REPRESENTATION RUINED

A genealogy of the different practices of representative democracy

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Introduction: the representative turn

Most of the modern states of the Western world are representative democracies, with the emphasis, especially in popular culture, on democracy. No wonder that we have such a thing as a 'democracy index', or a 'global democracy ranking'. Apart from the fact that these indices attempt to somehow transform democracy into a set of parameters which are measurable, they also leave out the other side of the coin, representation. Which is all the more troubling given the fact that, often, criticism on the workings of our modern democratic states is, in fact, aimed at the lack, or the demand, of representativeness, at the connection between the people and its representatives. Examine for instance the claim of the contemporary wave of populism in Western Europe. Their primary critique is that parliaments have lost touch with the people. The political elites which operate in the parties and parliament do not represent the people anymore, therefore the populists maneuver themselves within the political debates as the true voice of the people and, ironically, claim their own seats in parliament. However, the exact opposite has also been claimed. The institutions of representation need to represent the people independent of their input. The people as a capable sovereign is problematized in this perspective, and the political institutions in society need to be saved from the misguided input of the people. Or, finally, we can also signal a re-emergence of the criticism which is offered by several brands of direct-democratic conservatism, who either aim to return to a pre-political party type of representation, or to bypass political parties due to their so-called unrepresentative, or distorting, nature.

These criticisms are not aimed at democracy, but rather at the institutions that make democracy possible in our contemporary societies. They are aimed at the (dis)functioning of parliament, political parties, and representatives. Consider again the populist criticism, which alludes to a gap between politics and the people. The people 'will' one thing, but government does something else. Subsequently, the perceived cause may be some malevolent elite that is only in place to reproduce their own unjust privilege, or even the very notion of representation itself, which distorts the will of the people. The problem for populist critics of democracy is the indirectness of representative politics; the solution lies in bridging the gap between the represented and the representatives, replacing or supplementing the indirectness with a more direct form of politics. Or consider the comparable criticisms, which call for more direct forms of politics like referenda or even 'lotteries'. These practices are deemed to be more democratic than electing representatives, which is often dismissed as merely aristocratic.[1]

[1] See for instance David van Reybrouck's recent charge against the indirectness of modern politics: Van Reybrouck, D. (2016). Tegen verkiezingen. Bezige Bij bv, Uitgeverij De.

What is problematic is that democratic theorists cannot seem to come up with a satisfactory answer to such criticisms. The debates within the democratic tradition primarily focus either on the role of the citizenry, and its activity (or passivity), or on something else entirely, such as the justification of democracy itself.[2] However, the concepts under examination in the traditional debates of democratic theory, such as democracy itself, remain, to a high extent, unchallenged in the current practices of criticism.[3] Populist criticism of representative democracy sometimes even presents the populist force as a truly democratic force.[4] 'The citizens are not doing wrong, they have been wronged!'. 'Democracy is not bad, but the current situation isn't democratic!'. There is seemingly little ground to argue against these claims from a more mainstream democratic perspective. Fortunately, scholarly attention since the 1990s has also turned to the representative aspect of representative democracy. This has been dubbed the 'representative turn'. Its key claim is that representation is not a (necessary) distortion of democracy, but rather the very mechanism that makes democracy possible. The 'representative turn' is hardly a strictly coherent movement; it consists of a wide range of scholars who 'flip' the role of representation in respect to democracy.

According to Sofia Näströmm, two scholars who have been of importance for the reappraisal of representation are Claude Lefort and Frank Ankersmit.[5] Frank Ankersmit's work has mostly been influential in the 'aesthetic' approach to representation, wherein the relationship between the representative and the represented is flipped in the direction of the representative. Unlike the more common view in which a people exists apart from and prior to its representation, Ankersmit identifies the representational relation as constitutive for the people, and in Burkean fashion privileges the judgment of the representatives over the will of the people. Lefort challenges the conception of the people as a pre-defined unified body. According to Lefort, in the ancien régime stemming from the middle ages, there was a unifying figure in the king, a locus of power, but with the advent of popular sovereignty, this is lost. The empty place the king leaves behind becomes the symbolic seat of power, which is only ever filled temporarily by parts of the people, not in their capacity as divine rulers, but as finite humans. The people itself is not a pre-defined group, but rather a unity imaginatively formed by the people themselves. The unity of the people is always open to contestation. This 'foundationlessness' is the key feature of modern democracy,

