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The influence of collaborative governance processes on the performance of Blue Green Infrastructure projects in the maintenance phase within Dutch cities



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MSc Management of Governance Networks  
Master thesis  
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## Summary

This thesis contains an in depth case study on the influence of collaborative governance conditions on the project performance in the maintenance phase of blue-green infrastructure (BGI) projects within Dutch cities. Currently, cities can't cope well enough with the consequences of climate change in the form of more frequent and intense rainfall. That is why in addition to grey infrastructure, more BGI like green corridors, rain gardens, wetlands, permeable paving and rainwater harvesting are needed to better deal with these extreme weather events. Collaborative governance is said to bring multiple actors together in a common forum to engage in consensus-oriented decision-making, leading to more robust and durable solutions. The literature on collaborative governance is rich when looking at collaborative planning and collaborative decision making. Less research has been devoted to collaborative implementation and collaborative maintenance. In adapting to climate change durable solutions and long term collaborative maintenance is needed. Therefore this thesis examined whether the conditions on collaborative planning and decision-making, based on the collaborative governance framework of Ansell and Gash (2007) are also influential on project performance in the maintenance phase of the collaborative process. The research is conducted through a qualitative in depth case study and document analysis of four BGI cases. The results indicate that a distinction can be made between a) fundamental conditions which have an important influence on project performance in the maintenance phase and are crucial for the continuation of the initiative and b) complementary conditions that could really enhance project performance in the maintenance phase, but are not important for the continuation of the initiative. Performing the right leadership activities, having regular face-to-face dialogue and creating a shared understanding on what the actors collaboratively want to achieve prove to be fundamental conditions. On the other hand creating an initial agreement on how to behave during the collaborative process, creating actor commitment to the initiative and building a trusting relationship among the collaborating actors has shown to be of complementary influence on project performance in the maintenance phase and the continuation of the initiatives.

## Preface and acknowledgements

The Erasmus University of Rotterdam is involved in the *Blue Green Infrastructure (BGI) through Social Innovation (BEGIN)* project by identifying governance strategies and tools for social innovation. Its overall objective is to show ten target cities within the North Sea Region how they can improve climate resilience with BGI's involving multiple stakeholders (BEGIN, 2016). This thesis was written as part of the Erasmus University BEGIN research team and contributes to the larger context of the BEGIN project. As part of this project, I researched four of the twenty blue-green infrastructure (BGI) cases: In exchange for being able to utilize the BEGIN project name in engaging respondents, selecting BGI cases from the BEGIN list of initiatives and using the BEGIN questionnaire in conducting interviews, I contributed to the project by conducting two interviews per case for the BEGIN project (naturally also being able to use the retrieved data for purpose of my thesis), prepared factsheets for eight BGI cases including my own (which I could also use for describing the context of the cases), and shared the transcripts of all the conducted interviews for my thesis with the BEGIN team.

First, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis supervisor professor dr. E. H Klijn for his academic guidance, support and patience throughout the thesis writing process. His comments, remarks and engagement during the process steered me into the right direction when necessary and were of great help for the completion of this master's thesis. Second, I would like to thank my second reader and supervisor in the BEGIN project dr. A. Molenveld for her valuable feedback and recommendations on the thesis, which really helped taking it to the next level. I would also like to thank PhD candidate L. Hagen from the BEGIN research team for helping and supporting me in the BEGIN project and for letting me use the questionnaire that she designed for conducting the interviews. The collaboration with the BEGIN team members has been very pleasant and a great learning experience.

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Motivation for the research

The world is confronted with a number of serious environmental problems and the evidence for rapid climate change is compelling. The global sea level has risen about seventeen centimeters in the last century and the global temperature has risen considerably in the last thirty-five years; the oceans are warming up, the ice sheets are shrinking in both extent and thickness, and glaciers are retreating almost everywhere in the world. Also the weather conditions have been changing: we are facing extreme weather events more often under which an increase in intense rainfall. The Earth's climate has changed throughout history. Most of the changes in the past 650,000 years are natural: small variations in the Earth's orbit change the amount of solar energy our planet receives. However the current warming trend is most likely human-induced and proceeds at a fast rate (NASA, 2017). The future challenges posed by climate change are global in scale and can be considered a complex wicked societal problem. A number of factors make collective action difficult. First, the causes and effects are spatially separated on a global level. This makes the problem too complex to solve by one actor alone: joint efforts are often needed and solutions will likely require collaboration on the local, regional and national level (Levi-Faur, 2014: 101; Emerson and Murchie, 2010: 2; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016: 3,4). Second, because of the uncertainty as to the cause-effect and cost-benefit relations, the issue itself and the potential solutions remain a controversial subject. The involved actors are autonomous and have their own interests and perceptions on the problems, the solutions and the strategies that should be used to combat the issue. Some groups might also ignore the existence or seriousness of the problem, or have a skeptical attitude towards being able to combat its consequences (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016: 11; Emerson and Murchie, 2010: 2). Third, resources necessary to solve the problem are owned by different actors, creating high interdependence: actors with differing interests will have to exchange or pool their resources in order to govern (Levi-Faur, 2014: 101).

Notwithstanding, there has been an emerging consensus on the need to combat the effects of climate change and that this goes beyond what any actor could achieve alone (Emerson and Murchie, 2010: 2). On October 5, 2016 the Paris Agreement entered into force, starting a new course in the global climate effort. For the first time all nations came together with a common purpose: to combat climate change and adapt to its effects. One of the goals of this agreement is to *strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change* (UN, 2016).



The North Sea Region (NSR), referring to the European countries and regions bordering the North Sea, created a programme (2014-2020) that relates on to this ideal by focusing on the question: *How can society adjust to climate change, especially in dealing with more frequent and major flooding?* In order to enhance the region's long term prosperity, stability and sustainable economic growth the NSR programme helps enterprises, institutions, NGO's, public administrators and other actors to pool their expertise, share their experience and cooperate to develop realistic solutions to mutual problems across the region (NSR, 2015). One of North Sea Regions projects contributing to reaching this goal is the *Blue Green Infrastructure Through Social Innovation*, also called the BEGIN project (NSR, 2016). Currently, many cities can't cope well enough with this more frequent and intense rainfall. That is why in addition to grey infrastructure, more blue-green infrastructure (BGI) like green corridors, rain gardens, wetlands, permeable paving and rainwater harvesting are needed to better deal with these extreme weather events<sup>1</sup>. The overall objective of the BEGIN project is to collaborate amongst ten cities within the NSR, examining how cities can improve climate resilience with BGI involving multiple stakeholders (BEGIN, 2016). This thesis aims to contribute to the overall BEGIN objective.

In order to create new insights for innovative BGI, diverse public, private and societal groups having differing perceptions, interests, expertise and resources will have to collaborate (Emerson and Murchie, 2010: 3). This entails the mutual engagement of participants in a coordinated effort to solve the problem together (Kozar, 2010: 16, 17). Over the last two decades a new strategy of "collaborative governance" has been developed which brings multiple stakeholders together in common forums with public agencies to engage in consensus-oriented decision making, and to work toward more robust and durable solutions (Ansell and Gash, 2007: 543; Emerson and Murchie, 2010: 2). According to Emerson and Murchie (2010) *"advocates of collaborative governance suggest that stakeholders will be able to share their diverse interests, become better informed, and become more invested in mutually beneficial joint solutions"*. Collaborative governance can thus provide a solution to a large range of problems.

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<sup>1</sup> Grey infrastructures are conventional piped drainage and water treatment systems which can be very energy-intensive. Blue infrastructure on the other hand consists of small footprint high efficiency devices, installed and retrofitted within existing collection systems. Green infrastructure consists of systems such as bio-filtration, ponds, wetlands, rain gardens and other natural land and plant based ecological treatment systems and processes. Engineering Nature's Way (2011) "Blue, Green and Grey Infrastructure: what's the difference?" Retrieved from <http://www.engineeringnaturesway.co.uk/uncategorized/blue-green-and-grey-infrastructure-what%E2%80%99s-the-difference-%E2%80%93-and-where-do-they-overlap/>

## Problem statement

### 1.1.1 Goal of the research

The literature on collaborative governance is rich if we look at collaborative planning and collaborative decision making. Less research has been devoted to collaborative implementation and collaborative maintenance. However, a project doesn't stop after collaborative decisions have been made. In adapting to climate change durable solutions and long term collaborative maintenance is needed. Research on the collaborative management in floodplains shows how the Netherlands has been struggling with the adoption and continuation of integrated and collaborative approaches in the maintenance phase of river management (Fliervoet and van den Born, 2017: 18). However the outcomes (relating to the lack of consensus on objectives and the fragmentation and complexity of maintenance activities) remain quite general and the authors emphasize that more analysis on other case studies relating to the maintenance phase is needed. If we look at reality, we can find projects that have successfully implemented BGI's and are still high performing during the maintenance phase (e.g the cityfarm Ceatshage in Culemborg<sup>2</sup>), but we also find projects where the maintenance phase is problematic (e.g floodplains in the article of Fliervoet and van den Born, 2017). This leads to the question of what conditions in the collaborative governance process, contributed to this 'successful' long term maintenance of environmental projects, in comparison to the projects that are experiencing problems. The goal of this research is twofold: a) to examine which collaborative governance conditions have an influence on the performance of the project during the maintenance phase of relevant projects and b) to understand what the drivers behind the most important conditions are: why and how do especially these conditions have a positive effect on the performance of BGI's in the maintenance phase?

Corresponding to the overall goal of this thesis, the main question is:

**What conditions within collaborative governance processes have an influence on the performance of Blue Green Infrastructure projects in the maintenance phase within Dutch cities?**

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<sup>2</sup> GroenBlauwe Netwerken (2017). Voorbeeldprojecten: stadsboerderij Caetshage, EVA-Lanxmeer, Culemborg. Retrieved from <http://www.groenblauwenetwerken.com/projects/caetshage-urban-farm-eva-lanxmeer-culemborg-the-netherlands/>

In order answer the research question some guiding sub-questions (SQ)<sup>3</sup> have been developed:

1. How can performance in the maintenance phase be measured?
2. To what extent does leadership during the collaborative process influence the project performance in the maintenance phase?
3. To what extent does institutional design during the collaborative process influence the project performance in the maintenance phase?
4. To what extent do process conditions during the collaborative process influence the project performance in the maintenance phase?
5. To what extent does the importance of the conditions change between the planning and decision making phase and maintenance phase of the collaborative process?

## 1.2 Relevance of research

### 1.2.1 Scientific relevance

Collaborative governance has recently become a popular topic in the field of Public Administration and much literature has already been dedicated to researching collaborative governance. However, most of the literature on collaborative governance focuses on collaborative planning and collaborative decision making, and less on collaborative implementation and maintenance. For a solution to be durable projects don't only have to be implemented, but also have to continuously and successfully be maintained. Still, little is known on how to successfully maintain the outcome that was gained through collaborative processes. This thesis therefore aims to contribute to the body of existing knowledge on collaborative governance, by providing more theoretical insights on the maintenance phase of the collaborative governance process and providing a foundation for future research on the maintenance phase. The theoretical framework of this thesis takes the conditions from the framework of Ansell and Gash (2007) on collaborative decision-making and examines if they are also influential on project performance in the maintenance phase.

### 1.2.2 Societal relevance

Climate change can be considered a wicked societal problem to which all countries contribute and that no governmental, societal or private actor could ever solve alone. This is why in the global climate efforts, as determined in the Paris Agreement, collaboration is crucial to even get slightly further in

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<sup>3</sup> Sub questions 2, 3 and 4 are derived from the theoretical framework on collaborative governance of Ansell and Gash (2007).

addressing the human induced causes related to climate change. By determining collaborative governance conditions that enhance performance of BGI's in the maintenance, this research paper contributes to the overall goal of strengthening the abilities of the countries to deal with the impacts of climate change and adapt to its effects. Additionally, this thesis gives researchers and practitioners in already involved in collaborative governance insights into possible reasons for their failures and successes, and could also serve as a 'starting document' for new collaborative initiatives as to which aspects to pay attention to in order to enhance a positive and sustainable outcome.

### **1.3 Structure of the thesis**

This thesis consists of a theoretical and an empirical part. Chapter 2 outlines the existent literature on collaborative governance, defines the most important conditions that seem to influence project performance in the maintenance phase. These expectations are brought together in a conceptual framework. Chapter 3 discusses and reflects upon the chosen research design (data collection, case selection and data analysis), and operationalizes the selected conditions. In chapter 4 the context of the selected cases is discussed after which they are ranked on performance. In Chapter 5 the results of the research are presented and analyzed. Finally, chapter 6 contains the most important conclusions and an answer to the research question, a discussion of the used research methods and some scientific and practical recommendations.

## 2 Theoretical Framework

*The following part examines the existent literature on collaborative governance. First, the shift from government to governance is explained after which the literature on collaborative governance is discussed. Then the collaborative governance framework from Ansell and Gash (2007) is clarified, after which the most important collaborative governance conditions that seem to influence the maintenance phase, are determined. Finally the conceptual framework based on the raised expectation per condition is presented.*

### 2.1 Collaborative governance literature

#### 2.1.1 From government to governance

In the past, government was the primary mover in public policy (problem solving, policy making and service delivery), but today many more actors are involved. From small non-profit organizations at the local level to large multinational organizations like International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the global level: many groups have become an important part to the policy process (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004). These public, private and non-profit organizations are increasingly faced with complex societal problems, and it is hard for them to address these wicked problems solely. Lacking either the resources or the problem solving capacities to tackle these problems, actors have to collaborate. This requires a shift from more traditional top-down ways of problem solving, to more horizontal cooperative ways of problem solving, often referred to as the shift from government to governance (Klijn en Koppenjan, 2016:3,4). We can thus see a change in the relationship between the state and society: government increasingly governs with a plurality of private and societal actors, each with their own interests, resources, expertise and experiences (Denhardt, 2011: 193,194).

A clear definition of governance is lacking, which is why several descriptions of governance exist. According to Rhodes governance refers to “a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed” (1996: 652-653). Vodden, Ommer & Schneider (2006) describe governance as “a social process that attempts to steer a society by influencing its orientation, capacity, and stability”. Keohane and Nye (2002) describe it as “The processes and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide the collective activities of a group”. Although different, these definitions are complementary in the sense that they describe governance as a *process*, in which *collaboration* is essential, and which requires *collective decision-making* by the involved stakeholders (Gibson, 2014).

### 2.1.2 Defining collaborative governance

Collaborative governance has become a common term in the public administration literature. Van Buuren and Edelenbos (2007: 105-106) describe collaborative governance as “a reaction to traditional planning and policy-making approaches that are primarily top-down oriented, focusing on the government instead of the governed, mainly technocratically oriented and adversarial organized”. This idea fits well with the critique on traditional Public Administration and the shift from government to governance. As knowledge becomes increasingly specialized and fragmented, the demand for collaboration increases (Gibson, 2014, Ansell and Gash, 2007: 544). Collaborative governance engages multiple actors with different and complementary knowledge and experience. It is about involving non-traditional policy actors in decision-making (Gibson, 2014: 47).

However, much of the literature focuses on specific types of collaborative governance, which makes finding a general definition hard and its use inconsistent. The collective of literature on collaborative governance is very sector-specific and exists over a wide range of topics. This variation in the scope and scale of perspectives restricts the ability of researchers to further develop and test theory. Additionally, Collaborative governance is closely related to other concepts like network governance, multi-actor governance, collaborative public management, co-management, joined-up network government, participatory governance and interactive governance (Ansell and Gash, 2007: 544; Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh, 2012: 1,2). In further elaborating these conditions we will also look at relevant other fields of research. In order to create a definition and broader collaborative governance framework, Ansell and Gash (2007) reviewed 137 cases of collaborative governance. They describe collaborative governance as *“A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets”*. In their article ‘Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice, Ansell and Gash outline six criteria for this definition: 1) the forum is initiated by public agencies, 2) Participants in the forum include non-state actors, 3) participants engage directly in decision making and are not merely ‘consulted’ by public agencies, 4) the forum is formally organized and meets collectively, 5) the forum aims to make decisions by consensus and 6) the focus of collaboration is on public policy or public management (Ansell and Gash, 2007: 544, 545). Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2012) use a broader collaborative governance term for their framework. Their definition is less restrictive than the one from Ansell and Gash: *“the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the*


public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished". This definition is broader in the sense that it does not limit collaborative governance to state-initiated arrangements (criteria 1) and has a broader sense of what non-state actors are (criteria 2), going beyond the conventional focus on the public manager and the formal public sector, thus accepting a fuller range of emergence of cross-boundary forms of governance (Emerson et al, 2012: 3).

