Explaining the increase in popularity of radical right parties in Europe

by

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Abstract

The aim of this research is identifying the factors explaining people’s support for radical right parties in eleven European countries. Radical right parties have re-emerged as an electoral force in Europe over the last two decennia. Scholars have wondered why Europeans who live in secure welfare states and liberal democracies, characteristics which should generate social tolerance and liberal attitudes, support radical right parties that promote the opposite like ethno-nationalism and xenophobia. Although there have been multiple studies on the increase in popularity of radical right parties, this study explains radical right voting from a micro perspective with the use of recent data. Recent data is important in examining voting behavior as the political environment is not static. The political environment is highly dependent on the occurring of unpredictable events which might influence the established political order like the rise of the radical right. The Euro crisis, the migration crisis and the Brexit are all recent events in Europe which might have affected this political order. Anti-immigrant attitudes, political discontent and Euroscepticism are the factors that are studied and tested to explain radical right voting from the micro perspective. Furthermore, the anti-immigrant attitudes are subdivided in perceptions of economic threat and perceptions of cultural threat to provide an encompassing view of the underlying processes on radical right voting. The Integrated Threat Theory is the central theory in explaining the influences of the factors. This theory states that perceptions of economic threat, cultural threat and political threat lead to people’s support for radical right parties. Empirical analyses are performed using the European Social Survey of 2014. Findings of the logistic regression analyses show that anti-immigrant attitudes, political discontent and Euroscepticism are all positive predictors for people’s support for radical right parties. Herein, cultural threat has the strongest effect. Implications of these findings and recommendations for future research are discussed.

Keywords: radical right, voting, Europe, anti-immigrant attitudes, political discontent, Euroscepticism.
Acknowledgements
The elections in the Netherlands in March 2017, the elections in France in April 2017 and the upcoming elections in Germany in September 2017 combined with the fear of the rise of the radical right truly fascinated me last January to decide to write a thesis that gives more insights in the increase in popularity of radical right parties in Europe. Although thesis writing is a painful and lonely process with many struggles and difficulties, in the end this thesis process was satisfying as I managed to write a thesis on a topic of my choice and on a topic which is societal relevant today.

This thesis could not have been taken off the ground without a number of people, whom I must thank. I want to thank my supervisor, Dr. Haverland, for his constructive feedback and helpful comments. I enjoyed the discussions we had on the subject and the new inspiration and ideas these gave me. Furthermore, I want to thank Dr. George for his effort to provide valuable comments as second reader to mainly improve the statistical matters in this thesis. Besides that, I would like to thank Rose Ní Chléirigh and Tessa Speelman from my thesis circle for the useful advice, the courage to pull through and the laughter during the feedback sessions. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for listening and the support through the whole thesis process.

It remains me to say that I hope you enjoy reading this thesis.

Larissa Jongenelen
Utrecht, 2017
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1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction

“The rise of the far-right in Europe is not a false alarm” (The Telegraph, 2016), “The ruthlessly effective rebranding of Europe’s new far right” (The Guardian, 2016) and “The Radical Right’s united front” (The New York Times, 2017) are recent headlines of reputable newspapers which indicate the increase in popularity of radical right parties in Europe. The radical right has re-emerged as an electoral force in Western Europe as well as in other stable democracies like Canada and Australia over the last two decennia (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2007; Rydgren, 2007). In Austria the Freiheitliche Partei Österreich got 20.5 percent of the votes in the elections of 2013, whereas the Danish Dansk Folkeparti even got 21.1 percent of the votes in the elections of 2015 and the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid became the second biggest party in the elections of 2017. However, radical right parties have not been successful in all European countries. In Spain, most people might not even know there is a radical right party called Democracia Nacional (Lubbers, Gijsberts & Scheepers, 2002).

This increase in popularity of radical right parties also has revived the interests of scholars in the radical right. They have been intrigued by the question why millions of people in Europe who live in welfare states, liberal democracies, who are the best educated and most secure populations in the world, all characteristics which should generate social tolerance and liberal attitudes, support radical right parties that promote the opposite like ethno-nationalism and xenophobia (Norris, 2004; Rydgren, 2007).

When examining the increase in popularity of radical right parties the political environment is key, as it is not static. It is highly dependent on the occurring of unpredictable events which might influence the established political order like the rise of the radical right. The Euro crisis, the migration crisis, and the Brexit were all unpredictable events in Europe of the last decennia which might have increased people’s support for radical right parties. Firstly, the Euro crisis in 2009 led to an increase in the unemployment levels within the European Union (EU) with a top of 11.5 percent of the EU citizens being unemployed. Secondly, a few years later the so-called migration crisis arose with hundred thousands of refugees reaching the European borders. The United Nations (2015) states that only in 2015 700,000 refugees have moved to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. Lastly, the Brexit in 2016 was a clear illustration of the promotion of ethno-nationalism.
Although research on this topic has increased over the last decennia, new research is needed as the political environment is not static. Most studies have been conducted years ago when the abovementioned events had not yet occurred. Hence, older research cannot address the problems of Europe today while these events and problems might affect people’s support for radical right parties. Research should therefore be based on newer data and the latest events to provide the most up to date explanation for the increase in popularity of radical right parties. As aforementioned, events might influence the established political order like the rise of the radical right. They influence the established political order by having an impact on how individuals perceive the world. For instance, a certain crisis can change an individual’s view on the performance of national or European governments. For example, the Euro crisis is an explanation for the increase of Euroscepticism in Europe (Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014; Clements et al., 2014).

1.2 Purpose of the study
The objective of this study is therefore to explain radical right voting from a micro perspective by identifying which factors have an influence on radical right voting\(^1\) in the political environment of Europe today. To assess the political environment of Europe today, the data of the European Social Survey (ESS) of 2014 is used. This dataset is a widely-recognized dataset as this dataset is considered reliable and as it contains data about political interests, norms, values and personal interests (Jowell et al., 2004). Furthermore, the ESS data of 2014 is recent and therefore covers recent events which might have changed the established political order like the Euro crisis which started in 2009 and the migration crisis which started in 2013. Next to that, the focus is on European countries as in most of these countries there has been a significant increase in the popularity of radical right parties. Consequently, the following research question is formulated:

*What factors explain people’s support for radical right parties in Europe?*

After answering the research question, it will be possible to look at the results and provide an answer to the sub question:

*Which factor explains people’s support for radical right parties in Europe the most?*

As previously discussed, recent events like the Euro crisis and migration crisis might have changed the established political order by changing the views of individuals on how they

\(^1\) \text{Radical right voting, increase in popularity of radical right parties and people’s support for radical right parties will be used interchangeably in this study.}
perceive the world. Hence, their might also have been a change in which factor explains radical right voting the most.

1.3 Scientific and societal relevance

1.3.1 Scientific relevance

As aforementioned, research on radical right voting has revived. However, most of the studies on the increase in popularity of radical right parties have been conducted years ago and are based on older datasets. As the political environment is changing all the time with multiple events and social developments occurring in short time era’s, previous research does not represent the political environment of Europe today. Literature on radical right voting after the occurrence of the Euro crisis and especially the migrant crisis is limited (The Economist, 2016). Therefore, this study contributes to the existing literature as it offers new insights on radical right voting based on the political environment of Europe today using the ESS data of 2014. Furthermore, previous research uses different and narrow definitions of radical right parties. Sometimes scholars only included one aspect of it like indicating a radical right party only as extreme or racist. In this study, a broad definition for radical right parties will be used to make sure that no party with radical right sentiments is excluded in the research to provide an encompassing overview of which factors explain people’s support for radical right parties (Rydgren, 2005; Mudde, 2007). Besides that, analyzing multiple factors in examining radical right voting is not a standard in the existing literature, especially not the subdivision of anti-immigrant attitudes in perceptions of economic threat and perceptions of cultural threat. Therefore, this study contributes to the existing literature as these factors offer new insights on this topic.

1.3.2 Societal relevance

Research on radical right voting is of importance to illustrate the social cohesion problems in a society. Radical right parties have extreme stances on exclusionism and immigration. These stances lead to tensions or distrust between different (ethnic) groups but also to a division of different (ethnic) groups; the in-group and the out-group (Lubbers, 2001). This division is damaging for a society’s cohesion. As there is an increase in the popularity of radical right parties it is important to understand why people vote for these parties with these extreme stances. Hence, trying to answer the question what factors influence people’s support for radical right parties is highly relevant for both policy making at the national level and the EU level. If factors have changed or if existing factors have changed in strength policy-makers might want to change certain policies or introduce new ones to improve the social cohesion in
a society. For example, if anti-immigrant attitudes have increased in strength policy-makers might want to intensify existing integration policies or develop new integration strategies.

1.4 Reading guide

This chapter introduced the topic of radical right voting and provided some background information on this topic. Furthermore, the research question and sub question were placed within the existing literature and the scientific and societal relevance are discussed. The rest of the study is structured as follows:

*Chapter 2* provides a literature review by reviewing the current literature on the definition of the term radical right and the factors which influence radical right voting: contextual level factors, individual level factors and individual background characteristics.

*Chapter 3* introduces the theoretical framework, herein the dependent and independent variables and the expected relationships between them are identified.

*Chapter 4* explains the methodology. It describes the research design, country selection, methods of data collection and the operationalization of the variables. Furthermore, this section also discusses the strategy used to analyze the data.

*Chapter 5* presents the results of the data analysis and discusses the research findings. This is a binary logistic regression analysis including three models with standardized and unstandardized coefficients.

*Chapter 6* is the conclusion and discussion, the first part evaluates whether the predictions can be confirmed and provides the answers for the research question and sub question. The second part discusses the theoretical implications, limitations, and suggestions for further research.
2. Literature review

The existing literature on the increase in popularity of radical right parties will be examined in this chapter by first looking at the definition of the term radical right and second at the possible factors influencing radical right voting.

