European defence integration: a comparison of support in Belgium and the Netherlands

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# Contents

*List of figures and tables* \hspace{1em} 6  
*Acknowledgements* \hspace{1em} 7  
*Abstract* \hspace{1em} 8  

## Chapter 1  
Introduction  
1.1 Introduction \hspace{1em} 9  
1.2 Aim and relevance \hspace{1em} 10  
1.3 Problem analysis \hspace{1em} 11  
1.4 Methodology \hspace{1em} 13  
1.5 Outline \hspace{1em} 14  

## Chapter 2  
History of European Defence  
2.1 Introduction \hspace{1em} 15  
2.2 European Defence Community \hspace{1em} 16  
2.3 Western European Union \hspace{1em} 18  
2.4 European Political Cooperation \hspace{1em} 19  
2.5 Common Foreign and Security Committee \hspace{1em} 21  

## Chapter 3  
European Security and Defence Policy at present  
3.1 Introduction \hspace{1em} 25  
3.2 The quick emergence of EU defence \hspace{1em} 25  
3.3 Elements \hspace{1em} 27  
3.4 Objectives and operations \hspace{1em} 31  
3.5 Relation to the US and NATO \hspace{1em} 32  
3.6 Coming years \hspace{1em} 36  

## Chapter 4  
European integration theory and defence integration  
4.1 Introduction \hspace{1em} 37  
4.2 Integration and integration theory \hspace{1em} 37  
4.3 Liberal intergovernmentalism \hspace{1em} 40  
4.4 Defence integration \hspace{1em} 42  
4.5 Expectations in this study \hspace{1em} 45
List of figures and tables

Figure 3.1 EU political-military structure 30
Figure 4.1: defence integration continuum 42
Figure 4.2: defence integration: support at the domestic level 46
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Abstract

In the early 1990s the EU has established its own Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as one of the three pillars of the European Union in the Maastricht treaty of 1992. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is a major element of this Foreign policy. Since then a serious defence potential developed inside the European Union (EU). Although defence integration has advanced considerable, there is no such thing as a European army and the future development of European defence integration is unclear. EU member states are in general unwilling to engage in real defence integration.

In this study the stances towards European defence integration of two neighbouring EU member states are examined: Belgium and the Netherlands. Their views towards defence integration are put in a historical perspective and followed by an analysis of their present stances, based on literature study and interviews with officials at the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

When European defence integration was in its early days, Belgium and the Netherlands shared a more or less common view on the then proposed European Defence Community and both countries shared an orientation at NATO. Since then their stances have been diverging. Belgium has developed itself as a loyal supporter of European defence integration and is among the member states in the EU that are most in favour of loosening the EU’s dependency on the United States. The Netherlands kept an orientation at NATO. These different stances are explained on basis of both countries’ domestic political structure. The Netherlands and Belgium share many characteristics but differ extensively in their political structure. The Netherlands is a unitary state in which there are relatively minor divisions. Belgium is a federal state with considerable internal divisions. It is concluded that this explains their differences on European defence integration.
Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

If the cold war had not ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, one could reasonably argue that Europe would not have a security and defence policy of its own today. The end of communism, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact brought sudden change in Europe. NATO’s raison d’être fell off and new Eastern European democracies were established. These developments brought the beginning of EU enlargement and, with it, new security responsibilities (Tigner, 2007, p. 97). Europe was quick to respond to the changing circumstances. In barely 15 years the EU developed a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and as a major element of it the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Despite political rhetoric, the Balkan wars of the 1990s showed uncoordinated military policies of individual European capitals. Furthermore, the 2003 Iraq war showed a divided European Union, provoking questions about the possibility of true EU foreign policy. In the case of the war in Bosnia (1992-1995) Europe was dependent on the political, and even more on the military contribution of the United States (Van den Doel, 2004, p. 13). The need for stronger coordination became clear and criticism was heard about European defence and security efforts. As, Buckley recently stated (2007, p. 113): European defence “does not deliver the new capabilities that were promised”.

Nonetheless, almost a dozen and a half security-related missions were undertaken around the globe within the ESDP: peacekeeping, police training, defence reform, border security reform and other stabilising missions. Most of these have been modest in scale, but they could not have been achieved without secure planning and coordination. Furthermore, ambitions for further cooperation and integration are there. Recently, German Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed her hope for an army for the European Union. In an interview with a German newspaper, Merkel envisioned Europe growing even closer together and more transparent. From out that perspective she also wants a Europe with its own fighting force: “In the European Union we have to come closer to the creation of a European army”, she said (Der Spiegel, 2007).

On the other hand, there is also much resistance to the idea of further military integration. It is a sensitive subject, because like most sensitive subjects in Brussels, sovereignty is to be given up for defence integration. The impasse around the EU constitutional treaty recently and the difficult negotiations about the new treaty showed
that European integration in general is at present faced by fierce resistance of member states.

The sensitive subject of security policy and defence integration, on the one hand pursued by various actors but on the other hand meeting national resistance, caught my attention. By studying this subject I hope to get more insight in the delicate process of European integration. In this thesis I would like to take a closer look at the stances of two countries and the arguments used by them: Belgium and The Netherlands. Both countries are similar in many respects (although different in others), but the first one clearly is a greater supporter of European integration than the last.

1.2 Aim and relevance

What type of political organisation (or system) is the EU? What are its effects? Questions like these, although difficult, have been asked by many, both inside and outside the academic world. Academics have been trying to move away from ‘the facts’ and provide deeper insights. Conceptualising, which essentially means thinking about phenomena in abstract terms, and theorising, which means positing general explanations of phenomena, have constituted the base of much academic writing on European integration (Nugent, Paterson & Wright, 2003, p. 463). Out of this academic writing on European integration a whole array of integration theories has emerged, making European integration an academic research strand in itself (Rosamond, 2000, p. 1-3). This body of European integration theory can be a useful entry-point for greater understanding of important changes occurring in our politics and society.

In this thesis a specific case of European integration is studied: European defence and security integration. The ambition is twofold. In the first place, it has the ambition to gather insight in European integration theory in general. Since European integration theory may be applied to all policies that are subject to European integration, insights about the specific issue of European Defence integration generated by this study, may give better understanding of European integration (theory) in general.

Furthermore, it has a more practical edge too. By taking a closer look at the subject of military integration in two countries, this may generate more insight and understanding of the possibilities and difficulties of the emergence of a true European army. So, insights of European integration theory may provide better understanding of the specific field of European defence policy.

The subject is relevant. As referred to above the subject is debated in the EU at present. It also addresses some fundamental questions: the nature of security in twenty-first century Europe, the long-term relationships among European and transatlantic politics, economics, society and military affairs, the role to be played by the EU in a fast changing, globalising world (Hunter, 2002, p. 3).
1.3 Problem analysis

European integration has taken place in a broad range of subjects, to very different degrees. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) established a single market, providing free movement of persons, goods, capital and services. A group of countries even agreed to give up their national currencies and monetary policy, becoming part of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). At present, many policy competencies are, at least to some extent, at the European Union. However, security and defence policies are still mainly at the competence of the member states. These areas have been particularly difficult to develop EU inter-state cooperation in, let alone integration. A main reason therefore is that security and defence are closely associated with the very essence of sovereignty (Nugent et al., 2003, p. 417). Another reason is the different capabilities of member states regarding security and defence. Furthermore, member states have a varying degree of willingness to use armed force and differences between member states with regard to their attitudes and degrees of commitment to various security and defence organisations that exist. On this last point, NATO and the transatlantic relationship have been especially problematical for some states (idem, p. 418).

Notwithstanding these obstacles the EU has begun to engage with security and defence policy from the early 1990s. In 1994 the development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was started. Since the Treaty of Maastricht there is a Common Foreign and Security Policy. In this regard, the EU can ask the Western European Union (WEU) to conduct military operations. In this way a European security and defence policy came into being, with the EU as the leading organisation and the WEU as the operational part. In theory this enables the EU to conduct its own foreign and security policy and use the whole spectrum of instruments: from diplomatic and economical to military (Biscop, 2000, p. 11).

A major ‘breakthrough’ came in December 1998 at the Franco-British summit in St Malo. At this summit France and the United Kingdom (UK), two main players in the EU who had been each others opponents in the debate about European foreign and defence policies, showed a convergence in their positions by calling for a strengthening of the CFSP through the creation of a European Security and Defence Policy (Nugent et al., 2003, p. 418-419). Since this breakthrough security and defence policies have advanced rapidly.

In practice however, the EU faces problems dealing with conflicts. During the Yugoslavian civil war it had to lead the initiative to the United States, one of the direct reasons to create the CFSP. After the terrorist attacks on September 11 and the invasion of Afghanistan later on, European allies had difficulties to deploy and sustain the capabilities needed for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). After the tsunami in Southeast Asia in 2004, a number of European countries lacked the necessary strategic lift capabilities to respond rapidly to aid victims (Flournoy & Smith, 2005, p. 16). During the Iraq crisis, the EU’s lack of political ability became apparent. The Iraq crisis deeply divided the European Union and is therefore seen by many as a painful
example of this. With respect to structures and competences, as well as means, fundamental decisions have to be taken.

In the EU the changing global nature of security is recognised and the need for further defence and security integration is expressed. The European Council formulated the European Security Strategy that guides the international security strategy of the EU. With the emergence of the ESDP, this was the first time that Europe formulated a joint security strategy. The document states "The world is full of new dangers but also of new opportunities" (European Council, 2003, p. 14). Therefore, it argues that in order to ensure security for Europe in a globalising world multilateral cooperation within Europe and abroad is to be the imperative, because “no single nation is able to tackle today’s complex challenges” (ibidem, p. 1).

So, on the one hand voices are heard to pursue a stronger European defence and security policy. On the other hand many countries show unwillingness. Defence and security policy touches upon core sovereignty of a country. Giving up this sovereignty is difficult. That is why I would like study the various arguments that are used in order to support or reject the further emergence of European security and defence policy. As stated in the former paragraph, consideration of these arguments may give a clearer idea about the (possible) development of such a policy and, furthermore, may give insight in the process of European integration in general.

The European Union consists of 27 member states, which is to high a number to study all. I would like to make a comparison between Belgium and the Netherlands. Both countries have much in common: located geographically between the three main European powers, bordering the North Sea, having small and relatively open economies, dependent on trade and being both members of the same important international institutions. However, at present they hold different view towards the European Union. Belgium is one of the staunchest supporters of a strong and communitarian EU. The Netherlands used to be a fair supporter, but is at present much more sceptical about Europe, especially since the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by referendum.

In this thesis the arguments of both countries concerning (non-)support for a European defence integration are examined. Theoretical explanations are sought for their stances. These explanations enable me to better understand European integration and to give recommendations to policy-makers involved with European defence policy. The central research question is:

**Central research question**

How can the degree of support for true European defence integration in Belgium and the Netherlands be explained?
In order to answer the central research question a couple of sub questions are dealt with.

**Sub questions**

- How did European defence policy evolve?
- What is the present state of European defence policy?
- What are the benefits and disadvantages for European defence policy for Belgium and the Netherlands within the European context?
- What are the various arguments used in both countries towards (non-)support of European defence policy?
- How can these arguments be explained?

**1.4 Methodology**

In order to answer the various sub questions, and eventually the central research question, two research strategies are used. For the first chapters, literature has been searched (background sketch and theoretical framework). In order to get the ‘picture’ as complete as possible, a diverse and broad range of sources has been used, among which academic journals, text books, scientific and government reports etcetera. Furthermore, to research Belgian and Dutch attitudes towards defence integration and their attitudes therefore, four interviews were held.

**Interviews**

In the interviews I tried to look in depth at the interviewees’ views and opinions. The interviewees were officials of both countries working at the Permanent Representation at the EU of their country for their ministry of Defence. Furthermore interviews were held with officials working at the Permanent Representation at NATO. These persons are especially interesting with respect to the conflicting interest between a European Army and the NATO.

Interviewing is a widely used technique and there are different types of interview. I used semi-structured interviews. This meant that predetermined questions were made, but that the order of them could be modified upon the interviewer’s perception of what seemed most appropriate. Questions could be changed and explanations given. Also questions could be omitted if they seem inappropriate with a particular interviewee. Additional questions could be included if needed (Robson, 2002, p. 270). This strategy seemed appropriate to me, since the interviewee’s perceptions about particular phenomena will be asked for. Qualitative interviews may also clarify and illustrate the meaning of findings (Robson, 2002, p. 271).

An interviewee has to be able to express his opinions and ideas frankly. That is why it is important to create an atmosphere wherein there is mutual trust. In that respect it is important to create certain neutrality in the interaction (Hüttner, Renckstorf &
Wester, 2001, p. 548). The interviews started with an introduction of the subject. This informed the interviewee about what is expected of him exactly. Most interviews consist of several topics. A new subject has to be introduced to draw the interviewee’s attention towards the subject and to give him some time to think about it (ibidem, p. 551). The interviews are digitally recorded. An overview of the organisations of the interviewees is enclosed in appendix A. At their request no names are given. In appendix B the interview questions can be found.

1.5 Outline

This thesis consists of 6 chapters. In this first chapter the subject is introduced, the research questions posed and guided by sub questions. Furthermore the methodology is made clear in the last paragraph. Chapter 2 gives an outline of the history of European defence cooperation and integration after the Second World War until the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the 1990s. Subsequently, chapter 3 examines the present state of European defence cooperation that has been set up as part of the CFSP in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In chapter 4 a theoretical foundation guiding this study is introduced and explained. Furthermore in this chapter a closer look is taken at defence integration. At the end of the chapter some ‘working hypotheses’ are made. In the following chapter 5 Belgium and the Netherlands are compared regarding defence integration. First a historical outline is given and subsequently the present state is described. With respect to the latter, the present stance towards defence integration, four interviews were held of which the outcome is presented. The final chapter 6 analyses the outcome and tries to explain both country’s stances. Furthermore, shortcomings of this study are reflected upon.
Chapter 2

History of European defence

2.1 Introduction

The history of European integration began with defence. After the Second World War security was an issue of high importance in Europe, mostly as a result of fear for German remilitarisation. That is why the UK and France signed the Dunkirk Treaty quickly after the Second World War, in March 1947, thereby creating the first after war European defence cooperation (Biscop, 2000, p. 13). Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg joined a year later. On March 17, 1948 these five countries signed the Treaty of Brussels. This treaty created the Western European Union (WEU), a defence pact. The main goal of this Treaty was collective defence, in case of new German aggression, but also because of an increasingly felt threat of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (ibidem).

Also in 1947 the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) was established to put an embargo on Western exports to East Bloc countries. CoCom had 17 members, among which all the states that would found the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) a few years later. Two years later, in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was created. This organisation created, likewise the WEU, a system of collective defence. This meant that its member states agreed to mutual defence in response to an attack by any external party. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed by the US, Canada and the partners of the Treaty of Brussels (Biscop, 2000, p. 13). The fundamental role of NATO was ‘to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means’. It provided a forum for countries from North America and Europe, in which they could coordinate security issues of common concern and take joint action in addressing them (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2006a, p. 15).

Security cooperation did not only occur in real defence institutions. The emergence of the Cold War also contributed to the growth of the European movement, which stressed the need for the countries of Europe to get together in the increasingly bipolar world (Dinan, 2005, p. 18). As a consequence there was a stable basis for European integration and reconciliation on the continent. In 1950 it was France that came up with the plan of pooling Germany’s and France’s coal and steel resources in a joint organisation. The Schuman Declaration by Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, announced the plan. The declaration was phrased in the language of
reconciliation rather than realpolitik\(^1\) (Dinan, 2003, p. 23), although the plan obviously had a strong security component. Since coal and steel were fundamental resources for war industries, the pooling of them would create combined interests for the participating countries and make new contention on the continent far less likely. The plan developed fast and in 1952 the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was launched, creating a common market in coal and steel products for Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries (Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg).

