

Master Thesis

To what extent do housing policies tend towards convergence in European countries or follow the country-specific original housing policy approach as a response to the refugee crisis?

An analysis of desegregation, laissez-faire and segregationist European housing policies.

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Governance of Migration and Diversity



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1 Introduction

In August 2012 the small residential area of Vollsmose in the city of Odense in Denmark experienced an outbreak of violence that captured nation-wide attention. It was the day of the Muslim celebration of Eid al-Fitr, when 60 to 80 men of immigrant background stormed into the emergency room of the Odense University Hospital. The men, who carried “clubs and iron pipes, threatened nurses and doctors to hand over a wounded man, making the police draw their weapons on them” (Grünenberg and Freiesleben, 2014, p. 49). Beforehand, the residential area with its 78 different nationalities was officially classified as a “ghetto”. Through political rhetoric and media echoed an outcry of indignation, naming the dramatic consequences of parallel societies. Instead of connecting the incident with gang-related criminality or wider societal issues, the fact that the offenders had an immigrant background directed the public debate in a completely different direction (Grünenberg and Freiesleben, 2014). The Danish national newspaper claimed the following day: “Don’t these completely unacceptable events show that there is a fundamental problem of integration, and that parallel societies centred especially on certain Muslim migrant milieu threaten to undermine the community and the values which uphold Danish society?” (Jensen, 2012).

Spatial segregation of ethnic minorities is one of the most visible side effects of extensive immigration and the (discursive) link between ghettoization, ethnic segregation and integration is in most western countries heavily debated. Political rows about potential problems and opportunities of ethnic segregation are nothing new. Already in the 70’s and 80’s an increasing segregation of guest-worker immigrants became visible. Nonetheless, the topic spilled over into the focus of political and academic attention only since the beginning of the 21th century (Bolt and Van Kempen, 2013). Herewith, the correlation between integration and the place of residence gained particular importance. The large body of research on this issue indicates both positive and negative consequences of ethnic residential segregation. On the one hand it has been shown that living in a minority-dominated neighbourhood leads to the development of “values that are not in line with those of the mainstream society” as well as a lack of contact with natives and an acquirement of language skills (Neuman, 2013, p.6). On the other hand, studies show a positive correlation between living in an ethnic enclave and the likelihood of being employed as well as

“positive spillover effects” from resource-richer to resource-poorer migrants (Iceland, 2014, Cutler and Glaester, 1997). Also the political discourse mirrors this divergence. Many European countries have adopted various social mixing strategies over the years, accompanied with conflicts on how and to what extent these can be beneficial for the aim of integration. However, one thing is for certain: Housing is not only defined in terms of simply providing a roof over one’s head, but it is most often a highly politicised issue, which is connected with various policy fields. In light of new global migration developments, this conflict appears in a new dimension. The refugee crisis confronts highly receiving countries with an unprecedented challenge concerning the accommodation of newcomers. As we will see in the following analysis, housing plays a central role in current discussions of possible integration failure and mostly desired integration success. The European Commission defines integration as the “key to make (...) the most of the contributions that immigration can make to EU development” (European Commission, 08.07.2017). The 2016 developed ‘Action plan on the integration of third-country nationals’ describes the “access to basic services such as housing” as one of the most important policy areas concerning integration (European Commission, 08.07.2017). The European Commission connects their integration plan with the policy area of housing for a reason. Where you live, can directly influence your access to education and the labour market, the content of your social network and your sense of belonging. Therefore the policy area of housing poses immense societal as well as theoretical relevance for integration research. Existing country-specific evaluation studies have examined the situation of housing for asylum seekers and refugees (see for Germany Wendel, 2014, for Denmark OECD, 2016, for Italy Medecins Sans Frontiers, 2016), while older research deals with a different housing policy approach in European countries (see Bolt et al., 2010). However, according to my knowledge comparative studies on housing policy approaches are missing. The existing literature observes single policy aspects at a given time, quite like a snapshot. It is needed to join these single aspects together and look at the developments *over time* in order to understand underlying patterns and processes of the makeup of housing policies in Europe. Only when we understand the driving forces behind why a country adopted a certain approach in the domain of housing or, respectively, why they didn’t, we can make attempts to impact these developments and realign them towards the goal of integration formulated by the European Commission. Correspondingly, this paper aims to explore European

housing policies in the domain of refugees and see whether they follow their original housing policy approach, which they have adapted before the “refugee crisis”, or if this particular influx triggered a policy change. This paper seeks to answer pressing questions such as: do adopted measures really correspond with positive impacts on the host society and on refugees themselves? By comparing countries with similar external and internal pressures but with very dissimilar original approaches, we can filter out the crucial aspects of these original approaches, which explain how countries react the way they do. Herewith, countries can follow various strategies in the domain to achieve similar or different political goals, motivated by theoretical consideration and principles. In further research, these fundamental findings can also contribute to the research of other policy domains in the field of refugee integration.

Through the refugee crisis, the issue of housing for refugees gained a new momentum of societal urgency. Refugee integration is a matter of developing sustainable policies to secure cohesion in European societies and sustain democratic political systems. Housing policies, in an interplay with other domains, which need to be developed early on, function as an instrument for integrating refugees into society and prevent isolation from both sides. Herewith it is crucial to prevent mistakes from past immigration flows, where many policies in these areas pushed people to the margins of society. Current housing policies will have long-term consequences for failure or success of the new situation of co-existence in the light of the refugee crisis. Therefore, it is important to devote more scientific attention to this field of study. Due to this societal urgency, this paper focuses on policies targeting *recognized refugees* and not asylum seekers. Although the latter will appear as background information, the classification of the policies refers to recognized refugees.

This paper aims to answer questions on continuity or policy change in European housing policies with respect to the refugee crisis with the following structure.

Firstly, the next chapter will provide the theoretical foundation of this research paper. Herewith the distinct housing approaches will be classified and indicators for these categories theoretically established. Moreover, a central aim of the paper is to explore the determinants of policy change. Therefore, the three-streams theory of Kingdon (2014) will help us to identify the policy process in the examined countries. He offers some valuable insights on the impact of focusing events and defines them. Accordingly this chapter shows that the refugee crisis can be seen as a focusing event according to Kingdon. Lastly from the theoretical expectations, hypotheses will be

developed. The following chapter on methodology marks the second supporting column. Firstly, the most important terms will be operationalized to “make them ready” for the analysis. Secondly, the conceptual model will be explained. Thirdly, the focus lies on the qualitative empirical foundation of this paper. The focus group and the use of secondary sources are crucial to outline and lastly the coding scheme will be explained to give the reader insight in the exact process of work and data gathering. The then following chapter incorporates the country reports of the three examined countries. Herewith, the original housing approach prior to the refugee crisis will serve as background information, necessary to explore the refugee crisis and its impact on policy developments. Kingdons (2014) three streams theory will be applied on the countries in order to re-construct the policy process and finally determine the kind of policy window and policy change. The final chapter offers an extensive country comparison, orientated around the four hypotheses, the limitations of this research and the broader meaning of the findings.

This structure aims to explore possible answers to the question if countries move towards convergence as a response the comparable pressure of the “refugee crisis” or if they follow their path nonetheless? Deriving from the pressing societal and theoretical relevance the following research question has been developed. It is advised to keep this question in mind, since it guides the reader through the research.

To what extent do housing policies tend towards convergence in European countries or follow the country-specific original housing policy approach as a response to the refugee crisis?

2 Theoretical framework

This chapter lays down the theoretical basis for the following empirical research and consists of two parts. Firstly, the concept of housing policies will be specified and secondly theoretical consideration on policy change based on Kingdon (2014) will be presented. Herewith, the variables, which will be analysed, will be elaborated on. Accordingly, following the presented theory, hypotheses will be drawn.

2.1 Housing Theories

The various dimensions of housing are subject to many fields of study. For example psychologists see the correlation between housing and the expression of personal space, identity building processes or security. Sociologists explore the concept of privacy in housing and economists with the price-performance ratio depending on location and square metre. The first section of this first part of theory, clarifies the 'lense' through which housing policies will be observed in the research of this paper. Due to the many dimensions of housing, it is crucial to filter out the political aspect based on theory. In the second step, I will look closer at contrasting options of housing policy and their values. This will be necessary in order to classify the approaches of the examined countries and allow for a comparison.

2.1.1 The concept of space

This paper deals with the political dimension of housing, expressed through the concept of space. Calpham (2005) introduced the housing pathways framework to determine this concept of "space": "housing is not just a reflector of human activity, but can become an active mediator and agent of human activity as it provides the physical space for human interaction, relationships and developments within the home, and the surrounding neighbourhood" (Netto, 2011). Depending on the characteristics of the space and the individuals living there, "spaces can facilitate certain interactions and inhibit others" (p. 126). Many theories are dealing with different aspects of roots and consequences of living in a certain space. For example Zwiers et al. (2016) studied neighbourhood decline and Galster (2012) the mechanisms of neighbourhood effects. These studies follow the question, which characteristics of "space" lead to different individual outcomes. For instance the effects of high levels of criminality or unemployment for the individual's mental health or level of education. This paper only touches upon one aspect of this correlation: between space (housing) and integration. More specifically, the political

courses of action will be analysed, referring to this correlation. Policy-wise, it can be distinguished between desegregation policies and laissez-fair policies. Generally speaking Europe has a “stronger interventionist tradition” and more centralised housing policies than for example countries such as the United States with the clear laissez-fair housing market approach (Iceland 2014). Nonetheless the examined European countries vary greatly in their degree of policy intervention in the domain of housing, following different integration policy approaches.

The concept implies clear characteristics of both types of policies and therefore helps to identify the strategies used by the four examined European countries in terms of housing asylum seekers and refugees.

2.1.2 Desegregation policy approach

By applying the concept of ethnic segregation, an in-depth understanding of the correlation between segregation and integration will be provided. The concept builds the basis for identifying a country’s policy approach in the field of housing and explains possible reasons and motivations behind these policies.

The most interesting element out of theories surrounding ethnic segregation is the connection with integration. According to Bolt and Van Kampen (2013) the common assumption is that ethnic segregation is a “major impediment of integration” (p. 195), because the concentration of ethnic minorities which “leads to fewer social contact with (...) (natives) and less identification with the (...) society” (p.195). Likewise, Van Ham and Tammeru (2016) argue, that similar individuals face different outcomes in integration and social mobility according to where they live. They state that the major reason for that is residual ethnic segregation. The inversion of the argument, however, would be that ethnic minorities living in resource-rich neighbourhoods with a high share of natives are better integrated. Many researchers have shown this correlation. Studies on residential ethnic segregation often refer to the experience of “ghettoization” in the US, concerning the concentration of black minorities in certain areas (see for instance Johnston et al., 2002; Walks and Bourne, 2006 and Peach, 1996). Already studies in the 1990’s suggest negative consequences of segregation for socio-cultural integration, saying that living in a minority-dominated neighbourhood leads to the development of “values that are not in line with those of the mainstream society” (Neuman, 2013, p. 6). According to Edin et al. (2003), segregation hampers the acquiring of host country skills, due to a lack of contact with

natives. He describes this as an impediment of the assimilation process into the host society. Likewise, Lazear (1999) as well as Chiswick and Miller (2005), show “that immigrants have a higher probability becoming fluent” in the host countries language, if they live in an area with fewer co-ethnics (Neumann, 2013, p. 6). The acquisition of language skills has than positive spill-over effects on socio-cultural and labour market integration. Moreover, also more recent studies analysed consequences of ethnic segregation. For instance a research conducted in the Netherlands by Havekes and Uunk in 2008 shows the “negative effect of ethnic concentration on the identification with the Netherlands (...) and on social ties with the native Dutch (Bolt and Van Kempen, 2013, p. 200).

In the following section on the values of the variable of “desegregation policy approach”, political courses of action aiming at desecration will be presented. The two policy instruments below reflect forms of desegregation policies, however with district mechanisms and motivations behind them.

- Scattered-Site Programs

One form of desegregation policies are scattered side programs. These policies aim at reducing ethnic concentration by allowing residence “to choose housing in a wider range of neighbourhoods” (Iceland, 2014, p. 8). Herewith, they follow the logic of social mixing. Social housing is often concentrated in resource-poor areas with a high level of ethnic minorities (Anderson, 2010). Due to a lack of financial resources, refugees mostly apply for social housing or are accommodated in social housing by responsible authorities. Correspondingly these structural forces foster ethnic segregation, by forcing individuals to live certain segregated areas. Instead of restricting beneficiaries in moving freely or in certain areas, scattered side programs refer to a de-concentration of social housing in only one neighbourhood and distribute them “across a wide range of neighbourhoods” (Iceland, 2014, p. 8). Low-income residence, to which refugees often belong, is offered a greater housing choice.