2.1 Terminology radical right

The increase in popularity of radical right parties of the last decennia has revived the interests of scholars in the radical right (Rydgren, 2007). Therefore, one would expect that there is consensus in the academic literature on the meaning of the term radical right. But in fact, this is not the case. During the last decennia, an enormous variety of terms has been used for this topic like extreme right, far right, radical right, radical right-wing, right-wing populism, ethno-nationalism, anti-immigrant and so on (Betz, 1994; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2008; Rauta, 2013). This chaos in terminology is not because there are fundamental differences about what is the correct definition, it is the consequence of a lack of a definition. (Mudde, 2007). In this study, the term radical right will be used as explained in the following paragraph.

In the past radical right parties were often compared to fascist parties of the inter-war period, due to the similarities on their anti-immigrant stances (Given, 2005). Although, it depends on the definition of fascism as well if the comparison between the two is correct. Of course, there are aspects of the radical right parties today that are like the ones of the fascist parties from the inter-war period, but there are differences in the historical contexts in which these parties emerged (Rydgren, 2007). Inter-war fascism emerged due to the class struggles and a ruined society after war. While one of the main reasons radical right parties occurred is because of the emergence of a multicultural society (Given, 2005). Due to the emergence of a multicultural society, radical right parties share an emphasis on ethno-nationalist xenophobia and antiestablishment populism (Rydgren, 2007; Rydgren; 2008). Therefore, scholars later considered the term radical right as a reference to its ideological core themes - extreme right, populist and right wing (Art, 2011) (Rydgren, 2007).

2.1.1 Extreme/Radical

The term radical right is a predecessor of the term extreme right and is nowadays mostly used interchangeably with it as both terms are about the rejection of the democratic political system and the democratic values (Mudde, 2010; Rydgren, 2007). However, there is a small difference between the two terms. Radicalism is opposing the constitution and is therefore
favoring fundamental change, while extremism is hostile against the constitution and therefore only holds extreme views (Mudde, 2010). Evidence that these terms are used interchangeably although the small difference is Powell’s (1986) definition of the extreme right. Powell (1986) states that the extreme right represents a demand for major transformations in the society mostly to an idealized past, while a demand for major transformations originally is a characteristic of radicalism.

2.1.2 Right
There are several ways to distinguish the right and the left in the political arena. A party can be defined as left or right by its position on socioeconomic politics, which is about the free market versus a state controlled economy. Another way concerns the position on sociocultural politics which relates to issues about values like national identity, immigration and order. Radical right parties today can be characterized by their positions on sociocultural politics (Rydgren, 2007). Radical right parties prioritize these issues, mainly issues related to the national identity. They focus on issues related to the national identity as a response to the increasing ethno-national society. According to the radical right parties this society causes some threats for the national identity: Muslims and the EU. Firstly, Muslims are a threat as they are the least assimilated to national values and the national identity. Secondly, the EU is a threat as it is a supranational entity with increasing powers (Zaslove, 2004). Hence, radical right parties use the ethno-pluralist ideology “to claim the right of European national cultures to protect their cultural identity” (Rydgren, 2007, p.244). This explanation of Rydgren (2007) comes from an older ideology called ‘nativism’, which is a combination of nationalism and xenophobia: states should have inhabitants who are exclusively member of the native group and that “nonnative elements” are threatening to the (homogenous) nation-state (Mudde, 2007, p.18).

2.1.3 Populism
Populism is the newest ideological characteristic of the radical right, for the first time proposed by Betz (1993). The radical right is characterized as populist due to their view that society is a fight between the ordinary people and the corrupt elite and due to their anti-establishment strategy (Mudde, 2007). However, nowadays not only the elite but also other groups like immigrants are excluded from the ordinary people. The antiestablishment strategy constructs an image of a party that opposes the political class but is not antidemocratic. It opposes the political class because the political elite does not represent the interests of the
ordinary citizen. Hence, populism appeals to anxiety and disenchantment in society (Rydgren, 2007).

All in all, the term ‘radical right’ refers to parties of the 21st century that share an emphasis on ethno-nationalism rooted in the idealized past and an anti-political establishment (Betz, 1993; Rydgren, 2007; Rydgren, 2008).

Table 1. Overview terminology radical right.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radical right</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extreme/Radical</strong></td>
<td>Rejection of the democratic political system and the democratic values (Mudde, 2010; Rydgren, 2007). Radicalism: opposes the constitution and wants fundamental change. Extremism: only hostile against the constitution (Mudde, 2010).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right</strong></td>
<td>Sociocultural politics: focus on the national identity (Rydgren, 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Populism</strong></td>
<td>Society is a fight between the ordinary people and the corrupt elite. Antiestablishment strategy (Mudde, 2007).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2 The increase in popularity

There is a clear trend of an increase in popularity of radical right parties in European countries since the 1990s, which has already granted these parties with (more) power in national parliaments (Rydgren, 2007; The Guardian, 2015). Together with the increase in popularity of radical right parties came the revival of academic literature on radical right voting. However, the roots of the academic literature on this topic rests in the political sociological literature of the 1950s and 1960s on understanding the support of Nazism and fascism (Norris, 2005).

The term ‘modernization’ is inevitable in the early explanations for the increase in popularity of radical right parties. The rise of these parties is directly and explicitly linked to ‘processes of modernization’ (Mudde, 2007). These processes and developments brought changes in the socioeconomic and sociocultural structures in European democracies, like the transformation of an industrial to a post-industrial society. But also, globalization, risk society and a post-Fordist economy are examples of ‘modernization processes’ (Betz, 1994; Norris, 2005;
Mudde, 2007). Betz (1994) argues that these processes led to an enormous increase in individualization which caused fragmentation and differentiation in European societies. This created the so called: ‘modernization losers,’ people who are suffering from status anxieties due to these processes. They cannot cope with the acceleration of modernization and run into the risk to become useless for society (Betz, 1993; Betz, 1994). Radical right parties were “radical efforts to undo” the developments and processes of modernization (Minkenberg, 2003, p.151). Therefore, these losers of modernization were the main actors in the increase in popularity of radical right parties, since the positions of these radical right parties were appealing to them (Betz, 1993; Art, 2011). However, modernization alone is not the only explanation for people’s support for radical right parties in Europe for two reasons. First, the theory of modernization is correct intuitively but is too general and vague (Mudde, 2007). Second, the processes of modernization were quite similar throughout Europe while there are enormous differences in the support for radical right parties along European countries (Rydgren, 2007).

2.2.1 Contextual level factors
Scholars started to focus on contextual level factors, also called macro-level explanations, that came separately with the processes of modernization, like: unemployment and immigration (Mudde, 2007). Unemployment can be a sign of the malfunctioning of the current parliament and other democratic institutions (Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014). However, consensus on the effect of the unemployment level on the support for radical right parties has never been achieved. Some scholars found a positive relation between unemployment and radical right voting (Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Arzheimer, 2009), most found a negative relation (Knigge, 1998; Lubbers et al., 2002), and several others found no significant relation (Givens, 2005). Even more recent studies have contradictory conclusions, Wertz et al. (2012) found no significant relation in their European study on Euroscepticism and radical right voting while Rydgren and Ruth (2013) found a positive relation in their case-study of Sweden.

As aforementioned, radical right parties are ethno-nationalistic. They exclude those who do not belong to the national community, like immigrants. However, empirical research has produced highly contradictory results on the effect of the immigration level on radical right voting, due to the choices of datasets and indicators (Mudde, 2007). Several scholars discovered a positive relationship between immigration and radical right voting (Knigge, 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002; Arzheimer, 2009; Werts et al., 2013), while others did not (Norris, 2005). The most recent study of Werts et al. (2013) used data from the European Social
Survey (ESS) and found that the higher both a country’s immigration level and the level of asylum seekers the more likely people are to vote for radical right parties. Furthermore, not only immigration in general but also a specific group of these migrants has been studied: the Muslim community. Muslims are considered to have the most dissimilarities with the national community in European countries and as radical right parties exclude those who do not belong to the national community, one would assume that a larger size of the Muslim community would lead to an increase in popularity of radical right parties (Norris, 2005). However, results are contradicting as well. Some scholars found a positive relation between the size of the Muslim community and radical right voting (Schniderman et al., 2004), while others found no relation or a negative one (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012).

Moreover, after a while scholars also started to focus on political macro-level explanations. Gallagher (1991) and Jackman & Volpert (1996) have stressed the importance of opportunity structures for radical right parties. The electoral system of a country is such an opportunity structure and is of great importance, especially the distribution of seats according to the percentage of the votes. There are two electoral systems: the proportional system and the disproportional system. In the proportional electoral system a party gets exactly the same percentage of seats as the percentage of votes, while in a disproportional electoral system a party does not get the same percentage of seats as the percentage of votes (Gallagher, 1991). Although there is a clear difference between the two electoral systems, also on this contextual level factor no consensus exists in the academic literature about the effect on radical right voting. Several scholars argued that a proportional electoral system increases people’s support for radical right parties (Jackman & Volpert, 1996), while others did not (Arzheimer. 2009). Even some scholars found the effect that a disproportional electoral system increases people’s support for radical right parties (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006).

Although, the strength of macro-level explanations is to explain similar developments in very different settings they cannot solely explain the increase in popularity of radical right parties in Europe. The main weakness of macro-level explanations is that they cannot explain different developments in similar settings, while for example in some European countries unemployment and immigration levels are quite the same but the electorate of radical right parties is not (Mudde, 2007).

2.2.2 Individual level factors
Individual level factors, also called micro-level explanations, are an essential aspect in explaining the increase in popularity of radical right parties. It is argued that the radical right
voters share the same xenophobic, populist and sometimes racist sentiments as the parties (Mudde, 1999; Rydgren, 2007). Opinion polls and the Eurobarometer surveys revealed that European countries currently exhibit high levels of xenophobia, populism and racism. The Eurobarometer survey of 2000 already found that 50% of the Europeans agreed with the statements that minority groups ‘abuse the system of social welfare’ and ‘are a reason for unemployment’ (Thalhammer et al, 2001). Moreover, scholars demonstrated that xenophobic and racist sentiments, especially anti-immigrant attitudes, are crucial factors in indicating radical right voters (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000; Lubbers et al, 2002; Norris, 2005). Although not all voters who have anti-immigrant attitudes vote for radical right parties, most voters who do vote for radical parties contain such attitudes (Rydgren, 2007). It is argued that these anti-immigrant attitudes are induced by perceptions of threats from immigrants, culturally and economically (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Werts et al, 2012). Herein, the cultural threat is a stronger predictor for these attitudes than the economic threat (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012).