2.2 European Defence Community

NATO was crucial for international stability in the post World War II era. Nevertheless, in the security field it was felt that the Atlantic Alliance did not contribute to greater European unity (Bloed & Wessel, 1994, p. xiv). That’s why the same six countries that founded the ECSC started negotiations to form a European Defence Community (EDC) in February 1951, as a follow-up to their economic cooperation in the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the European Coal and Steel Community. Winston Churchill, prime-minister of the United Kingdom had been expressing the idea of a European army in a speech to the Council of Europe. He issued the following motion:

> “The Assembly, in order to express its devotion to the maintenance of peace and its resolve to sustain the action of the Security Council of the United Nations in defence of peaceful peoples against aggression, calls for the immediate creation of a unified European Army subject to proper European democratic control and acting in full cooperation with the United States and Canada” (Furdson, 1980, p. 24).

The motion was adopted, but it took a year before it got answered. This happened in a speech of the French prime-minister René Pleven to the French parliament on 24 October 1950. The speech was about the new European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Pleven used its speech about the ECSC to announce a next step in European integration, the creation of a European army:

> “As soon as the plan (ECSC) has been signed, the French government wants to see a solution to the question of Germany’s contribution to the creation of a European force that takes heed of the cruel lessons of the past and looks forward to the kind of future that so many Europeans from all countries hope to see in Europe. It proposes the creation, for the purposes of common defence, of a European army tied to the political institutions of a united Europe. (Applause from many benches on the left, centre and right)” (Furdson, 1980, p. 25).

\(^1\) The adoption of policies of “limited objectives with a reasonable chance of success” and the “willingness to use force if necessary” (Evans & Newnham, 1998, p. 467).
The plan for a European army was an answer on several problems; economically, politically and militarily. Western Europe was confronted with three questions (Furdson, 1980, p. 11):

- How to build up Western Europe politically and economically after the Second World War?
- How to cope the threat of the Soviet Union?
- How to build up Germany and prevent it from being a threat at the same time?

These three questions constituted the background of European integration. The ECSC, as outlined above, was a first answer and the EDC was a next step. Pleven proposed a common army, because in his view a European army consisting of national contingents would be little more than the coalitions Europe already had (Furdson, 1980, p. 89). The command over the army would be in hands of a minister of defence and the member states were not allowed to have their own autonomous forces. This choice for a truly supranational army was a strong element of political integration.

The EDC treaty was signed in May 1952 in Paris after complex and hard bargaining. In 1953, another draft Treaty was completed that combined the ECSC and EDC. This draft treaty covered foreign policy, defence, industry and trade and would create the European Political Community. Neither this draft, nor the EDC survived. The EDC treaty was rejected by the French parliament in August 1954, due to a diminishing interest in defence matters, unwillingness towards sharing sovereignty over national defence policy and opposition to German rearmament (Bloed & Wessel, 1994, p. xiv; Dinan, 2005, p. 27-28). A more structural reason was the détente in Europe at that time, which was partly a result of the amelioration of the security dilemma, because of “massive US military presence and long-term commitment to Europe” (Jones, 2007, p. 67).

After the collapse of EDC, serious plans for something likewise were abandoned for a long period. Articles 223-225 of the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty of 1957 clearly show that foreign policy and security issues were matters within the competence of the member states (Marauhn, 1996, p. 11).

Fouchet Plan

Although outright security and defence integration were abandoned of the failure of the EDC, the need for coordination and cooperation stayed. That is why a few years later, in 1958, European states began a serious debate about creating a European security institution. The discussion was based on a plan of Christian Fouchet, the French ambassador to Denmark. The French president De Gaulle had high hopes for the plan. Since the US wanted to retain control of the launch of nuclear weapons, France had to rely on them for its security. This presented uncertainty to France; could they be sure that the US would react quickly in case of Soviet aggression? And, in the event of a nuclear war, how much control would France have over its initiation and the conduct of the war? France wanted to lessen this dependency on the US. Moreover, the French
wanted to establish a security institution with a broader scope than the Atlantic Alliance, which could also address security issues in such areas as the Middle East and North Africa (Jones, 2007, p. 71-72).

Between 1958 and 1961, leaders of the then six member states held series of meetings to discuss greater political cooperation. A first draft of the plan called for a new European institution to coordinate foreign policy, called ‘Union of the European Peoples’. This institution sought to ‘strengthen the security of Member States against any aggression by adopting a common defence policy’, but should explicitly not be supranational (Jones, 2007, p. 73). In January 1962 a second draft, revised by De Gaulle was introduced. The French president refused to include a reference to NATO and widened the scope of the institution. In response the other five members prepared a third draft. But negotiations ended in a deadlock and the Fouchet Plan got stuck in April 1962: no date was fixed for further discussion (Jones, 2007, p. 74).

2.3 Western European Union

Already earlier, on 17 March 1948, the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries signed the Treaty of Brussels establishing the Brussels Treaty Organisation. This organisation was an effort towards European post-war security cooperation, providing for mutual defence. The Treaty was amended by the Paris Accords of 23 October 1954, following the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC). The Paris Accords founded the Western European Union (WEU) and were seen as an alternative solution. They ended the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), restoring sovereignty, and allowed West Germany and Italy to join the Brussels Treaty. Besides the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs that already existed, the new Treaty created a consultative parliamentary assembly, an Arms Control Agency, and a Standing Committee for Arms Control (Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe, 2007). Furthermore, the Paris Accords prohibited Germany from making or obtaining atomic, biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction. This time, the rearmament of West Germany was accepted by the French National Assembly. West Germany could now form its own army. It did so and joined NATO on May 5, 1955 (ibidem). The WEU provided for an automatic system of mutual assistance in the event of armed aggression in Europe. In the preamble of its treaty it stated that the WEU member states wanted:

“To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression”;

“To promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe” (Modified Brussels Treaty, 1954).

The Soviets responded to the negotiations on German rearmament with an intense propaganda campaign and with the conclusion of a treaty of cooperation and mutual
assistance between the eight ‘Eastern bloc countries’ (the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Hungary). This treaty, signed on May 14, 1955, became known as the Warsaw Pact (Biscop, 2000).

Judgements about the first two decades of the WEU differ. According to Marauhn (1996, p. 15), the WEU performed significant roles from 1954 to 1973. He states for example that it played a substantial part in the resolution of the Saar problem in 1955. By this it contributed to a complete Franco-German reconciliation and cooperation. However, he adds that it did not develop a true European security dimension, only carrying out tasks that were “generally of a routine nature and remained in the shadow of NATO” (ibidem). Various other authors are less positive about the WEU. For instance, Bloed & Wessel (1994, p. xviii) state that minimal use was made of the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty for a period of thirty years, mostly because of NATO’s capability to handle issues better.

In 1973 the WEU became inactive. No meetings at ministerial level took place until 1984 (ibidem, 1994, p. 15). In the early 1980s its sleeping status changed. Governments and public opinion became increasingly interested in the WEU, as a result of, inter alia, a new phase in the Cold War (ibidem). Consequently, the WEU was reactivated by ministerial meetings. In the Rome Declaration it was decided “to make better use of the WEU framework in order to increase cooperation between the Member States in the field of security policy to encourage consensus” (Western European Union, 1984). It was also decided to have two annual meetings. The Rome Declaration is often considered to be the ‘rebirth’ of the WEU. Reactivation took place within NATO: the Rome Declaration stressed the “indivisibility of security within the North Atlantic Treaty area” (ibidem, 1984).

Having had its ‘rebirth’ led to increased activity and new tasks (Petersberg tasks – see also paragraph 3.4) for the WEU from 1990 onwards. The Iraq-Kuwait conflict and the Yugoslavia crisis led to practical cooperation between its member states, on a scale unseen before (Græger, Larsen & Ojanen, 2002, p. 12). Further development of the WEU was brought about by broadening its membership structure. In 1990 Portugal and Spain entered the WEU and Greece followed in 1995. Also in the 1990s several observer countries entered, as well as associate member countries and associate partners. This leaves 28 countries related to the WEU.

In November 2000 in Marseille, WEU Minister agreed to begin transferring WEU capabilities and functions to the EU. No ministerial Councils have taken place since then. However, if necessary its Council can still meet (Western European Union, 2007).

### 2.4 European Political Cooperation

As noted earlier, after the collapse of the EDC, political and military integration was a taboo subject within the EEC. Nevertheless, after a few years, the need for cooperation in

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2 The Saar is a border region that has been both under French and German authority in the past and was a protectorate under French control between 1947 and 1956. It rejoined West Germany on January 1, 1957.
the field of foreign policy emerged. Discussions about reducing American forces on the continent (termed mutually balanced force reduction) were a major cause for reorientation on European cooperation in foreign policy and defence (Jones, 2007, p. 76). The Council of Ministers appointed a committee in 1970 that was asked to draw up proposals for deep political cooperation within the Community. This committee issued the Davignon Report, named after its chairman Étienne Davignon. It recommended that member states should try, where possible, to speak with a single voice on international problems. The Davignon report was the basis for the establishment of European Political Cooperation (EPC) (Jones, 2007, p. 78).

EPC was officially established in October 1970 by the foreign ministers of the European Community. It was designed to coordinate national foreign policies outside the EEC institutions and regulations, on an intergovernmental basis (Biscop, 2000, p. 19). Moreover, EPC was not very institutionalised. It was based on nothing more than certain collective procedures and series of largely “rhetorical formulas announcing commitment to common policy-making” (Nuttall, 2000, p. 14).

The ambitions of EPC were global, but security issues and even cooperation on issues like non-proliferation were, besides some exceptions, excluded. One of its successes was agreeing on a common position in the preparation and implementation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1973, establishing the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In following years, EPC produced policies with greater or lesser success, but “for many participants the value was less in the policies than in the process itself” (Nuttall, 2000, p.15). The system created a network of ever more frequent meetings at all levels that enabled all officials involved to communicate with each other, if needed on a day-to-day basis. The active participation of national officials in the EPC process that emerged was its great success (ibidem, 2000, p.15-16).

EPC traditionally did not deal with issues of security or defence. There were different reasons for this, among which the collapse of the European Defence Community was an important one. The reality was different however. By discussing other topics without clear defence connotations, viewpoints were exchanged. This led to a certain convergence: whereas policies on security issues were decided in NATO, positions of European NATO member states were partly developed in EPC (Nuttall, 1997, p. 37). Nonetheless, defence issues often were difficult to solve. In preparation for the Single European Act closer cooperation in the field of security met opposition, for different reasons, of Ireland, Denmark and Greece. As a result closer cooperation had to be limited to those states that were willing, and within the framework of the WEU or NATO (Nuttall, 1997, p. 38).

Overall it might be concluded that EPC has provided some coordination but cannot be judged as an effective instrument. Treacher (2004, p. 52) is more critical than most other authors and calls the policy-making mechanisms of EPC ‘extremely loose’ and ‘haphazard’. A reason for this lack of coordination as observed by Smith (in
Treacher, 2004, p. 52) might be the fear among Member States for EPC’s ‘communitarisation’ with formal legal procedures.

**Single European Act**
In July 1987, the Single European Act (SEA) came into force as the first major revision of the Treaty of Rome. Besides establishing the single European market, the SEA gave EPC for the first time a foundation in an instrument of international law (Nuttall, 2000, p. 14). Originally it was not designed to deal with foreign policy questions at all. The purpose just had been to change the Treaty of Rome in order to realise the Single Market. However foreign policy became part. Member states took the obligation to observe a certain foreign policy discipline, as well as rules and procedures by which this was to be achieved. The Member States for instance committed themselves to:

> [...] “consider that closer co-operation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters. They are ready to co-ordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security” (Single European Act, 1985).

They furthermore agreed “to endeavour to adopt common positions” on external policies. The presidency of the Council of the European Communities was decided to be responsible for initiating action, co-ordinating and representing the positions of the Member States within European Political Co-operation activities (Single European Act, 1985).

### 2.5 Common Foreign and Security Policy
As shown above, European defence developed after World War II in separate entities with different views and purposes. This is the reason that after the Cold War ended, the member states of the EU had very different views of defence, sometimes even opposite from each other (Missiroli, 2004, p. 55). As a result voices to integrate Europe in defence and security matters were heard more loudly in the early 1990s. Especially Germany and France issued some proposals in those years for a European political union with its own security and defence dimension. These voices received recognition in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 (official name: Treaty on European Union). This treaty is regarded to be an important step forward in foreign policy and allowed the EU to deal with all issues related to security (see Title V).

In the Treaty on European Union (TEU) three pillars were created. The second pillar became the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Article 11 of the treaty

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3 Communitarisation (or communautarisation) refers to a process in which supranational EU policy-making, in which the EU institutions share and wield considerable power, increases, mostly at the expense of intergovernmental methods of policy-making (see Bomberg & Stubb, 2003).
states that “the EU defines and implements a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy”. This entails the following objectives (Treaty on European Union, 1992, article 11):

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders
- to promote international cooperation
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms

The European Council is the foremost important body in international affairs. The principles and general guidelines for the CFSP are defined by the European Council, it decides on common strategies and it tries to ensure unity, consistency and effectiveness. On basis of the guidance of the European Council, the Council of Ministers is involved in more concrete policies. It adopts joint actions or common positions. The former, joint actions, address specific situations, in case the Union deems operational action to be required. Common positions define the approach of the Union towards a particular matter. In that case, Member States have to ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions (Treaty on European Union, 1992, article 14-15).

The country that holds the presidency represents the Union in matters within the scope of common foreign and security policy. The High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, exercised by the Secretary-General of the Council, assists the Council, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions (Treaty on European Union, 1992, article 26). It is important to bear in mind that the CFSP is an intergovernmental framework, outside the ambit of Community law (Trybus, 2004, p. 191). This means policies are made by consensus, or not at all.

The Maastricht Treaty is generally seen as a major shift in European external affairs. Nevertheless, some commentators are outright critical. For instance Treacher (2004, p. 51) calls the security dimension within the treaty “vague and non-committal”.

**European Security and Defence Identity**

The Treaty on European Union did not directly create a European defence, but opened the way for developing such a structure in the future (Sjursen, 1998, p. 99). It envisioned an “eventual framing” of a common defence policy which “might in turn” lead to a common defence (Treaty on European Union, 1992, article J 4.1). This careful wording and the provision to review the issue during the next intergovernmental conference, was
A clear indication of the still highly divergent views within the EU on the future shape of a European defence policy, but also on its very legitimacy (Sjursen, 1998, p. 99). A new reason to further work on common security would follow soon. Only a few months after creation of the CFSP, war broke out in former Yugoslavia. The EU tried to broker a political solution to the crisis, but did not succeed to do so. Since the EU was lacking a military force of its own, its member states could only intervene as part of UN and NATO forces. This experience of not being able to intervene in conflicts arising in its own backyard has urged the EU to continue on common security within the overall framework of the CFSP (European Commission, 2004, p. 8-9).

A step forward was made in 1996. Then it was decided to give the EU the possibility to demand the Western European Union (WEU) to act military, concerning humanitarian operations, peace keeping and peace enforcement. In this way the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was created. The EU was the leading organisation of the ESDI and the WEU became the operational part. To make things even more complicated, it became structured within NATO and used NATO headquarters and assets, preventing duplication. The military bodies that were created within ESDI were called Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) (Howorth, 2000, p. 4). Since the creation of ESDI, the EU has at least theoretically the possibility to conduct its own foreign and defence policy and use in that respect a whole array of instruments: diplomatic, economic and military (Biscop, 2000).

In 1997 the Amsterdam Treaty introduced several institutional reforms. For instance, the function of high representative for CFSP was created, to improve coordination and centralisation of foreign policy making. Also by the Amsterdam Treaty the so-called Petersberg Tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making - see chapter 3) were incorporated into the Treaty on European Union. By this incorporation the EU really became a military actor (Treacher, 2004, p. 49).

