



TRAINING FOR DEMOCRACY

“How did The Hague Academy trainings on local governance foster the consolidation of democracy in Tunisia?”

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Summary

This research analyses the outcomes of trainings on local governance that are organized by The Hague Academy for Local Governance in the framework of the Shiraka bilateral effort between the Netherlands and Middle East North African Region. This partnership aims to democratize the region, and the trainings target civil servants coming from different countries in the area. Among these countries is Tunisia, which is considered the *pillar for democracy in the Middle East*. It is for this reason that this research focuses on the training outcomes at the level of Tunisian participants.

This research is qualitative, deductive and aims to answer the following question: “How did The Hague Academy trainings on local governance foster the consolidation of democracy in Tunisia?” The conceptual framework for this research is based on literature on local governance and democratization, and vocational training for civil servants. This review of the literature on trainings on local governance (independent variable) and democratic consolidation (dependent variable) led to the definition a conceptual model. In this process, four variables emerged: strengthening of local governments, citizen participation, civil society participation and democratic leadership. Indeed, democratic consolidation and local governance—considered in a multi-level governance framework—suggest that forces be rebalanced and that all the relevant stakeholders in the decision-making process be involved. These two elements also emphasize empowerment of local level governments and the establishment of adequate settlements for social demands. Leadership in the governance paradigm, is expected to pay attention to democratic values at all levels of governments: to be facilitative, inclusive and innovative. The theory of democratization also considers these to be factors for the consolidation of democracy, namely because they foster trust between different stakeholders and bring decision-making closer to the citizens.

The four defined variables mentioned above (i.e., strengthening of local governments, citizen participation, civil society participation, and democratic leadership) are the subject matters of multiple sessions during the training organized by The Hague Academy. But the evaluation of these trainings by the Academy is limited to evaluation forms to be completed by participants right after the training has taken place. The results from these forms are considered by Kirkpatrick D. and Kirkpatrick J. to only be indicators of customers’ satisfaction (2007). According to them, proper evaluation of trainings requires that three other steps be undertaken:

evaluation of learning, evaluation of behavioral change, and then finally, evaluation of the training outcome (*op.cit.*).

This research analyses the evaluation forms that have been completed by participants right after the training has taken place. In addition, to supplement the analysis, semi-structured interviews with 16 former participants were conducted to assess whether the trainings also led to learning and behavioral change, which in turn would lead to outcomes (as regards the contents of the evaluation model designed by Kirkpatrick J. and Kirkpatrick D., 2007). The results from this research and the interviews have been sorted according to the level of the governments in which the respondents work. Since the research is based on interviews, the results also provide individual perspectives.

The interviews have firstly confirmed the relevance of the training programmes to a democratization process. Many respondents (i.e. Tunisian civil servants) called the programmes a driver of “radical change” at their levels, which highlighted the meaning and impact of remote concepts that some of them had only seen in laws and regulations. Seeing the Dutch example and experiencing the course were together a chance for them to see the actual benefits of a participative approach, democratic behavior, and multi-level governance with good local governance that is beneficial for the society. Most participants also acquired relevant tools such as negotiation, conflict management and presentation skills. These all proved to be useful in the exercise of their duties in a multi-level governance paradigm preconized by the international community and fostered by the new Tunisian Constitution.

The results have been twofold. Firstly, there were positive outcomes at both levels of governments on the matters of civil society participation and citizen participation, as the two have been perceived to be extended after the trainings took place. Concrete examples have come out of the interviews such as participative budgets or direct influence on the citizens or civil society in the redirecting of projects. Some participants felt this gave rise to more citizen satisfaction and more trust towards administrations. Democratic leadership has been positively evaluated as it led to changed behavior, but half of the participants could not describe concrete results. Secondly, outcomes on the matter of strengthening local governments have been perceived as very limited for local-level respondents, while central-level respondents concluded that the trainings led them towards the strengthening of local governments in regulations, laws, and delegations of powers to lower levels of governments. Local-level respondents considered that if the trainings enabled them to increase their knowledge on the matters and develop a changed behavior, but for half of them, the context (i.e, centralized, in the mentalities of central

level civil servants and in its regulations and administrations) prevented them to implement or use what they had acquired through the training.

In conclusion, The Hague Academy trainings on local governance have led to perceived tangible outcomes on the matters of citizen participation and civil society participation. But the centralized Tunisian context and mentalities have limited outcomes towards a more democratic leadership and outcomes that strengthen local governments, even though participants assessed that they have developed an increased level of awareness on the benefits of strengthening the latter and learning and that they have changed their behaviors by being more assertive and confident in the roles they perform in local governments. This makes these trainings on local governance relevant and useful within the transitioning context that Tunisia is undergoing now.

Figure 3: Research conclusions




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Abbreviations

MENA: Middle East North Africa

THA: The Hague Academy for Local Governance

NPM: New Public Management

NPG: New Public Governance

SCS: Senior Civil Servants

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

NGO: non-governmental organization

CSO: civil society organization

Foreword

The Middle Eastern and North African region has always fascinated me, and so have the issues that it continues to face nowadays. This interest led me to do an internship in Beirut in 2016 at the end of my first Master's Degree in journalism. The internship took place at the publisher of the reference newspaper on Middle East information. The experience I gained from reporting in Lebanon, a country facing a lot of challenges regarding governance (corruption, lack of trust towards government, more than one million registered refugees coming from Syria (UNHCR, 2017) and more than 500,000 from Palestine (UNHCR, 2016)), has made me question the journalism career I had always dreamt of. It actually made me wonder whether I should be more proactive about it and take action from the inside and reflect further on governance, cooperation, development and administration. This is one of the reasons that motivated me to embark on a second Master's Degree in Public Administration at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam.

To conclude this Master's program, I did an internship at The Hague Academy for Local Governance (The Hague Academy) from February through July 2017. The Hague Academy for Local Governance is a non-profit organization that organizes trainings that aim to strengthen local governance worldwide. Participants in these trainings are mainly (senior) officials coming from developing and transitioning contexts. The mantra of the organization is: "*We believe that real development starts at local level.*" (THA, 2016). The trainings organized by The Hague Academy aim to strengthen skills of civil servants from transitioning and developing countries. Trainings are based on diverse themes related to local governance such as anti-corruption, citizen participation, local economic development, gender equity or even fiscal decentralization. Working at The Hague Academy represented an opportunity for me to apply and reflect on the theories and knowledge I had acquired from my university studies. A lot of the application and reflection was made through my continuous interaction with experts, trainers and participants there.

During my time at The Hague Academy, and because of my interest in the MENA region, I actively took part in organizing two training programs that targeted participants from that region. These programs were part of the Shiraka bilateral effort (which was the *Matra South* effort until 2016) between the Netherlands and the Middle Eastern and North African region. The objective of this partnership is to support a "sustainable transition in the Middle East" (RVO, 2016). The trainings focus mainly on "transformation and constitutionalizing" of

regimes (RVO, 2017). During my interactions with officials, I began to develop an interest in the current transition and consolidation of democracy process that is happening in Tunisia.

Tunisia is said to be the only Arab country that has accomplished a democratic transition after the Arab Springs raised hope for a democratic future in the region (Masoud, 2014). In Tunisia, the Jasmine revolution in 2011 has been followed by successful free national elections and the making of a new national Constitution in 2014 (Baccouche, 2016). The role of this country in the hope of a future democratic Arab World is central because “if Tunisia manages to hang onto its hard-won democracy, it will constitute a living rejoinder to the argument that Muslims or Arabs lack the capacity or the desire for democratic government” (Masoud, 2014:83).

To achieve this goal, Tunisia must consolidate the fragile state of its democracy, which is facing very important challenges like the very high rate of unemployment, mainly amongst its youth. In addition, terrorism is harming its tourism. Furthermore, local governments are governed by *Délégations Spéciales*, which still function the way they did before 2011. The first municipal elections keep getting postponed, and they are now expected to take place in May 2018. The main reason for postponing the elections is that the Code of Municipalities is not ratified by the Parliament. All these elements together imply that the current authorities lack the trust that is expected of them to guarantee a stable, viable consolidated democracy (Baccouche, 2016). Protests that troubled the country at the 7th anniversary of the Jasmine Revolution represented a living reminder of how fragile the Tunisian democracy is.

I then began to develop certain questions: How is the work of The Hague Academy impacting the current transition process in Tunisia? What role do the trained civil servants embrace after the training has taken place? In my pursuit to answer them, I had to reflect, which meant that my reflections would be the starting point of this thesis.

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Defining the problem

As mentioned above, the general mission of The Hague Academy is to provide trainings that focus on local governance. In the last four years, 2,840 people, coming from 83 countries, with 25% of them originating from the MENA region, have been trained (THA, 2016).

Since 2013, The Hague Academy organizes two trainings every year in the framework of the Shiraka bilateral effort between the Netherlands and the MENA region: one on local governance, the other on social affairs and employment. The training courses cover theory, practice and study visits. These sessions are also a networking opportunity as it brings all those senior officials together for a week in the Netherlands, and then four days in Tunisia. Goal of the partnership is to foster democracy in the region (RVO, 2017).

In the preparations for the trainings at The Hague Academy, a lot of attention is paid to the preparatory work that goes into the trainings. On its website, the organization says that it offers a “thoroughly-developed, interdisciplinary curriculum focused on the training needs of course participants and their respective local contexts” (THA, 2016). In other words, it implies taking into consideration the Training Need Analysis, the organization of participative workshops, study visits and presentations on topics mentioned before, such as multi-level governance, decentralization, citizen participation, civil society participation or notions such as integrity, entrepreneurship, local economic development, change management and decentralization. Some sessions focused on the acquisition of skills (negotiation, presentation, change and process management). Programs are also created so that the participants can learn new perspectives and see them in practice (*op.cit.*). During the two-week training, participants also work on a Back-Home Action Plan to transform the theory and practice into concrete actions back home.

The training ends with an evaluation, which is generally positive. However, little attention is paid to what will happen after the training is completed. This is most likely because there is lack of time and resources in this organization, which only has slightly more than 16 people. This finding is general for training institutes because they consider their mission to be finished once the training has taken place (van Wart, 2016). But it is also this finding on which I will dedicate my focus here. So, did the participants, through the trainings on local governance, acquire the knowledge and skills that stimulate them in the consolidation of democracy in

Tunisia? Did the trainings organized by The Hague Academy play the role that they should have played according to the Shiraka partnership?

1.2. Purpose of the research

The goals of this research are both internal and external in nature. By internal, it is meant that its results will reveal the outcome of the THA trainings, thereby allowing the assessment of whether those did in fact play a role in the democratic consolidation of Tunisia. This will concretely allow recommendations and conclusions to be formulated with regard to the work of the NGO. At a broader, external level, this research will also define to what extent does training or educating civil servants on local governance stimulate democratic consolidation in a transitioning context, such as that of Tunisia.

For the purpose of this thesis, I will limit my research to the evaluation of the impact of one training, that is, the one on local governance that was given to civil servants from the MENA region, including Tunisians. This training program has already gathered 30 Tunisian officials from both the central and local levels of governments.

1.3. Research question and methods

The research question is then: *“How did trainings on local governance foster the consolidation of democracy in Tunisia?”*

I will answer this by conducting a qualitative and deductive research. Qualitative research allows one to acquire a lot of knowledge along the way and some experiences that are a phenomenon together with a broad depiction of the reality (Bleijenbergh, 2016). In addition, a deductive research process is recommended when there is an abundance of sources, a short time to complete it, and it limits risks (Dudovsky, 2017). The two are then relevant for this Master’s dissertation research, focusing on experiences of individuals in a define context, which are due to be realized in a few months and that explores the concepts of democracy and governance, which have already been widely researched.

In that deductive process, a theoretical framework will define hypotheses, that will be tested empirically, through semi-structured interviews of 16 former participants.

This research will then answer the 4 following sub-questions: (i) What is the theoretical relationship between trainings on local governance and the consolidation of democracy of a country? (ii) What is the empirically presupposed relationship between trainings on local

governance and democracy consolidation of the country? (iii) If we conduct research on the extent that The Hague Academy trainings stimulate democratic consolidation of Tunisia, does the theoretical framework help to test and define the empiric case study? (iv) And finally, what recommendations can be given will take into consideration the empirical links between trainings on the field of local governance, the one hand, and the democratic consolidation of Tunisia, on the other hand?

1.4. Relevance

The societal relevance of this research comes from the broad international concern about democracy in the MENA region, which is experiencing conflicts and deep social and economic issues. Within it, Tunisia plays a particular role. Why? Because Tunisia is said to be the only Arab country to have successfully completed its transition towards democracy after the Arab Springs (Masoud, 2014). The year 2011 marked the end of years of dictatorships, and it was also the year when universal suffrage was adopted (Stepan, 2012).

Seven years after the revolution that also marked the beginning of the Arab Springs, Tunisia must consolidate the regime that it has put in place. But it continues to face challenges regarding its administration and public service delivery. This implies that efforts are required from all players at all levels of governments and within the civil society itself. Tunisia's role as a democratic pillar entails the gathering of significant amounts of money, attention and programs from international organizations to support it. The relevance of this research, from a social point of view, is that it will assess from a specific case study analysis whether some of these investments in trainings lead to the stimulation of democracy through the application of the acquired skills and knowledge. In other words: whether trainings can represent useful, recommendable tools for democracy and better and efficient service delivery in transitioning or developing context.

From an academic point of view, the concepts of local governance, partnerships, and decentralization have been widely researched (for example by van Wart et al in 2015; Saito in 2008 who will be quoted in the next chapter). Different paradigms assess that inclusive (local) governance and democracy are interlinked because partnerships between different layers of governments and participation from the civil society lead to a more accountable, legitimate and even more efficient service delivery (Schoburgh et al in 2016 Bovenkamp and Vollaard in 2015). In that sense, research supposes that citizen inclusiveness, civil society inclusiveness, participation and partnerships between different levels of government are favoring democracy.

Furthermore, “given the changing roles of civil servants in a transition context, training the public servants is a key element to achieve public management reform” (Wise and Witesman, 2012:711). These trainings aiming towards democracy aim at different objectives: better service delivery, inclusiveness, accountability, efficiency (Wise and Witesman, 2012). When trainings aim towards democratization, they must imply methods that can prevent fraud and corruption and also imply policy analysis in support of public deliberation (*op.cit*). Many training institutes have been created through the years, and even worldwide in pursuit of this aim. Even the UNDP has established its UNITAR (United Nations Institute for Trainings and Research) 50 years ago.

Although “assessment of SCS [senior civil servants] training is generally less than ideal” (Van Wart, 2015:20). Kirkpatrick D. and Kirkpatrick J., who broadly researched the matters of vocational trainings, also said that “learning and training professionals still believe that their jobs are done when the training programs are over” (2007: 81). Indeed, post-evaluation from institutions and organizations that are offering these trainings are generally limited to using evaluation forms that are (expected to be) completed by participants right after the trainings has ended. Kirkpatrick D. and Kirkpatrick J. call these the indicators of “customer’s satisfaction” (2007:82). Such post-evaluation represents only one of four indispensable steps in trainings evaluation (reference to the training evaluation model drawn up by these scholars, which will be described in the second chapter). Therefore, they are not sufficient for assessing the effectiveness of the THA trainings or for answering whether these (as regards the Shiraka training) led to the stimulation of democratic consolidation in Tunisia.

Usually, not evaluating applying the knowledge acquired from the training is because of lack of time and resources. And evaluating trainings in a proper way indeed requires these two elements (*op. cit.*). In addition, few researches on reforms concern civil servants exerting in transitioning contexts where “citizens and administrators have been used to remaining passive and silent” (Witesman and Wise, 2012:711).

In that sense, this research is also academically relevant. Taking a closer look at the effects of the THA trainings, which have already gathered dozens of civil servants from the MENA region in The Hague for five years in a row, represents a socially and academically relevant case study from which I will draw empiric conclusions on how trainings can foster consolidation of democracy.

1.5. Thesis structure

In this process of a deductive research, I will firstly, in the second chapter, review literature on local governance, democratic consolidation and trainings and build a conceptual model on how trainings on local governance can foster democratic consolidation. This theoretical framework ends with the introduction of a conceptual model that will form the basis of hypotheses that I will illustrate. The third chapter presents the Tunisian context and The Hague Academy briefly. The fourth chapter describes concretely the methodology (variables, indicators, interviews) that will be used to answer our research question. The fifth chapter describes the findings of the research and a discussion about the conducting of further research is suggested. The sixth chapter is the conclusion of the thesis whereby it is an assessment of whether the links defined in the theoretical match can be confirmed by the case study. Finally, in this last chapter, recommendations are given.

Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Introduction

The research question, i.e.: “*How did trainings on local governance foster the consolidation of democracy in Tunisia?*”, contains two main concepts that need to be defined first so that the conclusions made on this subject by scholars can be understood. The first concept is local governance, and the second is democratic consolidation. After these terms are defined, this chapter describes to what extent the trainings given to civil servants represent a tool for democratic transition, and how trainings for adults can be evaluated in a reliable way. This chapter’s conclusion links all the previous theories together in the answering of the following question: “What is the theoretical, presupposed relationship between trainings on local governance and stimulation of democratic consolidation?” In the process of deductive research, these theoretical researches are used for establishing a conceptual model that defines how trainings on local governance can consolidate democracy. This conceptual model is the basis underlying the research design and methodology, which is discussed in the fourth chapter of this thesis.

2.2. Terms

2.2.1. Local Governance

The attention to local governance is to be considered as part of the current Governance paradigm dominating the world of Public Administration (Osborne, 2006). The Governance paradigm also emphasizes a system of multi-level governance. Hence, these two concepts will be defined before giving the definition of local governance.

Governance is defined as the “processes and outcomes of consultative interactions between different constituent members including public, private, and civil organizations in order to resolve common political, economic, and social issues” (Evans et al in: Saito, 2008:7). The current emphasis on this subject is considered part of the broader paradigm of New Public Governance within Public Administration, which is defined by Ling (in van Wart, 2015:12) as the reforms “to make government more effective and legitimate by including a wider range of social actors in both policymaking and implementation.” Common mechanisms include networks and partnerships of stakeholders, and horizontal instead of vertical supervision. This

is also seen as a way to overcome fragmentation, one of the side effects of the New Public Management that dominated public administration since the late 70s (Osbourne, 2006).

The attention to local governance is particularly important if we consider local governments as part of a larger interconnected system of multi-level governance that is preconized by the international community (OCDE, 2017). Multi-level governance is defined as a “system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers—supranational, national, regional and local” (Marks 1993, 392; Hooghe 1996 in Hooghe and Marks, 2005:234). The system is said to “generate outcomes which are more than the sum of the individual outputs” and that can “lower transaction costs by bringing resources together for more efficient management” (Saito, 2008:6,13).

Under these ideas of partnerships, networks, and inclusiveness, local governments (which is defined as any layer other than the central government and is the body of persons constituting it (Saito, 2008)) are considered to be more than a service provider. In a system of multi-level governance, a local authority “does not reason only in terms of the logic of ends and means, inputs and outputs, but recognizes that some characteristics of the key processes in society (such as transparency, integrity, honesty) are likely to be valuable in themselves” and is “inherently political” (Bovaird and Loffler, 2002:17). In conclusion, “an excellent local authority ... must also be excellent in the way in which it discharges its political and social responsibilities in the community” (*op. cit.*). Furthermore, giving more responsibilities to local governments is seen as more democratic. Indeed, the latter scores better on three aspects—accountability, responsiveness, and responsibility (Beetham in Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998: 111)—that are central for a democratic regime (definition of this found below in the next paragraph) than the central level.

Local governance is then defined as “the set of formal and informal rules, structures and processes which determine the ways in which individuals and organizations can exercise power over the decision (by other stakeholders) which affects their welfare at the local level” (Bovaird and Loffler, 2002: 16).