- Housing Allocation Procedures

The political measure of housing allocation procedure is aimed at reducing ethnic concentrations. This can be in form of a quota system or banning “the settlement of ethnic minorities in neighbourhoods in which they were already highly present”

(Iceland, 2014, p. 8). The approach follows the logic of preventing social isolation of ethnic minorities. According to Wilson (1987) “the absence of resource-rich people in high-poverty neighborhoods makes it difficult for the poor to form relationships with resource-rich people” (p. 144). In the case of refugees resource-poor is not necessarily meant in financial terms, but in terms of language proficiency, knowledge about the culture, labor market opportunities, bridging contacts and the availability of social capital. If we refer back to Calphams’ (2005) housing pathways framework of space, where refugees live or are allocated to, determine the individual integration outcome. According to Bolt and Van Kempen (2013) a resource-rich neighborhood can be characterized by many factors such as, most importantly, a high level of education amongst the residence, a low crime level and a low unemployment rate. This policy approach works with restrictions and punishment systems in order to prevent perceived “self-segregation” of ethnic minorities (Bolt et al., 2010). Moreover, this category also incorporates policies, which are more clearly aimed at the facilitation of integration, due to more practical reasons. According to Iceland (2014) policies are developed in order to secure the availability of integration tools, such as employment and educational opportunities. The motivation behind these policies is not concerned about the emergence of ethnic ghettos and is therefore not an obstacle to socio-cultural integration, but rather an imbalance in supply and demand. Countries mostly offer various integration courses to refugees, such as language courses and job trainings. A high concentration of beneficiaries in, for instance, big cities can lead to overstrain of the integration service systems in urban areas and a lack of utilization of services in rural areas. Therefore integration tools cannot be sufficiently provided for the ethnically segregated individual. These desegregation policies can for instance be the forced allocation of refugees to rural areas or the restriction of free movement of refugees in the country.

2.1.3 Laissez-faire policy approach

Despite the indicators for negative consequences of ethnic segregation, the geographical concentration of ethnic minorities does not necessarily indicate social exclusion or individual disadvantage. Also depending on the traditional integration strategy, some countries might follow a laissez-faire policy approach in the domain of housing. Within this thesis I distinguish between three policy options in the laissez-faire policy approach. The concept of space is seen in these policies either as not

relevant, being connected with different consequences than desegregation policies or specifically intent ethnic segregation.

- Non-policy

Following Alexander's (2010) framework of local migrant policies, non-policy can be classified as a re-active strategy, where governments only spatially intervene, when a crisis occurs. Interventions solely offer temporary solutions to the problem. Generally the segregation of ethnic minorities and its possible negative consequences are ignored.

- Tolerance of ethnic Segregation

Another option of a laissez-fair policy approach is the tolerance of ethnic segregation either by referring to positive impacts of segregation, or the negative impacts of diversity on neighborhoods. Scholars such as Neumann (2013), Iceland (2014) or Tasan-Kok et al. (2014) refer to various positive impacts of ethnic segregation. Firstly it is stated that ethnic networks facilitate employment opportunities. For instance, a research of Patacchini and Zenou (2012) shows that "a higher ethnic group share" increases the likelihood of an individual obtaining a job through these social contacts. Other arguments, which have been intensively researched and often mentioned in the literature, are the availability of information, the avoidance of discrimination and the share of social capital. According to Bodin et al. (2003) and Borjas (2000) migrants that live and work in ethnic enclaves, are less often confronted with discrimination compared with migrants working in the national labor market and feel better informed about labor market opportunities. Furthermore, the same authors suggest that in the context of ethnic enclaves, newly arrived resource-poor immigrants can profit from their resource-rich neighbors. The human capital of the latter has "positive spillover effects" on the former (Cutler and Glaester, 1997). Despite the fact that natives might have higher human capital on their disposal than resource-rich minorities residing in ethnic enclaves, theories and researches in the field of social cohesion show that residents living in a very diverse neighborhood don't mix (Tasan-Kok et al., 2014). For this reason, politicians might promote tolerance of ethnic segregation by referring to negative neighborhood effects through diversity.

Tasan-Kok et al. (2014) elaborates in her critical literature review "Towards Hyper-Diversified European Cities" on various negative consequences of diversified neighborhoods. First of all the homogeneity theory implies that "people prefer to

associate with others who have similar characteristics. It is therefore expected that people in heterogeneous neighbourhoods tend to have fewer contacts with fellow residents than people in homogeneous neighbourhoods” (p. 49). Accordingly, negative consequences for the level of social cohesion can be deduced. Studies evaluating social mixing policies of Bolt and Van Kempen (2013) and Bond et al. (2011) suggest that these policies even contribute to weaken social cohesion in a neighbourhood instead of strengthening it (Tasan-Kok et al., 2014). Likewise Putnam (2007) argues in his “constrict theory” that ethnic diversity in a neighborhood leads to less political trust, less social contact and less individual contribution to the neighborhood and the society. He states that “diversity seems to trigger not in-group/out-group division, but anomie or social isolation” (p.140).

Finally Tasan Kok et al. (2014) refers to the “evidence that the more diversity that exists in a community, the less trusting residents are of neighbours and the more they tend to isolate themselves from others, even from those of similar backgrounds” (p. 55).

2.1.4 Segregationist policy approach

Referring back to Alexander (2010) ethnic segregation can be politically intended, mostly to discourage integration. For instance, in the guest-worker policy approach, governments see immigrants as temporary. After a certain period of time, return migration is expected, and politically encouraged. Therefore, following the idea of “residential segregation (...) as the antithesis of successful immigrant integration”, segregation policies are an instrument to foster return migration (Iceland, 2014, p. 2). “Promotion of segregation” can be seen as a variable of its own. In this policy approach, governmental institutions as well as public (national or local) policies can create political boundaries, which are “manifestations of the widespread recognition of place, a spatial unit with its own identity, separate and recognizable from other spatial units” (Turner and Wolman, 2005, p. n/a). These spatial segregated spatial units can be purposely implemented or once they exist, supported by influencing the sorting patterns across urban geographies.

In light of the current developments of the “refugee crisis”, it could be particularly interesting to examine how countries deal with refugees in their housing policies, when they would be classified as temporary migrants.

- Land use control

This value refers in particular to local or national governmental institutions, which “provide incentives for or facilitate segregated residential patterns“ (Turner and Wolman, 2005, p. n/a). Herewith the policy instrument of land use control is a prominent instrument for instance observed in the US to promote ethnic segregation. Through this measure, resource-rich residents “are able to influence who their neighbours are by using land use controls to raise the price of housing beyond what lower-income households can afford” (Turner and Wolman, 2005, p. n/a). Moreover, another instrument to foster ethnic segregation are (local) governmental exclusionary zoning strategies or measures that facilitate the “self-segregation” of minority as well as majority groups by structurally fostering “exclusionary preferences of residence” (Turner and Wolman, 2005, p. n/a).

- Social housing on racial basis

This value refers in particular to national and local policies, which are aimed at residential ethnic segregation. When local governments have authority over allocating and creating the regional social housing stock, they can decide to place them “in minority enclaves rather than in integrated neighborhoods, thus reinforcing segregated patterns” (Turner and Wolman, 2005, p. n/a). Herewith the policies create new social housing stock in already deprived areas and therefore deny social housing tenants “the choice of living in non-segregated communities” (Turner and Wolman, 2005, p. n/a). Moreover, policy practices could also foster segregation by purposely not providing refugees with any tools (financial or social capital) to find appropriate housing in mixed areas and therefore forcing them into segregation and isolation.

2.2 Focusing events and policy streams

The following chapter explains the role of the refugee crisis as a focusing event and its possible impacts on European housing policy on the basis of Kindon’s (2014) theory of focusing events and policy streams. Herewith, the theory should lay the foundation for answering the central question: Why and in which particular way would the refugee crisis change housing policies concerning refugees in the examined countries?

First of all the three streams, namely problem, policy and politics streams, will be explained, including a particular focus on focusing events as part of the problem stream. Secondly, I will elaborate on the importance of a critical juncture and the

“policy window of opportunity” as the determinant for change. Finally, it will be argued, why the refugee crisis can be seen as clear focusing event. From these theoretical considerations, the hypotheses will be drawn.

Kingdon (2014) tries to explain with his theory of three streams why policy change happens and how certain conditions are important. Herewith agenda setting is from particular importance, dealing with the question why some issues rise up on the political agenda while others vanish. Insights in process will help to explain the outcome of following research and herewith in particular why countries reacted to the same focusing event, namely the refugee crisis, in their own way.

Firstly, the policy streams deal with the influence of policy field specific specialist and experts on policy proposals. Alternatives, proposals and solutions, which are being “discussed, revised and discussed again” (p.173), are floating around in this stream close to the government. Experts and specialists contribute with their knowledge to the generation of ideas, out of which some will succeed and put into practise through a legislation or authoritative decision.

However, Kingdon (2014) lays down some general criteria for the survival of the idea, such as *technical feasibility*, *value acceptability* and the *anticipation of future constrains*. Concerning the first criterion, it is crucial that realistic mechanisms and instruments exists to implement the idea while for the last criterion it is important that they correspond with relevant factors such as public opinion and budget constrains. The criterion *value acceptability* focuses on the importance of the idea to meet the dominant values amongst specialists. Since these values have a great influence on what ideas experts reject or support, ideas that diverge too much have a low chance of survival (Kingdon, 2014). It is attempted to attach the idea to a problem in the political stream or to an event, that increases the likelihood of adoption.

Moreover the degree of fragmentation in the policy community matters, since this can lead to fragmentation of policies and instability. In the policy stream a key role policy entrepreneurs play. They are the ones who can cause policy change by for instance advocating it and moving it higher up on the political agenda. Policy entrepreneurs could be actors inside or outside of the government (Kingdon, 2014).

Secondly the political stream deals with the political process that affects the agenda such as election results and changes in the public opinion. This stream deals with the time of new policy creation, respectively after the policy maker selected an idea or

solution and has the opportunity to put it into practise (Kingdon, 2014). Changes in the political processes can open up quite a predictable “window of opportunity” for policy change. For instance the empowerment of new political forces or the turnover of governmental officials can give room for new priorities on the agendas. In this case the balance of power has changed. The national mood can affect the success of policy proposals as well as influence the agenda setting of responsible authorities, especially when the policy makers “own belief” has changed because of a swing in the “*national mood*” (Kingdon, 2014, p.7), feedback from specialists or input from political parties and interest groups.

Thirdly, the problem stream concerns a general problem recognition. Kingdon (2014) speaks of certain indicators that show the responsible authorities that there is a problem “out there”. These indicators can be statistical insights into cases such as highway deaths or disease rates. However, indicators cannot be reduced to bare facts, it is important for their outcome how they get interpreted. Only if they get interpreted a certain way, they can cause the necessary powerful implications that are needed for a change. For instance, some officials could interpret ethnic segregation as a problem, while others would interpret it as beneficial.

Indicators of a problem can be used to mobilize support groups around an issue and press for change, especially when they are powerfully constructed and framed. Another form, how indicators can appear to be responsible authorities is policy feedback. Officials receive feedback about the performance of existing or previous programs and may become aware of problems either through systematic monitoring or more informally (Kingdon, 2014). Throughout these theoretical considerations the first hypothesis can be drawn:

H1: Feedback from previous implementations of either laissez-faire, desegregation or segregationist policy approach influences the problem interpretation. Therefore it can be expected, that negative feedback will lead to a continuation of the traditional housing approach and positive feedback will lead to a policy change.


In reality, indicators often only lead to incremental changes, since there hasn't been enough action to be the final straw. Therefore, focusing events play an important role.

They often give indicators that lead to the final “push” to cause drastic policy change and interrupt lethargic path dependency. Focusing events can have three expressions: firstly disasters or crisis, secondly powerful symbols and thirdly personal experience of policy makers.

According to Kingdon (2014) a crisis as a focusing event corresponds to certain characteristics. In the following I will show that the refugee crisis meets these characteristics and can therefore function as *the* central focusing event in our analysis. Firstly, focusing events are rarely the sole cause and motivation of policy changes, but they can “push” issues that have been occurring over a longer period of time higher up on the agenda. The graph on asylum applications in the 28 EU member-states shows a gradual increase until 2012 and from this year on a rather rapid increase that had its peak in 2015. Increasing immigration into the EU was already on the agenda before the crisis.

Secondly a crisis is then a focusing event when it poses a dramatic and unexpected event, which can influence policy making. In particular in comparison with the previous relative peak in 1992, the data shows that the refugee immigration starting in 2015 “was approximately double the number recorded” in 1992.

Figure 1: Asylum applications in the EU 28 Member States, 2006-2016



Moreover, Kingdon (2014) states, an event can become a crisis when a “magical threshold” is reached. In other words, when the event is “big enough”. Out of these theoretical considerations the second hypothesis can be drawn:

H2: Countries with a higher number of refugee immigration in 2015/2016 were exposed to a more powerful focusing event and therefore a policy change in the domain of housing can be expected.

Additionally Kingdon (2014) elaborates on the potentially stronger effects of an “aggregation of disasters” on policy change. These accumulations are publically very visible and can therefore cause more pressure for change on the political body. Therefore thirdly can be hypothesized that:

H3: Countries with an aggregation of focusing events potentially related to the refugee crisis, such as terrorist attacks, experience a policy change in the domain of housing.