This thesis borrows the collaborative governance definition of Emerson et al (2012) to both define what a collaborative governance initiative is and for the case selection, as this definition is less restrictive and thus widens the scope of selection. However, the collaborative governance conditions that influence project performance in the maintenance phase will be operationalized using the framework of Ansell and Gash (2007) as it provides the clearest and most usable visual representation of collaborative governance conditions. The next section briefly discusses their framework after which the (selection of) conditions will be discussed.

### 2.1.3 A model of collaborative governance

Ansell and Gash (2007) created a collaborative governance model that outlines the conditions for the emergence of new collaborative governance processes (cause-and-effect). Figure 1 provides the basis analytical framework for this model. The model has 4 broad variables: (A) starting conditions, (B) leadership, (C) institutional design and (D) collaborative process.

Figure 1: A model of Collaborative Governance (Ansell & Gash, 2007)



The Collaborative process can be seen as the core of the model; the *starting conditions* (resources, incentives for participation, prehistory of cooperation or conflict), *institutional design* (participatory inclusiveness, clear ground rules, process transparency) and *leadership* (including empowerment) variables represent critical contributions to *the collaborative process*. The collaborative process (trust-building, commitment, face to face dialogue, small wins, shared understanding) is non-linear. The model thus shows a simplification by representing it as a cycle (Ansell and Gash, 2007: 550).

The model will not be further discussed as not the framework itself, but rather the conditions within the framework will be used to create the theoretical framework for this thesis. As mentioned before, most of the literature on collaborative governance focuses on *collaborative planning and decision-making*, and less on the maintenance phase. In creating their framework, also Ansell and Gash (2007) analyzed very few cases that actually evaluated governance outcomes, but rather evaluate the collaborative process outcome (i.e. Under which conditions stakeholders act collaboratively), if collaborative decisions were made and if the decision was implemented (Ansell and Gash, 548-549). The maintenance phase of the collaborative process is not discussed. This thesis takes these existing Ansell and Gash (2007) conditions from the planning and decision-making phase and tests if and how they are influential on *the maintenance phase*, which starts after the collaborative decision has been implemented.

## **2.2 Collaborative governance conditions**

This thesis takes the model of Ansell and Gash (2007) as a starting point to look at collaborative governance. They describe the collaborative process as the core of the model, which have a direct influence on each other and on the outcome of the collaborative planning and decision-making phase. The starting conditions, the institutional design and leadership directly influence the collaborative process conditions, and thus indirectly influence the collaborative outcome. Table 1 provides an overview of the most prominent conditions that influence the outcome of the collaborative governance process. Appendix A provides a list of the used literature on collaborative governance used for table 1.



Table 1: Conditions that could influence collaborative outcome

Factors	Conditions ↓	Authors →	Ansell & Gash	Emerson et al	Bryson et al	Mattessich et al	Johnson et al.	Drost & Pfisterer	Fliervoet & Born	Fliervoet et al	Total
Starting Conditions	- Prehistory		X	X	X	X					4
	- Resources		X	X		X					3
	- Motivation/ incentives		X	X		X					3
	- Institutional environment			X	X					X	2
	- Uncertainty			X							1
	- Sector failure			X	X						2
	- Political/social climate			X		X					2
Collaborative Process	- Trust building		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		7
	- Communication		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	7
	- Commitment		X	X		X	X		X		5
	- Shared understanding		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	8
	- Intermediate outcomes		X	X	X			X			4
	- Building legitimacy			X	X						2
	- Building accountability				X						1
	- Managing conflict				X		X				2
	- Allocation of responsibilities.								X	X	2
Institutional Design	- Clear ground rules		X	X		X		X			4
	- Access/exit rules		X	X				X			3
	- Transparency process		X					X			2
	- Initial agreement				X	X	X	X	X		5
	- Competing institutional logic				X				X	X	3
	- Flexibility/adaptation								X	X	2
Leadership	- Facilitative, connective		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	8
Outcome	- Intended objective		X	X	X			X			4
	- Public value				X						1
	- Resilience			X							1
	- Re-evaluation & adaptation			X	X						2

The table distinguishes between starting conditions, leadership, institutional design and the collaborative governance process conditions, according to the Framework of Ansell and Gash (2007). Additionally two other collaborative governance frameworks have been used to 1), confirm the importance of the conditions used by Ansell and Gash (2007) and 2), add other important conditions to the existing structure. These are the models of Emerson et al (2012) and Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006). The conditions from the three frameworks have been further explored by looking at the work of Mattessich, Murray-Close and Monsey (2001), Johnson, Zorn, Yung Tam and Johnson (2003), Drost and Phisterer (2013) who all focus on key factors that impact successful cross-sector collaborations. In order to get a better understanding of the impact of collaborative governance on the maintenance phase, the research of Fliervoet and van den Born (2016) and Fliervoet, van den Born and Meijerer (2017) has been analyzed. Based on their importance according to table 1 a selection has been made of the most important conditions that seem to influence the collaborative outcome. The 'X' mark signifies that a specific condition was deemed important according to specific authors. The last column thus gives an indication of the importance of the collaborative governance conditions. It can be concluded that most important collaborative governance conditions can all be found in the framework from Ansell and Gash (2007), except for the initial agreement.

Table 2 provides an overview of the chosen conditions that will be researched in this thesis. The starting conditions will not be considered because of the scope of the thesis, and because they seem less important than the other conditions. The last column 'importance' refers to the number of times that specific condition was marked ('X') important according to the explored literature in table 1.

**Table 2: Selected conditions**

factor	condition	description	Importance
Leadership	Leadership activities	Leaders actively perform leadership activities to enhance collaboration	8/8
Institutional design	Initial agreement	Initial rules on how to behave during collaboration	5/8
Collaborative process	Shared understanding	The actors agree on what they collectively want to achieve	8/8
	Face to face dialogue	Thick 'real life' communication between involved actors	7/8
	Commitment	Involved actors feel ownership towards initiative	5/8
	Trust	Actors trust that other actors will refrain from opportunistic behavior	7/8

This thesis takes these existing conditions from Ansell and Gash (2007) on planning and decision-making and examines if they are also influential on *the maintenance phase*. The following section discusses the theory for the chosen conditions. Based on the theory for each condition, an expectation regarding its influence on the maintenance phase is made.

### 2.2.1 Leadership

Leadership is widely seen as a critical ingredient for bringing parties to the table and for steering them through the difficulties of the collaborative process (Ansell and Gash, 2007: 554,555). The amount of literature on leadership is astounding, but largely ignores the emphasis on collaboration and relationship building, as proved to be crucial in the collaborative governance literature. Much of this literature focuses on leadership *within* the organization, and little attention has been given to the fast growing inter-organizational collaboration and network governance perspectives (Ricard, Klijn, Lewis and Ysa, 2016: 136,137). In a survey among 265 senior top managers in Copenhagen, Rotterdam and Barcelona, Ricard et al (2016) researched perspectives on leadership that emphasize different activities that are essential to leadership and innovation. The three perspectives that fit best with the literature on collaborative governance will be further explored in the theoretical framework: transformational leadership, interpersonal leadership and network leadership (Ricard et al, 2016: 137- 152). Table 3 provides an overview of the leadership perspectives, describing its main activities and how collaboration is achieved.

**Table 3: Leadership perspectives compared, adapted from Ricard et al (2016)**

Leadership perspective	Transformational	Interpersonal	Network governance
The nature of Leadership	Charismatic people that drive change and performance	Secure outcomes through people in organizations	Facilitator that brings actors together
Main activities	Creating new vision designing institutional changes creating incentives for employees (coaching support, rewards)	Empowerment of people creating an atmosphere of trust and cooperation Persuasion and collaboration build relationships takes responsibility for initiative	Connecting actors and ideas Empowerment of people mediate between actors arranging processes exploring new content Setting new ground rules for interaction creating an atmosphere of trust and cooperation engage actors for deploy necessary resources
Collaboration is achieved by	Charismatic leaders who initiate the changes needed	Authentic leaders whose strength lies in stewardship and altruistic behavior	Collaborative leaders who explore new ideas and connect various actors to these ideas

Transformational leadership is composed of charismatic leaders that drive change and performance in the organization and the people working in that organization. From this perspective collaboration is achieved by a charismatic leader who initiated the needed changes to reach the final objective (Ricard et al, 2016: 137). Interpersonal leadership is composed of facilitative leaders that secure outcomes through people in the organization: they manage relationships and get the best out of them. The leaders strength lies in stewardship and altruistic behavior which empowers people to reach the objective (Ricard et al, 2016: 139). Network governance leadership is composed of leaders that mediate between actors and empower the collaboration by activating actors and their resources (Ansell and Gash, 2007). Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) describe the leaders' role as a form of 'assisted negotiation'. From this perspective collaboration is achieved by leaders who can explore new ideas and connect different people to these ideas in order to realize them (Ricard et al, 2016: 139, 140). Successful collaborations may also use multiple leaders, formally and informally, rather than relying on one leader (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016). As can be seen in table 3 the three perspectives partially overlap in the performed activities, which combined create the following grouping: 1) create new ideas and visions, 2) leading the discussion, 3) mediating between opposing viewpoints, 4) connect stakeholders and ideas, 5) create and maintain clear ground rules, 6) create atmosphere of trust among stakeholders, 7) create incentives for stakeholders to actively collaborate (coaching /supporting/rewarding) and 8) Engage the involved actors in securing sufficient resources for implementation (persuading).

The three leadership perspectives and their corresponding activities emphasize that that leaders actively have to *do* something in order to enhance the collaboration process. Leadership activities thus seem to have a significant influence on the overall collaboration process and its outcomes. Therefore we can derive the following expectation:

**E1:** if the leadership actively performs activities according to the leadership perspectives during the collaborative process this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.

### 2.2.2 Institutional Design

Institutional design refers to the basis protocols and rules for collaboration, which are critical for the procedural legitimacy of the collaborative process as they guide and manage interaction in the collaborative governance process (Ansell and Gash, 2007). This thesis will focus on the importance of having an *initial agreement*, as much of the literature on collaborative governance discusses the

importance of having some sort of initial agreement between the collaboration parties to guide collaboration (Bryson et al, 2006; Mettessich, 2001; Johnson et al, 2003; Drost and Pfisterer, 2013; Fliervoet and Born, 2016) . This initial agreement can be both formal and informal and manages expectation before the collaborative process actually starts. It sets a set of basic rules or agreements on how the actors will behave during the collaborations process and can serve as an additional impetus for the actors to commit themselves. This reduces uncertainty and prevents the development of misunderstandings between the collaborating actors during the collaborative process (Drost and Pfisterer, 2013; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016). Rules decided upon in the initial agreement could be about the purpose of the collaboration, interactions, participation, roles and responsibilities, structuring timing and sequence of activities, the sharing of information and decision making (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016: 159-170; Bryson et al, 2006: 46, Drost and Pfisterer, 2013) The initial agreement could also suffice as a basic document for the development of the actual ground rules that will be developed during the collaborative process (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016: 159-170, Ansell and Gash, 2007). We could argue that the earlier in the collaborative process the ‘initial rules’ are made, the easier the overall collaboration process will be (less misunderstandings and conflicts will arise), also positively influencing project performance in the maintenance phase. Therefore we can derive the following expectation:

**E2:** if an initial agreement is developed at the start of the collaborative process, this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.

### **2.2.3 The collaborative governance process**

According to Ansell and Gash (2007) successful collaboration depends on achieving a ‘righteous cycle’ between all the collaborative process conditions. Following the results of table 1, this thesis focuses on the process conditions 1) Shared understanding, 2) Communication, 3) Trust, and 4) Commitment.

#### ***Shared Understanding***

A problem can be defined as “a gap between an existing or expected situation and a desired situation” (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016:45). Problems are subjective and can be seen as social constructs: perceptions of actors on what makes a situation problematic. A perception can be defined as “a more or less coherent set of believes, ideas and opinions that actors have about the situation they find themselves in”. Apart from referring to the existing or expected problem perceptions can also refer to the solutions and the strategies involved into solving this problem (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016: 45, 46). Actors could thus perceive the same situation in very differing ways which could lead to diverging and

conflicting problem perceptions (Rein and Schön, 1992: 147). Different underlying perceptions prevent stakeholders from finding common ground, which can be seen as an obstacle to developing a shared understanding. Creating a shared understanding between collaborating stakeholders is important in creating a common vision, which, in turn is important for effective collaboration (Fliervoet et al, 2017). At some point in the collaboration process, the involved actors must develop a consensus or shared understanding of the nature of the problem, or at least about a solution doing justice to the variety of views on the nature of the problem. The involved stakeholders should thus agree on what they collectively want to achieve together. This involves agreeing on the perceived problem, solution, choosing a common mission, and setting clear goals and objectives (Ansell and Gash, 2007: 560). A shared understanding is more likely to emerge over time (Huxham and Vangen, 2005). According to the literature developing a shared understanding is one of the process conditions that increase the change of successful collaboration (Ansell and Gash, 2007: 558). In their research on Floodplain management in the Netherlands, Fliervoet and van den Born (2016) found that the continuation of integrated collaborative approaches in the maintenance phase was problematic. One of the reasons for this failure was found in the lack of consensus on the problems faced, the objectives and reaching a common maintenance strategy (Fliervoet and van den Born, 2016). Developing a shared understanding during the collaborative process thus seems to have an influence on the performance of the project in the maintenance phase. Therefore we can derive the following expectation:

**E3:** If the collaborating actors agree on what they collectively want to achieve during the collaborative process, this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.

### *Communication*

Because of this variety of perceptions on the problems, solutions and strategies, reaching consensus often takes shape of an argumentation game: a discourse where the involved actors promote their opinions and try to convince the other actors about the nature of the problem and the best fit solution. Creating a negotiated consensus is a crucial part of the collaboration process (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016: 55-57). According to Ansell and Gash communication is at the heart of collaboration. They emphasize the need for face to face dialogue between stakeholders, which is important for reaching consensus. This “thick communication” is essential for the involved actors to identify opportunities for mutual gain, and enhances the consensus reaching process. They argue that even though face to face dialogue is a requisite as “it is difficult to image effective collaboration without face

to face dialogue”, it is not a sufficient condition on its own to create a positive environment for collaboration (Ansell and Gash, 2007: 558). According to Johnson et al. (2003) open forms of communication are a critical component of successful collaboration. The lack of communication between agencies during the collaboration process is problematic, especially during the early stages of collaboration (Johnson et al, 2013). According to the research of Fliervoet et al (2017) poor internal communication during the collaborative governance process was one of the causes that stakeholders were unable to apply integrated and collaborative floodplain management in the Netherlands. Therefore we can derive the following expectation:

**E4:** If the collaborating actors have regular face-to-face contact during the collaborative process, this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase

### *Trust building*

Much of the literature on collaborative governance describes the importance of trust in governance networks. It is considered a key issue in collaborative governance, and could be described as the glue that holds the collaboration together (Ansell and Gash, 2007; Bryson et al, 2006). There are many ways to describe trust, which makes it a difficult condition to define and measure. The literature on trust generally agrees on the following characteristics on trust: vulnerability, risk, and expectations. Trusting another actor means that one is willing to assume an open and vulnerable position. One expects the other actor to refrain from opportunistic behavior even if the opportunity for it arises without having any guarantee that the other party will indeed act as expected. Thus, the actor believes and expects that the other actor will take both actors’ interests into account in the interaction (Klijn, Steijn and Edelenbos, 2010:3,4). Many authors used the concept of trust in their research and many forms of trust co-exist. According to Klijn, Steijn and Edelenbos (2010) four types of trust are frequently mentioned in the literature: benefit of the doubt, goodwill trust, agreement trust, the absence of opportunistic behavior. The first indicator ‘*benefit of the doubt*’ is seen as an important characteristic of trust. It means that the involved actors will simply believe what other actors say. *Goodwill trust* means that the parties involved in the collaboration can assume that the intentions of the other parties are good in principle. *Agreement trust* means that the involved parties generally believe that the other parties will live up to the agreements made with each other. The *absence of opportunistic behavior* means that the involved parties believe that other parties will not use the contributions of other actors for their own advantage (Klijn et al, 2010: 9, 10; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016: 115-118).

