

Partisanship in EU energy security policy: The fragile equilibrium and a fragmented constellation

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Abstract

“The founders of the EU were aware of the strategic character of energy. After years of slow drift, the question of pooling energy stakes is again at the heart of European policy making.”

-Mérinet, 2011

This thesis examines how partisan dynamics have impacted the European Parliament’s approach to the ‘wicked problem’ of energy security. A brief overview of how ‘energy security’ has been defined establishes the concept’s inherently contested nature. With this understanding as a backdrop, research focuses on how the European Parliament has served as a forum for contestation. A causal process tracing analysis is undertaken of the failed 2015 Parliamentary resolution on the Commission’s ‘European Energy Security Strategy’; a failure due largely to the abnormal lack of cohesion in the European People’s Party. The study makes a modest contribution to addressing lingering uncertainties in the literature on MEP voting behaviour, and to provide a case study of how the contested conceptualization of energy security impacts multilateral policymaking.

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List of acronyms

ALDE: *Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe*

CPT: *Causal Process Tracing*

EC: *European Commission*

EES: *European Energy Security Strategy*

EP: *European Parliament*

EPG: *European Political Group*

EPP: *European People's Party*

S&D: *Socialists and Democrats*

ITRE: *Industry, Telecoms, Research and Energy committee*

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 The EU's energy security challenges

In the first decades of the 21st century it has become apparent that the European Union faces acute and large scale challenges to its energy security. As such, energy security, a hitherto overlooked area of potential European integration, has emerged as one of the EU's most pressing policy challenges. As argued by Chester (2010), energy security represents a 'wicked problem': a seemingly intractable challenge which resists simple definition, requires widespread cooperation, and represents a moving goal which evolves unpredictably and reflexively as policymakers tackle it. The EU's policymaking response must necessarily be multifaceted, reflecting the multiplicity of potential threats to European energy security.

Internally, European societies remain dangerously reliant on fossil fuels, which undermine the long term security of environments, societies and economies across the world. Potential alternatives to fossil fuels themselves generate hazards, be they of nuclear disaster, or shortages created by unreliable renewables generation (Dreyer and Stang, 2013, 3). Such hazards are exacerbated by the still underdeveloped internal energy markets, distorted by energy silos and a narrowly national approach in energy policymaking (Hedberg, 2015; European Commission, 2015).

Meanwhile, the external dimension of energy security presents a picture of uncertainty, as in "the history of energy policy in the modern industrial era, there has never been a time of such rapid and drastic change the direction of which remains unknown even to key players" (Szulecki, and Westphal, 2014, 39). European countries find themselves in a position of both declining production of energy resources, and a declining share of global energy markets, raising the spectre of chronic supply problems as emerging economies increasingly compete for a greater share of global supply. Europe is highly exposed to security of supply risks, as the world's largest net energy importer, spending over €1bn daily and reliant on external suppliers for 53% of its energy, (European Commission, 2014c, 2). Furthermore, six EU Member States are reliant on one external supplier, Russia, for all their natural gas, creating

a potential for energy security hazards which has ready been realized in multiple gas supply crises.

European citizens today and into the future therefore face the simultaneous threats of “roasting on an overheated planet [or] freezing in un-heated homes” (Dreyer and Stang, 2013, 4). Achieving energy security requires policy responses which straddle the internal and external dimensions of European integration and cooperation, in a policy area where national sovereignty has traditionally been fiercely guarded (Gratz, 2011). Whilst EU institutions and Member States are acutely aware of the threats to the continent’s energy security, they face severe challenges to creating an effective policy response, leading Raines and Tomlinson (2016, 5) to argue that:

“Energy is the archetypal supranational challenge for Europe, characterized by the power of international market forces, divergent interests and priorities among member states, conflicting and sometimes contradictory policy aims, and the constraints of physical infrastructure. These factors mean that the case for collective action is persuasive, but also that its practicalities are formidable.”

Compounding these potentially conflicting material interests, immense difficulty in crafting EU-level policy responses to energy security issues stems from fundamental conceptual differences in how may understand energy security. This thesis therefore begins with an examination of how energy security is defined; establishing the competing discourses and frames which animate different policymakers in the EU energy security policy sphere.

Significant work has been done elsewhere to look at the different conceptualizations Member States apply to energy security in national policy and on the Council, and the tensions between these approaches and the policy initiatives of the Commission. Whilst inevitably re-treading some of this familiar ground, this thesis will mainly analyse energy security policymaking in the third supranational European institution, the European Parliament (EP). Whilst Bowler and McElroy (2015, 1363) can plausibly claim that “[a]fter the US Congress and UK Parliament, the EP probably constitutes the third biggest literature in political science on a single legislative body”, there remains scope for useful enquiry. In the context of energy

security, it appears that the EP, both as an arena for discourse contestation and policy formation, and as a set of actors, is an overlooked body. National delegations of MEPs within the EP may act to a degree as metonyms for national interests and positions, but this is moderated by powerful and well-developed supranational political forces. National political parties are affiliated with transnational ‘Europarties’, which act as European political groups (EPGs) within the EP. Within the EP, EPGs have long been the most significant unit of analysis, as “the central mechanisms for structuring debate and coalition formation in the legislative process” (Hix and Høyland, 2011, 56). If the importance of the EP to EU energy security policymaking grows, as it appears reasonable to expect, then EPGs and the partisan dynamics which they introduce to supranational European policymaking will represent an increasingly important consideration in EU energy security policy.

1.2 Problem Statement

The theoretical problem puzzle generated by EPGs as energy security actors is twofold: On the one hand the presence of transnational partisan dynamics ought to moderate the impact of national energy security cleavages on decision-makers in the EP, compared to the Council. On the other hand, the ability of EPGs to reach common positions is challenged by the existence of different conceptualizations of energy security amongst their constituent national delegations. Although it is widely held that policymaking in the EP is contested along a right-left ideological line, and less often along a pro-anti-Europeanization dimension, it is unclear whether this holds for energy security.

1.3 Research aim and research question

The fundamental question which this thesis seeks to address is, therefore:

“What is the influence of partisan politics on the European Parliament’s behaviour in the field of energy security?”

It is proposed to answer this question by analysing how partisan politics manifested in the EP’s most explicit handling of energy security issues to date: the June 2015 vote on the EU’s

European Energy Security Strategy (hereafter EESS). The EESS, published by the Commission in 2014, represented a drawing together of various strands of both internal and external energy policy. A causal process tracing approach will be applied to the EESS, placing it within the context of EU energy security challenges and developments in the preceding decade, and seeking in-depth explanations for why the largest EPG, the European People's Party (EPP) responded to the EESS with striking disunity. As a specific case study, the EPP's failure to vote at all cohesively on the EESS vote represents a marked departure from the norm, in this instance high EPP group cohesion.

1.4 Scientific and Societal Significance

By analysing the influence, or lack thereof, of partisan dynamics on EP energy security policymaking, this thesis may draw into question the applicability of generally held expectations of EP behaviour. Most academic writing on the EP assumes, following several comprehensive large-*n* studies of MEP voting behaviour by Hix and others (e.g. Hix, 2002; Hix and Noury, 2009; Hix et. al, 2009), that partisan affiliations exert by far the most significant impact on EP policy outcomes, as opposed to pro-/anti- integrationist dimensions, or divisions between national delegations. Ascertaining if these assumptions hold for energy security policymaking represents a contribution to the political science of the European Parliament, whilst also generating a case study of how the widely observed conceptual divides around energy security may be reconciled in a multilateral setting. Furthermore, the case study of the EPP delegation may invite a greater focus on how the balance of national partisan versus EPG partisanship may differ across the major EPGs.

Social significance is derived from improving understanding of how partisan dynamics in the EP may be expected to impact the EU's energy security policy, especially as the EU becomes a more influential actor in this policy sphere. The specific focus on the EESS is merited because, within EU energy policy, this vote is arguably a substantively important case, "of a special normative interest because of a past or current major role in domestic or international politics" (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006, 242). The Energy Security Strategy brought together the whole sweep of EU energy security related policies up to that point, and was also a

response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Whilst the EESS has been superseded on the policy agenda by the 'Energy Union', it remains at the core of this new project, and understanding the EESS's failure may shed light on tensions still simmering within the Energy Union. This question is also one with implications for how MEPs understand their role representing their constituents; whether they pursue essentially national policy objectives, or seek to represent their constituents as European citizens dwelling within a European energy security space.

1.5 Research Structure

Having introduced the EU's energy security challenges, and the usefulness of analysing the role of partisan dynamics the EP's policy responses, the research proceeds as follows:

First, a review of relevant literature is undertaken, establishing the conceptual, policymaking, and institutional background to EP deliberations on energy security. In addition, existing research on MEP voting behaviour will be introduced, highlighting a research gap with relevance to energy security, which this thesis may contribute to addressing.

From here a theoretical framework explaining and analysing partisan control of MEPs is presented, structured as a tripartite distinction between election-, office- and policy-seeking legislative behaviours as detailed by Hix et al. (1999) and Faas (2003). This model of MEP behaviour is used to derive several hypotheses about how partisan dynamics may have influenced MEPs' voting on the EESS.

To test these hypotheses a causal process tracing approach is deployed. This methodology is introduced and justified, before being applied in two stages: First the development of EU energy security policy in the decade prior to the EESS vote is briefly summarised, providing context of key discursive and material trends reflected in the EESS and its EP debate. With this background established, case study analysis is undertaken, treating the EESS vote as a 'critical juncture'. The specific case study focus will be on the EPP, with its striking failure of EPG cohesion. The theoretical expectations of partisanship and MEP behaviour will be tested

against the voting patterns revealed by roll-call, EPP MEPs' plenary statements, EPP and national government policy documents, amongst other sources.

After analysing the EESS vote in close detail, a more general discussion is undertaken about the votes implications for partisanship in energy security policy, and the relative explanatory powers of the hypothesized causal mechanisms. A brief comparison with the later vote 'Towards an Energy Union' contextualizes the EESS findings in the subsequent development of EU energy security policy.

Finally, the thesis will conclude with a general summary of its findings, as well as a critical reflection on the limits of its implications and potential avenues for further research.

Chapter 2: Background: Conceptualization and contestation of EU energy security policy

2.1 Energy Security: A contested concept

Despite enjoying a rising academic profile since the beginning of the 21st century, approaches to energy security remain a contested “conceptual tangle” (Herranz-Surrallés, 2015a, 914) with different researchers applying distinct theoretical approaches. There is no settled definition of what constitutes energy security, with a range of proposed dimensions, and an even wider range of possible material indicators. The expanding literature on the topic has looked both to the past, examining how energy security has been understood at different points by policymakers, and to the future, anticipating the widening and deepening of energy security’s importance as an objective of policymaking.

Cherp and Jewell (2011) trace the historical development of energy security policymaking to the early 20th century, arguing that it has displayed at different times competing perspectives concerned with: The *sovereignty* of energy resources, the *robustness* of existing energy systems, and the *resilience* of energy systems and markets to structural changes and risk. Ultimately, Cherp and Jewell suggest, 21st century energy security challenges require an integrated approach, which in their later work sees them define energy security as “low vulnerability of vital energy systems” (2014). Achieving this low vulnerability is challenging for policymakers because ‘vulnerability’ can manifest in different forms, inviting the question of “how do we make our energy systems more secure without merely trading one vulnerability for another one?” (Cherp and Jewell, 2011, 208). In multilateral decision making this dilemma may be even sharper; decisions which tackle vulnerabilities identified as critical by some states, for instance reducing the risk of nuclear accident, exacerbate risks which other states may view as more pressing, such as reliance on imported, or carbon-intensive energy. The potential for EU policy to trade one country’s perceived vulnerabilities for another’s is perhaps the major challenge of its energy security agenda.

Reflecting this multi-dimensional complexity, Johanson (2013) advocates approaching energy as both an object, and subject, of insecurity and risk. As an *object* energy systems are exposed to a wide range of risks, from natural limits or disasters to politically generated risks of supply disruption and terrorism. However, energy systems also represent *subjects* generating their own insecurity, notably through climate change, but also through disasters such as oil spills or nuclear reactor failure. By highlighting the dual nature of energy systems as vulnerable to insecurity generated externally, whilst themselves generating risks, Johanson captures the reflexivity and non-linearity of energy security challenges. Such reflexivity and non-linearity feeds into Chester's view of energy security as "akin to a 'wicked' problem... not amenable to traditional linear, analytical approaches or resolution by the systematic application of technical expertise." (2010, 893). In highlighting the complex and janus-faced nature of energy systems, Johanson is more explicit than Cherp and Jewell in considering energy security as a matter of "[s]ubjective security, which might be of great importance for policy, [but] does not have to be correlated to changes in the indicators used for measuring objective security." (2013, 200). In the EU context, Johanson's description of subjective energy security invites the possibility that Member States may stress particular energy security threats above others, with the emphasis not necessarily tethered to material realities. The importance of this subjectivity is highlighted by Escribano et. al's (2012) empirical study of Member State's energy mixes, which found evidence of at best modest 'Europeanization', but rather "process of differentiated convergence" (227). The contrast between this modest Europeanization of material energy interests and concurrent growth of calls for a common energy policy invites exploration of the framing of energy security threats.

Faced with this problematic subjectivity, several authors approach the conceptualization of energy security by looking primarily at the policy paradigms intended to reduce perceived insecurity. For Herranz-Surrallés (2015a). the dominant paradigmatic policy approaches to energy security can be categorized as *Energy Governance*; *Energy Diplomacy* and *Energy Sustainability*. The governance approach is associated with multilateralism, creation of regulatory frameworks and the widening and deepening of liberalized energy markets to ensure security through diversification of energy sources. In the EU context Herranz-Surrallés (2015a) associates the governance approach with the extension of the EU's internal market principles to the EU's neighbours. Energy diplomacy approaches represent a more

geopolitical paradigm, associated with more active government intervention to guarantee reliability of supply. This has typically come in the form of Member State interventions, such as bilateral deals with producer states. As demonstrated by its support for projects like the failed Nabucco pipeline, intended to improve access to non-Russian natural gas, the EU is becoming an active player in the energy diplomacy field, creating analytically interesting tensions. Finally, Herranz-Surrallés identifies an energy sustainability paradigm, which links energy security to the EU's wider normative presence in the world, most directly to climate change mitigation, but also in energy security policies' impacts on normative objectives such as human rights. The energy sustainability approach corresponds with what Aalto and Temel term the EU's "'new' energy security agenda, combining the old concerns of security of supplies (amount, time, location) and price with new, wider environmental and social concerns." (2014, 761)

The literature on energy security serves to highlight the concept's 'polysemic' nature, as a term to which diverse actors attribute a varying set of meanings (Chester, 2010). Whilst a parsimonious and universal conceptualization has proved elusive, energy security, as a goal and object of policymaking, "has quietly slipped into the energy lexicon and assumed a relatively prominent position" (Chester, 2010, 887). This includes the policymaking agenda of the EU, with a growing body of EU policy attempting to construct a coherent approach to energy security, straddling both internal reform and changes to EU external policy. To be successful, such a policy will have to navigate the conceptual fuzziness of energy security, a difficult task given its 'wicked' characteristics as a policy problem, and the ease with which energy issues become 'securitized', precipitating a defence of energy sovereignty.

2.2 The EU's Energy Security

A recent review of the literature on EU energy external policy noted that "[s]cholarly research has only recently started to keep pace with this fast-moving target" (Herranz-Surrallés, 2015a, 913). Nonetheless the high profile accorded to energy security in EU external policy since the 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis has seen a growing body of work emerge. The EU is generally perceived to be facing a position declining security of supply, stemming from its position as

the world's largest importer of energy resources, with dependency on external suppliers expected to grow for the foreseeable future (Ratner et al., 2013). In both academic and policy literature the greatest threat to EU energy security, is frequently presented to be Europe's reliance on imports of natural gas from Russia. Unlike oil, there is not yet a global market for gas, which instead relies on long-term contracts and high sunk-cost infrastructure. In the minds of many policymakers on the continent, these factors expose the EU to energy insecurity generated by the potential for intentional supply disruption as a tool of Russian foreign policy, what Martikainen and Vihma (2016) term Russia's "geoeconomics". Indeed Baran (2007, 131) goes so far as to characterize Russia's position as the EU's primary supplier as "an energy invasion", a term which epitomizes Cherp and Jewell's characterization of a 'sovereignty' energy security paradigm whereby by "the main threat for [vital energy] supplies was seen as hostile action, within or outside of formal military conflict." (2011, 203)

Whilst the supply insecurity generated by Russia is nominally a powerful driver of more active external energy security policy, analysis of EU policy formation encourages scepticism regarding the likelihood of substantive action. The common point of departure here is the recognition that the EU28's energy mixes represent a "fragmented constellation" (Aalto and Temel, 2014, 760) with Member States facing differing levels of insecurity, and different opportunity costs of tackling the diverse facets of energy security. Beyond assessing the composition of national energy mixes, (e.g. Escibano et al., 2012), work has been done to classify how different member states *conceptualize* energy security through their policymaking, notably Lilliestam and Patt's (2012) profile of UK, Swedish and European Commission legislation. Lilliestam and Patt's study of evolving energy security discourses captures the conceptual messiness of energy security: reviewing energy security policy documents from 1995 to 2010 they identify no fewer than 42 stated policy aims, spread across 5 'thematic groups' (2012, 9). For the Commission, achieving energy security requires strengthening market forces, increasing energy efficiency, increasing domestic energy resources, improving stability of access to external energy resources, and developing better crisis capacity (Lilliestam and Patt, 2012). They suggest that most Member States' approaches to energy security will fit within these thematic clusters, but that there may be differences in emphasis and approach: For instance, the UK's approach is more strongly driven by market logic, whilst Sweden lacks a foreign policy component to energy security discourses and

policy. Maltby (2013, 436) goes even further, arguing that within the Commission, different Directorates hold differing conceptions; whilst the DG Trade problematizes reliance on Russian gas exports through a market competition frame, the DG Energy frames this as a security of supply challenge. Drawing on the general energy security literature, the kinds of nationally generated conceptions discerned by Lilliestam and Patt embody competing energy security logics or paradigms, which “gain different weight at various security levels and change their essence through different periods of time” (Belyi, 2003, 365). In addition to changing depending on national-level developments and changes to international conditions, the EU’s pursuit of energy security is subject to changing interactions between its members. It may be that as Belyi (2003) anticipated, the influx of Eastern European states in 2004, most of which are markedly more reliant on Russian gas than the older member states, has changed the weight of energy security logics within EU policy-making in this area. It is important to note that the level of anxiety about Russia, or even dependence on external suppliers more generally, is by no means the only schism between EU Member States when it comes to determining energy security priority. A range of factors have been theorised in the literature, including attitudes towards nuclear power, extent of domestic energy market liberalization, and the presence of international energy firms (Kirchner and Berk, 2010; Lillestam and Patt, 2012; Escribano et al., 2014).

