strategic culture emphasizes the domestic constraints that may affect policy choices. The concept is also particularly insightful in understanding foreign policy patterns, as there is an inherent relationship between culture and behavior. Cultural theorists have identified three ways in which the former influences the latter. First, culture helps to define the basic goals of the community, and this further shapes its interests. It further frames the perceptions of the external environment, by conditioning the issues to which attention should be devoted. Third, it narrows the identification and evaluation of the behaviors available for defending the group's interests (Duffield, 1999). Of course, behavior may change as a result of change in the international environment, or technology. Yet, these issues will not be assessed objectively, but rather through the lens provided by the strategic culture (Gray, 1981).

Analyzing strategic culture allows us to see to what extent a certain type of strategic culture would match

South African foreign policy choice. Each expectation is conceptualized in reference to Destradi's strategies, to support the link with the dependent variable. If the overall strategic culture is reflected in the policy choice occurring in the case of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, it will thus be possible to conclude that domestic constraints have had an impact in the definition of the policy.

The complexity of the concept makes it hard to be captured by a single IR theory, hence the analysis is centered on three levels. Drawing on Biava, Drent, and Herd's method (2011), three drivers of strategic culture are systematically analyzed: (1) the perception of new *threats*, (2) the *operations* themselves, and (3) the shared norms regarding the appropriate *instruments* to tackle security challenges. From a constructivist inspiration, the perception of new threats, the subsequent adaptation of the country and the shared norms concerning the appropriate instruments are studied. In addition, the operations themselves and the resources deployed show a realist influence (Biava et al., 2011: 1235).

Based on Chittick and Billingsley's article (1988), South African strategic culture is analyzed under two spectra within which the beliefs of the appropriateness of alternative policies can vary: multilateralism versus unilateralism, and militarism versus anti-militarism.

The first, ranging from multilateralism to unilateralism, captures varying beliefs on the character of the international system, and the ultimate *purpose* of foreign policy (Chittick & Billingsley, 1988). The definition of unilateralism used for this study characterizes a state acting alone on the basis of narrow self-interest, without regard for the wishes of the other countries (Brooks, 2011). Consequently, one can assume that unilateral actions, led in nonconformity with a rule-based principle (Monten, 2008), are not legitimate.[13] Based on this, one can expect that:

> *Exp. 1*: States with a clear unilateral strategic culture, pursuing their narrow self-interest without the need for legitimation from other states, are likely to adopt either a hegemonic or an imperial strategy.

Multilateralism is an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more parties to solve commonly-shared problems (Wuthnow et al., 2012) on the basis of generalized principles of conduct (Monten, 2007; Tsai, 2008). Multilateralism also requires an absolute commitment to invest in the creation and maintenance of international institutions (Skidmore, 2005). From this definition, one sees that a multilateral strategic culture allows for common ends, but also an underlying self-interested behavior to see its 'shared problem' solved. Besides, the process is consensual and respects ruled

[13] Legitimacy here, is understood as the recognition of the right to govern, resting on the *consent* of involved countries, the *respect of norms* and the *conformity to the law* (Coicaud, 2002). By acting unilaterally, a state is not legitimate, because it has not the consent of other states and does not act on a rule-based principle.

principles, making it legitimate. Consequently, from this definition, one can expect that:

> *Exp. 2:* States with a clear multilateral strategic culture, acting in accordance with other states and willing to reach common ends, are likely to pursue a leadership strategy.

Yet, if its multilateral strategic culture is more oriented towards the resolution of shared problems, with an underlying pursuit of its national interest, states are likely to pursue a hegemonic strategy. This will be kept in mind while applying this expectation to South Africa.

These two aforementioned expectations will allow us to make the distinction between the *ends* of the policy choice of a country. It can be either pursuing its national interest or oriented towards common ends with other states.

When it comes to the second range, militarism versus anti-militarism, the focus is to highlight the various *means* accomplishing foreign policy goals, and the operation of the international system (Chittick & Billingsley, 1988). By militarism, one can understand the 'inclination to rely on military means of coercion for the handling of conflicts', in other words it is the propensity to utilize force to resolve conflict (Stavrianakis & Selby, 2012). Moreover, the militarist envisages the international system as a conflict arena in which the use of force is an imminent possibility (Chittick & Billingsley, 1988). The expectation stemming from this is straightforward:

> *Exp. 3*: States with a strong militarist strategic culture, using military interventions and threats in their foreign policy, are likely to adopt an imperial strategy.

When testing, attention will be paid to the potential military intervention of South Africa between 1994 and 1999. 'Military intervention' is here defined according to the UN Charter: 'a military intervention implies the use of military force, by air, sea or land forces (UN Charter, 1945: art. 42).

When it comes to anti-militarism, accommodationist strategies are preferred, seeing the potential of non-coercive means, like diplomatic tools, to satisfy goals (Chittick & Billingsley, 1988), and the possibility that threats can be managed through trade-offs and suasion (Johnston, 1995). Consequently, the following expectation is formulated:

> *Exp. 4*: States with a strong anti-militarist strategic culture, advocating for peaceful means to resolve conflicts, are likely to either adopt an intermediate, a soft hegemonic strategy, or a leadership strategy.

This second spectrum, when applied to South Africa, allows to see to what extent the country tends to use a specific set of *instruments* over another, essential discriminating factor in Destradi's typology.

When looking systematically at the three aforementioned drivers of strategic culture (perception of threat, following operations, and the norms concerning specific instruments) between 1994 and 1999, these expectations will enable to measure to what extent the domestic level might have had an influence on the foreign policy pattern of South Africa in the case of the ICD.

III. Regional socialization – second independent variable

Socialization implies that states assimilate the norms of a system without the use of force, and it is often associated with learning (Levy, 1994:298). There is thus a norm transmission by the *socializer* resulting in a 'pro-norm behavior' by the *socializee*. Moreover, this process leads to long-term changes in behavior, rather than short-term adaption (Acharya, 2011). As explained at the beginning of this chapter, scholars maintain that socialization – and changing minds – does have an impact on state's behavior and in the definition of their foreign policy (Ikenberry & Kupchan, 1990; Thompson, 2006; Baun & Marek, 2013).

This thesis will draw on Jeffrey Checkel's approach (2005) of socialization, understood as the shift from a *logic of consequences*, where agents calculate instrumentally the consequences of adopting a socializing behavior, to a *logic of appropriateness*. There are two ways in which agents may follow a logic of appropriateness, two outcomes of socialization. On the one hand, they may consciously behave properly, by learning a role, which is Type I socialization. On the other hand, following a logic of appropriateness may exceed role playing, where agents think that community rules are 'the right thing to do': they adopt the interests – or even the identity – of the organization in which they are part. This is Type II socialization (Checkel, 2005).

Both types of socialization result from three specific mechanisms of socialization, namely *strategic calculation*, *role playing* and *normative suasion*. This section elaborates on two of them[14], taking SADC as the regional socializer and South Africa as the socializee. From a structuralist perspective, the study considers an institution, SADC, as the socializer to ease the understanding of the potential overarching pressures in the region, instead of analyzing each separate country's appeals towards South Africa.

[14] Jeffrey Checkel proposes a first mechanism of socialization, namely 'strategic calculation'. Here, agents are only instrumentally rational and respond to incentives, be they social (status, shaming) or material (financial and trade opportunities). As there is no socialization, no shift from a logic of consequences to one of appropriateness exists Yet, it is understood as a first mechanism towards socialization, because this first behavioral adaptation may lead to sustained compliance, and even internalization (Checkel, 2005). Since it does not underline any socialization at stake, attention is mainly paid to the two other socialization mechanisms: role playing and persuasion.

Moreover, institutions can be seen as a promoter of socialization, and provide a thicker milieu of rules and norms, making it an easily identifiable socializer (Thies, 2012:498; Acharya, 2011).

Initially applied to the European Union institutions, the central question here is to investigate whether regional organizations have the ability to socialize states in Southern Africa. The aim of this section is to see whether these social mechanisms push towards a particular behavior from the socializee. In other words, it is to see whether SADC socialization would impact South Africa's behavior in its way of choosing a particular strategy. While keeping in mind Destradi's strategies, expectations will be drawn from each social mechanism at stake.

a. Role playing

Whereas strategic calculation is about *instrumental* rationality, role playing is a mechanism relying on the *bounded* rationality of actors: they cannot carefully calculate the costs and benefits of an alternative action. As Checkel (2005) puts it, 'role playing' as a socialization mechanism implies that institutional environments provide simplifying cues that can lead to the enactment of particular role conceptions. Under this social mechanism, agents adopt certain roles because they are appropriate in a particular setting, but without thinking of the reasons *why* it is appropriate. In other words, it leads to Type I socialization.

Under this process of socialization, the socializee is passively adopting the roles assigned by the socializer: role expectations take the lead over role conceptions. Not acting to pursue its own national interest, the analyzed state would only pursue socializer interests. In our case, this would mean that South Africa, seen as bounded rational, would accept the role that SADC wants it to enact, like pushing South Africa to intervene in DRC only for common regional interests. This would thus be a *leadership strategy*. Thus, under this socialization mechanism, the expectation is that:

> *Exp. 5:* If socialization occurs *via* role playing, it is likely that states, passively accepting the roles attributed by the regional organization, do not act in their self-interest.

To elaborate on this mechanism, role theory[15] is enlightening. It postulates that roles are created by the combination of an actor's subjective understandings of what its behavior should be (i.e. its role conceptions) and the norms and expectations that cultures, societies, institutions and groups attach to particular positions (i.e. role prescriptions) in the particular context in which the role is being enacted (Holsti, 1970: 39). Role *conceptions* can also be understood as what the 'ego' understands as its own

[15] Role theory studies the behavior using the notion of 'role'. International roles are understood as social positions, constituted by ego and alter expectations regarding the purpose of an actor in an organized group (Duggan, 2015).

position and functions and the appropriate behavior to them (Holsti, 1970:239), and can be expressed by policymakers within a specific country (Thies, 2009). And role *prescriptions* represent the 'alter' side, where external demands appear (Holsti, 1970).

When testing, it will be necessary to determine what the role conceptions of South Africa are, and what constitute the role prescriptions of SADC towards the country. If *role prescriptions*, coming from external demands, take over *role conceptions*, what the country thinks it should do, it could be concluded that Type I socialization is at stake in the South African behavior, and that it is not acting in its own self-interest. [16]

b. Normative suasion

Normative suasion involves an active and reflective internalization among social agents. Language takes here a crucial place: whereas under strategic calculation, actors would only use it as a means to exchange information for their algebra, in normative suasion, communicative tools are the principal channel of socialization (Checkel, 2005). Moreover, it leads to a homogenization of interests (Johnston, 2001) and even to a redefinition of the state's normative order and to a transformation in policies (Destradi, 2010: 920). In this case, the reversal from a logic of consequences to one of appropriateness is complete, we thus have a Type II socialization: the socializee considers the socializer norms as 'the right thing to do'. Moreover, implying a deep change in the preferences of the target government, persuasion is likely to also have an impact on the *means* preferred by the regional power. The expectation is thus formulated as follows:

> *Exp. 6*: If socialization occurs *via* normative persuasion, states are likely to adopt the regional community ends and means as their own, thus acting in total common interest. A leadership strategy is thus likely.

To determine whether persuasion appears, Johnston's (2001) scope conditions of persuasion in international institutions are applied, to see to what extent SADC provides a favorable environment for such an enterprise. Persuasion is most likely to occur in an institution if (1) the membership is small; (2) the authoritativeness of members is unevenly allocated, but legitimate; (3) decisions are based on consensus; (4) the institution's mandates are deliberative; and (5) the autonomy of the agents is high (Johnston, 2001:510).

[16] Although the operationalization of role playing is restricted to these two concepts only, I am aware that role theory extends much beyond these concepts: role expectations, role location, role demands or audience effects are many examples of how to further precise the role enactment of an entity within the international system (Thies, 2009).

Once these conditions have been applied, Johnston (2001) recommends analyzing whether normative suasion has led to pro-normative behavior by answering three questions: have attitudes and arguments of South Africa changed, converging with the arguments that predominate within SADC? Has behavior changed in ways consistent with these arguments? Finally, were material side-payments or threats not part of the decision to conform to pro-social norms?