By the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU -already being the principal actor of ESDI, rather than the WEU-, was maturing as a military actor. This caused the NATO to set up a new package of arrangements between the Atlantic Alliance and ESDI in 1999. Those arrangements became known later on as the ‘Berlin-plus’ agreement. In this agreement NATO’s primacy in terms of actual military action was reaffirmed. It was acknowledged that there would be no “unnecessary duplication” and restated that the military capabilities of NATO and the EU were “separable but not separate” (Hunter, 2002, p. 54-55). Furthermore it was laid down that the EU would operate only where NATO forces were not engaged militarily. In return, NATO acknowledged the notion of “autonomous [EU] action”. What the latter meant was not precisely defined (Hunter, 2002, p. 55).

In 1998, at the British-French summit in Saint-Malo in France, both countries laid the basis for a new European defence structure. There the French president Jacques Chirac and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair issued a Joint Declaration on European defence. In this declaration they stated that:
“... the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 1998).

Before Saint-Malo the UK had been unwilling to progress on European security policy. Now that they endorsed European defence, things went quickly. At the Cologne European Council, in June 1999, it was decided to incorporate the role of the WEU within the EU. This effectively shut down the WEU and brought ESDI under the jurisdiction of the EU. The acronym ESDP was used in Cologne to differentiate between an increasingly distinct EU military capability (ESDP) and ESDI (what was a plan for military restructuring within NATO). At the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999, a permanent political-military structure was created (Jones, p. 85). Also a declaration was made by the European leaders to establish a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), a transnational military force managed by the EU itself rather than any of its member states. The European defence policy was renamed Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). However the earlier coined term ESDP became usage4.

The founding of the ESDP may be seen as a major achievement in itself. However, it has posed many questions as well. It is felt that it lacks strategic clarity, a clear definition of interests and long-term policy objectives (Biscop, 2004, p. 1). One of the major problems is that there’s still a substantial overlap with NATO’s mission, although their body of members differs. Furthermore, there is concern that an independent European security pillar might result in a declining importance of NATO. Within the EU different views towards CFSP in general and the ESDP in particular can be found. It is often said that the United Kingdom, as well as some of the new member states, is most in favour of leaving security and defence policy largely out of the EU structures. Other opinions are heard too. For example, Howorth and Forster (2000, p.4) think that “there seems little doubt that London is now totally committed to the cause of […] ESDP”. France and Germany are in general supporters of a firm and independent CFSP for the Union.

Despite the European security dimension developed in three institutional contexts (NATO, WEU and EU), it has developed surprisingly fast. Nowadays the EU has a serious security and defence component. In the next chapter a closer look is taken to the current state of affairs.

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4 Various commentators and authors use the acronyms ESDI and ESDP interchangeably. Although ESDP is the successor of ESDI and thus refers to the same project, this is technically incorrect.
Chapter 3

European Security and Defence Policy at present

3.1 Introduction

As outlined in chapter 2, European defence integration has a fairly long history. But, despite all the efforts and good intentions, defence and security cooperation has not progressed substantially within the European context. Defence and security were mainly taken care of at the national level, or within NATO. However, since the end of the Cold War, European defence and security cooperation has undergone a “significant and largely unprecedented increase” (Jones, 2007, p. 14). In this chapter the most recent developments in the field of European defence and security cooperation are examined. The reasons for the quick rising of the ESDP are discussed, as well as objectives, elements and operations. Finally, attention is paid to the relation of the ESDP with NATO.

3.2 The quick emergence of EU defence

The collapse of the USSR took away the major threat for the Atlantic Alliance and thus changed the security situation fundamentally. This enormous shift in the international system is seen as the key determinant of an autonomous European security and defence policy (Treacher, 2004, p. 50). As a result of the collapse of the USSR, European leaders became concerned about an American withdrawal of its forces in Europe. Together with the reunification of Germany this created a potential security dilemma for Europe (Jones, 2007, p. 81). There were at least four plausible options to cope with this dilemma (ibidem):

- Balance against Germany
- Collective security through the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
- Continuation of NATO
- Creation of an EU security arm

First, with the demise of the USSR, European states could have refrained from any security institution, including NATO. Some realist authors predicted that the US would withdraw from the continent, leading to a return of balance-of-power politics in Europe (ibidem). French and British leaders argued that they would balance against Germany if
it refused to engage in a European institution, but preferred to prevent a destabilising security dilemma (ibidem).

Second, a European collective security institution along the lines of the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe could have been chosen. This option was preferred by Russian leaders and German foreign minister Genscher (ibidem). However, the OSCE was regarded to be inappropriate to prevent a security dilemma.

Third, Europe could have continued to utilise NATO. This institution had already played a pivotal role in the security dilemma during the Cold War. Continuing NATO would mean to transform NATO from a security institution to an institution with broader goals (Glaser, 1993). Especially the UK was supportive of the continuation of NATO as the central security institution for Europe. On the other hand, there were serious doubts about the US’s long-term military presence in Europe. Many European leaders thought that the US would eventually withdraw its troops out of Europe. As a result, NATO by itself was not considered to be a reliable long-term solution by many (Jones, 2007, p. 81).

A long-term solution to the security dilemma was offered by the fourth option, creating a security policy within the EU, thus including Germany (ibidem). As a result, European states pursued both a ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The Treaty on European Union, which signed in Maastricht in 1992 established CFSP as one of the three pillars of the EU, marking a significant change by bringing foreign policy for the first time into the framework of the EU (ibidem).

As outlined above, regional security concerns drove the formation of ESDP, but were not the only driving factor. Art (2006) states that the British, although insisting that ESDP be NATO friendly and that NATO had to handle any really big military operations, had another objective in mind. They wanted Europe to enhance its military capability so that it could have more influence on the US. Their reasoning is that if Europe brings more assets into NATO deliberations, it will have more influence on its outcomes. Also the French had the aim of making Europe less dependent on the US (Art, 2006, p. 181). This wish for more independency is something characteristic of Europe’s attitude towards the US for most of recent decades. European leaders had often criticised US foreign policy, from Suez to Vietnam, for the American avocation of toppling inconvenient governments to Soviet gas pipeline dispute (Brenner, 2007, p. 15). Furthermore, besides Europe’s endeavour to decrease dependency on the US, there also was the related goal to increase Europe’s ability to project power abroad (Jones, 2007, p. 22).

New defence approach needed
Changing circumstances demand for a changing approach to defence and security. First of all, the new challenges require new capabilities. As the European Council (2003, p. 3) laid down in its European Security Strategy, any large scale aggression against any EU Member State has become improbable. Alternatively, “Europe faces new threats which
are more diverse, less visible and less predictable”. Subsequently, the document sums up the key threats as perceived by the Council: the rise of global terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and international organised crime. Also other bodies, like NATO, as well as several EU member states in their national security strategies, perceive more or less the same threats (Flournoy & Smith, 2005, p. 18).

With respect to the new 21st century threats, various European strategies and summit declarations have articulated new requirements for military forces. For instance, European forces must be able to deploy rapidly in response to crises; must be able to deploy ‘out of area’ (i.e. beyond the borders of Europe itself), to conduct multiple, simultaneous operations; must be highly interoperable (able to communicate and operate effectively with one another) and they must be adaptable across the spectrum of operations (from humanitarian assistance to counterterrorism to war fighting) (Flournoy & Smith, 2005, p. 18-19).

Today, only a small part of Europe’s 1.9 million military personnel have the capabilities to meet these requirements. Moreover, unnecessary duplication often occurs among militaries across Europe, in areas such as military headquarters, training infrastructure and bases. The gap between requirements and capabilities poses a threat to Europe’s safety. European governments and the EU are aware of these shortfalls in European military capabilities and have launched initiatives to address them (Flournoy & Smith, 2005, p. 20-21).

Another changing factor is spending on defence. At some periods of the Cold War, European countries spent on average 3.5 percent of their Gross Domestic Product on defence. Today the average is far less: 1.9 percent. In recent years the trend was flat and the expenditure is expected to remain so, or grow just slightly. Furthermore, spending on defence modernisation, on which the percentage from country to country varies dramatically, is for many countries too little to achieve their stated objectives (Flournoy & Smith, 2005, p. 21-22). A future trend will probably further endanger defence spending. Europe is faced with increasing numbers of senior citizens, who enjoy long life expectancies, and decreasing numbers of young people. Consequently, Europe will face increasing health care and pension costs, which have to be paid by decreasing numbers of tax payers (Flournoy & Smith, 2005, p. 23). In this light many commentators think it is important for European states to come together and cooperate on security and defence matters.

3.3 Elements

The term EU defence policy is somewhat misleading, because there are no such things as explicit EU defence decisions. These decisions are taken strictly at the national level, but there is coordinated mission and capability planning between member states. Moreover there are defence industrial policy decisions (Tigner, 2007, p. 106). So, ESDP decision-
making is an intergovernmental construct, with all authority to launch a mission within the EU’s Council of Ministers. The assembled EU ministers of foreign affairs, called the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), have this authority to take the key political decisions. Only in special cases decisions are taken by the European Council. To date no separate Council formation has been created for the EU ministers of defence, which means that they can only meet informally or in conjunction with the GAERC (Missiroli, 2004, p. 59).

The execution power of ESDP is represented by several bodies. First comes the High Representative (HR) for CFSP (at present Javier Solana), who is appointed by the European Council. Since the Treaty was not very clear regarding precise competences of the HR, Solana had the possibility to shape his function (ibidem, p. 62). The HR is assisted by a Secretary-General (SG). For particular policy issues the HR may appoint a special representative (Treaty on European Union, 1992, article 18). The mandate of such special representatives varies greatly from case to case.

In connection with the HR, other bodies and positions were created over the years to deal with the increasing quantity of policy formulation and implementation. The Helsinki European Council of 1999 finally decided to set up three new bodies: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (MC) and the Military Staff (MS) of the EU.

The PSC is made up of the national representatives of the Member States’ foreign ministries of senior (or ambassador) level, functioning within the framework of Member States’ Permanent Representations. Every Member State their PSC serves under their national ambassador (or Permanent Representative) to the EU that meets at least once a week at the Committee of Permanent Representations (COREPER) to prepare Council meetings and decisions. The PSC its remit is:

- to monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy (CFSP);
- to contribute to the definition of policies;
- to monitor implementation of the Council’s decisions mentioned in Article 25 of the Treaty on European Union (Treaty on European Union, 1992, article 25).

The PSC exercises political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations, under the responsibility of the Council. It may therefore be authorised by the Council to take decisions on the practical management of a crisis. It is assisted by a Politico-Military Group, a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, and the Military Committee (MC) and Military Staff (MS) (European Commission, 2007).

The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is composed of the Member States’ Chiefs of Defence, which are represented by their military representatives (Council decision 2001/79/CFSP). The EUMC is responsible for providing the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with military advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. It exercises military direction of all military activities within the EU framework.
The EU’s military staff (MS) handles operational planning for missions and the coordination of medium-term capability goals among the 27 member states. It provides military expertise and support to the CSDP within the Council structure. This includes the conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations. It performs early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks (European Commission, 2007).

ESDP missions require a unanimous vote. Individual member states can (and do) abstain from voting on missions they oppose but do not wish to block for other member states to carry out collectively. This is a part of the ‘variable geometry’ approach, launching coalitions of the willing missions within the EU (Tigner, 2007, p. 104). Because ESDP missions are intergovernmental in nature, their funding is so as well. This means that they cannot be funded by Community sources. Costs are generally dealt with by the NATO principle ‘costs-lie-where-they-fall’ (ibidem, p. 104). This means that each participating member state is responsible for the direct costs of transporting and maintaining its military forces and other personnel. Some indirect and overhead costs (e.g. administrative costs) are shared and paid out of a common fund that is financed by all EU members. This fund, created in the Council in 2004, is known as the Athena Fund. Third countries may also contribute; however they have no vote in how it is spent (ibidem).

**European forces**

In 1999, at the European Council Summit in Helsinki, the EU members committed themselves to create the transnational European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). This intention was laid down in a ‘Headline Goal’, stating that the EU should be capable by 2003 to deploy 60,000 troops to a site within 60 days and of maintaining a presence at that site for one year (Helsinki Headline Goal, 1999). It was decided that the EU may use the ERRF in conjunction with other international organizations, but also separately. The ERRF may be deployed at the request of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations. It will not deploy on request of NATO, although it could share expertise and resources with the Alliance. Not all EU member states are participating. The UK, Germany and France are all three in and are the main contributors (Lindborg, 2001).

Although (commitment to) an ERRF was created by the Helsinki Headline Goal, the way of organising needed to be worked out. Subsequently an EU Military Rapid Response Concept was developed, based on the notion of the Helsinki Headline Goal that the ERRF should be made up by “smaller rapid response elements”. In November 2004 EU member states committed themselves to establishment of these smaller rapid response forces, which became known as EU ‘battlegroups’ (Lindstrom, 2007, p. 11). The EU battlegroups are combined formations of around 1,500 personnel and available for operations within 10 days, sustainable for 30 days. Necessary air and naval assets are

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5 Variable geometry is the possibility that countries need not to take part in every policy, but that willing countries can cooperate more closely if they want to (Grant, 2005).
made available for support of the battlegroups when needed (Flournoy & Smith, 2005, p. 20). The first battlegroups became fully operational on January 1, 2007. At present there are fifteen of them, who rotate activity in such a way that two of them are ready for deployment at any time (European Union Council Secretariat, 2007). Most of them are multi-national, but usually led by one nation.

The ERRF should not be confused with the Eurocorps. The Eurocorps is a force that also consists of up to 60,000 soldiers. It is not part of the EU (although it is at its disposal at request, as well as it is at NATO’s disposal), but an independent force from Belgium, France, Germany, Spain and Luxembourg. Its headquarters are in Strasbourg. It has been participating in some military missions, among which the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (Eurocorps, 2007).

There is also considerable bilateral defence cooperation and integration. Belgium and the Netherlands for instance cooperate extensively in navy matters. Their operational staffs are merged. Their fleet is under command of the Supreme Commander (Dutch: admiraal) Benelux (Ministerie van Defensie, 2004, p. 14-15).

**Defence industry**

With the emergence of ESDP, European defence industry has been developing as well. Between 1950 and 1989 European defence industry was likely to cooperate with US defence firms in mergers, acquisitions, codevelopment and coproduction (Jones, 2007, p. 10). Since

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**Figure 3.1 EU political-military structure (source: Jones, 2007, p. 201).**
1990, intra-European defence industry has been rising. This includes the European Defence Agency (EDA), a body established in 2004 to “support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities” (European Defence Agency, 2005). Tasks of EDA include, inter alia, developing defence capabilities and promoting defence research and technology (ibidem). Often member states are inclined to support their own national defence firms. EDA tries to move member states away from this practice towards transnational industries (Tigner, 2007, p. 107). By these efforts EDA tries to eliminate duplication and inefficiency in European defence industry.

3.4 Objectives and operations

The Common Foreign and Security Policy covers all areas of foreign and security policy, according to the Treaty on European Union, Article 11. Its objectives are:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Treaty on European Union, 1992, article 11).

Petersberg tasks

One of the main elements of ESDP are the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’. They were set out in the 1992 Petersberg Declaration, outside the framework of the EU, by the Western European Union (WEU). By this declaration the WEU Member States expressed their readiness to make military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces available to not only the WEU, but also to NATO and the EU. At the Amsterdam Summit of 1997 they were incorporated in the Treaty on European Union (1992, article 17). They cover:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peace-keeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

The Petersberg Tasks allowed the EU, for the first time, to use military instruments (through the WEU). These tasks are making European intervention possible in the whole violence spectrum.
Operations
If monitoring missions and crisis exercises are excluded, ESDP became operational in 2003. Directly this year ESDP became engaged in four missions already, involving over 2000 police and military personnel altogether (Lindstrom, 2004, p. 111). Those operations took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Till so far, the EU has conducted 20 civilian and military ESDP operations. At present (November 2007) the ongoing missions are (Council of the European Union, 2007):

- EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea)
- EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM)
- EU Planning team in Kosovo
- EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)
- EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah)
- EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (Eujust Lex)
- EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN)
- EUFOR TCHAD/RCA
- EUPOL RD CONGO
- EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo)
- EU Support to AMIS II (Darfur)

The planning phases prior to an operation are of major importance for success. A number of weaknesses appeared in recent operations. Recent missions showed difficulties in forming efficient procurement procedures, planning support, media relations, collaboration with third countries and collaboration with international organisations such as the UN (Lindstrom, 2004, p. 127-128).

