

# Scrutinizing European decision-making regarding the Temporary EU Relocation System

*Testing neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and post-functionalism*

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## Summary

This research tests dominant European Integration theories by scrutinizing the Temporary EU Relocation System. The theories outlined in this research are neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and post-functionalism. While the first two have been dominant theories for over the past decades, post-functionalism is a relatively new theory which claims that the others are outdated. Therefore, post-functionalism is the starting point for this research to test whether this claim holds.

The Temporary EU Relocation System is about states delegating former sovereign powers to the supranational level. This case offers a unique opportunity to test the theory of post-functionalism as central elements of the theory - public opinion and political party ideology - are highly applicable. Public opinion polls show that immigration was the most important issue in 2015. Furthermore, the theory specifically mentions immigrants as the biggest threat to national communities for traditional, authoritarian and nationalist parties who are expected to be opposed to European integration.

This research uses a qualitative approach and applies a congruence analysis. The focus is on the (mis-)matches between concrete expectations that arrive from the theories' key elements. The selected elements include the most influential *actors* in pressuring state preferences regarding the Temporary EU Relocation System. Each theory claims that different actors are most influential. To test the theories relative explanatory powers, all member states that have voted on the Temporary EU Relocation System are included in this research.

The theory of liberal intergovernmentalism appeared to have strong explanatory power when trying to understand state preferences regarding the Temporary EU Relocation System. Neo-functionalist's claim that supranational-oriented interest groups supported by the European Commission determine state preferences did not hold. Post-functionalism did not provide satisfying explanations for the formation of state preferences either, as public opinion and governments political party spectrum did not correlate with the voting-decisions of governments regarding the Temporary EU Relocation System.

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## List of abbreviations

AIEA	Amnesty International European Association
CE	Caritas Europe
CHES	Chapel Hill Expert Survey
CON	Congruence analysis
COV	Co-variational
CPT	Causal process tracing
EC	European Community
ECRE	European Council on Refugees and Exiles
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
GAL	Green, Alternative, Libertarian
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICMC-Europe	International Catholic Migration Commission-Europe
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
IR	International Relations
MEP	Member of European Parliament
N	Amount of cases
TAN	Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist
TERS	Temporary EU Relocation System

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## 1. Introduction

In May 2015, the European Commission adopted the 'European Migration Agenda' as a response to the massive amount of unprecedented African and Middle-Eastern refugees arriving at Europe's south coast and the numerous dreadful deaths of people trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea. Only in 2015, over 1.3 million refugees fled to the EU (Pew Research Center, 2016). This crisis has painfully revealed the EU's limitations in terms of problem solving capacities and has led to peerless forms of politicizing the issue while populist Eurosceptical forces were taking a central position in the debate (Schimmelfennig, 2014).

The European Migration Agenda outlines migration priorities and border and asylum policies to better manage migration. In the period from May until December 2015, several policy instruments have been proposed by the European Commission. Examples are a temporary relocation system to relocate refugees over Europe, a regulation to establish a permanent relocation system under the Dublin system and a European Border and Coast Guard assisting member states to secure the EU's external border (Rittberger et al., 2017). Of these three proposals only the first is accepted although its implementation has been insufficient at the least.

While the economic crisis was mainly seen as a southern problem, the consequences of the refugee crisis were felt equally by northern EU member states (Trauner, 2016). The reason for this is that most migrants were heading to only a few countries in the north. In 2015, 75% of all the applications were made in only five member states: Sweden, Austria, Italy, Hungary and Germany (CEPS, 2016). To regain control, the EU adopted the controversial Temporary EU Relocation System (TERS).

The TERS is based on a model of allocating responsibility between the member states to relocate 160,000 immigrants over a period of 2 years starting in September 2015 and ending in September 2017. The amount of refugees that a member state should adopt is based on the following criteria: national GDP (40%), population (40%), unemployment rates (10%) and the amount of asylum seekers already hosted (10%) (European Parliament, 2017).

The European Commission's first resolution led to the plan of mandatorily relocating 40,000 persons, who are in clear need of international protection, from Greece and Italy to other EU member states. This target was complemented on September 3<sup>rd</sup> 2015 by an

additional proposal to relocate another 120,000 asylum-seekers from Greece (50,400), Italy (15,600) and Hungary (50,400). After long and heated debates, a majority of the Council agreed on the European Commission's proposals. In two decisions rounds on 14 and 22 September 2015 a compromise was made between the European Commission and the European Council: the target of 160,000 relocations remains mandatory, but the distribution key quota is voluntary (Politico, 2015).

This research will focus on the TERS because it is often heavily criticized and is regarded as a controversial measure (Carrera, Blockmans, Gros & Guild, 2015). The relocation policy led to a direct confrontation between the Visegrad Group (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary) and the 'old' member states such as Germany. The final decision was made without the support of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. But because the vote was made under qualified majority it was binding for all member states. This shows how polarized the EU decision-making processes have become in the context of the refugee crisis.

Slovakia and Hungary explicitly refused to participate in the relocation scheme and attacked the decision at the European Court of Justice (Visegrad Group, 2016). Reports from February 2017 by the European Commission show that the set targets still fall short and that Poland, Hungary and Austria did not relocate any immigrants. In March 2017, the European Commission revealed that less than 14% of the total amount of 160,000 people had been relocated and that with the current pace the deadline will not be reached before September 2017 (European Parliament, 2017).

In this research three European integration theories will be tested to gain a better understanding of the decision-making process that led to a controversial migration measure. The theories used for this research are highly influential, conflicting and played an important role in the discussion among scholars over the past decades. They will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. Ultimately this research will conclude by arguing which of the theories possesses the most explanatory power for this case. The research question that is conducted is as follows:

*“How can the formation of the Temporary EU Relocation System be explained based on European integration theories?”*

### *Societal relevance*

The refugee crisis has been the EU's top priority ever since early 2015. Nevertheless, the EU is notably struggling to control the enormous influx of immigrants and its efforts have been little successful which resulted in heated debates and accusations. The Guardian (2016) stated the refugee crisis had more to do with the European governments and societies who seemed to be unable to respond in an efficient manner than with the refugees itself.

By gaining understanding on the government decision-making process regarding the formation of this policy, the results of this research can be valuable for similar future events. Numerous studies (Express, 2017) predict that there will be another wave of migrants coming to Europe because of climate change causing extreme drought in Africa. Understanding the mechanisms behind the decision-making process regarding the Temporary EU Relocation System might serve as an example and can therefore contribute to the effectiveness of future policy formations.

### *Scientific relevance*

This research is based on testing the theoretical relevance of three highly influential European integration theories and therefore contributes to the scientific debate and body of knowledge regarding European integration theories. While classic the theories of neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism have been dominant theories for the past decades in trying to explain European integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2009), the theory of post-functionalism is new and provides new as well as directly opposing explanations. By testing their explanatory power, the usefulness of each theory regarding political reality is questioned. Furthermore, this research might re-establish the classical theories which are considered outdated according to post-functionalists (Hooghe & Marks, 2009).



## 2. Literature review

The most recent influx of great numbers of refugees is not the only time the European Union was faced with such an event. The Yugoslav succession wars of 1992-2001 led to 1.5 million refugees from Bosnia in 1994 and 900,000 from Kosovo between 1998 and 1999. However, the influx of Bosnian refugees to the European Union was much more gradual and therefore it was better manageable. The inflow of Kosovars was more sudden but the numbers were relatively modest and people believed that they would return after a brief war (Heisbourg, 2015).

The recent crisis is characterized by both large and abrupt flows of Middle-Eastern refugees to Europe and the perspectives for the ongoing war in Syria do not provide much hope for an early return of these people. On top of this, the crisis occurred at a moment when Europe already was in a difficult position. The Greek economic crisis for example, as well as the rise of both left- and right-wing populism in numerous countries, the omnipresent threat from ISIS and the uncertainty about the future of the United Kingdom made the refugee crisis even more difficult to handle (Heisbourg, 2015).

In May 2015, the European Migration Agenda was adopted by the European Commission as a response to the increasing political pressing context regarding the arrival of asylum-seekers. It included six short-term EU policy actions among which the temporary relocation mechanism for asylum-seekers within the EU for the member states that were confronted with the highest influx, but also a mechanism to relocate 20,000 refugees from outside the EU. Besides relocating people, the European Commission proposed to triple the budget as well as the capacity of the EU's External Border Agency. An increase of emergency funding by €60 million was proposed to go to the frontline member states. Finally, to manage the smuggling of migrants, the European Commission proposed to strengthen Europol and to establish a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Operation that should subvert trafficker's networks in the Mediterranean Sea (Carrera, Blockmans, Gros & Guild, 2015).

Besides the short-term actions, there were also medium-term actions included in the Migration Agenda. The goals of these actions were to reduce incentives for migration to Europe, enhance European border management, create a strong common asylum policy and

to create a new policy on legal migration. Carrera et al. (2015) point out that most of the MEP's supported these proposals by the European Commission. The member states, however, were criticised for their inability to make compassionate decisions regarding the refugee crisis. The crisis revealed the member states underlying conflicts as well as the clashes between national and supranational levels (Maricut, 2017).

After the Agenda for Migration, the Justice and Home Affairs Council made decisions regarding resettlement and relocation of refugees in July and September 2015, as a EU Action Plan of Return, a plan for the Western Balkan route and the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan. This latter plan was implemented in March 2016 to end irregular migration to Europe of migrants coming from Turkey. Stern (2016) states that most of the measures that have been taken are aiming to reduce the asylum-seekers and migrant flows to the EU.

As a response to the refugee crisis, some countries adopted a 'welcoming culture' and expressed their willingness to offer protection for the people fleeing from warzones such as Syria. These countries were mainly Germany, Sweden and Austria. Contrary to the attitudes of these countries, others strengthened their border controls and built fences to keep asylum-seekers out or even used violence against them which has happened in the Czech Republic and Hungary (Stern, 2016). However, even the most welcoming countries implemented stricter measures after boats kept coming to Europe in the winter of 2015 and high numbers of refugees made their way through Europe.

Germany, for example, made a U-turn on its migration policy by applying the Dublin rules for Syrian asylum-seekers again. The key principle of the Dublin regulation is that asylum requests should be processed in the country of first entry. Countries that suffered much from the economic crisis, such as Greece and Italy, are also the countries at the external border of the European Union which makes them responsible for the handling of asylum seekers (Trauner, 2016). Therefore, Germany made an exception for Syrian refugees looking for asylum and welcomed them to its country. However, in November 2015, it applied the Dublin regulation again for all countries except Greece (EUobserver, 2015).

Austria planned to build fences along the Slovenian border and introduced legislation to decrease its attractiveness for asylum-seekers. Sweden, stated that it needed 'time to breathe' after having accepted at least 149.000 asylum-seekers in 2015 and introduced stricter measures (Stern, 2016). This trend continued in 2016 when African countries located nearby the conflict zones were labelled as 'safe countries' while there were major human

right violation concerns (Financial Times, 2016).

In August 2015, German Chancellor Merkel said that other member states should take a greater share of the refugees as Germany struggles to deal with the large number of immigrants. Merkel as well as European Commissioners often urged the importance of more solidarity to cope with the refugee crisis (Huffington Post, 2015; European Commission, 2015). In their article Bordignon and Mariconi (2017) argue that the major differences in welcoming refugees and implementation of EU policies between member states are inefficient as well as inequitable.

Bordignon and Mariconi (2017) furthermore point out that the member states differences in societal perceptions towards migration makes it hard to realise a common solution. Perceptions about how immigrants can contribute to the economy and culture of the country differs largely between the member states. While the continental and Nordic European societies hold more positive views towards immigrants, the central and eastern countries are overwhelmingly negative about the cultural impact of immigrants according to the European Social Survey.

The bottom-line of the European reaction to the refugee crisis is that there is a lack of a single European policy on immigration is lacking but appears to be essential. Even though some progress has been made, the major differences between integration and refugee welcome policies between the member states is unsatisfactory (Bordignon & Moriconi, 2017). Carrera et al. (2015) stressed that the lacking ability to come up with measures that actually treat the causes of the refugee crisis as well as the inability to efficiently act as a collective characterize the European response to the crisis.

### 3. Theoretical framework

With the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1951, the governments of Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg started a unique process that is referred to as European integration. This started a dynamic in which decisions that were previously taken by national governments were now taken together with other governments and the newly created European institutions. Governments relinquished their sole right of national sovereignty and decided to make legislation based on joint decision-making with other governments, while other tasks were delegated to European institutions (Bache, Bulmer, George & Parker, 2014).

This phenomenon of western European states giving up their national sovereignty in some policy areas puzzled academics of international relation (IR) theories. It gave a new dimension to the debate about the role of the state in international politics. Whereas the debate in IR was focused on the promotion of peace after the Second World War, the debate in the 1950-60s geared towards seeking explanations for European integration. Upon this moment realism used to be the dominant approach for explaining IR. According to this theory, states distrust each other, are self-interested and their only goal is to survive. Therefore, states are concerned about relative gains in terms of power and are not likely to cooperate with each other (Maersheimer, 2001).

The creation of the European Community (EC) was a major contradiction to this sovereign state centered view. It led to the emergence of new alternative analyses to explain European integration. The first attempt to understand this new phenomenon was named neo-functionalism. This led to debates with other academics who introduced several new European integration theories over time. The theories that will be focused on in this research are neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and post-functionalism.

Below each of these theories will be outlined extensively after which the valuable elements for this research will be outlined.

## Neo-functionalism

With the creation of the EC, a prominent example of national integration, a new internal actor was created that had to be reckoned by the world. This led to the birth of neo-functionalism in the late 1950s and early and early 1960s which was a direct response to the emergence of the EC. Haas (1985) presented this theory as the first European integration theory. Neo-functionalism was an alternate position to IR's dominant theoretical streams such as realism. The most prominent works within neo-functionalism are those of Ernst Haas (1985) *The Uniting of Europe* and Leon Lindberg (1963) *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration*.

Neo-functionalism's motive is to explain why and how states voluntarily mingle with each other and lose elements of their sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflicts between themselves (Haas, 1970). In contrary to realism, which argued that the state is a single unified actor within the international system, neo-functionalists argue that states' international activities are the outcome of a pluralistic process in which government decisions are influenced by pressures from various bureaucratic actors and supranational-oriented interest groups (Bache et al., 2014). Therefore, neo-functionalism is labelled as a pluralist theory. It emphasizes the importance of principal agents such as interest groups and technocratic elites in explaining further integration based on the pursuing of their own interests.

The core argument of neo-functionalism is that integration within one sector tends to spill over to other sectors. The aim of this integration process is complete political integration which benefits all states. Therefore, the establishment of supranational institutions that are created for specific functional tasks will lead to political, social and economic processes which will generate incentives towards further integration. Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991) points out three aspects of this snowball effect:

- 1) *Functional Spill-Over*: according to this mechanism some sectors are so interdependent that it is not possible to treat them in isolation. Therefore, problems will arise when one would try to integrate only a certain functional task to the supranational level without integrating more tasks to the supranational level. In other words, it is not possible to have a 'halfway house' consisting of both

sovereignty and integration because it would not be stable. The intellectual father of this type of spill-over is Jean Monnet. He argued that the integration of basic industries as steel and coal will also lead to an integration of other energy sectors and eventually the whole economy. In general; when two or more countries cooperate for integration within sector *a*, it is more effective to appoint a supranational higher authority to oversee activities. The advantages are, however, not optimal if related sectors are excluded. This leads to functional linkage pressures for sectors *b* and *c* which will consequently also become included (Rosamond, 2000).

- 2) *Political Spill-Over*: this mechanism's foundation lies in the pluralist nature of West European societies. In these societies, politics is based on conflict between interest groups that pursue their own welfare aims. Because these groups are represented by highly bureaucratized organizations, it is possible to solely focus on their leaders – the elites. According to the mechanism, these elites will undergo a learning process that will bring them to the perception that supranational solutions are more beneficial for them than national solutions. Therefore, their actions and loyalty will be focused to the new center and they will call for further integration by pressuring governments to speed up the process (Jensen, 2010).