The research of Klijn et al (2010) indicates a strong relationship between the levels of respondent's perceived trust in networks and the networks performance. According to Ansell and Gash (2007) developing trust also enhances the other process conditions which increases the change on a positive outcome. Therefore we can derive the following expectation:

**E5:** If the collaborating actors develop a high level of trust during the collaborative process, this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase

### *Commitment*

The actors' level of commitment to the collaborative initiative is critical in explaining success or failure. Unsuccessful collaborations often lacked long term commitment by the involved stakeholders. The agencies involved in collaboration should have a mutual commitment to the goals and vision of the collaboration and create a sense of ownership of the project (Ansell and Gash, 2007: 559; Johnson et al, 2003: 205). Ownership is seen as an important dimension of commitment and implies feeling responsibility for the process. Ownership is a vague and subjective concept. Therefore actors may have differing perceptions on the degree of ownership, even though they are in the same project (Ansell and Gash, 2007; Johnson et al, 2003). According to Ansell and Gash (2007) creating commitment among the participating actors can also have a positive influence on the other collaborative process conditions (shared understanding, communication and trust), which increases the overall change on a positive outcome. Research by Fliervoet et al (2017) of Floodplain management in the Nederland's showed that the actors did not feel responsible for the integrated management in the maintenance phase, assuming that the task was the responsibility of other participating actors (Fliervoet et al, 2017: 21). A lack commitment in the planning and decision-making phase could lead to a lack of shared responsibility in the maintenance phase. Creating commitment among the participating actors could thus positively influence performance in the maintenance phase. Therefore we can derive the following expectation:


**E6:** If the collaborating actors develop commitment to the initiative during the collaborative process, this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase



## 2.3 Conceptual framework

Based on the theoretical framework and the six formulated expectations, figure 2 illustrates the conceptual framework. *In this thesis the collaborative process is understood as consisting of both the planning and decision-making phase and the maintenance phase.*

Figure 2: Conceptual framework



The selected conditions could thus influence the maintenance phase indirectly through the planning and decision-making phase, as the planning and decision-making phase forms the basis on which the maintenance phase starts, but could also have a direct influence on the maintenance phase itself. It is therefore important to examine if the importance of the collaborative process conditions differs between the planning and decision-making phase and the maintenance phase. The next chapter discusses the chosen methodology and operationalization of the conditions.

### 3 Methodology and operationalization

*This chapter discusses the chosen research design, research methods (data selection, case selection and data analysis) and the operationalization of the chosen conditions based on the theoretical framework. Lastly the used methods will be reflected upon by discussing its reliability and validity.*

#### 3.1 Research design

To answer the research question **“What conditions within collaborative governance processes have an influence on the performance of Blue Green Infrastructure projects in the maintenance phase within Dutch cities?”** a research design is needed. According to Ragin (1994: 26) a research design is “a plan for collecting and analyzing evidence that will make it possible for the investigator to answer whatever questions he or she has posed”. In order to answer the main question insights are collected through qualitative research methods. In comparison to quantitative methods, qualitative research is better fit to address research questions that aim for an in-depth understanding of a specific phenomenon, which can't be incorporated by numbers and statistics alone (Collis and Hussey, 2003; McNabb, 2008). In this thesis, qualitative methods are useful because it takes the complex nature of collaborative governance initiatives into account, including the context of specific cases. Therefore qualitative research in the form of a case study will be conducted (Williams, 2007). A case study is the in-depth examination of a single instance of some phenomenon and produces context dependent knowledge, and has the distinctive ability to deal with multifarious evidence. (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001; Flyvbjerg, 2006).

In the thesis four collaborative governance initiatives are researched. By comparing multiple cases we can research if and why conditions hold an influence on the maintenance phase: what mechanisms are at play behind these conditions? This research is empirical, which means that conducting observations of social reality is a central condition. The conditions were chosen in a deductive manner, based on the literature provided in the theoretical framework. However the research aims to contribute to theory building on the maintenance phase of collaborative governance, and therefore contains an inductive aspect. Through the collected and analyzed data it will be concluded whether the expectations formulated in the theoretical framework are met.

## 3.2 Research methods

In accordance with the chosen research design, appropriate methods were selected to gather and analyze the data collected on the four cases. This section discusses the data collection, case selection and data analysis.

### 3.2.1 Data collection

A case study design provides different methods of data collection, such as interviews, observations and documentation, which help the researcher to gain a diverse perspective from a wide variety of sources (Yin, 2003). The data in this thesis was collected through semi-structured interviews and additional content analysis. In total four collaborative governance initiatives were selected according to the definition of Emerson et al (2012)<sup>4</sup>. For each case respondents representing different stakeholders will be interviewed with the purpose to reconstruct how the collaborative process was organized from different perspectives. The interviews are based on a topic list, to ensure that the same subjects were addressed by all respondents, but leaving room for new information that wasn't accounted for by the theoretical framework<sup>5</sup>. Additionally document analysis is performed as a complementary measure, to control for the information provided by the respondents in the interviews and make up for missing information.

Appendix B provides information concerning data collection: table 29 illustrates a list of interviewed respondents per case, providing both their affiliation and the dates of the actual interviews. Table 30 illustrates the analyzed documents per case. In Appendix C the semi-structured questionnaire that was used in conducting the interviews can be found. In total twelve interviews were conducted covering all cases with an average of three interviews per case, representing different involved actors. Additionally 13 documents were analyzed, consisting of policy documents, (local) newspapers, articles and publications in books and magazines, regulatory documents, newsletters and online interviews. The following section discusses the case selection.

### 3.2.2 Case selection

The four cases that will be researched were initially selected on two general criteria: all cases fit the collaborative governance definition according to Emerson et al (2012) as described in the theoretical

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<sup>4</sup> The four cases were selected from the list of 20 BGI initiatives of the BEGIN project.

<sup>5</sup> The topic list with questions is designed by PhD candidate Liselotte Hagen, based on the framework from Ansell and Gash (2007) and supplemented with relevant questions for this thesis.

framework, and all cases reached the maintenance phase of the project. Apart from these criteria, they were selected for their specific and diverging context<sup>6</sup>. *De Bickershof* was selected because it is one of the oldest and earliest collaborative governance initiatives in the Netherlands. *De Zeeheldentuin* was selected because of its substantial financial problems and lack of new volunteers. *De Speeldernis* was selected because it is a different type of project (no community garden) and the first of its kind in the Netherlands. *De Pluk & Proeftuin* was selected because of its temporality as it closed in 2016 because of construction plans for the plot. Table 4 provides an overview of the selected cases for analysis: information is provided on when the collaboration planning and decision-making phase started (start P&D), when the initiative opened, and if the initiative is still continuing, thus representing the duration of the maintenance phase. The table also provides information on the type of collaborative initiative, states the most important involved actors per case and where the initiative is located.

**Table 4: Selected cases for analysis**

Case	Start P&D	Open in	Continuation	Type	Main involved actors	Location
De Bickershof	1979	1987	present	Community garden	* Municipality * Active neighborhood citizens (later as association Bickershof)	Utrecht
De Zeeheldentuin	Around 2008	2015	present	Community garden	*Active neighborhood citizens (later association Zeeheldentuin) * Housing corporation Haagwonen * Association De Versterking	The Hague
De Speeldernis	2000	2002	present	Community garden	* Municipality * Board Botte Spijker (later association Speeldernis) * Bouw & Speeltuinwerk	Rotterdam
De Pluk & Proeftuin	2010/2011	2011	Closed in 2016	Natural playground	* Municipality * Citizen committee neighborhood * Cooperation Leerpark	Dordrecht

This thesis takes these existing conditions based on the framework from Ansell and Gash (2007) on decision-making and tests if they are also influential on *project performance the maintenance phase*. The selected cases can enlighten us with an in-depth understanding on what positively influences

<sup>6</sup> Initially another case was selected, *De Spinozahof*, for which I conducted one interview. Later on it became clear that *De Pluk* and *Proeftuin* would better fit my research design. For this reason I ‘swapped’ cases with Liselotte, also using her two conducted interviews for my thesis.

project performance, but also provide insight in bottlenecks and barriers to project performance. To compare the cases, ranking them on performance in the maintenance phase is necessary<sup>7</sup>. Chapter 4 will further discuss the context of the cases, and their ranking on performance.

### 3.2.3 Data analysis

The research design in this thesis is based on qualitative methods, including interviews, combined with a short questionnaire, participant observations and limited document analysis. Semi-structured interviews were held which provided most data. The method for analyzing consists of a deductive design of codes that is drawn from the conditions in the operationalization, and an inductive approach that is data-driven to cover for unforeseen connections that were not included in the theoretical framework. Appendix D illustrates the used coding scheme. The next section discusses the operationalization of variables. In this research we take conditions from existing theory on decision making and see how these conditions influence project performance in the maintenance phase.

## 3.3 Operationalization of conditions

The conditions were derived from the theoretical framework as visualized in the conceptual model. In order to be able to measure the chosen conditions empirically, they need to be translated into measurable units. In the section below all conditions are operationalized. Especially because so many conditions are included in the research, it is important that they don't overlap. When researching Leadership, only leadership activities are considered. Questions relating to activities are excluded from all other indicators to guarantee that leadership doesn't overlap with the other indicators. When researching Institutional design, we only look at the initial agreement. Most process conditions are measured as 'perceptions on'. Shared understanding measures the convergence of perceptions. Trust measures the perception an actor has of the intention of the other actor. Commitment is the actor's perceived shared responsibility and sense of ownership to the initiative. All the questions in the operationalization are derived from the literature discussed in the theoretical framework. The open character of the questions creates space for the 'inductive part' of the research. As the influence of the conditions during the collaborative process might differ between the planning and decision-making phase and the maintenance phase, they will be measured for both phases.

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<sup>7</sup> Initially a research design was chosen based on the comparison of 'best practices' and 'bad practices'. However empirical reality showed that the design was not sustainable, because of the lack of 'true' bad cases, as none of the BGI cases seem to have truly failed.

### 3.3.1 Leadership

#### Leadership activities

The three leadership perspectives and their corresponding activities emphasize that leaders actively have to *do* something in order to enhance the collaboration process. The perspectives partially overlap in activities that are deemed important to perform and together create the following list of activities: 1), leading the discussion, 2) mediating between opposing viewpoints, 3) connect stakeholders and ideas, 4) create and maintain clear ground rules, 5) create atmosphere of trust among stakeholders, 6) create incentives for stakeholders to actively collaborate (coaching /supporting/rewarding) and 7) engage the involved actors in securing sufficient resources for implementation (persuading). If the leadership actively performs these activities during the collaborative process, this is expected to enhance the project performance in the maintenance phase. Because we discuss the initial agreement and trust as separate conditions, they will not be included in the leadership condition. Successful collaborations may also use multiple leaders, formally and informally, rather than relying on one leader.

The goal of this condition is a) to determine who were the most prominent leaders or ‘driving forces’ in the initiatives, b) to determine what activities these leaders performed, and c) determine what leadership activities were most used. Table 5 illustrates the operationalization of condition leadership activities.

**Table 5: Operationalization condition leadership activities**

condition	indicator	Indicative questions
Leadership activities	multiple of leaders	Was there one or were there multiple leaders involved in the project? How many leaders were there during the collaboration process? From which party/ parties was/where this/these leader(s)? Are they still involved? Why do you think they were the leaders?
	Leading the discussion	Did the leaders lead the discussion? Did they create a long-term vision for project?
	Mediating activities	Did the leaders mediate between opposing viewpoints? Did the leaders make sure all viewpoints were clear?
	Connective activities	Did the leaders connect the involved stakeholders with each other? Did the leader connect ideas and information with each other?
	Incentives to collaborate	Did the leaders motivate stakeholders to collaborate? How did the leaders do this?
	Securing sufficient resources	Did the leaders actively try to secure sufficient resources to reach the objective? Were they successful?

To prevent proving the respondents with the desired answer, these questions will not be asked

directly, but kept in mind of the researcher. Instead the question will be asked in an open way “How was the leadership’s role reflected in the initiative” (i.e. What did they do?).

### 3.3.2 Institutional Design

#### *Initial agreement*

If an initial agreement is developed at the start of the collaborative process, this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase. The condition ‘initial agreement’ can be defined as ‘agreeing on a set of formal or informal rules about how participating actors will behave during the collaboration process’. These may include rules about interactions, actor participation, roles and responsibilities, structuring timing and sequence of activities, how and between whom information is shared, and decision making rules.

The goal of this condition was to a) determine if at the beginning of the planning and decision-making phase some sort of initial agreement was made between the collaborating actors, and b) what kind of ‘agreements’ were formally or informally included. Table 6 illustrates the operationalization of condition initial agreement.

**Table 6: Operationalization condition initial agreement**

condition	indicator	Indicative questions
Initial agreement	Formal or informal rules on how to behave during collaboration	Did the collaborating actors make and agree upon some sort of set rules as on how to behave during the collaboration process? What kind of matters did you have an initial agreement about?

### 3.3.3 Process conditions

#### *Shared understanding*

Developing a shared understanding between actors during the collaborative process is expected to have a positive influence on the project performance in maintenance phase. The process condition ‘shared understanding’ in this thesis is defined as ‘agreeing on what the collaborating actors collectively want to achieve’ and can be divided in three separate indicators 1) agreeing on the perceived problem, 2) agreeing on the solutions (or objective) and 3) agreeing on the strategy to reach the objective. How a respondent sees the problem, solution or strategy is a perception. We can thus speak of a shared understanding between the collaborating parties if the perceptions converge with each other.

The goal of this condition was to a) to reconstruct and compare the convergence of perceptions between actors by determining how the respondents separately perceive the problems, solutions and strategies during the planning and decision-making phase. The more they overlap, the better the shared understanding. Table 7 illustrates the operationalization of process condition shared understanding.

**Table 7: Operationalization process condition shared understanding**

variable	indicator	Indicative questions
Shared understanding	Agreeing on the perceived problem	What do you think is the problem that the collaborating parties are trying to solve?
	Agreeing on the solutions	What do you think is solution or objective that the collaborating parties are trying to accomplish?
	Agreeing on the strategy to reach the objective(s)	How do you think the collaborating parties are trying to accomplish this objective? What strategy do you use to accomplish the objective?

### *Face-to-face dialogue*

According to the literature successful communication especially in the form of face-to-face contact, is at the heart of collaboration and crucial for the consensus-reaching process. This ‘thick communication’ entails regular interaction, both formally and informally through face-to-face dialogue. If the collaborating actors have regular face to face contact during the collaborative process, this is expected to enhance the project performance in the maintenance phase.

The goal of this condition was to determine to what extent actors had face-to-face contact. Table 8 illustrates the operationalization of process condition face-to-face dialogue.

**Table 8: Operationalization process condition face-to-face dialogue**

condition	Indicator	Indicative questions
Face to face dialogue	Thick communication	Did the collaborating parties engage in face-to-face dialogue? How often did this happen during the planning and decision-making phase and during the maintenance phase? Are all parties present during the face-to-face dialogue? Who was/wasn't?

### *Perception on Trust*

The research of Klijn et al (2010) indicates a strong relationship between the levels of respondent’s perceived trust in networks and the networks performance. If the collaborating actors develop a high level of trust during the collaborative process, this is expected to enhances the project



performance in the maintenance phase. There are different types of trust: benefit of the doubt, goodwill trust, agreement trust and the absence of opportunistic behavior. Generally trust can be defined as ‘*a stable positive expectation that actor A has (or predicts he has) of the intentions and motives of actor B in refraining from opportunistic behavior, even if the opportunity arise*’. One can never truly measure trust as it is a subjective perception. This thesis thus focuses on the involved actors ‘perception on trust’: *the perception an actor has of the intention of the other actor*. The level and perception on trust will be measured on a 5 point likert-scale: 1(very true) 2 (true) 3 (neutral) 4 (not true) 5 (not true at all).

The goal of this condition was to determine how the perception and level on trust between the actors changed between the planning and decision-making phase and the maintenance phase. Table 9 illustrates the operationalization of process condition trust.

**Table 9: Operationalization process condition perception on trust**

condition	indicator	Indicative questions
Perception on trust	Benefit of the doubt	The parties in this collaboration give each other the benefit of the doubt (likert)
	Goodwill trust	The parties in this collaboration assume that the intentions of the other parties are good in principle (likert)
	Agreement trust	The parties in this collaboration will generally live up to the agreement made with each other (likert)
	Absence opportunistic behavior	The parties in this collaboration do not use the contributions of other actors for their own advantage (even if the opportunity arises) (likert)

### **Commitment**

Developing commitment between the collaborating actors during the collaborative process is expected to have a positive influence on the project performance in the maintenance phase. The process condition ‘commitment’ can be defined as ‘feeling a sense of ownership or responsibility towards the collaborative initiative’. A sense of commitment is subjective and can thus differ between actors. When we look at commitment we thus look at the actors’ perception on commitment.