The multiple streams can be an impetus or constraint for new ideas. As a constraint, items don't rise up on the agenda. Importantly, Kingdon (2014) states that focusing events do not necessarily always trigger a policy change they can also *prevent* them. A focusing event might reinforce an already existing pathway instead of opening a window for new ideas. Problems, which can become visible and powerful through focusing events, can also fade. This can be due to the feeling of responsible authorities that they have already solved the problem and then turn their attention to another problem or due to a failure to solve the problem in the first place. Officials feel that they “have done the best they could” and move on when they reached an impasse. Herewith it is very crucial to remember the importance of interpretation, especially when investigating ethnic segregation. A distinction can be made between a condition and an actual problem. According to Kingdon (2014): “conditions become defined as problems when we come to believe that we should do something about them. Problems are not simply the conditions or external events themselves; there are also perceptual, interpretive elements” (p.109 f.). If ethnic segregation is not defined as a problem in the first place, no potential policy change will follow. In addition, also the way of interpretation matters. Possibly all three streams come here together and

define the outcome of the question whether ethnic segregation should be judged favourably or negatively. This process can describe the cause of a policy change or the continuity of path dependency and moreover clarify the direction of the policy change: desegregation or laissez-faire?

Kingdon (2014) classifies the moment, when all streams come together as a critical juncture or window of opportunity, which can either be a problem or political window. Problem and political stream affects the governmental *agenda-setting*, while the policy stream produces various alternatives that circulate in the political community. The problem stream opens problem windows by putting pressure on the government. In contrast, the policy window appears in the political stream for instance by a change of administration. In this particular case study we expect the refugee crisis to emerge as the former.

The separate streams come together when “a problem is recognized, a solution is developed and available (...) and potential constraints are not severe” (Kingdon, 2014, p.165).

Suddenly proposals, which have already existed for a long time in the policy stream, are falling into the attention of governmental officials, due to their capability of solving the problem. Favoured through the developments in the political stream (for instance changing public opinion), policy change occurs. Kingdon (2014) calls this process “coupling”.

Open policy windows don't necessarily mean that governmental action is taken. Windows can close relatively fast and if the opportunity has been missed, there is no other alternative than attempting to implement a change the next time the window opens. When a problem fades, for instance due to failure, mostly the window also closes or likewise, if implication through the focusing events lose in power. Finally, these insights are leading to the fourth hypothesis:

H4: As the refugee crisis potentially opens a window in the problem stream, policy change will occur, if the stream couples with the political and the policy stream. In which direction the change goes, depends on the interpretation of the problem and the possible solution presented in either the political or the policy stream or both. Therefore it can be expected, that if residential ethnic segregation gets assessed as negative, policies change

towards desegregation and if it gets assessed positively policies change towards laissez-faire.

In this chapter, the theoretical foundations have been laid out for the following analysis. The hypotheses firstly aim to predict the temporal aspect of change, meaning the time when a change is expected (H2 and H3) and in which direction the change is expected to go (H1 and H4). In the analysis this hypothesis will be tested in the three examined countries. Before testing, the empirical methods will be elaborated in the following chapter.

3 Methodology

This thesis offers an empirically driven theoretical analysis concerning the developments of housing policies in three European countries in the specific context of the refugee crisis. Firstly, the research question will be derived from the body of theory presented above and central definitions will be given. Secondly, the explanation of the conceptual model is from central importance, since it structures the research and gives insights in the connection of the variables. Moreover, this chapter explains the qualitative empirical foundation of this paper, by presenting the practice of elicitation of the data, the structure of the survey and the focus group. Besides presenting the primary literature, an overview over the secondary literature will also be given. This paper builds on the research conducted in previous studies, especially those who deal with the connection between housing and integration, what allows me to raise my own research above that and explore discovered territory. For the background and policy research primary juridical sources and policy evaluations are crucial.

The research project on innovative refugee integration strategies across Europe, currently conducted by the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, plays a central role in this paper concerning the data collection. This research interrelates with the Erasmus University Project and therefore a part of this chapter will be dedicated to explain this connection and the project in detail.

The final part of this chapter will introduce the case study and elaborate on the country selection by referring to the theoretical framework of segregation or desegregation, or respectively, *laissez-faire* policy approaches.

3.1 Operationalization

In the following, terms will be operationalized in order to give scientific clarification concerning the analysis and conclusions drawn from this research. Starting with the “refugee crisis”, this paper refers to the definition proposed by the European Commission: The large influx of migrants into Europe by mostly crossing the Mediterranean Sea, starting in 2015 can be referred to as the “refugee crisis” (European Commission, 2016). Before starting the analysis it is important to distinguish here clearly between asylum seekers and refugees. The term “refugee” refers to all individuals, who have applied for asylum and who have been also *granted asylum*, or another form of protection such as subsidiary protection (OECD, 2017). In

contrast, the term “asylum seeker” refers to all people, who have applied for asylum, but who did not receive the final decision on their application yet. People also belong in this category when they have been granted a temporary suspension of deportation (OECD, 2017).

Moreover, this paper researches policy processes and changes in governmental agenda setting. These terms can be interpreted in various different ways, therefore they need to be operationalized according to the theory: According to Kingdon (2014) the public policy making is a set processes including agenda setting, consideration of political alternatives, an authoritative choice to elect alternatives and finally the implementation of the decision. Respectively, agenda setting refers in the context of thesis to “the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of the government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time” (p. 3).

Next to these rather general definitions, topic-specific definitions have to be given. In order to analyse the selected countries concerning their housing policies indicators such as ethnic segregation, social mixing, migrant enclave, and laissez faire policy approach have to be clarified.

In a broader sense ethnic segregation can be defined as “the uneven distribution of ethnic groups over neighbourhoods in a city” (Van Ham and Tammaru, 2016, p.1). In the context of this paper, the urban aspect of ethnic concentration should be coupled with the concept of space, discussed in the theoretical framework. Ethnic segregation is understood as spatial but also describes a certain degree of social isolation. The action space of segregated refugees is characterised by limited contact with natives and respectively, a great share of interaction with co-ethnics in various domains such as labour market and socio-cultural environment (Van Ham and Tammaru, 2016). Correspondingly, desegregation policies can be operationalized as not only aiming at spatial de-concentration of ethnic minorities, but also at preventing concentration in the first instance, referring to consequence of social isolation. In this context, policies often refer to social mixing. However, in policy documents mostly various terms such as social balance or heterogeneity, are used, not clearly defining this indicator. Especially when it come to the category of individuals or groups the policy is targeted at, it cannot be easily distinguished between characterises like unemployment, socio-economic status or education. In this thesis social mixing policies should solely refer

to ethnic mixing, or in other words mixing between people described as natives and people describes as refugees.

Moreover, the occurrence of ethnic segregation is often described with the term of “ethnic enclave”. Neumann (2013) gives a convenient definition: an “ethnic enclave” is a number of individuals from the same ethnic group (most often country of origin) residing in a certain metropolitan area, city, municipality or neighbourhood” (p. 5).

Generally laissez-faire policies in the domain housing refugees refers in the context of this paper to policies guaranteeing refugees a high freedom of mobility after they have received their residence permit. There are no or very limited requirements concerning time and place of residency. Policy-wise discussions on ethnic segregation are marginal.

Following these considerations and the elaborations in the theory chapter, the aim of this paper is to examine if the refugee crisis lead to a policy change in the domain of housing in four distinct countries and which factors can explain a change or, respectively, a continuation of the policy path. This brings us to the following research question:


To what extent do housing policies tend towards convergence in European countries or follow the country-specific traditional housing policy approach as a response to the refugee crisis?

3.2 Conceptual model

In the following section the conceptual model will be explained. In the first step, the countries will be classified, according to their traditional housing policy approach. This refers to the policies, that have been in place prior to 2015. The variable “traditional housing policies” consists of the variables “desegregation” “laissez-faire” and “segregationist” policy approach. Each of the identified approaches follows a path dependency until the policy changing focusing event of the refugee crisis. As an outcome of this event, the approach either continues their path for or changes to a different approach. Countries can change their approach from laissez-faire to desegregation or segregation or the other way around, depending on the makeup of the influencing forces in the three streams. Herewith, each of the three variables can have two different values. The laissez-faire policy approach can appear in form of a

non-policy or the tolerance of ethnic segregation. In contrast, the desegregation policy approach can have the value of either scattered-side programs or housing allocation procedures. Furthermore segregationist policy approaches can be enforced through measures of land use control or the establishment of social housing on a racial basis. Explanations for policy change or respectively continuation in the different countries can be explained by theoretical considerations presented in the previous chapter.

Figure 2: Conceptual model



3.3 IMISCOE Research Project

An important element of the thesis forms the data collected in the context of the “Research Project for Innovative Refugee Integration Strategies in Europe”. The Project is conducted for the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment by the Erasmus University Rotterdam. By analysing 10 European countries, it was aimed to detect best practises in various domains of integration, namely policies, civic integration, housing, labour market, education, health and socio-cultural integration. In this thesis I will refer to parts of research on the domain of housing in the four selected countries, which are also part of the research project. Under the supervision of Dr. Peter Scholten, five master students participated in the research. Moreover, the interviews, I refer to partly in this thesis, were conducted in the context of this project, making use of the IMISCOE network. However, the data largely focuses on integration policies from 2015 onwards.

3.4 Focus group

The survey participants have been selected according to their level of country-specific general expertise in refugee integration policies. For each of the four examined countries, both policy experts as well as academics have been questioned, in order to get perspectives from the side of political practices and theoretical

considerations. For the academic experts, in particular their expertise in refugee integration policies has been the crucial selection criteria. Herewith, this could be examined through publications on the topic and their respective research departments. Policy experts have been selected according to their affiliation with migration and integration policies, working in a governmental organ. Herewith, in countries with strong de-central structures such as Germany and Italy, experts with knowledge on more general national policies have been hard to find, due to their local focus. However, it has also been managed to deduct some general information from these interviews. In total four policy and academic experts from Germany were interviewed, three from Denmark and five from Italy. In the following analysis I will refer to the experts as Expert Country X, number Y.

3.5 Secondary Sources

Next to information gathered through expert interview, also an extensive research has been done, concerning screening and evaluation of secondary sources. In order to determine the countries' specific integration approaches before as well as after the refugee crisis, data of both international and national institutions has been gathered. Moreover, European Institutions provided convenient sources in form of descriptive and evaluative reports. In addition, national website often give extended overviews on migration and integration policies.

3.6 Data collection and coding

In this section the form of data collection will be described. This thesis couples three forms of qualitative research namely, qualitative content analysis, one-on-one in depth interview (IDI) and qualitative surveys.

The evaluation of the data, collected in all three methods will follow the research technique of a directed content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). In the following I will present the coding scheme and describe the procedure. For Miles and Hubermann (1994), codes are “tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during the study.” (p. 56). The initial two categories of the coding scheme have been deducted from the variables presented in the theory, namely *laissez-faire*, *desegregation* and *segregationist* policy approach. This way of proceeding corresponds with the directed approach. The theoretical framework provided predictions and expectations about the variables of interest, laid down in the four hypotheses in the previous chapter. Moreover the initial coding scheme as well

as key concepts are identified by the theory and insights from previous studies. This process is called “deductive category application” (Saldana, 2007). This allows an organised and systematic processing of the data. After operationalizing the variables, what has been done in section 3.1., the analysis of the data according to the predetermined categories can begin.

In the first step secondary literature has been revived (see chapter 3.5) and qualitative surveys have been conducted. The survey consists of two general, open-ended questions, relevant for the following country analysis (see Initial Coding Scheme 1 in Appendix).

The first step, of this scientific procedure is to code the survey answers and the body of secondary literature according to categorisation in *laissez-faire*, *desegregation* or respectively *segregationist* policy approaches. In consideration of the timeframe it is important to consider data from both before and after 2015. This rather general analysis especially aims to determine the traditional policy approach, the examined countries have adopted before the refugee crisis.

For completing the second step of the procedure, questionnaires were developed, consisting of “targeted questions about the predetermined categories” (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, p. 1281). Herewith more detailed coding scheme has been developed consisting of five categories. The detailed coding scheme is based on the theory, also taking the values for each variable into account. The questions have been tailored according to the findings of the initial coding scheme, individually for each country (see Detailed Coding Scheme in Appendix). Finally coding units have been developed in order to determine a policy change and the direction of the change, following Kingdon’s (1984) theory.

In the bodies of literature, including the conducted interviews and, again, secondary literature, all parts will be highlighted that belong to one category in the coding scheme. Remaining text parts, which don’t fit in one of the initial categories will be given a new code, named emergent or grounded codes. These codes are not represented by a priori codes (Gibbs & Taylor, 2005) and therefore can be detected during the reading and analysis of preliminary data collection or open interview questions. Finally the country- specific information from the text-parts will be assigned to the coding categories. This procedure facilitates a country comparison. From out the detailed coding scheme, statement conclusions can be drawn about the

general classification of the countries' approach as either laissez-faire, desegregation or segregationist policy, including findings on the exact values of these variables. Furthermore, the examination of material before and after the focusing event "refugee crisis" detects a possible policy change.