Haas' focus was on the non-governmental interest groups such as trade unions and trade associations. He argued that these groups will generate pressures that will spill over to the federal level and will lead to the integrative impulse. By this argument he shifts the attention away from national governments when explaining further integration (McGowan, 2007). While Haas argued that both governments and interest groups are crucial actors in driving European integration forward, he stressed that governments might be hesitant to participate in integration whereas interest groups would see further integration as in their interest. The reason for this is that all interest groups consider integration as a manner to solve their problems regardless of their differences in ideological position. This means that interest groups do not act in accordance to a shared vision of a united EU, but instead act out of self-interest. Neo-functionalism thus explains European integration as an elite-driven process (Jensen, 2010).

3) *Cultivated Spill-Over*: this mechanism focusses on the role of central institutions and in particular the role of the European Commission as this is believed to be the archetype of an activist bureaucracy. Because the fact that these institutions represent the common interest of states, they have a stimulating effect on the integration process. Haas elaborates on this idea by arguing that in classic negotiations, the outcome will be determined by the position the least cooperative actor takes. However, when there is a mediator involved negotiations can move somewhat further and will lead to a solution that lies somewhere between the final bargaining position of the actors. An institutionalized and autonomous mediator as the European Commission may therefore lead to an 'upgrade of the common interest' (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991).

According to the cultivated spill-over element the European Commission tries to push the European integration process forward by increasing their power to achieve goals in a more 'Europeanisation' manner (Rosamond, 2000). By doing this the European Commission acts as a political entrepreneur during intergovernmental negotiation processes to push through its own preferences and therefore expand its mandate of being just a mediator (Jensen, 2010). This type of entrepreneurship is described by Moravcsik (1999) as the 'act of selling policies to decision-makers'.

For the spillover process to be accomplished, transference of the elite's loyalty is required. These concept 'elites' includes both national and international actors as well as interest groups. In Haas's work, the concept of loyalty is a key element of political integration. He argues that loyalties are connected to political institution's attributes such as symbols. People tend to develop loyalties and preferences towards an institution when they are involved in a policy process over a given amount of time (Rosamond, 2000). This means that when elites are involved in a supranational policy process, they tend to become more loyal towards the European institutions.

This process is called elite socialization and occurs because the actors are interest-driven and therefore create functional linkages to complete their goals (Rosamond, 2000). The same line of argument is applicable for interest groups according to neo-functionalism. Interest groups will also become focused on the supranational institutions and therefore pressure states to become actively involved in the integration process (Jensen, 2010).

The primary divide in EC theories has been between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism. This is a debate about two broader schools of political thought known as supranationalism and state-centrism. Where neo-functionalists would argue that the EC would gradually replace all the nation state's functions, intergovernmentalists rejected the idea that supranationalism is an inexorable mechanism to integration and argued that states remain to control the process of European integration. This means that according to intergovernmentalists, states will generally reject the delegation of sovereignty to the European level and would continue to promote national interest (Hoffman, 1965).

The theory of neo-functionalism started to fall into disfavor and was even abandoned in the mid-1970s when the EC developed in other ways than expected. The French president de Gaulle advocated nationalism in the mid-1960s and tried to reverse the course of further European political integration. This led to a theoretical void in the study of European integration at the time and theories such as intergovernmentalism became more prominent.

Later, in the 1990s, neo-functionalist concepts became more relevant again and the concepts started to reappear in the IR debates (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991). The unity and rise of the European Union and the Single Market Program led to the rebirth of neo-functionalist ideas that predicted further integration. Supranational European entrepreneurship represented by the European Commission played a key role in the European integration process.



## **Liberal intergovernmentalism**

The theory of liberal intergovernmentalism builds on the work from Hoffman, who responded to neo-functionalism's analysis of European integration by putting forward the theory of intergovernmentalism. This theory drew heavily on realist's argumentations about the role of governments of states in IR. It rejected the neo-liberalist assumption that overwhelming pressures from elite interest groups would lead to integration by governments. Bache et al. (2014) point out the three intergovernmentalists core criticisms of neo-functionalism.

First, intergovernmentalists argued that European integration should be looked at in the global context whereas neo-functionalists applied a regional perspective. Neo-functionalists predicted an irreversible process towards further integration. Hoffman criticized this believe by arguing that this would only be possible when one would assume that the international background conditions would remain the same over time, which is unlikely. Second, within the process of European integration national governments are uniquely powerful actors. Their concern is to protect national interest which controls the pace and nature of integration. In neo-functionalism, the autonomy of supranational actors is emphasized while liberal intergovernmentalism stresses the national leader's autonomy (Moravcsik, 1993). Third, intergovernmentalists argued that governments might accept further integration in the technical functional sectors, but this would not occur in the fields of 'high politics' such as national security and defense.

This theoretical framework was the basis for a subsequent version of intergovernmentalism that was developed by Moravcsik. This theory, called liberal intergovernmentalism, also starts from a critique of neo-functionalism. Moravcsik (1993) argues that neo-functionalism lacks a theoretical core that is enough specified to provide a sound basis for accurate empirical testing. The steady development toward supranationalism was only predicted by the early variants of neo-functionalism. When the European integration failed to advance steadily in the 1960s, there was no clear direction for revision. This was confirmed argued by Haas himself who was self-critical.

Moravcsik argued that the self-criticisms of neo-functionalists themselves should be taken seriously. He points out three of these self-criticisms in his work. First, European integration theories should be supplemented by theories of national responses to

international dependence that are more general. Second, uncausal theories are inadequate when dealing with the complexity of EC policy-making. Third, common policy development responses shouldn't be overlooked because the emphasis on relocation of authority to the EC often covers up a failing to affect a real surrender of sovereignty.

Instead of resurrecting neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism is more in line with contemporary theories of political economy. These theories suggest that the EC should be an international regime for policy co-ordination. Its institutional and substantive development can be explained through the analysis of national preferences and the intergovernmental strategic interaction. Liberal intergovernmentalism builds further on the theory of intergovernmental institutionalism by using the theories' aspects of interstate bargaining and institutional compliance and adding a theory of national preference formation that is grounded in international dependency theories (Moravcsik, 1993).

Moravcsik outlines the three core elements of liberal intergovernmentalism. The first element is the assumption that the state is a rational actor. This means that states actions are purposively directed toward the achievement of certain objectives or goals. This approach that is used in many contemporary international relation (IR) theories stems from realist and neo-realist theories in which states have fixed preferences for security, power and wealth.

Secondly, liberal intergovernmentalism postulates that state governments act according to the goals that are defined within the national society. According to liberal theories, foreign policy goals of state governments are varying in response to shifts in pressure from domestic social groups or interest groups whose preferences are represented through political institutions. The focus, in other words is on state versus society relations.

The third core element is the intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation (Moravcsik, 1993). During these interstate negotiations, the domestic preferences of each state are represented by their officials and the outcomes reflect the member states relative weight (Guiraudon, 2000). The underlying factors in interstate bargaining process are alternative factors, intensity of national preferences and the available issue linkages (Moravcsik, 1993).

According to liberal intergovernmentalism's state centric view, international integration is driven by the interest of nation states. These national interests derive from political domestic conflicts between societal groups that compete for political influence. The states'

interests are represented in the European Council and the Council of the European Union. But because the national interests are often not harmoniously, decisions made by unanimity tend to be determined by the lowest common denominator principle (Moravcsik, 1993). This means that the involved actors must compromise with the preferences of the state that is least willing because a compromise is in the interest of all involved actors and therefore a veto must be prevented.

To understand state's strategic interactions among each other, one must understand their domestic politics. This model of rational state behavior based on domestically constrained preferences implicates that international cooperation and conflict can be modelled as a two-staged process. In the first step, governments define a set of interests then, in the second step, they bargain with each other to try to realize those interests. Thus, within the single framework of liberal intergovernmentalism two types of general IR theories are integrated. First, there is a liberal theory of national preference formation and second there is an intergovernmentalist aspect of bargaining between state governments and institutional creation.

Moravcsik (1993) argues that national preferences are primary based on a costs analysis and the benefits of economic interdependence. These preferences can change in response to domestic social group shifting pressures that are aggregated via political institutions. The outcomes of interstate bargaining on the other side are determined by the national preferences relative intensity, the existence of alternative coalitions and the opportunity for issue linkage. This two-staged process is described by the interaction of demand and supply in which the preferences by the national governments account for the demand side and the process of strategic interstate bargaining for the supply side. This interaction shapes the outcome of states foreign policies.

While national-oriented interest groups are the most important actors in constraining and influencing state preferences, the interests of these groups are not always well defined. The extent to which interest groups can constrain governments depends on the unity and strength of these groups pressures. The so-called principle-agent relationship in which the interest group is the principle, delegating power to the agent national government, can lead to 'agency slack' when interest groups do not provide sufficient pressures and thus giving the government greater discretion (Moravcsik, 1993). Interest groups are rational actors that base their interest on expected benefits and losses from policies. Their interests can

then either constrain or empower national governments during international negotiations. This means that the likelihood of an international agreement depends 'almost entirely' on these societal preferences because governments have little flexibility to make concessions. For an international policy to be accepted, it is thus important that the interests of dominant interest groups from various countries converge (Moravcsik, 1993).

Finally, the theory separates three different issue areas of national preferences. The first issue area pointed out in the theory is that of commercial liberalization and is about the EC's internal market. The second area of issues concerns commercial liberalization which includes the coordination of domestic market policies such as agricultural price policies. The third issue area is about political, institutional or distributional policies. It focusses on policies that are not a direct response to economic interdependence. Instead it focusses on policies related to areas such as security and common foreign policies.

## Post-functionalism

The final theory outlined in this chapter is post-functionalism, primarily described by Hooghe and Marks (2009) in their article 'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration'. Post-functionalism tries to move beyond the elite-focused view of functionalist IR theories to explain European integration by adding elements as public opinion, party politics and electoral choice (Schimmelfennig, 2014). Generally, the theory claims that the previously mentioned dominant IR theories' focus on efficiency and functional-based rationale for European integration and the emphasis on interest group bargaining has become less relevant for research on the EU.

In 1996 Hooghe and Marks found direct connections between societal groups and European actors which contradicted the argument that states monopolize the representation of its citizens in IR. This is in contrary to liberal governmentalism, which argues that the state is a transmission belt which means that state-society interaction has a crucial impact on a state's behavior international politics (Moravcsik, 1993). In their 2009 article Hooghe and Marks extend this line of argument and argue that domestic and European politics have become more connected.

The theory assumes that identity is a key aspect in multilevel governance and for European integration in particular. The authors argue that this is because of the nature of governance that is twofold. On the one hand, governance is a means to achieve collective benefits by coordination of societal activities. Because of the diversity of public goods and their externalities, governance must be multilevel to be efficient.

On the other hand, governance is also an expression of the community. The challenge here is that community's demand self-rule, but the preference for this self-rule is rarely consistent with the functional demand for regional authority. Therefore, to understand European integration, one needs to understand when and how identity is mobilized. The post-functional claim that identity forms preferences over European integration sharply differentiates this theory from neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism.

Hooghe and Marks (2009) cite Carey (2002) who has shown that national identity is able to shape attitudes towards Europe. The decisive element in this is how different groups identities relate to each other. The theory argues that the more *exclusively* a person identifies with a group, the less this person will be supporting inclusion of outgroups.

Hooghe and Marks (2009) therefore argue that for European integration, one should look at national identity in terms of *inclusiveness* and *exclusiveness* of other territorial identities. When a person has an exclusive identity, he or she is predisposed to Euroscepticism when he or she believes that loving his or her own country is not compatible with European integration. The post-functional claim that identity forms preferences over European integration sharply differentiates this theory from neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism.

Just as neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism, post-functionalism shares the view that regional integration is triggered by a lacking dynamic between efficiency and the existing authority structure. However, post-functionalism doesn't presume that the outcome will reflect functional pressures. It argues that political conflict engages communal identities, and that these political conflicts lead to certain policy outcomes. It also doesn't claim that preferences of interest groups are of vital importance when trying to understand the course of European integration as neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism do.

According to Hooghe and Marks, this focus on interest groups was relevant for the time of European integration in the late 1950s and late 1980s. In the first three decades of European integration, on which the theories of neo-functionalism and liberal governmentalism are based, the creation of legal systems at the European level were driven by the demand for adjudication of economic disputes between firms. At the time, the public opinion wasn't orientated on the European developments. This had to do with the fact that most implications of these developments were limited or not transparent. Deals were made by the elites and there was a trend of permissive consensus. (Hooghe & Marks, 2009).

Because of the elite-centered dynamics of the European integration that was mainly about the interests of business groups, it wasn't an important issue for the public. The public's view on European integration was superficial and generally insufficient for electoral incentives for European Parliament (EP) party positioning. Therefore, public opinion didn't have much influence on party competition. However, these characteristics have drastically changed over the past decades. This is the background on which arguments of post-functionalism have been created.

Post-functionalism argues that the public opinion on European integration nowadays is well structured, able to affect national voting and is linked to the dimensions that influence disputation in European societies. Hooghe and Marks (2009) claim that there has been a

shift from permissive consensus to constraining consensus that roughly started in 1991.

Because of this increased presence of European integration in societal discourse and national politics, the content and process of decision-making has changed because the elite had to make room for a more Eurosceptical public (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). This has led to a situation in which the public opinion on European integration, that is based on *inclusive* and *exclusive* identities, became an area of strategic interaction among party elites in their contest for political power because they had to anticipate the effect of their decisions on the public.

Besides the increased role the public opinion started to play, post-functionalism stresses the relevance of political parties. It argues that European integration has become more present and contested in party competition. Because areas of national identity and state sovereignty have become part of the European integration debate and produced extensive effects in national economic and welfare policies the public opinion became more Eurosceptic. Eurosceptic parties mobilized this skepticism as well as an increasing amount of referendums.

Because of this politicization of European integration and constraining dissensus, Hooghe and Marks (2009) expect a trend of downward pressure on the scope of European integration. They furthermore expect a decrease in government's ability to manoeuvre and a mismatch between politically feasible and functionally efficient solutions (Schimmelfennig, 2014).

Where politics on national policies are commonly divided between left versus right wing parties with a focus on redistribution, this spectrum on European issues is not the same. Redistribution at the European level is not about the individual level of rich and poor, but handles with the redistribution from the rich north-west to the poorer south-east. This difficult process, in which entire member states are involved, becomes even more complex because of the element cultural diversity. Because of the growing cultural diversity within the EU, the left versus right debate within the EU is much more about social regulation than it is about redistribution (Hooghe & Marks, 2009).

In their 2002 research on the left versus right structure of party positions on European integration, Hooghe and Marks found to their surprise that the strongest relationship between party positioning on European integration and the variation in party support on this matter is present in the dimension of new politics. This dimension includes green,

alternative, libertarian (GAL) as well as traditional, authoritarian and nationalist (TAN) parties. Furthermore, extreme left and extreme right-wing parties are significantly more Eurosceptic than parties located toward the center, but to a lesser degree than the GAL and TAN parties.

Concerning EU issues with a distributional economic character such as employment policies, the left-right dimension offers a good explanation for political parties' preferences. In European matters, the economic right is in favor of market integration and a national segmented political authority while the economic left wants to have a supranational redistributive capacity and social democratic policies at national level (Hooghe & Marks, 2006). This left-right spectrum is thus applicable for EU's economic issues, but for the non-economic issues this spectrum does not provide a complete answer.

When adding the non-economic dimension of GAL-TAN, Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) discovered that this dimension could better explain European integration than the dimension of left-right did. They argue that the GAL-TAN dimension is a powerful explanation of EU issues that concern the level of integration. TAN-oriented parties try to protect national culture and sovereignty against international regimes, immigrants and multiple identities. Therefore, these parties tend to be more Eurosceptical and oppose European integration. GAL-oriented parties are not so strongly motivated and are just driven by specific policy goals, such as environmental policies for the Green parties.

A final key aspect of the theory of post-functionalism involves the electoral aspect of the politicization of European integration. This deals with the question of when an issue enters mass politics. Hooghe and Marks (2009) argue that this doesn't depend on an issue's intrinsic importance but on whether a political party picks it up. Pressure by interest groups is most effective when the political parties and public are not focused on a particular issue. When an issue is in the spotlight of politicization, interest group lobbying can even be counter-productive.

