Religion, Socio-Economic Status and Voter Behavior: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Jakarta

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Elwyn Sansius Panggabean

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Members of the Examining Committee:

Dr. Matthias Rieger

Dr. Lorenzo Pellegrini

The Hague, The Netherlands
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Inquiries:

Postal address:

Institute of Social Studies
P.O. Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague
The Netherlands

Location:

Kortenaerkade 12
2518 AX The Hague
The Netherlands

Telephone: +31 70 426 0460
Fax: +31 70 426 0799

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List of Acronyms

BPS   *Badan Pusat Statistik* (Indonesian Statistic Bureau)

CI   Confidence Interval

IPI   *Indikator Politik Indonesia* (or Indonesian Political Indicator)

KPU   *Komisi Pemilihan Umum* (National Election Commission)

NIP   Non-Islam Be President

PP   Percentage Points

SIT   Social Identity Theory

SSR   Share Similar Religion

WVS   World Value Survey

Acknowledgements

When I decided to write this topic, I know that I will take the risks. Not only because it's out of my comfort zone and interest but because it's unrelated to my professional background. It is my concern about the political situation in my country that push me to bring my academic knowledge into this discussion. There were ups and downs during the process of this research and my whole academic year journey. Therefore, I would like to thank to those in this list of acknowledgements who have supported me, not only help me to survive but also make this writing process and my entire academic journey colourful.

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Abstract

Understanding voting behavior and how people make decisions is key to studying any democratic election. In-group and cognitive biases are frequently reported to influence our decision-making and judgment, including voting decisions, which may lead to illogical decisions and counter self-interest in the longer term. This paper investigates such decision biases in the case of the gubernatorial election in Jakarta. The electoral process in this case was widely seen to be marked by intolerance and discrimination against minorities rather than more substantive policy issues. I explore two plausible drivers of voting behavior and related biases, religion and socio-economic status, to analyze the paradox of high satisfaction of the candidate's work performance and the actual election result. To this end, I use survey experiments with priming treatments in an original dataset of 228 respondents in Jakarta. The priming with religious cues substantially provoked emotions, in-line with previous studies. The evidence suggests that religiously motivated voting behavior is salient, and stronger than economic-status anxiety. The evidence points to strong in-group bias. This present study argues that 'ethno-religious economic' motivations may explain paradoxical election results. Overall, the results complement previous studies in the area of social identity, priming and behavioral economics, in elections, most of which have been confined to Western countries.

Relevance to Development Studies

Studying social identity and out-group tolerance are relevant given current global trends related to immigrants/refugees, islamophobia, religious-based conflicts/crimes and hate speech. In the context of elections, in-group bias decisions may result in bad policy outcomes after elections. Indonesia, being the largest Islamic country in the world, faces issues of religion and ethnicity that may give raise to social conflicts. There is also a concern of the growing conservative and hardline Islamic groups that provoke discrimination towards other religions and ethnicity minorities. Increasing intolerance may exacerbate conflicts and threaten Indonesia as a whole and its diversity. Costs of conflict are high and can impede economic development. Thus, understanding current trends of out-group (in)tolerance in Indonesia, in particular during elections, is an important area of study.

Keywords

Voting Behavior, Survey Experiment, Social Identity, Priming, Religion, Socio-Economic, In-Group Favoritism, In-Group Bias, Election.

Chapter 1
Introduction

Social Identity Theory is about self-categorization which may stimulate in-group bias and out-group prejudice (Chuah et al 2014, Chuah et al 2016, Hogg 2016, Tajfel and Turner 1979, Vignoles and Moncaster 2007). Previous studies over the last decades report the theory's explanatory power of many social behaviors, particularly in the political sphere (as cited in Duckit and Sibley 2016).

This present study aims to evaluate voter's decision-making during the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2017 with respect to Social Identity theory, especially in-group favoritism. This election was reportedly dominated by religious intolerance, according to local and international media[1]. Compared to previous research which used data such from Election Panel Study (Campbell and Monson 2008, Lockerbie 2013), this study is based on a direct field survey experiment with a priming technique and behavioral economics approach. In addition, the Indonesia context is interesting, as it is a highly religious[2] society relative to previous studies (as cited in Shariff et al. 2016).

The Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2017 is seen as the most polarizing election, which has incited subsequent social conflicts in the nation (Jakarta Post 2017). *Ahok*, the incumbent, is a double minority, as he identifies as a Chinese and a Christian. Despite a 70% satisfaction of his performance in his first term, even amongst Islamic participants, he lost re-election (Cahya 2017, Indikator 2017:26). The reasons for his loss remain debated. Why was his electability and policy performance in contradiction to the actual election result? This raises the question how people make voting decision? If voting decisions are driven by emotion, this may lead to bad policy outcomes and end up hurting voters. This study aims to shed light on this paradox by experimentally investigating voter's decision-making.

There are two prominent current debates about *Ahok*'s defeat. The first is regarding the religious identity issue (Aspinall 2017). Being Christian in a Muslim-majority city may have hurt his electability. The second debate is economic in

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[1] For example, The Economist (2017) wrote "Division in Diversity: A Tense Election Threatens Indonesia's Religious Tolerance" <https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21721144-hardline-muslim-agitators-help-defeat-christian-incumbent-tense-election-threatens> and US News (Arifianto 2017): <https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2017-04-20/jakarta-governor-election-results-in-a-victory-for-prejudice>

[2] According to Crabtree (2010): http://news.gallup.com/poll/142727/religiosity-highest-world-poorest-nations.aspx

nature as his 'anti-poor' resettlement policy was unsupported by low-income classes (Wilson 2017). This present study investigates the role of a voter's socio-economic status (income-level), however it focuses on the role of religion. Two reasons motivate this emphasis. First, the religion issue has fueled a smear campaign accusing him of blasphemy. Second, religion has a divisive impact on Indonesian diversity and incites conflicts, which has happened[3] over the past few years. In addition, the growing number of supporters[4] of sharia law and an Islamic-based nation may endanger Indonesian ideology and its democracy.

In this sense, the research aims to answer the question: *"How does religion influence voters' decisions in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election? If in-group biases exist, what explains them?"* To answer this, the research will examine some sub-questions such as 1) what were voters' perceptions of 'leader' and 'nation'? 2) Was there any influence of religion and/or economic class (income-level) in the election? Which one was stronger? 3) Was there any signal of in-group favoritism in the election? 4) Did religious priming influence voting behavior/decision?

Voting behavior has been studied by political scientists for many years. Among other determinants, religion is one of the prominent factors in politics (Botterman and Hooghe 2009, Kohut et al 2000, Kotler-Berkowitz 2001:552, Layman 2001, Liddle and Mujani 2007:3, Olson and Warber 2008, Smidt 2017). Furthermore, the influence of religion in political orientation is more complex since it is determined by religiosity level that range from conservative to liberal (Kotler-Berkowitz 2001, Layman 2001:524-552, Olson and Warber 2008). Class cleavage, on the other hand, may similarly affect voter attitude. For instance, working-class voters tend to support Leftist parties, while middle-class voters want to keep the status-quo by voting for the Right-wing (DeCanio 2007, Lijphart 1979:442). However, due to growing irregularities in voting behavior, where some voters break class moulds, this concept is increasingly considered outdated (Achterberg and Houtman 2006:76-80). They (2006) argue that "cultural capital" – working-class "authoritarianism" and middle-class "post-materialism"– explain this relatively novel phenomenon. Working-class voters with a limited amount of cultural capital (weak economic position and low cultural capital, as may be indicted with low education) follow conservative cultural norms and thus vote more Right-wing. The reverse occurs with the middle-class (Achterberg and Houtman 2006:76-80). Adding to this, other studies propose personality traits determine voting behavior (Caprara and Vecchione 2013, Erisen and Blais 2016, Schoen and Schumann 2007), using "the big five" personality dimensions: Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness (Duckit

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[3] According to report by The Wahid Institute: http://wahidinstitute.org/wi-eng/
[4] According to The Strait Times (2017): http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/1-in-5-indonesian-students-support-islamic-caliphate-survey

and Sibley 2016). For instance, "openness" and "agreeableness" are traits connected with the Left, while "conscientiousness" is connected with support of the Right (as cited in Duckit and Sibley 2016:110)".

This present study hypothesizes that religious identity also played a critical role in the 2017 Jakarta election, more so than even economic anxiety. This, in turn may have led to in-group bias, especially among the Islamic group who rejected *Ahok* as a non-representative of their belief. Due to religious movements and social pressure from various avenues (the news media, religious houses, society), this study also presumes that priming has strengthened in-group bias.

To address the research objectives, this study uses a survey experiment with priming technique to capture in-group bias on decision-making. Two plausible parameters, religion and socio-economic status, are used in the analysis. Using this approach, this study expects to obtain honest responses on sensitive topics such as religion and political orientation. In addition, self-reported experiments result in a stronger effect size than other behavioral experiment measurements, such as economic games (Shariff et al. 2016). Two psychological and behavioral economic concepts, 'priming' and 'affect', are used to explain this phenomenon. Priming reveals that human behavior and acts may change if provoked with certain cues beforehand (Dolan et al. 2010:24-25). Affect, on the other side, means that emotions can strongly influence decision-making, which in turn can lead to favoritism, judgment, and to some extend may against self-interest (Dolan et al. 2010:25-26).

The priming cues include images and words in a religious context to induce emotion. The image was chosen from one of religious movement related to the blasphemy to send *Ahok* to jail. The effectiveness of priming rests on a causal-psychological-effect by manipulating the salience of religious concepts (Shariff et al. 2016), which motivates this present study to adopt it. Previous priming religion studies point to the effectiveness of this technique in politics (Bloom and Arikan 2012, Campbell and Monson 2008). A meta-analytic study in religious priming across various outcomes found small to medium effects, using Cohen's[5] *d* standard (Shariff et al. 2016), as also predicted in this study. By using priming, this study aims to provide evidence-based conclusions that the news media and social pressure allegedly primed voters' minds.

This research offers three main contributions. The first is to contribute to the social identity discourse, particularly in-group favoritism, in a society where religious perception is dominant. The second is to contribute to general behavioral

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[5] Cohen's effect-size calculation measure means difference between two groups (Cohen 1992). Example Cohen's *d* measurement: http://www.socscistatistics.com/effectsize/Default3.aspx and interpretation: http://rpsychologist.com/d3/cohend/

economics concepts, especially in decision-making in the election, with real field experiment setting. Third, this research hopes to contribute to religious priming studies in elections. To the knowledge of this research, in Indonesia particularly, there has been no study found on social, religious identities and elections that uses behavioral economics and a priming approach.

The study was conducted in July-August 2017 in Jakarta, Indonesia. The experiment covers all regions in Jakarta, to capture voters' socio-demographic dynamics that may produce different attitudes in the election. A total of 228 respondents participated in the experiment, which were evenly distributed to treatment and control groups through a randomized approach. Priming was used with the treatment group, followed by a questionnaire. The control group, however, was directly surveyed with the questionnaire without any priming condition. Two main outcome variables, 'share similar religion' and 'non-Islam be President' perceptions, highlight the roles of priming, religion, socio-economic status and other socio-demographics. These two outcomes estimate voters' decisions in the election to see if there is a sign of in-group bias.

The evidence suggests that in-group favoritism may be triggered by religious cues. Priming religion induced strong emotions among the treatment group which then affect subsequent survey responses: 82% of primed respondents felt anxiety/afraid/sad emotions as a response to the religious cue. This evidence supports other studies that provoking emotions with religious cues influence voters' decision (Andrade and Ariely 2009, Angie et al. 2011, Dolan et al. 2010). In other words, there is a strong first stage effect of priming. Given that, respondents who were primed have a 13 pp higher probability to agree to the perception that a leader should share the same religion as them (p =0.046, n =228). Furthermore, among the Islamic group this behavior is stronger. Islamic respondents have a 54 pp (p <0.01, n =228) higher probability to support leader who also hold Islamic beliefs. The Cohen's d effect-size measurement finds a small effect-size towards 'share similar religion' perception (d =0.27, n =228), in line with a meta-analytic study by Shariff et al. (2016). This effect-size means that respondents who support 'share similar religion' perception on the treatment group is above the mean of the control group by 58-62% (Magnusson n.d.). The study also estimates interaction between 'Share Similar Religion' perception and the vote in the election. The result shows that respondents who agreed with this perception had a 46 pp lower probability of supporting *Ahok,* the defeated Christian candidate (p <0.001, n =226).

On 'non-Islam be President' perception, the study finds that respondents who hold Islamic beliefs are more likely to disagree (38%, n =43) with having a non-Muslim president, as compared to other religious groups. This suggests that respondents who are Muslim have a 42 pp lower likelihood of supporting non-

Muslim leaders ($p < 0.01$, $n = 228$). The effect-size towards this perception is small to medium ($d = 0.3$), in line with the Shariff et al. (2016) study. These patterns indicate that religious cleavage is present and may lead to favoring in-group candidate, in line with previous, mostly Western, studies (Cassino and Erisen 2008, DeCanio 2007, Hogg 2016, Kohut et al. 2000, Layman 2001, Olson and Warber 2008, Smidt 2017, Tajfel and Turner 1979). As a complement, this study also reports that Muslim voters have a 62 pp lower probability of voting for *Ahok*, keeping other-variables constant ($p < 0.001$, $n = 226$).

On the other hand, evidence of the role of socio-economic status does not support Wilson's (2017) arguments for either main perceptions. Even though income level had some effects, its magnitude was lower than the effect of religion, particularly to explain in-group bias. Taken together, this evidence suggests that "ethno-religious economic" anxiety best explains voter behavior in the 2017 Jakarta election, as argued by Warburton and Gammon (2017).

However, this study is not without caveats, like data limitations, which can direct future study. For instance, this study uses only income level as socio-economic data. Hence, the study is unable to explore more class-effect analysis on voting behavior, and therefore unable to produce stronger conclusions on the class issue. Even though about 40% of respondents are low income, there is only a limited number of participants from the victims of *Ahok*'s resettlement policy. Thus, expanding the study by adding more economic variables, including increasing number of participants from those affected by the resettlement policy, will bring deeper analysis. Second, further analysis on the effect of different emotions (anger versus sadness) as indicated in this study may shape in-group bias differently. Lastly, future studies on (in)tolerance related to trust, cooperation and prejudice in economic activity may potentially contribute more to the religious identity study.