Johnston's article (2001) is used to uncover whether persuasion is at stake, because it perfectly fits the frame of this analysis. Arguing that international organizations should be treated as social environments, he develops a comprehensive study of the micro-processes[17] of socialization and develops propositions about the conditions under which one might expect compliance in institutions, and this is the point of my endeavor.

Clarifying the concept of 'Self-Interest'

One can see, throughout this Theoretical Framework, that 'self-interested behavior' is essential to clarify before operationalizing. Whether it is used to characterize a regional power strategy, to consider a country's strategic culture or its degree of regional socialization, the aforementioned expectations focus on 'self-interest' as an essential discriminating element. Drawing on Destradi's explanation, a self-interested state seeks "to pursue security for itself in an environment perceived as anarchical […] through the pursuit of *its own national interest*" (Destradi, 2010: 909-910). As her theory constitutes the core of this study, self-interested states will thus be inherently associated with the pursuit of their national interest. National interest, in Krasner's interpretation (1978), consists of a set of ordered state preferences, which can be inferred from the statements and behavior of the central decision makers. It must further satisfy two criteria: national interest must be related to general objectives, and not to the preferences of any group or class, and the ordering of policy preferences must persist over time (Burschill, 2005: 48).

Based on this, it is now possible to specify what constitutes South Africa's national interest. In 1993, Nelson Mandela, then president of the ANC, made an influential speech presenting the six pillars upon which South African foreign policy rested: the centrality of *human rights*, the promotion of *democracy*, a consideration of justice and respect for *international law*, *peace* and resolution of conflict through internationally agreed mechanisms, a commitment to the *interest of Africa* in world affairs, and finally a focus on *economic development* through regional and international cooperation (Mandela, 1993).

[17] Micro-processes in his study are equated to what we understand by 'social mechanisms' here, namely what supports socialization (see Thies, 2012:27).

Other policy documents confirm the importance of Mandela's speech to determine South Africa's national interest. In 1998, the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions clearly explained what its national interest entails. It precisely outlined the Constitution and the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) as national policy documents reflecting the national interest. Moreover, the 2003 Ten Years Review report of the South African government notes that the RDP has been the only encompassing framework of the long-term development objectives that provides a coherent vision of the formal institutions of government and of civil society (PCAS, 2003: 103-104; Van Nieuwkerk, 2004). Enacted in November 1994, the RDP is a policy framework highlighting the key state priorities and objectives for socio-economic progress in South Africa. The RDP develops concrete long-term social objectives[18], which are considered as guides to general government action. These three sources – Mandela's 1993 speech, the 1994 RDP and the 1998 White Paper – thus constitute reliable sources in determining South Africa's national interest.

As Carlsnaes and Nel note (2006), although Mandela's six principles were not official policy at that time, the degree to which they can be discerned in South African foreign policy over the next 12 years is exceptional. For instance, the 1998 White Paper 'repeats' these precepts and further presents South Africa's foreign policy as an important component of the definition of national interest. As the RDP principles completely fall within Mandela's speech and aims at 'general governmental action', my focus, more oriented towards foreign policy, requires the understanding of South Africa's national interest through the 1993 foreign policy pillars.

Keeping in mind these six priorities, constitutive of the South African national interest, allows for an easier test of the upcoming expectations taking into account the independent variables. To recall, these theoretically-informed expectations were formulated as follows:

[18] The country has to meet basic needs. It makes a point to develop human resources. Third, it needs to strengthen its economy. And finally, democratizing the state and society is the cornerstone of a proper development (RDP, 1994).

On strategic culture	On regional socialization
Exp. 1: States with a clear unilateral strategic culture, pursuing their narrow self-interest without the need for legitimation from other states, are likely to adopt either a hegemonic or an imperial strategy. *Exp. 2:* States with a clear multilateral strategic culture, acting in accordance with other states and willing to reach common ends, are likely to pursue a leadership strategy. *Exp. 3*: States with a strong militarist strategic culture, using military interventions and threats in their foreign policy, are likely to adopt an imperial strategy. *Exp. 4*: States with a strong anti-militarist strategic culture, advocating for peaceful means to resolve conflicts, are likely to either adopt an intermediate, a soft hegemonic strategy, or a leadership strategy.	*Exp. 5:* If socialization occurs *via* role playing, it is likely that states, passively accepting the roles attributed by the regional organization, do not act in their self-interest. *Exp. 6*: If socialization occurs *via* normative persuasion, states are likely to adopt the regional community ends and means as their own, thus acting in total common interest. A leadership strategy is thus likely.

CHAPTER 4 – RESEARCH DESIGN

When dealing with research designs, one first needs to narrow the scope of the research methods available by choosing whether to use qualitative or quantitative methods. Qualitative methodology is defined by its emphasis on the qualities of entities and on processes and meanings that are not examined in terms of quantity, amount, intensity or frequency (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). It attempts to explain individual cases by a "cause-of-effects" approach, i.e. starting with an outcome and moving backward toward the causes (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). Moreover, as this thesis is a small-N study and it focuses on what drives a country to act the way it does and measures the influence of factors on a foreign policy strategy, it thus uses a qualitative method. Based on this, this section presents the qualitative research design that will be used, namely Causal-Process Tracing (CPT). Then, attention will be paid to the data collection and its most appropriate sources. The third and final section of this chapter elaborates on the requirements for case selection of the CPT design.

I. Research design

The most appropriate design for our research is causal-process tracing (CPT). It implies generating and analyzing data on the causal mechanisms, processes, and events, that link presumed causes to observed effects (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). From this general approach, this thesis specifically does a 'process verification', or 'theory-based' analysis, testing whether the observed processes among variables in a case match those predicted by previously designated theories (George & Bennett, 1997). Furthermore, it admits that there is no methodological necessity for examining many cases for drawing causal inferences, rather the point is to dig deep into an individual case to make comprehensive evidence to infer causality (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 100), which is what this thesis carries out.

Causal-process tracing is much more centered on the dependent variables, that is to say on the many and complex causes of a specific outcome, and it is precisely what this research is about. Process tracing implies a 'configurational thinking'. Instead of focusing on the *effects* of individual causes, as it is the case in a co-variational study, approaches based on configurational thinking admits that all social outcomes are the results of a combination of causal factors, that there are divergent pathways to similar social outcomes (equifinality); and that the effects of the same causal factor can be different in different contexts and combinations (causal heterogeneity) (Blatter & Haverland, 2012: 80). In other words, process tracing is required if we want to know not only whether something mattered or made a difference, but also *how* exactly it influenced the outcome.

Besides its prime focus on the causes of a certain outcome and that it methodologically admits a

thorough inquiry on an individual case, there is an additional reason why CPT is the most relevant design. It also sheds light on its empirical foundations, and gives content for analysis. Its underpinnings may be structured around three major elements, (1) 'comprehensive storylines', in which the development of potentially relevant causal conditions is presented; (2) 'smoking guns', showing the temporal and spatial proximity of causes and effects, provide more detailed insights into the causal processes that occur at critical moments; and (3) 'confessions', reaching 'deeper' insights into the perceptions, motivations and anticipations of major actors (Blatter & Haverland, 2012: 111-112).

However, as it admits equifinality, results of a study based on CPT are not easily generalizable. It rather forces to look at further 'possible cases', hence the character of generalization of such an approach is called 'possibilistic'. Instead of striving for applying conclusions on a wider population, the goal of CPT is to specify the set of causal configurations that make specific outcomes 'possible'. By 'possible', it is meant that it can point to the set of proven causal configurations and can thus contribute to the identification of new social mechanisms (Blatter & Haverland, 2012).

Finally, because it is used to identify and describe policy events, and elaborate on the single or multiple paths by which they come about, CPT considers the dense web of relationships connecting states and individuals as a policymaking system, as well as analyzes their mutual influences (Kay & Baker, 2015). CPT holds the promise of a rich account of 'how' a complex political phenomenon like public policy emerges (Kay & Baker, 2015), and this is precisely what this thesis is about. For all these reasons, causal-process tracing is thus the most appropriate design for my research agenda, as it best suits the goal of uncovering why a certain outcome – choice over a regional power strategy – occurs, and what factors lead to it, in specific time and place.

II. Data collection

When it comes to considering the data that supports this chosen research design, one can refer to the three aforementioned empirical foundations, that provide temporal order, density and depth in the description of the causal process.

a. Comprehensive storylines

Providing an overview of the overall process that led to the outcome of interest, comprehensive storylines have two functions. In addition to describing the most important *structural conditions* that potentially have an influence on the outcome of interest, they also identify the most important *steps* that have led to the outcome. In fact, the overall process is sectioned into different sequences, that are separated by decisive situations and phases of transformations. By shedding light on the 'turning points',

two empirical steps are highlighted: the succession of turning points and phases of transformation of different conditions can be used as evidence for, or against, the claim that there are causal connections between these conditions. Moreover, as they are 'critical moments', it makes sense to dig deeper into the empirical process to reveal the workings of causal conditions and mechanisms in detail (Blatter & Haverland, 2012).

The type of data that may be used here are the narratives, and secondary sources that help to understand how things happened. Under this category, reliable sources encompass scientific journals[19], press files[20] and historical accounts.

b. Smoking guns

This metaphor is an "observation that presents a central piece of evidence within a cluster of observations, which together provide a high level of certainty for a causal inference" (Blatter & Haverland, 2012:115). Yet, the core observation must be complemented with further observations that provide additional evidence for the causal claim. The function of a smoking gun is thus to provide a high level of certainty that a causal factor actually led to the next step in the causal pathway or to the final outcome of interest. The observations need to be connected both by temporal and spatial contiguities. The former refers to the certainty that two things occurred at the same time, or almost, while the latter – beyond a narrow geographic proximity – includes notion such as 'social contiguity', close ties, and intensive communion within a same network (Blatter & Haverland, 2012).

The 'smoking guns' data that will be used relates to primary accounts, such as official documents (administrative documents, summit communiques, treaties). In addition to the above-mentioned official documents used to consider the South African national interest, publications of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)[21], white papers and green papers[22] on foreign policy will be closely analyzed to uncover what shapes the country's strategic culture. The SADC summit communiqués (1980-2006), its regional codes and policies will also give insightful information when it comes to the socialization process towards South Africa (e.g. regarding the rules and role prescriptions of the socializer).

[19] Such as the South African Journal of International Affairs, the Institute for Global Dialogue, the German Institute of Global and Area studies (GIGA), or Politikon (from the IAPSS network).
[20] South African newspapers, e.g. the Daily News, Cape Times and Mail & Guardian. Congolese media, e.g. Radio Okapi and le Potentiel.
[21] Publications by the Foreign Affairs committees, namely the Discussion documents on Foreign Affairs.
[22] Drafted by Ministries, Green Papers give an idea of the general thinking that informs a particular policy. This leads to the development of a more refined discussion document, a White Paper, which is a broad statement of government policy (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, n.d.).

c. *Confessions*

Important complements to the smoking guns are the confessions, because they reveal the motivations of the actors. The analysis here is on the micro-level, which helps inferring motives by combining the information on structural factors with the information on actions. Yet, one should not take them at face value and carefully examine the contexts in which actors provide information about their perceptions. Otherwise, one might not see the 'ex-post rationalization' that occurs: actors justify their decisions arguing that they were pursuing a particular strategy (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). Concretely, the conducted interviews, especially within such a short time-scope, will rely upon the memories, and the subjectivity of the interviewees. This is the reason why this study combines these confessions with other sources of data (such as official documents and scientific accounts).

It seems logical that the use of interviews is the most relevant source of data to reveal the perceptions and motivations of actors. More precisely, semi-structured interviews will be used: frequently associated with qualitative research, the structure of a semi-structured interview is usually organized around topics or themes to be covered during the course of the interview, rather than a sequenced script of standardized questions. Its aim is to generate data interactively, where the interviewer, and not only the interviewee, is seen to have an active and reflexive role in the process of knowledge construction (Mason, 2012). This type has been chosen, because it allows for flexibility, and can thus lead to unexpected outcomes.

As social processes are central in this thesis (socialization and culture), confessions are crucial pieces of evidence. To uncover these mechanisms, ground-level and academic interviewees will provide complementary angles. Researchers in think tanks[23] and members of the South African government (specially of the DIRCO) are planned to be contacted for interviews. The use of these three types of data – scientific articles, official documents and interviews – will guide our CPT in discovering what shaped South Africa regional strategy in a particular case.

III. Reasons for the case

Causal-process tracing states three main reasons for the selection of a case.