Hooghe and Marks (2009) argue that party leaders try to politicize an issue if they think that it will bring them electoral advantages. This argument is threefold: the more an issue correlates with a party's (potential) electoral popularity, the more it will be used in competition with other parties – if an issue could threaten to divide a party, its leaders will be reluctant to pick up that issue – a party's reputation is considered when trying to chase votes by strategic positioning.



## Theoretical foundation

In this section, the theoretical foundation of this research will be outlined by selecting elements of each theory that will be used to create predictions on which the data collection will be based. First, the theoretical structure and key elements will be outlined after which the predictions will be formulated. In the next chapter, the research design will be presented.

The academic field of integration theories takes a large scope of different approaches. Some of these theories have been (partly) imported from other disciplines such as Sociology or Economics, while others emerge from within the discipline itself. These theories are important to make sense of the world around us and to understand disagreements about policy that usually arise from a deeper disagreement about the underlying fundamentals that shape international outcomes (Walt, 1998). Within the large spectrum of integration theories that are introduced and heavily discussed in the academic arena over the past decades, this research will limit its scope to the three theories outlined in the previous chapter: neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and post-functionalism.

The theory of post-functionalism by Hooghe and Marks (2009) will be taken as a starting point in this research. This theory is relatively new in the debate of European integration and brings new elements to the table such as public opinion, referendums, politicization and party politics. It explicitly argues that previously dominant theories neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism have become less relevant in European Union decision-making and are outdated.

According to Hooghe and Marks (2009) domestic and European politics have become more connected. Whereas the EU used to be solely a matter of importance for interest groups in the late 1950s and 80s that focused on economic disputes between firms and was not considered important by the public, the EU now involves numerous issues that affect the public. This has led to an increased importance of the public opinion in European integration. Because the consequences of EU development had little implications for the public, supranational deals were made by the elites while there was a trend of permissive consensus by the public. Since European developments now do affect the public, there has been a shift from permissive consensus to constraining consensus.

This shift came about because of the increased presence of European integration in

societal discourse and national politics. Therefore, the content and processes of the formerly elite-centered decision-making had to make room for a more Eurosceptical public (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). Political parties had to strategically react to the fact that the European developments started to play an increasing role for the public because political parties are concerned to be elected by the public. The theory argues that the public opinion determines national voting on European integration and that political parties' position on the new political spectrum of GAL/TAN also plays a significant role.

The case of the TERS provides a unique possibility to test the elements of post-functionalism and the dominant theories of neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism to this recent phenomenon. All theories directly oppose each other in terms of the most influential actors regarding EU integration. Hooghe and Marks (2006), specifically mention that immigrants are the biggest threat for national communities for TAN parties. Furthermore, according to public opinion surveys by Eurobarometer (2015) immigration was seen as the most important issue facing Europe in 2015 in all member states. Therefore, the TERS provides a unique opportunity to test the theory as it covers both of its key elements because it is expected to have high explanatory power. To find out if the theories of neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are really outdated as post-functionalism claims, these theories will also be tested.

When testing the relative explanatory power of post-functionalism against the other theories, it is of vital importance to focus on the *conflicting* elements. These conflicting elements are the *actors* that are decisive in explaining government voting-decisions regarding EU integration as these directly oppose each other in the theories. The theories of neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are strongly engaged in a dominant and decades-long debate about the role of different actors' influence on EU integration. While neo-functionalists claim that pressures from non-state actors such as supranational-oriented interest groups and the European Commission have the most influence on governments voting-decisions, intergovernmentalists argue that the influence of domestic-oriented interest groups on the government and interstate bargaining are decisive in European integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). The conflicting elements are outlined in table 1.

The focus on the theory's actors means that not all the theoretical aspects will be considered for this research. The elements that are not included are the elements that do not focus on key actors and do not directly oppose one of the other theories' elements.

Therefore, the neo-functional element of *functional* spill-over pressures will not be included because this is about the interdependency of supranational sectors and policies which leads functional pressures to integrate more sectors and policies to the supranational level (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991).

The liberal intergovernmentalist principle of the lowest common denominator, outlined by Moravcsik (1993), will also not be considered. The lowest common denominator principle states that under unanimity voting, the final decision tends to be determined by the least willing actor(s) because this way a veto can be prevented and a compromise often is in the interest of all actors involved. Because the voting procedure for the TERS was based on qualified majority voting (European Parliament, 2015) governments didn't have a veto power. The principle of the lowest common denominator is thus not applicable here. It furthermore doesn't directly contradict the other theories' elements.

Finally, the element of politicization of post-functionalism will also not be included. Politicization is about the entering of an issue into mass politics and is used as a *tool* by political parties who think that politicizing an issue will bring them electoral benefits (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). This element does not focus on an actor's influence on government voting-decisions regarding the TERS and does not directly oppose another theory. It therefore is not taken further into account.

**Table 1. Schematic overview of theories.**

	<i>Key elements</i>	<i>Most influential actors regarding European integration</i>
<b>Neo-functionalism</b>	Political spill-over pressures	Supranational orientated interest groups
	Cultivated spill-over pressures	European Commission
<b>Liberal intergovernmentalism</b>	State preferences	National oriented interest groups
	Interstate bargaining	States
<b>Post-functionalism</b>	Public opinion	Citizens
	Political parties position on political spectrum	Political parties

## **Predictions**

In this section predictions will be formulated that are derived from the theories key elements. These key elements will now be operationalized to create testable predictions. Based on these predictions, empirical observations will be made to test the theories' relative strength regarding the formation of the TERS. The predictions are expected to be found when observing the real world (Blatter & Blume, 2008). For each theory, two predictions are formulated which do not necessarily have to be true at the same time. In other words, the validity of one prediction doesn't depend on the other prediction within the same theory.

In the following chapter, the expected and observed state preferences regarding the TERS will be presented. These preferences will then be compared to the actual government voting-decisions on the TERS to see what the relative explanatory power of the theories is. This could then lead to one the following outcomes: the observations are in line with the predictions; the observations are contradictory to the predictions; or the observations are not in line with the predictions, but also do not directly contradict the predictions they however lie outside the set of predictions linked to the theory (Blatter, 2012). The predictions generated in this research will contribute to the main question: *How can the formation of the Temporary EU Relocation System be explained based on European integration theories?*

When formulating predictions it is important that they are as diverse as possible and that they include multiple observations such as data sets, process observations, analyzation of the vital actors and possible other elements of the theory. When applying the CON approach, it is of crucial importance that the generated predictions are valid and that they actually capture, and thus are able to, measure the selected theory (Mills, Durepos & Wiebe, 2010). The core elements of each of the theories have been summarized in the earlier chapters of this research and will be integrated in the predictions. The different predictions per theory will now be outlined below.

### **Predictions for neo-functionalism**

To test the theory of neo-functionalism, predictions must include elements of political pressures by interest groups and elements of cultivated pressures by the European Commission regarding integrating the TERS.

### Political spill-over pressures

The first prediction concerns the element of political spill-over pressures which postulates that interest groups shift their focus to the supranational level instead of the national level because they come to the realization that this is more beneficial for them to reach their goals. These pressures will lead to an integrative impulse, because the interest group's elites will pressure the national governments to expedite the integration process (Haas, 1985). The prediction is therefore as follows:

- I. Pressures from supranational-oriented interest groups determined state preferences regarding the Temporary EU Relocation System.

### Cultivated spill-over pressures

The second element of spill-over pressures concerns the role of the European Commission. Both Haas (1985) and Lindberg (1963) stress the importance of the European Commission's supporting role in the process of European integration. By acting as a political entrepreneur rather than a mediator between the member states, the European Commission tries to push through its own preferences during the decision-making process to stimulate the process of European integration (Jensen, 2010). The prediction is therefore as follows:

- II. Pressures by the European Commission determined state preferences regarding the Temporary EU Relocation System.

### **Predictions for liberal intergovernmentalism**

To test the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, the predictions must include the elements of state preferences and of interstate bargaining. These elements together form the two-staged model that is outlined by Moravcsik (1993).

### State preferences

Moravcsik (1993) outlines intergovernmentalism's premise which is that state-society relations have a crucial impact on a state's behavior in world politics. He argues that state governments act according to the goals and preferences that are defined within their

societies by diverse national-oriented interest groups which makes the state a representative institution, or in other words a 'transmission belt'. Because societal groups compete over political influence, policy goals of governments can be subject to changes as they rely on the dynamic of preferences in society.

Besides economic interests, Moravcsik also points out another motivation interest groups can have: *federalism* or *nationalism*. The first group sees European integration as a 'cosmopolitan ideal' which is justified by a shared European purpose and identity. Opposed to this group are the national oriented ones who stress the preservation of national sovereignty and therefore oppose European integration. Geddes (2000) points out that pro-migrant groups are in favor of a common EU level response from member states and thus seek to achieve *more* Europe while the opposite counts for anti-immigration groups. These groups are expected to pressure governments to vote either in favor or against the TERS. The prediction is therefore as follows:

- I. Pressures from national-oriented interest groups determined state preferences regarding the Temporary EU Relocation System.

#### Interstate bargaining

After a set of state interests is defined based on societal group pressures, the second aspect of liberal intergovernmentalism's interstate bargaining comes into play. At the moment of interstate bargaining, the states are seen as unitary actors and the role of supranational institutions is expected to be very limited. During the bargaining process, governments try to make agreements in line with the preferences of societal groups. The outcomes of this interstate bargaining are based on the intensity of national preferences, the opportunity for issue linkages and the existence of alternative coalitions (Moravcsik, 1993; Cini, 2016). The prediction is therefore as follows:

- II. Interstate bargaining determined state preferences regarding the Temporary EU Relocation System.

## **Predictions for post-functionalism**

To test the theory of post-functionalism, the predictions must include the elements of public opinion and positions of national government parties on the political spectrum.

### Public opinion

Post-functionalists argue that the influence of the elites diminished while the influence of the public opinion started to become increasingly important and became able to affect national voting. Political parties now act strategically to anticipate on the effects of their decisions on the public and thus their electoral position.

*Inclusive or exclusive* national identities form the basis for public opinion. If one's national identity is exclusive, the affection with one's own country and European integration are incompatible while an inclusive identity can combine these two. Therefore, the people with an exclusive identity are more Eurosceptical according to the theory than people with an inclusive identity.

Based on the theory of post-functionalism one would expect that the public opinion is able to affect national voting regarding the TERS. The prediction is therefore as follows:

- I. States are against the Temporary EU Relocation System if its citizens possess an exclusive identity.

### Position political spectrum

In their work on left versus right party position structures on European integration, Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) came to the surprising conclusion that the strongest relationship between party position and their stance on European integration is among the new politics parties whereas the relation was mainly expected to be based on the left-right dimension. These new parties include the green, alternative and liberal (GAL) and the traditional, authoritarian and nationalist (TAN) parties.

Parties that are TAN-oriented focused on defending national sovereignty and cultural identity and therefore reject European integration, especially in a case that involves immigrants as they are the biggest threat for a country's cultural identity. While the association between TAN and European integration is strong, GAL has a weaker association.

GAL-oriented parties such as Green parties are selective in striving for a particular form of EU integration such as environmental policies. The prediction is therefore as follows:

- II. States consisting of strong TAN-oriented parties voted negative on the Temporary EU Relocation System proposal.



## 4. Research design

This chapter will elaborate on the qualitative design of this research. It will start by giving a short overview of the possible methods that could be used before legitimizing the design that is selected for this research. The independent variable (X) consists of the European integration theories: neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and post-functionalism. The dependent variable (Y) is the formation of the TERS. Variable Y is the variable one makes a prediction about which is based on variable X. This research will look for information that can either confirm or reject the influence of the theories elements to test their explanatory power regarding the case of the TERS.

In their work, Blatter and Blume (2008) argue that there are three distinct approaches that can be used when conducting a research based on case studies: co-variational (COV), causal process tracing (CPT) and congruence analysis (CON). These methods are generally used to draw conclusions from empirical observations to abstract causal explanations and interpretations regarding the case(s) that are being investigated. This process is referred to as 'inference'.

In a COV design, causal inferences are based upon the independent variable (X) and dependent variable's (Y) observed co-variation. When such a co-variation exists between variables X and Y, one can infer that there is causality between them (Blatter & Blume, 2008). Drawing causal inferences by using COV requires two conditions. First, control variables need to be created to include potential elements that might influence the outcome. Second, empirical observations need to be connected to the theory to give meaning to the co-variance between the variables. However, because this method's abstract conclusions are based on the logic: X has a causal effect on Y, this method is not appropriate for this research as it doesn't seek to find causality but instead focusses on the theories' relative strength and their explanatory power to explain cases (Blatter & Blume, 2008).

An alternative method for this research could be CPT. This method focusses on tracing complex interactions of causal factors and mechanisms. CPT attempts to 'identify and verify observable within-case implications of causal mechanisms' (George & Bennett, 2005). In this method traces for every step between the cause and outcome are identified. George and Bennett state that causal mechanisms are 'ultimately unobservable', however one can observe and identify their traces (Blatter & Blume, 2008). Because this method is focused on

a full 'storyline' and seeks causal mechanisms/interaction between the elements of a causal configuration, it is not appropriate for this research as the focus for this research is based on theories relative strengths and their explanatory power.

This brings us to the final approach which is the method that is chosen for this research: the congruence analysis. This method focuses on the (mis-)matches between empirical findings and concrete expectations that arrive from key elements of rival theories (Blatter & Blume, 2008). This theoretical design approach does not compare cases or data with each other but compares (opposing) theoretical expectations. Therefore, it is not necessary to look for variation across cases to scientifically answer the research question.

Instead, outcomes are based on the extent of coherence between expectations derived from theory and the empirical observations. When the implications of a theory match with the collected data while an opposing theory does not match, the former has more explanatory power. For this method, it does not matter in advance whether observations are based on similar or different cases from a cross-national perspective (Haverland, 2010). Because this research is based on three theories of international relations, this method will serve this research best as it provides a suitable option to explain the theories' explanatory powers.

To test the theories, data from all member states involved in the TERS decision-making is collected. Besides this cross-case analysis this research will derive multiple predictions based on the theories' key elements relevant to the research question. Gerring (2007) explains that usually it is not possible to grasp a theory by a single prediction, which makes several predictions preferable because it allows the researcher to conduct multiple observations to test the theory.

When applying CON to draw inferences from concrete observations with predictions that are based on theories to test their relative explanatory power to explain a case, the researcher can select a deductive or an inductive approach (Blatter & Blume, 2008). By using the deductive approach, the researcher produces predictions that are based on the theory and are expected to be found when observing the world. The inductive approach works the other way around, by starting with the observation after which the researcher reflects to see which theory best matches it. This research applies a deductive approach since theory-driven predictions are created to observe the world.

CON differs from the two previously discussed methods because it uses a much broader

scope of predictions and observations. The predictions derived from the theories should include assumptions based on their key elements (Blatter & Blume, 2008). In this research, the predictions that are derived from the theories will be used as a starting point in order to find information that is relevant for testing the theory. Based on the collected information of the 'real world', the relative explanatory power of the theories will be evaluated by comparing this information with each of the theories predictions.

### **Case selection**

Gerring (2007) points out that a case study focusses at a single case with the goal to understand a bigger range of cases. One can closely observe a single case by looking at a subset of *within-cases*. The researcher can also use a *cross-case* study by observing several different cases instead of one. Cross-case studies, consisting of a larger amount of cases (N), can test several hypotheses with more confidence than single case studies and are therefore more appropriate when testing extant theories. Cross-case studies furthermore limit the number of ways to interpret gathered evidence because of a larger N and are therefore more reliable.

Because this research revolves around the explanatory power of three IR theories based on the single case of the TERS, the cross-case method is applicable here. The cases that are selected to test the three theories are all the European member states that voted for the TERS proposal by the European Commission. Exceptions are Finland, Denmark, Ireland and Britain. Finland abstained from voting while Denmark, Ireland and Britain opted-out on the voting process (European Commission, 2016).