3.5 Relation to the US and NATO

During the Cold War, European defence could be seen as more or less synonymous with Atlantic defence. Because of NATO, the US provided the ultimate guarantee against Soviet threat. The collective defence among members of NATO was the cornerstone of European security. After the cold war, the environment has changed profoundly. The international system shifted from a bipolar structure, characterised by competition between the US and USSR, to a unipolar system, characterised by US dominance (Jones, 2007, p. 5).

As outlined above, the EU sought to strengthen its position in this new world order. It did so by developing into a political entity with serious foreign policy and defence and security ambitions in the past decade and a half. This emergence of European security and defence ambitions addresses two fundamental questions. Those
are the role to be played by the US in European security and the precise purposes to be developed in the new era for NATO and the ESDP (Hunter, 2002, p. 3).

**US concerns**

In the US concerns have arisen about Europe’s ambitions. One of the major concerns of the US is that European defence policy will do so much that NATO would become less effective and US influence in Europe would be weakened (ibidem, p. 5). Others inside the US government have strongly opposed security cooperation if that would be outside NATO (Jones, 2007, p. 5). For example, the US Department of Defense (2002) showed itself to be an opponent of an EU army when stating that it wants to “prevent the creation of an EU counterpart to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and a separate ‘EU’ army, and will ensure that EU operations are conducted in accordance with NATO doctrine via a common defense planning process”. Therefore an important principle for the US is the principle of “NATO first”, which means that the EU only acts “where NATO as a whole is not engaged”. This is deemed important for preserving cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance, an important goal for the US. Related, the US wants a clear division of labour between ESDP and NATO, to avoid specialisation into separate paths (Hunter, 2002, p. 149-150). Another requirement concerns approaches to operational planning. Additionally, the US supports having only one methodology for both NATO and ESDP, regarding command, control, communications and intelligence.

Art (2006, p. 182-183) shows himself to be cautious about European defence cooperation as well, bringing in another argument. He puts emphasis on the argument of balancing, by which he means getting a more even distribution of power. He states that an EU that can act autonomously in its own region and that can provide for its own security, will be less prone to listen to the US and more capable of influencing Washington across a certain range of issues. At the minimum, he states, this will give the EU an agenda setting power in NATO. At the maximum, this will give the EU the power to provide for its own security and make the EU independent on the US on this aspect.

**Berlin plus**

The practical relationship between NATO and the ESDP was initiated at the 1999 NATO’s Washington summit. There the EU and NATO agreed on an arrangement regarding the EU’s role on security and defence in relation to NATO. In the updated Strategic Concept of NATO the Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their “commitment to building the ESDI within the Alliance” (Washington Summit Communiqué, 1999). It was agreed that the EU would operate only where NATO forces where not engaged military. In return NATO accepted the notion of “autonomous EU action”, although it was not precisely defined what that meant (Hunter, 2002, p.55). Based on conclusions of this Washington Summit a comprehensive package of agreements between NATO and EU emerged. This package became known as the
'Berlin Plus' agreement. It contains among others the following major parts (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2007):

- Assured access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (CMO)
- Availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led CMO
- Procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities
- EU - NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led CMO making use of NATO assets and capabilities

All parts are brought together in the so called ‘Framework Agreement’, which came into effect in March 2003. Since then the ‘Berlin plus’ package has served as the foundation for practical cooperation between EU and NATO. The EU makes use of NATO planning support or NATO capabilities and assets for the execution of any operations (ibidem, 2007). The EU has launched two operations under Berlin Plus: operations Concordia and Althea.

It is also argued that the Berlin Plus-style collaboration should be set up the other way around; hence the proposal for a ‘Berlin Plus in reverse’ which could see NATO making use of EU strengths in policing and complex crisis management. According to the Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union (2006, p. 4) the military co-operation is good, but “several differences persist at the political level, threatening to prevent further progress”. Therefore, ‘grand bargains’ between NATO and the EU about ‘Berlin plus in reverse’ are yet to be made.

**Iraq crisis**

The Iraq crisis of 2002-2003 marked some clear differences between some EU member states and the US. The crisis was reached about Iraq’s disarmament. Military intervention in Iraq was opposed by Germany, Belgium and France, because they claimed that it would increase rather than decrease the risk of terrorist attacks. At the height of this crisis the French and Germans proposed the transformation of the ESDP into a European Security Defence Union (ESDU), so that the EU could play its own “full role in the international arena” (Franco-German Defence and Security Council, 2003). This declaration was the basis for the ‘Tervuren’ statement 3 months later in April 2003. In this statement the ‘gang of four’ (France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg), who led the resistance in the EU to the US-led intervention in Iraq and in NATO, opposed preparatory NATO planning to aid Turkey (Salmon, 2004, p. 453-454). Furthermore they called for a new impetus for ESDP, although the statement acknowledged that the “transatlantic partnership remains an essential strategic priority for Europe” (Tervuren Statement, 2003). Despite this, the four inter alia called for (ibidem):

- enhanced co-operation in the field of defence;
- a solidarity clause, with some accepting supplementary obligations;
a European Security and Defence Union in which participating members would commit themselves to mutual help, co-ordinate their defence efforts and develop capabilities.

The declarations of the ‘Tervuren’ statement were outright rejected by the other Member States of the European Union. It offended the sensitivity of the neutrals and caused great problems for the British, Spanish and Italians who supported the Bush administration over Iraq, and who believed that any development of the ESDP should mutually reinforce the strategic relationship between NATO and the EU (Salmon, 2005, p. 369). After the victory of the coalition of the willing over Iraq and long negotiations, France, Germany and the UK struck a deal that became part of the Draft Constitutional Treaty and that softened the call of the Tervuren statement.

**Benefits of EU defence**

Despite drawbacks however, many policy makers and scholars in the US think that European defence cooperation may have particular benefits. For instance a long-term benefit may be a more-equitable burden sharing (Hunter, 2002, p. 9). In addition, European defence structures can be an incentive for European states to take defence seriously, thus undertaking military efforts and sustaining military budgets. This is regarded positive for European security by the US and may also enhance NATO’s capabilities (ibidem). This is why the US continues to encourage military capability improvements in the EU, provided that “these do not weaken the transatlantic link” (Flournoy and Smith, 2005, p. 25). As a result, the US appears to be of two minds as it comes to ESDP. It welcomes steps that are taken to strengthen European defence, but shows concern about Europe taking independent action that could weaken NATO, or could conflict with US security interests (ibidem, p. 25).

Stronger European defence capabilities are often seen as good for both sides of the Atlantic. They strengthen the transatlantic relationship in a world in which neither Europe nor the US can provide security alone (Flournoy and Smith, 2005, p. 24-25). They both need the cooperation of the other to protect and advance their interests. For the US a coherent EU defence and security policy is beneficial, since it will be able to undertake a wider set of military missions as a full partner (ibidem, p. 25).

As is said by many, there does not need to be any conflict between NATO and ESDP. The EU has capacities to provide security by a broad range of means. For NATO, “collective defence will remain the core purpose of the Alliance”, as endorsed by NATO heads of state and government less than a year ago (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2006b, p. 3). NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer advocates deepening of the partnership between NATO and the EU. He states that the challenges of our times demand military and civil means to be employed together and in a coordinated way. Since there is “no stronger civil player than the EU” and “no stronger military alliance than NATO”, he wants them to get serious with their strategic partnership (De Hoop Scheffer, 2007).
3.6 Coming years

How will ESDP develop in years yet to come? The French and Dutch ‘no’ against the draft constitution and subsequent rising euroscepticism is seen as having stalled the process European integration in general. For some even, European defence will never really get serious at all, because of the absence of agreement on transnational strategic concepts (Jones, 2007, p. 218). On the other hand, the new treaty which EU leaders agreed on in Brussels recently (June 2007) still provides for a new foreign affairs chief, with opportunities and budget to really act at the world stage. The ratification process will bring clarity.

As described above, structural factors as the end of the Cold War, the potential security dilemma as a result of American troop withdrawal and the preponderance of US power in international affairs offer explanatory power for the significant increase in European security cooperation from the 1990s onwards. Current evidence suggests that the US will withdraw even more forces from Europe and will for the foreseeable future remain the preponderant global power (Jones, 2007, p. 228-231). Furthermore, as was seen during the Iraq crisis, the US differs in its views about international security with Europe and may well continue to do so. Moreover, the US is willing and able to act unilaterally, regardless of the UN or NATO. All these factors may well provide structural impetus for European States to pursue further cooperation in the security and defence realm.

As stated, the present treaties already make possible a whole range of defence actions. The EU has just started to carry out its first security missions in recent years. Security and defence policy structures will take time to crystallise. By being in use present ESDP structures will probably become more institutionalised. The possibility of further security cooperation and even more pronounced external acting in the future might be a result. One common European armed force, in which national armed forces are integrated, will be, for the time being, ‘far beyond the horizon’ (Van den Doel, 2004, p. 41). This however does not mean that there will not be any convergence in coming years.
Chapter 4

European integration theory and defence integration

4.1 Introduction

The EU is a highly complex political system and is probably going to become even more so. That is why “no single theory will be capable of explaining its dynamics and predicting its outcome” (Schmitter, 2004, p. 68). This does not mean that theorising the EU is unnecessarily. Different theories, converging in certain aspects and diverging in others, may move forward the understanding of integration processes. In this chapter an outline is given of European integration theory and the theoretical framework used in this study (liberal intergovernmentalism) is explained. Furthermore, the process of defence integration is looked at, including its advantages and disadvantages. The chapter ends with expectations regarding the factors that determine positions of states towards defence integration.

4.2 Integration and integration theory

This study is about European integration. But, what is meant with ‘integration’? Haas (1968, p. 16 in Rosamond, 2000, p. 12) defined European integration as

“the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones”.

This is a broad definition that includes both a social process (the shifting of loyalties) and a political process (negotiation and decision-making about the construction of new political institutions. Probably not all theorists would include both aspects in a definition, but most of them would agree that integration is first and foremost a process. Theorists of different schools are more concerned with the process of integration than with the political system to which that integration leads (Diez & Wiener, 2004, p. 3). That is also true for this study, in which the central question is why Belgium and the Netherlands are willing to integrate or not (see chapter 1). The explanations for their position in and stances towards this process are looked for. Possible future outcomes are of minor relevance in this study.
Speaking about (European) integration, distinction may be made between positive and negative integration. The latter one is basically the removal of barriers to further exchange, enabling goods, services, investment and labour to cross borders (Fligstein & Stone-Sweet, 2001, p. 30). The former, positive integration, is regulation in the form of European legislation. This means the replacements of national rules by supranational ones (ibidem, 2001, p. 44). The integration of European defence policy and structures is a clear example of positive integration.

‘Negative integration’ belongs to the category of ‘low politics’. This means that it does not threaten the position of national elites or imperil ‘vital national interests’. In areas of key importance however, in which national interests are at stake, nations are far more cautious to integrate. All matters that are vital to the very survival of a state may be referred to with high politics. Most national and international security concerns belong to this category. According to Hoffmann, states are prepared to engage in integrative and cooperative activity when it concerns low politics. With respect to high politics however, states are far not very willing to compromise on their self-government (Hoffmann, 1964 in Rosamond, 2000, p. 78-79).

So, negative integration is easier to pursue, since its ‘just’ about opening markets. However, negative integration, also called market-making, may create circumstances for further (positive) integration.

**Historical perspective**

Many scholars of European integration have explored ways to theorise the overall nature of the integration process. This enabled them to develop broad understanding of the factors underlying European integration and to facilitate predictions about the integration process (Nugent et al., 2003, p. 479). This kind of theorising began in the 1950s, soon after the EEC was established. After about fifteen years, from the mid 1970s, the interest in these ‘grand theories’ declined, because of disillusionment about what had been achieved by such theory.

However, from the mid-to-late 1980s on, interest was re-stimulated by developments in the EU. The launch of the Single European Market (SEM) and Single European Act (SEA) in 1985-1986 provided the European integration process with a new impulse. Although the limitations of grand theory were still acknowledged, the need for further understanding of the general character of European integration was as valid as ever (ibidem, p. 479).

When attempting to conceptualise the EU, a useful starting point is to compare it with the most important political unit of the international system, the state, and with the way in which states interrelate with one another on a structured basis (Nugent et al., 2003, p. 465). However, although the EU displays many state-like features, it falls a long way short of being one (ibidem, p. 466). When comparing the EU with Intergovernmental Organisations (IGO’s) differences are more striking. No IGO has

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* A grand theory is a theory that attempts an overall explanation of a phenomenon; explaining its main features.
anything like the policy responsibilities of the EU. The EU has a much more developed and complex institutional structure than is found in IGO’s (ibidem, p. 467). In important respects, the EU may be thought of as being less than a state, but more than an IGO. This is the problem and the challenge of EU integration, it is about a unique political system that is highly complex itself and made up by many states that differ to considerable extents in almost all respects.

Integration theory

Theories serve different purposes. They may explain outcomes, behaviour, or decision-making rationales; others criticize general trends on the basis of abstract considerations, seek to fit particular developments into a larger scheme or seek to provide normative guidance (Woods, 1996 in Diez & Wiener, 2004, p. 3). In this thesis, an explanation is sought using liberal intergovernmentalism.

Theorising and conceptualising the EU is a difficult endeavour. According to Nugent et al. (2003, p. 464) it is so for at least four reasons. First, the EU itself has never described or defined its political character in any clear manner. The Amsterdam Treaty (TEU) has provisions in which the integration process and some common principles are addressed (e.g. article 1 and 6), but there is not much more. Second, the EU has always been in transition. As the integration process deepened and widened, its character has changed substantially. This means that its nature has never been settled. For instance, its decision-making processes have changed by the extension of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers and the growing power of the European Parliament (EP). Third, is multi-faceted system and is highly complex. There are a lot of opportunities for different focuses of analysis. Fourth, the EU is unique. It embodies both supranational and intergovernmental features in its system of governance and shares policy responsibilities with its very different member states (Nugent et al., 2003, p. 465).

Because of the complexity of the EU as an actor and the process of European integration, there are different ways to look at European integration proceeding. As a result there are various theoretical schools of European integration. Different theories explain different parts of the process and are often better suited to explain a certain period in the European integration process than the whole process of European integration. The major theoretical school of neo-functionalism explains European integration as caused by ‘spill-over’. This means essentially that the integration process in a certain policy sector leads to a demand for policy measures in related sectors. As a result integration is believed to cause more integration (Schmitter, 2004, p. 45-71). Certain periods in the European integration practice, when the integration process stalled, showed the shortcomings of this perceived logic. Intergovernmental approaches stress the importance of national governments. Governments are seen as controlling the level and speed of European integration. Any increase in power at supranational level is thus the result of a direct decision by governments. However, the role and dynamic of international institutions are neglected by this focus on national governments.
In this study the framework of Liberal intergovernmentalism is used, because it puts emphasis on both above-mentioned key aspects of integration: the rationality of state-behaviour and the dynamic of international negotiations.

4.3 Liberal intergovernmentalism

Liberal intergovernmentalism is an approach, almost entirely founded by Andrew Moravcsik, which tries to explain European integration with a liberal theory of national preference formation and an intergovernmentalist account of strategic bargaining between states. This means that it theorises European integration as a two-level game, looking at the domestic and the international level both. National preferences are understood as arising in the domestic politics of member-states.

“National interests […] emerge through domestic political conflict as societal groups compete for political influence, national and transnational coalitions form and new policy alternatives are recognized by governments. An understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for, not a supplement to, the analysis of strategic interaction among states” (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 481 in Rosamond, 2000, p. 137).