Next to that, scholars argued that political discontent in European countries creates a public sensitive to anti-establishment messages, and thus provides an opportunity for radical right parties (Rydgren, 2007). Several scholars confirmed the relationship between voters who are dissatisfied with the way democracy works or distrust politics and radical right voting (Lubbers et al., 2002; Norris, 2005; Werts et al., 2012). For example, in Belgium distrust is positively associated with a preference for Vlaams Belang (Hooghe et al., 2011). However, Van Der Brug et al. (2000) did not found an effect of political discontent on radical right voting. Yet, a problem with the relationship between political discontent and the increase in popularity of radical right parties is that it is not clear why political distrust of voters leads to people’s support for radical right parties in some European countries, while in other countries it does not (Rydgren, 2007).

Furthermore, the increase in popularity of radical right parties can also be explained by the increase of Euroscepticism. After the expansion of the EU and its stronger role as supranational actor after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 there has been a decline in public support for European unification, called Euroscepticism. Citizens are scared to lose their national identity by further European unification and integration. This suits the principles of the radical right parties, who give a high priority to issues related to the national identity, and thus successfully mobilize national identity considerations against the EU (Norris, 2005; Rydgren, 2007; Werts et al., 2012). However, Euroscepticism was for a long time seen as only a small and weak determinant compared to political discontent and anti-immigrant
attitudes for radical right voting (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007). But more recent studies found an increase in Euroscepticism’s strength to determine people’s support for radical right parties (Werts et al., 2012).

Moreover, individual background characteristics are also important individual level factors. Lubbers et al. (2002) even argue that the absence of these characteristics is one of the biggest weaknesses in comparative research on radical right voting. There is consensus in the literature that lower educated people are more likely to vote for radical right parties than higher educated people (Norris, 2005; Werts et al, 2012). The same accounts for unemployed persons (Lubbers et al., 2002; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Werts et al, 2012). Further, age plays a role as well, support for the radical right is represented more among older generations (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012). However, Norris (2005) argues that this varies cross-nationally as in Slovenia younger generations are more appealed to the radical right while in Austria the older generations are. Next to that, religious people are less likely to vote for radical right parties than the non-religious (Lubbers et al., 2002; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012). Last, there is a gender gap in radical right voting since support is overrepresented among men (Lubbers et al., 2002; Norris, 2005; Immerzeel et al., 2015).
Table 2. Overview factors and their effect on radical right voting based on earlier academic literature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contextual level factors</th>
<th>Effect on radical right voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>+/-/*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>+/*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of the Muslim community</td>
<td>+/-/*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system (proportionality)</td>
<td>+/-/*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual level factors</th>
<th>Effect on radical right voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigrant attitudes</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political discontent</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroscepticism</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual background characteristics</th>
<th>Effect on radical right voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. + = positive effect. - = negative effect. * = no effect.

2.3 Conclusion

The list of possible factors that can explain radical right voting is extensive. Therefore, this chapter merely provided a brief overview of the main factors influencing the increase in popularity of radical right parties in Europe.

The review shows that the factors affecting people’s support for radical right parties can be divided in contextual level factors and individual level factors. Scholars focused at the start of radical right research on contextual level factors but found that individual level factors are indispensable in this research, as contextual level factors were quite similar throughout Europe but the increase in popularity of radical right parties was not. Moreover, the overview also helped to identify some challenges and openings for future research. First, it is noticeable that although a lot of research discussed in the overview is from the last two decennia, a lot of research is conducted on older data. Most of the data used in previous research is from surveys which are done after every two or four years. Therefore, the use of data from the latest version of these surveys can give new and different insights as political environments...
are not static. Furthermore, one can identify that Euroscepticism is becoming a stronger and more important factor in explaining radical right voting (Werts et al., 2012). Lastly, most people who support radical right parties have an anti-immigrant attitude which is based on perceptions of both economic threat and cultural threat (Rydgren, 2007; Werts et al., 2012). Although, Lucassen & Lubbers (2012) recently found that the cultural threat is a stronger predictor than the economic threat in explaining radical right voting.
3. Theoretical framework

Based on the last chapter, which has illustrated the main factors explaining people’s support for radical right parties, in this chapter the theoretical framework will be discussed. This chapter is divided in the factors as subsections, wherein relevant theories will be analyzed and propositions will be deduced.

In this study only the individual level factors discussed in the literature review will be examined: anti-immigrant attitudes, political discontent and Euroscepticism. Although, a lot of research has already been conducted and on most of the individual level factors their effect on radical right voting there is consensus in the academic literature, they will be examined again in this study as they will be analyzed with newer data (Norris, 2005; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Werts et al., 2012).

3.1 Anti-immigrant attitudes

Radical right parties give priority to issues related to the national identity (Rydgren, 2007). The notion of ethno-pluralism is herein their core frame: ethnic mixing leads to cultural extinction (Rydgren, 2005; Norris, 2005; Rydgren, 2008). Hence, radical right parties claim the right of European societies to protect their cultural identities. One of the biggest threats to the national identity is immigration (Zaslove, 2004; Rydgren, 2008). Immigration should be reduced or stopped and immigrants already living in the country should assimilate (Rydgren, 2005). Yet, ethno-pluralism is not the only frame used by radical right parties, there are other anti-immigrant arguments as well. The welfare chauvinist frame has become more important lately, in this frame immigrants and natives are competing for scarce resources. Hence, immigration is seen by this frame as a threat to the welfare states in European societies. Immigrants are depicted as ‘economic refugees’ or ‘social welfare refugees’. Furthermore, the welfare chauvinist frame uses the idea of national preference and gives priority to natives (Rydgren, 2005). Although, these anti-immigrant frames dominate the programs of radical right parties, they themselves do not explain people’s support for these parties as it is unknown whether they correspond with the attitudes held by the radical right voters (Rydgren, 2008).

Anti-immigrant attitudes are induced by perceptions of cultural threats and economic threats from immigrants (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Werts et al., 2012). Therefore, in this study these threats are examined in explaining radical right voting. The Realistic Group Conflict Theory was one of the earliest propositions made regarding intergroup threats (Coser, 1956).
In line with the welfare chauvinist frame, the Realistic Group Conflict Theory assumes that competition over scarce resources leads to conflict between social groups (Zarate et al., 2004; Schneider, 2008, Scheepers, Gijsberts & Coenders, 2002). Members of the dominant group perceive that certain resources belong to them and when these resources are threatened by a minority group, members of the dominant group will create unfavorable attitudes towards them. The central contention in this framework is that real competition over resources must exist. Herein, the natives are the dominant group and the immigrants are the minority group (McLaren, 2003) There are two main levels at which this group competition can occur: the individual level and the group level. Firstly, at the individual level the threat of competition over resources can be conceptualized as the concern from an individual that it will lose its job or welfare state benefits. Secondly, at the group level the threat of competition over resources is not conceptualized from the individual as they are not always self-seeking but from the concern that resources will be taken from the whole in-group (McLaren, 2003). The Realistic Group Conflict Theory mainly focuses on economic resources and is therefore also called the economic threat (Schniderman, Hagendoorn & Prior, 2004). However, competition between groups does not only have to be about economic resources but can also be over cultural values, beliefs, norms and identity called the cultural threat (Schneider, 2008; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012). Therefore, the Integrated Threat Theory has tried to combine the economic threat, cultural threat and other intergroup threats into one model. Herein, the economic threat is called the realistic threat and the cultural threat is called the symbolic threat (Stephan et al., 1998). The symbolic or cultural threat are similar to the ideas of symbolic racism (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012). It is the perceived harm caused by the minority group who have a distinct world view, values, norms and identity. When the members of the dominant group feel that these new norms, values and identity threaten their own culture, they create unfavorable attitudes towards them (Stephan et al., 1998; McLaren, 2003). Hence, immigrants who speak another language, have different values and norms will provoke more unfavorable attitudes than immigrants from countries with a similar culture or the respondent’s own country (Zarate et al., 2003).

Although, anti-immigrant attitudes are both induced by perceptions of economic threat and cultural threat scholars recently found that perceptions of cultural threat are a stronger predictor for anti-immigrant attitudes than perceptions of economic threat (Schniderman, Hagendoorn & Prior, 2004; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012). The major cause for this is the process of globalization. Norris (2005) argues that the process of globalization induces threats
to the national identity, which results in votes for the radical right. Furthermore, xenophobia increases because of the crisis around the national identity (Knigge, 1998). Combining the perceptions of economic threat and cultural threat with the radical right parties their frames leads to the following hypotheses:

H1: People who believe that immigrants take away jobs and take out welfare benefits are more likely to vote for radical right parties (economic threat).

H2: People who believe that immigrants undermine a country’s culture are more likely to vote for radical right parties (cultural threat).

H3: Perceptions of cultural threat have a stronger positive effect on people’s support for radical right parties than perceptions of economic threat.

3.2 Political discontent

A common tool to demonstrate political discontent is the protest vote (Van Der Brug & Fennema, 2007). The main motive of a protest vote is to show discontent with the political elite. As radical right parties use the antiestablishment strategy which opposes the political elite because they do not represent the interests of the ordinary citizen, votes for radical right parties have the goal to shock these elites (Brug & Fennema, 2007). Furthermore, the protest vote is part of the protest politics thesis which implies that people’s support for radical right parties depends on negative reasons, they are the primary drivers. Therefore, negative reasons are more important than positive motivations (Norris, 2005). But, these negative reasons can differ. Norris (2005) gives three different explanations:

1. Radical right voters might be alienated citizens lacking interpersonal trust.
2. Radical right voters might be deeply frustrated with the performance of the government over specific issues, like immigration policies for example.
3. Radical right voters might be unhappy with the working of the political system and lack confidence in democratic institutions in their country, the Betz view.

