Understanding Collaborative Governance in Practice:
The case of the Capital Cities agreement for implementing Victim’s and Land Restitution Law
Colombia

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List of Acronyms

ASOCAPITALES Association of Capital Cities
DNP National Planning Department
NAO Network Administrative Organization
ICA Institutional Collective Action
Abstract

This research emerged out from gap between the value added to collaborative governance and the empirical evidence of such benefits in Colombian. Despite the fact that there is not monitoring indicators that clearly illustrate how collaboration improves the implementation of complex public policies, national government has been promoting this strategy, ignoring the disparities among local and regional government, thus actual outcomes of multi-level governance. In particular, the paper looks at the case of capital cities agreement for implementing Victim’s and Land Restitution law, as the more tangible case of a collaborative initiative boosted by local entities.

Particularly, the research seeks to explain in what ways policy approach with respect to collaborative governance influence local government’s cooperation initiatives. Beyond the traditional input-output analysis, the paper explores into drivers, motivations and organizational dynamics among cities. The theoretical lenses used are the ones of Network governance and collaborative public management theories.

The study findings suggest that the speech of collaboration has progressed faster than the institutional mechanisms for doing so. The vagueness means for acting collectively blurs how collaboration can clearly contribute to improve local governments tasks when it comes to social policies. Findings also identify and explain how exchanges took place in the case of capital cities agreement, illustrating the impact of power imbalances and motivations when conducting a collaboration.

Relevance to Development Studies

The study provides a different level of inquiring for addressing collaborative governance initiatives among local governments. Beyond the traditional public management framework, the research offers an inter-organizational analysis of cross sector collaboration at the basis of motivation and the structural relations created among concrete entities. Moreover, the study provides shed insight regarding the unexplored aspects of collaboration not covered in policy framework.

Keywords

Collaborative governance, Network governance, Institutional Collective Action, Collaborative Public Management, motivations, power imbalances, relational content.
Chapter 1: 
Setting the scene

1.1 Problem statement

Collaborative governance processes in Colombia have gained importance in recent years. These practices have been treated as an instrument to improve the regional and territorial planning processes while promoting synergies, concurrence and territorial equity. Recent literature regarding new forms of governance (specially governance network theory), suggests “these bodies tackle the most nettlesome of public problems and ‘connect public policies with their strategic and institutionalized context’ (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan 1997 as cited in Agranoff 2006:56). Furthermore, it is claimed that “networks open up new possibilities that would be hard for one, two, or even three organizations working together to achieve” (Agranoff 2006:57).

Undoubtedly, the institutional changes that Colombia is going through have opened the door to new debates in terms of territorial re-organization and new forms of governance (Huilts and van Monfort 2007). The emergence of various types of relationships among institutions, specially “negotiated, non-hierarchical ex-changes between institutions at national, regional and local level” (Jachtenfuchs 1995 as cited in Peters and Pierre 2001:131), reinforced the idea of collaborative governance as an alternative to boost local development, specially for those municipalities with less public management capacities and that historically have been affected by the internal armed conflict.

The national government has been promoting this strategy, although it has not yet been fully explored, and its effectiveness to improve the implementation of complex public policies has not yet been confirmed. There is a convinced and continuous endorsement of this policy alternative, ignoring the disparities among local and regional governments and therefore, its influence on actual outcomes of collaborative initiatives. Trujillo (2016) and other scholars (Shergold 2008) have argued that, “despite the success and almost generalized acceptance that Cross Sector Collaborations (CSCs) represent the new paradigm to manage complex, uncertain, adaptive problems, there are important knowledge gaps about how CSCs generates value for society in general and its beneficiaries in particular” (Trujillo 2016: 1).

This is precisely the point of departure of this research. Beyond the value granted to collaborative governance in literature (based on developed countries experiences), there is no empirical evidence, nor performance-monitoring indicators that demonstrate the advantages of such alliances in Colombia. Certainly, policy development in this matter is recent. It was adopted in 2011 by the Land Use and Management law (whose nature is from the area of urban and regional development) and is intended to improve the public value of acting together by suggesting territorial partnerships. However, when reviewing the legislation, it becomes evident that there are no concrete institutional mechanisms that illustrate how this new collaborative public management manifests in practice. That is, how collaboration contributes to resolve structural problems of local entities, and improve the development of inter-organizational (cross-jurisdictional) culture (Shergold 2008:36).

My professional experience as a local government advisor allowed me to participate in different scenarios where the need for moving toward collaborative governance gained strength, but where the mechanisms (structure and process) through which governments can ensure its goals collectively remain unclear. The same occurs when it comes to identifying the motivations and the
commitment level of local authorities to engage in such cooperation initiatives. As there is not enough knowledge management regarding the ongoing collaboration processes in Colombia, why does the government insist on these new bodies of governance as an alternative to boost socio-economic development interventions? Others have expressed similar concerns. For instance, “recently, critical and development studies have argued that success of these interventions depends on the extent to which they help beneficiaries develop the capacity to collectively address their own problems and to have voice in the decisions that affect them” (Trujillo 2016). Others focus on collaboration advantages in terms of organizational culture and policymaking (O'Leary and Vij 2012; DNP 2015).

Drawing from the main principals of network governance and collaborative public management theoretical frameworks, this paper aims to provide a further understanding of collaborative governance practices in Colombia by exploring external drivers, motivations and the structure governance dimension, as conditions that explain “what makes things happen in a collaboration” (Huxham and Vangen 2008:39). This research seeks to respond to the question: ¿In what ways does the policy approach regarding collaborative governance influence local governments’ cooperation initiatives in Colombia? This research is guided by enquiring on, ¿How motivations affect the development of a collaborative ambition? and ¿In what ways relations established among local entities affect the collaborative network trajectory?

1.2 Research Strategy:

Since the research emerges from the gap between value added to collaborative governance in policy approach, and empirical evidence of such benefits, this inquiry looks at one of these collaborative governance initiatives in Colombia, which aimed to improve socio-economic development interventions. Thus, it serves to address what I consider unexplored aspects of collaborative governance initiatives among local governments in Colombia. That is, “the mechanisms that lead to the actual outcomes of a collaboration. More formally, this concern is with the formation and implementation of the collaboration’s policy and activity agenda” (Huxman and Siv Vagen 2008:39).

In particular, the paper examines the case of the Capital Cities agreement for executing Victim's and Land Restitution law, as a collaborative initiative boosted by local governments in an attempt to find efficient mechanisms for implementing a social policy. This agreement started in 2012 as a coalition of cities which shared the same concerns, and that gradually decided to move from a political scenario to a solid body of governance. At the core of this intervention is the intention of optimizing horizontal cooperation mechanisms, and strengthening its network governance capacity (Aleksie et al. 2013:14).

The case represents an empirical sample of the distance between the public value granted to collaborative governance in policy approach and the conditions required by local governments for dealing collectively with public problems. Some scholars have argued that flaws in providing insights about complexities surrounding collaboration occurs, because a significant number of studies focus solely on one aspect of it (Kaats et al 2014). For instance, focusing on goods and service provision, whilst ignoring key constituents in a collaborative initiative, such us commitment, intentions and organizational behavior (Wannas 2008:3). The relevance of the selected case, is precisely, what offers the possibility to explore these aspects in its context and dynamics, while examining the evolution of the cooperation mechanisms among local governments (partners) who
do not share a geographical position and whose institutional capacities are quiet different. This feature, in turn, allows the investigation to yield significant findings with respect to the scope of collaboration in the Colombian context.

To study the question, in what ways does the policy approach regarding collaborative governance influence local governments' cooperation initiatives in Colombia, this research follows a qualitative research approach. The dominant method utilized is the explanatory qualitative case study, which allows for getting deep into the context of a particular case of analysis. It also explores, in detail, those elements that are not covered, and cannot be inferred from the policy framework regarding collaborative governance in Colombian. Discourse analysis will also be conducted via interpretative policy analysis techniques. “In policy terms, this translates into believing that what implementers do, rather than what the policy “says” in its explicit language, constitutes the “truth” of policy (and thereby the state's intent” (Yanow 2000:9).

The main strategy of collecting data lies on semi-structured interviews with public officers from the Ministry of Government (Advisory group for territorial coordination of public policies), as well as public officers from the Victim’s Assistance and Reparation Agency. Government-Planning Secretaries (or assigned officials) from the Capital Cities and, staff members of international cooperation (International Migration Organization-IOM) will also be interviewed. Secondary data such as adopted agreements, working agenda, meeting minutes, systematization of procedures and experiences, will also be collected and analyzed.

Due to the fact that institutional capabilities has been treated as an imperative within collaborative governance policy approach in Colombia (DNP 2015), the paper reviews the institutional performance of local entities. Such secondary data illustrates institutional capacities of capital cities. I used this information in order to reflect on the ways in which capabilities (as precondition) affects motivations and structural governance of capital cities collaboration. The database is from National Planning Department and encompasses fiscal and administrative performance. The comprised variables are: saving capability, level of investment, level of the debt, own revenues and dependence of national transferences, technical and administrative skills. According to the results cities are categorized in High, Medium and low institutional performance. Such categories come from a methodology developed by the National Planning Department. (DNP 2015),

Furthermore, and faced with the impossibility to interview the 32 capital cities, the database was used as criteria for selecting a sample of cities with diverse institutional capacities. This serves to explore the scope of collaboration more objectively and be able to provide shed insights of how collaboration works among cities with substantive differences. In this sense, 3 cities from each category were selected. The selected cities classified as high institutional performance are Bogotá, Medellín, Barranquilla. The ones of medium performance are Cúcuta, Popayán, Bucaramanga. Finally, in the category of low institutional performance are Quibdó, Mocoa and Leticia. The interviews will be cited with following codes.

Table N° 1: Interviewees Categorization

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<td>Ministry of Government Staff</td>
<td>MGS</td>
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Considering that this is an empirical exploration, a theoretical framework is used “as part of an iterative process of data analysis” (Orlikowski 1993 as cited in Walshman 1995:76). Instead of using theory as a starting point of the study of collaborative governance principles and practices, the paper focuses on the different stages of capital cities agreement. Each phase uses a specific approach to identify analytical categories for interpreting and conceptualizing data (Walsham 1995:77).

The first one is John Wanna’s (2008) framework for recognizing diverse dimensions of collaboration, which serves to distinguish between the descriptive/pragmatic side of collaboration, as well as, its normative/intrinsic perspective. The advantage of such an approach is that it provides a different level of inquiry (practical realities) when emphasis is placed on the drivers, motivations and intended outcomes of collaboration. Such an approach is specifically used on chapter 3. The second lens is governance network theory. Such theoretical framework is used to explore the patterns of inter-organizational collaborations, such as dependencies, types of exchanges, and organizational forms, explored on chapter 4. In doing so, the research provides patterns of actual collaborative practices.

Due to the above, and for a better understanding of the role of collaboration when dealing with public policy constrains each chapter is presented as a toolbox to shed light on what, until now has been ignored by the national government when promoting multi-level governance.

Whilst Chapter 1 served to set-the-scene, Chapter 2 contextualizes the emergence of the Capital Cities agreement and explains how the idea of collaboration has been deployed from the urban realm to the execution of social policies. The chapter introduces main insights for assessing the ways in which a policy approach influences actual practices of collaboration. Chapter 3 explores the emergence of the Capital Cities agreement from an inter-organizational learning and cooperation process approach. This chapter targets attention on the drivers, motivations and forms of collaboration.

Chapter 4 provides a detailed account of network governance theory. The chapter examines the governance forms within the collaborative process studied, what variables affect these forms, and how these forms, in turn; influence the sustainability of the capital cities collaboration (Provas and Kenis 2008). The importance of this stream lies in the fact that the literature has concentrated its efforts in assessing the outcomes of these new bodies of governance, but as has been argued, few studies address what makes things occur in a collaboration.