3.7 Case study

The case study selection of the four examined countries is based on their dissimilarity in their traditional housing policy approach. Correspondingly the countries Germany, Denmark and Italy have been chosen. Since Denmark's original housing approach can be identified as desegregationist, Italy as laissez-faire and Germany as a mix between the two, we have a clear dissimilar case study. Herewith it is crucial to see, if and why different countries respond similarly to the same problem, the refugee crisis, or if they respond differently according to country specific factors. Accordingly, the three countries were chosen since they have experienced a refugee crisis comparable in scope and size. Denmark and Germany are classified as key destination countries in the refugee crisis, starting in 2015, and Italy as highly effected transit country. Therefore these countries are comparable according to the refugee crisis as "focus event".

4 Country Reports

This chapter incorporates the country reports of the three examined countries. Herewith, the original housing approach prior to the refugee crisis will serve as background information, necessary to explore than the refugee crisis and its impact on policy developments. Kingdons (2014) three streams theory will be applied on the countries in order to re-construct the policy process and finally determine the kind of policy window and policy change.

4.1 Germany

4.1.1 Prior 2015 housing policies

In the first part of this country report, the German housing policies concerning refugees prior to the refugee crisis in 2015 will be described. Furthermore, it will be identified, which policy approach, according to the typology presented in the chapter on theory, Germany had adopted. In order to understand the special position of refugees in the legislative body of German housing policies, this chapter also includes information on asylum seekers.

The most important federal laws regarding regulations on the accommodation of asylum seekers and refugees in Germany are firstly the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz), the Asylum seekers' Benefit Act (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz), and finally the Asylum Law (Asylgesetz). These bodies of legislation "provide the basis for a harmonized framework" regarding the form of accommodation for asylum seekers right upon their arrival, over housing during the application process until the providence of more permanent housing after a residence permit has been granted (Korntheuer, 2017, p. 73). Since this paper focuses on housing conditions for refugees, two judicial terms are of importance in this context. The national law on asylum and foreigners distinguishes between two forms of legislation concerning the residence of refugees and asylum seekers: residence requirement (Residenzpflicht) and domicile requirement (Wohnsitzauflage). After applying for asylum in Germany, asylum seekers are distributed to the different German states (Länder). This is coordinated through the distribution system EASY, which is based on a specific key (Academic expert Germany 1). This key is called "Königsteiner Schlüssel" and is based on tax income and population of each state, which gets re-evaluated every year. As long as the application is in progress, asylum seekers are not allowed to leave their assigned place of residence (§60 Abs. 2 Satz 1 Nr. 1 AsylVfG). They are neither

permitted to be accommodated in a different location, nor being physically present in different place than the assigned one by for example traveling (anwalt.org, 2015/2016). This obligation is called residence requirement (Residenzpflicht) (Pro Asyl, 04.02.2013). In most states, the assigned space does not comprise the state, but is often limited on regional districts, towns or villages (Deutschlandfunk Kultur, 27.09.2012 and Franfurter Allgemeine Politik, 02.12.2015). In contrast, a domicile requirement (Wohnsitzauflage) can apply for refugees with a certain status. Refugee without an asylum permit, but with a temporary suspension of deportation are obliged to live at the place they have been assigned to, meaning that they cannot change their place of residence (§25 Abs. 3 AufenthG). However, they can travel freely in Germany. Moreover, the domicile requirement can be imposed on refugees with subsidiary protection, when they receive social security benefits (anwalt.org, 2015/2016).

For Refugees with a status corresponding to the Geneva Refugee Convention, neither a residence requirement, nor a domicile requirement applies. They have the same rights and obligations in the domain of housing as German citizens and can therefore move freely (Wendel, 2014).

Germany has a long tradition of problematizing ethnic segregation. Already since the 1970s negative consequence of “ghettoization” have been societal and politically discussed. According to Münch (2009) the common assumption has traditionally been that “mixed and balanced inhabitant structures serve as the pre-condition for integration” and that “growing levels of (...) segregation further impairs integration” (p. 446). Moreover, it was widely assumed that ethnic residential segregation works as some sort of a “natural process”, following the idea of the homogeneity theory, implying that “people prefer to associate with others who have similar characteristics” (Tasan-Kok et al., 2014, p. 49).

According to Münch (2009), Ridinger (2006) and Musterd and Ostendorf (2007) actors in all three streams seem to expect the occurrence of ethnic segregation and see the consequences of this process as overwhelmingly negative, in particular regarding integration. Nonetheless, it has been tolerated, that refugees move and live freely, after receiving their asylum permit.

However, the traditional housing policy approach is not so unambiguous as it seems in Germany, since more generally “Germany is looking back at a long tradition of mixing strategies aimed at ethnic desegregation” (Münch, 2009, p. 441). If we look at

regulations concerning previous influxes of migrants we can find the two values of desegregation policies (scattered side programs and housing allocation procedures) at some point in history. For instance in 1975 the German government implemented an “influx ban” (Zugzugssperre) for foreign employees, in order to restrict the movement into large German cities with a share of more than 12% of foreign residence (Die Zeit, 11.04.1975). The ban applied in cities such as Frankfurt on the Main, Mannheim and Munich. Previously Berlin and Bavaria introduced similar measures for migrants (Die Zeit, 11.04.1975). However at the time right before the refugee crisis started in 2015, they had been abolished mostly due to legal and/or practical reasons (Münch, 2009). According to El-Kayed and Hamann (2016) the major reason for that was the violation of European Community agreements. Although these desegregationist approaches have not been implemented explicitly for refugees, which is also due to the fact that for the longest time Germany faced other kinds of migration such as “Spätaussiedler” and guestworker, nonetheless it is important to keep this considerations in mind in the following analysis. Moreover, we can observe a generic approach towards social housing in Germany. Local flat enterprises, cooperatives and other private investors, who receive advances on preferential terms or subsidies, typically provide these special forms of housing. In consequence, they have to meet certain criteria, such as the height of the rent and a limited circle of beneficiaries (Drucksache 18/8855). Generally, social housing should be open to low-income groups who struggle to find housing on the regular housing market (Drucksache 18/8855). Recognized refugees often fall into that group. Since the “Föderalismus Reform I” in 2007, the German states have the full responsibility for the supervision of social housing and therefore receive funds from the national government. The trend since 2009, however, is a steady decline of new constructions of social housing (Drucksache 18/8855).

In sum, we can observe a laissez-faire policy approach with the value of “tolerance of ethnic segregation” as the German housing approach prior to 2015, due to the renunciation of posing a residence or domicile requirement for refugees. Nonetheless we find indications for desegregationist approaches, when considering the generic approach for social housing and previous implementations of domicile requirements. Accordingly, Germany’s approach can be described as **mix of laissez-faire and desegregation policies**.

After this brief overview of the organisation of housing for refugees in Germany, the scope of the refugee crisis in Germany will be described, followed by policy developments in the aftermath of the crisis.

4.1.2 The refugee crisis and policy developments

As one of the key destination countries, around 1.2 million asylum seekers immigrated into Germany in 2015 and 2016 during the refugee crisis (OECD, 2017). In comparison with the influx in 2014, the numbers of applications rose by 135% (Eurofound, 2016). Although not all applications were proceeded in Germany or lead to a positive decision, the majority has a low perspective of return. In 2015, 441.899 asylum seekers applied for protection in Germany. The Federal Ministry for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) decided positive on 140.910 cases. Correspondingly, this transpired a protection rate of 57% (Asylgeschäftsbericht, 2015). However, a high amount of people, who arrived in Germany in 2015, were only able to bring their asylum request forward in 2016. Therefore the numbers are much higher in this year. The Ministry processed 695.733 applications in 2016, of which 433.920 asylum seekers were granted subsidiarity protection, asylum or temporary suspension of deportation. This corresponds to a protective rate of 62,4% (Asylgeschäftsstatistik, 2016). In 2017, the protective rate was slightly lower, reaching 45,1%. Until Mai the BAMF granted 168.000 people a temporary residence permit, out of 372.637 applicants (Asylgeschäftsbericht, 2017). Throughout this diverse group of immigrants, some general characteristics can be detected. The majority of applicants originated from Syria, followed by Afghanistan and Iraq (Mediendienst Integration). The protection quota differs between nationalities, which is particularly important in the German case, since distinctions in the integration efforts are made concerning asylum seekers with a “high and low recognition quota”. In 2016, 98% of Syrian asylum seekers were granted a temporary residence permit, while only 56% Afghanis and 51% of Iraqis received the permit. Moreover, the majority of the newcomers were males (about 70%) (OECD, 2017). Especially for the policy domain of housing the estimated duration of residence of refugees in Germany plays an important role. In a survey conducted in 2015, 85% of the interviewees from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq stated that “they would like to stay forever in Germany” (OECD, 2017). Furthermore the legal framework of the recent refugee immigrant is distinct to the former ones concerning the possibility of return. For instance, the

Yugoslavian refugees in 1992 were granted asylum through collective “humanitäre Aufnahmekontingente”¹, what made it legally easier to deport them after the civil war ended (Die Welt, 01.02.2016). The Syrian refugees enjoy individual legal claims (individueller Rechtsanspruch). In sum, the refugee crisis can be clearly described as a “dramatic and unexpected event” in the German case, when considering the scope of the influx and the relatively high recognition quotas. In the following we will have a look how this focusing event potentially influenced the German housing policies.

In the aftermath of the refugee crisis in 2015, a policy change in early 2016 can be detected. More specifically, the implementation of the “Integration law” in July 2016 makes changes in the regulations concerning the accommodation of refugees *after* they obtained an asylum permit. In the following, firstly the details of the of this federal legislation will be discussed and secondly the policy process will be reconstructed following the framework of Kingdon (2014). On the 25th of May 2016 the German federal parliament passed the Integration Law, in order to facilitate the integration of refugees and asylum seekers in various domains. According to Schammann and Kühn (2016) the legislation appears in form of a “skeleton law, that summarizes a number of changes” (p. 6) in the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz), the Asylum seekers’ Benefit Act (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz), and the Asylum Law (Asylgesetz), meaning that the Integration Act is not a “comprehensive, independent act of legislation”, it amends the others (SSRN, p. 19). According to the research on current policy changes by the Max Planck Institute (2017) the legislative framework of the act aims at strengthening integration efforts of state, municipalities and German society as well as establish tools that foster personal initiatives and integration efforts of the individual refugee. The law couples established measures with a negative framing of integration failures, since from a medium as well as long-term perspective this would lead to social problems and immense state expenses (p. 19). Evidently, these efforts also affect the domain of housing. Correspondingly, changes can be found in the “new interim residence regulations in section 12a (of) the Residence Act” (Hohenlohe-Oehringen, 2017, p. 24). The national government decided to allow the German states to restrict the mobility of refugees under subsidiary protection and recognized refugees.

¹ Humanitarian Admission Contingents

More precisely, retroactively, from the 1th of January 2016 onwards refugees have no freedom to choose their location of residence anymore, unless they have a job or are able to live together with a close relative, who earns at least 750 Euros per moth (Pro Asyl, 10.08.2016). Section 12a, paragraph 1, sentence 1 of the Residence Act precisely extends the domicile requirement (Wohnsitzauflage) on recognized refugees, while it applied before only to asylum seekers and people under temporary suspension of deportation. Like described above, asylum seekers get assigned to one of the German states during their application process. Through the domicile requirement they are obliged to reside in that state “which was competent for them during their asylum procedure or in the context of their accommodation procedure” (Hohenlohe-Oehringen, 2017, p. 24). There are two models for the local councils to allocate refugees: Firstly, they can assign an exact neighbourhood or city for refugees (“Wohnsitzzuweisung”) or secondly they can restrict certain neighbourhoods for them to live (“Zuzugssperre”), while letting the refugee choose between the remaining ones (Mediendienst Integration, n/a). The domicile requirement can apply for the individual for a maximum of three years.

This national policy is already implemented or in the process of implementation in some German states, namely Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Northrhine-Westphalia and Saxony-Anhalt and in many other states it is intended or in progress (Deutscher Städte- und Gemeindebund, 09.11.2016). Moreover, we can also observe the implementation of new scattered side programs on the national and local level. The national government decided to provide more funding for the creation of new social housing as a reaction to the refugee crisis in 2016 (Spiegel Online, 12.05.2017). In some states these projects are specifically directed at refugees by aiming to allocate them in a wider range of neighbourhoods (German Expert 4).

Herewith we can see a clear change from a mixed approach to a **purely desegregationist approach**.

In the following, it will be analyzed how this change happened. In the years 2015 and 2016 more than a million asylum seekers immigrated into Germany. The influx corresponded with the fear that a failure of integrating the newcomers would lead to unbearable costs for the welfare state as well as causing social unrest (German Expert 3). In this manner, the risk on high political costs for the ruling government of the CDU under Angela Merkel were to be feared, if the initial chaos in 2015 is not

dealt with. This triggered the call for a fast integration in both public and politics. The developments in 2015 and early 2016 started the ball rolling for the major policy change in the Residence Act in May 2016. The legal manifestation of the residence requirement arose from the fear that the newly arrived immigrants would stream into the big cities due to existing networks of families and/or friends and form ethnic enclaves or ghettos (Spiegel Online, 20.01.2016). This would seriously hamper their integration according to the German government. According to the official governmental statement, the domicile requirement was introduced for refugees because: “it is part of the general integration-political principle and should promote the integration of persons (refugees) and counteract integration-restraining segregation tendencies” (Integrationsgesetz, n/a, p. 3, own translation). Herewith it is intended to find how the governmental decision-makers adopted this idea and why it gained importance on the political agenda. What were the driving factors of change and how can this be related to the refugee crisis?