## 5. Analysis

After the predictions have been generated, data needs to be collected to see whether the predictions hold. In this research, a distinction will be made between three aspects. First, the *predicted* state preferences according to the three European integration theories as outlined in the previous chapter. Second, the *observed* state preferences, before the voting decisions on the European Commission's. By looking at the original state preferences closely after the proposals were unveiled, a comparison can be made with the final voting decisions to see if and why preferences have changed in the run-up to the final voting-decisions.

On the 27th of May 2015, the European Commission unveiled a proposal to relocate 40.000 refugees from Greece and Italy to other member states on a compulsory base. Euractiv (2015) reported that this plan to relocate refugees via a compulsory basis had been rejected by the member states on 16 June. Poland and Spain are repeatedly mentioned as the fiercest opponents. 12 countries were willing to accept the proposal of mandatory quotas but didn't agree on the parameters on which the amount was based while 12 to 13 countries didn't want to accept the mandatory quotas.

After this proposal was rejected, the new goal was to relocate the same amount of people but on a voluntary basis by the end of the year 2015 (Euractiv, 2015). On 9 September, another proposal was made by European Commission's President Juncker to relocate an additional 120.000 refugees from Hungary, Italy and Greece. He furthermore, (re-)introduced binding quotas for the total amount 160.000 migrants as well as a permanent relocation system. Finally, both proposals of relocation 40.000 and 120.000 migrants were accepted, however, on a voluntary basis. The observed preferences regarding the European Commission's proposals that were first formulated by states in official statements are presented in the table below.

**Table 2. State's observed preferences regarding TERS proposal**

<b>In Favour</b>	<b>Additional comments</b>	<b>Against</b>	<b>Additional comments</b>	<b>Other</b>	<b>Additional comments</b>
<b>BE</b>		<b>CZ</b>	Muslims are not in a good position in the Czech Republic and are potential terrorists (EUobserver, 2015)	<b>SI</b>	Did not specify its stance on the proposal
<b>BG</b>		<b>ES</b>	Stated not to be ready to absorb large numbers of refugees (Euractiv, 2015)	<b>DK</b>	Did not vote
<b>DE</b>	Urged for more immigrants to relocate (Euractiv, 2015)	<b>HU</b>	Stated it does not want to have more Muslim migrants (Euractiv, 2015)	<b>IE</b>	Did not vote
		<b>LV</b>	Stated to be willing to take in only 200 refugees, less than half of the Commission's proposal (Politico, 2015)		
<b>EE</b>		<b>PL</b>	Rejected quota system and stressed that immigrants should be Christian (Euractiv, 2015)	<b>FI</b>	Did not vote
<b>EL</b>		<b>SK</b>	Rejected quota system and stressed that migrants should be Christian (Euractiv, 2015)	<b>UK</b>	Did not vote
<b>FR</b>					
<b>HR</b>					
<b>IT</b>					
<b>CY</b>					
<b>LT</b>					
<b>LU</b>					
<b>MT</b>					
<b>NL</b>					
<b>AT</b>	Demanded a summit to encourage a relocation system together with Germany (EUobserver, 2015)				
<b>PT</b>					
<b>RO</b>					
<b>SE</b>					

\* country abbreviations in appendix

Table 3 shows what the member state's final voting-decisions were regarding both proposals by the European Commission. The first proposal consisted the relocation of 40.000

refugees and was approved on 14 September 2015. The other proposal of relocating an additional 120.000 refugees was approved on 22 September 2015. While most countries agreed on both, four Eastern European countries were strongly opposing the measures. These countries were Slovakia, Romania, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Finland abstained, while the Britain, Ireland and Denmark had to option to opt-out (The Economist, 2015).

Because the decision was made by qualified majority-voting, the relocation system was still pushed through despite the fierce opponents. This is seen by some capitals as politically unacceptable and it is a rare procedure in the EU that normally votes by consensus on highly sensitive issues (Financial Times, 2015). Prior to the European Council voting on both proposals, the Parliament had to be consulted before the measure could enter into force. The majority of the MEP’s were in favor of the proposals (European Parliament, 2015).

**Table 3. State’s final voting-decisions.**

Voted in favour of both proposals	Voted against both proposals	Did not vote
BE	CZ	DK
BG	HU	IE
DE	RO	FI
EE	SK	UK
EL		
ES		
FR		
HR		
IT		
CY		
LV		
LT		
LU		
MT		
NL		
AT		
PL		
SI		
PT		
SE		

In the following sections, the data collection for the theory predictions will be presented.

## **Neo-functionalism**

### **Political Spill-over**

Political spill-over states that supranational-oriented interest groups will pressure national governments to speed up the integration process. They do this because these groups claim that European solutions are more beneficial for them than national solutions (Jensen, 2010). Geddes (2000) states that pro-migrant groups are in favor of a common EU level response from member states and thus seek to achieve more Europe.

### *Operationalization*

Groups are selected based on their relevance towards the subject: related to policy concerning migration, asylum and refugees at the national or European level. Furthermore, the budget (grants) of the organizations is considered during the selection. All groups are selected through the Transparency Register that is offered by the European Commission and European Parliament. This register is designed to provide citizens information on individuals and groups that are in contact with EU institutions. Before getting access to these institutions, these individuals or groups must register to the Transparency Register (European Parliament, 2017). Therefore, all selected groups have been active at the supranational level.

Groups will furthermore be selected based on their capacity to influence policy outcomes. The most important indicators for a group's success to influence policies are its financial power, its staff and membership. This can increase the group's success as it can put more people on a case or even by using more money for an issue (Mahoney, 2007). Membership is measured by looking at the amount of countries the organization's activities take place in. The focus will only be on the most powerful interest groups as these are the most likely to be able to determine government preferences. The groups are presented in the table 4.

To find out if these groups could have determined state preferences regarding the TERS, their agenda's and projects in 2015 will be investigated to find out if they have been lobbying at the national level. This will be done by looking at their websites, the European Commission's Transparency Register, Lobbyfacts and newspaper articles via Lexis Nexis.

Furthermore, government agenda's and or statements concerning contact with interest groups will be searched for.

**Table 4. Supranational-oriented interest groups**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Grants</b>	<b>Staff</b>	<b>Membership</b>	<b>Lobbyists</b>
<b>Human Rights Watch (HRW)</b>	€78.162.105	400	90 countries	7
<b>The International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD)</b>	€19.937.269	200	15 countries	14
<b>Amnesty International European Association (AIEA)</b>	€1.977.387	530	160 countries	11
<b>Caritas Europa (CE)</b>	€1.899.149	<i>Not shown</i>	46 countries	13
<b>European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE)</b>	€1.810.540	14	40 countries	13
<b>International Catholic Migration Commission-Europe (ICMC-Europe)</b>	€1.694.574	<i>Not shown</i>	40 countries	2

*Source: Transparency Register & Lobbyfacts*

### *Human Rights Watch*

The HRW seeks to influence policies in line with human rights by meeting governments, the United Nations, and regional groups such as the EU and the African Union (HRW, 2017). It states in an agenda for action on the European refugee crisis that European countries should do much more to ensure the rights of asylum seekers and guarantee their protection. It stresses that EU countries must cooperate to protect the refugees and to establish an effective asylum system. The HRW stresses the importance of the relocation plan of 160.000 asylum seekers in Europe.

Reflecting on 2015, the HRW states that the EU's dismal reaction to the refugee crisis can be blamed on a lack of solidarity with human right principles, vision and leadership. It furthermore deplores the deal with Turkey and the lack of successful implementation of the



relocation system. It furthermore states that during this year, the organization had 'urged' member state governments and the EU institutions to ensure better cooperation and to fix the European asylum system. However, the HRW admits, the EU didn't listen and went the opposite direction (HRW, 2016).

After having a meeting with the European Commission on June 3 (Transparency Register) during which the human rights situation in Hungary were discussed, the HRW later had direct contact with the Hungarian government about its new border regime that denies access to asylum-seekers. Gall, a member of the organization, declared that a state has a right to protect their borders but the measure taken by Hungary encourages other countries to do the same and punishes the refugees who look for a safe haven. It furthermore stressed the importance of a EU-level solution (HRW, 2015). There is no evidence found of interaction with other member states.

### *The International Centre for Migration Policy Development*

The ICMPD has been active in the European Agenda for Migration as well as the Common European Asylum System, notably the relocation system (Transparency Register). Via so-called migration dialogues governmental discussions and interstate dialogue is encouraged. Their purpose is to promote sustainable migration policies by offering an informal consultation mechanism (ICMPD, 2017).

On their website, all ICMPD's completed and ongoing projects are presented. The project 'Asylum Programme for ICMPD Member States' concerns the asylum situation in Europe that started in 2013 and it still ongoing. In this project, the ICMPD visited various member states to understand their concerns and priorities regarding the area of asylum. The organization furthermore provides a forum for policy makers and asylum experts of these member states to share thoughts on the challenges they're facing in a round table setting or with expert hearings. In 2015 there were regular meetings in which the resettlement of refugees was discussed (ICMPD, 2017). There are no publications of the exact content of these meetings. But it is clear by the setting and character of the meetings that the ICMPD played a facilitating role rather than pressuring governments.

### *Amnesty International European Association*

AIEI stressed in a joint statement together with 20 other organizations such as the HRW the terrible situation that people are in who are stranded and stuck at the Greek shores. This statement was directed at all member states. The organizations heavily criticize the governments and stress that more effort is needed to help these people. In various press releases on their website AIEA has encouraged European governments to find a collective solution to manage the migration crisis. In July, it stated during a meeting of EU Justice and Home Affairs ministers that 'any deal to relocate some 40.000 asylum seekers across the EU would be only a small step towards fixing a broken system'. The real solution must be found in creating a more stable and permanent relocation system (Amnesty International, 2015).

In 2012, Amnesty International launched a campaign called 'Resettlement Saves Lives!' together with organizations such as CCME, ECRE, ICMC, IOM and Save Me. Its goal is to resettle 20,000 people in Europe by 2020 by calling on governments to increase resettlement (European Resettlement Network, 2017). Director Dalhuisen expressed his disappointment after attending the Council meeting in September by stating that an ambitious new approach was needed, but instead the countries continued with the failed strategy (ECRE, 2015).

### *Caritas Europe*

CE supports the Resettlement Saves Lives campaign but there is no evidence of pressures from this organization regarding the TERS towards EU governments.

### *European Council on Refugees and Exiles*

ECRE has been active regarding Common European Agenda on Migration. On 14 September 2015, the ECRE expressed its view on the relocation system by stating that it would be a 'useful tool' to relieve pressure on the most affected member states. For the system to be effective, the numbers should be much higher than the number proposed by the European Commission. ECRE underlines UNHCR's statement that the number of relocation should be augmented to a total of 200,000. ECRE had stated earlier that for Greece only, at least 70,000 people should be relocated. Furthermore, the organization says

that instead of two years, the relocation system should be carried out within one year (ECRE, 2015).

### *International Catholic Migration Commission Europe*

Since 2012 ICMC-Europe has been promoting refugee resettlement via the European Resettlement Network. ICMC-Europe also participated in the program 'Resettlement Saves Lives'. Via this campaign they try to influence government actions to support refugee resettlement (ICMC, 2017). No specific information has been found on interaction with governments regarding the TERS.

### **Cultivated Spill-over**

This element focuses on the role of the European Commission that aims to push through European integration by acting as a political entrepreneur and thereby expanding its role of being a mediator between the member states (Jensen, 2010). The theory of neo-functionalism does not provide an unambiguous explanation of *how* the European Commission tries to push through its proposals to achieve more European integration. Below the operationalization to measure cultivated spill-over for this research will be outlined.

### *Operationalization*

To find out whether the European Commission determined state preferences by acting as a political entrepreneur instead of just a mediator between member states, a distinction will be made between *direct* and *indirect* approaches. In his work Moravcsik (1999) points out that the political entrepreneur can directly impose its own preferences on the decision-making actors. This can be done by highlighting the problem and underscoring the potential benefits and symbolic values of the proposals outcome. It can also intervene in the interstate bargaining process by proposing new options.

The European Commission can also indirectly act as a policy entrepreneur by circumventing official communication channels and instead keep close contact with other actors such as interest groups. By reaching out to interest groups, the European Commission tries to sound out strong interests and obtain information regarding the policy area. Since these interest groups are often the same as those whom national government

administrations ask for help and support, this practice by the European Commission aims to restrict government choices in favor of the European Commission's proposals (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991).

Official documents and statements as well as news articles about communication between the European Commission and member states regarding the TERS will be searched for. Information on the indirect approach, via interest groups, will be collected by consulting Lobbyfacts which is a platform that provides detailed data on lobbying in European institutions. Its data is collected from the EU Transparency Register as well as data from the European Commission's website about high level lobby meetings. It possesses data on all officially registered meetings between interest groups and the European Commission and the procurements and grants from the European Commission to interest groups. The European Commission, however, does not publish any information about the content of the meetings with interest groups (Lobbyfacts, 2017). Therefore, this research must rely on the number of meetings and its topics. The most influential interest groups, as presented in the previous section, will also be used in this section.

### *Direct influence*

On the 19<sup>th</sup> of February 2015, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship Avramopoulos, declared in a speech that migration is a top 10 priority of the European Commission and is a joint European responsibility (European Commission, 2015). He stated that the European Commission and the member states need to 'establish a truly European program for the resettlement of refugees'. He furthermore highlights the 'thousands of lives that were lost in the Mediterranean' as well as the importance of human rights and solidarity with Italy.

On the 20<sup>th</sup> of April 2015, Mogherini and Avramopoulos presented a 10-point plan that included a EU wide voluntary pilot project on resettlement. They stressed that all these points require common effort by all member states and European institutions. On the 29<sup>th</sup> of April, President Juncker stressed the importance of solidarity regarding the relocation of refugees as 'we cannot leave it solely to the member states directly concerned'. This relocation plan 'will improve significantly the management of migration in Europe' and leads to greater solidarity, Avramopoulos stated in May (European Commission, 2015).

After the relocation proposal was presented to the member states, Avramopoulos

stressed that the proposals are ‘an expression of solidarity and responsibility’ and reminded the member states that ‘solidarity does not come in pieces’. He further stated that countries should look beyond their national interests because the very core of the European unity and collaboration is at stake. Later, after the first proposal to relocate 40,000 persons was accepted, the Avramopoulos stated that he was disappointed that it was accepted on a voluntary base instead of the proposed redistribution key. He addressed that the European Commission will propose another fixed system later that year (European Commission, 2015). This statement was repeated later by Commissioner Cañete and President Timmermans on August 20<sup>th</sup> who stated that they count on the courage and commitment of the member states as it is a collective problem.

During the State of the Union 2015 on September 9<sup>th</sup>, Juncker stated that the refugee crisis is the first priority of Europe. He stressed that the European Union does not act as a Union. After underscoring the moral importance of the crisis by making references to the Second World War, he proposes the second relocation mechanism of 120,000 refugees as well as a permanent relocation mechanism for the future. After the majority of the countries voted in favor of the relocation of another 120,000 the European Commission showed its appreciation but stressed that more must be done to cope with the challenges (European Commission, 2015). The proposal to relocate another 120,000 was accepted under the condition that it was voluntary (Euractiv, 2015).

### *Indirect influence*

#### *Human Rights Watch*

In 2015 the HRW had a total of eight registered meetings with the European Commission. Among these meetings there has been a meeting on 5 May between the HRW and First Vice-President Frans Timmermans about the upcoming migration agenda. On June 3, there was a meeting between the HRW and the European Commission represented by Liene Balta (cabinet member) where they discussed the Fundamental rights situation in Hungary. The subjects of this meeting were most likely about the Hungarian government’s actions failing to respect human rights by funding hate campaigns against asylum seekers and migrants, detention of these people without giving them a possibility to challenge it, poor access to asylum and using violence to force these people back to the border (Human

Rights Watch, -). These issues were occurring at the time of the meeting and therefore it is likely that these were discussed. On 22 July, the HRW had a meeting with Vice-President Federica Mogherini about Human Rights in general. Then on 15 September there was another meeting with Liene Balta on the Human rights regarding the migration crisis.