The goal of this condition was to a) determine if collaborating actors feel a sense of responsibility or ownership towards the initiative and b) determine if actors perceptions on commitment differs from other actors. Table 10 illustrates the operationalization on the perception on commitment.

**Table 10: Operationalization process condition perception on commitment**

condition	indicator	Indicative questions
Shared commitment	Degree of commitment	How do you experience the level of commitment among the collaborating participants? (ask for all specific actors) Why do you think the commitment is so high/low?
	responsibility towards initiative (ownership)	Are the people in the collaboration dedicated to the idea that we can make this project work? Explain Are the people in the collaboration dedicated to this project and its outcome? Explain Do the parties in the collaboration feel a shared responsibility for the outcome of the project? Explain

### 3.4 Limitations

#### 3.4.1 Reliability

Reliability refers to the extent to which the same results can be obtained if the research is repeated. The results have to be independent of the researcher. However, the methodological choice to perform qualitative research through interviews may result in an observers bias (Babbie, 2013). Additionally some conditions are measured as the ‘perception on’ instead of measuring ‘factual knowledge’. The respondent’s answers thus provides a subjective answer which is perceptible to change. The reliability is guaranteed as much as possible by recording and transcribing all interviews, using a coding scheme and a semi-structured topic list, which are included in Appendix C and D.

#### 3.4.2 Internal and External Validity

Internal validity relates to the degree to which the results are attributable to the measured conditions, and are not caused by extraneous conditions, which could allow for alternative explanation as to what caused project performance in the maintenance phase (Babbie, 2013). To create validity the method for analyzing consists of a deductive design of codes that is drawn from the conditions in the operationalization, and an inductive approach that is data-driven to cover for unforeseen connections that were not included in the theoretical framework. In order to enhance internal validity the conditions were operationalized clearly and transparently. External validity relates to the extent to which the results of the study can be generalized to groups or contexts beyond those of this research (Babbie, 2013). Generalizability is generally weak in case study designs as cases are very context specific: the results can only to a certain extent be generalized to other settings. Due to time constraints this thesis researches four cases. To improve external validity additional cases have to be analyzed.

## 4 Performance of BGI cases

*To comprehend why some cases are doing well in the maintenance phase while others experience problems, understanding the context of the selected cases is important (Yin, 2003). To compare the cases, ranking them on performance in the maintenance phase is necessary. This chapter first describes the context of the chosen cases by providing the reader with a background on each case, after which the cases will be ranked on performance in the maintenance phase.*

### 4.1 Context per case

This section provides the context for De Bickershof, De Zeeheldentuin, De Speeldernis and De Pluk and Proeftuin. The case descriptions are mainly based on the conducted interviews and supplemented by the initiatives' websites (if applicable) and the mentioned document analysis.

#### 4.1.1 De Bickershof

De Bickershof is a unique green area that can be found in the Wittevrouwen district of Utrecht. The courtyard opened in 1987, and is considered one of the earliest and oldest collaborative governance examples known in the Netherlands. During the last century the district became a more densely build-up environment without much greenery. The area now known as De Bickershof was an industrial site, like many other places in the district. In the late 70's (1979) a group of active citizens organized themselves with the purpose of improving livability of the neighborhood. They wanted more green, improve social cohesion, and reduce pollution and public nuisance in the area. However in 70's government was still very traditional. Involving citizens in decision making, not mentioning collaborative managing involving citizens, wasn't usual. Discussions concerning the redesign of the terrain between the municipality of Utrecht and the involved citizens went on until 1987. The municipality and the citizens had different ideas about the design and management of the place. The government wanted to keep the place low-maintenance like normal parks: grass, mostly paving and some bushes. The citizens had a different idea: they wanted an ecological garden, applying permaculture principles for sustainable and regenerative land use and community building – and they wanted to do it themselves. After years of discussion and political action from the citizens, they got the green light for 'experimental' self-management of the

entire area. In May 1987 De Bickershof was officially opened. The garden has now been a collaborative governance initiative for 30 years<sup>8</sup>.

#### **4.1.2 De Zeeheldentuin**

De Zeeheldentuin is an urban garden in The Hague, initiated by inhabitants of the Zeehelden-district. The land was owned by Housing corporation Haagwonen, who already had construction plans for the area. But when the financial crisis hit in 2008 the land stayed clear. It was around that time that citizens from the neighborhood came up with the idea to turn the wasteland into a green haven for the neighborhood. They entered into dialogue with Haagwonen and the municipality of The Hague, and started mobilizing people for their cause. Eventually Haagwonen agreed with the plan, if the citizens would be willing to buy the “undivided” half of the land for 350 thousand euro’s. It was by luck that Association De Versterking discovered the project online, and offered to buy this undivided half from Haagwonen. The terrain would be partly used for housing, and partly for creating The Zeeheldentuin. By that time a professional design for the garden was made, sourced out, and the 200 thousand euro’s necessary for building it was raised by the neighborhood through foundations and the municipality of The Hague. The situation became complicated when Haagwonen changed a clause in the contract between Haagwonen and De Versterking. Haagwonen did not longer want to redeem the ground, in case the initiative would fail. This was an important detail for De Versterking as they didn’t want to be owner of the land forever. This complicated the negotiations and the collaboration between the parties almost failed. After some challenging discussions it was decided that De Versterking would after all buy the ground from Haagwonen, but that it would loan the land to De Zeeheldentuin. In ten years the Zeeheldentuin would have to repay the outstanding loan (yearly 17,5 thousand euro’s) and take over as owner of the land from De Versterking. De Zeeheldentuin had to make a decision and consciously took the risk by signing the long term contract with the other two parties. In March 2015, De Zeeheldentuin was officially opened. De Zeeheldentuin hasn’t been able to repay its yearly debt to De Versterking, which has been a great burden on the exploitation of the garden<sup>9</sup>.

#### **4.1.3 De Speeldernis**

In the Northern district of the city of Rotterdam playground De Speeldernis can be found. This place is not an ordinary playground, but a natural playground where children get the opportunity to play in an

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<sup>8</sup> For more information on De Bickershof: <http://www.bickershof.nl/>

<sup>9</sup> For more information on De Zeeheldentuin: <http://zeeheldentuin.nl/>

unrefined and 'raw' setting. This playground has been the first of its kind in the Netherlands. Now natural playgrounds are gaining in popularity each year. Before the Speeldernis was build, the area was already a construction playground. Around the year 2000 the place did not longer meet the requirements. This is when some parents, together with the playground owner took action to give the place a new life. They believed that it was important for children growing up in the city to come into contact with and experience nature. They were lucky: the municipalities department of Sport and Recreation had a budget to renovate around ten playing grounds in Rotterdam and saw the opportunities a natural playground at this location could offer. A participatory process was initiated in which all actors were invited to workshops, picture surveys and other events to learn about the concept and possibilities. A plan for the new playground was chosen in collaboration with the involved parents, children, the municipality, experts and the owner of the previous playground. All participants helped in creating the new landscape for the playing ground. In the summer of 2002, natural playground the Speeldernis was officially opened and has since been a success<sup>10</sup>.

#### **4.1.4 De Pluk & Proeftuin**

The Pluk and Proeftuin project in the municipality of Dordrecht was realized in the Leerpark district on (temporary) wasteland .The land is owned by the municipality and the Da Vinci College, and was destined for constructing houses. However when the economic crisis hit the Leerpark area, construction was slowed down. This resulted in parts of the Leerpark area staying clear for longer than was originally expected. The neighborhood committee, who had been actively engaged in the area, came up with the idea to do something useful with the wasteland. They wanted to make it more attractive and add social meaning to it. In April 2011 citizens, students and other enthusiasts from Leerpark, the municipality of Dordrecht and the Urgenda Foundation came together to discuss the possibilities in working sessions. They came up with the 'Pluk and Proeftuin', a temporary flower and vegetable garden. The involved actors were supportive towards the initiative which created the right circumstances to start the Pluk and Proeftuin. With all the hard work and contributions from the involved actors the garden evolved into a place where people could meet with all that grows and flourishes within an urban environment. Apart from working, also social activities like barbeques were organized. After 5 years De Pluk and Proeftuin had to make place for construction. The project ended in 2016<sup>11</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> For more information on De Speeldernis: <http://www.speeldernis.nl/>

<sup>11</sup> No official website.

## 4.2 Case ranking on performance maintenance phase

Now that the context of the cases has been described, this section discusses what performance in the maintenance phase entails, what its limitations are, and finally the cases are ranked on project performance in the maintenance phase.

### 4.2.1 Performance as resilience towards shocks

SQ 1: How can performance in the maintenance phase be measured?

In this thesis high performance in the maintenance phase is considered the successful outcome of the collaborative governance process. Therefore it is important to be able to estimate the level of performance of initiatives in the maintenance phase. In their research Knapp, Veen, Renting, Wiskerke and Groot (2016) performed an analysis of urban agriculture project consisting of community and entrepreneurial gardens in the Netherlands and Switzerland. They concluded that their performance strongly depends on how resilient they are to shocks, which proved to be the most threatening to the continuity of these projects. What makes an initiative high performing during the maintenance phase is its resilience towards these shocks (Knapp et al, 2016). Initiatives thus require a good level of resilience to withstand both gradual and sudden changes: During the maintenance phase collaborative governance initiatives will be *exposed* to shocks, to which they are to a certain extent *sensitive* or vulnerable. However they also have a certain level of *resilience*, which enables them to endure. Knapp et al (2016) describe three types of shocks: social, judicial and financial. 1) *Social shocks* are related to neighborhood support towards the initiative. For example how well an initiative can deal with fluctuations in the amount of volunteers on which they are dependent 2) *Financial shocks* are related to the financing of the initiative. For example how well can the initiative survive, even if the subsidies are reduced or withdrawn? 3) *Judicial shocks* are related to contractual problems. Question relating to who owns the plot can lead to insecurity of land tenure as the initiative is dependent on the 'goodwill' of the owner for its continuation. Based on this description, resilience can be understood as '*the capacity of a collaborative governance initiative to react to and overcome social, judicial and financial shocks, so that they can continue functioning*' (Knapp et al, 2016: 1-13). The next section discusses the limitation relating to measuring

### 4.2.2 Limitations

The direction of the effect of resilience towards financial and judicial shocks is dependent on the context of the cases. For example being independent from subsidies might be positive as it shows that

the initiative can survive on its own. On the other hand being independent could also be risky as the initiative would have to resolve any financial problems on with their own financial buffers. Having external financiers, like foundations or the municipality, can also be interpreted as actors' 'goodwill' or commitment towards the initiative, which makes the initiative less fragile. Not having ownership of the plot leads to insecurity of land tenure, as the cases are dependent on the owners' goodwill for the continuation of the initiative. It also makes the cases susceptible for meddling and external involvement in the decision-making and daily management of the initiative. However in reality, local residents often don't have the means to buy the plot themselves. Without external help, the initiative might not reach the implementation phase in the first place, but it does make the project dependent on the buyers 'goodwill'. On the other hand being completely independent could also make the project vulnerable, as they have no one to rely on in case of trouble. If actors are financially and judicially involved, they are also more committed to reaching a positive outcome. Additionally having a powerful plot owner, like the municipality, also come with the necessary expertise and experience relating to collaborative initiatives. Because of these almost contradictory effects, determining how to rank on project performance in the maintenance phase is not without complications. Taking into account the context of the cases, not one case has either ownership of the plot or was financially independent. Therefore after carefully considerations, it is decided to look at the exposure, sensitivity and resilience towards shocks the initiatives are *actually* confronted with. This will be further elaborated in the next section.

### 4.2.3 Ranking on performance

It is thus possible to rank the chosen cases on their performance in the maintenance phase by estimating how exposed, sensitive and resilient they are towards these social, judicial and financial shocks. In the ranking the following categories are distinguished: high performance (+), medium performance (+/-) and low performance (-). The ranking is based on the retrieved data collected through the conducted interviews (See questionnaire Appendix C) and limited document analysis, which provided a good enough basis to rank the initiatives of performance even though the conditions (and relating questions in the questionnaire) are initially operationalized with a different purpose.

Table 11 provides an overview of the exposure, sensitivity and resilience towards *social shocks* for each case.

**Table 11: Ranking performance maintenance phase for social shocks**

Social shocks	Exposure & Sensitivity to shock	Resilience	Performance
Bickershof	Neighborhood support needed → Lack of neighborhood integration is	Acceptance and support of initiative + attracts many participants	high

	problematic		
Zeeheldentuin	Neighborhood support needed → Lack of neighborhood integration is problematic	Surrounding residents accepted, but not willing to participate enough. Difficult to find new leadership & volunteers	low
Speeldernis	Neighborhood support needed → Lack of neighborhood integration is problematic	Acceptance and support of initiative + attracts many participants	high
Pluk & Proeftuin	Neighborhood support needed → Lack of neighborhood integration is problematic	Surrounding residents accepted, mostly enough volunteers. Insufficient support to restart initiative on new plot.	medium

All cases are exposed and sensitive to social shocks in the sense that they need neighborhood support (active volunteers, committee members, leaders) for their survival. De Bickershof and De Speeldernis score high on performance as they have a supportive neighborhood, and can find enough volunteers and leaders to successfully maintain their initiatives. De Pluk and Proeftuin scores medium on performance as they had support from their neighborhood, and could mostly find enough enthusiastic volunteers. However there was not enough support to restart the initiative on a new plot, after the project ended in 2016. De Zeeheldentuin scores low on Performance as they have problems finding new volunteers and leaders willing to take over the board functions.

Table 12 provides an overview of the exposure, sensitivity and resilience towards judicial shocks for each case.

**Table 12: Ranking performance maintenance phase for judicial shocks**

Judicial shocks	Exposure & Sensitivity to shock	Resilience	Performance
Bickershof	Municipality owns the land → Contract for indefinite period, but: Project could take an end if not performing well	Existent since 1987: license to operate. municipality uses initiative as successful example	high
Zeeheldentuin	Undivided half of the land owned by Haagwonen and Versterking → Zeeheldentuin has purchase obligation (€17.500 yearly):project could end if failing to pay debt	Project is failing to pay of yearly €17.500 debt, but Association Versterking has been patient and understanding.	low
Speeldernis	Municipality owns the land → Contract for indefinite period, but: Project could take an end if not performing well	Existent since 2003: license to operate: municipality uses initiative as successful example	high
Pluk & Proeftuin	Municipality owns the land → Only temporary wasteland: construction plans already existed before start	Acceptance of temporality: knew it from the start.	medium



As none of the cases owns their own plot (exposure), they are all sensitive and dependent on the goodwill of the plot owner for the continuation of the initiative. De Bickershof and De Speeldernis score high on performance as they developed a ‘license to operate’ as a best practice throughout the years, diminishing the chance that their contracts will be terminated. De Pluk and Proeftuin scores medium on performance as the project was ended in 2016, but the initiative takers knew this from the beginning and accepted it’s temporarily. De Zeeheldentuin scores low on performance as they are currently now able to pay off the debt to De Versterking, which would guarantee their survival as an initiative.

Table 13 provides an overview of the exposure, sensitivity and resilience towards financial shocks for each case.

**Table 13: Ranking performance maintenance phase for financial shocks**

Financial shocks	Exposure & Sensitivity to shock	Resilience	Performance
Bickershof	Financed by subsidies municipality → Initiative for the most part dependent on these subsidies.	Different sources of subsidies available. Project has income from a bike parking shed and membership. Looking into possibilities crowd funding.	high
Zeeheldentuin	Financed by Association Versterking → Loan of 350.000 euro’s to pay off in 10 years	Unable to pay yearly 17.500 euro’s debt + unable to find alternative subsidies.	low
Speeldernis	Financed by subsidies → Initiative for the most part dependent on these subsidies.	Supportive government + other sources of finances available. Small income through entrée prices and group activities. .	high
Pluk & Proeftuin	Financed by subsidies → Initiative for the most part dependent on these subsidies.	Sufficient budget because only limited financial means necessary + other sources available	high

All cases are for the most part dependent (exposure) on external financing. De Bickershof and De Speeldernis score high on performance because they have alternative ways of financing apart from their main financier and also generate a small own income. Also De Pluk and Proeftuin scores high on performance as they only needed limited financial means, and had many generous donors and volunteers providing the necessary means for free. De Zeeheldentuin scores low on performance as they do generate their own small income, but are unable to pay of the €17.500 yearly debt, which proves to be a real burden on the initiative.