First of all, we will look into the **policy stream** in order to retrace how the idea of a residence requirement for recognized refugees found its way into the ruling government.

First of all, the influence of the specialists and experts on the policy proposal of May 2016 can be identified as very limited. According to Münch (2009) and German Expert (4) there is not much scientific evidence that desegregation policies through housing allocation programs in particular lead to successful integration in Germany. This is mostly due to the fact that political motivation behind these policies feeds from the assumption that migrants generally tend to “self-segregation” (p.444). The political consensus seems to presuppose that as soon as migrants are allowed to move freely they will immediately move into ethnic enclaves or “ghettos”, because they want to live amongst their own “culture group” (Münch, 2009, p. 444 and Spiegel Online 20.01.2016). However, there is little scientific evidence for this “taken for granted assumption” ((Münch, 2009, p. 444). Learning from previous implementations of “influx bans” (Zugzugssperre) for Turkish labor migrants, researches imply that the majority of immigrants were rather interested in living in mixed neighborhoods (see for instance Kühn 1979, Eichener 2006 and Wurtinger 1983). Likewise a study conducted by Bölten and Gatzweiler (2002) as well as a

research on immigrant milieus “Sinus Sociovision” (2007) found out that ethnic segregation is caused by choice only to a very limited extent. Moreover, if ethnic segregation occurs, it is mostly caused by processes such as “white flight”² from the majority group (Münch, 2009). In contrast to housing allocation measures, experts and specialist in the policy stream mostly suggest to imply policy that aims for instance at a reduction of discrimination in the housing market for migrants, efforts to rise residential mobility or provide a more mixed housing stock (Münch, 2009). However, other interest groups such as local governments had a rather strong influence on the national policy change. German states like Northrhine-Westphalia were highly affected from the refugee crisis. Many asylum permit holder moved prior to 2015 in the city-rich states. These feared to be confronted with segregationist tendencies, shortages in the available housing stock and an overtaxing of the labor market (German Expert (3) and (4)). These states were also the first ones, implementing the domicile requirement.

In sum, the ruling government could not have taken scientific findings on the reality of ethnic segregation as a major inspiration for proposing the domicile requirements for refugees. It can be assumed, that the major driving force behind this policy can be found in the **political stream**.

First of all, the political climate before the refugee crisis was not really beneficial for imposing a policy that restricts the freedom of movement for refugees. At this time, the residence requirement for asylum seekers had already been in place, which frequently caused social unrest, for example a protest of asylum seekers in Berlin and Lower Saxony. Prior to 2010, strong lobby groups had been formed, advocating for the abolishment of the residence requirement. Political parties like the FDP, politicians, local governments and citizens joined forces, which led to a liberalization of the requirement in many German states (see Frankfurter Allgemeine Politik, 02.12.2012 and Welt, 18.05.2010).

A further restriction of integration policies could not have been implemented without risking negative electoral outcome. However, shortly after the refugee crisis reached its peak in 2015, public concerns about managing the integration of so many (culturally very different) groups of people became more and more dominant (see Die

² „White flight“ can be defined as „a process in which white people move out of a certain area because people from other races move in“ (Cambridge Dictionary).

Welt, 13.03.2016 and Der Spiegel, 30.12.2015). The changing political climate concerning integration was favorable for imposing stricter policies. Added to that, the general traditional political and public interpretation of ethnic segregation might even led to a complete turnover concerning public support for stricter housing allocation measures for refugees. According to Münch (2009) Germany historically has a “moral panic about parallel societies” (p.445) going hand in hand with an exclusively very negative interpretation of ethnic segregation, since it is assumed “to foster illiberal and non-integrative behavior amongst immigrants” (p. 447). This particular framing of ethnic segregation, in particular in correspondence with integration, explains why the topic has been on the political agenda in the first place, even though only little scientific backup could be found. Therefore, measures against ethnic segregation were naturally ingrained in the overall goal to facilitate integration for refugees in the Integration Act, as stated in the official governmental explanation (Integrationsgesetz, n/a). Moreover, the “taken for granted assumption” that migrants tend to voluntary segregate themselves explains the policy change in the direction of housing bans for refugees instead of, for instance, improve the structure of the (social) housing market (Münch, 2009). The change in the general public mood concerning the acceptance, if not even the demand for stricter integration policies, made the change possible. However there has been another development that finally opened the “window of opportunity” for this approach. In March 2016, the European Court of Justice gave the “green light” for the implementation of the domicile requirement for refugees (Pro Asyl, 01.03.2016). The court came to the conclusion that such an implementation would not be in accordance with EU qualification directive (Art. 33 and Art. 29) and the Geneva Refugee Convention if the policy would follow the reasoning of the equal distribution of social security costs (Pro Asyl, 01.03.2016). In this case, also natives and other nationalities have to be effected by a domicile requirement.

However, if the implementation follows the reasoning of fostering integration, an explicit targeting at people with a “special need for integration” is permissible (Pro Asyl, 01.03.2016). This legal decision enabled the Federal Minister of Interior Thomas De Maizere from the CDU to push trough the domicile requirement for refugees.

Finally we will have a look into the **problem stream** in order to examine if events have been taken place that further explain the above-described developments. Indeed

we can observe an event in the problem stream, that was publically linked to the refugees crisis and majorly influence the change in the public mood. On New Year's Eve in Cologne 2015/2016, 1045 criminal charges were announced consisting of sexual harassments (around half), robberies and defamations (Flade, Pauly & Frigelj, 10.02.2016). The assumed commission of the offense suspected approximately 2000 men with mainly North African and middle eastern origin (Amjahid et al., 28.06.2016). The incident of New Year's Eve led to enormous media attention and threw the spotlight on ghettoization and integration as well as self-segregation of ethnic minorities (see Spiegel Online, 31.03.2017, Welt, 10.02.2016, Huffpost, 29.12.2016, Frankfurter Allgemeine Politik, 17.01.2016). The incident was depicted as an example of integration failure, especially socio-cultural in combination with the powerful, potentially dangerous, consequences of the accumulation of ethnic groups. As a consequence, form in and outside of the political sphere the reduction of refugee immigration and a harsher integration policy was strongly demanded (see AFD Schleswig Hollstein and CSU in Zeit online, 08.01.2016). This incident, and especially its interpretable close links to the dangerous consequences of ethnic segregation and therefore a failure in (socio-cultural) integration illustrates how fertile the breeding ground for stricter desegregation policies was at this time.

All in all, we can see here a clear momentum of coupling of all three streams. According to Kingdon (2014) a policy window occurs when "a problem is recognised, a solution is developed (...) and potential constrains are not severe". Firstly, possible integration failures as a consequence of ethnic segregation were recognized as a problem by actors (in particular local authorities) and governmental officials, the solution of the domicile requirement was developed and available through previous implementations of requirements, meaning that the technical feasibility of the solution was given through the pre-existing infrastructure and lastly the public mood had changed due to the refugee crisis, what minimized political constrains. Herewith it cannot be exactly distinguished weather the policy window was a political or problem one. Through the aggregation of focusing events (specially the incident in Cologne) the governmental decision makers became aware that a "problem is pressing" and therefore "reached into the policy stream for an alternative that can reasonably be seen as a solution" (Kingdon, 2014, p. 174). Although academic experts had little influence in the policy stream, other actors such as local governments had. In this case

the policy window can be described as a problem window. The decision of the European Court of Justice to give the “green light” for the implementation of the domicile requirement for refugees can be identified as political since it “opened windows for these advocates (local authorities)” (Kingdon, 2014, p. 168). However, a driving force behind the implementation is also the adaption of the ruling party to the new political climate and the pressure from the right political spectrum (German Expert 3). Politicians started “casting about for proposals that will serve their re-election” (Kingdon, 2014, p. 174).

4.2 Denmark

4.2.1 Prior 2015 housing policies

In terms of housing policies Denmark clearly distinguishes between refugees and asylum seekers. Generally only residence permit holders are allowed to move outside of the accommodation centres into private housing. There is no legally binding restriction how long asylum seekers are required to stay in the accommodation centres, according to Andersen (2010) some individuals live more than 10 years in the centres, if their status remains uncertain. Only, if asylum seekers have relatives in Denmark, exceptions can be made. After a person has been granted asylum the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) allocates the refugee to a municipality according to a yearly quota system (New to Denmark dk., 2016). In this case, already in 1998 Denmark established a form of “domicile requirement” for refugees (Danish Expert 3). They are obliged to take part in a three-year integration program and during that time, they are not permitted to leave their assigned municipality or region (Anderson, 2010). In this process of allocation, individual characteristics of the refugees are taken into consideration. Herewith, the possibility of employment plays the most important role. Personal skills and previous education as well as work experience should match the municipalities’ labour market situation and the educational facilities (New to Denmark dk., 2016). Moreover, if a refugee already has a job offer in one of the municipalities, he/she will be allocated there. The DIS also takes family ties into consideration (New to Denmark dk., 2016). Theoretically the municipalities are obliged to assist the refugees, whom they are responsible for according to the DIS, with finding a permanent accommodation and basic furniture (Bendixen, 2016). Even before the residence permit holders move from the asylum centres to their permanent housing, a contact person of the municipality should visit the refugees and help them

arrange the moving and furniture for their new homes (Bendixen, 2016). If no permanent housing can be found, due to, for instance, a shortage in the available housing stock, municipalities must provide temporary housing solutions (OECD, 2016). Since national regulations are not really precise, especially in financial terms, in practise the integration efforts vary between the municipalities on that matter (Bendixen, 2016). Only after successfully completing the three years integration program in their assigned municipality they are free to move wherever they want (Danish Expert 1). This first form of desegregation policy in Denmark has a long tradition.

However, also more recent policy developments were established to support further desegregation. The functioning of the Danish social housing market structurally facilitates these developments and is traditionally aimed at social-economic and ethnic desegregation (OECD, 2016 and Andersen, 2010).

Social housing in Denmark is provided by the non-profit sector, which is co-financed by the local authorities.

The organisation of the sector follows the principle of a relinquishment of minimal income thresholds, meaning that Danish social houses are “open to the entire population irrespective of education, age, nationality ethnical background and income” (OECD, 2016, p.63). In this type of housing vacancies are distributed through waiting list systems, whereby all individuals are entitled to put their name on (OECD, 2016). Herewith, the providence of social housing is specifically aimed at vulnerable individuals and groups. Municipality can “reserve” every fourth vacant subsidized dwelling (25%) for people in immediate need (Alves and Andersen 2015). To obtain a social house in Denmark can take up to years of waiting, depending on the type of dwelling and the neighbourhood that it is located in. In sum, Denmark has an elaborated generic social housing system, in which authorities try to ease the access also for refugees. Municipalities allocated their 25% of the vacant social housing stock for refugees, meaning that they can skip the waiting time on the list (Andersson, 2010). In some cases, municipal authorities can even “dispose of up to 100% of the vacant dwellings” (OECD, p. 63).

The third body of traditional desegregation policies in Denmark was created in 2011. The amendments of the Integration Act of 1999, removed “the right of local authorities to assign migrants housing in deprived neighbourhoods, in order to combat

residual segregation and thereby strengthen integration” (DEMIG, 2015a and OECD, 2016).

In sum, the main responsibility for providing independent accommodation for asylum permit holders lies in the hands of the local governments. National guidelines oblige local governments to provide housing for refugees assigned to their municipality “as soon as possible” after they have been granted asylum (Academic Expert Denmark 1). Considering the three policy measures presented above, the prior 2015 approach of housing for refugees in Denmark can be identified as **desegregationist**, with a clear distinction between asylum seekers and refugees. After this brief overview of the organisation of housing for refugees in Denmark, the scope of the refugee crisis in Denmark will be described, followed by policy developments in the aftermath of the crisis.

4.2.2 The refugee crisis and policy developments

According to the Eurofund report in 2016, also Denmark belongs to the key destination countries for asylum seekers during the refugee crisis. With 21,316 asylum applications in 2015 in contrast to 16,680 in 2014, the number of applicants in Denmark rose by 43% (Eurofound, 2016). Although many of these applications were not processed in Denmark, due to them falling under the Dublin regulation, Denmark still granted 10,849 residence permits to asylum seekers in 2015, which transpires a recognition rate of 85% (Bendixen, 2017). In the following years the rate became much lower. In 2016 7,442 positive decisions were made, which corresponds to a recognition rate of 72% (Bendixen, 2017). While in 2015 and 2016 the clear majority of asylum seekers had a very high likelihood of obtaining asylum, since they originated from Syria and Eritrea, in 2017 more people from Afghanistan and Morocco applied for a residence permit, explaining a recognition rate of only 38% (Bendixen, 2017). Correspondingly, the recognition quota per nationality in Denmark mirrors partly the European average. The nationality with the highest likelihood of being recognized was Syrians, since 97% of the applications were decided on positively in 2016. In the second place Eritreans lied with a recognition quota of 93% (Bendixen, 2017). However, individuals from Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan have a way lower chance of being recognized in Denmark than in EU average (only 12, 37 and 26%) (Bendixen, 2017).