First of all, the case must be *positive*. In other words, it is recommended to choose a case where the outcome of interest is apparent. If we want to determine whether a causal factor is a 'necessary'

[23] More precisely, researchers at the GRIP, the Institute for Security Studies, whose focus touches upon International Relations, and specifically on conflicts and security in Africa, can provide crucial insights in the empirical process. Besides, due to its colonial history, Belgium has developed a deep interest for the DRC war, hence professors from the Université Libre de Bruxelles will be contacted to investigate the Congolese dimension of this study.

condition for an outcome, only investigation into positive cases, which corroborate the outcome of interest, makes sense (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). As the point of this thesis is to explain what determines the involvement of South Africa in another country, our worry was to choose an intervention where South Africa played a crucial role. In this perspective, many sources portray the country as a key mediator in the peace process that was the ICD (Habib & Selinyane, 2006; Curtis, 2007; Rogier, 2004; Mutusi, 2016; Malan & Boshoff, 2002).

Second, Blatter and Haverland (2012) argue that the case must be *accessible* to identify the kind of empirical information that is necessary to make convincing causal claims. Whether it is from the academic world, or thanks to official documents, the ICD has been abundantly investigated, and lots of written sources are available. Moreover, as it happened in a recent past (1998-2003), people who lived during the Dialogue can still testify. This will bring a crucial insight to the data collection.

Finally, the chosen case must highlight practical and social relevance. In this vein, Blatter and Haverland argue the case under study should generate 'useful' knowledge: focusing on the necessary conditions and on the causal mechanisms, it should enable actors to identify specific points and times of intervention in social processes (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). Here again, the punctual intercessions of South Africa in the consecutive ICD steps favor a precise and relevant definition of Pretoria's strategy in the DRC.

These three reasons show that selecting the ICD as the case will allow to determine quite clearly what kind of strategy did South Africa use as a regional power, object of this research.

CHAPTER 5 – CASE PRESENTATION: THE INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE

This chapter is composed of two sections. First, some background is given on the case of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and its stakeholders. This will lead to the characterization of the dependent variable of this thesis, namely the choice for a strategy over another. This constitutes the core of the second section, which applies Destradi's theory to the ICD.

I. Background on the case: Inter-Congolese Dialogue (1999-2003)

Keeping in mind the ultimate purpose of this chapter, i.e. applying the Inter-Congolese Dialogue case to Destradi's typology (2010), this section further elaborates on the background of the process. Attention is closely paid to the South African role in the various agreements that constituted the Dialogue. Indeed, emphasis is put on the extent to which this regional power contributed to the peace process. It should be noted that the whole ICD process is here taken into account, that is, from the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999 until the signing of the Global Agreement in April 2003. Choosing a single step, or some agreements would be, in my view, a highly subjective way to analyze South Africa's strategy, and would not shed light on the whole complexity of its method.

a. General context: The Second Congo War (1998-2003)

Since the war that ousted former dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in October 1996, DRC has never truly found peace. The war tentatively ended in May 1997 when Laurent-Désiré Kabila took over power in Kinshasa. Subsequently, Kabila fell out with his Rwandan and Ugandan allies, who were purely instrumental in ousting Mobutu (Ahere, 2012; Apuuli, 2004). Laurent Kabila was expected to be cooperative in the economic, political and security interests of western governments and regional states.[24] Yet, he disregarded the terms and conditions of his installation, when he asked, only a year later, to all foreign troops to leave the country (Naidoo, 2002; Wilén, 2012).

Starting in August 1998 and with the ultimate purpose to oust Laurent Kabila, the Second Congo War was characterized by many actors in complex alignments. One side consisted of the DRC government, Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, the Maï-Maï[25] and the Hutu-aligned forces. Their opponents encompassed Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and the Tutsi-aligned forces (Ahere, 2012). The MLC, a

[24] These interests included making the country's enormous mineral sources available for exploitation mainly by Belgian, Canadian and US-based mining conglomerates, and at the same time allowing Rwanda and Uganda to take charge in Kinshasa (Naidoo, 2002).
[25] Armed group fighting against the invasion of the Rwandan armed forces (Mangu, 2003).

Congolese Ugandan-backed rebel movement led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, aimed at overthrowing Kabila's government (Mangu, 2003). The RCD, also a Congolese rebel movement opposed to Kabila, split between the supporters of the leaders Emile Ilunga on the one hand and Pr. Wamba-dia-Wamba on the other. Wamba created a rival RCD faction, the 'RCD-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML), while partisans of Ilunga were part of the RCD-Goma. The former was a Uganda-controlled group, whereas the latter was supported by Rwanda (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2004:51). Because of the conflict with its eastern neighbors, the DRC soon turned to Southern Africa, and became a member of the SADC in 1998 (Tonheim & Swart, 2015; SADC, 2006).

When SADC had to discuss how to intervene towards one of their members, it had to be decided whether Congo had been invaded by Rwanda and Uganda, or whether it was an internal conflict between ethnic groups. South Africa, backed by the USA and the UK, claimed that it was an internal conflict. Moreover, Pretoria, along with Botswana and Zambia, wanted to intervene diplomatically rather than militarily, while some SADC countries, such as Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, sent troops to help Kabila's regime (Tonheim & Swart, 2015). This turmoil already originated in the personal dispute between Mandela and Mugabe, concerning the Chairmanship of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS) that Mugabe wanted to monopolize. Mandela had told the SADC leaders that he would resign as the chairman unless the Zimbabwean President toed the line (Wilén, 2012).

The SADC was thus deeply divided on the stance to adopt towards Congo, explaining its heterogenic response, where three of its members intervened on the side of Kabila with military means, and the other members voted for a diplomatic answer to the conflict (Wilén, 2012; Africa Research Bulletin, 1998).

b. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue process

As its name suggests, the bottom-line of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue is to bring an African solution to an African problem. Among the various African sub-regional organizations involved, SADC played a leading role (Rogier, 2004). Yet, as previously mentioned, this Community was divided in its support – or opposition – to the Congolese President. Just before the war broke out, Mandela pushed for Kinshasa's inclusion to the SADC, with the motive to have better control over Kabila, but also because it would open for future economic investments (Landsberg, 2002; Ancas, 2011; Interview 1[26]).

But soon, the impartiality of SA was seriously questioned by Kabila: it was accused of siding with the anti-government rebels (Tonheim & Swart, 2015). Initially refusing to intervene militarily in Congo, it

[26] The name and position of each interviewee can be found in appendix 4.

contradicted itself when a coup broke out in Lesotho and the SANDF[27] was deployed right away (Litoki, 2007). Moreover, it sold weapons to Uganda and Rwanda in 1997, but stopped in 1998 (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

Yet, when Thabo Mbeki took over South Africa's presidency in 1999, he put forwards key proposals, such as the need for direct talks among the parties, the cessation of hostilities pending an inter-Congolese political arrangement and the withdrawal of foreign forces after the deployment of a peacekeeping operation (Rogier, 2004; Habib & Selinyane, 2006). This ten-point plan preceded the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.

Although South Africa strongly supported the process, it was precisely by the efforts of the SADC, the AU, and the UN that the Agreement was formed (Tonheim & Swart, 2015). In July 1999, it was signed by the allied heads of states of the DRC, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, and their Ugandan and Rwandan counterparts (Ngolet, 2011). On August 1st, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) subsequently signed the agreement, thanks to the tireless efforts of the South African foreign minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (Ngolet, 2011; SADC, 2006:104). Indeed, she traveled to Rwanda and DRC and stressed the need for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. This work was backed by Mbeki, who held talks with Wamba and Etienne Tshisekedi[28], to impress upon them the importance of all belligerents implementing the LA (Landsberg, 2002).

The much delayed Inter-Congolese Dialogue thus started with a dual purpose. First, as a provision to the Lusaka Agreement, it was expected to produce a negotiated settlement to the war that broke out in August 1998. Second, this process aimed at reviving and consolidating a democratization process that has been thwarted by Mobutu, and subsequently by Laurent-Désiré Kabila (Naidoo, 2002; ICG, 2001) to end up with an inclusive transitional administration. By *inclusive*, it means that its composition should represent the various Congolese stakeholders, and should govern the country on the principle of consensus (Rogier, 2004).

Throughout the process, all parties were expected to participate with equal status during the talks, under the aegis of a neutral facilitator. However, the appointment of a mediator was the first issue, as the different parties could not agree on a candidate. Finally, Sir Kentumile Masire, former President of Botswana, was chosen, and took up his functions in January 2000 (Rogier, 2004; SADC, 2006: 111). In parallel, Thabo Mbeki was pushing the UN to establish a peacekeeping mission for the DRC. This

[27] The South African National Defence Force.
[28] Tshisekedi was the president of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), belonging to the non-armed opposition to Kabila (Apuuli, 2004).

succeeded, in January 2000, the UN launched the MONUC. Aiming at playing a more active role in peacekeeping than under Mandela's presidency, the Mbeki government committed around US $12 million for the mission (Landsberg, 2002).

Although the war that broke-out in August 1998 was directed at Laurent Kabila's removal, his assassination on 16 January 2001, did not calm the situation. The monarchical-style appointment of his son, Joseph Kabila, was controversial. Aware that the Congolese authorities had little to gain in appearing the main obstacle to peace, Kabila junior radically changed direction. He renewed Kinshasa's economic relationship with big multinationals that wanted to obtain the country's mineral wealth, and instituted the desired economic co-operation with international players.[29] Yet, these economic reforms did not exempt Joseph Kabila from the transitional government his country had to introduce (Naidoo, 2002; Rogier, 2004).

Addis Ababa was chosen as the first official session of the ICD, after the DRC government showed their reluctance over South Africa for location, because it was accused of backing the RCD and its Rwandan supporters (Mangu, 2003). Held in October 2001, it resulted in a complete failure. Indeed, the talks collapsed because of disagreements over the representation, and they were later postponed in South Africa. The representation of non-armed opposition[30], the RCD-ML rebels, and the Mai-Mai representation proved difficult to resolve until the Sun City phase, in South Africa (Naidoo, 2002).

After a two-year delay, the real ICD negotiations finally opened in Sun City from 25 February to 19 April 2002. Crucial issues such as funding and representation first needed to be resolved to revive the dialogue. Financial resources were secured, with contributions from South Africa, Belgium, the EU and the USA (Rogier, 2004). Mbeki tried to seek consensus on the two main issues blocking progress at the talks: those of the position of DRC President Joseph Kabila, and the formation of a national army. The rebel movements were pushing for a new transitional leader to be chosen at the ICD, and for a new national army to be created. Conversely, the DRC government wanted Joseph Kabila to stay as president of the transitional government, and that the rebel movement should be absorbed into the existing army (IRIN, 2002).

This deadlock in negotiations concerning the sharing of power would lead to the complete failure of the ICD, and the continuation of war. Mbeki was called by facilitator Masire to find a compromise between

[29] Allowing that mining companies no longer required presidential approval for mining titles, Joseph Kabila gained international acceptance (Naidoo, 2002).
[30] It encompasses fifteen opposition parties, among them Tshisekedi's UDPS, also wishing to be part of the transitional government (Naidoo, 2002).

the parties. The two 'Mbeki Plans' were related to the allocation of key power positions during the transition period. 'Mbeki I' was rejected by the two rebel movements, the RCD-Goma and the MLC, because Joseph Kabila would remain head of state (Apuuli, 2004). 'Mbeki II' was so in favor of the RCD-Goma, concerning the allocation of power statuses, that it was not only rejected by the MLC, but also by Kinshasa (Rogier, 2004). These plans were thus unsuccessful. In parallel, the Kinshasa government and the MLC were negotiating the 'Accord de Sun City' in April 2002, enabling Kabila to be confirmed as president, and Jean-Pierre Bemba to be prime minister. The agreement was signed by more than 70% of the delegates participating to the Dialogue: but the Sun City Kabila-Bemba agreement was attacked as not being all-inclusive (Apuuli, 2004).

In the second half of 2002, the deal concluded by Kabila and Bemba proved to be short-lived, as they could not agree on constitutional issues. This encouraged the United Nations, and South Africa, to put the process back on track to find an agreement, involving all Congolese stakeholders. Negotiations thus continued in Pretoria, with the mediation of UN Special Envoy, Mustapha Niasse (UN, 2002), and South Africa's Local Government Minister, Sydney Mufamadi (Apuuli, 2004). Despite Mbeki's unsuccessful intervention in Sun City, the country remained highly committed to the peace process. Enjoying friendly relations with Kigali, it enabled the RCD-Goma and its sponsors to reach a deal. Indeed, the RCD-Goma was largely held responsible for the failure of the Sun City Accord, and was put aside by the Rwandan government, due to international pressure (Rogier, 2004).

