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**Challenges of illegal crops substitution programs toward
Local Economic Development
Catatumbo, Colombian case (2014-2016)**

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Contents

| | |
|-------------------------------|----|
| List of Tables | 4 |
| List of Maps | 4 |
| ACYRONIMS | 4 |
| Abstract | 6 |
| Relevant to Development | 6 |
| Keywords | 7 |
| | |
| Chapter I Introduction | 8 |
| 1.1 Research Question | 10 |
| 1.2 Sub-Questions | 10 |
| 1.3 Methodology | 10 |
| 1.3.1 Case Study Method | 10 |
| 1.3.2 Data collection methods | 11 |
| 1.4 Structure of the Paper | 12 |

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Chapter II Local Economic Development, a theoretical framework | 13 |
| 2.1 LED in weak context | 16 |
| 2.2 Drug production as local economy | 17 |
| 2.3 Illegal value chain | 20 |
| 2.4 Illegal actors, networks and alliances | 21 |
| 2.5 Economic transition | 22 |
| | |
| Chapter III Illicit crop substitution, Colombian Context | 23 |
| 3.1 Former experiences | 27 |
| 3.2 Forced eradication, a measure in question | 28 |
| | |
| Chapter IV: Substitution of illicit crops in Catatumbo (2014-2016) | 29 |
| 4.1 An overview of Catatumbo region | 29 |
| 4.2 Substitution in fragile context | 31 |
| 4.3 Substitution and LED | 34 |
| 4.4 A post-conflict model | 35 |
| | |
| Chapter V: Towards LED in fragile context, my findings | 37 |
| | |
| Chapter VI: Conclusions | 40 |
| References | 42 |
| List of Appendix | 43 |
| Semi Structure interview Guide | 43 |

List of Tables

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Table 1.1 Unmet basic needs in Catatumbo | 30 |
| Table 1.2 Cultivated hectares in Catatumbo 2008 to 2016 | 31 |
| Table 1.3 Drug market in 2014, 2015, 2016 | 33 |

List of Maps

| | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Map 1.1 Map of density of coca cultivation in Colombia 2012 – 2016 | 24 |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----|

List of Appendices

| | |
|----------------------------------------------|----|
| Appendix 1.1 Semi-structured interview guide | 45 |
|----------------------------------------------|----|

List of Acronyms

| | |
|-------|--------------------------------------------------|
| CBO | Community Based Organisation |
| DANE | National Administrative Department of Statistics |
| DPS | Social Prosperity Department |
| FARC | Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia |
| LED | Local Economic Development |
| SIMCI | Integrated Illicit Crops Monitoring System |
| UNODC | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |

Acknowledgement

I started this academic journey inspired by a deep need to understand from other perspectives the complex context in Colombia, my country. Guided for a personal and professional motivation, I chose the topic of my Research Paper which had several adjustments to get the result that I wanted. This would not have been possible without the commitment, unconditional support and addressing of my supervisor, Georgina Gomez, who was beyond everything and the second reader, Peter Knorringa, who challenged me throughout this research.

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Abstract

This paper investigates Local Economic Development in fragile contexts, in Catatumbo, Colombia. It aims to explore In what ways did substitution programs affect the transit from an illegal local economy to a legal economy?. It examines three key elements of LED to understand from a theoretical framework, the challenges in the transitional process to a legal economy in a context characterized by abandonment of state and prolonged internal conflict.

It employs qualitative methodology and case study approach. Also it takes my own experience as a source of information, since I worked within the government for 8 years on matters relating to poverty and attention to victims of violence. The overall research finding is a fragile context is the ideal scenario for the strengthening of illegal activities that mobilize the local economy through a value chain, generating income stability and development opportunities in a region with unsatisfied basic needs. Hence, investment in social welfare should be complementary to the development of alternative projects. Also, the articulation and coordination of different actors allows to broaden the impact of the interventions and mainly to strengthen the value chains of the new productive activities, in such a way that it is prevented from returning to illicit activities. In that sense, the role of government in strategic coordination is fundamental to recover its legitimacy in places where it has not had control for years.

Relevant to Development

My personal motivation with this subject and the case study selected is related with the historic moment of Colombia in terms of peace building and territorial transformation. The main findings obtained in the analysis of theoretical framework, Catatumbo strategy as a case study, internal documents of government, reports, interviews and my own experience, may be a contribution to understand a set of conditions to promote LED in weak contexts.

The theoretical and practical reflection of this Research Paper provide useful insights to policy-makers who have been charged with the difficult task of developing appropriate strategies dealing with substitution of illegal crops. Taking to account interventions such as Catatumbo strategy is an important contribution to the decision-making process and the design of public policy, especially in a moment as important and decisive as the one that Colombia experiences after the signing of the peace with the guerrilla of the FARC, with which the State sustained a war for more than 50 years. As this region is one of the most critical within the context of violence and drug trafficking, it is a key region and a priority for different types of interventions.

Within the 6 points of the Agreement, the point 4 deals specifically with: "Solution to the problem of illicit drugs" which includes the substitution of illicit crops in order to seek alternatives to improve the welfare conditions of communities in the affected territories. Thus, the emphasis is on the structural transformation of rural areas through "comprehensive development plans with the participation of communities in the design, execution and evaluation of environmental replacement and recovery programs for the areas affected by crops".

Given the above, Catatumbo is one of the prioritized areas for the implementation of these substitution programs with a new approach; reason why I chose it as a case study, taking into account the relevance of the strategy under investigation, as a basis for the construction of a new model that is replicable to municipalities with similar conditions.

Keywords:

Local Development, Local Economic Development, Bottom-up, Weak States, Illegal Economy, Illicit Crops, Colombia, Catatumbo, fragile context, local economy

Chapter 1

Introduction

Fostering Local Economic Development, hereafter is called LED, in weak context has become a major challenge for developing countries. Adverse conditions related to violent situations, poverty, corruption, geographic location, among others, have resulted in a weak state incapable of providing public goods and services; as well as respond to the demands and needs of citizens.

In the specific case of countries with prolonged armed conflict, the lack of legitimacy of the State has also led to the loss of confidence of citizens, victims of conflict and abandonment of the State that does not have the capacity to protect them (Rotberg, 2003:1).

In this fragile context, illegal economies have found the ideal environment to grow and consolidate as local economies. The ecosystem surrounding illicit activities provides communities with not only employment opportunities and fixed incomes, but also infrastructure and some public services in which the State does not respond. where the state has not fulfilled its minimum function of providing public goods, security and sovereignty, as well as basic infrastructure (Desch, 1996:241).

Since the end of the 1990s, Colombia has been fighting against drug trafficking, according with an international policy led by US. As one of the main producers of cocaine in the world, Colombia has carried out actions to affect the production and marketing chain of cocaine such as seizures of drugs, interdiction efforts by targeting drug dealers, destruction of coca laboratories, eradication of illicit crops, among others.

The abandonment and weakness of the State in certain regions, as a result of an armed conflict for more than 50 years, have allowed the increase of illegal activities related to the production of cocaine, which became the base of their local economy. The generation of employment, improvements in infrastructure, use of local capacity and participation of diverse actors, have been determining factors in the consolidation of illegal economy.

The impact of prolonged internal conflict on local development is deep in every level, thereby curbing development and weakens the economy dramatically. Violence threatens traditional agricultural activities, intensifies security problems, lack of infrastructure and weakens State actions, restricting the presence of local and national institutions (Cowen and Coyne, 2005). Under these conditions, the process of reconstruction of the territory entails a big effort from different stakeholders, leading to the strengthening of local capacity.

The rise of coca economy, found in these regions the ideal conditions for cultivation of coca leaf, being the main and first activity in the production value chain. Faced with the lack of economic opportunities, coca crops were spread and consolidated in different rural areas of the country, becoming sowing and processing a source of income and a means of survival for communities.

To deal with this situation, the Colombian government has implemented several strategies, with the purpose of achieving the transition from an illegal to a legal economy. However, in spite of many efforts, the substitution programs have not achieved the expected results, and

for the grower families, there are still no viable and sustainable alternatives offered by the State that allow them to gradually dissociate themselves from the coca economy, allowing a transitional process, in which they do not lose their livelihoods, which could exacerbate the situation of vulnerability.

Bearing in mind this scenario, I intend to answer the question: ***In what ways did substitution programs affect the transit from an illegal local economy to a legal economy?*** For the above, I am going to analyse how an illegal activity as coca crops became a local economy, taking the theoretical framework of Local Economic Development and Weak States in terms of use of local capacity, local resources, productive system and economic relations along the value chain in a fragile context. As well as, this paper aims at improving our understanding about the complex dynamics of coca economy and how it contributes to local economic development. Moreover, how a crop substitution strategy should have the accurate components to replace illegal economy with a productive activity that is profitable and sustainable for families and fostering local development.

These reflections tackle several perspectives in this transitional process. Theoretically, the analysis is underpinned by local development theory, identifying aspects such as the good use of local capacity, in terms of knowledge, human capital, productive vocation, natural resources, taking advantage of the opportunity to diversify and contribute to economic growth. Other aspects such as, participation and mobilization of different local actors from the public and private sector and civil society working together toward common development objective.

In order to answer these research questions, I employ case study as a methodology and selected the substitution strategy implemented in Catatumbo, Colombia between 2014 and 2016. I have chosen Catatumbo region mainly for three reasons. The first is because its economy is representative of any local economy that lives on coca production; second, for being a strategic region as corridor of drug trafficking networks given its geographical location; and finally, because the strategy carried out was one of the main inputs for the negotiation of point 4 of the Peace Agreement with the FARC guerrilla, which is about substitution of illicit crops.