Finally, Chapter 5 reflects on the scope of collaboration in the Colombian context, based on the analysis and conceptualization presented throughout the paper. The main contributions of this inquiry, to local development strategies, will also be mentioned.
Chapter 2:  
The case of the Capital Cities agreement for the implementation of the Victim’s and Land Restitution law

Considering this is an empirical case study, before launching into the theoretical analysis of the Capital Cities agreement, it is necessary to contextualize how collaboration has been deployed from the urban realm to a social context policy. The first section presents an overview of the legal framework where collaborative governance is rooted and promoted. The following section discussed in some detail the emergence of the selected case study. A preliminary remark in this respect will be given.

2.1 A wedding between two laws from different background

In 2011, the national government adopted two different but decisive laws. On the one hand, the Land Use and Management law, on the other, the Victim’s and Land Restitution law. Both legal frameworks were approved in a context characterized by crucial institutional changes, mainly related with negotiation and signing of peace agreements. The latter, not only boosted a new understanding of territorial relationships, but also suggested strong changes in the way that public policies have been designed and implemented.

Under the narrative of achieving lasting peace, the National Planning Department started to promote the so-called ‘Territorialization of public policies’ as a central property of public management. This ‘fancy’ way of addressing public policies, emerged with the aim to i) prioritize national government investment, ii) overcome short-term vision, iii) improve local capacities, but primarily, iv) to tackle structural deficiencies in planning and executing public policies. In other words, ‘territorialization’ means reinforcing the policy-making process from the bottom-up.

In terms of collaborative governance, the narrative of ‘territorialization’ more precisely, ‘territorialization for peace’ pushed for the idea of working together. It was expected to create a favorable scenario for multi-level governance, combining land management with regional and local development. As has been argued, collaborative governance was offered as a promising alternative for facilitating the articulation of actions and concurrence of efforts toward a common purpose of territorial development. Alliances among local authorities, as well as, alliances with other actors with solid presence in the regions became important. Private sector, civil society organizations and international cooperation agencies were assumed as fundamental partners in the execution and sustainability of public policies, partly, because the Habana agreements\(^1\) suggested an important component of land reform (agrarian reform) and new state-civil society relations (new participatory-electoral circumscription).

Since the adoption of the Land Use and Management law in 2011, collaborative processes, particularly those which attend to the interaction between the different levels of government (associations of municipalities, or, municipalities with regional governments) take part of regulatory

\(^{1}\) Refers to the peace process between Colombian national government and the Revolutionary armed forces, signed in the Habana, Cuba in 2016. The agreements encompasses five points included but not limited to comprehensive and agricultural development, territorial political participation, substitution of illegal crops. (Presidency of Republic of Colombia, 2012).
decrees or national strategies. The timeline below illustrates the adoption of collaborative initiatives in different sectors. It can be said that collaboration is almost an imperative of public management, ranging from the Victim's and Land Restitution law to the preparedness strategy for peace (CONPES-3867 2016). Some international cooperation programs such as the Territorial Alliances for Peace, and the Territorial Alliances for Reconciliation also considers collaboration as a good governance pattern.

Diagram Nº1: Timeline of Collaborative Governance initiatives

First, the Land Use and Management law will be addressed, giving attention to the establishment of territorial partnership schemes. Afterwards, a general mapping of the Victim’s and Land Restitution law will be presented, which explains how these schemes intend to solve the complexities surrounding such a policy.

2.1.1 A partnership-based Territorial Model for Development

The Land Use and Management law (1454/2011) was intended to reshape the organizational structure of the State, by modifying current administrative and political division. Its purpose was to create new bodies of governance in order to guarantee the systemic functioning of the entire public apparatus, taking into account the particularities and potentialities of the territories. The nature of this law is embedded in urban-regional planning and responds to a territorial model that encompasses autonomy and decentralized processes.

Consequently, the law introduced a set of complex partnership schemes\(^2\) whose nature is merely administrative. Complex, because the differences between one and others is not conclusive enough.

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\(^2\) Policy framework in this regard is rooted in the development of regional integration models adopted gradually by the national government since the 1970's. With an important influence from Europe, specially from Spain and France, Colombia adopted both, association of municipalities and metropolitan areas as a geographical delimitation prototypes for land use. In the early 1990's, those models had certain normative development, mainly associated with the decentralization process and delegation of fiscal powers to local governments. Nonetheless, its perspective still relates with the physical delimitation of the territories, and with the introduction of contractual instruments, which facilitate the execution of public heritage.
For instance, the association of metropolitan areas is intended to promote regional development and competitiveness. The so-called administrative provinces (association among two or more municipalities geographically contiguous) seek to execute comprehensive development projects. When it comes to association between departments (regional governance entities), the aim is to fulfill administrative functions granted by law, as well as, public service delivery. The same occurs with the association of municipalities (DNP 2015). At first glance, entities must come together to do the same that they could do individually.

Due to the fact that the Land Use and Management law does not deeply develop the scope of such territorial schemes, the National Planning Department has been working on policy documents (informative fact sheets) for promoting multi-level governance. The partnership schemes, as laid down in said policy documents, address seven broad objectives; that as stressed, are more a set of advantages instead of clear public management indicators. According to the Land Use and Management law, territorial partnership is intended to: i) create territorial identity ii) shared dreams iii) establish common goals iv) facilitate joined-up thinking v) promote territorial marketing and vi) ensure good governance (DNP 2015). Moreover, it is stressed that through the establishment of such associations, local administrations are able to improve their institutional capacities by optimizing technical and financial resources.

2.1.2 The territorial side of the Victim’s and Land Restitution law

As has been argued, the Victim’s and Land Restitution law (1448/2011) was adopted in a context with important institutional changes for the country. The idea of achieving lasting peace was the foundation of Juan Manuel Santos’ administration, and the process started with a normative that facilitated land restitution, but primordially, recognized the consequences of humanitarian rights violations for more than sixty years. “The Law also provides for comprehensive reparations for some survivors of human rights abuses committed in the context of the armed conflict and contains measures allowing the return to the rightful owners of millions of hectares of stolen land” (Amnesty International 2012: 5). Furthermore, the law endeavors for all victims to have the right to truth, justice, redress and non-repetition of human rights violations, while targeting ethnic communities, peasants and campaigners for the so-called ‘Programas de Reparación Colectiva’ (communal redress programs).

With the adoption of the Victim’s and Land Restitution law, the national government granted new competences to local governments. Besides land restitution, the Victim’s public policy encompasses 5 broad components as follows: i) preventive and protective policies, ii) assistance and care, iii) individual and collective compensations, and iv) memory, right to truth and justice and finally, promotion of victim’s participation and empowerment. Each component, in turn, suggests a set of measures that are mainly in the charge of local administrations. Such responsibilities required additional (technical and financial) efforts from local governments, but specially from those municipalities with less public management capacities and that historically have been affected by the dynamics of the internal armed conflict.

Law 1448 refers to “fiscal sustainability” as a principle which should be borne in mind in making decisions...This could severely restrict the resources available to ensure that victims receive full reparation for the damages they have suffered, especially as the Law may oblige state institutions to provide reparations without additional state resources being made available to make this possible (Amnesty International 2012: 17).
The first monitoring report in the area of national and territorial coordination (done by the supervisor bodies in August 2012), demonstrated significant constrains in the execution of the Victim’s law, particularly in the processes related with return or reallocation of the forcibly displaced population, delivery of humanitarian aid, as well as communal redress programs. In general, restrictions were related to the lack of extra-budgetary resources. Two years later, Harvard University carried out the second assessment of Law 1448. Even though some results were encouraging, institutional weakness, misunderstanding of procedures (from local entities), and lack of solid information systems, put the territories in the sights of the national government.

Once again, under the logic of ‘territorialization’ of public policies and the attributed advantages of collaborative governance, in December 2015 the corresponsability strategy was adopted. Such a plan lead by the Ministry of Government, the National Planning Department and the Victim’s Assistance Agency, was indented to facilitate the execution of the Victim’s public policy by promoting the principles of subsidiarity, coordination and concurrence. It is a matter of articulating programs, projects, actions, processes and resources from the three level of government. The principle of subsidiarity refers to the national government’s financial support for delivering humanitarian aid. However, the situation changes with coordination and concurrence principles, as there are no tangible instruments through which these principles can manifest in practice.

Concurrence, as defined in the strategy, refers to the desire of joint working when there are shared competences, or, wherever possible to undertake the provision of goods and services among two or more local entities. In short, this principle is assumed as a collaborative governance or multilevel governance exercise. Due to the above, the corresponsability strategy gives special attention to the formation of strategic alliances and stated “territorial entities might subscribe to any of the partnerships schemes defined in Land Use and Management Law, in order to comply with the competences with respect to Victim’s law” (República de Colombia, Decreto de Corresponsabilidad 2015:9). The diagram below illustrates the logic under which such partnership schemes should operate.

Figure Nº2: Partnership schemes

Source: The Author, 2017

Furthermore, the logic of co-responsibility and articulation of the three levels of government is quite vertical. It is expected that regional investment projects from the National System of Attention and Integral Reparation to the Victims, are consistent with local government needs. In this sense, local governments provide inputs of ‘what is needed’ and cannot be supplied to the regional
government, and the regional government in turn, provides the same inputs to the national government.

Figure N°3: Co-responsibility strategy operating logic

Source: The Author, 2017

2.2. The case of Capital Cities

The Association is a solid scenario that the country has been lacking for a long time. Capital cities have characteristics that make them homogeneous and that is why they are coming together to work in front of these problems by sharing solutions, Gaviria (2012).

In 2012 twenty capital cities founded the ‘Capital Cities Association’ - Asocapitales, with the aim of moving from a political scenario of discussion to a solid body of governance. The formalization of such a co-operation initiative meant, on the one hand, the opportunity to enhance their dialogue with national government, and on the other, the possibility to manage and optimize technical and financial resources by setting a long-term strategy. It is a matter of acting as a coalition, of building consensus. “Part of the impetus…is the desire for a new activism in government, to develop new policy agendas, take on wider responsibilities and remake policy frameworks to suit the changing times” (Wanna 2008:8).

Since its constitution, Asocapitales has been working in 5 action programs such as, urban and regional development, climate change, security, reconciliation and governance. As an association, Asocapitales has made fourteen summits, scenarios that have served (as mentioned above) not only to promote new policy agendas, but also as a platform for those capital cities where the presence of the State has historically been weak. In this sense, cities such as Leticia, Mitú, Inírida, Puerto Carreño, have had an opportunity to negotiate financial resources directly with national government and prioritize its territories for the execution of long-term national development programs. Each of these summits has been performed in different cities, as a way of manifesting isonomy among members.

Undoubtedly, as an association, capital cities have had the opportunity to engage in diverse projects facilitating responsiveness and finding alternatives to respond to humanitarian crisis, natural disasters and boost local economic development. For instance, in the second summit carried out in May 2012, sectorial and territorial consensus spaces were achieved, a strategy whereby budgetary

3 Acronym in Spanish from Asociación de Ciudades Capitales.
decisions in terms of total expenditures and its sector allocation are taken city by city. Progress is most extensive in job generation, assistance and communal redress programs for victims of the armed conflict, peace building (and its associated costs) as well as participatory budgets for infrastructure projects.

Through knowledge management, exchange of good practices and innovation, capital cities have been changing the way of implementing public policies, specially by driving solutions to shared problems. By networking among themselves, Asocapitales has acquired a solid position not only before national government agencies, but also before the international community. Currently, Asocapitales have signed about fifteen bilateral agreements, among which stand out, the deal with the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education, Presidential Council for Regions, World Bank and Ministry of Government which is the case study for this research.