[2] While we can hardly claim that debates in contemporary democratic theory solely focus on these topics, consider for instance the works of scholars like Robert Dahl, Tom Christiano, John Dryzek, and Ian Shapiro's The State of Democratic Theory from 2003, which gives an excellent overview of the topics that received most scholarly attention up until that point.

[3] See for instance: Green, J. E. (2010). The Eyes of the People: Democracy in an Age of Spectatorship. Oxford University Press on Demand.

[4] For instance: Laclau, E. (2005). On Populist Reason. Verso; and more recently: Mouffe, C. (2013). Agonistics: Thinking the world politically. Verso Books.

[5] Näströmm, Representative Democracy as Tautology, p.322

nothing is fixed, nothing is unquestioned. In the words of Näströmm: "the seat of power is there, but it remains open to contestation".[6]

Both these scholars see representation as the necessary condition for democracy. Only through a certain relation of self-representation can the people be 'made present'; otherwise, it doesn't exist. This is one of the primary claims of a more recent scholar of representation, Nadia Urbinati. Through her tie in with democratic theory, Urbinati has produced the most promising rendition yet of the rehabilitation of representation as the key feature of democracy. In her book *Representative Democracy*, Urbinati claims that while the emphasis in theories of representative democracy had shifted to include representation, they still lacked a normative foundation for the democratic dimension. She thus set out to normatively ground representation in democratic theory, or as she puts it: "to inquire into the conditions under which representation is democratic".[7] In this work, Urbinati investigates some of the theoretical foundations of the concept of representation through authors like Kant, Rousseau, Paine, and Constant.

This 'genealogy' of the conditions under which representation is democratic suffers however from two problems, which are symbolic for Urbinati's approach. First, method-wise, Urbinati employs a decidedly 'ungenealogical genealogy', mapping several principles of representative democracy, rather than tracing its emergence. Second, the question itself is problematic, as she looks to investigate the conditions under which representation, the mechanism through which democracy becomes possible at all, is democratic. I think we should read this conundrum primarily through her later work, which I will discuss in the next paragraph, as the identification of possible disfigurations of representative democracy. She is aiming to map what it means for there to be something like representation which isn't democratic, (and is) thereby eating away at its own foundation. Two other scholars, David Runciman & Monica Brito Vieira, have extended the investigation into the principles of representative democracy by taking up a classical linear historical approach. In their work *Representation*, they trace the 'concept of representation' throughout its theoretical history. Their central aim is close to Urbinati's: to give an alternative to democratic theorists who view the unmediated will of the people as the most important aspect of democracy. In turn, Urbinati, in a similar fashion to Runciman & Vieira, seeks to rehabilitate the process of political representation, and the freedom and contestation that result from this process, making it the central concept of democratic politics.[8]

In her subsequent work, *Democracy Disfigured*, Urbinati looks to build on her investigation of the theoretical grounds and formulates her own framework for understanding representative

[6] Näströmm, Representative Democracy as Tautology, p.329
[7] Urbinati, Representative Democracy, p.4
[8] Runciman & Vieira, Representation, p.58