Catatumbo located in the department of Norte de Santander, on the Venezuelan border, is one of the regions with the highest concentration of coca crops, characterized by the historical abandonment of the state that is evidenced by deficiency of provision of public goods and services, unsatisfied basic needs, absence of industrial activities, lack of infrastructure, among many others. Its geographic location has contributed to consolidating of illegal trafficking networks within Colombia and also to Venezuela. This, in turn, has generated the presence of armed groups and organized crime linked to the coca trade.

The challenges faced by the implementation of substitution illicit crops strategies get worse with a weak state as Colombian. As the experience has showed, without appropriate conditions, the negative effect on local economy and on the sectors involved cannot be counteract. Therefore, new approach is needed to enhance at transforming illicit economies.

The previous experiences implemented since Plan Colombia in 1998 have demonstrated that substitution cannot be considered just an economic process, but rather understand is a transformation of the territory, involving different actors and social, political and cultural dynamics.

Finally, my personal motivation with this research paper is to highlight some necessary conditions for driving a transitional process from illegal to legal economy in a marginalized region as Catatumbo.

1.1 Research Question

This paper aims to response at the following question: In what ways did substitution programs affect the transit from an illegal local economy to a legal economy? For the above, I am addressing as a case study the strategy of substitution illicit crops implemented in Catatumbo between 2014 and 2016, to identify achievements and failures in the transitional process.

1.2 Subquestions

This question has been divided into two subquestions related with economic issues,

- a. In what ways a weak state can affect LED in Catatumbo region?
- b. To what extent the international pressure by the United States led Colombia to carry out actions without taking into account the local context?

1.3 Methodology

For the above, I am addressing a case study the strategy a substitution illicit crops in order to analyse in a specific experience how was the transitional process from a illegal to legal economy. I selected Catatumbo for the reasons mentioned in the introduction, that are related with its typology as illegal economy, geographic location and relevance in the peace agreement context in Colombia.

As the subject of this research paper is related with an illegal activity such as drug production, there is not much information available; however, the sources of information used in this paper are diverse: measure tool as SIMCI report, secondary data as internal documents of national government institutions, internal documents of the Catatumbo strategy, reports from international organizations; bibliography and studies related with this subject. Also, my own experience is one of the main sources of information of the paper, since I worked within the government for 8 years on matters relating to poverty and attention to victims of violence. In recent years, I was working in substitution programs; hence, I have first-hand knowledge of the reality in these regions and also the approach of public policy thereon.

1.3.1 Case study method

Due to lack of available data because the nature in itself of drug production, I considered that case study method could give me the possibility to examine in depth “a class of events” in a certain experience for developing a theory (George and Bennett, 2005:18). In other

words, it is possible to get relevant insights through a case study in order to understand a theory in practical terms.

The advantage of choosing case study for my research paper is the possibility to validate concepts related with LED, through the analysis of context factors and other variables that are difficult to measure (George and Bennett, 2005:18).

Even though, I considered other research technique as ethnographic approach, which has a similarities and differences between case study. Both are on the basis a real situation. However, ethnography requires a direct observation of people or situation of study through a field work, that for me it was not possible to carry out (White et al., 2009:21).

On the other hand, I selected a particular case study which I knew before and I had the opportunity to do field work few years ago. The above, allowed me to get important knowledge through observation of the context and interaction with community. All these insights fortified the research.

1.3.2 Data collection methods

This research paper used quantitative and qualitative methods in order to get information.

Quantitative data: the main source is the Integrated Illicit Crops Monitoring System - SIMCI¹ by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, which produces annual information on the levels of illegal crop cultivation. This basic data is used to conduct a spatial analysis that has allowed different governments to evaluate changes that occur in the cultivation of illegal crops in different areas, identified by satellite images over different periods of time. Every year the SIMCI generates a report with relevant and detailed information about municipalities affected by illicit crops in the last period, number of seizures, number of laboratories destroyed, aerial fumigation, prices of coca leaf, among others.

Secondary data: data was collected through official documents of government, which notwithstanding its confidentiality, I could access to them through networking within the government. As well as, internal documents of the implementation in Catatumbo, reports by international organism as UNODC were used for the research.

Qualitative information: The research paper employed qualitative info such as interviews applied to a public official of the national government, who was participating from a high level in the strategy of Catatumbo 2014 - 2016. Also, I did an interview with a member of UNODC who was at the forefront of the process at the local level.

For reasons of public order and connectivity, it was not possible to get an interview with a member of the community.

¹ www.unodc.org

1.4 Structure of the Paper

This research paper is divided in six chapters. The current chapter one, is the general introduction which presents the context, definition of the problem, research questions, methodology and the structure of the paper. Chapter two is about key concepts in the theoretical framework of Local Economic Development that is developed throughout the research. Likewise, I examine the dynamics of illicit economy through LED and weak states theories. Chapter three presents a general context about fight against drugs in Colombia; particularly on the substitution illicit crops, achievements and failures of former experiences. Chapter four analyses the case study in Catatumbo between 2014 and 2016 framing the analysis with the key concepts of LED. This section describes the substitution process carried out in Catatumbo (2014 - 2016). Chapter five contains the summary of the key findings of the research. Finally, some concluding remarks related with the relevance of paper, general contributions and recommendations for future research are made.

Chapter 2

Local Economic Development, a theoretical framework

In this chapter, I frame the analysis focusing in Local Economic Development perspective which entails Local Development and Local Governance approach to understand the conditions to build welfare in a region with specific characteristics, within a weak context. The analytical framework takes weak state theory to identify the main challenges for LED in zones of high levels of poverty, violence and illegal economic activities. This theoretical structure will allow me to analyse the process of transition from an illegal to a legal economy, pointing out critical factors, triggers and barriers that can be taken into account to implement this kind of strategies.

Over the years, different definitions about local development have emerged with the need to understand what is and how should it be addressed, taking into account the particular features of each territory (Pike et al. 2007: 1254). In general, local development was linked with an economic growth, concept that comes from the classical economy, ignoring the interdependent relationship between social, cultural, environmental and economic dimensions for development. From this traditional framework, several approaches came out with alternative definitions undertaking aspects such as community driven, entrepreneurship and new indicators beyond income and job creation (Pike et al. 2007: 1255).

Under Local Development approach, the concept of LED takes a relevant place as it recognizes the emergence of local dynamics that drive economic growth. Both concepts are intertwined as long as they relate development with the potential of a region based on people and resources.

It was from the decentralization processes that we began to recognize forms of production based on characteristics of a specific territory, which in most cases always existed but had not been recognized within the mainstream thinking of development, which was predominantly industrial. Over the years, LED concept has been several definitions, which can be very brief as “bottom-up attempt by local actors to improve incomes, employment opportunities and quality of life in their localities in response to the failure of markets and national government policies to provide what is required, particularly in underdeveloped areas and areas undergoing structural adjustment” (LEED OCDE, 1998:23).

Based on the above definition and taking into account different approaches, this paper thereby examines 3 key elements of LED to understand from a theoretical framework, the challenges in the transitional process from an illegal to legal economy:

1. Local economy capacity: LED is focused on the territorial sphere, composed of geographic features, identity, networks and local dynamics. These specific characteristics draw the capacity immersed in the territory to generate their own development process.

Overall, after the decentralization process, the local capacity is creating autonomously faced the national dynamics and policies. Although it has not been easy, particularly in developing countries, communities and different actors related in the territory have achieved a high level

of influence in the decision making process that affect their quality of life and well-being. As a result of the devolution of power to local governments, new concepts came up such as local ownership, empower local community and “local economy’s capacity to create wealth for local residents” (Bartik, 2003:1).

As part of autonomous development, local capacity can be seen as "the ability of a locality or region to generate high incomes and improve livelihoods of the people living there" (Meyer-Stamer, 2008: 7). This ability depends largely on the participation of different stakeholders and the strengthening of local institutions, which has a very important role in building a favorable environment for local economy to be competitive in terms of market. As well as, local capacity can be increased with the appropriate use of the territory's resources and the stimulation of endogenous development.

Through LED, employment initiatives are developed, whether for self-employment, strengthen local business or job creation. The increase Bottom-up approach has been evident in recent years, with the logic to generate new activities on the basis of the local capacity. Thus, the specific features of a given locality and active participation of the communities, allow diversification of activities and a series of initiatives that respond effectively to local problems through developing human capital, spreading innovation and building local institutions and firm networks (Alburquerque F, 2004:159).

2. Better use of locally resources: The recognition of local resources as an engine for endogenous economic potential, makes it possible to boost the local economy, building competitive advantage and new employment opportunities. The variety of available resources in a given territory drives economic diversification and their use involve the participation of different actors to stimulate growth, competitiveness and job creation (Trah, 2004:1). In that sense, the proper use of resources can be in itself a barrier to local development, particularly in weak states context where there is corruption in local governments and exploitation of resources by private companies, which are mainly foreign ones. For instance, in developing countries is common to observe that territories with a large amount of natural resources, their communities are immersed in extreme poverty.

One of the principal capitals of a territory is the knowledge that underlies the people who inhabit it. Knowledge as a resource allows exploring new forms of local production that can give way to innovations and creation of new businesses; as well as to increase the local capacity. Knowledge is collective heritage of the community and it produces local links, local productive system, and economic relations. In the recent bottom-up approach new forms of growth are the focus, such as business based on indigenous or traditional knowledge, cultural activities and social entrepreneurship.

3. Partnerships among different stakeholders: In LED there are many actors involve from different sectors and levels, public, private and social. In the public sector there are regional and local authorities, as well as, national government. Although, government is not the main actor, its role is crucial to design and implement public policies in response to needs and demands of the citizens. Social actors are compound of community, CBO, local networks, NGOs, who carry out strategies, in certain cases, more effective than those led by national government.