This paper is organized as follows. Chapter two presents relevant background about the election, the issues and Indonesia. The next chapter reviews the theoretical framework, including the most pertinent and recent literature. Chapter four provides information about the experiment and the empirical approach. Chapter five presents the experimental data and some descriptive analysis. Chapter six presents the results. Chapter seven contrasts the study's results with previous findings and highlights potential research in the future. The last chapter concludes.

Chapter 2
Jakarta Gubernatorial Election 2017

2.1. About the Election

Just recently, Jakarta, a province and the capital of the Republic of Indonesia of about 10 million people (BPS 2016:55), held an important election for its Governor. About 5,6 million voters[6] participated in that election (National Election Commission/KPU[7] 2017). Many local and international media[8] highlighted the election as a signal of intolerance in Indonesia, committed by conservative and hardline Islamic groups. The Jakarta Post (2017) argued that the campaign was "the dirtiest, most polarizing and most divisive the nation has ever seen." The election has aroused social conflicts between secular moderates and the opponent, the more 'religious group', which continuously happens post-election. The election undeniably has fueled issues of religious and ethnic tolerance in Indonesia, which may harm the unity and diversity of the nation.

The election was completed in two rounds. The first was held on 15 February 2017 with three candidates, *Basuki Tjahja Purnama (*known as *Ahok*), *Anies Baswedan* (*Anies*), and *Agus Harimurti* (*Agus*). The second round was on 19 April 2017 for the best two from the first election. *Ahok* was the incumbent Governor. He inherited the position after the previous Governor, *Joko Widodo*, won the Presidential election when *Ahok* was the vice-Governor. *Anies* was the former Minister of Education in *Joko Widodo's* cabinet[9]. And *Agus*, the third candidate, is the son of former President *Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono*.

In the first round, *Ahok* won 42,96% of the vote, beating the other candidates, *Agus* and *Anies,* who received 39,97% and 17,6% vote, respectively (KPU 2017). Support for *Anies* dramatically increased, however, to 57.95% in the second round, to win the election, compared to 42.05% vote for *Ahok* (KPU 2017). His increased popularity and victory in the election raise questions on Indonesian

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[6] 7,2 million people eligible to vote, men and women are evenly distributed, but about 24% did not exercise their right (https://pilkada2017.kpu.go.id/hasil/2/t1/dki_jakarta). All citizen above 17 years old are entitled to vote, but it's not mandatory.

[7] KPU (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum* or translated as National Election Commission), an appointed institution to conduct all general elections in Indonesia (www.kpu.go.id)

[8] For instance, New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/world/asia/jakarta-election-ahok-indonesia.html and http://www.jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/ahoks-defeat-signifies-tough-road-ahead-democratic-tolerant-future/ by JakartaGlobe

[9] *Anies* was replaced on cabinet reshuffle on July 27th, 2016 (http://setkab.go.id), a couple months before the election.

politics. What are the critical reasons for his success? What caused *Ahok* to lose the election?

According to survey data by Indikator[10] (2017), only 1% of participants said they recognized *Anies'* work performance as compared to 32% who supported *Ahok* due to his track record (Indikator 2017). Moreover, Indikator (2017) surveys find that more than 70% of Jakartans were satisfied with *Ahok*'s work. However, the election has paradoxical results. What factors have contributed to this paradoxical result? How did voters make their decisions?

Some of the issues that emerged during the election are religion, ethnicity and a blasphemy issue he is accused of. *Ahok* is a Chinese and a Christian. These identities and his statement about one verse in the Koran, which was considered an insult of Islam by some groups, has fueled his defeat, as explained in the next section.

2.2. The Rise of Religion Issue: The Blasphemy Case

On September 27th, 2016[11], in his official meeting with residents in Thousand Islands district, North Jakarta, *Ahok* gave a statement in which he referred to one verse in the Koran, *Al Maidah 51* (BBC 2016, Debora 2016). He said that some people can misuse the verse to convince voters to not support him. Later, on October 6th the same year, *Buni Yani* posted the edited video of this meeting on his personal *Facebook* account, labeling it as blasphemy. The edited video took out one word that changed the entire message (BBC 2016). The video caused a reaction from Islamic organizations, Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam*, FPI) and Indonesian Ulama Council (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI*), who then reported this case to the police (BBC 2016). This action was followed by other Islamic-organizations afterwards. On October 10th, 2016 *Ahok* apologized for his words, but the public reacted wildly and asked that he be sent to court.

Led by the Islamic Defenders Front, there were seven[12] principal religious movements in Jakarta, asking for justice for Islam due to the blasphemy issue. Thousands of people participated in some of the movements to send him to court. The first six demonstrations were held before the election, the last one was before the final court decision. In and out of the media, debates between the two candidates' supporters expressed high social pressure. These marches and other

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[10] Refers to *Indikator Politik Indonesia* (IPI, Indonesian Political Indicator)
[11] According to BBC news (http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-37996601)
[12] According to *Republika* (2017), seven religious movements regarding this blasphemy issues are *1410* (October 14th, 2016), *411* (November 4th, 2016), *212* (December 2nd, 2016), *112* (February 11th, 2017), *212* (February 21st, 2017), *313* (March 31st, 2017), and *55* (May 5th, 2017). (http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/17/05/10/opp5r4330-ini-7-rangkaian-aksi-bela-islam-sebelum-ahok-divonis-2-tahun-penjara)

social pressures were seen as influential to voters' decisions and were harmful to *Ahok's* chances.

There is other evidence where conservative and hardline Islamic groups allegedly tried to influence people to not vote for *Ahok*. Social pressure that he had insulted Islam and to vote for him is to go against their religious-beliefs was used in social media and elsewhere (e.g. religious rituals/house and residential areas) (Kumparan 2017). Social exclusion of his supporters by some 'fundamentalists' and their supporters was common[13]. One popular news point was the refusal to conduct funeral prayers in the mosque to *Ahok*'s supporter (Jakarta Post 2017). This also included the election-day 'monitoring' booth by Islamic fundamentalists, which they called as "Al-Maidah tour."[14]

The blasphemy case was predicted to have changed the game in the election. This issue has been used extremely to influence voters against *Ahok*. Debates in social media raised issues about his identity, ethnicity and religion. This issue allegedly gave advantages to *Anies*, who was supported by conservative and hardline Islamic groups. Even worse, the court convicted *Ahok* for two years just three weeks after the election.

2.3. Current Debates About the Election

The two prominent debates about this election are related to his social (religious) identity (Aspinall 2017) and class issue (Wilson 2017). With his 'double minority' status, as a Christian and Chinese, issues of religion and ethnicity sentiment increased on the election. The blasphemy issue, it's argued, has strengthened social identities. On the other hand, Ian Wilson (2017), a researcher from Murdoch University, suggests that class issue explains *Ahok*'s loss. The low-income population's disappointment of his non-pro-poor and neo-liberal urban development programs, such as the resettlement-policy to reduce flood, has shifted their votes to other candidates (Wilson 2017). Other analysts conclude that voters may have assessed *Ahok* through "*ethnoreligiously-coloured economic anxiety*" lens where both, economic and religious-ethnic identity are two inter-related aspects that influenced voter's decision-making (Warburton and Gammon 2017).

However, these debates have not come into conclusion yet. This present study focuses on religion as the center of analysis, while also investigating the impact

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[13] For instance, according to: http://time.com/4747709/indonesia-jakarta-election-governor-islam-christianity-ahok-anies/
[14] According to: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/04/15/1-3-million-al-maidah-tour-participants-to-monitor-runoff-election.html

of economic status. Two main reasons motivate this research. The first is considering how religion has been used negatively during the election. The second is its potential negative impact of provoking social-conflicts. The Wahid Institute[15] (2017) reported there are about 147 religious-based conflicts in 2015 in Indonesia. In such a diverse country, a deeper understanding of the role of religion in many social-economic aspects should be sought to avoid potential conflicts that may endanger Indonesian ideology and democracy.

Focusing on the issue of religious identity brings discussion on the social identity theory. In this sense, this research investigates any potential in-group/out-group bias, which may influence voters' decisions. Further analysis about this theoretical framework is discussed in the following chapter.

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[15] The Wahid Institute (TWI) was founded in 2004 as inspired by *Abdurrahman Wahid*, former President of Indonesia. TWI aims the development of Indonesia and Islamic society by working in the area of religious discourses, peace, social justice, democracy, etc. (TWI n.d). (http://wahidinstitute.org/wi-eng/about-us/about-the-wahid-institute.html).

Chapter 3
Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

The center of analysis of this present research is in the context of social identity which may affect voter decision-making in the election. Using Social Identity Theory (SIT), this research seeks any cleavage motive that may lead to in-group bias. In addition, the study is interwoven with other conceptual frameworks on voting behavior, psychological and behavioral economics concepts, and priming studies, which are considered interrelated with regards to decision-making and judgment in the election.

The objective of the literatures review, both conceptual and empirical, is to enlighten the methodology, empirical approach, and focus of interest applied in this present study. The first section outlines Social Identity Theory, which reviews in-group/out-group discourse related to self-categorization. The second part is a review of voting behavior studies in political science. The purpose is to review determinants of voting behavior that may also be connected to in-group and out-group biases. The third section is about human behavioral concepts with focus on two concepts, affect and priming. The objective is to review how and what influence human decision and judgment. The final section reviews literature on priming (religious) studies, including a meta-analytic priming religion study.

3.1. Social Identity Theory

Social Identity Theory (SIT) was coined by Henri Tajfel in the 1970s while he studied about intergroup relations (e.g. discrimination, clash) in society (Hogg 2016:3). Tajfel argues that prejudice and intergroup conflict should be evaluated as group dynamics, which influenced how people look at themselves, society, and how they feel they belong in the group (as cited in Hogg 2016:4). Intergroup relations lie at the center of Social Identity Theory, which later discuss about prejudice, discrimination, cooperation, and conflict.

According to Tajfel's theory, social identity is defined as how individual perceives her/himself as part of particular group, with "emotional and value" attached to her/his group membership status (as cited in Hogg 2016:6)." In other words, social identity is about individual self-image and concept of belonging and belongs to. As human are social creatures, it is our nature to interdependent and put and categorized ourselves and others into 'boxes'.

This theory elaborates concepts of social categorization, social identification, and social comparison (Hogg 2016). This process puts value on one group over another that leads to a separation of 'us' and 'them', or known as in-group and out-group biases. A group, in this sense, is a set of individuals who join together due to their similar perception of themselves as in the same social-category. This implies some common emotions to achieve group social consensus (Tajfel and Turner 1979:40). This categorization can be based on race, religion, social class, and gender. Tajfel and Turner (1979:38) argue that self-categorization can cause "intergroup discrimination favoring the in-group."

Tajfel's theory explains more about the various sources of the social identity phenomenon and process (Hogg 2016, Spears 2011). The first is a conceptualization of "positive intergroup distinctiveness," which is motivated by "self-enhancement and self-esteem" (as cited in Hewstone et al. 2002, Hogg 2016:9). In order to increase one's self-image, individuals usually tend to find positive differentiation between his or her group and the out-group (Hogg 2016:6, Tajfel and Turner 1979). The purpose is to get or keep in-group prominence by creating belief that others are worse than "our" group. The second cause of this phenomenon is the "uncertainty-identity theory," which is based on erratic feelings about this world, others behavior and how should we bear oneself (Hogg 2016:10). People tend to minimize uncertainty through social categorization, which can influence how individuals behave and interact with others (Hogg 2016:10). The importance of belonging to a group increases with the level of uncertainty about the world (Hogg 2016:10). The last source of social identity is "optimal distinctiveness," where human behavior tends to seek a balance of two conflicting conditions, inclusiveness and distinctiveness (Hogg 2016:10).

These social identity drivers – "self-esteem, distinctiveness, meaning, belonging" – suggest that identity concerns lead to in-group favoritism and out-group prejudice (Vignoles and Moncaster 2007:91). Belonging and distinctiveness arguably strengthen in-group favoritism (Vignoles and Moncaster 2007:91). Also, when the group is threatened, in-group bias will increase (Voci 2006). Furthermore, Abrams and Hogg make two concluding corollaries on the self-esteem hypothesis (as cited in Vignoles and Moncaster 2007:92). The first is "successful intergroup discrimination will enhance social identity" and the second, "low or threatened self-esteem will promote intergroup discrimination" to increase self-esteem (as cited in Vignoles and Moncaster 2007:92)." However, these two corollaries are contested and has limited/no support.

Many previous studies have reported the role of social or group identity in behavior and politics (as cited in Duckit and Sibley 2016). For instance, a study about in-group favoritism in Northern Ireland shows in-group bias among Protestants towards Catholics (Cairns et al. 2006). Chuah et al. (2014:281,294-

295) use a prisoner's dilemma experiment to find that both religious and ethnic affiliation increase in-group cooperation and favoritism, but not necessarily raise out-group conflict. In another recent study, Chuah et al. (2016) experimentally tested the effect of religiosity on religious-based discrimination in attitudes towards trust. They found that individual connectedness is based on closeness to religious-based relationships (religiosity), which affects trust. They report that religiosity increases in-group favoritism (Chuah et al. 2016:41-42). Religiosity also positively related to willingness to discriminate against others across other non-religious social categories (Chuah et al. 2016:41-42). Many other studies also suggest in-group bias due to group identity (Chen and Li 2009, Currarini and Mengel 2016, Smurda et al. 2006).

Switching identity also happens to gain voters, depending on the political situation. For instance, when there are many candidates, favoritism towards similar ethnicities is high. However, when there are limited candidates, additional candidate categorization, such as by religion, can be used to distinguish in-group from others. Aspinall et al.'s (2011) study about the 2010 mayoral election in Medan, Indonesia, supports this view. They argue that there was a shifting identity used by voters from the first round of voting (when there were many candidates with different ethnicities) to the second round (when there were only two different identities, Muslim versus Buddhist) (Aspinall 2011:27).