In this study, the focus will be on the Betz view. Betz (1994) interprets the increase in popularity of radical right parties as an erosion of confidence in political parties, parliaments, and other democratic institutions. “The political climate of distrust and disenchantment that came to prevail in Western Europe in the 1980s was a significant precondition for the rise and success of radical right-wing populist parties” (Betz, 1994, p.67). Furthermore, scholars found that people who are dissatisfied with the workings of democracy are more likely to vote
for radical right parties (Lubbers, Gijsberts & Scheepers, 2002). In line with the above, the following hypothesis can be derived:

**H4:** *People who do not trust the country’s parliament, political parties, politicians and who believe that politicians do not care about what people think are more likely to vote for radical right parties (political discontent).*

### 3.3 Euroscepticism

European integration recently has become an important issue for radical right parties, as radical right parties are skeptical about the process of European integration and unification while this has not always been the case (Mudde, 2007; Hainsworth, 2008). Most radical right parties in Europe were supporters of more European integration in the 1980s. Le Pen’s party even called for a common European defense and nuclear strategy, common integration control and a common foreign policy (Mudde, 2007). But the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 was a turning point, wherein most radical right parties curved to oppose European integration. According to the radical right parties the Maastricht Treaty was a step too big in making the EU a supranational body and endangering a nation’s sovereignty and traditions (Mudde, 2007).

As aforementioned, radical right parties give priority to issues related to the national identity (Rydgren, 2007). Besides the ethno-pluralist frame and welfare chauvinist frame, they use the ethno-centric frame which argues that the nation with its own values and identity should be protected from foreign influences (Halikiopoulou, 2012; Hainsworth, 2008). They see the nation as a homogeneous and fixed entity, while they see the EU as a heterogeneous entity. The EU consists of multiple nations and promotes cultural mobility among its members (Mudde, 2007; Hainstworth, 2008; Halikiopoulou, 2012). But like the anti-immigrant frames, this frame alone cannot explain people’s support for the radical right parties as it is unknown whether this frame corresponds with the attitudes held by the radical right voters. (Rydgren, 2008).

As previously discussed the Realistic Group Theory was one of the first intergroup theories and was mainly focused on economic threats. However, scholars later found that there are more threats than only the economic ones and developed the Integrated Threat Theory (Schneider, 2008; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012). Furthermore, scholars argued that these threats might lead to unfavorable attitudes not only to groups like immigrants but also to institutions like the EU (Zaslove, 2004). Therefore, European integration can be claimed as a political threat that may harm the nation its sovereignty and traditions. The key idea of European
integration, especially after the Maastricht Treaty, is an institutionalized cooperation on the basis of pooled sovereignty. Countries transfer a part of their national sovereignty to the EU’s political institutions. Due to this transfer, the EU has more influence in the nations and the nations become more dependent on the EU. Therefore, the pooled sovereignty can be considered as a political threat as it diminishes a country’s protection from foreign influences, hence a nation its own identity (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002). Next to that, the European citizenship, a European passport, a European flag are also examples of a citizen’s fear to lose the national culture and its traditions (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007). Although, in the first decennia of the 21st century Euroscepticism was “a dwarf as compared to other sociopolitical stances that determine voting preferences” (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007, p.20) recent research has ratified Euroscepticism as a stronger predictor for people’s support for the radical right (Werts et al., 2013). The Euro crises which started in 2009 is an important explanation for the increasing strength of Euroscepticism as a factor in explaining radical right voting (Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014; Clements et al., 2014). Classical utilitarian approaches argue that support for governments decreases in times of a crisis (Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014). The Euro crises was evidence that the promised economic benefits of EU membership could not be realized, the EU could no longer guarantee growth and prosperity for its citizens. Hence, the Euro crisis led to an increase in Euroscepticism among EU citizens (Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014; Clements et al., 2014). In Greece, even all social classes had more negative sentiments towards the EU after the Euro crisis (Clements et al., 2014). Therefore, the following hypothesis can be derived:

H5: People who believe that European unification has gone too far are more likely to vote for radical right parties (Euroscepticism).
Based on all the theoretical arguments of this chapter the following conceptual model can be formed:

![Conceptual model of the research design](image)

Figure 1. Conceptual model of the research design.
4. Research design and methods
In this chapter, the most appropriate research design will be discussed to test the hypotheses presented in the theoretical framework. Moreover, the data collection will be outlined, the country selection will be clarified and the operationalization of the factors used in the empirical analysis will be operationalized.

4.1 Research design
This study aims to encounter what influences the increase in popularity of radical right parties. Therefore, the three following factors that explain people’s support for radical right parties will be analyzed: anti-immigrant attitudes, political discontent and Euroscepticism. Hence, this research design is deductive. In scientific research, there are two forms: inductive research and deductive research. Inductive research is used when there are only a few theories to explain phenomena, in this research own theories are made by starting with observations. While deductive research test existing theories with new empirical data (Agresti & Finlay, 2008).

Also, the research design of this study is outcome-centric as its goal is to assess’ alternative explanations by taking into account many independent variables that try to account for the variance in the dependent variable. Hence, the research question is mainly oriented on the independent variables. The outcome-centric design is a commonly used design in analyzing voting behavior (Gschwend & Schimmelfennig, 2007).

Furthermore, this study is a non-experimental design. This method is chosen since in this study there is no possibility to control for the independent variables or to measure the dependent variable before and after the influence of the independent variables, because it is hard to control the political environment. The main disadvantage therefore is the notion of endogeneity as it is not possible to know if there are other causes that could eliminate the relation between the factors and radical right voting (Antonakis et al., 2014). Another disadvantage related to this is the notion of causality as it is not possible to know if the factors influence radical right voting or if radical right voting influences the factors (Agresti & Finlay, 2008).

Next to that, this research is a large N design. It indicates that there is a large amount of cases, in this study respondents. A large N design is necessary in this study because the factors that explain people’s support for radical right parties can vary immensely among the respondents in the countries. Therefore, a large N design makes generalization across populations in
different countries possible, it increases the external validity. In contrast, in comparative or single case studies only a few cases are studied and therefore their external validity is low (Gschwend & Schimmelfennig, 2007).

Combining the non-experimental design and large N design, this study can be considered as an observational study. As it is known there are two major types of observational studies: cross-sectional studies and time series studies. The most appropriate design for this research would be the time series as it avoids issues of endogeneity and causality. However, the ESS does not contain any longitudinal data. Therefore, the design used in this research is the cross-sectional as “it allows observation of phenomena in more natural, realistic setting and increases the size and representativeness of the population study” compared to for example an experimental design (Buttolph Johnson & Reynolds, 2008, p.156). So, although the disadvantage of endogeneity and causality a cross-sectional study improves the external validity, which is of great importance to clarify the voting behavior of radical right voters in Europe.

4.2 Data
The selection of a cross-sectional design means that the measurements are taken in a single time unit. As aforementioned, all the variables will be analyzed in 2014, by the European Social Survey as this is their most recent dataset. The ESS data is worldwide recognized and seen as reliable data. The data has been used in a lot of scientific articles. Furthermore, the data is reliable and representative for the population in Europe (Jowell et al., 2004). The surveys are executed every two years and therefore the ESS data can monitor stability and change in the social structures of European societies. The respondents in the dataset are Europeans from fifteen years old or older, the respondents are selected by strict random probability methods and the data is collected by face-to-face interviews (European Social Survey, 2016). The most important themes of the data of 2014 are politics, human values, immigration and social inequalities in health.

The main advantage of using a survey like the ESS is that it is effective and efficient in collecting data on multiple variables at the same time. However, the last decennia surveys have been widely criticized. The main criticism is the common source bias (CSB). The CSB occurs when scholars only use a survey to measure all variables, the independent and dependent variables, at the same time. Some scholars believe that this bias causes that correlations between the variables will be inflated and therefore the findings are criticized by reviewers (Spector, 2006: George & Pandey, 2017). However, sometimes the use of only a
survey is inevitable as for example no other distinct source is available. Hence, George and Pandey (2017) constructed a guide on how to reasonably deal with CSB (Figure 2). In this guide which is a flowchart, several questions are asked with at the answers of each questions feedback to control for CSB as much as possible. I passed the first three questions. Firstly, I passed the question ‘survey as single data source?’ as the ESS data of 2014 is the only source I use in this research. Secondly, I answered ‘no’ to the question ‘distinct data source available and/or relevant?’ as the ESS data of 2014 is the only and most recent data containing information about anti-immigrant attitudes, political discontent and Euroscepticism. Lastly, I answered ‘yes’ to the question ‘individual perceptions or beliefs?’ as the variables used in this study pertain to the beliefs of individuals which are only measurable with surveys. The feedback given at this question to control and justify for CSB consists of four arguments which I will try to incorporate as much as possible by doing correlations between the variables and reliability checks later in this chapter.
Figure 2. Flowchart underlying the usage of surveys in public administration by George and Pandey (2017)\(^2\).

4.3 Operationalization

To perform analyses countries must be selected and the variables have to be operationalized. Variables have to be operationalized to turn the abstract concept from the theoretical framework into a measurable variable (Agresti & Finlay, 2008). Firstly, the country selection will be clarified. Secondly, the operationalization of the dependent variable will be discussed. Lastly, the operationalization of the independent variables and control variables will be explained.

4.3.1 Country selection

In this study, European countries will be examined as in most European countries there has been a significant increase in the popularity of radical right parties. Furthermore, European countries have a similar political environment due to the occurrence of the same events like the Euro crisis and migration crisis. Hence, they can be examined together as this makes it more plausible to generalize the results. Furthermore, I will try to include as much countries as possible in order to increase the external validity.