Such is the diversity of both material and paradigmatic positions of EU member states that Escribano et al. (2012) suggest that a single European approach to energy security is unlikely in the foreseeable future, instead proposing that any convergence is most likely to take the form of a consolidation of approaches around a handful of archetypal energy mixes. Despite this firm grounding in material interests, Escribano et al. leave space for the conceptual contestation approach in their predictions; the directions in which the EU28 have been moving towards a handful of positions suggests a strong role for paradigms, as determinants of the push or pull towards competing models.

2.3 Solidarity and Legitimation in energy policy

Given the well documented disparities in both energy security ‘exposures’ and discursive conceptualizations of energy security across Member States, it is worth exploring how energy

security has emerged as a European policy sphere. This is significant because contestation of energy security policy in the EU does not just play out across the dimension of content of policy, but also the dimension of whether competences should be allocated at national or European levels.

A starting point is the well-developed body of work documenting the Europeanization of energy security policy, especially in the last several decades. This corpus will be heavily employed later in this thesis to establish an empirical backdrop. Conceptually, the Europeanization of energy security can be approached both through examining the evolution of discourses within the energy security debate, or by looking at the role of energy policy within the wider European project.

In terms of evolving discourses within the energy security sphere, there has been relatively little systematic analysis. Herranz-Surrallés' (2015b) study of energy security discourses in the European institutions stands out in this respect. Applying content analysis to Commission and Council written output, and oral plenary submissions in the Parliament, Herranz-Surrallés notes a dramatic rise in the language of 'solidarity', resulting from a push by eastern Member States, particularly Poland, to establish this principle as a cornerstone of EU energy security policy. This analysis is supported by Brutschin's process tracing approach, which suggests that since ascension eastern Member States have been instrumental in successfully driving securitization of EU approaches to energy. Policy literature created by the EPP itself has embraced the principle and language of security-of-supply solidarity (EPP, 2015a, 2015b) Indeed, embrace of this discourse at the European level has been promoted so vigorously that Raines and Tomlinson (2016) caution that the preoccupation with ensuring stability of gas supply risks crowding out other, still vital, facets of energy security. It is not yet clear, however, to what extent increasing references to solidarity presage policy coherence either a horizontally (coherence of national policies) or vertically (alignment of policy at the national and supranational levels). This uncertainty is especially reasonable given that the EU's largest Member States exhibit differing energy security logics, a situation which Youngs (2009, 34) reports left the EU "muddling along' with an uneasy combination of opposed strategic rationales" (2009, 34).

Further challenging accounts that credit eastern Member States with high levels of influence, Buzan and Keay (2015, 5) suggest that “the slogan of energy union has been picked up by the Commission and many West European states to give political momentum to the EU’s existing agenda”. This points to a final theoretical insight which has explanatory potential in energy security; the concept of legitimation. Legitimation provides a lens to analyse how promotion of energy security as an area of EU action justifies expanding the EU’s influence and scope to European publics, thus serving the interests of EU institutions without necessarily satisfying the desires of Member States. In this vein, Bickerton (2007) applies the theoretical frame of legitimation to EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and to explain an apparent “disjuncture between the scope of the legitimizing claims and the degree of integration undertaken in foreign policy” (2007, 25). Likewise, Aalto and Temel interpret the ‘new energy security’ agenda as a means for the EU to legitimize its foreign policy activism to citizens and industry at a time of financial and political pressure (2014, 761). Indeed, the European Parliament has sought to quantify this justification, presenting Eurobarometer results to demonstrate the degree of public support (53%) for greater EU activism in energy security policy (Europarl, 2016). Energy security concerns provide a potentially powerful source of legitimation for expanded EU policy, especially given that the concept straddles internal and external policy.

2.4 Why does the European Parliament matter for Energy Security?

As seen, existing literature has covered several actors in EU policymaking, including the Commission, Member States, and, sparingly, the European Parliament. This last body has been relatively under-researched, indeed, “[a] systematic analysis of agenda-setting through the European Parliament within energy sector remains an interesting topic for future research.” (Brutschin, 2015, 202). The paucity of scholarly focus on the Parliament reflects its changing involvement in EU energy security policy: Questions of energy, especially when overlapping with foreign policy and security as energy security so often does, have generally been treated as exclusive matters for Member States. However, the energy policy sphere is evolving towards greater heft for the EP, with key legislation on the Energy Union to require the EP’s endorsement under the EU’s Ordinary Legislative Procedure (Europarl, 2015a).

Energy security, therefore, can be understood as part of the same trend by which “one cannot neglect the increasingly relevant role of the EP, both in the funding of the CFSP and in endowing it with a certain degree of democratic legitimacy” (Kerreman and Reyker, 2015, 431).

Though discussing the CFSP specifically, Kerreman and Reyker (2015) capture the two paths through which the actors within the EP can exert influence on EU approaches to energy security: At the simplest level, successive bolstering of its institutional power means that today “Parliament plays an increasingly independent and powerful role as opposed to its past experience as a junior legislative partner and an ineffectual and weak counterpart to the Commission.” (Birchfield, 2011, 250). This trend towards increasing institutional power, “from a toothless consultation chamber to a powerful legislative institution” (Hix and Hoyland, 2013, 185), coupled with the EP’s growing activism in energy security, means there are few policy spheres in which one could reasonably overlook the Parliament. A second, more indirect, role for the EP is as a site for the development of discourses and legitimation, thereby shaping policy preferences in the energy security sphere more widely. This claim to normative authority is put forward explicitly in the EP’s report on the EESS, which suggests that “there is a need of political impulse from the European Parliament to outline the framework for an improved energy security” (Saudargas, 2015a, 33). Crucially the importance of EP legitimation is recognized by the Commission, with then-Commissioner for Energy and Climate Change Miguel Arias Cañate heralding Parliament’s EESS report and vote as “add[ing] to the political momentum we [the Commission] have wanted to give to this and other issues with the Energy Union.” (Cañate, 2015)

In this context, the EP should not be understood as merely an arena for the projection of Member State-generated discourses. Rather, groups *within* the EP should be understood as potentially powerful policy entrepreneurs, actors who “initiate policy change by producing innovative ideas, promoting their proposals in multiple venues and gathering political support for their implementation” (Roth, 2011, 603). This is especially true of European Political Groups (EPGs), which also influence cooperation in the Council, whilst active at the national and European civil society level as ‘Europarties’. This breadth of presence allows Chrysogelos (2017, 259) to suggest that EPGs/ Europarties “are uniquely positioned to

infuse ideas in policymaking and shape the framework of policy debates in intergovernmental and supranational settings.” The European People’s Party (EPP) group in the EP consists of national delegations from 27 Member States, whilst the wider EPP Europarty has affiliates in 41 EU and non-EU states (EPP, 2017). With the EP’s activities becoming a focal point for the shaping of policy debates, the Parliament’s influence on energy security is greater than its still-limited formal decision making powers suggest.

From a methodological perspective, the emerging research gap around the Parliament’s role in energy security is an especially promising subject for study because of the level of transparency associated with the Parliament. This accessibility has been especially pronounced since 2014 when all legislative votes became roll-call, with each MEP’s vote being recorded and published, a rich seam of quantitative data. In addition, oral contributions by individual MEPs and written output by committees and EPGs can support qualitative approaches, as Herranz-Surrellés (2015b) demonstrates in her process-tracing study. Theoretically analyses of how energy security is contested in EP policymaking are able to draw on a well-developed body of work on partisan dynamics in the Parliament.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework: National and European partisan dynamics in the EP

3.1 Prior Studies of MEP voting behaviour

Whilst there is a lack of scholarly research into the European Parliament's role in energy security policy, there is an extensive and relatively uncontested body of literature detailing its more general decision-making. This has principally seen large-*n* analysis of roll-call votes, building on earlier research into US Congressional voting habits (Cencig and Sabini, 2016). Among the most influential research into this area, quantitative analysis by Hix (2002) treated MEPs as “agents with two principals”, beholden to both national political parties and EPGs, in addition to any personal political beliefs. Hix's study (2002) interprets MEP voting spatially, allowing identification of which dimensions or cleavages (e.g. left-right, pro- or sceptical of Europeanization) exert greatest influence on MEP voting. Hix (2002, 693) suggests that 85% of MEP voting behaviour can be determined by a left-right ideological split reflected in EPG positions, and uses a regression model to establish a hierarchy of MEP voting determinants: MEPs are most loyal to their national party positions, followed by the positions of the EPG to which they belong, with MEPs demonstrating the lowest level of cohesion along national lines. Building on the 2002 study, Hix and Noury (2009) demonstrate that this trend widened between the 5th and 6th Parliaments, such that “the European Parliament is much like other democratic parliaments- dominated by parties and left-right politics, and increasingly so” (159). These findings suggest that energy security policymaking and agenda setting dynamics in the EP may differ considerably from those of the more well-researched Council, where, though coalitions frequently form along ideological lines (Hix and Høyland, 2011, 66), the key actors are still fundamentally national. Crucially, Hix and Noury (2009) demonstrate that the enlargement of the EU in 2004 did not significantly change the left-right dynamics of the EP, despite the large influx of eastern European MEPs who might have been expected to manifest different voting behaviours. This last finding may be brought into question by focusing on energy security; whilst Hix and Noury assert that voting behaviours of MEPs from newer Member states are unremarkable, these Member states have been identified as facing distinctive, though not uniform, energy security challenges (Lessenski, 2009; Escribano et al,

2012), and as being especially active in energy security agenda setting (Roth, 2011; Brutschin, 2015). It might be expected that the stark differences in exposure to, and perception of, energy security issues by different Member States could strain the ability of EPGs to manifest cohesion. This matters in terms of concrete behaviour; can MEPs be relied on to vote on an EPG line? It is also potentially significant in discursive terms; how can the EPGs participate in discourse shaping when their constituent national delegations may approach energy security through diverse frames?

Given the divisive potential of energy security debates, it is important to go beyond general insights, generated by studies of all roll-call votes in a given time span, and to examine the potentially distinct dynamics of different policy areas. Hix and Noury (2009) hint towards this, noting a slight increase in national cohesion (still the least important factor) when voting on budgetary versus legislative policy. Going further, Hix and Høyland (2013) analyse all roll-call votes in the 6th and 7th Parliaments, finding that there are modest differences in the frequency at which different coalitions form across issue areas. In roll-call votes on legislation and reports arising from the Committee on Industry, Research, and Energy, for example, the EPP/S&D 'Grand Coalition' or a 'Grand Coalition +' including the ALDE group arose in approximately 70% of roll-call votes in the 7th Parliament. In contrast the same coalitions formed approximately 80% of reports originating from the Foreign and Security Committee, or approximately 55% of reports from the Environment and Public Health Committee (Hix and Høyland, 2013, 179). Whilst insightful, these findings are necessary broad brush, telling us nothing about how cohesive the EPGs are internally, and also only conceive of political divisions in the EP along the left-right axis, with coalitions assumed to all be either Grand Coalition, Grand Coalition+, Right, or Left. In the case of the Energy Security Strategy, the S&D/ALDE coalition faced opposition from both the left and the right, with the EPP sharply divided. A sharper focus on the dynamics of specific policy areas is called for.

Such an approach is demonstrated by Kang's study (2013) on the area of EU trade legislation, which emphasises the potential for national interests to be a stronger factor in MEP behaviour than has general been believed. Kang's quantitative analysis of roll-call votes on the EU-Korea and EU-Colombia/Peru free trade agreements found that an at-first-glance unremarkable level of total EPG cohesion in fact obscured some striking national cleavages. In one instance

all German PES MEPS voted in favour of a passage, whilst all Italian and French PES MEPS voted against, a pronounced cleavage which Kang attributes to differences in national industrial profile and thus relative adoption costs (2013). Such a pattern is readily imaginable in energy security debates, given the diversity of Member States' energy mixes. A similar study, Cencig and Sabini's 2016 quantitative examination of EP votes on economic governance reform during the Financial Crisis, found national interests to have considerably greater impact on MEP voting than in Hix's samples, findings which "open up new avenues for future research on territorial cleavages in the European Parliament." (Cencig and Sabini 2016).

Qualitative research by Rasmussen (2008) has raised similar questions: interviewing current and former Danish MEPs, Rasmussen finds certain issue areas, agriculture, environment and food safety, which see Danish MEPs voting decisions determined by their nationality to a greater extent than is generally the case. It is useful to consider whether rebellions against EPG voting recommendations tell us more about the role of national identities, or about a power struggle between EPG's and national parties for control of MEPs.

These and other studies suggest that the well-established voting dynamics detailed by Hix cannot offer a complete picture, there is space in the literature for additional research, with little systematic analysis of energy security voting behaviour across the whole parliament.

3.2 A theoretical framework for partisan influence on MEP voting behaviour

The theoretical framework for this research is structured by prior research into MEP voting behaviour. This encompasses specific theories focused on the European Parliament, but draws on the wider body of research into voting behaviour in national legislatures. These theories, designed to explain EPG control of voting behaviour may be able to accommodate the initially perplexing behaviour of the EPP with regards to the Energy Security Strategy. Alternatively, theories centred on EPG control may fail to explain the 2015 vote, and therefore suggest the need to caveat the theories and seek alternative explanations grounded at the national or national party level.

A useful theoretical framework for analysing MEP behaviour is a tripartite distinction between re-election seeking, office-seeking, and policy-seeking behaviours as developed by Hix et al. (1999) and later deployed by Faas (2003). This framework applies to behaviour of representatives in any elected and partisan legislature, but the institutional conditions of the European Parliament result in theoretical expectations which differ from those of national parliaments.

3.3 Election-seeking behaviours

Election-seeking behaviours are those by which legislators achieve and secure their office. Whilst in national legislatures this mainly consists of vote-seeking, encouraging the electorate to vote the legislator into office, in the EP the election-seeking dynamic is very different. As has been widely noted (e.g. Hix et al. 1999) citizens voting in European Parliamentary elections tend not to vote based on EU level issues, or as a reflection of the aspirant MEP's behaviour or stances. Instead, national parties "treat European Parliament elections as midterm polls on the policies and performance of the current domestic government" (Hix and Hoyland, 2013,184) which results in an extremely weak 'electoral connection' to voters. This is highly significant for MEP behaviour, as it insulates MEP's voting choices from immediate concerns about domestic public opinion. Furthermore, this weak electoral link erodes the importance of party cohesion as an element of electoral appeal, with Faas suggesting that "No one within the EP has an incentive to act cohesively in order to obtain an electoral advantage" (2002, 844). Whilst this lack of cohesion may certainly apply to EPGs, the dynamic of election-seeking behaviour entails a high level of loyalty to the national party by MEPs. This is because, with European Parliamentary election voting largely determined by attitudes towards national political parties, the internal party process of candidate selection is the most important element of election-seeking. Under these conditions effective election-seeking behaviour takes the form of 'selection-seeking'; each legislator's chances of re-election lie almost entirely on securing re-selection by their party apparatus, which is likely to induce a high degree of loyalty to the national party. In contrast the EPGs have no control over a candidate's re-selection by their national party, which theoretically incentivises loyalty to the party over the EPG.

One implication of the election-seeking theory is that the timing of a vote within the electoral cycle may be highly significant. It has been suggested by Faas (2003) that MEPs may display stronger election-seeking behaviour, manifested as reduced EPG cohesion, as elections approach. Alternatively, Hix and Noury (2009) suggest that EPG cohesion will be lower in the first few months after an election as new MEPs are socialized into the functioning of the EPGs, and move away from 'home style' (re)election seeking behaviours. Whilst this certainly constitutes an important area for further research, the EESS vote in June 2015 fell more than a year after the 2014 elections, and well before the next elections in 2019. Questions of legislative timing are thus unlikely to be relevant within this theoretical framework.

