Return Migration in Post-Conflict Colombia: Unpacking Government and Media Discourses.

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## List of Acronyms

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<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Discourse Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELN</td>
<td>National Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARC-EP</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia- People’s Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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Abstract

In Colombia, a civil conflict enduring for six decades promised to come to an end in 2016 when the Colombian government and guerrilla party FARC for the first time in the history of the conflict agreed to negotiate peace. A series of events ensued that promised a long yearned for condition of peace for Colombia; this included the adoption of a peace agreement and a plebiscite as democratic tool allowing Colombian citizens to choose to support or oppose the agreement. This period of political change brought with it concerns about the involvement of Colombians residing abroad in the peacebuilding process. Focusing on the publications of the Colombian government and national media during this period of political change, this research captured the first steps in the peacebuilding process, focusing particularly on the return of nationals living in Ecuador to Colombia. Bringing together theories on migration, peacebuilding and media representation, the case study of Colombia allowed for an overview of the end of a long-enduring conflict that had generated large-scale forced displacement outside and within the Colombian territory. The end of the conflict through the peace agreement announced the inclusion of emigrants in the peacebuilding process, particularly through the return of those victims that had left the country due to the conflict. However, restoring the bond between a sending country and its population abroad implies systematic efforts to change beliefs related to war that are embedded in the society. Therefore, the communication of the Colombian government and national media with nationals residing abroad was explored by means of a discourse analysis focused on the comprehension of intentions, interpretations and choices of the dialogues between these parties and Colombian civilians that are victims to the conflict. The findings showed that the discourses of both government and media sources fluctuated according to three specific events: the signing of the peace agreement, the plebiscite following the peace agreement, and the granting of the Nobel Peace Prize to Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos. As a result, expected and unexpected controversies altered the storyline of the peace process.

Relevance for Development Studies

Much effort has been put into critically studying the capabilities and responsibilities of countries that have had a long history of receiving large volumes of people fleeing from conflicts in their country of origin, in other words receiving countries. However, little attention has been paid to the competencies of sending countries in promoting the wellbeing of their nationals abroad who, in most cases, can be considered refugees, asylum seekers, or undocumented migrants living in host countries. Particularly in post-conflict contexts, sending countries should develop strategies that embrace the contribution of these conflict victims to peacebuilding work, instead of viewing them as part of the crisis. This research paper hence contributes to these debates by means of a case study that explores discourses from the government of a sending country in a post-conflict context, with a focus on the Colombian example, in order to reveal intentions underlying efforts to reconnect with populations that have fled to neighbouring countries due to long episodes of violence. In doing so, the analysis corroborates these discourses by focusing on the national media’s perspective.

Keywords

Migration, Return Migration, Victims, Peace Agreement, Post-Conflict, Peacebuilding.
Chapter 1 Introduction and Context

1.1 The Colombian Conflict, Forced Migration, and the Peace Agreement

After more than six decades of struggle between Colombian national armed forces, guerrillas and paramilitary groups, the Colombian internal conflict that to date has resulted in more than 220,000 casualties and the massive internal and external displacement of civilians, has produced a sceptical society (GMH 2013: 20). Generations of Colombians have been involved to a greater or lesser extent in a shared history of violence dating back to 1948, when Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, presidential candidate for the Liberal Party, was murdered; a cruel period of violent clashes between the liberal and conservative parties ensued. As a result of the political instability in Colombia and disregarded citizens as political parties waged war against one another, alternative political organizations emerged. Late in 1964, in alliance with the communist peasant armed group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) group was formed, followed by the establishment of paramilitary groups supported by the conservatives to fight recently formed guerrilla groups (Ortiz and Kaminker 2014: 36). Since then, confrontations have centred mainly on land distribution and have been accompanied by the systematic violation of human rights. In particular, human rights violations have taken place as non-governmental armed groups used forced migration as a powerful war strategy to strengthen territorial control, alongside their use of other strategies such as illegal recruitment, kidnappings, and the creation of fear through the use of terrorist tactics (Ibanez 2009: 49).

Even though the Colombian conflict has undergone several transformations over the last sixty years, civilian displacement due to the conflict can be traced back to three crucial periods. Firstly, during the period 1984 to 1995, failed peace talks with and the fear of alternative political organizations becoming guerrilla groups resulted in the repression of such groups. Secondly, the period 1996 to 2005, known as “the war against drug trafficking” era, saw the paramilitary presence increasing alongside the resettlement of guerrillas groups in strategic territories inside the country. Thirdly, “the war on terrorism” taking place from 2006 to 2010 was characterized by state\(^1\) control under the “Democratic Security Policy”, which established extreme measures to fight terrorism in the country. What resulted was a collective paranoia

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\(^1\) During this period, Álvaro Uribe Vélez was the Head of the State.
among civilians created by fear of repression, since many of the state’s targets were civilians such as academics, social leaders, and human rights defenders suspected of having ties with leftist movements and, therefore, guerrilla groups (Ortiz and Kaminker 2014: 41).

These cycles of violence in the country have been responsible for the internal displacement of 6.7 million Colombian people (DAPRE 2016: 2) and have produced an estimated 400,000 documented Colombian refugees that have fled across Colombian borders (Leguízamo 2016: 67). In contrast to the general knowledge of the internally displaced population within Colombia, the existence of Colombian refugees outside of Colombia has gone largely unnoticed since the beginning of the 21st Century, when internally displaced persons (IDPs) no longer found protection in Colombia and had to flee mainly to neighbouring countries such as Venezuela and Ecuador. However, the long-enduring denial of the conflict’s political nature created obstacles hindering the management of the humanitarian emergency outside of Colombian borders (Ortiz and Kaminker 2014: 37). This especially hindered the control of civilians who were fleeing the country in masse without necessarily having had been registered in Colombia, nor in their country of refuge (GMH 2013: 71).

Therefore, quantifying the dimensions of the conflict in terms of the outflow of civilians from Colombia has been a difficult task, and some discrepancies exist among official sources regarding the total number of Colombians abroad, in particular regarding the number of refugees and asylum seekers. By 2016, between 6 and 13 percent of the entire population was residing outside of the country (International Organization for Migration 2017, OECD 2016, Edwards and Gaynor 2016, International Organization for Migration 2013), although the exact number of Colombians who had fled the country due to the conflict remains unknown. Nevertheless, Castles and Miller argue that ‘no single cause is ever sufficient to explain why people decide to leave their country and settle in another’ (2009: 30). This implies that, even in cases when some Colombian migrants are not categorized as refugees, their main reasons for leaving the country may be related to the conflict. Regardless, Colombia’s history of human migration has led it to become the country in the world with the second highest amount of IDPs; it was only recently surpassed by Syria (Edwards and Gaynor 2016).
Moreover, it is the sending country\(^2\) with the largest number of refugees due to an armed conflict on the South American continent (International Organization for Migration 2013).

Amongst the Colombians who have fled the country, three categories of migrants, distinguished in relation to their dynamic in the conflict, can be identified: 1) civilians from rural communities and popular sectors who usually first would be internally displaced and then would migrate to neighbouring countries; 2) politically persecuted citizens, mostly called enemies or opponents of the regime, and 3) Colombians belonging to economically or politically influential circles who felt intimidated by violence related to drug trafficking, criminal gangs, or guerrilla movements and decided to migrate (Ortiz and Kaminker 2014: 47). As varied as these groups of migrants displaced by the conflict are, they are still not necessarily seen as refugees in their destination countries. As a result, many Colombians living abroad are not registered as refugees or possess other types of legal status that do not necessarily guarantee their protection in their host countries (Carvajal 2017).

Ecuador is an interesting case of the trend discussed above. This country has received around 234,000 requests from Colombians for refugee status from 1989 to date, of which 60,000 had been recognized by September 2016 (UNHCR 2016). At present, Ecuador is host to more than 194,000 Colombians registered under any legal status (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015), although an unregistered and, hence, invisible Colombian population lives on Ecuadorian territory. The majority of this vulnerable population – whether with or without refugee status – comes from rural and Afro-descendant communities most severely affected by the Colombian conflict (UNHCR 2016); this group corresponds to the first category of Colombian migrants described above who, besides being able to obtain easy access to Ecuador, recognize it as a peaceful country in the region with a stable currency (Aliaga Saez et al. 2017: 29).

Large concentrations of Colombian refugees have settled in the biggest cities of Ecuador – a phenomenon that is also observed for IDPs within Colombia. However, the concentration of persons displaced across borders is more visible for countries like Ecuador, which is four times smaller than Colombia in geographical size. The apparent high number of Colombian

\(^{2}\) Sending countries are distinguished by their history in emigration related to a particular reason (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003).
refugees in Ecuadorian cities has unleashed discrimination from within the Ecuadorian society, which associates foreigners with crime, illegitimate competition, or prostitution (Feinstein International Center 2012: 25). Therefore, refugees face obstacles in accessing education, employment opportunities, housing, or other services necessary to improve their livelihoods. Neither the host country, nor the Colombian government sufficiently provides access to such services, even when the latter has the highest responsibility towards its own population. Research on the perspectives of Colombian refugees in Ecuador shows that ‘they feel unprotected by the National Government, which does not have clear and effective assistance routes to meet their demands’ (Aliaga Saez et al. 2017: 29). Notwithstanding, the Colombian government, aware of its considerable diaspora community in Ecuador, has implemented a number of programmes to reconnect with and provide support to Colombians abroad; the work of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, active in six Ecuadorian cities, is one example (Carvajal 2017).

 Colombian victims of the conflict have been unconvinced by the Colombian government’s efforts to provide protection throughout the war, and have perceived no choice but to remain in the host country or to move to a third country instead of returning to Colombia (Aliaga Saez et al. 2017). Nevertheless, in 2016 the first draft of the Peace Agreement was announced following four years of negotiations between the Colombian government under leadership of President Juan Manuel Santos, and the non-governmental armed group FARC. This agreement is the most recent event in what promises to be an era symbolizing the end of an internal conflict that over decades configured or misconfigured the Colombian society-at-large. The agreement brings with it the possibility of an assisted return of victims of the conflict living abroad (Alto Comisionado para la Paz 2016).

 In contrast to the former president’s hesitance to do so, President Juan Manuel Santos recognized the parties involved in the conflict and invited FARC to participate in negotiations around five key points: rural reform; political participation; the shape and date of the end of the conflict; FARC members’ reintegration into society; solutions for the drug problematic; and strategies for dealing with victims of the conflict. Emphasizing the last point regarding the issue of conflict victims, the importance of including in the peacebuilding process those ‘who had to leave the country as a consequence of different human rights violations and
breaches of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) during the conflict’ (Gobierno Nacional de Colombia, et al. 2016: 182) was highlighted. A section of the draft was dedicated particularly to the reweaving of the Colombian social fabric through ‘collective processes of return of displaced persons and reparations of victims abroad’ (Gobierno Nacional de Colombia, et al. 2016: 182), along with a chapter discussing the implementation and verification of the agreement. This detailed document of 297 pages provides insights on migration management pertaining to the return of victims from abroad, and can be seen as a step toward future negotiations with other guerrilla groups³.