### *The International Centre for Migration Policy Development*

There have been no meetings between the ICMPD and the European Commission in 2015. The European Commission however is the most important institution for the ICMPD as it is responsible for almost half of its project funding. Among these projects are migration, asylum issues (ICMPD, 2017).

### *Amnesty International European Association*

In 2015 the AIEA had 20 meetings with the European Commission of which at least five have been about migration issues in Europe. There have been meetings with a general topic of 'Fundamental rights' which could have included the European migration crisis, but because there is no information about the meetings published this is uncertain. On 14 April, there has been a meeting with Liene Balta about the fundamental rights in the EU. Since the HRW had meetings with Liene Balta on migration issues and one of her responsibilities is migration (European Commission, 2017) it is likely that migration issues were discussed during this meeting. The same day there also was a meeting with Timmermans about the same topic. On five May the AIEA had another meeting with Timmermans about the upcoming migration agenda and on 29 May there has been a meeting about the migration policy. Other meetings with the topic migration were after the final voting-decisions in September and will not be considered.

### *Caritas Europe*

There have been no meetings between the CE and the European Commission in 2015 regarding the migration crisis.

### *European Council on Refugees and Exiles*

In 2015 there have been three meetings between the ECRE and the European Commission. One of these meetings, that took place on 5 May, was with Timmermans and concerned the upcoming migration agenda.

### *International Catholic Migration Commission Europe*

There have been no meetings between ICMC-Europe and the European Commission in 2015.

## Liberal intergovernmentalism

### State preferences

According to this theory, states are expected to act purposively within the supranational arena based on the goals that are set domestically by interest groups that focus on the national level. These groups are the most fundamental actors when one tries to explain the formation of supranational policy and EU integration. This relation and interaction between the state and its society explains the formation of state preferences. To find what the most fundamental influences on EU integration are one needs to look at the identities of the most important interest groups, their interests and their influence on national preference formation (Moravcsik, 1993). The focus in this research will be on federal and national oriented interest groups as is explained in the previous chapter.

Pressures from interest groups in the issue area of *political, institutional or redistributive policies* leads to little government autonomy because of the constraints by interest groups. If there are no strong pressures from interest groups, governments enjoy a relatively broad autonomy to pursue their own interests (Moravcsik, 1993).

### Operationalization

Measuring the effect of interest groups on other actors is accompanied with some difficulties. Dür (2008) outlines three obstacles in his work. He first argues that defining power is of vital importance when conducting an empirical research. There are many different definitions of what power is. The definition that is used for this research stems from Lukes (1974). Here, power is about the actor's ability to prevent other actors from recognizing their genuine interests. Preferences from weak actors are manipulated in a way that they might end up being opposing to their original preferences. This definition captures the theories' expected capability of constraining government preferences in accordance to their will.

Secondly, there is a difficulty on how to address ways in which interest groups can influence other actors. Dür (2008) argues that to not underestimate the power interest groups can have, it is important not to focus on one pathway only. Instead, the following pathways should be considered: *access, voice and structural coercion*. Access is



about the interest groups demands, directly expressed to decision-makers by testifying for expert commissions or via informal communication. Voice channel is used by interest groups when they produce 'noise' by setting up petitions, influencing referenda, manifestations, rallies, media statements and participating in public debates. This way interest groups try to shape public opinion in their favor and to inform politicians about policy preferences. The last element of structural coercion is about the interest groups ability to invest in policies that serve their interests. This can instigate politicians to be in favor of particular policies (Dür, 2008).

The final difficulty concerns the measurement of influence. The approach that is most used in this matter is process tracing. When applying process tracing, one must examine the preferences of interest groups, their political activities, the preferences of decision-makers have changes during the process, the degree to which interest groups preferences are reflected in policy outcomes and their satisfaction with these outcomes. The risk here is that one often concludes that group X didn't have any influence on outcome Y, while there may have been some influence. However, this approach is less appropriate when using large N-cases such as this research in which a relative large amount of countries and interest groups are being scrutinized because it is rather time consuming.

De Jesus (2010) points out another approach: the 'degree of preference attainment approach', which is described by Dür (2008) and Mahoney (2007). When using this approach one measures the policy outcome by looking at the distance between the interest groups' desired point of influence and its real achievement. The advantage here is that it is an appropriate method to use large N-cases. It can furthermore detect influence in various channels. Because of its appropriateness for this research, this approach will be used to measure influence by domestic interest groups on national government preferences.

Because of practical and time-related concerns, not all countries and interest groups will be investigated. Instead, to test the influence of interest groups on state voting decisions, the focus will solely be on the countries that voted differently from their first observed preferences. According to the theory, strong pressures from interest groups can influence government's preferences by constraining their autonomy. If a country voted different from their observed preferences, this would have been due interest group pressures according to the theory.

If a government's final voting-decision was in line with its earlier observed preference, this could mean that the government enjoyed broad autonomy because of a lack of powerful opposing interest groups or because the interest groups agreed with the government's preferences and therefore didn't need to excessively use 'access', 'voice' or 'structural coercion' pathways. In other words, the relation between the influences of interest groups regarding the government's voting decisions is less clear.

The countries that voted contrary to their first observed preferences are Spain, Poland, Latvia and Romania. Table 2 shows that Spain, Latvia and Poland originally uttered to be against the TERS as proposed by the Commission. Romania on the other hand was in favor. Table 3 shows that these countries ended up voting contrary to their observed preferences. Spain, Poland and Latvia voted in favor while Romania voted against the TERS.

Information on the domestic interest groups is found by considering the database of Nexis Lexis' news articles published worldwide concerning the particular country and by using keywords such as 'relocation', 'migration', 'immigrants' and 'protests'. All articles that were published in the period of early 2015 until the final voting-decisions at September 24 were then read. The findings are presented below.

### *Spain*

While the Spanish government stated not to be willing to accept the European Commission's proposal to relocate refugees from Greece and Italy because the country was not ready to accept large numbers of refugees, Spaniards have been 'overwhelmingly' supportive to welcome more refugees (CSmonitor, 2017). After Prime Minister Rajoy, stated only to accept less than half of the requested 6000 refugees, Spaniards started to protest.

On 1 September 2015, Barcelona and Madrid gathered together to form a 'network of cities' that was initiated to welcome hundreds of thousands of migrants that were arriving in Europe. Both cities, where left-wing councils are run by protest movements by citizens, were criticizing the Spanish government for its reaction to the migration crisis. Both cities expressed in official statements that their plan is to set up a network of cities to approach the refugee crisis in a united manner. The city of Barcelona initiated this movement on August 29, led by Mayor Ana Colau (Agence France Presse, 2015).

Shortly after, at least a dozen of other city council said to be willing to take part in the initiative. Among these cities were Valencia, Córdoba and Pamplona. Barcelona set aside an

amount of €200,000 to support the Service for Immigrants and Migrants and Refugees. Another indication that solidarity towards refugees was strong in Spain is shown by Real Madrid's donation of one million euros for Refugees in Spain. Club President Florentino Perez had a phone call with Rajoy in which he discussed this issue (Real Madrid, 2015). Furthermore, as a response to the initiative by the city of Barcelona, hundreds of people contacted the authorities to indicate that they were willing to offer shelter to the refugees (The Local, 2015).

After the Spanish government first rejected the relocation plan by the European Commission, they called for more unity in Europe concerning the refugee crisis on September 4. Instead of sticking to the earlier government statement that Spain was only willing to take less than half of the 6000 refugees, Rajoy ended up by accepting the quota of 14,931 refugees as was proposed by the European Commission in addition to the earlier accepted 2379 (Christian Science Monitor, 2016). Rajoy even said on television channel Telecinco, that he thought European Commission has been slow to address the refugee crisis and that the Spanish government would take as many refugees as the EU institutions demand. When asked if the government now acts differently because of public pressures, Rajoy denied this (BBC, 2015). The reason for this change according to Prime Minister Rajoy was that he was 'horrified' by the images of drowned immigrants. Deputy prime minister de Santamaria said that the change was due to 'the changed situation in recent weeks' (The Irish Times, 2015). However, according to the Christian Science Monitor this change can be attributed to the protests largely.

### *Poland*

Poland has also softened its stance towards the relocation system. Prime Minister Duda said on August 27 that his country would not help to relocate refugees because of expected refugees from Ukraine which, he argued, will come to Hungary and Poland. Poland was later willing to relocate more migrants than the 2000 which were previously mentioned (The Irish Times, 2015).

On September 12, close before the final voting-decisions on the TERS, there were thousands of rallies in several Polish cities that included radical right-wing people protesting the relocation of refugees. In Warsaw, approximately 10,000 people were marching through the city while shouting "Poland, free of Islam" and "Today refugees, tomorrow terrorists".

One of the organizers of the march said that they were protesting to make clear to the government that should abandon any plans to relocation Muslims. At the same time there were a few hundred of people marching with the goal to show that refugees are welcome in Poland (U.S.News, 2015).

Besides large-scale marches against the relocation plans by the European Commission, Polish conservative media also tried to make sure the public opinion would be against the arrival of refugees. Furthermore, wSieci magazine published an edition which showed Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz with a burka while holding explosives (Reuters, 2015).

The European Commission wants Poland to relocate 12,000 refugees, the capital however, has agreed to receive only less than 2000 refugees within two years under the condition that these people are Christians. In September, the Polish government surprisingly voted in favor of the relocation system, while strongest societal pressures were opposing the arrival of immigrants.

### *Latvia*

In Latvia, public group Tevijas Sargi (Guards of the Fatherland) announced a picket to protest the admission of refugees. About 1000 people participated at the picket that took place in front of the government building on August 4. Besides this group, other groups organized protests as well: Taisnigums (nationalist group), Vilki (men's folk group), Dieva Suni (organization), All for Latvia (national association) and National Alliance (conservative nationalist lawmakers). These activities were directed towards the government that agreed on July, in an emergency cabinet meeting, that it would be willing to relocate 250 refugees in the coming two years (The Baltic Times, 2015).

On August 24, demonstrations by both pro- and anti-refugee groups were demonstrating in front of the Ministry of Culture in Riga. The pro-refugee group outnumbered the group of anti-refugee protesters by a couple of dozen against 7. One of the pro-refugee protesters mentioned to be initiating in a public debate on more humane ways for integration of immigrants. They furthermore urged the Ministry of Culture to make more effort to change the public opinion in favor of refugees. The Ministry responded by saying that they were trying but that it can't be changed overnight (The Baltic Times, 2015).

The participants of the protests in August said they were planning to organize a signature collecting campaign to realize a national referendum on the refugee crisis. This

referendum was realized and was won by the pro-immigrant group that supported the European Commission's plan to relocate refugees by agreeing to accept 531 people, which was more than twice the number formulated by the government in July. Directly after the result of the referendum an aggressive demonstration took place in. While all three coalition parties of the government were first not accepting the quotas imposed by the EU, the government now decided to accept the number of refugees defined by Brussels Riga (Politico, 2015).

### *Romania*

On September 2, Prime Minister Ponta stated, "We aren't standing with our arms crossed, we are prepared". Ponta had a phone conversation with Bulgarian Prime Minister Borissov in which they shared their solidarity with the European countries that are affected by the refugee crisis. In an official statement of the Romanian government President Iohannis said that Romania is willing to take part in the relocation scheme by accepting a total of 1705 refugees from Greece and Italy and another 80 persons from outside the EU (Nineoclock, 2015).

The country, however, disagrees with the European Commission's mandatory quotas in which Romania should relocate a higher number of people. President Iohannis stated that he doesn't believe that this issue should be solved by using force from the European Commission by threatening with sanctions. Instead an agreement should be searched for in which member states can act according to the possibilities and capabilities it has. He furthermore stressed to be solidary with the EU and its Member States, but a solution should be based on open dialogue and consultation with other member states (Agerpres, 2015).

Romania ended up voting against the relocation system as proposed by the European Commission. Ponta stated that the country doesn't want to relocate more refugees than the offered total of 1785. According to the European Commission's proposal, Romania was expected to take an extra 2475 refugees.

Based on newspaper articles information that was searched for via LexisNexis, there were no recordings of any large-scale protests or pressures on the government by societal interest groups. Also, there were not official statements by government officials found in which certain pressures were expressed.

## *Slovenia*

Slovenia didn't clearly express its stance towards the European Commission's proposals before the final voting-decisions. Therefore, it is less relevant to see if and how societal interest groups have changed the government's stance towards the TERS.

### **Interstate bargaining**

To find evidence for this element of the theory, the bargaining process between member states regarding the European Commission's proposal must be investigated. This bargaining process is based on the 1) relative intensity of national preferences, 2) the existence of alternative coalitions and 3) the opportunity for issue-linkages. During this process, governments try to make viable agreements based on the domestically determined national preferences groups which define the governments 'bargaining space'. During the negotiation process, opposing preferences are reconciled (Moravcsik, 1993).

### *Operationalization*

To understand bargaining outcomes, it is important to understand the elements that determine a state's relative power. These will serve as a method to gather information on the interstate bargaining process. Moravcsik (1993) explains that a state's bargaining influence derives fundamentally from asymmetries in national preference intensities. These preference intensities reflect a state's relative benefits and costs of an agreement as preferable to the best alternative available.

If the status-quo is more beneficial than cooperating to make an agreement, a state will not agree on it. This rejection of cooperation in favor of a more desirable alternative provides a state with the most vital form of bargaining power. In other words, the less a state is concerned with making an agreement, the stronger its bargaining power is. In this research, the countries that are dealing with the most asylum applications per 100,000 citizens are considered to be more concerned with a relocation system than countries where there is a little amount of asylum applications which gives the latter group a greater bargaining leverage regarding the TERS. This means that the countries dealing with the highest migration pressures are expected to push through the relocation system while the

least affected countries are satisfied with the status quo (Rittberger et al., 2017). This aspect stresses the importance of the international interdependence as outlined by Moravcsik (1993).

The second aspect of the bargaining process concerns the existence of alternative coalitions. The crucial point of this element is that it is sometimes beneficial for states to form an alternative coalition from which other states are excluded. The formation of such alternative coalitions while excluding other groups strengthens the interstate bargaining influence of these coalition members versus the parties that are excluded. In other words, a single state's threat of non-compliance is less powerful than the threat of non-agreement by a coalition.

The third and last element concerns the opportunity for issue-linkages. Whenever there is uncertainty about time pressures or a breakdown of negotiations, governments can sometimes make exchanges of concessions in issue areas of which their preferences are weaker to gain in other areas that they care more about. This kind of linkages can create benefits for all involved parties. Their main limitation is, however, domestic opposition. Linkages are therefore more likely to happen in issue areas of which domestic group preferences are not intense and are seen as a second best option for integration.

Based on information provided by official state or EU institutional documents, statements and news articles worldwide by using diverse websites as well as Lexis Nexis, information based on these 3 elements of interstate bargaining are gathered and presented below.

In 2015, there were 1,322,825 asylum seekers from outside the EU applying for asylum in Europe. To determine which states were the most and least affected by the migration pressures an overview is presented below that shows the amount of asylum applications per 100.000 citizens as well as the number of accepted asylum claims per 100.000 citizens for each country. This table stems from Rittberger et al. (2017) who used it to determine state's preference intensity regarding solutions for the refugee crisis following a liberal intergovernmentalist method.

<i>Affected states</i>			<i>Non-Affected States</i>		
<b>State</b>	<b>Number of asylum applicants per 100.000 citizens</b>	<b>Number of accepted asylum claims per 100.000 citizens</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Number of asylum applicants per 100.000 citizens</b>	<b>Number of accepted asylum claims per 100.000 citizens</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	1664	330	<b>Poland</b>	38	2
<b>Austria</b>	1025	175	<b>Spain</b>	29	2
<b>Germany</b>	588	174	<b>Estonia</b>	17	6
<b>Luxembourg</b>	447	33	<b>Latvia</b>	16	4
<b>Malta</b>	430	291	<b>Czech Republic</b>	13	4
<b>Belgium</b>	397	93	<b>Slovenia</b>	12	2
<b>Bulgaria</b>	284	78	<b>Lithuania</b>	11	3
<b>Cyprus</b>	267	187	<b>Portugal</b>	9	2
<b>Netherlands</b>	265	97	<b>Croatia</b>	5	1
<b>Italy</b>	139	49	<b>Romania</b>	5	2
<b>Greece</b>	121	37	<b>Slovakia</b>	4	1
<b>France</b>	114	31	<b>Hungary *</b>	1754	5

*Source: Rittberger et al. (2017).*

*\* Hungary is not considered as an affected state because it only accepted a very limited amount of asylum claims despite its large number of asylum applicants.*

This table shows that there was an asymmetric interdependence in the EU between the affected and non-affected member states. The countries in the affected group are expected to push through the relocation system, while the non-affected states have a strong bargaining position as the status-quo is a desirable position for them.