democracy. In an attempt to capture the notion of (democratic) legitimacy, between a complete mobilization and a complete pacification of the public, Urbinati theorizes the notion of a democratic diarchy. This diarchy, derived from the Greek adjective dis (twofold) and the suffix arche (rule; office, principium) – as opposed to a notion of monarchy – consists of two poles, 'will' and 'opinion', which, albeit in tension, conjointly 'rule'.[9] On the one side, will stands for both the outcome and the process of political decision-making, 'the moment of decision', interpreted by Urbinati through concepts such as 'individual voting and counting' and 'majority rule'. On the other side, opinion stands for the ongoing open process of opinion-formation and political judgement by the people.[10] These two powers of the sovereign citizens are different, but should remain in constant communication with each other.[11] This diarchical figure allows Urbinati to identify the problematic criticisms of representative democracy, which she seemingly, as alluded to in the previous paragraph, already picks up on in her earlier work. The co-constitutive, intertwined, character of representation and democracy, of will and opinion, comes to the fore in the diarchy, thereby opening up the space in which the diarchy is disfigured, meaning that it collapses, or one of the two poles transforms.

The flipping of the role of representation allows us to address not only possible claims against the basic assumptions of democratic theory, but also criticism that is seemingly in agreement with these assumptions. It creates the space in which we can respond to, for instance, populist criticism. Urbinati identifies two more 'strands' of criticism and categorizes them as three ideal types: [1] unpolitical democracy, [2] populist democracy, and [3] plebiscite democracy.[12] Each of these categories of criticism disfigures the democratic diarchy on the side of opinion, or 'doxa'.[13] However, they do so in different ways. In the unpolitical democracy, the public forum, the stage of political opinion-making, is depoliticized. In the populist democracy a strong hegemonic opinion is promoted that aspires to embody the ruling class of the sovereign. And finally, in plebiscite democracy, the citizenry is rendered passive by its leaders through an 'aesthetic spectacle'.[14]

The value of Urbinati's works lies first, in the re-interpretation of sovereignty as both the institutional, will, and the extra-institutional, opinion, thereby moving past classical theories of principal-agent theory, or mandate theory, which merely acknowledge the institutional; and second, in the subsequent possibility that has been opened up to identify several disfiguring forces in society. Urbinati bridges the institutional approach, which focuses on will, delegation, and mandate,

[9] Accetti, Mulieri, Buchstein, Castiglione, Disch, Frank, Sintomer & Urbinati, Debating representative democracy, p.5
[10] Urbinati in Accetti et al, Debating representative democracy, p.32
[11] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.2
[12] Idem, pp.6-8
[13] Urbinati seems to use the term doxa, with Aristotle and Plato in mind, to give it a more precarious tone than simply popular opinion.
[14] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.80

with the discursive approach, perhaps most prominently represented by Jürgen Habermas. Due to the addition of the sovereign power of the people to 'opine', it becomes possible to thematize the disfigurations in the first place. However, in her typification of the diarchy and the disfigurations, Urbinati misidentifies both the locus of representation and the character of the disfigurations, which leaves us with two problems. First, while Urbinati consistently claims that the democratic diarchy is served best by a system of representative democracy, representation itself is conspicuously absent from her diarchy. The localization of representation is less apparent than she makes it appear. Should we see it in the 'will' of the sovereign, or is it the entire diarchy itself? Or is it somewhere else entirely? Somewhere in between the powers of the sovereign? Second, her characterization of the disfigurations is aimed at a conceptual baseline. She creates a composite image, attempting to reconstruct the conceptual base of a disfiguration through various authors from various periods. Furthermore, while Urbinati alludes to the disfigurations as forces, given the strain they put on the diarchy, she never identifies them as such. This, unfortunately, leaves us with an abstract and unhistorical notion of the disfigurations.

My aim in this thesis is twofold. First, I aim to localize representation within the democratic diarchy, as developed by Urbinati, and describe some of the mechanism's basic principles. Where does this process of representation play out? I will argue that we should see political representation as the very mechanism by which the 'will' and 'opinion' of the sovereign are both separated and brought in constant communication. It serves, therefore, as the bridge between these two normatively separated poles. However, positivizing the representational relation is a tricky undertaking. Every attempt at doing so will inevitably lead to an incomplete capturing of the practices it has to encapsulate. This is primarily because 'representation' is the resulting emblem we give to a mechanism operative within a force-field whose forces we can never fully describe, a force-field analysis we can never fully complete. To a certain extent, this makes the present attempt at localizing and describing the representational relation a negative one, in that I can only thematize the forces that move, and hold in place, representation within the practices of representative democracy as they have developed so far, and derive from this some basic principles. What we are left with then, is a kind of bandwidth whose outer limits cannot be transgressed, otherwise the practice will lose the emblem of representative democracy.