Thus based on the initiatives resilience towards social, judicial and financial shocks, they can be ranked on performance. De Bickershof and De Speeldernis are the most successful in maintaining the initiative (**high performing**), followed by De Pluk en Proeftuin (**medium performing**), and finally De Zeeheldentuin is the least successful case (**low performing**).

**Table 14: Selected cases ranked on performance maintenance phase**

Case	Ranking of performance maintenance phase	
Bickershof & Speeldernis	High	+
Pluk & Proeftuin	Medium	+/-
Zeeheldentuin	Low	-

In chapter 5 the findings of the research are presented and analyzed. It will be determined if there is a relation between the different collaborative governance conditions and the cases ranked on performance in the maintenance phase.

## 5 Findings & analysis of conditions

In this chapter the findings and analysis of variables are presented per condition. The chapter aims to find a relation between the conditions and the ranking in performance of the cases. For every condition the findings are presented in a table, after which they will be analyzed and the expectation based on the theoretical framework will be discussed.

### 5.1 Leadership: leadership activities

SQ 2: To what extent does leadership during the collaborative process influence the project performance in the maintenance phase?

The three leadership perspectives and their corresponding activities emphasize that that leaders actively have to *do* something in order to enhance the collaborative process. Therefore the expectation is: *if the leadership actively performs activities according to the leadership perspectives during the collaborative process this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.* In order to verify the expectation, the goal of this condition was a) to determine who were the most prominent leaders or ‘driving forces’ in the initiatives, b) to determine what activities these leaders performed and c) determine what leadership activities were most used. Table 15 illustrates the identified leaders per case both for the collaborating process and for the maintenance phase.

**Table 15: Identified leaders per case**

Leaders	De Bickershof	De Zeeheldentuin	De Speeldernis	Pluk & Proeftuin
<b>Planning and decision-making phase</b>	2 passionate leaders from Bickershof, representing the neighborhood	First 3 years: 2 strong-minded inhabitants after H was willing to sell land: board from Z and representatives from H & V.	Project leader from government, owner old playground, expert designer	Representatives from Leerpark, municipality and neighborhood committee.
<b>Maintenance phase</b>	A board of volunteers in charge of daily management	A board of volunteer in charge of daily management	Board for daily management. Director is main leader.	1 garden coordinator / core group of active gardeners.

As can be seen in table 15 the cases have multiple persons in charge during both phases of the collaborative process. Respondents describe a difference in ‘how active’ the leaders perform their activities. Mostly one or two persons per initiative do more than the others.

Table 16: Leadership activities during the planning and decision-making phase<sup>12</sup>

planning and decision-making phase		Bickershof	Zeeheldentuin	Speeldernis	Pluk & Proeftuin
Leadership activities (theory)	Leading the discussion (N, I)	Speaking up and Negotiating with municipality	Constantly trying to convince Haagwonen to sell the land	Give information, explain, and answer questions about the garden	Unclear.
	Mediating activities (N)	Negotiating and discuss plan for garden with municipality	Constantly trying to convince Haagwonen to sell the land	Listening and Convincing the parents to let go of their fears.	Being clear about temporarily of the project
	Connective activities (N, I)	Convey information, good ideas. Create coherence	Organizing meetings with all parties.	Participatory trajectory: organize meeting with all parties. Connecting people on all levels.	Discussing design with all involved actors during meetings.
	Create incentives to collaborate (T)	Create positive attitude by thinking in opportunities instead of problems	Never giving up on convincing Haagwonen to sell the ground.	-	Unclear. All parties wanted the same thing. Invite inhabitants neighborhood to participate.
	Secure sufficient resources (N)	Sufficient funds secured through municipality	Actively sought Sufficient funds for design and building the garden: through various funds.	Sufficient funds secured through municipality	Sufficient funds secured through municipality. inviting and visiting sponsors who were willing to donate resources.
	Other activities	Mobilize neighborhood	Mobilizing neighborhood and politicians by being on all political/ neighborhood events giving information, collecting signatures. Pressuring Haagwonen into collaborating through municipality	Widening the framework of reference on the possibilities for natural playgrounds for all actors (mostly children & parents)	

<sup>12</sup> The letters behind the leadership activities relate to the leadership perspective they correspond with. (T) is transformational leadership, (I) is interpersonal leadership and (N) is network governance.

Table 17: Leadership activities during the maintenance phase

Maintenance phase	Bickershof	Zeeheldentuin	Speeldernis	Pluk & Proeftuin	
Leadership activities	Leading the discussion (N, I)		Avoiding attitude towards Haagwonen and Versterking	Communicate openly and honestly about developments in the garden. Leading discussions during meetings	-
	Mediating activities (N)		Avoiding attitude towards Haagwonen and Versterking	Start open and honest dialogue	Telling people they need to maintain their garden, or give it up
	Connective activities (N, I)	Organizing social events like barbeques.	Avoiding attitude towards Haagwonen and Versterking. Trying to connect new volunteers to garden.	Bring people from different expertise together to improve garden	Organizing social events like barbeques. Participate in meetings to give update on garden
	Create incentives to collaborate (T)		-	Actively try to keep the vision of the garden clear for everyone: people should think from their inner child.	-
	Secure sufficient resources (N)	Looking for new funds, especially since the government is cutting back funds.	Trying but failing to raise sufficient funds/ resources to pay off debt.	Looking for new funds, especially since the government is cutting back funds.	Keep looking for people with resources when necessary.
	Other activities	Actively trying to spread information about the garden, continuously inviting people to join,	Having difficulties finding enough volunteers, even though they actively invite people to join in person and through social media	Use Speeldernis as a business card for this type of playing: actively inviting people to playground. Asking for feedback on how to better perform.	

Table 16 and 17 provide information on what activities were performed by the leadership and to some extent how they were performed during both phases. Based on the retrieved data it hard to determine how well the activities were performed. During the planning and decision-making phase almost all activities that according to the theory were considered important were performed in one way or another by the leadership in order to realize the objective. These leaders were described as strong people, with a clear objective, not willing to give up, having a positive attitude, thinking in possibilities instead of problems, and were considered as strong communicators on all levels, charismatic and having much substantive knowledge and expertise in both politics and nature. What stands out is that these leaders had a lot of patience, knew how to convince people and actively tried to mobilize the neighborhood and other actors to join. They were also constantly trying to mobilize enough resources to finance the initiatives. Leadership performing the leadership 'right' (i.e. the activities according to the three perspectives) activities during the planning and decision-making phase is important for the realization of the project. If leadership lacks during this phase the initiative is likely not to reach the implementation phase.

In the transition to the maintenance phase all cases go through a change of leadership. Two changes between the phases are noticeable. Firstly, in the planning and decision-making phase multiple stakeholders were still involved in most decisions, while during the maintenance phase leadership is transitioned to the initiatives themselves: the cases have a volunteering board or core group in charge of daily management of the initiatives. Secondly, there are differences between the types of activities performed in both phases. While securing sufficient resources remains important throughout both phases, leading the discussion and mediating activities become less important. During the maintenance phase creating incentives for volunteers to participate becomes a main task: all cases are dependent on volunteers and neighborhood support to stay alive. Even though all cases had strong leadership performing the 'right' activities according to the three perspectives during the planning and decision-making phase, not all cases are performing well during the maintenance phase. The departure of leadership in the maintenance phase seems to be an important reason. Most initial leadership 'quit' sometime after the implementation of the initiative. If no one is willing to take over, it doesn't matter how well the leadership performed during the planning and decision-making phase: maintaining the project becomes problematic. This can be seen in the case of the Zeeheldentuin: leadership has been incredibly talented in performing the 'right' activities in order to realize the initiative and reach the maintenance phase. However during the maintenance phase they are having trouble to find new

leadership and volunteers to transfer the leadership to, which results in a lower performance during the maintenance phase.

When linking the performed activities and description of the leaders to the three leadership perspectives (transformational, interpersonal and network governance) in both phases, we can conclude that the interpersonal, but mostly the network governance perspective activities is dominantly used by the leadership in both phases. Having strong leadership performing the activities according to the perspectives is thus crucial in both phases of the collaborative process and is considered “the fuel that keeps the initiative going”, as one of the respondents described it. The lack of leadership performing these activities causes a direct threat to the continuation of the initiative, both in the planning and decision-making phase as in the maintenance phase. Therefore it can be concluded that E1 is correct: *if the leadership actively performs activities according to the leadership perspectives during the collaborative process this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.*

## 5.2 Institutional design: initial agreement

SQ 3: To what extent does institutional design during the collaborative process influence the project performance in the maintenance phase?

The earlier in the planning and decision-making phase an initial agreement is made, the easier collaboration will be during the rest of the collaborative process. Therefore the expectation is: *if an initial agreement is developed at the start of the collaborative process, this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.* In order to verify the expectation, the goal of this condition was to a) determine if at the beginning of the planning and decision-making phase some sort of initial agreement was made between the collaborating actors, and b) what kind of ‘agreements’ were formally or informally included. Table 18 illustrates the initial agreement per case.

Table 18: Initial agreement per case

	De Bickershof	De Zeeheldentuin	De Speeldernis	Pluk & Proeftuin
Initial agreement	-	-	+ (formal)	+ (informal)

De Speeldernis is the only case where a formal participatory trajectory was started to guide the planning and decision-making phase. In the Pluk en Proeftuin some informal agreements were made. Before starting the planning and decision-making phase it was explicitly stated that the initiative was

going to be a temporary project, to avoid misunderstandings later on. It was also made clear that management was going to be the responsibility of the neighborhood, as the project truly had to be a “for the neighborhood by the neighborhood” experiment. An explanation could be that it is the only relatively small case (considering its temporality, involved resources and plot size) which didn’t make it necessary to have a formal initial agreement. However the project scope doesn’t explain how both De Bickershof and De Zeeheldentuin haven’t decided upon an initial agreement, as they are quite large. For De Bickershof an explanation can be found in ‘the spirit of times’ as it was created when citizen participation wasn’t usual. The actors might simply not have considered the benefit of having an initial agreement, but this is purely speculative as none of the respondents clearly remembers. De Zeeheldentuin is the only case where the municipality is barely involved. Apart from hosting some meetings between Haagwonen and De Zeeheldentuin in the first 3 years of the planning and decision-making phase, and a single donation of 50.000 euro’s for the construction of the garden, the municipality has not been involved as a main actor. Consequently the initiative takers in De Zeeheldentuin just organized themselves as they went, hoping for the best result.

Even though both De Bickershof and De Speeldernis are ranked as high performing in the maintenance phase, only De Speeldernis has an initial agreement. De Pluk and Proeftuin is a medium performing in the maintenance phase and has an (informal) initial agreement. Therefore we can conclude that having an initial agreement might enhance the planning and decision-making phase, but isn’t crucial for project performance in the maintenance phase, E2 could be partially true: *developing an initial agreement at the start of the collaborative process might have a positive influence on project performance in the maintenance phase, but isn’t essential.*

### 5.3 Process conditions

This section discusses the results for process condition shared understanding, face-to-face dialogue, trust and commitment.

SQ 4: To what extent do process conditions during the collaborative process influence the project performance in the maintenance phase?

#### 5.3.1 Shared understanding

The expectation is: *If the collaborating actors agree on what they collectively want to achieve during the collaborative process, this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.* In order to verify this expectation, the goal of this condition was to a) to reconstruct and compare the



convergence of perceptions between actors by determining how the respondents separately perceive the problems, solutions and strategies during the planning and decision-making phase. The more they overlap, the better the shared understanding. In Appendix E the systematic analysis of the shared understanding per case can be found. The results of their convergence can be found in table 19.

**Table 19: Convergence of perceptions for shared understanding per case**

Shared Understanding	De Bickershof	De Zeeheldentuin	De Speeldernis	Pluk & Proeftuin
Agreement on problem	+	-	+	+
Agreement on solution	+	-	+	+
Agreement on strategy	-	-	+/-	+/-

For all cases except De Zeeheldentuin the actors seem to agree on the problem and solution. However the extent to which the situation that needed to be changed was perceived as a problem differs per case. In De Bickershof both the municipality and the neighborhood really saw the necessity of improving the livability of the area. The data on De Speeldernis shows convergence on the problem and solutions, as the respondents present the idea of creating a natural playground as a logical next step that they all very much support. For De Pluk and Proeftuin the wasteland wasn't so much a problem, as a "nice opportunity to temporarily do something positive and see how it works out", and all parties were supportive towards it. De Zeeheldentuin the neighborhood saw the lack of green in the district as a real problem, while housing corporation Haagwonen didn't seem to care and instead preferred to construct more social housing (for which they already had plans). As Haagwonen didn't see the problem they also didn't agree on the necessity of the solution. In all cases there has been some kind of discussion about how to achieve the solution. In De Bickershof the neighborhood and municipality didn't agree on the design and maintenance part: the government wanted to keep it low maintenance, but the citizens wanted an ecological garden and they wanted to do it themselves. In De Speeldernis generally all actors agreed, but some parents were worried about the safety of their children and had to be convinced. Also one actor left the initiative in the planning and decision-making for "not feeling heard and considered". In De Pluk and Proeftuin all actors generally agreed, but one actor left the planning and decision-making phase in an early stage for not agreeing on the temporality of the project and the municipalities unwillingness to invest larger amounts of money. In De Zeeheldentuin, the negotiations on the financial details (on the repurchase obligation in case of project failure, which Haagwonen didn't want) in the contract between Haagwonen and De Versterking almost resulted in deadlock, but eventually Haagwonen agreed on selling the undivided half of the plot.

Thus all cases except De Zeeheldentuin generally agreed on the problem and solution, but had faced minor challenges during the planning and decision-making phase as how to deploy the best strategy. Not immediately agreeing on the strategy during planning and decision-making phase, doesn't seem to negatively influence performance in the maintenance phase: both De Bickershof and De Speeldernis experienced some trouble relating the strategy, but both are high performing in the maintenance phase. De Zeeheldentuin is the only case with little shared understanding and also the only case that scores low on performance in the maintenance phase. Therefore it can be concluded that E3 is correct: *agreeing on what actors collectively want to achieve (especially on the problem and solution) during the planning and decision-making phase enhances project performance during the maintenance phase.*

### 5.3.2 Face-to-face dialogue

The expectation is: *If the collaborating actors have regular face-to-face contact during the collaborative process, this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.* In order to verify this expectation, the goal of this condition was to determine to what extent actors had face-to-face contact in both phases, taking into account ranked project performance in the maintenance phase. Table 20 illustrates to what extent the involved actors had face-to-face dialogue during the planning and decision-making and maintenance phase. Additionally it clarifies what other means of communication were used.

Table 20: Face to face dialogue per case

planning and decision-making	Face to face	Frequency
Bickershof	Yes	Years of negotiations, numerous meetings, tedious process
Zeeheldentuin	Yes	First 3 years: occasional meeting at municipality with Haagwonen & alderman municipality. Later monthly meeting with Haagwonen, Versterking, Zeeheldentuin. Communication Z with citizens: door to door, neighborhood events (little markets etc.). Z with politicians: local debates internal Z; ones a month board meeting
Speeldernis	Yes	Architect was on scheme all summer, monthly meeting with municipality and other actors, workshops, excursions.
Pluk & Proeftuin	yes	Regular (monthly) meetings between municipality, Leerpark, citizens committee Leerpark (and sometimes other participants joined).
Maintenance	Face to face	Frequency
Bickershof	Yes	Two weekly working days for all gardeners/volunteers, monthly visit professional gardener. Everyday informal contact in the garden
Zeeheldentuin	Yes	Internally yes, externally not often. Obligatory yearly meeting between Zeeheldentuin, Haagwonen & Versterking
Speeldernis	Yes	Daily feedback from parents, several board meetings a month, weekly internal staff meeting, monthly general staff meeting. Several times a year: Staff

		activities. Speeldernis has little contact with municipality.
Pluk & Proeftuin	Yes	In the garden: Informal during gardening or activities. 3 or 4 monthly meeting between municipality, Leerpark and citizens committee.