As vital part of this transcendental transformation from war to an intermediary period of peacebuilding, Colombian citizens were requested to participate in the process by partaking in a plebiscite that took place in October 2016⁴. However, this demanded a certain level of involvement in and knowledge of the peace agreement, since the main question of this democratic tool was: ‘Do you support the final agreement to end the conflict and the construction of a stable and long-lasting peace?’ Citizens were then able to vote for or against the motion (El Tiempo 2016a). Colombians abroad were also invited to vote in the plebiscite. However, due to the short time lapse from the official plebiscite announcement in August 2016 to the event in October, the national media played an intrinsic role in the framing of this political process; several campaigns for and against the peace agreement ensued (CNN 2016). Similarly, Colombian representatives abroad were in charge of official government communications regarding the peace agreement and citizen involvement in the plebiscite (Cancilleria de Colombia 2017b).

However, national and international participation via consulates in the plebiscite was considered unsuccessful. Only citizens registered for the last elections in 2014 were eligible to vote (Taylor 2016: 179), reducing the electorate to only 10% of the Colombian population living abroad; moreover, less than 14% of this fraction of the eligible population actually voted. Unexpectedly, thus, the motion proposed in the plebiscite question was finally

³ The National Liberation Army (ELN), the second largest guerrilla group in Colombia, and the Colombian government also initiated peace talks at the beginning of 2017 after a one-year period of ceasefire (El Tiempo 2017).

⁴ ‘On July 18, 2016, through its Sentence C-379 of 2016, the Constitutional Court declared as constitutional the Statutory Bill, ‘which shall enact the plebiscite, for the public endorsement of the final agreement for the end of the conflict and the construction of a stable and long-lasting peace’ (Alto Comisionado para la Paz 2016: 34).
opposed; even the Colombian community abroad was divided, with 54% supporting the agreement and 45% rejecting it (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil 2017). Besides the block-chain (OECD 2016), the electoral process underlined apathy among Colombians towards government institutions, reflected in the high abstention rate (of 62.59%) from the plebiscite within and outside of Colombia (El Tiempo 2016b).

Additionally, this apathy toward the Colombian government was reaffirmed by Colombian refugees living in Ecuador, who argued that although the peace agreement proposes measures for the reintegration of victims residing abroad into Colombian society, ‘in terms of return and assistance to victims of conflict, the legal apparatus is disarticulated and operates poorly outside the Colombian territory, which is exacerbated by the lack of information that consulates have on this respect’ (Aliaga Saez et al. 2017: 29). Hence, the possibilities of return are skewed, on the one hand, by the miscommunication of the government and, on the other hand, by the national media that provided immediate information about the country’s situation if like the distance was insignificant between population abroad and the Colombian process (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 14). Therefore, in order to address these issues, this research will deconstruct the political processes of the peace agreement related to efforts for the return of Colombian victims of the conflict living in Ecuador to Colombia, observed under the dominant discourses presented by the Colombian government and in national media sources.

1.2 Objectives and Research Questions

The research focuses on the Colombian government’s representation in Ecuador, on the one hand, and of the national media, on the other hand, of the Colombian peace agreement, in order to understand dominant discursive practices regarding the return to Colombia of victims of the conflict living in Ecuador. The research objectives are narrowed down to the following two research questions:

1. During the period of the Colombian Plebiscite, which discourses were used by the Colombian government, and what purpose did such discourse serve regarding the return to Colombia of Colombian victims of the conflict living in Ecuador?
2. During the period of the Colombian Plebiscite, how did national media discourses promote the peacebuilding process relating to the return of conflict victims from abroad to Colombia?

1.3 Methodology and Research Techniques

The interpretation of discourses on victims’ return to Colombia in the time of the peace agreement requires responses to questions related to what, whom, when, why and how this process was presented throughout the plebiscite process, especially during three crucial weeks: 19 to 25 September 2016; 26 September to 2 October 2016 (voting day); and 3 to 9 October 2016, which represent the time before, during, and shortly after the plebiscite, respectively. For this reason, discourse analysis and interpretative research are used for this research, with “discourse” defined as an ‘ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena’ (Gasper and Apthorpe 1996: 2). This approach combines qualitative and quantitative research methods, allowing for comparisons between and categorizations of different systems of meaning related to the use of language. Consequently, framing and content analyses, as subcategories of discourse analysis, are the most appropriate methods for this study.

On one hand, a framing analysis helps to better understand fragments of a constructed reality since it ‘emphasizes the ability of any entity—media, individuals, or organizations—to delineate other people’s reality, highlighting one interpretation while a less favored one’ (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008: 54). Firstly, a database of publications from both sources will be used to provide an overview of the range of information given to the audience (Colombians inside and outside the country), classified according to topics; likewise, a keyword search will be conducted, with search terms including “victims”, “abroad”, “migrants”, “return”, and other related words that will emerge. Secondly, leaving aside what was included in “the frame”, this research also regards what and who was ignored and excluded, allowing for the comparison and contrasting of different perspectives. Overall, the framing of particular topics is particularly interesting, since framing influences both the politically informed and uninformed audience alike (Gasper and Apthorpe 1996: 6).
On the other hand, Grbich’s approach informs the content analysis, which provides a systematic way of collecting a large amount of data using qualitative and quantitative tools to organize data and provide holistic oversight (Grbich 2013). Due to the number of documents to be analyzed, this method is supported by Atlas.ti data analysis software, allowing the study to move beyond the superficial description or enumeration of information to deeper interpretations of linguistic choices. In this case, keywords will be placed into a context in order to unpack their significance in the “framed” reality, as well as their interrelations with other words, thus responding to the basic questions posed above (Alexander 2009).

Hence, the process will be divided into three stages that overlap to some degree: an initial free coding with primary findings guided by questions of what, how, who, why, when and where, and other relevant outcomes; an analysis and subsequent organization of these codes into themes that describe the entire scenario of the timeframe selected; and a final construction of analytical themes based on the descriptive themes and the theoretical framework. Stages One and Two will take place separately for each information source, while Stage Three combines the results of both.

1.3.1 Sources of Information

The Colombian Government

The official position of the Colombian government will be assessed by regarding the position of its embassy and all other diplomatic missions in different Ecuadorian cities. An analysis will be conducted of the publications of each of these missions, which serve as the official voice of the government in foreign countries and are in charge of the communication with and management of Colombians living in these countries. Accordingly, seven information sources related to missions in seven Ecuadorian cities will be analyzed and coded as follows:

1. ESM: Colombian Consulate in Esmeraldas
2. GYE: Colombian Consulate in Guayaquil
3. NVL: Colombian Consulate in Nueva Loja
4. UIO: Colombian Consulate in Quito
5. STO: Colombian Consulate in Santo Domingo de los Tsachilas
6. TUL: Colombian Consulate in Tulcan
7. EMB: Colombian Embassy in Quito

These codes will allow for the provision of an accessible reference to each document, along with the date of publication. Likewise, an additional code will indicate when the same article was published by all sources (the code name being “All: seven sources”). In total, 71 articles published by these government institutions during the focus period will be analyzed.

**National Media Sources**

In order to identify and scrutinize discourses of the “national media” (answering the second research question), it was imperative to obtain opinions from the Colombian diaspora community living in Ecuador regarding their most consulted media source. This information was collected through a survey conducted by means of a nonprobability sample (Battaglia 2011: 523). Through this sample, a specific media source was identified as dominant in the communication of the peace process in Ecuador. As a result of a pilot survey of 183 participants within the population sample (the population comprising Colombians living in Ecuador), the online newspaper El Tiempo turned out to be the most-consulted source of information regarding the peace process.

El Tiempo is one of the most recognized and important national newspapers belonging to Casa Editorial El Tiempo, the oldest communications company in Colombia (EL TIEMPO Casa Editorial ND). Due to its influence, circulation figures, and reputation, this source is a good representation of Colombian values in a post-conflict context, since “journalists usually share the beliefs of the society they belong to, and – in particular – those societal beliefs which enable the society to cope with intractable conflict’ (Kempf 1998: 5). Therefore, the online version of the El Tiempo newspaper will be analyzed, in particular the section on “Colombia” that brings together approaches from different cities in the country, since the redaction of these articles are diverse in contrast with other sections. This section then will provide an overview of Colombian society beliefs as reflected by the media in the post-conflict context. Both information sources together provide a compilation of more than 100 articles published
during a period of 21 days that will be classified and categorized separately, followed by a comparison. However, the in-depth analysis will focus on topics relating to the peace agreement process and to keywords processed through the initial framing analysis.

1.4 Organization of the Paper

The six chapters of this document offer a look at the discourses of the Colombian government and the Colombian national media, unpacking representations of the Peace Agreement as a political process that provides a possibility for victims of the conflict to return to Colombia. Particularly, this study is situated in the context of Ecuador, which has a long history of hosting Colombians that fled the conflict (UNHCR 2016).

In the introductory chapter (Chapter 1), the history of the Colombian conflict is related through reference to conjunctures connected with the migration flow for the last thirty years, with an emphasis on the case of the Colombian migrant population living in Ecuador. Likewise, this chapter introduces the main research objectives and questions and the methodology required to best respond to those interrogations. Chapter 2 presents a theoretical framework on the capabilities of sending countries in post-conflict contexts in relation to the return of its migrants and analyzes the importance of the role of the media in this process. Chapters 3 and 4 unpack dominant discourses of the Colombian government and the national media, and present the findings according to descriptive themes, thereby providing insight into the peace process and the return of conflict victims to Colombia. Chapter 5 brings together findings and links the theoretical framework to the analytical themes while, finally, Chapter 6 presents the final conclusions of the research process.
Chapter 2 Literature Review

2.1 Sending Countries and International Migration

In the migration field a large body of literature focuses on motivations of populations for migrating abroad, trends in human migration (South-North, North-North and recently South-South), and challenges that receiving countries face in identifying and incorporating immigrants into their own societies (Castles and Miller 2009). However, the relation between countries of origin (sending countries) and their populations abroad has received little attention, apart from some limited discussions on economic dependence created by remittance payments. The discussion about the responsibilities of sending states toward their displaced citizens hence requires further in-depth analysis by means of comparative studies of countries’ contexts (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 3).

Although some governments have long been involved in managing the emigration of their citizens, they are not always seen as influential actors in transnational fields relating to emigrants and their destination countries, since the legal capabilities of any state are limited to its borders and citizens abroad are consequently subjected to other states’ legislation (Bauböck 2006: 16). Nevertheless, some sending countries actually engage with their citizens, reaching out to their nationals abroad, particularly for economic or political support, or for socio-cultural engagement (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 215).

According to Østergaard-Nielsen (2003), sending countries could fit into three dynamic categories, influenced by trends in emigration trajectories or the policy reactions of such countries. Sending countries can be classified as labour exporting countries, for example Mexico or Bangladesh; as countries or homelands ‘which have gained independent statehood after a major exodus of nationals’ (2003: 6), such as Israel; or according to their relationship with groups of refugees or diaspora communities living abroad due to domestic conflicts, implying that such countries are hence involved in political and/or economic interventions in ongoing or post-conflict processes (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). This last category will be the main focus of the research, which is limited to the study of the “country of origin”.
2.1.1 Sending Countries in Conflict and Post-Conflict Settings

Recognizing the influence that refugees, diaspora or migrant communities can have either on the prolongation of ongoing conflicts through political and economic support, or on assisting the post-conflict reconstruction process, sending country governments aim to re-engage populations abroad in order to avoid the former scenario. Therefore, such states create institutions oriented towards return migration in order to encourage migrants to remain abroad, but to participate in national activities as citizens, or to influence and control the opinions and perceptions of the international diaspora community regarding the conflict (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 8).