The opposing and non-affected countries are expected to be pressured by the effected countries that are eager to push through a European solution. Romania, who was originally in favor of the relocation system but finally voted against it, is expected to have been pressured by non-affected states such as member of the Visegrad Group. This situation is best captured by a *Rambo game* which means that actor A has a strong incentive to cooperate to avoid an unbeneficial outcome while actor B's desired strategy is to defect



(Rittberger et al., 2017).

German chancellor Merkel was one of the most ambitious leaders in Europe to call for the distribution of migrants with no limitations on its amount. She stressed that a binding agreement to relocate refugees was needed (Euractiv, 2015). According to the Guardian (2015) Poland changed its stance towards the European Commission's proposal because of pressures by Germany and France. After Poland had voted in favor of the proposal, Germany thanked its government for breaking with the opposing Eastern European countries. Poland's interior minister Piotrowska states that Poland was willing to accept the migrants but not the mandatory quota's (Politico, 2015).

The countries that voted against the proposal (Romania, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) accused the western states, and in particularly Germany, of 'bullying'. Politico (2015) reported that Germany threatened the unwilling Eastern European countries with 'serious consequences' if they kept on their resistance towards the relocation of refugees. Since the Visegrad group countries are largely depending on Germany in economic terms because it is their most important trading partner (Aspen Review, 2017), this threat was not unfounded.

During a joint press conference Merkel and Vice Chancellor Gabriel stated that Eastern European countries, need to do more to help control the crisis instead of relying on others such as Germany, Sweden and Austria. Gabriel argued that the Eastern European countries will benefit the most from open borders. He also stated that it is in Germany's interest to keep the open borders, but if other countries keep relying on Germany, Sweden and Austria, the debate will take another direction.

Among the critics, Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán blamed Germany for the crisis arguing that by accepting thousands of refugees and waiving normal procedures, refugees were encouraged by Germany to come (Politico, 2015). Czech Republic interior minister Chovanec said that the inconsistent policy of Germany is the main problem in the migration crisis (Parlementaire Monitor, 2015). Hungary and the Czech Republic formed, together with Poland and Slovakia, the so-called Visegrad group. This coalition made a joint declaration on the refugee crisis by stating that it is crucial to protect the external border, to cooperate with third countries and to identify Turkey as the key partner concerning the cooperation for return policy. The group collectively disagreed with a quota system determined by the European Commission (Government of the Czech Republic, 2015).

After first having stated to be in favor of a relocation system on a European level, Romania later started to express similar positions of those of the Visegrad Group who argued that quotas would lead more migrants to Europe which would unsettle their societies (Euractiv, 2015). There is however no evidence found that Romania switched sides due to pressures from the Visegrad group. The officials of this group didn't criticize Poland when they voted in favor of the TERS but stressed the importance of their own beliefs. When asked if they are looking for more partnerships in Europe they argued that the Visegrad Group is like a 4-wheel driven car, a fifth wheel is not necessary to drive. From time to time, however, passengers such as Romania can tag along (Visegrad Insight, 2015).

No evidence was found of issue linkages between different governments. Even if there were any, it is likely that they purposively would have been kept out of the media because issue linkages often cause domestic opposition (Moravcsik, 1993).

## Post-functionalism

### Public opinion

Based on the theory of post-functionalism that serves as the starting point of this research, public opinion can affect government voting regarding European integration matters. According to Hooghe and Marks (2006) public opinion on Europe is shaped by individual's national identities. However, the authors argue that having a strong national or territorial identity does not mean that one is by definition against or in favor of regional integration. What matters is the degree in which people's identities are *inclusive* or *exclusive*. People that have exclusive national identities are, according to the theory, predisposed to Euroscepticism when they believe that loving their country is contrary to European integration. For people that have inclusive identities, the affection with the one does not per definition exclude the other.

The national identities per country will be measured, as outlined in the theory by Hooghe and Marks (2009), based on surveys by Eurobarometer in which people are asked about their identities. Each survey by Eurobarometer consists roughly of 1000 face-to-face interviews for each country (Eurobarometer, 2017). The question from this survey, highlighted by Hooghe and Marks is about how respondents would describe themselves: exclusively national, national and European, European and national or European only. This output on this question by Eurobarometer will be used in this research to determine a country's in- or exclusiveness. The answer 'exclusively national' and 'European only' hereby represent both sides on the spectrum exclusive versus inclusive.

Besides national identity, two other elements will be covered in this research based on questions from Eurobarometer's surveys. First, Europeans perceptions of what they believe are currently the most important issues facing Europe, their country and themselves will be shown in a Table. This way it becomes clear whether the issue of immigration is even seen as something of vital importance by the people and if so, to what extent. The theory after all argues that public opinion has gained power because European matters now highly affect the public and not solely interest groups.

Second, Europeans views on immigrants from outside the EU will be presented in a Figure. The theory argues that people that are more exclusive and solely identify with their in-group, are predisposed in terms of not supporting 'jurisdiction encompassing outgroups'

(Hooghe & Marks, 2009). Therefore, people from countries that scored high on the 'exclusive' side are expected to hold negative views concerning the arrival of immigrants from outside the EU.

### *Operationalization*

Because the government voting-decisions regarding the TERS took place on 14 and 22 September 2015, data from Eurobarometer 83 is used. This data was collected via surveys that have been carried out between 16 and 27 May 2015. During this time, the refugee crisis was already in full effect and several policies were already proposed by the European Commission (Rittberger et al., 2017). Furthermore, to track the developments and possible trends in public opinion the data from Eurobarometer 84 will also be used. Fieldwork for this publication was done between 7 and 17 November 2015, closely after the final voting decisions. This way the numerous developments that happened within this timespan and its effect on the public opinion are covered.

Below the data from Eurobarometer 83 will first be presented after which the data of Eurobarometer 84 will follow. Finally, data on national identity and public opinion on migration of people from outside the EU is merged together in Figures 1 and 2 to provide a clear overview of the trends. Every country is presented on the horizontal axe followed by the name of the country and a '2' (Country + Country2). While the first country name represents data from Eurobarometer 83, the latter represents data from Eurobarometer 84.

### **Eurobarometer 83**

Eurobarometer 83 (2015) includes a question that shows that of all member states a majority of 73% is in favor of a common European policy on migration. A fifth of the respondents were against and 7% didn't know. The respondents from the Netherlands (85%), Germany (84%) and Malta (84%) were the most in favor of a common migration policy while the Czech Republic (52%), Estonia (53%) and Finland (57%) had the lowest scores. Compared to the previous data that was conducted in 2014, the overall support has risen with a total of 2%.

However, this information does not provide us with a sufficient insight of the member states public opinions because the question is rather broad and does not indicate any

implications. A common policy on migration doesn't provoke much resistance when the respondents are not confronted with the conditions of such a policy. Would 73% of the respondents still be in favor of a common migration policy if this would include that they must relocate (mostly Muslim) refugees, originating from the Middle-East and Africa to their country and that a previous national sovereignty will now be handed over to the EU? The outcomes will most likely differ completely. It is therefore that this question will not be considered for the continuation of this research. From here on, the focus will be on the previously discussed questions.

An overview of what respondents considered to be the two most important issues currently facing either the EU or their own country is outlined in Tables A and B (appendix). The issue of immigration was the most important for Europeans and was generally ranked the highest in 20 countries. Immigration (38%) was seen in 2015 as the most important issue that was facing the EU by the member state respondents, followed by economic situation (27%). Compared to the survey results from 2014, the issue of immigration strongly rose with 14%.

At the national level, unemployment (42%) and immigration (23%) are in general pointed out as the two most important issues facing the countries of the respondents. Unemployment already was the main issue when measured previously in autumn 2014 when it had a EU28 average of 45%. Where immigration stood on the 6<sup>th</sup> place with 7% in 2011, it rose to 18% in 2014 and was seen as the second biggest national issue in 2015 with 23%.

In Figure 1 the data is presented that contains Europeans identities in terms of identifying oneself as solely national, solely European or a combination of both. This data shows that majority of 60% of Europeans regard themselves as European citizens ('Nationality and European', 'European and Nationality' and 'European only'). A minority of less than 4 out of 10 respondents solely define themselves as nationality only and 2% of all Europeans see themselves as 'Europeans only'. In Luxembourg (82%) the sense of feeling European is the highest while the United Kingdom (64%), Cyprus (57%) and Greece (51%) score highest on 'Nationality only'.

Figure 2 generates more specific insights in the public opinion regarding the immigrants. When looking at the data it becomes clear that a small majority of Europeans hold a positive stance towards immigration of people from other member states (51% positive, 40%

negative and 9% don't know). The Nordic countries are positive in particular: Sweden 79%, 69% Finland and 65% Denmark. The least positive countries towards this 'intra-community' immigration are Latvia (36%), Italia (33%) and the Czech Republic (31%).

When asked about their view on immigration from outside the EU, only 34% of the respondents notified to have a positive feeling, while a majority of 56% holds negative feelings. A clear majority of Europeans are thus opposed to immigration of people from outside the EU. Only in Sweden a majority of 66% of the respondents said to feel positive about immigrants from outside the EU against 31% negative votes. Romania follows by a gap with 48% and Ireland with 47%. Other countries in which, although more limited, most of the respondents feel positive towards immigrants from outside the EU are Spain, Croatia and Ireland. The least positive Europeans are the Czechs (14% versus 81%), the Latvians (14% versus 78%), the Greek (19% versus 78%) and the Slovaks (17% versus 77%).

## **Eurobarometer 84**

To find out what the trend of public opinion has been in in the run-up to the voting moments on September 14 and 22, the data from Eurobarometer 84 will now be outlined. The data for this publication was collected in November 2015 which is closely after the moments the final decisions were made. This provides a good opportunity to track the changes in the public opinion from the period of May (begin period of the refugee crisis) and November (closely after the final voting's).

The percentages of the three most mentioned issues are presented in table C (appendix) as well as the differences for migration compared to May (Eurobarometer 83). Immigration was considered even more important in Eurobarometer 84 while all member states, except for Portugal, saw immigration as the most important issues facing the EU. In May 2015, in 20 out of the 28 member states immigration was perceived the most important issue.

Furthermore, the total percentage of respondents that thought immigration was the most important issue rose from 38% to 58%. In Estonia, 79% of the respondents put immigration on top of the list. In the Czech Republic, Denmark and Germany the score was 76%. Portugal was the only country in which immigration was put on the second position, while Spain had the second lowest score of 39%. The numbers that indicate the differences in percentages between May and November show that the importance of immigration for the EU has undergone a vital and rapid growth.

Table D (appendix) shows the second publication in 2015 on the question about the two most important issues facing the respondent's country. Immigration was in September seen as the main concern at national level together with unemployment, both having 36%. Immigration rose with 13 points compared to Eurobarometer 83. In 12 of the 28 countries immigration was now placed in first position. The highest percentages were found in Germany (76%), Malta, (65%), Denmark (60%), the Netherlands (56%), Austria (56%) and Sweden (53%). The lowest, on the other hand, were found in Portugal and Cyprus (5%), Romania (6%) and Spain (9%).

In Figure 1, the Eurobarometer 84 data on the question about identity is represented by the countries on the horizontal axe that include a '2'. It shows that a majority of 57% sees themselves as (partly) European (nationality and European, European and nationality and


European only). This is a decline of 3% since Eurobarometer 83. The other observed trend is that more than 41% of the respondents define themselves by their nationality only which is an increase of 3%.

Finally, Figure 2 shows the Eurobarometer 84 data regarding the respondents' feelings towards immigration of people from outside the EU. The data shows that a clear majority of respondents from 25 countries evokes a negative feeling towards immigration of people from outside the EU. In the countries Latvia and Slovakia (both 86%), Hungary (82%) and the Czech Republic and Estonia (both 81%) the negative perception of these immigrants is most shared. On the contrary, Sweden (70%), Spain (53%) and Ireland (49%) are the only three countries in which most of the people holds a positive stance towards immigration of people from outside the EU.

When comparing the data from Eurobarometer 83, with the data from Eurobarometer 84, it becomes clear that the negative stance towards immigration of people from outside the EU has grown. Eurobarometer 84 shows that for both survey rounds the total percentage of people holding a positive feeling was 34%. The negative feelings rose from 56% to 59% while the percentage of people that voted 'don't know' decreased from 10% to 7%. In 18 countries, the negative attitude has increased compared to the data from Eurobarometer 83. The biggest changes were in Romania (+20%), Slovenia (+19%) and Hungary (+12%).




Figure 1. Do you see yourself as..?



Source: Eurobarometer 83 & 84 (2015).

**Figure 2. How do you feel about immigration of people from outside the EU (%).**



Source: Eurobarometer 83 & 84 (2015). The options 'very positive' and 'fairly positive' as well as 'fairly negative' and 'very negative' are bundled together as 'Total Positive' and 'Total Negative'.

## Political party spectrum

This section will present the data that is related to the second aspect of the theory, which is the political party spectrum. Hooghe and Marks (2009) found out that the traditional left/right dimension based on the conflict between market liberalism and regulated capitalism was not fully adequate when trying to explain European integration. Instead, they found that a political party's stance on European integration can best be explained and predicted by a *non-economic* and new dimension ranging from GAL to TAN. The left/right dimension can best explain European issues that have an economic distributional character.

While GAL party's association with their positioning on European integration is weaker, TAN parties are strongly associated with a negative support for European integration. TAN parties typically stress the importance of national values which leads to difficulties in transnational cooperation. Furthermore, they try to defend national culture and sovereignty against multiple identities, immigrants and international regimes (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). According to the theory, one would thus expect that the government decisions regarding the TERS would show high association on the GAL/TAN dimension while less association on the left/right dimension.

To find out whether this element of the theory holds, data of the member states cabinets will be presented below.

### *Operationalization*

The data that is presented in Figures 3 and 4 derives from the Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov, 2016). For all member states, the cabinets are selected that were in power during the voting moments on 14 and 22 September. Each of these cabinets consists of one or multiple political parties that each have a specific number of seats, a relative share and one party delivers a prime minister. These basic elements are included for each party at cabinet overview in the appendix. On top of this, a political party's position on a left-right scale, libertarian-authoritarian scale and EU integration scale is included.


These three scales consist of a 0-10 range dimension and the data is received from Benoit/Laver 2006 and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). The CHES surveys are filled out by experts who must place parties on various scales that have two opposite sides such as the

left-right scale. The GAL-TAN scale is also included in CHES. In this scale parties are classified based on their stance on democratic freedom and rights. Libertarian parties (GAL) are in favor of expanded individual freedoms such as same-sex marriage, active euthanasia and abortion while authoritarian (TAN) parties are typically against these topics and stress the importance of tradition, order and the moral authority the government has on cultural and social issues (Bakker et al., 2014).

Figure 3 shows how every country's cabinet scores on a 0 to 10 range on a left-right, libertarian-authoritarian and EU integration scale. These scores are based on data from ParlGov database (Döring & Manow, 2016) presented in Table E (appendix). This figure gives an overview of the political parties that form each member states cabinet. For the left-right scale a high score means that a party is more right oriented while a low score indicates a left orientation. The same applies to libertarian (low) and authoritarian (high). A party that has a high score on the EU integration scale is in favor of EU integration while a low score indicates a state centered preference. The outcomes per country are based on a weighted score in which each party score is weighted by their number of seats in the government.