Also in Denmark it is important to take the estimated duration of residence of the asylum permit holders into consideration, when analysing policies in the domain of housing. A survey conducted by TV2 News shows, that the vast majority of refugee (83%), who have arrived in Denmark from the middle-east, want to stay in Denmark (CPH Post Online, 03.11.2015). Despite the fact, that Denmark made several attempts to tighten its immigration policy and therefore as well facilitate return migration, due to the fact that the majority of asylum permits have been granted to Syrians and Eritreans, a fast improvement can not be expected and therefore no return. After six years of stay in Denmark, one can apply for a permanent residence permit (New to Denmark dk., 2017). In sum, the refugee crisis can be characterised as a focusing event according to the criteria of Kingdon (2014), when considering the scope of the influx and the relatively high recognition quotas. In the following we will have a look how this focusing event potentially influenced the Danish housing policies.

In 2015 Denmark faced one of the highest numbers of refugee immigration in Europe, compared to the number of inhabitants. In the countries' history, the numbers were seven times higher than in 2009. Despite this strong potential of the influx as a policy changing focusing event, no such thing can be observed in the domain of housing in the aftermath of 2015. However, we can observe minor changes in the local policy practise, concerning the housing of refugees. According to the Danish Expert (2), some municipalities adopted the practise renting or buying special houses for refugees in mixed neighbourhoods, to avoid placing them in social housing estates. Moreover, the government decided in 2015 to provide more funding for social housing programs for the years 2015-2018 (around 1,9 billion Danish kroner). Here we see a continuation of the desegregation policy approach with the value of housing allocation procedures. On the local level we see indications for the implementation of scattered side programs. Therefore we can classify the Danish approach after the refugees crisis as **strongly desegregationist**. Nonetheless, no major policy change on the national level occurred. Why is that the case?

In the following, firstly the details of the federal legislation on the "domicile requirement" will be discussed and secondly the policy process will be reconstructed following the framework of Kingdon (2014). It is aimed to analyze and understand why a policy change did not occur, despite of the refugee crisis. What were the driving forces that prevented a change?

As explained above, during the three years of the mandatory integration course for refugees, they are obliged to reside in the municipality or region they are allocated to after they obtained a residence permit by the DIS. However, they are entitled to travel freely in the country (Danish Expert 2). Allocated individuals can choose freely, where to reside within their assigned municipality (OECD, 2016). Theoretically, they can also move to another municipality and continue the integration program there, however, according to the elected residence of choice, local authorities must accept the responsibility for integration of the new individual (OECD, 2016). If the takeover is rejected by the municipality and the person settles there nonetheless, cutbacks in the integration or cash allowance can be the consequence (OECD, 2016). According to the Danish expert (2) in reality, there are almost no movements between the municipalities, since local authorities are not inclined to take up additional financial responsibilities. However, in exceptional cases, for instance when refugees got a job offer in a different municipality, a resettlement is considered (OECD, 2016 and New to Denmark dk., 2016). The integration program and therefore the domicile requirement is intended to run for three years, however, it can be extended to a maximum of five years. Only if the individual passes the final exams of the integration course, namely language and culture classes, they are free to settle in any municipality (Danish expert 1 and 2).

The official reasoning behind the implementation of the domicile requirement for refugees in 1999 is according to Anderson (2010) firstly to spread the cost of integration for the municipalities and second to prevent “geographical segregation of immigrants” (p. 41). Likewise, the other two policy measures concerning the municipalities’ right of disposal of social housing and the ban for authorities to assign migrants in deprived households of 2011 are clearly and explicitly aimed at combating “residential segregation tendencies in certain local areas” according to the OECD (2016) and DEMIG (2015) evaluation report.

In sum, we see strong indications that Denmark looks back at a long traditional systematic approach to combat ethnic residential segregation. Although the refugee crisis can be identified as a strong focusing event, is the Danish desegregationist approach “too big to fail”? Might it even be the case, that the refugee crisis reinforced the Danish policy path in the domain of housing? With the help of Kindons (2014) three streams theory we will look deeper into the political, academic and public

sphere that surrounds the desegregationist policy path and try to find answers to this question.

Firstly, it will be analysed to what extent discourses in the **policy stream** influence the Danish path dependency or respectively, path continuity. According to Grünenberg and Freiesleben (2015) Danish policy making in terms of residential desegregation and social mixing has been strongly influenced by researched-based models such as the “contact hypothesis”, which argues that “the best way to overcome prejudice between majority and minority groups is through social encounters” (p. 53). Herewith Puttmanns (2002, 2007) distinction between bonding and bridging capital played a crucial role in the orientation of urban policies. Accordingly, interactions and connections between diverse social/ethnic groups hold a greater benefit for individuals than between “homogenous social actors” (Grünenberg and Freiesleben, 2015, p. 53). These academic theories correspond with the political debate in Denmark as well as with aspirations in social mixing and desegregation policies. According to Amin (2007) the presented theoretical consideration have been “influential in shaping urban policy agendas and approaches, such as the focus on ‘community mobilisation and cohesion’ and on bridging social and ethnic differences through ‘interethnic proximity and mixing’” (Grünenberg and Freiesleben, 2015, p. 53). Moreover, strategies of urban and architectural planning are orientated towards more recent research on socio-cultural encounters in the public space. Throughout the last two decades Danish governments have introduced several strategies in order to combat ghettoization, which are clearly aimed at, among other migrants, also at refugees and where we find references to presented theoretical considerations. For instance, the liberal-conservative government in 2004 defined the goal in urban planning strategies, that “housing estates where immigrants, *refugees* and their descendants live, should be places, where they live with Danes, where networks across personal and cultural differences are established (...)”³ (The Government, 2004, p. 11.). In contrast, according to the Danish Expert (2) almost all evaluation studies that have been conducted since the implementation of the various desegregation measures pinpoint a rather positive effect of ethnic segregation. For instance, a study by the SBI shows positive correlations between segregation and

³ Translated by Grünenberg and Freiesleben (2015)

labour market integration (Danish Expert, 2). However, it seems that the Danish policy making is influenced only by a selective group of experts and that the political discourse is rather shaped by cultural manifestations and societal norms and values. If we refer back to the three stream theory of Kingdon, the criteria of “value acceptability” for the survival of an idea in the policy stream seems to play an important role for the academic bias in Danish policy making. For more clarifications on that manner, we will look deeper into the developments in the political stream.

In the **political stream** especially the national mood, or more specifically general public norms and values concerning the perceptions of ethnic segregation and necessary prerequisites for integration are assumed to be and have been highly influential in the agenda setting of responsible authorities as well as own beliefs of the authorities themselves concerning the “wrong and rights” of social mixing approaches. Generally integration policies in Denmark can be classified as strongly assimilationist (Jensen, et al., 2010). This implies that Denmark has strong notions of a national identity, which is closely connected with the culture. In which the Danes understand (western) values such as freedom of speech, equality of man and woman and social equality as ingrained in their culture: “The perception of Denmark as a cultural homogeneous country, and (...) the conceptions of social egalitarianism and universalism (...) (are) constitutive elements of Danish society” (Hedetoft, 2006, p. 25). Assimilationism means that the existence of cultures other than or conflicting with the Danish understanding of culture, is very restricted and often seen as problematic (Jensen, et al., 2010). Thus, the Danish Institution integration can be primarily characterized by “the question of immigrants’ cultural capacity to harmonize their values with Danish values, and focus is on ‘cultural sameness’” (Hamburger, 1990, p. 57). Policies generally emphasize clearly the recognition and duty of the newcomers to learn fundamental Danish norms and values. Already before the refugee crisis, we can observe the devolvement of stricter socio-cultural integration, which indicates a perceived momentum of threat towards the Danish national identity.

This insight in the fundamental of Danish self-perception might be a solid explanation for the strong focus on residential desegregation policies. According to Danish Expert (2) ethnic segregation is perceived as extremely negative in the public. This

corresponds with the explicit aspiration to avoid ethnic and therefore cultural enclaves, due to the focus of “cultural sameness”.

In the **problem stream**, an aggregation of focusing events cannot be observed. Other than the refugee crisis no major incident occupied the political or media landscape in Denmark. However, there have been focusing events in the past, interpreted as closely connected with negative consequences of ethnic segregation, such as “Vollsmore-Case” in 2012 that might have contribute to the Danish path dependency in their housing policies.

In sum, when looking at the developments in the three streams in Denmark, we see that a window of opportunity opened. Herewith the window can be clearly identified as a problem window. The refugee influx was framed as a national crisis, coupled with an extremely negative framing of ethnic segregation (Danish Expert, 2). We see, that a problem was recognised (ethnic segregation of refugees), a solution was attached (desegregationist policies) and no severe constraints could be expected. Then why didn't a national policy change occur? Kingdon (2014) states “once the window opens, it doesn't stay open for long. An idea's time comes, but it also passes. There is no irresistible momentum that builds for a given imitative” (p. 169). He explains the closing of the window with the fact that “they (actors) have addressed the problem through decision or enactment” (p. 169). It can be assumed that this is exactly what happened in the Danish case. The window of opportunity was open, but due to the traditional societal and political framing of ethnic segregation as negative and integration-impeding, governmental decision makers were convinced to already tackle the problem with the domicile requirement introduced in 1999. New ideas, such as a turn-over to laissez-faire policies in the policy stream could not reach the national agenda, due to a lack of “value acceptability” of these ideas.

4.3 Italy

4.3.1 Prior 2015 housing policy approach

Generally speaking, policy approaches concerning the housing for recognized refugees in Italy have not been implemented. However, in order to understand the position of refugees in the practise of the Italian housing system, in the following the

distinct forms of accommodation centres will be explained. This also includes information about asylum seekers.

Italy distinguishes between three phases of reception, namely first aid reception, first-line and second-line reception (Scholten et al., forthcoming). Since the former deals with initial registration, fingerprinting and identification, the latter are of more importance according to the analytical framework of this paper (Baggermann, forthcoming). From the first phase of reception asylum seekers are distributed into reception centres in regional or local areas. The organisation of this process follows a distribution key, which is orientated at spatial characteristics. The key is determined by “the access quota to the National Fund for Social Policies as well as the actual presence of asylum seekers already hosted in individual regions and the total resident population” (Baggermann, forthcoming, p. 6; and Italian Expert 1). Herewith, each of the 8000 Italian municipalities should bear their share of the burden. When allocated to the municipalities, asylum seekers can fall into two forms of reception systems, named SPRAR and CAS systems. The former was created as the main system for asylum seekers accommodation and integration in the year 2000. It was developed not only to provide accommodation for asylum seekers during their application process, additionally the system has to follow clear guidelines in terms of housing condition and location and integration programs, such as language and skill training, that has to be provided during the individual residence in those centres (Italian expert 4). Herewith, the guidelines incorporate clear desegregation features by stipulating accommodation in small facilities, with a population of generally five to six people but not more than twenty individuals, distributed across the area. However, the implementation of the SPRAR system depends on the local authorities, since the national guidelines determined the creation as voluntary. Correspondingly, the system is run by a network of local authorities coordinated and managed by ANCI (an umbrella organization congregating Italian municipalities) at the national level under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior (Scholten et al., forthcoming). The third sector plays a highly important role in the implementation of the SPRAR systems on a daily basis. Local NGO’s, volunteers and other actors of civil society manage the “actual provision of reception and integration” (Baggermann, 2017, p. 7 and Italian Expert 2). Refugees are entitled to stay up to six month after their recognition in the centres. In contrast, the CAS systems have been developed in 2013 in response to raising numbers of asylum seekers entering Italy. This system is created as a form of

emergency housing, for which no national guidelines apply (Italian expert 3 and 4). So far so good, but what happens after an asylum seeker has been granted asylum? As mentioned above, there are no specific policies in the post-reception phase concerning the accommodation of refugees. Asylum permit holders are obliged to leave the accommodation provided through the SPRAR system within a short period of time. On the national policy level there is no support of any kind envisaged, meaning that the house hunting is neither supported through counselling nor financially (Italian Expert 1). Some initiatives have been developed in civil society in order to provide and assist refugees with their housing situation, such as 'refugees welcome' and a social cooperation named 'Programma Integra' (Migration, Asylum and Social Integration Centrum) (Refugee Legal Aid Information, 2016). Moreover, there is no generic housing support system in place in Italy. There have been created only a few social housing stocks (Italian Expert, 4). Their number strongly depends on the municipalities, which have different regulations concerning the access. Generally, to obtain a social house in Italy, individuals must have lived in the city or area for several years to be entitled. The allocation follows a list system (Italian Expert 4).

We see here a clear approach of **laissez-faire policy approach** with the value of non-policy. After this brief overview of the organisation of housing for refugees in Italy, the scope of the refugee crisis in Italy will be described, followed by policy developments in the aftermath of the crisis.

