State, Society and Timber Mafia in Forest Conservation

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This document represents part of the author's study programme while at the Institute of Social Science. The views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute.

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Abstract

This research looks into problematique of collusive corruption between the state and timber mafia (groups of different actors involved in illegal logging). The corruption in forestry has been understood as an institutional problem and resolution has been proposed through regulatory measures. In Pakistan's context the state has intervened through different policy and regulatory measures, albeit, illegal logging continues. The state and timber mafia are seen as two separate entities that compete or collude with each other for personal benefits.

By taking Billion Tree Tsunami Afforestation Project as a case in point, this study explains that corruption in forestry sector in Pakistan exists as complex social networks of different state and non-state actors. These actors have dynamic and fluid identities, thus the binary between 'public' and 'private' is blurred. The social networks are driven by not just economic interests but also 'logics of sociality'; payments and favours based on cultural, familial and social norms. Local power relations and politics play an important role in these networks for resource capturing. Furthermore, I show how the power relations result in inclusion of some sections of society in conservation practices, while marginalizing others.

Keywords: State, Timber Mafia, Forest Conservation, Billion Tree Tsunami, social networks

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

KPK	Khyber Pukhtunkhwa
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
GGI	Green Growth initiative
BTTAP	Billion Tree Tsunami Afforestation Project
VDC	Village development committee
KNP	Khunjrab National Park
ADB	Asian development bank
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
REDD+	Reduced emission from deforestation and forest degradation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
SAP	Structural adjustment Programme
JFMC	Joint Forest Management Committee
DFO	District Forest Officer

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This research seeks to understand the dynamics of illegal logging between the state and timber mafia in context of contemporary conservation efforts in Pakistan. In recent times the issues of climate change and sustainability have put forests at the forefront of mitigation measures. Globally, efforts to restore degraded forest and afforestation of new areas is at the heart of agenda of forest sustainability. Deforestation threatens the sustainability of forests thus obstructs efforts to mitigate climate change. It is often claimed that illegal logging is among one of the major reasons of deforestation. Other reasons are corruption, poverty, conflicts, licensing agreements, usurpation of property rights and inadequate institutional supports (Van der Ploeg et al. 2011, Cerutti and Tacconi 2008, Obidzinski 2005). Some researchers put more emphasis on illegal logging as calling it main obstacle in achieving sustainable rural livelihoods and eradication of poverty (Van der Ploeg et al. 2011). While others have shown that illegal logging contributes to sustenance of livelihoods (Van der Ploeg et al. 2011, Cerutti and Tacconi 2008, Alemagi and Kozak 2010).

These contradictory claims point to problem of defining 'what constitutes illegal logging' because of the wide range of actors, practices and scale involved. There is no proper definition of 'what constitutes illegal logging'. However, in literature logging activities occurring outside the boundary of state's forestry laws are referred as illegal logging (Palmer 2001) or "lack of compliance with state institutions" (To 2014).

By no mean research on illegal logging/timber mafia and state is new. There is plethora of research available on illegal logging, especially in context of South East Asian countries; Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Laos (Wollenberg et al. 2006, Davis 2005, Brack 2003, Alemagi and Kozak 2010, Honey-Rosés 2009, Smith et al. 2003, Richards et al. 2003, Irland 2008). Similarly, in last two decades research has focused on different aspects of illegal logging in forestry sector of Pakistan (Knudsen and Madsen 1996, Tucker 1987, MacDonald 2004, MacDonald 2005, Hasan 2007, Knudsen 1999, Ali and Nyborg 2010, Azhar 1993).

In many cases scholarship on corruption and illegal logging simplifies the explanation of corruption in forestry by focusing only on institutional or economic analysis. These two type of

analyses do have their own importance. But, these analyses tend to focus on one aspect while overlooking social, cultural and political motivations behind corruption. Moreover, these analyses generally overlook or pay less importance to everyday practices. In following sections I move to different debates on illegal logging discussed in scholarship that inform the research statement of this study.

1.2 Illegal logging: weak institutions?

The scholarship on corruption in forestry is mostly informed by institutional political science perspective. These analyses maintain that weak state institutions and low capacities of these institutions to enforce laws are precursor of illegal logging.

According to Robbins (2000) modernization theory proponents blamed "weak states" for corruption in newly formed post-colonial states. This thinking was precursors to institutional theorization of corruption. According to institutional thinking weak institutions are cause of corruption. According to Palmer (2001) illegal logging is the result of weak enforcement and monitoring capacity of the state. The states, especially in developing countries, do not have enough recourse to enforce existing forestry laws. Therefore, resource constraints coupled with weak institutions are hindrance in monitoring illegal activities in forests. Sizer (1997) contends that federal control over forest resources is the major reason of corruption and illegal logging in different countries. He proposes that decentralization of control can help to improve forest governance.

According to Magrath and Grandalski (2001) even if monitoring and enforcement detects logging, the penalties imposed on forest offenses are very low. The benefits of illegal logging out-weight penalties, consequently, illegal logging keeps on operating. In Pakistan's context Hasan (2001) points to another problem of enforcement. According to her, under-staffed judiciary gives less preference to forest offenses as compared to issues of public law and order. Resultantly, many of forest offense cases keep on pending for years.

Callister (1999) points to another problem of weak institutions. According to him within one state there are many different departments and institutions that exercise control over forests. In such cases, permits and authorization are approved by government agencies that are not competent authorities. Along with parallel authorities existing legislation and rules are out-dated and inadequate

to cater with problems of illegal logging. According to him low wages, ill-trained and under staffed forest departments are also reasons of illegal logging.

Based on ideas of institutional weaknesses, agenda of decentralized forest governance was highly promoted by World Bank and other institutions. And the agenda of decentralization was coupled with different co-management and community management of natural resources to deal with problems of resource constraints.

In 1990s different forest policy reforms, aid programmes and capacity building interventions were introduced by transnational governance and aid institutes and NGOs (World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Australian Aid, IUCN, WWF). In many countries these reforms were introduced by World Bank and were part of structural adjustment programme (SAP). During this period for example, forestry sector reforms by World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) were introduced in China, Bangladesh, Philippines and Pakistan (ADB 2017) and Australian Aid and Australian Foresters back interventions in Nepal. Results of such interventions were drastic in most cases. For example, in Pakistan, IUCN backed Khunjrab National Park (KNP) created a huge controversy on nature of conservation reforms (see Ali (2010) for detailed discussion). In addition, two forest policies (1991 and 2001), a master plan for forestry (1992), ban on illegal logging since 1992 and many other donor-driven forest conservation programmes were introduced. Despite, all policy and regulatory efforts illegal logging still continues in many countries. As in 2012 according to a report by INTERPOL and UNEP, illegal logging costs 30-100 billion USD annually (Nellemann 2012). Same report also maintains that around 15-30 of global wood trade is from illegal logging (ibid). In 2000, the problem of illegal logging became so rampant in Indonesia that World Bank and other foreign donor's threat Indonesian government to stop funding (McCarthy 2000).

There are three critiques of institutional analysis of corruption. First, premised on weak institutions, institutional analysis does not provide a systematic theorization of corruption (Robbins 2000). Second, it reinforces colonial idea of "conditions at periphery" that hinders development of respective countries towards "Euro-American" experience (Robbins 2000). Third, institutional analysis puts entire emphasis on institutions leaving no room for human agency. According to these critiques failure of institutional reform policies is result of little understanding of intercommunity dynamics (Agrawal and Gibson 1999), 'intended beneficiaries' are treated as passive recipients, short-term period of these projects and marginalization of different sections of society (Leach et al. 1999,

Pimbert and Pretty 1997). This scholarship points to the fact that illegal logging is not the result of weak institutions or lack of enforcement of laws. Rather, it is a complex web of relations between institutions and actors. Without understanding these issues, reforms could backfire in form of resistance from communities.

1.3 Illegal logging: Economic benefits?

Another body of scholarship provides a different explanation of illegal logging then institutional analysis. This body of literature uses economic theory instruments to explain the phenomenon (Lambsdorff 2002). The analysis originating from economic theories are based on rational policy analysis. These analysis maintain that individual or collectives are rational actors that makes choices based on highest return. According to (Arts 2012) "individual make choice (political or otherwise) based on highest expected return".

Originating from economic analysis, rent-seeking theory has widely been used in the context of illegal logging. According to rent-seeking argument it is pursuit of economic benefit that state or non-state officials are after. Resultantly, it promotes rent seeking behavior that results in illegal logging. For example, Palmer (2001) maintains "the rents that determine rent seeking behaviour are cash flows and realisable assets, not the non-market forest values". Similarly, Hellman et al. (2000) propose that a firm will choose corrupt interactions with the state to "maximise rent".

According to Richards et al. (2003) "the market competition from cheap illegal timber reduces economic viability of operating legal". According to him economic benefit from illegal logging is more than legal logging. Thus, locals are "economically captured" by illegal loggers. In the same line of inquiry Stahl (2010) has shown in East-European countries broader economic and political changes have reduced "forest users' incentives" that is the major cause of illegal logging.