On the other hand, the interconnectivity of the globalized world allows migrants to retain their socio-cultural, political and economic networks that include non-migrant actors and national institutions in their countries of origin (Faist et al. 2013), since “migrants or refugees do not make a sharp break with their homeland” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 14). This facilitates the role of sending countries in retaining their nationals living abroad as allies in conflict- and post-conflict contexts. Similarly, the media’s leading role in the spread of national values remains fundamental, and the easy accessibility of electronic media makes it even easier to connect with and involve nationals living abroad in current events in the sending country (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 215). This includes official communications transmitted by diplomatic missions like embassies and consulates to migrants in receiving countries by means of virtual connections (Koser 2003: 184).

Nowadays, the debate on the active role of migrant communities in relation to domestic armed conflicts has increased in intensity and scope both among academics and policy-makers. While some literature points to risks related to the influence of diaspora communities on conflict perpetuation (Cochrane 2015: 28), other discussions highlight the return-development nexus5 where the return of the population is the end of the migratory cycle in post-conflict contexts. In that sense, the role of diaspora communities as new development actors are emphasized due to their significant contribution to conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

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5 ‘Understanding migration in terms of binary mobility between countries of origin and residence’ (Sinatti and Horst 2015: 139).
(Sinatti 2010: 6). Sinatti and Horst argue that “implicit in the idea of return is that it should be accompanied by positive development effects in home areas” (Sinatti and Horst 2015: 135).

In summary, the role of sending countries in the international migration field can be investigated by looking at the way in which these countries manage their large populations abroad and attempt to keep them involved to a certain extent in the country’s affairs for economic, political and/or socio-cultural reasons. In the case of sending countries in conflict- or post-conflict settings that form the centre of this research, the dynamics between the country of origin and nationals residing abroad are even more complex due to the composition of migrant populations, which include refugees seeking protection abroad. Therefore, the intent of communication of the sending country with its migrant population is closely related to the conflict (in terms of the validation or de-escalation thereof), or to the peacebuilding process.

2.2 Return Migration in Post-Conflict Settings

Return migration as part of the mobilization strategy of sending countries in reaching its nationals living abroad is considered one of the outcomes of conflicts. By entering the international policy agenda, the return of migrants to their home countries has become a symbolic representation of the end of conflicts and the re-establishment of the status quo6 (Black and Gent 2006: 31). Return migration is not a new concept: back in 1885 geographer Ernst Ravenstein already recognized it as a “counter-current” migratory movement (Gaillard and Center for Migration Studies 1994: 17). Moreover, at the end of the 1960s scholar Frank Bovenkerk in his book “The Sociology of Return Migration” described the typologies of returns and returnees after observing the massive flows of refugees in Europe in the period between the two World Wars (Bovenkerk 1974). Accordingly, the return of migrants has been described differently in different disciplines (as repatriation, reflux migration or homeward migration, for example); however, despite differences in the terminology, such terms

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6 Some authors critique the possibility of re-establishing a natural order following conflicts (Malkki 1992 in Black and Gent 2006: 19), since this would imply the denial of the realities of and changes in migrants’ lives over time as a result of conflict (Warner 1994 in Black and Gent 2006: 20).
essentially describe the same phenomenon, of return migration as 'the movement of emigrants back to their homeland to resettle' (Gmelch 1980: 136).

Return migration is related to the imaginary in the migrant’s mind of the real possibility of returning “home” that reinforces values of homeland and nationalism (King 1986: 13). Likewise, a sense of duty also motivates migrants to return to their home countries, especially when related to post-conflict reconstruction work. Nevertheless, this sense of duty is associated more with cases of exile migration, since the right to return become more valuable to exiled persons. Maletta (in Gaillard 1994) pointed out that examples can be found of the return of Latin American high-level professionals to their countries of origin even though domestic conditions did not guarantee their reintegration into society (Gaillard and Center for Migration Studies 1994: 32).

It would appear that motivating or attracting factors are stronger than dissuading factors such as racism, problems with social and professional integration, and/or legal barriers in informing return migration. This does not mean that facilities of the host country are not valued; in fact, migrants recognize that the environment in the receiving country will ensure their success or failure in reintegrating into society. However, migrants are drawn to return by individual motivations, whether they are economic incentives, or motivations related to social status or family bonds (Gaillard and Center for Migration Studies 1994).

Moreover, the consideration for return in post-conflict contexts is based on the sustainability of migrants’ return. Including dissuading or motivating factors -at an individual or collective level- for both the population abroad and the country of origin. The Sussex Centre for Migration Research for example states that '[r]eturn migration is sustainable for the home country or region if socio-economic conditions and levels of violence and persecution are not significantly worsened by return’ (Black and Gent 2006: 28). In fact, security issues are of prime importance in decision-making, meaning that return migration in post-conflict settings is only carried out when the initial security concern is resolved. Yet, factors for monitoring and ensuring return sustainability are far from straightforward, and this state can only be measured at least a year after the resettlement of return migrants.
In any case, sending countries in post-conflict settings may influence migrants’ decisions to return, both by promoting incentives that fulfil individual motivations for return and by creating expectations of normalcy in the country that would reduce security risks of collective return. However, these messages from the country of origin to its nationals abroad depend on the target group of return, and are usually distinguished according to different types of migrants. For example, as mentioned earlier, exiled migrants are more likely to consider the possibility of return.

Gaillard (1994) in her bibliographical overview of return migration states that sending countries are not highly in favour of the massive inflow of returnees, particularly of returning economic migrants, due to the economic and logistical consequences of such large-scale migration\(^7\). Nevertheless, the author recognizes that research on the return of refugees has been scant, especially for Latin America and Africa; yet, some studies on Latin America showed that returning refugees were welcomed (Gaillard and Center for Migration Studies : 54). This provides evidence that usually, refugees are considered desirable participants in the development process in their countries of origin, and are seen as agents of change (Sinatti and Horst 2015).

### 2.2.1 Return Migration Policies

Sending countries facing domestic conflicts are prone to establish migration policies facilitating the return of refugees and other displaced persons or populations affected by the conflict. These policies first and foremost encourage interventions of the international community in the peacebuilding process and reconstruction work (UNHCR 1997: ND). Moreover, the implementation of return policies also goes hand-in-hand with other developmental goals such as improved access to education or ensuring gender equality. In addition, such policies strengthen or rebuild citizen-state relations in order to validate post-conflict periods (that could include new regimes or the legitimization of the opposition) (Black and Gent 2006).

\(^7\) Neoclassical theory relates migration decisions to economic factors, such as wage levels and employment opportunities in destination countries (Castles and Miller 2009: 22).
Nevertheless, many campaigns for return migration have had symbolic rather than practical value, since ‘sending country governments are better at promoting their own agendas than taking the needs and wishes of their overseas nationals into account’ (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 215). History has shown that the encouragement of return processes has had an impact primarily on those who already had the intention to return, but did not have the resources to do so, and on those who were forced to return (Gaillard and Center for Migration Studies 1994: 49). This leads to the conclusion that sending country governments either have targeted their efforts to specific populations, or are not concern enough about nationals abroad. Regardless, the reality is that some challenges remain regarding the state’s role in the formulation and implementation of return policies.

2.2.2 Problems of Return Migration in Post-Conflict Settings

Besides their concern with the physiological and physical trauma of communities displaced or affected by war, as well as with the pre-conditions for the return of such communities discussed earlier, policy-makers also have to deal with ambiguities inherent in the complexity of the return migration process in post-conflict contexts. Return policies remain controversial, firstly due to difficulties regarding the categorization of beneficiaries (particularly which migrants to include in return programmes), and secondly due to insufficient support for the reintegration of returnees that could lead to the perpetuation of precarious conditions for refugees. A number of examples can be cited where citizens have been detained in refugee camps upon their return to their home countries⁸, forcing them to re-emigrate. Moreover, fundamental concepts related to the discourse of return can be questioned, since ideological assumptions based on singular and general understandings underlie these concepts. Allen and Morsink (in Black and Gent 2006) argue that general concepts understandings underlying the discourse on return migration are particularly problematic. For instance, the concept of “home” can be valued differently due to ‘conceptions of a homeland and shared values within a population which may or may not exist’ (2006: 20).

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⁸ See for example the case of United Kingdom government’s promotion of voluntary return to Somaliland (International Development Committee 2004 in Black and Gent 2006: 19).
For instance, the return policy ensuing after the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina had impressive results in terms of the number of returnees, due to the policy having had a clear and fixed definition of “home”. In this policy the right to return “home” implied that not only the country of origin was “home”; the policy also asserted that the returnees had the right to return to their physical “homes” that they were displaced from in the first place. This policy attempted to show that all refugees and displaced people ‘have the right to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities (...) and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them’ (IFOR 1995 in Black and Gent 2006: 23).

In general, return policies in post-conflict countries are key to peacebuilding efforts, since they promote national development, encourage participation by the international community, and reinforce citizen-state bonds. However, in order to promote values that encourage population to return in the peacebuilding process, it is necessary to understand inter-institutional contributions within a country, of which the national media is one of the most relevant institutions for the dissemination of values.

2.3 The Media’s Contribution to Peacebuilding Processes

The media plays an important role in post-conflict reconstruction work and the coverage of the transition from war to peace conditions in countries that underwent domestic conflicts. This means that, in order to contribute to peacebuilding processes, the media must deconstruct its own discourses on society’s common “enemy” and must actively undermine binaries and stereotypes promoting the idea of the “enemy” (Kempf 1998). However, this mindset change following the end of a conflict is not a straightforward process; in fact, war propaganda during the conflict produces strong societal beliefs that are embedded in perceptions and actions of each member of society and are also found in national journalism. According to Bar-Tal in Kempf (1998: 3), these societal beliefs can relate to: 1) perceived fairness of one side’s goals, numbing any attempt at negotiation; 2) the delegitimization of the opponent, which is closely related to the former belief; 3) patriotism; 4) a sense of unity that, together with patriotism, distinguishes between “them” and “us”; 5) a positive self-image
underlying “our” own values; 6) self-victimization; 7) security; and 8) peace as the final outcome, which contradicts itself during the war.

Deconstructing societal beliefs is a gradual process that requires a different type of journalism focused on two aspects. On the one hand, journalists have to “mistrust the plausible”, which includes the contextualization of the conflict and the calculation of the different parties’ intentions, actions and rights, and emotional involvement. On the other hand, they have to consider “the facts behind the plausible”, recognizing the involvement of several parties in a conflict in order to move beyond the perpetuation of the “them” and “us” binary, and that each party has its own perceptions of the conflict mirroring the realities with comparable experiences. The de-escalation of the conflict is thereby transformed into a cooperative process (Kempf 1998: 14-17).