3.4 Office-seeking behaviours

Office-seeking behaviours are those by which legislators, once elected, seek to maximise their influence within the legislature by gaining control of key positions and offices. In national legislatures this is most clearly seen in attempts by parties to enter government, often through negotiating to enter coalitions with other parties. In the institutional context of the EP, where EPGs do not form a government, office-seeking revolves around securing key roles and positions. Such roles include leadership positions within national party delegations, EPGs, or the Parliament itself. Influence in specific policy areas can be gained through committee chairmanships or 'rapporteurships', roles which allow MEPs to summarise and present committee findings, and thus influence the direction of committee advice, a role which for the EESS was held by Lithuanian EPP MEP Algirdas Saudargas. With EPG leaderships acting as the gatekeepers to career advancement and access to influence within the EP, it is reasonable to expect that MEPs are incentivised to display loyalty to the EPG through their voting behaviour and thus improve their chances of securing office. This incentive is strongest for members of the larger EPGs, especially the EPP (the largest) as committee positions and rapporteurships are allocated to the EPGs proportionately. National parties who defect wholesale from their EPG, as when the British and Czech conservatives left the EPP in 2009, lose access to a host of offices (Hix and Høyland, 2011, 76).

There is some division in the academic coverage of the EP as to how much EPGs are able to incentivise loyalty through office seeking (for a good summary of the debate, see Hix and Hoyland, 2013). According to Faas (2003, 887) “the party group leadership exerts tremendous influence on the career paths of MEPs *within* the EP by distributing influential committee positions and rapporteurships among their members”. In contrast Lindberg et al. (2008, 1117) present a more nuanced view of the ability of EPGs to use office-distribution for disciplining, concluding that national parties have greater means to enforce compliance on MEPs, but specifically highlight the EPP as being the most adept of the EPGs at enforcing compliance. The lack of EPP party discipline in the Energy Security Strategy vote is thus even more intriguing.

When both election-seeking and office-seeking behaviours are considered, a central question is to what extent MEPs endanger their reselection by defecting from their national party line to express loyalty to the EPG. This is conceptualised by Faas (2003) as the extent to which national parties monitor their MEPs behaviour. Where this monitoring is stronger, Faas expects MEPs to exhibit ‘home style’ behaviours which satisfy domestic (and domestic party) opinion and expectations, in contrast to behaviours which would satisfy EPG leadership and thus increase the MEPs office-seeking potential. Analysis by Faas suggests that wide disparities in the intensity of party monitoring exist between national parties and across policy areas, for instance finding that British Conservative MEPs (formerly in the EPP group) were twice as likely to defect on issues relating to employment, whilst Swedish Moderate MEPs, who defected from the EPP on fewer than 15% of votes, defected on 70% of votes relating to culture. Whilst Faas’s findings, based on roll-call votes in the 5th Parliament (1999-2004) may be outdated as EPG cohesion is generally thought to have continually increased, (though Bowler and McElroy, 2015 challenge this assumption) the finding that national parties are more likely to defect on specific policy areas than other appears highly theoretically significant.

3.5 Policy-seeking behaviours

The final tier of MEP behaviour identified by Hix and Faas is ‘policy-seeking’: the cooperative (or uncooperative) behaviours which MEPs undertake in order to achieve their desired policy

outcomes. As understood by Hix et al. (1999), MEPs pursue their *personal* policy preferences, which may not align with the policy preferences of their constituents, national party, or EPG, but rather incentivise cooperation as a means of attainment. Within this theoretical framework three determinants of policy-seeking behaviour are especially important: the distribution of information; the 'shadow of the future' of iterated votes; and the setting of the legislative agenda.

The role of information results from the sheer scale and range of policy issues leaves legislators able to individually develop understanding and policy stances on, at best, a narrow range of the issues which they must vote on. Under these conditions, parties play a valuable role for legislators, who can delegate their decision-making to the party, which is able to draw on greater information and expertise as a collective. The assumption underpinning partisan loyalty is thus that parties will tend to recommend stances that their individual members would likely reach on their own, if they had full access to the information and decision-making capabilities required (Faas, 2003). Because no MEPs can draw on experience, expertise, or even sufficient information in more than a fraction of the policy areas in which they vote on legislation and amendments, "voting cues provided by groups and particularly by group members in the responsible EP committee are an essential source of guidance for MEPs" (Raunio and Wagner, 2017, 5). As Faas (2003) argues, this decision-making division-of-labour results in a relatively stable equilibrium in which parties are cohesive because their members are happy to delegate decision-making to them on most issues. This equilibrium is upset, however, when legislators are exposed to other sources of information which suggest that their ideal policy preferences may not align with the party's position. Typically, this information is provided by lobbyists or pressure groups, but in the EP potential sources include national parties, governments and legislatures. In the case of the EESS vote, both the Polish and Czech legislatures formally submitted opinions to the EP, whilst there was a varying degree of information output by the main EPGs.

The second determinant of policy-seeking behaviour which this theoretical framework will emphasize is the iterated nature of legislative voting. Even in cases where MEPs or national parties determine that their ideal policy preferences do not match those of the EPG, defecting may not prove to be an effective means of achieving their preferred policy outcomes. At the

simplest level this results from what Hix et. al (2009) term the ‘internal group bargain’: when one group of MEPs yields to the wider EPGs preference on an issue and doesn’t defect, they can reasonably expect that in future votes its preferred policy outcomes will receive EPG support despite the reservations of other groups.

This dilemma for national parties, whether to support a non-ideal policy outcome to maintain the anticipated long-term benefits of EPG cohesion, is exacerbated when votes are expected to be close. When it is anticipated that a vote will pass by a wide margin defection of any given group of MEPs is unlikely to prevent their non-preferred policy outcome, but the ineffectual defection would likely compromise the success of their future office- and policy-seeking behaviours. Under these conditions there is little to gain from defection and much to lose. In contrast if a vote is likely to be closer then MEPs have a greater chance of pushing the policy outcome in their preferred direction by defecting. Furthermore, Faas (2003) suggests that uncertainty about the closeness of a vote also implies reduced penalties from defecting, as EPGs are less likely to discipline defectors if many national parties have defected. This has the potential to create a ‘vicious spiral’ of uncertainty and defection as number of defectors grows, reducing the potential loss in future policy-seeking efficacy and increasing the potential to achieve a preferred policy outcome in the short term.

The theoretical expectation that parties will be more likely to defect when there is a higher chance of affecting the policy outcome may be usefully problematized by analysis of the EESS vote. This is because the Commission’s Energy Security Strategy constituted a non-legislative document: MEPs were voting under the ‘own initiative procedure’ on whether to endorse an EP report on the Strategy, rather than on an actual piece of legislation. That the vote would not have binding legislative consequences might be expected to reduce the risk of defection from EPGs, in line with Raunio and Wagner’s (2017, 18) suggestion that “how MEPs vote matters less and party groups indeed often do not try to enforce group discipline in such non-legislative votes.” In the case of the EESS, it appears at first glance that the non-legislative nature of the vote didn’t result in the anticipated MEP behaviour.

A final theoretically central determinant of policy-seeking behaviour in legislatures are the means of agenda-setting. This constitutes both an important theoretical determinant of


legislative group cohesion, and a point where the EP's institutional context sets it apart from national legislatures. It can generally be expected that parties will vote more cohesively on proposals and amendments which they themselves have placed on the agenda (Hix et al. 2009, Hix and Hoyland, 2013). The institutional architecture of the EU, however, is such that the 'right of initiative', to propose new legislation, lies with the European Commission. This external agenda setter means that no EPG, even the members of the 'grand coalition' (the EPP and S&D) is voting on an agenda which they have set, potentially reducing their ability to foster cohesion by keeping contentious issue areas off the agenda (Lindberg et al. 2008, Hix et al. 2009) In the case of the EESS vote the 'agenda' as such was set by the Commission, which published the Energy Security Strategy in May 2014. It may still be expected that the link between agenda setting and cohesion will apply to the report's amendments. Muddying the water, the EESS report was an 'own initiative' vote, which had been requested by the EP Committee on Industry, Telecoms, Research and Energy; whilst it would be expected that the committee would produce a report on such an anticipated Commission publication, there is some element of agenda-setting by the Parliamentary Committee in this case. This is especially intriguing as the EP's report on the EESS, which was the formal subject of the vote, was authored by an EPP rapporteur, Lithuanian Christian Democrat Algirdas Saudargas, which would suggest that EPP MEPs should be especially likely to vote cohesively in support of it.

3.6 Theoretical overview

The theoretical framework which this paper applies to energy security as an EP policy area (represented in figure 1) is a familiar one in the literature on legislative behaviour. MEPs are assumed to be motivated by desire for re-(s)election, office, and achieving their preferred policy outcomes. It is expected that national parties will be able to exert strong influence over their MEPs because they alone, not the EPGs, can determine the selection of candidates. At the level of office seeking EPGs wield considerably more influence, though the extent to which this translates into control over MEPs has been brought into question. Finally, theories of policy-seeking behaviour emphasise the advantages of voting along EPG lines for securing preferable policy outcomes in a context of imperfect information and iterated voting. However national parties, governments and other actors may undercut these informational advantages. In addition, in certain policy areas MEPs may be willing to compromise their

longer term policy attainment in exchange for particularly valued short term policy gains, especially when the outcome of the vote is close or uncertain, with the pursuit of valued policy outcomes the ultimate motivation for selection- and office-seeking. As Hix et al. (1999, 13) succinctly capture “At different points in time, in response to different stimuli, and faced with different strategic choices, politicians may favour one set of goals over others”; within this *dynamic* pattern of interaction between institutional conditions and strategic considerations there is scope for energy security to manifest unusual MEP behaviour.

Fig 1: Theoretical model of MEP behaviour



The overall expectations which emerge from the three tier theoretical model of MEP behaviour are of EPGs “characterized by a very high degree of cohesion, but.... this is a rather fragile equilibrium that can easily be disturbed as soon as national parties interfere” (Faas, 2003, 850). In the case of energy security policy, exemplified by the EESS vote, it seems that this fragile equilibrium is especially difficult to maintain. The extent to which national parties

themselves were responsible for this ‘disturbance’, or whether the field of energy security raised specific difficulties, will be determined through a causal process tracing approach.

3.7 Hypotheses

The three-tier theoretical model generates multiple hypotheses to explain how partisanship has impacted the development of EU energy security policy. The failure of the EPP to achieve a cohesive position on the EESS may result from factors located at each tier of behaviour. It must be noted here that the theoretical background is generally couched in terms of defection from an EPG position. In the case of the EESS vote there was not a firm EPP position from which to defect. However, the EESS report was drafted by an EPP rapporteur, and moreover the Energy Commissioner at the time, German Christian Democrat, Günther Oettinger belonged to the EPP as did 12 of his fellow Commissioners, the largest group in the College of Commissioners. Under these conditions, and given the EPP’s role in the Grand Coalition, one would reasonably assume a EPP support for the report. For this reason in the following analysis ‘defection’ or breakdown of cohesion will generally be associated with voting against the EESS report.

Hypothesis 1, deriving from the theory on re(s)election seeking behaviour, is that:

H1) EPP MEPs opposed the report if their national parties did so.

Hypothesis 2, deriving from theories of office seeking behaviour, suggests that:

H2) EPP MEPs voted less cohesively if the EPP’s policy preference signalling was weak.

Hypotheses 3 and 4 are drawn from the final tier of MEP behaviour, policy-seeking. They draw on theories relating to information (3), and iterated voting (4):

H3) EPP MEPs were more likely to ‘defect’ if exposed to non-EPP sources of information.

H4) EPP MEPs defected at a higher rate if their Member State stood to be particularly impacted by the report's policy recommendations.

Answering these hypotheses requires a structured methodological approach to analysing the EESS as a case study of partisan dynamics in energy security, which is presented in the next chapter.

Chapter 4: Research design

In order to determine the influence of partisan behaviour on the EP's energy security policy-making this paper adopts a causal process-tracing method (CPT). In CPT research "the analyst combines pre-existing generalizations with specific observations from within a single case to make causal inferences about that case" (Mahoney, 2012, 570). In this instance generalizations from the theories on both energy security and MEP behaviour are applied to the single case of EPP behaviour surrounding the EESS. After establishing the appropriateness of this method for the subject matter and research agenda, a CPT methodological framework for EP energy security policymaking will be established.

4.1 Why use Causal Process Tracing?

Causal process tracing represents a 'Y-focused approach': a research method which seeks to explain a specific outcome, in this case the failure of the EESS vote. This Y-focused approach makes CPT an asset to investigating EU energy security policy. This is because the polysemic nature of energy security presents a substantial difficulty in pinning down a specific *cause*, with which to research its impacts of energy security concerns, an 'X-focused approach'. In contrast, the potential for a clearer methodological framework and more parsimonious (though not monocausal) explanation rewards a Y-focused approach centred on a highly relevant outcome, the failure of the EP report on the EESS.

Central to the CPT approach is the recognition that specific events are likely to have multiple significant causal factors, which take effect over time. This approach suggests that CPT is a promising method for understanding the EP's energy security policy, as EU energy security debates have developed unevenly over the last two decades, with input from a range of policy fields. Given the multi-tiered theoretical framework already established, the application of a CPT approach can be understood as an attempt to determine which partisan MEP behaviours have been especially impactful on decision-making around energy security in the EP. This expectation of multicausality allows that all the causal hypotheses derived from the three-tier model of MEP behaviour may be valid, though the relative importance is likely to differ.

A final strength of the CPT approach is the high level of detail which can be achieved through its analysis of a small number of cases. The EP, with its relatively high level of transparency compared to the Council, is thus an ideal subject of CPT analysis.

4.2 Comprehensive 'storyline': How has EU Energy Security Policy developed?

The first step in CPT analysis is to establish a detailed and comprehensive overview of how the subject phenomenon has developed, and how key actors have behaved. This central plank emphasises that causality plays out over time: an order to understand how different causal phenomena have contributed to an outcome and interacted, it is first necessary to establish when, how, and where these phenomena entered the picture.

To understand the failure of the 2015 vote on the EESS, as an outcome, it is necessary to develop a 'comprehensive storyline' of how the EU's involvement in the energy security sphere has developed in recent decades, in particular, the EP's activity in this policy sphere. Establishing such a storyline relies on a range of information sources: beginning with academic literature on the subject before analysing key written output such as European Parliament and Commission reports and recommendations. Of particular value for ascertaining how the EPP's stance on energy security policy has developed are the group's policy publications and those of the EPP affiliated thinktank, the Wilfred Martens Centre for European Studies.

4.3 'Smoking guns': The Energy Security Strategy vote as a key piece of evidence

Whilst a comprehensive 'storyline' is valuable for establishing the basic temporal order through which causality unfolded, the causal chain from X to Y is rarely smooth. Specific events may be considered especially significant; located at key points in the development of the causal chain. According to Blatter and Haverland (2012, 115), these 'smoking gun' empirical observations represent "a central piece of evidence within a cluster of observations, which together provide a high level of certainty for a causal inference". These especially important events are not in themselves sufficient evidence of causation, but must rather be

temporally and spatially tied to other evidences. The June 2015 EESS vote appears to satisfy these criteria. In the temporal sense it is located amidst a cluster of EU activity around energy security, as a new Commission from late 2014 had breathed new energy into the energy union theme (Watts and Saudargas, 2017, interview), and relations with Russia were deteriorated due to the Ukrainian conflict. In the spatial sense, which Blatter and Haverland (2012) emphasise includes social proximity, the vote directly engaged the EP, whilst seeing input from Member State governments, and was in response to the Commission's proposed strategy. Whereas most of the developments traced in the comprehensive storyline represent intergovernmental decision-making, the outcome of the EESS vote was determined within the Parliament, and the EPP, itself. The EESS vote thus appears likely to satisfy the criteria of both temporal and spatial contiguity with other key 'evidence' of the development of EU energy security policy.

The search for 'smoking gun' observations within the CPT approach is especially relevant given the theoretical framework's emphasis on the behaviour of MEPs. This is because after comprehensive storyline analysis has sketched out key structural factors "the behavior and the capabilities of actors usually take center stage in smoking-gun observations." (Blatter and Haverland, 2012, 117).

A key source of empirical evidence is therefore the roll-call data on the EESS vote. The specific vote of each MEP is recorded, along with their EPG affiliation. This data has been supplemented by information on the MEP's nationalities and national parties. The result is a rich seam of empirical evidence which can show disparities in cohesion across EPGs, and within national parties. The most striking finding of the data is the complete lack of cohesion within the EPP, which forms the overarching focus of this research. Other findings, such as high cohesion along certain national lines, or breakdowns in cohesion within specific national parties, will also invite analysis, as these offer explanatory potential.

4.4 'Confessions': How do European Parliamentary actors explain their own actions?

In order to fully explain causation, it is necessary to not simply capture *how* specific actors behaved at key junctures, but also to detail *why* they did so. These motivations are discerned through critical analysis of 'confessions'. This can take the form of an interview, or analysis of plenary statements, speeches, and similar sources. In order to determine what caused the lack of EPP cohesion, particular attention will be paid to 'confessions' of EPP MEPs. Given that this represents the largest group of MEPs in the 8th European Parliament, 217 out of the total of 751, emphasis will be placed on MEPs from national delegations identified as exhibiting particularly 'rebellious' behaviour, or those who appear critical to the votes outcome.

As Blatter and Haverland (2012) remind us, it is important not to take 'confessions' at face value. Actors are very likely to apply *ex post* rationalizations to their actions. Alternatively, there may be strategic purposes for misrepresenting the motivation behind particular actions. It is therefore important to adopt a critical approach to 'confessions', placing them in the context provided by the 'storyline' and 'smoking gun'.