**Capital Cities agreement for the execution of the Victims and Land Restitution law**

In 2014, shortly after the second assessment of Victim’s assistance, capital cities presented before the national government, in an attempt to seek alternatives that would strengthen their institutional capacities and respond to the humanitarian crisis caused by forced displacement. The idea of acting jointly, was not new. The first attempt was done in 2009 and was led by Medellín city. Two reasons boosted that exercise. The first had to do with the pressure received by capital cities for implementing the Forced Displacement law (387/1997), but specially for the constrains that meant the delivery of humanitarian aid as well as the reallocation of the displaced population. The second was related to the necessity of applying maximum pressure before the national government. As a coalition it would be easier to make visible the problem, but also negotiate with national authorities. It is worth noting that by that time, Asocapitales had not conformed but the Colombian Departments and Municipalities Federation did. The latter situation, in particular, warned capital cities on the need to move towards cooperation initiatives, as well as the importance of formalizing an alliance.

Even though this first experience was not strong enough, it encouraged collaboration processes among municipalities for socio-economic interventions. In fact, in 2011 Medellín city and San Carlos municipality signed a strategic alliance in order to return displaced families from Medellin to San Carlos, where the population originally came from. From this experience 2 main lessons have been learned. The first one has to do with the possibility of creating joint political agendas and strategies for implementing social public policies. The second refers to the creation of new legal forms that allows for the transfer of resources among local entities.

Drawing from such an experience, and with the aim of seeking institutional mechanisms that facilitate the formation of strategic alliances, in December 2014 the 9th summit meeting of Capital Cities was held. The importance of this meeting lies in the fact that, for the first time, capital cities led collaborative initiatives, overcoming geographical boundaries, political differences and claiming the adoption of a common social agenda for implementing a particular public policy. As the president of ‘Asocapitales’ mentioned, “We are convinced that the implementation of Victim’s law requires coordination, co-responsibility and generation of strategic alliances that allow an efficient articulation among the territories and central government” (Gaviria, 2012).

In 2015, the national government with the aim of finding a permanent coordination scheme, and to adjust current administrative, normative and budgetary elements, finds in capital cities an opportunity to create a network of focal points for Victim’s policy development. On the one hand,
for the main cities this meant better delivery of services and, of course, higher institutional capacity; on the other, these cities have historically been the largest recipients of forced displacement, which means a higher concentration of victims population. With this in mind, the Capital Cities agreement for implementing Victim’s law began.

In February 2015, the first round of negotiations started with the active participation of the thirty-two capital cities, national level agencies (those which are members of the national system for Victim’s attention) and a few members of regional governments. Such negotiation was lead by the Ministry of Government and the Victim’s Assistance and Reparation Agency. The National Planning Department, as well as, other agencies from the national level also had active participation. The dynamic was a sort of bargaining table under the so-called ‘World Coffee methodology’. This means that a group of cities comes together and discusses about a specific topic with the aim of drawing a consensus and establishing possible courses of action.

Each session or negotiation rounds were lead by a technical team of national level entities. In short, the main intention of this exercise was to encourage cities to cooperate rather than compete for resources. Similarly, it was expected to create links among cities for knowledge management and to seek possible collective solutions.

Finally, in December 2016, the Capital Cities agreement for the public implementation of the Victim’s law gained momentum, now, with clear purposes such as to design an overall strategy for goals alignment and territorial priorities, identify possible mechanism for joint planning, and to move forward a clear and consistent associative scheme.

Preliminary remarks

This chapter has provided an overview of how collaborative governance has been offered by the national government as a ‘one-size-fits-all recipe’. The idea of working together has moved from context to context, equating collaboration for urban service provision and management, or urban realm and infrastructure, with collaboration for socio-economic interventions. In someway, collaboration has been used by the national government as a promising alternative to solve structural problems, specially the ones related with underfinanced public policies, such as the case of Victim’s and Land Restitution law.

But beyond the possible ‘shared goals’ and the aim of acting together, collaboration entails “initial conditions, process dimensions, structural and governance dimensions, contingencies and constraints, outcomes, and accountability” (Bryson et al 2006:44). These elements are not covered, and have not been fully developed in the Colombian policy framework (DNP 2015). A detailed review of Land Use and Management law, evidence that policy framework regarding collaborative governance is limited to setting out the administrative figures that could take place among local and regional entities, through a single article within the law. Likewise, the supporting documents from National Planning Department are limited to tackle the advantages of cross sector collaboration in terms of public management, but do not offered, for instance, enough information about the way in which partnership schemes contributes to implementing Victim’s and Land Restitution law. Thus, it can be said that the discourse of collaboration progressed faster than the institutional mechanisms (including incentives) for doing so.
Chapter 3: What we desire and what we could have: How much I need the ‘others’ to tackle my problems?

There are diverse lenses through which collaboration can be explored. Institutional collective action, for instance, examines the externalities of governments when acting together (Feiock 2013). This approach mainly focuses on a cost-benefits analysis and introduces some alternatives to mitigate collective action problems. Others scholars, such us Benington and Moore (2011), place emphasis on the assessment of the public value of acting together. Studies in this area are more typical of management and public administration.

However, in order to provide a different level of inquiry that goes beyond the traditional input-output analysis of a collaborative initiative, this chapter examines the Capital Cities agreement from inside out. The lenses used at this stage of the research are the ones of inter-organizational learning and cooperation processes (Ehrmann 2013). This theoretical framework has developed relevant insights for understanding drivers and motivations for acting collectively. The advantage of such an approach is that it elaborates on how drivers and motivation influences the causal path of collaboration, in relation to the interactions among partners.

In this regard, this chapter presents the emergence of the Capital Cities agreement, focusing on the environmental factors that drove the initiative, the motivations and the initial model of collaboration proposed by this agreement. The point of departure is a conceptualization of collaborative governance, an exercise used for stating a set of assumptions that will guide the research. The following section looks into the progressively complex issues as the basis of collaboration. Some insights from network governance theory will be use for this purpose. Next, the chapter elaborates on the motives and the so-called ‘share understanding’ (Daniels and Walker, 2004). Finally, a review of the types of interaction and model in which collaboration was manifested in the case of capital cities is presented.

3.1 Conceptualizing collaborative governance

Collaborative governance occupies an important place in new public management. These new forms of governance have its roots in the evolution from government to governance, the disappearance of the strict barriers among state agents, and the inclusion of new stakeholders (such as private sector, local economic development agencies, and NGO’s) in policy making (O’Leary and Nidhi Vij 2012:507).

At the core of the concept is the idea of ‘collaboration, that has also been applied to diverse fields of study. Currently, literature on the topic recognizes almost a hundred definitions of collaboration, and therewith, the emergence of a set of synonyms on the basis of working together (O’Leary and Nidhi Vij 2012:507). Multilevel governance, cooperative governance, inter-organizational governance, cross sector collaboration, co-management regimes, and hybrid sectorial arrangements, are perhaps the most acknowledged denominations.
The flexibility in the concept could be explained by the fact that ‘collaboration’ in its simplest form means “joint working or working in conjunction with others” (Wanna 2008:3). But this simplistic definition is perhaps, the aspect that has contributed the most to the introduction of a range of variables (such as individuals, transaction costs, organizations, interdependence, participatory endeavor) to collaborative governance practices and assessments. Hence, it is not surprising that the boundaries between the descriptive/pragmatic (empirical evidence of joint working) and the normative/intrinsic (more ideally or accepted aspect), sides of collaboration become blurred.

Collaboration can be defined “as an emergent process between interdependent organizational actors who negotiate the answers to shared concerns” (Gray 1989:13). But it can also be defined as “working in association with others for some form of mutual benefit” (Huxman 1996:1). A third notion of collaborative governance is to “share information, undertake coordinated initiatives, or develop shared-power arrangements…in order to pool their capabilities to address the problem or challenge” (Bryson et al 2006:44). Kaats and Opheij define collaborative governance as “a form of organizing in which people from autonomous organizations go into durable agreements and, by doing so, mutually harmonize elements of the work between themselves. This results in a wide range of collaborative partnerships with a durable intention, but still with a finite duration” (Kaats and Opheij 2014:15).

While the first concept attributes specific characteristics to the idea of collaboration such as ‘emergent process’, ‘interdependence’ and ‘organizational actors’, the second one focuses directly on motivations, lets say, ‘possible benefits’. The third concept in contrast, emphasizes the ‘capabilities’ or ‘creating competences’. The final notion attaches importance to the temporality of the agreements. The fact that collaborative governance can take elements ranging from collective action to rational choice theory, as well as, from conflict management to public policy, make it not only a complex concept, but also problematic when it comes to measuring its benefits.

These variations within the concept deserve special attention because “all changes in the constituents of collaboration affect its internal dynamics, therefore, causal pathways of collaborative governance and its performance” (Emerson et al 2012:1). In other words, there must be coherence between what is assumed as the basis of collaboration (initial conditions), the institutional mechanism through which the agreements are carried out (governance structure) and its progress indicators (outcomes). Consequently, when it comes to conceptualizing collaborative governance, attention should be focused on what collaboration entails, and the ways in which these new bodies of governance are manifested, instead of emphasizing its social and political acceptance.

Due to the above, this paper uses the notion of collaborative governance proposed by Agranoff and McGuire (2003), because it comprises aspects that meet the scope of the investigation and the selected case study. Collaborative governance, or more precisely, collaborative public management is a concept that describes the process of facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by single organizations. Collaborative means to co-labor, to achieve common goals, often working across boundaries and in multi-sector and multi-actor relationships. Collaboration is based on the value of reciprocity and can include the public (Agranoff and McGuire 2003 as cited in O’Leary and Nidhi Vij 2012:508).

Such a concept encompasses three statements that will be treated as propositions to facilitate the research analysis. The first claim suggests collaboration as a ‘process of facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements’. This leads to proposition 1 that is: collaboration is not static, but dynamic across time. Its internal ways of operating are subject to continuous development. The
second statement assumes collaboration is intended to ‘solve problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by single organizations’. This results in proposition 2 that is: collaborative initiatives emerge from problematic, challenging or demanding environments. The third announcement states ‘Collaboration is based on the value of reciprocity’, which conforms proposition 3: there is interdependence among stakeholders. Thus, the number of exchanges among actors A and B, or A and C, or B and C, depends on how much can be returned. In short, collaboration “is particularly suited for situations that require ongoing cooperation” (Ansel and Gash 2008:560).

Reciprocity is one of the most discussed aspects of collaborative governance in the literature. There is prevalent agreement that transactions or exchanges influence governance structures and temporality of collaborative initiatives. Strongly linked with proposition 3, Proposition 4 states: stakeholders can share or exchange within a collaborative initiative. When mutual dependency decreases, it creates space for exchanges. In this case actor A remains independent, whilst co-existing with actor B. Actor A may feel free to look for another partner that is more appropriate (Kaats and Opheij 2014). The diagram below illustrates how the four propositions interact with the case of the Capital Cities agreement for executing the Victim’s and Land Restitution law.

Figure N°4: Capital Cities agreement for the execution of Victim’s and Land Restitution law

Source: The Author, 2017
Proposition 1 allows for exploring the evolution of the co-ordination mechanisms among cities. Proposition 2, provides some insights into the particularities of collaborative initiatives which arise from problematic environments. This also enables an exploration into the ways in which challenging contexts affect motivations and consensus among partners (cities). Proposition 3, looks at the type of exchanges among cities that as stressed, presents substantive differences. Strongly linked with proposition 4, this stream provides insights on reciprocity and the temporality of the collaborative initiative. It examines on the one hand, the number of possible exchanges among cities, and on the other, the degree of dependency created between partners drawn from those exchanges. For instance, the level of interaction between City A (Barranquilla) and City B (Bogotá) is higher than the level of exchanges among City A (Barranquilla) and City C (Cúcuta). This begs the question, how does this affect the governance structure and temporality of such a collaborative initiative?