This thus led to the Pretoria I agreement, in July 2002, on the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese soil.[31] Five months later, in December 2002, the *Global and All-Inclusive Agreement* (also called Pretoria II) was signed by the main parties in the conflict. These included the DRC's government, the RCD-Goma, MLC, RCD-ML, RCD-N, and the Maï-Maï. The agreement organized the power distribution as follows: Kabila would remain president during the 24-month transitional period, and would be assisted by four vice-presidents, in charge of several commissions[32] (Apuuli, 2004).

Although the Pretoria II agreement respected the inclusiveness which the Inter-Congolese process aimed at, three issues were not tackled in the text: the integration of all armed forces into a united national army; the personal security of transitional government leaders, and finally the interim constitution of the transition period (Rogier, 2004). Consequently, in March 2003, the signing of a Transitional

[31] This withdrawal would be verified by the MONUC, and the Joint Military Commission (JMC) (Malan & Boschoff, 2002). Structure created thanks to the LA, the JMC was responsible for executing the peacekeeping operations until the deployment of the MONUC (Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, 1999).
[32] Political commission was assigned to RCD-Goma, Finance and Economy to the MLC, Reconstruction and Development were attributed to the government, and finally the Social and Culture Commission to the political opposition (Apuuli, 2004).

Constitution, and of a memorandum on military and security issue, bridged these gaps (Mayne, 2005). This paved to the last session of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, on 1-2 April 2003, where the participants endorsed the package of agreements which comprises all the approved agreements until then (Rogier, 2004). The transitional government and Parliament were inaugurated in July and August 2003, and the adoption of the transitional constitution marked the formal end of the Congolese conflict (Mangu, 2003).

The success of the ICD is limited. Because of the large involvement of external parties in the process, peace is not still secured in the region. The different agreements did not lead to the stemming of violence in the country, and this can be attributed to numerous involved actors, whose interests were not sufficiently addressed to enter into any agreements, or respect them (Ahere, 2012). Yet, the point is less to assess the extent to which the ICD failed or succeeded, but rather to apply Destradi's typology to the South African involvement in the process, which is the point of the following section.

II. South Africa strategy in DRC: determining the dependent variable

As exposed in Chapter 3, Destradi's theory clearly highlights a path to determine a regional power strategy.[33] This section will thus apply it to the case[34], by asking consecutive questions.

The first question to ask concerns the goals of the regional power in entering the process. If South Africa closely pursues its national interest when intervening in the DRC, it is either an imperial or a hegemonic strategy. However, if it wants to establish common goals with subordinate states, it is a leadership strategy. Thus, one should first question the reasons why South Africa entered in the process of the ICD. The DRC being a recent member of the SADC from 1997, the members discussed the stance to adopt towards the fighting. Despite the conclusions that DRC had been invaded by Rwandan and Ugandan troops, South Africa claimed that the conflict was internal. Hence, it seems that the regional power was initially reluctant to intervene in DRC (Tonheim & Swart, 2015; Malan & Boshoff, 2002). Indeed, post-apartheid South Africa did not want to reinstate the 'Big Brother syndrome' and the old regime's bad habits (Fouere, 1997). But soon, and especially with Mbeki's overhaul of foreign policy in 1999, the DRC became one of the top-priorities of the government (Landsberg, 2002), to protect the following interests.

First, as a regional power, South Africa made a point of putting an end to Africa's wars, and the DRC conflict was one of them. Increasing its image as a regional peacemaker and its prestige on the

[33] As a reminder, these consecutive questions can be found at the end of the first section of Chapter 3.
[34] For a recall of the major dates and intercessions of South Africa in the ICD process, see appendix 2.

international scene was part of the rationale for SA to intervene in DRC. There was a desire for the country to play a strong regional role in promoting an ambitious agenda for regional and continental development (Interview 4; Alden & le Pere, 2004; Nathan, 2013; Tonheim & Swart, 2015; Bischoff, 2006). Second, as a commercial power, South Africa had important business opportunities in the country. Indeed, it wanted to maintain its status-quo by engaging business interests in an effort to align its regional economic policy with its geopolitical and security interests in southern Africa and beyond. As it had to protect its mining-industrial core, reaching north into the Congo, and other South African private sector conglomerates, such as SASOL and ASKOM (Africa Research Bulletin, 1998: 13224; Landsberg, 2002; Rogier, 2004). Yet, this statement is nuanced, as sources are not unanimous. For instance, according to Mrs. Louw-Vaudran, 'it is a myth that South Africa benefited financially from the intervention in the DRC. […] The financial cost of helping mediation did not outweigh the economic benefit'. She rather pointed towards Zimbabwe, whose officials had more direct material benefits in DRC, such as farms (Interview 4).

Third, as the host country of several meetings throughout the Dialogue, it wanted to gain from the financing of the process, and in human resources. Success of these investments thus became crucial (Tonheim & Swart, 2015; Rogier, 2004). A fourth reason is also that the successful conclusion of the ICD would prevent refugee flows (Interview 5; Landsberg, 2002). South Africa was already shaken by highly xenophobic movements in the country's population. The contact at the Belgian Embassy in Pretoria also confirmed that these streams led to very violent reactions in the country, and this issue is today at the very core of South African politics (Interview 5).

Promoting its economic development, its reputation on the international stage, and protecting the African advantages echo Mandela's 1993 principles. Whilst not all accounts agree, many sources argue that South Africa was pursuing its own national interest in intervening in the DRC.

Any leadership strategy is thus dismissed, which leaves room to investigate the imperial or hegemonic strategies. To proceed, it is necessary to take a look to the means used by South Africa in its intervention in the ICD. If the regional power, pursuing its national interest, uses coercion, it is either an empire or a hard hegemon. On the contrary, if it does not use coercion, it is either an intermediate or a soft hegemon. To know whether it is – or not – at stake, recalling Destradi's understanding of coercion is enlightening: it implies making credible threats to which the target might, or not, acquiesce, or engaging in unilateral moves which undermine the bargaining position of the weaker state (Destradi, 2010: 911). In the ICD case, the aim is thus to spot threats, sanctions or unilateral moves from South Africa towards the DRC conflict.

On this matter, South Africa's stance was clear from the outset of the Dialogue. Wanting to adopt an

anti-militarist orientation, it led to profound divisions within the SADC, between two groupings. On the one hand, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola wanted to deploy troops to strengthen Kabila's regime, while South Africa, Mozambique and Botswana refused to get involved militarily (Wilén, 2012; Landsberg, 2002; Tonheim & Swart, 2015). Concretely, in his ten-point plan to tackle the 1998 crisis, Mbeki promoted diplomatic tools: withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC, an inter-Congolese political conference of reconciliation and reconstruction, and a transitional government with a new constitution (Habib & Selinyane, 2006; Landsberg, 2002). Yet, South Africa's 1998 military intervention in Lesotho contradicted Pretoria's foreign policy. This incredibly damaged its credibility at the beginning of the ICD process, and Kabila accused Pretoria to back the rebels.

Still, an anti-militarist and non-coercive approach was adopted towards the ICD, and no coercive threats were used throughout the process. Moreover, it did not act unilaterally, as it was most of the time backed by the SADC. Indeed, South African presidents were chairpersons of the regional organization during that period, respectively Nelson Mandela from 1996 to 1998, and Thabo Mbeki during the year 1999 (SADC, 2006).

Finally, the very essence of such a dialogue was the inclusion of the Congolese stakeholders, under the mediation of African associates, characteristic of South Africa's peacekeeping missions (Interview 1; Schoeman, 2000). With this, it is possible to put aside the coercive strategies of Destradi's typology, namely the empire and the hard hegemony. A deeper look to the means employed by South Africa allows one to clarify the type of strategy: if material incentives (such as inducements, economic side-payments, military support) are at stake, the country pursues an intermediate hegemonic strategy. If it rather relies on normative persuasion, or socialization from workings groups and committees on contentions issues, a soft hegemony strategy is employed (Destradi, 2010).

Throughout the process of the ICD, one can note some financial incentives on the material side. Pretoria offered some post-conflict reconstruction aid, in exchange of more democratization from Kabila (Landsberg, 2002: 173). Moreover, after calling the UN to establish a peacekeeping force in DRC, the Mbeki government committed South Africa to play an active role in the process. On the one hand, it pledged approximatively US $12 million for the MONUC and $120,000 for the JMC. Regarding the ICD organization, South Africa committed US $107,000 to the overall process (Landsberg, 2002:179). On the other hand, it also invested in human capital by sending 1,500 peacemakers to the MONUC mission and 100 technical specialists of the SANDF in the DRC by the end of 2000 (UN Security Council, 1999; Malan & Boshoff, 2002; Landsberg, 2002).

When it comes to the 'soft' instruments that can be spotted, such as normative persuasion and socialization, the 'quiet diplomacy' of South Africa often occurred. From the very beginning of the

conflict, South Africa pushed for Kinshasa to be part of the SADC in 1997. The rationale was that Pretoria would have better control and influence over Kabila, and would be able to nudge him in the direction of democratization (Landsberg, 2002). Bringing the DRC into the regional organization would meet Pretoria's economic interests and open for future mutual investments opportunities (Interview 1).

In parallel, meetings between heads of states, and senior officials, also punctuated the process. South African foreign minister Dlamini-Zuma's efforts to persuade the Congolese rebels to sign the Lusaka ceasefire document at the beginning of the ICD (Ngolet, 2011; Malan & Boshoff, 2002) or Mbeki talks in July 1999 with Wamba and Tshisekedi, also aiming at including the rebels in the ICD (Landsberg, 2002) can be seen. Besides, following the MONUC intervention, Pretoria engaged Joseph Kabila by providing him support and encouragement towards his position on the ICD. It was a relevant strategy, as the young Kabila regime seemed to be cooperative, and willing to move towards Pretoria's desired direction (Landsberg, 2002: 179). Other illustrations are the Mbeki plans, that constituted a first basis for the Global Agreement of December 2002, the role of the South African Sydney Mufamadi, collaborating with Mustapha Niasse, UN Special Envoy, and Mbeki's persuasion of the RCD-Goma to sign a deal, leading to the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC are also to be highlighted (Mangu, 2003; Rogier, 2004). These numerous examples show the intense persuasive endeavors of South African officials, and underscore their 'behind-the-scenes' and facilitating role (Landsberg, 2002).

Still, it remains difficult to determine whether South Africa mainly resorted to material incentives or persuasion, and which of these instruments was the most influential in the regional power's strategy. Hence, to further precise what strategy was at stake, one should study the subordinate states' strategies towards South Africa, as Destradi's work suggests (2010). If the DRC was compliant only because of a rational cost-benefit calculation, then the strategy at stake is intermediate hegemony. If the DRC was compliant because of the convergence of norms and values, and not from utilitarian calculations, this is a soft hegemony. On this issue, the source of DRC compliance is not its convergence with SA's wishes. On the contrary, the Congolese parties accepted the Global Agreement because it met their interests: avoiding being marginalized, and having their share of power preserved, or recognized (Rogier, 2004; Naidoo, 2002). South Africa desires and instituting a peaceful democratic state were no primary concerns for some Congolese stakeholders.

This final answer thus enables to characterize the dependent variable of this thesis: South Africa's intervention in the DRC is thus an ***intermediate hegemonic strategy***. What could have led to such a behavior is discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6 – DATA ANALYSIS: CAUSAL-PROCESS TRACING

After setting the scene and determining the strategic choice of South Africa in DRC, this chapter aims at systematically comparing the deduced expectations to the collected data. As a reminder, the purpose of these expectations is to empirically determine to what extent the two independent variables, that is the *strategic culture* of South Africa and the *regional socialization* from SADC, shaped the choice of an *intermediate hegemonic strategy* in DRC, namely our dependent variable. The time-frame used is thus from the end of the apartheid in 1994 until the beginning of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, in 1999. According to the CPT method, causal mechanisms of every set of expectations are investigated thanks to three different levels of data, namely comprehensive storylines, smoking guns and confessions.