The core theoretic assumption of liberal intergovernmentalism is ‘rational choice’: actors are seen as calculating the utility of alternative courses of action and choosing the one that maximises their utility under the given circumstances (Schimmelfennig, 2004, p. 77). States are seen as rational actors like other institutions and actors. This assumption is shared with the realist school of International Relations, but it differs in its cause. In the Realist school state rationality is made up by fixed preferences. In liberal intergovernmentalism, different states may come to different stances, depending on their preferences that are the result of domestic political processes that may vary over time (Rosamond, 2000, p. 137).

The variations in the political processes are made up by preferences for material and ideal welfare of various societal groups that may see their preferences and influence change. As a result, “state preferences are neither fixed nor uniform: they may vary within the same state across time and issues, and they may vary between states depending on different domestic constellations of preferences institutions, and power” (Schimmelfennig, 2004, p. 77). Also, the preferences of national governments in European integration are for the most part issue-specific. On different issues, states may hold different stances towards integration. As state preferences have mainly been economic, so has been European integration (ibidem). For instance, surges in integration, such as in the late 1980s with the Single European Act, were a result of states that had to accommodate themselves to powerful domestic actors whose preferences fall together with liberalisation of European markets (Rosamond, 2000, p. 139). In other words, concerns for a competitive national economy were the main driving force for member states in this episode of European integration.
Another assumption of liberal intergovernmentalism is that states (and other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society. Their weighted preferences make up the underlying goals (state preferences) that are pursued via foreign policy by rational state officials (Moravcsik, 2003, p. 164). Representative institutions are thereby seen as a ‘transmission belt’ by which preferences and social power of individuals and societal groups enter the political realm and are formulated into policy7 (ibidem). Also the state itself is seen as a representative institution, constantly undergoing transformation, by coalitions of social actors. However, all this is not to say that all individuals and groups have equal influence on state policy. Every government represents certain individuals or groups more than others (ibidem).

Government’s preferences are shaped by domestic preferences, but this does not mean that those preferences will be directly found back in international policy. Outcomes of international negotiations are seen as the result of a bargaining game. The relative bargaining power of actors shapes the outcome. Bargaining power is the result of the uneven distribution of (i) information and (ii) the benefits of a specific agreement, compared to alternative outcomes (Schimmelfennig, 2007, p. 77). In general, those actors that have more and better information have more influence on the outcome and those actors that have the least need for a specific agreement, are able to gain relative power by threatening with non-cooperation and thereby forcing the other(s) to make concessions (ibidem).

Liberal intergovernmentalism also puts forward concrete propositions on the determinants of preference formation and bargaining. In its most concise form, it is a general argument of liberal intergovernmentalism that:

“EU integration can best be understood as a series of rational choices made by national leaders. These choices responded to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of each state in the international system, and the role of institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments” (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 18 in Schimmelfennig, 2004, p. 78).

The idea leaders and ruling groups making rational choices is also widely used in the broader field of international relations theory. Hagan (1995, p. 124) states that political decision makers want to survive politically. Therefore, they work to retain power, by maintaining and enhancing the political base. When domestic political pressures threaten to imperil leadership, (foreign) policy will be adjusted so that it imposes fewer domestic costs (ibidem).

In sum, domestic political preferences determine a state’s position on international policy. This does not mean that these preferences simply predict the outcome of integration processes. How much of the domestic stance comes through in

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7 This assumption is not only true for nation-states. Primary interests and commitment of individuals and private groups can shift to a supranational or sub-national institution able to represent them effectively. This is true for some aspects of European politics. Liberal analysis would then shift focus to these levels (Moravcsik, 2003, p. 164).
final policy is depending on outcomes of international negotiations and the role of institutions (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 481-482).

4.4 Defence integration

This thesis is about defence integration. What is exactly meant by that? Integration is the act of combining into an integral whole. Economic integration may then be defined as making national economies subject to supranational authorities. This process can take several forms that represent varying degrees of integration. It may start with a free trade area, a customs union, a common market, an economic (and monetary - AW) union and eventually complete economic integration (Balassa, 1962, p. 2).

Like complete economic integration eventually may be the final outcome of economic integration, a supranational army may be the final outcome of defence integration. Given the centrality of an army for a country this may at least for the foreseeable future be rather theoretical than realistic. However, this does not mean that other, less dramatic extents of integration are unrealistic. At present armies already cooperate, as outlined in chapter three. I regard this as a first step of integration. A step further multinational army forces can be created (like the ERRF – chapter 3), while having other forces under strict national command. In this thesis defence integration is used in this broad sense, referring to denote the process of ‘coming together’ of national defence systems, regardless of its actual progress. Strict national armies and completely supranational armies are both the extremes of a (partly theoretical) continuum.

I will not contend that this process is unidirectional or unavoidable. At least far-reaching defence integration is certainly theoretical at present and may always be so. Major foreign policy and defence decisions are still made in European capitals and there are no signs that a European army is at hand (Jones, 2007, p. 5). Moreover, the process of defence integration is not unidirectional either. A process of disintegration may also occur.
**Security cooperation: major developments**

What are the reasons for European states to integrate in foreign policy and security matters? As outlined in chapter 2, the first efforts to cooperate and integrate in defence were just after World War II. First, there was the German issue; the European continent had to be prevented from new aggression by Germany. Moreover, a new threat arose. The rise of the Soviet Union and its increasing influence in Eastern-Europe. Soviet aggression was deemed likely and a divided Europe would be helpless in that case. This meant that at least some form of cooperation was needed. The establishment of the WEU in 1948, to maintain “international peace and security and [...] resisting any policy of aggression” (Brussels Treaty, 1948). In the following year collective defence became bolstered by the founding of NATO.

Since the after war period European defence integration did not change extensively until the dramatic recent changes in Eastern Europe. This sudden change of the international system, the shift from a bipolar structure during the Cold War to a unipolar structure, brought about a new security dilemma for the EU. The new reality brought forward for European states the need to cooperate in the security realm for two reasons (Jones, 2007, p. 5): to increase Europe’s ability to project power abroad and to decrease reliance on the United States. The regional system changed fundamentally. Germany, divided into the German Democratic Republic in the east and the Federal Republic of Germany in the west, became reunified. Moreover, the considerable military presence of the US in Europe declined rapidly. US military forces in Europe fell from 326,000 military personnel in 1989 to 100,000 in 1999 (Jones, 2007, p. 88). This shift made European leaders adopt a ‘binding’ strategy to ensure long-term peace on the continent and building European power abroad. In sum, looking at the most important developments in European security cooperation it can be concluded that security cooperation has foremost been about preserving peace on the European continent (Jones, 2007, p. 5).

**Advantages and disadvantages**

The major reason that states are at least very careful to integrate, is that this may lead to a loss of sovereignty. Sovereignty means that, leaving obligations under international and Community law aside, member states have “the power to regulate and decide on everything and everyone within their territorial and personal jurisdiction (Trybus, 2004, p. 192). Military might is the ultimate defence of the national sovereignty. In extreme cases, states can use power to enforce their will. When countries integrate in matters of security and defence, some of this defence capacity is touched and countries loose some part of their self-determination. This is why countries are very cautious to engage in defence integration, even more cautious than with regards to integration in most other realms. As stated by Hoffmann (1966, p. 882 in Rosamond, 2000, p. 77), if national interests are at stake, it may be said that “nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the
untested blender”. To conclude, the loss of sovereignty is the major obstacle for defence integration in Europe.

Although states are careful to engage in defence integration, there has been considerable defence integration/cooperation in the past fifteen years (see chapter 3). As outlined in the section above, the external pressure for integration came from the changing security environment. But why precisely is defence integration beneficial for a better defence?

Flournoy and Smith (2005, p. 9) set up three guiding premises for European defence integration, that give a general idea of the benefits:

- New challenges (such as the need to be rapidly deployable, conduct multiple missions and be interoperable) mean that new capabilities are required;
- Resource constraints imply the need for a more integrated approach to defence between member states, the EU and NATO; demographics mean that both sides must “spend smarter”;
- Improved capabilities are good for both Europe and the US; the US needs a strong partner across the Atlantic.

The first point is about the security environment and the changing reasons why the military is used. For instance the ‘war on terror’ is the reason that troops are present in Afghanistan. New warfare is mainly about fighting smaller (terrorist) units and less about large-scale conventional fighting against another state. Furthermore, because of cut backs and savings on the one hand and the sophistication of equipment on the other, a fully equipped modern army is hardly affordable. When pooling resources countries can more easily sustain advanced armies. In defence, having the most technologically advanced military and other equipment is of crucial military importance; “good equipment wins battles. Bad equipment costs lives” (Trybus, 2004, p. 206). For instance, superior military technology was of major importance for the coalition of the willing’s quick success in Iraq in 2003. Since EU member states, especially the smaller ones, don’t have the resources to procure highly advanced technology all by themselves. This applies not only to equipment, but also to related issues, like maintenance, spare parts supply and ammunition (ibidem). The aging society in Western-Europe will cost enormous amounts of budget, which will put even more pressure on army budgets in coming decennia.

Moreover, maintaining international security cannot just be done by the United States. Europe has to take up its responsibilities too, is often stated by European leaders. Therefore the US needs a strong European military partner.

Above-mentioned guidelines give a general argument for defence integration. More detailed reasons for integration are given by the Dutch Advisory Council on International Relations, although they speak about ‘cooperation’. It laid down the following principal forms of defence cooperation among countries that are at least in theory conceivable (with many hybrid forms possible) (Advisory Council on
International Relations, 2003, p. 9-10). The order is based on the descending degree of loss of national autonomy (greatest degree of loss 1, least 7):

1. Collective procurement, management and decision-making in respect of military assets by a group of countries (following, for example, an AWACS-based model).
2. Multilateral task specialisation and division; this assumes a multilaterally agreed framework such as NATO or the EU. In such a cooperative scenario, task distribution is multilaterally agreed whereby each country carries out one or more tasks on behalf of the group. As will become apparent further in this advice, there is at present no framework in place for instituting such an exchange of tasks.
3. Task distribution based on, for example, a bilateral cooperative agreement.
4. Multilateral operational cooperation based on a multilaterally agreed concept, such as the recent NATO Response Force, which is part of the initiative for increasing military resources that was agreed at the NATO Prague summit.
5. Operational cooperation, for example, based on an agreement between (among) two (or more) participating countries, outside a multilateral framework.
6. ‘Pooling’: creating a multinational pool of equivalent military resources, such as transport aircraft or helicopters.
7. Cooperation in respect of materiel: joint development, production, procurement, and/or maintenance of military materiel by a group of (two or more) countries.

All in all, for a modern and effective European defence structure, at least some forms of cooperation of integration are needed. As put in chapter three, European countries acknowledged this need and have pursued extensive cooperation in defence matters in the past fifteen years. However, although the need of integration has been acknowledged, there is still a lot of variation in ideas about how and to which extent integration is needed.

4.5 Expectations in this study

Central in the framework of liberal intergovernmentalism is, as stated in section 4.4, the core theoretic assumption of ‘rational choice’: actors are seen as calculating the utility of alternative courses of action and choosing the one that maximises their utility under the given circumstances (Schimmelfennig, 2004, p. 77). States are seen as rational actors like other institutions and actors. Calculating the utility of alternatives will be based on perceptions that states have about that reality. Nye (1971, p. 83-86) distinguishes three perceptual conditions that explain the capacity of integration schemes to proceed. The first concerns perceptions of the distribution of benefits deriving from integration. Widespread perceptions of integration leading to a less than positive sum would be an obstacle to the integrative process. Secondly, Nye places emphasis on actors’ perceptions of their external situation. Common perceptions of external threats combined with agreement about appropriate policy strategies would advance integration. A lack of such perceptions or disagreement about policy strategies leads to the opposite. Thirdly,
the perception of the costs of integration matter. When costs are seen to be either low or exportable, integration is more likely to be pursued by actors.

In this thesis I would like to explore all three kinds of perceptual conditions. I use them as working hypotheses: as variables of which I expect to influence the degree of support for defence integration. This means that their influence in the defence integration process is seen as follows:

![Figure 4.2: defence integration: support at the domestic level](image)

**Indicators**

What may these perceptions in concrete terms be? First of all, the ‘perception of benefits of integration’ for a state is being part of a better functioning army structure. This means that indicators of perceived benefits are positive attitudes towards present European joint actions, positive expectations about the functioning of future army structures and perhaps a relatively negative perception about the capacities of the present national army.

Secondly, I regard the ‘perception of the external situation’ as the perception of the world security system at large and in particular its implications for the EU. During the cold war, world security clearly demanded different structures than it does now. Indicators of the perception of the external situation involve the attitudes towards the position of the United States in the world security system (inter alia the Iraq conflict, present relations with Russia), the role and functioning of NATO and the risks the EU is exposed to in the present globalising world.

Thirdly, I see the ‘perception of costs’ twofold. Of course there are financial costs, but I consider political costs as far more important. As governments pursue new international policies, home support is needed. The degree to which there is a lack of domestic support can be seen as costs (a lack of domestic support may well arise as a result of a perception of high financial costs). The expectations of the extra (or lesser) support ‘at home’ for deepening the European defence project, in comparison with staying at the status quo, are an indicator of the (political) costs. It is to be expected that this support will have a relation with the support for the European Constitution.
In the next chapter a closer look is taken at the Belgian and Dutch degree of support for European defence integration and it is tried to relate this support to the above-mentioned perception of various costs that come with defence integration.
Chapter 5

Belgium and the Netherlands compared

5.1 Introduction

Having had a closer look at defence integration and the way countries can be looked at; in this chapter the stances of Belgium and the Netherlands towards European defence integration are outlined. To begin with, the first paragraph gives a short overview of political similarities between both countries. This is followed by an outline of the history of European (defence) integration and the history of foreign (defence) policy in both countries. Subsequently, the situation at present is examined, including the arguments used in the Netherlands and Belgium. Therefore a first section is based on literature and government publications. In the second section, four interviews with officials of both countries, working at the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and NATO, are summarised.

5.2 Belgium and the Netherlands: much in common

In many respects, Belgium and the Netherlands are quite similar in Europe. Both are small countries in the EU when it comes to population (Belgium 10.3 million inhabitants and the Netherlands 16.3 million), although the Netherlands sees itself often as middle-sized. Both countries are located at the North Sea, between the three large European powers, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Their well-developed economies are highly dependent on its transport function.

Belgium and the Netherlands were among the founding states of the forerunner of the European Union, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), founded by the Treaty of Paris in 1951 and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. Some years before already, in 1948, both countries had already established a customs union together with Luxembourg, the Benelux. The name Benelux refers to the beginning of each country’s name.

Both were countries were occupied by Germany during World Wars II after only a short period of fights and have as such faced the same urgency after the war to find a solution for the European security dilemma (see also chapter 2). Both countries their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is almost equal; in 2006 Belgium’s GDP per capita was estimated on 33,000 American dollars and the Netherlands’ GDP per capita was estimated a little less, at 30,174 American dollars (CIA World Factbook, 2007).
countries are monarchies and have a bicameral system, which means that their legislatures consist of two chambers. Both countries have a multiparty system, in which the assembly is composed of several minority parties, leading normally to government by coalition. This party system is a natural consequence of their electoral system, which is based on proportional representation (see: Hague & Harrop, 2004, p. 199). This party system means for both countries that there is a relatively weak executive branch (government) compared to, for example, presidential party systems. In both countries a consensus mode of politics developed, because of the multi-party system and the social cleavages.

Belgium and the Netherlands are ‘pillarised’ countries. The term pillarisation is used in this sense to describe a non-territorial segregation of a society in several smaller ‘vertical’ segments or ‘pillars’ (in Dutch: zuilen). These pillars were (and sometimes to a certain extent still are) based on different religions or ideologies, which operate separately from each other (Hellemans, 1998, p. 257-259). The existence of these pillars contributed to a great extent to the political culture and political practices. Because of the social cleavages, differences and conflicts had to be accommodated in order to sustain peaceful coexistence. The destabilising effects of deep social divisions were neutralised by cooperation among the leaders of the political segments (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005, p. 221).