However, media representation in post-conflict settings and the deconstruction of security beliefs must be approached with caution, since deconstruction could leave a vacuum creating a sense of insecurity. Instead, security discourses must be oriented towards understanding peace as the product of non-violence and creativity, manifested in change to a more balanced perspective that includes the voices of all those involved in the conflict, not just those of political and military elites controlling traditional media sources (Kempf 1998: 17). Yet, even when the presence of all participants is reflected, media coverage cannot be supportive of the peace process when controversies exist in the political discourse. Therefore, political consensus is equally important as a strategy to include civil society as a way of promoting peace (Senthan 2008b: 17).

Indeed, peace frames are hard to reconstruct after long-lasting conflicts where societal beliefs are deeply embedded in the actions of both civilians and institutions that constitute a society. The national media has a particularly vital role in peacebuilding interventions since it can gradually shape the mindset of society by deconstructing war culture beliefs and supporting peaceful initiatives that might result from political consensus, as well as by representing other aspects of the civil society.

In general, and linked with the previous literature, for sending countries in post-conflict settings the national media should corroborate events around peace processes in the
country, promoting political discourses in consensus with elites that engage the national and international community in support of their involvement in the peacebuilding process.

2.4 Analytical Framework

The Colombian post-conflict case relating to the return to Colombia of Colombians residing in Ecuador, as representation of sending countries’ return migration efforts, will be analyzed by regarding the following aspects:

- The motivations of Colombia as sending country related to its dialogue with nationals abroad, particularly whether this dialogue centres on economic, political and social participation, and the implications for each type of involvement;
- The characterization of stakeholders in the peace process by means of mapping the actors involved and their role or contribution in the peacebuilding effort;
- Notions of peace and security in the country (Black and Gent 2006): considered as fundamental in return processes, the country of origin ought to portray incentives promoting a peaceful environment, security, and stability in general, especially for those who fled the country and are vulnerable, including refugees and other non-registered civilians;
- Intentions underlying return programmes for the victims of the conflict, whereas the victims abroad are identified and recognized as part of the peacebuilding work.

This analysis also includes as variable the media’s participation in the peacebuilding process due to its function as one of the most recursive sources of information for migrants on their country of origin, and due to its role in the diffusion and representation of national values (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 14). In particular, media discourses on the war and peace culture during a specific timeframe are regarded (Kempf 1998).

This case will hence be analysed by focusing on the plebiscite due to its relevance in the political and communicational process that can move the country one step closer to a peace agreement between the Colombian government and FARC that would signify the end of the armed conflict and an era of peace.
Chapter 3 The dominant discourse of the Colombian government

This chapter focuses on understanding discourses communicated by the Colombian government regarding the return to Colombia of Colombian victims of the country’s conflict living in Ecuador. In light of the analytical framework introduced in Chapter 2, it is a priority to determine first to what extent the Colombian government through traditional diplomatic tools engaged in the plight of its citizens abroad. In doing so, dominant meanings related to the “who”, “what” and “why” of the communications will be regarded.

Colombian consulates in Ecuadorian cities Guayaquil, Esmeraldas, Nueva Loja, Quito, Santo Domingo de Los Tsáchilas and Tulcan, and the Colombian Embassy in Quito, together shared 16 of the 71 news articles mentioned in Chapter 2 with the Colombian population living in Ecuador through the official webpages (See Appendix 1), which means that most of the publications distributed by the six offices contained the same information. These articles were distributed over a period of three weeks corresponding to the plebiscite event in October 2016; however, information appeared on just eight days. Moreover, government communication was intensified in the five days preceding the vote on 2nd October 2016 and, unsurprisingly, on the day of the plebiscite five different articles were published, although one of them is impractical for this analysis since it merely shows images of Colombians voting.

The analysis reveals that evidently, the government’s discourse centred on the peace process, with only two articles related to other topics. Consequently, the words used most frequently, as the Atlas.ti software indicated, were: “peace”, “agreement”, and “Colombians”. In the second level of occurrence “talks”, “conflict”, “government”, “FARC”, “to vote”, and “plebiscite” dominated, while in the third level, but with high relevance for further analysis, words such as “President”, “Santos”, “post-conflict”, “chancellery”, “polarization”, and “stability” were frequently mentioned. Moreover, there was a prominent recurrence of terms related to the Colombian military, such as “commanders”, “national forces”, “military forces”, and “colonel”. Nevertheless, the intensity of the words changed over time in accordance with the momentum of the plebiscite, with each week of the storyline corresponding to the periods before, during and shortly after this historical day of democratic participation.
In the first week of analysis (19 to 25 September 2016), an optimistic and encouraging discourse promoting values related to reconciliation, unity, and participation in the peace process was evident. During this period two central events were mentioned. Firstly, the signing of the peace agreement indicating the end of the conflict was announced and Colombians abroad and within Colombia were invited to be witnesses of this historic moment that was set to take place on September 26th, 2016 in Cartagena, Colombia. Likewise, one publication explained in detail how to follow this event through any of the diplomatic missions. On the other hand, one of the consulates had the initiative to organize a “teaching day” about the peace agreement for Colombians in Ecuador in order to build arguments for informed voters (UIO 23-09); however, this activity was not implemented or promoted by other missions in Ecuador. Additionally, information unrelated to the peace process was published during this week (GYE 23-09). Even when all of these articles mentioned were published on the same day (September 23rd), this week can be considered the period of “little hope” due to the limited information provided, but strong content in the government intention in reaching its nationals in Ecuador.

In contrast, government communications in the second week (26 September to 2 October) changed the discourse from one of triumph attributed to the signed peace agreement, to one of division related to struggles over the same document. This week can be characterized by an information overload as 45 out of the total 71 articles were published in this period; these articles varied from less relevant topics such as exemptions in the plebiscite as designated jury, and polling locations around the world, to other matters of interest that presented themselves during this period. For example, an overview was given of the enthusiastic visit of Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa to Colombia with the purpose of the signing of the peace agreement on September 26th. The alliance of Ecuadorian and Colombian governments for the peacebuilding work was also highlighted. Secondly, an overview was provided of the voting process around the world to show the number of eligible Colombian voters living abroad. Thirdly, an interesting handbook on way of talking that would promote peaceful dialogues, encouraged by ‘the moment of polarization that Colombia is living’ (All 29-09)⁹, was presented by the chancellery to Colombians abroad. At that moment, a few days

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⁹ A 16-page annex of this handbook offering clear points on how a good communicator should drive a conversation was not included in this analysis.
before the plebiscite, opposite perspectives hindering the good relations within the Colombian society were manifested through the handbook. Finally, the negative result of the plebiscite in President Juan Manuel Santos’s words exposed the paradoxical situation the country was experiencing, since a collective desire for reconciliation of the Colombian government with FARC had been expressed earlier.

While in the last week only four different articles were published, in this week of 3 to 9 October Colombian government communication was prominent, as two of the articles depicted interesting storylines of the President’s speech, who continued to be the main voice represented by this source. On the one hand, while the discourse one day after the voting process was still dominated by shock regarding the negative result, the peace process welcomed new actors: three spokesmen of the Democratic Center Party which was the political group who led the campaign opposing the motion. As a result, there was implied some flaws that the peace process had in not considering other strong political forces in the country. In Santos’s words, ‘we will have to act quickly and set time limits, because the uncertainty and lack of clarity about what follows puts at risk everything that has been built up’ (All 03-10).

On the contrary, confidence in the peace process returned to government communications a few days later, when President Santos received the Nobel Peace Prize. Suddenly, Santos’s speech turned the attention to the victims of the conflict who were proclaimed as the incentive for the peace agreement; oddly enough, this was the first time in the period of three weeks that conflict victims were mentioned in all of the articles published by Colombian missions. Despite these dualistic perspectives of the peace process, the dominant message of the week after the plebiscite was that unity among Colombians was needed.

In general, an analysis of three weeks of Colombian government discourses directed at nationals living in Ecuador revealed a specific standpoint regarding the peace process and described the intentions of the government in reaching this population. Through the analysis it was possible to identify answers to key questions of the research, including how different actors are involved and represented; why the government was communicating with the
Colombian population in Ecuador; and what the meanings are of peace processes presented to Colombians living in Ecuador.

3.1 National and International Participants in The Peace Process

Throughout the government communications, the multitude of actors was remarkable, since each of these actors was assigned an explicit role in the peace process, either in a more passive or active capacity. For the purpose of this descriptive analysis, participants in the government’s discourse are depicted according to three clusters alluding to the nature of the participant. Thus, they are classified into the individualization, institutionalization, and generalization clusters. Additionally, the main characters in the storyline are recognized.

The individualization cluster includes those characters that are not just considered individuals, but also possess individual agency in the communication process and, therefore, can speak with their own voices; the Ecuadorian and Colombian presidents form part of this cluster. On one hand, former Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa reaffirmed his commitment in the peacebuilding work, and with reference to a metaphor from a novel \( ^{10} \) Correa questioned, in a positive way, the role of the Colombian army after the end of the conflict. On the other hand, President Juan Manuel Santos’s voice was the most influential throughout the government’s communication, as he repeatedly proclaimed himself leader of all Colombians, ‘both those who voted for the NO and those who voted for the YES. Of all Colombians!’ (All 02-10) Additionally, Santos attributed to himself the role of guarantor of the nation’s stability and peace; however, as fearless response to the results of the plebiscite, he stressed that the plebiscite as democratic tool should not interrupt the hypothetical stability of the country that he claimed to pursue until the end of his term of office.

The institutionalization cluster proves that the government does not possess sufficient capacity or influence to accomplish peace by itself, especially for those capabilities that implicate the participation of population out of the national control, and therefore inter-institutional networks are essential. In this case, two groups of institutions were found through

\(^{10}\) “One Hundred Years of Solitude” is a highly acclaimed novel by Colombian author Gabriel García Márquez (García Márques 1970: 56).
the analysis, namely national and international institutions. The former group comprises the Ecuadorian government and other Ecuadorian organizations in charge of human mobility and foreign affairs expressly mentioned in the communications, although there is little evidence that they played any role besides “decorating” former President Rafael Correa’s presence in Colombia. This group is accompanied by the international group of institutions that includes other presidents (without names or countries being specified) and international organizations that have succeeded in their position of supporting peace and supporting the Colombian president by urging him to continue with the negotiation process.

By the same logic, the institutionalization national group also comprises Colombian representatives outside Colombia who form part of an extension of government control over its population in foreign countries. Evidently, the Colombian chancellery was highly active in promoting dialogue with Colombians living in Ecuador, particularly through its main task of information provision. Likewise, groups supporting the government, such as the police, military, Catholic Church, and peace negotiators (from both the government and FARC sides) were mentioned. However, the Democratic Center Party, the right-wing political party that explicitly opposed the peace agreement, was also identified. The party, founded by Álvaro Uribe (Centro Democratico 2015), besides opposing the motion also agreed to continue with peace talks. This cluster clearly reveals the Colombian government strategy of collaborating with different institutions; however, it seems that most participants were assigned a role either in favour of or against the peace agreement, in the context of the plebiscite.