In Pakistan's context Azhar (1993) has used rent seeking theory to explain illegal logging in community forests. He explains rent seeking behavior of bureaucrats and politicians as they are "rent seeker for others, but also rent seeker with others". Rent seeking through illegal logging generates economic benefits to bureaucrats, politician and state officials. This explanation of illegal logging echoes in different anti-corruption policy and general public's narrative in Pakistan.

Economic benefit as reason for illegal logging has become common sense. From rational theory and rent seeking perspectives it does make sense. But, another body of scholarship seeing the

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issue of corruption in forestry from anthropological perspective shows that the reasons behind illegal logging are much more complex than pursual of economic reward.

One of the major criticism on economic reason of illegal logging is that it doesn't include "question of culture and power" into the analysis. More recent work on illegal logging in different countries has shown that power and social norms play an important role in perpetuation of illegal logging.

Progress on scholarship on corruption has bring in new dimension into normative narrative of corruption. For example, Akhil Gupta's work on corruption in India shows that boundaries between public and private are not mutually exclusive (Gupta 1995, Gupta 2012) rather these are "blurred boundaries" (Ibid). Similarly, scholarship on the state interaction at local level has showed discrepancies in practices and agendas of the state. For example, Migdal's formulation of personalized version of the state at local level that Michael Lipsky would call "street-level Bureaucracy" (Migdal 1988). Following these lines of argument, To (2014) has shown in case of Vietnam that illegal logging is not just pursual of economic benefit or weakness of institutions. Rather, it is a network of individuals and institutions that operates on different rationalities; economic, social and cultural. In these networks of corruption, actors have fluid and dynamics identities. Thus, previous scholarship based on institutional or economic framework has not fully been able to understand the complexity of the nature of corruption in forestry.

1.4 Research objectives and question

Two major competing explanations of illegal logging have been informed by institutional and neo-classical theorization. Both explanations have been critiqued for different reasons. Such as lack of reading of internal dynamics of communities or not taking in consideration question of power and culture. More recent research based on Gupta (1995) and Migdal's (1998, 2001) anthropological and ethnographic theorization of state and non-state actors can be used to problematize illegal logging, in ways, previously over looked.

As stated earlier in section 1.1, institutional and economic analyses overlook social, cultural and political motivations behind corruption. The Billion Tree Tsunami Afforestation Project is an interesting case to study. Because, the project intersects with conservation and curbing corruption (timber mafia). Furthermore, it's internationally renowned project. The project is aimed at forest

sustainability and timber mafia is considered a threat to forest sustainability. This context of the project provides a unique opportunity to see how state, society and timber mafia interact in context of an internationally renowned conservation project. Where international actors and institutions are also involved in it. Though, the limited scope of the study does not allow to incorporate international dynamics. Yet, it is interesting to see if local dynamics are affected by involvement of these international players.

Based on scholarship on state and society interaction (Migdal, Gupta and Lipsky) this research is an attempt to further the understanding of complex nature of relationship between the state and illegal logging and going beyond traditional explanations of corruption. It is not to say that economic and institutional analysis are wrong all together. Rather, the point is to bring in missing questions of culture, power, social norms and values that makes illegal logging a complex phenomenon rather than just an economic or institutional problem. Thus my research question is an attempt to rethink, ethnographically, why state and non-state actors collude in illegal logging and how they interact, particularly given a context of conservation project. By using the same conservation context I also want to understand questions of power and local politics. Thus my research question can be formulated as

How do state, timber mafia and society interact in a conservation context? And what role do power and local politics play in inclusion and/or exclusion of different sections of society?

The research paper is structured in following order. Section 1, gives introduction to the topic, research question and methodology adopted for research. This section also gives details of study area and description of Billion Tree Tsunami Afforestation project. Section 2, lays out theoretical framework and assumptions on which this research is based. In section 3, ethnographic case study is presented. Section 4, explains nature of characteristics of network between the state and timber mafia. Section 5, outlines role of power struggles, local politics and dynamics of resource capturing. Section 6, is about revolving doors between the state and timber mafia. And, the way state co-opts timber mafia through conservation. Section 7, explains that despite network nature of state and timber mafia why they are seen in dichotomy. Finally, section 8 concludes the findings of the study.

1.5 Research Methodology

This research primarily uses qualitative research methods with ethnographic orientation. It makes use of primary and secondary data from different sources. Primary data was collected through a number of in-depth and semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and ethnographic observations. Secondary data is collected from the forest department, along with study of relevant literature.

Different stakeholders of the project were selected for interviews. These stakeholders include state officials, local community, timber mafia agents and timber traders. To grasp nuance differences of opinion and experiences, the choice of respondents was based on the idea that state and communities are not homogenous, rather, they are highly differentiated. Thus, interviews were conducted with different groups. For example state officials; respondents were chosen from top, middle and lower bureaucracy, with objective to understand how different hierarchical position inside state understand and conceive the project. Also, to understand the difference of normative policy narrative and everyday practices of the state that influence and are influenced by ground realities. From top and middle bureaucracy officers like Inspector General Forest, District forest officers and sub-divisional forest officers were interviewed. From lower bureaucracy forest guard and wildlife watchers were interviewed. These are state officials who interact with communities on day-to-day basis and are mainly responsible for on ground implementation of the project. Apart from forest and wildlife department concerned officials from other departments were also interviews. For instance, community development officers (CDO) from community development and human resource department, and personnel from research and development secretariat. Similarly, within community two main sections landowner and landless locals were interviewed. While keeping in view importance of ethnicity in the area (informed from background readings such as Barbar et al., 2011; Rome, 2005) locals from different ethnic groups were selected as respondents. Some in-depth interviews were done with locals who worked for timber mafia.

Secondary data was collected from department of forest and wildlife. That includes details about the project –type and number of species, geographical coordinates of plant nurseries, plantations and enclosures, working plans, operational procedures of department of forest and wildlife. The review of literature includes published and unpublished research, Reports from NGOs, Pakistan forest institute and Pakistan institute of development economics were also consulted.

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1.6 Study Setting

1.6.1 Study Area

The research was carried out in different parts of Hazara region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Pakistan. Hazara region consists of 14 forest divisions, out of which 5 are watershed regions. The remaining 9 division are forest divisions. I visited different areas in 5 divisions; Haripur, Agror-tanawal, Gallies, Siran and Tor Ghar (formerly known as Kala Dhaka). Following image shows the study area and different types of activities done under BTTAP in the region (Source: KPK Department of forest, wildlife and Environment 2017).


Figure 1. Study area [Source: Department of forest, environment and wildlife, KPK]

1.6.2 Billion Tree Tsunami Afforestation project (BTTAP)

In the backdrop of debates on rapid deforestation, environmental impacts and climate change, the ruling party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) unveiled 'Green Growth Vision' that laid out a strategy for the 'greening' of growth in Pakistan (Khan 2015). The six focal sectors are Forestry, Protected Area/National Parks, Clean Energy, Climate Resilience, Water/Sanitation, and Waste Management (Khan 2015). Within these sectors different projects are started based on priority area. These projects include 'Billion Tree Tsunami Afforestation Project' (hereafter BTTAP), the 'KPK National Parks' project, and '365 community micro-hydel' project (Khan 2015). This research will focus on BTTAP –Afforestation of 1 billion trees in the province through plantation and natural regeneration.

Under Billion Tree Tsunami project, the forest area in KPK is targeted for a major enhancement from 20 per cent to 22 per cent by 2018. Which would entail converting, at least, 30,000 hectares of additional forests through a massive afforestation drive (Dept. of forestry, Environment and wildlife 2015). In addition, the tree cover in existing forests would be increased from 20 per cent to 30 per cent by 2018 (Khan 2015). 550 million tree saplings are planted in two phases and remaining 450 million saplings are being naturally generated in forest enclosures. Different tree species planted are oleander, Aeasia Arabia, chir pine, walnut, ziziphus, Palosa, Shisham, eucalyptus. The project has been initiated over entire area of KPK, which is divided into three forest region further sub-divided into 28 division. The project includes different government departments; forest department, wildlife department, Community development, planning and monitoring, extension & Gender & development, Institutional and Human development. A specialized project management unit (PMU) has also been established with aim to oversee and implement the project with help of above mentioned departments.

1.6.3 Major Components of the Project

To achieve the goal of one billion trees the project, BTTAP, has three major components (1) Plantation of new tree saplings (2) Natural regeneration (3) Community participatory management of forest.

Plantations[1]

The project aims at planting 550 million tree saplings, referred as plantations. Under this component around 250,000 ha of area will be planted. These plantations are being done on government, private and communal lands. At government lands these plantation are in/around government owned forest (reserve forest), roadsides, canal/river banks and in watershed areas. In private land category, forest department does plantation, however, the land owner is subject to take care of plantation for the next five years and after five years they can use these plantations for logging timber or fuel wood collection. One block of plantation is of at least 40 ha but if area has good 'esthetic and promotional value' the lower limit can be reduced to 20 ha (Dept. of forestry, Environment and wildlife 2015).