This evidence portends that group identity determines cooperation with and discrimination against others. This phenomenon may also play an important role in the election by influencing voting preference. The next section reviews voting behavior studies to understand determinants in voter decision-making.

3.2. Voting Behavior: *Religion, Class,* and *Personality Traits*

One of the interesting results of the election is not only who wins or loses, but how voters behaved. The question of how people make decisions and what motivates them to support one particular candidate has always been interesting to observe. Voting behavior is influenced by some factors such as candidate leadership, partisanship, religious orientation, the economic and political situation, socio-demographics (class, ethnicity, age, gender), geography and media (Liddle and Mujani 2007:3-4). Among these, religion is argued to be one of the strong influences on a voter's attitude in the election (Botterman and Hooghe 2009:2, Kotler-Berkowitz 2001:552, Liddle and Mujani 2007:3). In U. S. politics, for instance, previous studies found that religion played an important role in elections (Kohut et al. 2000, Layman 2001:306, Olson and Warber 2008:201, Smidt 2017:133).

Religion has multiple dimensions: belonging (religious affiliation), behaving (commitment), believing (belief) (Olson and Warber 2008:192). In determine voting attitudes, these factors range from the devout, fundamentalist, conservative view on one side to the liberalist stance on the other (Kotler-Berkowitz 2001, Layman 2001:524,552, Olson and Warber 2008:197-201). Thus, religious political cleavage is not simply due to affiliation with a particular religion, but it also depends on the level of religiosity. For instance, conservative evangelical Protestants are more likely to support Republicans in the U. S. context (Kohut et al. 2000:4). Moreover, people who are more committed to a religious life are more likely to have a political orientation infused with religious sphere than a less religious voter (Lockerbie 2013:1148, Layman 1997:306). According to Djupe and Gilbert, this occurs due to possibly political message transmitted in sermons (as cited on Olson and Green 2006:458). In this sense, individual who more often got to religious house has higher probability to be exposed to political message induced in that rituals which may influence their political view.

Moreover, religious meaning and affiliation on an individual level change over time. Botterman and Hooghe (2009:9-11) conclude that even though in secular countries, like Belgium, people rarely go to church but they still follow some religious rites that affect their political action. LaMothe (2012) further suggests that even in secular Western societies, religious influence on political behavior is still salient in many ways. Either voters are affiliated or not to a particular religious belief, but religious values are internally a part of life (LaMothe 51-61). In addition, Kotler-Berkowitz (2001:526) argues that social interaction and the environment in which people live also play critical roles in shaping voting behavior, adding to the complexity of a religious factor in influencing political action.

Previous studies also report the importance of economics or class in voting behavior, aside from religion (DeCanio 2007:340-341, Lijphart 1979:442). Lipset argues that the common understanding of class cleavage in politics happens due to economic interest (as cited in Achterberg and Houtman 2006:75). The working-class supports the Left, with an expectation of economic redistribution, in contrast with the middle-class who wants to keep their economic status quo and hence vote for the Right-wing (Achterberg and Houtman 2006:75). Weakliem and Heath (1994:267) further suggest that profit orientation motivates working-class groups to support political parties that focus on economic development that would benefit them. Political orientation has changed over times so that class is equal to 'identity' in determining voting behavior due to modernity and growing post-materialist behavior (Jasiewicz 2009:505-506).

Nevertheless, until recently, this class analysis was considered outdated and no longer relevant, especially in some Western countries in the post-war period (Nieuwbeerta 1996). For instance, as cited in Achterberg and Houtman

(2006:76), it is argued that there is a growing 'unnatural' pattern where the middle-class has voted for the Left-wing (e.g. Democrat) in U. S. politics since the 1950s. This phenomenon is argued to be due to "cultural capital" (working-class "authoritarianism" and middle-class "post-materialism") rather than economic reasons (as cited in Achterberg and Houtman (2006:77). The working-class, who has a limited amount of cultural capital (weak economic power and low cultural capital may be due to a lack of education), follows conservative social norms which tends to make them vote for the Right. In addition, Inglehart concludes that "post-materialism," where the middle-class accentuates individual liberty, converts them to the Left (as cited Achterberg and Houtman 2006:77). The middle-class, with their strong economic power and high cultural capital, tends to be progressive and vote Left-wing (Achterberg and Houtman 2006:78-79). In this respect, class is a contested determinant in voting behavior. Class analysis should be evaluated when it intersects with other aspects which may vary across individuals.

Furthermore, DeCanio (2007:339) argues that voting behavior is more complex than just a simple religious or class cleavage. He suggests that both ethno-cultural and economic issues affect voting behavior in different ways. In addition, Karakoc and Baskan (2012) find that economic inequality and the saliency of religion are interrelated in influencing voting behavior, especially in developing countries. Moreover, the intersection between class, religion, and other socio-demographics may produce different political attitudes. Kotler-Berkowitz (2001:524,548) argues that the middle-class is more affected by the religious sphere than the working-class. Lockerbie (2013:1145-1147) also reports that in the U. S., political attitude affected by religion is different for Whites and African-Americans. For instance, among evangelical congregations, the White evangelicals are more likely to support Republican, but not necessarily the African-American evangelicals (Lockerbie 2013:145-1147). Difference responses may be related to different history and life experience between this two groups which confirms that religion should issue is should be integral part of other life aspects.

In Indonesia, religion in politics has a long influential history. Previous studies find that religion has played a critical role in politics since 1955 (as cited in Liddle and Mujani 2007:7-10). Geertz suggests that political orientation in Indonesia is influenced by religious streams (*aliran*), which also represent class (as cited in Liddle and Mujani 2007:7). The four *aliran*, the "*animistic abangan*, the orthodox *santri*, divided into conservative traditionalists and modernists, and the more Hinduized *priyayi*," have different class structures as villagers, traders, and state workers, respectively (as cited in Liddle and Mujani 2007:7). These *aliran* later declared their support for some political parties such as "*PNI, PKI, Masyumi* and *NU*, representing respectively the *priyayi, abangan*, modernist and traditionalist *santri* variants (as cited in Liddle and Mujani 2007:8)." This historical alignment

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has existed in different forms even though the political parties have changed. The religious sphere is still influential in Indonesian politics (Liddle and Mujani 2007:8), post the *Soeharto* dictatorship.

Recent studies analyze the effect of personality traits as determinants on voting behavior (Erisen and Blais 2016, Schoen and Schumann 2007). Caprara and Vecchione (2013:23-24) argue that a voter's character and "judgemental heuristics" have larger effects as determinants on political behavior than the role of "education, gender, and age." Personality influences how people look into themselves, their values, self-efficacy and self-esteem, which are summed in the concept of "the big five" (Caprara and Vecchione (2013:23-24). "The big five personality dimensions (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness)" help researchers to see the relationship between personality and political behavior (Duckit and Sibley 2016:109). Previous studies found that "Openness" and "Agreeableness" are connected with supporting the Left, while "Conscientiousness" is predicted as the Right (as cited in Duckit and Sibley 2016:110).

Lastly, relevant issues emerged during the election that are also important factors that influence voter. Debates on gay rights (marriage and child adoption) and abortion are some issues that are commonly raised in U. S. political campaigns (Lockerbie 2013: 1151-1155). The voting attitude is usually affected by looking at the role of religion and how parties or candidates respond to that issue. Media can play a critical role in this context on framing and spreading the news (as cited in Liddle and Mujani 2007:4).

This shows that religion, class, and personality traits are critical to determine voting behavior. However, what make potential biases will be discussed in the next section on behavioral concepts.

3.3. Human Behavioral Concepts: *Affect* and *Priming*

Human behavior is influenced by many factors: "social influence and norms, salience and priming, commitment and reciprocity, incentive and choice environment" (Dolan et al 2010:11-12). What make it problems, not all these aspects can be easily identified. To explain this, psychologists suggest some dichotomy analysis, for instance "between cognition and emotion, reason and intuition, or consciousness and unconsciousness" (Loewenstein & O'Donoghue 2004:4). Previous studies argue that human thinking, acts and decisions are not led by perfect logical thinking but influenced by our emotions, social values, interactions and our "fallible brain" (Dolan et al. 2010:13).

Daniel Kahneman, the Nobel Prize Laureate, is one of the prominent researchers in psychology of human behavior, choice and economic decisions. Kahneman (2012:19-30) argues that human brains work in two systems, System-1 and System-2, using terms coined by two psychologists, Keith Stanovich and Richard West. System-1 works fast, automatically, intuitively and effortlessly, whereas System-2 operates slowly, consciously, analytically, with reasoning and effort (ibid.). Kahneman (2012:21) further suggests that "the automatic operations of System-1 generate surprisingly complex patterns of ideas, but only the slower System-2 can construct thoughts in an orderly series of steps." Moreover, System-2 operates to "control and monitor" thinking produced by System-1 (Kahneman 2012:44). These two systems determine a wide range of human behavior and economic decisions. Sir Francis Galton argues that most of our decisions and acts are "automatic and unconscious" (as cited in Frankish & Evans 2009:9), which implies mostly using System 1.

In politics, previous studies conclude that human behavior is influenced by personality traits (Blais and St-Vincent 2011:400-401, Caprara and Vecchione 2013:8). Two common approaches for the analysis are either through the "Big Five" or specific traits, like "altruism, shyness, efficacy and conflict avoidance" (Ibid). Blais and St-Vincent (2011:406) argue that these specific traits influence one's willingness to vote. On the other hand, previous studies also conclude that the "Big Five" can be estimators of political behavior and orientation (Duckit and Sibley 2016:110). Another important element of political choice is values (Caprara et al. 2006:3). If traits are systems of "thought, feeling and action," then "values are cognitive representations of desirable, abstract, trans-situational goals that serve as guiding principles in people's life" (as cited in Caprara et al. 2006:3). Values relate to aspects that are considered critical priorities, and variation in values is the basis of judgment (Caprara et al. 2006:3).

Furthermore, Dietrich and List (2013:613) argue that "rational choice theory" strongly explains how people make rational or irrational decisions. These processes can be either as an individual agent or due to group associations, with or without certain information, and due to self-interest or other motivations. This theory, however, is still contested by some researchers (Dietrich and List 2013:614). Business Insider outlines the 20 most usual cognitive biases[16], which may cause poor decisions (as cited in Lebowitz and Lee 2015). In addition, Dolan et al. (2010) report the nine strongest effects on human behavior, abbreviated as MINDSPACE. This present study will focus on two factors, affect and priming, which are considered relevant to this study.

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[16] According to Lebowitz and Lee (2015): http://www.businessinsider.com/cognitive-biases-that-affect-decisions-2015-8?international=true&r=US&IR=T

Affect/Emotions

Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2004:1,8-14) propose a two-system concept to explain human behavior called deliberative and affective systems. The first evaluates with broader goal orientation thinking, and the latter is primarily driven by emotions (such as anger, anxiety, fear, jealousy) and by a "motivational mechanism." Both systems are influenced by "environment stimuli" and closeness to the stimuli (Loewenstein and O'Donoghue 2004:9). Affect (emotions related behavior as reaction to stimuli through words, image, or events) is a strong and effective power in decision-making and judgment (Andrade and Ariely 2009, Angie et al. 2011, Dolan et al. 2010:25, Kahneman 2012:93, Schwarz 2000, van Kleef et al. 2010). Decisions based on emotion may powerfully predispose our judgments to go against personal interest (Dolan et al. 2010:25). As result, a positive or negative judgment will depend on good/happy or bad/angry emotions we have (Angie et al. 2011:1393, Dolan et al. 2010:25, as cited in Schwarz 2000). Hence, provoking emotions can influence our perception and affect our future decision/behavior. For instance, previous studies conclude that provoking emotions has affected our behavior regarding eating, helping, trusting, and postponing tasks (Andrade and Ariely 2009:1).

Furthermore, Andrade and Ariely (2009:2-3) suggest that emotions influence decisions at least through two mechanisms, "behavioral consistency and false consensus." Behavioral consistency explains that human behavior is influenced by individually experienced emotions in the past; false consensus is due to the expectation of similar behavior by others as response to the same situation (Andrade and Ariely 2009:2-3). The effect of past emotions on future attitude is "live longer than the emotional experience itself" as argued by Andrade and Ariely (2009:6-7). In this sense, with regard to intergroup relations, false group consensus may determine individual's behavior to make decision that may be bias and not represent its own self-interest.

In a meta-analysis on the effect of discrete emotions, Angie et al. (2011) conclude that discrete emotions of anger and sadness both effectively influence judgment and decision-making (small to medium effect-size), but with different implications. The anger emotion has a small effect-size for risk-seeking (Cohen's d=0.31) and policy choice (d=0.33). In contrast, sadness has smaller effect for risk-seeking (d=0.16), but a bigger (moderate) impact on policy choice (d=0.57). Moreover, the study argues that emotions induced individually (anger d=0.52, sadness d=0.63) have larger effect-size then in-group emotions (anger d=0.10) (Angie et al. 2011).

Priming

Another concept that prominently influences human behavior is priming, which deals with the sub-conscious (Dolan et al. 2010:24). Priming, using images,

words, or sensation cues, can effectively shape our brains to act differently (Dolan et al. 2010:24). For instance, Winkielmen et al. (2005) study the ability of priming (with images) to influence behavior with positive results. They suggest that people who are exposed with happiness consume more beverages (B=17.11, t(34) = 2.73, p < .01) and derive positive value from it (B= .28, t(13)= 2.25, p = .05). In contrast, the opposite is true with people who are shown angry pictures (Winkielmen et al. 2005:127, 130). Another example in priming religion by Gervais and Norenzayan (2012) concluded that priming people with religious stimuli make them think about a God who watches them, and thus it elevates public self-awareness (t(94)=2.17, p=.03, Cohen's d=.45). These studies demonstrate that human behavior tends to be affected by sub-conscious cues.

3.4. Priming (Religion)

Priming, framing, and agenda setting are important political communications that may influence individual decisions in an election (Price and Tewksbury 1997, Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, Weaver 2007). Agenda setting related to a robust relationship between a particular issue accentuated by the media and a strong response to these issues by the public (as cited in Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007:11). Framing refers to the various ways of presenting specific information to influence the formulation of decision judgment (Brewer et al. 2003:495-496, Chong and Druckman 2007:104, Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007:11).