5.3 Contemporary history of international and security policy

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

Both the size and geographical location of the Netherlands have had an influence on the country’s Atlantic orientation (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005, p. 205). The Dutch domestic market is small, but is located ideally for serving as a gateway to the European hinterland. This made the Netherlands come to rely on maritime trade. As a result, an Atlantic perspective became part of the Dutch foreign policy, sometimes even bordering on anti-continentalism. In the 1950s the Dutch Foreign Office even proclaimed: “The Netherlands cannot exist without Europe, but it is a continental European nation neither in its history, nor in its character” (ibidem).

So, before the Netherlands joined the European Economic Community as one of its six founding states, NATO had been the main point of reference for both countries in foreign policy (Coolsaet & Soetendorp, 2000). When the EEC was set up, successive governments in both countries achieved to reconcile the two conflicting loyalties to the EEC (and later EC) and NATO by making a distinction between both memberships. The European project was considered to be important for economic reasons and NATO was seen as a necessary security purpose. By keeping a distinction loyalty could be maintained to both (ibidem).

The orientation on NATO, or the ‘primacy of the Atlanticism’ as it may be called, was based on the idea that in Europe, divided by the Cold War, only the US as leader of the western world could guarantee safety for the Netherlands (Harryvan, Van der Harst
& Van Voorst, 2001, p. 17). According to Van Staden (1974) this determined the Dutch European policy: every European policy option was put in the perspective of its possible consequences for the functioning of NATO and the Dutch - American relations in particular. The Netherlands refrained were European policy could harm NATO.

According to Voorhoeve (1979, p. 308) “the days of the super-loyal NATO ally are gone since the late 1960’s”, although he sees a real shift in the Dutch orientation. Also domestically the membership of NATO has always had loyal support. The decision to join NATO was at that time only opposed by the Communist Party and has never been seriously questioned. Despite opposition to American involvement in Indo China and Latin America and misgivings over NATO’s nuclear strategy, public support for NATO membership has always been firm. No major political party has ever advocated withdrawal from NATO, not even partially as the French did in 1966 (ibidem).

Unlike the Netherlands, and unlike as often thought, Belgium showed just after the Second World War little enthusiasm for a tight transatlantic relationship. When the UK and the US worked on the Atlantic Alliance in 1948, the long-standing Belgian minister of Foreign Affairs Paul-Henri Spaak (and in between also prime-minister) believed that there was not any need for a formal military alliance between Europe and the US. French, but also Belgian, reluctance almost lead to the breaking up of the talks in the summer of 1948. The reason that Spaak agreed on NATO later on was a result of a lack of alternatives (Coolsaet, 2005). In subsequent years however, the relationship would improve and, as often forgotten, Belgium at that time was not the loyal European integrationist as it is now. In 1955 Spaak even declared that “the European idea is necessarily a limited idea”. Furthermore he stated that the European construction needed to be seen as a part of an ‘Atlantic Commonwealth’ (ibidem).

Although support of the government for NATO thus increased after its inception, domestic support decreased. Already in the 1950s several political parties started to speak up against NATO and started to criticise the Belgian minister of Foreign Affairs for being focused to much on the US (ibidem, p. 463). This critical attitude towards NATO has since then been part of the domestic debate.

**European Defence Community**

The history of the European Defence Community (EDC) also shows reluctance at the side of both Belgium and the Netherlands to engage in this supranational project. As set out in chapter 2, the EDC was a far-reaching defence project that finally failed when it was not ratified by the French parliament. Belgium and the Netherlands had already ratified by that time. However, the Netherlands were initially sceptic about the establishment of a European army and for this reason it decided to keep a low diplomatic profile (Van der Harst, 2004, p. 74). The Hague was not in favour of continental European defence, since it was clear that the United Kingdom wouldn’t be part of it. Moreover the Netherlands feared that a supranational defence project would harm the relationship with the United States and NATO (ibidem).
The Belgians were also concerned about the EDC, although based on other arguments. The ‘Atlantic argument’ was not so much important for the Belgians, but there was unwillingness to give up national independency as a result of a European army (Van der Harst, 2004, p. 75). Belgium was divided by the language struggle and as a result maintenance of national independency was a sensitive issue. The Belgium government found that the constitution should be changed for participation in a supranational defence organisation and, partly for reasons of political survival, subsequent governments were not willing to put this issue on the agenda. Both countries took up ‘resistance’ together, one of the rare moments in the 1950s that the Benelux operated as a unity (although Luxembourg was hardly involved as a result of its only very limited military capacities).

During the negotiations in Paris a widening gap became apparent between the three large states (Germany, France and Italy) and the three small states (the Benelux members). This was remarkable, since the latter three are normally seen as federally oriented (Van der Harst, 2004, p. 76). Belgium and the Netherlands were able to maintain a joint position on most issues. In substance, their position was that the EDC should have very limited authority initially and would constitute little more than a coalition of national forces of the members, comparable to the Brussels Pact (Bruce, 1952). Nevertheless, review of minutes and discussions with individuals indicate that the Belgian and Dutch positions were quite different. The Dutch position seemed to be based on (ibidem):

(a) Belief that if a strong and effective EDC is created US might withdraw its military support from Europe, which support in Dutch mind provides their real security.

(b) Concern that France and Germany will dominate small countries, particularly if substantial authority delegated to central institutions.

(c) Hope that if EDC were sufficiently watered down the UK might some day join.

(d) Worry that under common financing and with continued support of US and UK forces in Germany, Dutch will have to make substantial financial contribution to build-up of German forces. Experts at conference, including Germans, seem to share view that Germany would contribute more than cost of own contingents in first year but would contribute less in subsequent years.

(e) Belief that Dutch can obtain more US end-items and military support aid if aid is handled on a national basis.

(f) Reluctance to give common institutions authority, particularly in build-up period, to make any modifications whatever in military program they have presented to Dutch Parliament and NATO. Basic concern appears to be that rapid build-up and equipment of German contingents might be attempted at expense of Dutch plans.
Despite its objections, parliamentary ratification on the EDC in the Netherlands went smooth. Van der Harst (2004, p. 78-79) sees two reasons therefore. First, shortly after the signing of the EDC Treaty, the minister of foreign affairs Dirk Stikker was succeeded by Jan-Willem Beyen. Stikker was a strong proponent of an Atlantic orientation, but Beyen appeared to be more and more a European integrationist (as was an important part of the lower house in the Dutch parliament). Second, the parliamentary ratification was partly a result of major changes in France, where the positive attitude towards the EDC changed rapidly. For various reasons support in France declined quick and soon the Dutch government stated that it would be ‘unlikely’ that France would ratify. Based on the expectation that France would not ratify, the Netherlands decided to be lenient towards ratification of the EDC Treaty, since that would give the country international prestige. The US had made the EDC one of its major policy priorities. Secretary of State Dulles even threatened with an ‘agonizing reappraisal’ of the American policy towards Europe (ibidem, p. 79). The lenient position of the Netherlands can thus be seen as a tactical move.

In Belgium ratification also happened for tactical reasons. At the end of 1951 Belgium’s obstruction to the EDC was that strong that the project was about to founder according to some. One of the German negotiators complained that everything ‘European’ about the project was obstructed by the Belgians, so that voices were heard to build up the EDC without the Benelux (since also the Netherlands was not supportive). French and German civil servants advised the US to put pressure on Belgium, which was considered to be the most anti EDC country of the Benelux. Belgium eventually gave in as a result of isolation in Europe and the strong pressure of the US (Coolsaet, 2005).

European Political Cooperation
Also in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Belgians and Dutch remained reluctant towards European defence structures. The creation of a security institution, as proposed by the Fouchet Plan was refused by Belgium and the Netherlands. The fundamental reason therefore was the almost absence of a potential security dilemma. As a result there was little need to push for a European security institution. Furthermore, both countries were concerned about the impact it would have on NATO, and more specifically on US involvement in Europe (Jones, 2007, p. 75). The Netherlands objected to any discussions on European defence outside NATO and inserted a clause into one of the preliminary versions stating that any common European defence policy must remain “within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance” (ibidem). The Belgian foreign minister Spaak similarly noted that he was “deeply concerned that the Fouchet Plan might lead to a departure of the US and perhaps even Britain from continental Europe” (Jones, 2007, p. 75-76).

From the mid 1960s on the Cold War went through a period detente; a period in which tensions slacked. It was this climate of relative relaxation that made Belgium accept the establishing of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE),
the central command of NATO military forces (Craeybeckx & Meynen, 2005, p. 464). In subsequent years, Belgium followed US leadership of NATO under various ministers, both Christian-Democratic and socialist. In 1979 the country was clearly willing to place cruise missiles on its territory. Even foreign affairs minister Leo Tindemans, being a loyal supporter of European integration, displayed an Atlantic orientation (ibidem, 2005, p. 465-466). However, outside the government criticism developed and in the late 1970s and the 1980s a broad peace movement emerged.

Also for the Netherlands the Atlantic orientation remained. When EC members started to deal with foreign policy issues in the early 1970s within the framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), the Netherlands had not changed its focus. Dutch foreign policy makers wanted to avoid any conflict of interest between the EC and NATO and therefore insisted on keeping security matters out of the EPC agenda (Coolsaet & Soetendorp, 2000).

**CFSP & ESDP**

Following increasing economic integration, in the early 1990s further political integration was on the agenda. In 1991 when the Netherlands was holding the presidency of the EC, it produced a draft treaty that was more integrated in nature than the one that was proposed before (Jopp, 1994, p. 10). The Netherlands wanted to subsume the CFSP firmly into communitarian procedures. Belgium was in favour (as were others) of this plan. On basis of this proposal, a unitary institutional structure could have been created for the external economic relations and the CFSP, instead of separate institutional frameworks. This transfer of sovereignty to the Union was opposed by others, among which the UK, France, Denmark and Greece. The final result was the creation of a second pillar for CFSP that formed an unclear outcome. Although including Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), it was put in conditions effectively preventing its use (Nuttall, 2000, p. 10-11).

The Dutch wish to include the CFSP in EC procedures, instead of keeping it purely intergovernmental, seems to represent a shift in its foreign policy pattern. Closer examination however learns that the Dutch position did not shift that much. The Netherlands only had the conviction that a merger between the economic external relations of the EU and the CFSP should be brought about (Coolsaet & Soetendorp, 2000). Rather than a shift, the Dutch attitude may thus be seen as a continuation of its strife for beneficial economic conditions.

The CFSP was not a contentious issue in the Netherlands. For long, European integration and the CFSP in particular were hardly disputed issues in the domestic Dutch debate. Only in the late 1990s some politicians have become more reluctant to transfer national sovereignty in the area of foreign policy to the EU. These views were

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8 Policy-making procedures in which the EU institutions “share and wield considerable power”. Usually contrasted with intergovernmental methods of policy-making, “whereby decisions are reached by cooperation between or among governments” (Bomberg & Stubb, 2003).
most clearly expressed by leaders of the Liberal and Labour fractions in the Dutch parliament (Coolsaet & Soetendorp, 2000).

The Belgians tried to align the procedures of EPC more closely with those of the Community by leaving behind the principle of consensus. They wanted to ‘seek a consensus in keeping with the majority opinion’. Most other member states however did not agree. The outcome was the device that became known as ‘constructive abstention’ (Nuttall, 2000, p. 18-19). By this advocating of European integration Belgium clearly “returned to its roots”, put Coolsaet (2005).

Since the 1990s Belgium has been an advocate of more European integration in matters of political cooperation and foreign policy. Between 1988 and 1991 Belgium firmly started to advocate the project of an autonomous European position in world politics, based on an own defence and foreign policy. Especially since the Gulf War of 1991 Belgium places its international policy orientation essentially in European perspective (Royal Institute for International Relations, 2007, p. 3).

5.4 Present views on European defence

Belgium

Bursens (in Coolsaet, 2004, p. 36) states that Belgium always has been in favour of European integration. This is certainly not true, when its position on the EDC is taken into account, as laid down in paragraph 5.3. However, besides this exception Belgium indeed has an image in the EU of a federally oriented nation. Especially in recent decades it has showed itself as a strong supporter of supranationalism. For that reason the country is by some even considered as “more European than the European Union itself”, reflected by its official position on the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996. There was stated by Belgium that “the construction of the European Union on a federal basis is a priority of Belgium’s foreign policy” (Kerremans & Beyers, 1998, p. 16).

The pro-European stance of Belgium is related to a critical attitude towards the US. In recent years Belgium showed itself as a proponent of an alternative vision on the world than that of Washington. Belgium has a vision with a certain ethical dimension and an autonomous role for Europe, to work on a world order where globalisation has a human face and where rules apply that are the same for everyone (Coolsaet, 2004, p. 41). The criticism towards the US’ foreign policy is crucial in Belgium’s propagation for European defence are its ideas about the transatlantic relationship. This was reflected by Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, who said that “the Iraq crisis underlined the need for a stronger European defence and foreign strategy” (BBC, 2003). Verhofstadt also wrote a book, published in 2005, showing his European spirit. The book, a reaction on the no-vote in the referendums about the European Constitution, was named ‘United States of Europe’. In this book he advocates a federal Europe, pursued by the member states that are willing to further cooperate. Furthermore in the book he shows himself a strong proponent of further federalisation of security policy and the construction of a common army. According to Verhofstadt “it is possible to have an autonomous
European defence with at the same time a pillar of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization” (ibidem). Belgium’s views towards European defence integration at
present are thus clear cut. The Belgian department of foreign affairs calls the ESDP a
‘strategic necessity’, and states that “the EU can and must be ambitious in the way it
develops the ESDP”. It also aims at broadening the scope of the ESDP, which it calls
“wholly justified and strategically grounded” (Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs,
2007). The former traditional Atlantic ‘line’ within Belgium is these days only
represented by a minority (Coolsaet, 2004, p. 34).

According to Coolsaet (2004, p. 37), the cause of the Belgian pro-European stance
is to strengthen the European position towards the US, as quintessentially laid down by
Joffe (2001); “its (ESDP) purpose is not to oppose the United States outright, but to
enhance Europe’s relative power vis-à-vis the United States with an asset that might
increase European autonomy or diminish U.S. preponderance”. This stance is based on a
classical Belgian aversion against international inequality and unpredictability, which
were characteristic of the country since its birth. A super power with military superiority
and willing to use it as a policy tool that declares and shows not wanting to be bound by
international rules laid down by other states, is a source of unpredictability in the
international system (Coolsaet, 2004, p. 38). In concrete terms this means for the Atlantic
relations that Belgium is afraid of a so-called ‘instrumentalisation’ of NATO. By this is
meant: the transforming of NATO into an alliance that can be used by Washington in
cases it suits the US and as a basis of changing sequence of ‘coalitions of the willing’
(ibidem). Belgium does not consider this strategy as a stable basis for the international
system. Prime Minister Verhofstadt referred to this phenomenon in 2002; “It seems that
in the future NATO will not be an alliance anymore. The US leads NATO into a
direction of a loose coalition, which will be formed according as the enemy and which
will deploy instruments according as the enemy. Such a coalition against a certain
enemy will be formed à la carte” (Peuteman & Renard, 2002). Supranationalism is for the
Belgium the best guarantee for a non-hegemonic organisation of the relation between
European states. The central role for the Commission, the control on the member states
by the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Auditors and most of all the
weight of votes in the Council of Ministers are relatively advantageous for small states
(Devuyst, 1999, p. 115). Herein is, for small countries like Belgium, a guarantee against a
fallback to power politics9.