3.2 Increasingly complex issues as the basis for collaboration

As mentioned in chapter 2, the capital cities agreement is at the basis of a challenging and problematic environment. The constrains in the execution of the Victim’s and Land Restitution law motivated the rise of such an initiative for political lobbying and better coordination mechanisms in implementing law 1448. Literature with respect to collaborative governance, has explored “broad themes related to the general environment in which collaborations are embedded, the notion of sector failure as an over-looked precondition for collaboration, and other specific and immediate preconditions affecting the formation of collaborations” (Bryson et al 2006:45). Some scholars argue that inter-organizational joint working is strongly linked with the increase of environmental complexity, thus it motivates agencies to create, as much as possible, links among them to decrease uncertainty.

Others scholars, state that the emergence of any collaborative initiative is a consequence of competitive and institutional pressures that determine the degree of commitment among partners, as well as, sustainability of the process (Oliver et al 1990 as cited in Bryson et al 2006:45). The latter is a priority for this research, because as Bryson et al (2006) stress, the institutional environment, which encompasses policy framework, can become the vehicle that facilitates cooperation or limits it. The authors provide an empirical example, which is useful for supporting the concern with respect to the ways in which institutional environment (policy framework) affects collaboration.

Using a public-private partnership in the garment industry as an example, Sharman et al (as cited in Bryson et al 2006:45) prove that both, competitive and institutional forces rapidly stimulate alliance formation. At first glance, institutional factors were in favor of the cross-sector collaboration. However, in a short time-period institutional forces turned more intractable that the competitive ones, limiting the scope and the long term run of cooperation. In this particular example, the decrease in public funds and changes in welfare payment policies (institutional forces) created disincentives for the partners to continue acting together. When it comes to alliances for dealing with public policy constrains, institutional factors become even more decisive. In such cases, collaboration involves not only the internal organizational mechanisms for acting collectively, but also the external operating systems for acting across jurisdictions.

Once again, following proposition 2 where increasingly complex issues are at the basis of collaboration, a differentiation must be made among complicated and complex systems. Teisman (as cited in Kaats and Opheij 2014), claims that while complicated systems lead to hierarchal and
simple operating mechanisms between organizations; complex systems, defined as “complicated interactions between and interferences by players (individuals, organizations, and institutions)” (Kaats and Opheij 2014), lead to non-linear and clear boundaries in the inter-organizational operating mechanisms. Complex systems are more conducive to organizing in chains and networks. From these perspectives the following claims were inferred in the case of the Capital Cities agreement:

1. The Capital Cities agreement has its roots in a complex environment related with the implementation of a social policy. As Bryson et.al (2006) argue, collaboration becomes the alternative for local administrations to reduce uncertainty and achieve stability in the execution of law 1448.

2. This collaboration is strongly influenced by institutional forces that in this particular case, manifest in the continuous endorsement of collaborative governance as a politically correct and effective strategy. Nonetheless, the vague operating mechanisms for collaboration proposed in policy framework (with respect to territorial partnership), affects the scope of such a multi-level governance initiative, and probably the incentives to continuum of the collaboration. Competitive forces (advantages of being together) remain unclear. This uncertainty in the outcomes, can create disincentives for the cities to engage in a long-term commitment.

3. The Capital Cities agreement comes from a complex environment with a high degree of complexity. On the one hand, constrains in implementing such a policy have not ended. Even though all cities share a generalized concern, the problem of each local entity is unique, which means that all partners look at things from different lenses. On the other hand, the problem that needs to be solved does not have a single solution. This means that the collaboration must develop innovative methods. The table below shows types of complexities within a challenging or problematic environment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of complexity</th>
<th>Problems with low complexity</th>
<th>Problems with high complexity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic complexity</td>
<td>Cause and effect are clone together in space and time</td>
<td>Cause and effect are far apart in space and time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A problem can easily be framed</td>
<td>There is no definitive formulation of the problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Problems have no stopping rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Every implemented solution to a problem has consequences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The causes of a problem can be explained in numerous ways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Its future is unfamiliar and unpredictable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social complexity</td>
<td>Its future is familiar and predictable</td>
<td>Every problem is essentially unique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People who are part of the problem have common assumptions, values, rationales and objectives</td>
<td>Their interests are different, even conflicting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People look at things very differently</td>
<td>Solutions to a problem are not true-or-false but good-or-bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Addressing the problem requires new and innovative methods and a wide array of disciplines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Addressing the problem requires standard methods and a limited number of disciplines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kaats and Opheij, 2014:12. (Based on Rittel and Webber (1973), Kahane (2010), and Teisman (2007).
3.3 Setting the agenda: Common Wisdom Vs Common Practice

Collaboration lies in the meaning of acting together, in what can be achieved, and in what needs to be given. In contrast to the processes of collaboration in the urban realm, collaboration in the execution of public policies requires the development of a so-called ‘share understanding’ (Daniels and Walker 2004). That is, the agreement of partners on what they can collectively obtain. That is, the more ambiguity in the value of acting together, the less the possibilities of the collaboration succeeding. Similarly, the more differences in the perception of ‘what needs to be solved’, the less the need of ‘the others’ to tackle the problem.

It is clear that the constrains in executing the Victim’s and Land Restitution law motivates capital cities to come together and exert pressure before national government. All cities share the perception that greater investment by the national government in the territories is needed, and that the requirements of the Victim’s law was exceeding local government capacities (proposition 2). Recent literature recognizes this fact as ‘common wisdom’. This means, that clarity is required in ‘what needs to be solved’ at the starting point of the collaboration (Huxham and Siv Vangen 2008). However, things become difficult when stakeholders need to move from ‘common wisdom’ to ‘common practice’. Common practice is the second stage in any collaborative initiative, and refers to proposition 1: harmonize all partner’s individual agendas (interest) toward ‘what needs to be solved’ by developing mechanisms to operate collectively.

Differences in political agendas can be rooted on the existence of multiple issues or, substantive differences among stakeholders. In the case of capital cities both circumstances occurred. Nonetheless, as Huxham and Siv Vangen (2008) stress, the reasons behind constrains in harmonizing agendas are not obvious and not easy to identify, especially when collaboration is driven by a turbulent environment (proposition 2). This is because the desire of acting together, in this case, to exert pressure before the national government is so strong, that it hides in some way the internal interest of each municipality.

Figure Nº5: Common Wisdom and Common practice

The pathway from ‘common wisdom’ to ‘common practice’ is intrinsic for the development of a coordination mechanism and the structure of governance by which collaboration will operate. The central argument of this section is that power imbalances (substantive differences among capital cities), as well as the multiple issues involved when implementing the Victim’s law, are the first breaking point in the attempt to address the constrains of such public policy through a collaborative initiative. In short, the Capital Cities agreement responds to the logic of ‘common wisdom’, but not to the idea of ‘common practice’.

First the two overriding differences among capital cities are addressed, i.e. its institutional capacities and the number of victim population residing. Subsequently, the multiple issues involved in the execution of the Victim’s law are presented. The core of this matter is not in the amount of constrains, but in how far apart they are from each other. Power imbalances, refers to the control, influence or dominance of some participants within a collaborative process for exclusion or domination of some partners. O’Leary and Nidhi Vij (2012), argue that power imbalances easily lead to conflicts within a collaboration, and that the extent to which these conflicts affects the effectiveness of the initiative, depend on how much the governance structure, or, operating mechanisms can remedy the conflict. Power encompasses “authority, resources, and discursive legitimacy as sources of power and considers the participants, the process design, and the content of collaborative governance processes as arenas for power use” (Purdy 2012:409). In the case of the Capital Cities agreement, power imbalances manifested in both, political legitimacy and resources. In a manner, both aspects go hand by hand.

Political legitimacy is based on a collaborator’s reputation and trajectory. This factor could be decisive, for instance, when the collaborator has support from the government in power, or when a collaborator’s interests are highly interrelated with the interest of officers from superior levels (Bryson et al 2006:50). Resources are assumed as institutional-management capacities, including technical and fiscal performance. As has been argued, there is no doubt in the ‘common wisdom’ nature of the Capital Cities agreement. They all require more technical and financial resources from the national government. However, the point is that such a collaborative initiative emerged from an important imbalance of power among the cities, manifested not only in terms of political legitimacy, but also in their institutional capacities. In the Colombian context both aspects go hand-in-hand, as institutional capacities (including financial resources) had been historically centralized in 5 capital cities (Bogotá, Barranquilla, Cali, Medellín, Cartagena) at the expense of smaller and peripheral municipalities.

When reviewing the secondary database of the National Planning Department (2016) with respect to institutional capacities, it becomes evident the gap that exists between some cities and others. This means that the amount of resources and efforts required by City A, are not the same amount than the ones required by City B or City C. Financial resources, generally, are the main interest of all partners and the most difficult to negotiate in the agenda. The diagram below illustrates the composition of the Capital Cities agreement based on so-called institutional performance4.

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4 The database is from the National Planning Department (2016). It comprises variables such as saving capability, level of investment, level of the debt, own revenues and dependence of national transferences. Technical and administrative capacities are also evaluated. According to the methodology proposed by this national agency, all cities beyond 80.00 have high institutional performance.
However, power imbalances affect the pathway to ‘common practice’ not only because of what is needed, but also because of the resources available. “Those with financial resources often behave as they have power, while those lacking them typically feel disempowered, even if they have alternative sources available” (Huxham and Vangen 2005 as cited in Purdy 2012:409). Therefore, the more financial resources or institutional capacities, the more influence in the decision-making processes. Resources, in the case of capital cities not only mean better access to solid information systems, but better technical teams which support the cities demands before national government. As stressed by a former member of the Victim’s Assistance Agency:

To make decisions in an agreement of such a level, it is necessary to have clarity on what the fundamental problem is. This was, perhaps, the crucial difference among cities. Some cities as Bogotá, Medellín, Cali and Barranquilla had identified their problems. These cities were clear in the number of victims residing in their cities, as well as their actual possibilities to accompany that process. For example, they knew if they were capable to do financial closure in delivering humanitarian aid, or if they had the ability to legalize land. Other capital cities had no information. In the same way, there were cities with technical teams that is, dependencies, secretariats, councils, dedicated to the implementation of the law. Other cities had only one advisor. This fact, limited its bargaining power, but mostly, restricted the possibilities to negotiate resources before national agencies (VARS-1).
Another example is illustrated by a member of the National Planning Department:

The case of capital cities is quite interesting, because the association of capital cities Asocapitales, used the strongest cities to advocate before national government. The exercise was led by a group of strong cities such as Medellín, Bogotá, Cali, even Pasto, with the aim of establishing arrangements with national government for the execution of law 1448. Asocapitales, also managed to give political level to the initiative by getting the support of the Ministry of Government. The Ministry in turn, provided the financial resources in such a way that smaller capital cities (San Jose del Guaviare, Leticia, Puerto Carreño, Quibdó, Pereira etc.) could attend the working tables. You can not forget that this scenario was in the political agenda of the Ministry of Government Fernando Cristo (NPDS-2).

Constrains in executing the Victim’s law encompasses a wide range of aspects that strongly differs from one to the other. Multiple issues mean multiple interests. Thus, multiple interests suggest that partners seek to obtain different outcomes from the collaborative initiative. Even though at first glance all cities have the same purpose, the truth is that each of them engaged in the agreement with diverse expectations and understandings of what they could obtain. While some cities were concerned about financial resources for delivering humanitarian aid, others prioritized the return or reallocation processes of the forced displacement population. In the same vein, some cities were struggling with the communal redress programs, while others were dealing with the construction of care and assistance centers. The following interviews quotes illustrated such differences:

- Adequate technical assistance is required to include reallocation plans in our financial annual operation plan (ICC-2).