I. Expectations based on strategic culture

Taking strategic culture as an independent variable allows the investigation of the ways the domestic level shaped South African strategy in Congo. Based on four definitions – unilateralism, multilateralism, militarism and anti-militarism – it was possible to come up with theoretically informed expectations. Whereas the two former are related to the purpose of the regional power's foreign policy, the two latter aim at underlining its preferred tools. This differentiation between *purpose* and *means,* echoing to Destradi's theory, is especially useful to see to what extent the overall strategic culture is reflected in the policy choice that occurred in the ICD. Moreover, when studying the strategic culture of a country, attention is closely paid to the three drivers of strategic culture: the perception of threats, the operations themselves and the shared norms regarding the appropriate instruments to tackle security challenges (Biava et al., 2011).

Exp. 1. Multilateral culture and common ends: leadership strategy likely

According to this expectation, states with a pure multilateral strategic culture were more likely to pursue a leadership strategy, as they establish common objectives with other states, and do not act according to their self-interest (Destradi, 2010). However, the theoretical study showed that multilateralism definitions also comprise that states acting multilaterally may try to solve together common-shared *problems*. This implies an underlying self-interest, where states collaborate because it is in their own interest, but also that hegemonic strategy might occur.[35]

[35] Imperial strategy is also characterized by a pursuit of self-interest, but is inherently incompatible with a multilateral behavior. Indeed, in the case of multilateralism, the process is consenting and respects ruled-based principles, which is not the case in the imperial strategy.

As the methodology requires, analyzing three levels of data is necessary, as well as keeping in mind the different drivers of strategic culture. Right after 1994, South Africa wanted to reintegrate into the international community, after forty-three years of isolation under the apartheid regime (Van Nieuwkerk, 2006). From our data analysis, two main characteristics of South African multilateralism were noticed.

First, whether it is in the chosen instruments, or in the operations led, it seems that South Africa's multilateralism is mainly focused on Africa, whether it is the Southern African region, or the whole continent. Already in 1993, when Mandela gave his influential speech, two of his six principles for foreign policy emphasized the need to work in the respect of international law, and concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should prime (Mandela, 1993). This line was closely followed throughout his mandate. The 'African Renaissance' of Thabo Mbeki is definitely representative of this African focus. His 1996 'I Am an African' speech initiated this movement. At this occasion, the then-Deputy President emphasized that continental solidarity should prevail in SA's foreign relations (Mbeki, 1996) to empower African people to 'deliver themselves from the legacy of colonialism and neo-colonialism' (Ajulu, 2001).

The 1998 White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions also emphasized that, "although South Africa acknowledges its global responsibilities, the prioritisation afforded to Africa in South Africa foreign policy makes Africa the prime focus of future engagements" (DFA, 1998:20). It thus started within its neighborhood: mediation in the constitutional crisis in Lesotho in 1994 (Gwexe, 1999; Ngwawi, 2014); Mandela's efforts during the 1996 elections in Zambia (IPS, 1996); or the mediation between Mobutu and Laurent Kabila in Zaire during the first Congo War (Tonheim & Swart, 2015).

Belonging to regional – and continental – organizations was a cornerstone of Pretoria's favorite instruments (DIRCO, 2004; Flemes, 2007; Alden & le Pere, 2006; Pfister, 2006). It became a member of SADC and the Organization for African Unity (OAU, which is now the African Union) in 1994 (DIRCO, 2004b). But it also aimed at international organizations, such as the Non-Aligned Movement, the G77, initiated negotiations with the EU, was re-admitted to the Commonwealth and the UN (DFA, 1995; Flemes, 2007). On this latter organization however, the ANC and Mandela's stance was clear: for them, the Security Council should not be dominated by a single power, or group of powers in order to foster South interests as well (Mandela, 1993; Lotze et al., 2015; Interview 1). The African solidarity – be it in the organizations it was a member, or its stance towards the UN – is emphasized here.

The second feature of SA multilateralism is its pursuit of veiled strategic interests. Being part of SADC

and the AU revealed that it wanted to achieve further regional integration, along with trade partnerships (such as SACU[36]), and to increase its influence in the region to be seen as a benevolent and peaceful mediator (DFA, 1998; Interview 4; Interview 5; Interview 2). Some accounts underline that these multilateral efforts, such as being part of SADC e.g., are often driven by domestic political concerns: besides making its diverse foreign policy goals more compatible, this multilateralism also protected it against criticism against its policy choices (Van Der Westhuizen, 1998; Saunders & Nagar, 2013; Pfister, 2006; Nathan, 2005: 366). In the same vein, Habib and Selinyane (2006) note that, of the eight SADC protocols adopted by 1998, South Africa had ratified only one: on the shared water resources.[37]

Finally, even if multilateralism as a cornerstone of its foreign policy was even clearer under Mbeki's presidency (Pfister, 2006), the years that preceded his election set the tone. To sum up, it seems that, whether it is in the operations it led abroad, or its preferred instruments, South Africa was very much following a multilateral line between 1994 and 1999, with a strong focus on Africa. Furthermore, according to some accounts, it seems that the country was acting according to domestic priorities, thus getting closer to a hegemonic rather than a leader strategy.

Exp. 2. Unilateral culture: hegemonic or imperial strategy likely

Testing the second expectation requires to remind Destradi's main discriminating characteristic of hegemonic and imperial strategies: states pursue *their self-interest*. Contrarily to 'leader' states pursuing common ends, when states purely seek self-interest without regards for the wishes of other countries and with no respect for rule-based principles, Brooks (2011) and Monten (2007) argue that they are acting unilaterally. The three levels of sources – storylines, smoking guns and confessions – showed that, in its foreign policy, SA was clearly acting according to a multilateral logic, be it in the chosen instruments, or in the operations it led. The 1996 White Paper on the National Defence reminds us that 'after two and half decades of isolation, South Africa has been welcomed back into the international community […]. The country's foreign relations have been transformed from an adversarial mode to a bilateral and multi-lateral co-operation' (DOD, 1996: 4). Their actions are consistent with this official statement, and is also proven by scientific accounts (Interview 1; Interview 4; Interview 2). This multilateral side of the foreign policy has thus been confirmed.

However, one may point towards the 1998 Lesotho intervention as an example of a unilateral approach, where SANDF troops were deployed. For the first time under Mandela's government (Daley, 1998),

[36] The Southern African Customs Unions is composed of South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland. Dating from 1969, it is the oldest Customs Union in the world (DIRCO, 2004a).
[37] SA did indeed have a dire need of Lesotho's water, as is further elaborated below.

this deployment aimed at securing strategic interests: avoiding the interruption of the Lesotho Highland Water Project (LHWP) in the Gauteng region to the industrial hub in Johannesburg (Amos, 2010; Interview 5). But the unilateral character of this endeavor is complex to determine, since data depict the 'Operation Boleas' both as a SADC intervention, or truly as pure unilateral intervention.

On the one hand, some accounts claim that it intervened on demand of the Lesotho government (Likoti, 2007), which was facing a coup after the 1998 elections. Acting under the SADC aegis, and in collaboration with Botswana, Operation Boleas was thus not purely a unilateral behavior for them (Amos, 2017; Interview 3; Interview 2; DOD, 2006; Neethling, 1999). Moreover, Pretoria insisted that it responded to a written invitation from the opposition parties to send troops, also extended to Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Kent & Malan, 2003; Africa Research Bulletin, 1998: 13215). On the other hand, some argue that Pretoria used SADC as 'a cover for unilateral military action' (Bischoff, 2006: 158). Still, without the approval of the SADC Summit, the operation was inconsistent with SADC decision-making rules and the UN Charter (Likoti, 2007; Tavares, 2009). Without respect for rule-based principles, this operation was described as unilateral. It was strongly condemned by the international community, and criticized for its focus on protecting South African strategic installations from being destroyed (BBC, 1998; Hadebe, 2011; Kent & Malan, 2003; Tavares, 2009; Likoti, 2007; Interview 1).

The limits in space and in time of this thesis do not allow for precise investigation on this complex debate over the Operation Boleas. Hence, one can keep in mind the overall multilateral character of the South African strategic culture. Still, the doubts raised on potential unilateral operations make it even closer to a hegemonic strategy, as South African interests seemed to be at stake in Lesotho.

Exp. 3. Anti-militarist strategic culture: Intermediate, soft hegemonic or leadership strategy likely

Before testing this expectation, one first needs to remember that, as the pursuit of self-interest has been proved in many instances (see Exp. 1 and 2), leadership strategy can be dismissed from the potential strategies at stake.

> "Incidents should be prevented or stopped by negotiation, persuasion or show of force, rather than by the use of force. Force should only be used when peaceful means have failed to stop a hostile act or when necessary to accomplish mandated tasks. The use of unnecessary force undermines the credibility and impartiality of a peace support force to the host countries, the parties in the conflict and within the international community" (DFA, 1998: 12).

This excerpt of the White Paper on SA International Interventions says much of the official stance of the government on the use of force. Whether this position is reflected in its operations, instruments and its reactions to threats are investigated to test this expectation.

First of all, South Africa has an 'external obligation' to resolve conflicts in a peaceful manner: it is part of SADC, committing its member to the peaceful settlement of disputes (Treaty of SADC, 1992: art. 4), of the UN (UN Charter, 1945: art. 2). In this view, many scholars have portrayed its influence within SADC as favoring strongly peaceful means of resolution. Indeed, in the first five years after the apartheid, there was a polarization within SADC. On the one hand, a Zimbabwe-led grouping of countries, advocating for a militarist inclination of the organization, on the other, a South Africa-led grouping that was in favor of a militarist orientation, but "South Africa eventually won that debate" (Interview 1). This ultimately led to the creation of the OPDS in 1996 (SADC Protocol, 2001: art. 2).

Following this general direction, this view is further corroborated by the *instruments* utilized by the country: it prefers the use of multilateral forums rather than bilateral diplomacy as a vehicle for exerting influence (Schoeman, 2000). Sometimes portrayed as a real 'mantra of inclusive negotiations', this deep belief in including all the stakeholders in the negotiations is a core tenet of foreign policy (Onderco, 2015:69; Flemes, 2007: 39; Tonheim & Swart, 2015).

This is corroborated by the scholars and official staff that were interviewed. Pointing out that Pretoria had a weak and ineffective army, Nathan claimed that the country never '[grew] up with the idea that it could solve problems militarily' (Interview 1). Furthermore, according to Pr. Zondi, Pretoria's tools were 'not very visible and domineering because that is understood to be imperialistic, and no country in the region would accept it' (Interview 3). Such behavior is often associated with Germany's influence in the EU (Interview 3; Interview 5). Discursive instruments and diplomatic tools were thus the favored way of acting for South Africa.

In concrete acts, this is also visible. After being the first to dismantle its nuclear weapons program voluntarily (Onderco, 2015), South Africa has become a champion of nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Since it signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1991, it has played a significant role during the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995 (Potter & Mukhatzhanova, 2011). Succeeding to find a compromise between the 'minimalist' and 'maximalist' groupings within the NAM, it managed to extend the NPT indefinitely (Schoeman, 2000; NIT, 2017).[38] Besides, the Mine Ban Treaty signed in

[38] This distinction comes from the stance that NAM countries have adopted towards the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS). Without going into much details, 'maximalist' and 'minimalist' approaches encompassed disagreements over the treaty obligations, and to whom it should apply (Shelton, 2000).

1997 showed a further step in Pretoria's anti-militarist position (ICBL, 2017).

In the operations led abroad[39], non-violent means were also favored. As noted above, during the First Congo War, Mandela managed to persuade Kabila senior to negotiate with Mobutu, and continued offering South Africa's good offices and diplomatic facilitation (Landsberg, 2002: 171-173). His efforts in Zambia to set up talks between Chiluba and Kaunda[40] in 1996 (Brittain, 2011) and the 1994 intervention against the royal coup in Lesotho (BBC, 1998; SADC, 2006: 52) were such examples of Pretoria's emphasis on dialogue and inclusion of belligerents. Even with 'rogue states', South Africa managed to intermediate between parties, such as in the Lockerbie case[41] where Mandela managed to get the suspects extradited from Gaddafi's Libya to the Netherlands in 1999. This further raised South Africa's stature as a mediator and showed his commitment that political differences cannot be solved by force (Schoeman, 2000; Flemes, 2007).

Hence, it is possible to say that, from an instrumental, and an operational point of view, expectation 3 is confirmed. South Africa has been cautious to respect its anti-militarist commitments, illustrated in its strategic culture. Yet, not concerned by establishing common goals with subordinate states, this section shows that soft or intermediate hegemonic strategies are likely.