Priming, using a particular cue (image, text, smell), influence human brain (long-term retention), that affect future behavior (as cited in Cassino and Erisen 2008:375, Dolan et al. 2010:24). In the context of politics, Iyengar and Kinder (2010:63) argue that priming refers to the shifts of criteria being used by an individual in assessing some particular cases. Priming is considered as an extension of agenda setting (Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007:11). Agenda setting and priming are inter-related because agenda setting adds heaviness to some information, and priming determines peoples' thoughts when evaluating that information (Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007:11, as cited in Sheafer and Weimann 2005:348-351). Priming works through at least two procedures, "semantically or affectively" (as cited in Cassino and Erisen 2010:375-377). Semantic priming occurs due to connection to the attributes given to the objects/"nodes" (Cassino and Erisen 2010:375-377). Affective priming connects the nodes based on positive or negative associations to the objects (Cassino and Erisen 2010:375-377). Activating these nodes influences human behavior.

Priming is considered a cutting-edge research technique in psychological study, such as in a religious context to evaluate and understand causal effects of human attitude (Shariff et al. 2016:27). Previous studies suggest that priming religion can tackle limitations in "existing correlational and quasi-experimental designs

by directly manipulating the salience of religious thinking" (Shariff et al. 2016:28). It is argued as an effective technique because it can elaborate the effect of priming on religious thinking with many other variables such as "demographic background and political orientation" (Shariff et al. 2016:28). This study concludes that priming is an important technique to provoke human behavior.

Some previous studies on the effect of priming relate to elections for instance, ordering priming Bush and the war in Iraq before the 2008 U. S. presidential election. The result showed that primed respondents more likely to support Obama as a candidate who was against the war (Cassino and Erisen 2010); priming religion on the gay marriage ban (GMB) issue in the 2004 U. S. presidential election showed that Bush was able to gain support from evangelicals who also supported a GMB (Campbell and Monson 2008); a study on the interaction between religion, priming, and democracy in Tunisia found that priming religious beliefs hinders support for democracy while priming religious social behavior leads to more support for democracy (Bloom and Arikan 2012); racial and religious priming to African-American by criticizing Obama for the 2008 U. S. presidential election results negative response to him (Pyszczynski et al. 2010:863).

Meta-Analysis on Religious Priming (Shariff et al. 2016)

Review on the meta-analytic study, is based on Shariff et al. (2016) to highlight priming as adopted research technique in this present study. Shariff et al. (2016) review 93 investigations on the effect of religious priming, covering 11,653 respondents. Three objectives of their research are (1) to assess psychological robustness and reliability of the four religious priming categories, (2) to know its effect especially on pro-social behavior, and (3) to evaluate its effect based on religiosity level.

Shariff et al. (2016:28) claims there are four types of religious priming classified by researchers: explicit, implicit, subliminal and contextual priming. Explicit priming induces religious thinking overtly and there is no intention to conceal the religious stimulus. Implicit priming keeps subjects unaware of the religious stimuli given to them. In subliminal priming, respondents are not aware at all if they have been showed any religious stimuli. This is different than implicit priming, which presents "supraliminal religious stimuli" but respondents do not consciously recognize that it talks about religion. Implicit and subliminal priming are considered robust, but work in limited areas and do not cover the complex world. Contextual priming takes natural setting research, such as inside religious venues such as use a Muslim call-to-prayer audio (Shariff et al. 2016:28).

The effect-size was measured based on differences (means, standard deviations, and sample sizes) of the outcome variables between the treatment and control groups. A standardized effect size, Hedges' *g,* was applied for the effect-size

measurement, which is considered capable of avoiding positive bias found in Cohen's *d* calculation (Shariff et al. 2016:30). The effect-size measurement is conducted for a variety of outcomes, including pro-social behavior.

As main result, Shariff et al. (2016) found that the religious priming over 92 studies (*n* =11.068) shows a robust, small to medium effect size (g= 0.40, p< .0001, 95% confidence intervals (CI)= [0.34, 0.46]), on various outcomes. Standard effect size by Cohen (as cited in Shariff 2016:34) indicates an effect ranging from small, medium to large with *d* ranging from 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8, respectively. Evaluation of publication bias (p-hacking) was conducted through subsequent analysis of the p-curve over 67 qualifying studies (*n* =6,949). The finding is robust, showing a real religious priming effect and negating the effect of "publication bias and p-hacking" (2016:37).

The study also suggests that all four priming types are robust (Shariff et al. 2016:34-35). However, contextual priming reported the strongest effect-size (*g* =0.44, p< .0001, 95% CI= [0.28, 0.71]) while subliminal priming showed the weakest (*g* =0.33, p < .0001, 95% CI = [0.20, 0.48]). Assessment on each experimental setting (laboratory, online or direct field experiment) effectiveness showed a significant and similar effect-size for each of them (*g* ranging from 0.34–0.44) (Shariff et al. 2016:37). Shariff et al. also compared two outcome measurement methods, self-reporting versus behavioral experiment (e.g. games). The study found that both measurements are significantly effective, but self-reporting showed a stronger result (*g* =0.46, p< .0001, 95% CI= [0.37, 0.55]) than the behavioral approach e.g. games (*g* =0.34, p< .0001, 95% CI= [0.26, 0.42]) (Shariff et al. 2016:35).

Shariff et al. (2016:39-41) found that a respondent's religiosity has a significant impact on the effect of priming. "High religiosity" respondents have a medium effect-size (*g* =.44, *p*< .0001, 95% CI= [0.24, 0.65]). The result is similar with Richard, Bond, and Stokes-Zoota's (2003) finding of 25,000 "social-psychological" researches for more than 100 years where *d*=0.43 (r=0.21). This result is higher than "no/low religiosity" respondents (*g* =0.04, *p* =.71, 95% CI= [−0.17, 0.24]), and even than when both types of respondents are included (*g* =.21, *p* =.015, 95% CI= [0.04, 0.37]) (Shariff et al. 2016:41). This result shows that religiosity is important factor to the priming effect-size.

Chapter 4
Experimental Strategy and Empirical Approach

This chapter describes the methodological approach to address research objectives in this study. This research uses survey experiment with priming techniques and econometric analysis to study voter decision-making in the 2017 Jakarta election. Two plausible parameters, religion and socio-economic status, are used in the analysis. There are two reasons to use a survey experiment. First, survey experiments can reduce the risk of measuring a sensitive topic, such as religion and political choice, but still keep the study direct, potentially reducing interpretation bias. The second reason, according to meta-analysis study by Shariff et al. (2016) on priming religion, is that self-reporting experiments produce stronger effect-sizes than other behavioral experiment types.

This research uses priming for two reasons. First, it is effective in causing a psychological-effect by enacting the salience of religious thoughts (Bloom and Arikan 2012, Campbell and Monson 2008, Shariff et al. 2016). Second, it helps provide evidence-based conclusions on the hypothesis that the news media and social pressure have allegedly primed voters' minds. Furthermore, the study uses econometric models to analyze experimental results robustness.

4.1. Hypothesis

As discussed in the previous chapters, self-categorization may produce in-group favoritism that may influence human behavior, thinking, and decision-making. Reflecting on the literature review and the issues in the Jakarta gubernatorial election, this current study hypothesizes that:
1) In-group biases due to religious identity influenced voters' decisions.
2) Socio-economic status (income level), has impact but weaker than religious cues and not only affected by the poor, contrary to Wilson (2017).
3) Priming religion [which presumably happens through various avenues predisposes people to an in-group bias.

4.2. Survey Experiment

Experiment Procedure
A total of 228 face-to-face survey experiments were conducted over three weeks in July and August 2017 in Jakarta, Indonesia. Jakarta was chosen as the main location because of the election. The experiment used a priming technique combined with a questionnaire. Respondents were randomly divided into two groups, treatment and control group. The treatment group was exposed to the

priming condition and then the questionnaire. The control group was directly surveyed with the questionnaire without priming. The order for the first few questions on the questionnaire are slightly different between the two groups as part of strategy to reduce sensitivity to and judgment of the research by respondents. Besides the priming treatment, both groups were treated equally, including the survey questions and results analysis.

Location

The research covers all regions in Jakarta province, Central, East, West, North, and South Jakarta (see Annex I: Experiment Location). The purpose was to capture vote dynamic and diversity, which may differ among regions. Residential areas, office buildings, shopping centers, and the street were all included in the research to capture respondents' socio-demographic diversity in a high population density location. The research tried to focus more on medium-low level of income participants to assess one of the current debates about the election as an issue of class, not religion, by covering medium-low income residence areas. Including *rusunawa Marunda[17]*, a residential area built by the government for 'victims' of resettlement policy from various locations. However, since the number of respondents from this location are limited, cautious results analysis is needed.

Sample Size

A total of 228 respondents, distributed equally for both groups, participated in the experiment. This meets the minimum sample size required, 200, which is determined by power calculation using simple random sample. The calculation is based on an assumption power of 80%, with a 5% significance level, and minimum detectable effect (MDE) of 9%. The assumption of a MDE of 9% (or about 21 pp) is based on minimum additional support for *Ahok* to win the election from the actual result (42.05%) in the election (KPU 2017). The minimum sample comprises a suggested attrition rate of 20% (Blair et al. 2004).

Respondents Requirement

Respondents' main criteria are Jakarta resident, eligible to vote, alone (or answer the questions privately), and willing to participate in the survey. Assessment of being Jakarta resident and vote eligibility was conducted through the survey questions. Participants who were found ineligible to vote due to residency status are excluded from the experiment results. The research did not ask for any written informed consent from participants, such as a signature as agreement to participate in the survey, and kept respondents' information anonymous. The reason is because the research found during the pilot that most of the participants prefer to keep it private.

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[17] Twelve (12) respondents were surveyed in this location. In this area, *Ahok* won in the first round, but not the second.

Recruitment of respondents was conducted randomly on the spot before the experiment. Randomization was also executed by mixing all printed questionnaires in advance and choosing one randomly without knowing which questionnaire was taken for each participant. Hence, the researcher did not choose under which survey each respondent would be evaluated.

4.3. Priming Conditions

The priming type adopted in the experiment is *explicitly* prime religion technique so respondents can consciously identify the religious stimuli (Shariff et al. 2016). As discussed in Chapter 3, this type of priming is robust and gives a small to medium effect-size (Shariff et al. 2016:34). The experiment uses explicit priming because it was conducted close to the election, where religious tension was already salient. The research expects to avoid the risk of a lack of awareness to the religious stimuli provided and thus it can extrapolate a true and conscious effect.

The priming used a photograph to provoke religious reactions, as it can cause stronger effects than text (Powell et al. 2015). The photograph was chosen from the internet from a real event and famous social/religious movements in Jakarta related to the blasphemy accusation discussed in Chapter 1, called as *212* movement or 02 December 2016 movement (see Annex II). Decision to use '*212*' image was because of its contextual meaning and popularity amongst Jakartans. This will reduce bias response to the priming due to knowledge about the issue. Since the event is considered new and real, the picture chosen is also expected to give a strong reminder to respondents about the issue on the election, which can later produce a strong effect to the treatment. A short description was written under the image to enhance the religious stimuli. The text consists of some cognitive religious concept/words (e.g. God, prophet) to make the religious stimuli powerful.

The priming setting was a field experiment, which is considered robust and produces a higher effect-size than other experiment settings (Shariff et al. 2016:44). Three reasons motivate this approach. The first is to reveal more honest and richer responses than other settings, like a laboratory (List 2007). Even though the experiment used a survey, the priming condition does not directly indicate the objectives of the study. Hence, it is expected to produce a true priming effect. Second, a field setting can avoid respondent selection bias due to randomization. Third, the field may provide additional insights, post-survey, to add to the narrative of the study.

The priming experiment method adhered procedures by Echebarria Echabe and Perez (2015). First, respondents were given few minutes to see the image and

read the description in private to conceive the given information. Followed with question[18] about what the image is about and the feelings inflicted. The third is an interval question[19] about their (dis)agreement for any anxiety/sad/afraid feeling evoked from the image/words. After this, the treatment group was asked with some questions on the questionnaire, which also be given directly (no-priming) to control group.

4.4. Survey Questions

The treatment and control groups were given questionnaires with the same questions (see Annex III). The questions capture the main issue to address the research objectives. Overall, the questionnaire covers three main dimensions, *perception about leadership, perception about a nation, and respondents' religiosity and religious views*. These questions will be used as proxies to analyze voters' behavior and thinking in the election. Respondents' socio-demographics were also gathered for further complimentary analysis, besides information about respondents' choices in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election.

There was a slight difference in the questionnaire order between the two group. The treatment group was asked first some religious stimuli questions, before the main research questions, and then some socio-demographic questions. The control group was asked first the main research question then religiosity and socio demographic questions[20].

The religiosity questions cover two dimensions, *belief* and *religious behavior* (as cited in Bloom and Arikan 2012)[21]. Decision to use these questions was taken after the pilot test, where the researcher found that respondents tended to be more sensitive and tried to guess the research purpose that may influence the way they respond to the questions. By using questions on religiosity dimensions, the research can slightly distract respondents but maintain the effect of priming religion in the questionnaire.

A total of 26 questions were asked on the survey. Some of the questions were taken from the World Value Survey (WVS)[22] wave 6 in Indonesia with some

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[18] Question: "*Tell me what you see? What emotional feeling do you have about that?*"

[19] Question: "*Do the picture makes you feel anxiety/fear/sadness?*"

[20] This technique follows ordering priming technique/study by Bloom and Arikan (2012)

[21] Three dimensions of religiosity on Bloom and Arikan (2012) study, *belief, behavior, and belonging*. 'Belief' refers to voter's religion, was asked with question: "*What is your religion?*". It was asked first before the main research questions for treatment group and later for control group. The religious behavior question (*Apart from (before) eating/sleeping, how often do you pray/attend religious services these days?*), was placed later after the main questions for both group.