- We require specialized training to perform the analysis of the results of the characterization of the victim population, as well as training to interoperate our information with other information systems (ICC-4).

- Financial resources for implementing physical and emotional rehabilitation measures for each of the 6,000 family units (the average cost is $ 6,000 million COP per family unit) (ICC-1).

- Financial and technical support for delivering emergency humanitarian aid for the 6,000 prioritized families, in order to avoid delays (the average cost is $ 72,000 million COP) (ICC-6).

The needs were so diverse and so distant that beyond the idea of joint working to ‘exert pressure before the national government’; there was no concrete purpose for engaging in a collaboration. As stated, the more differences in the perception of ‘what needs to be solved’, the less the need for ‘the others’ to tackle the problem. This circumstance was decisive in the structure and governance form whereby the agreement would be driven. In some way, it was a collaborative initiative that emerged through two scenarios as follows:

Scenario A: Capital cities with a common purpose: ‘more technical and financial resources for executing the Victim’s and Land Restitution law. Acting as a coalition brings better opportunities to be heard.

Scenario B: Capital cities agree on the fact that more technical and financial resources are needed, but each of them needs the resources for different purposes. In this sense, City A needs the support of City B, C, D to improve its negotiation possibilities, but does not need the support of City B, C, D to tackle the problem.
The graphs below illustrate the differences in constrains (interests) among capital cities. Chart Nº1 shows the distribution of capital cities main interest. In all cases extra-budgetary resources were needed. Chart Nº2 is a sample of two of the most relevant concerns of capital cities: solid information systems. Both charts bring to light that even though there is an agreement in the urgent needs, all cities wanted to address the problem from different perspectives.

**Chart Nº1: Distribution of capital cities main interests**


**Chart Nº2: Distribution of Information System concerns**

3.4 How much do I need the ‘others’ to tackle my problems?

The previous sections described the way in which the capital cities agreement emerged as a collaborative governance initiative embedded in two scenarios. Drawing on the conceptualization of collaborative governance, it is stressed that the case of capital cities matches with proposition 2 (problematic environment). This section now provides first insights regarding propositions 3 and 4. That is, how much exchanges could take place among cities, based on reciprocity (proposition 3) and how these exchanges in turn, establish degrees of dependency among partners (proposition 4). I mentioned first insights, because at this stage of the research it is only possible to express the collaborative archetype of the capital cities agreement. The analysis will be conducted using Kaats and Opheij (2014) forms of cooperation model.

Kaats and Opheij (2014) argue that collaborative governance initiatives can be expressed in diverse forms. Its nature is the factor that mainly contributes to shape the exchanges among partners and that explains the degree of dependency that could be established among them. In other words, the nature of collaboration determines how much one will need from the other, how much one will need to exchange with the other. This aspect is fundamental for understanding the connections created at the first stage of the collaboration and the form by which the capital cities collaboration manifested.

For this purpose, Kaats and Opheij (2014) propose a methodology, which serves to identify what they name collaborative archetypes. Such archetypes, in turn, are based on two types of correlations. The first one seeks to identify collaboration aimed at improvement or renewal. Improvement occurs when partners have done previous work and search for better and smarter processes. In this case the collaboration presents complete control of joint performance, because relations are based on direct interactions. That is, partner A always receives from partner B and vice versa. Renewal, in contrast, occurs when partners come together to see what opportunities can be obtained by working together. In this case, all partners agree that the collaboration makes sense, but do not necessarily have clearness about the yield of working together. A key aspect of renewal is that it’s guidelines lie on the quality of the process instead of the quality of the results.

The second correlation focuses on the difference between ‘exchange’ and ‘share’, which is relevant for the network governance structure. This correlation “mainly deals with the extent to which the partnership demands that the partners dare to relativize their uniqueness in exchange for synergy” (Kaats and Opheij 2014: 19). In this sense, as stated by the authors, partners share when they enter into a very close relation and seek for a constant harmonization in their work methods. In this case partner A does not make decisions or, move on without the participation of partner B. Most importantly, partners reaffirm their mutual dependency. However, there are cases where the degree of dependency is limited. Such situations lead to a relationship based on exchanges. Exchanges occur when partners focus their relations on specific outputs. For instance, services, knowledge-experience, information etc., but there is no need to move toward a radical organizational culture. Therefore, if partner A does not have much to exchange with partner B, partner A may look for another partner. Kaats and Opheij (2014) consider this scenario as a fact of co-existence instead of assimilation.

As indicated in the section above, power imbalances as well as multiple issues (or interest) creates a logic of common wisdom instead of common practice when setting the agenda among capital cities. Following this argument, this section claims on the one hand, that the nature of the Capital
Cities agreement is consistent with a renewal archetype, whilst on the other hand, that capital cities exchange instead of share. The intersection of these two aspects (renewal and exchanges) in turn, suggests that the Capital Cities agreement manifests under the form of an explorative collaboration.

Drawing upon the detailed analysis and interpretation of interviews and secondary data, as well as, my own background as an advisor for the Victim’s Assistance and Reparation agency during 2015, findings regarding the capital cities practices in light of this approach are presented below.

As mentioned capital cities agree in the need to collaborate. This was highlighted in the previous section by drawing on Huxham and Siv Vangen (2008) theoretical approach, which recognizes common wisdom as a feature. It is worth noticing that during the first rounds of negotiations in 2015, there was no certainty in the outcomes, and as such, no clearness on the competitive advantage of acting together. The term competitive is used here, to denote financial efficiency or, responsiveness capacity in the execution of law 1448. In this sense, it was “not obvious, in advance, what the partnership will actually ultimately yield; it (was) only possible to define this in terms of objectives, intentions and ambitions” (Kaats and Opheij 2014: 18). This scenario is what Kaats and Opheij (2014) consider as future oriented, therefore, pointing to renewal.

Capital cities exchange instead of share. In order to arrive at this conclusion a detailed review of the capital cities arrangements data matrix, interviews and my own experience in this process during 2015 were used. Using this data and analysis, an interpretation of the way that capital cities were interacting based on two aspects: type of arrangements and partner’s selection, are presented.

A. Type of arrangements: After the first round of negotiations in 2015, and considering the scattered concerns and interests of the capital cities, the national government (officers from the Victim’s Assistance and Reparation agency and Ministry of Government), classified the arrangements in order to facilitate the fulfilment of the process as follows: i) strategic activities with extra-budgetary resources and ii) strategic activities of co-ordination (non-financial resources). The strategic activities which, required financial resources created primary connections among capital cities and national level agencies, while strategic activities for co-ordination formed lateral connections among cities. Primary connections were all direct interactions formed to access financial resources, such as the subsidiarity system, or co-financing mechanisms. This has to do with specific outputs that do not create relations of dependency, neither among cities nor with national level agencies. This is in line with the claims of proposition 4. This is exemplified by the following empirical example:

Popayan city (represented as city F in the graph) was mainly interested in accessing the subsidiarity system for delivering humanitarian aid. Medellin, (represented as city C) was not interested in accessing the subsidiarity system, but co-financial resources from the same national level agency (national level agency I). Both created primary connections with the Victim’s Assistance and Reparation agency for specific exchanges, but there was no need to move toward a close relationship among them (Popayán and Medellin). In turn, these cities created lateral connections. Lateral connections, were those interactions established within cities for co-ordination or, operative activities, which do not imply financial resources, but serves to support and maintain the sense making of the collaboration. For instance, exchange of knowledge or good practices. In this

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5 The database contains information about the subscribed agreements of the first round of negotiations in February 2015. The matrix contains almost 130 arrangements among cities and national level agencies (UARIV, Mininterior, 2015).
particular case, the lateral connections were established among Popayán (city F), Medellín (city C) and Barranquilla (city D), for the exchange of good practices in the delivery of humanitarian aid.

This finding is quite relevant because it brings to light that, at the first stage of the capital cities cooperation initiative, there was not any high dependency relations among cities. Kaats and Opheij (2014) argue in this respect that, the less degree of dependency among partners, the less need of the other to tackle the problem (proposition 4). In other words, an exchange of knowledge is good, but not enough to “enter into an exclusive relationship, and consolidate their mutual dependency in agreements that will prevent their investment from draining away through the togetherness or fail to yield worthwhile” (Kaats and Opheij 2014: 19).

Figure N° 9: Initial relationships among cities

Source: The Author, 2017

B. Partner selection: This aspect within a collaboration refers to the selection criterion in the choice of partners. From the collaborative governance conceptualization exercise, this claim explains proposition 3, which places emphasis on the value of reciprocity. The point here is to identify the number of possible exchanges among partners in double track. If there is nothing to return, relations among partners end. According to Kaats and Opheij (2014) this is a particular feature of collaborative initiatives based on exchanges. Using the same empirical example, proposition 3 works as follows. Popayán and Medellín cities created primary connections with national level agencies. However, the lateral connection that existed in exchanges of good practices worked in one way. That is, Medellín shared their own strategies for delivering humanitarian aid to Popayán, but Popayán has nothing to return because it does not have knowledge that is relevant to Medellín. The same occurs with the lateral connection between Popayán and Barraquilla. Barraquilla was able to provide knowledge but Popayán was not. After these specific exchanges, Medellín and/or Barranquilla search for another alternative party.

As has been argued, the interaction between renewal archetype and exchanges based, collaborations lead to an explorative model of collaborative governance. In contrast to the entrepreneurial model (where the foundation of the partnership is supported by exclusivity and clearness in the scope of collaboration) or, to functional collaboration (where the principle and contractor relationship prevails), in the explorative model of collaboration partners cooperate with the aim of renewing their knowledge and creating better conditions for the fulfilment of their task (Kaats and Opheij 2014: 25). Without establishing a relationship of dependency, all parties are willing to make “collective agreements about the way they deal with a specific facet of their operations (natural goals) or, for example, about the standardized way they use information sources” (Kaats and Opheij
Reflecting on the case of the Capital Cities agreement, the following explorative mechanisms were identified.

1. Since all cities have created primary connections with agencies at the national level (looking for financial resources), lateral connections were supported in the aim of renewing their knowledge to improve their responsiveness capacity, and create better mechanisms for coordination among local and national entities. Such is the case of Medellín city that worked hand-in-hand with Bogotá city, in exchanging good practices with respect to reallocation processes. In the same vein, Medellín has provided technical support to Leticia city, and Bogotá to Bucaramanga. The explorative collaboration feature here, is the interdependence relation created between local entities. It has to do with interactions based on specific outputs. That is exchanges.

2. Accessibility and optimal conditions for interactions has been an imperative in the case of the Capital Cities agreement. On the one hand, because equality among members is rooted in Asocapitales, and on the other, with the support of the Ministry of Government, the capital cities have developed a participatory methodology for discussing technical and political agendas. The ‘rules of the game’ are based on consensus.

3. There is uncertainty in outcomes but a strong emphasis on the process. This is perhaps the main explorative collaboration feature of capital cities. Since the first round of negotiations in February 2015, capital cities have been working on building up a better horizontal coordination mechanism for executing the Victim’s and Land Restitution law. Moreover, cities have emphasized constructing a joint agenda, identifying joint planning alternatives, and moving toward a solid and formalized territorial partnership scheme.

All thing considered, this chapter concludes that beyond the politically desire and consensus of acting as a coalition, preconditions in which capital cities agreement emerged strongly affected the causal path of the collaboration. Examining first stage of such an agreement from inter-organizational learning approach, evidence that the core of collaboration lies on motivations and the extent to which capital cities were able to connect their own tactics with the collaboration strategy. As stated, the more differences in capital cities concerns or motivations, the more difficult to identify the value added of joint working.