Exp. 4. Militarist strategic culture: imperial strategy

While sources contradicted themselves on whether the 1998 operation in Lesotho was unilateral or not, they are all consistent in saying that it was highly militarist and aggressive. What is understood in this thesis as military intervention comes from the UN Charter: it entails the use of military force, by air, sea or land (UN Charter, 1945: Art. 42). This definition confirms that the only pure military intervention of South Africa within our time-frame was the one in Lesotho in 1998.[42]

One may wonder what can be drawn from this event for the general strategic culture of South Africa. Not much, according to several accounts. The interviews showed that the Lesotho intercession was 'an aberration' (Interview 1; Interview 2), and that it was not indicative of the new government foreign

[39] One could think of Zimbabwe's and Madagascar's interventions to further elaborate on this point. Yet, the former happened in 2009, while South Africa got mainly involved in the latter starting in 2001 (Cawthra, 2010; Prys, 2009) it goes over the time-frame.
[40] Chiluba and Kaunda were contesting for the 1996 Zambian elections (Brittain, 2011).
[41] UN sanctions were imposed on Libya after Colonel Qaddafi refused to turn over suspects in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, killing 271 people, over Lockerbie, Scotland (The New York Times, 1997).
[42] One may think of the well-known Burundi intervention where SA deployed between 600 and 700 troops to protect political leaders, but this extends beyond our time frame and happened in 2001. The 1999 MONUC participation of South Africa did imply the use of military land forces and fits within our time-frame. Yet, as it is part of our case study, it is not taken into account in the testing of the expectations.

policy (Interview 1; Interview 4). This haphazard decision was made by Mr. Buthelezi, Minister of Home Affairs, appointed as Acting President because neither Mandela nor Mbeki were in the country (Interview 4). Interviewees think it was not typical of anything, and even 'a hangover from the apartheid era, and their preoccupation with militarism' (Interview 1).

Other accounts ascribe this unpredictable intervention to the geographical location of Lesotho, within SA own territory, which triggers more sensitivity from Pretoria. My contact at the Belgian Embassy in Pretoria underlined the fact that this geographical position makes SA the first partner, but also the most dominant country of Lesotho. He also argued that Pretoria had a clear interest that Lesotho remains stable, and that it does not fear intervening in this enclave (Interview 5). Mrs. Louw-Vaudran supported the view that the rationale to intervene in Lesotho was to be seen as a mediator, and that it wanted to replicate its own successful transition to democracy, as the latter was threatened in the 1998 coup (Interview 4). This was corroborated by Pr. Zondi: 'Lesotho is not a neighbor of South Africa, but a territory within the landscape of South Africa and therefore, it is a bit more sensitive to crises that take place in Lesotho' (Interview 3). Still, he further recognized that it was a 'very rare use of the military' (Interview 3).

Hence, from the 'confessions' point of view, little can be deduced from this episode for the post-apartheid South African foreign policy. When it comes to analyzing the existing literature, the 1998 involvement is often depicted as a 'one-time event', a 'bullying antic' (Habib & Selinyane, 2006: 183) where Pretoria suddenly 'breaks the multilateral imperative and quest for pacifist solutions' (Vreÿ, 2009:9). Even in the official statements, anti-militarist tools are portrayed as the first answer in conflict resolution. As the 1996 White Paper on National Defence testifies, 'South Africa will only turn to military means when non-violent strategies and deterrence have failed' (DOD, 1996: Chapter 5). This commitment for anti-militarist tools is later recalled, in the 1998 Defence Review.

The Lesotho involvement shows that, when strategic core interests – in this case, water – are strongly threatened, South Africa did not hesitate to employ military means. Still, even in the following years, few operations of this kind were led[43], also because South Africa's reputation on the world scene was damaged after this episode. As explained in Chapter 5, intervening militarily in Lesotho undermined Pretoria's credibility in the DRC conflict, as it publicly condemned the troops deployment of Zimbabwe in the country (Landsberg, 2002). Following this debacle, it was not keen to utilize its military to forcefully address security issues in the region (Neethling, 2002).

[43] Burundi, Madagascar, Central African Republic in 2013 were quite isolated events. This confirms the general anti-militarist stance of the country.

For these reasons, expectation 4 fails to be confirmed: as the strategic culture is not militarist, the selection for an imperial strategy is unlikely.

To conclude on this first independent variable, what can be remembered from South Africa's strategic culture after the apartheid? The two first expectations, dealing on the ultimate *purpose* of foreign policy, highlight that, whether it is in the operations it led abroad or in the preferred instruments, Pretoria closely pursued a multilateral behavior. Concerned by building strategic alliances, the data showed that the country was acting according to domestic priorities. The two subsequent expectations, focused on the favored *means* of foreign policy, show that the country was worried about respecting anti-militarist commitments, although it has been questioned by its 1998 Lesotho involvement. Regarding the impact of the strategic culture on the selected regional power strategies of Destradi, the confirmed expectations show that the country seems to be more oriented towards a soft or intermediate hegemonic type of strategy.

II. Expectations based on regional socialization

Regional socialization, as an independent variable, aims at uncovering the institutional mechanisms at stake from SADC towards South Africa. Keeping this in mind, this section assesses the extent to which SADC's socialization may have influenced SA selection of intermediate hegemonic strategy in DRC. Based on Checkel's approach of socialization from institutions (2005), two mechanisms are analyzed, leading to two expectations. First, *role playing*, where agents adopt certain roles because they seem appropriate, is a conscious behavior where the socializee does what is expected of him. Second, *normative suasion* implies that the preferences of the targeted government deeply change (Johnston, 2001). It should be noted that, even though these two mechanisms are drawn from the same author, the way to operationalize them differ, contrarily to the strategic culture expectations.

Exp. 5. Role Playing - not acting according to its self-interest

Under role playing, states are not acting because of strategic or instrumental interests, but rather because it is easier in the situation in which they are embedded (Checkel, 2005). The investigation is here concerned about whether SADC is a powerful socializer and South Africa responsive to SADC "requests". To evaluate whether role playing is at stake or not, attention is paid to the role conceptions[44]

[44] Role conceptions are what the 'ego' understands as its own position and functions, and the appropriate behavior to them (Holsti, 1970:239) and how the state perceives itself, which can be expressed by the policymakers within a specific country (Thies, 2009). So, in the foreign policy area, it is what South Africa considers as its top-priorities

(RC) of South Africa and the role prescriptions (RP) of SADC towards Pretoria. When dealing with both concepts, Holsti (1970) states that the interests, attitudes and values and the needs are what constitute role conceptions. The prescriptions are rather made up of the culture, the social institutions, and laws. Role playing occurs if role prescriptions (from the SADC) exceeds the role conceptions (of South Africa). Keeping these sources in mind will ease the testing of this fifth expectation.[45]

Both RC and RP are conceptualized according the particular *position* of the considered entity. Thus, one first needs to clarify what this position is. In 1994, South Africa removed the racial and colonial rule in a peaceful manner. Despite its recent 'free' status, it is nevertheless the biggest player of the region, both in terms of economy and population.

Starting with the *role prescriptions*, attention is paid to what SADC expected from this big player. From several sources, it seemed natural that South Africa, post-apartheid, became a member of the region, from a geographical point of view primarily (Declaration of SADC, 1992:2; Interview 1; Interview 4).

The *raison d'être* of SADC is to push regional integration (Treaty of SADC, 1992: art. 5) at various levels, and South Africa was expected to play a leading role in this respect. Based on data collected, two major 'prescriptions' can be underlined.

Politically, it was counted upon to reinforce the solidarity links that keeps SADC together (Interview 3; Declaration of SADC, 1992:2) and play a mediating role and bridge-builder in conflictual situations. Hence, promoting peace and security in the region (Treaty of SADC, 1992: art. 4) was also part of the motives for the inclusion of South Africa within SADC. However, the latter was deeply polarized on the means to achieve it (Vreÿ, 2009; Mutusi; 2016). As mentioned, the OPDS was created in 1996, but due to ingrained differences on its military or peaceful orientation, it was only operational in 2002 (DIRCO, 2004b; Interview 1). When Pretoria entered the organization, the prior history of Pretoria's aggression in the region could not be swept under the carpet. Hence, some countries, including Zimbabwe which had so far played a leading role in SADC, were not happy to see that big player usurping his role (Saunders & Nagar, 2013; Africa Research Bulletin, 1998: 13222).

Economically, lots of expectations were placed on South African shoulders to push the economic development forward. Indeed, accounting for 70% of the region's GDP when it entered the SADC (SADC, 2011), countries wanted Pretoria's developed economy to invest in the region and to create

as a regional power. On the 'alter' side, role prescriptions are the norms and expectations cultures, societies, institutions or groups attach to particular positions (Holsti, 1970:239).

[45] For a recapitulation of my application of Role Theory in this thesis, see appendix 1.

trade relations (Interview 5; Interview 2; Interview 4; Interview 1). SADC, for South Africa, is the biggest export market, which makes them both interdependent (Alden & le Pere, 2006; Amos, 2010; Nganje, 2014).

Concerning the *role conceptions* of South Africa, aware of its position as a big power, played an important role of *norm advocate* on four aspects. In other words, Bischoff sees South Africa role conception as 'reformist': Pretoria 'relies on established institutions and diplomatic practices to change the dynamics of international interaction, without altering the ordering principles of that interaction' (Bischoff, 2006: 115). Acting with the worry not to be seen as a regional hegemon or a bully (Interview 1; Interview 3), it seems that the country's scope for action as a big player between 1994 and 1999 was mainly targeted on the fields of security and disarmament, economic and multilateral cooperation, and the agenda of regional integration.

First, on security and disarmament, many accounts underline that the ambitious agenda concerning the nuclear weapons was seen as inspiring by other countries. Committed to the non-nuclear proliferation and disarmament, Pretoria's progress made at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference in finding consensus by both camps was congratulated worldwide (Schoeman, 2000; Flemes, 2007). In the negotiations on the banning of anti-personal landmines in 1997, it also played a decisive role when chairing the Oslo talks leading to the final text of the treaty (Flemes, 2007). South Africa's perceived credibility as a norm-setter can here be ascribed to the fact that it had been one of the first countries to abandon its nuclear arsenal and to enact a unilateral ban on landmines (NIT, 2017; Schoeman, 2000).

Second, on economic cooperation within the region, South Africa again was a driver in the 1996 Protocol on Trade that led to the establishment of the Free Trade Area, fully operational in 2008 (Sandrey, 2013; SADC Protocol on Trade, 1996). Wanting to establish the Southern region as one of the highest possible degrees of economic cooperation (DIRCO, 2004a), it is also a crucial player in the SACU, as Pretoria's goods enjoy free access to SADC countries[46]. Besides, right after apartheid, South Africa has signed a series of bilateral relations with individual SADC member states, such as Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia and Namibia (Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan, 1998). In the same vein, SADC was largely funded by South Africa in these beginning years, as Mrs. Louw-Vaudran and Pr. Le Pere declared (Interview 4 and 2).

Third, the regional integration agenda was often presented as a top priority by the government. Mandela

[46] In 1995, SADC countries purchased 89,5%of South Africa's exports to Africa (Molefi, 2003).

claimed in 1993 that South Africa is 'inextricably part of southern Africa and our destiny is linked to that of a region' (Mandela, 1993). As part of SADC, the ruling ANC presented closer regional co-operation, and economic integration, would benefit the entire region (ANC, 1994). Pr. Zondi also argued that SA soon understood that "it was nothing without the region, and that the region was weak without it" (Interview 3).

Fourth, South Africa has been also very influential within the region in terms of multilateral progress. It was a strong advocate of multilateralism and encouraged countries to deal with disputes through multilateral frames, e.g. SADC or the AU. Whether it is internationally or regionally, Expectation 1 has shown how multilateral institutionalism was a linchpin in South Africa's foreign policy.

To answer this sixth expectation, did role prescription take over role conceptions?

Even though there was great optimism and huge expectations from the region when Mandela got elected (Interview 4; Interview 5), Pretoria's concordance with what SADC expected is rather mixed. There seems to be a concordance in the RC and RP of both parties, but pushing the investigation further shows that it is less South Africa that complies to SADC prescriptions than the other way around. It could be argued that the desires (regional integration, economic cooperation, security and peace within the region) of both parties match, but it is mainly because Pretoria is acting along its own domestic lines.