2.2.1.1 Leadership in a system of multi-level governance

Globally, every layer of government—in this multi-level governance system—has to play a facilitative leadership role in which they must listen to the opinions of different stakeholders.

Facilitative roles of governments require good communication skills, open-mindedness, broad perspective at every level of government to redefine public interest, courage to experiment with new initiatives, and the capacity to manage new projects for different partners (Saito, 2008).

On the same line, Bovaird and Loffler (2002 :18) assess that good governance at local level requires three different aspects: (i) a focus on governance issues that are not dealt with properly within the government, such as transparency, honesty, accountability, citizen engagement, levels of trust in society, level of respect for the democratic processes and the equalities agenda, (ii) a multiple stakeholder framework that transcends organizational borders, and (iii) involving all important stakeholders in the assessment by “taking into account their perception of how well ... governance issues are dealt with in their local area” (*op. cit.*).

It is also important to mention here that all the other stakeholders (CSO, NGO, citizens) who are due to play a future role in multi-level governance must also learn how to exercise agency, which is defined as the “capability and knowledge ability of actors with actions and reflections upon them” (Saito, 2008: 19). This is sometimes difficult for minorities, who must be empowered to foster democracy.

2.2.2. Definition of Democracy

Attempting to define the notion of democratic consolidation would not be possible without agreeing on the long-debated definition of democracy. One’s definition of democracy also defines what matters in its measurement.

Political scientists have gone from very minimalist, procedural definitions of democracy to more innovative conceptions of the regime, and even as far as defining broadly different countries. The latter approach towards defining the term ended up in a proliferation of subtypes of democracy¹ (Collier and Levitsky, 1997), even though defining different possible forms of democracy also raised questions on whether “these regimes should be treated as subtypes of democracy rather than subtypes of authoritarianism” (*op. cit.*). Agreeing on this last quote, this research will rather use a procedural definition of democracy as reference.

The most famous procedural definition of democracy comes from Schumpeter (in: Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 75) who, in 1943, defined democracy as an “institutional arrangement for

¹ With notions such as "authoritarian democracy," "neopatrimonial democracy," "military-dominated democracy" or "protodemocracy"

arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote". Through the years, definitions have tended to include more normative elements. For example, Robert Dahl (in Valenzuela, 1990: 4), named eight institutional requirements for a regime to be considered a democracy: (1) "freedom to form and join organizations"; (2) freedom of expression; (3) right to vote; (4) eligibility for public office; (5) right of political leaders to compete for support [and votes]; (6) alternative sources of information; (7) free and fair elections; and (8) institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.

Defining democracy has long been the subject of debates. Yet, the goal of this thesis is not to determine which scholar has the best definition of the concept. In addition to the previous definitions, Schmitter and Karl (1991:76) give a procedural definition of democracy with an emphasis on the ideas of governance, accountability of rulers to citizens and the relevance of mechanisms of competition and cooperation within the civil society, which they consider to be important to take into account besides election mechanisms. These notions are very relevant to this research because they link the notion of democracy with the notion of governance. Their definition of democracy is "a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives."²

2.2.3. Democratization

In his conception of what change is necessary to go from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one, Guillermo O'Donnell (in Valenzuela, 1990: 3) considers that two transitions must happen: The first one is the "installation of a democratic government", and the second is the "consolidation of democracy", which is described as "the effective functioning of a democratic regime."*(op. cit.)* Becoming democratic is a process that can be considered in a sense as linear, considering that transition implies in every case the affirmation and strengthening of institutions (electoral system), revitalization or creation of plural parties, independence of justice and

²Elements of these definitions, if old, still form the basis of the definitions of democracy and of its evaluation. For example, the Freedom House (on its website) assesses that "freedom is possible only in democratic political environments where governments are accountable to their own people; the rule of law prevails; and freedoms of expression, association, and belief, as well as respect for the rights of minorities and women, are guaranteed." The Economist Intelligence Unit's democracy index (2015) is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. (Kekik, 2007) Schmitter defined democracy in 2015 (32) as an ideal "that is self-ruled by citizens possessing equal rights and having equal influence over the choice of leaders and the conduct of public affairs". He also identified loss of trust for politicians and representative institutions, with lower participation and identification, volatility in elections as "morbidity symptoms" of democratic decline.

measures to respect human rights. The latter course of events also refers to a broadly researched concept of democratic transition, i.e., the first phase in O'Connell's view on what must happen first in order to reach democracy. Since the second transition, i.e., consolidation, sometimes requires giving up and changing policies and measures that have been taken during the first phase, the scholar does not consider the latter to be continuous. Recent studies are still using his conclusions, such as the one of Slovik (2008) who also distinguishes a first transition phase from the consolidation of democracy.

2.2.3.1. Definition of democratic transition (which is the “first phase” according to O'Connell's definition of democratization)

Democratic transition is the passage from one (undemocratic) political regime to a democratic political regime. Manuel Antonio Garreton (in O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:15)³ follows this interpretation when he says that "in its more classical conception, transition implies the ending of military rule and consolidation of the legal and political institutions of representative democracy." Again, later on, scholars tended to add more elements to the definition of the concept of democratic transition.

Robert Dahl (in Abidi, 2012:18), in his transition model, states that transition must involve the States in a three-dimensional restructuring of their regimes: (1) from a government with a unique political party to a pluralist democracy, (2) from a central planning to a market economy, and (3) from autarky to integration in the global economy.

While G. Hesmet (in Abidi, 2012:19) has a more dynamic conception of the transition into democracy, which must consist of four criteria: (1) the passage from one type of government to another type in a short period, (2) voluntarism in the management of political action and “strategic perspectives from actors from the top (elites)”, (3) chaos theories (which relate to the game of actors, determined in advance, that can result in opposite effects and results; this thought is namely shared by the UN also whereby the UN states in a guidance note that democracy is a “political and social system whose ideal functioning is never fully achieved.

³ With regard to the precedent footnote (2), definitions on democratic transitions also remain valid. In 1986, Schmitter and O'Connell wrote *Transition from authoritarian rule*, where their conclusions on democratic transition joined ideas quoted in this paragraph (i.e, great uncertainty about outcomes of transition, high level of fear of authoritarian repression, constant flux on how the role of the political regime are refined (...) and core tasks of new governments that include setting up mechanisms of participation, consensus building, end of military rule, ...). In 2013, Schmitter and O'Connell reedited the book and assessed that « the core insights of the project remain valid today» (p.viii).

Democratization can then be seen as neither linear nor irreversible” (UNSG), and (4) transition is characterized by the codified and predictable nature of its functioning.

2.2.3.2. Definition of democratic consolidation

A regime does not become a stable democracy overnight. Dahrendorf (in Bianchi, 1997:120) evaluated that major political changes can happen within six months. Sufficient economic changes take six years but that “basic social changes that are necessary for building a civil society require more than sixty years” (*op.cit.*). In that sense, Svobik (2008: 155) stated that “the age of a democracy *is* in fact associated with an increase in the odds of its survival”. The research of the latter even suggested that “half transitional democracies will revert to dictatorship within 14 years” (2008:156).

Witesman said in 2012 that “new democracies are often characterized by cultural and institutional vestiges of autocratic systems” (2012:712). Dimandouros and Larrabee (in Pridham: 2000:19) also analyzed 5 *salient characteristics* of new democracies (hence, non-consolidated): patrimonialists; sultanistics and (post-)totalitarian inherences in state/society relations, non-liberal concepts of democracy, ethnic concepts of the nation and the expected use of public office for private gains.

A “consolidated democracy” refers to—from a linguistic point of view—a stable, non-vulnerable government structure. If these characteristics are important to consider a democracy consolidated, more elements also matter. Consolidation of democracy indeed also suggests the redefinition of institution or relationships amongst political actors, which can imply the abandoning, altering of arrangements, agreements, and institutions that may have facilitated the first transition “by providing guarantees to authoritarian rulers and the forces backing them but that are inimical to the second” (Valenzuela, 1990:4).

Along the same lines of this thought, Stepan and Linz consider democracy to be consolidated when it becomes the “only game in town” (1998:2). The scholars see it as having no political groups attempting to overthrow the democratic regime, that the behavior of the newly elected (democratic) government is no longer dominated by the problem of how to avoid democratic breakdown. And that even in the face of severe political and economic crises, “the overwhelming majority of the people believe that any further political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic procedures” (*op. cit.*). A democracy is consolidated if all the “actors in the game become habituated to the fact that political conflict within the state

will be resolved according to established norms, and that violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly” (*op. cit.*).

In addition, Valenzuela defines a consolidated democracy as one that “does not have perverse elements undermining its basic characteristics (1990:8)”. These perverse elements are: existence of tutelary powers, reserved domains of authority and policy making (products of political actors who are not subjected to electoral accountability)⁴, major discrimination in the electoral process and non-centrality of the electoral means to constitute governments⁵. Hence, the process of democratic consolidation requires the elimination of institutions, procedures and expectations that are not compatible with the “minimal working of a democratic regime”. The fairly elected government’s authority does not have to be limited, and (civil and political) actors must trust the regime. Democratic procedures must gradually imply more actors’ active involvement in politics. This then generates a new political balance of forces “as some actors win, and others lose relative shares of power, authority, and influence when compared to the balance that prevailed under the previous regime (*op. cit.*)”

In addition, the conceptions of democracy and the first transition mainly focus on democracy at the level of the state, a narrow notion of citizenship, and formal and legal political equality. It then pays little attention to democracy at sub-national levels (Valenzuela, 1990:10). Along the lines of the same thought. Arato (1996:2) also added that “the more developed the additional levels of the institutions (...) the more secure will be the democratic design of free and competitive elections and accountable government, in terms of both stability and a given improving quality of democracy”. Arato (*op.cit.*) also stated that in the consolidation of democracy, the role of the civil society would also be bigger, while its role usually remains self-limited in the first transition. This idea was confirmed by a study of Bernhard et al (2015:23) who assessed that “democracies with a more entrenched civil society (...) decrease in their baseline hazard of experiencing a reversal (...) and enhances the regime’s survival time.” These thoughts can also be found in Pippa Norris’s work. In 2008, she underlined factors as power-sharing institutions, incentives for cooperation and consultation between executive and

⁴ By contrast, policy insulation in democracies results from arrangements reached by negotiation and agreement among political actors who are empowered to enter these arrangements by virtue of their recognized leadership and/or representation of a segment of the political community. (Valenzuela, 1990:11)

⁵ (that must be the only mean to elect governments. This then excludes military coups or insurrections) It is based on the idea that, if elections are the only means to form a government, it will oblige “significant political actors to design their political strategies in ways that are consistent with the democratic procedure”

legislature, decentralization, competition, representation and participation and freedom of the press as key elements driving (consolidating) a democracy.

Besides, Valenzuela (1990) cites five key conditions that play a positive impact on the consolidation of democracy: (1) former elites in favor of the democracy, (2) negative experience with repression or positive history of democracy and a first transition phase lived as positive, (3) a moderated political conflict, (4) a managed social conflict, which implies the creation of “adequate social demand settlements”⁶. Politicization regarding these settlements can be badly perceived by the persons concerned. And (5) making the military subordinate to the democratic government (Valenzuela, 1990). A more recent research from Berg-Schlosser (2011:300) joins Valenzuela’s ideas, stating that in the consolidation of democracy, “some of the transition factors, such as the more widespread acceptance of democratic ‘rules of the game’, civil control of the military and the ensuing ‘habituation’ effects, continue to exercise a positive influence. Free media and open forms of public expression and organization are also among the gains in this process.”

2.2.3.3. Decentralization and democratization

In the consolidation of democracy, decentralization plays an important role in many aspects. Saito (2008:9) said that first, localities being freed from the central level will imply more flexibility in consultation and better conditions in the negotiation concerning local affairs. Devised policies are more likely to be responsive to societal needs. It increases allocative efficiency “by subjecting public spending to local demand” (Grindle, 2007:7). The phenomenon also makes “information on the performance of government institutions ... more readily available to citizens” (*op. cit.*). This puts the citizens in a better position to make demands for effective services and to reward and punish local politicians, while the latter becomes more aware of local demand thanks to the daily contact they will have with citizens, which will motivate them more to perform well (*op. cit.*). However, the process of decentralization is generally facing barriers. These barriers concern power relations, participatory skills, political will, the level of participation, and insufficient financial resources at local level (Gaventa and Valderrama,1997).

⁶Which could imply “setting up [or restructuration] of new state institutions that will receive and process social demands”, the “establishment, expansion or recreation of popular and other associations to voice demands and negotiate some resolutions to them”, “the development of mutually agreeable procedures that social groups who confront each other regularly can follow to settle their differences”

Although, enforcing decentralization is complicated, and the phenomena of decentralization and democratization in changing regimes have been questioned. In 2009, Witesman (117) contradicted the wide belief that decentralization naturally led to democratization. She said that “decentralization of government structures prior to shifts in institutional reform may actually limit government’s capacity to provide the training necessary to achieve institutional democratization effectively, if at all”. This because of what she called the “decentralization paradox”, that is that “democratic structural reform requir[es] decentralization and democratic institutional reform requir[es] centralization”.

In her view, sequencing the two processes is vital. That is because “if decentralization occurs before a cultural shift, subsequent changes in values and attitudes occur in relative isolation, if at all” (*op.cit.*). This could then result in a fragmented reform. Also, a decentralized regime with no “democratic responsiveness and transparency may yield citizen discontent and disillusionment with the promises and rhetoric for democratic reform. The tide of public opinion may shift, and the newly democratic nation may call for a recentralization of government structure” (*op. cit.*). This is also coming from the assumption that a hierarchical culture would imply top-down influence on democratic reforms. She concludes that overcoming these barriers and fostering democratization requires that multiple initiatives be taken. These include the launching of innovative initiatives that can be classified as either participatory planning methodologies, actions for citizen education, awareness building, and training and sensitizing public officials.

2.3. Trainings on local governance

2.3.1. Training civil servants

Organizing and fostering trainings for governmental officials derive from a few premises. First, that society is changing. Secondly, that governments within this society evolve too “and can encourage, discourage, or be marginal to social change processes through political and administrative elements” (Huntington in Van Wart, 2015:4). That governments can be part of the problems but also part of the solutions. That good leadership always matters and at all levels (Bennis and Nanus in *op. cit.*). And finally, that managerial and leadership skills are also the result of education, professional experience that usually come before vocational, professional training.

The call for democracy suggests a need to reform fundamental institutions (Witesman and Wise, 2012). In that process, training of senior governmental authorities is based on the thought that “only when public administrators engage in reforms... is significant change likely to take place” (Witesman and Wise, 2012:710). Furthermore, the scholars assert that in a transitional context, “the lack of both legal obligation and any expectation of discretion allows public administrators ... to make important reform decisions with little interference from the political authority” (*op. cit.*).

Training governmental officials generally aims at fulfilling one of the two following needs: (1) improve technical skills of civil servants (in other words, countering the lack of experience in leading/administrative positions), or (2) foster democratic reforms, i.e., to “enable existing government officials how to engage with citizens and different stakeholders such as NGO or CSO in a participatory manner” (Witesman 2009:123 and Gaventa and Valderrama, 1997:10). Generally, trainings that have an objective of organizational change and executive skills are organized for senior civil servants who “tend to know their agency or organization’s technical and legal system well (Van Wart, 2015:3)”.

2.3.2. How can we evaluate trainings effectivity?


In adult learning, vocational trainings have three main goals: (1) grasp the theory, (2) practice the skills, and (3) apply the learning (for example, through an action plan). And they also have three possible learning outcomes, according to the European Qualification Framework (EQF) (in Brockman, 2008): (1) knowledge, (2) skills, and (3) competence. Competence is a holistic notion, which can be understood as the “ability to deal with complex situation, drawing to multiple resources that the employee brings to the workplace” (*op.cit.*).

Kirkpatrick D. and Kirkpatrick J. (2007) cite 10 requirement for a training program to be effective: (1) the program is based on the needs of participants, (2) the program is based on learning the objectives set, (3) the program is scheduled at the right time, (4) the program is held at the right place with the right amenities, (5) the right people are invited to attend it, (6) effective instructors are selected, (7) effective technique and aidare used, (8) program objectives are achieved, (9) participants are satisfied, and (10) the program is evaluated.

This last requirement, i.e., evaluation, is crucial, but it is also complex and time-consuming. Kunche et al (2011:1) name five main purposes for performing this step carefully: feedback, research⁷, control program⁸, power games⁹, intervention (as it helps in “determining whether the actual outcomes are matched with the expected outcomes”). Still, the costs and time needed for an effective evaluation cause most training institutes to limit their training evaluations to using evaluation forms that are distributed right after the training (van Wart, 2016). These are considered by Kirkpatrick D. and Kirkpatrick J (2007) to be indicators of customer’s satisfaction.

Hence, also witnessing this lack of evaluations in the training organizations, Kirkpatrick D. and Kirkpatrick J. have established a reference model that consists of four steps, destined to evaluate training and its related outcomes that is described in the next table:

Table 1: Effective evaluation of training



The first step—evaluation of reaction—is important for two reasons: because participants are clients, and they need to be satisfied. And they would be annoyed if no one asked for their

⁷ It helps in finding out the relationship between acquired knowledge, transfer of knowledge at the workplace, and training

⁸ It helps in controlling the training program because if the training is not effective then it can be dealt with accordingly with some advancement.

⁹ At times, the top management (higher authoritative employee) uses the evaluative data to manipulate it for their own benefits. This is more related to trainings made for a specific organization.

opinion about the training. However, being satisfied does not automatically mean that they learnt something. The second step —evaluation of learning— is, according to Kirkpatrick J. and Kirkpatrick D., respected by less than half of the organizations due to lack of resources, knowledge or “decision that it is not important”. Most organizations go straight to the third step even though the evaluation of the acquired knowledge is key for getting results (Kirkpatrick, 2007:79). The third step —behavioral change— is the “only way to define whether training failure was caused by an ineffective training or lack of sufficient follow-up” (2007:82)¹⁰. Reaction to this change of behavior can be multiple: the trainee could like it and continue, or he might not like it and go back to the previous behavior. Longer lasting reinforcement that leads to the first reaction is more likely to happen if satisfaction is intrinsic. However, extrinsic satisfaction is also favoring the long-lasting change. Finally, the fourth step —evaluation of results— is not difficult. The challenge is, however, to assess whether these are linked to the training. And that’s the challenge that these four steps scheme address.

In addition, Bray (2009:284) assesses that plans following trainings must be SMART: Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Timely. Then, reviewing the extent that the program design has led to the expected results will determine whether this should be continued, changed, or stopped.

2.4. Training on local governance and democratic consolidation: conclusion and conceptual model

“In the context of ... social, economic and political changes, the environment in which city and local governments operate has been undergoing and continue to face rapid changes. Such an environment has been and continues to be very unstable, placing a premium on governments (both national and local) to be more flexible, innovative and adaptive and to reinvent themselves to move away from (local) government towards (local) governance” (Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998 :101).

In the process of becoming democratic, “governments are being forced, not only to take notice but to become more democratic and to make fundamental changes in the way they operate” (Ellis, 1993:23). This suggests that multiple values and skills must be acquired, and that others

¹⁰ This aspect is more difficult to evaluate than the first two. Evaluating whether there is a change in behavior implies that an opportunity to do so occurs. When this opportunity will going to occur is impossible to predict.’ (Kirkpatrick D. and Kirkpatrick J., 2007:82).

must be forgotten. One of the biggest challenges is to change the old mentality, and this is done by “enhancing individual skills and social responsibility, increasing awareness to civil society and sensibility about human rights, and facilitating communication and consensus building in all sectors of society” (Bianchi, 1997:117). It is important to know that totalitarian systems are characterized by one-way communication, with decision-making, orders, supervision, and punishment always going from the top then downwards, i.e., from the “top of a political and social hierarchy” (Bianchi, 1997:116). These regimes punish disobedience, so skills for conflict prevention, solution, and negotiation are not needed from public administrators or local authorities (*op. cit.*).