Regeneration

Almost half number of trees, 450 million, are being naturally regenerated in the forest as undergrowth. To achieve this purpose the forest department along with help of wildlife department has created closures (protected areas). These closures are created in reserve forests –state owned forest. One closure consists of at least 40 ha. According to forest department, KPK forest are depleted because of animal grazing. To promote regeneration in those forests 'appropriate and most cost effective' option is to close forests from any kind of human activity. These areas will be enclosed for consecutive four years. Under this component 375,000 ha of area is enclosed in 3500 enclosures (Dept. of forestry, Environment and wildlife 2015).

State-Community and private partnership

The Billion Tree Tsunami project is envisaged as public-private partnership. Different areas of the project are outsourced to private sector as well as state will also play active role in it. According to Malik Asim, chairman of the project, the project is "outsourced and private sector driven model of

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[1] Here plantation is used as category, referring to plantation of new trees in an area. It is not conceptual category that is used for large scale industrial plantation of cash crops.

forest growth, as well as the community driven forest protection" (Khan 2015). The Billion Trees Tsunami project depicts an interplay of many actors; state, community and private actors. State authorities have envisioned the plan, making regulatory and policy intervention for the execution of the project. Along with that, state authorities are also involved in subsidizing tree nurseries, capacity building of individuals, and social mobilization of community. On part of state different policy and regulatory interventions include a complete ban on tree felling, dismantling sawmills to curb timer mafia, enclosing forest areas to stop livestock grazing and land eviction.

The local communities interact with the state authorities through Village Development Committees (VDCs) and Joint Forest Management Committees (JFMCs). These both type of committees play very crucial role as they are the interface between state authorities and community. Some of the important and crucial role these committees play are following

- Identification of closure of area
- Identification of individuals to plant tree nurseries
- Identification of individuals for appointment as forest '*Naghaban*' (caretaker)
- Distribution of payments for services from government to community

Chapter 2: Theoretical and conceptual framework

This research is focused on studying dynamics of corruption in context of a conservation project. I used following theoretical and conceptual framework to understand my empirical data. The overarching framework i have used is of political ecology. Further, I have narrowed it down to forest conservation and connected it with theories of corruption in forestry. From an ethnographic viewpoint corruption in forestry is a microcosm to understand state-society interaction. In doing so I have used state-in-society approach. One important feature of state-society interaction in KPK is patron-client relations that is discussed at the end of the section.

2.1 Political Ecology of forest conservation

"Action to conserve biodiversity, particularly through the creation of protected areas (PAs), is inherently political" (Adams and Hutton 2007). Often conservation projects are framed "to ensure long-term ecological and financial sustainability" that tends to exclude social and political context of these projects (Adams and Hutton 2007). Political ecology argues that social, political and environmental aspects are connected. Thus, it allows us to understand construction of 'nature', politics and impacts of conservation on socio-political and environmental conditions while keeping these aspects inextricably linked and interconnected (Watts and Peet 2004, Robbins 2011, Adams and Hutton 2007). Three key assumptions of political ecology are basis of this study, informed from (Bryant and Bailey 1997) work. First, there is uneven distribution of costs and benefits of environmental change. Uneven distribution of these effects is result of political, social and economic differences. These factors play key role in distribution of costs and benefits (Bryant and Bailey 1997). Second, the change brought by uneven distribution "inevitably reinforce or reduce existing social and economic inequalities" (Bauler. 2013). Third, unequal distribution and reinforcement or reduction of existing inequalities have implications on altered power relations that are produced (ibid).

From political ecology perspective forest conservation projects are not solely for the sake of conservation. There are different motivations for conservation projects. Even within one conservation project different actors have different motivations. However, increasingly state and/or other actors use forest conservation projects to take control of the resources through the process of "green grabbing –the appropriation of land and resources for environmental ends" (Fairhead et al. 2012). For

this purpose protected areas are created which in other words is the process of "internal territorialization" (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995) it serves two purposes. 1. Creation of subjects of governance through environmentality (See Agrwal 2005) 2. Control over forest that result in "appropriation" of resources. Appropriation is the process of "transfer of ownership, use rights and control over resources that were once publicly or privately owned – or not even the subject of ownership – from the poor (or everyone including the poor) into the hands of the powerful" (Fairhead et al. 2012). Once forest resources are appropriated, they can be commodified. The commodification of forest resources is "new frontiers of land control" (Peluso and Lund 2011). The conservation of forests for purpose of commodification is based on neo-liberal principles of conservation. That is instilled through Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and REDD+. According to Fairhead et al. (2012) institutionalization of REDD+ not only marginalizes local population, but, also effectiveness of these mechanism to conserve nature is highly doubted.

2.2 Corruption and Illegal logging

2.2.1 Defining corruption

As from above section, in retrospect, it can be conferred that commodification requires complete control of forest resources. And, corruption in forestry undermines control of the state or other actors over forest resources and results in degradation and deforestation (Meehan and Tacconi 2017). Corruption is a normative term and has been defined differently in different contexts (Sundström 2016, Robbins 2000). For example, Transparency International (2010) defines it as "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain". While Robbins (2000) in an attempt to theorize an institutional theory of corruption in natural resource management defines this term as "the use or overuse of community (state, village, city, etc.) natural resources with the consent of a state agent by those not legally entitled". In forest resources legal entitlements are not the only regime of entitlement. For example, in case of community forests, members of the community may be legally entitled to use community's natural resource, but, still their activity could be illegal. For the purpose of this research I am using Larmour's 2007 definition, it defines corruption as "a situation in which public agent draws private benefits at public cost in manners that is unlawful". This definition of corruption is useful for two reasons. First, it recognises diversity of actors as public agents. Second, benefits are not always realised in economic terms instead benefits can be social and political. It is the 'private' nature of these benefits that makes it unlawful.

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2.2.2 Theorizing Corruption

Robbins (2000) has developed institutional theory of corruption. This theorization contends that "corruption is an institution, not the absence of one" (Robbins 2000:439). The underlying assumption is that corruption is a parallel institution that facilitates certain activities deemed illegal in the law. This theorization falls short on 1. explaining the role of agency within institution, 2. Lumps together all illegal activities into one category. Lumping all illegal activities together is the very issue that makes defining corruption problematic. Because there are competing claims and narratives about legality and illegality (McElwee 2004). And, effects of these activities are not equally problematic in corruption context. In addition, institutional theorization doesn't explain, reliance of state officials on illegal means to perform their official duties referred as 'alternative system' (Ali and Nyborg 2010).

Some other theorizations of corruption pay more attention to the wide range of activities and scales. For example, one theorization of corruption in forestry is based on typology of activities that are differentiated between collusive and non-collusive corruption. Defined as, Collusive –"behaviour where the involved actor colludes to let illegal behaviour go unnoticed" (Sundström 2016), and, non-collusive –payment of bribes to get access to legal activities (Smith et al. 2003). For example, a forest guard's involvement in illegal logging is collusive corruption. And, a contractor bribing to get logging permit is non-collusive corruption.

Another theorization of corruption in forests uses scale (size) of illegal activity. This theorization differentiates grand and petty corruption (Hellman et al. 2000). According to this theory "The grand corruption is attempts to influence the setting of policy by making payments to politicians, while the petty corruption reflects payments made in an attempt to avoid the consequences of a given policy" (Wilson and Damania 2005). Bureaucratic corruption is associated with petty corruption and bribing politicians for policy change or to retain status quo is form of grand corruption. In my research setting I am looking at local levels of corruption in forestry thus collusive petty corruption. Furthermore, as I have identified earlier that there is wide range of activities that fall into category of corruption because of normative use of the term (Sundström 2016). For this research I am only using illegal logging as form of corruption to inform my analysis.

<u>2.2.3 Illegal logging and timber mafia</u>

Illegal logging is form of corruption considered as the biggest threat to sustainability of forests that is omnipresent in many countries. Illegal logging is set of logging activities that are "inconsistent with national laws" (Smith 2002). These activities can thus vary from logging in a protected area or obtaining concessions illegally (Callister 1999). This may include logging outside concessionary perimeters, logging above concessionary assigned volume, logging protected species or harvesting logs of smaller volume than permitted exploitable size.

It is pertinent to mention that in literature, actors who are involved in illegal logging are sometimes referred as 'Timber Mafia'. This use of the term is an analytical categorization rather a theoretical one. In this research timber mafia is used as analytical category to refer to set of actors; both public and private, who are involved in illegal logging. Timber mafia can also be called illegal loggers. But, I used this term because it is widely used in locally. And, was popularized in 1990s by newspapers, in aftermath of ban on logging in Pakistan. In broader sense timber mafia is set of actors within society. These actors don't have static identities rather they keep on changing their identities. In situation of dynamic and fluid identities, using timber mafia in analytical sense is more useful. Furthermore, the focus of the study is more on nature of interaction between different actors.