Furthermore, collaborative governance propositions analysis brings to light the relevance of reciprocity when conducting a multi-level governance initiative. Expectations regarding what could be obtain from the ‘other’ were the key element to define the type of interactions that would take place among cities. This is perhaps the most important findings at this stage of the research. Due to the fact that financial resources (as main expectation of cities) could not be provided by their peers, primary interactions were established with national level agencies, diminishing lateral connection among cities.
Chapter 4:
Capital cities agreement: its complexities and organizational dynamics

Since this research aims to provide a further understanding of the complexities and organizational dynamics of collaborative initiatives, this chapter goes in-depth into the governance structure, hierarchies, dependencies and network trajectory of the capital cities agreement. The theoretical lenses used here are the ones of network governance and institutional collective action. Both frameworks have developed important organizational and managerial practices when dealing with public problems (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012). Considering that this research is presented as a toolkit for understanding collaborative initiatives, main insights of both theories will be presented throughout the chapter, which is structured as follows. The first section provides an overview of the conceptual foundations of two theoretical frameworks. The next section focuses on the network governance structure and integrated mechanism of decision-making. Subsequently, the chapter examines the degrees of dependencies among capital cities and, capital cities and third parties.

4.1 Network governance and Institutional Collective Action (ICA)

To provide a better understanding of how the proposed analytical framework explains the patterns of the Capital Cities agreement, this study has identified the conceptual foundations where both, network governance and institutional collective action converge. Scholars such as Feiok (2013) consider the basis of network analysis, in public affairs, to come from the fragmented jurisdictions and interactions of regional and sub-regional governments (Feiok 2013:397). Feiok argues that the decentralization processes or distribution of specialized competences across jurisdictions have created a “division or partitioning of authority in which decisions by one government in one or more specific functional area impacts other governments and other governmental functions” (Feiok 2013:397). While the strength of network governance theory lies in explaining those organizational and interdependence dynamics, institutional collective action focuses on the policy dilemmas “in which local governing units can potentially achieve better outcomes collectively rather than acting individually by reducing barriers to mutually advantageous collaborative action as represented by the transaction costs required for achieving joint projects” (Feiok 2013:399). The conceptual foundations are:

4.1.1 Policy networks analysis is more typical of the area of political science, and targets attention on the decision-making process. The core of this stream lies in power relations. Such a research tradition explores the ways in which power affects the entrance to networks, as well as the possible networks taking place around decision-making processes. In this vein, the contribution of institutional collective action could be observed in the inquiry of power asymmetries and the mechanisms which deal with the transactional costs that power asymmetries entail (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012:588).

4.2.1 Inter-organizational learning for policy implementation comes from organizational theory. This stream particularly, has developed diverse lengths ranging from co-ordination operating mechanisms to organizational models for service delivery. At the basis of this approach is the assumption that organizations strongly depend on the resources of other organizations, to create, as much as possible, networks to survive (Hjern and Porter 1981 as cited in Klijn and Koppenjan 2012:588). Thus, special attention is given to the complexities involved in delivering service, and
alliance capability. This stream is perhaps the one that has contributed the most to current collaborative governance studies.

From Kaats and Opheij’s (2012) perspective the core of acting together (inter-organizational learning) lies in the role and meaning that executives grant to alliances. This approach, concentrates its efforts on studying the harmonization of operating mechanisms within partners, based on motivations and expected outcomes. Hence, a distinction must be made between the co-ordination mechanisms required for knowledge development, and the ones required for joint supporting services (market development). Scholars such as Jansen et al. (2005), argue that the key aspects of inter-organizational learning rely on the so-called absorptive capacity. From Jansen’s perspective, the focus should remain on coordination capacities, and system capabilities. This is understood as “system capabilities that program behaviors in advance of their execution and provide a memory for handling routine situations (formalization, routinization)” as well as, in socialization capabilities (Aleksic al 2013:14). That is, created codes for communication and dominant values.

Through the lens of institutional collective action, “inter-organizational networks can be viewed as a macro phenomenon that emerges from the micro-level decisions of organizations seeking to gain access to resources and to minimize the uncertainty associated with choosing collaboration partners” (Feiok 2013:417). This is achieved by concentrating its efforts on the mechanisms through which collective dilemmas can be resolved, such as mandated agreements, contracts, constructed networks etc., mechanisms that will be covered later. Furthermore, this approach provides insights regarding partners selection dilemmas, using statements from governance network theory such as “with whom to build relational ties” (Feiok and Scholz, 2010 as cited in Feiok 2013:417).

4.1.3 Managing networks are more typical in the field of public administration, and focuses on tackling public affairs through networks. In the same stream from an inter-organizational learning approach, attention is targeted on the complexities surrounding decision-making processes, by placing emphasis on the existing networks, or the improvement of networks taking place when achieving policy outcomes. At the core of this research tradition is the assumption that “governance processes in networks are a consequence of, and are co-evolving with, the development of the (post-)modern network society” (Castells, 2000 as cited in Feiok 2013:417). In other words, this stream transcends the traditional inter-organizational analysis among state institutions to new forms of management, or the new public management. The approach examines the extent to which networks solve societal problems and build horizontal relations.

The richness of governance network theory is, in this sense, its emphasis on structural relations. As Knoke and Yang (2017) argue, the advantage of this theoretical framework lies in its understanding of pattern relations as the basis for structural practices such us perceptions, decisions, and social context, instead of abstract norms. Furthermore, these structural practices are addressed in a specific period of time and context, which provides more accurate perspectives on relational patterns. In other words, structural practices are not static and gradually transform relations across time. Such a statement opens the door to quite an important concept within governance network theory: network embeddedness. At the core of theories on social embeddedness is the assumption that inter-governmental relations are embedded in political and socio-economic structures (Feiok 2013:417). “Within these structures, dense tightly clustered network relationships reduce shirking and enhance credible commitment. Regions depend heavily on relational communities that arise from long-term reciprocal linkages among co-located organizations. Thus, social embeddedness provides another basis for creating mechanisms to mitigate ICA dilemmas” (Berardo & Scholz 2010 as cited in Feiok 2013:400).
In this respect, institutional collective action looks for horizontal, vertical and functional manifestations of collective action dilemmas. For ICA, horizontal problems arise when the size of governments (could be too large or small) affect its capacity to provide a service. Horizontal dilemmas also occur, when the service delivery generates externalities that affect the governments of different jurisdictions. Vertical dilemmas, in contrast, occurs among the different level of governments when organizations, or the governments itself, aim at the same goals. Strongly linked with vertical dilemmas, ICA explores the namely functional collective dilemmas. This type of problem comes from responsibilities (functions) fragmentation within governments. At its core, such problems “are defined by the connectedness of services, policies, and resource systems as externalities occur between functional areas and policy arenas as well as governmental units” (Feiock 2013:398).

4.2 Network governance structure and the integrated mechanism of decision-making of the Capital Cities agreement

As mentioned, the Capital Cities agreement for executing the Victim’s and Land Restitution law is rooted on the foundation of Asocapitales. As a collaborative initiative such an agreement does not have a formal established structure. On the one hand, the institutional mechanisms for consolidation and registration as an association of municipalities (territorial partnership) remain unclear. On the other, which has been argued, this agreement responds to the logic of an explorative collaboration. Thus this is the reason why there is no clarity, or a better-defined division of tasks that enable a formal organizational structure to arise. Nonetheless, there are relational patterns that deserve to be explored in terms of the governance structure, which provides important insights into the scope of the Capital Cities agreement in terms of its purpose and the sustainability of the process. Therefore, the preliminary hypothesis of this section is that the Capital Cities agreement responds to the logic of network administrative organization (NAO). It is also worth noting that the Capital Cities agreement operates integrated mechanisms for addressing institutional collective action, which is done through constructed networks.

Provan and Kenis (2008) argue that governance configuration within a network is quite important in order to determine effectiveness, and the scope of collaboration. In the same vein it is argued, “the role of management is critical for effective network governance, especially regarding the handling of tensions inherent in each governance form” (Provan and Kenis 2008:5). The governance network structure manifests in two main dimensions. The first dimension refers to the existence or not of intermediaries, or brokers. When there isn’t a broker mediating the relations among partners, the network responds to the logic of the so-called share governance structure. Under this operating logic, partners are free to interact as much as possible among themselves and lead the collaboration together. As a consequence, there is a highly decentralized form. In contrast, when the network is strongly mediated by a broker, the direct interactions among partners decreases, and then takes place only for specific exchanges, for example, information exchanges (Provan and Kenis 2008:5). In such a case, “network governance would occur by and through a single organization, acting as a highly centralized network broker, or lead organization, regarding issues that are critical for overall network maintenance and survival” (Provan and Kenis 2008:6). In between these two extremes, Provan and Kenis (2008) indicate there is a possibility to find a single organization, or partner, who can lead most of the governance process, but still allows direct interaction among members for the execution of some tasks.
The second dimension, determines whether the network is governed by the members that comprise it; or on the contrary, whether it is governed by an external actor who leads and coordinates the activities within the network. When the former occurs, that is the network is governed by itself, it is called a ‘participant governed network’. The lack of a broker coupled with a highly decentralized governing process leads to a share governance structure (explained above). The main feature of the convergence of these two dimensions (non-broker highly-decentralized governed) is that power is as much asymmetrical as possible even though there are substantive differences among members in terms of its size, capabilities, resources and performance (Provan and Kenis 2008:6).

However, when an external actor governs the network this is referred to as a network administrative organization (NAO). The presence of an external party could be a consequence of an internal consensus decision, for instance, made in order to decrease transactional costs associated with co-ordination roles. Or it can be imposed, due to the characteristics and purposes of the network. This should not be confused with lead governance structures. Even though, a single member manages the main activities regarding co-ordination and decision-making in a NAO, this partner (or broker) is external and not only supports co-ordination activities, but also sustains the network activity. As Provan and Kenis (2008) stress, “this latter form may be used as a mechanism for enhancing network legitimacy, dealing with unique and complex network-level problems and issues, and reducing the complexity of shared governance. These more formalized NAOs typically have board structures that include all or a subset of network members” (Evan and Olk 1990 as cited in Provan and Kenis 2008:6). The figures below illustrate the differences in governance structure patterns.

![Figure Nº 10: Network governance structure modes](source: Kenis and Provan (2008))

Drawing upon empirical findings, this study inferred that capital cities respond to the logic of a network administrative organization (NAO). The following statements support such an argument based on two aspects: legitimacy and stability.

4.2.1 Legitimacy is one of the most discussed points of tension in network governance studies as it can manifest inside and outside the network. Internal legitimacy has more impact in collaborations in the area of business. However, external legitimacy has proved to be a determinant for recognizing that “the network is an entity in its own right, and not simply a group of organizations that occasionally get together to discuss common concerns” (Provan and Kenis 2008:6). Gaining legitimacy has been one of the roles that the Ministry of Government has been playing in the case of capital cities. It should not be forgotten that the capital cities agreement emerged from a political scenario, Asocapitales. Nor can it be forgotten that boosting the implementation of law 1448 was a priority for the Ministry of Government’s political agenda, as mentioned by an interviewer cited in Chapter 3.
The evidence in this matter suggests that the commitment and high leadership role of such a Ministry has been crucial in giving strength and meaning to the collaboration, before other entities at a national level. It also builds trust among members to maintain the initiative and encourage interaction. Since 2015 the Ministry of Government has attended the working tables, while mobilizing the capital cities agenda before the relevant national entities. This in turn, has facilitated the monitoring of bilateral arrangements among capital cities and national agencies.

4.2.2 Stability of the network depends highly on the governance structure taking place. Scholars such as Kapucu and Van Wart (2006) argue that the more flexibility in network structure, the easier to adapt the collaboration to new challenges. Flexibility also allows members to develop as much as possible ties within the network, as needs change. Nonetheless, stability is strongly linked with legitimacy, and when a governance structure is flexible, legitimacy tends to decrease. Provan and Kenis (2008) argue that “the most obvious mechanism for maintaining stability is the formation of a formal hierarchy...NAO-governed networks are likely to be much more formalized, emphasizing the stability end of the continuum. NAO structures are typically either imposed on participants, as with government broker entities, or they are established most often after networks have started to mature” (Provan and Kenis 2008:17).