Figure 4 (appendix) shows how, per country, political parties that are included in the cabinets are positioned on a vertical GAL-TAN axe and a horizontal left-right axe. Each country is indicated by an icon as indicated in the legend. The icons are labeled with the name of the political party and are positioned in the figure based on their scores on both scales. The Portuguese political party CDS-PP is the most TAN-oriented party (9,0) and is highly right-oriented (8,0). This figure shows how political parties differ within a country and compared to other countries on a GAL-TAN and left-right spectrum. It furthermore shows how GAL-TAN and left-right dimensions relate to each other. When looking at the figure it becomes clear that there is an association between the two: in general, the more right-oriented a party is, the more authoritarian it is.

Figure 3. Cabinet dimensions



Source: ParlGov database (Döring and Manow, 2016).

## 5. Discussion

In this chapter, the presented data of the previous chapter will be interpreted and conclusions will be drawn based on the formulated predictions. The structure of this research is based on the 1) predicted state preferences according to the theories, 2) the observed state preferences and 3) the final voting-decisions. Each theory will be discussed separately before moving on to the conclusion in which the most important results and the limitations of this research will be outlined.

### *Neo-functionalism*

#### *Political spill-over*

According to the first element of political spill-over, pressures from supranational-oriented interest groups determined state preferences regarding the TERS. Supranational-oriented interest groups have been scrutinized to find out if they have pressured national governments to participate in the TERS and if this could have determined state preferences. The biggest interest group the HRW, criticizes the EU for its response to the refugee crisis and urged member states to fix the European asylum system. It also had direct contact with the Hungarian government about its reluctant attitude. When reflecting on 2015, the HRW admitted that despite its efforts, the EU went the wrong direction (HRW, 2016).

The ICMPD also visited member states to talk about the refugee crisis and to understand their concerns. Their approach, however, seemed to have been more mediating rather than urging as they facilitated a forum for policy makers and asylum experts to share thoughts instead of trying to convince countries to participate in the TERS. The organization claims that its aim is to offer an informal consultation mechanism (ICMPD, 2017).

To encourage the member states to resettle more refugees, several interest groups joined forces by launching a campaign called 'Resettlement Saves Lives!'. The goal of this campaign was to resettle 20,000 refugees by 2020. The ECRE underlined an earlier statement by the UNHCR that the European Commission's proposal to relocate 160,000 refugees was not high enough and should instead be 200,000 within one year. Just as the HRW, AIEA stated after attending the Council meeting in September that governments continue with the failed strategy (ECRE, 2015).

The AIEA and HRW criticized the member states in a joint statement with 18 other organizations by underlining the terrible situation of the people stranded at the Greek shores. The organizations encouraged governments to find a collective and permanent relocation solution (Amnesty International, 2015). ECRE also pushed for more ambitious measures than the European Commission proposed by arguing that the number of the relocation should be augmented to a total of 200,000 and should be carried out within one year instead of two (ECRE, 2015).

While there certainly have been pressures from various supranational-oriented interest groups on governments to engage with the TERS or even to strive for a more ambitious measure, their influence seems to be limited. The most influential groups such as the HRW and AIEA expressed their dissatisfaction by arguing that despite their efforts, the EU made the wrong decisions to adequately react to the crisis (HRW, 2016; ECRE, 2015).

When applying the degree of preference attainment approach (De Jesus, 2010), the influence of supranational-oriented interest groups can be measured by looking at their desired policy outcome and the actual policy outcome. Ambitious proposals by AIEA and the ECRE to integrate a permanent relocation system (Amnesty International, 2015) and a one-year program to relocate 200,000 refugees (ECRE, 2015) are far away from the eventual voluntary relocation system.

No evidence is found of pressures from CE on governments and besides participating in the 'Resettlement Saves Lives' program, the ICMC and HRW did not seem to have been in contact with governments regarding the TERS. There are no government statements found that indicated that supranational-interest group pressures have contributed to their voting-decisions. The prediction of political spill-over therefore does not provide a satisfying explanation.

#### *Cultivated spill-over*

Pressures from the European Commission are predicted to have determined state preferences regarding the TERS by acting as a political entrepreneur instead of a mediator between member states. Below, the direct and indirect approach that the Commission could have used will be outlined.

The direct approach is addressed by looking at the way the European Commission directly addressed the member states by underscoring potential benefits and the symbolic

values of the proposals outcomes. Also, intervening in interstate bargaining by proposing new compromises or options is considered. Based on the official statements from the European Commission it becomes clear that the refugee crisis was top priority. Several representatives of the European Commission have repeatedly stressed the importance of the TERS. This was done by highlighting the thousands of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea. Member states were told that solidarity is crucial and that the TERS is necessary for a better management of migration (European Commission, 2015).

After the first proposal of relocating 40,000 refugees was accepted on a voluntary base, the European Commission stressed the importance of a mandatory relocation scheme and proposed another system of relocation 120,000 refugees as well as an even more ambitious permanent relocation system. However, the member states did not accept the mandatory nature of these proposals and the relocation of 120,000 was finally accepted on a voluntary base (Euractiv, 2015). Even though the European Commission did show signs of political entrepreneurship, it becomes clear that the member states preferences on the final voting decisions are not determined by the European Commission as the final agreements are far less ambitious than the original proposals.

The indirect approach is tested by looking at the number of meetings the European Commission had with the interest groups and the nature of these meetings. There have been eight meetings with the European Commission and the HRW. The issues that concerned migration were related to the Fundamental rights situation in Hungary. The AIEA had at least 5 meetings with the European Commission that concerned the migration crisis, while the ECRE had one meeting. The ICMPD, CE and ICMC-Europe didn't have any meetings with the European Commission. Only the CE, ECRE and ICMC-Europe receive significant grants from the European Commission.

Even though the European Commission had several meetings with the interest groups about the refugee crisis, it is hard to contemplate the extent to which it has enabled and encouraged these groups to pressure national governments as the European Commission doesn't publish any information on the content of these meetings. However, based on the number of meetings with governments and activities it seems unlikely that pressures by the European Commission had significant impact on the state preferences regarding the TERS.



## *Liberal intergovernmentalism*

### *State preferences*

Pressures for of national interest groups were tested in the countries that voted differently on the final decisions regarding the TERS than their first observed preferences. Spain, Poland, Latvia and Romania are selected to see if pressures of national-oriented interest groups changed the state's preferences. This was determined by the pathways of *access*, *voice* and *structural coercion* (Dür, 2008). In Spain, there was an overwhelmingly support to welcome more refugees coming from societal groups after the government had stated not to be willing to accept the European Commission's proposal. At least a dozen of cities came together to welcome hundreds of thousands of refugees that had stranded in Europe. Cities such as Barcelona and soccer club Real Madrid set aside amounts of money to support refugee service centres and organisations.

In Poland, on the other side there were reporting's of huge anti-immigrant's protests by right-wing groups. Polish conservative media also tried to make sure the public opinion would be against the arrival of refugees. In Latvia, reporting's of nationalist anti-refugee groups as well as pro-migrant group protests have been reported. The pro-refugee groups were outnumbering the nationalist groups and set up a national referendum. This referendum was won by pro-immigrant groups that supported the European Commission's plan to relocate more than twice the amount of people than the earlier stated government preferences.

These three countries eventually voted in favour of the TERS. Romania on the other hand, voted against the TERS while first having said to be in favour of the European Commission's proposal. However, there is no evidence found of large-scale protests or other strong pressures by national interest-groups.

While none of the governments stated that their change of heart had been due to national interest group pressures, the case of Spain and Latvia showed that there were strong pressures by national interest groups that could have changed states final voting decisions. The cases of Poland and Romania, do not point to large societal pressures on the government. It is therefore unlikely that in these latter cases government decisions were determined by national-oriented interest groups.

### *Interstate bargaining*

The process of interstate bargaining is outlined based on three elements mentioned by Moravcsik (1993) which are the relative intensity of national preferences, the existence of alternative coalitions and the opportunity for issue-linkages. While there is no evidence found for the latter element, the other two elements lead to interesting findings. The countries that were facing relatively the most immigrants were expected to actively encourage other states to push through the relocation system while the countries that were least affected were expected to play their dominant strategy of reluctance.

The countries that were most affected such as Germany, Austria and Sweden indeed were the strongest supporters of the relocation system. Germany and France were claimed to have pressured Poland to the degree they it finally turned away from the opposing Visegrad group and voted in favour of the TERS.

Other explanations for Poland's change of heart are provided in the work of Dowd (2015). These explanations include Poland's large record of loyal participating in EU and UN Human Right treaties which could have been the reason that it voted in favour of the TERS. Furthermore, Poland's economy, unlike other European state, survived the economic crisis without dipping into contraction. Their economic stability might have contributed to its vote in favour of the TERS. The strongest explanation is the centre-left oriented state leaders at the time of the voting such as Tusk and Kopacz. Right-wing ideologists said that Poland had cheated on her Visegrad allies (Dowd, 2015).

The remaining Visegrad group countries accused Germany of 'bullying' and stated that Germany threatened with profound consequences if the countries would not comply with the measure (Politico, 2015). This threat by Germany is not unfounded since each of the Visegrad group countries is financially dependent of Germany in the sense that it is their most important trading partner (Aspen Review, 2017). However, pressures from Germany and other member states could not convince the remaining Visegrad countries to switch sides.

Romania had a change of heart by voting against the TERS while first having stated to be in favour of a European relocation system. It started to express the same positions as the Visegrad countries by stating that relocation quotas would encourage more migrants to come to Europe (Euractiv, 2015). No evidence, however, was found that the Visegrad group pressured Romania to adopt their opinion.

## *Post-functionalism*

### *Public opinion*

Post-functionalism claims that exclusive identities are typically opposed to European integration because this is incompatible with the love for their own country. Hooghe and Marks (2009) point out a question of Eurobarometer's survey which measures if countries' citizens have in- or exclusive identities. This question is 'Do you see yourself as..?' with the options: (Nationality) only, (Nationality) and European, European and (Nationality) and European only. Respondents who identified themselves with their nationality only are considered as exclusive identities while the other options indicate an inclusive identity.

Data from both measure moments show that the five countries with most exclusive identities are the UK, Cyprus, Greece, Latvia and Bulgaria while the 5 most inclusive identities were found in Luxembourg, Germany, Malta, Spain and Croatia. The countries that voted against the TERS do not have a high exclusive score. Hungary and Slovakia even have more inclusive identities than the EU28 average.

On the two other questions about the way people feel about immigration from people from outside the EU and peoples view of the EU, the results are divergent. When asked how people feel about immigrants from outside the EU, most citizens of Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia indicated to have a negative feeling. Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were among the 5 most negative countries. Romania (34% positive, 54% negative) scored just below the EU28 average in Eurobarometer 84's measurement which is an enormous decline since Eurobarometer 83's measurement in which Romania was the most positive country regarding immigrants from outside the EU (62% positive, 27% negative).

However, Romanians are the most positive people of all EU member states regarding the EU. Hungarians are a little bit more positive regarding the EU as the EU28's average while Slovakia scores just a little lower. The Czechs are largely negative about the EU (27% positive, 42% negative) which makes them the fourth most negative.

The claim that exclusive identities determine state preferences regarding the TERS does not hold based on this data as the countries that voted against the measure did not have higher exclusive identities than the countries that voted in favor. The claim that exclusive identities solely identify with ingroups and are therefore expected to hold negative views of

the arrival of immigrants from outside the EU provides interesting results. Data from Eurobarometer 83 shows that of the four countries that voted against the TERS, only Slovakia and the Czech Republic were among the five countries with the less positive feelings towards immigration of people from outside the EU.

However, as the refugee crisis continued, these numbers changed. When looking at Eurobarometer 84's data, Hungary also joins the five countries with the least positive feelings regarding immigration from outside the EU. Romania equals the EU28 average of 34% positive feelings. However, when comparing the scores on both Eurobarometer's measures one can see that Romania went from the second most positive country to below EU28 average (5% more negative than EU28). This country experienced the most drastic loss of support for immigration of people from outside the EU between the two measurements together with Slovenia.

When looking at the observed state preferences of the countries that voted against the TERS, it is striking that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia all stressed that migrants should be Christians (EUobserver, 2015; Euractiv, 2015). Muslims are not favored or even unwanted in these countries. Also, Poland first stated that they only want to relocate Christian refugees (Euractiv, 2015).

#### *Political party spectrum*

According to the theory's second prediction, governments that consist of strong TAN-oriented parties are expected to vote against the TERS. The degree of GAL- and TAN-oriented parties is determined by its libertarian or authoritarian score. The three most TAN-oriented governments were those of Spain, Hungary and Portugal, while the three most GAL-oriented governments were those of Croatia, Italy and Greece. The GAL and TAN dimension is roughly like the positions of left- and right-oriented governments.

The data is not in line with the prediction that governments that consist TAN-oriented parties vote against the TERS. While Hungary has the second highest TAN-score, the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia have average or even below average TAN-scores. When looking at the political parties that form the countries governments, only Hungarian parties Fidesz and KDNP score high on the TAN-scale. Czech Republic party KDU-CSL also scores among the highest parties on the TAN-scale (Figure 4). However, since it is by far the smallest party of the Czech government (Table E), its influence seems limited and therefore

it is unlikely that the KDU-CSL's TAN-positioning determined the governments negative vote regarding the TERS.

## 7. Conclusion

The goal of this research was to find an answer to the main research question:

*“How can the formation of the Temporary EU Relocation System be explained based on European integration theories?”*

The explanation for the formation of the TERS is based on the European integration theories of neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and post-functionalism. The latter theory was hereby used as a starting point because it is a relatively new theory which argues that the first two theories are outdated. It shifts the focus away from a decade-long elite centered view to a view that puts European citizens at the center when trying to explain European integration.

The TERS offers a unique opportunity to test the theory of post-functionalism against the theories of neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism as it directly addresses its key elements: public opinion and immigrants. According to data from Eurobarometer, the immigrants was seen in 2015 as the most important issue facing the EU by the public. Furthermore, immigrants seen as the biggest threat for national communities according to TAN-oriented parties that are expected to be opposing European integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2009).

Each of the theories consists of two predictions about the fundamental *actors* in determining state preferences regarding European integration. Each of the theories provide a different explanation for European integration which makes them conflicting. The most important results are now presented for each of the predictions which will then lead to the final answer of the main research question.

### *Neo-functionalism*

The theory of neo-functionalism is tested by two predictions that argue that (1) supranational-oriented interest groups and (2) pressures by the European Commission determined state preferences regarding the TERS. According to the collected data neither of these predictions seems to be applicable for the formation of the TERS.

### *Liberal intergovernmentalism*

The theory of liberal intergovernmentalism consists of two predictions that stress the influence of societal groups and that of the states itself. Contrary to neo-functionalism, this theory argues that (1) national-oriented interest groups and (2) the interstate bargaining process determined state preferences regarding the TERS. In Spain and Latvia, there are strong indications that pressures by national-oriented interest groups caused a change of heart by the governments. Both governments voted in favor of the TERS after massive protests and pressures by national-oriented interest groups while first having stated to be against the measure. In Poland and Romania there were no strong indications of strong pressures by national interest groups that could have changed the government's decisions regarding the TERS.

When looking at the state preferences it is striking that of the countries opposing the TERS, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia stated that migrants coming to their countries should be Christians. Muslims are not favored and or are not welcome at all. Poland, which was originally against the TERS also stated that immigrants should be Christians.

The interstate bargaining process however showed that the most affected countries by the migrant crisis Germany, Sweden and Austria were among the most active in encouraging other countries to accept the TERS (DW, 2015). Multiple sources stressed that Poland accepted the European Commission's proposal by first having stated to be against it because of strong pressures by Germany and France. After Poland had voted in favour, Germany specifically thanked Poland. The opposing Visegrad group accused Germany of 'bullying' as Germany had threatened them by saying that voting against the TERS could lead to profound consequences for them. Since these countries are economically dependent on Germany because it is their most important trading partner, this threat was not unfounded. By doing this Germany used an issue-linkage to convince other states to vote in favour.

The pressures from countries encouraging the members of the Visegrad group did not convince the other members besides Poland to change their position. The Visegrad group is an example of alternative coalition formation to gain a stronger position in the bargaining process since a coalition is stronger than a single voice. There is however no evidence that the Visegrad group convinced Romania to switch sides and vote against the TERS.