Another point that needs to be explained here to avoid possible confusion is that I have used term illegal logging to refer to the activity of illegal logger/timber mafia. Whereas, timber mafia is used to refer to those actors involved in illegal logging.

2.3 State-Society interaction

As said earlier this research is more concerned about nature of interaction between different categories of actors, broadly speaking state and non-state. The rationale to use state as differentiating parameter between actors is based on political ecology analysis' emphasis on state. As (Peluso 1993) says that in conservation projects, state uses the narrative of conservation for directing, legitimizing and exercising power. Given the central position of state in conservation it is justifiable to use state and non-state categorization. In which former drives the agenda and latter participates in it.

To understand the nature of interaction between state-society, three type of analysis are applied. Das (2007) gives an overview of three analytical theorizations of state as 'society-centric',

'state-centric' and 'state-in-society'. First, analysis originates from Marxist understanding of state. According to this analysis "state reflects the interest and ideas of particular socio-economic groups" (Das 2007). The state is an instrument of implanting policies that can further the interest and ideas of the group who controls state apparatuses. Second, analysis puts more weight on state-centrism and originates from Poulantzas' approach. According to Das this type of approach towards state argues that "the state shapes society in ways that do not necessarily reflect the interests of any single socio-economic group" (Das 2007). The third, is state-in-society approach, popularized by Migdal that argues "the relations between each element are not given but constructed and – thus – fluid: the state influences society and society influences the state" (Das 2007).

2.3.1 State-in-society Approach

The statement of problem and methods adopted for this research informs that an anthropological view of state-in-society is best possible way to explain the network of actors. So this research follows Migdal (1988; 2001) and Gupta's (1995; 2006) theorization of state and society interaction. According to this approach state is not monolith entity, rather, "state is a field, a gathering place for actors (individuals and institutions) to negotiate, struggle, and play within (and beyond) the state field to achieve their objective". Furthermore, Migdal (2001:13-14) contends that "states are fragmented and that they face a multitude of social organizations – families, clans, multinational corporations, domestic businesses, tribes, political parties, and patron-client dyads – that maintain and vie for the power to set the rules guiding people's behaviour". This theorization of state as social field coupled with Gupta's (1995) findings that boundaries between 'public' and 'private' are blurry, informs anthropological view of state and society interaction. Furthermore, Gupta (1995) argues that the actors have dynamic identities that fall sometimes into public and other times into private regimes.

According to Gupta (2006) corruption charges question the legitimacy of the state. And, state legitimacy depends on "cultural construction" (Gupta 2006:22) or "images of state" (Migdal 2001:59). Thus anthropological view of state has capacity to interconnect the two conceptual building blocks of this theoretical framework. 1. Political ecology to analyze power, control and legitimization in conservation context. 2. Corruption between state and non-state actors.

According to Migdal (2001:16) "actual states are shaped by two elements, image and practices". (Migdal 2001). Images refer to how state portrays itself as coherent entity and 'practices' refer to acts of state official, what Gupta (2006:11) calls "embodied encounters" of people with "state process and

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officials". Migdal has identified three notion that give state an image of coherent entity. These three notions are 1. Law, 2. Public rituals and 3. Informal behaviour in public sphere (2001:150). Law as social control and self-limitation of state itself, stresses centrality of the state. State's ability to formulate and implement its laws depends on how it negotiates to other set of laws, for example, traditional or customary. The power of the state to implement those laws portray the image of state as coherent entity. State law also defines what is right or wrong to do. In other words creation of legal and illegal boundaries. Second notion of state' image building is Public rituals and ceremony. "These rituals and ceremonies connect the central authority …….. to the mundane institutions of the state" (Migdal 2001:158). This connectivity of central authority with state institutions gives the image of unity to both.

2.3.2 Patron-client relations

One of the important feature of society in KPK is patron-client relationships (Lyon 2002). Three features of patron client relationship (Scott 1972) were observed. First, the "imbalance in the exchange relationship creates a sense of debt on client's part" that is a measure of how much a client is dependent on his patron. Second, the reciprocity of the partners creates trust that furthers solidifies patron-client relationship. In which both partners can rely on each other in time of need. Third, feature is that these patron-client ties are "diffuse and 'whole-person' relationships rather explicit and impersonal" (Scott 1972). Furthermore, Scott (1972) has also observed that the patron-client relationship can be 'multiplex', connected with tenancy, friendship or past exchange of services etc. That is the third feature of patron client relationship and is a way of broadening our analysis from "patron-client cluster" to "patron-client pyramid" (Scott 1972). With this conceptual framework, in addition to the frameworks on corruption, political ecology and state-in-society framework, I am able to approach my research question and the case study in KPK, which I will describe below.

Chapter 3: The case study

The Literature on timber mafia/illegal logging primarily is concerned with issues of legality and illegality (McElwee 2004, Mir and Fraser 2003), types of illegal logging (Alemagi and Kozak 2010), land tenure insecurities and their role in illegal logging (Finley-Brook 2007), causes and role of illegal logging in deforestation (Honey-Rosés 2009, Alemagi and Kozak 2010, Obidzinski 2005). The research that considers role of state is primarily around corruption of forestry departments (Van der Ploeg et al. 2011, Alemagi and Kozak 2010, Smith et al. 2003, Irland 2008), lack of logistics (Geiser and Steimann 2004, Shahbaz et al. 2011), and role of powerful individuals (Shahbaz et al. 2011, Davis 2005, Hasan 2001).

There are two underlying assumption in these analyses 1. These analyses are based on idea of state that presents itself as one coherent body. 2. These analyses tend to look state and illegal logging in a dichotomy. Which means the two entities are separate that compete and/or collude with each other to achieve their objectives (Smith et al. 2003, Irland 2008). One exception is, To (2014), he found in a case of trans-boundary timber trade that state and illegal loggers operate in a network. Thus, these two entities do not operate in separation (To et al. 2014). However, it remains obscure 'how these networks operate at local level that allows illegal harvesting of logs at first place?'. By situating my analysis at local level I try to fill this gap. The following section gives ethnographic observations and shows the state as heterogeneous set of actors and institutions, which may not necessarily work for one single goal (Migdal 2001). In the next section i outline different characteristics of the social network of corruption between different actors.

3.1 State and timber mafia: The network

To reveal the network of actors in forestry department in KPK, I focus on one specific study area; *Jabori*. *Jabori* is a small town in *Mansehra* district, a commercial hub for nearby villages. District forest range quarter is situated in *Jabori* that makes it center of forest related activities in the district. The range quarter has two distinctive features that makes it suitable study setting to understand local level state-society interaction. First, it is spatially disconnected from central core of forestry department. Second, it is a place of interaction of different actors. I followed trails of corruption and social network that were happening in or around the range quarter.

I was interviewing *Arshad* (forest guard) in district range quarter *Jabori*, then there appears a middle aged man (*Aslam*). To whom Arshad pointed, saying "You should interview him. He is very famous *Blackiya* (timber smuggler)". I asked *Arshad*, if he can help me in this regard and he immediately asked *Aslam* for interview by explaining him the context. *Aslam* offered me to go with him to his village, stay at his place. Where I can interview him as well as he will show me around, the forest, locals and new plantations. Here one point is important to explain that *Aslam* now works as *Nighaban* (forest caretaker)[2] with state's forestry department, and according to one of the official who appointed him told that *Aslam* was recommended by the concerned community for *Nighaban*'s job. Next two days, i stayed in *Madha Gucha*; *Aslam*'s village. Through him, I was able to interview two other respondents who were part of timber mafia as well. Although, they maintained that they are not involved into it anymore. Both of these respondents are *Aslam*'s cousins and now appointed as *Nighaban*. Another relative of *Aslam* is *Banars Khan*. He is among the local elders and part of the local *Jirga*[3]. According to *Aslam*, *Banars* has been outlaw for many years in murder charges, "he is a powerful of the area as even police did not try to catch him and he roams around in the valley". When the project (BTTAP) started, range officer of the area contacted *Banaras khan* after his frustrated attempts to control timber smuggling from the area. *Banaras* recommended his cousin *Aslam* to be appointed as *Nighaban* to cater timber smuggling, this proposition was accepted by the range officers. The range officer went through bureaucratic procedure that included approval from the District Range Officer (DFO). In this process *Aslam* been shown as 'a suitable candidate to be appointed as *Nighaban*, also recommended by the community'. According to range officers, after *Aslam*'s appointment issue of tree felling and smuggling have reduced substantially. To this situation another forest caretaker pointed in these words "situation was bound to improve, because *Aslam* and *Banaras Khan* are head of local timber mafia groups". *Aslam* belongs to landed ethnic group (*Pashtun*) and *Gul Niaz* his tenant. *Gul*

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[2] These *Nighaban* are the locals, hired by forestry department for a period of four years. These caretakers are apparently recommended by the concerned community. Which according to policy documents of BTTAP, is one aspect of community participation. Section 6.3 and 6.4 provide account of politics of so called community participation.