The previous part has shown that transition must imply two steps: becoming democratic, and consolidating democracy (Guillermo in Valenzuela, 1990). Indeed, “new democracies are often characterized by cultural and institutional vestiges of autocratic systems” (Wise and Witesman, 2012:712). These vestiges are generally corruption and patronage, lack of citizen involvement, use of coercion and intimidation in the formulation of public policy (*op. cit.*). Elements that are similar to Valenzuela’s (1990) *undermining* elements for democracy, i.e., tutelary powers, reserved domains of authority and policymaking, major discrimination in the electoral process, and non-centrality of the electoral means to constitute governments. Valenzuela’s (1990) theories on democratic consolidation consider that these elements need to be eliminated to consolidate democracy.

Many characteristics of the system of multi-level governance, a “system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers—supranational, national, regional, and local” (Marks and Hooghe in Hooghe and Marks, 2005:234), are joining characteristics of the process of democratic consolidation. Indeed, democratic consolidation specifically insists on the redefinition of balance of powers and on the increasingly important role that the local level must take on within the new equilibrium (Valenzuela, 1990). Advocates of decentralization or devolution of power consider that as local level authorities are the closest to the citizens, they are more likely to successfully foster inclusiveness in the deliberative processes, and so as to be more accountable (Arato, 1996). Furthermore, empowered local governments will soon have “serious implications for the achievement of broad social and political goals such as social inclusiveness, equitable distribution of resources, and citizen empowerment” (Shoberg et al, 2016:90).

In conclusion, in a multi-level governance system, good local governance is important because local governments will be a real partner at central level with its own responsibilities (Chambers in Saito, 2008:12). However, totalitarian systems are characterized by top-down decision-making. And in a period of transition, many characteristics of totalitarian systems remain. Then, the theoretical presupposition is that effective trainings on local governance for civil servants must make them aware of the benefits of multi-level governance and importance of good local governance within it. At every level, participants should acquire facilitative and/or negotiation/conflict prevention communication skills that would enable them to strengthen local governments. Then, if we follow the evaluation model of Kirkpatrick J. and Kirkpatrick D., and if evaluation of a given training show that the latter leads to behavioral change, which lead to results, the conclusion would be that trainings on local governance foster the strengthening of local governments, hence democratic consolidation.


Participation by multiple stakeholders in the decision-making is central in the consolidation of democracy, and so is the main characteristic of a system of multi-level governance which, again, insists on the facilitative skills of governments (at every level). Democracy is also in theory described as an ideal, which, to achieve it, requires the work from the people, their leaders, and the political directorate (Bogason and Musso, 2005). Participation is then a notion that is central, being at the level of the civil society and is aimed at the citizens themselves. Then, the theoretical presupposition is that trainings on local governance for civil servants must make them aware and give them knowledge about the benefits of citizens and civil society participation and skills such as communication/facilitative leadership/negotiation/conflict management that could enable the latter. If the training evaluation shows that the latter leads to behavioral change that in turn lead to results, then it can be concluded that trainings on local governance foster citizen participation and civil society participation, which in turn fosters democratic consolidation.

(Local) governance also emphasizes the imperative of attention to the transparency, accountability, integrity at every level of government (Bovaird and Löffler, 2002). These skills are necessary for moving towards an inclusive system and are fundamental in democracy and a democratic leadership. Then, it can be concluded that effective trainings on local governance would foster attention to core values of democratic leadership. These are transparency, innovation, accountability, and integrity. This can lead to behavioral change that can lead to

outcomes. The conclusion would be that trainings on local governance foster democratic leadership that consequently stimulate democratic consolidation.

To conclude, effective trainings on local governance will presumably address four main topics that foster democratic consolidation: strengthening of local governments, citizen participation, civil society participation, and democratic leadership. For a training to be successful, its impact must be threefold: that participants acquire—from the four subjects—learning, which leads to behavioral change, which will then lead to an outcome. Theoretically, trainings on local governance can imply that more inclusive, more democratic local and central government officials who enable participation from the civil society and citizens and work towards the strengthening of local governments. These conclusions result in the following conceptual model:

Figure 1: conceptual model



The following question that should be answered is whether these theoretical assumptions are verified empirically through the evaluation of trainings organized by The Hague Academy.

Chapter 3. The Tunisian context and The Hague Academy trainings

3.1. Introduction

This chapter describes the Tunisian transitional context in which the interviewees perform their duties. The regime in place is first described, with a short explanation of the events that led to the revolution in 2011. Then, a description of the Tunisian administration and the challenges that still lie ahead of the public servants are depicted. Thirdly, the trainings and the functioning of The Hague Academy for local governance will be described in detail. The chapter is concluded with a description of the relevance of the case study with regard to the conceptual model.

3.2. Recent democratization

Before the Arab Springs (2011), Tunisia was ruled by dictator Ben Ali. The triggering event that led to the so-called *Jasmine revolution* was a police officer's confiscation of the goods of an unlicensed vegetable seller. The latter drenched himself in gasoline and set himself on fire. Wave of protests that followed the event put an end to the ruling of Ben Ali in December 2010 (Abouzeid, 2011). It also marked the end of years of dictatorship that also defined the previous regime under Bourguiba after Tunisia became independent from France in 1956 (Stepan, 2012).

When Ben Ali left, the civil society sought “full participation in decision-making by newly emergent and solidly united groups within political society” (Stepan, 2012:91). An entity emerged comprising representatives from all parties. This was called the Ben Achour Commission, whose responsibility was to reform the Constitution and law. Afterwards, the first elections took place in October 23, 2011. There were 217 representatives from the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) who were elected, and their crucial mission was to draft a new Constitution and prepare subsequent free elections. From the 217 NCA representatives, 41% of them were from the Ennahda Islamist movement (also called al-Nahda). The NCA elected Hamadi Jebali (Ennahda former secretary-general) as Prime Minister and Moncef Marzouki—a human rights activist—as president. 2011 marked for Stepan (2012:90) Tunisia's achievement of transition, because of 4 criteria: (i) “sufficient agreement on “procedures to produce an elected government.” (ii) A “government that comes to power as the direct result of

a free and popular vote.” (iii) Government’s (...) authority to generate new policies”. (iv) “Executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure”. Hesmets’ (in Abidi, 2012:19) criteria of a successful transition, which was described in the theoretical framework, confirm Stepan’s assessment (that Tunisia successfully achieved its transition to democracy): Tunisia’s regime and government changed in a short period, voluntarism has been found in the management of political action (Ben Achour Commission which is said to have taken relevant decisions) (Stepan, 2012) and strategic perspectives from actors from elites have occurred. Tunisia has also made considerable efforts towards a free market economy, but these actually already started under Ben Ali in the 80s (Allison, 2015). Finally, even the “chaos theories” are verified as the new democracy is still seen as fragile.

Today, Tunisia is a republic. The Assembly of the People’s Representatives’ single chamber holds legislative power. Tunisia’s president Beji Caid Essebi was elected in 2014 after the first free presidential elections. The same year, the Constitution was adopted. The prime minister has been Youssef Chahed since 2016. His unity government “includes a broad coalition of secular, Islamist and leftist parties, independents and trade union allies” (BBC, 2017).

Although, the international community and Tunisians themselves show concern about the current situation of the country, even though the country is often called “pillar for democracy”. Fast democratization is said to have “brutally awakened social tensions that are only a reflection of the cumulating failures of ruling authorities, including the aftermath of the revolution” (Baccouche, 2016:184). As mentioned in the theoretical framework, former autocratic systems often keep vestiges of autocracy or undermining elements of democracy. Baccouche (*op.cit.*) has summarized Tunisia’s current challenges through this transition process in the following paragraph:

Once it becomes democratic, the central government no longer imposes, it proposes. It must seek to convince enormously and find acceptable solutions. It must have the ability to adapt its proposals and to deal with diversity. But will the central government be able to break with its inherited habits that exist since many years that were shaped by despotism? It will have to deal with citizens and no longer with subjects as it was used to. Its agents must get used to renounce their privileges and admit that they have no longer the unique position to realize the public interest. Furthermore, they are asked to make concessions, sometimes painfully, especially when it comes to government funds, in other words financial issues. At the regional level, the elected president of the local community will have the priority, including in terms of protocol.

Recent events have also been denounced by journalists and political scientists as a threat to the Tunisian democracy. First, in September 2013, Parliament has passed its Retaliation law that pardons ex-corrupt officials (Aliriza, Chettaoui, 2017). This was done “while indefinitely postponing more urgent laws affecting local elections and local government” (*op. cit.*). This latter issue will be discussed in the next paragraph. The government’s scorn for formal procedures is not entirely unexpected. President Beji Caid Essebsi and key figures in the ruling party have been publicly criticizing the 2014 Constitution — the crowning achievement of Tunisia’s transition — as too restrictive on executive power. Some politicians even suggested that “a referendum seeking to amend the constitution and change the political system be launched” (*op.cit.*).

3.3. Tunisia’s Administration

Tunisia is divided into 14 provinces (locally called “*wilayas*” or “*governorates*”), which are subdivided into delegations (*mutamadiyat*) or districts (*shaykhats*) and sectors (*imadats*). Each province is headed by a governor who is appointed by the President through the Secretary of Interior (Encyclopedia of the Nations, 2014). There are 264 municipalities, governed by 165 rural councils (UCLG, 2006). New municipalities were created by decree, upon proposal from the Ministry of the Interior, and following consultations with the Ministries of Finance and Equipment. Thus, the municipalities’ activities are controlled under trusteeship (UCLG, 2006).

3.2.1 Changing Forces in Tunisia’s Administration: decentralization, local governance

Tunisia has a centralized history. Municipalities have suffered abuses under the dictatorships that took over the regions after the independence. In 2011, Municipalities accounted for only 7% of public spending and played a minor role in local development (Achy, 2011). In the aftermath of the Jasmine revolution, the high level of centralization of the state has been questioned, and the new Constitution of 2014 has made clear commitments towards decentralization, with a vision of local governments becoming “fully devolved and empowered (...) with autonomy for executing their mandates of providing local services according to transparent principles of participation by, and accountability to, their citizens” (WB, 2014). With this aim, the government launched a US\$770 million plan to strengthen local governments “and address the needs of disadvantaged areas” (*op. cit.*). It mainly focuses on reforming the management of responsibility for the public funds available for municipalities. This comes

together with a “national priority of redistributing decision-making from the central government to local governments” (*op. cit.*).

But until today, the municipal councils are still unelected, and they function the way they did before the time of the revolution. The appointed special delegations are legal, but they lack legitimacy “and have failed to respond local demands, becoming increasingly subject to partisan tensions” (Abderrahim, 2017). Because of that, their composition changed many times, among other reasons, for members’ resignation or absence. When considering these points all together, it implies that seven years after the revolution, municipalities make only a small contribution to local development¹¹, and “frustration with these councils has been simmering” (ECDPM, 2017).

The process of decentralization is still facing political, social, and economic challenges due to the institutional, legal, and judicial system. For decentralization to be fully processed, it will require the deployment of human and financial means that will have to be used in a very cautious way (Baccouche, 2016). On January 31, 2017, a law on regional and local elections was adopted. A code for localities was proposed and is currently being analyzed by the Parliament. The Parliament aims to put the “Constitutional principles in concrete terms, while taking into consideration the reality of communities that lack of financial and human resources” (Baccouche, 2016:188). The document has already undergone 18 rounds of review.

Baccouche (*op.cit.*) says that many different aspects of the current Tunisian situation play a role in the fact that the code still has not been approved. Firstly, authorities are reluctant towards financial decentralization in the current economic crisis that is hitting the country. Plus, citizens are reluctant in paying their taxes. Thirdly, a significant number of municipalities are characterized by a financial deficit, which makes them unable to meet the minimum requirements of the local people. The situation globally worsened after the revolution, with communities losing a lot of their own resources, and local taxation became insufficient to carry their burden. Consequently, communities are becoming more and more dependent on the State that is currently providing them with special assistance (*op.cit.*).

To impose discipline and management, the code lays down provisions regarding borrowings, which Baccouche (2016) considers to be a restraint for decentralization. The code also sets out

¹¹ Investigations conducted by the Court of Audit on municipalities have assessed this issue. For example, the Municipality of Hammam Sousse has been accused of having deficiencies in resources gathering, irregularities regarding the exploitation of the municipal patrimony. In the governorate of Sfax, it has been denounced that there were insufficiencies in the management of regional projects and irregularities in the administrative and financial management.

the modalities on how citizens can participate in the management of social affairs. It also authorizes the State to offer various kinds of “central services to assist the decentralization program” (Baccouche, 2016:192). This implies the training of civil servants, with the support of international help. The National School of Administration has also been appointed to create three or four regional offices to provide training and staff development programs that will help the regions (*op.cit.*).

3.4. Trainings on local governance to stimulate democratic consolidation in Tunisia?

Elements of the theoretical framework are verified here, in this context description. Tunisia, in its process of democratic consolidation, must empower local government. Decentralization has been broadly emphasized in the Constitution. The fact that the Code for Local Communities has not been approved is currently raising concerns among scholars, also because this postponed the organization of the first municipal elections. In the governance paradigm, empowerment of the civil society and citizen participation are important. However, it is said that so far, in Tunisia, the current government has failed to design a “consensual manner of a system socially acceptable for tax and allocations of public funds” (Baccouche, 2016:84). The same criticism has been made on the economic, financial, and administrative reforms for introducing transparency and rational management that are considered to “have been slow to give the ruling forces the credit of confidence they need” (*op. cit.*). Some of Valenzuela’s perverse elements described in the theoretical framework that threaten democracy are found at the local level, as the authorities are still not elected (we will go further into this subject in the next paragraph). To conclude, a new balance of power must exist with more players being involved in politics. Also, inclusiveness of citizens and civil society still needs more adequate settlements (*op. cit.*).

In addition, Van Wart’s (2015: 339,340) seven criteria on what makes the perception of the importance of senior civil servants (SCS) trainings bigger confirm the relevance of trainings. These criteria are: (1) the importance of training is perceived first because all systems decay over time; (2) the perception that there is a need to reinvigorate the administrative system; (3) the perception that SCS skills, awareness, and motivation are deficient; (4) the perception that there are common gaps in education in technical, management, and leadership competencies among SCS; (5) the perception that high-quality experience is lacking from many aspects; (6) there are perceived competency gaps due to lack of previous training; and (7) the perception that “government needs to constantly invest in itself over time”. In the recently democratized country of Tunisia, these have all been met except for the first one.

Finally, providing this mission to The Hague Academy for Local Governance is theoretically relevant with regard to the way the organization work.

As explained in the first chapter, The Hague Academy for Local Governance (THA) is a non-governmental organization that delivers trainings to civil servants mainly coming from transitioning and developing countries. The organization believes that “adult students learn best through a good mix of lectures, participatory learning methods¹² and open space for discussions” (THA, 2016). THA believes in the mantra of John McLeish’s statement that “it has in fact been established that if we were to reverse the natural order of things and keep children away from school while sending their parents instead, we could teach the parents the same thing for about a quarter of the expenditure in time and money” (THA, 2010).

Before each training, every participant completes a form in which they indicate their expectations and needs, which are taken into consideration in the design of the trainings. Every training session consists of four steps that are repeated: introduction, explanation, application, and summary. Participants are at the center of every session and must use their experiences together with the knowledge acquired. They must think in order to apply the reflections to their context. The training on local governance designed for the Shiraka programs includes various sessions on the themes approached in the theoretical framework that are important in a multi-level governance system and in the process of democratic consolidation. The program consisted of 16 to 20 sessions (study visits, workshops, and presentations) over a period of 10 (until 2015) to 13 working days (from 2015 onwards). Every year, the sessions focused on local governance, multi-level governance, decentralization (general notions, in the Netherlands and in the MENA region), socio-economic development, citizen and civil society inclusiveness (mostly through study visits). Skills training sessions were also conducted on the subjects of negotiation, presentation, change and process management, working in a team, accountability. Notions that are in the theoretical framework are described as indicators of the variables of democratic consolidation and of democratic leadership. The presupposition with regard to the case-study is that trainings designed by The Hague Academy can play a role in the consolidation of democracy in Tunisia.

¹² Role-playing, discussions, simulation games, case-studies, and small group work

Chapter 4: Research design and methodology

4.1. Introduction

In the second chapter, theoretical assumptions permitted the creation of a conceptual model that illustrates the possible links between training on local governance, on the one hand, and democracy, on the other. The next step is to analyze whether these theoretical assumptions are verified by the case study. This suggests building a research design with relevant variables and indicators.


4.2. Research design

This research will be qualitative and deductive. Qualitative analysis — that “aim at collecting and interpreting linguistic material about a phenomenon to make conclusions on the reality” (Bleijenbergh, 2013:12)— is relevant because the intensity of the data collected (through extensive discussions and open-question) allows one to acquire a lot of knowledge along the way on some experiences that are a phenomenon together with a broad depiction of the reality (*op.cit.*). Which is important in that research that explores the impact of a training on a define context. Furthermore, a qualitative analysis allows reliable conclusions based on a small number of observation units, because “the richness of the material ensures that within a qualitative study based on a relatively small number of observation units you can make statements about a specific phenomenon in the social reality” (*op.cit.*).

In that deductive process, the theory of trainings, local governance, and democracy has allowed the creation of a conceptual model, which consists of defined variables of democratic consolidation. Answering the research question suggests that these last variables be put into operation (Smith, 2016). That is, one must be able to measure the influence that the dependent variable (democratic consolidation) has on the independent variable (trainings on local governance). Gathering the results is done through analyzing the contents of the evaluation forms that have been completed right after the training has finished and through conducting semi-structured interviews with 16 participants from the trainings. Interviews were conducted by phone and other online media such as Skype, Viber, or WhatsApp call because of logistical reasons, i.e., almost all of those participants are working for different organizations throughout Tunisia. Furthermore, this research explores the change at their level. Hence, field analysis is not fundamental.

The main research question is how trainings on local governance stimulate democratic consolidation in Tunisia. And the summarized conceptual model is the premise of the Shiraka partnership, i.e., training senior civil servants on local governance (independent variable) stimulate the democratic consolidation of the country (dependent variable).

Figure 2: research question



Trainings are designed to give participants (from central and local government levels) the knowledge, awareness, and tools to strengthen local governance and multi-level governance, and to enhance citizen participation and civil society participation. The last elements of focus are described in the learning objectives of each of the five training programs, which have been analyzed and adapted according to a training need analysis received before the training takes place. Trainings aim to provide skills (negotiation, working in teams, presentation) and change behavior (i.e., by developing an awareness among stakeholders with regard to the principles and actions that foster action). The purpose of the back-home action plan that participants design during the training (per country) is to allow them to take concrete action also on one of these points.

From looking at the training design, it can be said that the steps followed by The Hague Academy correspond to the criteria established by Kirkpatrick D. and Kirkpatrick J. for an effective training, except for the evaluation part, which would be considered as customer's satisfaction. The presupposed relationship (with regard to the training's program and design) between trainings on local governance, on the one hand, and democratic consolidation, on the other, is that the focus of trainings on local governance stimulate democratic consolidation. The conceptual framework has formed the basis of 4 hypotheses:

- Hypothesis 1: Trainings on local governance give civil servants awareness about the benefits of a strengthened local government and skills and tools to strengthen the latter. Consequently, this stimulates democratic consolidation.
- Hypothesis 2: Trainings on local governance give civil servants (at central and local levels) awareness about the benefits of citizen participation and skills and tools to enhance citizen participation. Consequently, this stimulates democratic consolidation.