4.6 Operationalization of Methodological framework

As conceptualized by Blatter and Haverland (2012, 117) the causal process tracing approach brings together three levels of explanation: *macro*, *meso* and *micro*. The 'comprehensive storyline' represents a *macro-structural* level, in this case taking a broad sweep of how the European institutions have conceptualized energy security and rendered it into policy over the last decade or more. The 'smoking gun', in this case the EP's vote on the Energy Security Strategy, represents a *meso* level approach. Finally 'confessions', in the form of interviews or analysis of plenary statements by specific MEPs, provide *micro* level insights. Taken together, the three elements of this methodological framework offer strong explanatory potential to understanding the impact of partisan politics on the EU's energy security agenda.

The first element of the CPT analysis, the storyline, can be constructed broadly by drawing on secondary sources as, at this general level, EU energy security policy is well-covered by existing academic literature. In order to address the *meso* and *micro* levels; that is the failure

of the EESS vote and why EPP MEPs were so divided, several methods of data collection are drawn upon.

As a first step, the EP-wide voting records on the EESS vote are presented, drawn from roll-call data and analysis presented by Votewatch (2015b). This establishes whether the EPP's high level of division is simply theoretically interesting as a study of the EPG, or whether it was a significant cause of the votes' failure. The roll-call data is used to look at the EPP in greater detail, disaggregating it into its national delegations. In order to better compare national delegations in terms of cohesion and support, roll-call data is formulated using the Agreement Index measure of cohesion, and a 'support index' applied by the author to measure relative support or opposition to the EESS.

Measuring the cohesion of the national delegations within the EPP is important to answer hypothesis 1, that *"EPP MEPs opposed the report if their national parties did so"*. If national delegations within the EPP are found to have achieved low levels of cohesion, then hypothesis 1 is thrown into doubt. In this respect, the cohesion of national delegations constitutes a 'hoop test' for hypothesis 1; high cohesion is not sufficient in itself to confirm the hypothesis, but its absence would strongly suggest that the hypothesis is invalid.

An important outcome of the meso-level roll-call analysis is to highlight key national delegations within the EPP, which are shown to be particularly critical to the ESS's rejection. MEPs from these states then form the primary focus of the micro-level analysis, the search for 'confessions' as to what motivated MEP's behaviour.

Thematically, the debate around the EESS will be divided into two categories, echoing the presentation of the EESS report itself (Saudargas, 2015a). Issues relating to the internal dimension of energy security will be presented first, followed by examination of the external issues. In some of the issues examined the key delegations belong to Member States with clearly and repeatedly stressed national interests. Whether their EPP MEPs voted in line with these interests (revealed through roll-call records) or espoused strong stances on them (derived from analysing plenary statements) serves to test hypothesis 4, that *"EPP MEPs 'defected' at a higher rate if their Member State stood to be particularly impacted by the report's policy recommendations"*. These 'national interests' are ascertained through a

variety of data sources. Secondary sources including media and think-tank reports, as well as some national government communications which indicate stances on specific issues. These sources, combined with an overview of EPG policy outputs, allow a tentative weighing of hypotheses 2 and 3, on the impact on cohesion of EPP policy preference expression and exposure to non-EPP information sources. A more systematic analysis is also undertaken to establish likely material national interests, drawing on primary data on energy sources. This permits an assessment of whether material indicators of national interest correspond to the stances of national delegations. Turning from material explanations, a similar comparison is undertaken with national-party ideological preferences: after deriving relevant indicators from the literature, Manifesto Project data is used to assess whether the ideological positions of national delegations correspond with their MEP's voting records, an especially relevant exercise for hypothesis 1, that *"EPP MEPs opposed the report if their national parties did so"*.

Chapter 5: The development of EU Energy

Security Policy: The EESS in context

5.1 Tracing the EU's energy security storyline

In order to properly examine the EESS vote, the policy can be understood as the culmination of a long-running development of the EU's involvement in energy policy, and energy security more specifically. This 'storyline' is best understood as consisting of three interconnecting strands. First, the decades leading up to the EESS saw changes to what, drawing on De Jong and Schunz (2012), are here termed the energy security 'exposures' of Member States; the material possibilities of their energy mixes and infrastructure, and thus their vulnerability to various types of disruption. A second strand is that of the development of energy security paradigms and discourses at the EU level, often driven by Member State 'policy entrepreneurs'. A recurrent observation in the literature on European energy policy is what De Jong and Schunz (2012) term the 'dissonance' between the rhetoric on energy security at the supranational level and the concrete actions of Member States. The third strand, the successive development of formal EU energy security policy, can be understood as attempting to bridge this dissonance. Policy formation has generally been limited by the parameters of Member States' energy security exposures, whilst, as will be seen, it has been a powerful means of 'locking in' specific discursive totems, such as the need for 'solidarity'.

A frequent point of departure in academic treatments of the EU's energy policies is to observe that energy security has, at least as an aspiration, been part of the European project since its beginning, with the European Coal and Steel Community the first common European institution (Méritet, 2011; Maltby, 2013, 437) In practice, however, energy security has only recently become a significant area of EU activity. The 'storyline' which cumulates in the European Energy Security Strategy is here broken down into several temporal stages: The limited developments in the energy security policy field prior to 2005 will be briefly introduced, before moving to more detailed discussion of the EU's activities since 2005. The decade of increasing activity around energy security between 2005 and 2015 will be discussed in two stages: pre- and post-Lisbon treaty, reflecting the significant changes the treaty, which came into effect in December 2009, made to the place of energy security on the EU's agenda,

and the EP's role. From here, the EESS will be introduced, with the main policy proposals detailed to support subsequent examination. Finally, the development of the 'Energy Union' concept under the Juncker Commission (2014-present) will be briefly introduced, providing the contemporary backdrop to energy security policy in the EU.

It is worth noting that, as well as demarcating institutional changes to the role of the EP and the formal inclusion of an energy security agenda in the Treaty, these time spans roughly correspond to the spaces between major disruptions to Russian gas flow into Europe in 2005-6, 2008-9, and the tensions since Russia's seizure of Crimea in 2014. These moments of crisis have been powerful drivers of energy 'securitization' for member states such as Poland (Roth, 2011, 601) and in turn of EU level discourse. The changing perception of the Russian 'threat' to energy security is a key part of the arc of EU energy security policy from a market/governance oriented approach which showed "limited concern about the overdependence of individual member states on a single supplier" (Roth, 2011, 606) to the 2014 *European Energy Security Strategy*, which "had an unprecedented geopolitical tone and is remarkably open in its stated aim of pushing back against Russian influence." (Far and Youngs, 2015,13)

5.2 EU Energy Policy before 2005

Prior to 2005 the EU's attempts to produce cohesive action on energy security had been severely constrained by lack what Grätz (2011, 69) terms the EU's lack of "necessary institutional and structural features to act coherently in the energy sphere", especially regarding external actions. Major efforts to secure EU energy supply security principally involved seeking energy market integration with the Soviet Union/Russia, and had largely underperformed. 1990 saw the launch of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), an ambitious example of 'energy governance' which sought to extend European standards and market access to the former Soviet sphere. Whilst initially well received, with the EU, USSR and former Soviet Sphere, US, and Japan all ratifying, negotiations soon broke down in the face of the difficulties of reconciling concerns about energy sovereignty with the ECT's market integration principle. Significantly, much of this difficulty came from within the EU itself, with Grätz (2011, 67) suggesting that "the EU itself established disincentives for Russia to ratify the treaty by its disunity and its incoherent approach to the ECT..... a recurrent problem."

Ultimately the ECT proved unable to bind Russia into European energy governance, as Russian withdrawal in 2009 meant that the EU's first major energy governance scheme "therefore does not bind the one country it was most designed to apply to" (Buchan, 2014, 42)

As it became apparent that the ECT was unlikely to match the Commission's expectations, 2000 saw the launch of the 'EU-Russia Energy Dialogue', a bilateral initiative to ensure clear communication and encourage market integration. Meanwhile, beyond Russia, the 'energy governance' discourse has found expression in the Energy Community. Established in 2005, the Community seeks to create a wider European energy market by extending the *acquis communautaire* of EU energy market regulation to partner states in Southern and Eastern Europe. Whilst the Energy Community continues to feature in EU external energy policy, the Energy Dialogue achieved underwhelming results (Grätz, 2011), in part because by this point global energy prices had risen substantially compared to their position at the signing of the Energy Charter, meaning Russia was less reliant on access to EU capital, and more able to instrumentalize its energy exports for geopolitical purposes (Grätz, 2011; Martikainen and Vihma, 2016).

These external developments in world markets saw the importance of security of supply rise during the pre-2005 period. EU concerns resulted in the adoption of a range of 'priority projects'; energy infrastructure projects which were deemed important to diversification of supply routes and sources, and thus qualified for EU support. These included, for example, the Nabucco pipeline which was to run from Turkey to Austria. As Grätz (2011) notes, the potential impact of EU financial support for these projects was limited by the internal dynamics of Member State negotiations; buy-in could only be achieved by expanding the range of projects, reducing the potential support to key projects. The designation of these 'Trans-European Networks- Energy', or TEN-E, project laid the groundworks for the EU's attempted engagement in 'pipeline politics' later in the decade.

In addition to the fledgling 'external' energy security policy encompassed by the Energy Charter and Energy Dialogue, prior to 2005 the EU had moved towards an 'internal' energy agenda. This largely took the form of extending the internal market into the energy sphere. In practise this liberalization had a limited impact due to Member States's tendencies to stand by 'national champion' energy firms. These firms retained the role of 'gatekeepers' managing

supply and demand from national energy markets (Grätz, 2011), and in this interest Member State governments were willing to limit supranational authority, especially over deals with Russian gas firms.

5.3 From the 2005 Hampton Court summit to the 2007 Lisbon Treaty


This period began with the October 2005 EU Council summit at Hampton Court, which “marked the arrival of a powerful policy entrepreneur” (Roth, 2011, 610) in the form of the UK, occupying the Council Presidency. The UK had traditionally been sceptical of an active EU energy security agenda, limiting its advocacy to its more traditional cause of internal market liberalization. By 2005, however, facing changing energy security exposure (McGowan, 2011, 205) and keen to take action on climate change, the UK was keen to stimulate European action on energy and climate change. The summit is highlighted by Youngs (2011, 43) as leading to a more overarching and strategic approach to energy security, in place of hitherto fragmented policy initiatives.

A far more significant change in energy security exposure in this period occurred, however, at the EU wide level. This is because the EU’s aggregate exposure to energy security risk, especially its vulnerability to disruption of supply, increased sharply in 2004 with the EU’s ‘Fifth Enlargement’. This saw the EU expand from 15 Member States to 25, with the new members (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Cyprus and Malta) largely former Eastern bloc countries. These new members were, generally, considerably more reliant on Russian energy exports, which altered the material context in which the EU determines its energy security policy, especially vis-à-vis Russia. (Belyi, 2003, Lessenski, 2009; Malthby, 2013; Roth, 2011).

Coupled with the 2007 addition of Bulgaria and Romania, the EU’s dependency on imported natural gas rose from 48.9% to 62.4% from 2000-2010 (Maltby, 2013), with six Member States dependent on Russia as their sole supplier of gas imports (EC, 2014a). The expansion also increased the number of EU members reliant on nuclear energy, with seven of the ten 2004 joiners using nuclear energy, and generally viewing their domestic nuclear industries as important sources of energy security (Lessenski, 2009, 22). Crucially there has been relatively

little convergence in the energy mixes of Member States (Escribano et. al, 2012), so the disparity in reliance on Russian gas imports in at the time of the 2004 expansion was still marked a decade later, forming the backdrop to the Energy Security Strategy, as illustrated in Figure 2.

Fig 2: Reliance on Russia as a natural gas supplier, 2014



*Data from Eurogas, 2015. Data not available for Malta and Cyprus.
Created on Mapchart.*

The EU's increased energy security vulnerability was highlighted in 2006 when Russian gas supplies were disrupted due to a commercial dispute with Ukraine. Though short-lived, this and the later 2009 disruption "drew newer and older Member States closer together in perceiving significant dependence undiversified sources of gas as a risk to energy security" (Maltby, 2013, 439), and gave impetus to the Commission's energy security policy entrepreneurship (Maltby, 2013)

Following expansion, a shift occurred in the discursive landscape of EU energy policy, resulting from the presence of vulnerable new Member States, for whom historical experience means “attitudes towards Moscow are anything but “business as usual”” (Lessenski, 2009, 24) coupled with the experience of Russian- induced energy shortages. This saw a shift from an *energy governance* paradigm to one of *energy diplomacy*; marked by greater emphasis on external facets of energy security, a more active role for the Commission, and reduced reliance on market mechanisms. Tracing this discursive shift, Herranz-Surrallés (2015, 1395) notes a rise in the number of references in line with the energy diplomacy paradigm in EP debates from 26 in 2001-03 to 87 in 2007. Over the same period, references which fit within an energy governance paradigm declined from 68 to 36. Particularly striking has been the rise in the rhetoric of ‘solidarity’ within EU energy security policy, which “emerged in a spectacular fashion” (Herranz-Surrallés, 2015, 1396) in the 2007 energy security debate, following the previous year’s gas crisis.

The energy diplomacy paradigm, particularly the promotion of ‘solidarity’ as a guiding normative principle, has been especially driven by Poland’s activities as a policy entrepreneur. (Herranz-Surrallés, 2015; Roth, 2011). However, as Roth (2011) charts, this discursive shift and Poland’s fervent attempts to steer the direction of energy security policy were largely unsuccessful in the post-ascension period. The sharpest example of this was Poland’s failure to translate the ‘policy window’ of the 2006 gas crisis and the rising energy diplomacy discourse into ‘European Energy Security Treaty’ or ‘Energy NATO’. This treaty, proposed at the March 2006 Energy Council, treaty would have formalised the solidarity principle, obliging Member States to provide any necessary assistance to any Member State experiencing a security of supply crisis. Despite considerable diplomatic efforts by Warsaw, the proposal failed to make a mark on the European policy agenda which Roth (2011, 604) credits to “the heavy emphasis on geopolitical considerations and the military overtones of the ‘Energy NATO’, as well as Warsaw’s failure to engage in consensus-building”. More general explanations for the lack of concrete policy development over this period include a lack of urgency because several (especially western) Member States continued to regard Russia as a generally reliable energy partner despite the 2006 gas crisis (Roth 2011; Maltby, 2013). Additionally, Roth (2011) points to the still limited formal competences of the EU in the energy security area. However, Poland’s persistence in promoting energy solidarity eventually

paid off in 2007, with the inclusion of an explicit reference to the principle in the Lisbon Treaty, ratified in November 2009.

5.4 The Lisbon Treaty: Energy Security enters the EU's legal framework

The inclusion of a clause on energy, and energy security specifically, in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 194, in appendices, 1) marked a symbolically major development in EU energy security policy. Despite deep roots in the European project, this was the first time that energy entered the EU treaties as an area for common policy. Until the Lisbon Treaty, as Marin-Quemada et. al (2012, 203) suggest, “the EU’s actions in the energy field could never have been considered a common policy”. In addition to raising the profile of energy security as an EU-level issue, Roth suggests that the treaty language, which called for a “spirit of solidarity” in ensuring security of supply, marks a limited embrace of a geopolitical, energy diplomacy paradigm, suggesting that: “the commitment to reinforce solidarity mechanisms represented a visible departure from the neglect of the risks linked to high levels of import dependence on a single supplier and the unquestioning reliance on Russia” (2011, 618).

In practise, the inclusion of energy in an EU treaty had a more limited impact on policymaking than might be expected. Though European energy legislation is now classed as a shared competence, the Lisbon treaty also explicitly affirmed the primacy of national governments in determining their energy mix and sourcing, and Member States continued to guard their sovereignty. As a result, most significant decisions about energy sourcing and composition remain with Member States, rendering the heralded transfer of authority more symbolic than concrete. As Maltby (2013, 440) summarises, the treaty remains essentially vague on how ‘solidarity’ is to be made concrete, and overall “[t]he Lisbon Treaty reiterated existing decision-making rules in the sphere of energy.”

5.5 The 2009 Gas Crisis: Energy security to the top of the agenda

If the Lisbon treaty itself did not decisively move the EU towards more coherent and impactful energy security policy, a major boost to the prospect was provided earlier that year by the January 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis. This crisis, resulting from disputes over payment of Ukrainian debts to state-gas firm Gazprom, resulted in severe disruption of Russian natural

gas flows into Europe, with approximately 20% of Europe's gas cut off for two weeks (Parani et al, 2009, 61).

Whilst after the 2006 disruption the sense of vulnerability to Russian energy geopolitics had not truly been widely or deeply entrenched, an immediate impact of the 2009 crisis was that "40 years of Russia's reputation as a secure gas supplier, and Ukraine's reputation as a secure transit country, have been damaged, probably irreparably" (Pirani et al, 2009, 57). With the impact on energy markets unevenly distributed across the Union, and some countries in possession of unusually high levels of stored gas, Member States were able to arrange significant relief measures via an 'EU Gas Coordination Group'. These included reverse-flow of gas from Germany to Slovakia, and the supply of German gas to Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. As summarised by Pirani et. al (2009, 54), finally "here was solidarity in action".

In addition to the sense of urgency created by the 2009 gas crisis, which increased Member State's motivation to improve coordination, there were increased means available at the EU level. This is because part of the EU's response to the global economic crisis of 2008/09 was to boost spending on infrastructure funding. Crucially the 'European Economic Programme for Recovery' made available funds of €4bn for upgrading of gas and electricity infrastructure projects, such as a new LNG terminal in Poland (Maltby, 2013). Together with subsequent funding pledges, these allocations signal a greater willingness for the EU to commit significant resources to commercially uncertain, but politically expedient, energy projects (Maltby, 2013, 441).

