



*Circumstance or powerplay?
Explaining the policy process
of the EU-Turkey deal*

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Author: Yael Kappers

Student number: 428450

Supervisor: Dr. Peter Scholten

Second supervisor: Dr. Michal Onderco

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Summary

This master thesis tests the explanatory power of two public administration theories, the multiple streams framework and the advocacy coalition framework, by applying them on the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal. This deal was struck between two international power structures and finds its origin in the circumstance of the 2015 refugee crisis. The underlying question here is whether circumstances or power were more decisive for the outcome. The predictions derived from the theories are compared with reality through congruence analysis and by using causal process tracing to reconstruct the policy process. The visibility of the following eight key variables in the empirics is analyzed: urgency, political motives, policy alternatives, policy entrepreneurs, advocacy coalitions, policy brokers and external shocks. The conclusion of this study is that although both frameworks are not easily applied to the case, power politics is what proved to be decisive. The outcome of the negotiations could have been predicted by looking at the balance of power between the EU and Turkey. This means that ACF has the most explanatory power of the two frameworks in the case of the EU-Turkey deal.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In the summer and fall of 2015, the European continent was confronted with a high influx of refugees. Most of these people came from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, fleeing civil war and conflict in their home country. 80% of all refugees reaching Europe by the sea in 2015, took the route through Turkey, crossing the Aegean Sea to the Greek islands (Tunali, 2015; Rethmeijer 2016). The number of small boats filled with refugees arriving on the beaches of Greece was so high, that the capacity of many EU member states to register and give shelter to all these people fell short, at the cost of the quality of care and living conditions. Also, groups of European citizens felt overwhelmed by the number of newcomers, were unsure about the consequences for their own lives and culture and started to oppose any refugees coming into their country. At the same time, many people trying to reach Europe by crossing the Aegean Sea lost their lives during the attempt and human traffickers retained very profitable businesses. The situation was untenable and it was clear that not one EU member state could solve this problem on its own. European leaders were desperate for a solution for the sake of human rights, public opinion and to ensure their own reelection (Rethmeijer, 2016).

Early October 2015 German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that a possible solution was on its way. It involved a collaboration between the EU and Turkey whereby both parties would agree to tackle the crisis together. It was important to involve Turkey, because it was the country where most refugees departed from on their way to Europe. The origin of the idea for the EU-Turkey deal lies in a small thinktank based in Berlin called the European Stability Initiative (ESI). The chairman and co-founder, Gerald Knaus, says that the idea behind the deal was that 'you can't control a sea border without cooperating with your neighbor on the other side. You can't build fences on water' (Somaskanda, 2016). He had emailed his plan to policy makers and journalists only three days before he heard Chancellor Merkel talk about it on German national television.

So, what is this plan? The content of the deal as it was designed by ESI, is that irregular migrants arriving in Greece will be sent back to Turkey. In return, the EU will resettle part of the Syrian refugees who arrived in Turkey before, give Turkey financial support to facilitate shelter and care for the refugees in their country and provide the Turkish people with visa-free travelling to the EU member states. To agree on all elements that were put in the deal, policymakers from the EU and Turkey negotiated for months, holding several high-level meetings, under the supervision of the European Commission. As holder of the rotating presidency of the European Council, Prime Minister Rutte of the Netherlands was one of the leaders of the negotiations (Alonso & Kranenburg, 2016). On Thursday night 17 March, it was announced by the European Commission that all 28 member states of the EU agreed with the text and on Friday 18 March 2016, the EU-Turkey deal was signed by all parties (Alonso, 2016a).

The agreement was thoroughly thought-out on paper and was expected to form the solution that was awaited by all partners. Indeed, the number of refugees arriving on the Greek islands decreased profoundly after the signing of the deal (Peeperkorn, 2016a; Schmidt, 2016). According

to a civil servant of the Turkish government, the EU-Turkey deal is the most successful collaboration between the EU and Turkey ever (interview MFA, 2016). However, soon after the signing of the deal, it became clear that not all issues were solved. Turkey failed to meet all criteria that were agreed upon, which meant that not all advantages that were promised by the EU could be granted. Also, the process of resettling refugees by the EU turned out to be much slower than expected. Critics say that Ankara has always been a controversial and unreliable partner and that the EU should have been more aware about this on beforehand. It is also said that it is against the international treaties regarding refugees and against European law to send refugees back to Turkey as if it is a safe third country (Azmani & Lucassen, 2016; Boogaard et al., 2016). But then how come there was an agreement in the first place? Was it a coincidental combination of events or the play of powerful actors that led to such a breakthrough in international cooperation in the field of migration? How can this extraordinary process be explained on a theoretical level?

Research Aim and Research Question

The aim of this study is to explain the process of the EU-Turkey deal and place it in a broader, theoretical perspective. In order to do this, I will evaluate the explanatory power of two theoretical frameworks: the multiple streams framework and the advocacy coalition framework. By choosing these frameworks, I aim to compare two different tried and tested theories from the realm of public administration that both provide an explanation for policy change. The multiple streams framework is based on institutionalism and explains a policy change with multiple factors in a chaotic system with coincidental policy windows. The advocacy coalition framework is based on power structures and explains policy change with the influence of powerful actors, pressure groups and the existence of uneven relations. Which concept is decisive in big policy decisions, circumstance or power, is a fundamental question in the field of public administration.

The case I use to test both frameworks, is that of the EU-Turkey deal. The Turkish perspective and the perspective of the Netherlands will be taken into consideration, since they both played an important role in the process and had different preferences concerning the content of the deal. The reason that I chose to direct my research towards the case of the EU-Turkey deal, is that it is an example of a complex process of policy change influenced by many elements. The deal has been established by different actors and for each actor, different factors were of importance for their preferences and decisions. Political and geographical tensions surfaced during the negotiations, and on top of that there was a large humanitarian aspect to the issue, which made it sensitive as well as very pressing. What interests me is to find out what factors were most important for the outcome of such a complex process, and what determines whether an agreement like the EU-Turkey deal is or is not established. Is it a coincidental combination of events with many moments where the process could have turned in a completely different direction? Or is an international

agreement like this the predictable outcome of the balance of power between the involved parties and the state of play at the time of the negotiations?

The central research question is:

How can the policy process leading to the EU-Turkey deal better be explained: through the Multiple Streams Framework or through the Advocacy Coalition Framework?

Explanations from both theories are to some extent reflected in the policy process, but it proves to be difficult to find a perfect match between frameworks from the field of public administration and a case that is not a regular, national policy change. The existence of the EU-Turkey deal was triggered by circumstances, the preferences of both countries had an impact on the content of the deal and the policy process was led by international power structures. The concept that turns out to be most influential on the outcome of the process and therefore gives the most explanatory power to the advocacy coalition framework, is power structures.

Academic and Societal Relevance

The academic relevance of this study lies in empirically testing the theories of the multiple streams framework and the advocacy coalition framework and finding out which theory has more explanatory power in the case of the EU-Turkey deal. The expectations are based on these theories and in this way the theoretical explanatory power will be measured. The research will lead to a better understanding of and a contribution to the body of knowledge in the theoretical field of policy change. It will contribute to the discussion of what determines the outcome of policy and what considerations are important for the different actors in a negotiation process. Two fundamental concepts in this discussion, circumstances and power, are directly compared in the case study. In addition, two frameworks from the field of public administration are applied to a typical international relations topic, to see if their explanatory power still holds up.

The societal relevance of this study in a more general sense is that it furthers the understanding of the policy process. It also contributes to the knowledge about why actors agree with a policy, how political motives are reflected and therefore why a policy process has a certain outcome. More specifically, the societal relevance is to find out why the EU-Turkey deal was established and how this process came to be. The actors involved had different views, but eventually had the same aim of putting an end to illegal migration. To generate better understanding of the reasons behind the deal, will help to improve the quality of the discussion and can serve as a tool for governments to defend the outcome of the policy.

Research Design

This research has a case study design with congruence analysis as methodology. The case is the policy process preceding the EU-Turkey deal, a unique case which makes within-case analysis necessary. Congruence analysis is a methodology which compares expectations based on theoretical frameworks to reality, to compare the explanatory power of the frameworks to each other. The data to reconstruct the policy process, comes from document analysis of media, think tank and government output and interviews with policy makers. I use the different sources in combination, so they can complement each other. The method that I will use to analyze the data and come to a comparable set of observations, is causal process tracing. To explain why the deal was made and why it has the form it eventually has, it is important to look at the different steps of the policy process and the causal mechanism that led to the outcome.

Research Structure

This thesis will have the following structure. In chapter two I will give the theoretical background of the research question and elaborate on the two frameworks I will use to answer it. All expectations will be introduced in their own theoretical perspective. Chapter three consists of the research design and methods used for this study, the operationalization of the variables from the expectations and a description of the data collection. In chapter four, I will describe the context of the EU-Turkey deal. The refugee crisis, the relations between Turkey, the EU and the Netherlands and the content on the EU-Turkey deal are discussed here. Chapter five consists of a detailed description of the policy process based on the data collection. Chapter six shows the analysis of the empirics for each variable and therefore for each expectation from the theoretical chapter. Chapter seven is the conclusion of this study, where the main findings and recommendations for future research are presented. In the end of this thesis, the list of references and the interview guide are added respectively.

Chapter 2: Theory

In this chapter, I will introduce the theories used in this study: the multiple streams framework and the advocacy coalition framework. First, I will explain why these are suitable to apply on the case of the EU-Turkey deal. Second, I will describe both frameworks in detail, including their main assumptions and different elements they identify as causal factors for a policy change. To stress the differences between the two frameworks, I added a general comparison on their main assumptions. In the end of the chapter, I will introduce all expectations derived from the theories that are used to answer the central research question.

Selection of Theories

The process that leads to an international agreement such as the EU-Turkey deal, can be explained in different ways, depending on whether you look at power structures, societal routines, circumstances or other institutional explanations. These explanatory concepts can be found in all general theories on policy making from the field of public administration. The policy process preceding the EU-Turkey deal is both international as well as very political which makes it the obvious choice to use international relations theory to explain the outcome with. However, in this study I have selected two frequently used political perspective theories from public administration. Although they are usually applied on a national level, I am interested to see which is a better fit when applied to this international relations topic.

The first overlooking theory that I will use for this research is the multiple streams framework (MSF) which aims to explain policy change with a combination of political and institutional factors. It assumes a world of chaos and anarchy where coincidence is an important causal factor. Through the coupling of different 'streams' by a policy entrepreneur, a window of opportunity can be created which is necessary for opening the way to policy change. This school of thought focuses on circumstances to explain complex processes. It looks at circumstances and coincided events that lead to opportunities and changes in the policy community.

The second overarching theory that I will use is the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). It assumes an uneven distribution of power to be an important causal factor and incorporates conflict and power struggles between groups in the policy making process. Policy change can be triggered by these groups, called 'advocacy coalitions', and is based on their preferences and learning process. This school of thought focuses on power as an explanation for policy change. They identify shifts in power structures and changes in the beliefs of the most powerful coalitions as decisive.

The reason that I chose these two theories for this study, is that they both offer a different view on what explains the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal. People invested in one of the two judge the same situation in a different way. According to MSF, multiple factors must have been influential

and the actors involved got the opportunity to construct a policy based on circumstances and coincidence. One could say they were at the right place at the right time. According to ACF, policy change is orchestrated by powerful actors who aim for a certain policy and influence the process through advocacy coalitions. In this case, the power structures at place would be decisive for the policy process.