Lastly, the generalization cluster comprises collectives that cannot necessarily be classified as institutions. Then, all Colombians fall into this category that is further stratified according to their relationship with the peace agreement and post-conflict context. The cluster firstly comprises nationals abroad and citizens eligible for participating in the plebiscite; secondly, future generations of Colombians that will not suffer the consequences of an armed conflict after the peace agreement; thirdly, victims that the conflict has generated over years; and, fourthly, Colombians that voted “yes” or “no”. In the case of the general collective of Colombians, this group in the first place was motivated to become involved in the peace agreement process, then to acquire more information about democratic participation, and, finally, to stay united in order to reach the desired period of peace.
In summary, through a process of mapping the actors, the individualization cluster can be considered the most dominant of the three clusters due to the resounding voice of President Santos that provided direction and assigned roles to the other actors; likewise, Santos was classified through his speeches as part of the second cluster due to his use of pronouns such as “we”, “our”, “all of us” when referring to his place within Colombian society. Actors forming part of the generalization cluster were the second most prominent group of actors due to their active role in communications, whether as spectators of instructions or executors of actions: ‘Colombians must remain united’ (All 03-10) versus ‘and the majority (Colombians who voted), even by a very narrow margin, has said NO’ (All 02-10). The last link of the chain is the institutionalization cluster. Even though none of the actors forming part of this cluster, but the chancellery, expressly spoke, their independent and different actions were clearly recognised; this allows for a focus on more on relevant actors for the research, such as the chancellery, the Democratic Center Party, and the international community.

3.2 Dialogue with Colombians Abroad Regarding The Peace Process

‘No matter the distance, this historic day unites us!’ (All 23-09). This sentiment, expressed through a call of the Colombian government to bond with Colombians abroad, defines the first week of analysis, here referred to as the period of little hope. With this statement, the government was attempting to bridge physical distances by asking for engagement in a national event. This section therefore provides responses to questions regarding the reasons why the government was communicating with the Colombian population in Ecuador, and what the implications are of this communication for the peace process. These motivations are explicitly stated in the following order:

Firstly, the government sought to encourage the involvement of Colombians abroad as witnesses of the peace process by providing clear and accessible tools to keep them informed about the historic moment. Likewise, this detailed process suggests the high level of interest to increase the attention of international observation:

On the webpages of Colombian Embassies and Consulates, you can also follow the transmission. If you still do not know the web address of the page of the diplomatic mission in your country of residence, finding out is very simple: you just have to be clear about the
domains .embajada.gov.co and .consulado.gov.co; your place of residence must precede these domains. In this way, if you live, for example, in Miami the page you must enter is miami.consulado.gov.co, and if you want to access information via the Embassy’s website in the United States, you must enter estadosunidos.embajada.gov.co (All 23-09).

During the five days preceding the plebiscite, the high concentration of information focused overwhelmingly on the plebiscite itself, which suggests that the government was hoping to mobilize participation abroad, and even when there was no explicit propaganda asking for support of the motion, a causal relation between civic approval of the agreement and the end of the conflict in Colombia was suggested. On the one hand, when the peace agreement was mentioned in relation to the plebiscite, it was officially referred to as the ‘final agreement to end the armed conflict and build a stable and lasting peace’ (Alto Comisionado para la Paz 2016). In contrast, when the accord was mentioned in other contexts related to the peace process besides the plebiscite, it was referred to as the ‘peace agreement between the government and the FARC’ or simply the “peace agreement”.

The day of the plebiscite arrived for Colombians abroad, and the motivation of government communication then was to provide accountability for the inclusive participation of citizens around the world. Thus, extensive and specific details pertaining to registered citizens and voting locations were published. For example, ‘the electoral day abroad will be held in a total of 203 voting points, with 1,372 tables, distributed in 138 cities of 64 countries; the electoral census is made up of 599,026 people’ (All 01-10). Even though the motivation for providing this type of information seems to be technical and bureaucratic, such information was equally important in reflecting a positive image of the peace process for those Colombian nationals residing abroad and also for the international community.

Moreover, the provision of information during the second week of analysis was induced by ‘the polarization that is being experienced, not only in Colombia, but also among Colombians abroad’ (All 29-09). As a result, the chancellery was the main intermediary in communication between the government and Colombians in Ecuador, in order to diminish this polarization within the society, within families, and among friends. In doing so, the chancellery promoted ‘a basic guide to learn how to talk and invites to use the power of dialogue for peacebuilding’ to show national abroad how to “interact” in the peacebuilding
process without reversing the positive perceptions that the government had created of the process through the peace agreement.

Finally, considering the divisions within and outside the country that were already exposed immediately after the plebiscite result, government communication focused on highlighting the plight of ‘millions of victims that the conflict has left’, asking for support in continuing in the search for peace. Overall, these motivations linked to the peace process allow for an understanding of the relationship between the government and its requests to the Colombian population abroad in peacebuilding work. Consequently, the next section offers alternatives after unpacking meanings of this so-called ‘stable and lasting peace’.

3.3 Post-Conflict Perceptions Regarding Peace

The last engagement with Colombian government discourse disseminated through its diplomatic missions in Ecuador is linked to the aim of seeking to understand the meanings around “peace” in the post-conflict context, along with other symbolic values related to the peace process presented to Colombians abroad by means of government communication. As a result, findings were organized according to the use of words related either to peace or war.

On the one hand, positive connotations with the peace process were particularly found in terms such as “unity”, “unite” and “united” as a way of reaching peace, also associating this value with a “historic moment” (All 23-09) within a specific period when ‘the country needs unity’ (All 03-10). Similarly, meanings relating to a better future and hope for future generations were marked as consequences of peace, in the sense that a period of peace is ‘the way to leave a better country to our children’ (All 02-10), because future generations deserve ‘a country in peace, quiet, without armed conflict’ (All 03-10). Likely, victims of the conflict also justify this search for peace through national unity; however, victims were found to be associated with conflict.

Moreover, the second individual actor with his own voice, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, also contributed by giving straightforward meanings of peace, such as that it ‘not only means the absence of war but the presence, presence of justice, equal opportunities, equity, rights, and a good living’ (All 26-09). Correa also stated that Colombian peace is an
achievement for the entire region. Hence, all of these positive attributions are not necessarily associated with the end of war, but also with conditions that could exist without a conflict.

In contrast, other connotations of peace were related to ‘ceasefire and bilateral hostilities’ (All 02-10) or the end of the war in the country, which was repeatedly mentioned. Likewise, peace was attributed to the victims of the conflict, since ‘it is for the victim – so that there is not just one more victim, not one more dead – that we must reconcile and unite to complete this process, and begin to build a stable and lasting peace’ (All 07-10). In this statement, besides unity, “reconciliation” is also a way to pursue peace in the post-conflict reconstruction period that requires the involvement, or presence, of the victims in this work.

Lastly, it was recognized that even when peace is a collective and final desire of all Colombians, ‘those who said NO and (...) those who said Yes. All, without exception, want peace. This is what they have expressly said’ (All 02-10). The high level of polarization among Colombians was not only reflected in the plebiscite results, but also embedded in the Colombian society inside and outside the country. In this sense, not only the end of the war and a ceasefire would be sufficient for ensuring peace – it is also necessary ‘to leave behind the quarrels, the hatreds and the polarization that produce us so much harm’ (03-10), since ‘one of the challenges of the post-conflict period will be that Colombians must learn to “talk” without attacking us’ (All 29-09).

In general, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, the international community, and all Colombians were the most active participants in the communications. Particularly, Colombians abroad were contacted by the Colombian government with a socio-political request demanding different levels of participation (as witness and voters) and providing tools to interact with the peace process. Additionally, this request for help was presented to nationals living abroad through a discourse on the meanings of peace in the post-conflict period. During the three weeks of analysis, it was possible to unpack the “who”, “why” and “what” around the communications between the Colombian government and its nationals in Ecuador.
Chapter 4 The Colombian Media and The Peace Process

This chapter focuses on the Colombian media’s communication of the peace process, particularly on its communication with Colombians living in Ecuador. The results obtained in this research show that the El Tiempo newspaper was the most prominent source of information on Colombia for Colombians in Ecuador during the period of the plebiscite. Even if the sample was not representative of the Colombian population living in Ecuador (as it was declared in the methodology), the survey conducted among this population nevertheless revealed this established newspaper’s strong influence, supported by its long history of circulation and its reputation. This case allowed for the exploration of representations of social values and beliefs by means of an analysis of the section “Colombia” on the newspaper’s website that focuses on local perspectives around the country. In the post-conflict context, such beliefs are vital for enabling society to engage with peacebuilding processes (Kempf 1998: 5). Therefore, the representation of these values will either reinforce or fail to reinforce governmental discourses regarding the peace process found in government communications to Colombians abroad.

In order to conduct the analysis, a number of newspaper articles were selected. It was found that the El Tiempo newspaper produced on average 25 articles per day under the section “Colombia” in the period 29 September to 9 October 2016. Due to the high frequency of publications, particularly during this period, articles containing words such as “peace”, “victims”, “abroad”, “migrants”, “return”, “refugees” and “Colombians abroad” were selected. Hence, after examining newspaper article titles and themes, 75 articles associated with the peacebuilding process were selected out of 529; these articles were then categorized in terms of favourable, unfavourable or neutral positions towards the peace process. In order to overcome researcher bias and to improve the accuracy of the categorization, this process was conducted thrice and on different days by the author.
4.1 Neutral: Contextualization and concrete facts

The neutral cluster contains newspaper articles with seemingly impartial titles or content that were not identifiable as either favourable or unfavourable of the peace process. During the categorization process, some articles produced mixed results, for example “neutral-favourable-neutral”. Despite this, for the neutral cluster, articles were selected that provided information without explicitly employing a “we” or “us” and “them” discourse. For example, in the phrase ‘Antioquia’s Governor invites Álvaro Uribe to a peace event. The event will take place this Wednesday, at noon, in a hotel in Medellin’ (W1-8), neither “Antioquia’s Governor” nor “Álvaro Uribe” can be associated with any particular position or specific group. Likewise, the second line did not suggest anything circumstantial.

On the other hand, neutral statements that referred to accountability about the plebiscite results were also assigned to this cluster. For example, one article stated: ‘Installed the Commission of Vigilance and Electoral Follow-up of the Plebiscite. In “El Valle” 3,401,889 citizens are eligible to vote’ (W1-13). From this example, it is clear that due to the impartiality of the language and absence of words with negative or positive connotations, such statements might not necessarily have an impact on perceptions of the peace process to the same extent as those observed for the next sections.