5.6 The European Energy Security Strategy

By 2014 Polish ambitions to place energy security cooperation at the heart of the EU's agenda had been achieved to the extent that, as Polish EPP MEP Janusz Lewandowski stated: "Energy security, or more broadly understood energy union, already has a lasting place in the European Union dictionary. The battle for words [has been] won" (Plenary statement, 2015). External developments also encouraged new policy; by 2014, Russian involvement in armed conflict in Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea had added new urgency to EU desires to

reduce vulnerability to Russian disruption. It was “as a response to the current uncertainty” that the Council requested the Commission to present an Energy Security Strategy, which the Commission was able to do within two months, (Oettinger, 2014), a swiftness which lends credence to Maltby’s (2013) view of the Commission as a policy entrepreneur, meeting emerging problems with preconceived policy responses.

The European Energy Security Strategy, published by the Commission in May 2014, can be understood as a culmination of the developments in the EU’s energy security discourse over the preceding decade. As understood by Far and Youngs (2015, 14) “The EU has gradually realized that today’s geopolitical context requires a less technical approach and deeper reflection on the relationship between energy and foreign policy actions”, an approach which the EESS fulfils; calling for both a deepening on the long-running internal market measures promoted by the Commission and simultaneously encapsulating a greater emphasis on the external element of EU energy security and the ‘energy diplomacy’ paradigm identified by Herranz-Surrallés (2015a). The report explicitly calls 2006 and 2009 gas disruptions a “wake up call” (European Commission, 2014a, 1) revealing the need for a more developed common approach, and proposes a range of short term and long term measures, organized into eight ‘pillars’, to bolster energy security:

1. Immediate actions aimed at increasing the EU's capacity to overcome a major disruption during the winter 2014/2015;
2. Strengthening emergency/solidarity mechanisms including coordination of risk assessments and contingency plans; and protecting strategic infrastructure;
3. Moderating energy demand;
4. Building a well-functioning and fully integrated internal market;
5. Increasing energy production in the European Union;
6. Further developing energy technologies;
7. Diversifying external supplies and related infrastructure;
8. Improving coordination of national energy policies and speaking with one voice in external energy policy.

(European Commission, 2014a)

The Commission's Energy Security Strategy had been released for over a year before the European Parliament's Committee on Industry, Telecoms, Research and Energy released its report on the strategy in May 2015 (hereafter referred to as the Saudargas report, or EP report). The Saudargas report consists of a proposed EP resolution, with attached opinions by the Committees on Foreign Affairs; International Trade; Environment, Public Health, and Food Safety; and the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection. As this breadth of input indicates, the report is a wide-ranging document, which broadly endorses the Commission's Strategy across the eight pillars, whilst bringing in additional detail and proposals, "[a]ll in all... call[ing] for a fundamental change to the way the EU supplies, distributes and consumes energy" (Votewatch, 2015).

The first pillar, an immediate bolstering of the EU's ability to overcome short term disruption, was rapidly put into effect through EU wide 'stress tests' of national energy capacity. These saw 38 European countries (the Energy Community) simulate the impacts of both a total suspension of Russian gas exports and a partial disruption of Russian gas exports via Ukraine. The tests confirmed the general vulnerability of the EU, and specifically the vulnerability of the EU's eastern and southern Member States even in a scenario where the EU responded with "maximum solidarity" (EC, 2014b, 15).

The second pillar, 'strengthening emergency/ solidarity mechanisms...' taps into the theme of "solidarity that is the hallmark of the EU" (EC, 2014a, 6), which pervades the EESS document. The EESS is explicitly cast as a call for solidarity, particularly with the eastern Member States which are identified as especially vulnerable to disruption. The Saudargas report calls for coordination across all levels of European governance, from the municipal to the pan-European Energy Community. Crucially, the report argues for the compatibility of energy security objectives with meeting climate and market integration goals.

The third pillar, that of 'moderating energy demand' contains a call to Member States and the Commission to "treat energy efficiency as an energy source in its own right, representing the value of energy saved" (Saudargas, 2015a, 13). The Saudargas report calls for increased Member State and Commission involvement in promoting energy efficiency of vehicles, consumer products, and especially buildings, through increased monitoring, standards and regulations.

The EESS's fourth pillar, strengthening the internal market, is woven throughout the Saudargas report, with market integration held as a means of directly improving supply security, and facilitating increased efficiency and sustainability of energy systems.

The ambition to increase energy production within the European Union represents, perhaps, a stark rejection of the energy governance approach to energy security, which had seen some states actively tout the advantages of creating interdependencies with Russia (Lessenski, 2009). The strategy highlights the potential for renewable energy technology to provide much of this sought-after domestic capacity increase, but recognises the role for fossil fuels in domestic production as well. The strategy sought to steer clear of the most controversial forms of domestic energy production; nuclear power and shale gas. However, these energy sources did enter the debate in the European Parliament, with proposed amendments to defund nuclear subsidies and to refrain from shale gas exploration both failing, and the Saudargas report can be interpreted as tacking closer to the positions of opponents of these energy sources than to their proponents. The report affirms that energy mix composition is a matter for national governments to determine, whilst noting the potential environmental, climate and health risks associated with these forms of energy production, and especially highlighting nuclear energy's inevitable risk, "however remote, of severe accident" (Saudargas, 2015a, 17). In contrast, the report is heavily in favour of supporting renewable energy generation, with 20 of the 33 clauses in the section on 'Increasing indigenous energy production' either advocating for greater use of renewables, or backing measures to increase their use (Saudargas, 2015a, 16-20).

The seventh and eighth pillars of the Strategy deal explicitly with external dimensions of energy security. The seventh pillar calls for diversification of external supplies, advocating an expansion of transit infrastructure such as the Southern Corridor linking Azerbaijan gas production to the EU via Turkey. The prospects for LNG are also highlighted, particularly noteworthy are the Commission's desire to bring energy issues into its TTIP negotiations with the US, an initiative wholeheartedly backed by the Saudargas report. The Saudargas report echoes the geopolitical tone of the Strategy, arguing that "Russia can no longer be considered a reliable partner" in light of its questioning of EU law and behaviour during the 2006 and 2009 gas crises (Saudargas, 2015a, 28).

In its eighth and final pillar, the EESS addresses the wider and long-standing EU ambition to ‘speak with one voice’ in external affairs. More specifically, the report calls for Member States to ensure transparency and communication with the Commission and each other when negotiating energy deals with third party countries. It also stresses the Commission’s intention to stringently monitor such projects for compliance with EU law. The Saudargas report adds calls for greater cooperation between the EU’s foreign and trade policies and its external energy policy instruments. The report also addresses the prior failings of EU energy security policy; implicitly calling for an end to siloed energy policies and privileging of national champion firms by stressing that “no Member State shall by its action or inaction jeopardise the security of another Member State or of the EU as a whole” (Saudargas, 2015a, 29). Indeed, in its emphasis on solidarity the Saudargas report goes so far as to call for investigation of the establishment of a collective purchasing mechanism for natural gas. (Saudargas, 2015a, 30).

The EESS itself, and the Parliament’s proposed response in the form of the Saudargas report, covered the breadth of EU energy security debates. Whilst stressing the importance of fully achieving existing EU energy policy, especially the development of the internal market, the Saudargas report matched the EESS’s ‘energy diplomacy’ discourses, whilst seeking to integrate energy security measures into the EU’s wider energy agenda, especially is climate change and sustainability measures. Signalling this holistic approach, the report itself was subtitled “Towards a European Energy Union” (Saudargas, 2015a, 11), updating the EESS to reflect the most recent direction of EU energy policy, the Energy Union concept.

5.7: The emergence of the Energy Union concept

During the gap between the Commission’s presentation of the EESS and the EP vote, a major development had taken place in EU energy policy; the rise of the ‘Energy Union’ concept. Energy Union became a Commission priority with the November 2014 appointment of Jean-Claude Juncker as President of the European Commission. Juncker promptly created a ‘Project team’ of Commissioners for “A Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy, headed by Maroš Šefčovič in the role of ‘Vice-

President for Energy Union'. The advent of Energy Union as a Commission priority saw energy security become more enmeshed with the EU's climate change and energy efficiency agendas: with 'Security, Solidarity and Trust' one of five "Mutually-reinforcing and closely interrelated dimensions designed to bring greater energy security, sustainability and competitiveness" (EC, 2014c) within the envisaged Energy Union.

With the Energy Union one of the flagship projects of the Juncker Commission, energy security concerns were rolled-into a more holistic approach. These developments were reflected in the Saudargas report and plenary debate on the EESS, which sought to shape the role of energy security within the Energy Union as well as responding to the EESS itself. Despite the high profile of energy security as a challenge, and after 16 votes on specific sections and amendments, the EP voted not to endorse the Saudargas report, "an unprecedented turn of events, [in which] the forces opposing greater EU integration obtained their first significant victory since being reinforced in the 2014 EU elections" (Votewatch, 2015). That the Parliament would be so deeply divided, and strike a blow to an EU's energy security which appeared to have been building immense momentum, suggests that close analysis of the EESS vote may yield important findings about the challenges facing the EU's energy security policymaking.

Chapter 6: The European Energy Security

Strategy vote: a critical juncture?

6.1 The European Energy Security Strategy and vote

As has been established, the EESS represented a culmination of trends in EU energy security policy: calling for a more active internal and external policy, promoting market integration and sustainable energy, and representing an “unprecedentedly geopolitical tone” (Far and Youngs, 2015,13) with the language of solidarity as a guiding principle. Furthermore, the vote on took place at a time when the ongoing deterioration of EU-Russia relations prompted by the war in Ukraine presented a clear policy window. Indeed, the report’s rapporteur has suggested that 2015 may have represented an apex of attention towards energy policy; with relations with Russia acting as a policy driver, but before the UK’s Brexit referendum shook up the EU’s agenda (Watts and Saudargas, 2017, interview) Despite these favourable conditions, however, the parliament failed to endorse the report in its vote on June 10th 2015.


6.2 The EPP’s role in the failure of the report

The report was backed by 227 MEPs (34.8%) mainly ALDE and S&D. In contrast 315 (48.2%) opposed, whilst 111 (17%) of MEPs abstained, with the distribution of votes represented overleaf in figure 3.

Of the major EPGs the ALDE demonstrated an impressive cohesion of 100% in favour, whilst the S&D saw 89.29% cohesion in favour. The EPP, however, didn’t have a common line. This represented a rare occurrence: Raunio and Wagner (2017) find that the EPP and ALDE voted together on 83% of external relations votes in the 2009-14 Parliament, whilst the EPP and S&D ‘grand coalition’ occurred in 75% of votes. In the absence of EPP MEPs voting in favour along with the other major party the report was voted down by an “unusual majority made up of a combination of the small groups, i.e. conservatives, communists / radical left, the Greens/EFA, eurosceptics (EFDD group) and non-attached nationalists” (Votewatch 2015). Strikingly these fringe groups within the EP, both those to the left and to the right of the S&D, ALDE and EPP, saw almost total cohesion in rejecting the report. Altogether the ALDE and S&D together fell 121 votes short of a simple majority. With just 4 MEPs from smaller EPGs

voting in favour, it would have taken at least 117 of the 209 EPP MEPs present to pass, instead of the just 42 who supported the Saudargas report in reality.

Fig. 3: Distribution of votes on the EESS by EPG



Graph created by Votewatch (2015a)

Under these conditions it is clear that the EPP's role in rejecting the report represented not just an unusual breakdown in EPP cohesion and inter-group alignments within the EP, but also constituted the major reason for the EP's failure to endorse a timely report into a high-visibility issue.

Within the EPP the largest bloc of MEPs were abstainers, representing 94 MEPS, or 44.9% of presents MEPs. Abstainers were the largest (Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, Spain) or joint largest (Belgium, Cyprus, Slovenia, Sweden) bloc in 14 national delegations.

73 EPP MEPs actively voted against the report, or 34.9%. This bloc was the largest in 4 national delegations (Poland, Croatia, France, Germany) and joint-largest in a further two (Cyprus, Slovenia).

Just 42 EPP MEPs supported the report, or 20.1%. Pro- report MEPs made up the largest contingent in 8 national delegations (Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Portugal), and joint largest in two (Belgium, Sweden).

6.3 The importance of national interest to the outcome: key national delegations

Were the EPP to have cohesively voted against the report, or abstained from it, this would in itself be somewhat surprising, given that the EPP finds itself in legislative coalition with the other pro-EU EPGs far more commonly than it does with the smaller right wing, and indeed radical left wing EPGs. It is even more uncommon for the EPP to display such low levels of cohesion; since the First European Parliament in 1979, the group's Agreement Index score (a measure of cohesion) has never dropped below 0.87, its average for the 5th Parliament (Cincci, 2011, 141). The EPP's lack of cohesion was especially striking because its group cohesion, at 0.17 on the Agreement Index, was lower than the average national cohesion (0.38) a rare occurrence which has not been repeated in any of the other energy security related votes in this parliament (appendix, 2). Several national delegations within the EPP also displayed surprisingly high, or in some cases low, cohesion.


National cohesion is here calculated using Hix's Agreement Index (AI), also used by the influential EP-analysis site Votewatch:

$$AI = \frac{\text{Max}(Y, N, A) - \left(0.5((Y + N + A) - \text{Max}(Y, N, A))\right)}{Y + N + A}$$

where A=voted in favour, N= voted against, and A= abstained.

Scores for the cohesion of EP-wide national delegations are calculated and published by Votewatch (2015a), whilst the EPP specific cohesion scores were calculated by the author applying the Agreement Index to the publically available roll-call data (Europarl, 2015).

Fig.4: Application of the Agreement Index to national delegations in the EESS vote




Roll-Call data from Europarl (2015b) Agreement index calculated by Votewatch (2015) for whole parliament, and by author for EPP national delegations.

As can be seen in Figure 4, the extent of national cohesion in the EESS vote tested the general rule that high AI scores “are primarily reserved for small countries such as Malta, Luxembourg and Estonia with a small number of MEPs” (Raunio and Wagner, 2017, 14-5), with several larger national delegations demonstrating AI scores above 0.5. The most notable Member State in this respect is Poland, one of the largest national delegations, which demonstrated a high national cohesion score of 82.95%, or 0.8295 on the Agreement Index. The degree of national cohesion is far higher within the EPP itself, which is unsurprising given that there are far fewer national parties within each national delegation at the EPP-only level; As such, high cohesion scores thus result from agreement within an ideologically much closer pool of MEPs. National parties within the EPP were, in general, highly cohesive: of the EPP’s 45 constituent national parties, 26 had the highest possible Agreement Index scores, of 1, whilst only 6 had

AI scores below 0.75. The very lowest was the French *Les Republicans*, with a score of just 0.15, but this was a clear outlier.


As a qualitative study, the closest analysis of the EESS vote as a critical juncture or ‘smoking gun’ will focus on a handful of key national delegations. In doing so, emphasis is placed on the causes of active opposition to the report, instead of mere abstention. This decision is driven partly by consideration of the role of Member States as policy entrepreneurs, where active endorsement or denunciation of a policy choice is more significant than abstention. In many national delegations very few MEPs voted against the report outright, but large numbers abstained, contributing to the report’s failure. Examples of these national delegations include Bulgaria, Ireland, Italy, Hungary and Spain, where in each case upwards of 90% of MEPs abstained. Consequently, opposition to the report was relatively concentrated, with the distribution of opposition demonstrated in figures 5 and 6 below.

Fig. 5: Relative distribution of EPP opposition to the EESS



Roll-Call Data from Europarl (2015b)
Created on Mapchart

Fig. 6: Absolute distribution of EPP opposition to the EESS



Roll-Call Data from Europarl (2015b)

Looking at the distribution of opposition to the report, two member states stand out as particularly significant; Poland and Germany. As seen in figure 4, these two national delegations demonstrated relatively high opposition to the report. Poland's EPP delegation had the highest proportional opposition to the report, at 100%, followed by Croatia at 80%. Meanwhile, 76% of German EPP MEPs actively voted against the report, the 3rd highest rate of any national delegation. Because Germany and Poland rank amongst the largest EU Member States, with correspondingly large EP national delegations, this high relative opposition manifested in very significant absolute opposition to the report within the EPP, demonstrated in figure 5. Given the close balance of the EESS vote, if either of these national delegations had voted cohesively in favour of the report it would have passed. The Polish national delegation within the EPP also represents a promising subject of analysis because Poland was one of two Member States, along with the Czech Republic, in which national

legislatures submitted written opinions on the EESS prior to the EP vote. Whilst ascertaining the full impact of these interventions on voting by Polish and Czech MEPs would require in depth interviews which were not possible in the brief span of this research, several indicators suggest that these sources of ‘outside’ information were influential. An initial observation is that both Polish and Czech MEPs appeared highly ‘engaged’ in the vote, with levels of abstention much lower than the average of 41% (0% of Polish MEPs abstained, and just 14% of Czech MEPs). The high level of engagement by Polish MEPs was also evident during the debate on the report; with 5 Polish MEPs amongst the 27 EPP speakers, the largest national contingent. The implications of the Polish legislature’s involvement are discussed in more detail later.