In this study, the explanatory power of both frameworks when applied to the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal is tested. What makes this case interesting to use is that the negotiations took place in a contested, chaotic environment with numerous factors influencing the process and many different actors involved. There was a lot at stake, since the outcome would deal with the lives of people but also with the important future relations between Turkey and the EU. Despite this complexity and pressure, an agreement was reached. Elements from both theories can be traced back in this process and they are not mutually exclusive, but because they have a different view on what is decisive for such a fundamental policy change, they still offer a good comparison.

Multiple Streams Framework

MSF is a theory of choice that explains how certain policies are made, mostly by governments, under conditions of ambiguity. It mostly focuses on the agenda setting and decision-making stages of the policy process. In these stages, policy making is assumed to be influenced by the timing of policies and political manipulation. For the process to be successful, there is a need for a window of opportunity in which timing and the political situation are optimal. MSF describes how such a window arises based on a model of three streams: problems, policies and politics. When these three streams are coupled by policy entrepreneurs it leads to a policy window and therefore to policy adoption or policy change (Zahariadis, 2007). Further in this chapter there is a graphical visualization of these three streams and an explanation of what they comprehend.

According to MSF, agenda setting and decision making are highly context dependent. Several factors such as information and political communication can be used strategically to influence the choices of policy makers. Solutions are found through a dynamic and interactive process under ambiguous conditions (Kingdon, 1995). Policy systems are characterized, according to Kingdon, by fluid participation, problematic preferences and unclear technology. Under fluid participation, Kingdon means the quickly changing of the group of decision makers, both because people come and go, and because different actors enter and exit the decision-making process. Problematic preferences refer simply to people not knowing what they want. Because the goal of public policy is not always clear, and because of time constraints, decisions are often made before politicians formulate precise preferences. Finally, an unclear organizational process with many layers of communication leads to a lack of feelings of responsibility among the different individuals and leads to inefficiency (Zahariadis, 2007).

The three explicit assumptions guiding the framework are:

- * *Individual attention or processing is serial, systemic attention or processing is parallel.* Because MSF is a systemic theory, the problem-solution sequence is not based on individual decision making, but on the many levels of government that exist. Individuals can only focus on a limited number of issues, but in a system many issues will be attended to at the same time.
- * *Policy makers operate under significant time constraints.* There is often an urgency to make a decision, which limits the number of policy alternatives that will be discussed and the attention given to each alternative.
- * *The streams flowing through the framework are independent.* Each stream has a life of its own. Problems concern everyone in society but policy is generated by a select group of people. Politics includes the select group of legislators but also the public opinion of everyone in society. The streams move parallel to each other, just like the many different levels of government (Zahariadis, 2007).




Figure 1: Flow Diagram of the Multiple Streams Framework (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 71)

As is mentioned in the third assumption, the three streams flow parallel and independently through the framework. These streams make for the structural elements of MSF, graphically visualized in figure 1 above. The three streams, problem, politics and policy, are direct or indirect influences on the possibility of a policy window. Policy entrepreneurs are added as an additional step between the policy stream and the policy window. All elements influence the final part of the graph: the policy output.

The problem stream consists of conditions that rise to the policy agenda that are addressed as problems by individuals inside and outside the policy system (Ness, 2010). According to Kingdon, there will always be problems and there will always be people who find these problems important enough to put them on the agenda. Through indicators such as costs and benefits, focus events and feedback from previous programs, these problems can reach the policy makers. Not all conditions turn into problems. They are defined as problems by people guided by their own values and beliefs and are therefore constructed, subjective concepts (Kingdon, 1995). The number of problems or problem load brought under the attention of policy makers determines the issue's place on the agenda. In other words, if a situation is perceived as more problematic, there is a higher probability of a policy window (Zahariadis, 2003).

The politics stream, which exerts most influence on the policy process according to Kingdon, includes the national mood, pressure group campaigns and administrative or legislative turnover (1995). Essentially, it captures all elements of domestic politics. Politicians play an important role in sensing changes in public opinion and putting this on the policy agenda. Support of pressure groups for policy is an indicator for politicians to determine what the issues in society are. They are motivated to respond to these issues partly because of self-interest since it could be important for their reelection. A change of government will most likely affect policy choices as well. Other people with different political ideologies may focus on issues long left untouched and policy windows may appear shortly after the elections (Zahariadis, 2007).

The policy stream or solution stream consists of the answers to the problems from the problem stream. All the possible policy alternatives, generated by numerous different actors and considered in numerous different forums and forms, are part of this stream. Only a few proposals will ultimately be considered by the policy makers in charge. Whether this will happen is dependent on the value acceptability, affordability and technical feasibility of the proposal (Stout & Stevens, 2000). When the problem is more urgent, a larger deviation from the status quo is accepted. Another factor that affects the probability of a proposal to float to the surface, is the consistency of the policy making system of a given country. When the level of integration, or institutional configuration, within the policy community is high, more ideas will be officially considered. The integration is high when the community 'is smaller in size, has a consensual mode, higher capacity and a more restricted access' (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 73).

Policy windows are the moments in time when the three streams are joined together and changes occur. The windows are opened by an event in the problem or the politics stream and are 'opportunities for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems' (Kingdon, 1995, p. 165). Policy entrepreneurs are those who come in action when a policy window opens. They can be individuals or corporate actors with the goal of influencing policy. They link problems to their solutions and make politicians initiate these solutions. To be a successful policy entrepreneur, you first need access to policy makers. Second, resources such as time, money and energy are necessary for success. Third, entrepreneurs make use of manipulative strategies to join the three streams. Only when the three streams are coupled, a policy window appears (Zahariadis, 2007). The decision style of the policy makers in office and how much time and information they need, determines the outcome of the policy window. A more cautious decision style leads to a higher predictability (Zahariadis, 2003).

According to MSF, a policy window is necessary for establishing a policy change. Since the EU-Turkey deal was established on 18 March 2016, there must have been a policy window in the process leading up to it. This means that the problem stream, policy streams and politics stream must have been coupled by policy entrepreneurs. This leads to the following expectation 1:

If MSF is correct, the EU-Turkey deal was established in a policy window caused by the coupling of the problem stream, politics stream and policy stream by policy entrepreneurs.

Advocacy Coalition Framework

Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a theory concerning the policy process developed to simplify the complexity of the world of public policy (Weible et al., 2009). It originally aims to deal with 'substantial goal conflicts, important technical disputes and multiple actors from several levels of government' (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 189). Its focus is on the agenda setting and decision-making stage of the policy process. ACF is based on three assumptions.

First, policy making is believed to be so complex, that the involved actors must specialize to have influence on the process. Policy areas or subsystems that arise, attract a set of legislators, researchers, agency officials, interest group leaders and/or journalists as advocates. In this way one to four advocacy coalitions will emerge within a policy subsystem (Meijerink, 2005). Although there are external factors, the policy process largely occurs within this subsystem (Sabatier & Weible, 2014).

The second assumption is that actors have a set of preexisting, normative beliefs and that they perceive information in a certain way that is difficult to change. The beliefs are explicitly identified as the causal driver for political behavior (Weible et al., 2009). Actors who share core policy beliefs are likely to form a group and become an advocacy coalition. Since they share the same policy beliefs, these advocacy coalitions are relatively stable although they consist of different actors

across various governmental authorities and private organizations (Sabatier, 1998). There are three types of beliefs defined in ACF: deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs and secondary aspects. The first type, deep core beliefs, consists of the fundamental values that are often implicit and apply to almost all policy areas. It is easy to visualize deep core beliefs with the example of the political left-right scale. An individual's position on the scale encompasses a lot of different values about what policy should look like. These values are very difficult to change (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). The second type, policy core beliefs, are not general values but are specific to a certain policy area. It defines how an actor prefers a policy subsystem to look like. This does not necessarily reflect the deep core beliefs in every area. For example, someone can believe in a free market system, but make an exception for health care policies. Policy core beliefs are, just like deep core beliefs, difficult to change. The third type, secondary aspects, are the choices of instruments to achieve specific values and goals with a new policy (Sabatier, 1998). These are for example the budget of the program and the rules regarding public participation. They are policy preferences in the most practical and narrow form and therefore easier to change by presenting evidence and arguments for other options (Sabatier & Weible, 2014).

The third assumption of ACF is that the specialized groups of actors that arise, share policy core beliefs and try to accomplish the same goals. Important to add to this, is that individuals are boundedly rational and remember losses more than gains (Weible et al., 2009). Fear of losing to opponents with different beliefs and preferences motivates the actors to work together with allies and form like-minded networks. Within these networks, there is at least some form of coordination to achieve similar policy objectives (Sabatier & Weible, 2014).

The major objective of ACF, is explaining policy stability and policy change. According to ACF, policy stability exists as long as the balance of power between advocacy coalitions remains stable. In other words, as long as resources, authority, information and knowledge do not change significantly, the status quo stays in place. There are two probable ways in which a major policy change can occur (Weible et al., 2009). First, it can be caused by a trigger in the form of an external shock. This can be for example social and macro-economic changes, changes in executive or economic power, shifts in public mood, special focus-events or disasters and spin-offs from other policy domains (Sabatier, 1998). The external shocks can cause a direct shift in agenda's, public opinion and attract the attention of policy makers (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). The most influential event to create major policy change is when the balance of power between competing advocacy coalitions is modified. This automatically leads to different policy core beliefs to shape new decisions.

The second cause for a policy change to occur is policy learning or the changing of previous causal beliefs. This process is described by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith as 'relatively enduring alternations of thought or behavioral intentions that result from experience and/or new information and that are concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives' (1999, p. 123). Policy learning primarily affects the secondary beliefs of actors and can lead to alterations of existing policies or

the implementation of new ones (Weible et al., 2009). However, this process is slow and most likely only becomes visible if you look at a period of a decade or more (Sabatier & Weible, 2014).

One final feature of ACF that is important to address, is the role of policy brokers: the groups of actors who take on the task of mediating between the different conflicting strategies from various advocacy coalitions to ensure a successful outcome (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994). Policy brokers can be politicians, civil servants or actors from public organizations (Bratt, 2013). Their goal is to reduce conflict and to find a reasonable compromise (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994). In many cases, this is the only chance to an agreement and a policy stalemate is the unwanted option. Although individuals are unlikely to deviate from their own policy beliefs, the policy brokers try to find common ground to at least find a solution to the stalemate. Brokers can be members of an advocacy coalition at the same time and thus do not have to be completely independent actors.




Figure 2: Flow Diagram of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 191)

All influences on the policy subsystems and policy change are visualized in Figure 2 above. The relatively stable parameters rarely change and therefore have the least likely major influence on a policy change. However, they form the framework for the possibilities of the subsystem actors and are therefore important to consider. These include basic attributes of the problem area, natural

resources and social and constitutional structures. Under external subsystem events, the external shocks that were already mentioned in the preceding paragraph are listed. These events are the most likely to trigger policy change. Long-term coalition opportunity structures are partly dependent on countries and partly flexible. The openness of the political system for example, can differ vastly between countries (Weible et al., 2009). The final column, the policy subsystem, shows how the two (or more) competing advocacy coalitions attempt to influence policy. As opposed to other frameworks, ACF distinguishes the policy subsystems as the major units of analysis, instead of the broader political environment.

Policy changes are explained by ACF through changes in the balance of power between advocacy coalitions, which causes different policy beliefs to determine how new policies are shaped. The factors that can influence the process are policy learning, policy brokers and external shocks. Since the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal is a successful policy change, these factors must have played a role. This leads to the following expectation 2:

If ACF is correct, the EU-Turkey deal was established due to a shift in power structures, policy learning and the influence of policy brokers and external shocks.