[22] WVS is an international network of social scientists that conducts research on the area of social and political life. (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp)

adjustment. Insights from studies by Bloom and Arikan (2012) were also incorporated. The questionnaire was designed mostly as 'interval scale questions', from 'one (1) – absolutely disagree/no' to 'four (4) – absolutely agree/yes'. There was no neutral option provided, except in the question about their choice in the election. Using interval answer questionnaires helps respondents avoid the need to feel too strong a position than in a simple binary '*yes/no*'. This may encourage honesty and willingness to answer questions.

Some socio-demographic questions were asked in the survey, such as gender, age, job, level of income, education, ethnicity, marital status, and media consumption. These questions use multiple-choices answer. Level of income and age answers were given as ranges to avoid respondents' resistance to answer. The income question is on a household level, so in case a respondent is a student, a housewife or has no job, income per month was estimated from their spouse or parents.

4.5. Econometric Model and Analysis

The analysis uses an econometric model with the aim of understanding the effect of priming to voters' behavior in the election. It explains the relationship between the dependent variable and the priming condition as the main independent variable, apart with other explanatory variables. Reflecting on the effect-size of the priming will give insight to the power religion has in influencing voters' behavior. Designing the dependent variable as randomized binary data, the analysis adopts a linear probability econometric model. The estimated model is as follows:

$$D_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Prime_i + \beta_2\, Religion_i + \beta_3\, Income_i + \beta_{xi}X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where D_i is the outcome variable for respondent i. Two main outcomes are, perception on (1) the leader 'shares similar religion'[23] with voters (SSR) and (2) 'non-Islam be President'[24] (NIP). The main outcomes explain respondents' perceptions to agree (D_i=1) or disagree (D_i=0) to have 'similar religion leader' and 'non-Islam leader/president' with exposure to the priming treatment ($Prime_i$). The $Religion_i$ assesses the interaction between respondents' religion (Islam =1 and non-Islam =0) with these outcome variables. Income level (above 3 million rupiah=1, otherwise 0) is also analyzed as socio-economic status relationship to

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[23] Question on the survey (interval scale 1-abolutely disagree to 4-absolutely agree): "*Listen or take a look at this list of leader characteristics and tell me if you generally agree/disagree that these are important criteria to be president in Indonesia: d). share similar religion*"

[24] Question on the survey (interval scale 1-abolutely disagree to 4-absolutely agree): "*Listen or Take a look at this list of statements and tell me generally if you agree or not that you feel afraid/sad/angry about this statement: a). Non-Islamic politician running for president in Indonesia*".

the main outcomes. X_i are other explanatory variables of respondent i (e.g. gender, age, education, job, ethnicity, length of life in Jakarta, and media consumption behavior).

The specification model is estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. The variable $Prime_i$ is assumed uncorrelated with the residuals (unobserved factors), ε_i. The mean of residual is assumed equal to zero and normally distributed (Wooldridge 2015).

The main outcome variables are used as proxies to explain voters' decision in the election with regard to the priming. The coefficient of the priming variable is the main parameter of interest in this model. Its sign, magnitude and statistical significance are the basis of the analysis. This result is used as interpretation of religious effect on voters' thinking and decisions. A positive sign coefficient means that priming effectively increases religious sentiment, which can increase support of SSR and NIP perceptions. Conversely, a negative sign may imply that voters' decisions declined due to religious priming. This sign direction interpretation works in the opposite way with the 'non-Islam leader' outcome. Furthermore, religion is used as an indicator of the priming effect based on Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, to see in-group favoritism (and out-group prejudice) based on their perceptions in the main outcome variables.

In addition to this analysis, the research will also evaluate some other complementary results. The first one is to outline respondents' characteristics of those who voted for *Ahok* and of those who supported his opponent[25]. These results will be used for further analysis related to voters' socio-demographics, particularly based on income level. This narrative will reflect to the dichotomous debates about the election, either due to religion or socio-economic issues. The model to explain this is as follows:

$$Support\ Ahok_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Religion_i + \beta_2\ Income_i + \beta_{xi}X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where, $Support\ Ahok_i$ is a vote for *Ahok* by respondent i in the election based on his/her socio-demographics information (income, religion, gender, education, and age).

Another side-result is interaction between a development policy by *Ahok* and support for him. Blair et al. (2014:1046-1047) suggest that measuring approval of a leader's particular policy indicates support of his or her leadership. To this

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[25] Question on the survey: "*who did you vote for in the last Jakarta gubernatorial election?*"

end, two questions given to respondents regard *Ahok*'s development resettlement policies[26]. A question about resettlement was chosen after tested during the pilot, where most people were familiar with the issue. The model for this interaction is as follows:

$$Support\ Ahok_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Policy_i + \beta_{xi} X_i + \varepsilon_i \qquad (3)$$

The first step for model analysis is to make all explanatory variables into binary data (see Annex IV). Both, 1 (absolutely disagree/no) and 2 (disagree/no) answers in the interval scale 1 – 4 will be categorized as '0–disagree/no' and for both answers 3 (agree/yes) and 4 (absolutely agree/yes) as '1– agree/yes'. Some other questions are classified as binary data differently as defined in Annex IV. The second step is to run the regression with the model and analysis. Lastly, check robustness and heterogeneity of the model and variables to evaluate consistency of the prediction.

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[26] Question on development policy: "*Do you in general support Ahok's development policy*?" and for resettlement policy: "*what do you think generally about this statement: Jakarta resettlement policy is disadvantageous to poor people.*"

Chapter 5
Data and Descriptive Statistics

This chapter discusses the data collected from the survey experiment. The first part presents the data collection process. The second part outlines the dataset. The third section elaborates the descriptive statistics of the respondents. The last section discusses randomization balance across all respondents' socio-demographics.

5.1. Data Collection

The experiment obtained data in July – August 2017 in Jakarta, Indonesia. The surveys were conducted on weekdays, four to six hours per day, usually from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. The reason to limit the time is to avoid research fatigue that may influence quality of the survey. The time chosen was considered moderately busy, but not rush hour, to increase responses and reduce rejection rate due to 'bustle-time'. The experiments occurred in different places every day to avoid repetition from the same respondents and risk of awareness of the experiment. Besides, the research wanted to capture more diverse responses from various socio-demographics. Overall, response rate was more than 90%. Respondents who rejected to participate are mostly due to time availability. There were two respondents who rejected to continue the experiment for personal reasons after they rescinded their willingness to participate.

The data collection was conducted through direct field experiment. It was designed initially in two channels, direct field experiment and online. The online survey was sent through researcher's personal network, not randomly distributed in public. In total, there were only about 20 data gathered from this approach. The study decided to drop this data because its limited number and to ensure similar experiment treatment.

A pilot[27] experiment was conducted to test for any potential sensitivity to the questions and priming and to measure a response rate. 20 respondents were surveyed in the pilot, which resulted in minor adjustments for the final survey.

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[27] Pilot experiment was conducted both in The Hague, the Netherlands with some Indonesian students and also in a residential area and office buildings in South Jakarta to test response rate, sensitivity, and other potential technical issues in the experiment. During the pilot, the research found that respondents were mostly willing to answer the surveys with some minor inputs (such as wording) given by them to reduce the sensitivity.

5.2. Data Sample

The experiment covers a total 228 re-
spondents, distributed equally between
treatment and control group. Two re-
spondents did not answer two ques-
tions, about who they voted for in the
election and the reason to vote for that
candidate, for personal reasons. They
are still included in the analysis since
they still answered the main questions.

5.3. Demographic Statistics

Men and women were almost evenly distributed. This dataset consists of 46%
respondents who voted for *Ahok*, which reflects the actual election result (42%
voted for *Ahok*). 66% are Muslim, and the rest includes Protestants (29%), Cath-
olics (4%), and Buddhists (1%). More than 80% of respondents are younger than
40 years old. Ages between 17-40 years old are important as reference for two
reasons. First, about 35% of Jakartans are in this range (BPS 2016). Second, this
group is considered young, was not exposed to the *Soeharto* regime[28] (*Orde Baru*
or new regime), and is targeted by political parties. About 40% of respondents
have income less than 3 million per month (below minimum wage in Jakarta).
50% have medium income ranging from 3-8 million rupiah, which is also close
to the minimum income. Trade and Services are the top two respondents' job
sectors. Almost half of all respondents are married and have education level of
at least a diploma (I/II/III years) or higher. The level of education between men
and women is statistically similar. Table 1 displays full sample demographics.

5.4. Randomization Balance

Randomized assignment compliance across all socio-demographics of all re-
spondents is high, which is confirmed by the descriptive statistics between two
groups, treatment (prime) and control group (no-prime), present in Table 1. Dif-
ferences of means above 10% between the two groups are rejected.

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[28] This regime is predicted to be indirectly related to the election and still plays an important role
in Indonesian politics.

Table 1. Randomization Balance Compliance

Variable	Obs	Mean Prime	Mean No-Prime	*p-V*alue
Dummy, Religion, Muslim= 1	228	0.649	0.667	0.781
Dummy, Income above 3 million= 1	228	0.614	0.649	0.585
Dummy, Gender, Female= 1	228	0.491	0.518	0.693
Dummy, Ethnicity, Betawi= 1	228	0.281	0.228	0.364
Dummy, Education Level, Diploma and Higher= 1	228	0.465	0.535	0.291
Dummy, Age 30+ Years Old= 1	228	0.447	0.412	0.594
Dummy, Age 40+ Years Old= 1	228	0.175	0.202	0.613
Dummy, Years Live in Jakarta, 3 years and more= 1	228	0.956	0.965	0.735
Dummy, Job Sector, Trade= 1	228	0.175	0.211	0.504
Dummy, Marital Status, Married= 1	228	0.482	0.482	1.000

Source: Author's analysis

Chapter 6
Results

This chapter is organized in three sections. The first part reports the priming effect to induce anxiety/sadness/fear. The next section presents the main results and analysis. The third discusses complementary results of the study. The last part evaluates the robustness and heterogeneity of the main findings.

6.1. Priming Effect to Evoke Emotions

Figure 2. Priming Effectiveness to Provoke Emotions

Source: Author's analysis

The experiment reports that priming religion induces anxiety/fear/sadness. 82% of respondents (n =114, 95% CI [0.75,0.90]) in the treatment group confirmed that they felt those emotions, as displayed on Figure 2. This emotion may firmly influence and determine their future behavior (Andrade and Ariely 2009, Dolan et al. 2010:8).

Further analysis detects that two different responses about the emotions were identified[29] from the experiment across religions. For the non-Muslim group, they felt these emotions because they think that the election has divided the nation, and showed superiority-inferiority power relations, which make them feel insecure as religious minorities. In contrast, the Muslim group, felt more like anger as response to the blasphemy issue, where Islam had been insulted in a country where Islam is the majority. As argued by Angie et al. (2011), anger and sadness both effectively influence decisions, but in different ways. The different reactions to this emotion may also imply different future in-group/out-group behaviors. However, this study did not do further analysis on this subject. These two different results indicate that priming religion produces different conscious responses across religions.

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[29] The study finds this difference when comparing respondents' answers on the following questions on priming conditions (Chapter 4.3). This includes additional comment from respondents either they support or not these religious actions.

Figure 3. Feeling Anxiety/Afraid/Sad Across Socio-Demographics

Within the treatment group, this study evaluates emotions felt by respondents across different religions, socio-economic statuses, and genders as displayed in Figure 3. The result shows that as compared to the non-Muslim group (78%, *n* =40, 95% CI= [0.64,0.91]), there are more Muslim (85%, *n* =74, 95% CI= [0.77,0.93]) respondents who feel this emotion. Based on socio-economic status, number of low-income (*n* =44, 95% CI= [0.76,0.97]) respondents who felt anxiety/fear/sadness is more than the middle-up group (*n* =70, 95% CI= [0.70, 0.90]). This gap result may produce different response to the main question later. Across gender, there are more women (*n* =56, 95% CI= [0.76,0.95]) who feel these emotions than men (*n* =58, 95% CI= [0.69,0.90]).

Effect-size measurement across religion evaluates which group gets affected with the priming and produce stronger emotions. The results show a small[30] effect-size (Cohen's *d* =0.2, 95% CI= [-0.58,0.19]). It means that about 58% of the Muslim respondents will be above the mean of non-Islamic group for these emotions. In other words, there is 56% chance that any respondent chosen randomly from the Muslim-group will feel anxiety/fear/sadness than the non-Muslim group. It shows that religiosity produces different responses to the priming, which may indicate different decisions and judgments. In this experiment, Muslim respondents tended to have stronger emotions to response religious cues, which may lead to stronger in-group bias. In comparison, effect-size based on socio-economic status reports a smaller effect than religion (Cohen's *d* =0.17, 95% CI= [-0.21,0.54]). This suggests that there are more low-income respondents who feel anxiety, fear, or sadness.

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[30] Cohen classify effect-size as small, medium, large with *d* = 0.2, 0.6, 0.8, respectively. Guidance to Cohen's *d* interpretation (Magnusson n.d): <http://rpsychologist.com/d3/cohend/>.

6.2. Main Results: Does Religion Influence Voter Behavior?

Analysis to estimate voter behavior and decision-making is done by evaluating the relationship between the priming religion effect and a respondent's perception on 'share similar religion' and 'non-Islam as President'. Effect of priming religion to these two main outcomes is analyzed with the model suggested in Chapter 4. The study also uses this perception as a proxy for support *Ahok* or not which can be used to estimate in-group favoritism.

Perception on: Leader should 'Share Similar Religion' (SSR) with Voters

On perception to have a leader who shares a similar religion with voters, the result shows that 62% of treatment group support this idea (n =114, 95% CI= [0.53,0.71]). Higher than the control group where only 49% of respondents agree with the perception (n =114, 95% CI= [0.40,0.58]). The result confirms that priming religion influences their thinking and increases agreement to the perception. This indicates that a religion cue is effective to stimulate in-group bias.

Figure 4. Agreement on 'Share Similar Religion'

Source: Author's analysis

Figure 5. 'Share Similar Religion" Perception Across Socio-Demographics

Source: Author's analysis

To evaluate more the likelihood of in-group favoritism, the study analyzes the responses across socio-demographics between treatment and control group as

displayed in Figure 5. The results suggest that 84% (*n* =74, 95% CI= [0.75,0.92]) of Muslim respondents in the treatment group support a leader that shares a similar religion with them. This is higher as compared to control group where 64% (*n* =76, 95% CI= [0.53,0.75]) agree with the perception.