This section showed that Pretoria's and SADC's agendas were not always conflicting. As already mentioned, regional and continental interests lie at the heart of SA foreign policy (Amos, 2010) and 'the spirit of regional solidarity and principles of sovereignty also shape its conduct' towards the region (Interview 3). Rather than being framed by the region, it seems that South Africa is so powerful that it managed to create regional dynamics and drive SADC agenda (Interview 1; Interview 3).

The gap between the role conceptions 'as a big player' and Pretoria's actual behavior was often large. On security and disarmament, it truly was an important country in the NPT and in the Mine Ban Treaty, yet this commitment was contradicted by big arms companies (as shown in Ch. 5 for example, where it sold weapons to Rwanda and Uganda, major parties involved in the Second Congo War). Another contradiction of this 'peaceful' poster-child was its relations with rogue states, such as Iran (Onderco, 2012), Syria or Libya (CNN, 1997; Schoeman, 2000). On economic cooperation, whereas SACU is the largest consumer of SA goods and services (Molefi, 2003), SADC states are secondary in terms of economic rankings with Pretoria. In 1995, only five SADC countries were among the 20 largest trading

partners with South Africa.[47]

Finally, in the mid-1990s, officials from SADC states complained that Pretoria devoted less attention to its relations in southern Africa than elsewhere, and wondered whether South Africa was a pure player or driven purely by self-interest (Nathan, 2005). This is also confirmed by other accounts according to whom the unwillingness of southern African governments to subordinate immediate national political interests to long-term regional goals is the biggest obstacle to regional integration (Nyirabu, 2004; Interview 5; Interview 1).

To conclude, although one might notice a certain consistency between RC and RP in theory, this is not reflected in practice, as South Africa keeps acting according to its domestic priorities. Role playing, as a socialization mechanism, is thus not at stake and expectation 5 fails to be confirmed.

Exp. 6. Normative suasion - community rules and means as their own, common regional interest: leadership strategy likely

Under normative suasion, social agents engage in an active and reflective internalization: this leads to a homogenization of interests (Johnston, 2001) and a redefinition of the state's normative order and to a transformation in policies (Destradi, 2010: 920). In this case, the socializee thus considers the socializer's norms as the right thing to do. That is why it is expected here that South Africa, under normative suasion, would accept the SADC's rules and means as its own, thus acting in a total common regional interest. With such common objectives, a leadership strategy would be likely.

One may question the utility of this expectation, as it has just been proved that 'role playing' was not at stake during these years in SADC. Yet, according to Checkel, the different socialization mechanisms should not be considered as 'ordinal', they are rather 'nominal'. He highlights that 'it has clear benefits […] in allowing the analysis to flesh out and empirically test how a particular mechanism works in practice' (Checkel, 2005:814). Moreover, our methodology to test this sixth expectation is different than the previous: it is done by applying Johnston's five conditions (2001) that make an institution the likeliest for normative persuasion to occur. These conditions are first applied to SADC, to determine secondly whether it has led to a pro-normative behavior from Pretoria.

For the five conditions to be applied, a first requirement needs to be fulfilled: the state will be more compliant if it is a novice in the social environment. Indeed, the 'design-dependent' effects will be

[47] Based on McGowan and Awhireng, 1998. See table of SA's largest trading partners in appendix 3.

enhanced for novices who are exposed to the new environment for a long period of time (Johnston, 2001:510). This is the case for South Africa, newcomer in SADC who became a member in 1994.

The first condition states that the institutional design is more likely to favor socialization if the membership is small, because social liking and in-group identity effects are strongest (Johnston, 2001:509). In the case of SADC, with 10 members in 1992 (SADC Treaty, 1992: Preamble)[48], it is rather a small organization. These countries, belonging to the same region, initially united together to 'reduce their dependence on the Republic of South Africa' (SADC, 2006). [49] Their 'common cultural and social affinities, common historical experiences, common problems and aspirations remain a firm and enduring foundation for common action', which shows that there are strong in-group identity effects (SADC Declaration, 1992:1).

Second, the authoritativeness of members should be *unevenly* allocated, but legitimate (Johnston, 2001). This condition is also respected in SADC: The Chairman and Vice-Chairman are appointed by the SADC members for an agreed period of time (SADC Treaty, 1992: Art. 10). During that chairmanship, as powerful stakeholders within the institution, they will appoint other members, such as the Executive Secretary and the members of Tribunal (SADC Treaty, 1992: Art. 16). As it stated in the Treaty, it is considered as legitimate among the members. Let us note that, before SA's adhesion to SADC, Zimbabwe was legitimately recognized as the most powerful country in the organization (Saunders & Nagar, 2013; Nganje, 2014).

According to the third condition, decisions are based on consensus. Indeed, this rule requires deliberation, where cognition effects to the counter-attitudinal messages are the strongest. This is the case in SADC institutions (SADC Treaty, 1992: Art. 19).

The fourth condition necessitates that the institution's mandate is deliberative. Here, the relation between the principal (in our case, the SADC Summit) and the agents (SADC Council of Ministers and Executive Secretariat) is important. A mandate is deliberative if the principal leaves the agent some flexibility in implementing its responsibilities. Increasing the deliberative cognition on how to proceed to realize tasks, the agents' autonomy makes persuasion more likely (Johnston, 2001:510). The Summit is the supreme policy-making institution of SADC. Subordinate to it, the Council of Ministers and the Secretariat are the main institutions responsible for the implementation of SADC's policies (SADC

[48] This investigation is based on the 1992 version of the SADC Treaty, and not the 'Consolidated Text of the Treaty', which is today of application, but dating from 2015.
[49] This was of course intended against *apartheid* South Africa.

Treaty, 1992: Art. 14). Article 15 is indicative of this flexibility: The Executive Secretary 'pursuant to the direction of Council or Summit, or *on his/her own initiative'* undertakes measures aimed at promoting the objectives of SADC. While it is the Council that 'directs, coordinates, and supervises the operations of the institutions of SADC' (SADC Treaty, 1992: Art. 11). As stated by the treaty, these two powerful institutions have very broad functions and these agents are quite free in the implementation of their tasks. As will be shown below, each institution can also choose its own rules of procedures, reinforcing the flexibility of its mandates.

Finally, the autonomy of the agents needs to be high for an organization to favor persuasion. This is the case in SADC, whether it is in the official articles, or according to the interviewees. Articles 17, 20, 33 or 34 of the SADC Treaty are good examples of such autonomy among the Member States. For example, members of the Secretary shall not receive any instruction of the Members States (Art. 17) or the Institutions may decide their own rules of procedures (Art. 20). Moreover, interviews confirmed that SADC was not a constraining set of norms on the Members States (Interview 1; Interview 5).

All the conditions are fulfilled, presenting SADC as a favorable institution for persuasion to occur. Then, Johnston claims that one needs to inquire whether persuasion led to pro-normative behavior in the institution, and this is the most decisive part.

To proceed, one has to show that after involvement in a new social environment, attitudes and arguments of the socializee have indeed changed, converging with the arguments that predominate in SADC. On this question, it is true that South Africa has changed, more oriented towards the region. However, it is less because of its membership to SADC than because the regime fundamentally changed in 1994 (Van Nieuwkerk, 2006; ANC, 1994). Whilst SADC represents a conducive organization for persuasion to take place, SA's behavior was internally-oriented, and acting along its domestic lines. As a reminder, Expectation 5 showed that it was because the apartheid rule fell that South Africa naturally became member of SADC (Flemes, 2007; Pfister, 2006) and became more interested in the region. As Pr. Nathan underlined, 'under apartheid, South Africa had adversarial relations with its neighbors. After the ending of apartheid, its relations became fraternal' (Interview 1). This was further confirmed by Garth le Pere according to whom SA mainly played an 'isolated role' during apartheid, trying to destabilize the region (Interview 2). This shift truly marked the renewal of its relations with the region, and was the driver of its SADC membership.

It is thus not correct to say that its behavior changed because SADC 'persuaded' Pretoria: rather it acted consistently with its domestic priorities. Although it often declared the contrary, South Africa has often put its national interest before those of the region. Its policies towards the region have often been

incoherent: in 1999, it signed a trade agreement with the EU without considerations for its regional trading partners, that would be hard hit by revenue losses and other repercussions (Saunders & Nagar, 2013). Indeed, for countries such as Namibia, Lesotho or Botswana, the deal meant that these smaller economies were obliged to accept a de facto free trade area with the EU because of their strong economic ties to South Africa through the SACU (Irving, 1999). In addition, as mentioned in Expectation 1, out of the eight SADC protocols that were adopted by 1998, South Africa only ratified one, namely on the shared water resources (Habib & Selinyane, 2006). Generally speaking, SA's foreign policy was more interested by the continent than by the region. It was particularly clear under the Mbeki presidency, where the integration and institution-building were more advanced at the continental level, than at the regional one (Interview 1; Saunders & Nagar, 2013). Stemming from this, SADC officials wondered in the mid-1990s whether South Africa was 'a SADC team player or driven purely by self-interest' (Nathan, 2005).

As Bischoff (2006) summarized, regional organizations in Africa seems to remain the instruments of nation-states, and of national interests. This was further evidenced in 2010 when SADC head of states decided to disband the SADC Tribunal, set up to adjudicate on disputes in the region (SADC, 2012; Saunders & Nagar, 2013). Moreover, as the contact at the Belgian Embassy corroborated, regional integration is tenuous in Southern Africa, and grows at the mercy of states' objectives (Interview 5). This further supports the fact that SADC was not the reason why South Africa changed its behavior towards the region. Consequently, as it is showed that SADC was not a powerful socializer, Johnston's two subsequent questions[50] will not help determine whether this environment has led to a compliant behavior.

Expectation 6 fails thus to be confirmed. On several accounts, the 'leadership' strategy was dismissed as an option, and this is a last confirmation.

[50] Has behavior changed in ways consistent with these arguments? Were material side-payments or threats not part of the decision to conform to pro-social norms?

CHAPTER 7 – DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

How can the domestic and regional political levels impact a regional power's foreign policy strategy? The initial driver of this study was the acknowledgement that regional powers, dealing with their regional and international ambitions, have to cope with domestic constraints on their capacity of action. In the South African case, it seems that, although being restraining on some levels, the domestic level was also the instigator of these global objectives. As the research question points out, this study was less about comparing two independent variables against each other than understanding their influence in shaping a common process, that is a regional power strategy.

In this view, Causal-Process Tracing, puts the emphasis on the dependent variable, and on the complex causes of a specific outcome. That was my endeavor throughout this work: within a time-frame from 1994 until 1999, I analyzed what could have led South Africa to choose an **intermediate hegemonic strategy** to intervene in DRC. The main finding of this research highlights that strategic culture was a strong indicator in shaping South Africa's involvement in the ICD. The combination of two angles, multilateral vs. unilateral and militarist vs. anti-militarist, is the best-suited frame to understand Pretoria's behavior. Furthermore, it showed that SA multilateralism was, already in the mid-1990s, oriented towards the continent. The 1996 'I am an African' address and the following African Renaissance were clear illustrations of this. Moreover, Pretoria made a point to generally respect an anti-militarist commitment in its foreign relations. Yet, when strategic interests – such as water in Lesotho – were highly threatened, it did not hesitate to make use of military forces. Being a one-time event within the analyzed time-frame, the anti-militarist tendency is rather remembered.

What has also been recurring is the self-interested behavior of the country. As explained in Chapter 3, Mandela's 1993 six principles have been influential in the decisions Pretoria took, be it its economic development, preserving the African interest, respecting international principles for peace and democracy. With such a strategic culture, South Africa seemed inherently oriented towards this intermediate hegemonic strategic choice when intervening in the DRC. Lots of it can be explained by its recent past: its peaceful commitment, its desire to overcome the isolation of the apartheid regime, its position as a big player on the regional stage.

Still, regional socialization is not to discredit. What has been learnt from its analysis, and contrarily to my previous anticipations, the region needs South Africa more than South Africa needs the region. Right after the apartheid, Mandela was indeed interested in Southern Africa, and aimed at its development. Yet, this commitment faded throughout the years, as the country sought to fulfill its own priorities before the regional ones: its 'role conceptions' overcame the 'role prescriptions'. SADC could be an important

socializer, and may be towards weaker states than South Africa. Yet, facing such a big player, data showed that it was too vulnerable to put forward its own priorities.