Stability in the case of the Capital Cities agreement is strongly linked with the network administrative structure, where the Ministry of Government acts as the external broker. As has been argued, the Ministry of Government has played an important role guarantying external legitimacy. However, a significant finding of this study shows that, the Ministry of Government is providing substantial administrative support for the operation of the agreement. In other words, without the commitment and accompaniment of this national level agency, such collaboration would not be possible, as demonstrated in the following interview material:

The Ministry of Government has financed each of the meetings of capital cities. This financial support ranging from arranging the meeting place, to the payment of flight tickets, lodging, food etc., of the participating cities in the process. It was evident that if these expenses were not covered, cities such as Mocoa, Quibdó, Manizales, in short, the majority would not be able to attend. Due to capital cities low financial capacity, there is no place for this type of operating expenses. Furthermore, there is no way to consider extra-budgetary resources for our meetings (VARS-2).

However, this legitimacy and administrative stability that the Ministry of Government is providing needs to be approached carefully. Beyond such advantages (legitimacy and stability), network administrative organizations also have important risks. This study finds that NAO's require high-level capacities, as well as high-level consensus among its members in order to survive. Otherwise, if the administrative organization decides to leave the process, the probability that the network maintains its activity as a collaboration decreases. This is one of the most relevant results arising from the interview material and secondary data collected.

It is evident, that the Ministry of Government not only has provided the above mentioned administrative and legitimacy support to this collaborative initiative, but also, has helped to develop the methodologies by which capital cities are building up the political agenda. In the same vein, such a ministry has provided technical support for capital cities co-ordination mechanism, while guarantying equilibrium among the cities’ interests and bargaining capacity. To some extent, the Ministry of Government has also played an important role, for instance, in negotiating and finding alternatives for the capital cities to move toward a solid and formalized association before the National Planning Department. Thus the question remains, what would happen if the Ministry of Government leaves the process?
A review of the network governance structure, allows for an easier inquiry into the integrated decision-making mechanism. The crucial role that the Ministry of Government has played in the capital cities collaborative initiative has been a determinant in building up decision-making processes. Institutional collective action approaches suggest that the transactional costs involved in a self-governed network are less than the ones involved when collaborative arrangements are guided through a third party (in this case a national level government agency) (Feiok 2013:401). Feiok (2013) argues that share governance structure networks develop the so-called informal network for an integrated decision-making mechanism, which refers to interactions among members without central planning. These informal interactions generate capacity within the network for resolving collective dilemmas. Similarly, Axelrod (1984) states, “repeated face-to-face interaction is especially important in order for norms of reciprocity to develop and cooperative agreements to form (Axelrod, 1984 as cited in Feiok 2013: 402).

However, matters differ when it comes to NAO governance structures. Although the role of the Ministry of Government is not imposed, capital cities have attributed to it the power to intervene and deal with collective dilemmas, or resolve fragmentation problems. Partly because the collaboration, as previously mentioned, has yet to develop an internal organizational structure, or a clear division of tasks. Institutional collective action in this respect delegates authority, which leads to the namely constructed network integrated mechanism for decision-making. This mechanism delegates power in order to structure bilateral and multilateral relationships, while providing funds and incentives for engaging in the collaboration (Feiok 2013).

When the collaboration is in its first stage the constructed network mechanism works, because it allows members to prepare for the next steps. However, when the constructed network becomes the adopted operation mechanism in the collaboration, the transactional costs related with information exchanges, bargaining, bilateral and multilateral arrangements, are at its highest. Such a mechanism encompasses the risks of “not being able to coordinate on a course of action (incoordination); not being able to agree to a division of costs despite agreeing on the action (division); or risk that once action is agreed upon, others may renege or free ride (defection)” because this is the job of the third party (Feiok 2013: 408).

Perhaps the most significant finding in this matter is that the administrative network governance structure, as well as the contract network integrated mechanism for decision-making adopted, limits the possibility to create the desired horizontal co-ordination structure (proposition 1), as illustrated in this quote of NPDS-1:

One of the most complex issues in relation to territorial schemes, particularly in the case of capital cities, has to do with the forms of internal organization. Not only because there is not an elaboration of internal statutes that bound their functions, as well as the scope of action that cities have as an association, but in the capacity to develop management and monitoring mechanisms. I have accompanied some meetings of capital cities. Sometimes 10 cities attended the working tables, sometimes 6, and the tasks resulting from this tables are left to the Ministry of Government, or granted to other entities of the national order, instead of boosting initiatives within the collaboration (NPD-1).

A possible explanation for this is found in Knoke and Yang’s (2008) hypothesis that considers the evolution of the network structure highly dependent on the changes in the relational form and content within the network. Both elements (form and content) go hand-in-hand in practice, but can
be analytically distinguishable (Knoke and Yang 2008:8). Content encompasses drivers and motivations covered in Chapter 3. Forms, on the other hand, “are modes of interaction through which specific contents attain social reality” (Knoke and Yang 2008:8). In this sense, content and modes are so intrinsically related that they determine the governance structure. In Chapter 3 it was stated that capital cities create primary connections with national level agencies and lateral connections among them. Partly, because the collaboration responds to the logic of an explorative initiative, but mainly, because content (motivations) is linked to national level agencies instead of being linked to another capital city in order to achieve goals. For instance, Popayán required a direct or primary connection with the Victim’s Assistance and Reparation Agency for accessing subsidiarity benefits. The content here is the ‘need of financial resources’ and the form is ‘a direct tie’ (connection) between Popayán and the Victim’s Assistance and Reparation Agency. The diagram below illustrates the current network governance structure of the Capital Cities agreement.

Figure Nº 11: Capital cities network governance structure

![Diagram of Capital Cities Network Governance Structure](source: Kenis and Provan 2008)

The role of the Ministry of Government is so strong that not only do they provide the administrative and coordination mechanism for sustaining the collaboration, but they also become the broker by which bilateral arrangements are monitored and implemented. Interview material and secondary data also illustrate that the participation of the Ministry of Government contributes to mitigating power asymmetries among cities. That is, it blurs the differences in institutional capacities when it comes to negotiating a political agenda. Nonetheless, this role is not enough to foster a nexus among cities.

4.3 Capital cities ties and nodes, the key to a long-run collaboration

Whilst considering the Capital Cities agreement as a network administrative organization; this section goes in-depth into the form-content dichotomy. The purpose here is to explore the meaning of the relations established among cities, and how these relations affect the network trajectory. Returning to the collaborative governance conceptualization, this section reviews proposition 3, that is collaboration based on reciprocity, and proposition 4, which suggests that capital cities exchange instead of share (explained in Chapter 3). Moreover, this analysis offers insights into the future prospects of such a collaborative initiative.

In December 2015, a year after the first round of negotiations, the panorama of the capital cities collaboration was still vague. Although this scenario allowed some cities to access technical assistance or facilitate a path for accessing financial resources (co-financing or subsidiarity systems), for other cities the scenario did not turn out to be sufficiently attractive. By the end of 2015, 15 of
the 30 capital cities were still in the process. Why did this occur? Interview material suggests that expectations were not met. On the one hand, national level agencies could not have complied with all commitments undertaken, and on the other hand, not all cities saw their interests reflected in the agenda. The diagram below shows some quotes that support this claim.

Figure No 12: Interview material

Source: The Author, 2017. Based on interview material

Nevertheless, when conducting a form-content dichotomy analysis, it becomes evident that weakness within the collaboration relies on the emergence of triad and dyad ties among cities, not strongly associated with political will or failures in the development of the capital cities agreement. As has been argued, the advantage of the network governance theory is that it goes a step further in addressing the so-called relational content. That is, the reason relations occur (Burt 1983 as cited in Knoke and Yang 2008: 8). In other words, what this exercise explores is why two or three cities create relationships and why others do not. First the context in which this analysis was conducted is addressed. Thereafter, a portrayal of the nexus among cities that still are in the process is presented.

In January 2016 the Ministry of Government, again, boosted the Capital Cities agreement. By this time, 10 cities were actively participating in the process. Although the concerns regarding the execution of the Victim’s law were still the same, the capital cities were strongly convinced of the need of moving toward a solid body of governance. The possibility to act as an association of municipalities (territorial partnership figure proposed in the Land Use and Management law) gained strength. One again, with the support of the Ministry of Government, a new agenda was on the table. Such an agenda not only encompassed the needs related to the implementation of the law 1448, but also considered the methodology development for a horizontal coordination alternative between cities. Knowledge management, systematization of good practices, institutional strengthening for horizontal co-operation, and horizontal information exchanges became a priority on the agenda. The meetings that took place in 2016 fostered the creation of primary connections among cities. It is worth noting that cities had previously created primary connections however these were with national level agencies. The Ministry of Government, in its role as network administrator, facilitated the labour of identifying who would exchange with whom.

In the previous section it was already stated that the Capital Cities agreement responds to the governance structure of NAO. Drawing upon secondary data and interviewer material, in this
The research recreated the form-content dichotomy in the case of capital cities. Such a simulation of exchanges builds on the following fundamental notions within network analysis: nodes, ties, content, dyad, triad (Forbidden triad). Networks structure is the graphical representation of “a structure composed of a set of actors, some of whose members are connected by a set of one or more relations” (Knoke and Yang 2008: 5). Each actor is graphically recognized as a node. The nexus among these nodes are illustrated as ties (Knoke and Yang 2008: 5). Due to the fact that all relations are motivated by different content, not all members need to be totally connected. When the relation takes place between two nodes this is referred to as dyad. When the relation includes three nodes we refer to it as triad (Knoke and Yang 2008: 5). This in turn means that within a network structure it is possible to find strong ties, weak ties or absent ties.

The sampling units are the 10 capital cities actively engaged in the collaboration. The content is assumed as main capital cities interest or motivation. The form or interactions comes from secondary data and interpreted interview material.

4.3.1 From concerns to relational content:

As has been argued, all relations among actors are based on content (motivations) and form (modes of interactions) (Burt 1983 as cited in Knoke and Yang 2008: 8). The way in which relations take place highly depend on the motivations, on what is needed from the other. City A creates links with City B to the extent necessary for the benefit of both cities. Such links can be categorized in terms of intensity and direction. Intensity refers to the frequency or the strength of the interaction (Knoke and Yang 2008: 5). Direction refers to the course of interaction among actors, to the sequence of links connecting a sequence of individuals (Knoke and Yang 2008: 5). The operational logic, in this sense, is that cities create connections to one another on the basis of who represents added value. This value could be in terms of knowledge, information, procedures etc. The table below illustrates the capital cities main interest and institutional performance.

### Table N° 3: Capital cities contents

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<th>Institutional Performance</th>
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<td>Strengthening schemes of reallocation processes</td>
<td>Satisfactory Institutional Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medellín</td>
<td>De-concentration of humanitarian aid delivery</td>
<td>High Institutional Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartagena</td>
<td>Strengthening the humanitarian aid delivery scheme</td>
<td>Satisfactory Institutional Performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>Strength economic stabilization through employability or entrepreneurship for victim population</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucaramanga</td>
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<td>Institutional offer for implementing communal redress programs</td>
<td>Low Institutional Performance</td>
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<td>Barranquilla</td>
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Concrete institutional offer for victim population

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<th>City</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibagué</td>
<td>High Institutional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leticia</td>
<td>Low Institutional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villavicencio</td>
<td>Satisfactory Institutional Performance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The diagram below shows the capital cities connections. Blue arrows simulate the direction of primary connections based on interests and experience. Red arrows represent actual connections. One way arrows denote an interchange without return. Two way arrows denote reciprocity (yellow).