Differences

The two frameworks show many similarities as they are both public administration theories from a political perspective, focusing on multi-level, multi-actor systems that explain major policy change. They also both focus their assumptions on the agenda setting and decision-making stage of the policy process. Because of these similarities, they are sometimes used together to give complementary explanations for the same phenomenon. Despite the overlap between the two frameworks, they illustrate specific conditions and processes to explain policy change and they provide an alternative view on the policy environment (Meijerink, 2005). In general, they use two different concepts in the explanation of policy change: circumstances and power structures. This study aims to compare the explanatory power of the two frameworks to see which concept will turn out to be more decisive in the end. The individual elements of the two will be formulated as expectations and later applied on the EU-Turkey deal in the analysis part of this study. For now, I will first stress some of the most important general differences between MSF and ACF.

In MSF, the choices of policy makers are dependent on contextual conditions. Different proposals and ideas float around in an ambiguous setting or 'soup' and are chosen by policy makers as a result of coincided events and a considerable amount of randomness (Kingdon, 1994). These conditions can be for example a problem that got public attention but also the information that reaches the policy makers (Kingdon, 1995). Problems, policies and politics occur independent of each other and are not influenced by individuals (Meijerink, 2005). In general, there is a state of chaos and anarchy in the policy making world. On the contrary, in ACF conditions and opportunities

for policy change are often created by actors themselves, who have clear preferences and goals. A policy window occurs when it is prioritized by the smartest and strongest advocacy coalition (Compston & Madsen, 2011). The choice for the specific policy is a product of this process and is based on the belief system of the group.

In MSF, we speak of fluid participation in the sense that the group of decision makers changes constantly. Furthermore, individuals do not know what they want and because of unclear policy goals and time constraints, decisions are often made before policy makers have formulated clear preferences (Kingdon, 1995). ACF claims the opposite. There is at least some sort of coordination within networks (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). In addition, actors are boundedly rational and have a preexisting, fixed, clear set of policy preferences (Sabatier, 1998; Weible et al., 2009). Instead of fluid participation, stable advocacy coalitions are formed within a subsystem with a common policy goal. 'The emergence and stability of coalitions sharing policy core beliefs' is a specific assumption of ACF (Meijerink, 2005, p. 1061).

The final difference between the two frameworks that I want to stress is that MSF claims that in a policy system, many issues will be attended to at the same time (Zahariadis, 2007). Individuals can only focus on a few of them and must shift attention constantly. ACF recognizes the problem of complexity of the policy system, but presents this as the reason that individuals will specialize to specific fields (Meijerink, 2005). Policy subsystems attending to a specific issue are the units of analysis, instead of the broader political system (Weible et al., 2009). This final difference between the two frameworks, is specific for domestic politics. In the case of the EU-Turkey deal, the actors participating in the negotiations were national leaders instead of specialized policy makers.

Expectations from MSF

Now that I have described the frameworks and their main differences, it is time to look at what this means for the explanation of the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal. Do the contextual features of MSF or the power structures of ACF offer a more fulfilling explanation? In this section, the theoretical expectations based on MSF and ACF will be introduced. The sub expectations are derived from the basic expectations of the frameworks that were mentioned before and are based on the differences and specific elements of the frameworks. These sub expectations will be used in the analyzing part of this study to compare the theoretical frameworks to the empirical results of the research and to each other.

The basic expectation from MSF, expectation 1, is:

If MSF is correct, the EU-Turkey deal was established in a policy window caused by the coupling of the problem stream, politics stream and policy stream by policy entrepreneurs.

The Problem Stream

The problem stream consists of conditions from the context of a policy that rise to the agenda of policy makers as problems (Ness, 2010). Not all circumstances will turn into problems that need addressing. Situations are only problematic if they are perceived as such by policy makers. This means it is a subjective concept that is dependent on views and ideas. Also, there is always more than one problem that needs addressing at the same time. Policy makers have to decide about which problem is more pressing and will therefore be placed higher on the policy agenda. In other words, the more problematic the situation, the more likely it is that the problem stream will lead to a policy window (Zahariadis, 2003).

Expectation 1.1:

MSF expects the problem stream to be part of the cause for a policy window for the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal.

The Politics Stream

The politics stream encompasses the current political situation and is the most influential to the policy process according to Kingdon (1995). The political ideas of the executive determine the direction of the policy. It should reflect the public opinion, since it is changed after elections when other people take office. It is the responsibility of politicians to put the popular policy issues on the agenda and to design policies that are positively evaluated by their citizens. The policy makers themselves do not have clear goals. They must attend to many issues at the same time and time constraints influence their decisions, which are often made before they had the opportunity to formulate a clear preference (Zahariadis, 2007).

Expectation 1.2:

MSF expects the politics stream to be part of the cause for a policy window for the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal.

The Policy Stream

The third stream is the policy stream. A certain problem at a certain moment in time asks for a fitting solution, which must be considered and decided upon by policy makers. All possible solutions to the problems of the problem stream are a part of the policy stream. The alternatives are designed and considered by the different actors in the policy community (Zahariadis, 2007). Which of the policy proposals will surface is determined by value acceptability, affordability and technical feasibility (Stout & Stevens, 2000). It depends on the level of integration of the policy community how many different proposals will be considered (Zahariadis, 2007).

Expectation 1.3:

MSF expects the policy stream to be part of the cause for a policy window for the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal.

Policy Entrepreneurs

Policy entrepreneurs are actors who are needed for the coupling of the three policy streams and initiating the policy to policy makers. Kingdon defines policy entrepreneurs as ‘advocates for proposals or for the prominence of an idea’ (Dudley & Richardson, 1999, p. 227). They can be people in government, parliamentarians, researchers, journalists or other people who are willing and motivated to invest their time, money and efforts in accomplishing a policy change they believe in. The more access to policy makers, the more successful the policy entrepreneur (Zahariadis, 2007).

Expectation 1.4:

MSF expects policy entrepreneurs to be part of the cause for a policy window for the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal.

Expectations from ACF

The basic expectation from ACF, expectation 2, is:

If ACF is correct, the EU-Turkey deal was established due to a shift in power structures, policy learning and the influence of policy brokers and external shocks.

Power Structures

Power structures or powerful groups that have specialized to a specific policy field and thereafter pushed for a policy proposal are influential for the outcome of the process according to Sabatier (2014). The theory of ACF is based on the assumption that powerful advocacy coalitions determine the direction of policy change, because they have strong beliefs and are motivated to translate these beliefs into policies. Important for successful negotiations between different groups, is that a policy stalemate is unacceptable. It can be difficult to break the stalemate, since there is a level of distrust between the different groups, caused by a lack of understanding and fear (Sabatier & Weible, 2014).

Expectation 2.1:

ACF expects power structures from the Netherlands to have pushed for the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal.

Expectation 2.2:

ACF expects power structures from Turkey to have pushed for the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal.

Policy Learning

Policy learning or the changing of causal beliefs is an important factor in the policy process. New ideas or preferences based on the evaluation of previous decisions or new knowledge, lead to alterations of existing policies or the implementation of new ones. Scientists and researchers have an active role in producing this new knowledge. Another large impact on the policy learning of actors, is a failing policy. The reason for this is that actors remember defeats more than victories and everyone is afraid to lose from their opponent (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). The secondary beliefs of the advocacy coalitions, the specific choices and goals in a policy process, are the most likely to shift because of policy learning (Weible et al., 2009).

Expectation 2.3:

ACF expects policy learning to have played a causal role in the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal.

Policy Brokers

Opportunities for policy change are not coincidental but created with a specific goal in mind (Compston & Madsen, 2011). The actors who are essential for this creation are policy brokers, who mediate to reach a compromise between the different advocacy coalitions, breaking a policy stalemate and reducing conflict (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994). They can convince powerful actors to prioritize certain issues and certain policy alternatives. Policy brokers are often high-level civil servants, but can also be politicians or actors from public organizations (Bratt, 2013; Bing-Yan Lu, 2015). They have policy preferences themselves and an overlooking preference for the policy to succeed.

Expectation 2.4:

ACF expects policy brokers to have accomplished a compromise between the actors involved in the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal.

External Shocks

Policy shifts happen after a change in the balance of power, since this will lead to new policy core beliefs and new priorities of the executive. Such a change can simply be caused by elections or rearrangement of the government, but occurs most likely through external shocks like a focus event or disastrous situation (Sabatier, 1998). When there is a problem that soaks up all attention of the public opinion, policy makers are forced to adapt and prioritize this. This can lead to a rapid

shift in the secondary beliefs of policy makers and have an impact on the agenda and focus of the discussed policy (Sabatier & Weible, 2014).

Expectation 2.5:

ACF expects external shocks to have played a causal role in the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal.

Chapter 3: Methodology

In this chapter, I will give an overview of the used methodology and methods in this research that I use to answer the general research question:

How can the policy process leading to the EU-Turkey deal better be explained: through the Multiple Streams Framework or through the Advocacy Coalition Framework?

The design of this study is a case study design, the methodology is congruence analysis and the method I use is causal process tracing. These are described in more detail below. I also added the operationalization of the variables from the expectations that will be used for the analysis. The data I gathered for this research is partly from document analysis and partly from semi-structured interviews. In this chapter I will elaborate on how I retrieved all the data.

Case Study Design

For this study, I have chosen to use a case study design. A case study design is used to explain how a complex phenomenon from the real world came to be (Yin, 2009). It is often used in the field of public administration and has many variations, which makes it difficult to put together an exclusive definition. There are however four characteristics that are specific to case studies according to Blatter and Haverland (2012):

1. a small number of cases;
2. many empirical observations per case;
3. a huge diversity of empirical observations for each case; and
4. an intensive reflection on the relationship between concrete empirical observations and abstract theoretical concepts.

Researches that include case studies focus rather on the explanation of the causes behind the effects, than on the explanation of the effects of the causes (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). In this study, the aim is to explain the policy process that led to the EU-Turkey deal. In a way, I am looking for the causes behind a complex phenomenon in the real world. A case study is therefore a suitable design of choice. I will make use of a within case analysis, instead of the also commonly used cross case analysis in which multiple cases are compared. The within case design allows for an in-depth research of a diverse set of observations of one phenomenon and the testing of multiple theories. Apart from my preference for a within case analysis based on the research aim and central research question, there is also a practical motivation. The case of the EU-Turkey deal is unique and exceptional and does not allow for an easy comparison with other cases. The downside of the within case design is that the conclusions are not generalizable, since they concern a specific case (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). I believe however, that the case of the EU-Turkey deal in itself is relevant enough to study, for both academic and societal reasons.

Congruence Analysis

The methodology that I have chosen for this research is congruence analysis, which is often used when the explanatory power of theories is tested. It establishes the level of congruence in a case between the expectations based on (at least) two theories and the empirical reality that is seen in the observations (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). There are two steps to be taken in congruence analysis. First, the predictions based on the two theories and the ideal processes that follow from them, are compared to the empirical observations. Second, the comparisons are compared to each other to see the difference in explanatory power between the two theories. For congruence analysis, a small n case study design is needed, so that the researcher can come to a broad and diverse set of observations to compare to abstract concepts.

I chose this methodology, because I want to compare two theoretical explanations for policy change and see which one is more relevant for the case of the EU-Turkey deal. In this study, both MSF and ACF will be tested as a possible explanation for the policy process behind this agreement. The frameworks show similarities, but I have formulated specific expectations for both which were introduced in the theory chapter. These expectations will first be compared to reality. After that, the level of congruence of both frameworks will be compared to each other to come to a comparison and to argue which theory has the most explanatory power.