Therefore, and second, I will re-interpret the disfigurations thematized by Urbinati as the products of forces operative within representative democracy. These forces are dialectical: they are inherent to the practice(s) of representative democracy and (partly) develop the practice itself through continuous interaction between the forces; our view, our understanding, of the political practice, partly shapes the practice, and the continued interaction of those forces propels its

development. This approach allows me to historicize these forces. Not in the sense of looking for origins, but rather of tracking their emergence, or imprint on the practice. I will use Urbinati's categorizations and relate them back to their self-proclaimed antagonist, representation, which I will, by then, have localized within the democratic diarchy. This allows me to examine the different practices of representation within which the forces emerge. My analysis thereof is 'discontinuous', it is marked by the breakpoints. Since the formation of our current modern states in the late 18th century – the advent of modern representative democracy – several breaks, or rather transformative moments, in which the old relations between democracy, representation, and sovereignty, no longer seem possible, are identifiable. With each of these breaks, and the ensuing new situation of representative democracy, we see the forces active within democracy shape the practice of democracy itself.

The first moment I explore, is the one in which representation becomes the central tenet of political life at all: the sudden entrance of popular sovereignty as the legitimating principle of political order during the late 18th century. With this moment and the first established practice of representative democracy in the form of 'parliamentarism', I identify the unpolitical force.[15] The first parliamentarians argued that there should be trust in the judgment of the representative, effectively leaving the people's opinion without much influence or scrutinizing power. The force of depoliticization, of retaining the judgment with a wise few, starts in the very first parliaments that seemed tasked with the democratization of power, exactly in order to cope with the apparent loss of power by those wise few. This unpolitical force is perhaps best formulated by Edmund Burke (1729-1797) when he argues for the trust in the representatives to best judge what is in the interest of the constituency. Urbinati states that the notion of the unpolitical democracy aims to evaluate democracy in light of its outcomes. It utilizes an instrumental argument, that the people cannot come to the correct outcomes, which serves as the basis for a wise few to retain their powers. As Urbinati herself states, the diarchy is thus displaced from 'will and opinion' to 'will and truth'. This means that the entire process of democratic decision making is scrutinized under some external 'truth', some outcome that should be achieved. However, what it fails to recognize is that this 'truth' is always stated by someone, or some group.

The second important moment is the break from the practice of parliamentarism to party democracy.[16] From the late 19th century onwards, political parties become increasingly dominant in the establishment of the candidacy of the individual representatives. While parties existed before,

[15] I am using parliamentarism here in the sense that Bernard Manin did: as a historical period of representative politics.
[16] Here again, I refer to the usage by Bernard Manin: as the historical period of the dominance of party politics in representative democracy

they transform from mere mechanisms for financial support into platforms of ideology. Subsequently, these parties are successful in establishing sharp lines along which specific groups of the population will be divided. With the advent of party democracy, the notion of a hegemonic party, or group, comes into play: a single group aiming to embody the "ruling power of the sovereign".[17] Populism within this practice of party politics takes on a character of anti-party-plurality, re-interpreting an 'us' versus 'them' tendency into a framework of party politics. Thus, with the advent of party politics, we see the populist democratic force come to the fore.