- Hypothesis 3: Trainings on local governance give civil servants awareness about the benefits of interactions with NGOs and CSOs, and the trainings also give skills and tools to them to enable their interaction with NGOs and CSOs. Consequently, this stimulates democratic consolidation.
- Hypothesis 4: Trainings on local governance give civil servants the knowledge about democratic governance, skills and competences to perform their work with integrity, transparency, accountability, and to foster innovation. Consequently, this stimulates democratic consolidation.

These hypotheses will be confirmed or declared weak by the case study.

4.3. Operationalization

This research explores whether the training produces the expected learning, behavior changes, and outcomes that are variables to foster democratic consolidation.

According to Kirkpatrick D. and Kirkpatrick J., one of the main challenges when evaluating training outcomes is to assess whether they are linked to the training. The scholars offer a reliable training analysis model with these four suggested different steps: evaluation on reaction, learning, behavior change, and results.

Results, based on a qualitative research, will show what are the outcomes that the training on local governance has on the alumni (their reaction, learning, skills, actions). In the theoretical framework, four variables came about when linking trainings on local governance with democratic consolidation: strengthened local governance, citizen participation, civil society participation, and democratic leadership. This allowed for the development of four sub-questions that will—together—answer the main research question. These four sub-questions are:

1. What is the impact that the trainings on local governance—with regard to its evaluation, learning, behavior, and results, as perceived by participants—have on the strengthening of local governments?
2. What is the impact that the trainings on local governance—with regarding to its evaluation, learning, behavior, and results, as perceived by participants—have on citizen participation?

3. What are the outcomes that the trainings on local governance—with regard to its evaluation, learnings, behavior, and results, as perceived by participants—have on civil society participation?
4. What are the outcomes of the trainings on local governance —with regard to its evaluation, learnings, behavior, and results, as perceived by participants— have on democratic leadership?

Table 2: Variables, indicators, and measurements

Variable	Indicators	Measurements
Strengthened local governments	Interaction, partnerships between central level government and lower levels of governments	Evaluate whether the trainings have led to a more inclusive approach from central-level participants, interaction between local- and central-level
	Independent and empowered local level	Evaluate whether the trainings have enabled local-level participants to gain more power and be more independent, and/or enabled central level to give more power and independence to lower-level participants.
	Assertive local level	Evaluate whether the trainings lead to a more assertive local level.

Variables	Indicators	Measurements
Citizen participation	Social Citizen Participation	Evaluate whether training outcomes have enabled central and local levels to foster citizen initiatives for the community.
	Political Citizen Participation (Vote, Advocacy, Raising Awareness)	Evaluate whether training outcomes have enabled central and local levels to foster citizen inclusiveness in the decision-making for the community or in the process and recommendation from the central level towards local level.
Civil Society Participation	Civil society participation	Evaluate whether training outcomes have enabled central and local levels to foster participation, information, consultation of the civil society in the decision-making
	Extension of civil society	Evaluate whether training outcomes have allowed the civil society to be extended
Democratic Leadership	Attention to core democratic values	Evaluate whether the trainings have led officials from the local and central levels to direct more attention to democratic core principles, such as accountability, integrity, transparency.
	Innovative Leadership	Evaluate whether the trainings have led to innovative behavior and innovations

4.3.1. Data Collection

4.3.1.1: Primary and secondary data and steps for data collection

The information that are necessary to evaluate the trainings are gathered principally through primary data: semi- interviews of local- and central-level government officials. Secondary data are the evaluation forms from the latest trainings and scientific sources that also helped in devising the contextual description of Tunisia. Some personal observations coming from my experience during the training have also been added.

Table 2: Steps for data collection and data analysis

Kirkpatrick J. and Kirkpatrick D. evaluation model	Data-collection method and analysis
1. Evaluation of reaction	Qualitative analysis of evaluation forms that are completed right after the training (secondary data)
2. Evaluation of learning	Qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews of former participants from central- and local-level governments (primary data)
3. Evaluation of Behavior Change	Qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews of former participants from central- and local-level governments (primary data)
4. Evaluation of Results	Qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews of former participants from central- and local-level governments (primary data)

Results will be divided per variable, and a difference will be made with responses from the central- and local-level participants.

The people who were interviewed had to meet two criteria: (i) working or having worked in a Tunisian institution and (ii) having participated in one of the five trainings on local governance, which were organized by The Hague Academy in the framework of the Shiraka or Matra South partnership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Netherlands.

4.3.1.2. How many semi-structured interviews?

In the quantitative research process, researchers have an “idea of how many cases they will need to test their hypotheses” (Adler and Adler in Baker et Edwards:4). To the contrary, in the process of qualitative research that is “that is exploratory by nature” (*op.cit.*), researchers might not know how many cases they will need to test their hypotheses (*op.cit.*). The number of interviews required actually depends on the subject that is being researched, as explained by Wolcott (in Baker et Edwards, 2012:3,4): “It depends on your resources, how important the question is to the research, and even to how many respondents are enough to satisfy committee members for a dissertation.”

Scholars set as guideline the idea of data saturation. This concept is defined by Ragin (in *op.cit.*) as the process of “identifying commonalities between types and then drawing out the implications of these commonalities to the larger whole.” In other words, once the researcher’s evidences become repetitive, there is no need to continue the data collection.¹³

That said, data saturation is complex because “it forces the researcher to combine sampling, data collection, and data analysis, rather than treating them as separate stages in a linear process” (Bryman in *op.cit.*) In that sense, scholars—while assessing saturation is the ideal method—give indicative numbers as reference (*op.cit.*). For example, Beleijenbergh (2013)—generalized that gathering reliable results requires between 10 and 20 interviews. Adler and Adler (in *op.cit.*) estimate it between 12 and 60.

All these elements taken into account in the case study that for the subject of this thesis, I estimated a minimum of 15 interviews should be conducted in order for me to gather sufficient and reliable results. This represents half of the Tunisian participants who participated in a training on local governance in the Shiraka framework and, as such, is a relevant sample for analyzing the outcomes at their levels. In addition, a relative balance had to be observed between the number of respondents at local level and at central level.

¹³ In some extreme cases, one single interview is enough to produce “rich accounts of subjectivity (Passerini and Saniti in *op.cit.*:5). Other scholars say one single interview is relevant, if the case is unique and not comparable to other cases (Brannen in *op.cit.*) or that it may “also only take a few interviews to demonstrate that a phenomenon is more complex or varied than previously thought” (Becker in *op.cit.*:5). Mason (in *op.cit.*) also underlined the need within qualitative research “to build a convincing analytical narrative based on ‘richness, complexity and detail’ rather than on statistical logic.”

4.3.1.3. Sample (Final list of Interviewees)

Table 3: Central-level Alumni

Year of Training	Name	Position and Employer	Interview Date
2013	M. Zaghdoudi	Evaluation, loan and support fund to local authorities, Ministry of Interior	24/11/17
2013	M. Dridi	SONDE - National Society for Water Exploitation (Société Nationale D'exploitation des Eaux)., Management Unity	By e-mail
2013	M. Belkhir	Advisor Public Services, Ministry of Interior	23/11/17
2013	M. Labidini	Trainer CFAD: Center for Training and Support for Decentralization	30/11/17
2014	M. Frihi	Senior Urban Planner, works at the central level of governments and member of the Tunisian Urbanists association ¹⁴	4/12/17
2015	M. Nasri	Director, Ministry of Local affairs	3/12/17
2016	M. Atef Farhat	Former Senior Executive, Collections of Public Expenditure and Public Accounting Directorate, Ministry of Finances	4/12/17
2017	Ms. Gremdha	Study of taxes and legislation, Ministry of Finances	23/11/17
2017	M. Oueslati	Head of Unit, Loan and support fund to local authorities, Ministry of Interior	29/11/17
2017	M. Kaddraoui	Ministry of Local Affairs and Environment	26/11/17

Table 4: Local-level alumni

Year of Training	Name	Position and Employer	Interview
2015	M. Trabelsi	Architect, planning agency of Greater Tunis	26/11/17
2015	M. Thabet	Administrator under director, Municipality of Jemmel	18/11/17
2016	Ms. Mizouni	Head of Unit, Municipality of la Marsa	27/11/17
2016	M. Mili	Former president of local council, Jemmel Municipality	29/11/17
2017	M. Mathlouthi	General Secretary, Municipality Hencha Sfax	15/11/17
2017	Ms. Ayed	Main Architect, Sidi Hcine Municipality	By email

¹⁴ The respondent did not want the name of the organisation for which he works to appear in this thesis

4.3.1.4. Challenges in data collection

Many challenges have been faced in the collection of data. To start, only 30 persons met the criteria for interviewees (i.e., they are or were a former participant in the training on local governance, they are working or have worked in the Tunisian context). The Hague Academy, in their selection phase before the training, made sure that these participants had a relevant background that could allow them to implement the knowledge, skills, competences acquired in their contexts. Among these 30 former participants, 20 were working at central-level, but only 10 at local-level. In order to have an acceptable amount of data to analyze and draw conclusions from, I intended to interview at least 15 persons, with a good balance of both central-level and local-level participants (meaning 7 out of 20 possible central-level interviewees and 7 out of 10 possible local-level interviewees). Organizing the interviews was complicated and required multiple exchanges and reminders to former participants. Finally, gathering reactions from 70% of the alumni from the local level was not possible despite recurring trials. Hence, only 60% were interviewed, with one person being a former participant from the local council.

Then, the interviews had to be done through an online medium (as it was not especially relevant to personally meet participants who are dispatched across Tunisia for the purpose of the interviews). Lastly, for some participants, interviews were done years after the training, as some of the trainings were dated 2013. Another challenge that emerged during the interviews was that some participants—who hold relatively influential positions at the Ministry of Finances, Interior, or even at the Training Center for Support to Decentralization—have attended more than one training, which was aimed at the stimulation of democracy in the country and at its decentralization process.

Finally, a gender balance in the data collection has been impossible to make, as in the possible interviewees, only 6 women were represented. This is namely a general concern within The Hague Academy that, according to my observation during my time there, tries to create a gender balance. However, there is a gender imbalance every year among the persons applying for the training program. This could be an illustration of the remains of patriarchy that is still an apparent characteristic in most of the Arabic countries, including Tunisia.¹⁵

¹⁵ According to UNDP (2016) 31.3% of parliamentary seats are held by women. Finally, female participation in the labor market is 25.1% compared to 71.3% for men. Furthermore, 37.5% of adult women have reached at least a secondary level of education compared to 49.9% of their male counterparts.

4.3.1.5. Design questionnaires for interviews

A questionnaire must fit the criteria of acceptability (i.e., it must examine the full scope of the research question in a balanced way whereby it measures what it actually aims to measure), reliability (i.e., reproducibility and consistency of an instrument), and validity (Williams, 2003:248).

To fulfill this aim, and in the design of the questionnaire, I observed the different rules suggested by the scholar: (1) use simple language, (2) avoid jargon, (3) keep questions short and specific, (4) avoid ambiguities, (5) avoid double-barreled questions (those with “and” or “or” in the wording, (6) avoid double negatives, (7) avoid loaded words, (8) avoid leading questions, (9) do not overtax the respondent’s memory, (10) avoid hypothetical questions. (Williams, 2003:247). I also went from general-appreciation questions based on the four variables defined, but as the interview progressed, I went deeper and asked them to explain their answers in a more qualitative way.

Questionnaires from local- and central-level participants were also drafted in slightly different ways, considering that participants from the central level were not always interacting with civil society or citizen. For example, on the subject matter of strengthened local governance, questions put forward to central-level participants focused on their attitude and actions towards lower-level governments, whereas questions to local-level participants focused on their attitude towards higher-level of governments. These questionnaires are in Annex.

Interviews of all alumni have been conducted through Skype and were recorded after agreement of participants. Because of the inability to speak English by most former participants, while French is the second official language in Tunisia, I conducted these interviews in French and translated the results into English.

4.3.1.6. Coding interviews

To evaluate the data gathered, the four-step evaluation model of Kirkpatrick D. and Kirkpatrick J. (2007) will be used in order to evaluate the actual outcomes of the trainings. Finally, if these outcomes are indicators of the variables defined in the theoretical framework, the data gathered will be sorted according to pre-set codes, being the indicators defined in Table 2, which also served as basis in the design of the questionnaires of interviews. However, this research remains open, so emergent codes have appeared in the analysis of the interviews (inductive emergent

codes). It is because one of the recurring characteristic in a qualitative analysis is that “the data are more raw and are seldom pre-categorized. Consequently, you need to be prepared to organize all that raw detail. And there are almost an infinite number of ways this could be accomplished” (Trochim, W.)

The process of coding the interviews was done according to the following steps:

1. Transcribing the records
2. Defining codes and sub-codes according to the conceptual model and emergent codes after a first analysis. Codes have been sorted according to the four research questions, and then split between local- and central-level.
3. Making a quantitative analysis on regularity.
4. Qualitative Conclusions

4.4. Validity, Reliability, and Objectivity

According to William M.K. Trochim, the traditional criteria for qualitative research are internal validity, external validity, reliability, and objectivity.

Validity of this research is mostly internal: it will explore the impact that one training has on a defined context (Tunisia). The research is based on interviews conducted with relevant interviewee profiles. External validity is that the research will draw conclusions on whether the trainings represent reliable tools for democratic consolidation. However, it cannot ensure that the effect would be similar in another context. Reliability is that consistent literature has been used in the definition of research design. Furthermore, 16 Tunisian alumni have been interviewed, which represents 53% of all Tunisian alumni of the training on local governance. Objectivity is expected from the number of interviewees and from the search of a balance between the interviewees at the local and central levels. Interviews have been coded so they could be analyzed in the most objective way possible. Besides, this thesis was not anything asked by The Hague Academy, but rather, it was something that I myself had decided to pursue in evaluating their trainings. If The Hague Academy showed any interest in the results and was supportive in the data collection, they would have only had access to the final version of the document and played no role in its realization. Furthermore, before each interview started, each interviewee was reminded about the transparency and honesty that were expected from them, regardless of whether the answers were negative or positive.

4.5. Scope and Limitation

It is important to remind the reader that the alumni of The Hague Academy represent a tiny part of all of the officials in Tunisia. Besides what this ratio meant as a challenge in the data collection, broader conclusions on the consolidation of the whole country's democracy must be taken into account carefully. This research rather aims towards answering the question on what has been the impact of trainings at the level of participants who hold reasonably important positions, and then, whether these outcomes foster the process of democratic consolidation. Then, it does not ensure that the trainings would have the same impact in another transitional context, even though it could show positive (or negative) first signs.

Besides, the notion of democratic consolidation is complex. Measuring it is difficult, and it is based on theories that are themselves subject to debates. Measurements and variables, if based on existing theories, are also partly due to what I estimated adequately at the level that was being evaluated.

Then, this research is based on perceptions. If the participants have no interest in lying and that the interviewer (who I was) insisted on the interviewees to justify all their answers, verifying everything they said is, from distance, complicated.

In this regard, it is important to mention the social desirability bias that is often considered as a threat in research social sciences, particularly when research involves self-report measures (King and Buner, 2000). SDB is defined as the "pervasive tendency of individuals to present themselves in the most favorable manner relative to prevailing social norms" (King and Buner, 2000:80).¹⁶ It can be either 'self-deceptive enhancement' (unconscious) or 'impression management' (conscious) (*op.cit.*). There are 2 ways to cope with social desirability bias: measuring it (scales exist such as Marlow-Crown's) or preventing it. But methods to measure are considered as partially effective (Nederhof, 1985). Although, it was taken into consideration: questionnaires were administrated in a way to counter it with respects to William's (2003) validity and reliability criteria. It has been insured towards participants that there would be no judgement coming from the organization and that transparency was fundamental. Opportunity was also given for them to answer anonymously (which none of them

¹⁶ Even though more optimists think that SDB could possibly "provid[e] important insights into the self-presentational implications of holding specific cultural values." (Fisher and Katz, 2000:117).

took). But these steps cannot fully guarantee SDB has not been present, and the latter remains important to acknowledge.

Lastly, the interviews and their analyses will have to be translated from French into English, and the translation could also be biased towards the interviewer and translator/interpreter, who was I.

Chapter 5. Results

5.1. Introduction

This chapter is divided into six parts. The first part is a general analysis of the reactions to the training. Most participants fill those out anonymously, and it was by then impossible to divide or organize it per country and/or per level of government. Afterwards, the results were sorted into three parts according to each of the four variable elements described in the conceptual model: strengthening of local government (5.2), citizen participation (5.3), civil society participation (5.4), and democratic leadership (5.5). In these four parts, the three-step analysis of the reaction is carried out: learning, behavior change, and outcome. Finally, further discussion concerning these findings is open (5.6).

5.2. General analysis of the reaction

This step consists of the analysis of the evaluation forms, which were filled out by the participants right after the training was completed in The Hague, and then in Tunisia (and Morocco in 2015). Participants give a score on a scale of 1 to 5 or 1 to 10 for every session they participated in. To simplify the analysis, all results have been placed on a 1-to-5 scale.

As stated earlier, all the feedback received right after the trainings were positive, with most of the sessions having a rating above 4/5 (14/18 in 2013, 10/20 in 2014, 17/24 in 2015, 16/18 in 2016, 15/16 in 2017). The overall assessment of the training in The Hague scored above 4/5 every year. In their comments, participants were mostly enthusiastic about the tools on citizen participation, the new insights into local governance, autonomy of the local-level government, negotiation tools, change management, working in teams, the exchange of best practices on fiscal governance, decentralization, and multi-level governance. Applicability of the training to the daily work scored 4.3/5 in 2013 and 4/5 in 2014. In 2016 and 2017 all participants said the acquired knowledge and tools were applicable to their contexts. However, a few participants had expressed doubts about the sustainability of their actions in their sociopolitical contexts. This also confirms the relevance of this in-depth research.

In 2014 and 2016, 22 out of the 24 participants said that they would recommend the training to peers who working in local governance (2 “maybe”), in 2015 it was 22 out of 23 (1 “maybe”), and in 2017 it was 15 out of 19 who said yes (with 4 “maybe”). Some participants suggested that the program design be improved with more study visits and more example of good practices

in governance, more sessions on decentralization, and more post-training follow-up work. Others also mentioned that the program should have involved notions such as tourism management, water management, accountability, integrity (which were included in the program only in 2015 and 2017), and urban governance.

Furthermore, when looking at the program design (which has been similar every year), and sorting the sessions according to the four research questions (which were defined according to the variables of democratic consolidation), the general conclusion is that the reactions that were sorted according to the four research questions were positive. These are elaborated below.

Regarding multi-level governance, which suggests underlining partnerships between all the layers of governments and strengthening of local governance, a theoretical session was organized every time and scored (an average of) 4.2/5. All participants also went to study visits that showed the multi-level governance system in the Netherlands. This implied a visit first to the Ministry of Interior (average evaluation of 4.1/5), then to the provinces (average evaluation of 4.3/5), and lastly to the Dutch municipalities. The sessions have also emphasized the importance of local economic development (4/5 on average) with one session being focused on the local economic development situation in the MENA region, which was also evaluated at 4/5 on average. In Tunisia, participants have also had the opportunity to visit the Ministry of Regional Development (evaluated with a 4/5 average) and a Tunisian municipality (evaluated with a 4/5 average).

An analysis of these secondary data shows that the sessions on local governance, and the process and benefits of decentralization as the benefits of strengthening local governments are the ones that have gained the most attention from the training design. However, this statement must be nuanced by the fact that these different notions are interlinked. Indeed, if citizen participation and civil society participation have each been the object of only two specifically dedicated sessions (evaluated with an average of 4.5 and 4.3, respectively), they are also part of the governance paradigm. Furthermore, in my experience at The Hague Academy, I have seen that these notions were also dealt with during other sessions and skills workshops, namely workshops on negotiation skills (evaluated at 4.6 on average), change management (4.1 average evaluation). In the same idea, if few sessions were specifically dedicated to these matters, a general attention would have also been given to the core democratic values: integrity, transparency, responsibility, and accountability.