To more easily compare national delegations and national parties support for the EESS, their roll-call voting is calculated as a ‘support’ scale from -1 to 1. This is a simple representation of aggregate support:


$$Support = (1 \times (\%Y/100)) + (-1 \times (\%N/100))$$

where %A represents the percentage of the national parties’ MEPs who voted in favour, whilst %N represents the percentage of the national parties’ MEPs who voted against.

The scale therefore ranges from -1 (all MEPs opposed) through 0 (all abstained, or perfect division in support and opposition) to 1 (all MEPs supported). On this scale the largest Polish party in the EPP, Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska, PO*) scores -1, representing complete cohesion in voting against the report, a score shared by the Polish national delegation within the EPP. The largest German EPP party, the Christian Democratic Union (*Christlich Demokratische Union, CDU*) scores -0.64, reflecting the more mixed, but generally sceptical, approach of its MEPs, which make up the entire national delegation, which therefore shares this support score.

The support scores for national delegations within the EPP varied widely, and are presented overleaf in figure 7, whilst the support scores of the national parties are listed in the appendices (appendix 3).

Figure 7: Support score for national delegations within the EPP



Roll-Call Data from Europarl (2015b)

In assessing why so many EPP MEPs, especially those in the German and Polish national delegations, voted against the EESS report, analysis of this ‘critical juncture’ considers several tensions in the EP’s energy security engagement, including: the extent to which MEPs are motivated by national and national partisan concerns as opposed to those of their EPGs; whether these motivations are primarily related to ‘material’ interests or discursive traditions, and; the role of information availability. The research is structured in two stages. First issues relating to the internal dimension of energy security are addressed; in particular the debates around indigenous energy sources. Following this, debates relating to the external dimensions of the EES are analysed. In both cases, the trends in the roll-call data presented above are supplemented by examining a range of primary and secondary sources including: ‘confessions’ of MEPs in plenary speeches or interviews; policy documents and

statements by national governments, EU bodies, and EPGs; and publically available data on relevant indices including energy mixes and manifesto platforms.

6.4 Key debates in the internal dimension

The 9th June EP debate on the EESS, held the day before the vote, saw several amendments proposed to the wording of the Saudargas report. Because they represent points of lingering dissatisfaction with the report the amendments act as useful indicators for which internal dimension issues proved the most controversial. One proposed amendment concerned energy efficiency, whilst three related to indigenous energy generation. The vast majority of EPP MEPs opposed an amendment supporting a “binding energy efficiency target”, in a vote which split the EP down its traditional left/right ideology divide and narrowly passed. Amendments on shale gas, an important issue for Polish MEPs, were a mix of pro- and anti-shale: An amendment calling on Member States to refrain from exploration and exploitation of shale gas was rejected, whilst a second amendment urging Member States to avoid such activities until proven safe for “the environment, citizens and workers” narrowly passed. A final amendment, which would have called for the ending of public subsidies to the nuclear industry was also rejected.

It is important to note here that the EPP voted almost entirely cohesively against each of these amendments; the high level of EPP division in the final vote did not result from disagreements over the amendments. Rather, the amendments must be understood as at most a marginal factor, serving to muddy the waters: Given that the potential for state-supported exploitation of nuclear coal and shale gas were preserved only MEPs whose prior voting intentions had been on a knife edge may potentially have swayed their votes.

Whilst the amendments appear unlikely to have decisively swayed much of the EPP vote, they do highlight the importance of debates around indigenous energy sources. Indeed, the balance between utilizing indigenous fossil fuel resources and promoting renewables appears to be the most contentious and significant issues of the ‘internal’ facet of the EESS.

A particular sticking point, revealed by both proposed amendments to the report and the arguments made by EPP MEPs in the plenary debate, is that of 'unconventional hydrocarbons': principally shale gas. Potential extraction of previously inaccessible natural gas via 'fracking' has introduced a contentious new element to energy security calculations. The way in which fracking is presented within different logics of energy security varies greatly. From an 'energy diplomacy' standpoint the development of indigenous energy sources represents an important opportunity to increase a state's energy sovereignty. The advent of fracking has also shifted the global energy landscape, with traditional energy exporters including Russia losing market share as North American fracking takes off. Whilst the potential for shale gas imports to diversify the EU's gas supply has been welcomed by some, (Dreyer and Stang, 2013; Johnson, 2014; Hedberg, 2015; De Micco, 2016), others fear that, unless Member States develop domestic fracking industries rapidly they will lose out on investment and suffer a "brain drain" (Watts and Saudargas, 2017 interview). The potential for increased energy imports from the US is not raised explicitly as an energy security issue within the report, but rather as a means to "fully integrate the EU gas market into the global market and... contribute significantly to the competition of the internal energy market." (Saudargas, 2015, 27)

In discursive terms, the debates around fracking which acted as a backdrop to the report's recommendations can be understood as, in part, a contest between an environmentalist discourse and an energy sovereignty/ diplomacy discourse. Environmental concerns around fracking match Johanson's (2013) description of energy systems as 'subject', capable of generating their own insecurity, in the case of shale gas this security can be both long term (anthropomorphic climate change) and short term (fracking has been linked to increased risk of earthquakes and contamination of water supplies). Within the 'sovereignty' discourse development of indigenous energy resources is a vital means of guaranteeing national independence and security, in line with MEP Szjenfeld's assertion that "One of the main pillars of this strategy should be the strong involvement of indigenous energy sources, as they provide external independence. In this regard, there should be no policy of discriminating against any native source, including hard coal or shale gas" (Plenary Statement, 2015).

The EESS balances these concerns, striking a cautious, but noncommittal tone on fracking

within the EU, and “recall[ing], in this connection, the environmental, climate and health risks and impacts related to the extraction of unconventional fossil fuels” (Saudargas, 2015a, 17). However, the language of the report is especially favourable to the “no regrets” option of increasing renewable energy relative to fossil fuels more generally, and “emphasises that increased indigenous energy production must not increase or prolong European dependence on fossil fuels” (Saudargas, 2015a, 16), a sentiment which may have prompted opposition in Poland, heavily reliant on coal, and Germany, which has seen its reliance on coal grow rapidly as it phases out nuclear power generation (WSJ, 2014)

Of the two EPP national delegations which did the most to block the report, Germany and Poland, Poland has manifested the stronger support for unconventional hydrocarbon extraction. Indeed, the conservative Polish government had hoped that shale gas extraction could transform its energy mix, into “a second Norway” (The Economist, 2014). Meanwhile the Polish legislature’s response to the EESS expressed support for Polish state support for clean coal and nuclear industries, whilst “draw[ing] attention to the necessity of creating favourable conditions for the exploitation of unconventional natural gas sources in the EU”. The desire to defend sovereignty over energy mixes, and this support for unconventional hydrocarbon extraction was thus, unsurprisingly, a strong theme of Polish EPP MEPs plenary statements. For Jerzy Buzek, the current ITRE Committee chair, Polish delegation energy expert and former Polish Prime Minister: “energy security is certainly a crucial subject for us, and we have two sides of the coin: external and internal. Internally, indigenous energy resources are the most important consideration” (Plenary Statement, 2014). Polish rhetoric on indigenous energy sources was backed up by voting; Polish MEPs went against the EPP mainstream in seeking to strike out paragraph 7 of the report, which:

“Emphasises that the Energy Union, in addition to ensuring security of supply, should adopt a comprehensive approach focusing on key dimensions such as achievement of a fully integrated internal energy market, moderation of energy demand, *decarbonisation of the energy mix (essentially based on renewable energy sources)*, and research and innovation.....” (Saudargas, 2015a, 12, italicized by author)

In contrast to the cohesive support for unconventional hydrocarbon extraction in Poland, Dohmen and Jung (2014) noted that “aside from nuclear energy, no other technology is currently as controversial in Germany as fracking.” Fracking represented a major schism in German politics shortly before the EESS vote, with both the governing CDU/CSU – SPD coalition struggling to compromise on legislation. Moreover, the CDU itself was split, with leading figures advocating for fracking on energy independence grounds, whilst over 100 of its deputies favoured greater restrictions on environmental grounds (Deutsche Welle, 2015) If support for fracking was a major motive for EPP MEPs to reject the report, this division in domestic debate might partially explain why the German national delegation in the EPP was less cohesive than its Polish counterpart.

6.5 Key debates in the external dimension

In addition to the controversy surrounding indigenous energy production and the internal energy market, the plenary debate saw significant doubts raised about the Energy Security Strategy’s implications for the external dimension of energy security. Once again Polish MEPs were especially strident, in line with their government’s long-running role as a policy entrepreneur pressing for an external energy security policy (Roth, 2011), as was stressed by the written opinion on the EESS submitted by the Polish Sejm (legislature). Whilst the Czech parliament’s opinion was relatively supportive of the strategy, the Polish Sejm’s opinion was far more critical of the EESS, which it located as at best a potentially “good basis for further discussion” (Sejm, 2014, 1). The Sejm’s response to the EESS provides an important source of information into how the government of the “undisputed ‘super policy-driver’” amongst eastern member state (Lessenski, 2009, 60) viewed the report. In addition to acting as a potential prompt to Polish EPP MEPs as a ‘national’ perspective, the Sejm was at the time dominated by EPP affiliated parties, so the opinion likely reflects national partisan influences. The Sejm provided especially clear preference signalling to MEPs in the case of the EESS’s external dimension, with its opinion documenting stating that it:

“Fully supports the European Commission’s recognition of energy security as an important part of the EU’s common foreign policy and at the same time points out that the strategy

makes only minimal proposals in terms of new instruments for leading the EU's external energy policy." (Sjem, 2014)

The plenary statements of Polish EPP MEPs were broadly in line with this national position; a preference for stronger external action epitomized by Szejnfeld's description of the strategy and report as "a poorly outlined, timidly outlined aspect of external coordination of EU policies towards major suppliers" (Plenary statement, 2015).

The question of external coordination is one which has tended to divide Polish and German policymakers, against which the relative agreement of Polish and German EPP MEPs in rejecting the Saudargas report appears puzzling. As the largest gross consumer of Russian natural gas, German firms have been able to negotiate favourable deals with Russian state-run firm Gazprom, resulting in lower prices for German consumers. This runs counter to the ideals of 'solidarity' championed by Poland, which has been fiercely critical of Russo-German energy infrastructure projects, the Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines. These projects alarm Poland and other eastern Member States left bypassed from the supply process, and thus vulnerable to being cut off, with the same implications for Ukraine in what is presented as a failure of solidarity (Votewatch EU, 2016). Polish fears of energy security exposure resulting from the infrastructure bypass, coupled with the discursive implications of Germany's unilateral energy policy, were such that the Polish Foreign Minister went so far as to liken the original Nord Stream to the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (Kramer, 2009). In contrast to the unilateral external energy policy which Nord Stream appears to represent, several Member States are keen for EU external energy policy to facilitate the collective purchasing of natural gas, a step which it has so far been unwilling to take, but which the Saudargas report suggested might be implementable in "exceptional circumstances" (Saudargas, 2015a, 31).

The lack of external coordination of energy policy was demonstrated shortly after the EESS vote, with the announcement of Nord Stream 2, an expansion aiming to double the quantity of gas flowing to Europe through Nord Stream, at the same time as Russia ceases exports to the EU via Ukraine (Erbach, 2016). Ironically, given the report's calls for transparency and communication, the rapporteur on the EESS report was unaware of Nord Stream 2's imminent

announcement at the time of writing the report, and has suggested that unevenly distributed information about the project may have impacted support for the EESS amongst national delegations (Watts and Saudargas, 2017, interview). This appears to be a poor explanation for the EPP's division, however, as Nord Stream expansion appears to mark a real schism not just between the German and Polish governments, but between the German government and the German national delegation in the EP. This was starkly demonstrated in December 2015 when every single German MEP from the governing CDU/ SPD coalition voted against increasing the capacity of Nord Stream (Votewatch EU, 2016). This development, which occurred as part of the 'Towards and Energy Union' vote (15/12/2015) suggests that, in energy security matters, German MEPs voting habits cannot be satisfactorily explained through reference to national interest. It also chimes with Duffield and Westphal's (2011, 182) assertion that the CDU/CSU has tended to be somewhat Russo-sceptic.

The external dimension saw little preference signalling prior to the vote, with the EPP publishing a detailed position paper on the external dimension of energy security several months after the vote, but not prior (EPP, 2015a) The position paper, adopted in October 2015, makes no mention of the EESS, though its accompanying press release confrontationally presented the report as a call for a "*real* European energy security strategy" (EPP, 2015b, author's emphasis). The position paper frames energy security as an issue within the emerging Energy Union framework; the timing of its release suggests that its policy recommendations likely reflect the perceived drawbacks of the EESS, and attempt to forge a common EPP energy security platform after the disunity displayed in the June vote. Tellingly, the report calls for "the creation of a genuine Common External Energy Policy to increase the EU's geopolitical credibility, efficiency and consistency" (EPP, 2015a, 5), a policy aspiration clearly in the tradition of MEPs castigation of the EESS as insufficiently ambitious in the external dimension. The report also solidifies EPP opposition to Nord Stream 2, stating that the expansion "is not in line with the EU strategy of diversification of sources of supply and routes of transit of imported energy, as well as the EU's energy security strategy and foreign, security, and Eastern Partnership policy goals" (EPP, 2015a, 13). The report suggests that the EPP were attempting to construct a cohesive stance on energy security issues in the latter half of 2015, and leading into the Energy Union vote, the lack of such formal policy platforms prior to the EESS vote is telling. It should be noted that the wider EPP Europarty had issued a

declaration on ‘the Energy Union as a vehicle for enhancing Freedom, Security, and Growth’ in March 2015 (EPP, 2015c) which covered many of the elements of the EESS. EPP MEPs were not, therefore, acting in a total lack of EPP policy preference signalling, but did not have a formal EP policy platform at the time of the vote. Indeed, it has been reported (Gurzu, 2015) that the EPP had begun to draft the policy paper at the beginning of 2015, but faced severe internal divisions between national delegations which were overwhelmingly concerned with reducing reliance on Russia and those which were cautious of increasing bureaucratization of energy. In contrast, the S&D group, which voted with 89.29% cohesion, had guidance in the form of a full position paper on the Energy Union, including energy security, published several months before the EESS vote in February 2015 (S&D, 2015).

6.6 Assessing ‘National interest’: Material or discursive?

Reviewing the most controversial aspects of the EESS suggests that opposition amongst EPP MEPs was motivated by both concerns about the strategies likely ‘material’ impacts on energy risk exposures, and by a commitment to discourses of solidarity and environmentalism. What is uncertain is the causal weight of these respective motivations, and whether they represent a commitment to a national interest or national party ideology. It is therefore important to analyse whether national party and national delegation support or opposition to the report corresponds to differences in national energy mix, or to different national party ideology.


A useful guide in assessing the impact of material factors is Brutschin’s (2015) study of eastern European Member States positions towards the 2009 Third Gas Directive. “Starting from the basic assumption that material variables should reflect the costs of possible policy changes” (194) Brutschin identifies the consumption of gas (as a % of total energy consumption) and the concentration of energy markets (% market share of the largest electricity generator) as the key determinants of Member States likely material costs and benefits from gas market liberalization. Using this data to present member States spatially generates expectations as to which states will strongly support, mildly support, strongly oppose, and mildly oppose the directive on the Council. Ultimately Brutschin found that the Third Directive’s policy changes could not be adequately explained as caused by the newer Member States changing the balance of economic interests, instead suggesting that the main difference made by the

newer Member States was that of advancing securitized 'frames'.

Brutschin's approach to the Third Gas Directive can be applied to the EESS, generating expectations of how Member States' material interests might predispose the MEPs of their national delegations to seek specific policy outcomes. In line with hypothesis 4, MEPs from Member States with particularly impacted material national interests, or 'energy exposures', might manifest policy-seeking behaviour which sees them 'defect' from the rest of the EPG. In contrast MEPs from Member States without acute material national interests at play will be more likely to comply with the EPG majority, as this is the most effective way of ensuring support for future policy-seeking goals.

Adapting Brutschin's method to the setting of the EP, and the context of the EESS, requires identifying the likely key indices determining support amongst EPP national delegations. Based on the issues which appeared most controversial in the plenary debate and votes, a reasonable set of indices are the share of renewables in national energy mixes, and reliance on Russian gas imports. The share of renewables, with data sourced from Eurostat (2017) represents the potential opportunity cost of limiting indigenous fossil fuel or nuclear production as some feared the EESS would move towards; Member States with higher shares of renewables generation would be expected to be more supportive of the report. Data from Eurogas (2015) is used to calculate reliance on Russian gas, quantified as the percentage of Russian-imported natural gas amongst net natural gas consumption. This indicator generates expectations about the positions of national delegations on coordinated external energy actions and collective gas purchasing, with delegations from Member States with higher dependency on Russia expected to be more likely to support the report. The 'material interests' in renewables and Russian gas dependency are presented spatially in figure 8 below, with the expectations of which position national delegations would be expected to adopt if they were purely motivated by 'national interest'. The distribution of Member States along these dimensions of material interest can then be compared to the actual positions of their EPP delegations, in terms of degree of support for the EESS, presented in figure 9.