Furthermore, regardless of the priming, the result confirms that agreement to the share similar religion perception is higher among the Muslim group (74%, *n* =150, 95% CI= [0.67,0.81]) than amongst non-Muslim respondents (21%, *n* =78, 95% CI= [0.11,0.30]). Interestingly, medium-up income respondents are more likely to support SSR idea than low-income participants. This result is contradictive with Wilson (2017) suggestion that low-income population determines *Ahok* lost in the election. This indicates that religion is more salient than socio-economic variables.

Table 2 reports further analysis of the estimated relationship between religion and SSR perception. The result suggests that respondents who were primed (column 1) have 13 percentage points (pp) higher probability to agree to the perception that the leader should share similar religion with voters, holding other aspects constant. The coefficient is statistically significant at 95% (*p* =0.046, *n* =228). Across different models with additional independent variables, the result shows significance consistency. This result confirms that priming religion influences voters' behavior by increasing the importance of shared similar religious identity with the leader (supporting Hypothesis 3).

The evidence supports Dolan et al.'s (2010:24-25) suggestion that "our acts are often influenced by sub-conscious cues." When respondents were primed with religious stimuli their brains were affected, and thus their behavior. This could happen due to emotions induced by the priming, as explained by the concept of 'affect', where it can strongly influence our actions and decision (Dolan et al. 2010:25-26). These emotions can influence our conscious decision-making and may produce decisions that against self-interest (Dolan et al. 2010:25-26).

The results also confirm that among the Islamic group this perception is strongly supported. Table 2 (column 2) suggests that Islamic respondents have 54 pp (*p*< 0.001, *n* =228) higher probability to support a leader who is also Muslim. This result is consistently significant at 99% across all models. Moreover, this behavior is in line with respondent's perceptions about the nation, sharia law, and democracy. Respondents who support sharia law (column 5) are suggested to have 18 pp higher probability to support leader based on religious similarity (*p* =0.01, *n* =228), in contrast with respondents who support democracy. This concludes that the perception about a nation is in line with leader preference. Respondents who support a religious-based nation are more likely to support SSR. In contrast, ones who support democracy, have lower probability (15 pp) to support SSR (*p*

34

=0.063, *n* =228). In comparison, the socio-economic status analysis (column 2) shows a statistically significant coefficient. It reports that respondents who have an income of more than 3 million rupiahs have 10 pp higher probability to support a leader who has a similar religion with them (*p* =0.069, *n* =228).

Table 2. Priming Effect on 'Share Similar Religion' Perception

Variables	Perception on Leader 'Share Similar Religion' with Voters				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dummy, Prime =1	0.132**	0.145***	0.143**	0.134**	0.0939*
	(0.0655)	(0.0557)	(0.0555)	(0.0560)	(0.0559)
Dummy, Religion, Muslim =1		0.543***	0.469***	0.457***	0.383***
		(0.0572)	(0.0687)	(0.0697)	(0.0760)
Dummy, Income above 3 million =1		0.105*	0.126**	0.159**	0.161***
		(0.0573)	(0.0587)	(0.0626)	(0.0607)
Dummy, Praying Frequency, At Least Once A Week =1			0.0346	0.0374	0.0118
			(0.0992)	(0.100)	(0.0955)
Dummy, Gender, Female =1			0.0802	0.0773	0.0503
			(0.0557)	(0.0554)	(0.0555)
Dummy, Marital Status, Married =1			0.0686	0.0599	0.0562
			(0.0699)	(0.0691)	(0.0719)
Dummy, Age 40+ Years Old =1			0.0822	0.0588	0.0751
			(0.0882)	(0.0879)	(0.0878)
Dummy, Age 30+ Years Old =1			-0.0605	-0.0419	-0.0559
			(0.0707)	(0.0706)	(0.0714)
Dummy, Ethnicity, Betawi =1			0.166**	0.163**	0.157**
			(0.0666)	(0.0667)	(0.0656)
Dummy, Education Level, Diploma and Higher =1				-0.0987	-0.0763
				(0.0618)	(0.0612)
Dummy, Years Live in Jakarta, 3 years and more =1				-0.164	-0.154
				(0.103)	(0.119)
Dummy, Job Sector, Trade=1				0.00948	0.0127
				(0.0704)	(0.0661)
Dummy, Support Sharia Law =1					0.177***
					(0.0677)
Dummy, Support Democracy =1					-0.146*
					(0.0782)
Dummy, Need Religious Leader=1					0.0384
					(0.0668)
Constant	0.491***	0.0609	-0.0379	0.158	0.271
	(0.0470)	(0.0614)	(0.113)	(0.156)	(0.180)
Observations	228	228	228	228	228
R-squared	0.018	0.291	0.322	0.333	0.367

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author's analysis

Reflecting on the current debates (Chapter 2) over *Ahok's* loss, these results indicate that religion identity is more salient in shaping the election than economic issues. Religious belief increases the probability that in-group/out-group distinction are developed (support Hypothesis 1). The Islamic respondents indicate that they are more likely to support an SSR perception, which may have led to in-group bias by supporting a candidate that represents their religion. On the other hand, socio-economic status also influences SSR perception, but less so

than religion. Moreover, it reports that there is a higher probability of medium-up income respondents to not support *Ahok* than the low-income ones. This result concludes that even though socio-economic status influences SSR perception, it is not necessarily produced by low-income respondents (supports Hypothesis 2). This finding is in contrast with Wilson's (2017) suggestion. This result is parallel with the third line of debates about this election, as suggested by Warburton and Gammon (2017), that an "*ethno-religious economic anxiety*" may be relevant in this case.

Other socio-demographics variables, such as gender, marital status, age, and education, do not show statistical significance. However, the ethnicity coefficient has statistical significance. This result suggests that *Betawi* people, as original ethnic Jakartans are known, have 17 percentage points (column 3) higher probability to support a leader that shares a religion with them. Important to note, without trying to generalize it, *Betawi* is an ethnic group that supports[31] the Islamic Defenders Front organization, not to mention they also have their own organization (called *Forum Betawi Rempug)* that rejects *Ahok*[32].

Table 3. Effect Size of 'Share Similar Religion' Perception by Prime

Mean Comparison	Cohen's *d*			Hedges' *g*		
	Estimate	[95% Conf. Interval]		Estimate	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Total Sample	-0.27	-0.53	-0.01	-0.27	-0.52	0.00
Islamic Group	-0.45	-0.77	-0.12	-0.45	-0.77	-0.12
Non-Islamic Group	-0.10	-0.54	0.34	-0.10	-0.54	0.34
Income ≦ 3	-0.33	-0.76	0.10	-0.33	-0.76	0.10
Income > 3	-0.23	-0.56	0.09	-0.23	-0.56	0.09

Source: Author's analysis

Cohen's *d* and Hedge's *g* measure the priming religion effect-size (mean comparison) to SSR perception. According to Cohen, as discussed in Chapter 3, the result suggests that priming religion, overall, has a small effect to support perception of 'share similar religion'. This is in line with the meta-analytic study of priming religion by Shariff et al. (2016), where priming religion produced a small to medium effect-size. The size is statistically identical with Hedge's *g* calculation.

With Cohen's *d* =0.27 (95% CI= [-0.53,-0.01]), it tells that respondents who support SSR perception in the treatment group are above the mean of the control group by 58-62% (Magnusson n.d.)[33]. Put simply, someone who is chosen

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[31] According to Ratnasari (2017): <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20170123143009-20-188279/jawara-maen-pukulan-betawi-ikut-kawal-rizieq-bersama-fpi/>.

[32] According to tempo.co news: <https://metro.tempo.co/read/611836/kenapa-fpi-dan-fbr-menolak-ahok>.

[33] This estimation is according to Magnusson (n.d.): <http://rpsychologist.com/d3/cohend/>.

randomly from treatment group has 56-58% higher probability to support SSR perception. Interestingly, across different religions, the result detects signal of in-group favoritism as discussed in Social Identity Theory. The Muslim respondents show higher effect (d =0.45, 95% CI= [-0.77,-0.12]) to agree with having a leader with a similar religion, in contrast to non-Muslim respondents (d =0.01, 95% CI= [-0.54,0.34]). On the other hand, a mean comparison measurement based on socio-economic status reports a small effect-size, but lower than religion. Moreover, the effect-size between the two categories among income-level group has little difference. Meaning that socio-economic status cleavage is important but not strong. This result again supports the hypothesis that religion creates in-group bias and is more relevant than socio-economic issues.

Table 4. Proxy on 'Share Similar Religion' and Vote in the Election

Variables	Dummy, Candidate Voted in the Election, Ahok =1				
	(1) Total	(2) Muslim	(3) Non-Muslim	(4) Income>3	(5) Income≦3
Dummy, Share Same Religion =1	-0.458***	-0.230**	-0.153	-0.486***	-0.426***
	(0.0598)	(0.0890)	(0.116)	(0.0746)	(0.0993)
Constant	0.720***	0.421***	0.903***	0.763***	0.659***
	(0.0451)	(0.0806)	(0.0380)	(0.0558)	(0.0750)
Observations	226	148	78	142	84
R-squared	0.208	0.054	0.034	0.229	0.184

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Author's analysis

To estimate the effect of 'share similar religion' perception with voters' decision, this study uses as a proxy the real vote in the election. Table 4 presents the result of this interaction. The result (column 1) suggests that respondents that agree that a leader should share a religion with them have a 46 pp lower probability of supporting *Ahok*, keeping other variables constant. This result is statistically significant at 99% (p< 0.001). Moreover, analysis based on religion group (column 2 and 3) confirms that religion identity is salient. The result reports that Muslim respondents who agree that a leader should share a similar religion with them have a 23 pp higher probability of not voting for *Ahok* (p =0.01). On another hand, the non-Muslim responses produce a lower and statistically insignificant result.

In addition, the result (column 4 and 5) related to income level reports a high correlation. Respondents who agree with the SSR perception have a 50 pp lower probability of supporting *Ahok*. However, both socio-economic statuses show identical results statistically, which means that income-level disparity is not significant. This confirms that economic issues may play a role in the election, but not necessarily to the advantage of a particular candidate. Thus, the result suggests that both, religion and socio-economic status issues, influence voters' decision in the election.

Perception on: 'Non-Islam Be President' (NIP)

The result reports only 57% treated respondents (*n* =114, 95% CI= [0.48,0.66], *p*-compare =0.03) agree to have non-Islam leader, lower than the control group (71%, *n* =114, 95% CI= [0.63,0.80]). This result suggests that priming religion effectively affects a respondent's decision. Provoking with religion cues in-duce emotions that increase

Figure 6. Agreement on 'Non-Islam Be President'

Source: Author's analysis

their in-group distinctiveness and hence make them more likely to denounce candidates of other religions.

This study investigates this sign of in-group favoritism by analyzing responses based on religion, socio-economic status, and gender as presented in Figure 7. The study reports that 42% of respondents who are Muslim (*n* =74, 95% CI= [0.30,0.53], *p*-compare =0.05), in the treatment group are less likely to agree if there is a non-Muslim candidate running for president, as compared to 58% in the control group (*n* =76, 95% CI= [0.47,0.69]). During the experiment, some respondents argued that as a Muslim-majority country, it is better and preferable to have an Islamic leader, as confirmed by this result. In contrast, among the non-Muslim participants, both treatment and control groups report a higher agreement. This indicates that perception to have non-Muslim leader is more sensitive and less likely supported among Muslim respondents. In this sense, religion may inflict in-group/out-group cleavages across religious groups.

Figure 7. 'Non-Islam Be President' Perception Across Socio-Demographics

Source: Author's analysis

Based on socio-economic status, the result indicates similar signs with the perception on 'share similar religion', where respondents with income of more than 3 million rupiahs are less likely to support non-Muslim candidates as compared to lower income people.

Table 5. Priming Effect on 'Non-Islam Be President' Perception

Variables	Perception on 'Non-Islam Be President'				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dummy, Prime =1	-0.140**	-0.155***	-0.160***	-0.150***	-0.108*
	(0.0632)	(0.0560)	(0.0565)	(0.0572)	(0.0563)
Dummy, Religion, Muslim =1		-0.424***	-0.428***	-0.418***	-0.321***
		(0.0514)	(0.0632)	(0.0649)	(0.0680)
Dummy, Income above 3 million =1		-0.201***	-0.197***	-0.242***	-0.239***
		(0.0579)	(0.0597)	(0.0674)	(0.0642)
Dummy, Praying Frequency, At Least Once A Week =1			0.0333	0.0211	0.0844
			(0.0981)	(0.0955)	(0.0853)
Dummy, Gender, Female =1			0.0191	0.0265	0.0584
			(0.0562)	(0.0558)	(0.0542)
Dummy, Marital Status, Married =1			-0.0512	-0.0353	-0.0511
			(0.0727)	(0.0729)	(0.0709)
Dummy, Age 40+ Years Old =1			-0.0145	0.00421	0.0133
			(0.0921)	(0.0968)	(0.0928)
Dummy, Age 30+ Years Old =1			0.0876	0.0732	0.0942
			(0.0759)	(0.0768)	(0.0719)
Dummy, Ethnicity, Betawi =1			0.0473	0.0575	0.0703
			(0.0796)	(0.0819)	(0.0783)
Dummy, Education Level, Diploma and Higher =1				0.126*	0.100
				(0.0705)	(0.0674)
Dummy, Years Live in Jakarta, 3 years and more =1				-0.0654	-0.0967
				(0.174)	(0.184)
Dummy, Job Sector, Trade=1				0.0589	0.0504
				(0.0725)	(0.0713)
Dummy, Support Sharia Law =1					-0.200***
					(0.0637)
Dummy, Support Democracy =1					-0.0421
					(0.141)
Dummy, Need Religious Leader=1					-0.129**
					(0.0645)
Constant	0.711***	1.124***	1.065***	1.070***	1.185***
	(0.0427)	(0.0522)	(0.105)	(0.208)	(0.246)
Observations	228	228	228	228	228
R-squared	0.021	0.229	0.235	0.251	0.309

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Author's analysis

Table 5 outlines the interaction between the priming religion effect to NIP perception. The result reports that priming religion has a significant effect to this perception. It suggests that respondents who were primed (column 1) have a 14 pp lower probability of agreeing with a non-Muslim candidate, holding other aspects constant (p =0.027, n =228). The levels of significances are consistent

statistically across all different models. This also confirms that priming religion induces emotions, which may shape voters' decision-making processes (supports Hypothesis 3).