[3] "*Jirga* means council, assembly or meeting in *Pushto* language. It may also refer to a community council of elders. *Jirga* is normally composed of elderly males often belonging to the dominant tribes of a village. The youth, women, minorities and (sometimes) less powerful or small tribe of the village have no representation in the *Jirga*" (Suleri et al. 2013).

was allegedly involved with *Aslam* in hiding a lot of illegally felled trees at his place. A case was filed against *Gul Niaz* by DFO. Although, later with help of *Banaras khan* and elders of the area, both parties (*Gul Niaz* and forest department) reached an agreement outside the court of law. Once the negotiations between *Jirga* and forest officials were done. Forest officials withdrew the legal charges and *Gul Niaz* was fined (about 1/4th of total value of timber). Interestingly, the fine was paid by *Banaras Khan* as loan to *Gul Niaz*. In ideal situation forest officials could go with the charges without negotiating with *Jirga*. But, in areas like *Jabori* going against *Jirga* would defy the social logic – which is *Jirga* is socially embedded dispute resolution institution that best represents the interest of all parties. All parties have to abide by whatever *Jirga* decides. Going against the *Jirga* would mean going against the society thus social boycott of non-abiding party. Furthermore, *Jirga* represents the power embedded with actors that is exercised in case of non-compliance. For example, for forest officials non-compliance could mean transfer to remote area. It is important to mention that the local *Jirga* consisted of ten local members and forest officials. Among local representatives two of the members are *Syed* and reaming eight members are from *Pashtun* tribes same as *Banaras khan* and *Aslam* e.g *Jahangeri* and *Swati* etc. *Gul Niaz* by his ethnic group is *Gujjar* and his representation in the *Jirga* was not direct. His interest was represented through patron client ties that he has with *Aslam* –who is kin to *Banaras Khan* (member of the *Jirga*). *Banaras* himself is from *Jahangeri* Pashtun ethnic groups that makes him kin to the remaining seven members of the *Jirga* and some of them are local public office holder. For instance, *Kalu Khan* is a member of Jirga who is chairman of elected local government body and he is also chairman of district anti-corruption committee of National Accountability Bureau[4] (NAB). All the members of *Jirga* no matter Syed or Pashtun are connected with each other through social relations. For example, being part of *Jirga* they negotiate with each other in all social disputes, they are invited on wedding/festivities of other members.

During my stay in *Jabori* range quarter, another events explains further the network outlined above. On 17th July, 2017 a team of wildlife watcher arrived at *Jabori*. In the early morning the team of three watchers, left for an expedition to find traces of black bear in the area. In the afternoon one

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[4] Pakistan's federal apex anti-corruption institution (National accountability Bureau 2017).

member of the team, *Tassawer*, came back on jeep loaded with 7 goats confiscated from the forest. In few moments *Zubair* with two other locals appeared at the range quarter to do negotiations on behalf of the goat owner for the release. Later I came to know that *Zubair* is also president of a local VDC and runs a grocery shop in *Jabori* Market. These tree people, *tassawer* and a forest guard went to closer by tea stall. Where they negotiated the terms of release. Finally, they agreed that goat owner has to pay 5000 Rs and 1500 Rs. jeep rent paid to bring goats to range quarter. *Zubair* and two of his companion could collect only 4000 Rs. that they paid to *Tassawer*. And, agreed to pay remaining amount to *Idrees* –gate keeper of jabori range quarter, who will give it to *Tassawer*. In this whole process of negotiation *Kalu khan* (mentioned above) got to know about it. He accused *Tassawer* of taking bribe for releasing goats. He asked *Idrees* to get all information so that he can start a corruption inquiry against *Tassawer*. As, he had a commitment to attend a funeral so he left. In evening when *Tassawer* left for home he said to *Idress* "*Idress* brother, please take care of this issue". Later my follow up with *Idrees* informed that he will not pass the information of *Tassawer* to *Kalu Khan*, which means no action will be taken against him. Here interesting is to note that *Kalu khan* was acting as state official in his capacity of chairman of district anti-corruption team. Contrarily, in previous case of *Gul Niaz* he was acting as *Jirga* member, a local powerful, negotiating with state officials (forest department) in favour of accused timber smuggler. His position in *Jirga* was influenced by his social and kinship ties with *Banaras Khan*. *Idrees*, the gate keeper, has to go beyond his duties as state official to save *Tassawer* from a potential inquiry. This favour is based on what Gupta (2012) calls "culturally grounded favours and payments sustained through the logic of socialiaty". In this case Idrees is following the logic of socialiaty but in another case he plays role of mediators between state and society, in its broader sense. On 23rd June 2017, *Idrees* and range officer went to a forest compartment for inspection that is closer to *Idrees*'s house. According to *Idrees* he informed his cusions that there been a complaint about them and they should stop logging. During their visit Idrees's cusions started a fight with range officer, who later filed a case against them with police. In the afternoon on 13 July 2017, in my presence, *Idrees* received a call from his cusion asking his for mediation with range officer. *Idrees* first reluctant later agreed for mediation. He talked to the range officer and on 28 July 2017 a meeting of both parties was held at *Jabori* range quarter where they reached a *razinama* (peace accord). The charges were dropped in return to agreed payment to range officer, some part of that payment was paid to *Idrees* as token of gratitude to act as mediator.

Figure 2. Social network of state and non-state actors in timber mafia

Chapter 4: State-in-Timber Mafia and Timber Mafia-in-State

4.1 State and Timber Mafia: Characteristics of the network

Series of events outlined above show that on local level the dynamics of illegal logging are complex. Here, I describe different characteristics of network outlined in above section.

4.1.1 Network Nature of interaction

The case of *Jabori* shows that in context of a conservation project, interaction between state and non-state actors forms a network. The network operates through formal and informal ties between actors. Formal ties are colleagues, subordinates, same jurisdictions or inter-departmental connection of actors. Informal ties are tribal, familial, kinship, friendships and cultural norms and values that connect actors in informal relationships with each other. These relationships are maintained through reciprocal actions. The payment of favours are made in anticipation of reciprocity. The social network of state and non-state actors allows state actors to influence society. Similarly, societal actors influence state actors that molds acts of state. The influence of state over society and vice versa can be understood from *Kalu Khan*, *Tassawer* and *Idress*'s case. *Kalu khan* as chairman of district anti-corruption committee wanted to start an investigation against *Tassawer* on accusation of taking bribe. The act of state to start investigation was 'molded' by *Tassawer*'s informal relationship with *Idress*. This is an example of "the state influences society and society influences state" (Migdal 2001 cited in Das 2007).

4.1.2 Dynamic and blurry boundaries

In social networks state and non-state actors operate in dynamics and fluid identities (To et al. 2014). For example, in case mentioned above *Kalu khan* and *Ideees* have multiple identities. *Kalu khan* in one context acted in capacity as state anti-corruption official. However, in another context he acted as local *Jirga* leader, playing role of mediation in a dispute between the state officials and locals. Similarly, *Idrees* was acting in state official capacity when he visited forest compartment with range officer and later filing a case against his own cusions. But, then acted in private capacity as mediator

between his cusions and forest officer. So it can be conferred that the actors don't have static identities. Rather, these identities are ambiguous, dynamic and blurred (Gupta 1995). In one context the actors represent the state while in others represent private sector. These fluid identities "complicate the binary between 'public' and 'private' actions that defines corruption in more 'normative' literature" (Harrison 2006, To et al. 2014). These observations from social network viewpoint show that the state and timber mafia consist of different actors. The state (actors) operate in socially embedded context and the network nature of these interactions show that the state and timber mafia do not exist as separate entities. The relation between state and timber mafia "is not given but constructed and thus fluid" (Das 2007).

4.1.3 Logic of sociality

Furthermore, the case of *Jabori* shows that it is not just economic reward that state and non-state actors are after. The literature on rent-seeking posits corruption as sole motive of actors (Obidzinski 2005, Azhar 1993). Contrarily, the above case shows that corruption is deeply grounded in social relationships e.g kinship, tribal, familial. The corruption is diffused in acts of reciprocity that maintain and strengthen these social relationships. These actors do achieve some economic benefit from corruption but "it is not the sole motive" (To et al. 2014). For example, favour by *Idrees* towards his cousin and as well to *Tassawer* was not based on anticipation of economic benefit rather it was based on logic of sociality. This finding is supported by the literature that looks into corruption from an anthropological and ethnographic viewpoint. It maintains that corruption is founded upon intimate relationships (To 2014) that finds support from "culturally grounded representations and beliefs, payments and favours that are sustained through the logic of sociality" (Gupta 2012, Singh 2012).