Furthermore, and related, is the Belgian plea for what Verhofstadt calls ‘new
Atlanticism’; building an alliance on two equal pillars, an American and an EU pillar
(Verhofstadt, 2003). The idea of Verhofstadt is for the EU to establish a stronger
cooperation between its member states with respect to European security and defence
policy. This should lead to a European army with a European headquarters. This new

9 The concept of power politics is equivalent to the theory of Realism in international relations. Its central
proposition is that “since the purpose of statecraft is national survival in a hostile environment the
acquisition of power is the proper, rational and inevitable goal of foreign policy” (Evans & Newnham, 1998,
465).
Atlanticism fits into the multipolar world that is evolving according to Verhofstadt. He thinks that Europe has a different, softer profile than the US, although certainly not inferior. Europe is more and more seen as a showcase of multilateral cooperation, as a mediator and peacekeeper in complex conflicts. According to Verhofstadt there are many misconceptions about European defence. “Too much is looked at the US, but what they do is not only unfeasible, but might well be undesirable. The European security policy should, unlike that of the US, not be aimed at waging and winning two regional wars at the same time and dominate the oceans. That is not the goal of the European continent” (Verhofstadt, 2003).

As a result Belgian stances towards European (defence) politics have been straightforward and predictable, unlike those of The Netherlands (Coolsaet, 2003, p. 465). For instance, this was showed by the recent Iraq crisis and war. The Belgian stance was clearly coherent with its earlier stance towards the Gulf war of 1990-1991 and was moreover coherent with the public opinion.

In the strategic ‘Guiding plan of defence’ (Stuurplan van defensie) of 2003, the Belgian ministry of Defence stated that the transatlantic partnership is a strategic priority for both Belgium and the EU (Ministerie van Landsverdediging, 2003, p. 2). The document also puts that the EU at the global level “will only be a credible partner and player in case it possesses its own European defence capacity, which is enmeshed in the strategic partnership between the European Union and NATO” (ibid, p. 3).

In the ‘Guiding plan of defence’ of the Belgian ministry of Defence is also laid down that Belgium sees itself as a loyal partner of NATO. At the NATO summit in Prague Belgium took up clear engagements. At the same time it pleads for real European defence, because it regards this of vital importance for the future of the renewed Atlantic Alliance and the transatlantic relation. The strengthening of European defence will establish a pillar inside NATO that gives a perspective on a real equal transatlantic relation, for the first time since the end of the Second World War. Furthermore it says that complementarity and equality are the central underpinnings of this evolution. NATO capacities have to be available and deployable for European defence and vice versa (Ministerie van Landsverdediging, 2003, p. 3).

According to this plan, Belgium wants to downsize its number of military personnel. With respect to its transport capacities (strategic transport, helicopter transport air-to-air refuelling) cooperation is sought with other countries, in the first place The Netherlands and Luxembourg. These reforms have to enable Belgium, in cooperation with other member states, to further develop the capacities of the EU. The result should be that demanding crisis and peace-keeping operations can be deployed (Ministerie van Landsverdediging, 2003, p. 4).

In sum, it is to say that Belgium has developed itself as the foremost proponent of European foreign policy and defence integration. Unlike (most) other member states it is clearly willing to give up a part of its sovereignty for the sake of this goal.
The Netherlands

As described, the Netherlands also has a strong Atlantic tradition and has always been reluctant towards strong political and military cooperation in Europe. Nevertheless, in recent years the Netherlands has been willing to engage in further EU military cooperation, but the focus remains at NATO. For instance, in the most recent defence policy paper of the Netherlands, the ‘Defensienota 2000’ not much attention is given to defence developments in Europe. The report states that the development of a European security and defence policy foremost has to lead to an increase in the military capacity of European countries. The development of a European defence policy is considered to be an important addition to the instrumentation of the EU, but has to be closely related to NATO (Defensienota, 2000, p. 21)

In the policy paper several external threats are recognised. It explicitly states that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction –nuclear, chemical and biological weapons- is one of the major security risks. An important aspect of threats is their diversity and unpredictability. The Advisory Council on International Affairs is quoted; “Since the end of the Cold War the world is in a turbulent situation, of which the development is unclear and the outcome uncertain” (2000, p. 22-23). The paper states furthermore that “NATO warrants the territorial integrity of the Netherlands”. The EU is seen as a “pre-condition for our own wealth”, but also to tie countries in Middle and Eastern Europe.

The Netherlands were amongst the countries that plead successfully for crisis management as one of the Alliance’s fundamental security tasks. Crisis management including crisis response operations is now part of the strategic concept, the political-military guidance of NATO. Furthermore the paper states that the Dutch government prefers NATO for the heavier crisis management operations in and nearby Europe. Even when the US keeps itself aloof, as much as possible NATO capacities will be used, for the reason that Europe lacks sufficient capacities (2000, p. 30-31). With respect to military mission preference is given to NATO, or to a construction in which a larger NATO member has the lead.

Nonetheless, in the paper also the ambition is laid down to strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Military action requires a certain degree of unity regarding foreign policy. It is stated that the European diplomacy will gain strength if it has military means at its possession. All in all, it is obvious that NATO remains the central point of focus regarding security and defence for the Dutch government, despite a single claim for the strengthening of European defence. As Coolsaet and Soetendorp (2000) put it: “a revised NATO remains the cornerstone of Dutch security, as the most recent policy paper on Dutch defence policy10 indicates”.

The Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs that advises the Dutch government and parliament, published a report on military cooperation in Europe. In the beginning of the report is made clear that by definition European defence cooperation is not only cooperation in the framework of the ESDP, but also cooperation

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10 Coolsaet and Soetendorp base this finding on the ‘Defensienota 2000’
within the framework of NATO or bilateral cooperation outside any multilateral structure (Advisory Council on International Affairs 2003, p. 6). The report is about practical implications of defence cooperation and not on institutional questions, but it is stated that it supports the Netherlands firmly believes that deepening military cooperation between European countries has the future (Advisory Council on International Affairs, 2003, p. 33). In the appendix of the report is enclosed the request of the ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence for issuing the report. In this letter national sovereignty regarding defence cooperation is emphasised. It is however also made clear that further cooperation is the only option to sustain adequate defence capacity.

Strikingly, in another report 2005 report with the promising title ‘The Netherlands in a changing EU, NATO and UN’, the Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs leaves ESDP without consideration. It claims in this report that “there is no alternative to NATO as a framework for military cooperation, and it must therefore be cherished (Advisory Council on International Affairs, 2005, p. 34). European defence integration is not addressed at all, the report just puts that “there is a need for further transformation and updating of capabilities on the European side of the alliance, together with willingness to deploy them” (ibidem). Furthermore, it stresses the importance to work further towards a joint political agenda for the US and Europe; “there is a great need to deepen the security debate” (ibidem).

In the ‘Staat van de Europese Unie 2007-2008’, a European agenda for the Netherlands, some attention is paid to the ESDP. The government states here that it deems international cooperation very important to promote peace, security and stability. Directly is added that cooperation with other relevant organisations, like the United Nations and NATO is of major importance too (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2007, p. 17). In the ‘Staat van de Europese Unie 2006-2007’ there is attention for the increasing cooperation between member states in the framework of the ESDP regarding, inter alia, the EU Battlegroups. It also states that in the Democratic Republic Congo the cooperation with NATO is suboptimal as a result of drawbacks of ‘some small member states’. The Netherlands thinks that should not impede practical cooperation and wants to improve the cooperation pragmatically (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2006, p. 23-25).

Important with respect to European defence integration and European integration in general is of course the present discourse about Europe. Especially since the no-vote at the referendum for the Constitutional Treaty the public opinion is sceptical about European integration in general. The government understood the grievances and advocated various adjustments with respect to a new treaty and got its way on several issues.
5.5 Views from within: officials at the EU Political and Security Committee and NATO

Belgium
At the Political and Security Committee of the Belgian permanent representation of the EU the attitude towards defence integration within the structures of the EU are positive. Even the idea of a true European army, on the long term, is supported. Such an army could be structured according to the NATO article 5 principle (which states that any attack on a member state will be considered an attack against the entire group of members). A reason for its position is that Belgium thinks that there is a basis therefore at the European population. This population would like to see protection against threats, something which people mainly have in mind when speaking about defence.

According to the interviewed Belgian official its Belgium’s conviction that integration offers the best guarantee for a Europe that can cope with the challenges posed by the 21st century. Defence is a logical result of earlier integration, for instance in the area of foreign policy. The possibilities of foreign policy are limited when it is not supported by ‘troops on the ground’. However, a cost-benefit analysis gives the same result. On this moment European defence is highly fragmented and mainly organised at the national level. As a result, defence spending is often not rational. Competition rules on basis of article 296 of the Treaty of the European Community do not apply to the defence industry. Every army invests separately in programmes, but could spend much more efficient when investing along with others.

Spending together will not necessarily lead to lower defence budgets. The money that is gained may be spent on things that require more spending at present, as for instance research and technology. As a result of under-spending we have not enough innovative technology and troops not optimally equipped. This should be improved by cooperation as already happens sometimes, for example the A400M of Airbus is now bought by various European countries. Looking at numbers, the EU is not doing bad compared to the US. In the area of modern defence technology however, Europe is lagging far behind.

“For Europe it is important to be a full-fledged partner of the US”. Not only for Europe, but also for the US, so that it can count on a serious European partner. This is at present not the case, as appeared in Kosово-Serbia in the late 1990s. European capacities have to be increased, for instance transport capacity, on which Europe now is dependent on the US that can deploy C-5 Galaxy airplanes to provide strategic heavy airlift over intercontinental distances. In Europe, only the UK has heavy strategic transport capacity at the moment.

The creation of the EU military dimension is still very recent, but since its beginning there has been a lot of progress. A supranational structure for foreign or defence policy will not emerge soon. A transformation of procedures and streamlining of the decision making process may occur however. Within a couple of decades it may be possible for a supranational army to emerge. Although there is stagnation now, the
logic for further integration is that coercive that ‘the train can be delayed, but hardly stopped’.

“I also think that there is support in Belgium for defence integration”. According to the ‘Eurobarometer’ (opinion poll) there is support for European integration regarding security and defence. This is related to feelings of insecurity in general, not only in Belgium, but also in the rest of Europe.

The Belgian wish to be independent plays a role. There is no use being dependent on another country for international security. If Belgium its goals are the same as those of other countries, there does not need to be a problem. “But how sure can we be they remain the same?” It is however clear for Belgium that the development of European defence needs not trouble the transatlantic relation. But this relation can be strengthened by European defence structures, since it will lead to a common defence with larger capacities at the side of the EU. We do not believe that this will make NATO less important.

At present there are Belgian troops in Afghanistan and there is support for this NATO mission. You cannot leave such mission just for large member states, because of solidarity and because it will leave you out of the decision making process. But it is important to be able to explain such a mission to the population.

In some countries there is a euro-scepticism, but not so much in Belgium. Important in this respect is that the European idea is deeply embedded in Belgium. “Euro-scepticism is seldom based on substantial arguments, but more on misunderstanding and feelings. I do not think there are rational arguments that plead for a divided Europe”.

According to a Belgian official at NATO, Belgium is, as a loyal NATO partner, willing to be part of missions like the one in Afghanistan. He points at Belgium’s small size and small army: “especially our ground troops are more suitable to be deployed in missions with a lower violence level. But, given our possibilities we are not a priori against taking part in such missions”. Some other countries perhaps think that Belgium is to much oriented on peace-keeping missions, which are its main task. On the other hand, the official states that other small countries are interested in the way Belgium transformed its military. Belgium was one of the first countries to reform its military extensively.

The EU is important for Belgium as a European country and it is important to further strengthen the EU. “I am not for a clearer demarcation between NATO and EU responsibilities. Within the EU we have to be able to decide about our security too”. The official however thinks that NATO and the EU can supplement each other. He sees a supranational army not as a goal to strive for and thinks at the time that the EU is not ready for it. On the long term it might become a goal. “A priori I am not against, but I think a deeper integration of EU member states is therefore needed”.

European states are already increasingly looking for ways to cooperate. He thinks this is a good thing as such, not just because it may cut back costs. He also thinks there is support in Belgium for defence integration within a EU context.
In his views, Belgium is perhaps too much dependent on the US, but on the other hand has no alternatives. The US has enormous defence capacities. It should not be the Belgian or the EU’s goal to equal that and the EU will not be able to do that. The Belgian and European dependency on the US will remain. “We can cooperate as allies and try to understand and support each other if possible. But we should not hesitate to question political issues as well”.

Belgium has always been active to integrate Europe and also within the Benelux. Perhaps the location of the EU institutions plays a role in this too he thinks. Another explanation might be in his eyes the Belgian culture. “But, I think that the pro-European stance is not confliction with a pro-NATO stance”.

The Netherlands

According to a Dutch official at the EU Political and Security Committee, the Netherlands is taken serious internationally seen, despite being a small country. The Netherlands is however not that confident as the UK and France. It is inclined to focus on developmental aid, and disregard the military. “But we are clearly situated above countries like Belgium and Austria in the international pecking order”.

For many international problems however armed forces are needed. Since a couple of years it becomes apparent that efforts abroad have effect on the security situation in the Netherlands. That was less visible in the 1990s, when the justification was more humanitarian.

The shift in the EU its orientation recently is perhaps not been that bad: “Europe does not need to do everything”. He thinks however that the Dutch position at the moment is too much based on emotions. We benefit from a European market and I think this is often overlooked in the Dutch domestic debate. The Netherlands was not enthusiastic about the initial ESDP initiative. It is thought that this should not undermine NATO. It was however acknowledged by the UK that an inequality had emerged between the US and Europe. The reasoning is that if Europe gets more responsibilities it will invest more in its forces.

Being after the Cold War, Europe cannot be entirely dependent on the US. By having an own defence policy and capacity, Europe becomes an attractive partner. NATO is mainly for ‘article 5 security’ (collective security), so there is a difference in tasks between the EU and NATO. The EU has a broad range of possibilities.

It is also asked if the EU needs its own military headquarters. At present national headquarters can use SHAPE (the military headquarters of NATO) and since recently there is an operational centre at the military staff of the EU that can be used as military headquarters. “For the Netherlands this is enough for the moment”. Countries like France and Belgium think more for ideological than practical reasons that the autonomy of Europe should be increased. This should be part of an independent Europe they think. This also has to do with another vision on security and the way to handle countries that have different visions on politics, such as Russia and various countries in the Middle-East.
Belgium is supportive of a European army because it is in favour of a federal Europe. On the one hand there is not much to lose for them to be subsumed in a larger European entity, and on the other hand there is much to gain. This is the same as with the Basques and the Scottish, who are also pro-European. By bringing national competences in the greater European framework these regions get many possibilities. Moreover, Belgium is a weak state and has a weak army. As a result it will have more difficulties conducting foreign policy, which makes it more in favour of European foreign policy and defence. “I also think that the Belgians are more anti-American in their orientation and more reluctant to deploy the military. That is why they put more emphasis on peace-keeping”.

The Dutch position towards European defence has not anything to do with the ‘no-vote’ in the referendum for the EU constitution, but stems from before. “Moreover, I think this ‘no-vote’ had nothing to do with the international aspects of the Constitutional Treaty”.

The EU is only one of the organisations to which troops are offered, besides NATO and the UN. So it is not realistic to just focus on the EU. Also the vision on the EU as an actor plays a role. “The French pretend to be the leader of Europe, but what do they give in return? Nothing. If you cooperate with the US you know you do not have much influence, but at least you get protection”.

A Dutch official at NATO relates the Belgian views towards the ESDP to its strong federal orientation: “the Belgians are the last federalists”. This is so because they need something to keep their divided country together. “Naturally Belgium seeks unity in Europe, because they only survive in the broad European context”.

The Netherlands has defined that it wants to fulfil tasks until the highest level of violence. The Netherlands is doing quite well within NATO if you look at indicators like the investment quote, the share of GDP spent on the military and the actual deployment of troops. The Netherlands is not the best, but in the top 4-5. Belgium is in the lowest section. Also in the future he thinks that the Netherlands has to be able to take its responsibility, also in the highest level of violence. In the past, burden-sharing was important; which means do you spend enough? At present risk sharing is more important, by which is meant if you are actually taking part or not.

There is not much enthusiasm for the ESDP at the moment. After the problems with the ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty it is generally thought that the deepening of the EU has been enough for now. “The Netherlands is satisfied about what the EU can do at the moment and I do not expect major developments”. The ESDP structures that are devised should now be implemented and brought into practice. “I do not expect a European army to emerge; that will never happen”. In a supranational army member states will lose control over their armed forces and countries will not be willing to give up this control.