Furthermore, similar to the previous result on SSR perception, a respondent's religion is influential to their perception of supporting a non-Muslim leader. Respondents who hold an Islamic belief (column 2) have a 42 pp lower probability of agreeing to have non-Muslim leader (p <0.001, n =228). However, religiosity does not show a significant coefficient, statistically. In column 5, the result also reports that respondents who support sharia law have a 20 pp lower probability of supporting a non-Muslim leader (p =0.002, n =228). Moreover, respondents who expect to have a leader that is religious also show preference of not supporting a non-Muslim leader (by 13 pp, p =0.046, n =228). The result suggests that respondents that have prefer a religious-based nation tend to support leader that belongs to their group. This again indicates in-group favoritism.

Socio-economic results also confirm that respondents with an income higher than 3 million rupiahs have a 20 pp lower probability to support a non-Muslim leader (p =0.001, n =228). However, the magnitude is lower than the religion effect. This means that even though socio-economic status influences the election, it is weaker than religion (supports Hypothesis 1). Moreover, it shows that medium-up income respondents are less likely to support NIP perception, as compared to low-income participants. This result is in contrast with Wilson's (2017) suggestion (supports Hypothesis 2). This evidence confirms the suggestion that a mix of religious and economic factors contributed to *Ahok's* loss in the election.

Table 6. Effect Size of 'Non-Islam Be President' Perception by Prime

Mean Comparison	Cohen's *d*			Hedges's *g*		
	Estimate	[95% Conf. Interval]		Estimate	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Total Sample	0.29	0.03	0.56	0.29	0.03	0.55
Islamic Group	0.32	0.00	0.64	0.32	0.00	0.64
Non-Islamic Group	0.44	-0.01	0.89	0.43	-0.01	0.88
Income $\leqq$ 3	0.24	-0.08	0.57	0.24	-0.08	0.57
Income > 3	0.45	0.01	0.88	0.43	-0.01	0.88

Source: Author's analysis

Moreover, Table 6 presents an effect-size measurement between the treatment and control groups. Cohen's *d* calculation reports that the effect-size is small to medium (*d* =0.3), in line with the meta-analytic study by Shariff et al. (2016). Comparing results across religions also detects a signal of in-group favoritism. The distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims on the agreement with NIP perception indicates in-group/out-group cleavages. Non-Muslim respondents

also show higher preference to support a non-Muslim leader, which may indicate in-group bias in inverse ways to the Muslim respondents. Interestingly, economic status detects a high difference effect-size to NIP perception. However, the result also concludes that respondents with a higher income level are more likely to disagree with NIP.

Table 7. Proxy on 'Non-Islam Be President' and Vote in the Election

Variables	Dummy, Candidate Voted in the Election, Ahok =1				
	(1) Total	(2) Muslim	(3) Non-Muslim	(4) Income>3	(5) Income<3
Dummy, Non-Muslim Be President, Agree =1	0.557***	0.399***	0.173	0.638***	0.460***
	(0.0525)	(0.0642)	(0.177)	(0.0634)	(0.0907)
Constant	0.110***	0.0533**	0.714***	0.115***	0.0952
	(0.0347)	(0.0261)	(0.173)	(0.0411)	(0.0648)
Observations	226	148	78	142	84
R-squared	0.288	0.212	0.022	0.400	0.161

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Author's analysis

To predict how voters made decisions in the previous election, this present study makes a proxy to evaluate the relationship between a respondent's agreement of NIP perception and the actual vote the election. The result suggests, as presented in Table 7, that respondents that agree to have non-Muslim as a leader have a 56-percentage points higher probability of supporting *Ahok* (column 1). In other words, the fact that *Ahok* lost in that election indicates that voters are more likely to disagree with a non-Muslim as governor of Jakarta. In this sense, religious sentiment plays a critical role. Only respondents that support NIP perception are open to having a leader regardless of his or her religion.

6.3. Other/Complimentary Results

This study also conducts complimentary analysis for further assessment about the election, which relates to the main objectives of the research. The first analysis is about voters' characteristics to find out who voted (or not voted) for *Ahok* to identify signals of in-group/out-group mechanisms. The second is also to assess media consumption demographics to briefly see the role of media (priming) during the campaign. The third is to evaluate respondents' views towards *Ahok's* development policy.

Who Voted for Ahok?

Table 8 outlines voters' characteristics. Muslim voters have a 62 pp lower probability of voting for *Ahok*, keeping other-variables constant (*p*< 0.001, *n* =226). In line with this is the response of voters who agree with sharia law (column 3). Unexpectedly, religiosity reports that voters who are considered religious have a 24 pp higher probability of supporting *Ahok*. This is in contrast with Chuah et

al.'s (2016) study that fundamentalism increases out-group prejudice. This result suggests that further analysis based on religiosity is needed. Table 8 also reports that socio-economic status is not significant statistically to influence a voter's decision. Muslim respondents tended to not support *Ahok,* in line with earlier discussions on SSR and NIP perception.

Table 8. Voters' Characteristics Who (Not) Support Ahok

Variables	Candidate Voted in the Election, Ahok =1		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dummy, Religion, Muslim =1	-0.622***	-0.589***	-0.396***
	-0.052	-0.063	-0.078
Dummy, Income above 3 million =1	0.003	0.005	0.009
	-0.056	-0.060	-0.054
Dummy, Gender, Female =1		0.024	0.062
		-0.053	-0.050
Dummy, Marital Status, Married =1		-0.155**	-0.167***
		-0.063	-0.059
Dummy, Education Level, Diploma and Higher =1		0.000	-0.060
		-0.060	-0.056
Dummy, Age 40+ Years Old =1		-0.030	-0.043
		-0.085	-0.076
Dummy, Age 30+ Years Old =1		0.143**	0.171***
		-0.071	-0.065
Dummy, Ethnicity, Betawi =1		0.045	0.072
		-0.075	-0.067
Dummy, Job Sector, Trade=1		0.048	0.048
		-0.064	-0.057
Dummy, Years Live in Jakarta, 3 years and more =1		0.015	-0.050
		-0.171	-0.161
Dummy, Pray Frequency, At Least Once a Week =1		0.163**	0.243***
		-0.082	-0.083
Dummy, Support Sharia Law =1			-0.217***
			-0.069
Dummy, Support Democracy =1			-0.044
			-0.128
Dummy, Need Religious Leader =1			-0.090
			-0.064
Dummy, Follow Religious Leader Suggestion =1			-0.090
			-0.071
Dummy, War for Religion Justice, Agree=1			-0.093
			-0.071
Dummy, Life Quality in Jakarta, Better =1			0.106
			-0.064
Dummy, Friend Different Religion, Many (>5)=1			-0.021
			-0.061
Constant	0.870***	0.676***	0.798***
	-0.052	-0.196	-0.227
Observations	226	226	226
R-squared	0.351	0.381	0.483

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Author's Analysis

Response to Ahok's Development Policy

Table 9 reports that respondents who agree with *Ahok*'s development policy (column 3) have a 41 pp higher probability of supporting *Ahok* in the election (p <0.001, n =226). This is in line with the actual election result. Interestingly the

result suggests that non-Muslim respondents who disagree with *Ahok*'s development strategy have a 16 pp lower probability of supporting him (*p* =0.01, *n* =78). In contrast, among Muslim respondents who agree with his development policy, there is a 23 pp higher probability to vote for him in the election (*p*< 0.001, *n* =148). It means that acceptance towards his development strategy also plays important role, even though in small magnitude. In terms of socio-economic status, both groups of income-level that agree with *Ahok's* policy have a greater probability of supporting him by 40 pp (*p*< 0.001, *n* =142, 84).

Table 9. Vote and Ahok's Policy Relationship

Variables	Candidate Voted in the Election, Ahok =1				
	Total	Islam	Non-Islam	Income >3	Income ≦3
Dummy, Ahok Development Program, Agree =1	0.414***	0.227***	-0.162**	0.416***	0.412***
	(0.0665)	(0.0632)	(0.0618)	(0.0898)	(0.103)
Dummy, Resettlement Policy Is Bad, Agree =1	0.0494	-0.0168	-0.0622	0.0286	0.0843
	(0.0667)	(0.0749)	(0.0785)	(0.0865)	(0.107)
Constant	0.0868	0.0730	1.062***	0.105	0.0552
	(0.0574)	(0.0528)	(0.0785)	(0.0746)	(0.0957)
Observations	226	148	78	142	84
R-squared	0.084	0.043	0.010	0.079	0.093

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author's analysis

Table 10. Resettlement Policy Vs Religion and Income

Variables	Dummy, Resettlement Policy Is Bad, Agree =1	
	(1)	(2)
Dummy, Religion, Muslim =1	-0.161**	-0.159**
	(0.0688)	(0.0688)
Dummy, Income above 3 million =1	-0.00731	-0.00632
	(0.0667)	(0.0670)
Dummy, Gender, Female =1		0.0296
		(0.0642)
Constant	0.492***	0.475***
	(0.0722)	(0.0810)
Observations	228	228
R-squared	0.025	0.026

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author's analysis

To investigate more, this study analyzes the interaction between religion and socio-economic status with resettlement policy. Table 10 outlines religion's effect on support of the resettlement policy. This result reports that Muslim respondents have a 16 pp lower probability of denouncing it as bad policy. This means that there is paradox between approval of policy and vote decisions, in contrast with what is argued by Blair et al. (2014). For the Muslim group, there is no issue with the resettlement policy, but they do not support *Ahok* as the leader. In addition, income-level is statistically insignificant and thus unable to support economic issue in the election.

Media Consumption

Most of the media consumption behavior presents insignificant results, statistically. The study only finds that respondents who are exposed to the internet have a 15 pp ($p =0.009$, $n =78$) lower probability of supporting *Ahok,* same as with radio consumers. However, overall, this result is not enough to report a complete interaction between voters' characteristics (based on their media consumption) and their decision in the election.

Table 11. Vote and Media Consumption Interaction

Variables	Candidate Voted in the Election, Ahok =1				
	Total	Islam	Non-Islam	Income >3	Income ≦3
Dummy, Television, Everyday =1	-0.0115	0.00161	0.0508	0.000641	-0.0626
	(0.0745)	(0.0813)	(0.0834)	(0.0965)	(0.128)
Dummy, Internet, Everyday =1	0.0819	0.111	-0.155***	0.0382	0.113
	(0.0943)	(0.103)	(0.0577)	(0.120)	(0.181)
Dummy, Social Media, Everyday =1	-0.00843	-0.0936	0.0150	-0.00628	-0.0265
	(0.0883)	(0.101)	(0.0852)	(0.104)	(0.177)
Dummy, Newspaper, Everyday =1	0.0293	0.0195	0.0255	0.109	-0.117
	(0.0831)	(0.0922)	(0.0875)	(0.105)	(0.135)
Dummy, Radio, Everyday =1	-0.0767	-0.0226	-0.192*	-0.0566	-0.0835
	(0.0810)	(0.0915)	(0.113)	(0.101)	(0.145)
Constant	0.430***	0.234**	0.990***	0.443***	0.473***
	(0.0897)	(0.0903)	(0.0830)	(0.125)	(0.141)
Observations	226	148	78	142	84
R-squared	0.009	0.009	0.098	0.011	0.026

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author's analysis

6.4. Robustness and Heterogeneity Check

With respect to the randomization treatment in this experiment, this study evaluates robustness of the main outcome analysis. The purpose of this test is to ensure that the model remains stable across observable parameters and respondents' socio-demographics. Table 2 and Table 5 display the results with regard to the main outcomes model, which are 'share similar religion' and 'non-Islam be President' perceptions, with robust standard error regressions. Both main outcomes outline different regressions (five models) by adding more independent variables in every model. Across all models, both dependent variables report consistent and significant results for the main variables (prime, religion, and income level). Adding all observable variables (model 5), the model still reports significant results and keeps the coefficient magnitudes statistically stable.

Using the Breusch Pagan test, this study evaluates heterogeneity to examine whether the models violate homoscedasticity assumptions. The model used for the test is model 5 (Table 2 and 5), where all observable variables are included. The results report either 'share similar religion' or 'non-Islam be President' perceptions do not reject the null hypothesis, with *p*-value 0.51 (chi2(15)=14.27) and 0.10 (chi2(15)=22.29), respectively, meaning that there is no heteroscedasticity problem.

Chapter 7
Discussion

This study aims to understand the role of religion and socio-economic status in politics from a voter's behavior perspective. The survey experiment provides evidence that religion is a salient issue and plays a critical role in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, more so than economic based anxiety. In this sense, the evidence supports Social Identity theory where religion was used to formulate in-group/out-group distinction as argued by Tajfel (Hogg 2016, Tajfel and Turner 1979). By evaluating respondent's perception about a leader and concept of nation, the result reports religious cleavage exists in that election.

The evidence reports a significant difference in results regarding openness to having a leader of a different religion between the treatment and control groups. Responses across different religions detect in-group bias signals due to a religious cleavage between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. This finding is in line with previous studies where social categorization, religion in this sense, can trigger in-group bias (Chuah et al. 2014, Duckit and Sibley 2016, Hogg 2016, Tajfel and Turner 1979). This cleavage is also influenced by a voter's concept of a nation. Ones who supports sharia law have a higher probability of in-group bias, in contrast with others who support democracy. On the other hand, the effect of socio-economic status is not dominant and smaller than that of religion, in contrast with Wilson's (2017) suggestions. This present study concludes that "ethno-religious economic" issue explains better the election results than anything else, in line with Warbuton and Gammon's (2017) and DeCanio's (2007) suggestions.

The experiment also shows effectiveness of priming in religion study. When people are primed with religious cues, it stimulates anxiety, fear, and sadness. 82% respondents ($n = 114$, 95% CI [0.75,0.90]) felt those emotions. These feelings potentially produce religiously triggered human behavior (Dolan et al 2010, Kahneman 2012, Angie et al 2011, Andrade and Ariely 2009). This means that priming religion is effective in provoking the human brain, which may influence future decisions. The effect-size of the priming is small to medium.