4.1.4 Patron-client relations

One of the important feature of social relations in the area that perpetuates corruption is patron-client relationships. In *Jabori's* case the features of patron-client relationship, as identified by Scott (1972), can be observed. These relations are produced and strengthen through imbalance in exchange relationship between patron and client. The patron's wealth, social and political capital is source of protection for the client. The payments from the patron are then returned by the clients through actions of reciprocity. These patron-client relations are diffused. They overlap with other social relations e.g kinship. Even in non-kinship cases patron and client use familial titles for each other. That is a way to show intimate connection between the two. Although, diffused but patron-

client relationship can be identified from imbalance of power and wealth within the relationship. Furthermore, these relations are 'multiplex', that the basis for patron-client relation are different e.g family, tribe and tenancy. For corruption or illegal logging one patron-client cluster has a patron who maintain cliental in state and as well in community. The clients from community guarantee access to the forest resources and help/oversee tree felling process. Once logs have been harvested and shipped to market it's the client in state who ensures safe movement of those logs.

For example, In case of *Gul Niaz,* patron-client relation comes from his position as *Aslam*'s tenant in which former is client and later is patron. And *Aslam*'s patron-client relationship comes from his friendship and kinship with *Banaras Khan,* in which *Aslam* occupies the role of client and *Banaras Khan* as patron. *Gul Niaz* hide lot of illegally felled logs in his house is the payment made by client. In reciprocity the patron *Banaras khan* paid the fine that was imposed on *Gul Niaz* by *Jirga.* These investments create trust that further solidifies the relationship. In future the payments and favours from clients (*Gul Niaz and Aslam*) to patron are made through their continued involvement in illegal logging. This kind of patron-client relationships not only exist between locals but also between state and non-state actors. For example, *Banaras Khan* is also patron to range officer. The patron pays favour to the range officer in terms of economic benefits and using his political influence to reward the officer e.g influencing possible corruption charges and transfer to other area etc. In 2014 the range officer approached *Banaras khan* with the *nighaban'*s job, was an act of reciprocity at client's part along with other acts. For example, using his state official position to facilitate movement of illegal timber.

4.1.5 Horizontal and Vertical ties

Another feature of these networks is the horizontal and vertical relationships. And, these relationships "mold state's actions" (To et al. 2014). For example, in the network outlined in above section *Idrees, Tassawer, Aslam* and *Arshad* are horizontal line of the network. In vertical positioning it goes to *Banaras Khan, Kalu Khan* and the range officer. One important aspects of these ties are that some actors have positioned themselves at conjecture of state and society. For example, *Kalu Khan,* local *Jirga* leader and chairman anti-corruption committee. This positioning allows these actors to use their influence and social capital in both realms. Back in 2015, the minister of the forest department along with 8 officers and 12 lower staff were ousted and held under charges for the corruption and linkages with timber mafia (The News 2013). From this it can safely be conferred that these networks can be traced further, till higher levels of the state.

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Chapter 5: State and Timber Mafia: two sides of the same coin?

In the above discussion, I have explained different characteristics of social network of timber mafia at local level. This network can further be complicated to explain the dynamics at district and national level. Because of, resource and time constraints study of such big network is out of scope of this research. However, the basic characteristics of the network; kinship, familial and social ties, and formal relation, remain the same. For example, To et al. (2014) found the same characteristics of social network of illegal logging at district level in Vietnam.

In BTTAP, the importance of community participation is duly acknowledged for conservation of forests. Though, the dynamics of differentiated community were poorly understood by the policy and it allowed the local powerful; in most cases timber mafia, to capture these opportunities. The BTTAP community participation policy introduced the idea of hiring *Nighabans*. According to policy documents, these *Nighabans* are local people from community living in proximity of forests. And, are be hired based on recommendations from concerned community. However, *Aslam*'s recruitment as *Nighaban* (see section 4.1 on social network) points to contrary practices than what is sought in policy. As I have already shown that *Aslam* belongs to the local network of timber mafia in *jabori*. And, he was recruited because of his patron-client relationship with *Banaras khan*, a powerful of the area. *Aslam* who is part of timber mafia group is now part of the local state as *Nighaban*. The takeover of powerful locals on such positions is not only based on patron client relations. Other cases show that different aspects of social relation also affect the possibilities of elite capture of resources. One of such aspects is ethnic group. It was observed in another part of my study area. *Naqash* is a wildlife watcher in Agror-Tanawal sector. There are six Nighabans in this area and all of them are Naqash's cusions. They all come from the same tribe (*Jadoon*) which is landed ethnic group. All of them are not only *Nighabans*, but also have provided land for forest plantations to the state. In this case benefits ought to go for community are practically in hands of one family.

5.1 Legitimizing timber mafia and control:

The co-optation of timber mafia into the state makes timber mafia disappeared. Based on this superficial disappearance of timber mafia, the central body of the state, and political party who initiated the project, claims they have controlled timber mafia. Undoubtedly, it seems intuitive that once the

local players in timber mafia start getting rent in form of pay from the state department, their activity might reduce. As they have found a new outlet for wealth accumulation. So, it can be conferred that BTTAP has changed accumulation strategy of timber mafia by providing them legal rents. However, this intuitive assumption, also presented in words of range officer "after *Aslam*'s appointment issues of tree felling and smuggling have reduced substantially", does not hold ground in practice. Far from disappearance the mafia exists and now as *nighaban*s. Also, the rents from illegal logging were not just going to so called local timber mafia but rather were making their way into the state bureaucracy.

So, if the mafia has stopped its activity, then, how the state officials are generating rent or they are not doing it at all? As literature also points to 'symbiotic relationship' (Smith et al. 2003) between state and timber mafia in which both provide benefit to each other. In this case, state is providing benefits to timber mafia by appointing them as state officials (forest caretakers). In return the continued tree felling[5] (Nagri 2017) is generating rent to state officials. The activity of mafia is disguised under legal cover. Furthermore, this evidence shows how local elite captures power and opportunities to generate wealth with complicity/co-opting the state. These actions of the state to help timber mafia in capture of power are legitimized in name of 'community participation'.

This finding diverges, yet, furthers the literature which maintains that the boundary between public and private is blurry (To 2014, Harrison 2006, Gupta 1995). The divergence is, the state formally co-opts sections of the society that threaten its authority thus legitimacy, e.g timber mafia. Hence, the boundaries between public and private become blurry. The co-option legitimizes the state action. For example in KPK state's claim to curb timber mafia has legitimized it coercive actions in name of fighting against timber mafia. The existence of timber mafia also helps in state building process. The state uses timber mafia as a justification to extend its control of resources agendas. Moreover, co-option justifies and help in territorialization- process of control resources (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). For example, once the powerful are co-opted as *nighaban* then these *Nighabans* are responsible

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[5] Recently, many news stories appeared in local and national newspapers. These stories show increased activity of timber mafia, that state claims has disappeared. For example see this report https://www.dawn.com/news/1368342

to stop community's action in forests. Because, these *nighabans* are part of those communities thus they exercise more personalized version of control that is not possible for the state.

5.2 Struggles over state power

The social network and co-option of timber mafia points to false dichotomy of timber mafia and the sate. These findings challenge the notion of state as a monolithic entity by showing inconsistency between the 'image and practices' of the state (Migdal 2001, Sikor and To 2011, To et al. 2014, To 2015, Sharma and Gupta 2009, Wollenberg et al. 2006). The top core presents the state as one coherent, controlling and purposeful entity but my findings shows that at local level the practices of state officials are embedded in social relations. These embedded social relations influence state. Different actors and institutions (e.g *Jirga*) struggle over state power to control individual behavior. At local levels officials face disadvantage in implementing state's policies. A full implementation of a policy requires to change the rules of the game, which inevitably jeopardize interest of local powers and officials. Also, in case of full implementation of policy the incentives that officials are receiving from status quo will be gone as well. Furthermore, the state at local level is more personalized and politically weak to implement its agendas because other local and traditional institutions also exercise their power. Resultantly, state's power is negotiated through these competing powers. As in *Jabori*'s case traditional institution of *Jirga* is powerful enough to change state's agenda at local level. In *jabori* the state is a social field of gathering of different actors and institution; state officials, *Jirga*, local leaders and timber mafia etc. who negotiate and struggle to achieve their objectives. The struggle and negotiations between different actors are captured in *Gul Niaz*'s case (see section 4.1).

5.3 State and timber mafia: Why dichotomy exists?

Majority of scholarship on illegal logging and corruption posits state and timber mafia as two separate entities (see section 1.2 and 1.3). These two entities collude in pursual of benefits, yet, maintain separation. However, my research shows that the two entities are not exclusive. There are overlapping and blurred boundaries. There are revolving door between state and timber mafia that allow actors to assume role in sometimes state and other times in timber mafia. If state and timber mafia are intimately interconnected then 'why dichotomy between the two exists?'.

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The dichotomy between state and timber mafia can be understood by using 'images and practices' lens from Migdal (2001) and/or 'discursive construction and everyday practices' (Gupta 1995). Images and discursive construction of the state is the way state portrays itself, as coherent, monolith and purposeful entity. In contrast, everyday practices are the "embodied experiences" of subjects with state processes and officials that construct the image.