Ideal Processes

To perform congruence analysis, I will describe the ideal processes of policy change as they would be according to each theory. These processes are based on the theoretical predictions from chapter two.

First, the ideal policy process in the case of MSF. If MSF is completely correct, a policy change would be caused by the coupling of the problem stream, politics stream and policy stream by a policy entrepreneur. A degree of randomness, chaos and coincidence would be visible in the process. Also, the policy makers would be characterized by fluid participation, problematic preferences, and unclear technology. In the problem stream, circumstances would form a problem that was identified as important by policy makers and therefore get placed high on the agenda. There are multiple problems, but the attention goes out to the most urgent one. In the politics stream, the public opinion would be reflected in the preferences of the elected politicians, who make decisions but do not have clear goals of their own. In the policy stream, a matching policy alternative, forming a solution to the problem at hand would surface and get selected by policy makers. This policy alternative would be initiated by a policy entrepreneur who successfully detected a window of opportunity, coupled the three streams and triggered a policy change.

If we look at the causal mechanisms that can be extracted from MSF, we see the following:

Urgency	→	Outcome
Political motives	→	Outcome

Policy alternatives → Outcome

Policy entrepreneurs → Outcome

Second, the policy process in the case of ACF. If ACF is completely correct, a policy change would be caused by a shift in power structures, policy learning and the influence of policy brokers and external shocks. The power structures would consist of stable powerful groups or advocacy coalitions, specialized in a policy field and homogenous in their policy core beliefs and their preferences for a policy proposal. Different coalitions would distrust each other which complicates the communication and the balance of power would be uneven. Policy learning of previous successful or unsuccessful proposals and new information generated by researchers, would determine whether new ideas are considered by the advocacy coalitions. The mediation between the groups would be done by policy brokers: actors who are motivated to come to a policy agreement in the field and mediate to break the policy stalemate. Finally, the process would be influenced by external shocks which are an important cause for policy change. They can lead to a direct shift in power structures and public opinion, new secondary beliefs of policy makers and a change in the agenda.

If we look at the causal mechanisms that can be extracted from ACF, we see the following:

Advocacy coalitions → Outcome

Policy learning → Outcome

Policy brokers → Outcome

External shocks → Outcome

Operationalization

In the table below, the variables used in this study together with their values and indicators are listed. The description of the variables will be used in the analysis of the explanatory power of the theories to see how much of them is reflected in the empirics.

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Definitions</i>	<i>Values</i>	<i>Indicators</i>
<i>Outcome</i>	The outcome of the policy negotiations in the field of migration between the EU and Turkey	Agreement/ no agreement Criteria for both parties	What do both parties gain and lose from signing this deal?
<i>Urgency</i>	The urgency of establishing a successful deal which ends illegal	The extent of urgency to establish an agreement	What are the consequences of not establishing a deal for both parties?

	migration from the Turkish coast to the EU		
<i>Political Motives</i>	Political views and strategies that influence the negotiations about the EU-Turkey deal	Positive / negative	What non-migration issues are incorporated in the EU-Turkey deal? What political issues such as elections and party politics were visible in the negotiations?
<i>Policy Alternatives</i>	The different options to end illegal migration from the Turkish coast to the EU	The policy alternatives	What policy initiatives are considered by the policy makers in the field of migration?
<i>Policy Entrepreneurs</i>	Actors who established or recognized a window of opportunity for the EU-Turkey deal	Actors	Which individuals or organizations contributed to establishing the EU-Turkey deal and in what way?
<i>Advocacy Coalitions</i>	Powerful groups that influence the policy process	Preferences of the groups	What do the different power structures aim for in the negotiations?
<i>Policy Learning</i>	Learning based on new information and previous experience of cooperation or failed policies	Positive / negative	What previous relations between the EU and Turkey are there? Did new information play a role in the negotiations?
<i>Policy Brokers</i>	Actors who mediated between the advocacy coalitions	Actors	Which individuals or organizations contributed to establishing the EU-Turkey deal and in what way?
<i>External shocks</i>	Events and circumstances that trigger a policy change	Circumstances	What circumstances led to the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal?

Table 1: Operationalization of the variables

Causal Process Tracing

To establish to what degree the preferences of the individual actors and individual events influenced the outcome of the policy process, I have chosen to combine congruence analysis with the method of causal process tracing (CPT). This qualitative method of analysis is defined by Collier as ‘the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator’ (2011, p. 826). The aim of CPT is to uncover the causal mechanism between the independent variables and the dependent variable (George & Bennet, 2005). It measures the influence of the X’s on the Y within cases in detail. By breaking the process down to steps, the influence of all separate causal factors, whether it concerns events or decisions, will become visible (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). Preferences of the actors are compared to the outcomes to see to what extent they are reflected. Throughout the process, all factors that influence a political decision are considered, as is the (dis)satisfaction of the actors with the outcome (Dür, 2008).

CPT studies often have a small n design because they focus on analysis within specific cases, linking causes and effects. The other option of case study analysis, comparing across cases, looks at the different effects independent variables have on the same dependent variables in multiple cases (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). CPT is the best suitable research method for this study, because I use only one case in my case study, which makes a within case analysis automatically necessary. Also, CPT breaks down the different steps of the process of influencing policy. The focus of this research is to explain the result of the negotiation process of the EU-Turkey deal. To uncover the steps of influencing policy in this process, is therefore essential. Finally, CPT is a method used for testing which theory gives the best explanation for a given outcome, which is the main objective of this study.

Data Collection

Useful data that are necessary to conduct a CPT study are described by Blatter and Haverland as ‘an insight or piece of data that provides information about context, process, or mechanism, and that contributes distinctive leverage in causal inference’ (2014, p. 10). The data for this research will be collected in two ways: by semi-structured interviews and by desk research. It is essential that the two types of data are used in combination to complement each other. Semi-structured interviews can give insight in the factors that influence a policy process of a case. A disadvantage of this research method is that it is not always possible to uncover all steps of a policy process. This can lead to gaps in the causal chain and incorrect conclusions. Checking the information retrieved from interviews with document analysis is therefore important (Dür, 2008). A downside to document analysis is the challenge to uncover real views and preferences out of official documents, so these will be collected from the interviews as well.

Semi-Structured Interviews

The first source of data I used for this study is semi-structured, face-to-face interviews. Weiss (1994) describes in his book the research aims whereby qualitative interview study could be the method of choice. Three of these aims are also found in this study. First, interviews can be used to develop a detailed description of developments through the eyes of people who were there to see them. Second, when there is more than one perspective on certain events, interviews are useful to incorporate multiple views in a study. Third, interviews are a suitable method for describing steps in a process. All in all, it is valuable to include interviews for detailed descriptions, multiple perspectives and describing the policy process. These data will help to support the findings from the desk research about the process of the EU-Turkey deal. I chose to conduct semi-structured interviews, because they are often used to explore people's views on a certain topic. The questions are predetermined but with a flexible order of asking. The questions can be formulated differently, more explanation can be given and questions can be avoided or added depending on the position of the interviewee. Also, follow-up questions depend on the way the conversation develops and are not the same in every case (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006; Rabionet, 2009). The interview guide I used can be found at the end of this study.

I conducted the interviews for this study with three policy makers who were closely involved with the policy process. I came into contact with the interviewees during my internship at the embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Ankara. The first two work for the Turkish government, respectively for the ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) and the directorate general for migration management (DGMM). They were both directly involved in assembling the preferred package of agreements for the Turkish side. They agreed to the interview only when their name and job title were not mentioned and when I would speak to no one else from their ministry. The third person I interviewed works for the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs and was involved with the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal by delivering information to the Dutch government. He too wants to remain anonymous. The data I retrieved from the interviews, are the political motives and expressed preferences of the actors. Furthermore, the information from the interviews is used to confirm the order of events and which actors were involved in the process.

Document Analysis

The second source of data is document analysis, a qualitative research method which involves analyzing and interpreting data from written documents. These are for example public records, policy documents, newspaper articles, press releases, independent reports, minutes of meetings and public statements of the actors involved in the policy process. Much of the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal was extensively covered by the press and documented by the involved institutions, so there are a lot of materials available. When collecting the documents for document analysis, there are two types that can be distinguished: primary sources and secondary sources. The distinction between the two is based on the distance of the author to the actual events. In

primary sources, the author reports about the impressions of events from the first hand. In secondary sources, the author describes the impressions of others or certain events. In this study, I used both types of sources. I categorized the documents in government output (primary sources), think tanks and media (secondary sources).

The government output I used comes directly from the Turkish and Dutch government and from the institutions of the European Union. These were necessary to check the order of events through official statements by the governments, to see if any other policy alternatives were considered and documented upon and to get a better view of the political relations between the Netherlands, the EU and Turkey. I used publications from thinktanks to get more background information on the circumstances of the EU-Turkey deal and a more nuanced view of the different elements that were of importance in the policy process. They also helped me to identify political motives and preferences of the actors. The scientific analysis of these research institutes was a good starting point for me to start my own analysis. Finally, the media sources I used are news articles and reports by journalists. I selected them based on the source (only quality newspapers are used) and the detail of the content. They are necessary for the reconstruction of the policy process. I looked at many descriptions of the complete policy process in many different sources, to make a complete and reliable reconstruction. I also specifically looked for the presence of the following core variables during the media analysis: urgency, political motives, policy entrepreneurs, policy brokers and external shocks.

<i>Source type</i>	<i>Sources</i>	<i>Retrieved data</i>
<i>Interviews</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Turkish ministry of foreign affairs * Turkish directorate general for migration management * Dutch ministry of foreign affairs 	Political motives, which actors were involved in the policy process, the preferences of the actors and the order of events
<i>Government</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * EU Turkey statement by the European Council on 18 March 2016 * Overview of the Turkey-EU Relations on the official website of the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs * Presidency Report: Migration 1, 2016 * Presidency Report: Migration 2, 2016 * Presidency Report: Migration 3, 2016 * Remarks by President Donald Tusk after the meeting of the EU heads of state or government with Turkey (2016) 	The order of events, possible policy alternatives and the political relations between the EU and Turkey

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Results of the European Council meeting 17-18 March 2016 * The official website of the Netherlands European Council presidency 2016 	
<i>Thinktanks</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Collet (2016) for the Migration Policy Institute, a think tank dedicated to analysis of the movement of people worldwide * Eralp (2016) for the CESifo, an economic research group * Hellerstein (2016) for Stratfor, a geopolitical intelligence platform * The website of the European Stability Initiative (2016), think tank for South East Europe and enlargement * Toygür & Özsöz (2016) for the Elcano Royal Institute, a think-tank for international and strategic studies 	The background and circumstances of the EU-Turkey deal, the different views on the policy process, political motives and the preferences of the actors
<i>Media</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * The leaked minutes of the meeting between Tusk, Juncker and Erdogan (Pappas, 2016) * Alonso (2016) in NRC Handelsblad * Alonso & Kas (2016) in NRC Next * Alonso & Kranenburg (2016) in NRC Next * Kingsley & Rankin (2016) in The Guardian * Peeperkorn (2016) in De Volkskrant * Rethmeijer (2016) in Vrij Nederland * Somaskanda (2016) in Foreign Policy * Traynor (2016) in The Guardian * Tunali (2015) in Het Financieel Dagblad 	The reconstruction of the policy process and the presence of the following core variables: urgency, political motives, policy entrepreneurs, policy brokers and external shocks

Table 2: description of sources

Chapter 4: Context

In this chapter I will give context to the study by describing the situation in which the EU-Turkey deal was formed. First it is important to learn more about the refugee crisis of 2015, which caused the need for a policy change in the field of migration and eventually led to the first negotiations about a deal between the EU and Turkey. Second, I will give a brief description of the history of the relations between Turkey, the EU and the Netherlands, since this affected the policy process and the way the actors perceived each other. In the end of the chapter I added a summary of the content of the final agreement, so it is clear who got what out of the negotiations and into the final agreement.