To summarize, the evaluation of trainings has been positive at every level, even though more attention has been given to multi-level governance and empowerment of local governments (which is logical, as there were also the main themes of the training programs). But as this concept also emphasizes the importance of inclusiveness of citizens, the civil society, and democratic leadership, the reactions to the four concepts (empowering of local governments, citizen participation, civil society participation, and democratic leadership) are positive.

However, as the theoretical framework suggests, if this positive evaluation represents a first positive step towards answering the question of whether trainings consolidate democracy in Tunisia, these positive reactions do not guarantee that training lead to the expected outcomes. As stated by Kirkpatrick J. and Kirkpatrick D., if this step is important for the training institute, because it shows that the trainee (and his or her reaction) is taken into consideration and that satisfaction is valuable for every organization, these are only indicators of customer satisfaction, as evaluating the results requires more in-depth research. In this case, this research will be done through semi-structured interviews with former participants. Only then will it be possible to assess whether the trainings also led to change in behavior and to outcomes favoring democratic consolidation in Tunisia. A total of 16 interviews were conducted and transcribed for this aim (the design of the interviews is to be found in the annexes). To analyze whether emerging categories can be defined, results have been coded in tables according to each research question (strengthening of local governments, citizen participation, civil society participation, and democratic leadership). These are in annexes.

5.3. What is the impact that the trainings have on strengthening local governments?

Section 4.3.1 above has shown that reaction on the trainings regarding the strengthening of local governments is positive. The decentralized system of the Netherlands, which can also be defined as a multi-level governance system with powerful local governments, has been the subject of multiple training sessions, and its functioning has been shown during study visits. All those sessions have been evaluated and attained a score of a minimum of 4/5 on average. Reactions have therefore been positive.

5.3.1. Perception of learning: positive at both levels

The second step that needs to be done in respect of the evaluation model suggested by Kirkpatrick J. and Kirkpatrick D. is to evaluate the learning. And this step has been perceived positively by interviewees. Indeed, 100% of former participants from central level have been

assessed, having acquired through the training an increased level of awareness and knowledge on the benefits of interaction and partnerships with other level of governments. Hafedh Dridi, former employee of the SONDE¹⁷ said that he “*understood, during the training, the importance of multi-level governance*”. Other respondents also said they have understood through training what the notion of governance implied. This acquired knowledge seemed to come from observing the Dutch governance system. This was emphasized by Moufida Gremda, who directs studies on taxes and legislation in the Ministry of Finances: “*It’s not like reading an article or a book on the matter... It’s refined. This multi-level governance concept was clarified*”. On the same line, Mejdî Frihi, senior urban planner at the central level and member of the Tunisian urbanists associations said: “*The most important thing, for me, was the chance to see these concepts [governance, multi-level governance] implemented on the field*”.

Seeing how the Dutch system is organized also convinced participants about the benefits of decentralization. Moufida Gremda also said that: “*We saw the local finances of municipalities [in the Netherlands], and we learnt that a very important share of budget goes from the state to municipalities*”. Ziad Labidini, trainer at CFAD¹⁸ was also amazed to see that “*in the Netherlands, the municipalities are at the first rank*”. Ammar Nasri, who works at the Ministry of Local Affairs, also perceived it as a novel experience: “*It was the chance to see on the field how decentralization is exerted. How different level of governments can work together. It is something new.*”

Participants at central level have expressed that the main thing they learned was the ability to recognize the advantages of the local level and the role of the local level as an independent partner (90% of respondents). For 40% of the respondents, the trainings made them realize that local economic development is important for the country’s future equilibrium. For Ammar Nasri, the notion was even totally new: “*We saw in Morocco the notion of local economic development that does not exist at all in Tunisia.*” In their recognition of the positive aspects of a multi-level governance system through which central governments and local governments would interact with each other, the training alumni also confirmed that the training provided them with useful tools such as conflict resolution (20%), communication (60%), and negotiation (60%). These tools have been described in the theoretical framework to be necessary in a multi-level governance system.

¹⁷ National Society for Water Exploitation (Société Nationale D’exploitation des Eaux).

¹⁸ “Centre de Formation et d’Aide à la Décentralization” (CFAD) in French (or the Support and Training Center for Decentralization).

There were 83% of the local level respondents who perceived the learnings on strengthening of local governments positively. Participants have felt a convincing enthusiasm, except for Habib Mili, who is the former president of a local council, who considers that *“he already knew before the training”*. However, he still assessed that the training *“strengthened my teamwork skills, the establishment of a working team. How to perform better. I knew already, but I deepened it... I also know better how to solve conflicts and negotiate ... By visiting the Ministry of Interior, I witnessed how the different criteria are taken in charge. And what are the responsibilities they delegate to municipalities, and they explained how they redistribute national funds to communities... I could see they master the relations between local and central. That’s real decentralization”*. Half (50%) of the local level participants have also confirmed that they discovered through the training that governance was a notion that had to be implemented also at the local level. Afef Ayed, main architect of the Sidi Hcine municipality said, for example, that *“In Tunisia, we are only starting to witness the importance of local governance on the quality of life of the citizens. Mostly at the level of municipalities. Myself, I realized it after the training”*. Atef Trabelsi, also an architect (but for the planning agency of greater Tunnis), shared this opinion: *“Before the training I did not understand the importance of governance, I saw it rather as a remote concept. But now I know governance has an impact on social life, politics, economy. I pay attention to exercise its principles on a daily basis.”*

These results join what was mentioned in the theoretical framework, the lack of awareness about local governance perceived by participants is explained by the transitional context they work in and by the dictatorship under which they had to perform their duties. Dictatorships emphasize top-down decision-making and municipalities being nothing more than the service providers, while democratic consolidation and multi-level governance require more skills and responsibilities. Interviews confirmed this assessment and the relevance of this training in this regard for local-level civil servants. For example, Farah Mizouni, Head of Unit la Marsa Municipality, said that she *“understood through the training that it [governance] defines not prioritizing in its leadership actions top-down, but rather build relations between leaders and citizens.”*

Furthermore, 66% of local level respondents have said that they have learned tools that can enable them to have a better assertiveness and that can underline their autonomy. These tools were presentation (33%), negotiation (33%), teamwork (33%), conflict management (33%). Also, 33% of them emphasized during the interviews that the tools learned were useful for the

process of decentralization. Thabet Majdi, administrator under the director at the Municipality of Jemmel illustrated it so: *“It showed us how to handle our daily work, local issues, rural municipalities. We could see how to implement decentralization, a real decentralized power”*. For Atef Trabelsi, *“it clarified the meaning of governance, and how to underline its autonomy. That it’s the basis of democracy and the way to evolve”*. Bahri Mathlouthi, general secretary at the municipality of Hencha Sfax said this in this regard: *“There are difficulties, some collectivities have big financial issues... But we are going to enter a new period. And training for such decentralization is important. The help of THA in the training of our administrators is important”*.

5.3.2. A changed behavior

The third step of the training evaluation model that is guiding this research is analyzing behavioral change, which was also positively perceived by the participants. Only one central-level respondent did not see any result after participating in the training. But ever since the training, 90% of the remaining central-level participants changed the way they consider the local level, that is, that they are a real partner. Nejib Belkhir, advisor of public services for the Ministry of Interior said: *“The way I see governance changed completely. The way I analyze, and find solutions, through interactions with other administrations”*. This resulted in 20% of the latter being assertive towards their central colleagues in the roles that local governments are due to play in the new regime. This was also fostered through a better conflict management, according to Mohammed Zaghdoudi, who evaluates funds of local authorities in the Ministry of Interior: *“We are going from a centralized policy towards a policy of decentralization. And a lot of people refuse it, are not willing to change. In that context, through the experience with The Hague Academy, I learnt how to handle this conflict”*. On the same line, Fourat Oueslati, head of the same unit in the Ministry of Interior, said that he *“defend[s] the participative approach.”* This resulted also, among 70% of them, in a will to interact more with the local level, and even (for 60% of the respondents) give more power. Some (20%) have also said that they have become more reactive towards requests coming from local level, that they (40%) have become more flexible towards it, and (30% of them) have a generally clearer and more open communication. Nejib Belkhir summarized it as a *“radical change”*, because he became after the training *“more interested in them [the local level] (...) And so, I became more reactive, more flexible, more communicative, more impactful”*. This change also derived from the tools and skills they acquired. Nejib Belkhir also said that he is since the

training “using the communication, presentation tools when I interact with other level of governments.”

Regarding behavioral change, relevance of the training has also been underlined by central-level respondents. Mohammed Zaghdoudi said that “The training comes right in time, in this transition period which brings a lot of conflict on the matter of devolution of power. I can handle these conflicts better and that way, I help making projects happen. I am also more flexible, less severe”. The tools have also been perceived as necessary for Moufida Gremda, who works at the Ministry of Finances: “I am responsible, at the central level, to negotiate budget with the local level (...) I used to think that their own resources were sufficient for localities... But I realized, witnessing other experiences, that if you want a good local governance and strive towards decentralization, local governments must be a priority (...) I changed my mind... And I used to not see empowered local governments not as a fundamental point of focus.” For many of them, behavioral change was developed from witnessing the successful experience in the Netherlands. In that sense, Mohamed Atef Farhat, a former senior executive at the Ministry of Finances said that “It was the chance to see and appreciate the reality and the benefits of local governance, multi-level governance, participation and accountability in the Netherland (...) we could tell it changed our vision and way of communicating with different levels of administrations”.

One (16%) of the local level participant said that the training did not result in any behavioral change because “the laws and the central level government do not let enough space to implement it” (Farha Mizouni). The other interviewees saw either better assertiveness with central level (66%) or more trust in local governance (33%). Habib Mili said that the training “...made us stronger. During talks. I gained self-confidence and extra arguments”. On the same line, Afef Atef said that “Realizing that governance had an impact on social life, on political life and economical life makes you think twice and pay more attention to it... I communicate better with other levels because the Dutch example is always on my mind”.

To conclude, behavioral change has been perceived to be positive by the participants.

5.3.3. Strengthened local governments? Mitigated outcomes at local-level.

The question remains: did it lead to the expected outcomes? As mentioned in the theory, if the training makes participants change their behavior, the risk remains that they would go back to “business as usual” (Kirkpatrick D. and Kirkpatrick J., 2007) afterwards if they are not

convinced about what the training had done to give rise to this changed behavior. And through the interview with the alumni of The Hague Academy, I could indeed see a difference between the very positive responses to the learning and positive conclusions on their post-training behavior for all participants from local or central level. This, because answers concerning the outcomes of strengthening the local governments revealed to be less positive than the learning and behavioral change of the local level respondents, while central level respondents had positive conclusions.

In terms of percentage, 90% of the central-level participants' power are being given away to local-level governments. Fourat Oueslati said that since the training, *"We gave more power to the municipality which can now decide on interventions, projects across citizen participation and local collectivity"*. And 80% supported the inclusion of notions that would empower local governments in the coming regulations. For example, Moufida Gremda *"...participated to a study to harmonize the code of local taxations and make it match with the future code of local communities. And the recommendations of this study [being the benefits of having an empowered local level] were also based on what I saw during this training, in the Netherlands and in Tunisia."* There were 60% of the respondents who empowered local governments on other programs, and 40% ran capacity building programs for localities so that they could take on more responsibilities. Two participants have also become trainers for local authorities. Ziad Ladini became a full-time trainer at CFAD (see footnote 16), and Nejib Belkhir is involved in some trainings at the organization: *"I also share this knowledge [on governance], because I am since the training myself giving trainings¹⁹."* Also, 60% of central level respondents have self-delegated power towards municipalities in their projects. And 20% even assessed that these actions resulted in a self-perception of a more efficient local level. Nejib Belkhir said: *"Thanks to the fact that I become more reactive, they became more efficient. You know, if you welcome them with closed doors and are not available to help them solve their problems, it impacts the efficiency of their work"*. It even directly helped the resolution of issues for Ziad Labidini who said that *"In Tunisia, we have a lot of difficulties on local economic development, disparities when we look for example at Coastal municipalities... And we, through trainings, insist on experiences, methodologies, group work, discussion, the search for solutions together."* Mohammed Atef Farhat has been the only one (at the central-level) who did not witness any outcome, but this was more because of his executive position (at the Ministry of Finances): *"I did not used the tools because I, for example don't need to negotiate with my*

¹⁹ Nejib Belkhir sometimes gives trainings at CFAD where another training alumnus (Ziad Labidini) is working.

position within the administration. I handle finances afterwards... In conclusion, the acquired knowledge was interesting, but I did not use it... It was not focused on the financial aspects... Although there might be a few notions that influenced our work in the discussions of the law project on local communities... But it remains very general.”

Participants coming from the local level perceived less outcomes on the strengthening of local governments (i.e., strengthening among themselves). Half (50%) of the local-level respondents did not witness any concrete results. The other half, who perceived that the training led to outcomes saw (for 33% of them) more power in the coming laws, legislative texts, and regulations, with 33% of them having regular interaction with the central level. Bahri Mathlouthi said that *“We acquired new tools, and the interaction got better and improved... At the regional and local level, we could feel a change in direction”*. Habib Mili illustrated this input with this concrete example: *“We were facing issues regarding the system of water evacuation, in the city, that were tasks of the central government. To make our voices heard, I gathered citizens, civil society organizations and we defended the city... The fact that I ameliorated the tools of gathering opportunities, negotiations were very beneficial in that sense”*.

These results give rise to the question why is there such difference between outcomes from training the local-level participants and central-level participants? Many participants (33% of the local-level alumni and 50% of the central-level alumni) assessed that factors outside the training have also influenced its outcomes (positive and negative) on strengthened local governments and saw the training as one factor that led to one outcome, amongst others. Hence, some of the depicted results were to be attributed partly to the training, and partly to other (contextual) factors.

5.3.4. Contextual restrains

It is also important to underline that while being generally positive, participants at the central level also underlined the difficulty in fully applying the acquired knowledge to their contexts. Medji Frihi (senior urban planner at the Ministry of Housing, equipment and Environment) said that *“We are currently trying to work within the same centralized system but with a few improvements, at a personal level thanks to experiences such as The Hague Academy. At the governmental level, or administrative level things change slowly... By changing the terms of references of the studies for example and work more with the local level, ask more people to participate... That’s what we are doing while waiting for the Code of Municipality to be approved”*.

Some participants from the central level (i.e., 30%) also mentioned the lack of resources in the country to go towards a less centralized system. Ziad Labidini said that *“We are going through a period of crisis and so, there are other priorities than decentralization and local governance and so, we are waiting”*. In that sense, 20% of the central-level respondents said that local resources were insufficient to empower local governments, and 10% said that the general economic situation in Tunisia did not make it possible. But what restrained the outcomes for most of them was the centralized tradition (40%) that is still defining the country. Sami Khaddraoui, who is in charge of the regional and local governance council for the Ministry of Local Affairs, said: *“People are not used yet to the notion of governance. It’s a new orientation. It takes time for it to change”*. In that sense, 20% of the central-level participants said that their central-colleagues were unwilling to release/delegate power, and 30% said that the system was still too centralized (but both are interlinked because one of the things that is currently blocking the move towards a less centralized system is the non-approval of a code of municipalities). Ammar Nasri described the problem as this: *“There is a consensus in Tunisia: to implement a decentralized power, a real power for communities and regions... But the real issue now is: the code on municipalities and regions. It’s now in the Parliament, at his 19th version... So, it’s very complicated (...) People are used to centralized power and are against decentralization... Mostly at the central level. For example, in the coming laws, a governor will not have power on municipalities, nor on regional councils because those will be elected in direct suffrage. To governors are reluctant to this idea, which will make them lose powers”*. On this matter, Mohammed Atef Farhat who used to work for the Ministry of Finances and was involved in negotiations on the Code for Localities said that the reason the Code has still not been approved was mostly due to financial measures that the latter wants to take: *“there are contradictions between the people who work for the Ministry of Local Affairs who thought they had the whole power in budget management and finances of collectivities. There is always a pull between local and central power, so the head of government has to decide... And the Code is still being discussed in the chamber of deputies (...) They are going against the traditions and against sometimes it’s not compatible with the law. So, it’s very difficult to implement it. Some notions contradicted the others.”*

Local-level respondents also mentioned the resistance of their central-counterparts (16% of all participants). And 33% (in correlation with central level) also mentioned the centralized system that was still ruling Tunisia was preventing their empowerment (non-adoption code of municipalities, which has also postponed the date of the municipal elections until now). And

Farah Mizouni expressed it in a very clear manner: *“It’s very difficult for me, and my superior, to apply what we saw at The Hague Academy... The laws, and the central government don’t leave us the space we need to implement what we learnt”*. Thabet Majdi said that what was acquired at The Hague Academy on the matter of strengthened governance would be useful in the future: *“We are facing a real change since the revolution, it’s tangible. But the real issue, is that our municipal council is not elected. I think the tools we learnt in The Hague will lead to beautiful things. But if the texts are not approved, we are going to have an issue (...) We are waiting for laws that will change everything for local collectivities.”*

However, the picture has not only been depicted in a negative way by respondents. Some positive comments on the context have also emerged and positive change in Tunisia has also been emphasized, mostly by central-level participants. For example, the political conjuncture in Tunisia with the approval of the Constitution and current political will towards decentralization and governance (30% of all central-level participants), but only one (16%) local-level respondent shared this optimism.

In addition, two back-home action plans were directly aiming at the strengthening of local governments. In 2014, participants planned their support towards decentralization with regard to territory planning. This was a good assessment of the acquired knowledge on the matter, according to Mejdri Frihi: *“It is not easy to handle and did not fully succeed... I rather tend to recommend it when I find an opportunity to integrate principles of governance, I do it even if that’s not that much.”* In 2017, participants established a project to find alternative funding for local communities, which is still in negotiation because they *“have to wait for the Code of Municipalities to be approved; then we will be allowed to go further”* (Sami Khaddraoui).

Table 5: Conclusions: impact on the evaluation of the strengthening of local governments

Learning	→ Behavior	→ Outcome
Awareness, knowledge about the benefits of multi-level governance, of the strengthening of local governance, decentralization, tools: conflict resolution, communication, negotiation, notion of governance at local level.	Assertiveness, underlining of one’s autonomy, defense of local governance, will to interact with local level, will to devolve power, more open communication, flexibility.	Positive at central level: devolution of power to municipalities, devolution of responsibilities that lead to a more efficient local level. Outcomes considered limited at local level, mainly due to the centralized context.