4.2 Unfavourable: Between Controversy, Mistrust, or Threat

For the interpretation of the peace process, discourses, titles and their leads focusing on controversy, mistrust, or threats were identified as unfavourable. Firstly, a number of statements highlighted political discrepancies and reiterated that political consensus needed to reach peaceful agreement did not exist. For example, the phrase ‘Uribismo scolds Juan Carlos Vélez and denies strategy in the “No” ’ (W3-70) exposes the division inside the circle of political elites. Secondly, arguments were identified that portrayed a lack of involvement in or suspicions of post-conflict participation, for example: ‘Uncertainty among towns’ victims of the war who voted “Yes”. Some remain hopeful. Others have been critical of the plebiscite result’ (W3-56). In this sense, involvement in the peace process is linked to mistrust and fear: ‘Antioquia’s victims ask to be part of the peace renegotiation. They claim that some (of them)
lied, manipulated and generated fear in order for the agreements to be rejected’ (W3-69). Likewise, the unfavourable cluster confirmed the vulnerability of the post-conflict context and alarmed the population about the negative consequences of engagement: ‘Four victims of Quindío received threats after voting “Yes” ’ (W3-74). Attributions to the peace process found in articles belonging to this cluster counteract and harm efforts related to post-conflict work. In this sense, beliefs centring on instability, insecurity, and uncertainty were exposed by the Colombian media.

4.3 Favourable: Towards a Peace Culture and the Inclusion of Other Voices

In contrast to the more negative connotations of the peace process discussed above, articles with a more positive opinion of the process were allocated to this cluster. Such articles are positive in the sense of perceiving the described scenarios as oriented towards the de-escalation of the conflict. Firstly, looking for inclusion of many participants to provide a balanced perspective, including academia, leaders of the “Yes” and “No” camps, victims, Colombians abroad, the international community, indigenous people, local governments, experts in conflicts, journalists, Colombian families, and next generations of Colombians actively involved in post-conflict work. For example, one article stated that ‘[t]his is how “#MarchaPorLaPaz” is lived in the different cities. New York, Quito and London were some of the cities where Colombians met’ (W3-66). Other articles focused on the reintegration of FARC into society by describing it as merely one of several parties instead of “the opponent”. For example: ‘FARC invites deserters to join their political movement. The guerrilla made a call to the “Frente Primero” to join the peace process’ (W1-17).

Secondly, those statements promoting creative and peaceful ways of interacting in the post-conflict context were assigned to this cluster, and phrases such as “dialogues”, “events”, “educational”, “rituals”, “replicas”, “representations”, “activities” and many “campaigns” proving the involvement and free expression of participants were commonly seen. One article for example described ‘Juan José Hoyos, a journalist of gold and blood. The chronicler assures that the narrative journalism is a valuable tool to narrate the conflict’ (W1-14). Additionally, strategic plans were highlighted as favourable: ‘Plan of Action for the victims of the conflict
in the Valley was approved. Transitional Justice Council gave its approval. In the department there are more than 400 thousand affected’ (W3-64). This cluster includes articles on economic contributions and estimates directed at societal reconstruction, for example: ‘The United States has $390 million ready for the post-conflict. The United States Secretary of State stressed that his country will provide resources for the post-conflict’ (W2-24).

Thirdly, non-violent understandings of peace were found in statements assigned to this cluster. Thus, the peace process is driven by a celebratory discourse where terms such as “hope”, “optimism”, “victory”, and “support” commonly featured in announcements. Moreover, these understandings of peace were closely linked to discourses on the victims of the conflict, who in most of the cases featured in the media by talking with their own voice: ‘I forgive and when you forgive, you live quietly. – victim of “La Chinita”’ (W2-45). This notable finding suggests, on the one hand, that “victims” as actors in the conflict and post-conflict strongly influence media communications, since “victim” is one of the most frequently mentioned words in the media. On the other hand, this indicates that these actors are crucial to understanding the peace process outside of a violent context, through reconciliation and forgiveness.

As a whole, the “favourable” cluster contained the largest amount articles, with titles seemingly supportive of the peace reconstruction process; however, these appraisals were replaced in some instances by other neutral or unfavourable titles throughout the storyline of the peace process. The 75 articles analysed in this study were found to be more or less evenly distributed across the period, although 10 additional articles were published during the second week (Figure 1). Yet, changes in the intensity of discourses over this period were noticeable. In Week 1 (19 to 25 September 2016), democratic participation was already being discussed, but the main emphasis was on the upcoming adoption of the peace agreement. Both this historical moment and increased civic activity inspired mostly favourable coverage of the process, and at that time political divisions were seldom discussed in the media: ‘Tolima’s Governor, close to Uribism, will vote “Yes” in the plebiscite. Oscar Barreto said that he told President Santos to count on him to seek peace’ (W1-15). Even articles with a neutral view, comprising around 34% of the total analysed publications, at that time were creating space for expectations of the events: ‘Monteria, where Santos and Uribe do pedagogy for the plebiscite.'
The President will be in the capital of Cordoba on Thursday 22nd. The former was on Monday 19th (W1-12).

Figure 1. Favourability, Unfavourability, and Neutrality in Media Discourses

Then, during the second week, media articles were overwhelmingly focused on the signing and adoption of the peace agreement, as well as on the massive response to this event, which also motivated the high rate of civic participation. This time, civic participation was projected through reference to emotional involvement: ‘This is how the signing of peace between the Government and the FARC was lived out in the cities. Smiles, tears and hugs were seen in the main areas of the national territory’ (W2-27). The overtly favourable view of the peace process during this week (with more than 70% of articles revealing positive perceptions) could be ascribed partly to the relationship between victims and reconciliation experiences: ‘The FARC asked for forgiveness for the slaughter of “La Chinita” in “Apartadó” ’ (W2-43). Unexpectedly, on the last day of this week negative sentiments of the plebiscite were already becoming evident, although only a few unfavourable positions related to disappointment were seen; many discussions neutrally centred on the results of the plebiscite.

By the start of the third week – the Monday after the voting weekend – 35% of the publications revealed a switch of perspectives toward unfavourable views of the process. Somehow, a correlation was drawn between the negative aspects of the peace agreement and
voters’ disapproval of FARC: ‘The “No” in the plebiscite prevailed in the village of “Timochenko”’ (W3-57). However, more than 50% of the publications still revealed favourable views, along with fewer “neutral” publications. For example: ‘Santos and Uribe advance in a possible adjustment of the agreement with the FARC’ (W3-67). This last week produced the three highest-ranking news topics: ‘The controversy of Juan Carlos Vélez, the march of silence, and the Nobel Peace Prize’ (W3-72). This last event undeniably reinstated a positive view of the victims and their role in the peace process. However, it was not sufficient to counteract the unfavourable positions that dominated media communications in the preceding two weeks.

Moreover, it was interesting to find a subsection under the “Colombia” section on El Tiempo’s website that provided a list of articles displayed according to importance. This section contained prompts such as ‘Do not go to bed without reading this’ or ‘If you did not have time to inform yourself today, here is a summary of the most important news of the day’ that highlighted what it considered to be the most relevant news articles. In the period of three weeks regarded in this study, on ten days El Tiempo published articles relating to the peace process in this section. Of these articles, eight were classified as favourable, and two as neutral. This subsection hence provided useful insight into the priorities and positionality of the newspaper.

The analysis of news articles published by El Tiempo provided evidence that the coverage during these three weeks was mostly favourable, since it showed the disposition to support the peacebuilding process through two central strategies. Firstly, even when the exposure of the polarization in the country following the plebiscite was unavoidable, the polarization was not accentuated in the discord between political elites (former President and ex-President) that emerged due to the “Yes” and “No” campaigns. Conversely, the newspaper managed to balance the participation of both sides across favourable or neutral interventions. Secondly, El Tiempo’s coverage of the process acknowledged the existence of multiple actors involved in the post-conflict process, while the victims, as one of the main groups of actors, were seriously overexposed by the media in general. In the same way, interactions among these participants were framed as cooperative, inclusive, and non-violent. This media approach to

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11 Rodrigo Londoño Echeverrì, better known as Timoleón Jiménez or Timochenko: former FARC leader.
the peace process revealed that Colombian society beliefs regarding the post-conflict period are largely represented by victims’ voices, which transformed discourses of violence into discourses built on values such as empathy, understanding, and reconciliation.
Chapter 5 Discussion of Analysis Results

This chapter links together the descriptive processes of Chapters 3 and 4 in order to shape analytical categories that can be related back to the analytical framework. In so doing, the analysis confirmed that despite the fact that dialogues between the Colombian government and its population abroad were not focused on return migration, such dialogues symbolized an important first step towards establishing and cementing their relationship. Thus, even when the peace agreement explicitly announced its intent toward the victims of the conflict by referring to the ‘return and relocation of displaced persons and victims abroad, including refugees and exiles, which form part of these processes’ (Alto Comisionado para la Paz. 2016: 194), no indication of a timeframe for return migration was found in the analysis. Nevertheless, the analysis showed that the current government in connecting with its nationals abroad had a great number of expectations of their engagement in the peace process. Similarly, the national media was shown actively to support this post-conflict proposal of the government.

Initially, the government and national media were assumed to have different motivations for communicating with nationals abroad. However, both sources discussed central issues related to the implications of peacebuilding work and the involvement of the Colombian population abroad, particularly pertaining to victims of the conflict. Likewise, the three events of 2016 facilitating a turning point in Colombian history informed the agendas underlying both government and media discourses. As a result of these turning points, it was later agreed that the engagement of victims abroad with the peace process would move beyond a symbolic act to an act with practical value for the country.

5.1 The End of the Conflict

The signing of the peace agreement through both government and media communications generated enormous expectations. The coverage of this event was so optimistic– “today I announce that the war in Colombia has ended” – Santos to the United Nations’ (W1-11) – that it prompted active participation and positive reactions. On the one hand, the adoption of the agreement inspired proposals from civil society, and the media tended to focus on the
most creative initiatives proposed. Then, a partnership between civil society and the media was initiated to ‘create a peace discourse from the bottom to the top’ (Senthan 2008b: 104).

On the other hand, the Colombian chancellery served to convene all Colombians abroad to bear witness to the historic moment. The information provided alongside this event to promote connectivity was extraordinarily clear and detailed. In this sense, governmental institutions in post-conflict contexts are oriented toward retaining contact with populations abroad and encouraging their participation in national activities, thus promoting long-distance nationalism through values such as unity that can be convenient in further steps of the process (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 8). Even more, the former Ecuadorian mandatory was mentioned in the Colombian government communications with the purpose of highlight his approval of the peace process. Therefore, the celebratory discourse emphasized ‘that the signing of peace in Colombia is the best news in recent decades for the “Patria Grande” ’ (EMB 29-09).

However, great expectations also tend to create great uncertainty, which was evident in the increasing neutrality of media coverage of the peace agreement as uncertainty grew. Additionally, dialogues centred more on peace and less on the significance of the agreement signed just one week before the plebiscite. Moreover, the lack of detailed information on the content of the agreement, meaning that it could only be seen as an emblem and not as a practical tool, was noticeable in government and media communications. Consequently, Colombian society had ‘no other chance than to believe the conclusions they are told by their political leaders or to withdraw into selective inattendance, prejudice or evasive scepticism etc.’ (Kempf 1998: 22). In light of this, two days before the plebiscite, the Colombian chancellery launched a handbook to prompt nationals abroad to learn how to engage in a peaceful manner (All 29-09). This initiative re-engaged Colombians outside the country in order to act on – if not control – criticism within the migrant population of the process and government (Koser 2003: 178).