Despite the different actors involved, Local Development approach cannot be seen as set of isolated and uncoordinated initiatives in local level. Unlike, part of the logic of this perspective is the integration of different strategies and policies, establishing synergies among various stakeholders and involving local people as a main actor in the design and implementation of public policy (LEED – OCDE, 1998: 9). In this process, the concept of governance is crucial, as long as the coordination between actors and actions is a key factor in responding to the interests and needs of the community. Likewise, the role of local and regional governments is fundamental to guide actions from different actors and provide a base structure that allows access to opportunities (Helmsing, 2001:301).

The participation and mobilization of different local actors from the public and private sector and civil society united by a common development goal is one of the main characteristics of LED. This mobilization of diverse actors is fundamental for the identification and prioritization of local problems; as well as the search for solutions that take into account the interests of all. This public-private cooperation requires a proactive attitude from the local government to facilitate networking, promote local dialogue, and build a favorable environment for exploring new sources of employment and contributing to economic growth through innovation and diversification of new businesses.

The level of participation and influence of the actors involved (public, private, civil society) play an important role in local development. These can be both a barrier and a trigger for inclusion or exclusion processes, as long as they drive the development process to their specific interests building uneven development and the concentration of wealth in the hands of few (Harvey, 2000:25). Despite its significance, the dilemma between growth and equity is not a subject of this paper.

“Participatory development process that encourages partnership arrangements between the main private and public stakeholders of a defined territory, enabling the joint design and implementation of a common development strategy, by making use of the local resources and competitive advantage in a global context, with the final objective of creating decent jobs and stimulating economic activity. (ILO, 2006:2)”

The importance of public - private cooperation in LED is the opportunity to design and implement local development strategies with greater impact and better results, which promote innovation and increase efficiency in local development activities. “LED is a process in which partnerships between local governments, NGOs, community based groups and the private sector are established to manage existing resources, to create jobs and stimulate the economy of a well-defined territory. (Helmsing & Egziabher, 2005:1)”.

Undoubtedly, the participation of different actors is a key factor in LED due to the potential of collaboration and network creation, which provide an enable environment for local business, workforce development, transfer capacities, access to markets, strengthening of value chain and quality of life improvements as a result (Ruecker & Trah, 2007:13). Nonetheless, the conditions and characteristics of each region built particular development process. For instance, in fragile context, LED faces great challenges and different experience than in a stable situation. Furthermore, strategies can be implemented in communities affected by internal conflict entails great efforts to face human capital deterioration, damages infrastructure, weak institutions and the loss of livelihood of households (Ibáñez et al. 2013:3).

2.1 LED in weak context

When the state, for various reasons, is unable to provide welfare to the citizens, especially the most vulnerable, does not fulfil its function, loses legitimacy and therefore the trust of citizens who become victims of state abandonment and are left unprotected in a fragile context, with great barriers to development (Rotberg, 2003:1).

To understand to what extent a weak state affects LED, it is necessary to address the theoretical framework that distinguishes different categories ranging from weakness, collapse and failure (Rotberg, 2003: 1). In general terms, the function of a state is to respond to the demands, needs and expectations of citizens; likewise exercise its legitimacy in all the territory that comprises it. Thereby it is the duty of the state to provide public services, educational and health services, infrastructure, security, among others. Bearing this in mind, weak states show poor performance due to several aspects such as geographical features, corruption, violence and different kind of tensions (Rotberg, 2003: 4).

Weak states context constitutes a threat to development and fuel for unequal power relations, corruption, private interests over the public good, do not have an equal development, because the powers direct development towards their interests (Eizenstat et al. 2005). That situation has serious implications for local development which must also be considered. “There are many reasons why fragile states deserve special attention. Civil wars do more than inflict heavy human and material costs. They also diminish the capacity of a country to deal effectively with their underlying causes, increasing the risk of future, even more costly and debilitating, conflicts” (Panić, 2009:1).

Within a fragile context, a set of conditions facilitate the emergence of illegal activities. Through these factors the illegal activities become to a local economy providing public good and services, road infrastructure, job opportunities and financial stability for communities.

Some of these factors are:

- Absence of state: local institution weakness, failure in national government polices.
- Corruption: illicit activities must ensure the support of authorities and other local actors.
- Armed conflict: there is evidence of the close relationship between illicit activities and armed groups and terrorism.
- Rural economy insecurity: lack of legitimacy of the state unable to protect citizens and have control of the territory.
- Geographic characteristics: isolated areas contribute to increase the level of vulnerability and illegal activity takes place.
- Economic, social and politic fragile context: high level of poverty, unemployment, failures of markets.

In the case of Colombia, a country with an armed conflict of more than 50 years and divided territory between official forces, different armed illegal groups and large drug trafficking networks, is a clear example of the failure of the State and its inability to maintain its legitimacy (Rotberg, 2003:15). Despite the abundance of natural resources, Colombia has seen its economic growth truncated, in a context of violence, in which the security of citizens and firms represents the biggest threat for local development.

Thus, in the regions where the absence of the state prevails, the dominance of armed groups has favored the growth of illegal activities such as coca crops cultivation, which have become the local economy of these territories.

The case of the Colombian State is a particular phenomenon within the theory of weak states because the failure occurs only in the regions dominated by armed groups, while in the rest of the country, the State fulfils not only its primary function as provider of public services, infrastructure, security, but there are innumerable successful experiences of public policies and government programs that promote local development through entrepreneurship, development of capacities for communities, innovation, among others (Rotberg, 2003:15).

Within this fragile context, rural households seek ways of subsisting despite the risk and uncertainty generated by multiple dynamics of violence. The inability of people to sustain their livelihoods, prompts them to find economic alternatives, thereby in illegal activities become an option. In certain regions of Colombia, farmers are involved in different activities of the coca value chain such as coca bush cultivation, pasta production, and so on. In this adverse situation, agricultural activities must overcome barriers, which in most cases are impossible for peasants such as market instability, weather conditions, lack of road infrastructure and multiple requirements for entrepreneurship.

Although illicit crops carry risks for growers, especially with the anti-drug policies implemented by Government, the profitability of the coca leaf crop represents great benefits in terms of income generation (Mejía & Rico, 2010). With that in mind, the transition from illegal to legal economy has the great challenge to engage families in a viable and sustainable economic alternative. Substitution programs need an enable environment to ensure the success of the transition; as well as a set of policies to boost local development and discourage participation in illegal activities (Ibáñez, A.M et al, 2013:3).

An illegal economy such as drug production is intertwined with development in many aspects. The negative effect related with cultivation, production and trafficking is evident at different levels; however, they are exacerbated more at the local level due to “socioeconomic elements such as poverty and lack of sustainable livelihoods are important risk factors leading farmers to engage in illicit cultivation. They are also manifestations of poor levels of development which, alongside other development issues linked to security and governance, are enabling elements of large-scale illicit cultivation” (UNODC, 2016:17).

2.2 Drug production as local economy

Globally, drug trafficking is one of the most profitable industries. In the case of cocaine, its value chain starts at the local level with coca bush cultivation and ends with distribution and consumption worldwide. Although it is true that fight against drug is geared towards every stage of the chain, the revenue remains high. For instance, global production of cocaine shows an upward trend observed in last 3 years, despite of success efforts on interception, seizures and development of new productive activities (UNODC, 2016: 36).

In fragile contexts, some conditions mentioned in the previous chapter contribute to the

growth of illegal economies, such as coca cultivation, which for growers provides higher income and security than other agricultural activities due to the fact that they have a purchase guarantee no matter changes in the market price, transportation issues and distribution or commercialization of the product. (Morrison, 1997: 127).

This paper is focus in the substitution of illegal crops in Colombia, particularly in coca bush cultivation. In this respect, my interest is highlight some critical factors enabling the growth of illegal economy:

- Food-supply deficiency: the lack of a solid value chain in food production: irrigation systems, insecticide and chemical investment, transport and commercialization, have enabled an economy such as that of coca being dominant and almost a monoculture (Chouvy and Laniel 2007:134).
- Drug markets at the local: the price of coca by far is higher than other crops, which makes it a better livelihood for the peasants (Chouvy and Laniel 2007:134). Even when there is more pressure from government through eradication activities, the purchase price of coca leaf is raised as a compensation measure for growers.
- Characteristics of the plant: coca bushes grow in warm and humid areas, with approximately temperatures of 18 degrees centigrade, to a height between the 400 and the 2000 msnm. It does not need chemicals, it grows almost anywhere and it adapts to different climates and environments. It means less investment and saving money for other needs. The properties of the plant imply that the sales dynamics are very fast, because once harvested, the leaf quickly loses its active properties, so the farmers must sell it again or some also carry out the process of transformation into coca paste. “Thus, coca farmers are often more than just farmers: they are involved “one step further” in the illegal economy, and therefore are a little more dependent on it” (Chouvy and Laniel, 2007:134).
- Global market: although this is different level to local, is an important feature that makes cocaine a profitable business, therefore a stable activity for growers is that: “the fact that while supply is elastic demand is not ...” “Drug supply is elastic because drug producers and markets are very price sensitive: when opium, coca, or cannabis production dries up in one country because of law enforcement, falling prices, or climatic vagaries, other sources of supply emerge (and vice versa). Drug demand is inelastic because drug consumers are not price sensitive: levels of drug consumption are not related to price. While forced eradication raises the price of drugs at the farm gate and ends up being an incentive for increased production, the drug war only slightly affects prices of consumed drugs as traffickers and dealers often alter the purity of heroin and cocaine instead of raising the price. While forced eradication raises the price of drugs at the farm gate and ends up being an incentive for increased production, the drug war only slightly affects prices of consumed drugs as traffickers and dealers often alter the purity of heroin and cocaine instead of raising the price” (Chouvy and Laniel, 2007:134).