The Refugee Crisis

Groups of migrants coming to Europe from the neighboring continents is nothing new and has happened for centuries. Sporadically, there is a peak in the number of refugees caused by external factors such as conflict and disaster. In 2015 there was such a peak, with a total of more than a million migrants who crossed the outer borders into Europe, the clear majority of them travelling over sea (BBC, 2016). 3550 people lost their lives during their dangerous journey (Spindler, 2015). It is because of these tragic numbers, the relatively unprepared state of the EU and the impact it made on not just the border states but on all European countries and all of the world, that we now speak of the refugee crisis of 2015 (Heck & Leijendekker, 2015). In figure 3 below, the numbers of refugees and migrants arriving by sea in 2014 and the first half of 2015 are compared and an increase is clearly visible.




Figure 3 (Agabani, 2015)

The main cause for the increase in the worldwide number of refugees is conflict. There are several conflicts close to the European border that force many people to flee and move elsewhere. The most known and the one causing the most displaced people is the ongoing civil war in Syria that started in 2011. In 2016, more than five million Syrians had already fled their home country (Rummery & Gaynor, 2016). Many of them sought refuge in neighboring countries such as Lebanon and Jordan, who received financial aid from European countries to provide shelter. Many also crossed the border with Turkey, where large refugee camps were set up. Welcoming the Syrian refugees is a source of pride for Turkey and since 2011, there is a so-called 'open door' policy (Eralp, 2016). More than three million Syrians have registered in Turkey as 'guests' since then, and most of them are building a future there to stay (International Crisis Group, 2016).

Apart from the war in Syria, there were and are the armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the regime in Eritrea that have many displaced people as a result. UNHCR announced that there were 21.3 million refugees worldwide in 2016, the highest number ever measured (UNHCR, 2016). Apart from the refugees, there were people from several African and Eastern European countries who joined the flow of migrants in 2015, in search of better lives and opportunities. Not all of them had Western Europe in mind as their destination, but many did. Figure 4 shows the numbers of people who arrived in Europe by sea in 2015. These were mostly Syrians.




Figure 4 (Agabani, 2015)

The refugees and other migrants entering Europe in 2015, made use of different routes. Many of them took a boat from the coast of Africa across the Mediterranean Sea to Spain or Italy. The most frequently used route, especially for people from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, was through Turkey across the Aegean Sea to the Greek Islands (Tunali, 2015; BBC, 2016). There were no visible restrictions from the Turkish authorities to take on this journey, there was hardly any control from

the coastguard, nor were there sufficient measures against human trafficking in place (Gischler, 2015). It is for this reason that the crossing place to the EU from the Turkish beaches became the issue of policy negotiation that eventually led to the EU-Turkey deal. To close this route, a wish of the EU, collaboration with neighbor Turkey was inevitable (Tunali, 2015).

EU-Turkey Relations

The relations between the EU and Turkey are complicated. The status of Turkey is not that of a fully European country, but of a special partner to the EU. An association agreement was signed between the two in 1963, which opened the ways for establishing the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey in 1996 (Dienelt, 2008). In 1999, Turkey became a candidate member state of the EU. It had already applied for this status in 1987. Ever since then, the possible accession of Turkey has been frequently debated between the current member states, but without a positive result. Some member states, such as France and Italy, have already explicitly made their objection to the accession of Turkey known at an early stage (McLaren, 2007). Furthermore, Turkey fails to meet the criteria that are needed for finalizing the different chapters in the accession procedure (Holehouse, 2016).

There are two important sides to the arguments of the opponents of Turkey's accession to the EU. First there is the cultural side. Turkey has an Islamic majority while Europe has a history of Jewish-Christian culture. Also, Turkey is close to the Middle East and has some instable neighboring countries that are perceived as threatening by some member states (WRR, 2004). The second, more practical side of the discussion is about the size and political geography of Turkey. If Turkey becomes a member state of the EU, it would be the largest country in geographical size. Moreover, with the current population growth it will soon exceed Germany in being the country with the largest population. If Turkey joined the EU, this would significantly change the balance of power (Lewis, 2010). The EU institutions would have to be adjusted to 'make room' for Turkey and it would alter the dynamics within the EU. Furthermore, Turkey is in a dispute with Greece about Cyprus, an EU member state that is not recognized by Turkey. This should change before actual EU accession can be discussed (Alonso & Kranenburg, 2016).

The discussion of Turkey's accession to the European Union has come up occasionally in the past decades. However, in all these years Turkey has only managed to complete one chapter of the accession procedure and fails to meet the criteria for EU membership (Holehouse, 2016). Every year, the European Commission publishes a report about the progress in the accession procedure of all candidate member states. In the 2015 Turkey report it says that major shortcomings in the area of human rights remain and that significant backsliding in the area of freedom of expression is visible (European Commission, 2015). After the failed coup attempt of July 2016, the situation deteriorated even more. The relations between the EU and Turkey seem to have never been this difficult since Turkey officially became a candidate member state for the EU (Rankin, 2016).

Therefore, in the current state of affairs, it is almost unthinkable that the membership of Turkey lies in the near future. The discussion has lost its relevance for now and it is more useful to look at the relations between the EU and Turkey that are still in place. The association agreement between the European Community and Turkey from 1963 for example, also called the Ankara agreement. It forms the basis of the economical but also political and institutional relations (Dienelt, 2008).

The relations between Turkey and the Netherlands are more than 400 years old and special in different ways. Economically speaking, the two countries are important partners and the amount of trade between the two tripled in the past ten years. The Netherlands is one of the largest investors in the Turkish economy worldwide. Politicians and ministers frequently visit each other and millions of Dutch tourists travel to Turkey each year. On top of that, more than 400.000 inhabitants of the Netherlands are of Turkish heritage and still hold the Turkish nationality alongside the Dutch one (Rijksoverheid, 2017). At the time of this writing, the relations between the Netherlands and Turkey have cooled down and are more complicated than ever due to a series of diplomatic incidents. Because this study focuses on the time of the negotiations about the EU-Turkey deal in 2015 and 2016, I will base the findings of this study on the relatively positive relations that were in place back then.

Content

The EU and Turkey agreed on nine action points in 18 March 2016. These nine points are in combination the content of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal. All nine points are listed below in short.

- 1) All new irregular migrants (migrants not applying for asylum or whose application has been found unfounded or inadmissible) crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey.
- 2) For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria.
- 3) Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU.
- 4) Once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are ending or have been substantially and sustainably reduced, a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be activated.
- 5) The fulfilment of the visa liberalization roadmap will be accelerated vis-à-vis all participating Member States with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016, provided that all benchmarks have been met.
- 6) The EU, in close cooperation with Turkey, will further speed up the disbursement of the initially allocated 3 billion euros under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and ensure funding of further projects for persons under temporary protection identified with swift input from Turkey before the end of March.
- 7) The EU and Turkey welcomed the ongoing work on the upgrading of the Customs Union.

- 8) The EU and Turkey reconfirmed their commitment to re-energize the accession process: The opening of Chapter 17 on 14 December 2015 and decided, as a next step, to open Chapter 33 during the Netherlands presidency.
- 9) The EU and its Member States will work with Turkey in any joint endeavor to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria, in particular in certain areas near the Turkish border which would allow for the local population and refugees to live in safer areas. (European Union, 2016b).

Chapter 5: Empirics

In this chapter, I will introduce the information I gathered through the interviews and the document analysis about the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal. All data is retrieved from a combination of sources. I reconstructed the process step by step, so the information can be used for causal process tracing during the analysis phase of the study. The influence of the core variables as well as other important factors in policy making, such as preferences and decisions by key actors, are included in the reconstruction.

Timeline of the Policy Process

To get an overview of the policy process, it is important to see it in a chronological perspective. Below I will make a reconstruction of what happened when and who were involved. It includes the most important dates from the policy process and the roles of Turkey and the Netherlands at that time, between September 2015 and March 2016. I identified three important phases in the process which I describe separately: the start of the negotiations, constructing the plan and finalizing the deal. The most important meetings between the main actors in the negotiations are visualized in the timeline in figure 5.




Figure 5: Timeline of the policy process

The Start of the Negotiations

The civil war in Syria started in 2011 and triggered many people to relocate domestically or leave the country. Since then, Turkey has hosted a large population of Syrian refugees, in addition to migrants from Iraq, Afghanistan and several African countries (Tunali, 2015). The official negotiations about a collaboration between the EU and Turkey on the issue of migration, only started in the fall of 2015. The EU offered to help with the refugee crisis long before, according to the civil servant of the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs, but Turkey refused out of a sense of pride and took on the financial burden alone. For this reason, the EU directed their available resources for the hosting of Syrian refugees to other countries in the region such as Lebanon and Jordan (interview Dutch MFA, 2017).

But then the refugee crisis reaches a new low in September 2015. The numbers of crossings over the Aegean Sea keep increasing and people continue to put their lives at risk to reach the European continent. In just a few months, 850.000 people cross from Turkey to the Greek Islands (Rethmeijer, 2016). Many lose their life during their attempt and those who make it, lost all or a large part of their savings to human traffickers. The situation has become extremely problematic. The Migration Policy Institute reports that all EU leaders are motivated to look for a way to stop illegal migration and take preventive measures against it as soon as possible (Collet, 2016). The civil servant from the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs notes that from September 2015 on, more and more delegations from EU member states visit Turkey (interview Turkish MFA, 2016).

In early October, the idea behind the EU-Turkey deal is developed by the European Stability Initiative (ESI). This small think tank is based in Berlin and focuses on the South-East European region and EU enlargement (ESI, 2008). Its chairman and co-founder, Gerald Knaus, has sent the plan around to civil servants and policy makers, hoping that it would touch ground somewhere. German Chancellor Merkel first mentions the plan in a talk show only a few days later (Somaskanda, 2016). When Merkel visits Istanbul and meets with Turkish president Erdogan, they discuss the possible refugee deal and make up a draft agreement. It is called the Joint Action Plan and says Turkey will receive 3 billion euros for the sheltering and readmitting of refugees from Europe (Tunali, 2015). The think tank Elcano Royal Institute claims that Erdogan asks Merkel to wait with the start of the negotiations, since their meeting is only two weeks before the Turkish general elections (Toygür & Özsöz, 2016).

President of the European Commission Juncker and president of the European Council Tusk visit Ankara on 19 November and have a meeting with Erdogan. In the report of this meeting, which was leaked to the press and reported upon by the Guardian, it becomes clear that Erdogan is convinced he is holding the cards in the negotiations (Traynor, 2016). He claims he does not need any money from the EU and threatens with the number of refugees he can let into Europe by opening the borders. 'We can open the doors to Greece and Bulgaria anytime and put the refugees on buses' (Pappas, 2016). After Tusk makes clear that the EU really wants a deal with Turkey, Erdogan replies: 'So what are you going to do with the refugees if you don't get a deal? Kill the refugees?' Juncker reminds him that the EU helped his government out during the elections, by

delaying the publishing of a critical report on Turkey. Erdogan denies having ever requested this and says the report was an insult anyway (Pappas, 2016).

Two weeks after the awkward meeting between the three presidents, on 29 November 2015, the conference between the leaders of the EU and Turkey takes place. They issue a joint statement for more structured high-level meetings on a regular basis or when one of the parties requests it (European Union, 2016b). They activate the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, which is roughly based on the proposal Merkel made to Erdogan in October. It is described in a report by the Netherlands that this includes a common approach to migration management and handling the refugee crisis by working together on finding a solution (Presidency Report: Migration 1, 2016).