To classify which parties belong to the radical right the expert judgement scale of Immerzeel et al. (2011) is used, since these expert judgements scales are widely used in the academic literature for categorizing radical right parties. Immerzeel et al. (2011) conducted an expert survey in Europe, a sample of almost 870 political scientists from 33 countries. These 33 countries included all the 28 countries of the EU except Luxembourg, plus Iceland, Israel, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and Turkey. The survey asked the respondents to place the political parties in their country on a scale from zero to ten, wherein zero represents the left political ideological side and ten the right political ideological side. Plus, it asked the respondents some specific questions about the position of a party on immigration and nationalism, wherein zero represents a position not very restrictive on immigration and not strongly advocating nationalism and ten represents a position very restrictive on immigration and strongly advocating nationalism. Although, expert surveys have been criticized to produce data which are biased scholars have compared these surveys with other sources and found that they are useful (Benoit & Laver, 2006). This is especially due to the high response rate (37.7%) and high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha .900 or higher), which indicates that the political scientists generally agreed on the positions of the political parties (Immerzeel et al., 2015).
As previously discussed, the expert judgement scale consists of 28 countries of the EU (Immerzeel et al., 2011). However, the ESS data of 2014 does not contain all these countries. Therefore, only the EU countries which are in the data are included in this study. These are eighteen countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK). Hereafter, a selection of the countries was made based on the existence of a radical right party according to the expert judgement panel (Immerzeel et al., 2011). As illustrated in Table 3, Czech Republic, Ireland, Lithuania, Spain were therefore excluded as no radical right party exists in their country. Furthermore, in the selection of the radical right parties, parties who do not have a value on the question ‘Which party did you vote for in the last election?’ in the data are also excluded. Therefore, Poland (LPR), Slovenia (SNS & Lipa), the German REP, the Dutch TON and British BNP are excluded. Possible reasons for the missing values of these parties in the data are that the party has resigned since the ESS data is a few years later than the expert judgement scale, the party did not participate in the last elections or although very unlikely the party did not obtain any votes.
Table 3. List of radical right parties in fifteen European countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Abbrev.</th>
<th>Name (in English)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>FPÖ</td>
<td>Freedom Party of Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BZÖ</td>
<td>The future of Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>VB</td>
<td>Flemish Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FN</td>
<td>National Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>DFp</td>
<td>Danish People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>EIP</td>
<td>Estonian Independence Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>True Finns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>FN</td>
<td>National Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>REP</td>
<td>The Republicans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>National Democratic Party of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>MIEP</td>
<td>MIEP-Jobbik Third Way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance of Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>Party voor de Vrijheid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TON</td>
<td>Proud of the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>FrP</td>
<td>Progress Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>League of Polish Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>PNR</td>
<td>National Renovator Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>Slovenian National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lipa</td>
<td>The Lime Tree Party (The Linden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Sweden Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United Kingdom</td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>British National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>United Kingdom Independence Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4 shows the voting proportion of the radical right parties in the thirteen European countries. Overall, the proportion of votes in the data matches the proportion of votes in the elections of the 2010s. However, for most countries the proportion of votes in the data is lower than the actual results in the elections. Furthermore, countries with radical right parties less than 0.5 percent of the votes are excluded in this study as the sample will not be representative to the whole population in the analysis. Therefore, Poland and Estonia are excluded and the analysis will only be done for the following eleven countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK.

32
After excluding Estonia and Portugal the total number of respondents in the data from the eleven European countries is 19441.

Table 4. Radical right voting and proportion of votes in thirteen European countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Radical right party</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>N (total RRP-voter)</th>
<th>Percentage votes in data</th>
<th>Percentage votes in 2010s elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>FPÖ</td>
<td>1094</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20.5 (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BZÖ</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.5 (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>VB</td>
<td>1360</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>7.8 (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>&lt;0.5 (2010)</td>
<td>&lt;0.5 (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Dfp</td>
<td>1179</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.3 (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EIP</td>
<td>1029</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>21.1 (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;0.5 (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>1345</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>19.1 (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FN</td>
<td>1060</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>13.6 (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>2082</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>16.4 (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MIEP</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>16.4 (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>FrP</td>
<td>1083</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>16.3 (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>PNR</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3 (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5 (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1437</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.7 (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>1401</td>
<td>1401</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>3.1 (2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. <0.5 = less than 5 percent of the votes, these results are mostly subsumed into the category of ‘other parties.’ Furthermore, presidential elections are not taken into account in this comparison. Source: electionresources.org

4.3.2 Party definitions

Before specifying the variables a closer look will be taken on the radical right parties in the eleven countries. In this study thirteen parties are included, whereby Belgium and Austria both have two parties. All the thirteen parties their history and electoral successes will be briefly discussed.

Austria: FPÖ & BZÖ

The Freedom Party of Austria was founded in 1956 as the successor of the Federations of Independents with a former Nazi officer as its first leader. The last decennia the party became more successful, after 2000 the party joined the coalition government in Austria and became a powerful party in the country. The party got 20.5 percent of the votes in the last elections of 2013 (Time, 2011; New York Times, 2016). The Future of Austria was established more recently in 2005, and is a moderate and smaller version of the Freedom Party of Austria as it
is more moderate regarding immigration and the EU and only received 3.5 percent of the votes in the elections of 2013 (Time, 2011; Electionresources, 2017).

**Belgium: VB & FN**

The Flemish Interest was established in 2004 as the successor of the Flemish Block, it had its peak with the elections of 2007 as it got 12 percent of the votes. From 2008 onwards the party lost votes, in the elections of 2014 it only got 3.7 percent of the votes. Furthermore, their main and original concern is the independence of Flanders from Belgium (Time, 2011; Vlaams Belang, 2016). The National Front now called National Democracy is the French and less successful version of the Flemish Interest in Wallonia as this party never gained more than 3 percent of the votes in the Belgium elections (Time, 2011; Electionresources, 2017).

**Denmark: DfP**

The Danish People’s Party was founded in 1995, and grew from the third largest party in the elections of 2011 to the second largest party in the elections of 2015 in Denmark with 21.1 percent of the votes. This party wants to ensure Denmark’s independence and the freedom of the Danish inhabitants (Time, 2011; Electionresources, 2017).

**Finland: PS**

The True Finns was also founded in 1995 as a successor of the Finnish Rural Party. Although a significant increase from 4.1 to 19.1 percent of the votes between 2007 and 2011, it fell back to 17.6 percent of the votes in the last elections of 2015 (Time, 2011).

**France: FN**

The National Front was established in 1972 by the controversial Jean-Marie Le Pen. His daughter, Marine Le Pen, took over in 2011. Her strategy of ‘‘detoxification’’ of the negative and racist image of the National Front has been effective as the votes for the French National Assembly rose from 4.3 percent in the elections of 2007 to 13.6 percent in the elections of 2012 (BBC, 2017, p.1).

**Germany: NPD**

The National Democratic Party of Germany was founded in 1964 as the successor of the German Reich Party, and is Germany’s oldest nationalist party. It has never been successful as it always gained a low percentage of the votes and never had any seats in the federal parliament. The party is often described as neo-Nazi and therefore the German government attempted to ban the NPD, but it failed (Time, 2011).
Hungary: MIEP-Jobbik
The MIEP was established in 1993, and was a nationalist party that joined forces with a more radical nationalist party Jobbik in 2005. Jobbik was founded in 2003 by students as an association and later as a political party. After the elections of 2010 the party gained access to the parliament with 16.4 percent of the votes and stayed there after the elections of 2014 with 20.4 percent of the votes. The party is often called fascist or anti-Semitic as it is strongly against the Roma minority and migrants (Time, 2011; New York Times, 2016; Electionresources, 2017).

Netherlands: PVV
The Party for Freedom was founded in 2005 by Geert Wilders, and already entered the Dutch House of Representatives after the elections of 2006 with 5.9 percent of the votes. The party gained success and was the second largest party in the Netherlands in the elections of 2017 (Time, 2011; New York Times, 2016; Electionresources, 2017).

Norway: FrP
The Progress Party was founded by Anders Lange in 1973, and was originally an anti-tax protest movement. The party has always been an important party in Norway since the elections of 1997 where it became the second largest party. In the last elections of 2013 the party became the third biggest party with 16.3 percent of the votes (Time, 2011; Electionresources, 2017).

Sweden: SD
The Sweden Democrats was established in 1988, and had its roots in fascism and Nazi trappings. However, after 2001 it softened its image and became less extreme. The party entered the parliament in 2010 and became the third largest party in Sweden in the elections of 2014 with 12.9 percent of the votes (Time, 2011; New York Times, 2016; Electionresources, 2017).

United Kingdom: UKIP
The United Kingdom Independence Party was established in 1991, and began as the Anti-Federalist League. This League was against the Maastricht Treaty and wanted the UK to leave the EU. The party did not gain any seats in the House of Commons until the last elections of 2015, where it gained 12.6 percent of the votes and is part of the opposition in the House of Commons (UKIP, 2017).
4.3.3 Dependent variable

As this study is about voting behavior, only respondents are included who voted in the last elections. Therefore, the data was filtered by respondents who answered ‘yes’ to the question ‘did you vote in the last national election?’ The dependent variable in this research: people’s votes for radical right parties, is measured by questioning whom the respondents voted for in the last election. The answers of this question are recoded into ‘voted for a radical right party’ (1) and ‘voted for another party’ (0). People who did not vote or did not answered the question got a missing score.

4.3.4 Independent variables

In this study there are multiple independent variables: anti-immigrant attitudes, political discontent, Euroscepticism and the individual background characteristics also called control variables (Table 5). To test the hypotheses first scales have to be constructed for the factors.

Table 5. Variable names and labels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Label</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prtvt (country abbreviation)</td>
<td>Party voted for in last election, #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imtcjob</td>
<td>Immigrant take jobs away in country or create new jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imbleco</td>
<td>Taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imbgeco</td>
<td>Immigrants are good or bad for a country’s economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imueclt</td>
<td>Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trstprl</td>
<td>Trust in country’s parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trstplt</td>
<td>Trust in politicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trstpirt</td>
<td>Trust in political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ptcpplt</td>
<td>Politicians care what people think</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euftf</td>
<td>European Union: European unification go further of gone too far</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Icgndra</td>
<td>Respondent’s gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agea</td>
<td>Respondent’s age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Highest level of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rlgblg</td>
<td>Belonging to a particular religion or denomination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uempla</td>
<td>Doing last 7 days: unemployed, actively looking for job</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All variables = 10-point scale. Source: ESS2014.