Figure 8: 2014 Renewables share and share of natural gas sourced from Russia, EU member states, with anticipated support/ opposition to ESS




Renewables data from Eurostat (2017); natural gas source data from Eurogas (2015)

When these results are compared with the degree of support or opposition to the EESS (fig.9, overleaf), it appears that, despite the high profile that indigenous fossil fuels and vulnerability to Russian gas played in debates around the EESS, the ‘material national interests’ created by these indicators bear little resemblance to how EPP national delegations voted, with weak correlations of 0.09 (Russian gas %) and 0.17 (renewables %). This may suggest that these indicators, reliance on Russian gas and availability of renewables, were not the main material dimensions motivating national delegations support or opposition to the EESS report, despite

their high profile in the plenary debate. This would support the cautious and sceptical approach to ‘confessions’ urged by Blatter and Haverland (2012). Alternatively, the failure of differences in these material indicators to account for differences in support or opposition can be interpreted as supporting Johanson’s 2013 description of energy security as significantly subjective, and thus not tightly tethered to changes in material indicators.

Figure 9: Support scores of National Delegations within the EPP



Roll-Call Data from Europarl (2015b)

The apparent absence of a national interest explanation based on material indicators invites an examination of ideational or discursive factors. It may be that MEPs, rather than act as units within the EPP or as representatives of a clear national interest, instead voted in line with their national parties’ ideological preferences. Theoretically this is tied to interpretations of EU Energy Security development as driven by competing discourses or frames. A useful insight into the participation of EPP member parties in these competing discourses is provided by the Manifesto Project Database (MPD, by Volkens et. al, 2016). This database relies on national experts conducting content analysis of the manifestos of major political parties across most democracies, resulting in a qualitative assessment of their stances on a wide range of issues. To assess the EESS vote, the most recent manifesto prior to the June 2015 vote was extracted for the majority (41) of the national parties making up the EPP. Insufficient

data was available for the Maltese Nationalist Party (three MEPs), the Bulgarian Reformist Bloc Coalition (three MEPs), and the Belgian CdH (one MEP), in addition to two national independents. The MPD does not contain direct variables for energy security stances, which does limit its applicability for this research area. Instead, insight can be derived from its indicators on environmental protection and ‘importance of external security and defence’, which here act as metonyms for a securitized or ‘energy diplomacy’ discourse and what Herranz-Surrallés terms the ‘energy sustainability’ discourse. The MPD data was also analysed for each party’s pro-EU and EU-critical attitudes and enthusiasm for market regulation and free market economics, which may indicate adherence to market and competition-based energy security discourses, as well as indicating whether opposition stemmed from concerns about EU overreach. The correlation of scores from the MPD and the agreement score for the 41 national party delegations within the EPP are shown in table 1.

Table 1: Correlation of EPP national party EESS support to selected indicators from the Manifesto Project Dataset

Party ideology indicator	Pearson Correlation	Significance
Environment+	-.272	.085
Military +	-.073	.650
Regulation+	-.008	.962
Free Market+	.182	.101
Europe+	-.047	.770
Europe-	.047	.673

Party ideology data from Manifesto Project Dataset (2017) and EESS support calculated using Roll-Call data from Europarl (2015b)

The results of comparing support for the EESS to these indicators of party ideology are, largely, inconclusive. Most of the suggested correlations are extremely weak, whilst none are

statistically significant. Along the dimensions identified in this study there therefore seems to be neither an obvious impact of material 'national interest' motivating MEP voting, nor a strong link to the individual parties' ideological stances.

Chapter 7: Discussion: What does the Energy Security Strategy vote reveal about partisanship in energy security policy?

The Energy Security Strategy vote represents a highly anomalous outcome for the European Parliament; splitting its largest political grouping and seeing the EP reject endorsement of the report despite strong support amongst the S&D and ALDE. The EPP's MEPs demonstrated a high rate of 'defection', failing to support a report written by an EPP member and backed by the other major EPGs. A CPT approach has examined how this lack of cohesion and support may have been caused by conditions around the report interacting with three theoretical tiers of MEP behaviour: election-seeking, office-seeking, and policy-seeking. The CPT approach deployed generated insights relevant to each of the four hypotheses, suggesting a range of causal mechanisms of varying strengths. In addition to the three tiers of MEP behaviour, it is suggested that the case study of the EESS vote may be relevant for analysis of 'legitimation'. Finally brief comparison with the later Energy Union vote is introduced to tentatively gauge the generalizability of the present analysis's findings.

7.1 Election-Seeking Behaviours

It has been shown that the level of cohesion amongst national member parties of the EPP was generally high, in many cases 100% cohesion on the Agreement Index. This lends weight to hypothesis 1, that *"EPP MEPs opposed the report if their national parties did so"*. It should be noted here that the small membership of most national delegations makes high cohesion unremarkable, rendering this a 'straw in the wind' test that cannot independently claim to be definitive. In seeking to explain the impact of national partisanship, party ideology was compared to the degree of support for the EESS, along key indicators derived from analysis of the debate and voting. However, for the Manifesto Project Database indicators used, none demonstrated a substantial or statistically significant correlation. In the absence of a clear

role for party ideology, explanations for high national party cohesion default to the concern for reselection.

7.2 Office-Seeking Behaviours

Hypothesis 2, derived from theories of office-seeking behaviour, was that *“EPP MEPs voted less cohesively if the EPP’s policy preference signalling was weak.”* In the absence of a strong signalling of the EPP’s preferred outcome, MEPs would be faced without the risk of career-impacting ‘sanction’ in voting against the EESS. It is telling that there was a relative scarcity of EPP policy output on energy security prior to the vote. This represents a weak preference-signalling to MEPs, reducing the office-seeking incentives to support the report. This is partially corroborated by the report’s rapporteur, who suggested that certain delegations may have been swayed from opposition to abstention had they received clearer information (Watts and Saudargas, 2017, interview)

7.3 Policy-Seeking Behaviours

Closely related to hypothesis 2, on EPG policy preference signalling, was hypothesis 3, that *“EPP MEPS were more likely to ‘defect’ if exposed to non-EPP sources of information”*. In the literature on partisan behaviour a key function of parties, and EPGs, is held to be an information aggregators; party positions are assumed to be proxies for the positions MEPs would reach if they had the information, expertise, and time to reach their own informed decisions. In the case of the EESS this information role was bolstered because the rapporteur was an EPP member, which would be expected to nudge the report towards the preferences of EPP MEPs. As noted above, the EPP engaged in little information output, which increased the relative importance of information from other sources. Whilst little evidence has been found of outsized exposure of MEPs to non-EPP information, independent observers suggested that *“at the end of the vote, most Members were unsure of what actually came out of the document and did not feel confident enough to support it”* (Votewatch, 2015a). As has been discussed, the high level of Polish cohesion in the Parliament generally corresponds at least partially with the opinion submitted by the Polish legislature. The more balanced opinion expressed by the Czech parliament, meanwhile, may also be reflected in the division of the Czech national delegation. A major gap in this analysis is likely to be the role of interest

groups, which may have acted as influential sources of information but have fallen outside the scope of this research.

The second hypothesis derived from theory on policy-seeking behaviours, hypothesis 4, was that *“EPP MEPs defected at a higher rate if their Member State stood to be particularly impacted by the report’s policy recommendations”*. This does not appear to have been the case. Analysis of ‘national interest’ drew on the issues which received the most attention in the debates and coverage of the EESS, and have historically been the main drivers of EU energy security policy. Using publically available data on the share of renewables and Russian natural gas in energy mixes, expectations were generated as to which national delegations ought to most strongly support or oppose the EESS. These expectations do not correspond to the reality of EPP national delegation’s support for the report, suggesting that material ‘national interests’ were not a major determinant of position on the EESS.

If neither party ideology, nor national interest, can be shown to have decisively impacted the vote’s outcome, then what explains the wide variations in support and opposition along national lines within the EPP? In the case of Poland, who’s EPP delegation voted with 100% cohesion against the report, opposition matches the countries wider reputation as an energy security hawk, policy entrepreneur, and ‘super policy driver’ (Lessenski, 2009). Polish MEPs were extremely vocal in both defending potential coal and shale gas use, and in pressing for a yet more active external dimension, in line with their government’s long-running ambitions. Tellingly, four of the five Polish S&D MEPs also defected from their EPP’s support for the report, instead abstaining, which suggests that Polish opposition was very much a national endeavour. It may be that this reflects a strength of national material interest not anticipated in this study’s analysis. Alternatively, it may be that we must look to national, rather than party level, discourses to explain Polish opposition.

7.4 A legitimization dimension?

Looking beyond theories centred on MEP behaviour, does the case study of the EESS tell us anything about the position of energy security within EU policymaking? One debate to which it may well contribute is the function of legitimization. As discussed above, various authors

have identified the development of external energy security policy, or the EU's broader external agenda, as a means of increasing the legitimacy of European integration more generally (Bickerton, 2007; Aalto and Temel, 2014; Buchan and Keay, 2015). Elements of the debate surrounding the Energy Security Strategy certainly lend weight to these expectations, as critical EPP MEPs perceived the report as attempting to expand EU oversight of internal energy affairs, especially energy sources, whilst lacking weight in its intended role as a driver of external policy. These concerns were especially pressing for Polish MEPs and the Polish national legislature, which specifically called for energy security to be recognised as a separate pillar to competitiveness and sustainable development (Sejm, 2014, 1). In the plenary debate this concern was most clearly articulated by Szejnfeld's (2015) assertion that as well as the report's content failing to articulate a clear enough vision of an external energy policy: "I see the amendments that break the balance of the climate and energy agenda, so they probably do not deserve support." Even the report's Rapporteur implicitly cautioned against the side-lining of external policy or security concerns, arguing in his plenary introduction to the report that security must retain its "central location" in policy making rather than becoming "collateral" to energy efficiency and other concerns. (Saudargas, 2015b).

7.5 The Energy Union: A reassertion of the 'fragile equilibrium'?

The EP's failure to endorse the energy security strategy was perhaps 'reset' within the year, when it passed a resolution supporting the Energy Union, in a vote which may serve as an insightful foil to the EESS. Again, the resolution faced significant opposition, passing with 58% of MEPs voting in favour, whilst 25.4% voted against and 16.8% abstained. The vote was opposed by the same mix of Green/ Left and Eurosceptic/Right EPGs, but crucially the EPP largely switched to support of the resolution, resulting in the EPP/S&D/ ALDE 'Grand Coalition+' configuration. Strikingly, none of the EPP's MEPs voted against the report, and just 32 abstained, most of these Polish. A potentially significant difference between Polish positions may be that the rapporteur on the Energy Union report, Marek Gróbarczk, was a Polish MEP with close ties to the national government. This may be interpreted as a recognition of Poland's strong national interest and proven role in obstructing energy security activities. Of the 26 German EPP MEPs who contributed to the failure of the EESS,

all but 2 abstainers switched to fully support the resolution. This is especially intriguing because most of the S&D's German MEPs, all of whom had supported the EESS, moved in the reverse direction to abstain on the Energy Union vote.

The content of the Energy Union report did not differ significantly from that of the EESS. Indeed, the Saudargas report acknowledged the Commission's energy union activity, stating that "the European Energy Security Strategy should be an integral part of the broader, emerging concept of Energy Union and would encourage the new Commission to continue working in this direction." (Saudargas, 2015). The short time period between the EESS and Energy Union votes had seen some potentially significant changes to the energy exposures of key Member States. October 2015 had seen the announcement of a new gas pipeline between Poland and Lithuania to reduce the Baltic states' 'energy isolation', backed by €295mn of EU funds (Gotev, 2015). Meanwhile Germany had itself engaged in more pipeline politics, announcing the intended expansion of the Nord Stream pipeline, with a doubling of its import capacity from Russia to the acrimony of eastern Member States.

Whilst changes to energy exposures may well be one part of explaining the reversal in EPP cohesion between the EESS and Energy Union, this seems unlikely to be the only explanation. Not least, this assumption is undermined by the aforementioned unanimous opposition to the Nord Stream expansion by German MEPs from the domestic governing coalition (Votewatch EU, 2016). The reversion to form of EPP cohesion certainly implies a change to the partisan dynamics within the EPG. It may be significant, for instance, that the EPP designated rapporteur for the Energy Union, Marek Josef Gróbarczyk, belong to the Polish national delegation, resulting in a first draft report described by one environmental interest group as "everything that Europe's oil and gas lobby could hope for" (Decock, 2015) Likewise it seems reasonable to expect that the building of a common EPP policy position on energy security between the two votes (EPP, 2015a) was reflected in the group's higher cohesion. Whilst the reassertion of EPG partisan control in the Energy Union vote justifies its own study, it does appear that Faas's "fragile equilibrium" (2003, 850) was reasserted in the months after its conspicuous failure in the EESS vote.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

8.1 Contesting energy security in the European Parliament

The European Parliament's vote on the European Energy Security Strategy demonstrated the difficulties and conflicts which have characterized energy security policymaking across the EU. The degree of both national and EPP cohesion was far lower than is normally seen in roll-call votes, both for all parliamentary votes and those specifically relating to energy. This research has sought to explain the high amount of division in the EPP by applying theories of MEP behaviour relating of 'election-seeking', 'office-seeking', and 'policy-seeking' incentives. In analysing the debates surrounding the EESS and the vote itself, it has emphasised the importance of competing discourses about energy security, discourses which remain far from settled. As Far and Youngs remark:

"The Energy Union document does not definitively delineate the EU's understanding of energy security so much as it engenders a new debate about how the Union should strike an appropriate balance between market and geopolitical logics." (2015, 28)

As a means of explaining the breakdown in EPP cohesion in the EESS vote, this study has explored several potential explanations. Though several national delegations, especially within the EPP itself, voted with striking cohesion, it was not possible to find a clear link between national parties' support or opposition and national energy security 'exposures'. Nor was there credible evidence that national partisan ideology acted as a significant predictor of support for the EESS. Therefore, whilst the hypotheses that national partisan loyalties would be strongest has been somewhat validated, this does not exert a clear explanatory power to explaining the failure of the report.

The partisan dynamics of the EPP itself have mainly by notable for their absence; there was little evidence that the EPP engaged in strong preference signalling, nor that it enjoyed the theorized role of 'EPG as information aggregator' in this vote. The hypotheses that MEPs were swayed by the presence of non-EPP information sources and that the EPP didn't take advantage of potential office-seeking pressures have therefore not been contested. However, the limited availability of first hand 'confessions', coupled with the fact that the most impactful example of non-EPP information provision related to Poland, which perhaps

amounts to a 'special case' in this literature, means these findings lack explanatory power outside of this case study. Significantly, the absence of significant EPP partisan control appears to have been reversed by the time of the Energy Union vote, a comparison which may yield useful insights on further study.

8.2 Limitations of this study

Given the vast and multifaceted scope of energy security, this study has necessarily overlooked many aspects which may be relevant for fully grasping the partisan dynamics of this topic. In particular; the discourse of 'energy sustainability' and related issues have been largely absent from this analysis, but may have been significant given the much-lauded Paris Climate Change Agreement between the EESS and Energy Union votes. Likewise, relatively little has been said here about the liberalization agenda, which progressed unevenly throughout this period, and has been well documented elsewhere (e.g McGowan, 2011; Brutschin, 2015). Within the scope of the study, the focus on Poland and Germany has meant that this analysis tells us little about those parties and member states which were cohesively in favour of the report, which limits its explanatory scope. As a study of the EU policy space, this study would also benefit from analysis of a broader range of actors than Member States, EPGs, and national parties. In particular the Commission, interest groups and larger energy firms may well have played roles in the decision-making of national parties or individual MEPs. More research into their roles drawing on studies by Maltby (2013) on the Commission or Gratz (2011) and De Jong and Schunz (2012) on energy firms would be advantageous.

In more practical terms, confidence and precision of the findings could be significantly improved by greater depth of data. This study has not been able to draw on the extensive interviews with MEPs which would ideally make up its 'confessions', relying instead on a single specific interview (with Rapporteur Algirdas Saudargas) in addition to plenary statements and interviews in the news media. Additional compromises were made in assessing national party preferences and adherence to the dominant energy security discourses: whilst the Manifesto Project Database proved an invaluable resource, its categories are necessarily broad-brush. In particular; availability of data on partisan attitudes towards Russia, which could usefully inform adherence to the 'energy diplomacy' discourse is only available for an extremely

limited number of parties. To get a clearer picture would require first hand analysis of the EPP's constituent national party platforms which was not undertaken in this study.

8.3 Implications for future research

The EP's formal involvement in energy security has thus far been of a limited nature. As the significance of EP activity in this policy sphere increases in impact, and as the body of suitable cases does so correspondingly, opportunity for research will increase. The current study, though of limited generalizability and modest explanatory power, has demonstrated that the seemingly intrinsic conflicts within EU energy security policymaking can manifest in the EP in ways which upset its assumed partisan dynamics. Coupled with the markedly different outcome of the Energy Union vote, this suggests that further research into energy security as a partisan issue in the EP is justified.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Article 194 of the Lisbon Treaty

“In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a *spirit of solidarity* between Member States, to:

- (a) ensure the functioning of the energy market;
- (b) *ensure security of energy supply in the Union;*
- (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and
- (d) promote the interconnection of energy networks.”