The present situation has much to do with the ‘no-vote’ for the EU Constitutional Treaty. This is not to say that nothing is possible at this moment already. There already are a lot of provisions and on basis thereof the EU can conduct large operations. “But we
have to think about what we can and what we want”. Without access to American infrastructure like satellites some tasks at the highest level of violence are impossible. For instance, we lack the capabilities to set a no-fly zone above Afghanistan. In that sense there is sometimes a difference in the EU between what is said and what it is able to. Furthermore, NATO is cheap for European countries, because many capacities are taken care of by the US.

“Further integration is for the moment not a good idea”. The debate is spoiled by zero-sum thinking. There can be both; a military EU and a military NATO, since most of the countries that take part in the EU are also in NATO. There should not be any competition. Countries can easily share capacities with both NATO and the EU and have common standards for both. Many countries however, also the Netherlands, do not want to choose.

“A European army will never exist. How do you want to command it? Should a supranational European army be deployed by consensus between all member states, or by majority voting? Everything that is beyond consensus is out of the question”. The Netherlands is willing to conduct monetary policy supranational, but this is something different. Every parliament wants to have national control over its army. The step for EU defence policy to a common army is enormous and will never be made. Also France does not want a European army. “What about nuclear weapons, should they be made supranational too? The point of Belgium’s plan of supranational army structures is just that they want others to pay for it”.

A European army is not a way to cut costs either, unless the ambitions are lowered. Cooperation can be improved however. But this does not mean simply putting the own capacities under command of other countries.

Countries that pursue defence integration -actually only Belgium- do not do this because of idealism, but mainly because of self-interest too. Belgium is a country that falls apart. To get the country together there is an orientation on Europe, of which European defence integration is a part. “Belgium needs the European construction and thus advocates stronger European unity. It has no other option”.

In sum, since 1945 the Netherlands has had an Atlantic orientation and despite deepening foreign policy cooperation in Europe within the framework of the CFSP and the ESDP in more recent years, it seems not to have lost this preference. Belgium clearly did change its orientation. In the beginning during the EDC project it was Atlantic oriented. Through the years Belgium has become more critical towards NATO and the US. Also, Belgium’s believe in the ‘European project’ seems to have increased. It appears that the interviewed officials do certainly not dismiss the idea of a supranational European army. The Dutch officials on the contrary think such an army will never emerge. The Netherlands faces perhaps the opposite of the Belgians; criticism about the ‘European project’ seems to have increased. So, unlike the Dutch engagement in the CFSP and ESDP perhaps suggests, no real change in the Dutch stance can be discerned in recent years: the Atlantic orientation remains. In the next chapter a closer look is taken at both countries their stances and several explanations are discussed.
Chapter 6

Conclusion and discussion

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter the outcomes of the comparison of Belgium and the Netherlands are reflected upon. By discussing and interpreting this comparison, is sought to answer the central question posed in the introduction: “how can the degree of support for true European defence integration in Belgium and the Netherlands be explained?” After an answer to this question the study is reflected upon. At last some ideas about further research are laid down.

6.2 Outcomes

*Stances in general*
When conducting this study it became clear that there is a lack of detailed discussion openly available wherein national positions of Belgium and the Netherlands on the issues of European defence integration are explicitly made clear and explained. In some sources positions are clarified, but elaborations on the arguments are normally left aside. Their stances *an sich* do however become clear.

When comparing statements in the Belgian government reports and statements of politicians as Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt it becomes clear that Belgium is a staunch supporter of defence integration. As showed in chapter 5 Verhofstadt explicitly expressed his ideas regarding European defence, as he said that “it is possible to have an autonomous European defence with at the same time a pillar of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”. This cannot be considered as loose political rhetoric, since he expressed himself likewise more often. In the official governmental ‘Guiding plan of defence’ the call for European defence is also clear, although perhaps a bit more careful laid down.

The Netherlands obviously is not such a strong proponent of European defence integration and has never been so in the past. Especially in recent years, amplified by the no-vote in the referendum for the Constitutional Treaty, the Netherlands appeared to have become rather eurosceptic. There are clear reasons therefore. First of all there was the issue of the Netherlands being the highest net contributor to Europe. Far more important however was the just-mentioned referendum. Having faced a no-vote almost all parties changed stances towards the EU. With a clear majority of the population having showed itself against a European Constitution and sceptic about further-going
integration, the perception of political costs were far too high for political parties to pursue a clear pro-European policy.

Discussion of explanations
How can the different stance between Belgium and the Netherlands towards defence integration be explained? What are the arguments used by Belgium to underpin their favourable stance towards defence integration in Europe? Although not explicitly mentioned, some aspects can be discerned. As made clear, a form of anti-Americanism is one of them. Although the term anti-Americanism might have strong connotations it is not this dramatic. But it is clear that Belgian views about international politics are clearly different than those of the US. Although there are more countries in Europe that clearly have different views, Belgium is also willing to speak out differences.

Another related reason for the Belgian stance towards defence integration is the strong support for ‘Europe’ as a whole. Belgium might be seen, as stated, as the most loyal supporter of the EU. In April 1979 a Belgian governmental programme for the first time formally opted in favour of a federal Europe (Coolsaet & Voet, 2002). Where this stance comes from was unknown by the Belgian interviewees, neither I found a reasoned argumentation in literature. As was mentioned in the interviews it might have some connection with the home of the EU institutions in Brussels. Although this is not considered to be a reason for Belgium to be a loyal EU supporter.

Belgium has according to the literature, despite some minor exceptions, always been a loyal EU supporter. According to the Belgian interviewees this might be a reason for its present pro-European stance. Such reasoning sounds logical, but does not hold water if is looked at other European member states, for instance the Netherlands, that show a shifting loyalty to the EU. Moreover it does not fit in the theoretical foundation that states pursue their own interest, which is based on domestic preferences. If a country its interests change, domestic preferences will do the same and as a result a country’s governmental position will change in the same direction. An ever-present stance, merely out of tradition, is therefore unlikely to occur.

Another argument that comes into mind for Belgium’s position is the present state of its army. The argument was heard in an interview with a Dutch official that the Belgian army is not suited for tasks in the highest level of violence and has faced that many cutbacks that Belgium simply needs to seek cooperation and integration with others. Thus having neglected their own army they simply need to seek others for their defence and security and when not wanting to be totally left aside in international affairs. The perception of the Belgian officials however was certainly not one in reference with this thought. They saw the Belgian army as being well prepared for a broad array of tasks. Moreover, following the logic of this argument, many small countries with limited defence and security capabilities would pursue European defence integration, or at least be willing to more cooperation. This is however certainly not the case.
The Netherlands has since 1945 always had an orientation on NATO with regards to defence matters and foreign policy. From the recent publications that are examined in paragraph 5.4 appears that this has not changed. The interviews of paragraph 5.5 indicate the same. Why is this so?

Although the Netherlands is clear to show itself a proponent of NATO, arguments are not explicitly mentioned. Off course NATO offers collective defence, which for long was of enormous importance for the Netherlands. After the end of the Cold War NATO changed its role somewhat and took up new tasks. This means that the Atlantic Alliance is still of major importance for the Netherlands, as also appears from the interviews. As is said that we still need the US if real security issues will emerge or if large-scale missions have to be deployed. This is however not a sufficient explanation for the Dutch stance on European defence integration, since the same reasoning also applies to Belgium. The benefits of NATO are the same for Belgium and the Netherlands. The costs are more or less equal too.

Thus, in sum the Dutch and Belgian position differs, as was already known and sharply pointed out by Coolsaet (2003, p. 464) when stating that the Belgian and Dutch security policies have a ‘different horizon’ with respect to European defence. For the Netherlands the choice for an Atlantic or European stance towards an issue is a result of an ‘independent weighing of arguments’, thus a matter of tactics. In Belgium the choice is primarily for Europe as the level for its international position. This is a strategic choice that is upheld by the entire Belgian political class since the 1990s and also supported by the public opinion (ibidem). He does not offer an explanation however, nor do other authors.

The literature did hardly offer concrete explanations for the differences between both countries, but Coolsaet and Voet (2002) point at Belgian federalism that during the mid-1960s became intertwined with European federalism. At the time it became clear that “the question of Flemish and Walloon identities and interests had not come to a satisfactory and sustainable solution within the framework of the Belgian state”. The proponents of devolution of the Belgian state became to support the view that a federal Europe offered an “acceptable and even attractive projection of the future political organisation of the European continent” (ibidem). In the interviews the same insight was offered: as a result of the lack of unity in Belgium there is less resistance to the transfer of sovereignty to ‘Europe’, since there is relatively little attachment to the Belgian state.

As outlined in chapter 5, Belgium and the Netherlands share many characteristics. Especially characteristics with respect to international factors, like membership of international organisations, geopolitical position and economy. In domestic politics there is one clear difference however. The Netherlands is a unitary state without major internal divisions and Belgium increasingly federalised with major (and in a certain sense increasing) internal differences between Flanders and Wallonia. Belgium used to be a unitary state, but faced state reforms in 1970, 1980, 1988, 1993 and a fifth round spread over the period 2000-2002 (Witte, 2005). At the moment of writing government coalition negotiations broke the record for the longest coalition talks in
Belgium a couple of days ago, as a result of a deadlock about a new round of state reforms. This epitomises Belgium; a domestically divided country with a complex internal form of government, having a federal government, 3 regional governments, 3 language communities and 10 provinces. Because the major differences between the Flemish and the Walloon region (the third region is the Brussels Capital Territory which is predominantly ‘Walloon’ in character -French speaking-, but surrounded by the Flemish region), domestic politics is sharply divided. As voiced by the two Dutch interviewees, this division is the reason that the country lacks a sense of nationalism that is more apparent in most other countries. In such a divided state there will be, as a result, less resistance to integration into international structures, since there is less ‘national pride’ to lose. International organisations like the EU do even offer a platform to bypass the national level and as such gives regions the possibility to be more independent of the federal state. The Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2006, p. 27) also shows that ‘national pride’ in Belgium is among the lowest of the (then 25) EU member states.

To conclude, Belgium seems to lack national unity and as a result the wish of domestic political groups to protect Belgian national sovereignty will be less than in states that have a stronger feeling of domestic unity, such as the Netherlands. This may be an explanation for Belgium to be a loyal supporter of European integration in general, and thus also defence integration. As far as the information concerned that is analysed in this study, this is the only real difference with the Netherlands that may explain the difference in both countries’ stances.

6.3 Reflections

This study has a qualitative research design; solely based on document reading and interviews. This means that there has been no quantitative measurement or explicit controls for threats to validity or direct replication.

The reliability of this study has two aspects. Robson (2002) defines reliability as the extent to which a study “would produce the same results if used on different occasions with the same object of study”. First of all, this study consists of a comparison of Belgium and the Netherlands that is based on literature. As findings in this study are based on conclusions and statements out of this whole array of literature, another study should *grosso modo* have the same findings as far this part is concerned. Secondly, interviews were held with stakeholders. Since only four interviews were conducted, they constitute a modest variance in information. The interviewee’s were asked not about their personal ideas, but about the stances of their departments. It is however necessary to bear in mind that information obtained by an interview will necessarily reflect the interviewee’s own perception.

Validity is defined by Robson (2000) as “the degree to which what is observed or measured is the same as what was purported to be observed or measured”. In this study
the interviews that were held ran the risk of not getting the answers that were intended. As outlined in the methodology in chapter 1, the interviews were conducted cautiously. It is tried to be as neutral as possible, so as not to steer interviewees in a certain direction.

As is common in studies within the field of public administration the results of a study can be used to come up with some recommendations for policy makers. This study however is not about a defined policy problem. Non-support for European defence integration might be a problem from out of the perspective of a supporter. Vice versa, support for European defence integration might be unfavourable for countries unwilling to give up sovereignty. For that reason no recommendations can be given.

For policy makers working on European security and defence policy it is of course of crucial importance to take into account the background of national stances. As explained, the domestic political situation may influence a state’s policy position in international affairs. If certain policy outcomes are to be pursued, insight and understanding of domestic objections and support may help to understand the policy process at large.

6.4 Getting more understanding

As appeared not much information was available about the specific background of the Belgian and Dutch stances towards European defence integration. In order to get more understanding about support for defence integration in Belgium and the Netherlands, more information is needed. Other research could try to get more detailed sources about both countries their viewpoints. These are not available in public, but perhaps these could be obtained from within the defence ministries. More interviews could be conducted too, for instance with officials from within the defence ministries, although I suppose these will be quite likely to get more or less the same answers as already obtained in this study.

According to the theoretical foundation of liberal intergovernmentalism and as outlined in chapter 4, domestic actors influence a country’s position in international affairs. Therefore, another way to get more insight might be by an analysis of the position of various actors (e.g. political parties) in public debates concerning European defence and security issues. The question remains however if such public debates (and the position of actors within) will rest on extensive analysis and well-argued positions by those actors. I suppose that it will not be unlikely that those actors lack well-argued stances and base their position mainly out of ideology or conviction.
Bibliography


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## Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoCom</td>
<td>Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benelux</td>
<td>Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg</td>
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<td>CESDP</td>
<td>Common European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Crisis Management Operations</td>
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<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERRF</td>
<td>European Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Identity</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDU</td>
<td>European Security Defence Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organisation</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>MC</td>
<td>Military Committee</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Military Staff</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>QMV</td>
<td>Qualified Majority Voting</td>
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<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
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<td>SEM</td>
<td>Single European Market</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
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<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>TECE</td>
<td>Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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Annex A

Interviewed persons

Netherlands Permanent Representation to the EU
Defence Counsellor
Political and Security Committee

Netherlands Permanent Representation to NATO
Defence Counsellor

Belgian Permanent Representation to the EU
Military Counsellor
Political and Security Committee

Belgian Permanent Representation to NATO
Lieutenant-Colonel
Deputy Military adviser

11 On request no names are displayed, only functions
Annex B

Interview outline

Introduction

[Digital recording: ask if okay]

First of all, I would like to thank you for your cooperation on this interview. I conduct this interview for my research project at the department of Public Administration at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The information that I hope to obtain will be used for my thesis. I will ask for personal views, but also about your ideas of what is thought in your organisation in general. I will make notes during this interview and will use the record for further writing out this interview. I suppose the interview will take around forty-five minutes.

[Ask interviewee to introduce himself shortly]

Situation Belgian army

- Do you think the Belgian army is sufficiently equipped for its present tasks and potential (future) tasks?

- How is looked at the Belgian army internationally?

- The ISAF mission in Afghanistan appears to be more and more a high-violence mission. The Belgian army plays a role too in Afghanistan. Do you think, also with an eye on the future, that the Belgian army should contribute to such missions? So, do you see a role to play for the Belgian army in the highest level of violence?

- What do you think your colleagues think about this?

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12 Interviews were loosely structured and ‘customised’ to the interviewee.

13 All interviews were conducted in Dutch.
Europe/ EU

o What do you and you think about the EU in general; are you in favour of a widening or deepening of activities?

o What do your colleagues think in general about the EU?

o Do you see any relation with the ‘no-vote’ in the referendum about the EU Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands? And your colleagues?

o What do you think about defence integration in a European context? And why (is this a stance on basis of idealistic notions or mainly practical?)

o Will further defence integration lead to more cutbacks in defence budgets in Belgium? And in Europe in general?

o Do you think the EU is able to conduct heavy military missions?

o Do you think there is support for further European defence integration in Belgium?

NATO, US and international security

o What do you think about the present and future security situation in the world?

o What do you think about the Belgian dependence on the US and in general the European dependence on the US in the field of international security?

o Do you think NATO is sufficiently appropriate for future missions?

Other

o Do you think cultural differences play a role in countries’ preferences for their orientation on the US or Europe?

o Could the presence of the European institutions in Brussels be of influence on Belgium’s position towards the EU?

o Why do you think many countries are against defence integration? What do you think about this?