In this first stage of the peace process, the complexity of the situation was reduced, so that a reductionist picture was painted of “the end of the conflict” through a signature. The triumph was soon replaced by uncertainty related to the voting day, at the same time skewed by ‘the advertising war between the Yes and the No’ (Semana 2017). As a result of this undesirable controversy, Colombian government discourses regarding peace and unity were
not replicated by its nationals inside or outside of the country (All 23-09), despite El Tiempo’s efforts to provide a balanced perspective and dampen discussions on political discrepancies.

The effort to bind the population abroad to the post-conflict process at this point was motivated as a symbolic act, so that the plea to Colombians in Ecuador to witness this event was considered a mere formality. This symbolic act promoting long-distance nationalism was weakened by the limited capacity of the Colombian state to deal with nationals that had fled the country due to the conflict, and with Colombian migrants in general (RIDH 2017: 4). Moreover, the intensity of the dialogues increased once the expectations of the peace agreement created polarization. As a result, the international handbook presented by the government gave evidence of this disunity among political elites and recognized this division and its support from abroad.

5.2 Reaching the Peace Agreement

Peace frames will be used to organize information about both successes and setbacks: successes will lead to more optimistic coverage and setbacks will be seen as “problems” that must be solved (Senthan 2008a: 18)

While President Juan Manuel Santos was addressing public communications around the plebiscite results, unfavourable scenarios regarding the peace process started to encroach on the media’s neutral coverage of the events. Indeed, issues related to insecurity and instability emerged after opponents to the agreement entered into the negotiations; this was confirmed when President Santos stated: ‘I called you to decide whether or not to support the agreement for the termination of the conflict with the FARC, and the majority, even if by a narrow margin, has said NO’ (All 02-10). Nevertheless, among the three parties supporting or opposing the agreement, the true lack of civil participation in the plebiscite was never mentioned in government communications.

These setbacks (polarization and absenteeism) were exponential threats for the peace process, reducing largely the engagement of the population in the post-conflict reconstruction process, especially of those Colombians living abroad, due to unaddressed concerns regarding security (Gaillard and Center for Migration Studies 1994). In the same vein, the rejection of
the agreement through both voting and abstinence from voting to some degree suggested an invalidation of the transition of the regime demanding the inclusion of a new political force, the FARC. A connection between disapproval and this political group is suggested, for example in the following quote: ‘In Planadas, Tolima, where the FARC was born, the “No” overshadowed the “Yes”’ (W3-58).

Yet, the unfavourable image of the country that the plebiscite had left provoked another response from El Tiempo, which presented (through wider coverage) alternatives to address the national struggle. For example, it reported that ‘Cali is mobilized for forgiveness and reconciliation. More than 4,500 people clamoured with banners and music to save the agreements between the Government and the FARC’ (W3-75). Likewise, leaders against and in favour of the agreement showed willingness to negotiate for political consensus, as government and media communications framed peace as the final desire of the Colombian population.

Nevertheless, the analysis showed many representations of “peace” where, regarding to the plebiscite, a desire for peace was implied in voting “Yes”. This causality generated criticism of the involvement of the Colombian society in participatory democracy after the Brexit event that had occurred a few days prior; Fjørtoft (2016: 6) commented that ‘positioning voters as incapable is frequently done in analogy to Brexit’. As a result, the international community that was largely aware of the Colombian process recognized in the plebiscite another dilemma regarding participation and deep polarization also found in the case of Brexit (Brodzinsky 2017). However, this time the situation was related to the end of an armed conflict.

At this stage of the peace process, the plebiscite as democratic tool announced both inside and outside of the country did not improve the relationship of the Colombian government with its nationals abroad. On the contrary, the plebiscite generated unfavourable responses, exacerbating antagonism in the Colombian society. Apparently, however, these interferences were not fully counterproductive, since the obstacles to the peace process were presented to the international community to advertise the Colombian post-conflict process and as a consequence, make a call for support.
5. 3 International Intervention in the Peace Process

“There is a real danger that the peace process will come to a halt and that civil war will flare up again. This makes it even more important that the parties, headed by President Santos and FARC guerrilla leader Rodrigo Londoño, continue to respect the ceasefire” (Nobel Media AB 2014 2017a).

Almost immediately – just four days after the plebiscite – President Juan Manuel Santos received the Nobel Peace Prize, indicating the overwhelming support of the international community for the fragile peace process, in general, and the empowerment of the Colombian government, in particular. The analysis showed that this was the moment when the attention shifted to the peace process that was so widely communicated to Colombians both outside and within the country. Clearly, the discourse on the peace process changed abruptly from one of polarization and political divergence, to one of inclusion and reconciliation, whereby conflict victims became the common factor of both discourses in the search for peace.

This international “intervention” opened up space for the recognition of the victims as important allies of the Colombian government in the development of the peace process. Despite critiques regarding the awarding of the prize only to President Santos, the Nobel Prize Committee emphasized that the Peace Prize ‘is also attributed to Colombian people who have kept their hope for justice and peace and reconciliation … And last but not least to the representatives of the victims who have been participating quite actively in the process’ (Nobel Media AB 2014 2017b). Therefore, after the plebiscite, the central focus of Santos’s discourse was this group of actors, which before then had been invisible in the government communications.

In contrast, throughout the three weeks the media advocated for the plight of the victims. At that time, El Tiempo thoughtfully chose to respond to the topic in the following manner: “It is very joyful to feel recognized” – victims of the conflict. Leaders spoke about the Nobel Peace Prize that President Santos received’ (All W3-71). This clearly shows the causal relation between the international recognition of Santos and the shift of the government rhetoric towards a more celebratory discourse highlighting the victims’ significance for the peace process. This finding is strengthened when recognizing that sending states seek the support of the international community in order to validate an existing regime or integrate a new one –
in this case FARC as a political movement (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 8). In this last stage, then, the discourse on victims had practical rather than symbolic value, especially when considering the implications of this event for victims living abroad. This group of Colombians thence was assigned greater relevance in national agendas. The Nobel award exposed victims as the target of support of the international community for peacebuilding and, as a result, victims abroad were also perceived to possess practical value for the country.

The story of Colombia’s peace process transitioned along the three stages discussed in this thesis. From a tale of uncertain expectations of witnesses abroad as the symbolic inclusion of all Colombians, it became a tale about the rejection of the process along with efforts to disseminate divergences until, finally, the happy ending was reached when the international, national and local communities met. These three tales converged in a fortuitous celebration of political consensus and the inclusion of victims, reinforced by the national media. Figure 2 illustrates the arguments and contributions from the sources along the three stages.
Figure 2. Peace process stages through government and media discourses

Whether or not it is an outcome of the Nobel Peace Prize, at present plans to return Colombians living in Ecuador to their home country are already on the table. This is evident in communications of the chancellery, who states that ‘Colombia and Ecuador held the 11th meeting of the Binational Commission, where the issue of Colombian refugees and a Return Plan were addressed’ (Cancilleria de Colombia 2017a). Notwithstanding all the flaws of migration management in Colombia, specifically the failure to recognize those who fled the country due to the conflict and to identify them as victims, one year after the peace agreement was approved by the congress, efforts have been oriented toward the recognition of this population in Quito, Ecuador to ‘offer the opportunity for Colombians who consider themselves to be victims residing in Ecuador’ (Cancilleria de Colombia 2017c). This can be seen a step towards the identification of beneficiaries in return programmes (Black and Gent 2006: 20), since until the time of the plebiscite no distinctions were made between Colombians abroad, victims abroad, and victims.
In summary, this analysis showed that the main incentive of Colombia, as a sending country in a post-conflict context, in reaching out to its population abroad was to promote shared national values while encouraging them to remain engaged in the peace process, albeit from abroad. Following the same logic, contributions in the peacebuilding process were stated, although not yet specify the kind of contributions required rather than passive participation as witness. However, this motivation was hindered by the political struggle among national elites that generated an imperative intervention from the Colombian government, who warned about the influence of migrants’ perceptions on the post-conflict context. On the other hand, the lack of national support for victims and the period of political polarization unleashed calls by the international community, who had acknowledged victims of the conflict, to de-escalate the struggle. Effectively, the media validated these efforts. In reflection, this research wishes to stress that ‘ending civil conflict is difficult, particularly through political settlements’ (Matanock and García-Sánchez 2017: 152). Therefore, victims of the conflict abroad are in a long queue to return to the country.
Chapter 6 Conclusions and suggestions for future research

In tracing the steps of a sending country in its post-conflict peacebuilding process, this research focused on the victims of the conflict who were force to migrate to a foreign country. The Colombian case registered the massive exile of nationals from Colombia and their spread across the Latin American region. Ecuador, as one of the neighbours of Colombia and a main host of Colombian nationals that has had to deal with the consequences of the conflict, was selected for the analysis. In 2016 a peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC was signed successfully. The peace agreement emphasized the need for the inclusion of victims of the conflict living abroad in the peacebuilding process to enable the end of the conflict and bring about lasting peace.

The analysis thus asked whether the discourses of the Colombian government and national media who, together, control the dissemination of information, discussed the relationship between the peace agreement and the return of victims abroad during a particular phase of the peacebuilding process. The results produced a negative answer to the question – no explicit announcements about this relationship were found, nor even mention of victims abroad. Nevertheless, as with the plebiscite results that were negative, space was provided for arguments revealing the opposite. In this sense, even though the discourses were silent on victims of the conflict and their return to Colombia, the communications of both parties were dedicated in a more implicit manner to next steps in including victims living abroad in the return migration process.

Several conclusions can be drawn for this research. Firstly, the involvement of civil society in the peacebuilding process, including the population abroad, was greatly encouraged. However, the lack of support for the plebiscite as democratic tool that was to validate the peace agreement wobbled the national stability and in the process exposed insecurity. As a result, national discourses shifted from the symbolic inclusion of Colombians abroad to dynamic practices that highlighted the influence of this population in this process, though this influence was unfavourably perceived. At the same time, the uncertainty around and stagnation of the peacebuilding process following the plebiscite was a wake-up call for the international
community that, coincidentally and opportunistically, decided to intervene by acknowledging President Juan Manuel Santos’s work through the Nobel Peace Prize assigned to him. The impetus that this recognition gave to the peace process was key to validate the regime’s transition, characterized by the inclusion of a former guerrilla group (FARC) in the country’s decision-making processes and its integration into civil society.

Secondly, the research showed that both sources of information realized the practical value of the victims of the conflict in their storytelling processes. Precisely for this reason, nothing was deemed more valuable for encouraging international participation in the post-conflict peacebuilding process that would require not only political and social counselling, but also a significant economic investment. Remarkably, it seems that the stages of the post-conflict process analyzed for this research were a series of coincidences that allowed for a better understanding of the development of a peacebuilding process that contains a strategy to involve Colombians based abroad, particularly victims of the conflict, in the peacebuilding process. As a result, previous steps, such as the call for civic participation by the Colombian government and the advocacy for peace in the national media, are first revisited before the attention is turned to the assistance of return migrants.