5.3. What is the impact of the trainings regarding Citizen Participation?

5.3.1. Analysis of learning: an ‘eye opener’.

A first evaluation with regard to citizen participation is that the citizens considered the training to be efficient on the matter. Bahri Mathoulouthi said that: *“It’s really the big asset of the training”*. Almost all participants—local- and central-level—have assessed that the trainings increased their awareness and learning about the benefits of citizen participation. Some participants at the central level even called it an eye-opener. Moufida Gremda *“...understood that citizen participation is necessary for the municipality to succeed in its duties. They must participate so that the municipality becomes aware of the issues they encounter... I saw in Rotterdam²⁰, the citizens decided what was best for them.”* Only one participant at the central level—Ziad Labidini—nuanced the almost-fully-positive conclusions on the matter of citizen participation and said that *“it was positive, but that training was really too short to learn anything”*. The other (90% of the) central-level participants said that the training has provided them with tools that would enhance citizen participation and underline the positive input that they witnessed the Dutch example had on this matter: a participative approach (80%), communication tools (50%), presentation (20%), conflict management (50%). Mohammed Zaghdoudi said that he *“saw the inclusive approach working on citizen in Rotterdam. Along with the way they handle discussions, how they share ideas with citizens. It’s an initiative I still remember”*. Some realized that they—from their central positions—had a role to play in citizen participation. Mejdri Frihi illustrated it so: *“I used to not pay attention to the notion of citizen participation because I am working in a central department. But I realized it’s a work for the central level also: if the central level pays attention to participation, then it will be done at the local level as well”*. Respondents also considered the Dutch example on citizen participation as positive and an example to follow: *“The Dutch experience is an experience to follow, and we are in the process of reform so it’s really important that we see it”* (Moufida Gremda). Nejib Belkhir underlined it in a poetic way: *“it showed that there are cities with an army of employees who clean up trash but remain dirty, and cities where no one has to pick up trash because they have an army of citizens”*

²⁰ Residents of the Schepenstraat protested against radical plans that the municipality had planned for their streets. After many meetings, within the framework of Right to Challenge, the Municipality allowed the plan to be made for the Schepenstraat. The core group wanted to keep retain as many trees as possible, a green and varied traffic-safe street, taking into account self-management and residents' wishes (Schepenstraat, 2015).

The learning acquired from the trainings have been evaluated even more positively at the local level as 100% of participants have said that they have gained an increased level of awareness about the benefits of citizen participation. Relevance of these learnings for the Tunisian context was underlined by Thabet Majdi: “... *it is slowly starting* [citizen participation in Tunisia] (...) *So it is more difficult in that sense... And THA provided some responses and tools to communicate with the citizens, or the central level (...) how to involve him, how to speak to him, how to include him*”. Farah Mizouni also “*understood that local collectivities cannot work alone*”. Local level respondents also perceived the trainings provided them with tools to enable citizen participation in their mission such as team work (33%), negotiation (33%) and conflict management (33%).

5.3.2. Behavioral change: assertiveness and will to involve citizens

Among the participants, behavioral change has been mostly perceived through their even greater will to involve citizens in the decision-making. Hafedh Dridi is “...*ever more willing to involve others in decision making*”. For Mejdi Frihi, it was “*a radical change in my behavior. I always try to gather attention on the importance of local governance (...) I can handle conflicts... I know how to present a project to the population... I pay attention. I now really believe in citizen participation.*” Seeing the Dutch example was also, for many, a concrete example of abstract notions. Mohammed Atef Farhat said that “*Before the training, all those notions of participation were only remote concepts that I had read on a website or on law texts, but training made it clearer. And that was something amazing, that we really wanted to implement within our administration*”. However, one participant working at the central level said that the training was too short to make such conclusion.

Half (50%) of the local-level participants also perceived more assertiveness about citizen participation towards colleagues from the central level. And 33% had a better conflict management. All local-level participants said that change was felt in their trust towards citizen participation and in their will to make them participate through a better communication (66%) or a more open communication (50%) Bahri Mathoudli said that “*We learnt tools to organize reunions, to manage them, tools for communications with citizens how to provoke citizens to arrive, participate I use those*”. For local-level respondents, the Dutch example was also one to follow: “*It was impressive to see how it was in the Netherlands. We saw many people come in and out the Parliament. We saw responsible citizens in the Netherlands, we are responsible and respect the law*” (Habib Mili). On the same line Farah Mizouni said that she “*realized*

the possibilities of citizen participation are high. And I want to reach it, because it's not the case in my country now."

5.3.3. Outcomes: "the big asset of the training"²¹

On the matter of citizen participation, perception of outcomes is positive at both levels of governments. A total of 90% of the participants from central level have seen outcomes of the training regarding citizen participation, and so did 100% of local level participants. At the central level, this resulted in tools for enhancing citizen participation, which includes capacity building programs for municipalities with regard to citizen participation (40%). Ziad Labidini, trainer at CFAD includes it in his programmes: *"In the trainings programmes I design for CFAD, I include the participative approach for citizen and civil society organizations"*. On the same line, Nejib Belkhir said that: *"Thanks one the training I gave, the city of Sayada launched a participatory budget, with citizens. Which means their decisions are not coming top-down but bottom-up"*. Ever since the trainings, Mejdri Frihi organizes *"... workshops, meetings with local citizens to ask for their opinion and take them into consideration when making strategic choices... We ask for citizen participation, and also civil society participation"*. One participant also said that he has underlined the inclusion of citizen participation in the writing of the code of municipalities. And 70% of the central-level respondents implemented changes in regulations and projects handled by the municipalities: *"In our texts addressed to municipalities, we ask for and push for more citizen participation or civil society participation."* (Sami Khaddraoui). For the others (30%), citizen participation got integrated into top-down methodology organized by the central level. In that sense, Nejib Belkhir said after the training programme, that he had *"established a project of citizen ambassador, who represents his local community in front of the municipality, or even the municipality in regard of other citizens to whom he communicates decisions, budgets, actions..."* Also, 10% launched advocacy programs for Tunisian citizens.

Besides programming citizen participation, 60% also witnessed more citizen participation, with more regular citizen consultation. Fourat Oueslati said that *"We are now having a participative approach... Before we appointed a responsible who was responsible for projects and now, the citizen is deciding."* Around 40% initiated a participative budget in the municipalities: Mohammed Zaghdoudi said that he *"... helped the establishment of Annual Investments Plans, to which citizens participate. This must be improved but it's happening*

²¹ (Bahri Mathlouthi)

slowly and, if Tunisia has delay on the matter of decentralization, this is the first initiative worldwide of participative annual investments plans". This same central-level respondent also *"put in place a whole process for municipalities to include citizens. A guide, trainings for technical attendants. We put a place a policy of communicating the citizens. And we made housewives to participate, to attend debates and that's very important. Particularly in rural and Arabic communities... and in some localities, women even outnumbered men! These things that were put in place, it was thanks to the training."* Mejdri Frihi, urban planner, also fostered the integration of citizen spaces into municipalities. Impact has been even perceived by one of the respondents who confirmed that citizen participation has resulted in more efficient programs. Nejib Belkhir also mentioned that with more citizen participation, governments have a new role: defamation. Finally, 30% at the local level witnessed directly citizen satisfaction. And Nejib Bellhir again illustrated it so: *"If people feel you are taking them into account, they are already satisfied. Even if solving the issues end up being more complicated, people are already satisfied because you are showing them respect."* Mejdri Frihi also underlined that citizen participation made projects more likely to happen: *"When you involve citizens within decision making, they defend the study and try as hard as possible to put action plans they participated to."*

At the local level, 66% said that citizen participation was underlined in coming projects, for example, a participative budget for Bahri Mathlouti, who completed the training programme in 2017: *"I am organizing currently, for the first time, a participative budget in the city of Gremda"*, or a capacity building program for Tunisian citizens. Every local-level respondent perceived that the training resulted in better citizen participation, but some nuanced the assessment saying that change takes time. For example, Thabet Majdi said that *"it's difficult, to involve citizens but it is starting slowly."* Concrete outcomes have been the implementation of a participative budget (66%), redirecting projects with regard to the influence of citizens on decisions for Atef Trabelsi (16%): *"Citizen participation helped the definition of a green zone, a displacement of a sport field"*. One participant (Habib Mili) also felt more support from citizens as a result. He said, with regard to citizen satisfaction, that: *"Citizens are more and more motivated, which is logical in a sense because I was paying more attention towards their participation to local affairs and by so, towards the general interest of the city."* And so did 50% of local level participants, for example, Thabet Majd said: *"The citizens who are not used to participate are interested. If you present them a participative budget, the citizen is going to be really interested and very active for the good of the municipality."* Afef Ayed

also underlined that citizen participation can also guarantee that a project will be successful: *“Involving the citizen in the decision making makes him feel like an active part of the project, and he can even offer an alternative to a problematic and so, become a potential actor in the success of a project.”*

In 2013, the training inspired participants to foster citizen participation through implementing a back-home action plan. It was described by Ziad Labidini as a non-coordinated plan of action that everyone had to implement at his level. He himself said that this plan was devised while he was working for the Ministry of Interior in the implementation of the ISO 26 000 standard. On its website, the ISO 26 000 is described to have “provided guidance on how businesses and organizations can operate in a socially responsible way. This means acting in an ethical and transparent way that contributes to the health and welfare of society. Concluding on this action plan, Ziad Labidini said it was *“in a way implemented. My colleagues at the Ministry of Interior established this action plan and they used it.”*

As for the previous question, some participants have, in their answers, considered the training, coming at the same time as other development programs and in the middle of a more global process within the country, just as it did for Ziad Labidini: *“the situation now is the result of a synergy of experiences.”*

5.3.4. Contextual influences

Those participants have considered the (positive and negative) outcomes as partly due to the training, partly to other factors. These other factors that influenced the outcomes in a positive way for participants of central level have been other development programs (30%), a general willingness for citizens to participate in the decision-making after the revolution (30%), and 10% also mentioned the favorable conjuncture as an element that fosters citizen participation. This generally favorable conjuncture for citizen participation has also been mentioned by 33% of the participants of the local level. Also, 16% of the local-level participants mentioned the non-existence of the code of municipalities as a restraint for them to attain full citizen participation. But besides, Atef Trabelsi, urban planner also underlined that he had also felt a radical positive change in his work: *“The citizen participation has become compulsory. When we have a plan; urban in my duties, it must be indicted two months before it starts, so that citizens can give their meanings on it.”* Nejib Belkhir made a similar comment with regard to freedom of speech: *“In Tunisia, we have a climate of freedom of speech never seen before. Democratic transition, that has never been seen before. And this transition gives everyone*

freedom, a freedom that is more than welcome. But this also implies a new role for governments: defamation.” And Mohammed also underlined it in a particularly enthusiast way: “Currently in Tunisia, there is a radical change within citizen’s behavior, attitude and even how they are tightening to their localities, communities. Everyone wants to participate to put in place this and this neighborhood.”

However, again, contextual restraints have been felt. Around 30% of the central level mentioned that the generally inherited traditions from dictatorship slowed the process down. Ammar Nasri said that “People are still not used to participate. It takes time”. Moufida Gremda also said in that sense that “Citizens don’t have this culture of participative democracy, we have to promote it... Plus, the code has still not been approved... So, it’s starting, but for example in my municipality I haven’t seen anything yet.” Mohammed Zaghdoudi also mentioned the remaining lack of respect for youth, women, and seniors, among colleagues.

Table 6: Conclusions on evaluation of citizen participation

Learning	➔	Behavior	➔	Outcome
Raised awareness on the benefits of citizen participation, tools: communication, presentation, conflict management, participative approach, Dutch experience		Will to involve citizens, attention to citizen, a generally better communication, trust towards citizen participation		Top-down inclusion of citizen participation in future laws, current rules and methodologies, bottom-up inclusion of citizen participation (participative budgets), citizen satisfaction, more efficient program. But it started and takes time in their contexts

5.4. What is the impact that the trainings have on civil society participation?

A first interesting point that has been underlined, mostly by central-level participants on the matter of civil society participation, is that the number of civil society organization has increased like never before in the country. In that sense, Nejib Belkhir said that “There is a spate of civil society organizations in Tunisia since the revolution.” According to participants, the current number of civil society organizations ranges between 19 000 (according to Moufida Gremda) and 21 000 (according to Ammar Nasri): “We went from 7000 CSO in 2011 to almost 21000 that are active on the collectivities and citizenships.” This fact, according to those participants, emphasizes the relevance of this subject in the training design: “It was

important, in our context to integrate and associate these types of associations in the municipal actions and how to collaborate with the municipality” (Ammar Nasri). Although, local level was less enthusiastic on this subject matter, and one participant also mentioned the fact that civil society is today still not used to participating in decision-making, which represents sometimes a restraint in its participation.

5.4.1. Positive analysis of learning

Going back to the trainings’ impact, participants at both levels of governments said that they acquired a better awareness about the benefits of civil society participation. It was the case for 90% of the central-level participants. For example, Sami Khaddraoui said that: *“The civil society can help taking a decision, and help the local authority in the follow up, creation of even choice for different projects.”* For some of them, it was a fundamental change in their vision. Mejdi Frihi said that through the training, *“We understood that change does not always comes from governments, but governance follows a reverse process that is bottom up (...) I am now very aware that if I do not involve civil society in decision making in the establishment of a strategy, then the project will be thrown away (...) When involved, the civil society takes our strategy into consideration and defends the action plan itself.”* Mohammed Atef Farhat emphasized that he became aware of civil society’s role towards attaining democracy and governance, and *“... learnt that civil society is fundamental in the concretization of the principles of local governance... It’s a catalysator for local democratic transition (...) I used to only see from far as a theoretical notion and did not understand the link between the civil society and local governance. At this level, the training in 2014 was already a revolution and every learning are important.”* Central-level participants also perceived that the training made them acquire tools: 60% have learned a participative approach; 20% negotiation; 20% conflict management; 40% communication tools.

An increased level of awareness has also been felt for local-level participants, such as Afef Ayed who said that she *“realized civil society can play a role in every project and even restrain one political will.”* A total of 83% of the local-level participants assessed that they found these tools useful in fostering civil society participation: the participative approach (83%), negotiation (33%), conflict management (33%), communication (16%). For Thabet Majdi, the training made him understand what was suggested by the international community: *“It put in exergue what was preconized at the international level and made us able to make everyone participate.”*

5.4.2. Changed behavior: trust and willingness to make CSO participate

At the central level, less participants have felt that the training changed their behavior towards civil society participation than towards citizen participation. Indeed, 30% of the central-level participants witnessed no change and even considered the question to be irrelevant because they never interact with CSO in the exercise of their duties. The 70% who perceived a behavioral change described it as a will to include civil society participation in decision-making (70%) and, in a more general tendency to oneself, involve civil society in decision-making (40%). In that sense, Mejdî Frihi said that he “...listen[s] to the civil society more, I pay more attention to their proposals, their interventions... It used to be impossible for me, to accept that they were intervening in a hard way with no respect for the administration... I learnt how to handle conflict also and that’s a big change, at my level.” This comes with more trust in the role of civil society in society. And for Moufida Gremda, this derived also from witnessing the Dutch experience: “We saw concrete cases... Projects where civil society participates and succeeds, and it’s a very good example that we want to follow ... I tended to believe in the role of CSO in the municipal work, but now I believe 90-95% in it and know that without a participative approach they won’t succeed in their duties... My vision has changed.”

100% of the local-level respondents perceived more trust in the civil society, and 66% said, ever since the training, they were more reactive towards the civil society and could give better communication. Farah Mizouni said she “...use[s] the tools we learnt: how to communicate, how to share a message for it to be clear and without foginess. How to convince CSO to participate, for the good of the citizen of la Marsa.” Atef Trabelsi that his municipality “...[is now] counting on this very young civil society in our activities.”

5.4.3. Encouraging results

Confirming the theoretical link between change in behavior and outcome and then, indirectly, confirming the relevance of the conceptual model, 30% of the central-level participants have not perceived any outcome regarding civil society inclusiveness. One of them was Mohammed Atef Farhat who said “It [training] was interesting to see but again, at my level, I couldn’t implement it.” Moufida Gremda said that if she did not see outcomes, she also considered it was too soon to tell: “I have not seen it yet, but I think there will be a change, positive things happening from this participative approach.” The remaining 70% of the central-level respondents have integrated civil society participation into their coming projects, such as future

laws (10%), regulations (50%), future international initiatives aiming at civil society participation and empowerment (30%), or advocacy programs for the civil society (10%). Some 40% of central-level participants considered that the training's outcome has been a seeable and extended civil society participation. For example, Mohammed Zaghdoudi said that: *“the tools of negotiation, delegation, communication helped towards the inclusion of civil society within decision making... It's a radical change! Before, at the central level, we thought it was not their roles to participate, to reflect on our activities and to introduce themselves into our activities. Now, we know that the civil society must be a fundamental part of our process... In some municipalities, the civil society took fully in charge this communication policy in regard of citizens... It was amazing.”* Ammar Nasri also underlined how new it was for the country:

“We used to not interact with civil society associations. It was like a taboo to communicate with them. Today, we receive those everyday just like citizens... And at their level, they even ask for it.” Furthermore, 30% said they have taken top-down initiatives to foster civil society participation at the local level, and 20% performed actual delegation of tasks to the civil society. One of them was Mejdi Frehi, who said that *“In the terms of references of studies, we ask for civil society participation, meetings with civil society associations. That what local governance is about. And secondly, we organize in the establishment of territorial diagnose meetings. And we present it to local, central levels, politics and even citizens who give their opinions.”*

An emerging element on the matter of civil society participation is that 30% of participants (still working in central administrations) said that they themselves have been involved in a civil society after the training. First was Nejib Belkhir who *“established a CSO on governance... My attitude, my role within my own community has changed. I used to be shy, careless and I became more aware of issues and the possibilities of societies within it.”* Moufida Gremda also said so: *“Myself, as a citizen, I participate to civil society associations.”* The third one was Mejdi Frihi: *“It [the training] had much more impact on my personal life. I am an active member urban office... We are establishing projects to support government... Local Governance... You could tell that it is easier to see rapid change within the civil society because a change within government is not that easy, it implies many actors, revision of laws, ... But change at the level of civil society goes faster as we do not have limits, requirements.”*

At the local level, more participants have perceived outcomes on the matter of civil society participation (83%). These have all been felt in the amount of civil society participation influence on projects. According to Habib Mili: *“We established a new tennis club, at the*

initiative of an NGO.” Or, the involvement of the civil society was seen in a participative budget (according to 50% of the local-level respondents), support by the local level towards the central level (16%), and more generally, consideration of the civil society as an everyday partner (for 50% of them). This resulted in the development of more trust towards administrations, according to Afef Ayed: “We reestablished the trust between the civil society and the administration, and strengthen our relations. That helped overcoming daily issues.”

On the same line, Bahri Mathloui said that *“The civil society is now a real effective partner of the municipality, here in Gremda.”* And Atef Trabelsi that: *“The direct impact is through the exercise; my works... I consult and discuss projects before I implement it.”* Also, 33% of local-level respondents have been involved in a civil society association after the training. One was Habib Mili, who established his own civil society organization called “Anjez”, which is dedicated to local governance. Another person, Atef Trabelsi, said that: *“Right after trainings, I registered in a civil society association. The La Marsa Protection Association... Tools learnt at The Hague Academy gave me faith in our role in the society.”* However, the latter also said that impact on this matter had been more felt at his level because in Tunisia, *“The society is still not ready for that kind of democracy. Even the civil society tends to not react if things seem to run by themselves.”*

Table 7: Concluding table, evaluation of civil society

Learning	Behavior	Outcome
Awareness about the benefits of civil society participation, that change can come from the civil society, make a project successful, participative approach, negotiation, conflict management, communication.	Not relevant for some (30%) central-level participants, will to include civil society in decision-making, trust in civil society for the rest, better conflict management, and better communication.	Civil society as a real partner. More civil society participation. Civil society included in programs, laws, regulations. Self-involvement in a civil society association.

5.5. What is the impact that the trainings have on democratic leadership?

As mentioned in the theory, democracy is a holistic notion that encompasses many different aspects. Analyzing a democratic leadership indirectly implies the analysis of three previous points: strengthening of local governments, an inclusive approach towards civil society, and citizen participation. This was also underlined by the participants during the conducting of the interviews. For example, Mohammed Zaghdoui said that *“For [him], local governance, it’s*

democracy.” Which was also voiced by Samy Khaddraoui: *“We could say local governance, or we can call it democracy, it is the same thing.”* And also by Moufida Gremda:

“For me, the participative approach is democracy.” This shows that those participants share the consideration that a training on local governance can have an impact on the consolidation of democracy through multiple factors. A democratic leadership requires attention to be given to the notions of integrity, transparency, accountability, and innovation. These notions were also given attention in the design of the training programs.