The scholarship informed from institutional and economic perspectives do not take in consideration this nuance of images and practices of the state. Thus, falling into false dichotomy between state and timber mafia. In following paragraphs, I shows from my research context that how this dichotomy is maintained.

5.3.1 Images of the state

I present two argument related to the images of the state. My first argument is about the image of the state. The state builds its image, as if it is one purposeful entity and all actors and institutions of the state are coherently working on one agenda. My second argument is that project's image portrays state's agenda of conservation, yet it hides the political nature and other agendas (commodification).

Images of state

My first argument concerns image building of the state in this project. Migdal (2001) has identified three notion that give state an image of coherent entity. These three notions are 1. Law, 2. Public Rituals and 3. Informal behaviour in public sphere (Migdal 2001:150). Law gives image of centrality to the state. In KPK state introduced different legislative interventions that are aimed at controlling behavior of subjects of governance. Through law, state has also defined what is right or wrong to do, creating legal and illegal categories. For example, till 2013 grazing in government owned forests was not an offense. Later, when BTTAP was started in 2014, different legislation intervention were introduced. One of such intervention is revoking right of grazing in government owned forests. This law gave legal status or legitimatize state's action to stop grazing. While delegitimizing action of society to graze in those forests. Similarly, certain logging practices deemed illegal are result of law created during British colonial period. When for the first time state made claim for ownership over forests. Interestingly, the narrative to introduce law to control logging was sustainability of the forest. Although, colonial state itself was involved in large scale logging (Tucker 1987). In BTTAP's case the

state again used legislative intervention to reinforce the narrative that timber mafia is illegal. Once, through law 'other' category has been created which is illegal. It becomes state's responsibility to fight against others to maintain is monopoly over controlling subjects. Though these claims of state do not go uncontested. They are contested and negotiated in practices of the state, for example, negotiation between *Jirga* and state officials.

State's image building process is in a soft and subtle ways like images, promotional videos, news showing the different actors together for the agenda of conservation. For example, following images taken from the official website of BTTAP show this image building process.

Figure 3. Release of 80,000 Kanals (1000 acres) from illegal occupants [English translation of text in pic]

Figure 4. Actions against timber Mafia

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Another feature of creating state's image of unity is public rituals. In this context, For example, tree plantation act (ritual) by different political leaders, especially chairman PTI (central authority) created the image of coherent state focused on one agenda of conservation. For example, following image is representation of this argument. It shows different state and political leaders (central authorities) getting together on one agenda of conservation.

Fig. 4 shows gathering of different state and political leaders on visit to a plantation site.

[From right to left] advisor to chief minister, chairman of governing party, Chief conservator (forest), Member of governing party, chairman of BTTAP (also global Vice president of IUCN).

Figure 5. Different government and the state functionaries together

Images of state's conservation agenda

My second argument is about the image unity of the agenda of the state. The state's image building process promotes ecological side of its agenda and hides commodification side. The BTTAP project is framed in the context of environmental concerns and livelihood. The aims and objectives of the project as stated in the project document are

"The project will support KPK Forest Department, as a catalyst, to plan, design, and launch sustainable development in the Forestry Sector (through active involvement of local communities) and promote green jobs. It will accordingly result in enhancement of forest resource base, rehabilitation and improvement of existing forest ecosystems of the province, arresting environmental

degradation, livelihood improvement and job creation for rural youth at their door-step" (Govt. of KPK 2015).

The project is portrayed as conservation for sake of conservation thus apolitical. However, theoretical framework of political ecology point to political nature of acts of conservation (Adams and Hutton 2007). A deeper look into narrative of project officials reveals the political nature of BTTAP. For example, Malik Amin Aslam –Chairman of Green Growth Initiative and BTTAP, who is also global vice president of International Union of Conservation of Nature (IUCN) – wrote a policy brief. In which Malik writes "for the successful implementation of any 'green' agenda, it has to be politically owned….. [GCI is] political conceptualization of the notion of a green economy in Pakistan". Further he explains BTTAP as 'Unique political experiment' (Khan 2015). However, what political gains the ruling party and the projects seeks are not mentioned.

The objective of the project is to achieve environmental conservation by "shifting the current philosophy from treating forests as a 'revenue' machine towards preserving them as a valued 'natural capital' (Khan 2015). On the other hand, it also aims to employ REDD+ and CDM to preserve so-called 'natural capital', in words of (McAfee 1999) 'selling nature to save it'. According to official plan one of the objective to realize GCI is to "establish rules for REDD+ to assign carbon value to forest and institute REDD+ as a tool to promote conservation" (Govt. of KPK 2015). REDD+ has extensively been criticized for its exclusionary nature by dispossessing local population of their access and rights to the resource (Adams and Hutton 2007). However, not all REDD+ projects result in exclusion of local population (Fairhead et al. 2012). The results of each project are very much dependent on local context and contestations between local community and other players (McCarthy et al. 2012). While keeping in view the qualitative differences of projects this research shows that BTTAP has exclusionary aspects in it that I discus in chapter 6. It is pertinent to mention that the news or website, brochures and a dedicated YouTube channel published by the forest department, government and International NGOs doesn't mention REDD+ at all[6].

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6 For example see this promotional video from the forestry department https://youtu.be/Gvf4vOL7f3w. Or visit dedicated website of the Project http://billiontreeproject.kp.gov.pk/

<u>5.3.2 Practices of the state</u>

In this section, I outline some practices of 'street-level bureaucracy' that in some cases are augmenting the images of the state as explained in above section. But, in some cases these activities are undermining the images of the state. In BTTAP's context the image of state is that of a unitary entity with agenda of conservation. So, these practices that augment or undermine this image are actually augmenting or undermining the conservation agenda.

In 2014 when BTTAP project was introduced and a complete ban on any kind of activity in forest was imposed e.g grazing, grass cutting etc. This ban was based on the idea that grazing in forests kills undergrowth, hence is lethal for forest sustainability. Though this decision did not consider in the fact that landless sections of society completely rely on forests for grazing. A complete ban created chaotic situation for them. As shown earlier, at local level state officials are socially embedded in dynamic and blurred identities. The practice of the state officials is that they allowed local community to cut grass from forest, but with instructions to save undergrowth. As *Aslam* (*Nighaban*) showed me "these people are my tenants. I have allowed them to cut grass from forest but I have asked them to save undergrowth. Sometimes, I check their grass lots to see if there is a small plant in there" (personal communication).

Another example is of *Arshad*'s (Forest guard). *Arshad* took charge in *Bari Baig* in 2013. He is strong believer of sense of duty. After taking charge he came to know that in some areas, locals have encroached forest land, allegedly result of corruption of former forest guard. *Arshad* attempt to maintain writ of the state on forest resulted in a litigation against him. According to him the locals injured on the community member and filed a cased against him. The forest department did not support him in that litigation, however, through his own contacts in army he was able to get away with

IUCN's reporting of the project https://www.iucn.org/news/forests/201708/pakistan%E2%80%99s-billion-tree-tsunami-restores-350000-hectares-forests-and-degraded-land-surpass-bonn-challenge-commitment

it. Eventually, the locals agreed to have a peace accord with him and drewback litigation on condition that they will leave encroached property, once they harvest their crop.

Another example is of *Riaz* (range officer) he narrated the story as "I was informed that a truck full of illegally logged trees is coming down the road. I with one of my colleague went to the check post to stop it. When I stopped the truck at front seat was sitting brother-in-law of my colleague. I had no option then to let the truck go".

These three narratives from my field work show the practices of the state. As noted by Migdal these practices reinforce or undermine the image of the state. In this case first and third narrations are the acts that undermine the image of the state with an agenda of conservation. The act of leaving truck full of illegal logging is in complete contradiction to the images of the state as fighting against timber mafia. Where as in second example, *Arshad*'s sense of duty to implement writ of the state or abiding law has created the image of the state as authority committed to its conservation agenda, in front of locals of *Bari Baig*.

The discrepancies between state images and practices explain very important aspect of continuity of timber mafia or corruption broadly. This shows us that the state's image is of fighting against timber mafia. But, state's practice is to collude with timber mafia under 'logic of sociality'. The prospective act of local level of state to fight against timber mafia are molded by these logics. In a way that is what Migdal calls as "state shapes society and society shapes state" (Migdal 2001:16).

Further, these cases show that institutional and economic analyses that consider state as one coherent entity miss the complexity of social causes of corruption in forestry. Thus, leaving these aspects out renders analyses over-simplified.