- Abandonment of the State: in regions with higher concentration of coca crops, the armed conflict is critic. For the peasants, coca cultivation is the only alternative of sustenance for their families, living in regions completely abandoned by the state. Traditionally, families grew food together with coca crops. With glyphosate spraying, all food crops were destroyed and even farm animals too, plunging these communities into much more critical poverty. Because of the impact on people's health, as well as on the soil and animals, many families abandoned their farms and were displaced to new places, losing everything they had, aggravating the phenomenon of displacement and extreme poverty.
- Geographical conditions: factors such geographic location play an important role in shaping illegal economy as long as isolated areas make it difficult for government to access with programs and strategies; as well as military force find hard to protect the civilians. The geographical features of Colombia hinder the country's connectivity, trade, transportation and the access for local institutions. Furthermore, the location of coca crops and past laboratories is a big challenge for eradication and destruction activities by government.
- Traditional use and indigenous identity: in some regions coca cultivation has an ambiguity between legal and illegal status. Coca leaf is a legal crop as long as is essential part of the culture of some indigenous groups. For them coca leaf symbolizes, friendship to share and exchange. Its use has traditionally been masticated, although at present there is a greater diversification. Among the benefits that this plant reports are improving physical performance, eliminate hunger and sleep, facilitate acclimatization to heights, function as a nutritional supplement for its rich vitamin properties, in addition to possessing medicinal and analgesic functions.

With the conditions described above, coca cultivation is an engine that moves the local economy in certain regions of Colombia; nevertheless, in contrast to its effectiveness, the impact on the social and economic deterioration of the population is dramatic, which is evident because these municipalities are, on average, poorer than the rest of the country. There is not investment in public goods, they have low levels of connectivity and low levels of institutional development. The above contribute to the enabling environment for illegal activities (Pontón, 2013: 136). Moreover, is common to see different stages in the value chain located in the same region, from coca leaf crops, harvesting and transportation, pasta processing in local laboratories, final production of cocaine to traffic networks.

As an illegal economy, coca bush cultivation is profitable alternative as long as consumed markets are large in terms of users and revenue, and this guarantee stable income for the whole value chain. Furthermore, drug trafficking has impact on local development through the construction of infrastructure such as landing strips and illegal roads, as well as indirectly through the privatization of public land to create “narco-estates”. When eradication induces a displacement of the location of drug crops it may result in deforestation as farmers react to eradication initiatives and seek places out of the reach of law enforcement. (UNODC, 2016: 19).

2.3 Illegal value chain

Within drug production, coca crops cultivation is the first stage of the value chain; therefore, it has relevant place in the fight against drugs. In order to understand the process of transition to legal activity, it is necessary to analyse the different links in the coca production and trafficking chain, taking into account that, since this is an illegal economy, the available data are not many and must be examined from different perspectives. Although this paper is focused on coca leaf cultivation, I will make a brief review of the other parts of the chain.

Cocaine production process has different phases: 1) Cultivation of coca leaf, then the harvested coca leaves are dried; 2) Transformation of the leaf into paste and base of coca. The dry leaves are placed in a solution of water with sulfuric acid for 12 to 24 hours, during which time alkaline solution of kerosene, calcium carbonate, sodium carbonate and other substances are added. The result of this combination gives the basic cocaine paste, which, after being refined with other chemicals, becomes cocaine-laundered paste; 3) The coca paste be turned into cocaine by purifying the washed paste with hydrochloric acid; 4) In the last phase, cocaine trafficking begins to be sold to consumer countries.

Peasant families participate in the first and second stage of the chain, since in some cases they not only grow it but also transform it into paste using homemade methods, and then sold to cocaine producers. In the third and fourth stages of the production process, money flow and business profitability increase; Likewise, production costs are increased, since the laboratory infrastructure is required, which in Colombia have been established in the most remote and difficult access areas and are managed and monitored by illegal groups, such as the guerrilla. (Mejia & Rico, 2010:3).

It is well-known that cultivating coca leaf as a productive agricultural activity has multiple advantages for growers. This assumption is due to its features, such as the relation with costs and time dedicated; favourable market dynamics and security of monthly income. Thus, coca cultivation has been an extensive agricultural activity of families in different rural areas of Colombia, especially the most remote ones.

As mentioned above, the characteristics of the plant make it a profitable crop, with low cost (fertilizers, water, pesticides, etc.) and high profits for farmers. It also has an assured market, with capacity and willingness to increase the price of the leaf, in response to the eradication pressures imposed by the government on the cultivating families.

In addition, coca is a perennial crop “once it is planted, the coca bush continues to produce foliage each year with a minimum of maintenance, thus muting the responsiveness of production to price changes. The control that guerrilla groups and paramilitaries exert over production and marketing decisions in coca- producing areas in Colombia probably further diminishes the effect of the farm gate price on coca cultivation (Moreno-Sanchez et al, 2003: 379)”.

“The coca bush also shows resilience in a marginal environment. It is able to grow in a variety of altitudinal, climatic and soil conditions. It can tolerate acidic soils and shows a resistance to pests and diseases. The use of pesticides and fertilizers is therefore limited, making the coca bush a popular crop in the economically and environmentally fragile areas of the Andes. It is a perennial that matures in only 18 months and can be harvested 4-6 times per annum for up to 40 years, although productivity begins to dwindle after 15 years.

The labour-intensive nature of harvesting means that coca bush not only provides a livelihood for the producer but has also given those on the altiplano a consistent source of employment (Mansfield, 1999:21)”.

Despite profit is generated in whole value chain of drug production, is at the final stage that it tends to be highest. However, for growers represent an opportunity for savings and investment, they can access to credits because the purchase of coca leaf is guarantee, at least with 3 months in advanced (UNODC, 2016:20).

2.4 Illegal actors, networks and alliances

As an economy, there are several actors involved in coca production, who generate connections between them and complex dynamics that strengthen illegal activity as a local economy. Some of them are:

- Growers: in most cases, they are families in rural areas, in poverty and with an agricultural vocation, who cultivate the coca leaf and are sometimes part of the production of coca paste.
- Armed groups: the relationship between armed groups and drug production is very close. Since the illegal economy and armed groups grow in the same context of fragile states, they are interrelated, to the extent that illicit activity finance operations of armed groups and, in turn, armed groups, are part of the drug production value chain and guarantee the political-territorial control. It is also important to mention, in Colombia there are several illegal armed groups: guerrillas (FARC / ELN), paramilitaries, criminal gangs (more than 10). All of them active in coca crops areas.
- Traffickers: in charge of distribution networks, they create power relationship with the actor related and connections with different routes to move drugs.
- Local authorities: illicit economy fosters corruption in society. Thus many negotiations take place with local authorities, police and armed forces.

The dynamics of interaction are complex and some generate acute levels of violence. For instance, growers have contact and interaction with illegal armed groups, who have the control of the land in these regions, collect the harvest and lead the laboratories where the process of transformation to coca paste is carried out. As well as, they play an important role through different channels: direct control of production, crop protection, production taxation, and civilian displacement (Davalos, 2016:127).

Through the interplay, a number of violence is generated, not only due to illegitimacy and lack of sovereignty of the state, but for the conflicts between different actors for the control of business, land and natural resources. Moreover, in fragile contexts, corruption possibilities are increased, because the actors involved in different stages of the chain, need to guarantee security and have the support of local authorities, leaders of the community, among others. The purchase of security, is a sample of the power by the traffickers and high degree of violence that can be generated in a territory (UNODC, 2016: 19).

Likewise, communities face violence situations due to the suppression strategies adopted such as forcible eradication by government, where they are in the middle of combats between official armed forces and illegal armed groups.

2.5 Economic Transition

The transition from illegal to legal economy is a process with different implications. As I have developed in previous chapter, this transition implies the implementation of socio-economic interventions to respond to unmet needs in municipalities historically abandoned for the state. As well as, alternative development projects must be carry out to guarantee secure income for grower families.

Efforts to eliminate illicit crop cultivation can impact the income source and employment opportunities of farmers and farm labourers. Several researches have also shown that such efforts have positive development outcomes in the affected communities only if they include development measures to ensure alternative livelihoods and restore security and rule of law. Examples in Colombia and Peru have shown that effective alternative development programmes can weaken the population's ties with armed groups and drug trafficking (Rincón-Ruiz et al, 2016:57).

To face the great challenge of substitution, the questions that arises is: how to develop sustainable productive projects for communities, and the analysis points to a number of factors: identification of agricultural products according to the characteristics of the territory and that are environmentally sustainable, strengthening of the product value chain, which goes through the creation of marketing networks and access to marketing channels, transportation thereby optimal road infrastructure is required, as well as security conditions.

In the case of Colombia, various strategies of illicit crop substitution have been carried out over 15 years, but most of them have not been successful, because the intervention have focused on eradication crops and in new productive projects, only in the initial stage of design; however, when the new products are ready, the farmers do not find circuits to market, so they have to look for other more profitable ones in the market, among them the cultivation of coca.

I can draw for my experiences in field work in Colombia, the transition to a legal economy must take into account certain conditions in order to make the new activity will be sustainable, such as:

- Strengthen of whole value chain, from supply to demand
- Technological development
- Investment in public goods and services
- Active participation of community in the whole process

In short, the transition to a legal economy is a complex process, which should take into account that illegal activities reduce entry barriers and increase the attraction of illicit drugs production (Morrison, 1997:134); whilst legal productive activities have a several obstacles to be sustainable and effective alternative for coca growers.

Chapter 3.