## *Post-functionalism*

Two predictions are formulated based on post-functionalism's key actor elements. According to this theory, (1) countries that include citizens with an exclusive identity are expected to have voted against the TERS as well as (2) governments that consist of TAN-oriented parties.

Hooghe and Marks' (2009) fundamental element public opinion, which includes in- or exclusive identities, didn't provide a strong explanatory power for governments' decisions regarding the TERS. Countries in which strong exclusive identities were dominant were expected to have voted against the TERS. However, the countries who voted against (The Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia) didn't have particularly high exclusive scores. Hungary and Slovakia even had more inclusive identities.

The public opinion data on immigration from people from outside the EU showed that three (Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) of the four countries that voted against the TERS were among the five countries that had the most negative feelings toward migrants from outside the EU. Romanian people's view regarding immigrants from outside the EU declined the most during 2015. The country decreased from the second most positive position to just below the EU average. This rapid decline might explain the governments' change to vote against the TERS while first having stated to be in favour.

The second element that is measured of this theory is that of political party's stance on the spectrum of GAL and TAN. Governments that consist of strong TAN-oriented parties are expected to vote against the TERS. However, the results did not show that there is a correlation between the countries that voted against the TERS and their score on the TAN spectrum. Even though, Hungary had the second highest TAN-oriented government, Romania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia had average scores.

All political parties that form the governments of the opposing countries had an average or below average TAN-score. Only the Czech party KDU-CSL scored high on the TAN-scale, but because it is by far the smallest party of the government its influence on the final voting decision is expected to be limited.



### *Concluding remarks*

Post-functionalist's claim that the theories of neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are outdated and not relevant anymore seems only partially true for the case of the TERS. While neo-functionalist predictions did not provide satisfying explanations, liberal intergovernmentalism provided the strongest explanatory power for the state voting-decisions regarding the TERS. Pressures from national-oriented interest groups as well as interstate bargaining is likely to be able to determine state preferences based on the evidence. The influence of government preferences also seemed to have strong explanatory power as three of the four countries that voted against the TERS mentioned not to be willing to relocate Muslim migrants.

Public opinion did not provide satisfying explanations as exclusive identities did not determine state preferences regarding the TERS neither as the influence of TAN-oriented parties. The public opinion on immigration from people from outside the EU seemed to provide a partial explanation. Three of the four countries that voted against were among the five most negative countries while the fourth experienced a decline from the second most positive to below the EU average. Since not all countries with a negative public opinion regarding immigrants from outside the EU, this explanation is dubious.

### *Limitations*

When trying to find information about the interaction between the European Commission and the supranational-oriented interest groups, the lack of transparency of these meetings limited the insights for the element of cultivated spill-over. The European Commission does not provide information about the content of these meetings and therefore the influence of the interest groups had to be determined based on the number of meetings and their topics. For further research, it might be valuable to conduct interviews with members of interest groups to find out more about the interaction and possible influence of the European Commission.

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## Appendix

EU28	Average of the 28 Member states		
Belgium	BE	Lithuania	LT
Bulgaria	BG	Luxembourg	LU
Czech Republic	CZ	Hungary	HU
Denmark	DK	Malta	MT
Germany	DE	The Netherlands	NL
Estonia	EE	Austria	AT
Ireland	IE	Poland	PL
Greece	EL	Portugal	PT
Spain	ES	Romania	RO
France	FR	Slovenia	SI
Croatia	HR	Slovakia	SK
Italy	IT	Finland	FI
Republic of Cyprus	CY	Sweden	SE
Latvia	LV	United Kingdom	UK

**Table A. “What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?”**

	Immigration	Economic situation	Unemployment
<b>EU28</b>	<b>38%</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>24%</b>
BE	39%	25%	26%
BG	37%	24%	9%
CZ	44%	18%	13%
DK	50%	30%	26%
DE	55%	18%	19%
EE	54%	22%	9%
IE	23%	27%	31%
EL	27%	40%	32%
ES	25%	37%	32%
FR	34%	30%	29%
HR	22%	24%	25%
IT	43%	29%	32%
CY	20%	47%	43%
LV	38%	24%	14%
LT	31%	24%	13%
LU	45%	19%	39%
HU	43%	26%	18%
MT	65%	21%	11%
NL	49%	35%	20%

AT	37%	28%	26%
PL	24%	20%	20%
PT	16%	23%	32%
RO	21%	18%	10%
SI	31%	23%	26%
SK	35%	20%	24%
FI	24%	34%	23%
SE	48%	36%	27%
UK	36%	30%	20%
1 <sup>st</sup> most frequently mentioned item			
2 <sup>nd</sup> most frequently mentioned item			
3 <sup>rd</sup> most frequently mentioned item			

Source: Eurobarometer 83 (2015).

**Table B. “What do you think are the two most important issues facing your country at the moment?”**

	Unemployment	Immigration	Economic situation
<b>EU28</b>	<b>42%</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>21%</b>
BE	40%	23%	16%
BG	44%	8%	39%
CZ	29%	18%	19%
DK	25%	35%	13%
DE	13%	46%	7%
EE	21%	24%	32%
IE	43%	7%	16%
EL	56%	11%	51%
ES	74%	6%	35%
FR	65%	12%	19%
HR	63%	3%	34%
IT	51%	31%	28%
CY	69%	4%	65%
LV	35%	10%	26%
LT	33%	13%	22%
LU	38%	15%	11%
HU	45%	13%	26%
MT	5%	76%	6%
NL	29%	23%	24%
AT	33%	31%	20%
PL	53%	9%	15%
PT	63%	3%	28%
RO	26%	3%	33%
SI	59%	1%	39%
SK	57%	4%	24%
FI	46%	6%	37%



SE	40%	28%	15%
UK	22%	35%	14%
1 <sup>st</sup> most frequently mentioned item			
2 <sup>nd</sup> most frequently mentioned item			
3 <sup>rd</sup> most frequently mentioned item			

Source: Eurobarometer 83 (2015).

**Table C. “What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?”**

	Immigration	Terrorism	Economic situation
<b>EU28</b>	<b>58% (+20)</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>21%</b>
BE	61% (+22)	25%	22%
BG	61% (+24)	38%	14%
CZ	76% (+32)	32%	12%
DK	76% (+26)	21%	22%
DE	76% (+21)	15%	18%
EE	79% (+25)	32%	17%
IE	48% (+25)	30%	18%
EL	52% (+25)	13%	36%
ES	39% (+14)	24%	24%
FR	49% (+15)	27%	22%
HR	52% (+30)	26%	15%
IT	49% (+6)	20%	25%
CY	49% (+29)	20%	33%
LV	66% (+28)	39%	14%
LT	64% (+33)	28%	18%
LU	55% (+10)	25%	18%
HU	68% (+25)	34%	15%
MT	74% (+9)	38%	13%
NL	75% (+26)	24%	25%
AT	66% (+29)	15%	17%
PL	54% (+30)	28%	11%
PT	31% (+15)	23%	23%
RO	47% (+26)	43%	15%
SI	74% (+43)	17%	19%
SK	72% (+37)	39%	10%
FI	58% (+34)	20%	25%
SE	74% (+26)	18%	28%
UK	61% (+25)	34%	23%
1 <sup>st</sup> most frequently mentioned item			
2 <sup>nd</sup> most frequently mentioned item			
3 <sup>rd</sup> most frequently mentioned item			

Source: Eurobarometer 84 (2015).

**Table D. “What do you think are the two most important issues facing your country at the moment?”**

	Immigration	Unemployment	Economic situation
<b>EU28</b>	<b>36% (+13)</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>19%</b>
BE	38% (+15)	29%	14%
BG	21% (+13)	39%	33%
CZ	47% (+29)	19%	16%
DK	60% (+25)	16%	10%
DE	76% (+30)	11%	8%
EE	45% (+21)	22%	29%
IE	11% (+4)	32%	13%
EL	20% (+9)	55%	45%
ES	9% (+3)	69%	29%
FR	22% (+10)	54%	14%
HR	11% (+8)	61%	31%
IT	30% (-1)	46%	28%
CY	5% (-1)	71%	60%
LV	22% (+12)	30%	25%
LT	12% (-1)	32%	20%
LU	35% (+20)	31%	5%
HU	34% (+21)	36%	23%
MT	65% (-11)	7%	7%
NL	56% (+33)	23%	17%
AT	56% (+25)	30%	17%
PL	17% (+8)	37%	17%
PT	5% (+2)	62%	35%
RO	6% (+3)	27%	29%
SI	48% (+47)	41%	27%
SK	19% (+15)	46%	24%
FI	41% (+35)	42%	27%
SE	53% (+25)	28%	19%
UK	44% (+9)	16%	12%
	1 <sup>st</sup> most frequently mentioned item		
	2 <sup>nd</sup> most frequently mentioned item		
	3 <sup>rd</sup> most frequently mentioned item		

Source: Eurobarometer 84 (2015).

**Table E. EU28's cabinet information**

Country	Cabinet name	Cabinet parties	Party family	Seats	Share	L-R	L-A	EU	O
Belgium	Michel	N-VA (New Flemish Alliance)	Conservative	33	22.0	6.5	6.1	6.4	
		MR (Reformist Movement)	Liberal	20	13.3	6.7	4.2	8.3	PM
		CD&V (Christian Democrats & Flemish)	Christian democracy	18	12.0	5.8	7.2	8.9	
		O-VLD (Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats)	Liberal	14	9.3	7.0	3.7	8.8	
Bulgaria	Borisov II	GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria)	Conservative	84	35.0	7.4	6.9	7.8	PM
		RB (Reformist Bloc)	Conservative	23	9.6	7.4	6.9	7.8	
		ABV (Alternative for Bulgarian Revival)	Social Democracy	11	4.6	3.3	3.5	8.1	
Czech Republic	Sobotka	CSSD (Czech Social Democratic Party)	Social democracy	50	25.0	3.0	4.2	8.6	PM
		ANO (Action of Dissatisfied Citizens)	Liberal	47	23.5	6.0	3.5	8.7	
		KDU-CSL	Christian	14	7.0	5.8	7.9	8.4	

		(Christian Democratic Union)	democracy						
Denmark	N/A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	Merkel III	CDU (Christian Democratic Union) + CSU (Christian Social Union)	Christian democracy	311	-	6.3	6.9	8.5	PM
		SPD (Social Democratic Party)	Social democracy	193	30.6	3.6	4.0	7.9	
Estonia	Rõivas II	Ere (Estonian Reform Party)	Liberal	30	29.7	7.9	5.3	8.6	PM
		SDE (Social Democratic Party)	Social democracy	15	14.9	4.2	3.2	7.8	
		IRL (Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica)	Conservative	14	13.9	8.5	6.1	9.3	
Ireland	N/A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Greece <sup>1</sup>	Tsipras I (II)	SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left)	Communist/Socialist	149	49.7	2.9	2.0	7.1	PM
		AE (Independent Greeks)	Right-wing	13	4.3	8.7	8.6	2.4	
Spain	Rajoy I	PP (People's Party)	Conservative	186	53.1	7.6	7.8	7.7	PM
France	Valls II	PS (Socialist Party)	Social democracy	292	50.6	3.2	2.9	7.9	
		PRG (Radical Party of the	Social democracy	16	2.8	4.1	4.2	7.9	

		Left)							
Croatia	Milanovic	SPH (Social Democratic Party of Croatia)	Social democracy	61	40.4	3.2	2.4	8.8	PM
		HNS (Croatian People's Party)	Liberal	13	8.6	1.8	1.7	8.9	
		IDS (Istrian Democratic Assembly)	Liberal	3	2	3.4	2.5	9.2	
Italy	Renzi	PD (Democratic Party)	Social democracy	292	47.3	2.6	2.1	7.8	PM
		SC (Civic Choice)	Liberal	37	6.0	6.0	3.5	8.7	
		UdC (Union of the Centre)	Christian democracy	8	1.3	6.1	7.8	7.1	
Cyprus	Anastasiadis II	DISY (Democratic Rally)	Conservative	20	35.7	8.7	5.0	9.4	PM
		EK (European Party)	Liberal	2	3.6	6.0	3.5	8.7	
Latvia	Straujuma II	V (Unity)	Conservative	23	23.0	7.4	6.9	7.8	PM
		ZS (Green and Farmers' Union)	Agrarian	21	21.0	5.3	6.1	6.8	
		NA (National Alliance)	Right-wing	17	17.0	8.3	7.4	7.0	
Lithuania	Butkevicius	LSDP (Lithuanian Social Democratic	Social democracy	38	27.0	3.2	5.3	9.1	PM

		Party)							
		DP (Labour Party)	Liberal	29	20.6	3.9	5.8	8.6	
		TT (Order and Justice)	Conservative	12	8.5	5.3	7.2	7.3	
		LLRA (Election Action of Lithuania's Poles)	Special issue	8	5.7	3.9	7.3	7.5	
Luxembourg	Bettel	DP (Democratic Party)	Liberal	13	21.7	6.6	2.8	7.3	PM
		PS (Socialist Party)	Social democracy	13	21.7	3.3	3.5	8.1	
		Greng (The Greens)	Green/Ecoligist	6	10.0	2.5	0.8	7.5	
Hungary	Orban III	Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Union)	Conservative	117	58.8	6.5	7.5	6.6	PM
		KDNP (Christian Democratic People's Party)	Christian democracy	16	8.0	7.4	8.3	5.8	
Malta	Muscat	MLP (Malta Labour Party)	Social democracy	39	56.5	4.2	6.3	2.4	PM
The Netherlands	Rutte III	VVD (People's Party for Freedom and	Liberal	41	27.3	7.3	4.4	5.9	PM

		Democracy)							
		PvdA (Labour Party)	Social democracy	38	25.3	3.6	3.2	8.0	
Austria	Faymann II	SPO (Social Democracy Party of Austria)	Social democracy	52	28.4	3.7	3.5	8.4	PM
		OVP (Austrian People's Party)	Christian democracy	47	25.7	6.5	7.6	8.8	
Poland	Kopacz	PO (Civic Platform)	Conservative	207	45.0	6.2	3.7	9.3	PM
		PSL (Polish People's Party)	Agrarian	28	6.1	4.2	6.5	5.4	
Portugal	Passos Coelho I	PSD (Social Democratic Party)	Liberal	108	47.0	6.3	7.0	8.5	PM
		CDS-PP (Democratic and Social Centre)	Christian democracy	24	10.4	8.0	9.0	4.4	
Romania	Ponta IV	PSD (Social Democratic Party)	Social democracy	160	38.8	3.2	6.3	8.6	PM
		LRP (Liberal Reformist Party)	Liberal	22	-	6.0	3.5	8.7	
		PC (Conservative	Conservative	13	3.2	4.8	6.3	8.2	

		Party)							
		UNPR (National Union for the Progress of Romania)	Social democracy	0	0.0	3.3	3.5	8.1	
Slovenia	Cerar	SMC (Party of Miro Cerar)	Social democracy	36	40.0	3.3	3.5	8.1	PM
		DeSUS (Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia)	Special issue	10	11.1	3.2	5.1	7.1	
		SD (Social Democrats)	Social democracy	6	6.7	3.1	3.0	8.2	
Slovakia	Fico II	Smer (Direction- Social Democracy)	Social democracy	83	55.3	3.4	3.7	7.2	PM
Finland	Sipilae	KESK (Finnish Centre)	Agriarian	49	24.5	5.8	7.2	5.5	PM
		Ps (True Finns)	Agrarian	38	19.0	6.6	8.0	1.1	
		KOK (National Coalition Party)	Conservative	37	18.5	7.2	5.6	9.1	
Sweden	Lofven	SAP (Social Democrats)	Social democracy	113	32.4	3.4	4.4	7.4	PM
		MP (Greens)	Green/Ecolo gist	25	7.2	3.4	2.5	1.0	




United Kingdom	N/A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
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*Source: ParlGov database (Döring and Manow, 2016). The data concerns the political parties the formed the cabinets of the member states during the two voting moments on 14 and 22 September 2015 (European Parliament).*

<sup>1</sup> *After losing parliamentary majority Tsipras I resigned on 20 August 2015. On 21 September Tsipras was appointed for Tsipras II.*

Figure 4. GAL to TAN and left to right positioning.



Source: ParlGov database (Döring and Manow, 2016)