All cases had regular face-to-face meetings with the involved actors during the planning and decision-making phase, and still do in the maintenance phase. However where De Bickershof, De Speeldernis and De Pluk & Proeftuin still have regular meetings with the involved actors, De Zeeheldentuin only has one yearly meeting with Haagwonen and De Versterking. The fact that regular face-to-face contact was held during the planning and decision-making phase thus doesn't seem to guarantee good communication during the maintenance phase. An explanation can be found in the details: De Zeeheldentuin is the only case where the owner of the land didn't care for the initiative. During the initial three years Haagwonen partly attended meetings because they were pressured into them by the local municipality, not because they really wanted to collaborate. During the whole communication process they are mentioned to have had a "businesslike attitude", which didn't improve the negotiations. During the maintenance phase De Zeeheldentuin is failing to keep in contact with Haagwonen and De Versterking. De Zeeheldentuin admits to feel guilty because they can't keep their financial agreement to De Versterking, which makes it harder to them to be in touch. They also lack volunteers to properly maintain the garden, which resulted in communication with Haagwonen and De Versterking to be less of a priority.

Haagwonen and De Versterking both aren't content with the current situation and would like to improve their relationship with De Zeeheldentuin. De Zeeheldentuin scored lowest on Performance during the maintenance phase and is the only case where face-to-face contact is experienced insufficient by the involved actors during the maintenance phase. The other cases still have regular face-to-face contact with the involved actors. Therefore it E4 proves to be true: *If the collaborating actors have regular face to face contact during the collaborative process, this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.* However willingness to participate in the communication processes seems to be crucial during the planning and decision-making phase, and therefore has an influence on face-to-face dialogue. In all cases except De Zeeheldentuin, the involved actors were *willingly* involved in the communication process, and they all performed better in the maintenance phase than De Zeeheldentuin.

### 5.3.3 Perception on trust

The expectation is: *If the collaborating actors develop a high level of trust during the collaborative process, this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.* In order to verify this expectation, the goal of this condition was to determine how the perception and level on trust between the actors changed between the planning and decision-making phase and the maintenance phase, taking into account ranked project performance in the maintenance phase. Table 21 provides an overview on the actors' perception on trust per case, for both the planning and decision-making phase and the maintenance phase. The numbers in the table indicate the score the respondents gave on the liker scale. Table 22 illustrates how the likert scale can be interpreted.

Table 21: Actors perceived trust per respondent per case<sup>13</sup>

Case	Type of trust	Planning and decision-making phase		Maintenance phase	
De Bickershof	Benefit of the doubt	Government: Bickershof:	- 3	Government: Bickershof:	1 2
	Goodwill trust	Government: Bickershof:	- 3	Government: Bickershof:	1 2
	Agreement trust	Government: Bickershof:	- 4	Government: Bickershof:	1 2
	Absence opportunistic behavior	Government: Bickershof:	- 2	Government: Bickershof:	1 2
De Zeeheldentuin	Benefit of the doubt	Zeeheldentuin: Haagwonen: Versterking:	5 3 4	Zeeheldentuin: Haagwonen: Versterking:	1 2 2
	Goodwill trust	Zeeheldentuin: Haagwonen: Versterking:	5 1 4	Zeeheldentuin: Haagwonen: Versterking: :	2 1 2
	Agreement trust	Zeeheldentuin: Haagwonen: Versterking:	4 3 4	Zeeheldentuin: Haagwonen: Versterking:	2 4 3
	Absence opportunistic behavior	Zeeheldentuin: Haagwonen: Versterking:	5 1 4	Zeeheldentuin: Haagwonen: Versterking:	4 1 2
De Speeldernis	Benefit of the doubt	Government: Speeldernis: Architect:	2 2 2	Government: Speeldernis: Architect:	- 2 -
	Goodwill trust	Government: Speeldernis: Architect:	2 2 1	Government: Speeldernis: Architect:	- 2 -
	Agreement trust	Government: Speeldernis: Architect:	2 2 1	Government: Speeldernis: Architect::	- 2 -

<sup>13</sup> In conducting the interviews, not all respondents were both involved during the start and in the present. Therefore for some respondents the likert scale on trust was only filled in for the moment they were involved.

	Absence opportunistic behavior	Government: Speeldernis: Architect:	2 3 1	Government: Speeldernis: Architect:	- 3 -
De Pluk en Proeftuin	Benefit of the doubt	Government: Leerpark: Pluk & Proeftuin:	- 1 2	Government: Leerpark: Pluk & Proeftuin:	- - 1
	Goodwill trust	Government: Leerpark: Pluk & Proeftuin:	- 1 1	Government: Leerpark: Pluk & Proeftuin:	- - 1
	Agreement trust	Government: Leerpark: Pluk & Proeftuin:	- 2 1	Government: Leerpark: Pluk & Proeftuin:	- - 1
	Absence opportunistic behavior	Government: Leerpark: Pluk & Proeftuin:	- 1 1	Government: Leerpark: Pluk & Proeftuin:	- - 1

Table 22: Interpretation of the likert scale for the perception on trust

Likert scale	Perception on trust	
4-5	Negative perception on trust	-
3	Neutral perception on trust	+/-
2-1	Positive perception on trust	+

**In De Bickershof:** all indicators show that over time the trusting relationship between the government and De Bickershof improved. The interviews indicate that the low level of trust at the start and during the process was mainly caused by the opposing view of what to do with the land. The municipality feared that the neighborhood would “hijack” the place or make a mess of it. The citizens were afraid the municipality would ignore all their efforts, and just create a low maintenance mostly paved park. The general perception on trust between the actors was negative to neutral. Ever since the maintenance phase the level of trust slowly improved. In the first years after the opening there seemed to be a tug-off-war between the two parties on the design of the garden. However after almost 30 years in the maintenance phase the perception on trust is positive: the garden has owned its license to stay and is often used by the municipality as a successful example of self-management. **In De Zeeheldentuin:** the indicators show that generally the perception on trust went from negative to mostly positive. However the perception on trust between actors differs. Both De Versterking and De Zeeheldentuin were generally trusting towards each other, but not towards Haagwonen. This was caused by their “businesslike attitude, lack of goodwill and unwillingness to compromise”. During the maintenance phase both Haagwonen and De Versterking indicate that De Zeeheldentuin fails to keep agreements. This causes the agreement trust towards De Zeeheldentuin to be lower than the other indicators. The

perception on trust from the Zeeheldentuin slightly improved, however they blame Haagwonon for “only thinking about their own benefit” which can be seen in the absence of opportunistic behavior indicator. **In De Speeldernis:** the indicators show that the perception on trust was and still is positive. None of the actors have a negative perception on trust. The reasons that the respondents have for this trust are not necessarily connected to the indicators: the substantive knowledge, expertise and communication skills made it easier for the involved parents to trust them. The interviewed parties do name goodwill trust: “we all really wanted it to succeed”. **In De Pluk & Proeftuin:** the indicators show a positive perception on trust between the collaborating parties both during the planning and decision-making phase as during the maintenance phase. Respondents indicated that it was because all actors had goals in the same ‘sustainable’ direction. The involved actors gave the project and each other the benefit of the doubt: “let’s just try it and see how it develops”. Table 23 provides an overview of the general perception on trust per case.

**Table 23: General perception on trust per case**

case	Start & during process	maintenance
Bikkershof	- to +/-	+
Zeeheldentuin	-	+/-
Speeldernis	+	+
Pluk & Proeftuin	+	+

Eventually all cases managed to build a trusting relationship, even though not all actors trust each other to the same extent. Trust needs time to be build: the earlier mutual trust is developed, the better this will resonate throughout the maintenance phase. De Bikkershof, De Speeldernis and De Pluk and Proeftuin all developed a mutual trusting relationship. The lack of a trusting relationship seems to influence the maintenance phase in a negative way: De Zeeheldentuin lacked a mutual-trusting relationship and scores low on performance in the maintenance phase. However the condition is not necessary for realizing or maintaining the project. De Bikkershof proves that time can heal wounds: even though De Bikkershof, like De Zeeheldentuin had a rough start when it comes to trust, they managed to improve it to a mutual trusting relationship 30 years later. Therefore E5 proves to be true: *If the collaborating actors develop a high level of trust during the collaborative process, this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.*

#### **5.3.4 Perception on commitment**

The expectation is: *If the collaborating actors develop commitment to the objective during the collaborative process, this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.* In order to

verify this expectation, the goal of this condition was to a) determine if collaborating actors feel a sense of responsibility or ownership towards the initiative and b) determine if actors perceptions on commitment differs from other actors c) and if it differs the actors commitment changed between the planning and decision-making phase and the maintenance phase, taking into account ranked project performance in the maintenance phase.

Table 24 illustrates to what extent the most important actors per case feel committed toward the goals and vision of the initiative for both the planning and decision-making and maintenance phase.

**Table 24: Actors perception on commitment per respondent per case**

Case	planning and decision-making phase		Maintenance phase	
Bikkershof	Government: Bikkershof:	+/- +	Government: Bikkershof:	+ +
Zeeheldentuin	Zeeheldentuin: Haagwonen: Versterking: Government:	+ - + -	Zeeheldentuin: Haagwonen: Versterking: Government:	+/- - + -
Speeldernis	Government: Speeldernis: Architect:	+ + +	Government: Speeldernis: Architect:	+ + +
Pluk & Proeftuin	Government: Leerpark: Pluk & Proeftuin:	+ + +	government Leerpark: Pluk & Proeftuin:	+ +/- +/-

When asking the respondents about their and other participating actors' commitment towards the goals and vision of the initiative, this was mostly interpreted in two ways: 1) stakeholders feeling financially responsible towards financing the initiative and 2) volunteers willing to actively contribute to the initiative in time, energy and sometimes resources. This interpretation of commitment holds true for both the planning and decision-making phase as well as for the maintenance phase<sup>14</sup>.

**Financial commitment:** None of the cases has ownership of the plot they are using, and are dependent on the plot owners' financial contributions towards the initiative. For all cases, except De

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<sup>14</sup> Commitment proved to be a hard condition to operationalize and measure. This seems to be reflected in the respondents' answers as they find it a 'vague' term and thus create their own interpretation on commitment. This problem will be further reflected upon in chapter 6.

Zeeheldentuin, the local municipality is the plot owner. The municipalities say to feel committed towards the initiative, and show this through financial contributions and by 'allowing' the initiative to keep existing on their plot. De Zeeheldentuin is in a similar situation, although in this case De Versterking is the financier and owner of the plot. De Versterking feels committed and shows this in similar fashion. Although De Zeeheldentuin has not been able to pay off the yearly debt, De Versterking stays committed: "we are not just going to pull the plug on them". De Zeeheldentuin is the only case where the local municipality was barely involved, thus illustrating a lack of commitment from the municipality. Haagwonen also feels minimal responsibility towards the initiative, as they didn't really feel for the initiative in the first place. They do feel responsible towards their residents living on the undivided half of the plot, especially if something goes wrong (e.g. receiving complaints from residents concerning the garden). Striking is that all initiatives feel that their main financier has the responsibility for the continuation of the initiatives, while the financiers themselves urge the initiatives to claim more responsibility for their continuation by urging them to look for alternative ways of income (for example through crowd funding, renting vegetable gardens and organizing events). Another fact that stands out is that the cases where the municipality was (financially) involved and committed score higher on performance in the maintenance phase than the cases where this is not true. **Committed volunteers:** The respondents describe the commitment from the neighborhood to the project as extremely important. Finding enough volunteers willing to donate their time, energy and sometimes financial resources to the project is crucial for all cases, since their continuation is dependent on this support.

Both financial and volunteer commitment seem very important for both phases of the collaborative process, but lie very close to the financial and social shocks used in ranking the cases on performance. Therefore it is hard to say if process condition commitment influences project performance in the maintenance phase, or the other way around. This will be further discussed in the final chapter. As condition commitment might not have been measured in the right way, and no conclusion regarding the causality of commitment on project performance in the maintenance phase can be made, no conclusions regarding this expectation will be made.

## 5.4 Overview results

SQ 5: To what extent does the importance of the conditions change between the planning and decision making phase and maintenance phase of the collaborative process?



This chapter has discussed the importance of all the conditions for both the planning and decision-making phase as their influence on the maintenance phase in four BGI cases. Table 25 provides shows the presence of the individual conditions (for both phases) per ranked case and an overview of the importance of each condition for both phases.

**Table 25: Overview importance conditions for the planning and decision and maintenance phase**

Case	Ranking performance	Presence conditions ->	Planning and decision-making phase	Maintenance phase
Bikkershof	High performing	Leadership activities	+	+
		Initial agreement	-	n.a.
		Shared Understanding	+/-	+
		Face to face dialogue	+	+
		Commitment to initiative	+/-	+
		Trusting relationship	+/-	+
Zeeheldentuin	Low performing	Leadership activities	+	+
		Initial agreement	-	n.a.
		Shared Understanding	-	+/-
		Face to face dialogue	+	+/-
		Commitment to initiative	+/-	+/-
		Trusting relationship	-	+/-
Pluk and ProeftuinSpeeldernis	High performing	Leadership activities	+	+
		Initial agreement	+(formal)	n.a.
		Shared Understanding	+	+
		Face to face dialogue	+	+
		Commitment to initiative	+	+
		Trusting relationship	+	+
Pluk and Proeftuin	Medium performing	Leadership activities	++	++
		Initial agreement	+(informal)	n.a.
		Shared Understanding	+	+
		Face to face dialogue	+	+
		Commitment to initiative	+	+/-
		Trusting relationship	+	+
Importance conditions			Planning and decision-making phase	Maintenance phase
Leadership activities			+	+
Initial agreement			+/-	-
Shared Understanding			+	+
Face to face dialogue			+	+
Commitment to initiative			+/-	+/-
Trusting relationship			+/-	+/-

The table clearly indicates that even though a condition is present during one or both phases, this doesn't necessarily guarantee high project performance in the maintenance phase. Performing the leadership activities according to the three leadership perspectives, creating a shared understanding on especially the problem and solution and having regular face-to-face dialogue are the most important conditions for creating a smooth planning and decision-making phase and a high project performance in the maintenance phase. Without these conditions, and especially without leadership, the collaboration is likely to fail. Commitment to the initiative and creating a trusting relationship with the collaborating parties could certainly enhance the planning and decision-making phase, but doesn't seem crucial for a high project performance in the maintenance phase. Creating an initial agreement seems to be the least important when it comes to the planning and decision-making phase, and doesn't really seem to influence performance in the maintenance phase. In the next chapter an overview is given with the most important conclusions per conditions. This final part of the thesis will discuss the conclusion, discuss the used methodology and give some commendations.

## 6 Conclusion and discussion

*This final chapter presents the conclusion and discussion of the thesis. In the conclusion the most important results per condition are presented, after which the expectations are discussed and the research question is answered. In the discussion the used methodology is reflected upon, after which some practical and scientific recommendations will be given.*

### 6.1 Conclusion

This thesis aimed to contribute to the overall BEGIN objective of examining how cities can improve climate resilience with Blue Green Infrastructure involving multiple stakeholders. Different public, private and societal actors will have to collaborate in a coordinated effort in order to create durable solutions. There are projects that have successfully implemented BGI's and perform continuously well during the maintenance phase, but there are also projects where this is not the case. The goal of this research was twofold: a) to examine which collaborative governance conditions have an influence on project performance during the maintenance phase of relevant projects and b) to understand what the drivers behind the most important conditions are: why and how do these conditions have a positive effect on the performance of BGI's in the maintenance phase? Corresponding to this goal the main question is: **What conditions within collaborative governance processes have an influence on the performance of Blue Green Infrastructure projects in the maintenance phase within Dutch cities?** To arrive at an answer a qualitative in depth case study was performed on four BGI cases. Twelve interviews were conducted with respondents that covered the most important actors involved in the cases, and additionally document analysis was performed. The following sub questions were developed in order to structure and guide the research:

1. How can performance in the maintenance phase be measured?
2. To what extent does leadership during the collaborative process influence the project performance in the maintenance phase?
3. To what extent does institutional design during the collaborative process influence the project performance in the maintenance phase?
4. To what extent do process conditions during the collaborative process influence the project performance in the maintenance phase?
5. To what extent does the importance of the conditions change between the planning and decision making phase and maintenance phase of the collaborative process?