Illicit crops substitution, Colombian context

The drug problem is a global issue as long as border lines intersect in production, distribution, traffic and consumption of the same. According to the World Drug Report 2016, “it is estimated that 1 in 20 adults, or a quarter of a billion people aged 15-64 years, used at least one drug in 2014” (UNODC, 2016:1). The market dynamics of this illicit activity generates connections around the world and high profitability in almost all the links of the value chain; Therefore, the drug problem has become a declared threat to both health, safety and the environment.

According to the World Drug Report 2016 produced by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime – UNODC, in Colombia, coca cultivation increased in the last 2 years, with 52% hectares cultivated more in 2015 regard to 2014 and 3 times more than in 2012. Half of the increase is in the departments of Norte de Santander and Nariño, and it is precisely in the first, where the Catatumbo region is located, which is the subject of the case study of this research paper (UNODC, 2016: 23).

For various reasons mentioned throughout this paper, areas with the highest concentration of coca crops remain the same, which demonstrates a problem that has not been easy to tackle and a set of strategies and programs that have not been successful in terms of crop reduction. The following map shows the density of coca crops in the different regions of Colombia between 2012 and 2016, marked in a circle is Catatumbo.

Map 1.1 Density of coca cultivation in Colombia 2012 - 2016



Source: Coca Cultivation Report, UNODC 2016

Being Colombia, the largest producer of coca leaf in the region and in the world, many strategies against drug production and trafficking have been carried out by different governments. Over the years, different strategies of transition from illegal and legal economy have improved and integrated new elements in the process, which contributes to rise levels of effectiveness. In the same way, programs have failed to reduce cultivated areas, as well as to provide an economic and sustainable alternative for family growers.

For several years, the main strategy to reduce illicit crops has been forced eradication. Although the anti-drug policies by Colombian government are aimed at weakening the different stages of value chain, the first link: the cultivation of coca leaf, has been the main focus of these interventions, which mostly have been addressed at forced eradication, either in a manual way or by aerial fumigation. For the other links in the chain, interventions include seizure of the product, destruction of coca paste laboratories and interdiction. However, despite all efforts dedicated to the fight against drugs, the transition to a legal economy has not been effective and there are a number of factors that have contributed to this situation. Bearing in mind, that the regions with the highest concentration of coca crops in Colombia remain in conditions of vulnerability.

Colombia's fight against drugs is not new. In the late 1990s, Colombia implemented the largest crop substitution program to date, called "Plan Colombia," which was led by the United States Government as part of its anti-drug fight. After 15 years of implementation, different phases of this program, several failures, lack of sovereignty, motivate the permanent search for effective strategies, which contemplates a period of transition between illicit crops and the new productive activity. Also with an integral approach with actions in the economic, social, cultural and environmental level.

Most of the substitution programs implemented have common characteristics and have failed in similar aspects, according to several analyses by different authors. The persistence of identified deficiencies draws my attention due to the fact that despite of the accumulated know-how over the years, some lessons learned have not been taken into account in subsequent interventions. This question is raised to be developed in the research, highlighting the strong influence of the US anti-drug policy, as one of the possible causes of an approach that remains some requirements such as total eradication of crops, as a necessary condition to be benefited by State-led substitution programs.

Some repetitive aspects in former substitution strategies are the lack of articulation of institutions at both the national and local levels, which is a critical element in the State's capacity for response. Likewise, the visible influence of the US anti-drug policy, which is the main source of international aid for the eradication and substitution of illicit crops in Colombia; constitute elements of analysis of this paper.

One of the main problems for substitution is the lack of confidence of communities in government, which historically have been abandoned by the state, and as a result they live in conditions of poverty and marginality. These communities have been subject to different types of government intervention, with actions that have not solved basic problems such as the provision of public goods, access to health and education services, promotion of decent housing, food security, income generation, among others. Bearing in mind that these areas have been under guerrilla control, which leads other implications, in terms of violence and security. In this scenario, the transition to a legal economy requires the construction of the minimum conditions and the creation of a bond of trust with the communities.

Precisely, the forced eradication actions have contributed to weaken the relationship between the communities and the government, since this intervention is done through the public force, generating confrontations with the communities. However, although the eradication has not had successful results in the reduction of crops or in relation to the

community, the implemented strategies use eradication as a minimum requirement for the processes of substitution.

Another factor that has been the subject of debate in the substitution of crops, is related to licit and illicit use. The traditional use of the coca leaf by some communities is an element to consider in certain regions of Colombia, about the identity and autonomy of the territories claimed by indigenous people. The debate focuses on the substitution of uses, rather than on the substitution of crops because as mentioned earlier, the coca leaf and its production has been part of the indigenous culture for millennia, being a bush native to the Andes, where different indigenous groups like the Incas used it and continues today as a means of connection with the spirits of nature.

In Colombia, coca grows in tropical regions with temperature around 18 degrees, used by indigenous groups, for who is a sacred plant surrounded by respect and admiration, which provides great medicinal and nutritional benefits.

In the Sierra Nevada the greeting is through the exchange of coca, not only with the hand. Each time the men meet, whether in a meeting or walking by the way, they exchange coca leaves from their respective backpacks, which reinforces their bonds of brotherhood. In some regions coca cultivation has an ambiguity between legal and illegal: coca leaf is in turn a legal and illegal crop because it is an essential part of the culture of some indigenous groups (Heitzeneder, Angela 2010: 35).

The traditional meaning of the coca plant is not considered as a determining factor for crop substitution or eradication actions. The focus is on avoiding the increment of the cultivated hectares, which constitutes a great challenge for public policy in Colombia. "There are two main explanatory lines for the increase: the first of a political nature associated with the expectations that peasants and community organizations perceive from other intermediation processes between the Government and coca growers, which is summarized in some communities feeling that when having coca, they have a greater opportunity of interlocution with the Government. The second line has to do with the market, in particular an increase in the price of the leaf in strategic regions (...), which adds to a reduction in the risk of spraying and manual eradication, it means lower production costs and better selling prices for primary producers" (UNODC 2015:13).

The investment that Colombian and United States Government have made in the fight against drugs has been very high and is not reflected in the results obtained. A high budget has been spent in aerial fumigation, manual eradication and crop substitution activities, through different programs in specific periods of time.

In 2000, the US government approved a two-year budget of US \$4.5 billion in support of Plan Colombia, the main objective of which is to reduce drug production and trafficking as a part of their security policy (Veillette, 2005:1).

The investment to control illicit crops has been addressed to manual eradication and spraying more than social investment, infrastructure and human capital, this can be part of the answer to understand the failures of programs, especially when these are not solving in depth the basic unmet needs of population. In the process of transition to a legal economy, social welfare in terms of, health services, access to education, job creation, infrastructure, stimulates legitimate production opportunities (Davalos, 2016:126).

Over the years, substitution processes also have achieved a know-how, which is evident in new aspects incorporated in the last programs, such as more community participation, actions toward food security, and transition employment, with an integral approach and increased social investment as a strategy to “discourage farmers from growing coca and leading them to adopt other income producing activities” (Davalos, 2016:126). These components show an evident evolution in the fight against drugs in Colombia started with Plan Colombia implemented in the late 1990s. Thus the country embarked on a path with successes and failures, with complex dynamics in terms of territorial development.

3.1 Former experiences

The Plan Colombia has been the largest crop substitution program, financed to a large extent by the US Government. It was developed in Pastrana president government (1998 – 2002) with the goal to eliminate drug trafficking and promote economic and social development (Veillette, 2005:1). Subsequently, the government of President Uribe continued with the second phase with more emphasis on security actions and military strengthening.

Since United States is the country with the highest rate of cocaine users, different governments have led the fight against drugs, financing programs in the region in countries such as Colombia, under their own interests to prevent the flow of illegal drugs into the country. “Plan Colombia has provided the institutional framework for a military alliance between the U.S. and Colombia in the war against drug production, trafficking and the organized criminal groups associated with these activities” (Mejía and Restrepo, 2016:256).

Plan Colombia's strategy was focused on the different links in the drug production chain. Thus, to control of coca crops, the main action was manual and aerial eradication; in the distribution and traffic stage, interdiction efforts were focusing in the final product rather than the coca leaf or pasta because it imposes greater costs on traffickers (Veillette, 2005:1).

Since the beginning of Plan Colombia, eradication has been subject of debate for reasons related with health effects in animals and humans, environmental impact and destruction of other crops that are part of the livelihood of farmers.

Although the Plan had an alternative development component, these projects were never agreed with the communities, therefore, they did not respond to the needs of population and territorial conditions. This was one of the greatest failures of Plan Colombia because the growers did not have a transition process, they lost their livelihood with the eradication of the coca crops and the new economic projects were not sustainable. As a result of the above, the intervened regions increased their levels of poverty, violence and farmers returned into illicit cultivation.

In mid-2003, the Plan Colombia led military's Patriot Plan, a campaign to recapture FARC-held territory through new laws giving the security forces increased powers (Veillette, 2005: 5). The emphasis of this new phase was to directly attack the illegal armed groups, as an effort for peace building and weaken their key role behind the production of drugs.

Throughout 15 years, Plan Colombia focused its efforts on strengthening the capacities of the Public Force, the mechanisms of interdiction and eradication of illicit crops, providing support for the alternative and economic development of the regions affected by the armed conflict, and support the administration of justice (DNP, 2016:1)

3.2 Forced eradication, a measure in question

After more than two decades of implementing strategies of forced eradication, the results obtained were not satisfactory. There is a great deal of evidence that eradication does not discourage the replanting of illicit crops. On the contrary, the area fumigations induce growers to plant in smaller plots, in which coca bushes are interspersed with legitimate crops, making aerial search difficult.