4.3.4.1 Anti-immigrant attitudes

The anti-immigrant attitudes scale can be divided into two subscales: ‘economic threat’ and ‘cultural threat.’ Firstly, based on the theory the economic threat is measured by two items. These items indicate if immigrants take jobs or create new jobs (imtcjob) and if immigrants take out more than they put in or less (imbleco), which is about welfare benefits (McLaren, 2003). Both items have a classification ranging from zero to eleven and are recoded so that a higher value means more feelings of economic threat and therefore also of anti-immigration.
Secondly, based on the theory the cultural threat is measured by only one item which indicate if a country’s cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants \((iniueclt)\). The cultural threat is only measured by one item as other items in the data about traditions and culture are not involving or pointing to anything about immigrants or immigration. Therefore, the cultural threat is not a scale. Further, the item on a country’s cultural life also has a range from zero to eleven and is recoded so that a higher value means more feelings of cultural threat and therefore also of anti-immigration.

4.3.4.2 Political discontent

The protest vote is a common tool to measure political discontent, which holds that people support radical right parties due to an increase in the lack of confidence in political parties, parliaments and other democratic institutions (Betz, 1994). Therefore, the political discontent scale consists of three items which indicate multiple levels of trust: trust in a country’s parliament \((trstprl)\), trust in politicians \((trstplt)\) and trust in political parties \((trstprt)\). Plus, one item which indicates if politicians care about what people think \((ptcpplt)\). All these items have a classification ranging from zero to eleven and are recoded so that a higher value means less feelings of trust and less feelings that politicians care.

4.3.4.3 Euroscepticism

Euroscepticism comes from the threat of European integration and unification (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007). Hence, Euroscepticism is measured by only one item: if European unification should go further or already has gone too far \((euftf)\). Although trust in the European parliament is another item in the data about the EU, it does not measure the threat of European integration and unification. Therefore, this item is not included in this study. The item if European unification should go further or already has gone too far has a classification ranging from zero to eleven and is recoded so that a higher value means more feelings of Euroscepticism. Furthermore, all the scales in this research are made by the taking the mean of the variables.

4.3.4.4 Individual background characteristics (control variables)

The following individual background characteristics will be included in this research as control variables: gender \((icgndra)\), age \((agea)\), education \((edulvlb)\), religion \((rlgbglg)\) and unemployment \((uempla)\). Support for radical right parties differ among males and females, among different ages, among different educational levels, among the employed and unemployed, and among the religious and non-religious. The study of Lucassen & Lubbers (2012) showed a significant effect between gender, as well as age, religion, level of education
and unemployment on perceived ethnic threats which are important indicators for people’s support for radical right parties. Gender and religion are recoded into dummy variables, so that ‘0’ means being female or religious and ‘1’ being male or non-religious. Considering unemployment, there are two items in the data indicating if someone is unemployed but the difference between them is that one is actively looking for a job (uempla) while the other is not actively looking for a job (uempli). In this study only respondents who are unemployed and are actively looking for a job are included, since people who are not actively looking for a job probably do not perceive conflict over economic resources and therefore might not want to see a change in the political arena as in voting for the radical right (Schniderman, Hagendoor & Prior, 2004). Here, the variable is also recoded into a dummy variable wherein ‘0’ means not unemployed and ‘1’ means unemployed and actively looking for a job. The variable education is recoded into two dummy variables based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED)\(^3\). One dummy indicates the higher educated and the other dummy indicates the lower educated. Furthermore, the variable age is also recoded into multiple dummies. Although the variable age is continuous and could be left unchanged, dummies are made to get a better image of which age category is more likely to vote for radical right parties. The first dummy indicates younger persons from fifteen to 24 years old. The second dummy indicates persons with a middle age from 25 to 54 years old. Last, the third dummy indicates older persons from 55 to 101 years old. These ranges are based on widely used standardized survey classifications (ESS, 2014).

Before I can assess the effects of the factors on radical right voting certain statistical procedures need to be carried out. First, the sample data used in this research is introduced in Table 6. It shows the minimum and maximum scores (range) of the variables. It also shows the means and the standard deviations of the variables, the latter indicates how well the means represent the data. Radical right voting and the control variables are dummy variables and therefore have a range between zero and one. Next to that, economic threat and political discontent are scales and consist of multiple variables which clarifies their range. Second, it will be examined if the factors and radical right voting are related. A correlation will be used to show the direction and strength of the relations between the scales and the variables (Agresti & Finlay, 2008). Third, the reliability of the economic threat and the political discontent scales will be examined to check if these scales are constructed in a statistical right

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\(^3\) ISCED is a statistical framework for organizing information on education maintained by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for all countries in the world (UNESCO, 2017)
manner (Bland & Altman, 1997). Last, a factor analysis will be performed to check if the scales made based on the theory are confirmed by the data as a factor analysis shows which items fit a certain factor (Kim & Mueller, 1978).

Table 6. Descriptive statistics of all the variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Radical right voting</strong></td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.207</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Threat</strong></td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.871</td>
<td>-2.38-2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants take jobs</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>1-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants take out more</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>1-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural Threat</strong></td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>1-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Euroscepticism</strong></td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>1-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Discontent</strong></td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>.870</td>
<td>-2.51-1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in country’s parliament</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>1-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in parties</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>1-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in politicians</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>1-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians care about what</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people think</td>
<td>6.54</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>1-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td>.509</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 15-24</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.223</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 25-54</td>
<td>.470</td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 55-101</td>
<td>.478</td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>.354</td>
<td>.478</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower education</td>
<td>.646</td>
<td>.478</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>.403</td>
<td>.491</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Valid N: 19441*

### 4.4 Correlations

The purpose of correlations is to check if there is coherence between two variables or scales by measuring if there is a linear relation (Agresti & Finlay, 2008). As I expect that economic threat, cultural threat, political discontent and Euroscepticism have an effect on radical right voting, the coherence between radical right voting with these scales and variables are analyzed. Table 7 shows the outcomes of these correlations, plus the correlations between the scales and variables themselves. A relevant outcome is the significant correlation between the economic threat and the cultural threat \( r = 518 \) \( p<.01 \). They are both different dimensions of anti-immigrant attitudes and have an own meaning. Although, both represent a part of the same concept and therefore the correlation is logical. Furthermore, all the scales and variables have a low correlation with radical right voting. This means that they are connected, but that the scales and variables are not the only factors measuring radical right voting. Hence, CSB as an universal inflator of correlations between the variables is not very likely (Spector, 2006;
George & Pandey, 2017). Next to that, scholars found that the cultural threat is a stronger predictor for voting for radical right parties than the economic threat (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012). In this study, the cultural threat also correlates more with radical right voting than the economic threat. The correlation between the cultural threat and radical right voting is $r=.151$, $p<.01$, while the correlation between the economic threat and radical right voting is $r=.129$, $p<.01$.

Table 7. Correlations between the scales and variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Economic Threat</th>
<th>Cultural Threat</th>
<th>Political Discontent</th>
<th>Euroscepticism</th>
<th>Radical Right Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Threat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.518**</td>
<td>.302**</td>
<td>.268**</td>
<td>.129**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Threat</td>
<td>.518**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.291**</td>
<td>.314**</td>
<td>.151**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Discontent</td>
<td>.302**</td>
<td>.291**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.203**</td>
<td>.064**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroscepticism</td>
<td>.268**</td>
<td>.314**</td>
<td>.203**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.148**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.** $p<.01$

### 4.5 Reliability analysis

The purpose of a reliability analysis is to check the homogeneity of the items in a scale, to see if the items fit in the scale and so the scale is constructed in a statistical right manner (Bland & Altman, 1997). But before measuring the reliability, the items are standardized as not all the items have the same amount of values.

A Cronbach’s alpha is performed to measure the scales their reliability. The reliability check on the economic threat scale gave a Cronbach’s alpha of $\alpha = .759$ which is an acceptable lower-bound reliability. Therefore, the economic threat scale is reliable.

Furthermore, the reliability check on the political discontent scale gave a Cronbach’s alpha of $\alpha = .894$, which is a perfectly fine lower-bound reliability. The lower-bound reliability would be a little higher when removing the item which indicates if politicians care about what people think (*polcare*), but the difference is too small to ignore the theoretical considerations. So, the item will remain in the scale. As all the scales have an acceptable lower-bound reliability the occurrence of CSB in this study is not very likely (George & Pandey, 2017).

### 4.6 Factor analysis

Factor analysis is a statistical method for variable reduction; it searches for the multi-dimensionality in a set of items. It is different than a reliability test because it does not check
the homogeneity of a set of items, plus items are not weighted equally in a scale construction. There are two different types of factor analysis: confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and exploratory factor analysis (EFA). EFA is used here, because it is unknown which items will load high on which factors. The factor analysis will search for factors in a set of items without implicitly testing a theory about which items could affect which factors (Kim & Mueller, 1978)

In this study two EFA’s are performed, one for the four scales altogether and one for the two dimensions within the anti-immigration scale. Both these EFA’s are performed with the extraction method principal axis factor (PAF) as with this extraction method research statements that are answered (items) are used and I expect that the latent constructs (anti-immigrant attitudes, Euroscepticism and political discontent) influenced people when answering these statements. Plus, this extraction method is most common in statistical research. Furthermore, for both the EFA’s oblique rotation will be used as it cannot be assumed that all the four scales and more specifically the economic threat and cultural threat subscales within the anti-immigrant scale are not correlated (Kim & Mueller, 1978),

Firstly, the communalities will be checked. Except for the items about trust (trstprl, trstplt, trstprt) all the items have communalities under .5. This indicates that these items are not explained well by all the factors together and might have trouble to load significantly on any factor. However, as explained in the following paragraphs this not the case for these items and therefore the low communalities are not important in this analysis (Costello & Osborne, 2005).