Finally, the main contribution of this research to the regional power literature is the approach it used. Overcoming the traditional 'structuralist' *or* 'actor-centered' stance, my purpose was to combine both angles to shed a new light on regional powers' strategies. From a constructivist inspiration, a particular attention has been paid to how identities, roles, and interests were socially formed. The 'actor-centered' side was taken into account thanks to the strategic culture variable, and Destradi's regional power strategies. The 'structuralist' side was illustrated by the emphasis put on regional socialization, and South African relations with SADC. By combining an 'internally-rooted' variable, the strategic culture, with an 'externally-rooted' one, the regional socialization, this research managed, in a certain extent, to bring up a new perception of regional power's strategies.

CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSION

The beginning of this thesis strongly emphasized that regional powers, concerning their regional and international ambitions, are also affected by the domestic level. South Africa is no exception to the rule: from the literature review through the data analysis, the purpose of this study was to assess the impact of the domestic and regional political levels on a regional power strategy.

These domestic and regional levels were conceptualized thanks to two independent variables. Strategic culture served as an indicator of the domestic level. Indeed, it appears that culture has an impact on the way policy-makers perceive their priorities, such that this independent variable sheds light on the way limited resources obligate officials to set goals and priorities in an environment of political constraints.

As the introduction highlighted, the difficulty of classifying a state as a regional power is related, not only with its power resources, but also with the *perceptions* other states have about the configuration of the global and regional power hierarchies (Nolte, 2010). Guided by this assumption, the present thesis considered not only the way South Africa identified itself, but also how SADC regarded this prominent power. The regional level was conceptualized thanks to regional socialization, the second independent variable. Studying the extent to which SADC would 'socialize' South Africa to act in a particular way thus aimed at adopting a 'structuralist' approach. In the case of South Africa, the data showed that strategic culture was more indicative of Pretoria's behavior, than any regional socialization process. Its self-interested multilateral anti-militarist strategic culture predisposed the country to select an intermediate hegemonic strategy when intervening in the DRC. While SADC did not play a significant role in shaping SA behavior, regional socialization was worth considering to precise the regional relations at stake, and SA-SADC relative perceptions.

Coping with the external appeals from the regional level and the domestic conceptions deeply influenced SA's foreign policy. On the one hand, protecting its reputation as a regional peacemaker, integrating multilateral institutions, and its pledge to the African solidarity were illustrations of SA's regional and continental aspirations. On the other hand, the study also showed that the domestic level significantly impacted the definition of its policy: developing business opportunities in the DRC, negotiating trade agreements with the EU, safeguarding water resources in Lesotho, or enhancing its peaceful and diplomatic commitment inherited from the post-apartheid period. In this antagonistic context, setting up a 'Pax Pretoriana' was a complex task. 'Exporting' its own political transition, based on a hard-won negotiated settlement and power-sharing political arrangement (Landsberg, 2004), was regarded by many as controversial. Seeing this as an attempt to become a Big Brother, South Africa often experienced mistrust from its neighbors, or and even from some Western countries. Regularly in tension

between its domestic demands and external commitments[51], it has not been able to achieve the expectations of a 'Pax Pretoriana' leadership.

When it comes to identifying the limitations of the present thesis, regional socialization may have been less indicative because the strategic culture variable was more straightaway connected to Destradi's classification. Indeed, her typology allows for two main discriminating factors to define a regional power strategy: its *ends* and *means*. Linking these ideal-types with strategic culture was thus easier than under the socialization variable: the multilateral/unilateral dimension gave the *ends* of the foreign policy, while the anti-militarist/militarist range dealt with the favored *means*. This is a first limitation of this study: there is thus room for improvement regarding the way regional socialization was linked with Destradi's strategies. The second limitation concerns the data collection. While I had the chance to speak with particularly insightful scholars, members of think tanks and journalists, most interviews were mainly done with the academic world, rather than the political one. More balance between both academic and political interviews would have increased the validity of this thesis. In the same perspective, more Congolese accounts would also have been valuable, in order to assess the Congolese dimension of this thesis more deeply. Although contacted, not many political officials accepted or replied.[52]

These imperfections allow for further generalization of this approach, as well as for further research. As was discussed in Chapter 4, results of CPT are not easily generalizable, as this method admits equifinality. One should thus look at other 'possible cases' of such an approach and specify the set of causal configurations that make other outcomes possible (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). This research focused on a single-case, but a large-N study would increase the validity of its conclusions. Keeping in mind the aforementioned limitations, new research could be done by adopting a multiple-case analysis in order to compare the selected strategies of the regional power in several instances. Indeed, this thesis made a point of developing a testing approach that can be applied to several instances: analyzing a regional power's strategy in a particular case and then assessing the extent to which this was framed, either by its strategic culture or its regional socialization, is indeed generalizable to other instances. One could for example think of big powers within regional groupings: Germany within the EU, Nigeria within ECOWAS, Indonesia within ASEAN, Brazil within Mercosur or India within the Non-Aligned Movement.

[51] E.g. its arms sales policy to rogue states increased the tension between its reputation as a democracy and human rights advocate and its economic and trade interests.
[52] For a comprehensive list of the contacted people for interviews, see appendix 5.

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a. *Appendix 1: Role theory. Illustration of Role Theory and the sources of role conceptions and role prescriptions*



Based on Holsti (1970). Role Theory and the Sources of Behavior. Own adaptation.

b. *Appendix 2: The ICD. Important dates and major South African intercessions*

1996	Argument between Robert Mugabe and Nelson Mandela over the orientation of the ODPS
1997	Mandela pushes for DRC to be part of SADC SA sells weapons to Uganda and Rwanda (stops in 1998) *17 May*. Laurent-Désiré Kabila takes over power in Kinshasa
1998	*2nd August.* DRC conflict starts *Mid-August*. SA claims the conflict is internal at SADC meeting

1999	DRC conflict is a top-priority in Mbeki's government. Ten-point plan for an inter-Congolese political arrangement *Early July*. Mbeki meets Wamba and Tshisekedi to convince them to respect the upcoming LA *10 July*. LA signed by most stakeholders *1st August*. Thanks to Dlamini-Zuma, MLC signs the LA *30 November*. Creation of the MONUC mission, thanks to Mbeki's pressure
2000	*January*. Deployment of MONUC in DRC. Kentumile Masire is chosen as the neutral facilitator for the ICD
2001	*16 January*. Laurent-Désiré Kabila's assassination *April*. SA sends the first contingent of military support staff to back up the MONUC *August*. Gaborone talks: 'pre-dialogue' meeting, decisions about the venue, the rules underpinning the negotiations *October*. Addis Ababa dialogue: failure *November*. MLC, RCD-Goma and the DRC government meet informally in New York: agreement for the re-launch of the process
2002	*25 February*. Start of the Sun City talks *March*. Mbeki is called for help by Masire: leads to 'Mbeki plans' I and II. Kinshasa government and MLC conclude a bilateral power-sharing deal *19 April*. Accord de Sun City *June – October*. UN Special Envoy Mustapha Niasse: missions in the region SA Sidney Mufamadi convinces RCD-Goma to reach a deal *30 July*. DRC – Rwanda deal, 'Pretoria I' for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese soil *September*. DRC – Uganda deal. *17 December*. 'Global and All-Inclusive Agreement' (Pretoria II): Main Congolese parties sign a peace agreement
2003	*24 February*. Committees meet in Pretoria for pending issues concerning Pretoria II *March*. Approbation of 3 additional agreements: Memorandum on the National Army, on the security provisions during the Transition, and the adoption of the transitional constitution *1-2 April*. Final session of the ICD in Sun City: Final act is signed

c. Appendix 3: Table. South Africa's 20 Largest Trading Partners, 1995

Table 1: South Africa's 20 Largest Trading Partners, 1995 (R '000)

Rank	Country	Exports	Country	Imports
1	United Kingdom	8 642,4	Germany	16 656,2
2	United States	6 544,1	United States	11 860,6
3	Japan	5 720,2	United Kingdom	10 943,6
4	Germany	5 333,4	Japan	9 922,5
5	**Namibia*#**	5 125,4	Iran	4 377,2
6	**Botswana*#**	4 822,4	Italy	4 045,8
7	**Zimbabwe#**	4 240,8	France	3 804,2
8	Switzerland	3 825,9	Taiwan+	3 252,9
9	**Swaziland*#**	3 366,0	Switzerland	2 398,4
10	**Lesotho*#**	3 219,3	Netherlands	2 315,2
11	Italy	3 172,0	Belgium	2 136,8
12	Belgium	3 163,0	China+	1 852,3
13	Netherlands	2 901,2	Australia	1 660,9
14	Taiwan+	2 525,0	Hong Kong+	1 660,9
15	South Korea+	1 968,3	**Namibia *#**	1 525,1
16	Hong Kong+	1 887,3	South Korea+	1 497,1
17	**Mozambique#**	1 839,9	Sweden	1 453,5
18	Spain	1 624,9	Singapore+	1 177,6
19	Australia	1 369,2	**Swaziland *#**	1 159,7
20	**Zambia#**	1 301,6	Canada	1 024,4

Sources: Kotelo (1995:11); South Africa Foreign Trade Organization (Safto) (1997).
* Member of Southern African Customs Union (SACU), data are for 1994.
# Member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
+ Classified by the US Department of Commerce as a 'Big Emerging Market'.

In thousands of Rands. Based on Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan, 1998.

d. Appendix 4: List of interviewed persons

1. Pr. Laurie Nathan, Senior Researcher at Pretoria University and Research Fellow at the University of Cape Town. 15 May 2017: Interview 1.
2. Pr. Garth le Pere, Executive Director of the Institute for Global Dialogue. 16 May 2017: Interview 2.
3. Pr. Siphamandla Zondi, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Pretoria. 19 May 2017: Interview 3.
4. Mrs. Liesl Louw-Vaudran, Johannesburg-based journalist and independent analyst. 25 May 2017: Interview 4.
5. Contact at the Belgian Embassy in Pretoria. 25 May 2017: Interview 5.

e. Appendix 5: List of people contacted for interviews

Name and position	**Answers**
1. Mr. E.X. Makaya SADC National Contact Person in South Africa.	Contacted.
2. Pr. Laurie Nathan Senior Researcher at Pretoria University and Research Fellow at the University of Cape Town.	Contacted, accepted. Interview: 15 May 2017.
3. Mrs. Sophie Ferrand-Hazard Adviser for the External Trade in Southern Africa, from the French Embassy in Johannesburg.	Contacted, but could not help.
4. Mr. Garth Le Pere Executive Director of the Institute for Global Dialogue, Pretoria.	Contacted, accepted. Interview: 16 May 2017.
5. Pr. Gareth Newham Specialist of South Africa, from the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.	Contacted, accepted, but realized he could not help. Directed towards Louw-Vaudran and Cilliers.
6. Ms. Liesl Louw-Vaudran Journalist and independent analyst.	Contacted, accepted. Interview: 25 May 2017.
7. Dr. Jackie Cilliers Member of the ISS and expert on SA foreign policy.	Contacted

8. Pr. Funmi Olonisakin, Founding director of the African Leadership Center at the King's College London.	Contacted
9. South African Embassy to the Netherlands: Mr. Lindsay Louis. Third Secretary – Bilateral Cultural Attaché to the Kingdom of the Netherlands	Contacted, accepted, but when scheduling the meeting, no answers anymore.
10. Embassy of Belgium to South Africa Contact at the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pretoria.	Contacted, accepted. Interview: 25 May 2017.
11. Congolese Embassy to the Kingdom of Belgium Ambassador Dominique Kilufya	Contacted
12. Pr. Siphamandla Zondi, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Pretoria.	Contacted, and accepted. Answers by email.
13. Mr. Michel Luntumbue, Specialist of the Great Lakes Region at the GRIP, Belgian think tank on peace and security.	Contacted
14. Pr. Stephanie Wolters Specialist for SADC at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria.	Contacted
15. Mrs. Nina Wilen, Researcher on peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region at the Université Libre de Bruxelles.	Contacted, could not help, but sent a chapter she wrote on DRC and SADC.
16. African National Congress (ANC) - HQ	Contacted
17. Ambassador Magubane, Director of SADC branch at the DIRCO (South Africa)	Contacted
18. Ambassador Maitland, Chief Director for Central Africa at the DIRCO.	Contacted
19. Ms. Castleman, Director for Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, Angola and DRC at the DIRCO.	Contacted