5.5.1. Learning: a raised awareness on values

About learning, 90% of the central-level respondents have said that they acquired an increased level of awareness about the importance of the previously cited values (60% on accountability, 70% transparency, 20% on responsibility, 30% integrity and anti-corruption). Mohammed Zaghdoudi said that: *“We saw, in Rotterdam, one far-left politician and one right wing politicians talk together. And we saw how people, despite their conflicts sit together and discuss for the good of the Dutch citizen and that’s enriching... You know, you can give any magistral class on democracy, but you won’t remember anything if you don’t see how the latest is practiced... And now we foster participative democracy. For us; visiting a democrat country was very important.”* 80% also said to have learned skills that would help in a process of innovation. For example, Nejib Belkhir said that: *“Two main inputs [of training] come out: how to overcome resistance to change. And how to communicate with other layers of governments, citizens.”* 60% participants from the central level said they learnt new way of governing and new ideas. Among them, Mohammed Zaghdoudi said that: *“[he] realized accountability can be fostered by indicators. And being accountable for the citizen, it’s having performance indicators, defined goals that have to reached.”* Also, 40% said that they learned how to operate a better budget management with deadlines and targets, and one the benefits of international benchmarking. At the local level, 83% of the respondents said that they gained awareness about the benefits of democratic leadership and tools to foster the latter. Training increased their awareness about the benefits of democratic values. Around 33% said that they have learned to take opposition into account. Atef Trabelsi illustrated it so: *“We saw, in the municipality of Rotterdam, that opponents have their voices, and their voices are taken into consideration. They share their meanings and offer solutions to every kind of issue.”* Then 66% said that they learned how to communicate better, and 44% saw the importance in acting with more transparency: *“It taught me how important it is to be transparent”* (Atef Trabelsi).

Finally, 33% increased their knowledge about the benefits of integrity, responsibility, and accountability: *“I have a better knowledge on the importance of societal responsibility”* (Hafedh Dridi). Farah Mizouni also assessed that he gained awareness about the benefits of equity.

5.5.2. Changed behavior

These learning sessions made the participants change their behavior (70% central-level respondents and 83% local-level respondents). At the central level, 40% said that the training made them act with more transparency (40%) and accountability (20%). Fourat Oueslati said that in *“[his] duties, that compound the definition of steps of intervention, we prepare steps that are easy to understand, clear and we are transparent because it’s important for the citizen.”* Mejdi Frihi also underlined that he *“... see[s] accountability as the key factor of every project, that must be taken in its elaboration, strategy. I am very aware of it and share it.”* Also, 40% of the central-level participants said that after the training, they tried to become more innovative regarding local economic development. For Hafedh Dridi, it was so: *“Since the training, I tend to underline the necessity of good practices. I foster indicators of performance and international benchmarking.”* But 30% of the central-level respondents said that training has led to no behavioral change. At the local level, 83% said that they have acted with more transparency after the training. Among whom was Farah Mizouni: *“I changed in the way I behave with my colleagues and with the citizens. How I present some subjects, how I try to convince but stay transparent in my words and act in a responsible manner.”* And 33% of the local-level respondents have also given more attention to opposition ever since the training. Also, 33% handled projects in a more innovative way.

5.5.3. Mitigated outcomes

Outcomes on the matter of democratic leadership have been perceived by only half of the participants, which is less than the three previous variables. A hypothesis is that measuring the outcomes of a democratic behavior are harder to tell and relate to. However, positive outcomes have been voiced, and Ziad Labidini has even been particularly so: *“We are in a situation of transparency at the local level.”* Central-level respondents said they have fostered these values at the local level. For example, Samy Khaddraoui said that *“We push local authorities to be democratic in their work, by making citizens participate in decision making... We give them tools, work methodology.”* Mohammed Atef Farhat did just that during his talks on the

organic law on local communities: *“We put in evidence all those principles of responsivity, integrity, transparence, ...in the legal text of the organic law on local collectivities. It became primordial to every actor to play its role in the concretization of those principles”*

At the central level, 40% said that their democratic behavior led to a more efficient local government: *“I have a different way of working: clearer, with defined steps and that leads to better results”* (Fourat Oueslati), and so did 33% of local government alumni. Also, 40% at the central level confirmed that they have taken on new innovative measures in their leadership roles such as incentives towards democracy at the local level. For example, Nejib Belkhir said that: *“We established a code of conduct, that was centered on transparency, transitional change.”* 20% implemented performance indicators. Ziad Labidini said that *“In the programme of urban development, we set up evaluation criteria such as management, governance, ... It ended up defining their access to donations by the Support Funds for Local Communities.”* And Nejib Belkhir that: *“We created a positive climate of concurrence among municipalities who want to be the best on the matters of transparence and innovation.”* Central-level respondents also considered that those steps towards democracy made local level governments more innovative (20%). That came for Nejib Belkhir in his implementation of top-down initiatives: *“At the Price Fund,²², we also put in place an incentive system where we give financial subventions based on local innovation.”* Results show also that there have been new initiatives on economic development, according to Moufida Gremda: *“We are thinking of new way to gather founds. Like a tax on hotels, and give a percentage to localities. And devolution of taxes at the benefits of local level.”*

At the local level, one alumni assessed that the training contributed to a national recognition of their municipalities. Thabet Majdi said that: *“We applied the tools succeed in this performance requirements and succeeded [was elected the most democratic municipality] (...) It [training] helped at the local level the success of a national initiative.”* And Farah Mizouni is trying to implement gender equity: *“There is a topic I try to introduce everywhere: gender. And that’s a revolution.”* Regarding innovation, outcomes have been less tangible at the local level where only 16% of local level participants have introduced new initiatives (performance indicators and a different project management).

²² (“Caisse des prix”)

5.5.4. Contextual restrains

Contextual restraint also emerged from the interviews when speaking of democratic leadership. Ammar Nasri considered the phase when municipal councils remain unelected: *“every year, we wait for municipal elections to enter a real democracy. We wait for regional councils to be elected... It’s going to multiply democracy at the local level”*. Finally, Ziad Labidini underlined very well the idea that was already described in the theoretical framework that democracy is an ideal that can never be achieved and is not invincible: *“Everything goes towards more equity, efficiency, diminishing disparities among municipalities... actors are sharing, spreading the word on good governance, its practices, transparency, responsibility, accountability and fight against corruption. But the work is never over. You need patience before seeing outcomes. We inherited from a centralized regime, administrations that do not listen, nor its environment, nor youth, nor women. And things are changing. But we still need to be patient... You can’t change the society with decrees. There will be a minimum of nine years to go towards a decentralized regime. There is still so much work to do.”*

Two back-home action plans focused on democratic leadership. In 2015, the back-home action plan included a project to *“implement to favor and promote municipal action”* (Thabet Majdi), which was inspired by the “one-stop shop” example they witnessed in the Netherlands. Although, according to Ammar Nasri who also established the latter back-home action plan: *“the project failed. Each one of us belongs to a different administration and busy with our daily routine. Although, we need coordination to make it happen, a framework for these projects”*. On the same line, Thabet Majdi said they were *“missing a follow up on the projects (...) everything was ruined”*. The back-home action plan 2016 was a new budget management based on performance within local communities. *“It taught how to be strategic. To define a target; and divide it in multiple under elements with deadlines. Which necessitated teamwork. It was a defined subject, doable that would benefit to local management”* (Mohammed Atef Farhat). The latter is still in process.

Table 8: Evaluation of democratic leadership

Learnings	Behavior	Outcomes
Increased awareness and importance of integrity, accountability, taking opposition into account, responsibility, transparency, benefits of innovation, new ways of working.	Act with more transparency, accountability, innovative thinking	Only one in two participants saw outcomes of democratic leadership. When implemented: innovation works, better results and, for one, a situation of transparency. Action-plan of social responsibility.

5.6. Discussion

A general comment is that even though the results at the local level have been enriching and can be considered to have answered the research question, the imbalance between the results from the central-level (10 respondents) and local-level (6 respondents) interviewees resulted in broader descriptions on the analysis of outcomes for central-level respondents than for local-level respondents. If this sample of 16 respondents (10 central-level respondents and 6 local level respondents) allowed the previously depicted results, it would have been interesting to have had a perfect balance. That said, this fact also reflects the imbalance between local- and central-level participants in the Shiraka training on local governance given by The Hague Academy. Although through the years, balance does get achieved more and more (no local level participants in 2013 and 2014, 3 (out of 8) in 2015, 3 (out of 5) in 2016 and 2 (out of 6) in 2017. Secondly, the trainings were perceived to have increased the learning and behavioral change levels on each of the four variables (i.e., strengthening of local governments, citizen participation, civil society participation, democratic leadership), but outcomes were perceived to be limited for the strengthening of local governments and democratic leadership. On that matter, it is important to underline—as depicted in the theoretical framework—that transition takes time. In this regard, outcomes could possibly be predicted in the future. Furthermore, the training evaluation scheme that this research follows is designed for any kind of vocational training. But considering Witesman’s (2009) reflection on the paradox of democracy and decentralization—that “democratic structural reform requir[es] decentralization, and democratic institutional reform requir[es] centralization”—is interesting in relation to this point. Indeed, the scholar suggests that there be a shift in culture before decentralization is necessary for democratization. Considering that, it could be that these learnings and behavioral changes are to be considered as the first positive steps towards a decentralized country even

though participants are not describing concrete outcomes from the trainings. Even though tangible outcomes haven't been felt by all participants.

Thirdly, the semi-structured interviews focused on four variables of democratic consolidation with regard to trainings on local governance. If the latter have been defined after in-depth previous theoretical research, there is still a possibility that some aspects have not been approached, even though I left room for emerging elements. Further research on the second Shiraka training organized by The Hague Academy, which was focused on Social Affairs and Employment that also aims at democratic consolidation, would also be particularly interesting, considering the current context of crisis and unemployment that is hitting Tunisia and the Middle East hard in general.

Fourthly, one of main reflections that comes after the writing of this thesis is that now knowing the impact that the trainings have had on the *pillar of democracy* in the MENA region and how the context of the country has had an impact on its results, the following questions come to mind: what would be the impact from the same training but in different contexts? Could it be that the training would lead to more results in those different contexts? Co-participants in these trainings on local governance also came from Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, and Libya, where outcomes of the Arab Springs have been considered to be more limited than in Tunisia. Further comparison would also be interesting in the sense that it would generalize the conclusions on the impacts of the trainings in transitioning contexts.

Then, one recurrent question that I have been asking myself throughout the internship is: to what extent would the knowledge acquired through the *Dutch example* demonstrate to be efficient in the participants' context? The first answer, as an example, that came to my mind was that a relatively high number of participants said that after the trainings, they had implemented the Dutch ways of working, such as the KPI or *key performance indicators* that are sometimes questioned by researchers, for example, as regards policy alienation towards which they are led (Tummers et al., 2009).

In addition, this research explores how the trainings on local governance impact democratic consolidation of Tunisia. Conclusions from the research have shown some positive outcomes and allowed for recommendations to be made. However, this research does not analyze broadly how more impact could be achieved through these trainings, through other training methods, or through the subjects covered, for example. These would all be particularly interesting for future research that would benefit the training institute.

Chapter 6. Conclusions & Recommendations

6.1 Conclusions

Ever since the Jasmine revolution of 2011, Tunisia itself has faced tremendous changes. Since Ben Ali had fled, Tunisian authorities have given priority to a peaceful and constitutional transition for the country (CNCD, 2017). Tunisia is said to have successfully completed its transition into democracy (Stepan, 2012) and is called by scholars a *pillar for democracy* in the Middle East North African region. It ratified the Constitution in 2014, which contains many initiatives towards a democratic regime and decentralization. During the interviews, respondents (i.e., civil servants of this transitioning context) have spoken about a situation of “tangible” change in the way they operate, which consists of freedom of speech and citizen participation like they’ve “never seen before”. This has also been felt for in the number of civil society organizations, which have doubled since before the revolution (CNCD, 2017).

However, change takes time, and the current situation in Tunisia is raising concerns among the international community. The country is facing an economic crisis that led to waves of protests at the 7th anniversary of the Jasmin Revolution. It still relies heavily on international help. On October 9th of 2017, the UE granted a macro-funding of €500 million to Tunisia. Disparities across regions have also been simmering. And the code of local communities has still not been adopted, which is postponing the organization of the first municipal elections and is therefore slowing down the process of decentralization that the Constitution had committed to.

Considering O’Donnel’s theory on democratization (in Valenzuela, 1990), Tunisia must consolidate its democracy—after it has completed a successful transition. This phase implies a redefinition of the balances of forces and the consolidation of trust-building towards the regime and its administration that is also found in the articles of the Constitution (among others) that aim towards a more decentralized system. In that sense, trainings on local governance with a focus on multi-level governance are relevant. And interviews with former participants showed gaps in knowledge as they had exercised their duties in a centralized context throughout their lives with decision-making and initiatives only coming from a top-to-down direction. In a dictatorship, skills such as negotiation, presentation, and communication were not useful, i.e., a context in which the civil society and citizens did not have say at all on decision-making.

The trainings on local governance organized by The Hague Academy in the framework of the Shiraka partnership between the Netherlands and the MENA region includes notions on multi-

level governance, local governance, tools on democracy, and democratic consolidation. With regard to the previously depicted context, notions are particularly relevant. However, did they lead to the expected outcomes?

The organization ends each training with an evaluation form, which is rather an indication of “customers’ satisfaction” than an effective training evaluation. The aim of this research, which was based on semi-structured interviews with participants months or years after the trainings had taken place, was thus twofold: filling this gap in the evaluation of the training organization, and assessing whether the trainings represent a useful tool in a transitioning context. A total of 10 central-level alumni have been interviewed, together with 6 local-level alumni. They represented 53% of the Tunisian alumni who took part in the Shiraka (/Matra South) training programme.


Conclusions from the latter have shown that the trainings organized by The Hague Academy provided participants with an increased level of knowledge regarding multi-level governance, benefits of local governance, decentralization, democratic leadership, and the benefits that all these have on democracy. For some participants, it was the beginning of a *radical change* as some “did not even know the notion of governance itself”. It was also the chance for them to witness and learn about the benefits of citizen participation and civil society participation and learn to be equipped with the tools for negotiation and conflict management, while for many of them, those were remote concepts that were only found in texts and regulations. This again underlined the relevance of the trainings in a transitioning context. The outcomes have been felt mostly on citizen participation and civil society participation with initiatives such as participatory budget and, in a general manner, extended participation and generalized participative approach from participants.

But as for the strengthening of local governments, outcomes have been mostly felt at central level while local-level respondents believed that the context did not leave them the space and freedom of action to implement what they had learned. The fact that the code for localities has still not been adopted has been emphasized by many participants, such as the very centralized system and mentalities of colleagues. The lack of follow up has also been emphasized by many participants as the reason they did not implement their back-home action plans. However, conviction among the participants about the benefits of multi-level governance, participative approach, and democratic behavior all suggest that their motivation towards implementing those is intrinsic, so it could limit the chances that they would go back to “business as usual” (Kirkpatrick J. and Kirkpatrick D., 2007). On this matter, a reasonable number of respondents

have said that they are confident that the tools they learned will lead to more and better results once Tunisia takes more steps towards a more decentralized system (for example, adoption of the code of localities, and holding municipal elections).

The conclusion is that the trainings have fulfilled their objective and have created a positive impact on the range of participants even though some improvements at the level of back-home action plan should and could be overcome. Their perception towards change after having completed the trainings makes the trainings relevant for civil servants in transitioning contexts in general. However, the latter has also been broadly emphasized as a restraint for many outcomes of trainings. Furthermore, many outcomes depicted by respondents are still at project-stage. The debate is whether patience should be exerted by participants, or whether training design should take more into account the possibilities of the Tunisian context.

Figure 3: Research conclusions



6.2. Recommendations

6.2.1. Recommendation for theory

If it would be interesting to deepen some aspects described in the point 5.6. (Discussion), this research itself also brings new insights for administration literature.

This research firstly confirms the relevance of the design that Kirkpatrick J. and Kirkpatrick D. (2007) made for training evaluation. Following their four-step training evaluation (i.e., evaluation of reaction, learning, and then results) allowed for this research to have more concrete conclusions on the impact of training, whereas the evaluations forms filled by participants after the training were indeed considered to be more of indicators of customers' satisfaction.

It also allows one to assess empirically the theoretical assumption that giving training on local governance can foster democratic consolidation. And this, because interviews showed that it led to outcomes such as civil society participation, citizen participation, and (to some extent), to a more democratic leadership and to the strengthening of local governments.

Secondly, this research provides useful information on the transitional Tunisian context, and what the latter implies for its civil servants and its administrations. Interviews and the way participants perceived their context have joined theory on democratic transition and democratic consolidation. Respondents have emphasized a freedom never seen before and a tangible change in the way the country is being governed (Constitution, elections). They witnessed a rise in the civil society, a freedom never seen before and a political will towards participation and decentralization. However, remains of authoritarianism are still felt 7 years after the revolution. These have been felt by respondents mostly in centralized and autocratic mentalities in administrations. These have induced restraints that are mostly for empowering local governments and for democratic leadership. They should be eliminated to guarantee a stable regime. But these conclusions are based on perceptions. It would also be interesting to supplement the latter with deeper research on administrations contexts, citizens and civil societies in transitioning contexts (not only Tunisian civil servants).

This research has also confirmed theories on skills that civil servants lack when coming from an autocratic regime. All participants said they raised their awareness on the matters of multi-level governance, participation and democratic leadership, and to have acquired useful tools

and changed their behavior through the trainings, which furthermore also globally led to concrete outcomes (such as participatory budget). It can be concluded globally that participants must acquire skills when exerting in a transitioning context (i.e, conflict prevention, negotiation, a participative approach) and must become aware of the benefits of citizen participation, civil society participation, democratic leadership, and the strengthening of local governments. But if these conclusions positively imply the positive impact of The Hague Academy, they are also worrying signs that in Tunisia, many civil servants remain unaware of the benefits of participation and on the necessity of 'good governance'. Of course, other national and international initiatives have been taken to foster this knowledge and the skills of civil servants in the country. But a deeper research, with an extended sample of respondents for example, on what remains from autocracy are still to be felt within Tunisian civil servants and administrations would be useful.

6.2.2. Recommendation for The Hague Academy

In general, training evaluations are limited to the online evaluation forms at the end of each training, which are merely *indicators of customers satisfaction*. The main recommendation to The Hague Academy would be the following: The Hague Academy could organize evaluations of the outcomes every year in a simplified and organized way online. That would allow useful feedbacks that could be considered during the training design process and even be a reliable support in their collection of financing or contracts from international institutions dedicated to peace and development, which are some of the main sources of funding for The Hague Academy. Furthermore, interviews have revealed to be extremely positive on the matter of perceived learnings. It would be particularly interesting for the organization to make questionnaires that are distributed to the participants in the beginning and at the end of the trainings.

As the outcomes on the matter of strengthening local governments, which have been felt mostly by local-level respondents, are limited, we could ask: Could a handful of participants overcome a system in place? Probably not. However, a suggestion with regard to this restraint would be to pay an increased amount of attention to how participants can act within their actual context. There was a training session focused on change, but this was hardly cited by the participants.