**Table 26: Most important conclusions per condition**

<b>Conditions</b>	<b>Conclusions</b>
Performing the leadership activities according to the three perspectives:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Enhances planning and decision-making phase and is crucial for realizing initiative.</li> <li>* During planning and decision-making phase is no guarantee for high performance in maintenance phase</li> <li>* Departure of leadership is a threat for the continuation of initiative</li> <li>* The interpersonal and especially network governance perspective are most dominantly used</li> </ul>
Developing an Initial agreement:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Not crucial for enhancing planning and decision-making phase</li> <li>* Only weak influence on project performance in maintenance phase</li> <li>* If municipality is plot owner, chances on initial agreement seem higher</li> </ul>
Creating Shared understanding:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* In planning and decision-making phase has positive influence on project performance in maintenance phase</li> <li>* Agreeing on problem and solution is more important than agreeing on strategy.</li> </ul>
Having regular Face to face dialogue:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Enhances both planning and decision-making phase and project performance in maintenance phase</li> <li>* Willingness to participate in the communication process is important for positive outcome dialogue</li> </ul>
Creating Commitment:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Respondents see commitment as: 1) feeling financially responsible and 2) volunteers willing to actively participate</li> <li>* Financially: important for realizing the initiative and a high performing maintenance phase</li> <li>* Commitment plot owner is important for realization and continuation initiative</li> <li>* Neighborhood support crucial for realizing initiative and project performance in maintenance phase</li> <li>* Seems trivial: really a condition for good collaboration, or logical consequence of collaboration?</li> <li>* Overlaps with performance criteria: social shocks &amp; financial shocks. Can thus not be used to measure commitment.</li> </ul>
Creating a trusting relationship:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* As soon as possible enhances both planning and decision-making phase as the maintenance phase.</li> <li>* Is not crucial for reaching maintenance phase</li> <li>* Takes time to build: even if trust is low during planning and decision-making phase, can still develop through hard work during the maintenance phase.</li> <li>* Goodwill trust seems most important, followed by agreement trust.</li> </ul>

Table 26 provides an overview of the most important conclusions based on the results and analysis in chapter 5. When comparing the conclusions per condition, two types of conditions can be distinguished: 1) **fundamental conditions** that are crucial for developing the collaborative process and high project performance during maintenance phase of the initiative. When these conditions are not sufficient this will cause an immediate threat for the continuation of the initiative and 2) **complementary conditions** that could really enhance both phases of the collaborative process but are not crucial for the realization of the initiative or project performance in the maintenance phase. Table 27 provides an overview of the fundamental and complementary conditions.

**Table 27: Fundamental and complementary conditions**

Type of conditions	Condition	Expectation
Fundamental	Leadership activities	E1
	Face-to-face dialogue	E4
	Shared understanding	E3
Complementary	Initial agreement	E2
	Perception on commitment	E6
	Perception on trust	E5

### 6.1.1 Fundamental conditions

The lack of leadership performing the right activities, having regular face-to-face dialogue and creation of a shared understanding between the actors leads to a direct threat to the continuation of the maintenance phase, and thus has a big influence on project performance in the maintenance phase.

#### *Leadership activities*

**E1: if the leadership actively performs activities according to the leadership perspectives during the collaborative process this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.** Performing leadership activities is definitely a crucial condition for both a smooth planning and decision-making phase and project performance in the maintenance phase. In the planning and decision-making phase leaders performing the leadership activities according to the three perspectives (especially the interpersonal and especially network governance activities is very important for enhancing the process conditions: creating a shared understanding between actors, realizing regular face-to-face dialogue, creating trust between the actors, and creating commitment to the collaborative objective. As the process conditions form a large part of the ‘basis’ on which the maintenance phase starts, leadership performing the right leadership activities during the planning and decision-making phase indirectly influences the project performance in the maintenance phase. If leadership is lacking, or if the leadership is not adequately executing the right activities, the process conditions are likely not to develop sufficiently. Having ‘leaders’ thus is a requisite for this condition to ‘work’, but having leaders

doesn't necessarily mean that the leadership activities are well executed. Additionally, the initial leader(s) often 'quit' sometime after the implementation phase started. If this happens without first properly transferring the responsibilities to willing successors, the initiative is likely to collapse or decay. It then doesn't matter how well the initial leadership did during the planning and decision-making phase, project performance in the maintenance phase is likely to be low and the initiatives continuation threatened. We can thus conclude that E1 correct. *It is true that if the leadership actively performs activities according to the leadership perspectives during the collaborative process this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.* However the expectation doesn't grasp the fundamentality of having leadership performing the right activities at all times, as the lack of leadership performing the right activities causes a direct threat to the initiative, both in the planning and decision-making phase, as in the maintenance phase.

### *Face-to-face dialogue*

**E4: If the collaborating actors have regular face to face contact during the collaborative process, this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.** Regular face-to-face dialogue during the collaboration process (both in the planning and decision-making and maintenance phase) enhances project performance in the maintenance phase. The cases that score high on performance in the maintenance phase are all still having regular face-to-face dialogue. The only case where face-to-face dialogue was considered insufficient is also the only low performing case in the maintenance phase. When face-to-face dialogue is considered insufficient by one of the main actors, this negatively influences the other process conditions. The involved leadership plays an important role in keeping up face to face dialogue between the participating actors. Therefore it E4 proves to be true: *If the collaborating actors have regular face to face contact during the collaborative process, this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.* However, even if there is regular face-to-face dialogue between actors, 'willingness to participate in the communication process' influences the outcome. If a crucial actor feels pressured to participate in negotiations, their 'goodwill' to the initiative is not sincere, which could lead to a negative outcome.

### *Shared understanding*

**E3: If the collaborating actors agree on what they collectively want to achieve this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.** Creating a shared understanding proves to be important both during the planning and decision-making phase as the maintenance phase, but the focus between the phases differs. During the planning and decision-making phase, agreeing on the problem and solution are the most important when it comes to creating shared understanding between the

collaborating actors. If actors feel like they collectively have to solve a problem, they are more willing to contribute to its solutions, even if they might not agree on the strategy to reach the objective right away. As long as the involved actors agree on the problem and solution, they will eventually also agree on the strategy. If actors don't reach a shared understanding on the problem, solution and strategy, the collaboration process is not likely to reach the implementation phase. During the maintenance phase shared understanding in the form of 'agreeing on the strategy to maintain the initiative', becomes more important. If the collaborating actors create a positive basis by developing shared understanding in the planning and decision-making phase, this positively influences project performance during the maintenance phase. Therefore E3 proves to be true: *If the collaborating actors agree on what they collectively want to achieve this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.*

### 6.1.2 Complementary conditions

Creating an initial agreement, commitment and trust can definitely enhance both phases, but are not crucial for the realization of the initiative or project performance in the maintenance phase.

#### *Initial agreement*

**E2: if an initial agreement is developed at the beginning of the collaborative process, this could enhance the project performance in the maintenance phase.** Even without formulating an initial agreement, either formally or informally, an initiative is still capable to realize its objectives and have a high performing maintenance phase. There is a case that scores high on performance, but doesn't have an initial agreement, there is a case that scores high and does have a formal initial agreement, there is a case that has an informal initial agreement but scores medium on performance, and there is a case that scores low and also doesn't have an initial agreement. E2 could be partially true: *developing an initial agreement at the beginning of the collaborative process might have a positive influence on project performance in the maintenance phase, but isn't at all essential.* However if an initial agreement is developed it could: a) clarify the rules and intentions from the beginning which prevents misunderstandings later on in the process, and b) enhance the transition from one phase to another. Consciously thinking about the steps that actors are about to take together before they are taken could prevent trouble.

#### *Commitment*

**E6: If the collaborating actors develop commitment to the objective during the collaborative process, this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.** Commitment seems to be an almost trivial condition and partly overlaps with the ranking on performance. Both financial commitment and

commitment from volunteers lie very close to the financial and social shocks used in ranking the cases on performance. Therefore it is hard to say if process condition commitment influences project performance in the maintenance phase, or the other way around. As all initiatives are all financially dependent on their plot owner, financial commitment seems important for the realization and continuation of the initiative. Also the lack of volunteers threatens the continuation of the initiative. However both cannot be separated from the ranking on performance and both don't grasp the entirety of the 'being committed to'. *Therefore E6 was not measured correctly, which makes it hard to make a conclusion regarding the expectation.* This will be further discussed in the discussion part.

### ***Trust***

**E5: If the collaborating actors develop a high level of trust during the collaborative process, this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.** Creating a mutually trusting relationship between the participating actors enhances both the planning and decision-making phase as the maintenance phase. However developing trust is not a necessity. The cases illustrated how actors can also have a negative perception on trust, but still decide to collaborate out of a sense of dependency or necessity. Two of the initiatives showed a negative to neutral perception on trust during the planning and decision-making phase, and both managed to improve this perception over time in the maintenance phase. The earlier mutual trust is developed, the better this will resonate throughout the collaborative process and the maintenance phase. It can be concluded that E5 is true: *If the collaborating actors develop a high level of trust during the collaborative process, this enhances the project performance in the maintenance phase.* However the condition is not necessary for realizing or maintaining the project, and thus only a complementary condition.

In answering the research question **“What conditions within collaborative governance processes have an influence on the successful maintenance of Blue Green Infrastructure projects within Dutch cities?”** we can conclude that collaborative governance conditions can certainly increase project performance in the maintenance phase. However the extent to which conditions can influence project performance and thus a successful long term maintenance phase differs and can be separated into fundamental and complementary conditions. We argue that the conditions of leadership performing the activities according to the three perspectives, having regular face-to-face dialogue between the actors and creating a shared understanding on the especially the problem and solution are fundamental conditions in order to reach and continue a high performing maintenance phase in the collaborative process. The conditions of formulating an initial agreement, commitment to the initiative and a mutually trusting



relationship could certainly enhance the collaborative process, but are only complementary and not crucial in their influence on project performance in the maintenance phase.

## 6.2 Discussion

This section discusses whether the chosen research design and operationalization of conditions was sufficient to answer the research question.

### 6.2.1 Methodological discussion

Throughout the research the case selection and ranking on performance proved to be a challenge. Initially a research design was chosen based on the comparison of ‘best practices’ and ‘bad practices’. However empirical reality showed that this design was not sustainable because of the lack of ‘true’ bad cases, as none of the BGI cases seem to have truly failed. As described in section 4.2, project performance in the maintenance phase was measured as resilience towards social (i.e. neighborhood support), judicial (i.e. ownership) and financial (i.e. subsidies) shocks. However judicial and financial shocks could also have an effect in the opposite direction. Because of these almost contradictory effects as described in section, determining how to rank on project performance in the maintenance phase was not without complications. Taking into account the context of the cases, not one case had either ownership of the plot or was financially independent. Therefore after careful considerations, it was decided to look at the exposure, sensitivity and resilience towards shocks the initiatives are *actually* confronted with. The chosen method for case ranking on project performance was thus not the first choice and had some negative effects on being able to determine causality for the condition commitment. The problems relating to measuring and analysis commitment will be discussed next.

In general the operationalization of the conditions in order to verify the expectations and in answering the research question worked well. However during the interviews it appeared that for the condition of commitment, the questionnaire did not work the way it was intended to. Some meaning in the translation of commitment to the Dutch language might have been lost: the questions did not match the reality of the respondents. As commitment is measured as the ‘perception on commitment’, this is not very problematic. It was expected that respondents might have different ideas on what ‘being committed to the initiative’ entails. However their interpretation of commitment as ‘stakeholders feeling financially responsible towards the initiative, and ‘actively volunteering in the initiative’ overlaps with the resilience towards financial and social shocks used in the case ranking on performance. Therefore no causal influence between of the condition ‘perception on commitment’ and ‘project performance in the maintenance phase’ can be determined. This makes commitment an almost trivial

condition: it is hard to say if process condition commitment influences project performance in the maintenance phase, or if commitment to the process is a consequence of collaborative efforts. Some minor problems emerged regarding other conditions as well: In measuring leadership activities it became clear that although all actors actively perform leadership activities during both phases, there was not a good way to measure how well these activities were performed, therefore reducing the meaning that could be derived from the condition. In measuring the initial agreement it proved hard to determine whether De Bickershof really had a formal or informal initial agreement, as I didn't have the opportunity to interview a respondent that was around during the start in 1987. Also the additional document analysis did not provide a clear answer. In measuring the perceptions on shared understanding, trust and commitment it proved hard to compare between the two phases, as the respondents didn't all participate in both phases; some were only around during the start of the planning and decision-making phase, and some only joined the initiative after the maintenance phase started. This partly limits the quality of the retrieved data for these conditions. Finally only four cases were researched due to the time-constraint of the thesis project. Therefore the results are very context-specific and hard to generalize to other contexts. However as this thesis is being written as part of the BEGIN project, in the future the results from the analysis on all twenty BGI cases will be known. These can then be compared to the thesis results, which might reinforce the explanatory power of this research.

## **6.3 Recommendations**

Based on the conclusion and discussion, some practical and scientific recommendations can be made.

### **6.3.1 Practical recommendations**

Based on the conclusions of this research it is recommended to the collaborating actors to not underestimate the importance of leadership, and then especially the transfer of leadership to successors within the initiative. Leadership is crucial for the continuation of an initiative: even if the leadership was extremely successful in creating the right circumstances for collaboration in the planning and decision-making phase, when it is not properly transferred to a new group, the whole initiative can fall apart in the maintenance phase. This problem can be foreseen by actively thinking about how to transfer leadership to new person or group of people beforehand. This is why even though an initial agreement is not crucial for realizing or maintaining an initiative, it could play a significant role in preventing the "lack of leadership problem" by forcing people to think about the collaborative process step by step and discuss problems before they arise. Even if no initial agreement is decided upon, during the planning and

decision-making phase rules will be determined. This now seems to happen haphazardly: “we will cross that bridge when we come to it”, which could lead to conflicts. Using an initial agreement as a lever to talk about the collaboration process and start discussions on important steps of the planning and decision-making phase, forces the collaborating parties to constantly evaluate what is happening, why it is happening, and if maybe the course should be adjusted. It is therefore also important to use the initial agreement as a flexible or basic document, which can be changed as the actors move through the whole collaborative process. The collaborative process as a whole is a slow process, building on past decisions and focusing on incremental instead of extensive changes. The main reason can be found in the lack of organizational slack, which isn't unusual for collaborative governance processes. Since these kind of initiatives are largely initiated by the citizens, they often have limited people (volunteers) and financial resources. The continuation of the initiatives is largely dependent on volunteers wanting to take responsibility. This crucial group of people is often working on the initiative besides their normal work, thus donating their free time. The initiative is therefore not always a priority. Also the most crucial condition leadership often isn't organized into a formal position. In formal organizations leadership is hired and gets calculated time and resources in order to finish the job. This is often different for collaborative governance initiatives, which makes them vulnerable. When starting these kinds of initiatives, the collaborating parties should be fully aware of this vulnerability. It is highly recommended to find an organization, preferably the government, willing to officially manage the process from the start well into the maintenance phase. In this way at least one party has 'organizational time and resources' calculated into the initiative, which gives it more organizational slack and thus increases its overall resilience towards social, judicial and financial shocks.

### **6.3.2 Scientific recommendations**

Only little research has been done on the maintenance phase of collaborative governance initiatives. This thesis aimed to contribute to the existing theory collaborative governance on the maintenance phase by providing a foundation for future research on which conditions could positively influence project performance during the maintenance phase. The results in this thesis only scratched the surface of what needs to be known and done in order to give more collaborative governance initiatives a fighting change. Generally more research is necessary on this topic, but future research should especially focus on one fundamental condition: leadership. Most of the literature on leadership focuses on leadership styles, roles or activities. But this research proves that all of that is irrelevant if the leadership is not correctly transferred to a new group when necessary. Future research on leadership

should thus focus on the transition of leadership from one person or group to another, and how to best guide that process in order to secure the initiatives license to operate.