In conclusion, this case study provides a brief glimpse of the next phase in the Colombian conflict, that will include presidential elections, an emerging migration crisis for the region due to the Venezuelan domestic crisis, and other events that certainly will influence the peacebuilding process and the involvement of the Colombian population, including victims living abroad, therein. A similar analysis of the conduct of the government and national media in mobilizing Colombians abroad to vote in the presidential elections would be equally interesting. Such an analysis would allow for an examination of the migration debate in a post-conflict context during the presidential election period – another active period when regarding the state-citizen dynamic.
References


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# Appendices

## Appendix 1. Codification Government sources used for DA

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These sources were the last time visited on the 14th of November of 2017.
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<td>Las campañas más curiosas para dar a conocer los acuerdos de paz</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/campa%C3%B1as-para-conocer-los-acuerdos-de-paz-56928">http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/campañas-para-conocer-los-acuerdos-de-paz-56928</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>W1</td>
<td>Acuerdo de paz con las Farc ya está en la ONU</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/hoy-en-noticias-19-de-septiembre-de-2016-no-se-acueste-sin-leer-esto-57070">http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/hoy-en-noticias-19-de-septiembre-de-2016-no-se-acueste-sin-leer-esto-57070</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>W1</td>
<td>Los del 'Sí' y los de 'No' se sentaron a hablar en Medellín</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/medellin/los-del-si-y-los-de-no-se-sentaron-a-hablar-en-medellin-37580">http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/medellin/los-del-si-y-los-de-no-se-sentaron-a-hablar-en-medellin-37580</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>W1</td>
<td>Montería, donde Santos y Uribe hacen pedagogía por le plebiscito</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/uribe-y-santos-en-monteria-se-enfentan-por-el-si-y-el-no-41722">http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/uribe-y-santos-en-monteria-se-enfentan-por-el-si-y-el-no-41722</a></td>
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<td>W1</td>
<td>Centro Democrático no permite desmontar valla de Timochenko</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/valla-de-timochenko-presidente-en-santa-marta-34438">http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/valla-de-timochenko-presidente-en-santa-marta-34438</a></td>
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<td>W1</td>
<td>'$11,5 billones costará el posconflicto en Antioquia'</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-16707907">http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-16707907</a></td>
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<td>W1</td>
<td>Gobernador de Antioquia invita a Álvaro Uribe a evento de paz.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/medellin/gobernador-de-antioquia-invita-a-alaro-uribe-a-evento-de-paz-49179">http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/medellin/gobernador-de-antioquia-invita-a-alaro-uribe-a-evento-de-paz-49179</a></td>
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<td>W1</td>
<td>El presidente Santos entregó acuerdo de paz en la ONU</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/santos-deposito-acuerdo-de-paz-en-la-onu-35276">http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/santos-deposito-acuerdo-de-paz-en-la-onu-35276</a></td>
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<td>W1</td>
<td>Hoy anuncio que guerra en Colombia ha terminado': Santos ante la ONU</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/discurso-de-santos-en-la-asamblea-de-la-onu-en-nueva-york-57781">http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/discurso-de-santos-en-la-asamblea-de-la-onu-en-nueva-york-57781</a></td>
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<td>W1</td>
<td>Lecturatón de los acuerdos de paz en Barranquilla</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/barranquilla/lecturaton-de-los-acuerdos-de-paz-en-barranquilla-30380">http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/barranquilla/lecturaton-de-los-acuerdos-de-paz-en-barranquilla-30380</a></td>
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<td>W1</td>
<td>Instalan Comisión de Vigilancia y Seguimiento Electoral del Plebiscito</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/cali/elecciones-suero">http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/cali/elecciones-suero</a> occidente-52461</td>
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<tr>
<td>W1</td>
<td>Juan José Hoyos, un periodista de oro y sangre.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/medellin/juan-jose-hoyos-un-periodista-de-oro-y-sangre-43952">http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/medellin/juan-jose-hoyos-un-periodista-de-oro-y-sangre-43952</a></td>
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<td>W1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Experto suizo dice que diez años de posconflicto costarían 31 mil millones de dólares</td>
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<td>W1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17. Farc invitan a desertores a que se unan a su movimiento político</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CODE</strong></td>
<td><strong>TITLE</strong></td>
<td><strong>LINK</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Este proceso nos va a traer la paz para los colombianos&quot;: Santos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Así se vivió en las ciudades la firma de la paz entre Gobierno y Farc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1. Histórico: Santos y Timochenko firmaron el acuerdo de paz entre el Gobierno y las Farc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Víctimas del conflicto celebraron la firma de la paz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>42 familias guajiras firmaron la paz tras 54 años de guerra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Así amaneció Cartagena, la ciudad en la que se firmó la paz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1. Delitos que Farc cometan tras acuerdo serán investigados por la justicia ordinaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Alcalde de Medellín reveló cómo votará el plebiscito: apoya el sí</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W2</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1. Iglesia católica inicia campaña pedagógica sobre la paz</td>
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<tr>
<td>W2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Tumaco se acerca a la paz con cautela.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W2</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Dolor por muerte de niño víctima de mina antipersona, en Algeciras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Las Farc pidieron perdón por masacre de La Chinita, en Apartadó</td>
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<tr>
<td>W2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>La histórica firma que selló la guerra con las Farc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODE</td>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>LINK</td>
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<tr>
<td>W2</td>
<td>54 Eje Cafetero está listo para votar 'Sí' o 'No'.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/logistica-del-plebiscito-sobre-el-acuerdo-de-paz-en-el-eje-cafetero-37611">http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/logistica-del-plebiscito-sobre-el-acuerdo-de-paz-en-el-eje-cafetero-37611</a></td>
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<td>W3</td>
<td>56 Incertidumbre en pueblos víctimas de la guerra que dieron el 'Sí'.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/los-pueblos-que-votaron-si-en-el-plebiscito-43293">http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/los-pueblos-que-votaron-si-en-el-plebiscito-43293</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>W3</td>
<td>57 El 'No' en el plebiscito se impuso en el pueblo de 'Timochenko'</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/plebiscito-por-la-paz-pueblo-de-timochenko-51701">http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/plebiscito-por-la-paz-pueblo-de-timochenko-51701</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>W3</td>
<td>58 En Planadas, Tolima, donde nacieron las Farc, el 'No' opacó al 'Sí'.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/planadas-tolima-voto-por-el-no-52272">http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/planadas-tolima-voto-por-el-no-52272</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>W3</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1. Uribe y Santos se reunirán para hablar de los acuerdos de paz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W3</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Cumbre extraordinaria de Gobernadores para cobijar al Presidente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W3</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Santos y Uribe avanzan en un posible ajuste del acuerdo con las Farc</td>
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<tr>
<td>W3</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Uribismo regaña a Juan Carlos Vélez y niega estrategia en el No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W3</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Lo que fue noticia esta semana tras el 'No' en el plebiscito.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W3</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1. Presidente Juan Manuel Santos obtiene premio Nobel de Paz 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W3</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>Cuatro víctimas del Quindío recibieron amenazas tras apoyar el 'Sf'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W3</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Cali se movilizó por el perdón y la reconciliación.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These sources were the last time visited on the 14th of November of 2017.
*The leads of each article were also part of the analysis
Appendix 3. Survey Colombians in Ecuador

Encuesta

Buen día, señora/s señora. Esta encuesta únicamente tiene fines académicos como parte de la investigación de M.A. en el Instituto Internacional de Ciencias en La Haya, Holanda. Estoy estudiando las opiniones de los colombianos en Ecuador sobre el proceso del Acuerdo de Paz y participación de los ciudadanos en el plebiscito, y como parte de este proyecto se están haciendo una breve encuesta. Su participación es de gran ayuda para este proyecto académico. La encuesta durará un promedio de 5 minutos.

1. ¿Cuál es su sexo?  
   - [ ] Hombre
   - [ ] Mujer

2. ¿Votó en el pasado plebiscito acerca del “Acuerdo final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera”?  
   - [ ] Sí
   - [ ] No

3. En caso de que su respuesta haya sido “No” en la anterior pregunta, ¿Por qué?  
   - [ ] Desconocía el plebiscito
   - [ ] Desconocía del proceso para votar
   - [ ] No tenía la intención de votar
   - [ ] No estaba interesado en votar
   - [ ] Otro (especifique):

4. ¿Cómo evalúa la comunicación del Gobierno colombiano a través de la Embajada y/o Consulado en Ecuador sobre el Acuerdo de Paz? Diría usted que la comunicación del gobierno ha sido: muy buena, buena, mala, o muy mala?  
   - [ ] Muy buena
   - [ ] Buena
   - [ ] Mala
   - [ ] Muy mala

5. ¿A través de qué medio(s) recibió comunicaciones del Gobierno colombiano acerca del Proceso de Paz y participación en el plebiscito de los colombianos en el exterior?  
   - [ ] Correo electrónico
   - [ ] Página web de la embajada y/o consulado
   - [ ] Eventos de la embajada y/o consulado
   - [ ] Otro (especifique)
6. De los siguientes medios de comunicación, podría indicar por favor los medios a los que usted más acudió para enterarse del Acuerdo de Paz en Colombia, siendo uno (1) el medio más consultado y cuatro (4) el menos consultado.

- Televisión
- Radio
- Redes sociales online
- Periódico (prensa escrita)

7. Del medio de comunicación: **televisión**, ¿Cuál fue el programa televisivo del que más se informó sobre el proceso el acuerdo de paz y participación en el plebiscito?

- Televisión local (de Ecuador)
- Televisión Colombiana
- Otro
- ¿Cuál programa televisivo?

8. Del medio de comunicación: **radio**, ¿Cuál fue el programa radial del que más se informó sobre el proceso el acuerdo de paz y participación en el plebiscito?

- Radio local (de Ecuador)
- Radio Colombiano
- Otro
- ¿Cuál programa radial?

9. Del medio de comunicación: **periódico**, ¿Cuál fue el periódico del que más se informó sobre el proceso el acuerdo de paz y participación en el plebiscito?

- Periódico impreso
- Periódico digital
- Otro periódico
- ¿Cuál periódico?

10. Según su opinión ¿Cuál cree usted que es el mensaje del "Acuerdo final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera" para los colombianos residentes en el exterior? Comente brevemente.
Appendix 4. Communication with Colombian embassy in Ecuador

[Image of the page with text and contact information for the Colombian embassy in Ecuador]
Appendix 5. Communication with the newspaper El Tiempo
Señor(a) Ivanñez Cardenas

En las siguientes líneas se encuentra el contenido del chat que tuvo con nuestra empresa.

Atentamente,

Contratista

00:00 Hora: La línea telefónica 25404300 no fue alcanzada.
00:01 Hora: Ivanñez Cardenas - Estuve en el agente de llamadas y llame en los ultimos 2 días sin éxito. Lamentablemente no puedo colaborar.
00:02 Hora: Ivanñez Cardenas - Lamentablemente no puedo colaborar.
00:03 Hora: Ivanñez Cardenas - Lamentablemente no puedo colaborar.
00:04 Hora: Ivanñez Cardenas - Parece que la línea telefónica tampoco tiene ese número. Estamos tratando con otras líneas que terminan en llamadas fallidas.
00:05 Hora: Ivanñez Cardenas - Bueno, muchas gracias por tu tiempo.
00:06 Hora: Ivanñez Cardenas - Gracias por contactarme por este medio, que tenga bonita día.

Click here to reply or cancel