Chapter 6: Power and local politics in community participation

6.1 Community participation in BTTAP

Co-management based natural resources management focuses on community and local people. However, the communities are not homogenous group of people. Rather, these are composed of set of groups with different interest and agendas and power. They drive their power from occupation (state official) or their cast and/or ethnic group. There is a wide range of actors/stake holders in KPK forests (Shahbaz 2008). In KPK local communities can broadly be defined into groups of –forest owners, non-right holders, landless forest users and graziers. BTTAP has strong emphasis on community participation. The community has been incorporated by two ways. First, creation and re-activation of existing Village Development Committees (VDCs) and Joint Forest Management Committees (JFMCs). These both type of committees play very crucial role as it is the interface between state authorities and community. Some of the important role these committees play are identification of closure, appointment of forest *Nighaban*, and distribution of cheques. Second, from community living nearby forest, one person is appointed as *Nighaban* for three years, who is responsible for taking care of forest area.

6.2 Elite capture of power in Community participation

On face value of it, VDCs and appointment of locals as *Nighaban* appears to ensure community participation. The state authorities has deliberately looked over local politics in this whole process, as in words of a Community development officer (CDO) "we don't intervene into community's conflict. We ask them to resolve their issues and then come to us". For example, many of these VDCs consists of the powerful landowner groups of the area. There is little to no representation of landless tenant class in these communities. Ultimately, these committees who are to decide which area to enclose are not the ones affected by closure. Furthermore, final selection of *Nighaban* is done by the same committees. They give preference to their relatives. In many of the areas demographics of VDCs and *Nighaban* point to this. For instance, during my interviews in Agror-tanawal I was informed that all members of VCD were from same ethnic group; Swatis, and relatives to each other. The VDC has appointed three *Nighaban*s who again are Swati and relatives of members of VDC. Though, there are many Gujjar families in the area but there is zero representation of their interests.

6.3 Differentiated community

The enclosures for plant regeneration are having devastating effects on local population. Land distribution in the area is skewed along ethnic lines. Major ethnic group in area are Swati (Pashtun tribes), Syed and Gujjars.

The mountainous geography and availability of water in the area only allows small scale sustenance agriculture. These factor also limit yield of crops that often times surplus is not enough to be transported to market. And transportation expenses are also higher. The result is, agriculture is not a lucrative option. Swatis are the biggest group of land owners. Many of these Swatis are absentee landlords, who have rented out land to Gujjars. Many of these landowner Swatis have moved to the nearby cities of *Mansehra* and *Abbotabad.* And, there they work in services sector or self-employed as shopkeepers and construction contractors etc. Their connection with land is limited to collection of rent which is nominal because of low productivity of land. There are two main tenancy arrangements in the area. First, in areas where land is suitable for agricultural purposes tenancy is based on sharecropping, paid in kind. Second, in area where land is used as pastures rent is fixed and paid in cash.

Gujjars are mainly landless herders. They rent in land from Swatis or other landowners. They raise animals, mostly goats and sell them into market. These Gujjars use land as private pastures in winters when there is shortage of grass and fodder. In summers they move their herds to common pastures in *Kaghan* Valley. And at start of winter in September they move back to *Jabori* and some going even further down to *Haripur.* For Gujjars land constitutes central position in their survival. If they don't have land they cannot have grass in winter which means reproduction of their means of livelihood will cease.

6.4 Exclusion of *Gujjars*

With the announcement of the project use value of land has changed all of sudden. For instance, now land owners could contract with forest department to plant trees on their land in return of assurance that these plants will be protected for five years. After five years landowner have de-facto right to cut and sell these plants in market. Also, the choice of species to plant is landowner's discretion. Which in most cases is Euclyptus because of it fast growth. As a result many of the landowners have taken their land back from tenants and have got into contract with forest department.

According to the many of the landowners I talked to, Euclyptus will generate more surplus than rent from tenants. Resultantly, many of the Gujjars have lost land and now they don't have any land to be used in winters. As result, those Gujjars have sell all of their herds and some moved to cities to work and some have started working as labourer in local market. One such young boy met me in *Jabori*. I was standing in the town center waiting for my host to arrive. *Amir* aged 22-23 approached me and asked if I could give him some money. Upon asking he told that he been trying to find work but no success for last three days. Now he doesn't have money to have lunch. I agreed to buy him lunch on condition that he tell me the whole story. *Amir* was use to herd his father's goats. The herd size was around 150 goats. In 2015, their landowner contracted with forest department for plantation and they could not graze their goats anymore in that land. They tried to get land from other people but land has already become scarce as more and more people are planting trees on their lands. They tried to buy fodder from the market but it too expensive and needs readily availability of cash. Before the project one option for grazing was using reserve forest (state owned) but that is also gone. Because, under article 144 of constitution of Pakistan all rights of grazing, passage or living in state owned forest been withdrawn. Thanks to corruption that you could bribe local forest officials and have permission to cut grass but it is not enough to raise a herd of 150 goats. So, the family started selling goats to get money to buy fodder for other goats. That is how, they tried to make both ends meet. But, eventually his father gave away the idea of keeping animals and sold all of the herd. Amir stayed with parents in the areas and started working as construction labourer. One brother moved to *Mansehra,* where he works at his uncle's shop. And, father is at home taking care of one cow left in this whole crisis.

Chapter 7 Conclusions

This research is an attempt to answer 'why state and non-state actors collude in corruption? what is the nature of interaction between different actors? Third, what role power and politics play in this interactions?

This research challenges institutional and economic answers to corruption in forestry. It argues that economic benefit or state's weak institutions as cause of corruption are oversimplification of complexity of the phenomenon. The findings of this research show that corruption is deeply tangled in social values and norms. Its logic of sociality –payments and favours based on culturally grounded norms and values, that results in widespread and continued corruption in forestry. Corruption is entrenched in acts of reciprocity in intimate relationships e.g familial, tribal and friendship etc. Thus, state and non-state actors collude in corruption because of social logics of intimate reciprocal relationships.

These state and non-state actors interact with each other in horizontal and vertical social networks. In these networks identities of actors are blurred and dynamic. These actors operate in networks on logics of sociality and patron-client relations. This research shows that state, society and timber mafia don't exist as separate categories. In context of BTTAP, community participation has resulted in co-option of timber mafia into state. State's claim over forest resources and controlling behavior of subjects are contested by different actors and institutions. In these contestations state's power is negotiated. Although, state claims and shows an image of coherent entity but these claims are augmented or undermined by its own agents. By using 'images of coherent entity', state maintains it separation from timber mafia, yet in 'practice' works in social networks with timber mafia.

Finally, I have shown that implementation of conservation project without reading internal dynamics of communities can result in exclusion of certain sections of society. And, makes possible for local elites to capture opportunities of power and wealth created through these conservation projects.

The understanding of corruption as complex socially embedded phenomenon have strong implications for forest governance policies. This understanding of corruption asks for more nuanced and socially informed anti-corruption policy interventions. That goes beyond discourse of 'corrupt individuals' and try to contextualize it social and political culture of the area.

Theoretically this study challenges normative understanding of corruption. The institutional and economic understanding of corruption overlooks the complex reality. That is not captured in these analyses. It is result of our weak understanding of dynamics of corruption that despite all regulatory and legal interventions, aids and support, corruption in forestry continues. This study asks for a new theoretical understanding of corruption, not based on narrow or oversimplified explanations. It also shows the inherent difficulties in theorizing corruption in general and forestry in particular. Furthermore, this research asks for removing dualistic notion between state and timber mafia as two separate entities. Theories on corruption in forestry need to recognize that boundaries between state, society and timber mafia are blurred. They don't operate exclusive to each other. Once scholarship recognizes blurriness of boundaries, it can enhance our understanding that why corruption is an epidemic in forestry.

Methodologically, this research argues that an ethnographic orientation of analysis of corruption in forestry can substantiate our understanding of the context in which corruption takes place. Furthermore, the dichotomy of state and timber mafia found in literature is strongly challenged from ethnographic methods. Incorporation of ethnographic methods with institutional and economic analysis can probably give best possible picture of corruption in forestry.

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Appendix A

List of Interview

Last three names are not shown to keep identity of respondent's identity anonyms.

Sardar Saleem	DFO	
Iftikhar-u-zaman	DFO	
M. Riaz	DFO	
Fahad	CDO	
Zulafqar	CDO	
Abdul Rasheed	SDFO wildlife Abottabad	
Muhammad Farooq	Forester (*Thandiani*)	
Arshad	Forest guard (*Bari Baig*)	
Saeed	Forest Guard (*Beeran Gali*)	
Arshad	Wildlife watcher	
Naqash	Wildlife watcher (agror-tnawal)	
Fida	Nighaban	
Aslam	Nighaban	
Idrees	Jabori range quarter	
Saeed	Presidents VCD	
Zubair	President VDC (Dabbur)	
Tasleem	Vice president VCD	
Fareed	Member local government. Union council (Beeran Gali)	
A.	Timber Mafia	
B.	Timber Mafia	
C.	Timber Mafia	

Appendix B

<u>Photographs</u>

Figure 6. Goats that Tassawer consifcated from forest.

Figure 7. Confiscated Timber at Jabori Range quater

Figure 8. Aslam (Nighaban)

Figure 9. Corn field on encroached forest land