The eigenvalue of the first and the second factor of the EFA of all the four scales is higher than one, which means that these factors explain more variance than one single observed variable could explain. These are two factors less than expected, because according to the theory there should have been four factors with an eigenvalue higher than one, because there are four scales (cultural threat, economic threat, Euroscepticism and political discontent) to distinguish in this analysis. Although, this is two factors less than expected according to the theory the EFA will still be executed on four factors. For the EFA of the anti-immigration scale only the eigenvalue of the first factor is higher than one. This is also one factor less than expected, because according to the theory there should have been two factors with an eigenvalue higher than one, because there are two subscales to distinguish in this scale. Although, this is one factor less than expected according to the theory the EFA will still be executed on two factors.
The pattern matrix for the four scales altogether and the anti-immigration scale was studied to see which items load high on a factor, thus to see if the scales made based on the theory are confirmed by the data. In the EFA of the four scales altogether the items assumed to be in the political discontent scale all have high loadings on the first factor (Table 8). The same accounts for the item of the Euroscepticism scale which only loads high on the second factor. Scores higher than .3 are a good factor score and mean that they belong to the factor (Zwick & Velicer, 1982). The loadings of the items assumed to be in the anti-immigration scale are not that clear cut. The anti-immigration scale consists of two subscales the economic threat and the cultural threat. These items assumed to be in these two subscales should have high loadings on the third or fourth factor. However, the only item assumed to be in the cultural threat scale has a high loading on the second factor together with the item assumed to be in the Euroscepticism scale. Furthermore, the items assumed to be in the economic threat subscale have high loadings on the third factor, except for imbgeco this item has a high loading on the second factor together with the item assumed to be in the cultural threat subscale and the item assumed to be in the Euroscepticism scale.

This also occurs in the EFA on the anti-immigration attitudes scale, the items assumed to be in the economic threat subscale have high loadings on the second factor, except for imbgeco this item has a high loading on the first factor (Table 9). The only item left for the cultural threat subscale has a high loading on the first factor.

Despite the theoretical arguments, the factor analysis on the anti-immigrant scale shows that there are items which do not fit in the factor. Due to this the subscales based on the theory are not founded. The economic threat item on whether immigrants are good or bad for a country’s economy (imbgeco) is statistically regarded more as a cultural threat item than as an economic threat item. Therefore, based on the factor analysis this item should be removed from the economic threat scale. But when this item is removed the lower-bound reliability of the economic threat scale would drop just under the accepted border of .700. However, as this drop in the lower-bound reliability is not big (α = .686), the item will be removed from the scale in this research for further analysis. Hence, the economic threat scale will only exist out of two items: if immigrants take jobs or create new jobs (imtcojob) and if immigrants take out more than they put in or less (imbleco). Furthermore, the cultural threat item on if a country’s cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants (inueclt) is statistically regarded the same as the Euroscepticism item if European unification should go further or has gone too far (eufif). Although this result, these items will still be used for the two factors as they are the
only items for the factor and based on the theory imueclt is an important indicator for cultural threat and eutf an important indicator for Euroscepticism.

Table 8. Pattern matrix for the selected items for the four scales altogether.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trstprl</td>
<td>.791</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trstplt</td>
<td>.943</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trstprt</td>
<td>.894</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ptcpplt</td>
<td>.712</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imtcjob</td>
<td></td>
<td>.765</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imbleco</td>
<td></td>
<td>.473</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imbgeco</td>
<td></td>
<td>.694</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imueclt</td>
<td>.832</td>
<td>.417</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eutf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
<td>3.964</td>
<td>1.822</td>
<td>.838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% explained</td>
<td>44.049</td>
<td>20.244</td>
<td>9.309</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The loadings of the factor scores are based on the recoded and standardized versions of the variables.

Table 9. Pattern matrix for the selected anti-immigrant-related items.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imtcjob</td>
<td></td>
<td>.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imbleco</td>
<td></td>
<td>.646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imbgeco</td>
<td>.734</td>
<td>.619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imueclt</td>
<td>.741</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
<td>2.533</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% explained</td>
<td>63.314</td>
<td>15.482</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The loadings of the factor scores are based on the recoded and standardized versions of the variables.

4.7 Analytical strategy

To test the hypotheses, binary logistic regression models for the eleven countries altogether will be analyzed. A binary logistic regression model is chosen, since the dependent variable is a binary variable (range 0-1). In the first model, the individual background characteristics (control variables) are presented. As the goal of this study is to explain the factors which influence people’s support for radical right parties, anti-immigrant attitudes, political discontent and Euroscepticism are studied. Therefore, in the second model unstandardized coefficients of these factors will be presented as unstandardized coefficient indicate what effect one unit change of the independent variable will have on the dependent variable. Furthermore, the standardized coefficients of these factors will be analyzed to indicate which
of the independent variables has a stronger effect, which is necessary to test hypothesis 3. Nevertheless, a logistic regression does not perform standardized coefficients automatically like a linear regression while standardized coefficients in a logistic regression model have the same utility as standardized coefficients in linear regression model (Menard, 2011). Consensus in the academic literature was missing for a long time on the best way to construct standardized logistic regression coefficients. But, Menard (2011) proved sufficient evidence for an approach to the construction of these coefficients. The following formula calculates the standardized coefficient in a logistic regression model:

\[ B = \frac{(b_{yx})(s_x)(R)}{s_{\text{logit}(Y)}} \]

The standardized coefficient of a logistic regression analysis is calculated by multiple variables with similar weights, whereby \( b \) = the unstandardized coefficient of the particular independent variable; \( s_x \) = standard deviation of the particular independent variable; \( R \) = R-value (pseudo R) and \( s_{\text{logit}(Y)} \) = the standard deviation of the outcome variable: \( \text{logit}Y \), which was estimated using steps available by Menard (2011)\(^4\).

Next to that, the structure of the data is naturally nested within the countries as I want to examine which factors influence radical right voting in eleven countries. When units are nested in the countries, measurement on units within a cluster are more similar than measurements on units in different clusters. Not taking care of these clusters can lead to misleading inferences (Fitzmaurice, 2005). Therefore, a fixed effects model is made. In this model dummies of the eleven countries are added in the models of the logistic regression.

\[^4\text{For more information see formula 5 of Menard, S. (2011). Standards for standardized logistic regression coefficients. Social Forces, 89(4), 1409-1428.}\]
5. Results

In this chapter the logistic regression models will be analyzed. As aforementioned, the first model captures the individual background characteristics (control variables). In the second model the variables economic threat, cultural threat, political discontent, and Euroscepticism are included. For this model, the standardized and unstandardized coefficients will be analyzed.

5.1 Logistic regression analysis

To explain people’s support for radical right parties in the eleven countries by the different factors, multiple logistic regression models are analyzed. The results of these logistic regression analyses are presented in Table 10. The first model which includes the individual background characteristics has an $R^2=0.256$. Therefore, the prediction of the first model is average since 25.6% of the variance in the votes for radical right parties is explained by the individual background variables. Gender and religion have a positive effect on radical right voting. So, males ($p<.001$) and the non-religious ($p<.01$) are more likely to vote for radical right parties than females and the religious. Also, unemployment has a positive effect on radical right voting. The unemployed ($p<.05$) are more likely to vote for radical right parties than the employed. Furthermore, lower education has a positive effect on radical right voting. This means that lower educated people ($p<.001$) are more likely to vote for radical right parties than higher educated people. Next to that, the higher ($p<.01$) and lower age category ($p<.05$) both have a negative effect on radical right voting. Therefore, people in the middle age category are more likely to vote for radical right parties.

The second model is analyzed to predict the effects of the economic threat, cultural threat, political discontent, and Euroscepticism on radical right voting. This model has an $R^2=0.370$. Therefore, 37% of the variance in the votes for radical right parties is explained by the three factors and the individual background characteristics. This percentage is high as more than one third of the variance in the votes is explained by these variables and the three factors explain more variance than the individual background characteristics alone. All the variables from the three factors have a positive significant effect on radical right voting. People who perceived economic threat ($p<.001$) are more likely to vote for radical right parties than people who did not perceived economic threat. People who perceived cultural threat ($p<.001$) are more likely to vote for radical right parties than people who did not perceived cultural threat. People who are Eurosceptic ($p<.001$) are more likely to vote for radical right parties than people who are not Eurosceptic. Plus, people who are political discontent ($p<.001$) are
more likely to vote for radical right parties than people who are not political discontent. Furthermore, males, non-religious and lower educated people (p<.001) are still more likely to vote for radical right parties than females, religious and higher educated people. Also, people in the higher age category (p<.001) are less likely to vote for radical right parties than people in the middle age category. Plus, unemployed persons (p<.05) are more likely to vote for radical right parties than employed persons. Astonishingly, in comparison with the first model in this model the effect that people in the younger age category are less likely to vote for radical right parties than the middle age category turned insignificant.