Figure Nº 13: Capital cities interest connections


This exercise demonstrates that there are few primary connections among capital cities. Whether blue or red arrows, it is clear that not all member within the network are interconnected or can be interconnected. The reason is that interests among actors remain different, so there is no need to interact with all members within the network. In short, there is not much to exchange.

Empirical evidence also suggests that relations are not constructed on the basis of reciprocity. Beyond the cases of Bogotá-Medellín and Barranquilla-Medellín (yellow arrows) where both partners expected to exchanges, connections among other cities are usually one-way. Such is the case of the bilateral relation established between Medellín and Leticia. Looking at the red and yellow arrows (actual interconnections) Medellín, Bogotá and Barranquilla are the ones clearly connected, and whose exchanges are based in double track. Medellín transfers knowledge with respect to reallocation processes to Bogotá. Bogotá in return, provides knowledge and experience regarding
humanitarian aid delivery schemes. However, when looking at the bilateral relation between Medellín and Leticia, it is possible to see that while Medellín is giving feedback with respect to reallocation processes, Leticia has nothing to return to Medellín.

The network theory literature recognizes such a situation as a network constructed by dyads and triads, which in turn generates structural holes (Knoke and Yang 2008: 10). The triad being Bogotá, Medellín, and Barranquilla. The dyads are constituted by all possible bilateral connections such as Cali-Medellín, Bogotá-Barranquilla, Bogotá-Cali, and Medellín-Leticia. The structural holes refer to a lack of connections between nodes. In this case, the lack of direct connections among some cities. Two explanations can be provided at this point.

**Figure Nº 14: Capital cities relational content**


The first relies on proposition 3, which states collaboration is based on reciprocity. That is, dyads or triads are constructed depending on what could be exchanged (relational content), and of what could be obtained from the other. The three, more active members, within the collaboration (Bogotá, Medellín and Barranquilla) created dyads and triads based on their institutional capacity and technical experience in implementing the Victim's law. It is worth noting that Bogotá, Medellín and Barranquilla have high institutional performance. Such institutional capacity places them in a privileged position within the collaboration and thus, allows them to create as many possible relational connections. Besides the dyad formed between Medellín and Leticia, cities categorized with satisfactory or low institutional performance had not created enough connections among them. Power imbalances (in terms of institutional capacity) is the aspect that contributed the most to this situation.

The second explanation, which is strongly related with proposition 3, denotes that once the exchange has taken place, the level of dependency of the cities decrease. This means, that cities enter in a co-existing relation while establishing new dyads or triads with new partners (proposition 4). An empirical sample of this situation is the dyad formed between Medellín and Leticia. As soon as Medellín provided the technical assistance to Leticia, it looked for other partner, which would bring in more added value, in this case, Bogotá and Barranquilla. Hence, Medellín merely co-existed with Leticia.
Moreover, findings here suggest that the only triad created, emerged among the three cities with high institutional performance. Its privileged position within the collaboration (more technical and financial resources, solid information systems, direct dialogue with national entities when representing the collaboration externally) allows them to establish strong ties, and to develop their own internal agenda. A tie is considered strong when there is frequency in the exchanges. Partners here can enter into a very close relationship. A tie is considered weak when it serves to approach other members across the network but interchanges are not frequent (Ehrmann et al. 2013).

The point here is that, while Bogotá, Medellín, and Barranquilla have been strengthening their capacity to act collectively, other cities such as Villavicencio, Ibagué and Cúcuta do not find the added value of acting together. In terms of a relational content analysis, these cities have not found the interaction whereby content attains reality. From the following quote it is possible to infer that the expectation of reciprocity becomes a key element for long-run collaborations, i.e. for strong ties.

Bogotá also wants to be recognized, we think we have many things to say regarding the implementation of law 1448. We have developed important schemes to assistance victims of sexual violence, victims of public forces, as well as victims who wish to return to the country. We met together with Medellín and Barranquilla, because we are aware that we can elaborate strategies. We know it is also possible to have political incidence. We want others cities who have same concerns to be able to strengthen their capacities (ICC-3).
Once again, it is evident that the capital cities agreement responds to the logic of common wisdom, whilst the path toward a common practice remains unclear. Distance among cities’ interest, power imbalances, the lack of a solid co-ordination mechanism and uncertainty in outcomes, have endorsed the rise of structural holes while creating dyads and triads. In the same vein, these dyads and triads have been formed between the same groups of cities (Bogotá, Medellín, Barranquilla, and Cali). Knoke and Yang (2008) for instance, argue that the substantial presence of structural holes in a network deserves special attention. The existence of such structural holes clearly denotes the emergence of hierarchically organized internal groups. This means that there is tendency for a boundary to develop within the network between active and passive members. The active members may tend to cluster around the central core, attend meetings, debate policy and pursue goal accomplishment. The passive members may tend to be little more than names on the membership rolls, recipients of newsletters and payers of dues (Human and Provan, 2000 as cited in (Knoke and Yang 2008: 10).

When this occurs, the trajectory of the network rapidly changes. The more structural holes, the more loosely coupled the network (Knoke and Yang 2008: 11). Thus, the probability of building up a horizontal co-operation mechanism decreases. Another relevant finding is that active members within a network tend to act as new brokers. Even though the capital cities agreement responds to the logic of a network administrative organization (Ministry of Government), Medellín, Barranquilla, and Bogotá have created a new centralized power. Their privileged position and high institutional capacities illustrate that there is high-stake but low interdependence. High stake manifests in the strong position that there is a social problem that needs to be solved (common wisdom). Low interdependence manifests in the belief that partners are not strong enough (not potential participant) to tackle the problem.
Chapter 5: ¿Does collaboration solve all the problems it tackles?

To answer the question of ¿In what ways does the policy approach regarding collaborative governance influence local governments’ cooperation initiatives in Colombia? the research addressed the case of capital cities for implementing Victim’s and Land Restitution law. This empirical case study provided shed insights of those aspects that any collaborative initiative entails, and that have not been fully explore by the national government to empirically demonstrated the public value of acting together. To present main conclusions with respect to each categorized and conceptualized data, findings regarding the the two research subquestions will be address first. Subsequently, remarks with respect to main research question will be presented.

a. Motivations affect the development of a collaborative ambition

To understand how motives (or interests) affect the development of a collaborative ambition, this research used the lenses of inter-organization learning theory. Findings in this phase of the study demonstrated that capital cities agreements responds to the logic of common wisdom, but the path toward common practice remains vague.

Even though local governments agree on the need to come together to exert pressure before the national government as a collective, the internal motives (or concerns) were so diverse and distant that each city had a different expectation and understanding of what could be obtained from the collaboration. Hence, local governments did not succeed in their attempt to elaborate a logical connection among its individual concerns and the capital cities strategy. This misapprehension of how the agreement contributes to tackling its problems led to a dynamic based on ‘product exchanges’, diminishing the probabilities of cities to engage in a long-term commitment, at least in practice.

A contribution of this paper is to recognize that the logic of common wisdom led to the establishment of primary connections among cities and national level agencies, while maintaining secondary connections among them. This automatically affected the trajectory of the collaboration, and instead of creating a path toward horizontal co-operation mechanisms; it shaped occasional exchanges between cities. The third proposition denoted that for collaboration to make sense reciprocity must be present. If there are only a few exchanges partners rarely enter into a close, or at least interdependent relation that maintains the sense of joint working. Such is the case of privileged cities (Bogotá, Medellín, Barranquilla) that after providing technical assistance were unable to receive anything in return. This in turn indicated that cities with less technical and financial capacity become unattractive partners.

b. Relations established among local entities affect the collaborative network trajectory

To understand the ways in which preliminary relations establish among local governments affect the Capital Cities agreement trajectory, the paper uses the lenses of network governance and institutional collective action. The main contribution of relational content analysis was to identify that such a collaboration had created few dyads and one solid triad, reinforcing the lack of interactions among all cities. In this sense, cities are co-existing but not sharing. Moreover, those bilateral interconnections are dividing the internal structure between active and passive members,
diminishing the possibility of the network to pursue its goals. Once again, if there is nothing to exchange the public added value for acting together remains unclear.

Main principals of institutional collective action, allowed also to identify that the transactional cost involved in a network administrative organization structure are higher that the ones of a share governance network structure. Although the role of the Ministry of Government as an administrator of the agreement guarantee the financial support of the collaboration, this dynamic progressively limited local government’s capacities to develop the horizontal co-operation mechanism they were looking for. Empirical and secondary data reveals that working tables carried out during 2016, were not enough to building up such a horizontal operating mechanism.

Further analysis will be needed to examine the extent to which not sharing a geographical position reinforced the administrator role of the Ministry of Government. Nonetheless, it is clear that the role of such an entity as the broker created, somehow or other, a strong dependency from cities to the Ministry of Government. If for some reason, for instance change in government, such an entity cannot continue accompanying the agreement, the collaboration could rapidly finishes. It is worth recalling that capital cities do not have extra budgetary resources to drive the collaboration. Thus, will be difficult to come together.

¿In what ways does the policy approach regarding collaborative governance influence local governments’ cooperation initiatives in Colombia?

Collaborative governance conceptualization (proposition exercise) denoted that the appearance of a co-operating mechanism is a consequence of an organizational learning process instead of merely an administrative legal means. Collaboration requires on the one hand, organizational capacities for authorities to solve problems collectively, and on the other, the development of mechanisms for mitigating possible institutional collective dilemmas. It is worth noting that collective dilemmas in public policy affairs do not only denote conflict of interest among governments, but also the connectedness for these local entities to provide services. The more fragmentation there is in the competences granted to local governments, the more difficult it becomes to provide a service collectively.

When looking at the policy framework development, it is clear that seven-years after the adoption of the Land Use and Management law, the national government has neither regulated nor applied the mechanisms by which local authorities can implement social policies together. On the one hand, the legal means to constitute a partnership scheme remains vague. This automatically depresses the momentum of local governments to constitute a collaboration. On the other hand, engaging in a collaboration does not mean access to financial or technical resources. To date, the national government has not established the legal means by which associations or collaborations can receive and execute resources jointly. Nor is the association prioritized, for example, to access royalties. This strongly discourages local entities from getting involved in a collaboration.

Without a solid and empirical foundation of how collaborative governance improves local practices, multi-level governance was quickly deployed from the urban realm to social policies. In a way, it was transformed into a ‘one-size-fits-all’ recipe to solve structural problems, such as low technical and financial resources, poverty and inequality, low innovation and poor economies of scale etc. However, critically the national government has focused on the politically correct and acceptable speech of collaboration, whilst ignoring key components of collaboration. That is power
imbalances, motivations and organizational capacities. The Capital Cities agreement is an empirical case, which illustrates that working together can be even more challenging than trying to solve a public problem individually.

In this sense, the adoption of territorial partnerships (Land Use and Management law) as a strategy to boost the Victim’s and Land Restitution law seems to be inconsistent. As illustrated in Chapter 2, law 1448 granted specific duties to each level of government, partly, because the aim of the law was to guarantee individual assistance and redress to the victim population. This makes the implementation of such a law evidently vertical. In other words, it is not clear how partnership schemes (as the legal means of collaboration among local governments) could contribute to delivering humanitarian aid, affiliation process to social security systems, safeguard access to education, implement some of the collective reparation measures etc. Without establishing the criteria for the distribution of competences and operating resources, the probability of the collaboration succeeding decreases.

It is clear that the normative development with respect to collaborative governance in Colombia, is not consistent and comprehensive enough to influence the practices of collaboration. The public value of acting together comes in essence from the gradual capacity of local governments to connect fragmented responsibilities with a potential collaborative strategy. Although the paper does not aim to deny the advantages of cross sector collaboration in public management, it is claimed that collaboration does not solve all problems it tackles.
References