Also, two participants said to have, following the training been giving training themselves training. Ziad Labidini is working for the CFAD (Training center for transition support) who is training a large number of civil servants (Ziad Labidi is said to have reached 1/3 of the

administrations' workers). The latter has expressed a will to cooperate with The Hague Academy. Further cooperation in a train-the-trainer²³ (of the CFAD), for example, would extend the (positive) impact that The Hague Academy could have on Tunisia, as it could reach more than 30 persons (which is the number of Tunisians who participated in the training on local governance)

Furthermore, the Shiraka programmes gather participants from the same countries every year. But contact between different “*promotions*” are limited to questions put forward to the previous alumni about their Back-Home Action Plan. This fact has been questioned by many participants during interviews. An idea would be to foster contact between former participants of the Shiraka trainings by way of an online group or even in physical reality through the organization of yearly gatherings in the country. But whether funding could allow the organization of events or whether their organization would be ready to finance such projects should also be taken into consideration. Indeed, I sincerely believe that exchanges of ideas could be beneficial in the framework of democratic consolidation. Furthermore, many participants regretted the lack of follow-up, which restrained the outcome with regard to the back-home action plan.

Regarding this latter subject matter, the interviews showed that few participants reached the goal of implementing the back-home action plans. These plans were often very ambitious. They represented a good assessment of knowledge and behavioral change that put them in the mindset towards entrepreneurship and change in a framework of a democratic leadership, rather than steps of concrete action in their contexts. Indeed, all of them were either *in process* with few chance to develop or *failed*. If five years could be too early to assess whether the outcomes of some are doomed, many participants regretted The Hague Academy did not follow up on it. It could also indicate that some plans were not as SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Timely, criteria defined by Bray, 2009) as preconized by The Hague Academy. This was also a question I had then raised which was relevant to dedicating two training days or sessions that aim towards establishing the Back-Home Action Plan, or if the latter shouldn't be even more framed in a certain context or followed up.

²³ The Hague Academy also regularly organizes Trainings of Trainers in their duties.

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Annexes

Annex 1: Questionnaires

Central

1. Renforcement gouvernance locale

1. A) Comment évaluez votre connaissance des avantages de la gouvernance à plusieurs niveaux après la formation ?

- a. Bien meilleure qu'avant la formation
- b. Meilleure qu'avant la formation
- c. Égale à avant la formation
- d. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer:

1. B) Considérez-vous que la formation vous a donné des compétences, outils qui vous ont permis d'interagir différemment avec différents niveaux de gouvernement?

- a. Oui
- b. Non
- c. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer

1. C) Avez vous-constaté un changement de comportement, d'attitude lors de vos interactions avec d'autres niveaux de gouvernements?

- a. Oui
- b. Non
- c. Pas de réponse

Veillez-expliquer

1. D) Ces changements, connaissances, compétences ont-ils eu un impact dans votre travail de tous les jours (projet, façon de travailler, procédures...)?

- a. Oui
- b. Non

c. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer

2. Participation citoyenne

2. A) Comment évaluez votre connaissance des avantages de la participation citoyenne après la formation?

a. Bien meilleure qu'avant la formation

b. Meilleure qu'avant la formation

c. Égale à avant la formation

d. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer :

2. B) Considérez-vous que la formation vous a donné des compétences, outils afin d'encourager la participation citoyenne dans votre travail (sociale, politique)?

a. Oui

b. Non

c. Pas de réponse

d. Veillez expliquer

2. C) Avez-vous constaté chez vous un changement de comportement, d'attitude par rapport à la participation citoyenne ?

a. Oui

b. Non

c. Pas de réponse

d. Veillez expliquer :

2. D) Avez-vous constaté un changement de comportement, d'attitude lors de vos interactions avec les citoyens ?

a. Oui

b. Non

c. Pas de réponse

d. Veuillez expliquer

2. E) Est-ce que ces éventuel(les) connaissances, compétences, changement d'attitude ils eu un impact dans votre travail (projet, ...) ?

a. Oui

b. Non

c. Pas de réponse

d. Veuillez expliquer.

3. Participation société civile

3. A) Comment considérez-vous, après la formation, votre connaissances des bénéfices, avantages de la participation de la société civile?

a. Bien Meilleure qu'avant la formation

b. Meilleure qu'avant la formation

c. Égale à avant la formation

d. Pas de réponse

Veuillez expliquer :

3. B) Est-ce que vous considérez que la formation vous a donné des outils, compétences pour inclure la société civile dans la prise de décision ?

a. Oui

b. Non

c. Pas de réponse

Veuillez expliquer :

3. C) Est ce qu'au niveau de la participation de la société civile pour votre travail, vous avez remarqué en vous un changement d'attitude dans votre travail de tous les jours?

a. Oui

b. Non

c. Pas de réponse

Veuillez expliquer :

3. D) Est ce que lors de vos interactions avec la société civile pour votre travail (*si elles ont lieu*), vous avez constaté un changement en vous d'attitude ?

- a. Oui
- b. Non
- c. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer :

3. E. Est-ce que ces connaissances, changements, ont eu un impact dans votre travail (projets, façon de travailler, ...)?

- a. Oui
- b. Non
- c. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer :

4. Leadership démocratique

4. A) Considérez-vous que la formation vous a doté d'une meilleure connaissance, conscience de l'importance de la gouvernance (locale à démocratique? (responsabilité, intégrité, transparence, inclusivité, ...)

- a. Oui; bien meilleure qu'avant la formation
- b. Oui, meilleure qu'avant la formation
- c. Non, égale à avant la formation
- d. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer :

4. B) Considérez-vous que la formation vous a doté d'une meilleure connaissance, conscience de l'importance de la gouvernance (locale) effective?

- a. Oui; bien meilleure qu'avant la formation
- b. Oui, meilleure qu'avant la formation
- c. Non, égale à avant la formation
- d. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer

4. C) Considérez-vous que la formation vous a doté d'outils, aptitudes pour gouverner de façon démocratique (ou pour la permettre au niveau local) ?

- a. Oui
- b. Non
- c. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer :

4. D) Considérez-vous que la formation vous a doté d'outils, aptitudes pour gouverner de façon plus effective (ou pour permettre cela au niveau local)?

- a. Oui
- b. Non
- c. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer :

4. E) Est ce que la formation vous a fourni des connaissances, outils, compétences qui ont induit un changement d'attitude par rapport à la gouvernance démocratique?

- a. Oui
- b. Non
- c. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer :

4. F) Est ce que la formation vous a fourni des connaissances, outils, compétences qui ont induit un changement d'attitude par rapport à la gouvernance effective?

- a. Oui
- b. Non
- c. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer :

4. G) Est ce que ces connaissances, outils, changements d'attitude sur la gouvernance démocratique ont eu un impact dans votre travail (projets, façon de travailler, ...) ?

- a. Oui
- b. Non

c. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer :

4. E) Est ce que ces connaissances, outils, changements d'attitude pour une gouvernance efficace ont eu un impact dans votre travail (projets, façon de travailler, ...) ?

a. Oui

b. Non

c. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer

5. BHAP

Veillez décrire votre BHAP, et l'état d'avancement de celui-ci.

6. Commentaires supplémentaires ?

Local

1. Renforcement gouvernance locale

1. A) Comment évaluez votre connaissance des avantages de la gouvernance à plusieurs niveaux après la formation?

a. Bien meilleure qu'avant la formation

b. Meilleure qu'avant la formation

c. Égale à avant la formation

d. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer :

1. B) Considérez-vous que la formation vous a donné des compétences, outils qui vous ont permis d'interagir différemment avec différents niveaux de gouvernement ?

a. Oui

b. Non

c. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer

1. C) Avez-vous-constaté un changement de comportement, d'attitude lors de vos interactions avec d'autres niveaux de gouvernements ?

a. Oui

- b. Non
- c. Pas de réponse

Veillez-expliquer :

1. D) Ces changements, connaissances, compétences ont-ils eu un impact dans votre travail de tous les jours (projet, façon de travailler, procédures...) ?

- a. Oui
- b. Non
- c. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer

2. Participation citoyenne

2. A) Comment évaluez votre connaissance des avantages de la participation citoyenne après la formation?

- a. Bien meilleure qu'avant la formation
- b. Meilleure qu'avant la formation
- c. Égale à avant la formation
- d. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer:

3. Participation société civile

3. A) Comment considérez-vous, après la formation, votre connaissances des bénéfices, avantages de la participation de la société civile?

- a. Bien Meilleure qu'avant la formation
- b. Meilleure qu'avant la formation
- c. Égale à avant la formation
- d. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer

3. B) Est-ce que vous considérez que la formation vous a donné des outils, compétences pour inclure la société civile dans la prise de décision?

- a. Oui
- b. Non

c. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer

3. C) Est ce qu'au niveau de la participation de la société civile pour votre travail, vous avez remarqué en vous un changement d'attitude dans votre travail de tous les jours?

a. Oui

b. Non

c. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer:

3. D) Est ce que lors de vos interactions avec la société civile pour votre travail, vous avez constaté un changement en vous d'attitude ?

a. Oui

b. Non

c. Pas de réponse

Veillez expliquer

3. E. Est ce que ces connaissances, changements, ont eu un impact dans votre travail (projets, façon de travailler, ...)?

a. Oui

b. Non

c. Pas de réponse

d. Veillez expliquer

Gouvernance Démocratique

4. A) Considérez-vous que la formation vous a doté d'une meilleure connaissance, conscience de l'importance de la gouvernance locale démocratique? (responsabilité, intégrité, transparence, inclusivité, ...)

a. Oui; bien meilleure qu'avant la formation

b. Oui, meilleure qu'avant la formation

c. Non, égale à avant la formation

d. Pas de réponse

e. Veuillez expliquer

4. B) Considérez-vous que la formation vous a doté d'une meilleure connaissance, conscience de l'importance de la gouvernance locale innovante?

f. Oui; bien meilleure qu'avant la formation

g. Oui, meilleure qu'avant la formation

h. Non, égale à avant la formation

i. Pas de réponse

j. Veuillez expliquer

4. C) Considérez-vous que la formation vous a doté d'outils, aptitudes pour gouverner de façon démocratique au niveau local ?

a. Oui

b. Non

c. Pas de réponse

d. Veuillez expliquer

4. D) Considérez-vous que la formation vous a doté d'outils, aptitudes pour gouverner de façon plus effective, innover au niveau local?

a. Oui

b. Non

c. Pas de réponse

d. Veuillez expliquer

4. E) Est ce que la formation vous a fourni des connaissances, outils, compétences qui ont induit un changement d'attitude par rapport à la gouvernance démocratique?

a. Oui

b. Non

c. Pas de réponse

d. Veuillez expliquer

4. F) Est ce que la formation vous a fourni des connaissances, outils, compétences qui ont induit un changement d'attitude par rapport à la gouvernance effective, innovante?

- a. Oui
- b. Non
- c. Pas de réponse
- d. Veuillez expliquer

4. G) Est ce que ces connaissances, outils, changements d'attitude sur la gouvernance démocratique ont eu un impact dans votre travail (projets, façon de travailler, ...) ?

- a. Oui
- b. Non
- c. Pas de réponse
- d. Veuillez expliquer

4. E) Est ce que ces connaissances, outils, changements d'attitude pour une gouvernance efficace ont eu un impact dans votre travail (projets, façon de travailler, ...) ?

- e. Oui
- f. Non
- g. Pas de réponse
- h. Veuillez expliquer

5. BHAP

Veillez décrire votre BHAP, et l'état d'avancement de celui ci.

6. Commentaires supplémentaires ?

Annex 2: Strengthening of local governments

Analysis of learning

Central level participants

Code	N(/10)	Sub code	N (/10)
Raised awareness of benefits of multi-level governance and decentralization	10	Advantages local level as partner	8
		Advantages independent local level	6
		Awareness of the importance of local economic development	4
Skills to foster multi-level governance	8	Conflict resolution	2
		Communication	6
		Negotiation	6
Tools to implement decentralization	7		

Local level participants

Code	N(/6)	Sub code	N (/6)
Notion of governance at the local level	3		
Raised awareness of the benefits of multi-level governance	5		
Tools for a bigger assertiveness	4	How to underline one's autonomy	4
		Presentation skills	2
		Negotiation Skills	2
		Teamwork	2
		Conflict Management	2
Tools to implement decentralization	2		

Analysis of behavior change

Central level participants

Code	N (/10)	Sub-code	N (/10)
Local level seen as partner	9	Assertive concerning local governance towards colleagues	2
		Wil to interact with local level	7
		Will to give more power to local level	6
		More reactive towards local level	2
		Clear and open communication	3
		More flexible towards local level	4
Better conflict management	2		
No behavioral Change	1		

Local level participants

Code	N (/6)	Sub-code	N (/6)
Assertiveness with central level	4		
Trust in governance, will for governance	2		
None	1		

Analysis of outcomes

Central level participants

Code	N (/10)	Sub code	N (/10)
Decentralization integrated in coming laws, programs, regulations	8	Capacity building programs local level	4
		Empowered local level in law projects (mostly Regulation Code for Localities)	6
		Integration decentralization in programs (see table for examples)	6
Delegation of power towards municipalities	6		
More efficient local level	2		
None	1		

Local level participants

Code	N (/6)	Sub code	N (/6)
Strengthened local governance in laws, texts, laws, rules	2		
More interaction local and central level	2		
Limited impact	2		
None	3		

Emerging category: outside of training elements restraining/slowing down training outcome on strengthening of local governments

Central level participants

Code	N (/10)	Sub code	N (/10)
Resources	3	Lack of local resources	2
		General crisis in Tunisia	1
Centralized Tradition	4	Officials not willing to lose power	2
		Centralized System	3

Local level participants

Code	N (/6)	Sub code	N (/6)
Resistance central level	1		
Centralized system: old rules	2	code of localities not adopted	2
		local council not elected	2

Emerging category: outside of training element favoring training outcome on multi-level governance

Central level participants

Code	N (/10)	Sub code	N (/10)
Constitution 2014	3		
Other trainings	2		

Local level participants

Code	N (/6)	Sub code	N (/6)
Political will towards decentralization and governance	1		

Annex 3: Citizen Participation

Analysis of Learning

Central Level

Code	N (/10)	Sub-code	N (/10)
Raised awareness on the benefits of citizen participation	10	Awareness of the benefits of participation at every level of society	1
		Awareness of the benefit of citizen participation	10
Tools to foster citizen participation	9	Participative approach Dutch municipalities	8
		Communication	5
		Presentation	2
		Conflict Management	5
None	0		

Local level participants

Code	N (/6)	Sub-code	N (/6)
Raised awareness on the benefits of citizen participation	6		
Tools to foster citizen participation	6	teamwork	2
		Negotiation	1
		Conflict management	1
		Communication	3

Analysis Behavioral Change

Central level participants

Code	N (/10)	Sub-code	N (/10)
Willingness to involve citizens in the decision making	9,5		
Better conflict management	2		
Assertiveness about citizen participation towards colleagues from central level	3		

Local Level Participants

Code	N (/6)	Sub-code	N (/6)
Trust in Citizen Participation	6		

Analysis Outcome

Central level participants

Code	N (/10)	Sub-code	N (/10)
Citizen participation included in projects, programs, laws	9	Capacity building programs for municipalities regarding citizen participation	4
		Involving citizen participation in law projects	1
		Citizen participation from municipalities required in central programs	7
		Citizen participation integrated in central level methodology	3
		Advocacy programs for citizens	1
Citizen participation	6	Participative budget municipalities	4
		Consultation citizens	6
		Citizens space integrated in municipalities	1
		Self-involvement in a participative approach	4
Efficiency	1		
New role governments: defamation	1		
Citizen satisfaction	3		
None	1		

Local level participants

Code	N (/6)	Sub-code	N (/6)
Integration citizen participation in projects, laws, rules	4	Capacity building Tunisian citizen	1
		Code of municipalities	2
		Participative budget	1
Citizen participation	6	Participative budget	4
		Influenced decisions	1
		Supported local level in regard of central level	1
Citizen satisfaction	3	Motivation	

Emerging category: element favoring outcome on citizen participation

Central level participants

Code	N (/10)	Sub-code	N (/10)
Other development programs	3		
Citizens willing to participate to decision making after revolution	3		
General: favoring conjuncture	1		

Local level participants

Code	N (/6)	Sub-code	N (/6)
Favoring conjuncture	2		

Analysis of Learning

Central level participants

Code	N (/10)	Sub-code	N (/10)
Raised awareness on the benefits of civil society participation	9		
Tools to enhance citizen participation	6	Participative approach	6
		Negotiation	2
		Conflict management	2
		Communication	4

Local level participants

Code	N (/10)	Sub-code	N (/10)
Raised awareness on the benefits of civil society participation	5		
Tools to enhance citizen participation	5	Participative approach	5
		Negotiation	2
		Conflict management	2
		Teamwork	2
		Communication	1

Analysis of Behavior Change

Central Level Participants

Code	N (/10)	Sub-code	N (/10)
General tendency always consult civil society in own decision making	7		
General tendency always consult civil society in own decision making	4		
None	3		

Local level participants

Code	N (/6)	Sub-code	N (/6)
Trust in role of civil society	6		
Reactiveness towards civil society	4		

Analysis of Outcome

Central Level Participants

Code	N (/10)	Sub-code	N (/10)
Civil Society Participation Integrated in programs, laws, regulations	7	Laws	1
		Regulations of programs of ruling municipalities	5
		Favoring international initiatives aiming towards civil society participation	1
		Civil society participation included in capacity building programs for municipalities	3
		Advocacy programs for civil society	1
Witnesses extended civil society participation	4	Civil society more included in decision making	3
		Civil society taking over tasks from municipality (public-private partnerships)	2
None	3		
Self-involvement in a civil society	3		

Local level participants

Code	N (/10)	Sub-code	N (/10)
Civil society implied in projects, law, regulations	2		
Climate of Trust	1		
Civil society participation	5	Participative budget	3
		Support to local level in regard of central level	1
		Regular partner	3
None	1		
Self-involvement in a CSO	2		

Emerging category: contextual element favoring outcome on civil society participation

Central Level Participants

Code	N (/10)	Sub-code	N (/10)
Growing number of civil society organizations	4		

Emerging category: contextual element restraining outcome

Code	N (/10)	Sub-code	N (/10)
Civil society not used to participate	1		

Annex 4: Democratic Leadership

Analysis of Learning

Central Level

Code	N (/10)	Sub-code	N (/10)
Raised awareness on the importance of Democratic Values	9	Integrity, anti-corruption	3
		Accountability	6
		Transparence	7
		Responsibility	2
Innovativeness	8	Alternative funding for local level	6
		Project Management	4
		International Benchmarking	1

Local level participants

Code	N (/10)	Sub-code	N (/10)
Raised awareness on the Democratic values at the local level	3		
Raised awareness on democratic Leadership	5	Taking opposition into account	2
		Communication	4
		Integrity	2
		Responsibility	2
		Accountability	2
		Transparency	4
Equity	1		
Limited	1		

Behavioral Change

Central level participants

Code	N (/10)	Sub-code	N (/10)
Democratic	5	Transparence	4
		Accountability	2
Innovative thinking towards local economic development	4		
None	3		

Local level participants

Code	N (/6)	Sub-code	N (/6)
Democratic	5	Transparence	5
		More attention to opposition	2
		Accountability	2
Innovative thinking towards local economic development	3		

Analysis of outcomes

Central level participants

Code	N (/10)	Sub-code	N (/10)
Incentives for democratic local level	2		
Innovations	4	KPI	2
		Incentives for local level innovations	2
		Economic innovations	1
Local level more efficient	4		
Local level more innovative	2		

Local level participants

Code	N (/6)	Sub-code	N (/6)
Democratic behavior	5	Transparence	5
		More attention to opposition	2
		Accountability	2
Local level more efficient	2		
Recognition of the municipalities	1		
Equity	1		

Emerging element: contextual restrains

Central level participants

Code	N (/10)	Sub-code	N (/6)
Unelected local councils	1		
Remains of authoritarian mentalities	1		

Local level participants

Code	N (/6)	Sub-code	N (/6)
Unelected local councils	1		
Code non-adopted	1		