4.3.2 The refugee crisis and policy developments

According to the Eurofund report in 2016, Italy belongs to the cluster of "highly effected" transit countries. As recorded in the previously presented countries the number of asylum applications in Italy rose in 2015. In contrast to 64,625 in 2014, in 2015 83,540 people applied for asylum in Italy (Eurostat, 2017). The recognition rate in that year was 45% and therefore lower than in the other examined countries (Asylum Information Database, 2015). The composition of the applicants in 2015, however shows a different picture than in Germany and Denmark. The majority of asylum seekers originated from Nigeria, Pakistan and Gambia (Eurostat, 2017). While in 2015 still 29,615 asylum requests were decided positively, in 2016 122,960 applications face the allowance of only 35,405 residence permits (Eurostat, 2017). In that the recognition quota fell to 39,4% (Asylum Information Database, 2017). The

share of asylum seekers in the general population was 0,2% in 2016. Information on the aspirations of asylum seekers and refugees to stay in Italy are not available. In sum, compared with the other analysed countries, Italy did grant as many individuals asylum. Moreover the difference of the influx between 2014 and 2015 is not as wide. Nonetheless, the refugee crisis can still be characterised as a focusing event according to the criteria of Kingdon (2014), also due to the high amount of people that arrived in Italy. In the following we will have a look at how this focusing event potentially influenced the Italian housing policies.

In the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis Italy didn't undergo a policy change in the domain of housing. Concerning the accommodation of recognized refugees, the laissez-faire approach has been maintained. Nonetheless, some developments can be observed, which indirectly affect the housing of refugee as well as the establishment of informal practices. First of all, the CAS system almost entirely replaced the ordinary SPRAR system as the major tool of asylum seeker accommodation in 2016 (Italian Expert, 3). The overwhelming use of the CAS system led to further dilapidation of housing conditions for asylum seekers and refugees in Italy. Following the EU directive LD 142/2015 the use of Emergency Centres (CAS) has been established as the main tool of accommodation after 2015 (Baggermann, forthcoming). Due to the high numbers of asylum seekers immigrating into Italy in 2015 and 2016, the SPAR systems couldn't cope with the amount. Therefore CAS was being used, an emergency housing system, which, in contrast to the SPRAR systems, doesn't obey to any national guidelines (Italian Expert 3 and 4). The asylum seekers is officially neither entitled to have access to any form of integration and language courses, nor to housing support. In some cases, civil society is stepping in to provide various forms of support (Italian Expert 1 and 2). Once asylum has been granted, individuals are required to leave the CAS accommodation. A shortage of vacancies in the SPRAR accommodation led to a practise where 75% of asylum seeker were hosted in the CAS system, a total of 135, 218 persons (Baggermann, forthcoming). People leaving the CAS system have even a lesser chance of finding and especially affording adequate housing, since they mostly don't speak the Italian language nor have sufficient information about the labour market (Italian Expert 3). According to Italian Expert 3, many refugees end up living segregated and isolated non-official housing in scattered places. Moreover, already in the collective

accommodation arrangement of the CAS systems pose a special form of segregation. In some municipalities, up to 1000 asylum seekers are hosted in the same facility (Italian Expert 4). We see here a strong tendency towards a segregationist approach. Secondly, the SPRAR system informally developed to become a shelter for especially vulnerable recognized refugees, such as families (Italian Expert 3, 4 and 5). Although the national guideline allows the individual to remain for a maximum of six months in the SPRAR system after they have been granted asylum, in practise the centres accommodate persons for up to 12 months, due to the fact that have literally “nowhere to go” (Italian Expert 2). These informal practises of providing housing for refugees and the lack of public policies on this issue in post-reception phase “leads to a situation of social marginalization and unacceptable living conditions” (Medecins Sans Frontiers, 2016). As a consequence, according to O’Neill & Nallu, 2017, there are around 10.000 refugees and asylum seekers that live in informal settlements⁴. Considering the above described developments, we can classify Italy’s housing approach after the crisis as a **mix of laissez-faire and segregationist**.

However, despite the constant high number of asylum seekers in the past years and the peak of incoming migrants in 2015, national regulations concerning housing have remained the same. However, the day to day practices of housing have changed in the direction of segregation. Why is that the case? In the following, the policy process will be reconstructed following the framework of Kingdon (1984). Why has Italy adopted that specific policy approach and what were the driving forces that prevented a change? How can the informal drift towards a promotion of segregation be explained?

According to many reasons, the influence of the **policy stream** can be described as marginal and at the same time as indirectly powerful. Historically, ethnic residential segregation has not been majorly discussed in the policy stream (Italian Expert 5). This is firstly due to the fact, that Italy never had such high numbers of ethnic concentrated areas or neighbourhoods as many other Northern European countries. Secondly, when segregation is discussed by scholars and local authorities, the focus lays on socio-cultural segregation, instead of the ethnic aspect (Italian expert 3 and 5). According to Italian Expert (2) this could be explained by the historically high

⁴Informal settlement can be defined as “those housing solutions with a prevalence of people indicated above and characterized by forms of self-management and by lack of rental payments” (ibid.).

contrast between the resource-rich North of Italy and the resource-poor south of Italy and the consequential constant internal migration. If segregation was debated, mostly neighbourhoods inhabited by southern Italians with a poor socio-economic status were focused on. Another explanatory factor is the high mobility of migrants and refugees, which can be observed already since the 1990's. A great share of migrants and refugees enter the structural sector of seasonal work, meaning that they spend the summer in Southern Italy and the autumn/winter in Northern Italy (Italian Expert 3). Housing is therefore temporary, which leads to only possible temporary segregation. Interestingly, qualitative studies from the Yugoslavian refugee population in Italy show, that the Italian *laissez-faire* approach led to high levels of socio-cultural integration and self-sufficiency amongst them. According to Korac (2003) "the lack of an initial reception system forced them to become self-sufficient" following that "the lack of a state-organized attempt to meet the group needs of refugees (...) forced them to rely on their personal skills and resources in finding their way into Italian society" (p. 59 f.). Korac (2003) finds low levels of ethnic social isolation in Italy. Therefore we can see the influence of experts and specialists as indirectly powerful, since they barely communicated the issue of ethnic segregation to the political sphere and therefore powerfully prevented a problematizing of the issue or its raise in the political agenda. On the other hand, all experts confirmed that Italian politics have historically been very re-active and characterised by ad-hoc measures when facing emerging problems. The influence of the policy stream can be considered as marginal in pressing forward a rather long-term systematic approach in the domain of housing.

If we take a closer look at the discourse of politics and public concerning refugees in Italy it becomes clear in the **political stream**, that the restriction of immigration, the initial care of incoming migrants and the inclusion of the European Community is primarily focused. Refugee integration doesn't seem to be a priority. Therefore, the pressure of providing sufficient accommodation for recognized refugees on the governmental decision makers can be explained as relatively low. Italy's new prime minister, Paolo Gentiloni, characterises "the on-going Mediterranean refugee and migration crisis" as "one of the biggest challenges for Italy" (Benedikter and Karolewski, 2017). Herewith, the adequate control of Italy's coastline and implementation of the European relocation programs stand clearly in the problem's focus. According to Benedikter and Karolewski (2017) this is mainly aimed to satisfy

Italy's social and political landscape. First of all, the political agenda government faced pressure from its own ranks. Members of the ruling Democratic Party (PD) problematized the issue of "uncontrolled immigration in unpredictable ways" into Italy (Benedikter and Karolewski, 2017). In 2016 "waves of several thousand people per week continued across almost the entire year", highly effecting Sicily, Rome and Milan ((Benedikter and Karolewski, 2017). Although the problem of segregation of asylum seekers in particular though overcrowding in this main reception areas was recognized, it triggered a call for tackling the refugee crisis at the European level rather than inner-political solution through urban policies. The former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi lobbied intensively for juridical and diplomatic European initiatives. Benedikter and Karolewski (2017) state, that attention of the Italian public was mostly devoted to refugee immigration rather than integration. In the Italian referendum on the fourth of December "was a vote in favour of anti-European parties and their populist leaders, who promised to end the migration crisis once and for all without the European Union" (Benedikter and Karolewski, 2017). Concerning the political and public debate in Italy it becomes clear that integration per se and especially housing policies for refugees were not focused and didn't appear on the political agenda.

Finally, due to the special geographic position of Italy in refugee crisis, it is important to look at the **problem stream**. According to Kingdon (2014) this stream deals with general problem recognition by certain indicators that show that there is a problem "out there". The refugee crisis can be seen as such an indicator in the Italian case, however more importantly, other focusing events that correlate with the refugee crisis. While the number of asylum seekers crossing the central mediterranean route from Lybia to Italy by sea in 2015 made up only 18% of the general irregular immigration into Europa, by 2016 it was almost half (48%) (ESI, 2017). In both years, the central mediterranean route recorded the highest death rates (ESI, 2017). These incidents most certainly were powerful focusing events in the Italian discourse. The developments in the problem stream are another powerful explanation why the attention of governmental decision makers was mainly directed at border-control and security (including the humanitarian aspect) and pressuring for European relocation programs. In addition to that, the duration of stay of the refugees in Italy is mostly estimated differently, than in the other European Countries. The Eurofound report (2016)

classifies Italy as “highly affected transit country “, where the “crisis is considered an emergency issue” (p. 11). This mirrors also the Italian mentality towards the immigration flow: most refugees are expected to move further up north after staying for a short period of time in Italy (Pastore, 2017). According to Duvell (2006) transit migrants can be defined as “aliens who stay in the country for some period of time while seeking to migrate permanently to another”. This pattern we can identify clearly in the Italian discussion on the “refugee crisis”.

In sum, we see that in Italy the three streams did not join and no policy window opened. This is mostly due to the reason, that a problem was not recognized in the first place. There was neither a change in the political stream, nor a general problem recognition by governmental officials. The issue of refugee housing never made it into the high political agenda of Italy and therefore no policy change can be observed.

5 Country Comparison and Conclusion

The final chapter of this paper provides a comparative analysis of the examined countries Germany, Italy and Denmark. Herewith the main findings of the country analysis will be presented and compared with respect to their policy developments in housing policy approach as a reaction to the refugee crisis. All three countries were exposed to a similar focusing event, since all countries can be classified as highly affected by the influx starting in 2015 (Eurofound, 2016). However, they have been selected according to highly different housing approaches prior to the refugee crisis. The table below summarises the findings and shows that all countries experienced a change in their approach, albeit only in Germany this change was implemented through national policies. Moreover, it becomes obvious that these three European countries do not tend towards convergence, but rather follow their assigned policy path (Denmark) or diverge from the (northern) European model of desegregation (Italy). Why is that the case? In the following, the comparative analysis of the four hypotheses will bring clarity in the driving factors of change, or respectively, path continuity and discuss more general underlying patterns of the policy developments in the three countries. Moreover, this chapter presents limitations to the research and debates the broader meaning of the main findings.

Figure 3: Main findings country analysis

Policy approach	Germany	Denmark	Italy
Prior 2015	Laissez-faire/ Desegregation	Desegregation	Laissez-faire
Value	Tolerance/ scattered side programs	Housing Allocation programs	Non-policy
Policy change	Yes	No	No
Level	National	Local policy practise	Local policy practise

After 2015	Desegregation	Stronger Desegregation	Laissez-faire/Segregationist
Value	Housing Allocation programs	Housing Allocation programs	Non-policy/social housing on racial basis

When looking at the comparative summary of the main findings, the divergence between Germany, which experienced a major policy change, and Denmark and Italy, which mainly continued their policy path, stand out. In the first hypothesis, policy feedback was expected to be an important explanatory factor for policy change. Can this indeed be confirmed as an explanation for the differences we see between the countries?

H1: Feedback from previous implementations of either laissez-faire, desegregation or segregationist policy approach influences the problem interpretation. Therefore it can be expected, that negative feedback will lead to a continuation of the traditional housing approach and positive feedback will lead to a policy change.

When looking at the previous analysis, this hypothesis cannot be verified. In all three countries the impact of possible feedback about the performance of existing or previous programs, can be identified as marginal when it comes to general problem recognition of governmental decision makers. In Germany and Denmark, several studies and evaluation reports from previous implementations of the domicile requirement, which indicate a misinterpretation of the problem, were largely politically ignored. We can see that in the case of these countries positive feedback did not lead to policy change. In Germany, politicians even moved in the opposite direction. In Italy, we cannot really speak of any feedback at all. Since ethnic segregation was not discussed, feedback could not contribute to make policy officials aware of a problem. Although, in this country case we cannot rule out that the ignorance of the issue had potentially indirectly powerful impact on preventing policy change. We see in Germany and Denmark, that indeed the pre-existence of policy instruments played an important role in their distinct policy approach developments. In Germany we can observe clear indications that the implementation of

“Zuzugssperren” (influx bans) for guestworkers and “Aussiedler” in the 1970ies was used as a model for the implementation of the current domicile requirement for refugees. All German experts as well as many evaluation studies (see Münch, 2009, Bültgen and Gatzweiler, 2002 and Sinus Sociovision, 2007) confirm that these measures did not lead to the desired outcome of fostering integration and even had a negative influence due to fatal symbolic effect of undesirability (German Expert 4). Nonetheless the domicile requirement was implemented in 2016, with the official reasoning of promoting integration and avoiding segregationist tendencies. Likewise, in Denmark positive feedback on the effects of the domicile requirement, which is implemented since 1999, did not pressure the authorities to deviate from their policy path.