When analyzing the unstandardized coefficients, all the variables of the three factors remain significant in the same direction. Cultural threat is the strongest predictor for radical right voting of these three factors. After that Euroscepticism and political discontent are the strongest predictors. Economic threat is the weakest predictor for radical voting of the three factors with a difference of .098 with cultural threat. Furthermore, of the individual background characteristics the lower educated and the males are the strongest predictors for radical right voting.
Table 10. Results logistic regression analysis of the effects on radical right voting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic threat</td>
<td>.312***</td>
<td>.090***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.054)</td>
<td>(.054)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural threat</td>
<td>.229***</td>
<td>.188***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political discontent</td>
<td>.408***</td>
<td>.118***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.054)</td>
<td>(.054)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroscepticism</td>
<td>.145***</td>
<td>.125***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 15-24</td>
<td>-0.355*</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.157)</td>
<td>(.167)</td>
<td>(.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 55-101</td>
<td>-0.257**</td>
<td>-0.301***</td>
<td>-0.050***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.074)</td>
<td>(.079)</td>
<td>(.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower educated</td>
<td>1.174***</td>
<td>.586***</td>
<td>.093***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.088)</td>
<td>(.094)</td>
<td>(.094)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>.372*</td>
<td>.365*</td>
<td>.022*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.171)</td>
<td>(.185)</td>
<td>(.185)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>.239**</td>
<td>.313***</td>
<td>.051***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.073)</td>
<td>(.079)</td>
<td>(.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-22.315</td>
<td>-24.189</td>
<td>-24.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(470.167)</td>
<td>(445.062)</td>
<td>(445.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R²</td>
<td>.256</td>
<td>.370</td>
<td>.370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>19441</td>
<td>19441</td>
<td>19441</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. *p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.
6. Conclusion & discussion

6.1 Conclusion

The main aim of this study was to get insights in the increasing popularity of radical right parties in Europe by answering the research question: ‘What factors explain people’s support for radical right parties?’ These factors were tested with the use of the data from the European Social Survey (2014). The following individual level factors which would affect radical right voting were examined: anti-immigrant attitudes, political discontent and Euroscepticism. The former can be divided into two sub factors: economic threat and cultural threat, wherefore it is expected based on the process of globalization (Norris, 2005) that the cultural threat has a stronger effect than the economic threat on radical right voting. Through the inclusion of the micro perspective by the examination of multiple factors and sub factors, this study provides an encompassing view of the underlying processes on people’s support for radical right parties.

Results showed support for the hypotheses. First, I found that people who hold anti-immigrant attitudes are more likely to vote for radical right parties. This supports the argument of the Integrated Threat Theory that persons who perceive economic threat (H1) and cultural threat (H2) are more likely to vote for radical right parties. This result implies that people who perceive the threat of competition over scarce resources and who perceive the threat that their dominant culture will be undermined by the minority have anti-immigrant attitudes (Schneider, 2008; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012). Also, the effect of the cultural threat is stronger than the economic threat on radical right voting (H3). Therefore, the hypothesis is supported. An explanation here for is the process of globalization as this process induces threats to the national identity and its culture, which results in votes for the radical right (Norris, 2005). Even compared to all the other factors cultural threat has the strongest effect on radical right voting and therefore provides an answer to the sub question: ‘Which factor explains people’s support for radical right parties the most?’ Furthermore, Euroscepticism as hypothesized proves to be a positive predictor for people’s support for radical right parties (H5). The increased pooled sovereignty after the Maastricht Treaty diminished a country's protection from foreign influences, hence European integration and unification is considered as a political threat. This outcome puts the political threat next to the economic threat and cultural threat as part of the Integrated Threat Theory (Zaslove, 2004). Next to that, political discontent has a positive effect on radical right voting (H4). This result implies that people
who distrust the political system with its parties and politicians are more likely to vote for radical right parties. The hypothesis is therefore also supported.

The individual background characteristics (control variables) also yielded some interesting findings. As in line with previous research males, the non-religious, the unemployed and the lower educated are more likely to vote for radical right parties. However, consensus lacks in the literature which generation is more likely to vote for the radical right parties. Some argue it is the older generation, others argue that it varies cross-nationally (Norris, 2005; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012). In this study it is the middle age generation which is more likely to vote for the radical right compared to the older generation. A possible explanation for this might be that most of the radical right parties in the eleven countries are relatively new in the political arena and therefore older generations are more likely to stick to the classical parties they have always voted for.

Altogether, the results find evidence for the Integrated Threat Theory as the economic, cultural and political threat have a positive effect on people’s support for radical right parties. Furthermore, the results on the individual background characteristics (control variables) are mostly in line with previous research with only age as an exception.

6.2 Discussion

The findings in this study make important contributions to the existing literature and theoretical understanding on radical right voting. First, this study contributes to the academic literature on radical right voting by using the most recent data of the European Social Survey (2014). There has been a lot of earlier research on the increase in popularity of radical right parties and radical right voting. However, these studies are conducted years ago and as the political environment is not static these studies do not address the problems in Europe today. By using data of 2014 possible changes in the importance and strength of the factors are taken into account due to changes and events in the political environment. For instance, the Euro crises which started in 2009 is an explanation for the increasing strength of Euroscepticism as a factor for deterring people’s support for radical right parties (Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014; Clements et al., 2014). But also, the start of the migration crisis in 2013 might have changed the importance of certain factors. Overall, using recent data on radical right voting in a rapidly evolving and changing society, a new lens is offered in understanding the influence of the factors on this topic. Second, this study complements existing literature by emphasizing the importance of subdividing anti-immigrant attitudes in perceptions of economic threat and cultural threat. As this study proves that the cultural threat is a stronger predictor for radical
right voting than the economic threat more differentiation between the cultural threat and the economic threat by creating separate items in the development of future surveys is of great importance in further explaining radical right voting.

Methodologically, I have made the outcomes as reliable as possible by testing the scales their lower-bound reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha and by running two factor analyses. Also, I have accounted for the clustered data with a fixed effect model as the structure of the data is naturally nested in the countries. Furthermore, this study used Menards (2011) standardized regression coefficients formula so that a comparison between the factors their influence on radical right voting was still possible within a logistic regression model.

In addition to the theoretical implications of this study, the findings on radical right voting in the eleven countries also have valuable implications for future policies of national governments and the EU. This study suggests that people who hold anti-immigrant attitudes, who are political discontent and who are Eurosceptic are more likely to vote for radical right parties. Firstly, as the cultural threat is a stronger predictor than the economic threat for radical right voting changes in the focus and importance of certain policies might be possible as anti-immigrant attitudes are not desirable for the social cohesion in a country. National governments might shift the focus from policies that reduce the economic threat to policies that reduce the cultural threat. For example, the shift from policies that diminish immigrants their advantage on the labor market to policies that stimulate the integration of immigrants. Secondly, to reduce the political discontent in societies the trust must be restored between the parliaments, politicians, political parties and citizens. Hence, parliaments, politicians and political parties might need to show more transparency. Lastly, to reduce Euroscepticism in societies the EU might want to improve its image. The EU needs for its further existence support from its citizens (Hix & Hoyland, 2011) Therefore, the EU might change its treaties or introduce new policies to for example get rid of the democratic deficit in order to reduce the Euroscepticism.

Overall, the findings exemplify a clear picture of the factors their effect on radical right voting in the eleven European countries. However, the findings of this study need to be dealt with some caution as there are several limitations. First, ideally to provide an encompassing view of the underlying processes on people’s support for radical right parties one would include both the micro and macro perspective, next to the examination of individual level factors one would have examined the contextual level factors as well. However, I was unable to asses a multivariate analysis which examines the individual level factors and contextual level factors
simultaneously as for the ESS data of 2014 the ESS multilevel download was not yet available. In this multilevel download, the data consists next to the individual level factors also of contextual level factors. Therefore, without the multilevel download of the ESS data of 2014 other sources should have been used to measure the contextual level factors which make it impossible to test the contextual level factors statistically. Furthermore, the number of countries in the ESS data who matched the categorization of radical right parties by the expert judgement scale of Immerzeel et al. (2011) was too small to asses a multivariate analysis. Further work should try to incorporate more countries and use a multilevel download to replicate this study with a multilevel analysis. Second, the outcome of the reliability test for the economic threat scale is just below the border of .700 due to the removal of the item about if immigrants are good or bad for a country’s economy. Without removing this item the scale would have had an acceptable lower-bound reliability but this item did not fit the factor. Therefore, it is possible that this scale is not solid. Further work should take this into account and might use another dataset as the ESS data did not had a great variety of items for all the factors. Third, this study was a cross-sectional research, hence it is not possible to prove any causal relations only correlations between the factors and radical right voting can be proven. Longitudinal data is needed to prove causal relations, however the ESS data does not include this. Last, this study only uses one source of data and therefore their might be the occurrence of CSB. Although, I tried to reasonably deal with this following the instructions of the guide of George and Pandey (2017) it is still possible that this bias caused inflated correlations between variables. Further work should take this into account and might want to use more sources instead of one survey to control for CSB.

Further research can be taken into a couple of directions. The present findings show that anti-immigrant attitudes, political discontent and Euroscepticism have an influence on radical right voting. Herein the cultural threat is the strongest predictor, Euroscepticism the second strongest predictor, political discontent the third strongest predictor and the economic threat the weakest predictor. Euroscepticism is a stronger predictor than political discontent and economic threat, while in the past it was a ‘‘dwarf’’ compared to these factors (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007, p.20). Further research should therefore extent the influence of the underlying processes of Euroscepticism, by gaining more insights in the conditions when people become Eurosceptic and when people who are Eurosceptic vote for radical right parties. As aforementioned, ideally to provide an encompassing view of the underlying processes on people’s support for radical right parties one would examine both the individual
level factors and contextual level factors. However, due to the unavailability of the multilevel download of the ESS data of 2014 and the small number of countries in the data this was not possible. Future research should assess a multivariate analysis where individual level factors and contextual level factors can be examined simultaneously, as there is a lack of consensus on the effect of different contextual level factors on radical right voting in the academic literature. For example, some scholars found a positive relationship between the immigration level in a country and radical right voting (Knigge, 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002; Arzheimer, 2009; Werts et al., 2013), while others did not (Norris, 2005). Also a multivariate analysis can offer new insights about the relation between the contextual level factors and individual level factors by testing interaction effects. Another venue for future work is the difference between theeconomic threat and the cultural threat, it has been acknowledged in recent academic literature that the cultural threat is a stronger predictor than the economic threat for radical voting. However, this has not been analyzed much yet. Last, the data used in this study and in most research on radical right voting is secondary data. Secondary data is data wherein a researcher had no influence on the questions like the Eurobarometer and the ESS. Hence, to gain more information and new insights future researchers should generate new data based on new methods, like for example qualitative ones.

All in all, more research is needed to arrive at a full understanding of which factors influence people’s support for radical right parties. The theoretical and methodological models of this study hope to provide a step towards this goal.
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