Despite the criticism, forced eradication remains to be a requirement for substitution programs; without a viable proposal from government to face the loss of livelihood, and the fact that there is no transition process to provide families economic stabilization while productive projects produce results. Hence, eradication is one of the main points of disagreement for communities because the state – which has historically been absent – is responsible for destruction of coca plantations, the main source of revenue for the local population by aerial spraying of herbicides that also often destroy food crops. Meanwhile, alternative development programmes, supposed to compensate the destruction of coca fields and its consequences, have turned out to be altogether insufficient. Aerial spraying, a measure applied under US pressure, de-legitimises the Colombian state, since “rather than contribute to the strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, these (aerial spraying) programs reflect an authoritarian stance and the undermining of national sovereignty through the open and unrestricted intervention of the USA in Colombia’s economic, social and political affairs” (Chouvy and Laniel, 2007:144).

Without going deep into the fact that aerial spraying activities generate great environmental damage, this measure has not achieved consolidate areas free of illicit crops in two decades of implementation (Davalos, 2016:128). By contrast, investment in the development of alternative livelihoods has been low, being a complementary and fundamental action to control illicit crops.

In short, eradication actions like aerial fumigation have been effective to reduce coca cultivation; however, has significant negative effects which have to be taking in to account. Former experiences have proven that manual eradication is cheaper and produces less damage; as well as, has a positive impact particularly if is a process discussed with communities and complemented with alternative development projects.

Chapter 4.

Substitution of illicit crops in Catatumbo (2014 – 2016)

Colombia, in 2014 according to the United Nations SIMCI report, had 48,000 hectares planted with coca distributed in 23 of the country's 32 departments; the same level reported in the previous year's census. This is the result of a compensation effect between a strong increase in regions where the phenomenon continues and a generalized reduction tendency in the rest of the country. 13 departments showed a tendency to reduce the area planted with coca, while 7 showed a tendency to increase. 76% of the increase is concentrated in Nariño (+2,444 ha), Norte de Santander (+ 1,829 ha) and Putumayo (+ 1,519 ha); On the other hand, 77% of the reduction is concentrated in Chocó (- 1,768 ha), Antioquia (- 1,734 ha), Bolívar (- 1,043 ha) and Cauca (-999 ha). The participation of indigenous guards in the area planted with coca increased from 11% in 2012 to 13% in 2013; On the other hand, in Afro - Colombian community councils, participation increased from 20% in 2012 to 19% in 2013. Crops in Natural Parks increased by 12%. Furthermore, 41% of the area planted with coca is found in the 10 municipalities most affected by coca sowing; This is 4 points above the participation in 2012, which confirms the trend towards the concentration of the phenomenon that is occurring in Colombia (UNODC, 2014:13).

As figures show eradication programs have low effect on crop decline and in some cases have the opposite effect. In Catatumbo case before the implementation of this strategy, the situation of coca crops according to the SIMCI² 2014 report indicates that between 2004 and 2013, 1,325 hectares were cultivated with coca. In the same time interval 6,500 hectares were intermittently affected, 600 hectares of coca crops were abandoned and 1,450 hectares were affected recently.

For a better understanding of these data, it is necessary to know the context of the region, which is one of the most complex in the country.

4.1 An overview of Catatumbo region

Catatumbo is region with 10,089 km located in the department of Norte de Santander, on the border with Venezuela. The region is composed by 11 municipalities and has complex geographical characteristics with mountainous areas, abundance of water resources and biodiversity, which has a great agricultural and energy mining potential (UNDP, 2014:7). Precisely because of its geographical conditions and its proximity to the border, Catatumbo has been one of the centres of government interventions in the fight against drugs.

Is a region with agricultural tradition which had a large number of farms and family crops, as well as the infrastructure that belonged to cooperatives and trade associations that were organized around products such as sugar cane, livestock and coffee crops. As well as, it was a strategic region for commercial exchange and interconnectivity with the north of the country.

² Integrated Illicit Crops Monitoring System – SIMCI of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNODC.

Due to the violence that the region suffered in the 1990s, there was a stagnation in the peasant economy, and at that moment, coca cultivation emerged as an alternative of income generation for families. The armed conflict has had a very negative impact on community development, on raising poverty levels and weakening scenarios such as community leaderships. In addition, the permanent absence of the State is reflected in the lack of provision of public services, security, infrastructure, access and strengthening of market networks, channels and marketing routes, roads, etc.

Nowadays, the majority of the inhabitants of the region have unsatisfied basic needs, especially in rural areas, as a result of the weakness of the institutions, the lack of opportunities and a stable socio-economic base.

Table 1.1 Unmet basic needs in Catatumbo

| Municipalities | Total | Urban | Rural |
|----------------|-------|-------|-------|
| El Carmen | 66 | 31,0 | 74,7 |
| Convención | 45,1 | 21,8 | 62,40 |
| Teorama | 56,5 | 34,7 | 60 |
| Ocaña | 26,1 | 21,5 | 57,5 |
| El Tarra | 73,1 | 50,3 | 87,1 |
| Tibu | 56,7 | 40,3 | 56,7 |
| San Calixto | 73,8 | 44,5 | 80,2 |
| Hacarí | 79,1 | 37,7 | 85,0 |
| La Playa | 50,8 | 13,8 | 55,5 |
| Sardinata | 53,3 | 28,9 | 70,6 |
| Bucarasica | 64,3 | 46,2 | 66,3 |

Source: DANE General Census 2015

Due to the availability of natural resources, different armed groups have settled in Catatumbo region, generating violent combats over the control of lands. Similarly, the lack of control of the state on the border and commercial corridors have allowed the movement of illegal activities and the marginalization of communities.

At the end of the 80s the coca crops reached the region, which were propagated and consolidated in the following decade. The guerrilla of FARC promoted the cultivation of coca bush, production of base and coca paste through laboratories built in remote areas of difficult access, and the subsequent commercialization of the product. (UNDP, 2014:10). Later traffic networks came to Catatumbo generating high levels of violence for the control of the business. Thus, cultivation and production of coca became a main source of income and mean of economic survival for population.

Based on the above, Colombian Government is focused on this territory as a priority for the implementation of a strategy to replace illicit crops for a new productive activity, being the main activity the forced eradication.

Colombia, in 2014 according to the United Nations SIMCI report, had 48,000 hectares planted with coca distributed in 23 of the country's 32 departments; the same level reported in the previous year's census. This is the result of a compensation effect between a strong increase in regions where the phenomenon continues and a generalized reduction tendency in the rest of the country. 13 departments showed a tendency to reduce the area planted with coca, while 7 showed a tendency to increase. 76% of the increase is concentrated in Nariño (+2,444 ha), Norte de Santander (+ 1,829 ha) and Putumayo (+ 1,519 ha); On the other hand, 77% of the reduction is concentrated in Chocó (- 1,768 ha), Antioquia (- 1,734 ha), Bolivar (- 1,043 ha) and Cauca (-999 ha). The participation of indigenous guards in the area planted with coca increased from 11% in 2012 to 13% in 2013; On the other hand, in Afro - Colombian community councils, participation increased from 20% in 2012 to 19% in 2013. Crops in Natural Parks increased by 12%.

41% of the area planted with coca is found in the 10 municipalities most affected by coca sowing; This is 4 points above the participation in 2012, which confirms the trend towards the concentration of the phenomenon that is occurring in Colombia” (UNODC, 2014:13).

As the results of the different eradication programs have demonstrated their low effect on crop decline and in some cases have had the opposite effect. In Catatumbo manual eradication and fumigation have been applied, generating continuous confrontation between legal and illegal armed groups and communities. The strategy that is the subject of this research paper, was born in response to a peasant strike in 2013, which mobilized the area and stopped all product transit, generating a serious crisis in the country.

4.2 Substitution in a fragile context

The statistical historical analysis shows that the activity related to the cultivation of the leaf in the Catatumbo region presents a significant expansion despite the increase in the eradication actions, period in which an annual average of almost 15.3% is reached both in the production volume growth as in the cultivated area (UNDOC, 2016:8).

In recent years, Catatumbo region has had a strong increase in the amount of cultivated hectares, which shows that this illegal activity has been strengthening as a local economy. Some reasons to explain this increase are: the restriction to perform spray operations that was implemented in 2010, when the fumigation with glyphosate was suspended; the dialogues with the negotiating tables that began in 2010 but were implemented in 2013 and the limitation of forced manual eradication operations in some areas associated with the agreements reached with the farmers seeking a concerted and gradual program of substitution of coca crops (UNDOC, 2016:41).

Table 1.2 Cultivated hectares in Catatumbo 2008 to 2016

| Region | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
|-----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|
| Catatumbo | 2.886 | 3.037 | 1.889 | 3.490 | 4.529 | 6.358 | 6.954 | 11.560 | 24.587 |

According to the testimony of a public servant of the Department of Social Prosperity³, institution in charge of a social policy in Colombia, *“everything began in the Catatumbo strike in 2013, which was generated because between April and May of 2013, the Ministry of Defense through members of the public force carried out forced eradications, which clashes with the communities of the region”*. From that moment a permanent negotiation table was installed, on August 28, 2013 the agreement was signed with a series of commitments to serve 400 families, who had been the object of the forced eradications carried out at the beginning of the year.

This strategy is implemented as a second phase, after the eradication process and to response to the commitments acquired at the negotiation table after the strike. In 2014, Colombian Government implemented a substitution illicit crops strategy in Catatumbo with the aim of promoting the integral development of the region, incorporating new elements such as greater interaction and participation of the community, actions in food security, transfer of knowledge and skills, community development. Likewise, the strategy reproduced the model of previous programs where crop eradication is a requirement for the substitution process, which has been the subject of multiple questions as long as communities lose their livelihood and in the transition process there is insufficient support for economic stabilization of the community, whose income depend on the results of new products, which does not happen in the short or medium term.