This present study has some limitations, most likely due to data. The research finds different reasoning of the evoked emotions among religious groups. Muslims tend to be angry while non-Muslims feel sad and afraid. In this case, this present study was unable to conduct further analysis. In addition, socio-economic status discussed in this study is limited to income-level of respondents. Adding more variables to support analysis in economic issues would be a deeper

approach. Moreover, having more respondents from the victims of the resettlement policy may produce a deeper analysis of economic relevance.

Due to these limitations, at least three areas can be expanded in this study in the future. The first is studying about different emotions and their implications. Different emotions may shape in-group/out-group development differently. The second is by adding more information for the socio-economic status variable and more respondents from victims of *Ahok's* resettlement policy. The last, tolerance and intolerance related to trust, cooperation, and prejudice in and out of economic activity potentially contribute broader context to a future study.

Jakarta, as the most modern and developed city in Indonesia with high number of people with higher education, is a barometer in Indonesia for democracy implementation and perception of unity in diversity. However, the evidence on this present study suggests that in-group bias influences a voter's political orientation. It means that signals of political intolerance exist, which may incite more conflicts. In 2019, Indonesia will have a presidential election, and this similar issue has heated the competition from now, using another form which is communism issue. The hardline Muslim has started raised issue of communism[34] to attack the incumbent from the next presidential election. On another hand, growing of conservative and hardline Islamic groups may endanger Indonesia and its democracy. Recent surveys find that 20 percent[35] of high school and university students support sharia law and a caliphate nation. Thus, a deeper understanding about a voter's behavior and decision-making is important for policy makers to regulate the election in better way. The purpose is to avoid a black campaign, which would be bad for the nation, incite conflict, and divide society. For us, as voters, knowing that our attitude can be affected by our emotions induced by religious cues can increase our awareness and conscientiousness to make better and more rational decisions.

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[34] For instance, Hutton (2017) argues: "Islamists Find another Stick to Beat Widodo with - Communism" (http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/2113404/islamists-find-another-stick-beat-widodo-communism) and Lamb (2017): "Beware the red peril: Indonesia still fighting ghosts of communism" (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/01/beware-the-red-peril-indonesia-still-fighting-ghosts-of-communism).
[35] According to The Strait Times (2017): http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/1-in-5-indonesian-students-support-islamic-caliphate-survey

Chapter 8
Conclusion

By providing evidence from a survey experiment on voter behavior in election, this study complements current debates on the role of religion in the case the 2017 gubernatorial election in Jakarta. This contributes to Social Identity Theory and helps us understand how people make decisions in elections. Evaluating human behavior, decision-making, and judgment in politics is important as unpredictable results are increasingly frequent. Similarly, religious studies are critical for understanding religious-based conflicts that still occur, especially in the global South.

This study suggests that religion affects decisions in the election, stronger than socio-economic issues. These findings support the social identity framework. Provoking people with religious cues effectively stimulates emotions that lead to in-group biases. Findings across different religious group report that Muslim respondents are more likely to support a leader who has a similar religion and tend to disapprove of a non-Muslim leader. This result is reiterated by results on perception about a nation, where respondents who support religious-based law have a higher probability of exhibiting in-group favoritism. With these perceptions, in-group/out-group distinctiveness is developed and leads to in-group bias. On the other hand, socio-economic status has an effect, but smaller than religious issue, and not necessarily affected only by low-income respondents. Overall, this study concludes that ethno-religious economic issues explain the paradoxical election result.

While not apart from reproach, this present study has limitations with respect to data. This present study finds that emotions produced by Muslim and non-Muslim respondents have different reasons (anger versus fear) but it is unable to analyze the different implications as suggested by Angie et al. (2011). Future investigation of different emotions and their implications, including researching which emotion drives greater in-group bias, would be a valuable contribution to this study. Adding richer information on socio-economic status, including victims of the *Ahok's* resettlement policy, will also expand this study. Lastly, future research on religious tolerance related to trust, cooperation, and prejudice in economic attitudes could bring a wider horizon to the study.

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Appendices

Annex I: Experiment Locations

Picture 1. Map of Jakarta as Experiment Location

Annex II: Priming Condition

Picture 2. Image for the Priming

(Source: Kurniawan, S. or ANTARA photo (2016) 'Foto Udara Aksi Damai 212 di Monas (Aerial Photo 212 Action on Monas)'. Accessed 20 June 2017. <http://m.viva.co.id/foto/berita/17165-foto-udara-aksi-damai-212-di-monas>

Moslems frequently get insulted and discriminated in other places such as Europe and the USA. Indonesia, as the largest Moslem nation should protect its people and does not allow any form of humiliation towards religion, God, and the prophets. Keeping religious values and protect the nation from any negative influences for religion are important for Indonesian.

After looking at the picture and the statement above, please answer these questions:

- Tell me what you see?
- What emotional feeling you have about that?
- Do the picture makes you feel anxiety/afraid/sad?

Absolutely Not			Absolutely Yes
1	2	3	4

Annex III: Questionnaire

I. Survey Questions: Please answer all these questions honestly

1. Do you believe in God, heaven and hell?

   Absolutely   Absolutely
   Disbelieve   Believe
       1   2   3   4

2. What is your religion?

1	Islam	5	Hindu
2	Protestan	6	Konghuchu
3	Catholic	7	Other/None of Them
4	Buddhist		

3. To follow our religious leader voices/suggestion in making decision such as to choose our nation leader is:

   Not at all   Absolutely
   important   important
       1   2   3   4

4. Listen or take a look at this list of leader characteristics and tell me how important generally these criteria to be President in Indonesia:

	Absolutely Not Important	Somewhat Not Important	Somewhat Important	Absolutely Important
1) Experience	1	2	3	4
2) Trustworthy	1	2	3	4
3) Share similar religion	1	2	3	4
4) Smart	1	2	3	4

5. Listen or Take a look at this list of statements and tell me what do you think generally about this statement:

	Absolutely Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Absolutely Agree
1) Non-Islamic candidate running for President in Indonesia	1	2	3	4
2) Jakarta resettlement policy disadvantageous poor people	1	2	3	4

6. Assume that this person runs for President in Indonesia, if you have to choose between this two candidates, which candidate (1 or 2) you think you will support?

           1   2

Source: Gayapopuler.com (n.d.). Accessed 25 June 2017 <http://gayapopuler.com/ini-dia-4-news-anchor-pria-ganteng-pujaan-masyarakat-indonesia/.>

Figure1. Martin, 45 y.o., successful entrepreneur, senior politician, development thinker in Indonesia, smart and humble, known as kind and honest person.

Source: clear.co.id (2014). Accessed 25 June 2017 <http://antiketombe.clear.co.id/men/bergaya-lebih-trendi-dengan-baju-koko-214fa0e.html>

Figure 2. H. Moh. Yunus, owner some successful companies, politics expert, wise and polite person, known has no corruption issue. Active in development of Indonesian.

7. To protect our country from negative influence (such as alcohol, drugs, pornography), Indonesia should incorporate religious-based law (concept of sharia) for our country?

Absolutely Disagree			Absolutely Agree
1	2	3	4

8. How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?

Not at all important			Absolutely important
1	2	3	4

9. With which one of the following statements do you agree most?
The basic meaning of religion is:

    1   To follow religious norms and leaders

    2   To do good to other people

10. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
"To bring Indonesia to be a great nation we need a religious nation leader"

Absolutely Disagree			Absolutely Agree
1	2	3	4

11. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
"Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice for my religion."

Absolutely Disagree			Absolutely Agree
1	2	3	4

12. How long you've been living in Jakarta?
    1   Since I was born
    2   More than 10 years
    3   > 3 to 10 years
    4   1 to 3 years
    5   Less than 1 year

13. Do you think overall living quality in Jakarta is getting better for the last three years? (less traffic, less flood, better economic, cleaner).

Absolutely Disagree			Absolutely Agree
1	2	3	4

14. Who did you vote on Jakarta Gubernatorial election round-2?
    Candidate Number   2   (Ahok)

    Candidate Number   3   (Anies)
    No answer, reason: …………………………….

15. Reasons to vote for him? (Choose/circle all you agree)
    1. Experience
    2. Trustworthy/Not Corrupt
    3. Pro-people
    4. Smart/Highly Educated
    5. Have great programs
    6. Share similar religion
    7. As long as not Ahok

16. Do you in general support for Ahok development policy?

Absolutely   Absolutely
Disagree   Agree
      1   2   3   4

17. How often do you use this media channel to get on news update?

	Never at all	Rarely/ Ir-regular	Often (1 – 2 times a day)	Very often (several times a day)
Television	1	2	3	4
Internet Browsing	1	2	3	4
Social Media (e.g. Facebook)	1	2	3	4
Newspaper	1	2	3	4
Radio	1	2	3	4

18. Apart from (before) eating/sleeping, how often do you pray/attend religious services these days? (*Code one answer*):

     1   More than once a day
     2   Once a day
     3   Once a week
     4   Several times a week
     5   Only on special holy days
     6   Not regular, less often
     7   Never, practically never

19. Do you have (close) friends with different religion than you?

Not   Less   Somewhat   Absolutely
At All   (<5)   Many   Many
    1   2   3   4

20. What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [*NOTE: if respondent indicates to be a student, code highest level s/he is now*]:

1	No formal education	5	Diploma I/II/III
2	SD/Primary School	6	Sarjana/Bachelor Degree
3	SMP/Junior High School	7	Master Degree/S-2
4	SMA/SMK/Senior High School	8	Doctorate/S-3

21. Ethnicity *(if mixed choose majority one that respondent feels more into it):*

1	Javanese	7	Bugis
2	Betawi	8	Palembangnese
3	Sundanese	9	Dayaknese
4	Bataknese	10	Melayu
5	Chinese	11	Papuan
6	Padangnese	12	Others: ……………

22. Age:

     1   ≥ 17 – 30 years old
     2   31 – 40 years old
     3   41 – 50 years old
     4   ≥ 51 years old

23. Which industry/business sector you are working on?

     1   Government (PNS)/Police/Army
     2   Private company owned by Government (BUMN)
     3   Banking, Financial Services, Insurance, Real Estate
     4   Hotel, Food/Restaurant and Beverages
     5   Wholesale and Retail Trade
     6   Transportation

7	Manufacture
8	Services
9	Health
10	Education
11	Law
12	Fishing
13	Construction
14	Housewife
15	Unemployed
16	Others:…………………

24. Income level (*If he/she is not working, use partner/family/household income; for student use monthly expenditure or fund support*):

1	≤ 3 million rupiah per month
2	> 3 – 8 million rupiah per month
3	> 8 – 15 million rupiah per month
4	> 15 million rupiah per month

25. Marital status (*read out and code one answer only*):

1	Married
2	Divorced
3	Widowed
4	Single

26. Gender

| 1 | Female |
| 2 | Male |

Annex IV: Variables Label

Table 12. Descriptive Statistics Variables

Variable Name	Variable Lable	Obs	Mean
prime	Dummy, Prime =1	228.00	0.50
af_sad	Dummy, Feels Afraid/Sad/Anxiety =1	228.00	0.41
believe	Dummy, Believe in God/Hell/Heaven =1	228.00	0.95
reli	Dummy, Religion, Muslim =1	228.00	0.66
frleader	Dummy, Follow Religious Leader Suggestion =1	228.00	0.60
exp	Dummy, Should Have Experience =1	228.00	0.95
trustw	Dummy, Should Trustworthy =1	228.00	0.99
samereli	Dummy, Share Same Religion =1	228.00	0.56
smart	Dummy, Should Smart =1	228.00	0.98
nmbpres	Dummy, Non-Muslim Be President, Agree =1	228.00	0.64
resttlmnt	Dummy, Resettlement Policy Is Bad, Agree =1	228.00	0.38
pic	Dummy, Candidate Photo, Muslim Look =1	228.00	0.57
sharia	Dummy, Support Sharia Law =1	228.00	0.50
democy	Dummy, Support Democracy =1	228.00	0.95
relimean	Dummy, Religion Meaning, Follow Norms and Leader =1	228.00	0.39
relileader	Dummy, Need Religious Leader =1	228.00	0.75
war	Dummy, War for Religion Justice =1	228.00	0.57
livejak	Dummy, Years Live in Jakarta, 3 years and more =1	228.00	0.96
livqual	Dummy, Life Quality in Jakarta, Better =1	228.00	0.78
vote	Dummy, Candidate Voted in Election, Ahok =1	226.00	0.46
vreason	Dummy, Reason to Vote Him, Religion =1	226.00	0.36
devprog	Dummy, Ahok Development Program, Agree =1	228.00	0.87
tele	Dummy, Television, Everyday =1	228.00	0.71
intrnt	Dummy, Internet, Everyday =1	228.00	0.73
socmed	Dummy, Social Media, Everyday =1	228.00	0.68
npaper	Dummy, Newspaper, Everyday =1	228.00	0.21
radio	Dummy, Radio, Everyday =1	228.00	0.22
pray	Dummy, Pray Frequency, At Least Once a Week =1	228.00	0.88
friend	Dummy, Friend Different Religion, Many (>5) =1	228.00	0.79
edu	Dummy, Education Level, Diploma and Higher =1	228.00	0.50
agecod	Age (Code)	228.00	1.69
age30	Dummy, Age 30+ Years Old =1	228.00	0.43
age40	Dummy, Age 40+ Years Old =1	228.00	0.19
ageavg	Age average	228.00	31.04
sector	Job Sector (Code)	228.00	8.80
incomecod	Income (Code)	228.00	1.82
income3	Dummy, Income above 3 million =1	228.00	0.63
marital	Dummy, Marital Status, Married =1	228.00	0.48
gender	Dummy, Gender, Female =1	228.00	0.50
livejakcod	Years Live in Jakarta (Code)	228.00	1.54
ethnic2	Dummy, Ethnicity, Betawi =1	228.00	0.25
sctrade	Dummy, Job Sector, Trade= 1	228.00	0.19