Constructing the Plan

In December 2015, Samsom, a Dutch Member of Parliament and head of the social democratic party, visits Turkey to get a better view of the situation at the coastline. Because he is interested in the migration situation, he receives a folder with useful articles from the embassy of the Netherlands in Ankara. One of these articles is about the migration deal between the EU and Turkey as composed by ESI. When Samsom returns to the Netherlands, he discusses the plan he came across with Rutte, the prime minister of the Netherlands, together with both their party colleagues in government and parliament in a coalition meeting (Peeperkorn, 2016b). Rutte in his turn, introduces the idea he heard about from Samsom in a meeting with EU leaders and Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu in Brussels. In the media, he presents it as the 'Samsom-plan', to make it more convincing to other social democratic leaders in Europe (Alonso & Kas, 2016). All present at the meeting want to speed up the collaboration between the EU and Turkey and they agree on a first draft of the agreement (Peeperkorn, 2016b).

On January 1st 2016, the Netherlands' term of the rotating presidency of the European Council kicks off (EU2016, 2016). The situation of the refugee crisis is described in the first presidency report of the Netherlands as an important issue at the top of the political agenda. Working together with Turkey to reduce the numbers of incoming refugees is one of the three pillars of the migration approach (Presidency Report: Migration 1, 2016). In the first week of the presidency term, Dutch undersecretary of justice Dijkhoff invites the Greek minister of migration Mouzalas to The Hague to talk about the draft agreement on migration. The Greek government is reluctant about deporting all refugees that arrive on their islands back to Turkey, but Dijkhoff convinces him of the necessity (Peeperkorn, 2016b). Rutte has several meetings on the issue as well and makes this known through his twitter account. International media recognize that the Dutch are strongly pushing the plan (Traynor, 2016). Establishing a deal is the main goal of the EU presidency term and the Dutch government wants to make clear they are in control in the matter (Alonso & Kranenburg, 2016).

For the Turkish government as well, finalizing a deal with the EU in time is a clear objective. Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu expresses his desire to establish a deal during the presidency of the Netherlands, not having too much faith in the presidency of Slovakia that will follow (Peeperkorn, 2016b). The civil servant of the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs says: 'Common policies with the EU were the only way to solve the issue of migration. The deal was supposed to send a message to human traffickers and to make an end to the horrible situation of 2015' (interview Turkish MFA, 2016). On the website of the Turkish government, the official three aims of the EU-Turkey deal are described as follows:

- (1) to prevent loss of lives in the Aegean,
- (2) to break the migrant smuggling networks
- (3) to replace illegal migration with legal migration.

(Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

These aims are confirmed during the interview with the civil servant of the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs and during the interview with DGMM (interview Turkish MFA, 2016; interview DGMM, 2017). Another reason for Turkey to collaborate, is that the deal is an opportunity to strengthen ties with the EU. In an instable region with IS and Russia close by and with a stagnating economy, renewed and positive relations with the EU have become important (Eralp, 2016).

On the occasion of the World Economic Forum in the end of January, the Ankara Club is founded. This group of diplomats and civil servants will be working on a completed text for the agreement between the EU and Turkey. Meanwhile, Samsom gives an interview to a Dutch national newspaper, leaking the agenda of the Netherlands saying that they want to return all migrants to Turkey right after their arrival on European beaches. Davutoglu uses this information when he comes to visit Rutte in The Hague on 10 February. He demands for an equal exchange of migrants instead of being only on the receiving end (Peeperkorn, 2016b). This is the moment when Turkey first introduces the one-for-one scheme (interview Turkish MFA, 2016).

On 18 and 19 February, another conference with all EU-leaders takes place, this time concerning the Brexit-issue. The dinner on the first night is reserved to talk about migration and the EU-Turkey deal. Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu is also welcome at the dinner, but has to cancel due to terrorist attacks in Ankara that week. The proposal that he made to Rutte in The Hague is discussed among the EU-leaders and a new meeting date is arranged. Merkel wants to have an agreed deal before 13 March, when there are federal state elections held in parts of Germany (Peeperkorn, 2016b).

Finalizing the Deal

Samsom gives an interview to the press again in March, in which he says that Europe should enable readmission of refugees from Turkey. It leads to a conflict between him and Rutte, who wanted to

wait for the next move from the Turkish side. In Samsom's own words it was his goal to put pressure on the negotiation process because he feels the momentum of 'his plan' is disappearing (Alonso & Kas, 2016). It is no coincidence that Samsom chose this tactic, he later explains. He heard from Gerald Knaus of the ESI that Ankara is willing to make concessions and he knows that there will be a high-level EU-visit to Ankara that day. That evening, during a dinner meeting of the Ankara Club, the Turks are prepared to discuss the taking back of all migrants as part of the deal. They promise to come up with a new proposal. One of the civil servants sends a text to Rutte: 'De deur bij de Turken gaat open, probeer zeker meer te halen' (Peeperkorn, 2016b).

In the second presidency report on migration, the Netherlands calls on all member states to join the cooperation with Turkey. They praise Turkey for their effort on the Joined Action Plan and what has been accomplished so far. However, the numbers of irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to Greece remain high. Therefore, both the EU and Turkey must continue to commit to the fulfillment of their obligations to make the Joined Action Plan a success (Presidency Report: Migration 2, 2016). The report also describes border closings on the Western Balkan Route as a problematic situation. Because of these developments, more people will be stranded in Turkey and Greece. For Turkey, this means becoming the final destination of all refugees that enter the country. It leads to a stronger need for a more permanent refugee deal with the EU as soon as possible (Alonso & Kranenburg, 2016). Turkey needs a clear deal so they can evict all irregular migrants with help of the EU, the civil servant if the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs explains (interview Dutch MFA, 2017).

The new meeting of EU leaders at the conference on migration is set to take place on 7 March. All ambassadors of the EU go through the final draft text of the EU-Turkey deal a day before. 'Done by the book', they conclude. That evening, Rutte and Merkel are summoned to the hotel of Davutoglu in Brussels. He proposes a new plan, to not only take back economic migrants but all new migrants as well. This offer means a complete change of the draft agreement that is supposed to be discussed the next day (Alonso, 2016a). In addition to that, Davutoglu proposes to resettle a Syrian national from Turkey to the EU for every Syrian national readmitted by Turkey, to speed up the implementation of the visa liberalization and the financial aid of 3 billion euros for refugees in Turkey, to open new chapters in the accession talks and to work together on the improvement of humanitarian conditions in Syria (Presidency Report: Migration 3, 2016).

The new and altered plan is presented to the other EU leaders in the morning, who react with disbelief. They feel betrayed by being kept in the dark but are at the same time interested in the new options that were proposed by the Turkish side (Alonso & Kranenburg, 2016). It is something completely different from what they were prepared for and the new plan is discussed behind closed doors. Late at night, a compromise is reached, still with a lot of the demands of Davutoglu intact (Peeperkorn, 2016b). The EU leaders give out a statement reading: 'The President of the European Council will take forward the Turkish proposals presented during the meeting and work

out the details with the Turkish side before the 17-18 March European Council' (Presidency Report: Migration 3, 2016).

On 17 March, the spring meeting takes place in Brussels, in presence of the EU leaders and Davutoglu. Officially, this meeting is presented as to further discuss steps to address the migration crisis and EU-Turkey cooperation (European Union, 2016a). Among other things, the exact starting date and the number of refugees that will be exchanged through the one-for-one scheme are decided here (Kingsley & Rankin, 2016). Rutte, Tusk, Juncker and Davutoglu sign the EU-Turkey deal on 18 March (Peeperkorn, 2016b). In his closing remarks, Tusk invites the EU agencies and UNHCR to participate in the process of monitoring the implementation of the new signed policy agreement (European Union, 2016c).

Chapter 6: Analysis

For the execution of congruence analysis, the expectations based on the theory should be compared to reality (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). Therefore, all predicted observations that are described in the expectations derived from MSF and ACF plus the ideal processes that are summarized in the methodology chapter, will be compared to all evidence from the chapter of empirics. I will describe the causal mechanism between the independent and dependent variable in each expectation. Confirmation or disconfirmation of the main expectations by the empirical results will be illustrative for the explanatory power of both theories and will lead to answering the research question of this study.

Multiple Streams Framework

The Problem Stream

The problem stream consists of conditions that rise to the agenda as problems (Ness, 2010). Because they are selected based on constructed urgency, I identified the causal mechanism that can be derived from the influence of the problem stream as:

Urgency  Outcome

2015 was the year of an exceptional refugee crisis. When large numbers of people arrived in Europe and many people drowned trying to reach the continent, policymakers adopted the issue as problematic and started looking for a solution. To put it in costs and benefits: the problem became so urgent that the willingness to bear the costs for a solution rose. This urgency led to the start of the talks between the EU and Turkey about a possible collaboration on the issue of migration (Collet, 2016). The proposed policy of the EU-Turkey deal forms a solution to the problematic circumstances the European continent found itself in.

For the EU member states panic and urgency were the main motivations, since they wanted to find a way to close the borders and they did not manage do to this on their own. Therefore, a collaboration with Turkey was necessary (interview Dutch MFA, 2017). The situation of the refugee crisis was at the top of the political agenda of the rotating presidency of the European Council of the Netherlands (Presidency Report: Migration 1, 2016). The benefit of finding a solution to stabilize the refugee crisis clearly became worth a lot to the Netherlands and to its leaders. Since the crisis reached public opinion, it could endanger the popularity of politicians at that moment as well as their possible reelection if they would not act quickly and effectively (interview Dutch MFA, 2017). This made the Netherlands and especially Prime Minister Rutte highly motivated to prevent further influx of large groups of refugees. To accomplish this, he was willing to support concessions from the EU side to make this policy work.

The Turkish government was also aware of the pressure on the EU institutions and leaders, and claims that the European countries were desperate to find a solution for the refugee crisis in the fall of 2015 (interview DGMM, 2017). Ankara's need for the deal was far less pressing than Brussels', a distinct disadvantage for Europe (Hellerstein, 2016). However, the civil servant of the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs refutes this by saying that Turkey also had a need for a deal with the EU. Especially after the border closings on the Western Balkan Route, Turkey feared to become the final destination for all migrants traveling to Europe and feared an increase in terrorist attacks by extremists among the migrants. They needed a clear deal so they could evict all irregular migrants with help of the EU (interview Dutch MFA, 2017).

Many elements from the theoretical description of the problem stream are visible causal factors in the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal. Without the urgency factor the policy process would have never started, which makes this variable decisive in the causal mechanism. Therefore, expectation 1.1 can be confirmed:

MSF expects the problem stream to be part of the cause for a policy window for the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal.

The Politics Stream

In the politics stream, the current political situation including all elements of domestic politics is considered to be influential. I identified the causal mechanism that can be derived from the influence of the politics stream as:

Political motives  Outcome

For both the Netherlands as for Turkey as for other parties involved in the EU-Turkey deal, there were political factors that played a role in their position in the negotiations. Elections for example were mentioned twice as an important factor in the description of the policy process. Turkish president Erdogan wanted to wait until after the elections to start with the negotiations of the plan when chancellor Merkel visited him to discuss it for the first time (Toygür & Özsöz, 2016). He did not want the attention to move away from himself and his party at this critical moment for his government. The publicity about a deal with the EU could affect his position negatively. Chancellor Merkel in her turn wanted the plan finalized before the elections in parts of Germany (Peeperkorn, 2016b). The refugee crisis created a lot of negative attention for her and affected her political position. Establishing this agreement would form the solution to a problem that is very urgent to many Germans. Rutte found himself in the same situation. In fact, all EU leaders were thinking about their own, national political position when they decided to get a deal (interview Dutch MFA, 2017).