In 2014 the National Government with the support of UNDOC started a process of substitution through a integral strategy. With an intervention to 400 families, which were beneficiaries of the 5 components that were part of the strategy: i) Base for the economic support; ii) Food assistance; iii) Transition employment; iv) Food and nutrition security; v) Formulation and implementation of the productive project.

The strategy was aimed at 400 families, including families whose illicit crops were eradicated and coca leaf collectors. This process involved different actors, among which are mainly: national government of Colombia through the Department for Social Prosperity; The United Nations through the Office on Drugs and Crime UNODC; the peasant community of Catatumbo represented by the Catatumbo social association ASCAMCAT⁴.

The strategy was carried out in three phases:

- Phase 1: Diagnosis and identification of affected families: strategy census mechanism to identify families that have been subject to forced eradication. The Census was carried out by ASCAMCAT, validated by the United Nations.
- Phase 2: Implementation. The execution of commitments agreements is made and the implementation of the components is performed. UNODC accompanied the verification and monitoring of compliance with zero illicit crops and no reseed.
- Phase 3. Monitoring and verification. Verify eradicated plantations and official UNODC monitoring reports. Verify compliance of agreements by all parties.

³ Interview with Andrés Felipe Herreño, member of the national government team, interlocutor of the negotiation table in Catatumbo in 2013.

⁴ Internal document: Internal strategy for post-eradication and initial phase of intervention for socio-economic stabilization as part of the process of substitution and alternative development. August, 2013

For the first time in the history of crop substitution, the government made an important investment, especially in social welfare issues, providing a socio-economic stabilization to families in transition, which generated better results. Although this was not the initial purpose of the strategy and emerged more as a measure to stop the strike, it is the basis of the Model that is being built for the implementation of the Peace Accords signed in 2016.

The data of the new productive projects of the 400 families are in the processing phase; However, the strategy has generated a series of lessons learned that are being capitalized in point 4 of the Peace Agreement signed between the Government of President Santos and the FARC guerrilla. Likewise, one of the positive results of the process is that government has fulfilled with the agreements and timeline defined; therefore, it has generated a positive perception within communities.

For now, the process will be extended to other municipalities of Catatumbo, where families have expressed their desire to eradicate crops and substitution. From other families in different municipalities of Catatumbo to enter the substitution process. However, the “dark side” of the situation is that, being municipalities abandoned by the State, the interventions induce families that had not cultivated or had small plots to increase the crops in order to be the object of intervention.

The substitution strategy implemented in Catatumbo made a great investment of resources for eradication, technical assistance, and incentives that compensate the dynamics of the illegal economy, which continues to generate great benefits for the growers. Thereby, an effective transition requires a large investment of resources, taking into account that the state has not made the basic investment in the region.

Table 1.3 Drug market in 2014, 2015, 2016

| | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Average price of coca leaf at production site | COP \$2.150 /kg US \$1,07 /kg | COP \$3.000 /kg US \$1,09 /kg ⁵ | COP \$2.900 /kg US \$0,95 /kg |
| Total value of the production of coca leaf and its derivatives on the farm | US\$400 millions | US\$478 millions | US\$560 millions |
| As a percentage of GDP | 0,2% | 0,3% | 0,4% |
| As a percentage of GDP in the agricultural sector | 3% | 3% | 3% |
| Number of households involved in coca cultivation | 67.000 | 74.500 | 106.900 |

Source: Illicit Crop Monitoring 2014-2016, UNODC

In the table above, you can see the increase in the purchase prices of the coca leaf, which coincides with the eradication operations, that before the risk of the growers, the traffickers raise the purchase price and maintain the stability of the income.

⁵ The Representative Market Rate (TRM) used for estimates of Colombian pesos in US dollars was COP \$ 2,741 / \$ US in 2015 and COP \$ 3,052 / \$ US in 2016

In contrast, “Low national and international prices for coffee and other legal crops, rising poverty rates in rural areas of Colombia, the virtual abandonment of some regions by the national government, inequality in land distribution, and the presence of left-wing guerillas and right-wing paramilitaries. Guerrilla and paramilitary groups, which profit from the drug trade, control the main coca-producing regions, and civil unrest has undoubtedly contributed to the expansion of coca acreage in Colombia” (UNDCP, 2000).

Taking into account the same theoretical framework with which I analysed the illegal activity as a local economy in chapter 2, in the following section I examine the substitution strategy implemented in Catatumbo, in terms of effectiveness in the transition to a legal economy.

4.3 Substitution and LED

Based on the 3 key elements of LED developed in Chapter 2, I will examine substitution illicit crop strategy implemented in Catatumbo between 2014 and 2016.

1. Local economy capacity: the strategy in Catatumbo incorporated the component of community participation as one of its core; thus, the process led to a negotiation table with representatives of the community, who expressed the most pressing needs and the focalization of the territory for the intervention. Later, using local capacity, a census and information collection of the 400 selected families was carried out to implement the strategy.

On the other hand, with the support of United Nations UNODC, technical assistance was given to families for the definition and implementation of new productive projects; as well as transfer of skills and knowledge, through diagnostic tools that were applied by the community, analysis of soil to define the productive vocation of the territory.

This approach not only allowed the strengthening of local capacity, but also reflected in the reduction of costs for the program, since it was the members of the community who carried out the diagnostic work and the collection of information. Additionally, the participation of the community gave greater legitimacy to the process and a higher level of receptivity for the process of transition to legality.

2. Better use of locally resources: During the strategy a group of the community was trained to do soil analysis, which allowed a recognition of natural resources and define the most appropriate use from an environmentally responsible approach.

In the transition employment component, a family member was hired, full time, to perform work related to the improvement of public goods and services in the area, construction of tertiary roads, improvements to schools and community spaces, among others. The knowledge and experience of the people, as one of the main resources of the territory, was used for the improvement of the quality of life of the region.

3. Partnerships among different stakeholders: the strategy is a relevant example of the joint work of different actors, as they were: the national government and local authorities, the community, social organizations and an international organism. This alliance allowed to

generate a safe environment for the implementation of the strategy, to build trust between the different actors and an interinstitutional articulation, which has always been one of the great challenges of the state in Colombia.

On the other hand, the community had an important role in the process and for its part, the government fulfilled the commitments in the defined times, contributing to the generation of trust and an enabling environment for the transition of the growers towards a legal economy.

During the intervention, the field work was carried out with the support of the communities through the Community Action Boards of the villages where the strategy was implemented. Five sessions were held in which socialization of the process and presentation of the monitoring were carried out with the assistance of the communities, social organizations, national government, departmental and municipal; as well as the families participating in the strategy.

An important achievement of this strategy in Catatumbo is that community became a relevant actor and centre of the intervention. The positive effect of this change is on the effectiveness of substitution programs, which now have a sense of reality that they did not have before, because in the design process, community was included in the definition of needs and priorities, through the negotiation spaces held over 8 months.

“Community-Driven Development gives control of decisions and resources to community groups. These groups often work in partnership with demand-responsive support organizations and service providers, including elected local governments, the private sector, NGOs, and central government agencies. CDD is a way to empower poor people, improve governance, and enhance security of the poorest” (Donguier et al.2003:3).

4.4 A Post-conflict model

After more than 50 years on civil war, Colombia achieved a peace agreement with FARC guerrilla, after 4 years of continuous dialogue and with the intermediation of international community. This agreement for "the end of the conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace" was signed in November 2016 and consists of 6 points with a territorial approach that "involves recognizing and taking into account the needs, characteristics and economic, cultural and of the territories and communities, guaranteeing socio-environmental sustainability"⁶.

⁶ "Final agreement for the termination of the conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace", signed on November 24, 2016, between the Government of President Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army FARC-EP.

The historical moment of Colombia towards the social and economic reconstruction of a large number of municipalities affected by the conflict, implies great challenges, as well as articulated efforts at national and local level to guarantee the fulfilment of the commitments and participation of communities and other sectors of society as a fundamental basis of the Agreement.

Within the 6 points of the Agreement, the point 4 deals specifically with: "Solution to the problem of illicit drugs" which includes the substitution of illicit crops in order to seek alternatives to improve the welfare conditions of communities in the affected territories. Thus, the emphasis is on the structural transformation of rural areas through "comprehensive development plans with the participation of communities in the design, execution and evaluation of environmental replacement and recovery programs for the areas affected by crops"⁷.

Given the above, Catatumbo is one of the prioritized areas for the implementation of these substitution programs with a new approach; reason why I chose it as a case study, taking into account the relevance of the strategy under investigation, as a basis for the construction of a new model that is replicable to municipalities with similar conditions.

Some of the aspects of the 2014-2016 strategy that were taken for the construction of the substitution model are:

- Agreements with the communities
- Participatory construction of integrated plans
- Rapid execution social infrastructure works

⁷ *Ibíd.*

Chapter 5

Towards LED in fragile context, my findings

The starting point of this paper, was about the impact of weak state for promoting Local Economic Development in a marginalized region as Catatumbo. In answering this sub-question, I have identified key aspects in the transition from illegal to a legal economy that may contribute to an effective process; bearing in mind the fragile context related with an internal conflict and systematic abandonment of state.

The research has demonstrated that prolonged violence in Catatumbo and strong drug trafficking network dimmed the social fabric and economic growth. It is a fact that the municipalities with the highest concentration of coca crops are, on average, poorer than the rest of the country. These municipalities have low levels of connectivity, low levels of institutional development and the illegal economy is the only one that generates a guarantee income.

Given the above, the transition to a legal activity has to go through a process of reconstruction of the territory, with an integral approach, that recognize the need of a complementary social investment.