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## Appendix A: List of used literature on collaborative governance

Table 28: Literature used to determine the used collaborative governance conditions

Authors	year	title	category
C. Ansell and A. Gash	2007	Collaborative governance in theory and practice	Visual representation of collaborative governance conditions
J. M. Bryson, B. C. Crosby and M. Middleton	2006	Design and implementation of cross-sector collaboration	Visual representation of collaborative governance conditions
K. Emerson, T. Nabatchi and S. Balogh	2012	An integrative framework for collaborative governance	Visual representation of collaborative governance conditions
P. W. Mattessich, M. Murray-Close and B. R. Monsey	2001	Collaboration: what makes it work (2 <sup>nd</sup> edition)	key factors that impact successful cross-sector collaborations
L. J. Johnson, D. Zorn, B.K. Yung Tam, S. A Johnson	2003	Stakeholders views of factors that impact successful interagency collaboration	key factors that impact successful cross-sector collaborations
S. Drost and S. Pfisterer	2013	How to make cross-sector partnerships work? Key factors for successful partnering	key factors that impact successful cross-sector collaborations
J. Fliervoet, R. Van den Born, S meijerer	2017	A stakeholders evaluation of collaborative processes for maintaining multi-functional floodplain	Maintenance phase of collaboration
J. Fliervoet, R van den Born	2016	From implementation towards maintenance: sustaining collaborative management in the Netherlands	Maintenance phase of collaboration



## Appendix B: Data collection

Table 29: Data collection - interviewed respondents per case

Respondents per case	date
<b>Bickershof</b> respondent 1 – board member Bickershof respondent 2 – involved civil servant	April 22 2017 April 26 / May 16 2017
<b>Zeeheldentuin</b> respondent 1 – board member Zeeheldentuin respondent 2 – Area manager Haagwonen respondent 3 – board member De Versterking respondent 4 – Initiator Zeeheldentuin	May 15 2017 June 8 2017 May 25 2017 June 23 2017
<b>Speeldernis</b> respondent 1 – director playground (Speeldernis) respondent 2 – Assistant project manager (municipality) respondent 3 – designer, coordinator playground ( expert)	April 24 2017 April 25 2017 June 29 2017
<b>Pluk and Proeftuin<sup>15</sup></b> Respondent 1 – project assistant Respondent 2 – director Cooperation Leerpark Respondent 3 – initiator, coordinator garden	April 18 2017 April 13 2017 June 23 2017

Table 30: Data collection - analyzed documents per case

Case	Document name	Year	Type document
Bickershof	De Grote Kleine kansen Atlas	2003	Chapter in Book
	Bickershof 1987 -2012	2012	Own publication
	Welkom in de Bickershof	2014	Article magazine
	De favoriete groene plek van..	-	Online interview
	Pioniers in zelfbeheer	2008	Collection of initiatives
Speeldernis	De Speeldernis: een spannende speelplek in de stedelijke wildernis	2004	Publicatie van Sport & Recreatie
	Speelnatuur in de stad	2009	Boek van ministerie van LNV
	Voorbeeldproject GroenBlauwe netwerken: Speeldernis rotterdam	-	Webpage Atelier GROENBLAUW
Zeeheldentuin	Bezoekersreglement	2014	Visitors regulations
	Gebruikersreglement	2014	Users regulations
	Beheersregeling	2014	Management regulations
Pluk & Proeftuin	Leerpark Dordrecht start aanleg Pluk & Proeftuin	2011	Policy document
	Nieuwsbrief – bewonerscomité Leerpark	2014	Newsletter

<sup>15</sup> Respondent 1 and 2 from the Pluk & Proeftuin Dordrecht were interviewed by my colleague from the BEGIN research team Liselotte Hagen. This is due to the fact that we switched cases for the analysis after they were already divided within the team. This means that 2 interviews that I conducted for another case (De Spinozahof) were not used in this thesis. The total of interviews conducted the author thus still remains 12.

## Appendix C: Questionnaire used conducting interviews

### Topiclist voor interviews met Nederlandse blauw-groene cases

#### **Blok I: Algemeen**

1. Wat is uw functie binnen het project?
2. Kunt u de aanleiding van het project kort beschrijven?
3. Welke partijen waren betrokken bij de start van dit project en welke partijen zijn op dit moment betrokken?
4. Om welke reden(en) wilden de partijen betrokken zijn bij het project?  
**Focus op:** motivatie  
*Indien van toepassing:* om welke reden(en) zijn sommige partijen afgehaakt?
5. Wat zijn de verschillende taken/verantwoordelijkheden van de verschillende partijen?  
Was deze taakverdeling gedurende het project hetzelfde?
6. Welke fasen kunnen in dit project worden onderscheiden? Verliep het proces in de ene fase gemakkelijker dan in de andere fase en waar lag dat aan?

\* *Wat was het probleem dat moest worden opgelost?*

\* *En hoe wilden jullie dat oplossen? het 'probleem op te lossen?' (wat wilden jullie er aan doen?)'*

\* *Wat was volgens jullie (als partij) de meest manier om dat te bereiken? Hoe wilden jullie dat doen?*

Denk bijvoorbeeld aan gezamenlijke initiatieven formuleren, vormgeven van het project, realisatie en onderhoud.

7. Het project bestaat nu .... jaar. Wat is jullie sleutel tot succes? Oftewel, hoe passen jullie je keer op keer aan om te kunnen blijven bestaan?

Let op, stel deze vraag niet bij projecten die inmiddels niet meer bestaan. Dan kun je de vraag ook omdraaien en vragen waarom het project is opgehouden te bestaan.

#### **Blok II: Start condities**

##### Power resources knowledge asymmetries & incentives to participate

8. Welke middelen hadden en hebben jullie tot beschikking en welke partij/partijen beschikken over deze middelen?
  - a. *Wie heeft het project gefinancierd?*
  - b. *Wie investeert het meeste tijd in het project?*
  - c. *Welke kennis van welke partij is onmisbaar in dit project?*
  - d. *Hoe is de beslissingsbevoegdheid verdeeld onder de verschillende partijen?*

De volgende mogelijke middelen in het achterhoofd houden: kennis, macht en bronnen (denk aan geld en tijd)

### Incentives to participate

9. In hoeverre hadden de verschillende partijen elkaar nodig om het project op te kunnen starten en in hoeverre hebben de partijen elkaar op dit moment nodig?

De bedoeling van deze vraag is om de (on)afhankelijkheid van de verschillende actoren ten opzichte van elkaar te verifiëren. Ansell & Gash beschrijven dat een belangrijke incentive om samen te werken afhankelijkheid kan zijn.

### Prehistory

10. Hoe was/is de samenwerking tussen de verschillende partijen?
- Soepel of zijn er veel hobbels te nemen? (Wat ging lastig/soepel?)*
  - Kunt u een voorbeeld noemen wat typerend is voor de verstandhouding?*

Blijf niet te globaal, maar probeer ook in te spelen op de verschillende partijen. Bij verstandhouding kan bijvoorbeeld gedacht worden aan conflict, harmonie of onbegrip.

### **Blok III Samenwerking**

#### Facilitative leadership

11. In hoeverre was er een sprake van (of meerdere) een leider in het begin van het project en hoe heeft het leiderschap zich gedurende het project ontwikkeld?
- Wie was en is de trekker van het project?*
  - Welke partij/partijen zijn/waren dit?*
  - Hoe kwam het leiderschap tot uiting? Toen en nu? (wat deden de leiders zoal?)*

Verifieer ook de volgende activiteiten van leiders: 1. promoten van actieve participatie, 2. verstevigen en behouden van invloed en controle in het proces, 3. zorgen voor een goede sfeer in de groep en 4. richten op duurzaamheid van het project. \* *gevoel van vertrouwen in de groep* \* *duidelijke grond regels opgesteld (en houden ze zich eraan?)* \* *Verkrijgen van voldoende middelen om doel te bereiken* \* *verbinden van mensen & ideeën aan elkaar* \* *belichten van alle perspectieven* \* *leiden zij de discussie in goed banen*

#### Institutional design

12. Hoe is de inzichtelijkheid van de beslissingen die bij de start van het project en nu genomen worden? Is het voor iedereen transparant waarom bepaalde beslissingen genomen worden?
- Welke partijen worden betrokken bij het nemen van de beslissingen?
  - Initial design: zijn er aan het begin van het proces expliciet, informeel of formeel, afspraken gemaakt over de relaties tussen de actoren? (over zaken als besluitvormings proces, tijdsvolgorde, verantwoordelijkheden, manieren van communiceren)*

Het doel van deze vraag is om erachter te komen of de respondent vond/vindt dat het project transparant is en dat er geen sprake is van achterkamertjes waarin beslissingen genomen worden.

#### Face-to-face dialogue

13. Hoe hielden en hoe houden jullie contact met elkaar (de betrokken partijen)?
- Welke verschillende communicatiemiddelen gebruiken jullie?*

b. *Hoe vaak komen jullie samen?*

*\* zelf naar face to face dialogue vragen: wekelijkse momenten van samenkomen?*

Ansell & Gash beschrijven dat face-to-face contact belangrijk kan zijn. In deze vraag willen wij verifiëren in hoeverre de partijen face-to-face contact met elkaar hebben of hebben gehad.

Commitment to the process

14. In hoeverre was/is er met draagvlak voor het project onder de verschillende betrokken partijen?
- Waarom is het gelukt of juist niet gelukt om draagvlak te creëren?*
  - In hoeverre voelden/voelen de verschillende partijen zich verantwoordelijk voor het project? (START & NU)*

Trust

15. Hoe is de perceptie op vertrouwen tussen de verschillende betrokken partijen?
- Hoe was het vertrouwen tussen de verschillende betrokken partijen bij de start van het project?*
  - Hoe staat het nu met het vertrouwen tussen de verschillende betrokken partijen?*
  - Likert schaal stellingen laten doen.*

In deze vraag is het vergelijkende aspect tussen het begin van het project en nu extra belangrijk.  
*\* duidelijk maken dat het om hun persoonlijke perceptie op het algemene vertrouwen tussen de partijen gaat*

Shared understanding

16. Hoe denken de verschillende partijen over wat zij willen bereiken met dit project?
- Wat wilde \*naam partij\* bereiken met dit project? (probleem/ oplossing)*
  - Hebben de verschillende partijen een soort gelijk idee over wat zij willen bereiken? (strategie)*
  - In hoeverre trekken de partijen samen op om dit te bereiken?*

*\* Is uw perceptie over dit 'gelijke idee' van wat we willen bereiken nu verandert? (Wordt daar nu op een manier anders over gedacht?)*

Intermediate outcomes & outcomes

17. Wat kunt u vertellen over de doelen van dit project?
- Zijn er doelen afgesproken, en zo ja, welke?*
  - Zijn dit voornamelijk korte of lange termijn doelen?*
  - Wanneer in het project zijn deze doelen afgesproken?*
  - Zijn er in het project successen behaald en zo ja, welke?*

In deze vraag wordt naar twee verschillende factoren van Ansell & Gash gevraagd. Blijf er scherp op dat je niet alleen naar de doelen vraagt, maar ook kort aandacht besteed aan deelvraag b. en d.

**+ rapport cijfer project & waarom.**

## Appendix D: Coding scheme for analysis conditions in interviews

Table 31: Coding scheme used to analyze the cases

condition	Code abbreviation	Dutch recognition words	English translation
Leadership	LS	De discussie leiden, bemiddeling van activiteiten, mensen verbinden, Motiveer om samen te werken Zoek voldoende (financiële) middelen overtuigen, onderhandelen, luisteren naar meningen, discussiëren, sociale evenementen organiseren, informatie verstrekken, mensen bij elkaar brengen, blijven uitnodigen, vrijwilligers blijven zoeken.	Leading the discussion Mediating activities Connective activities Create incentives to collaborate Secure sufficient resources convincing, negotiating, listening to opinions, discussing, organizing social events, motivating actors to participate, providing information, bring people together, keep inviting
Initial Agreement	IA	Formele informele eerste regels, afspraken, rolverdeling, frequentie samenkomen, besluitvorming, verantwoordelijkheden, plan van aanpak	Formal or informal first rules, agreements, division of roles, frequency of meetings, decision-making, responsibilities, plan of action
Shared Understanding	SU	Probleem (overlast, braakliggend land, geen of weinig groen) Oplossing (doel, bereiken, aanpak, benadering) Strategie (hoe, bereiken door)	Problem (nuisance, wasteland, little or no green) Solution (goal, reaching objective, solving Strategy (how to reach it, approach)
Face-to-face dialogue	FTF	<u>Face-to-face</u> (vergadering, in gesprek gaan, contact houden, update, overleg, ALV, ledenvergadering, bestuursvergadering, bijeenkomst, mening geven, feedback, ontmoeten) <u>anders</u> : Facebook, website, sociale media, nieuwsbrief, email, WhatsApp, zenden, brieven, belletje	Face-to-face (meeting, conversation, keeping in touch, update, consultation, meeting of members, board meetings, meeting, giving opinion, feedback, otherwise: Facebook, website, social media, newsletter, email, WhatsApp, send, letters, calling
Commitment	C	Draagvlak, goodwill, financiële verantwoordelijks, verantwoordelijkheidsgevoel, gevoel, ownership, er echt voor gaan, toegewijd.	goodwill, financial responsibility, sense of responsibility, feeling, ownership, really going for it, committed, feeling supported by
Trust	T	Vertrouwen, doen wat je zegt, goodwill, begaan, intentie, samenwerking, afspraken nakomen	Trust, do what you say, goodwill, committed, intentions, cooperation, fulfill commitments
Other findings	Extra	Financiën in orde krijgen, subsidies regelen, (niet) genoeg vrijwilligers krijgen of vinden.	Getting finances in order, arranging subsidies, (not) getting or finding enough volunteers.

## Appendix E: Shared Understanding per case

Table 32: Shared understanding per actor: problems, solutions and strategies

SU	problems	solutions	Strategies
Bikkershof	Area developing at a rapid pace: a lot of houses were build, but there wasn't much space for greenery. The involved citizens wanted to improve livability in the area: more green, improve social cohesion and reduce (noise) pollution from the industry. Municipality recognized this problem.	After some negotiation both actors agree that they want to create a green area to solve the problems.	The municipality and the citizens had different ideas about the design and management of the place. The government wanted to keep it low-maintenance: some trees, bushes and pavement. The citizens wanted an ecological garden,- and they wanted to do it themselves.
Zeeheldentuin	Plot with elementary school burned down, the land was bought by Housing Corporation Haagwonen, which wanted to construct houses and already had plans for the land (complete designs which they were already promoting). However when in the financial crisis hit, the land stayed wasteland longer than planned. Haagwonen didn't think the lack of greenery was a problem. The citizens wanted more green and improve social cohesion within the neighborhood. More than 10.000 people live in the district, but there was almost no greenery.	Haagwonen didn't see a problem, and thus didn't want a solution. Citizens: create a community garden as a green haven for everyone to enjoy.	Haagwonen initially didn't want to sell the land, but after years of negotiation agreed to sell it for 3,5 thousand euros. De Versterking offers to buy the plot, but didn't want to be owners of the land forever, and wanted a guarantee that in case the Zeeheldentuin would fail, that Haagwonen would redeem the ground. Haagwonen didn't want to as this would mean keeping 350.000 euro's reserve at all times and they didn't want to make that commitment. Because of this disagreement the negotiations almost ended in deadlock. Eventually De Versterking bought the land, if de Zeeheldentuin would buy back the land over 10 years (thus becoming owners and agreeing on paying of a yearly 17,5 thousand euros debt to De Versterking.
Speeldernis	Before the Speeldernis the area was a construction playground. But around the year 2000 the place didn't meet the requirements any longer. Parents & volunteer board Botte Spijker came together: They believed that it was important for children growing up in the city to come into contact with and experience nature. The municipalities department of Sport and Recreation agreed.	All actors saw the benefits of a natural playing ground. The Municipality had a budget to renovate around 10 playing grounds. Speeldernis would be one of them.	All parties agreed on wanting a natural playground for children. But some parents were worried about the safety of this adventurous place, and found it hard to imagine how it could look. It thus took some time in the participatory process to broaden the frame of reference of the parents and children about the possibilities, before realizing the final plan for the Speeldernis. Also one actor left the negotiations as it didn't feel its opinion considered seriously.
Pluk en Proeftuin	The garden was located in a district called "Het Leerpark", which was developing at a rapid pace, which made it a turbulent location to live. After the financial crisis hit, some wasteland stayed clear longer than expected. This wasn't really problematic, but it wasn't a nice view either: it looked messy and didn't add to the livability of the neighborhood. The municipality, citizen committee, Urgenda and cooperation Leerpark agreed.	All parties agreed on creating a temporality garden. The wasteland was not seen as a problem but as an opportunity or experiment:.	There have been some discussions regarding the purpose and design of the garden. One actor had different ideas of what to do with the garden, but the involved citizen's didn't feel for their idea. The actor also had a problem with the temporality of the project: they expected large investments, which the government didn't want to make because of the time limit. Eventually the actor left the negotiations. The citizens opinion was important in the discussions: it was a citizen's initiative. The Leerpark area and municipality wanted the neighborhood to feel ownership, and manage it themselves.