Not only through the timing of elections was the EU-Turkey deal used for political advantages by the parties involved. The deal gave Turkey the opportunity to move closer to the EU and gain a lot

of 'extra's' in the negotiations. Strengthening ties with the EU was important for Turkey due to the instable region and a stagnating economy (Eralp, 2016). The extra elements include the financial aid for refugees, more frequent EU meetings, the opening of new chapters in the accession procedure and, most importantly, visa liberalization for Turkish citizens. Visa liberalization was vital for public opinion, since it would affect all Turkish people (interview Turkish MFA, 2016). The civil servant from DGMM even admitted that 'visa liberalization was a purely political issue' (interview DGMM, 2017). In the negotiations, Turkey could use the fact that the deal was so needed by Europe and that the EU was under so much pressure, to gain additional political advantages (Hellerstein, 2016). In this way, Turkey used the refugee crisis as a leverage and political tool to gain other privileges. In the future, the deal and the issue will remain a big card to play in political disputes (interview DGMM, 2017).

The EU-Turkey deal was politically motivated by all parties, but because Turkey had less pressure from problematic circumstances, political preferences were even more important for them in the policy process. There was more to gain from a possible deal with the EU than to lose and the crisis formed an opportunity to win both nationally and internationally. Furthermore, Turkey had a lot of leverage while already hosting a large population of refugees and knew the EU was highly motivated to prevent these people to come to Europe in large groups. They therefore wanted to include popular elements leading to approval by the Turkish public of the deal, while the EU accepted this if they could save the Schengen area and hold the damage away from forthcoming elections (Toygür & Özsöz, 2016).

Political factors have a causal relation with the policy process according to MSF. In the process around the EU-Turkey deal, this proves to be true. Many of the political elements from the theoretical framework can be traced back in the empirics and there is a causal relationship visible between this variable and the outcome of the policy process. Therefore, expectation 1.2 can be confirmed:

MSF expects the politics stream to be part of the cause for a policy window for the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal.

The Policy Stream

The policy stream consists of all possible solutions to the problems in the problem stream. I identified the causal mechanism that can be derived from the influence of the policy stream as:

Policy alternatives  Outcome

The EU-Turkey deal is a solution to a complex problem. At the time of the policy process, there were not many other options to solve the problematic situation the actors found themselves in. The Joined Action Plan that Merkel had initiated did not work, but collaborating with Turkey was still a vital policy goal. As Knaus said, 'you can't control a sea border without cooperating with your

neighbor on the other side. You can't build fences on water' (Somaskanda, 2016). For the deal to become a success, all involved parties had to see the benefits of the proposal, identify not having a solution as a big loss and keep it on the agenda. Although the reasoning and views of the EU and Turkey differed, they could both benefit from the solution after it was implemented and they were therefore both expected to aim for a successful outcome. No one wanted to go back to the situation of 2015, the civil servant from the Turkish directorate general for migration management explained (interview DGMM, 2017). In the view of the civil servant of the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs, the EU-Turkey deal is the most successful collaboration between the EU and Turkey ever (interview Turkish MFA, 2016).

But was this policy decided upon in the way that MSF describes? There was no 'soup' of options or coincidental rising of this particular plan. It was thought out much more calculated and it was carefully placed under the attention of policy makers. Moreover, it was the only suitable alternative for many of the actors. There is no clear causal mechanism between the policy stream and the EU-Turkey deal, which is why expectation 1.3 cannot be confirmed:

MSF expects the policy stream to be part of the cause for a policy window for the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal.

Policy Entrepreneurs

Policy entrepreneurs establish a window of opportunity by coupling the three streams. I identified the causal mechanism that can be derived from the influence of policy entrepreneurs as:

Policy entrepreneurs → Outcome

Parlementarian Samsom is a policy entrepreneur in the case of the EU-Turkey deal. He came across the plan through the Dutch embassy in Ankara and recognized the window of opportunity. I also identify Prime Minister Rutte as a policy entrepreneur, since he introduced the plan in the European context. The Dutch civil servant from the ministry of foreign affairs says the personal roles of Rutte and Samsom in the policy process must not be underestimated, since they contacted all their European party colleagues to find support for their plan (interview Dutch MFA, 2017). Party politics is an important instrument for policy entrepreneurs, which Samsom and Rutte managed to use for their objective of establishing policy change (Herweg et al, 2015).

Without the role of policy entrepreneurs, the outcome of the process would not have been the establishing of the EU-Turkey deal as we know it. The causal influence of policy entrepreneurs on the outcome has been decisive. Therefore, expectation 1.4 can be confirmed:

MSF expects policy entrepreneurs to be part of the cause for a policy window for the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal.

The Process

After revisiting all elements of MSF as applied to the case above, what remains is to look at the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal as a whole. How does it compare to the ideal process as I described it in the methodology chapter? According to Kingdon, a considerable amount of randomness is visible in policy making. In the process of the EU-Turkey deal this does not apply. The causal mechanism works from the urgency of the refugee crisis in the problem stream, to the solution of the EU-Turkey deal. The circumstances of the negotiations were political, as were most of the actors, but it is hard to imagine that coincidence determined the course and outcome of the process.

The three characteristics of government as described by MSF, fluid participation, problematic preferences and unclear technology, are not identified in the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal either. The participants in the negotiations and policy making were the same throughout the process and their preferences were unambiguously. Of course, they all had an agenda with goals besides stopping illegal migration, but even these were clear and not hidden. Overall, the decisions were made on the highest political level and there were not many layers of civil servants. The multilevel governance model in which unclear technology and losing information through the system of communication takes place is not applicable.

The most important part of MSF is the idea of having three streams that must be coupled to get to a policy window. Was the policy change of the EU-Turkey deal caused by the coupling of the three streams by a policy entrepreneur? In a sense, this has proven to be true. There were problematic circumstances and politicians followed the public opinion and tried to solve these with a matching policy alternative. The general expectation for MSF, expectation 1, is:

If MSF is correct, the EU-Turkey deal was established in a policy window caused by the coupling of the problem stream, politics stream and policy stream by policy entrepreneurs.

The expectation cannot be confirmed as such. All the elements of MSF became visible during the analysis, but not all have proven to be completely applicable to the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal. Mostly this is because the assumptions are based on domestic systems of policy making. Although this limits the explanatory power of the framework in this case, it is clear that urgency, political motives and policy entrepreneurs played a decisive role for the outcome of the policy process.

Advocacy Coalition Framework

Power Structures

Power structures are specialized groups who are in favor of a certain policy proposal and influence the outcome of the process. They are also called advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 2014). I identified the causal mechanism that can be derived from the influence of advocacy coalitions as:

Advocacy coalitions → Outcome

The EU-Turkey deal as a policy proposal is part of the subsystem of migration. For both the Netherlands as for Turkey, there were multiple actors specialized in this subsystem involved in the policy process. These actors together can be described as advocacy coalitions: stable groups who share policy core beliefs and have a specific common goal. Since there was no organized opposition to the policy proposal in either of the countries, only one advocacy coalition can be identified for each one. The preferences of the two parties for the content of the agreement did not completely align, but they both had the aim of stopping illegal migration. That is why I identify them as two opposing advocacy coalitions with different policy core beliefs, but ultimately with the same goal. During the policy negotiations about the plan by ESI, both parties could push their own preferences for the final content of the deal.

The advocacy coalition in the Netherlands that pushed for their preferences in the negotiations for the EU-Turkey deal consisted of several different actors, including politicians, the ministry of justice, the ministry of foreign affairs, diplomats, bureaucrats and civil servants. Their aim was most importantly to stop refugees from coming into Europe, because this was an important issue for the national public opinion and therefore for the politician's positions. Second, they wanted to make sure this deal was sealed within the presidency of the European Council. The Dutch leaders were personally invested in finding support in the other member states (interview Dutch MFA, 2017). They were pushing for the plan in the European context and used different means to gather momentum and attention (Traynor, 2016).

The Turkish advocacy coalition in the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal consisted of the government, the president and the prime minister, and the civil servants of three ministries: foreign affairs, internal affairs and European affairs. Their aim was to prevent loss of lives in the Aegean Sea, break the migrant smuggling networks and replace illegal migration with legal migration (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). Furthermore, the government wanted to get additional benefits from the deal in return for taking back irregular migrants and refugees from Greece. It becomes clear in the leaked report of the meeting between the Juncker, Tusk and Erdogan, that the Turkish president used his power in the negotiations and is convinced of its own beneficial position (Pappas, 2016).

Power structures from both the Netherlands and from Turkey were in favor of the EU-Turkey deal. A policy stalemate was unacceptable for both parties, which led to successful negotiations and the signing of the agreement. There is a causal mechanism between the advocacy coalitions and the outcome. In that sense, ACF was right and both expectations 2.1 and 2.2 can be confirmed:

ACF expects power structures from the Netherlands to have pushed for the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal.

ACF expects power structures from Turkey to have pushed for the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal.

Despite proving the existence of the influence of the two power structures on the process, it might be more interesting to see who won the negotiations. Who got the most out of the deal and therefore proved to be the most powerful in this case? If we look at the content of the deal, we see that many items were added to the benefit of Turkey. The benefit for the EU however, the end of irregular migration, is an incomparable advantage. The civil servant of the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs admits that the EU won the negotiations in terms of who got most out of the deal (interview Turkish MFA, 2016). The problem was so pressing for them that any solution was invaluable. Turkey already hosted a large population of refugees, so focused on other elements to add to the agreement. Furthermore, since the EU is a global power, both economically and politically, the power relations were uneven. The civil servant of the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs confirms the position of the EU and says that although Turkey got some elements that were important for public opinion in the deal, that this did not cost the EU much if anything at all. Visa liberalization and the opening of new chapters in the accession process was free and the financial aid of 6 billion euros was a small amount of money when divided over 28 member states. Moreover, there was a lot of momentum at the time of the policy negotiations to make concessions, because the deal had to be struck at all costs (interview Dutch MFA, 2017).

Policy Learning

The concept of policy learning is dividable in the influence of previous experience and new information, both with the power to change the secondary beliefs of the policy makers involved. I identified the causal mechanism that can be derived from the influence of policy learning as:

Policy learning  Outcome

Previous experience in the case of the EU-Turkey deal would be previous losses or gains in the collaboration between the EU and Turkey. The relationship between the EU and Turkey is complicated, due to a long accession procedure and issues concerning human rights violations and the recognition of Cyprus. The civil servant of the Dutch MFA claims that the EU offered a collaboration on the issue of refugees before, but that Turkey rejected this out of a sense of pride and wanted to solve their issues on their own (interview Dutch MFA, 2017). The first half of 2016 was the Netherlands' turn to fulfill the rotating presidency of the European Council, a country that had good relations with Turkey at the time (EU2016). Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu explicitly expressed his desire to finalize the EU-Turkey deal during this time (Peepkorn, 2016b). It is however important to note the timeframe Sabatier and Weible attached to this form of policy learning. They say that it takes at least a decade to see any effects of policy learning from previous experience in a policy change (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). Therefore, it cannot have the impact as described in the theory in the process of the EU-Turkey deal.

The other instance of policy learning, the impact of new information, can happen when researchers and scientists provide new, technical information that modifies the beliefs of participants. In the case of the EU-Turkey deal, no such information was decisive in changing the beliefs of either

advocacy coalition. The secondary beliefs of the policy makers did not change throughout the process, which means no policy learning occurred and this variable has not been a decisive influence of the outcome. Therefore, expectation 2.3 cannot be confirmed:

ACF expects policy learning to have played a causal role in the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal.

Policy Brokers

Policy brokers are the actors who mediate between the advocacy coalitions, with the aim of reaching a compromise, breaking a policy stalemate and establishing a successful common policy (Bratt, 2013; Sabatier & Weible, 2014). I identified the causal mechanism that can be derived from the influence of policy brokers as:

Policy brokers  Outcome

In the case of the EU Turkey deal, the policy broker is Gerald Knaus, who brought the policy designed by ESI under the attention of politicians by sending it around to civil servants of various European governments. Knaus was in touch with people from many EU member states during the process and paid regular visits to Turkey (interview Dutch MFA, 2017). This fits the description of policy brokers from ACF. Parliamentarian Samsom, chancellor Merkel, Prime Minister Rutte, presidents Tusk and Juncker and Prime Minister Davutoglu were all invested in securing the outcome of the negotiations as well. I do not identify them as policy brokers, because they held an office which made it their role to mediate between the different parties. Moreover, they all shared the goal of preventing further illegal migration, which makes it logical that they were willing to compromise to solve a policy stalemate. It is not unthinkable that when there would have been other people in their positions, the process would have led to the same result.

Gerald Knaus was a policy broker during the negotiations of the EU-Turkey deal, who aimed to prevent a policy stalemate and searched for a compromise between all parties. Without actors actively looking for the middle road, the EU-Turkey deal as we know it would not have been established. The causal mechanism between the variable of policy brokers and the outcome is clear. Expectation 2.4 can be confirmed.

ACF expects policy brokers to have accomplished a compromise between the actors involved in the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal.

External Shocks

External shocks can be the cause for a shift in the balance of power, a change in the secondary beliefs of policy makers and therefore a trigger for policy change (Sabatier 1998; Sabatier & Weible, 2014). I identified the causal mechanism that can be derived from the influence of external shocks as:

External shocks → Outcome

In contrast to the policy learning based on previous experience, the effect of external shocks is immediately visible. In the case of the EU-Turkey deal, the external shocks consisted of the refugee crisis and all tragic events around it. Before these circumstances arose, the policy system of migration between the Netherlands and Turkey was stable. The influence from the external shocks in the environment, was a necessary cause for the existence of the EU-Turkey deal. For both power structures, the circumstances led to a willingness to negotiate.

In the case of the EU-Turkey deal, the theoretical concept of the variable of external shocks from ACF overlaps with elements from the description of the problem stream from MSF. The refugee crisis is both a subjective and constructed urgent problem, as it is a series of disastrous events that can lead to a shift in the balance of power. As said before, these events were a decisive cause for the start of the policy negotiations between Turkey and the EU (interview Dutch MFA, 2017). At the same time, the Turkish government used this change of situation as leverage in the policy process (interview DGMM, 2017). This makes the external circumstances of the refugee crisis a decisive causal factor in the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal. Without its influence, the outcome of the policy process would be completely different. Therefore, expectation 2.5 can be confirmed:

ACF expects external shocks to have played a causal role in the establishment of the EU-Turkey deal.

The Process

In the paragraphs above, elements from the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal are compared to the theoretical descriptions from ACF and the expectations for the empirics. I described the ideal process as a whole in the methodology chapter. According to ACF, the greatest influence on the policy process is exercised by power structures and a policy change is caused by a shift in the balance of power. The different groups involved in the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal were definitely strong, independent power structures with their own agenda. What makes it difficult to compare the situation to the theoretical framework of ACF, is that they both aimed for the same outcome in the end and there were no competing advocacy coalitions nationally. Although the EU got more out of the negotiations, there is no clear winning or losing set of policy beliefs as a result of this policy change.

The other variables from the expectations of ACF were policy learning, policy brokers and external shocks. Policy learning, only visible over a period of a decade according to Sabatier, was not a clear cause for policy change in the case of the EU-Turkey deal. The period of negotiations was too short to identify the influence of this variable. Policy brokers did play an important role. Since a successful outcome was invaluable to the participants, reaching a compromise was essential and Gerald Knaus assisted this process as a policy broker. There was also definitely a case of external shocks through the circumstances of the refugee crisis, which had a large impact on this case.

The general expectation for ACF, expectation 2, is:

If ACF is correct, the EU-Turkey deal was established due to a shift in power structures, policy learning and the influence of policy brokers and external shocks.

This expectation can be partly confirmed, since power structures were decisive in the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal. However, not all elements of ACF are applicable to this complicated international relations issue, which shows that the explanatory power of the framework is limited for this case. Most importantly, a situation of multiple advocacy coalitions integrated in multiple levels of governance interfering with the policy process was absent. Instead, two large international power blocks came to an agreement through negotiations between the political leaders.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

In the introduction, I described the circumstances of the refugee crisis in 2015 that led to the EU-Turkey deal. This international agreement did and still does receive a lot of media attention and since it embodies an international policy change in the field of migration, it forms a unique case for public administration research. I asked myself how such a unique and fascinating policy process could be explained: was it a coincidental combination of events with many moments where the process could have turned in a completely different direction? Or was it the predictable outcome of the balance of power between the involved parties and the state of play at the time of the negotiations? In other words: were the circumstances or the power structures decisive for the outcome?

To find the answer to this fundamental question, I chose two tried and tested theories from the field of public administration that explain policy change with the concepts of circumstance and power and applied them to the case of the EU-Turkey deal. These theories are: the multiple streams framework and the advocacy coalition framework. The central research question of this study is:

How can the policy process leading to the EU-Turkey deal better be explained: through the Multiple Streams Framework or through the Advocacy Coalition Framework?

In this chapter, I will give a short overview of the research and present the findings and conclusions of the analysis. Furthermore, I will give recommendations for future research.

Overview

The aim of this research is finding out which factors were decisive in the establishing of the EU-Turkey deal. I tested the explanatory power MSF and ACF, to find an answer to this question. In chapter two, I discussed these two frameworks and described the concepts that are relevant for the case of the EU-Turkey deal. I also added a comparison between the two and the theoretical expectations for each of them. In chapter three, the methodology chapter, I explained the choices for a case study design, congruence analysis and causal process tracing and I described the ideal policy processes, the operationalization of the variables and the data collection. In chapter four, I provided insight in the circumstances of the EU-Turkey deal. I elaborated on the policy process in detail in chapter five and presented all empirical data by doing so. Finally, in the chapter six, I used the data to test the theoretical predictions and to analyze whether the expectations of this research could be confirmed.

Findings

The analysis of the sources, using congruence analysis and CPT and separately testing the causal influence of all variables, led to the following findings. The process of the EU-Turkey deal does not make a perfect fit with the ideal process of policy change of the multiple streams framework. All the elements of MSF were visible, but not all have proven to be decisive for the outcome. The theoretical concept of the policy stream was not applicable to the case of the EU-Turkey deal, since there were no other policy alternatives considered in the process. MSF is usually applied to pluriform, multilayer governance, where a 'soup' of possible solutions is more likely to exist. The assumptions of the framework are based on national systems, which limits the explanatory power in this international relations case. However, it becomes clear from the analysis that urgency, political motives and policy entrepreneurs played a decisive role for the outcome of the policy process.

For the advocacy coalition framework as well, it must be concluded that the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal cannot be perfectly explained by the theoretical framework. Power structures did play a decisive role in the negotiations about the EU-Turkey deal, as did policy brokers and external shocks. The rest of the policy change however, differed from the ideal process as explained by ACF. ACF is usually applied on a longer period and on a domestic level. The concept of policy learning usually takes a decade to become visible, while the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal took only six months. Furthermore, the characteristics of international relations are different from the national system and there was no situation of multiple advocacy coalitions integrated in multiple levels of governance and specialized in specific policy subsystems, interfering with the policy process. Instead, two large international power blocks came to an agreement through high level negotiations.

The contribution of this study to the literature of MSF and ACF, is that these frameworks need the elements from national policy making systems to hold their explanatory power. Also, when applied to an international issue, the political factors in both of them become more important, because of the lack of bureaucratic, multi-level governance. The conclusion that neither of the two frameworks forms a good explanation for the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal, is based on the congruence analysis and causal process tracing on specific variables that I chose beforehand. This does not mean that the more general questions I asked at the beginning of this study cannot be answered. I began by asking what concept, circumstance or power, would be more decisive in a complex international process such as the one leading up to the EU-Turkey deal. Could it have been predicted that this deal would be the outcome of the negotiations or were there coincidental turns of events that were of importance?

The origin of the EU-Turkey deal, a plan to first and foremost stop illegal migration from Turkey to Europe, lies in the circumstances of the summer and fall of 2015. Without the refugee crisis and the urgency for European leaders to find a solution, a collaboration between the EU and Turkey in the field of migration would not have been initiated. It provided the window of opportunity that

was needed for a policy change with a scope like this one. My study focuses on the policy process from the moment it started until the moment the deal was signed on 18 March 2016. The circumstances of the refugee crisis were a visible factor not only before, but also during the policy negotiations.

The two large power structures I identified in the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal, are the European Union under the rotating presidency of the European Council of the Netherlands and Turkey. Both used their power and their political leverage to maximize their own preferences in the negotiations. The EU, being the more powerful actor, benefits greatly from the outcome of the deal. Turkey takes back all irregular migrants which is incomparable to the benefits and financial aid the EU gave in return. Turkey demanded some elements that were beneficial for national public opinion, but in the end, it had no choice but to accept the agreement. Since the EU is a global power, economically and politically, it was in a better position in the negotiations. Although the refugee crisis caused stress and urgency for the EU, it had the luxury to discuss this on a policy level. For Turkey, the presence of a large refugee population was already the daily reality.

All in all, power politics is what proved to be decisive in the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal and the outcome of the negotiations could have been predicted by looking at the balance of power between the EU and Turkey. Although the frameworks I used could not be applied in detail, testing and comparing the explanatory power of MSF and ACF is what led to this conclusion. By operationalizing the variables from the theories and breaking down the policy process into causal steps, I uncovered the decisive factors that led to the EU-Turkey deal. The differentiation between circumstances and power structures as key concepts is based on these two frameworks. Because power proved to be the more decisive concept, ACF has the most explanatory power of the two frameworks in the case of the EU-Turkey deal.

Recommendations for Future Research

First, it would be interesting to conduct further research on the explanatory power of ACF and MSF in different case studies. To apply these theories on other international policy processes, would provide more insight in how international policy making compares to national processes and how the outcomes could be better predicted in the future. Second, further research on explaining the EU-Turkey deal can provide a better understanding of migration deals in general. This is necessary since more migration agreements between the EU and other departure countries on the European borders are considered by political leaders and policy makers at the moment. It would be valuable to have more knowledge about the policy process of such deals and research of the EU-Turkey deal could provide this information.

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Interview Guide

The question asked in the semi-structured interviews:

1. When and why did the negotiations that led to the EU-Turkey migration deal start?
2. Which actors (ministries, departments, officials) were involved in the policy process of the EU-Turkey deal in your country?
3. Which actors were involved in writing the final text of the EU-Turkey deal?
4. Has there been contact with other organizations such as NGO's during the negotiations in order to receive more information about the situation and get a clearer picture of the possibilities?
5. What was the main aim to get out of the EU-Turkey deal for your country's delegation?
6. What was the reason for your country to start negotiating about a possible deal in the field of migration with the other party?
7. What do you think was the main reason for the other party to start this process?