My argument about the importance of social welfare as a complementary strategy to alternative development, is based on the evidence that results from the research carried out by Eleonora Dalvos⁸ that concludes this way: “Increasing social investment by about USD 5.55 per inhabitant is associated with the reduction of a whole hectare of new coca crops. In an average municipality with 30,000 inhabitants that is equivalent to increasing social investments by USD 166,500. Preventing the appearance of a whole new hectare saves around USD 1954 that would have been otherwise spent on aerial spraying to control that same area. These estimates are based on conservative measures of USD 1768 per hectare spent to support spraying operations and a survival rate of coca crops of 10.5 per cent” (Davalos, 2016:128).

Social investment is fundamental for local development, particularly in fragile context like Catatumbo region or other with the similar situation. It must be a main purpose to increase labor market participation, promoting human capital, mobilizing resources into poor communities, and fostering enterprise in a local level. Moreover, investment in public infrastructure is a priority for the sustainability of productive projects, because in Colombia it is a reality that many farmers must destroy their crops due to lack of marketing circuits, due to a drop in prices that does not compensate for the investment made.

In any case, the eradication and substitution of cultivation of illegal use is a complex process, that over the years has produced relevant knowledge from the implementation of several strategies. Capitalized knowledge can generate important insights for future interventions, especially in relation to the integral approach and the participation and collaboration of the community. Furthermore, its contributions to Local Economic Development have been characterized for partial interventions, in some cases the levels of poverty increased due to

⁸ Eleonora Dalvos, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Public Policy Program.

the loss of their livelihood with coca crops and the lack of sustainability in the new productive activity. Bearing in mind that territories covered by the substitution programs like Catatumbo, are regions characterized by the absence of the State as to lack of provision of public services, security issues, poor infrastructure, beside internal conflict with different actors and a strong network of drug traffic.

Although it was not the initial purpose of the strategy in Catatumbo and emerged as a response to the strike, the Government recognized that beyond a substitution program, the transition to a legal economy requires the transformation of the territory and therefore an important one. investment of resources.

Additionally, in Colombia there is not a single entity that assumes all the components (income generation, infrastructure, food security, etc.), so it is essential to coordinate actions that will be carried out. This has become a barrier to the success of the substitution processes, since when a government entity fails or fails to comply with the agreements it generates a high risk that families return to illicit crops is high.

On the other hand, one of the key aspects to foster LED are partnerships among stakeholders. In the case of Catatumbo, it is one of the innovative elements included in the strategy, where synergy was given between national and local authorities, social organizations and CBO and international organizations such as UNODC and FAO. All of them were involved from the beginning of the process, improving the coordination of actions, as well as giving a relevant place to the community as protagonists of the process.

In that context, a noteworthy and important step forward is the level of community participation. From my experience, engage growers in decision-making process allows to build an effective model based on real needs and limitations, which contribute to the success of the transitional strategies. The zones with illegal economies are characterized by the lack of confidence of the communities towards the institutions of the state, due to the continuous breaches and the systematic violation of human rights in the area. In a fragile context like that of Catatumbo, the building of trust must be the first step towards the transition to legality.

Likewise, within the transition process, it is essential to guarantee security conditions for the community and the leaders of the same, since substituting illicit crops will be confronted by all the actors involved within the value chain, especially the pressure of armed groups. Without security, the sustainability of the new productive projects is not possible.

Other sub-question posed in the research paper is: to what extent the international pressure by the United States led Colombia to carry out actions without taking into account the local context? To answer this question, I took into account the results of the former programs and several studies by researchers, to affirm that as long as US has been involved in the implementation of a number of strategies in different countries in Latin American, sovereignty has been undermined, as well as the legitimacy of programs that obey extreme interests, ignoring the context and needs of the territories.

Proof of this, is the relevance of crop eradication as a metric of Colombia's commitment to the anti-drug fight. It is a simplistic view measures the fight against drug only through coca cultivation reduction; conversely, all efforts must be taken into account in all parts of the production chain as destruction of laboratories, seizures, interdiction, among others.

Likewise, Colombia keeps the forced eradication as a requirement for every intervention, notwithstanding this induces to a new cultivation dynamic and don not solve the underlying problem. So far, eradication has been more important than encourage growers to be part of alternative development projects or social investment. This requirement has remained in time due to the pressure exerted by the US, which requires Colombia to show results and greater commitment in the fight against drugs, ignoring the real need to change and improve conditions in the territories. Where illegal plantations are viewed as a major factor of Andean instability and a threat to the national security of Andean states and the USA. The Andean governments have subordinated their policies, especially on drugs, but often also in matters of economics and trade, to the wishes of the USA for 20 years at least. Such submission may doubtless be explained by the intransigent, even intimidating stance adopted by Washington. (Chouvy and Laniel, 2007:143).

Law enforcement interventions aim to restore the rule of law, the cornerstone of governance and sustainable development, and can also influence the availability of drugs in illicit markets, not only by reducing supply through interdiction but also by increasing the risk for traffickers, which raises the price of drugs in consumer markets. However, enforcement activities by authorities can also generate violence, particularly when they affect the internal and external structure of illegal markets. Research suggests that targeting enforcement and policing on both the protagonists and the elements in the drug trafficking chain that generate the greatest profit and the most violence can be particularly effective in reducing violence. On the other hand, strategies that focus on rapidly disrupting drug trafficking organizations and reducing violence in the short term can sometimes lead to more violence (UNODC, 2016:21).

“The most important aspect of the strategy of the small farmers is not to achieve maximum benefit but rather to minimize risk, in other words, to guarantee secure income, through an adequate combination of crops and other types of activities that as a whole enable them to satisfy the basic needs of their families. Rather than high income levels for the communities, coca provides ease of storage, transport and commercialization along with guaranteed access to the market in isolated and poor zones. Thus structural solutions for local development might involve guaranteed local or regional markets. As confirms, anti-drug policy in Colombia has failed to take into account the cultural and socioeconomic characteristics of the farmers and their reasons for cultivating such crops. In other words, the policies are not based on knowledge of the local reality nor are they agreed upon with the population” (Rincón-Ruiz et al., 2016:57)

Chapter 6

Conclusions

In Colombia, the abandonment and weakness of the State in certain regions, as a result of an armed conflict for more than 50 years, have allowed the increase of illegal activities related to the production of cocaine, which became the base of the local economy in a considerable number of municipalities. The generation of employment, improvements in infrastructure, use of local capacity and participation of diverse actors, have been determining factors in the consolidation of illegal economy.

To deal with this situation, the Colombian government has implemented several strategies, with the purpose of achieving the transition from an illegal to a legal economy. However, in spite of many efforts, the substitution programs have not achieved the expected results, and for the grower families, there are still no viable and sustainable alternatives offered by the State that allow them to gradually dissociate themselves from the coca economy, allowing a transitional process, in which they do not lose their livelihoods, which could exacerbate the situation of vulnerability.

My personal motivation with this subject and the case study selected is related with the historic moment of Colombia in terms of peace building and territorial transformation. The main findings obtained in the analysis of theoretical framework, Catatumbo strategy as a case study, internal documents of government, reports, interviews and my own experience, may be a contribution to understand a set of conditions to promote LED in weak contexts.

Based on the above, this chapter presents the following conclusions which summarize the responses to the questions that have been achieved throughout of this paper.

Development not only economic matter. LED can not be limited to a economic growth, when there is a fragile context in which the absence of the state and the armed conflict have destroyed the social fabric and increased the levels of vulnerability of the territory.

A fragile context is the ideal scenario for the strengthening of illegal activities that mobilize the local economy through a value chain, generating income stability and development opportunities in a region with unsatisfied basic needs. Hence, investment in social welfare should be complementary to the development of alternative projects.

People, the most important resource. The most important resource of a territory is its people, who give it meaning, build identity, generate networks. Human capital is translated into knowledge and management. The ability to transfer skills to communities strengthens the local capacity and self-management capacity of citizens.

The articulation and coordination of different actors allows to broaden the impact of the interventions and mainly to strengthen the value chains of the new productive activities, in such a way that it is prevented from returning to illicit activities. In that sense, the role of government in strategic coordination is fundamental to recover its legitimacy in places where it has not had control for years.

Finally, it is a fact that public policy and programs related to crop substitution and, in general, the fight against drugs, generate, in themselves, an improvement in terms of development for the affected populations, to the extent that the State is present, there is an attempt to recover the security of the territory; however, it is undeniable that the approach to the transition to a legal economy must be comprehensive and take into account some recommendations:

- To be in line with the needs of community. This is only possible by building a participative and collaborative process with the communities.
- When the communities have cultivated coca for years, it has a series of incorporated dynamics and identity components related to the crop.
- Dual track: aim to replace crops and develop actions for local development, such as road construction, access to education and health services, promotion and accompaniment to alternative development initiatives.

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List of Appendix

Appendix 1.1 Semi Structure Interview Guide

Interview general information:

Interview Date:

Interviewer name:

Country and language of interview:

Location setting (Office, market, home, on-line):

Method of Interviewing (In person, Skype, Telephone, Other):

1. Since when are you linked to the implementation of programs / strategies for illicit crop substitution?
2. How have substitution processes been in Catatumbo in general?
3. Did you become part of the government team that supported this specific process?
4. What was the main challenge that the process had to face in terms of being accepted by the community? Barriers to implementation?
5. How does government see the facilitation of an environment to move from an illegal to a legal economy?
6. What was the role of UNODC?
7. Were all the phases and the 5 components of the strategy fulfilled?
8. What were the main achievements of the strategy?
9. What were the main fails of the strategy?
10. What is the national government's perception of eradication as a requirement of the substitution process?
11. With this strategy, does it show any degree of evolution in the previous substitution processes?
12. What things could be improved, aspects to include for future interventions?