(Lisbon Treaty, 2007, emphasis added by author)

Appendix 2: Selected energy security related votes in the 8th EP

Procedure	Name	Ave. National Cohesion	EPP cohesion	Committee	Date	Rapporteur EPG
Legislative	Energy Efficiency Labelling	74.99	100	ITRE	13/06/17	EFDD
Legislative	Information Exchange Mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements and non-binding instruments in the field of energy	66.75	100	ITRE	02/03/17	ECR
Non-Legislative	Towards a new energy market design	59.45	100	ITRE	13/09/16	EPP
Non-Legislative	Renewable energy progress report	77.54	81.58	ITRE	23/06/16	GUE/NL
Non-Legislative	Delivering a new deal for energy consumers	87.06	100	ITRE	26/05/16	S&D
Non-Legislative	Towards a European Energy Union	59.05	76	ITRE	15/12/15	EPP (Polish)
Non-Legislative	Making Europe's electricity grid fit for 2020	88.79	100	ITRE	15/12/15	GUE/ NL
Legislative	Fuel quality directive and renewable energy directive	71.19	100	ENVI	28/04/15	ALDE
Non-Legislative	European Energy Security Strategy	38.44	17.46	ITRE	10/6/15	EPP (Lithuania)
Legislative	Energy Efficiency labelling	78.53	85.37	ITRE	06/07/16	EFDD
Non-Legislative	Renewable energy progress report	77.54	81.58	ITRE	23/06/16	GUE/NL
Non-Legislative	Implementation report on the energy efficiency directive	41.74	82.8	ITRE	23/06/16	EPP (Germany)
Non-Legislative	EU Strategy for liquefied natural gas and gas storage	56.41	91.09	ITRE	25/10/16	EPP (Hungary)

Appendix 3: Support scores for the EESS, EPP National Parties

Member-State	National Party	EESS Score
Denmark	Conservative People's Party	1
Finland	National Coalition	0.33
Netherlands	Christian Democratic Appeal	1
Luxembourg	Christian Social People's Party	1
France	Union for a Popular Movement	-0.04
Italy	People of Freedom	-1
Italy	Union of the Center	0
Spain	Popular Party	0
Spain	Convergence and Union	1
Greece	New Democracy	0.2
Portugal	Social Democratic Party	0.17
Portugal	Social Democratic Center-Popular Party	0
Germany	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	-0.64
Ireland	Family of the Irish	0
Cyprus	Democratic Coalition	-0.5
Bulgaria	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	0
Croatia	Croatian Democratic Union	-0.75
Croatia	Croatian Peasant Party	-1
Czech Republic	Christian and Democratic Union - Czech People's Party	-0.33
Czech Republic	Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity 09	0.75
Estonia	Pro Patria and Res Publica Union	1
Hungary	Alliance of Federation of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic Union - Christian Democratic People's Party	-0.9
Latvia	Unity	0.75
Poland	Civic Platform	-1
Poland	Polish Peasants' Party	-1
Romania	Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Romania	0
Slovakia	Christian Democratic Movement	0.5
Slovakia	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union - Democratic Party	0
Slovakia	Bridge	1
Slovenia	Slovenian Democratic Party	-0.33
Slovenia	Slovenian People's Party	1
Slovenia	New Slovenian Christian People's Party	-1
Austria	Austrian People's Party	0
Sweden	Moderate Coalition Party	0.67
Sweden	Christian Democrats	0
Belgium	Christian Democratic and Flemish	0

Belgium	Christian Social Party	1
Lithuania	Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats	1
Romania	Democratic Liberal Party	0.4
Slovakia	Party of the Hungarian Coalition	0
Romania	National Liberal Party	0

Appendix 4: Interview with Algirdas Saudargas, MEP

Conducted in person by Josh Watts, Brussels, 02/06/2017

Josh Watts:

Thank you. So I have a couple of questions, mainly focusing on your understanding of why the report wasn't approved by the Parliament. And then moving a little bit towards looking at the vote on the Energy Union later that year.

Algirdas Saudargas:

So on the first question; just very simply I didn't know.

Josh Watts:

OK

Algirdas Saudargas:

But I guess that, at the same time, because I didn't know at the moment of writing, about the second track of Nord Stream. So that was activated, and now is moving forward. So I guess that it should influence that. But I cannot say anything more, about what the reality was, but I guess that that did influence it.

Josh Watts:

OK. So you say you hadn't been aware of the developments with Nord Stream?

Algirdas Saudargas:

I knew about it, but it was announced just after the vote, I read it, but not before. But others, maybe, knew.

Josh Watts:

So do you think other members who then opposed the report, perhaps their MEPs had information that you hadn't seen yet?

Algirdas Saudargas:

Well, maybe. But that's clear, there were various interests in Nord Stream, my position was a bit different. Strategically speaking, I can explain; Because with the second Nord Stream... leaves Russia, in the position where they can avoid the transit through Ukraine. So Ukraine is [?] in the hands of the Russians so if you want to know my position, my position was against Nord Stream. There was, maybe, this different thinking that, ok, Europe would be, on the other hand, devoid of problems related with Ukraine, and get their gas.

Josh Watts:

So there was perhaps a tension between....

Algirdas Saudargas:

I have no evidences that it was, but the point is that we had too much against.... There were some deliberations, as usual, in the Committee, but the [Inaudible] some were neutral, some were not.. [Inaudible]

Josh Watts:

So did you have much indication... So aside from Nord Stream and any potential impact that had, did it become apparent to you before the vote that there would be so much division?

Algirdas Saudargas:

I don't know, I cannot say anything more, on that point.

Josh Watts:

OK. So you couldn't say anything to do with whether you or other senior EPP members expected any member states to particularly oppose the report?

Algirdas Saudargas:

I don't know, you should look at who voted against and ask them. I could only guess, and my guess is not the topic of your Master's thesis.

Josh Watts:

Well I'm interested to know...

Algirdas Saudargas:

You need to investigate facts.

Josh Watts:

Yes, I'm taking a range of sources...

Algirdas Saudargas:

And opinions. I've told you my opinion but my guesses have nothing to do with it.

Josh Watts:

Ok. So the next question I was going to ask is that there were a lot of MEPs who abstained. This was the largest group of EPP MEPs, were those that abstained. Do you think that there was a lot of uncertainty amongst MEPs about what the report actually entailed?

Algirdas Saudargas:

No, that was their decision. I can tell you just that, it was a decision that was made in just a few days, I was working with shadows and they had been, I can tell you just in general, but afterwards there had been indications that if I had informed, I didn't know, certain groups which were voting against, and they were voting against but they were in general in favour that it would be approved, they would abstain. And it would not fail. So abstaining is a political decision so I cannot say which MEP voted on which grounds.

Josh Watts:

There were lots of common ideas and themes across the Energy Security Strategy and the Energy Union report, which came out later. They covered a lot of the same ground and the same issues, but the Energy Union did pass and a lot of EPP MEPs especially did change the way that they voted to be more supportive. Do you have any views or opinions on why that was?

Algirdas Saudargas:

Energy Union... Energy Security is a part of Energy Union, it's a pillar, and aspect of Energy Union, and understandably it's incorporated there. But you should ask who did this Energy Union what they negotiated and what the difference was with... Some parliamentary opinion they have not voted for example, for my paper, but they have voted for Energy Union. But their, arguments, I don't know, I'm not interested (laughs) It's not my desire, I finished the report and that's it. I told my colleagues that my country is solving this with our own money. [inaudible] with the Commission of course, but investing in gas terminals and this LNG terminal in Lithuania and we solved our energy security

problem, our independence from Russia. We're still involved, with a pipeline to Kaliningrad, so we had an option, and it cost money! People were protesting, but they understand security and the value. But European looking, even [?] they like to have this Nord Stream thing. [inaudible]

Josh Watts:

I'm interested by this idea of the Energy Security Strategy and how it's one part of the Energy Union, and it's a very important part. And it seems to me that a lot of the ways in which people talk about the Energy Union and it's been conceived, the Energy Security aspect is really prominent. By the time the EESS got to the vote in the Parliament there had already been quite some activity on the Energy Union initiative, do you think....

Algirdas Saudargas:

... the Energy Union really started from the very beginning of new term of the Parliament, the Commission... The idea was Buzek's, even earlier, but the realities came with the new Commission, and I remember that there had been meetings, presentations by Vice-President of the Commission [Maroš Šefčovič] even discussing that "OK, we have a Commissioner now, a Vice-President of the Commission with a portfolio, but this portfolio maybe is void, we don't know what is inside". So the process started, maybe they had something in that portfolio, maybe we didn't know what they had, but it started to be disclosed what was inside, the financing schemes came later, and this and that, and it was filled with the substance which we have now. Now we see inside, so this process was really exposed, so to say, in the [inaudible] portfolio. You can look... at this portfolio, what was put inside, what was discussed, so metaphorically speaking that was the process. So the Commission was approved, and now we have documents [Inaudible]

Josh Watts:

And do you think that the way the Energy Union was developing, that it was becoming apparent that it was a major European project that would come to the Parliament later that year, do you think that it took momentum away from the Energy Security Strategy?

Algirdas Saudargas:

You know, to put you openly, if you're asking me personally I can say that Europe is now busy with other things.

Josh Watts:

Such as?

Algirdas Saudargas:

(laughs) So its not just that it dropped that, but that there are other... Today we see even more clearly that just as problems with Russia are even more grave than the were in the beginning with just some disturbances with gas supply when we started, it was 7 nearly 8 years ago when I started my job in the first term and we were working on security of gas supply. And that was because in winter time some one week of disturbances. Now we have the Syrian war, we have terrorism spreading in Europe, we have Trump in America, we have Brexit, we have whatever you want and all those things, you know, strikes at the importance of energy security. But the problems now concentrate at other means of solving the general political problem. So I think that, it is complicated even I do not know because the key problem with Russia which was, energy security was the Russia issue, mostly, and the Russian issue with Europe mostly was the Ukraine issue. And the Ukraine issue is frozen, so that's the reality. And nobody can do anything, or maybe in the backrooms, I don't know what they're doing; Trump just started to travel, and Europe is speaking with different voices etc. etc... But the problem is frozen, so that is the main dependency, so all those other; Nord Stream is going on, but no major decision could be expected here. So they will be discussing about purchasing maybe it continues, ... in the

Commission, but when you have Brexit, when you have an attitude developed towards the Commission that nobody likes to speak of 'more Europe, more Europe'... That changed.... Energy Security now is the same subject, Energy Union is the same subject, the same content, but in a different context, and in different circumstances. Do you see my point?

Josh Watts:

Yes, it seemed to me that you're saying that because there've been so many other major developments that almost, simply the amount of attention energy security can expect as an EU action....

Algirdas Saudargas:

Energy security, this tension, has become just one aspect in a whole package.

Josh Watts:

And do you feel that this is the same across all the EU institutions, or do you feel it is mainly Parliament that has less time and attention for energy security now but the Commission, for example, is still working away from the status quo?

Algirdas Saudargas:

Any institution, the manner of job, of action. If you take the Commission; you have some continuous activities, which haven't stopped. So if there are no major changes... there are no major changes in this moment, maybe this or that aspect, I don't know, this is the current thing. Because if you take all the substance, energy security, energy union, this was spoken about in Parliament. But the substance, this was initiated in the Commission, as a Commission communique, and Parliament, acting therefore, making reports, discussing and voting etc. So this substance side, was dependent on the Commission, so if the Commission does something the Parliament will continue. On the other side, let us say the resolution side, a package of resolutions in parliament; that is another thing. So there you have now different moods, different discussions, different [inaudible], you have Brexit, you have this and that, you have Syria, you have Crimea discussed, and now Energy Security is disappearing, or going to the bottom of this whole different thing of motions.

Josh Watts:

And in your personal opinion when did the decline of energy security as an issue that got a lot of attention, when did this start? Was it already by the point when the EESS report reached parliament, was it something that people had started to pay less attention to, or was it after the Energy Union vote passed that people started to pay less attention to energy security?

Algirdas Saudargas:

Mostly after Brexit. Because Brexit had a major impact on the mood in Europe. It was surprising, very surprising. This was the fact that had an impact like Fukushima did for nuclear power. Because in Europe, there had been referenda before, there had been discussions, but maybe they couldn't believe that it might occur, in reality. And now it is reality, and now the whole existence of Europe is *questionable*. Before we thought [inaudible]. In reality it is not so tragic because Britain has always been a bit aside, and nothing will change so much in the geopolitical arena, but just the regulations, the treaties and agreements and etc, will do. But psychologically this was a change, and we had this change in Europe and those elections we had there, but in general I think that stability is still, stability of major traditional parties in Europe. In France it was not a party story, it was a personal story, about the personal failures of traditional failures. It's not expected that Le Pen will win in the parliament in the summer. And in Britain as well Farage could not win elections, but he won the referendum, because of mistakes of major parties, so that is a point. And so we still have some stable establishment in Europe, it's shaken but it is not denied. What will happen later I don't know.

[interlude]

Josh Watts:

Going back to the aftermath of the EESS vote. A few months afterwards, in November 2015, the EPP published a policy paper on energy security, which they hadn't done before the EESS vote to my knowledge. Do you think that there was a reaction within the EPP group to the splintering?

Algirdas Saudargas:
What?

Josh Watts:

Do you think there was a reaction in the EPP to the vote on the energy security strategy, to the lack of cohesion? Was there any kind of attempt to rethink energy security and find a common line, or was this just forgotten and assumed to have been a one off?

Algirdas Saudargas:

This would be just speculation... If you want to follow those reactions you should take note of realities. And in reality each issue has two aspects. Take European Energy Union: That is documents, they are exposed and in the media, there is this public opinion reaction and influences public opinion etc, that is one thing. But what is in the portfolio, as I mentioned, you must get financial decisions. Without those financial decisions you don't have any substance. And that was [inaudible], you must take a look; connecting European facilities, and so-on. They're doing this and that, and you will find where the money is going. And they are connected obviously, but those are the two aspects.

The same is true in energy security: The security story was launched as we see with Ukraine, it was just about the gas supply, it was a gas story. Then you have a report, and of course you include many things in here: You have Greens, with their position, you have Socialists, the EPP on Nuclear, on Green Energy, on commitments to this and that, on binding targets, you have all these aspects. You discuss again, say 90% of subjects have already been discussed and you just review them, you have an angle probably. If you look back to this energy security story it is Nord Stream, South Stream, and probably nothing more. Because Nabucco was already dead, almost, or had certain smaller implementations I should say. When I was in Azerbaijan I remember, the business people of Azerbaijan, they were quite important people, they were "oh we built to Georgia, to the Turkish border and we can export to you". But just to increase the supply from Azerbaijan is not the solution. You have Turkmenistan, but on the other side of Caspian and with the diplomatic [angle?] on that, and there is Iran, with all those stories. I think very specific, to rush to do something. That was the story because of South Stream and North Stream. If you want to compare the EPP papers, please look at them, and compare yourself, that's a task for you. What is the difference between the EPP position towards South Stream and Nord Stream?

Josh Watts:

So you would say, in your opinion, the division in the EPP on this specific vote was just a reflection of this more technical side of implementation...

Algirdas Saudargas:

It is not technical, not the technical side. As far as I see we've just discussed about North Stream, and its moving forward, with no technical problems, unlike South Stream. How it is done, it's not part of this to discuss. And South Stream is dead, and North stream isn't. And that is, I don't know, because including my country as well we were discussing nuclear and a lot of... but we still have energy problems in general, this unbalanced, or wrongly balanced link with East and West. So in gas we just

took and solved in this way, and you can talk with Gazprom and it's more relaxed because they need transit to Kaliningrad and so on. They could do this via Nord Stream, why not, but they must invest in their transit. They are not going to close and they have closed [inaudible]. So so far the problem is electricity systems, in particular the synchronization, in the former [USSR], because it's still working in a synchronized way, that's the point, and it's already more than 25 years. And that's a problem of money, once again. Because it could be solved with a very big amount of money, but who would pay? So we paid for the LNG terminal, ok. And now in Lithuania if you look, we're moving forward with this electricity de-synchronization. But if you look where our money is now directed, you see we dropped some years ago just below 1% of GDP for Defence. Now we are rapidly approaching 2% as Trump is requiring, rapidly. And everybody supports that. And that's money. Additionally we have also accommodated the NATO partners, some battalions, the [?] brigade which included Germans, and I believe, from BENELUX countries, you know, they have tanks, we have tanks, but we are also buying armoured machines for the infantry. So we need to look where we're going to invest. Do we need jet fighters? Planes, or drones? You see where money is being spent, what is the reality? And reality is, because thanks to Mr. Putin perhaps, because he sent a message in Crimea to our society, in which it has become positive for finance. Before it was difficult for the parties to discuss, you know; "oh who is going to attack you? Why should we pay money for defence?" Now everyone is silent, they sign immediately.

Josh Watts:

Yes, it was a focusing event.

Algirdas Saudargas:

Yes, after Crimea. 'Thank you Mr. Putin for this' in a sense. Of course that's black humour, but that's the reality. It's like Fukushima, you know. A bad story. Maybe for Greens it's "thanks for the Pacific ocean", after Fukushima they get votes for non-nuclear power (laughs)

Josh Watts:

Yes, which was one of the amendments [anti-nuclear]. Most of the amendments to the report weren't actually about the external energy security aspect directly, they seemed to be mostly about energy sources; nuclear, coal, fracking, renewables. Had you expected that?

Algirdas Saudargas:

In Europe the problem is, what Mrs. Merkel says: we must do many things ourselves. Because Americans established fracking technology. We have discussions in Lithuania; somebody looking for gas, someone is protesting, Gazprom is financing these people (laughs) Now you have coal coming related to this fracking as well, and Poles are in trouble, and by the way Poles as well voted against, some Poles, voted against the energy security because of their problems with coal, in some way related. This is a bit bad, but let it be. So we have all those stories. We have our brains draining to the United States and what is going on here...

Josh Watts:

So it sounds like... were you expecting that there would be a lot of these attempts to specify energy sources, as amendment? Did you know that that would be the part of the strategy that was perhaps most controversial.

Algirdas Saudargas:

I don't know what more to tell you.....

[End of Formal Interview]