In sum, it seems like regardless of positive or negative feedback concerning the success of previous or existing measures, governmental decision makers formed their political agendas. An explanation for this could be that the refugee crisis was indeed a focusing event like described by Kingdon (2014) as “dramatic and unexpected”, which triggered ad hoc (policy) solutions, such as in Italy with the implementation of the CAS systems as the main housing tool and in Germany with the implementation of the domicile requirement. The focus seemed to be more on the technical feasibility of the solution in order to react quickly to a suddenly pressing problem, through for instance, pre-existing infrastructure, rather than positive or negative feedback. Since the hypothesis cannot be verified, we will have a look at if the second hypothesis, which deals more with the characteristics of the focusing event per se, can provide an explanatory factor for the findings.

H2: Countries with a higher number of refugee immigration in 2015/2016 were exposed to a more powerful focusing event and therefore a policy change in the domain of housing can be expected.

When looking at the previous analysis, this hypothesis can be verified. Indeed, Germany was confronted with the highest influx of asylum seekers in 2015, when compared with the other two examined countries, and underwent a national policy change as the only country of the three. Here, we can apply Kingdon’s (2014) reference on the power of focusing events: the events are rarely the sole cause and motivation of change, but they can “push” issues higher on the agenda. In Germany

the refugee influx was not only considered as humanitarian and European crisis but also clearly as a domestic crisis. The initial moment of “chaos” concerning the immigration and accommodation in 2015 further contributed to the construction of a “crisis”. In Germany, the focusing event was most powerful in terms of numbers, but also certainly in terms of framing and medial, political and public attention, which led to pressure on governmental decision makers and the raise of the issue in the political agenda. Nonetheless, there are some limitations to this hypothesis. It seems next to the actual numbers of immigrants, the framing of the influx was highly important. Although Germany had the highest influx, the numbers in all three countries are comparable. How “dramatic” the crisis is perceived, however, differs in the countries, especially when we look at the difference between integration and immigration. While in Germany the influx was perceived as a clear integration crisis, Italy interpreted the influx as a pure immigration crisis. This framing as integration crisis in Germany, provides a powerful explanatory factor for the policy change, since officially the domicile requirement was implemented as an instrument to promote integration. Hypothesis three correlates with the findings in hypothesis two.

H3: Countries with an aggregation of focusing events potentially related to the refugee crisis, such as terrorist attacks, experience a policy change in the domain of housing.

When looking at the previous analysis, this hypothesis can only be partly verified. In Germany we can observe, that the aggregation of focusing events, closely connected to the refugee crisis, had a powerful impact on pushing the issue of desegregation policies higher on the political agenda. Herewith, the incident on New Years Eve 2015 in Cologne stands out. The event triggered in particular local governments to press for a policy change on the national level. In Denmark, it could be seen as an explanatory factor for their path continuity, that no other focusing events followed the refugee crisis, especially none, that could be connected to consequences of ethnic segregation. However, we see the existence of an aggregation of focusing events, concerning perceived problems with segregation in the past, which could have further contributed to the Danish path dependency. Thus far, the hypothesis can be verified. However, when we look at Italy, focusing events closely connected with the refugee crisis occurred, such as the high numbers of asylum seekers in 2016 and the death

rates on the central Mediterranean route, however, they seemed to be responsible for preventing a policy change in the domain of housing instead of triggering one. Herewith we see, that depending on the type of focusing events following the refugee crisis, they can distract policy makers and the public from specific topics and direct the attention from governmental decision makers to “more urgent problems”. Therefore, the focusing events prevented the issue of ethnic segregation and, in wider context, integration, from rising high on the political agenda and “catch fire”. After observing policy feedback and the scope of focusing events as possible explanatory factors for the general finding, we will finally have a more general look at the interplay of the streams as determinants for change.

H4: As the refugee crisis potentially opens a window in the problem stream, policy change will occur, if the stream couples with the political and the policy stream. In which direction the change goes, depends on the interpretation of the problem and the possible solution presented in either the political or the policy stream or both. Therefore it can be expected, that if residential ethnic segregation gets assessed as negative, policies change towards desegregation and if it gets assessed positively policies change towards laissez-faire.

When looking at the previous analysis, this hypothesis can be clearly verified. We can observe, that in Germany and Denmark a coupling of the three streams occurred and a window was opened. Both countries have a very similar framing of ethnic segregation, but in Denmark, due to its already established desegregation policies, the window closed without policy change, while in Germany policies changed from a mix of laissez-faire and desegregation to pure desegregation. In Italy the streams did not join and therefore no window opened and no change occurred. In contrast to the other two examined countries, where governments identified possible ethnic segregation as a pressing problem, in Italy this general problem-recognition did not take place. Ethnic segregation was neither assessed as positive nor negative, it was just not discussed and therefore no issue on the political agenda. It is questionable, if due to the trend to more segregationist local policy practise in Italy, the issue will become a pressing problem in the future.

It is conspicuous, how much influence the political stream had on the developments in all three countries. In Germany, the previous implementations of the influx bans, have been assessed overwhelmingly positive by the public according to German expert (3). It was perceived as successful, even though no academic evidence for this can be found. Segregationist tendencies are publically widely connected with fear therefore, the political measure of the domicile requirement was widely supported. Likewise, we see in Denmark that the desegregationist approach is closely connected with the (political) culture in Denmark. Ethnic segregation is perceived as so negative, that there even official “ghettolists” where the percentage of refugees is one of the classification criteria. Also in Italy the public attention on immigration rather than integration issues can be identified as one of the main factors for the policy developments.

In sum, we see that the coupling of the three streams can be identified as decisive for change, however, in which direction the change goes depends mostly on the political stream. Why is that the case? One argument could be, that the refugee crisis is such a politicalised topic, that policy actions on that issue most certainly have serious consequences for the electoral outcome of the ruling party. Consequently, policies will be developed more explicitly in accordance with the national mood than in other areas.

The country comparative analysis following the four hypotheses corresponds with the data gathering through the initial and detailed coding scheme (see appendix). However, in the process of this paper, some additional findings, outside of the coding scheme, were detected.

First of all, it is conspicuous that both in Germany and Denmark desegregation instruments were implemented to tackle the perceived self-segregation of refugees (and migrants). However, there is no scientific evidence that this actually happens. Research suggests, that instead of domicile requirements and influx bans, policies should be developed that tackle processes such as white flight or discrimination in the housing market in order to counteract effectively segregationist tendencies. Do we find here a case of misleading policies?

Second of all, the existence of generic support systems in the domain of housing is crucial for the likelihood that refugees will be incorporated in this system. In Denmark and Germany, where such generic systems are largely in place, we find

housing support systems for refugees, while in Italy no generic policy has been adopted and therefore also no policy that specifically target recognized refugees.

Third of all, the estimated duration of stay of recognized refugees plays an important role in policy making. While Denmark and Germany adopted the idea that the refugee crisis is indeed a more permanent phenomenon, Italy rather sees itself as transit country. In Germany and Denmark policies in the domain of housing have been adopted and lastly a window of opportunity opened, in Italy neither of those happened. The estimation of the duration seems to influence the power of the crisis as a policy changing focusing event and the process of problem recognition.

The table below summarises the most important findings of the comparative analysis and tries to outline more general underlining patterns.

Figure 4: Main findings comparative analysis

Hypothesis	Verification/Falsification
H1: Policy feedback	<i>Falsified</i>
H2: Scope of Influx	<i>Verified</i>
H3: Aggregation of focusing events	<i>Partly Verified</i>
H4: Policy window	<i>Verified</i>

Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marginal influence of policy feedback • Marginal influence of academics • Importance of framing and interpretation of the crisis • High importance of problem recognition in policy process and policy change • High importance of the type of “follow-up” focusing events • High influence of public mood (“political climate”) in decision-making process
Additional Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contradiction between desegregation policies and research • Influence of generic policy approach on implementation of specific policy approach • Importance of politically estimated duration of stay of recognized refugees

Before giving indications of the broader meaning of the findings above and put them in context, I have to point out the **limitations** of this research. First of all during the data collection I faced some practical constraints. First of all, the analysis of Italy is largely based on the five conducted expert interviews, since I faced difficulties in gathering the data, due to a lack of English sources. Moreover, the in first round of data collection (see initial coding scheme 1), the response rate of the experts was limited. Therefore the election criteria had to be extended. Originally it was intended to find experts with broader knowledge of national policies, rather than local experts. Due to the low response, local experts were also considered.

Second of all, the findings of this paper have limited value, due to the, how Bolt and Van Kempen (2013) call it, “omitted-variable” problem (p.201). In the country analysis of the influencing and explanatory factors, in particular in the three streams, possibly not all relevant variables could be considered. On the one hand, there might

be an overestimation of some of the described factors, while on the other hand intervening or moderating variables were not considered. More specifically, there are possibly other factors, such as individual performance or norms and values of governmental decision maker or internal political power imbalances that could not be taken into account in this research. The influence of “unobservable characteristics of individuals” and actors around the political sphere, might cause a (causality) bias in this research (Bolt and Van Kempen, 2013, p. 201). Adding to that, possibly not all relevant stakeholders in the three streams have been taken into account. This is because the entire political spectrum, especially in Italy and Denmark due to language constraints, couldn't be fully reconstructed.

Third of all, the values for each of the presented variables desegregation, laissez-faire and segregationist approach do not meet the full scope of policy programs that are “out there”. According to previous literature, the most common ones have been chosen. However, it cannot be guaranteed, that they cover all existing values.

When putting the findings in a broader context we see a clear divergence from North to South. Therefore we can clearly answer this paper's research question. Referring back to the European Commission that defines integration as the “key to make (...) the most of the contributions that immigration can make to EU development” and classifies housing as one of the fundamental backbones of this integration process, it seems that this idea has not become prevalent in one the key European countries Italy (European Commission, 08.07.2017). Although the refugee crisis was similarly framed on the European level, the examined countries have very distinct ideas of what this crisis indicates. In Germany and Denmark the influx triggered a call for integration and a trend towards more assimilationist rhetoric, framing the crisis as a major challenge for the countries' society. In Italy the influx was primarily seen as an immigration crisis, interpreting the residence of refugees in their own country as mainly temporary. This political and societal interpretation plays a major role in the developments of policies in the three countries. Clearly, the role of political culture and pre-existing institutions has been underestimated in previous research on policymaking and policy change. Especially in highly politicised domains, such as policies concerning the refugee crisis, the traditional interpretation of societal phenomena like ethnic segregation, majorly influences the policy making process. If

we refer back to the beginning of the paper, it was stated that only if we understand underlying patterns of this process, we can influence it. Throughout this advocated policy change in the domain of housing, ideas need to be developed in this area that respect the country-specific pre-existing norms and values, or in other words the “value acceptability” of their ideas. Moreover, we have to understand, that the most import pre-condition for the access of refugee to fundamental services like housing, is the existence of generic policies. We see in Italy, that the lack of general housing support systems creates a difficult task for advocates to establish refugee-specific measures. The housing situation in Italy could have serious long-term consequences for the country, but also for Europe. If the situation of social marginalization of many refugees in Italy leads to serious displeasure amongst the Italian population, the projecting of this unrest on the European Community is quite nearby. But also in Germany and Denmark not all glitter is gold. In both countries we see a clear contradiction between policies and academic evidence regarding residential segregation patterns. The instruments are exclusively directed at refugees themselves and undermine the two-way process idea of integration. Previous implementations show that these practises could lead to fatal symbolic effects of undesirability amongst the migrants and erode possible positive effects of ethnic concentrations. In these countries, the approach should be reconsidered and a middle way should be found in order to secure sustainable housing policies. All in all, a general one-fits-all housing approach cannot be found due to the structural, societal and political differences in European Countries. Much rather, an approach should be developed as soon as possible, tailored to the specific needs and resources of each country. This paper gives clarity about the elements, which are needed to develop this approach in order to turn the refugee crisis into an enriching experience and lead the new situation of co-existence to a success, both for natives and for refugees.

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7 Appendix

Initial Coding scheme 1:

Coding Units	Categorisation		
	Desegregation	Laissez-faire	Segregation
Freedom to choose residence location	No	Yes	Yes or No (allocation to segregated areas)
Assistance in house hunting		Assisted	Not assisted

Detailed Coding Scheme 2:

Coding Units	Categorisation					
Variables	Desegregation		Laissez-faire		Segregation	
Values	Scattered side programs	Housing Allocation	Non-Policy	Tolerance	Land use control	Social housing on racial basis
Policies aimed at desegregation	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Perception of ethnic segregation	Negative	Extremely negative	Not discussed	Positive	negative	Politically Intended
Location of social housing stock	Mixed NH or NH with majority group	n/a	n/a	In ethnic enclaves	In ethnic enclaves	In ethnic enclaves

	population					
Equal distribution of integration costs	Yes (partly)	Yes	Not discussed	n/a	No costs	No costs
Promotion of segregation	No	No	Not discussed	No	Yes	Yes

Policy process coding categories:

- Existence of national policy change
- Reasons for policy change
- Reasons for Path dependency
- Effect of refugee crisis on housing policy approach
- Role of policy feedback
- Public discourse on ethnic segregation
- Policy discourse on ethnic segregation
- Academic discourse on ethnic segregation

Survey and interview questionnaire: