Gender Disparities in Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Missions

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ABSTRACT

This thesis has examined the influence of gender equality in a country on the contribution of female personnel to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations by United Nations member states. The gender disparity of these personnel contributions can depend on multiple factors which can be hard to define or specify. Nonetheless, this study has found a relation between some indicators of gender equality and the gender disparity of personnel contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. By conducting a quantitative analysis, through carrying out a hierarchical regression analysis, the relations between several factors have been tested, leading to several insights. The results of the quantitative analysis show that there is no significant relationship between gender societal equality in a country and the percentage of female personnel contributed by that country to UNPKOs. However, the results do show a positive influence of the political representation of women in a country on the percentage of female personnel contributed to UNPKOs.

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Content

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFR	Adolescent Fertility Rate
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
CSW	Commission on the Status of Women
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
GDI	Gender Development Index
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEM	Gender Empowerment Measure
GEI	Gender-related Empowerment Index
GII	Gender Inequality Index
GNI	Gross National Income
HDI	Human Development Index
IR	International Relations
LPF	Labor Force Participation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MMR	Maternal Mortality Ratio
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
PR	Parliamentary Representation
RSW	Relative Status of Women (Index)
SC	Security Council
SE	Secondary Education
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNPKO	United Nations Peacekeeping Operation
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

"The United Nations is our world's greatest mechanism for making peace"

- Gillian Sorensen

Since sexual violence accusations on the address of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have emerged in the 1990s, women are more and more urged to participate in peacekeeping missions, where this lack of representation was of no big concern before. The United Nations, scholars, women's organizations and feminists have been urging countries to contribute more female personnel for several decades. Although there has been a small increase in the 1990s (but never exceeding two percent) the numbers of female personnel have been always low, as women did not have equal participation in peacekeeping. The widely carried recommendations for an increased representation of women in peacekeeping only emerged as reports on sexual violence and exploitation by male peacekeepers surfaced and became a focus of attention for women's organizations and feminists. The Security Council adopted several resolutions on increasing the representation of women in peacekeeping forces, however the implementation of these resolutions has not been very successful so far. Various reasons have been cited for the lack of implementation, of which several are related to the domestic characteristics of contributing countries, including democracy and gender-equality (Crawford et al., 2015; Simić, 2010; United Nations, 2003; United Nations, 2010a). This thesis aims to study the underlying reasons for the (lack of) contribution of female personnel by UN member states, related to domestic gender characteristics.

In this chapter, the role of the United Nations as a peacekeeping organization will be explained, followed by an explanation of policies related to gender and peacekeeping. Furthermore, this chapter will contain the problem statement and the research question and will close with the theoretical and societal relevance of this thesis.

1.1 The United Nations as a Peacekeeping Organization

This paragraph will outline the history of the United Nations as a peacekeeping organization, the modern-day peacekeeping reforms and the gender issues which play a role in the United Nations peacekeeping operations.

1.1.1   HISTORY

In the late 1950s, when the United Nations peacekeeping efforts began, peacekeeping was often simply described as a strategy to aim to control and resolve armed conflicts. The official view of the United Nations (UN) is that the United Nations Truce Supervision Organizations (UNTSO) was the first United Nations peacekeeping operation (UNPKO). The UNTSO was established to supervise the Armistice

Agreement between Israel and its neighboring countries in 1948 and stayed on after the Security Council (SC) ordered so. Later on, in 1956, the first armed UN force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), was deployed to the Suez conflict in Egypt. The important role played by both UN operations accelerated the demands on the UN peacekeeping services, which played a large role in helping to control armed conflicts in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. Even though the Security Council was facing difficulties in taking effective action due to the tensions and rivalries of the Cold War, ten peacekeeping operations were established in these decades. During the late 1970s and 1980s there were not much new developments in UN peacekeeping, until a renewed willingness of the United States and the Soviet Union to cooperate on regional conflicts spawned the demand for UN peacekeeping interventions. However, during the Cold War there were thirteen UNPKOs established, from 1956 till 1988, these early operations set the framework for a body of procedures, principles and practices for peacekeeping operations (United Nations website; Goulding, 1993).

The established principles for peacekeeping are fivefold. First, peacekeeping operations are United Nations operations, meaning they were established through the UN legislative organs, under the command of the Secretary-General, and financed collectively by the member states. The fact that they were operations under the hat of the United Nations made the interference of these missions acceptable to member states which would otherwise not be likely to provide access to foreign troops. Secondly, it became clear that peacekeeping operations only could be established with the consent of the parties to the conflict and could only be successful with the continuation of that consent. Furthermore, it was established that impartiality is an important treat of peacekeepers, peacekeeping operations cannot take sides in a conflict, ensuring that peacekeeping forces could maintain normal relations with all parties to the conflict. Fourth, considering armed peacekeeping operations and the troops of the UN, it was established that the UN would not have a standing army. The member states of the UN would provide personnel for the UNPKOs. Last, it had been established that the use of force by peacekeeping forces should be kept to a minimum and only when necessary (United Nations website; Goulding, 1993). These principles lead to a broader definition of UN peacekeeping, as Marrack Goulding (1993) stated it:

"Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary."

1.1.2 PEACEKEEPING NOWADAYS

After the end of the Cold War, the UN shifted the focus of its operations to complex and multidimensional missions to ensure the implementation of peace agreements and help to build a foundation for sustainable peace. Furthermore, the nature of conflicts the UN interferes in has changed as well, from mostly inter-state conflicts to more intra-state conflicts. These changes led to a broadening task base for UN peacekeepers, from human rights monitoring, to governance and security sector reforms, to disarmament and reintegration of former combatants in intra-state conflicts.

The end of the Cold War also led to an increase in the amount of peacekeeping operations, as a result of a new common sense of purpose, leading to twenty new UNPKOs between 1989 and 1994 increasing the number of peacekeepers to a total of 75,000 peacekeepers in 1994. However, after several setbacks in high profile missions in the mid-1990s the criticism towards UNPKOs rose. These events caused the UN to start a process of self-reflection which led to a series of reforms in the UN peacekeeping strategies. In 2000 a panel was appointed to assess the shortcomings of the peacekeeping system, leading to the Brahimi Report and several other reports and resolutions on the shortcomings and possible solutions of the UN peacekeeping system, including the Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325). In the early 2000s, the UN established several new peacekeeping operations with peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks, which included several challenges. Today's peacekeeping operations comprehend a multidimensional framework of tasks and operate in physically and politically difficult conflict areas. Hence, today's definition of peacekeeping operations is more extensive than it was in the previous decades and is described by Gaibulloev et. Al (2015) as:

"Today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights, and assist in restoring the rule of law. As such, peacekeeping includes monitoring of ceasefires, traditional peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian aid, nation-building, police training, and peacebuilding."

1.1.3 UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS & GENDER ISSUES

Entering the 2010s, the number of countries contributing to peace operations stand at its all-time high, as do the numbers of personnel contributions to UNPKOs. However, this increased participation does not show the imbalance in UNPKO forces. The United Nations peacekeeping forces remain a predominantly male force, with to date only 4.4% of peacekeepers being female, only 4109 female peacekeepers compared to 88548 male peacekeepers on a total of 92657 combined police and military

peacekeeping personnel (data from the month September 2017) (United Nations, 2017). As a connection between the presence of all-male peacekeeping forces and sexual exploitation and gendered violence in post-conflict areas by UN peacekeeping personnel has been severely documented, the need for an improved gender balance in the UN forces has been expressed. The United Nations has taken these issues as a call for action. This is related to the fact that violent conflict is exhibiting gendered patterns of agency and victimization, where men tend to be the perpetrators of violence and are perceived to be particularly threatening. Furthermore, another pattern of gendered violence is sexual violence, which primarily victimizes women, and which is often used as a strategy of war. Additionally, women in post-conflict situations are disproportionately affected by gender inequality, including degrees of poverty, malnutrition, access to education, and human trafficking. Even when women are taking part in the peacekeeping operations, they are often not taken into account in the post-conflict situation or are excluded from high ranking positions (Crawford et al, 2015; Kreft, 2017).

1.2   History of Gender Mainstreaming in UN Security Council Policies

Gender has only been included in the policies surrounding United Nations peacekeeping addressing women as active participants in the peacekeeping process since two decades, as before women were mostly addressed to as the victims of conflicts. This changed with the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security (UNSCR1325) on 31 October 2000. The process surrounding the resolution and its implementation, and the role of women in peacekeeping operations are explained in this paragraph.

1.2.1   EXPLANATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325

The roots for the UNSCR 1325 lie in the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, specifically in the chapter on women and armed conflict. Following, in the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) in 1998 when discussing the obstacles of implementing the chapter a group of NGOs started discussing taking the issue of "women, peace and security" to the Security Council (SC). The CSW in 2000, where the Beijing Platform was reviewed, centered on discussions of issues of women and armed conflict again. After a call for action by the SC president to examine the connections between gender, peace and security the NGOs had a legitimatization for their insistence on discussing the issue in the SC. At the end of the 2000 CSW the Working Group on Women, Peace and Security was created to advocate on a SC resolution. The complete groundwork for this resolution was done by this workgroup, consisting of NGOs, positioning themselves as "helpers" to the SC. Only after the NGOs made considerable steps and impact within the UN, the UN agencies became involved in the project. After their extensive efforts, the UNSCR1325 was unanimously adopted in October 2000 (United Nations Security Council, 2015a; Cohn, 2008).

The adoption of the resolution is considered historical considering the fact it is the first time the UN Security Council specifically addressed gender issues and women's views in 'conflict' and 'post-conflict' situations, and specifically the role of women in conflict resolution and prevention, ensuring that all UN peacebuilding and post-conflict endeavors would be sensitive towards gendered inequalities. As previous UN resolutions put women as victims of war, but not including them as peace-building agents. After the adoption of the resolution it was clear that the practical implementation of the resolution would be a difficult process. Ten years after the adoption of the SCR1325 the UN has done research into the implementation and effects of the resolution on gender sensitivity in UN peacekeeping missions, leading to the report 'Ten-year Impact Study on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security in Peacekeeping' (2010). The report on the impact of peacekeeping operations regarding the advancement of women's rights and the promotion of gender equality according to UNSCR1325 focusses on seven thematic areas. This extensive evaluation report generated data through interviews, focus groups, and quantitative data collection. The seven areas of evaluation consist of:

1.) Women's participation in peace negotiations
2.) Women's participation in political processes
3.) Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
4.) Security sector reforms
5.) Legal and judiciary reforms
6.) Sexual and gender-based violence
7.) Protection of women IDPs and refugees

The study led to several common and cross-cutting findings, specifically focusing on the gender composition of the UN peacekeeping forces. The evaluation ten years after the UNSCR1325 found that the gender balance of UN peacekeeping personnel was lagging behind the policy goal and the senior mission management was not held adequately accountable for complying with the provisions of the UNSCR1325 (Cohn, 2008; Coomaraswamy, 2015; Pratt, 2011).

1.2.2 IMPROVING IMPLEMENTATION: UNSCR 2242

In 2015, fifteen years after UNSCR1325 was adopted, the SC adopted the eighth resolution on women, peace and security, UNSCR2242. The adoption of this resolution has been the result of a critical reflection on the implementation of UNSCR1325 and the role of the UN in incorporating the principles of the resolution in the core elements of the UN and its operations. Furthermore, the assessment of UNSCR1325 exposed the failures to combat sexual violence in conflict situations, to increase the numbers of female peacekeepers and to address new challenges. The new resolution emphasizes the

role of women's participation in achieving sustainable peace and provides tools to spur the implementation of the UNSCR1325. The resolution addresses several areas, for this study focusing on the presence of female peacekeepers, the paragraphs on expanding the role and contribution of women in United Nations operations are the most valuable sections of the resolution. Furthermore, in the adoption of UNSCR2242, the UN encourages an increased contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs. The tools to achieve this include the use of incentives for troop-contributing countries (Berg & Bjarnegård, 2016; George & Shepherd, 2016; United Nations Security Council, 2010; United Nations Security Council, 2015a; United Nations Women, 2015).

1.3 Problem Statement

Reaching the targets for female personnel contributions can be challenging, and thus far the implementation of previous targets concerning female personnel contributions have been a struggle. Although there are many studies on the UNSCR1325, and its impact on a broad level, the country contributions of female personnel have not been studied extensively, neither data over a longer period of time nor possible increases in contributions of female personnel. Studying the contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs can display if the contribution of female personnel is progressing and can display the underlying reasons for the likelihood countries are contributing female personnel to UNPKOs. Testing the relationship between contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs and several independent variables (consisting of domestic and mission characteristics) can provide a theoretical framework on factors influencing the likelihood a country will contribute female personnel. Furthermore, the data on contributions of states to UN forces divided by gender is only recorded from 2009 onwards, which can explain why the research on this data is limited, or only applied to a short timeframe (Crawford et al., 2015). However, now there are eight years of data available, therefore this thesis wants to study the average contributions of female personnel to UNPKOs in relation to gender-related factors in the contributing countries to find out if there is a relation between gender equality in a country and the contribution of female personnel to a UNPKO.

Hence, the research question of this thesis is composed as the following:

How does the national gender equality of a country affect the contribution of female personnel to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations over the period 2009-2016?

1.4   Relevance

This paragraph will elaborate on the theoretical relevance, how useful this study might be in relation to the existing theoretical framework, and the societal relevance, the usefulness of this study for the practical implications.

1.4.1   THEORETICAL RELEVANCE

The call for female peacekeepers is relatively new, and compliance by states with a non-binding agreement is low. The reasons behind the noncompliance are of importance for international governance research. The data on contributions of states to UN forces broken down by gender is recorded from 2009 onwards. Therefore, the theoretical relevance of this study is evident as there are still few studies analyzing the data from 2009-2016 on the gender composition of UN security forces, as the most recent study focusing on the domestic gender equality of a donor country in relation to personnel contributions to UNPKOs dealt only with a 2010-2011 timespan (Crawford et al., 2015). Meaning there is a gap concerning this topic with newer and more extensive data. This thesis will use data from 2009-2016 on the gender composition of UN security forces to evaluate a larger database. Although there are many studies on the UNSCR 1325, and its impact, there is not very extensive research on the contribution of women personnel to the UN peacekeeping missions by states. These issues leave a gap in the scientific literature on the implementation and compliance of states with the part of the UNSCR 1325 focusing on gender composition of the UN forces.

1.4.2   SOCIETAL RELEVANCE

Gender inequality is a global issue effecting women and men within several areas of their lives. Especially the safety of women is, and has always been, endangered because of gender inequality. In conflict and post-conflict areas this safety is even further reduced, mostly because a lack of law enforcement and control in the area. UN peacekeeping missions intend to bring peace and security in times of conflict and in the process following these violent conflicts. However, UN forces were not able to protect women in these areas, on the contrary during several UN peacekeeping missions, consisting of male forces only, UN forces themselves have been alleged of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of women. The absence of women in the UN forces has been recognized as problematic and in operational paragraph 4 of UNSCR1325 the UN requests the increase of women in peacekeeping operations, in order to implement women's perspectives on peacekeeping and increase the gender balance in the UN forces. Furthermore, the UN is being more and more committed to having a role in international peace, showed by the increase of deployed UN personnel from approximately 12.000 forces in the end of the 1990s to over 95.000 in 2017. For the UN and member states to reach the undoubtedly ambitious goals of the UNSCR2442, adopted in October 2015, to double the number of female personnel (4408 female

peacekeepers out of 105480 in total, meaning 4.2% female peacekeepers in September 2015) in the military and police components of the UNPKOs, it is of importance to address the underlying roots of gender imbalance in UNPKO personnel contributions. It requires continued monitoring of personnel contributions by gender to UNPKOs to evaluate the impact of domestic gender equality on a country's personnel contributions to UNPKOs (Kathman, 2013; United Nations, 2003, United Nations, 2017).

This chapter will provide an overview of the literature on the topics of United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs) in relationship to gender disparities, the factors influencing a country's willingness and capability to contribute personnel to UNPKOs and a breakdown of the literature discussing the incentives and factors influencing the contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs.

2.1   The United Nations Resolutions on Peacekeeping and Gender

After 2000, there has been a significant trend towards increased gender-sensitivity in UNPKO mandates. Especially in conflicts with systematic sexual violence the probability of a gender-mainstreamed UNPKO mandate increases. However, the implementation of the UNSCR1325 has been slow and the impact of the resolution has been described as modest and unsystematic (Kreft, 2017).

Almost 17 years after the adoption of the resolution several recommendations of the UNSCR1325 are still only sparsely implemented, female personnel in UNPKOs accounting only for 4.4 percent and female military personnel for even 3.4 percent in 2017. To improve the implementation of the UNSCR1325 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2242 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR2242) in 2015. This resolution aims at doubling the number of women in UNPKOs within a five-year timespan, calling to initiate a revised strategy within the existing resources and urging the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to ensure gender analysis and technical gender expertise throughout all missions (Berg & Bjarnegård, 2016; UNSCR2242).

2.2   Factors Influencing UNPKO Contributions

The contributors to UNPKOs have various incentives and characteristics which explain their willingness to contribute personnel to UNPKOs. These indicators include first of all, a country's domestic characteristics in relation to the conflict, including the risk level of UNPKOs and the conflict location, a country's democracy level, a country's size and (military) capabilities, and the political sensitivity and media attention for the conflict or participation in the conflict. Secondly, there are tactical incentives for personnel contribution to UNPKOs, including conflict proximity and risk, refugee inflows and military benefits. Furthermore, monetary reasons, including receiving financial reimbursements for contributing personnel to UNPKOs, form a third category for explaining a country's incentive to contribute personnel to UNPKOs.

2.2.1   DOMESTIC CHARACTERISTICS

A country's domestic characteristics can have a considerable impact on the willingness and capability of a country to contribute personnel to UNPKOs. These domestic characteristics include the democracy

and humanitarian characteristics of a country, the country's size and (military) capabilities, and the sensitivity of the conflict.

Democracy and Humanitarianism

First, the level of democracy of a state might have a strong link to a country's contributions, an outcome Lebkovic (2004) links to Liberalist theories. Liberal International Relation (IR) theories are based on the concept of freedom and explain domestic policies in relation to the international society and states behavior in international organizations (Doyle, 1983). As the United Nations have shifted the focus of peacekeeping operations towards promoting human rights and democracy and protecting civilians in conflict areas, participation in peacekeeping operations gives countries the opportunity to respond to domestic pressures to provide humanitarian help in conflict areas and simultaneously gives them the opportunity to promote liberal norms and the status quo they benefit from (Lebkovic, 2004; Uzonyi, 2015). However, although liberal theories can explain the participation of liberal democracies in peacekeeping operations, it does not explain the participation of illiberal autocratic states, as the humanitarian reasons do not account for these states. Other explanations like tactical or monetary benefits might have more explanatory power concerning the reasons for illiberal autocratic states to provide personnel for UNPKOs (Uzonyi, 2015).

Country Size and Capabilities

A second indicator is a country's size and (military) capabilities, an empirical study by Lebkovic's (2004) found a relationship between the size of a country or the prominence of its role within the United Nations and the size and likelihood of personnel contributions to UNPKOs. Population size seems to have a significant positive influence on UN personnel contributions as well, however there is no significant relation between the population size of a country and the gender disparity a country's personnel contributions to UNPKOs (Crawford et al., 2015). Furthermore, research by Victor (2010) showed that the size of a state's military forces will predict the contribution of the country's contribution to UNPKOs, a statement which was supported by the results from a study by Bove & Elia (2011), which indicated that contributing countries personnel contributions are subject to the military capacity of a country and are these contributions indicators of the state objectives for joining an UNPKO.

Conflict Sensitivity

A third factor incorporates the sensitivity of a conflict or UNPKO. First of all, contributions to UN peacekeeping missions can be politically sensitive. Especially when the contributed forces engage in criminal behavior, which has been the case with the personnel of multiple UNPKOs, where several charges of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), torture and smuggling have been made. Furthermore,

when the perceived success rate of the mission is low and national forces are failing to accomplish their military or humanitarian objectives (Lebkovic, 2004; Grady, 2010). Furthermore, Bove & Elia (2011) state that the media coverage and public attention for conflicts with especially social dislocations (refugee issues) and the related domestic pressures can play a role in a country's decision to contribute personnel to a UNPKO.

A country's decision to contribute personnel to a UNPKO is also dependent on several tactical incentives, namely the proximity to and risk of the conflict, the probability of refugee inflows, and the military benefits of contributing.

Conflict Proximity and Risk
States are less willing to contribute forces to missions where they will be at risk (Lebkovic, 2004). Bove & Elia's (2011) support these findings in their study, which relies on a theoretical model and a dataset on troop contribution of 102 states and 45 operations from 1999 to 2009, found a country's willingness to contribute personnel to UNPKOs to be based on two risk related characteristics of the conflict, the level of security threat a conflict poses for a country and the proximity of a country to the conflict area the UNPKO takes place in. However, Lebkovic (2004) concluded that a state's proximity to the conflict has shown to have little impact on a state's decision to contribute peacekeeping personnel to UNPKOs and found no significant evidence for this assertion. In contradiction to Lebkovic (2004), Bove & Elia (2011) state that a country's proximity to the conflict area and the level of threat a conflict poses to a country are factors which affect the willingness of a country to contribute personnel and the size of these personnel contributions to UNPKOs. Uzonyi (2015) supports these findings, by analyzing the data of all UN peacekeeping missions since 1990 she emphasizes the direct benefits states receive from stabilizing conflict areas, as this leads to decrease the externalities of conflict and can allow refugees to return to their countries. These refugee related externalities resulting from conflict can induce third parties into entering a conflict to stabilize their borders and prevent further refugee flows (Kathman, 2010; 2011).

Refugee Inflows
The number of displaced people in the conflict area fleeing to neighboring countries as a result of the conflict affects the size of the personnel contribution to UNPKOs and the probability of interference in the conflict by contributing personnel to a UNPKO as well (Bove & Elia, 2011). As conflict causes multiple externalities for neighboring countries, including the diffusion of conflict across their border, a decline in economic growth and most commonly the threat of refugee inflows these factors lead to an increased

willingness of a country nearby the conflict to contribute personnel to the UNPKO for that conflict (Uzonyi, 2015). Refugee inflows can be especially damaging for a country as they can damage the economy, strain food supplies and shift the demographics. Participation in peacekeeping operations can be helpful as these operations can keep the levels of violence in the conflict area low, which makes civilians less likely to flee from the conflict area, thus lowering the numbers of refugees which will move to other nearby countries. Therefore, a country's willingness to contribute personnel to peacekeeping operations should be linked to the benefits the country will harvest from securing its borders and preventing refugee inflows (Beardsley, 2011; Uzonyi, 2015).

Military Benefits

Another possible incentive for countries to contribute personnel to UNPKOs is the possibility for their militaries to receive additional or more advanced military training than the country itself is able to provide its military forces. As peacekeeping forces consisting of militaries of multiple countries train together, less advanced militaries are able to benefit from the tactical training of more sophisticated military forces (Uzonyi, 2015). However, there is not much significant evidence of research which studies the relationship between a country's military needs and the personnel contributions to UNPKOs, and Blum (2000) suggests that the military training needs of a country is not a significant factor for contributing personnel to UNPKOs.

2.2.3 MONETARY REASONS

Furthermore, the decision to contribute personnel to a UNPKO can be related to several monetary reasons. A country's lack of financial influence on UNPKOs or troop reimbursement when contributing to UNPKOs can play a role.

Lack of Financial Influence

Military related reasons also play a role as incentives for a country to contribute personnel to UNPKOs. First, a country can have more influence over its troop contributions than over financial contributions, as a country's financial contribution peacekeeping operations is based on a strict payment scale and cannot control where it is used for, but a country can choose whether to deploy its forces in certain conflict areas. This can be an argument to focus more on influencing UNPKOs by the contribution of personnel than on increasing the financial contributions. Although a country has the option to withhold its financial contribution, this is a bigger political statement and a more political action to execute, therefore countries are more likely to influence UNPKOs through their contributions of human resources than through their financial contributions (Lebkovic, 2004).

Troop Reimbursements

Furthermore, Lebkovic (2004) does not find a significant relationship between the wealth of a country and the country's probability to contribute personnel to UNPKOs. However, in contrast with the finding of Lebkovic (2004), Bove & Elia (2011) found a link between a country's contribution to peacekeeping missions and the country's relative wealth, concluding that poorer countries are more likely to contribute personnel to UNPKOs. Kathman (2013) supports these findings by stating that less-developed states have increased their role and responsibility concerning personnel contributions to UNPKOs. As personnel contributions to UNPKOs are voluntary, the major drive for these troop-contributing countries is perceived to be the UN monthly troop reimbursement. Contributing states receive a specified amount per soldier per month, which allows governments of poorer states to use these funds to support their military forces or other state projects (Uzonyi, 2015; Victor, 2010). Gaibulloev et al. (2015) support these statements, emphasizing that contributions to UNPKOs bear severe donor-specific benefits, which are benefits solely for the country contributing personnel to the UNPKO. Furthermore, Gaibulloev et al. (2015) conclude that concerning UNPKOs personnel contributions donor countries are motivated by money-making personnel deployments; especially relatively poorer countries are willing to contribute higher numbers of personnel to UNPKOs (Gaibulloev et al., 2015). An outcome which corresponds with studies of several scholars (Bove & Elia, 2011; Kathman, 2013; Uzonyi, 2015) emphasizing a relation between a country's relative wealth and their willingness to contribute personnel to UNPKOs.

2.3 Factors Influencing the Contribution of Female Personnel to UNPKOs

The countries that contribute personnel to UNPKOs have multiple reasons and specific country characteristics which indicate their willingness and capability to contribute female personnel to UNPKOs. These indicators include first of all a country's political and societal factors, including societal characteristics, and the role of international pressure. Secondly, the role of women in a country's military organizations, including the social constructs surrounding the military and the characteristics of military missions, can explain a country's willingness and capability to contribute female personnel to UNPKOs.

2.3.1 POLITICAL & SOCIETAL FACTORS

Gender diversity in UNPKOs is dependent on the willingness and capability of countries to contribute female personnel to the missions. This depends first on country's political and societal factors, including societal characteristics and international pressure.

Societal characteristics

Several societal factors influence the contribution of females to UNPKOs, the extent to which countries are rights-observant and if these countries are democratic, leading to national policies on women and the military. These national policies vary, where some countries have no gender-specific policies towards women in the military, others have active gender-specific recruitment policies. This shows how governments can act as agents of liberal policies using their institutions to lead a societal transformation towards a more gender equal society and a more gender equal military (Crawford et al., 2015; Dharmapuri, 2013, Lebkovic, 2004). Therefore, Crawford et al. (2015) argue that countries that provide women with more political rights are more inclined to provide female personnel to UNPKOs. The results of their study show a significant positive relationship between women's political rights and countries contributions of female personnel to these UNPKOs, supporting their theory that countries providing equal political rights are likely to support international attempts to improve the gender disparities in UNPKOs. These findings are supported by the theoretical framework of Wechsler Segal (1995) on the factors affecting women's military participation, which consist of military factors, social structure factors and cultural factors. Wechsler Segal (1995) emphasizes that when the social structure and values of gender and family roles change the percentage of women in the labor force of a country increases, which also leads to an increased participation of women in the military. Dharmapuri (2013) also mentions that the social norms and behaviors prohibiting gender equality are preventing women's full participation in national militaries, leading to low contributions of female personnel to UNPKOs. Countries which are providing higher percentages of female personnel to UNPKOs have addressed these social norms which prevent gender equality in their societies and militaries. These findings support the statements of Crawford et al. (2015) on role the extent of women's (political) rights in a country and the fact if a country is democratic or not play in the contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs.

International Pressure

Another factor influencing the presence of women in national militaries and in UNPKOs is the relationship between a state and international institutions (like the UN, the NATO, or the EU) or between states in a bilateral context. The relation between a state and international institution, in this case the UN, can affect the willingness of the state to contribute to the wishes of the UN. If a state is willing to implement and is active in the formulation of UN conventions and resolutions concerning gender equality the state might be contributing because of their concern for their own reputation if they defect (Crawford et al., 2015). Furthermore, democratic states feel a sense of obligation towards the UN and the international community, thus resulting in the wish to comply with the resolutions concerning female representation in peacekeeping. Countries seek to preserve their liberal and democratic reputation, by implementing the actions called for by the UN (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). As the

concern with gender disparities and its results in UNPKO forces has been expressed by the international community through the adopted UN resolutions, the willingness of countries to improve the presence of women in UNPKOs was shown by the adoption of the UNSCR1325, and in a later stage through the impact report of 2010 and the adoption of UNSCR2442 in 2015. Although the critical note on the implementation of increased female representation in UNPKO forces is that the resolutions are mainly diplomatically supported and less so actually implemented, the UN and its members have worked on increasing the implementation of the resolutions, improve gender mainstreaming and increase the contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs. An issue which counteracts the efforts for gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping is the fact that multiple post-UNSCR1325 resolutions have focused narrowly on sexual violence in conflict, not taking into account women's active participation in peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts and addressing women as passive victims. These ways of portraying women in conflict situations are counterproductive to gender mainstreaming efforts and undermines women's value in society and in the peacekeeping process. To counter the selective activation of UNSCR1325 and focus on the full agency of women in all areas of peacekeeping, the universal role of women in all UN conflict and post-conflict contexts should be emphasized, including women's presence in the UNPKO forces (Dharmapuri, 2013; Kreft, 2017; Tryggestad, 2009; United Nations, 2010a).

2.3.2 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTS

Next to political and societal factors, the social constructs surrounding the military and the characteristics of military missions have an influence on the gender disparity of the personnel contribution to these missions as well.

Social constructs & female military personnel

The factors influencing the low contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs derive from the low representation of women in domestic military institutions. One of the factors influencing women's representation in the military which embodies the combination of the three main categories of Wechsler Segal's (1995) model on the factors affecting women's military participation (military factors, social structure factors and cultural factors, see figure 2.1) is the masculine military culture, specifically the glorification of military masculinities. The military needs its personnel to be willing to risk their lives for the nation, a risk that few civilians would be willing to take. To attract new recruits the military must justify and promote this kind of risk-taking behavior to the public, by idealizing risk-taking, lethal violence and aggression, ultimately resulting in the masculine activity of combat. This is the result of the fact that women in the military have been kept away from combat positions, because combat is perceived as the core of the military masculinity ideal and there is a sensitivity to feminine influence within the military.

Social arguments against the inclusion of women are mostly based on the idea that their presence will unsettle the construction of military masculinity by affecting unit cohesion, although studies in relating fields show little support for these claims. The traditional idea that women are caregivers and that the protection of the nation is not a female responsibility are still at the base of ideas about femininity in relation to risk-taking and cohesion of the military (Berg & Bjarnegård, 2016). Karim & Beardsley (2013) state that the glorification of military masculinities, and thus social factors and gendered societal norms, are the main explanation for the fact that fewer female military personnel is placed in high risk military operations than male military personnel (Dharmapuri, 2013).


Figure 2.1: Theory of Factors Affecting Women's Military Participation (Wechsler Segal, 1995)

Mission Characteristics & Social Constructs

Berg & Bjarnegård (2016) show that the risk level of a military mission has an influence on the allocation of female personnel, especially within the personnel category *troops* a high-risk mission has a negative effect on the proportion of women personnel. Because risk-taking is closely linked to the military masculinity ideal, sending women to high-risk missions with a high probability for combat is not in line with the dominant masculine identity of military organizations. However high risks are not a satisfactory explanation for the non-combat personnel categories of military experts, where the percentage of women personnel is higher than in the category *troops*. A factor which can influence the gender division in the non-combat category might be the seniority in service (the career path and time within the military) of personnel, because military observers are often high-ranking officers. The fact that the personnel in this category consists of high-ranking officers can influence the presence of

women because of their late inclusion in most military organizations and gender-related obstacles in their career. Crawford et al. (2015) stress the divergences between the personnel categories as well. Their study stresses that the ratio of females in UNPKOs differs between the *troops* personnel category and the *police forces*, where in the latter the share of female personnel is higher. Female personnel are most underrepresented in the *troops* category, although this category accounts for the majority of female personnel contributed to the UNPKOs. Furthermore, in some UNPKOs the levels of female personnel are quite high, thus raising the average percentage of the UNPKOs, even though the majority of the UNPKOs consists of even lower ratios of female personnel. Additionally, according to Crawford et al. (2015) the geographical location of an UNPKO, the closer the conflict situation to the contributing country, and the size of an UNPKO, the more personnel needed for the operation, increase the likelihood that a country will contribute female personnel to a UNPKO, which is in line with the non-gender specific characteristics which contribute to a country's willingness to provide personnel to the UNPKO.

2.4   Conclusion

The literature on country contributions to UNPKOs focusses mostly on factors influencing countries contributions, not specified by gender. These factors can be divided in domestic factors, tactical reasons, and monetary incentives. First, domestic factors discussed in empirical research are the influence of democracy and humanitarianism, the size of a country and the sensitivity of the conflict. Multiple scholars emphasize the relationship between the democracy of a country, domestic pressure to act in humanitarian situations and the focus of UNPKOs on promoting human rights and protecting civilians (Doyle, 1983; Lebkovic, 2004; Uzonyi, 2015). The size and military capabilities of a country can have an influence on country contributions to UNPKOs as well, according to Bove & Elia (2011), Lebkovic (2004) and Victor (2010). Furthermore, the political sensitivity of a conflict and the level of attention in society for the conflict can pressure a country to contribute personnel to an UNPKO (Bove & Elia,2011; Grady, 2010; Lebkovic, 2004). Tactical reasons which are discussed in scientific literature are first of all the influence of conflict proximity and risk on country contributions to UNPKOs. These factors are related to the probability that externalities occur, refugee inflows are discussed by several scholars as a factor influencing country contributions to UNPKOs (Beardsley, 2011; Kathman, 2010; 2011; Uzonyi, 2015). Furthermore, the military benefits of contributing personnel to UNPKOs are being discussed, although there is a lack of significant evidence on the influence on country contributions of personnel to UNPKOs (Blum, 2000; Uzonyi, 2015). Lastly, monetary reasons can be incentives for a country to contribute personnel to an UNPKO, as these incentives are discussed in studies by Bove & Elia (2011), Gaibulloev et al. (2015), Kathman (2013), Lebkovic (2004), Uzonyi (2015) and Victor (2010).

Next to extensive literature on the contributions of personnel to UNPKOs, there are also several scholars discussing the factors influencing country's contributions of female personnel to UNPKOs. The influence of societal characteristics and political factors on the contribution of female personnel is discussed and studied in research by Crawford et al. (2015) and Dharmapuri (2013). The role of international pressure on country contributions of female personnel is discussed by several scholars, often within the framework of UN resolutions on women, peace and security (Crawford et al., 2015; Dharmapuri, 2013; Kreft, 2017, Tryggestad, 2009). Furthermore, the role social constructs play in the representation of women in national militaries and the relationship between social construct and the characteristics of military missions are researched in several empirical studies. Berg, A., & Bjarnegård (2016), Dharmapuri (2013), Karim & Beardsley (2013), and Wechsler Segal (1995) discuss several social constructs influencing the participation of women in national militaries. Lastly, the effects of the characteristics of a mission on the contribution of female personnel to that mission are discussed in studies by Crawford et al. (2015) and Berg, A., & Bjarnegård (2016). In discussing these studies, this literature review aims to give a thorough overview of the relevant literature on country contributions of female personnel to UNPKOs, by providing a structural framework of the empirical research and scientific discussions on this topic.

Starting with Liberal theories, this chapter will provide the theoretical framework for this study. The application of liberal theory on domestic policies and the influence of societal gender norms will be discussed leading to a deliberation on liberalism, gender norms and political representation.

3.1 Liberalism and Domestic Policies

Liberalism is based on the essential principle of the freedom of the individual, a principle which has formed the groundwork for several institutions and national and international human rights. This call for freedom is threefold, as liberalism requires freedom from arbitrary authority (free press, free speech, equality under the law and the right to hold property), the rights to protect the capacities and opportunities for freedom (social and economic rights) and the right for democratic participation and representation. These three sets of freedoms answer to the dilemma described by Kant (1795) to "organize a group of rational beings who demand general laws for their survival, but of whom each inclines toward exempting himself, and to establish their constitution in such a way that, in spite of the fact their private attitudes are opposed, these private attitudes mutually impede each other in such a manner that [their] public behavior is the same as if they did not have such evil attitudes". However, liberalism struggles to harmonize these three sets and since Kant's philosophy two forms of liberalism have emerged, conservative liberalism and liberal liberalism. Where conservative liberalism has favored a more constrained role for the state and a bigger role for the market and private groups, liberal liberalism favored an expanded role for the state and a constricted role for the market and private groups (Doyle, 1983; Kant 1795).

In discussing the social influences on national policies in an international and transnational playing field, liberal international relations (IR) theory forms the guideline of the discussion. As the relationship between states and their domestic and transnational social context has a fundamental impact on the behavior of states in global political institutions. In the basic liberal theory states have the right to freedom, to be free from foreign intervention, invoking the right to exercise political independence as a democratic representation of its citizens. Respect between states for these rights has become the groundwork for liberal international relations theory (Doyle, 1983).

However, although liberal argumentations have played an increasing role in international relations theory, focusing on the importance of state-society relations shaped by economic interdependence, domestic institutions and public goods provision, liberalism has been often portrayed by scholars as an ideology or at best an "approach" instead of an accepted international relations theory (Doyle, 1986; Moravcsik, 1997). However, Moravcsik (1997) identified the basic assumptions on liberalism concerning the nature of fundamental social actors, the state and the international system. Furthermore, he

emphasizes there are nowadays three major liberal theories, ideational liberalism, commercial liberalism and republican liberalism, laying down a solid framework of modern liberal IR theory. Liberal theory is based on a bottom-up approach of politics, where the demands and preferences of the societal groups define the direction of political action. Furthermore, individuals and groups are assumed to act rationally and define their interests independently of politics and strive to advance those interests through collective action and political exchanges.

3.1.1 THE CORE ASSUMPTIONS OF LIBERALISM

The fundamental framework of liberal IR theory can be discussed on the base of three core assumptions. The first assumption focuses on the primacy of societal actors. Private groups and individuals are assumed to be the fundamental actors in the field of international politics. The bottom-up approach to politics is therefore closely linked to liberal theory, with the demands of social groups and individuals shaping politics and domestic policies. Societal groups are perceived as rational individuals who define their ideational and economic interests independently of politics and try to advance their interests through collective action and political exchange. Social conditions will determine if the societal actors will cooperate or coerce. The first factor influencing cooperation are the fundamental beliefs of societal actors. If these beliefs are complementary they promote cooperation, whereas if there are irreconcilable differences in beliefs this promotes conflict. Secondly, scarcity of material goods can increase the likelihood of conflict, as the willingness of social actors to assume risks and costs to obtain these goods when scarce increases. A third factor influencing cooperation is the inequality in political power. If the inequality in societal influence among individuals or societal groups is large, the likelihood for conflict is substantial as well. When social power is more equally distributed among societal groups the costs and benefits of actions and influence on shaping policies is more likely to be internalized through the existence of mutually beneficial institutions and influence groups and legitimate domestic political processes and institutions. Thus, conflicting societal demands and the readiness of societal groups or individuals to accept risks in pursuit of these demands shapes the eagerness of societal groups to organize collective action to promote their interests and preferences (Moravcsik, 1997).

Moravcsik's (1997) second assumption discusses the role of the interests and wishes of domestic society as the basis on which states define their preferences and actions in world politics. In liberal IR theory, the state is a representative institution which is constantly reflecting the preferences of domestic groups and individuals, however not all societal groups are represented equally, governments privilege certain societal interests. Characteristics of government representation include the type of regime, the shape of policy processes and finally cost-effective exit options as a substitute for formal representation. Thus, societal pressures by representative domestic institutions are the prime element determining "state

preferences". One must not confuse the concept of "state preferences" with the concepts of national strategies, policies and tactics as these concepts refer to policy positions, goals and negotiations. Liberal IR theory focusses on explaining the effects of shifts in fundamental preferences of domestic groups and individuals on state behavior, not on analyzing the effects of changes in strategic circumstances. Altogether, the first and second assumption of liberal IR theory imply that states will act upon a combination of factors and particular interpretations of security, welfare and sovereignty, as preferred by powerful domestic actors. These two assumptions are in contradiction to the realist and institutionalist perspectives that states automatically maximize fixed conceptions of security, sovereignty and wealth (Moravcsik, 1997).

The third assumption defining liberal IR theory considers that the interdependency of state preferences on the preferences of other states drives policy preferences. Thereby rejecting the realist view that state preferences are in nature conflictual and the institutionalist view that state preferences are partially convergent. The concept of policy interdependence between states assumes that state behavior is constrained by patterns of interdependent state preferences. Leading to negotiations between state governments when the state preferences are deadlocked and worth the high costs of coercion. The form, substance and depth of interstate cooperation relies, according to liberal IR theory, on the patterns of state preferences but is determined by strategic (domestic) considerations which reflect the international political environment as well (Moravcsik, 1997).

3.1.2 LIBERALIST IR THEORY APPLIED TO DOMESTIC POLICIES

The three main forms of liberalism, as mentioned by Moravcsik (1997), are ideational liberalism, commercial liberalism and republican liberalism. Where ideational liberalism focusses on the role of domestic social identities and the order of societal preferences, commercial liberalism emphasizes the patterns of market incentives as the base of state behavior, and republican liberalism accentuates the ways domestic institutions and processes transform those preferences and incentives into state policies.

The ideational form of liberalism can be used to explain the influencing process of domestic policies, arguing that the basic determinant of state preferences is the configuration of domestic social identities. Social identity is thus defined as the array of preferences shared by a country's individuals or social groups concerning the proper scope of public goods provision, specifying the nature of domestic order by imposing what policy outcomes social groups or individuals are entitled to. The domestic public order is often determined by three crucial elements, shaped by social identities, namely geographical borders, the political decision-making process and socioeconomic regulations. Especially the decision-making process and socioeconomic regulations are elements where domestic policies are influencing societal gender norms. First, concerning political decision-making processes, the commitment of social groups

and individuals to particular political institutions is crucial for the legitimization of domestic policies. When there are differences in perceptions between societal groups (or states) on legitimacy of institutions and policy processes this translates into patterns of underlying preferences on domestic and international issues. In the emergence of a group of developed countries with a shared vision on democratic norms and human rights, which agree on certain social and humanitarian issues and cooperate on an international level (for example in the UN) to achieve certain social and humanitarian standards representing their domestic values, this element can be recognized. Secondly, the nature of legitimate socioeconomic regulation and redistribution is a crucial element of social identity. According to modern liberal theory societal preferences concerning the nature and level of regulation of government policies impose limitations on markets. Domestic and international markets are ingrained in local social compromises on preferences concerning the provision of regulatory public goods. These are compromises between different societal groups on policies concerning social welfare, families, health and safety, cultural promotion and other areas deeply intertwined with gender equality issues. Furthermore, the domestic preferences, the outcomes of compromises between societal groups, shape interstate behavior and policy strategies on international level. Substantial prior similarities in underlying domestic values and preferences is also an essential condition for cooperation between states in regulatory issue areas, like social policies concerning gender equality and human rights policies (Moravcsik, 1997; Moravcsik, 1995).

Next to ideational liberalism, the republican form of liberalism has characteristics which can explain the influence of gender norms within society on local, national and international policies. Republican liberalism emphasizes the ways in which domestic institutions and processes transform societal groups' demands and preferences into state policies. The crucial factor in republican liberalism is the *mode of domestic political representation*, which is the determinant of whose social preferences are institutionally favored. The policies governments create and implement depend on the domestic societal groups which are best represented, therefore government policies are biased in favor of a coalition of the most powerful domestic societal groups, this phenomenon is called *domestic order*. These characteristics can positively influence the creation and implementation of certain policies, especially when they are supported by powerful domestic societal groups, but it can also have a negative effect on the influence of the less-well represented societal groups on government policies (Moravcsik, 1997).

Thus, both ideational and republican liberal theories explain to a certain level the influence society and societal groups can exert on the domestic policy processes. The societal demands and preferences, depending on social identity and social domestic order, shape domestic policies and influence the relations with other states and the international policies of states on a global level.

3.2 Societal Values and Domestic Policies

The underlying reasons for the gender disparities in UNPKOs lie in the national contributions of peacekeeping personnel. Liberal IR theory assumes that the national contributions to UNPKOs are influenced by national policies and the gender norms in that particular country. This paragraph aims to give a solid framework of the theories concerning the primary arguments capable of explaining the gender disparities in UNPKOs. Therefore, the second part of the theoretical framework of this thesis will elaborate on the relationship between liberalism, domestic policies and national gender norms and their influence on national policies. Furthermore, this paragraph will elaborate on theories concerning the effect of policy processes on national and international levels on country contributions of female personnel to UNPKOs.

3.2.1 SOCIETAL GENDER NORMS

Several processes in upbringing, cultural socialization and societal construction constitute the social construction of gender. To explain gender in society it can be discussed as a social institution, as a process and as a stratification system. First, the social institution of gender defines a predictable division of labor, a traditionally assigned responsibility for children and care for others, legitimate leadership and common values and their transmission upon the members of the society. Although societies vary in the extent to which it assigns certain roles and responsibilities to different genders, the process of gendering and its outcomes are legitimated in law, science, a society's values and religion (Lorber, 1994; Connell, 1987).

The concept of gender is intertwined in representational, interactional and social structural processes. Gender as a process creates a social difference between males and females, both genders are expected to act in certain ways and learn this through the social interactions throughout their lives, while simultaneously maintaining the gender ideas and order. However, because gender is a social process it is possible to shape the values and norms attached to gender roles and institute institutional change (Budgeon, 2014; Lorber, 1994; Connell, 1987, 2005a). The social structural processes allow that a particular group (males) acquire and sustain dominance over the perceived "lower ranked" group (females), not only through the use of force, but through institutionalization, discursive centrality, cultural consent and the marginalization and delegitimating of alternatives as well (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 846).

Furthermore, gender norms are part of a stratification system, a system by which a society ranks categories of persons in a certain hierarchy based on their access to status, power and wealth. The differences between these groups led to social stratification. Social stratification is a character of a society as a whole, is likely to persist over generations, is universal (although there are variations

between societies) and involves not only inequality but is heavenly rooted in a society's beliefs (Moffitt). Gender ranks men above women (and other genders) in essentially all societies (with few exceptions (Mattison, 2010) and the dominant category is perceived as the hegemonic ideal and the dominance of men is thus often taken for granted. Although the extent of gender inequality in societies varies, when there is inequality the female gender is often perceived as less than the male gender. This asymmetrical ordering of masculinity and femininity is maintained by the power dynamic governing the boundaries which delineate both genders, conceptualized as 'hegemonic masculinity', which is the as 'the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women' (Budgeon, 2014; Connell, 2005a, 1987; Lorber, 1994).

Additionally, gender norms are viewed as a structure which divides work (at home and in the workforce), legitimates authority and organizes sexual and emotional norms and roles. With gender being an important component of structural inequality, the most valued gender (the male gender in most societies) have more prestige, power and better economic positions than the less valued gender(s) (females and other genders). Even in nations that discourage gender discrimination and promote gender equality gender roles are still strongly present in all aspects of society. For example, the male domination in positions of leadership in governments, the military and law. In nations which create greater gender differences (for example Saudi Arabia), the less valued gender, women, even have severely less basic civil rights. Gender norms and the inequality between genders is created and maintained by social processes, systems and structures, built into the general social structure and individual identities in societies (Budgeon, 2014, Lorber, 1994).

3.2.2 LIBERALISM, GENDER NORMS AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

According to Martin (2004) in order to change the existing institutionalized gender norms and produce institutional change focused collective action is needed, which coheres with the first assumption of liberal IR theory that societal groups and individuals can influence political change. The awareness of gender socialization and the inequality between genders ingrained in a social construction consisting of social processes, social stratification and social structures is getting more attention in society, politics and policy-making. In more nations, organizational rules and institutional laws have been rewritten to be gender neutral or less gender discriminatory. However, these developments have not occurred in all nations, and although some organizational and institutional rules and laws have changed, the interactional and cultural dimensions of gender norms should be addressed and acted upon as well (Budgeon, 2014; Moravcsik, 1997; Risman, 2004).

Mazur and McBride (2008) mention that democratic governments are expected to promote women's status and rights and undermine gender-based hierarchies in society which maintain gender-based inequalities, because democratic governments and democratic institutions tend facilitate a more equal representation and participation in government regardless of gender. The issue of gender equality was put on the policy agenda by women's rights groups through social pressure and collective action in their nation states. This bottom-up approach, a core characteristic of liberal IR theory, where preferences and demands of the societal groups concerned with gender equality pressured governments to alter their policies, led to a change in the state preferences. Furthermore, as a result of the pressure of societal groups governments started to incorporate gender equality in their domestic values and interstate cooperation. This led to a move toward a more gender-equal society involving institutional change and changes in societal norms and values concerning gender equality. These changes also incorporated the adoption of quotas for women, reflecting a rising consensus that women should be more equally represented in governments and other sectors (Connell, 2005b; Moravcsik, 1997; Mazur & McBride, 2008; Trip & Kang, 2008).

To pursue the implementation of gender equality, women's policy agencies (WPAs) played a significant role. Through the institutionalization of women's movement assets in government and semi-government institutions, women's movement actors adopt strategies to reach their goals through state institutions. The areas of institutionalization of the preferences and visions of women's movements include the presence of women's movement actors in bureaucracy, political parties, unions and lobby coalitions (Mazur, McBride & Hoard, 2016). WPAs are conceptualized as state-based mechanisms which are charged with furthering women's status and gender equality, therefore WPAs are a mechanism to influence the process of policy formulation and implementation. The effectiveness of WPAs in addressing women's policies shows the capacity of a democratic nation to include underrepresented groups into the government affairs. This intertwinement between groups focusing on gender equality and the state and thus the focus on including women's visions and policy agenda's in government policies began taking shape in the 1980s when feminist movements in Nordic countries became willing to engage with the state through political parties and parliament (Mazur & McBride, 2008; Christina et al., 1999). A strong vision of the state as an important actor of social justice emerged, producing redistributive welfare policies, which led to a rapprochement between the women's rights groups and the government. These first steps were followed by the worldwide mobilization around the UN policy processes, where the International Women's Policy Conferences produced Plans of Action on gender equality and women's rights for UN member states. With the Beijing women's conference in 1995 women's policy agencies were the spill of the UN processes and by the end of the 1990s, 127-member states had created WPAs at a national level (Mazur, 2005; Mazur & McBride, 2008; Rai 2003). WPAs and

women's movements both are (potential) representatives of women and their interests in governmental policy formulation and implementation. Furthermore, WPAs expand women's participation in the state by largely employing women. The facilitation of women's representation and participation in government processes, bodies and affairs can contribute to the process of democratization and inclusion of the underrepresented gender (Mazur & McBride, 2008).

This leads us from a bottom-up approach to a top-down approach, as these processes within states are connected to processes in other states and international and transnational politics. Furthermore, women's rights are human rights under the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, therefore equal rights for women are connected to international human rights law and an international issue which is discussed in multilateral organizations like the UN (United Nations, 1948; Wagner,2014). Finnemore (1993) emphasizes that forces external to states, like international organizations, can have an influence on domestic policies. The relationship between international organizations as influencers of state policies cannot be easily explained through state-centric theories. However, in regarding states as socially responsive entities, as liberal IR theories emphasizes, one can explain that state preferences and values are shaped by societal groups but also that international organizations are shaped by societal groups, both through the state preferences arising from domestic society and through NGOs which represent certain societal preferences and groups on both a domestic as an interstate level. The influence of international organizations on state policies can therefore be perceived as the influence of combined domestic societal groups (defined through state preference) and the influence of interstate societal groups on state policies (Finnemore, 1993; Moravcsik, 1997). Therefore, the emergence of WPA's and the growing female representation, supported by several (internationally) launched quotas, shows a crucial role for collective action of domestic and interstate societal groups and NGOs. The adaption of societal preferences by the government as state preferences in creating WPA's to increase gender equality and gender equality policy implementation emphasizes the role of collective action by societal groups and NGOs. Furthermore, the interdependence of state preferences leads states to cooperate as much as possible on issues of gender equality as shown by the many UN policies on the topic in the past decades (Connell, 2005b; Moravcsik, 1997; Mazur, 2005; Mazur & McBride, 2008; Tripp & Kang, 2008; Weldon, 2002).

However, due to the fact that most gender issues were put on the agenda by women, they have been often regarded as women's issues with little concern to men. In addressing gender perspectives in policy discussions and in national and international policy documents, this means mostly addressing women as the subjects of policy discourse. Furthermore, on national and international level, agencies and institutions which formulate, monitor or implement gender policies mostly have a mandate to act for women, not an equally explicit mandate to act on behalf of or for men. This does not mean men are

absent from the policy process concerning gender equality issues. First of all, men are mentioned often in statements on women's inequality as the advantaged group or in discussions on violence against women men are often implied as the perpetrators of violence. Concerning policy processes men are implicitly named as the power holders, capable of excluding women from decision making processes and power. Although this is supported by the worldwide figures on gender representation in national parliaments, there is an increase in the female representation, even though on average men still make up more than three quarters of national parliaments (Worldbank, 2017). However, when men are only perceived as a "background category" or an "antagonist" in the issue of gender equality, it becomes complicated to raise issues about men's problems and differences which are strongly intertwined with gender equality issues and it excludes men as strong allies (as men still hold the majority of power in policy formation, decision making and implementation) in the process of striving towards gender equality through policy processes (Connell, 2005b; IPU, 2016; Shepherd, 2008).

Furthermore, as gender equality is perceived as an especially hard to define concept, consisting of the two highly contested concepts *gender* and *equality*, the transmission from national gender societal norms to international gender norms and policy behavior by countries is hard to define. This is shown in the ongoing struggles to define gender equality on domestic and international levels and the ongoing discussions and inconsistent and uneven implementation of international agreements and resolutions. Although states have often been quick to adopt (sometimes vaguely defined to reach consensus) international gender agreements, the effects have been mixed, although quota policies have mildly increased the political representation of women (Krook & True, 2010).

To conclude, gender societal norms and women's political representation can have a major influence on national policies concerning gender equality. This stems partly from the liberalistic characteristics of collective action and a bottom-up approach to changing and influencing local, national and international policy processes. Where in the 1980's and early 1990's women's organizations played a large role in influencing state preferences and international organizations, in the past decade the transfer of democratic and human rights norms through international organizations, societal group and NGO pressure, and an increasing representation of women in government institutions influenced state preferences and state policies. Gender equality has emerged on local, national and international policy agenda's and even though worldwide consensus on gender equality cannot be expected, there is already a cultural shift towards an increasing global consciousness on gender and the possibilities to transform gender equality through social action. The, although slow, increase in women's representation in parliaments from 11.3 percent in 1995 to 22.9 percent in 2016 also shows the improvement in the political gender equality over the last decade (IPU, 2016). The latest step in these national and international developments consist of creating more sense of agency and ownership

among men, which means steering away from perceiving gender issues and gender equality as *women's issues*. Men are still holders of much power towards the shaping of gender equality policies and creating a sense of agency and ownership might lead to a "joint responsibility" between states, international organizations, NGOs, and between men and women on increasing gender equality through policy creation and implementation (Connell, 2005b; Finnemore, 2003; Moravcsik, 1995; 1997).

The liberal theories applied to the role of gender societal equality and the political representation of women lead to the expectation that gender equality in a country will have an influence on the gender parity of countries' contributions to UNPKOs. Therefore, two hypotheses will be formulated according to the expectations of liberal IR theory, as:

H1: The greater the gender societal equality in a country, the greater a country's contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs.

H2: The greater the parliamentary representation of women in a country, the greater a country's contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs.

As described in the preceding chapters, this study aims to examine the relationship between the level of political and societal gender equality in country's contributing personnel to UNPKOs and the percentage of female personnel contributed by those country's to UNPKOs within the period 2009-2016. This chapter will elaborate on the research design for conducting this study and illustrates the most appropriate choice of research design for answering the research question and sub questions and testing the hypotheses. Thereafter, the methodology will be explained, through the conceptualization and operationalization of the dependent, independent and control variables. These paragraphs lead to the final quantitative model which will be used in this study. In conducting a quantitative study, the process of data collection shapes the foundation of the entire analysis. The accessibility of the data, but also the trustworthiness and impartiality of the data sources are vital for the accuracy of the study and the reliability of the outcomes of the analysis. Therefore, the data sources of the variables and their reliability will be discussed in 4.2. Although capturing gender equality is a rather incomprehensible ambition, this chapter will try to establish the foundation for this empirical study.

4.1 Quantitative Research

For this study, we will use a quantitative approach to answer the research question and the hypotheses, as quantitative study designs often rely on using numbers and statistical methods to measure specific numerical aspects of a certain phenomenon to seek a general description or to test causal hypothesis. (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994). After building a dataset consisting of the data of the dependent variable, independent variables and control variables, this dataset will be entered into the statistical program SPSS.

The dependent variable and independent variables of this research will arise from the research question of this study. Furthermore, two control variables will be added to the model. The hypotheses lay down the framework towards answering the research question of this thesis and a quantitative analysis will be conducted to examine the influence of gender equality on the contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs, the quantitative analysis and research model will be described in the next few paragraphs.

Thus, the research question of this study is once again:

> Research Question
>
> How does the national gender equality of a country affect the contribution of female personnel to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations over the period 2009-2016?

The first two sub questions and their respective hypotheses, the expected outcomes of the research, are derived from the research question and the theoretical framework and appear in table 4.1:

Sub question	Hypothesis
Does the level of gender equality of a country influence the percentage of female personnel contributed to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations over the period 2009-2016?	H1: The greater the gender societal equality in a country, the greater a country's contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs.
Does the parliamentary representation of women in a country affect the percentage of female personnel contributed by a country to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations over the period 2009-2016?	H2: The greater the parliamentary representation of women in a country, the greater a country's contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs.

Table 4.1: Sub Questions and Hypotheses

4.2 Methodology

This study aims to measure the relationship between the gender equality in a country and the numbers of female personnel that countries contributed to the (number of) UNPKOs in the period from 2009 to 2016. This chapter will focus on the empirical part of this study, starting with a quantitative operationalization of the variables leading to the final quantitative framework and multiple regression model which will be used. The multiple regression will be conducted through the statistical computer program SPSS and will test the relationships between the contribution of female personnel by countries to UNPKOs and the political and societal gender equality in the country. Furthermore, multiple control variables will be included in the analysis to check if the measured outcomes are not the result of other characteristics.

This research is building on the results of a study by Crawford et al. (2015) on the explanations of the gender composition of personnel contributions to UNPKOs. They state in their research that "Gender diversity in UN missions ultimately depends then, upon the political predispositions, socioeconomic conditions, and societal resources of UN members. Why some countries provide female personnel to UNPOs, while others demure, is a topic for international politics theory." The outcomes of their research showed that several independent variables did not show a significant relation to country contributions of female personnel to UNPKOs. Societal gender equality, as measured by the annual gross enrollment ratio of girls to boys in secondary education, does not have a significant influence on the likelihood that

a country will contribute female personnel to UNPKOs. Crawford et al. (2015) attribute the null finding for the influence of societal gender equality to the fact that governments, not society, decide about contributing personnel to UNPKOs.

Their research did show a significant relation between the *political rights for women,* as measured by the women's rights index of the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Set, in a country and the probability that a country provides female personnel to UNPKOs, which is why this study will test the relationship between political gender equality in a country and the contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs. However, Crawford et al.'s (2015) assumption that the *gender societal equality* has an influence as well on the country's likelihood to provide female personnel annual gross turned out not to be significant, although their study measures *gender societal equality* only through the enrolment ratio of girls to boys in secondary education. This conceptualization of gender societal equality appears to be very narrow, as it does not take economic factors or health factors into account. Furthermore, the size of a mission has a significant influence on the contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs in Crawford et al.'s (2015), a reason to add this variable as a control variable in this study although their study does not focus on the percentage of female personnel contributed. Additionally, Berg, A., & Bjarnegård (2016) explain the relationship between the risk of an UNPKO and the likelihood of the contribution of female personnel to that mission, therefore the variable mission risk will be added as a control variable. Furthermore, this study will not use Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a variable, due to the fact that the chosen measure for *gender societal equality* includes a Gross National Income (GNI) component and the fact that there is a lack of empirical research on the relationship between the GDP and a country's contributions of female personnel to UNPKOs. Also, this study will not incorporate a democracy variable, although democracy has a significant influence on the contribution of female personnel in the study by Crawford et al. (2015), the conceptualization of democracy is a highly contested subject with broader and smaller definitions. Sodaro (2004) makes a difference between several minimal and maximal conceptualizations of democracy, and Kekic (2007) refers to "thin" and "thick" concepts of democracy. Campbell (2008) rewords these definitions as focused or comprehensive concepts of democracy, where a focused democracy concept explains democracy as a characteristic of a political system, whereas a comprehensive democracy concept defines democracy as a characteristic intertwined with society and perhaps even the economy as well. Thus, the focused and political conceptualization emphasizes the minimal standard of democracy, which can be described as an electoral democracy, where the comprehensive and social conceptualization of democracy emphasizes the sufficient standard of democracy, which can be described as a liberal democracy. The scientific discussions on the conceptualization of democracy therefore are a reason democracy is not included as a variable in this study.

Dependent Variable: Country Contribution of Women to UNPKOs

The contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs by countries is not a directly measurable phenomenon, in order to have an overall view of the percentage of women in UNPKOs the total of women in UNPKOs will be measured and converted into percentages of the total of personnel per mission. The data for the gender dispersions of UNPKOs has been collected since 2009 by the DPKO and is available per country, per mission, per month and for consistency for each year the data of the month December are being used for this study. Limited by the scope of this research, this study will not focus on the separate data per year, but on the average of the data over an eight-year period from 2009 to 2016 (United Nations 2009-2016). The data on the dependent variable, the percentage of female personnel contributed by countries to the eleven UNPKOs in the 2009-2016 period are provided online by the UN Peacekeeping Office, therefore the reliability of this data is presumed to be high (United Nations, 2009-2016).

Independent Variable: Gender Equality in contributing countries

To measure the level of gender equality of a state there are several available so called 'gender indexes'. These are indices to measure gender disparities in well-being and agency. The definition of what gender equality encompasses can be very broad, however this study focusses on two aspects. First, the societal gender equality, often measured as a combination of economical, educational, political and health factors. Secondly, political gender equality, which is often measured as a part of societal gender equality but is distinctively separate as it encompasses the representation of women in the government and can have a distinct influence on the societal gender equality as a whole (Crawford et al., 2015).

Two indexes often discussed in scientific literature are the Gender-related Development Index (GDI), although the measure has been updated with new data, and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). However, both indexes do not measure gender inequality per se, but a combination of relative female attainments and absolute levels of attainment (Dijkstra, 2002). The GEM is more a combination of female and male empowerment and absolute income levels per capita (Dijkstra, 2006). It consists of three shares as well, income, parliament positions and high labor market positions (Dijkstra, 2002). Dijkstra (2006) is critical of both the GEM and the (older) GDI index, stating that there is a necessity for an index that measures the position and status of women compared to men, but independent from the absolute income levels per capita and independent from human development. It is important to clarify as well that speaking of gender equality in relation to these indexes does not imply equality between the sexes. As mentioned by Ferber & Nelson (1993) "Gender is the social meaning that is given to biological differences between the sexes; it refers to social constructs rather than to biological givens''.

The GEM is more informative on gender equality than the (old) GDI but faces the same disadvantages on penalties for gender inequalities in both directions and dominating gender differences in income.

However, Dijkstra and Hanmer (2000) have developed a Relative Status of Women (RSW) index, which uses the same components as the GDI but without the connection to absolute levels of achievement. The RSW uses the average of three relative scores. Consisting of the ratio of the female and male education index, the ratio of the female and male life expectancy index and the relative female and male labor returns. Dijkstra (2006) describes the RSW as a promising improvement to the GDI. However, the RSW is not flawless either, as the variable with the highest variation, the income variable, has the highest actual weight in the index score. Secondly, the RSW does not include a measure of overall welfare nor political gender equality. Although with the use of a separate measure for political representation of women, the lack of measurement of political gender equality is not a disadvantage.

Another index is the Gender Equity Index, which includes three indicators representing the social, economic and political dimensions of gender equality. The social component includes only education levels, where the economic dimension uses share in total paid jobs and income to indicate inequality. The political dimension includes the share in parliament and the share in higher labor positions. The health component has been dropped in this index, avoiding the adjustment problem for biological differences between men and women (Gaye et al., 2010). As is the case with the RSW index as well, the fact that political representation is measured with a separate variable in this study makes that this index is not the best fit for this research.

Furthermore, the UNDP's Gender Inequality Index (GII) proposed in the 2010 Human Development Report has been one of the most recent gender indexes and has been designed to overcome the most important limitations of the (old) GDI and GEM. In order to achieve this the dimensions covered by the GII are first of all reproductive health, which consists of two indicators, the maternal mortality ratio and the adolescent fertility rate. The second dimension is women empowerment, consisting of the indicators educational attainment above secondary level and the parliamentary representation. The last dimension, economic activity, consists of the gender-specific labor force participation rates (Permanyer, 2013). It replaces the income component used in the GEM, which was based on questionable indicators. The inclusion of reproductive health indicators seems an improvement from the GEM and is linked to the UNDP's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (United Nations Development Programme, 2015). However, the composition of the GII sees several flaws. First, the incorporation of absolute and relative indicators into one formula leads to an index which penalizes low-income countries for poor performances in reproductive health, while their poor performance might be explained by their low-income status as well next to discriminatory practices and gender-related issues, an issue also occurring

in the GEM. Furthermore, the GII ignores men's average health status and allows a decline in women's education or economic participation to be compensated by identical declines in men's corresponding dimensions, whereas there is no corresponding dimension concerning women's reproductive health indicators. Another issue with the GII, just as with the indexes mentioned above, is that the gender differences in income are a dominating factor in the equation of the index score (Permanyer, 2013; Gaye et al., 2010; UNDP, 2015). There are several issues with the GII which might lead to a deviation between the theoretical definition of gender equality in countries (as described in the theoretical framework) and the actual measurement of gender societal equality in countries. Lastly, the GII index incorporates an indicator on political representation, which clashes with the use of a separate variable for political representation in this study and would make it harder to measure the societal gender component separately from the political representation of women.

The new Gender Development Index (GDI), is a measure focusing on human development and is than corrected for gender inequality in three dimensions of the Human Development Index (HDI), namely education, health and income (Figure 4.1). The GDI measures the gender gaps in human development by taking into account the disparities between men and women in these three dimensions. By calculating the Human Development Index (HDI) separately for men and women it shows the female HDI as a percentage of the male HDI. This shows how far women are lagging behind when it comes to the dimensions of human development. As the GDI is calculated for 160 countries, it seems to be the most accurate and most complete measure of the gender societal equality of countries which is widespread and globally accepted as an influential gender equality measurement. The first dimension, health, is measured through male and female life expectancy at birth, the second dimension, education, is measures by male and female expected years of schooling and the mean years of schooling for adults over twenty-five years old, and the third dimension, the Gross National Income (GNI), is measured by male and female estimated earned income. The measurement of the GNI is based on the male and female share of the economically active population, the male and female share of the population, the ratio of female to male wages in all sectors and the GNI per capita in purchasing power parity in US dollars. Although the use of the GNI as an indicator for the standard of living might be criticized, as a number of countries does not have sex-aggregated wage data, the use of the global average of the female to male wage ratio across all sectors for countries with missing data by the GDI is a solution to this issue. This average might not coincide with regions where the number of countries with data is limited, which is a limitation of the GDI. However, the GDI seems to be the best fitted gender equality index to represent the socioeconomic position of women, which seems to have an effect on the representation of women in national armed forces (Crawford et al., 2015). The lack of a political representation indicator also fits with the use of a separate variable for political representation in this

study. The data on the first independent variable, the gender societal equality level in countries as measured by the GDI, is provided by the United Nations Development Programme, on the website with their Human Development Reports where the data on the GDI are provided (United Nations Development Programme, 2017).


Figure 4.1: Visual Representation of the Indicators of the Gender Development Index (United Nations Development Programme, 2017)

Independent Variable: Political Gender Equality

Although the political representation factor is already included as a part of the women empowerment dimension in this broader measure of gender societal equality, this study will invest the influence of women's political representation as a separate variable as well. The reason for using political representation as a separate control variable is the division between gender societal equality and political gender equality. Although political gender equality is an effect of gender societal equality

Furthermore, the study by Crawford et al. (2015), on which this study builds, observed a significant relation between women's political empowerment and the gender disparity of country's contributions to UNPKOs but did not find a significant relation between the used measure of gender societal equality (Gender Parity Index, annual gross enrollment ratio of girls to boys in secondary education) and the gender disparity of country's contributions to UNPKOs. As the dataset Crawford et al. (2015) use only consists of data till 2011, focuses only on the rights of women and not the actual representation of women in parliament, this study will use data on women's political representation. The data of the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Set includes five rights: the right to vote, to run for political office, to hold elected and appointed government positions, to join political parties and to petition government officials. By using data on political representation of women, most of these rights are covered as well as the actual participation of women in the decision-making body of the government. Furthermore, as the results of the study by Crawford et al. (2015) have shown no significant relationship between gender societal equality and country contributions of female personnel to UNPKOs but did find a significant relationship between political rights and country contributions of female personnel to

UNPKOs, the importance of using two independent variables is clear. The use of several indicators in the gender societal equality variable might lead to a non-significant or non-existing relationship with the dependent variable, based on the results of the Crawford et al. (2015) study, therefore measuring the effects of political representation separately through the use of a political representation variable can spread light on the actual influence of active women's political empowerment instead of only passive women's empowerment. The data for the women's political representation is retrieved from the World Bank database, by using the average proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments from 2009-2016 (World Bank, 2017).

Control Variable: Size of the Mission

To focus only on the relative percentages of female personnel per mission understates the gender disparities in UNPKOs. The mission where the female personnel percentage is above ten percent of total personnel is the smallest UN mission. Where of the largest five UN missions discussed, four of the five have female personnel levels below the average of 5.27 percent over the eight-year period. Furthermore, a mission's size in total personnel can lead countries to contribute larger numbers of female personnel to the mission. When the quantity of UNPKO personnel in a mission increases, the chances of a female peacekeepers contributed will rise as well, a characteristic which should be considered when investigating the link between the dependent and the independent variable in this study (source). A mission's size, as measured by total personnel, can lead to countries contributing larger numbers of female personnel. Thus, the likelihood that countries will contribute female personnel to a UNPKO will increase with an increase in the overall size of the mission (Crawford et al., 2015). Although not measured in their study, Crawford et al. (2015) emphasize their expectation that a mission's size could lead to countries contributing larger numbers of female personnel to UNPKOs. The fact that Crawford et al. (2015) focus purely on the likelihood of contribution of female personnel and not on the percentage of female personnel contributed is a difference between this study and theirs.

The data for the control variable "mission size" can be deducted from the statistical data the UN Peacekeeping Office provides on their website. These data are therefore certainly correct and reliable (United Nations, 2009-2016).

Control Variable: Mission Risk

In their research on the importance of risk for the assignment of women to UNPKOs Berg & Bjarnegård (2016) explain the influence of mission risk on the proportions of women assigned to certain missions. This study will use the variable of mission risk to control for the dispersions in gender of personnel contributed to UNPKOs. Although Berg & Bjarnegård (2016) observe a variation in the troop personnel category and not in the observer personnel category the scope of this study is too broad to distinguish

between these two categories. In analyzing the results this limitation should be considered. To operationalize the riskfulness of a mission, the study of Berg & Bjarnegård (2016) measured the number of fatalities per mission as a percentage of the number of personnel. Missions with a high percentage of fatalities per total personnel are considered high risk missions, where missions with a low percentage of fatalities per total personnel are considered low risk missions. Based on the outcomes of the study by Berg & Bjarnegård (2016) it is expected that to high risk missions a lower percentage of female personnel will be contributed, whereas low risk missions are expected to have a higher percentage of women contributed. Thus, this variable can influence the dependent variable, a country's contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs (Berg & Bjarnegård, 2016). Therefore, the risk of an UNPKO should be taken into consideration in this model. This study will take the average of the percentage of fatalities per mission over the eight-year period the study comprises. The data for the control variable "mission risk" can, just like the data for the control variable "mission size" be deducted from the statistical data the UN Peacekeeping Office provides (United Nations, 2009-2016).

4.3   Final Framework

To explain the dependent variable, countries contributions of female personnel to UNPKOs, the model for analysis employs the independent variables and multiple control variables. The statistical model incorporates the independent variables, the gender societal equality (a country's score on the Gender Development Index, which incorporates a *life expectancy index*, an *education index* and a *GNI index*) and the political gender equality (the percentage of female representation in parliament), which are both country specific characteristics. Next to the independent variables, control variables are incorporated in the model. The size of a mission is added as a first control variable, controlling for the influences of size of missions on the amount of female personnel contributed. Secondly, we add the measure of the risk of the mission, which is operationalized by the percentage of fatalities on the number of total personnel per mission (see table 4.2).

Variable	Definition	Hypothesis	Measure Construction	Data Source
Dependent: Percentage Female Personnel	A country's contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs		Percentages female personnel of total personnel per country contributions to UNPKOs. (percentage between 0 – 1)	UN Peacekeeping Office – Statistics
Independent: Gender Societal Equality	The gender societal equality in a country contributing female personnel to UNPKOs.	Hypothesis 1	Gender Development Index score. (between 0.7 – 1.1)	UN Development Programme – Human Development Reports
Independent: Political Gender Equality	The political gender equality in a country contributing female personnel to UNPKOs.	Hypothesis 2	Political representation of women as measured by percentage of women in parliament. (reduced to score between 0 -1)	World Bank – Statistics
Control Variable 1: Mission Size	The size of the total personnel of the UNPKO a country is contributing female personnel to.		Total mission personnel. (percentage between 0 – 1)	UN Peacekeeping Office – Statistics
Control Variable 2: Mission Risk	The risk level of the UNPKO a country is contributing female personnel to.		Percentages fatalities of total personnel per mission. (percentage between 0 – 1)	UN Peacekeeping Office – Statistics

Table 4.2: Variables and measurements.

For this study, we will use a quantitative approach to answer the research question, as quantitative study designs often rely on using numbers and statistical methods to measure specific numerical aspects of a certain phenomenon to seek a general description or to test a relation between multiple variables. (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994). This study aims to link the trends in the percentage of female personnel in UNPKOs to the theories on gender equality in contributing countries based on gender indexes and controlling the relation between the dependent, independent and control variables. The variables are incorporated into a hierarchical regression analysis in the statistical program SPSS. The model is tested on annual contributions from UN member countries to the eleven missions which run in the entire eight-year period of 2009 to 2016. This leads to 455 (country-mission-year average) cases (United Nations, 2009-2016).

4.4   The Model

It is crucial to outline the details of the empirical process of this thesis, by conducting quantitative research the relationship between the level of gender equality in a country and the country's contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs will be etched. The model for analysis employs independent variables, the gender societal equality level and the political gender equality level in a given country, and two control variables to explain a continuous dependent variable, to study the relationship

between gender equality in a country and its contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs in the period of 2009 to 2016.

The model incorporates two types of independent- and control variables, contributing country's characteristics and mission characteristics (for each of the eleven missions). The contributing country's characteristics include the independent variables *"gender societal equality"* in a country and the *"political gender equality"* in a country. The *"gender societal equality"* variable includes a life expectancy indicator, an education indicator and an GNI indicator. The *"political gender equality"* variable consists of the percentage of female representation in parliament. The mission characteristics include the *"mission risk"* control variable including the average percentage of fatalities per mission, and the *"mission size"* control variable consisting of the total number of personnel per mission. This leads to the following statistical representation of the model:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3$$

Mean percentage female personnel $= \beta_0 + \beta_1 *$ mean mission size $+ \beta_2 *$ mean mission risk $+ \beta_3 *$ GDI

In this hierarchical regression model, the variable for percentage female personnel, as the dependent variable, is situated on the left in this equation. On the right side of the equation β_0 embodies the constant term, and the parameters β_1 to $\beta 3$ represent the possible explanatory variables, the independent and control variables.

To measure the relationship between the continuous dependent variable and the independent and control variables complex statistical applications are needed which can assess the relationship between the dependent and independent variables and deal with interval and ratio level variables. Furthermore, the statistical model must be able to process correlated data, as multiple related measures take place. A multiple regression analysis is an often-used type of regression analysis for predicting the value of one dependent variable from the value of two or more independent (or independent control) variables. Together the independent and control variables are incorporated into a hierarchical regression model. However, the question rises if averaging mission specific variables per country in order to be able to perform regression analyses, leads to a well fit model on the data. Averaging mission size and mission risk leads to the chance that countries who partook in only one or a few missions may have more extreme mission size and mission risk scores, and mission size and mission risk may be more evened out for countries who participated in many missions. The model is tested on the average of eight annual contributions by member countries to the eleven UNPKOs which run throughout the 2009-2016 period. The dependent variable consists of 455 country-mission average cases, consisting of the averages over

the period 2009-2016. with 122 countries included. However, of these countries, 5 are not included in the GDI (independent variable "gender equality level"), consisting of 12 cases. These cases will be excluded to not influence the results. This leads to a dataset consisting of 443 country-mission-average 2009-2016 cases, consisting of 113 countries. This dataset will be entered into a hierarchical regression analysis in the statistical program SPSS (Field, 2009, Appendix).

In this chapter, the results of the statistical analysis are presented. The multiple regression that is tested includes all independent variables and the dependent variable on the percentage of female personnel contributed to UNPKOs as mentioned in the previous sections. First, the significance of the model, and the coefficients of the variables will be discussed. Followed by the interpretation of the model outcomes. In this chapter, the results of the statistical analyses are presented. First the descriptive statistics of the variables, used in this research are shown. The hypotheses will be tested using performing hierarchical regression analyses.

5.1 Descriptive Statistics

Among the 113 countries the mean percentage of females in the parliament, which is the measure for political gender equality, was 21%, varying from a minimum of 0% females in the parliament to a maximum of 60% of females in parliament (Table 5.1). The mean gender societal equality level in the countries, which is measured through the Gender Development Index (GDI), is 0.94 (SD=0.07), with a minimum of 0.73 and a maximum of 1.03. In table 5.2 the contributions of the several countries on the eleven missions are presented. The average percentage of female personnel of total personnel of the missions was 9% (SD=0.18), where seven times the countries sent 100% females to a mission and 168 times the countries sent 0% females into a mission. The average percentage of mission fatalities was 7%, with a minimum risk factor of 1% fatalities and a maximum risk factor of 17% fatalities.

Parameter	M	SD	Min	Max
Political gender equality	0.21	0.11	0.00	0.60
Gender societal equality level	0.94	0.07	0.73	1.03

Table 5.1: Country specific characteristics (N=113)

Parameter	M	SD	Min	Max
Percentage Female Personnel	0.10	0.12	0.00	0.55
Mission Size	65819.58	33152.77	1217	156275
Percentage Mission Fatalities	0.07	0.03	0.01	0.17

Table 5.2: *Mission specific characteristics*

Figure 5.1 shows line graphs of the percentage of female personnel on the different missions. Every line color represents a different country. From this figure some information about the dataset can be interpreted. One important aspect is that eighteen countries have participated in one mission, six countries in eight missions and the other eighty-nine countries participated on two to seven missions.

However, no country has participated in all eleven missions. In figure 5.1 it also appears there are a few different 'groups' of countries. Some countries consistently contribute to missions with high percentages of females, some countries differ in the percentage of female personnel they send into a mission, but most countries contributions to missions include relatively low percentages of female personnel as can be seen on the dense amount of country lines in the bottom part of the figure.

Figure 5.1: *Line chart of percentage female personnel per mission and per country*

In order to be able to perform regression analyses the variables that varied among missions were averaged over all 11 missions per country, regardless if they had participated in one or more missions. In the continuation of this chapter the mission-specific variables, percentage female personnel, mission size and mission risk are an average score per country.

To test if there are significant relationships between the dependent, independent and control variables, correlation analyses have been performed. As tests of normality, assessed by visually inspection of the histograms, show that not all variables are normally distributed, the Spearman's rank correlation tests have been performed. In table 5.3 the results of the correlations analyses are presented. First of all, a weak, but significant, positive correlation was found between the mean percentage female personnel during missions and the percentage females in parliament (ρ=.274, p<.001). No other correlations

between the mean percentage female personnel on one hand and democracy level, GDI, Mission size or Mission risk on the other hand was found.

	1	2	3	4	5
1. Mean percentage Females Personnel					
2. Percentage Females Parliament	.274**				
3. Gender-related Development Index	.124	.267**			
4. Mean mission size (per country)	.022	-.189*	-.419**		
5. Mean mission risk (per country)	.075	-.164	-.337**	.493**	

Table 5.3: Spearman's rank correlations between study parameters (N=108 (GDI) / N=113 (other variables))

5.2   Statistical Results

This paragraph will interpret the output of the hierarchical regression analysis for the dependent and independent variables by discussing the significance of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables and the direction of this relationship.

In order to test hypothesis 1, the greater the gender societal equality in a country, the greater a country's contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs a hierarchical regression analysis was performed in SPSS. The mean percentage of female personnel of the missions that a country participated in over the period 2009 to 2015 was the dependent variable. In block 1 the control variables mean mission size and mean mission risk were entered in the model and in block 2 the independent variable gender-related development index was added, resulting in the following model:

Mean percentage female personnel = b0 + b1 * mean mission size + b2*mean mission risk + b3 * GDI

First, the assumptions for a hierarchical multiple regression were checked. There was independence of observations as assessed with the Durbin-Watson score (1.8) and it was determined that the relationships between the dependent variable and independent, both separately and combined, were linear, as well as homoscedasticity after visually inspecting the partial and total scatter plots. Two outliers were found. The residuals of the regression model did not appear to be normally distributed, as assessed by visually inspecting the histogram and PP-plot. The dependent variable 'mean percentage female personnel' was for that reason transformed by calculating the square root of the variable. The assumptions were tested again with the new dependent variable and the residuals were considered normally distributed. There were also no longer any outliers. It was therefore decided to choose this

square root transformed 'mean percentage female personnel' as the dependent variable in the equation.

$$\sqrt{\text{(Mean percentage female personnel)}} = b0 + b1*\text{mean mission size} + b2*\text{mean mission risk} + b3*\text{GDI}$$

The first model, with only the control variables mean mission size and mean mission risk, explained only 1% of the variance of the dependent variable. Model 1 was not significant, $F_{(2, 105)} = 0.489$, $p = .614$, $R^2 = .009$. Adding the independent variable gender-related development index to the model led to an explained variance of 3%. The model was not significantly improved by this addition; $F_{(3, 104)} = 1.235$, $p = .301$, $R^2 = .034$. In Table 5.4 the results of the regression analysis are shown, but no conclusions can be drawn from the results as the variables have no significant contribution to the model. No evidence has been found to support hypothesis 1: the greater the gender societal equality in a country, the greater a country's mean contribution of female personnel to UNPKO's. Therefore hypothesis 1 needs to be rejected.

	Model1			Model 2		
	b	β	p	b	β	p
Constant	0.22		.000	-0.23		.417
Mean mission size	0.00	0.04	.768	0.00	0.09	.467
Mean mission risk	0.45	0.07	.556	0.44	0.07	.560
GDI				0.46	0.17	.103
df	2 , 105			3 , 104		
F	0.49			1.24		
p	.614			.301		
R^2	.009			.034		

Table 5.4: *Results of the hierarchical regression analysis hypothesis 1 (N=108)*

Hypothesis 2, The greater the parliamentary representation of women in a country, the greater a country's mean contribution of female personnel to UNPKO's, was also tested using a hierarchical regression analysis. The model with 'mean percentage female personnel' was the dependent variable, with the control variables in block one and the independent variable 'percentage parliamentary representation by women' in block 2. After testing the assumptions of the hierarchic regression model, it had to be concluded that the residuals of the regression-line were not normally distributed, and one outlier was found. After replacing the dependent variable 'mean percentage personnel' with its square root, no outliers were found, and the residuals appeared normally distributed.

$$\sqrt{\text{(Mean percentage female personnel)}} = b0 + b1*\text{mean mission size} + b2*\text{mean mission risk} + b3*\text{Percentage parliamentary representation by women}$$

As was seen in the hierarchical regression model testing hypothesis 1, the model with only the control variables did not significantly explain the variance of the mean percentage female personnel; F (2,110)=0.046, p=.955, R2=.001. Adding the independent variable percentage parliamentary representation by women to the model, however, did result in a significant model; F (3,109)=2.98, p=.034, R2=.076. In table 5.5 the regression coefficients of the separate variables in the model can be found. The percentage parliamentary representation by women was significant; the higher the percentage of women in parliament the higher the mean percentage of female personnel during missions. Therefore, hypothesis 2 can be accepted.

	Model1			*Model 2*		
	b	β	p	*b*	β	p
Constant	0.25		.000	0.13		.028
Mean mission size	0.00	-0.02	.855	0.00	0.00	.969
Mean mission risk	0.22	0.04	.763	0.36	0.06	.611
% parliamentary representation				0.47	0.28	.004
df	2 , 110			3 , 109		
F	0.46			2.98		
p	.955			.034		
R^2	.001			.076		

Table 5.5: *Results of hierarchic regression hypothesis 2 (N=113)*

5.3   Results & Related Research

This research is based on the results coming from the study by Crawford et al. (2015), and specifically focusing on the relationship between gender equality in countries contributing personnel to UNPKOs and the percentage of female personnel these countries actually contribute to these UNPKOs. This study focusses specifically on the variables related to gender equality used by Crawford et al. (2015), although different measures are used. Furthermore, their study focusses on data from 2009-2011, a 2-year time span, where this study takes the average of data over an 8-year time span, from 2009-2016. Taking the average of data does not show any changes over time, which might be a disadvantage, on the other hand the fluctuating changes in troop contributions between years can give a distorted image as well.

The Crawford et al. (2015) study found a significant positive relationship between women's political rights and the probability that a country would provide female personnel to an UNPKO. Although the focus and measure of the variable is different, the expectation in this research that the greater the parliamentary representation of women in a country, the greater a country's contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs shows a significant positive relation in this study over eight years of data as well. This means that the political representation of women in governments does have a positive effect on

the contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs. However, the political representation of women in parliament might be linked to several societal factors as well, the participation of women on the labor market or the gender equality in society, but these relationships are not extensively measured in this study.

The lack of a significant positive relationship between the gender societal equality variable and the contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs was not entirely expected. If we look at the results of the Crawford et al. (2015) study where gender equality was measured through the annual gross enrollment ratio of girls to boys in secondary education, there was no significant positive relationship between contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs and gender equality as well. Their study concluded that the contribution of personnel to UNPKOs is more a task for governments than for society on the base of these findings. However, the measure used in the study was limited with the focus only on secondary school enrollment. In this study it was expected that, by using a broader measure of gender equality through the GII Index (see figure 4.1) which included a broader range of women empowerment indicators, there would be a significant positive relationship. It is entirely possible that some of the indicators used in the gender societal equality variable could have a significant positive relationship with the country contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs, but as the GII Index uses a network of indicators this study can only asses the results of the totality of those indicators. Must be said that by measuring political representation separately as well through hypothesis 2, it turned out that political representation which is one of the indicators of the GII has a significant positive relationship with the dependent variable. Concerning the other two control variables, mission risk and mission size, the results of the research show that they do not show a significant relationship to the dependent variable and do not explain country's contributions of female personnel to UNPKOs.

This chapter discusses the conclusions of this study by answering the sub-questions and the research question, followed by stressing the limitations of this study, emphasizing the recommendations for further research and reflecting on the conducted study.

6.1 Central Research Question and Sub Questions

This study discussed the possible influence of gender equality in a country on the contribution of female personnel by that country to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs). The gender societal equality, as measured by the Gender Development Index, and the political gender equality, as measured by the female representation in national parliaments were expected to have an influence on the contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs. The two hypotheses stating the expectations of the relationship between these two independent variables and the dependent variable have been quantitatively analyzed through a hierarchical regression analysis and this chapter will discuss the conclusions to be drawn from the results of this analysis.

Once more, the research question of this study is:

How does the national gender equality of a country affect the contribution of female personnel to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations over the period 2009-2016?

The sub questions deriving from this research question and the theoretical framework of this study are:

1. Does the level of gender societal equality of a country influence the percentage of female personnel contributed to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations over the period 2009-2016?

Leading to the first hypothesis:

H1: The greater the gender societal equality in a country, the greater a country's contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs.

2. Does the parliamentary representation of women in a country affect the percentage of female personnel contributed by a country to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations over the period 2009-2016?

Leading to the second hypothesis:

H2: The greater the parliamentary representation of women in a country, the greater a country's contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs.

6.2 Answering the Sub Questions

Answering the sub questions of this study help to produce a more elaborate and supported answer to the central research question of this thesis. The first sub question asks how the level of gender societal equality in a country influences the percentage of female personnel contributed to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations over the period 2009-2016. The outcomes of the hierarchical regression analysis show us that there is no significant relationship between the gender societal equality and the country contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs.

This comes not entirely as a surprise, first of all, as gender societal equality is a variable which is measured with several indicators of gender equality in society, which leads to the fact that it is hard to determine if the variable includes all characteristics of gender societal equality and if all measures measure exactly what they want to measure. This is also related to the fact that it is still hard to determine what the exact definition of gender societal equality should be and which indicators it should include. Where in this study the choice is made to focus on the indicators used in the Gender Development Index, other scholars might argue in favor of other indicators to measure gender societal equality. The outcome that there is no relationship between the gender societal gender equality and the contribution of female personnel is in line with the study of Crawford et al. (2015), although the variable used in their study is limited to a measurement of secondary school enrollment ratios of girls and boys. The variable used in this study is broader, as the GDI focusses on life expectancy, education and GNI indicators. The use of a broader measure might have been a reason for finding a positive relationship, as several combined societal factors have been considered. But on the other hand, the combination of several indicators in one variable can make it difficult to measure any relationship at all. Although some recent studies showed that the representation in domestic forces improves when the socioeconomic power improves (Wechsler Segal, 1995), scholars have not yet found a significant relationship between the level of gender societal equality in a country and the contributions to UNPKOs (Crawford et al., 2015). Several scholars argued that governments can act as agents of liberal policies and can have a leading role in transforming society into a more gender equal society (Crawford et al., 2015; Dharmapuri, 2013, Lebkovic, 2004). However, these studies are focusing more on the democracy level of government and the political rights and representation, not on societal elements like life expectancy and living standards. Wechsler Segal (1995) and Dharmapuri (2013) emphasize that the socioeconomic position of women influences the increase of women in the military, elements which are taken into account in the independent variable gender societal equality (through the GNI indicator). However, the lack of a significant relationship between this variable and the dependent variable in this study does not add to their theories. The issue with the concept of gender societal equality is that it consists of several indicators which can be more likely or less likely have an influence, but as most of

these indicators are intertwined and hard to separate, finding the 'right' conceptualization can be very difficult. Thus, measuring these concepts or finding significant relations between these variables can be hard.

Concerning the second sub question, which asks in what way the parliamentary representation of women in a country affects the percentage of female personnel contributed by a country to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations over the period 2009-2016. The results of the hierarchical regression analysis display a significant positive relationship between the parliamentary representation of women and the contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs.

Although a different measure was used than in the study of Crawford et al. (2015), due to a lack of available data over most of the 2009-2016 period which this research covers, both studies find a significant positive relationship between political rights/political representation and country's contributions of female personnel to UNPKOs. The positive relationship between political representation of women and the contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs can be explained by several factors. First, a higher political participation level of women in the government can be a sign of a more gender equal society and countries which provide more equal political rights are more likely to support international efforts to improve the gender disparities in UNPKOs. furthermore, governments that guarantee a higher degree of political rights to women and countries where women gain more access to government positions seem more likely to support the UN efforts to increase the contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs (Crawford et al., 2015).

6.3 Concluding Discussion

This study aimed to answer the national gender equality of a country affects the contribution of female personnel to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations over the period 2009-2016. This question was divided into two specific definitions of gender equality which were measured through two distinct hypotheses. Based on the results from the analysis, resulting in the lack of a significant relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable gender societal equality, hypothesis 1: *The greater the gender societal equality in a country, the greater a country's contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs* is rejected. Regarding hypothesis 2: *The greater the parliamentary representation of women in a country, the greater a country's contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs*, the results of the analysis showed a significant positive relationship between the independent variable women's parliamentary representation and the dependent variable, therefore hypothesis 2 is accepted.

The positive relation between political representation of women and the contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs can be discussed within the framework of liberal IR theory. The assumptions that

states will act on a combination of factors as preferred by domestic actors and the characteristics of government representation are shaped bottom-up by societal groups and domestic institutions, can be an indication that the political representation of women is shaped by the social and cultural norms of domestic society (Moravcsik's, 1997). Liberal theories support the idea that the characteristics of gender societal equality can influence countries contributions to UNPKOs through the bottom-up approach and the influence domestic social and cultural factors can have on policy processes and government preferences. Although the influence of gender societal equality is not detected in this study, which can have several reasons as explained previously, according to liberal IR theory several societal factors could influence a government's decision to contribute (more) women to UNPKOs. Furthermore, republican liberalism emphasizes the influence of domestic institutions and processes which transform the ideas and preferences of societal groups into state policies. The *mode of domestic political representation* underscores the bias of government policies towards the most powerful domestic societal groups. The growing influence and empowerment of women in society can therefore, according to republican liberalism, influence the government's willingness to contribute more female personnel to UNPKOs and might have an impact on the political representation of women as well.

Concerning gender societal equality, liberal IR theory states that the social institution of gender defines a division of participation in the labor market, participation in legitimate authority and other common values. Gender as a factor of structural inequality leads to more power and better economic positions for the dominant group (males), shown in the male domination in positions of leadership and representation in governments. As gender is seen as a social process, it is possible to shape and change the values and norms which are attached to gender roles and create institutional change (Budgeon, 2014; Connell, 1987; Lorber, 1994). Although a significant relationship between national gender societal equality and the contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs has not been found in this study, the link between gender societal equality and the shaping of government policies and government actions is clear according to liberal IR theory. The challenge however might be to measure the relation between the hard to conceptualize influences of gender societal equality on government policies and actions. Furthermore, it is arguable that gender societal equality and political representation of women are interconnected according to liberal IR theories. In order to change institutionalized gender norms and achieve political change, the first assumption of liberal IR theory assumes that societal groups can affect these changes. These influences can be perceived to be at work in the change of national organizational rules and institutional laws being changed to be more gender equal (Martin, 2004; Risman, 2004). Equality issues have been often put on the policy agenda by societal groups, women's rights groups, by using social pressure and collective action, thus leading to pressure on governments to alter their policies and domestic values. This bottom-up approach, a characteristic of liberal IR theory,

incorporated several policies changes in country's worldwide, including the adoption of quotas for the political representation of women, which shows the intertwined relationship between gender societal equality indicators and women's political representation in a country (Connell, 2005; Moravcsik, 1997; Mazur & McBride, 2008; Trip & Kang, 2008).

Therefore, although the influence of gender societal equality on country contributions of female personnel to UNPKOs is not found through this study, using the data of the GDI index, this variable still can affect the dependent variable in an indirect way. The issue concerning measuring the influence of gender societal equality is that the conceptualization is a topic for discussion and the relationships are too indirect to be measurable. Women's political representation is a concept which can be more clearly defined and therefore might have a better measurable influence on country contributions of female personnel to UNPKOs.

In summation, this thesis concludes that a country's gender societal equality does not predict a country's contribution of female personnel to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. However, there are several issues concerning conceptualization and the choice of measurement (and indicators) which can influence this result. Furthermore, although there might not be a direct relationship measurable, according to liberal IR theory gender societal equality can have an influence on women's political representation and on a government's actions and policies. Secondly, the positive influence of the political representation of women on a country's contribution of female personnel to UNPKOs is a result which is supported by earlier studies (Crawford et al., 2015) and can be explained through liberal IR theory as well. Although there are expected and unexpected results coming from this study, there are mostly more questions and ideas for an improvement of the study coming forth from this research.

6.4 Limitations and Issues for Further Research

Concerning the limitations of this thesis, it must be recognized that there are several theoretical, empirical and practical implications. Concerning the theoretical issues, there is no agreement among scholars on the correct conceptualization and measurement of the independent variables in this study, which makes it hard to determine if the fact that no significant relationship has been shown between gender societal equality and the dependent variable really means that there is no relation at all between gender societal equality and the contribution of female personnel. Further limitations concern the lack of specified data between the different kinds of personnel categories, as there might be a differentiation between the relationships between gender equality and observer personnel categories or troop and police personnel categories. Unfortunately, the scope and time of this thesis was limited, and not all specified data could be taken into account. Although the use of more recent data for this study increased the relevance of this study, it might furthermore be interesting to look at the specified yearly data, to

check if any relationships occur when separate years are studied as well. The missions also have taken place in an eight-year period. This means that there could be a time-aspect that is ignored when all missions are combined into one score. Gender equality stands high on the political agenda of many countries. It is not unrealistic to expect that in the course of seven years the percentages of female personnel have evolved over time. By averaging the percentage scores of female personnel, regardless if the countries took part in a mission in 2009 or in a mission in 2015 may lead to data which are not able to show possible improvements in the contributions of female personnel to UNPKOs. Last, as mentioned before, the chosen measurement for gender societal equality can be criticized, it can be worth exploring if there are better fitting measurements to capture the concept of gender societal equality in a country or to use multiple separate indicators to measure all indicators in relationship to the percentage of female personnel contributed to UNPKOs.

A. The Database

Contribution nr.	Country	Mission	Percentage Female Personnel	GDI Score	Percentage Females Parliament	Mission Size	Percentage Mission Fatalities
1	1	1	0.0400	0.9819	0.3737	1819	0.1318
2	1	2	0.0665	0.9819	0.3737	67609	0.0964
3	1	5	0.0540	0.9819	0.3737	7439	0.0489
4	1	9	0.0882	0.9819	0.3737	332	0.0129
5	1	10	0.0500	0.9819	0.3737	66456	0.0176
6	1	11	0.0000	0.9819	0.3737	1217	0.0069
7	2	6	0.0000	0.9932	0.1004	88529	0.0303
8	3	5	0.2336	0.9779	0.2610	7439	0.0489
9	3	11	0.0761	0.9779	0.2610	1217	0.0069
10	4	1	0.0000	0.9566	0.2979	1819	0.1318
11	4	4	0.0178	0.9566	0.2979	7935	0.0401
12	4	5	0.0000	0.9566	0.2979	7439	0.0489
13	4	6	0.0288	0.9566	0.2979	88529	0.0303
14	4	7	0.6667	0.9566	0.2979	125	0.1401
15	4	11	0.0000	0.9566	0.2979	1217	0.0069
16	5	1	0.1095	0.9270	0.1951	1819	0.1318
17	5	2	0.2717	0.9270	0.1951	67609	0.0964
18	5	3	0.0090	0.9270	0.1951	156275	0.1685
19	5	5	0.0000	0.9270	0.1951	7439	0.0489
20	5	6	0.0000	0.9270	0.1951	88529	0.0303
21	5	8	0.0059	0.9270	0.1951	58143	0.0247
22	5	10	0.0036	0.9270	0.1951	66456	0.0176
23	6	6	0.4000	1.0206	0.2963	88529	0.0303
24	7	6	0.0577	0.9784	0.3865	88529	0.0303
25	7	7	0.0000	0.9784	0.3865	125	0.1401
26	7	11	0.0000	0.9784	0.3865	1217	0.0069
27	8	2	0.0161	0.8581	0.0870	67609	0.0964
28	8	3	0.0000	0.8581	0.0870	156275	0.1685
29	8	8	0.0000	0.8581	0.0870	58143	0.0247
30	8	10	0.0615	0.8581	0.0870	66456	0.0176
31	9	1	0.0000	0.8998	0.0824	1819	0.1318
32	9	2	0.0000	0.8998	0.0824	67609	0.0964
33	9	3	0.1111	0.8998	0.0824	156275	0.1685
34	9	4	0.0000	0.8998	0.0824	7935	0.0401
35	9	8	0.2222	0.8998	0.0824	58143	0.0247
36	9	11	0.0000	0.8998	0.0824	1217	0.0069
37	10	2	0.0674	0.9344	0.3540	67609	0.0964
38	10	3	0.7308	0.9344	0.3540	156275	0.1685
39	10	8	0.1000	0.9344	0.3540	58143	0.0247
40	10	10	0.0455	0.9344	0.3540	66456	0.0176

41	11	5	0.1731	0.9227	0.3540	7439	0.0489
42	11	8	0.2090	0.9227	0.3540	58143	0.0247
43	12	1	0.0000	1.0049	0.0911	1819	0.1318
44	12	2	0.0108	1.0049	0.0911	67609	0.0964
45	12	5	0.0000	1.0049	0.0911	7439	0.0489
46	12	6	0.0013	1.0049	0.0911	88529	0.0303
47	12	8	0.0357	1.0049	0.0911	58143	0.0247
48	12	10	0.0204	1.0049	0.0911	66456	0.0176
50	14	8	0.0400	0.9840	0.2134	58143	0.0247
51	14	5	0.0000	0.9840	0.2134	7439	0.0489
52	14	7	1.0000	0.9840	0.2134	125	0.1401
53	15	2	0.2431	0.8743	0.1438	67609	0.0964
54	15	3	0.0164	0.8743	0.1438	156275	0.1685
55	15	10	0.1243	0.8743	0.1438	66456	0.0176
56	16	2	0.5000	0.9187	0.1438	67609	0.0964
57	16	3	0.0369	0.9187	0.1438	156275	0.1685
58	16	10	0.0343	0.9187	0.1438	66456	0.0176
59	17	2	0.0625	0.8925	0.2050	67609	0.0964
60	17	3	0.5600	0.8925	0.2050	156275	0.1685
61	17	6	0.0287	0.8925	0.2050	88529	0.0303
62	18	2	0.2423	0.8527	0.2250	67609	0.0964
63	18	3	0.5976	0.8527	0.2250	156275	0.1685
64	18	10	0.1859	0.8527	0.2250	66456	0.0176
65	19	2	0.1376	0.9835	0.2444	67609	0.0964
66	19	3	0.1250	0.9835	0.2444	156275	0.1685
67	19	4	0.0000	0.9835	0.2444	7935	0.0401
68	19	5	0.0000	0.9835	0.2444	7439	0.0489
69	19	10	0.1481	0.9835	0.2444	66456	0.0176
70	19	11	0.0385	0.9835	0.2444	1217	0.0069
71	20	2	0.2121	0.7763	0.1028	67609	0.0964
72	20	10	0.1094	0.7763	0.1028	66456	0.0176
73	21	1	0.0000	0.7650	0.1221	1819	0.1318
74	21	2	0.0899	0.7650	0.1221	67609	0.0964
75	21	10	0.0941	0.7650	0.1221	66456	0.0176
76	22	2	0.0318	0.9657	0.1480	67609	0.0964
77	22	5	0.0000	0.9657	0.1480	7439	0.0489
78	22	9	0.0000	0.9657	0.1480	332	0.0129
79	22	11	0.0000	0.9657	0.1480	1217	0.0069
80	23	1	0.0000	0.9544	0.2240	1819	0.1318
81	23	2	0.0481	0.9544	0.2240	67609	0.0964
82	23	3	0.0000	0.9544	0.2240	156275	0.1685
83	23	5	0.0000	0.9544	0.2240	7439	0.0489
84	23	6	0.0732	0.9544	0.2240	88529	0.0303
85	23	8	0.0237	0.9544	0.2240	58143	0.0247
86	23	10	0.0000	0.9544	0.2240	66456	0.0176
87	23	11	0.0000	0.9544	0.2240	1217	0.0069

88	24	2	0.0923	1.0039	0.1464	67609	0.0964
89	24	6	0.0000	1.0039	0.1464	88529	0.0303
90	25	2	0.0993	0.8141	0.0968	67609	0.0964
91	25	3	1.0000	0.8141	0.0968	156275	0.1685
92	26	1	0.0962	0.9971	0.2125	1819	0.1318
93	26	2	0.0000	0.9971	0.2125	67609	0.0964
94	26	4	0.0602	0.9971	0.2125	7935	0.0401
95	26	5	0.2813	0.9971	0.2125	7439	0.0489
96	26	6	0.0000	0.9971	0.2125	88529	0.0303
97	26	7	1.0000	0.9971	0.2125	125	0.1401
98	26	8	0.0000	0.9971	0.2125	58143	0.0247
99	26	9	0.0877	0.9971	0.2125	332	0.0129
100	27	6	0.0000	0.9790	0.1250	88529	0.0303
101	28	4	0.1667	0.9835	0.2006	7935	0.0401
102	28	7	0.1000	0.9835	0.2006	125	0.1401
103	28	8	0.1333	0.9835	0.2006	58143	0.0247
104	29	6	0.0997	0.9704	0.3840	88529	0.0303
105	29	7	0.0000	0.9704	0.3840	125	0.1401
106	29	8	0.0667	0.9704	0.3840	58143	0.0247
107	29	11	0.0230	0.9704	0.3840	1217	0.0069
112	31	10	0.0654	0.8320	0.0900	66456	0.0176
113	32	2	0.0051	0.9759	0.3659	67609	0.0964
114	32	3	0.0000	0.9759	0.3659	156275	0.1685
115	32	8	0.0000	0.9759	0.3659	58143	0.0247
116	32	10	0.0000	0.9759	0.3659	66456	0.0176
117	33	1	0.0059	0.8836	0.0668	1819	0.1318
118	33	2	0.0000	0.8836	0.0668	67609	0.0964
119	33	3	0.0003	0.8836	0.0668	156275	0.1685
120	33	8	0.0000	0.8836	0.0668	58143	0.0247
121	33	10	0.0000	0.8836	0.0668	66456	0.0176
122	34	1	0.2188	0.9584	0.2513	1819	0.1318
123	34	2	0.0642	0.9584	0.2513	67609	0.0964
124	34	3	0.0000	0.9584	0.2513	156275	0.1685
125	34	5	0.1875	0.9584	0.2513	7439	0.0489
126	34	6	0.0072	0.9584	0.2513	88529	0.0303
127	34	8	0.0400	0.9584	0.2513	58143	0.0247
128	34	10	0.0000	0.9584	0.2513	66456	0.0176
129	35	6	0.0263	1.0315	0.2170	88529	0.0303
130	35	7	1.0000	1.0315	0.2170	125	0.1401
131	35	11	0.0000	1.0315	0.2170	1217	0.0069
132	36	2	0.0000	0.8425	0.2981	67609	0.0964
133	36	3	0.0531	0.8425	0.2981	156275	0.1685
134	36	8	0.0181	0.8425	0.2981	58143	0.0247
135	36	10	1.0000	0.8425	0.2981	66456	0.0176
136	37	3	0.0215		0.1533	156275	0.1685
137	37	4	0.0503		0.1533	7935	0.0401

138	37	6	0.0272		0.1533	88529	0.0303
139	37	8	0.0756		0.1533	58143	0.0247
140	37	11	0.0000		0.1533	1217	0.0069
141	38	3	0.0000	1.0001	0.4163	156275	0.1685
142	38	4	0.0000	1.0001	0.4163	7935	0.0401
143	38	6	0.0459	1.0001	0.4163	88529	0.0303
144	38	8	0.0588	1.0001	0.4163	58143	0.0247
145	38	9	0.0000	1.0001	0.4163	332	0.0129
146	38	11	0.0308	1.0001	0.4163	1217	0.0069
147	39	1	0.0108	0.9882	0.2364	1819	0.1318
148	39	2	0.0769	0.9882	0.2364	67609	0.0964
149	39	6	0.0527	0.9882	0.2364	88529	0.0303
150	39	8	0.0000	0.9882	0.2364	58143	0.0247
151	39	10	0.0079	0.9882	0.2364	66456	0.0176
152	39	11	0.0667	0.9882	0.2364	1217	0.0069
153	40	3	0.1236	0.8781	0.0821	156275	0.1685
154	40	8	0.0530	0.8781	0.0821	58143	0.0247
155	40	10	0.2222	0.8781	0.0821	66456	0.0176
156	41	1	0.0000	0.9637	0.3468	1819	0.1318
157	41	2	0.3333	0.9637	0.3468	67609	0.0964
158	41	3	0.0612	0.9637	0.3468	156275	0.1685
159	41	6	0.0567	0.9637	0.3468	88529	0.0303
160	41	7	0.0000	0.9637	0.3468	125	0.1401
161	41	8	0.0556	0.9637	0.3468	58143	0.0247
162	42	1	0.0952	0.8988	0.0979	1819	0.1318
163	42	2	0.0741	0.8988	0.0979	67609	0.0964
164	42	3	0.2919	0.8988	0.0979	156275	0.1685
165	42	6	0.0812	0.8988	0.0979	88529	0.0303
166	42	7	0.0000	0.8988	0.0979	125	0.1401
167	42	8	0.0873	0.8988	0.0979	58143	0.0247
168	42	9	0.0000	0.8988	0.0979	332	0.0129
169	42	10	0.1078	0.8988	0.0979	66456	0.0176
170	43	1	0.0000	0.9569	0.1946	1819	0.1318
171	43	6	0.0000	0.9569	0.1946	88529	0.0303
173	45	2	0.0823	0.9586	0.1313	67609	0.0964
174	45	3	0.0000	0.9586	0.1313	156275	0.1685
175	45	6	0.0000	0.9586	0.1313	88529	0.0303
176	45	10	0.0286	0.9586	0.1313	66456	0.0176
181	48	1	0.0000	0.9420	0.2149	1819	0.1318
182	48	2	0.0000	0.9420	0.2149	67609	0.0964
183	49	1	0.0545	0.9884	0.0961	1819	0.1318
184	49	5	0.1592	0.9884	0.0961	7439	0.0489
185	49	6	0.0000	0.9884	0.0961	88529	0.0303
186	49	7	0.0000	0.9884	0.0961	125	0.1401
187	50	8	0.5000	0.9652	0.4169	58143	0.0247
188	51	1	0.0000	0.8187	0.1125	1819	0.1318

189	51	2	0.0018	0.8187	0.1125	67609	0.0964
190	51	4	0.0058	0.8187	0.1125	7935	0.0401
191	51	5	0.0909	0.8187	0.1125	7439	0.0489
192	51	6	0.0109	0.8187	0.1125	88529	0.0303
193	51	8	0.3840	0.8187	0.1125	58143	0.0247
194	51	10	0.0164	0.8187	0.1125	66456	0.0176
195	51	11	0.0000	0.8187	0.1125	1217	0.0069
196	52	1	0.0000	0.9262	0.1780	1819	0.1318
197	52	2	0.0178	0.9262	0.1780	67609	0.0964
198	52	3	0.0133	0.9262	0.1780	156275	0.1685
199	52	6	0.0159	0.9262	0.1780	88529	0.0303
200	52	8	0.0000	0.9262	0.1780	58143	0.0247
201	53	3	0.0000	0.8620	0.0334	156275	0.1685
202	54	1	0.0000	0.9765	0.1599	1819	0.1318
203	54	4	0.0396	0.9765	0.1599	7935	0.0401
204	54	5	0.2212	0.9765	0.1599	7439	0.0489
205	54	6	0.0568	0.9765	0.1599	88529	0.0303
206	54	10	0.0000	0.9765	0.1599	66456	0.0176
207	54	11	0.0000	0.9765	0.1599	1217	0.0069
208	55	1	0.0000	0.9628	0.2630	1819	0.1318
209	55	2	0.0000	0.9628	0.2630	67609	0.0964
210	55	3	0.0000	0.9628	0.2630	156275	0.1685
211	55	5	0.0769	0.9628	0.2630	7439	0.0489
212	55	6	0.0466	0.9628	0.2630	88529	0.0303
213	55	7	0.0000	0.9628	0.2630	125	0.1401
214	55	9	0.0000	0.9628	0.2630	332	0.0129
215	55	11	0.0227	0.9628	0.2630	1217	0.0069
216	56	2	0.0000	0.9747	0.1345	67609	0.0964
217	56	3	0.5000	0.9747	0.1345	156275	0.1685
218	56	8	0.0000	0.9747	0.1345	58143	0.0247
219	57	2	0.0000	0.9696	0.0956	67609	0.0964
220	57	4	0.0000	0.9696	0.0956	7935	0.0401
221	58	1	0.0000	0.8637	0.1130	1819	0.1318
222	58	2	0.0000	0.8637	0.1130	67609	0.0964
223	58	3	0.0120	0.8637	0.1130	156275	0.1685
224	58	8	0.0067	0.8637	0.1130	58143	0.0247
225	58	10	0.0000	0.8637	0.1130	66456	0.0176
226	59	1	1.0000	1.0063	0.2256	1819	0.1318
227	59	3	0.0000	1.0063	0.2256	156275	0.1685
228	59	10	0.0000	1.0063	0.2256	66456	0.0176
229	60	3	0.1165	0.9193	0.1454	156275	0.1685
230	60	6	0.0000	0.9193	0.1454	88529	0.0303
231	60	8	0.2209	0.9193	0.1454	58143	0.0247
232	61	1	0.0000	0.9291	0.1564	1819	0.1318
233	61	2	0.0205	0.9291	0.1564	67609	0.0964
234	61	3	0.0000	0.9291	0.1564	156275	0.1685

235	61	6	0.0193	0.9291	0.1564	88529	0.0303
236	61	8	0.2083	0.9291	0.1564	58143	0.0247
237	61	9	0.1967	0.9291	0.1564	332	0.0129
238	61	10	0.0667	0.9291	0.1564	66456	0.0176
239	62	1	0.0000	0.9666	0.2256	1819	0.1318
240	62	2	0.0000	0.9666	0.2256	67609	0.0964
241	62	3	0.1765	0.9666	0.2256	156275	0.1685
242	62	8	0.1579	0.9666	0.2256	58143	0.0247
243	63	3	0.0000	0.9617	0.2534	156275	0.1685
244	64	2	0.0000	1.0316	0.2184	67609	0.0964
245	64	5	0.1429	1.0316	0.2184	7439	0.0489
246	64	8	0.0000	1.0316	0.2184	58143	0.0247
247	65	6	0.0000	0.9664	0.2436	88529	0.0303
248	66	6	0.0000	0.9468	0.3280	88529	0.0303
252	68	1	0.0000	0.9209	0.1983	1819	0.1318
253	68	3	0.3654	0.9209	0.1983	156275	0.1685
254	68	8	0.0000	0.9209	0.1983	58143	0.0247
255	68	10	0.0189	0.9209	0.1983	66456	0.0176
256	68	11	0.0000	0.9209	0.1983	1217	0.0069
257	69	1	0.0505		0.1028	1819	0.1318
258	69	3	0.0000		0.1028	156275	0.1685
259	69	6	0.0190		0.1028	88529	0.0303
260	69	8	0.0303		0.1028	58143	0.0247
261	70	2	0.0619	0.7858	0.0976	67609	0.0964
262	70	3	0.0000	0.7858	0.0976	156275	0.1685
263	70	8	0.0000	0.7858	0.0976	58143	0.0247
264	71	10	0.0000	0.8181	0.2326	66456	0.0176
265	72	1	0.0000	0.9506	0.3448	1819	0.1318
266	72	2	0.0000	0.9506	0.3448	67609	0.0964
267	72	6	0.0000	0.9506	0.3448	88529	0.0303
268	73	7	0.0000	1.0102	0.2043	125	0.1401
269	73	8	0.0000	1.0102	0.2043	58143	0.0247
270	73	10	0.0833	1.0102	0.2043	66456	0.0176
271	74	1	0.4063	1.0257	0.2043	1819	0.1318
272	74	3	0.4286	1.0257	0.2043	156275	0.1685
273	74	8	0.0375	1.0257	0.2043	58143	0.0247
274	75	1	0.0000	0.9547	0.1574	1819	0.1318
275	75	5	0.0690	0.9547	0.1574	7439	0.0489
276	75	8	0.0000	0.9547	0.1574	58143	0.0247
277	76	10	0.0000	0.8264	0.1581	66456	0.0176
278	77	8	0.0000		0.0686	58143	0.0247
279	78	3	0.4874	0.9856	0.2959	156275	0.1685
280	78	8	0.2097	0.9856	0.2959	58143	0.0247
281	78	10	0.4286	0.9856	0.2959	66456	0.0176
282	79	1	0.0000	0.9247	0.3183	1819	0.1318
283	79	2	0.0370	0.9247	0.3183	67609	0.0964

284	79	3	0.0350	0.9247	0.3183	156275	0.1685
285	79	4	0.0071	0.9247	0.3183	7935	0.0401
286	79	6	0.0231	0.9247	0.3183	88529	0.0303
287	79	8	0.0324	0.9247	0.3183	58143	0.0247
288	79	10	0.0000	0.9247	0.3183	66456	0.0176
289	79	11	0.0000	0.9247	0.3183	1217	0.0069
290	80	3	0.0000	0.9462	0.3926	156275	0.1685
291	80	4	0.0000	0.9462	0.3926	7935	0.0401
292	80	5	0.2727	0.9462	0.3926	7439	0.0489
293	80	11	0.0632	0.9462	0.3926	1217	0.0069
294	81	11	0.2131	0.9628	0.3205	1217	0.0069
295	82	2	0.1160	0.7316	0.1297	67609	0.0964
296	82	3	0.0156	0.7316	0.1297	156275	0.1685
297	82	6	0.0000	0.7316	0.1297	88529	0.0303
298	82	8	0.0000	0.7316	0.1297	58143	0.0247
299	82	10	0.0106	0.7316	0.1297	66456	0.0176
306	84	2	0.5135	0.9935	0.3960	67609	0.0964
307	84	3	0.1818	0.9935	0.3960	156275	0.1685
308	84	5	0.0000	0.9935	0.3960	7439	0.0489
309	84	7	0.0000	0.9935	0.3960	125	0.1401
310	84	8	0.4146	0.9935	0.3960	58143	0.0247
311	84	11	0.0825	0.9935	0.3960	1217	0.0069
312	85	1	0.0000	0.7415	0.2150	1819	0.1318
313	85	2	0.0013	0.7415	0.2150	67609	0.0964
314	85	3	0.0155	0.7415	0.2150	156275	0.1685
315	85	7	0.0000	0.7415	0.2150	125	0.1401
316	85	8	0.0041	0.7415	0.2150	58143	0.0247
317	85	10	0.0000	0.7415	0.2150	66456	0.0176
319	87	3	0.0000		0.0203	156275	0.1685
320	88	1	0.0370	0.9661	0.1406	1819	0.1318
321	88	2	0.0247	0.9661	0.1406	67609	0.0964
322	88	5	0.0183	0.9661	0.1406	7439	0.0489
323	88	8	0.0000	0.9661	0.1406	58143	0.0247
324	88	10	0.0000	0.9661	0.1406	66456	0.0176
325	89	1	0.0000	0.9586	0.2398	1819	0.1318
326	89	2	0.0293	0.9586	0.2398	67609	0.0964
327	89	3	0.0000	0.9586	0.2398	156275	0.1685
328	89	5	0.0000	0.9586	0.2398	7439	0.0489
329	89	8	0.2800	0.9586	0.2398	58143	0.0247
330	89	10	0.0526	0.9586	0.2398	66456	0.0176
331	90	2	0.0632	1.0008	0.2504	67609	0.0964
332	90	3	0.0787	1.0008	0.2504	156275	0.1685
333	90	4	0.0547	1.0008	0.2504	7935	0.0401
334	90	8	0.0513	1.0008	0.2504	58143	0.0247
335	90	9	0.0000	1.0008	0.2504	332	0.0129
336	90	10	0.0000	1.0008	0.2504	66456	0.0176

337	91	1	0.0000	1.0060	0.2378	1819	0.1318
338	91	4	0.0000	1.0060	0.2378	7935	0.0401
339	91	7	0.1429	1.0060	0.2378	125	0.1401
340	91	8	0.0000	1.0060	0.2378	58143	0.0247
341	91	10	0.0000	1.0060	0.2378	66456	0.0176
342	92	2	0.0000	0.9796	0.3023	67609	0.0964
343	92	6	0.4483	0.9796	0.3023	88529	0.0303
344	92	7	0.0000	0.9796	0.3023	125	0.1401
345	93	6	0.0000	0.9908	0.0000	88529	0.0303
346	94	2	0.1657	0.9896	0.1269	67609	0.0964
347	94	5	0.0000	0.9896	0.1269	7439	0.0489
348	94	7	0.1111	0.9896	0.1269	125	0.1401
349	94	8	0.0000	0.9896	0.1269	58143	0.0247
350	94	10	0.1333	0.9896	0.1269	66456	0.0176
351	95	1	0.0000	1.0158	0.1359	1819	0.1318
352	95	2	0.1538	1.0158	0.1359	67609	0.0964
353	95	5	1.0000	1.0158	0.1359	7439	0.0489
354	95	7	0.4286	1.0158	0.1359	125	0.1401
355	95	8	0.0000	1.0158	0.1359	58143	0.0247
356	95	10	0.0000	1.0158	0.1359	66456	0.0176
357	95	11	0.0000	1.0158	0.1359	1217	0.0069
358	96	2	0.1393	0.9924	0.6005	67609	0.0964
359	96	3	0.0358	0.9924	0.6005	156275	0.1685
360	96	8	0.0244	0.9924	0.6005	58143	0.0247
361	96	10	0.3333	0.9924	0.6005	66456	0.0176
362	97	3	0.0000		0.0636	156275	0.1685
363	98	2	0.0472	0.8864	0.3528	67609	0.0964
364	98	3	0.0026	0.8864	0.3528	156275	0.1685
365	98	8	0.0000	0.8864	0.3528	58143	0.0247
366	98	10	0.0118	0.8864	0.3528	66456	0.0176
367	99	2	0.0313	0.9685	0.2920	67609	0.0964
368	99	5	0.0510	0.9685	0.2920	7439	0.0489
369	99	6	0.0513	0.9685	0.2920	88529	0.0303
370	99	8	0.0615	0.9685	0.2920	58143	0.0247
371	99	10	0.0000	0.9685	0.2920	66456	0.0176
372	99	11	0.0000	0.9685	0.2920	1217	0.0069
373	100	2	0.2500	0.8708	0.1263	67609	0.0964
374	100	3	0.2576	0.8708	0.1263	156275	0.1685
375	100	6	0.0000	0.8708	0.1263	88529	0.0303
376	101	2	0.1667	0.9908	0.1801	67609	0.0964
377	101	5	0.0630	0.9908	0.1801	7439	0.0489
378	101	11	0.0000	0.9908	0.1801	1217	0.0069
379	102	6	0.0000	1.0027	0.2930	88529	0.0303
380	102	7	0.0000	1.0027	0.2930	125	0.1401
381	102	11	0.0833	1.0027	0.2930	1217	0.0069
382	103	3	0.1696	0.9623	0.4265	156275	0.1685

383	104	2	0.0940	0.9735	0.3764	67609	0.0964
384	104	6	0.0652	0.9735	0.3764	88529	0.0303
385	104	7	0.0000	0.9735	0.3764	125	0.1401
386	104	10	0.0000	0.9735	0.3764	66456	0.0176
387	105	1	0.0000	0.9345	0.0563	1819	0.1318
388	105	2	0.0018	0.9345	0.0563	67609	0.0964
389	105	3	0.0000	0.9345	0.0563	156275	0.1685
390	105	6	0.0000	0.9345	0.0563	88529	0.0303
391	105	8	0.0816	0.9345	0.0563	58143	0.0247
392	106	2	0.1818	0.9973	0.4468	67609	0.0964
393	106	3	0.0000	0.9973	0.4468	156275	0.1685
394	106	8	0.4860	0.9973	0.4468	58143	0.0247
395	106	9	0.0227	0.9973	0.4468	332	0.0129
396	106	11	0.0000	0.9973	0.4468	1217	0.0069
397	107	1	0.0000	0.9738	0.2994	1819	0.1318
398	107	8	0.1176	0.9738	0.2994	58143	0.0247
399	107	9	0.0000	0.9738	0.2994	332	0.0129
400	107	10	0.0000	0.9738	0.2994	66456	0.0176
401	107	11	0.0700	0.9738	0.2994	1217	0.0069
402	108	3	0.2121	0.9295	0.1855	156275	0.1685
403	109	3	0.0647	0.9371	0.3533	156275	0.1685
404	109	6	0.1626	0.9371	0.3533	88529	0.0303
405	109	10	0.9615	0.9371	0.3533	66456	0.0176
406	110	2	0.4000	1.0012	0.1154	67609	0.0964
407	110	3	0.0157	1.0012	0.1154	156275	0.1685
408	110	8	0.8000	1.0012	0.1154	58143	0.0247
409	110	9	0.2667	1.0012	0.1154	332	0.0129
410	111	1	0.0000	0.8405	0.1408	1819	0.1318
411	111	2	0.3582	0.8405	0.1408	67609	0.0964
412	111	3	0.0290	0.8405	0.1408	156275	0.1685
413	111	8	0.0000	0.8405	0.1408	58143	0.0247
414	111	10	0.0186	0.8405	0.1408	66456	0.0176
415	112	2	0.0571	0.9043	0.2865	67609	0.0964
416	112	3	0.0652	0.9043	0.2865	156275	0.1685
417	112	10	0.0155	0.9043	0.2865	66456	0.0176
418	113	2	0.0227	0.9084	0.1315	67609	0.0964
419	113	3	0.0379	0.9084	0.1315	156275	0.1685
420	113	6	0.0025	0.9084	0.1315	88529	0.0303
421	113	7	0.0000	0.9084	0.1315	125	0.1401
422	113	8	0.0552	0.9084	0.1315	58143	0.0247
423	113	10	0.0659	0.9084	0.1315	66456	0.0176
424	114	3	0.1299	0.8776	0.3391	156275	0.1685
425	114	8	0.1978	0.8776	0.3391	58143	0.0247
426	114	10	0.1136	0.8776	0.3391	66456	0.0176
427	115	5	0.0831	0.9999	0.0983	7439	0.0489
428	115	7	0.0000	0.9999	0.0983	125	0.1401

429	115	8	0.0066	0.9999	0.0983	58143	0.0247
430	115	10	0.0309	0.9999	0.0983	66456	0.0176
431	116	2	0.5000	0.9638	0.2380	67609	0.0964
432	116	5	0.0677	0.9638	0.2380	7439	0.0489
433	116	8	0.0000	0.9638	0.2380	58143	0.0247
434	117	1	0.1429	1.0171	0.1428	1819	0.1318
435	117	2	0.0398	1.0171	0.1428	67609	0.0964
436	117	8	0.2500	1.0171	0.1428	58143	0.0247
437	117	9	0.0000	1.0171	0.1428	332	0.0129
438	117	10	0.0000	1.0171	0.1428	66456	0.0176
439	118	2	0.1227	0.9927	0.1805	67609	0.0964
440	118	8	0.0968	0.9927	0.1805	58143	0.0247
441	118	11	0.2500	0.9927	0.1805	1217	0.0069
445	120	1	0.0000	0.7368	0.0023	1819	0.1318
446	120	2	0.0000	0.7368	0.0023	67609	0.0964
447	120	3	0.0000	0.7368	0.0023	156275	0.1685
448	120	8	0.0000	0.7368	0.0023	58143	0.0247
449	120	10	0.0000	0.7368	0.0023	66456	0.0176
450	121	3	0.1170	0.9239	0.1300	156275	0.1685
451	121	8	0.1515	0.9239	0.1300	58143	0.0247
452	121	10	0.1538	0.9239	0.1300	66456	0.0176
453	122	3	0.1852	0.9267	0.2325	156275	0.1685
454	122	8	0.3117	0.9267	0.2325	58143	0.0247
455	122	10	0.8125	0.9267	0.2325	66456	0.0176

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