Finally, the plebiscitary force in democracy aims to render voters into an audience. Here, I diverge most from Urbinati's identification of the force. Urbinati bases her identification primarily on the transformed role of the public into one of 'watching' the political spectacle. While I agree with this transformation, it lacks a second piece of the puzzle. For Urbinati, the main prop of plebiscitarianism is 'the television'; for me, however, it is the web 2.0. In order to understand the emergence of the plebiscite force, I argue we also need to understand how democratic institutions during the 20th century have related to interaction, or input from its citizenry. During the 1960s we saw the emergence of an increased demand to extend the interactive character of party politics to other domains in society. While this making-interactive can initially be hailed as democratization and liberation, this can eventually turn into an overload. I argue, with reference to the work of Gijs van Oenen, that there is a definite moment in the late 20th, early 21st century when the people start outsourcing their part of the interaction. This doesn't mean that those people do not believe in the democratic ideals and interaction itself, but they cannot uphold their own norms any longer in the increasingly interactive society, it becomes too much of a burden for them. So, the democratic institutions become 'interpassive'.[18] Interpassivity refers to the practice of rendering the citizenry in a post-interactive passive state, not merely the pre-interactive passivity that would result from a lack of being able to give input, but rather the citizenry being worn out by having to provide input to the democratic institutions.[19] However, I believe this notion of interpassivity, as developed by Van Oenen, should be supplemented. The inability to act in full accordance with your own norms also comes about in the form of an 'efficient' attitude, of putting in a minimal amount of effort to at least experience something like a fulfillment of those norms. This becomes especially apparent through the web 2.0 and its interactive character, which has subsequently displaced opinion formation and to a large extent detached it from the 'will'. Furthermore, while interpassivity stems from the inability to act accordingly to the emancipatory principles of autonomous decision-making, it is harnessed by political leaders of our current day and age. Through the usage of media

[17] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.80
[18] Van Oenen, Nu even niet! Over de interpassieve samenleving, pp.70-72; 97-98
[19] Idem, p.57

communications, the citizenry is demoted to an interpassive audience by its own outsourcing of opinion formation, but also through the encapsulation and displacement of the 'opinion', thereby disconnecting it from 'will', from change within the political institutions. Subsequently, the people is also hailed in this way by the institutions, and politicians, themselves, as a strategy to gain political influence, thereby, perhaps inadvertently, demote the role of the people. I link this genealogy and emergence to what Bernard Manin calls the era of 'audience democracy', and, according to him, it is the era in which we find ourselves today.[20]

[20] Manin, The principles of representative government, p.218

Chapter I: Representation and democracy's diarchy

"The conceptualization of representative democracy as diarchy makes two claims: that 'will' and 'opinion' are the two powers of the sovereign citizens, and that they are different and should remain distinct, although in need of constant communication".

Nadia Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.2

Representation in the democratic diarchy

In this first chapter, I will examine Urbinati's notion of the democratic 'diarchy' and the place of representation within the specific figure of representative democracy. Urbinati's main claim is that "the character of democracy is diarchic, and its nature procedural".[21] It is what she calls the 'figure' of democracy. Figure, in that it is a shape "externally identifiable", a recognizable set of characteristics, or how she otherwise calls it: phenotype.[22] She is quick to separate her typification of figure from the much older notion of the 'body politic', as deployed by, for instance, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). Rousseau links the term in a substantive fashion to what makes it political. The body politic cannot obey laws it did not make itself, or the association loses its political aspect and becomes something like domination instead. Urbinati however, aims to stay away from this substantive use. Instead of a baseline substantive demand, she investigates the characteristics, the different figurations, of democracy. This distinction has not gone unquestioned. To what extent can the externally observable characteristics be configured, or rather disfigured, without there being some reference to its substance?[23] Furthermore, her typification of 'disfiguration' reveals a normative claim that seems comparable to that of Rousseau, in that for there to be a true political association it cannot be disfigured. Nevertheless, her attempt at a re-symbolization of democracy as a figure remains interesting, for it shifts the focus from a possible singular baseline, to the "certain traits that belong only to [representative democracy] and make it recognizable".[24] However, the main question thus becomes, what then, are these traits that are so recognizable in democracy and more specifically in the figuration of representative democracy?

The figure of democracy is a 'diarchy', as mentioned in the introduction, which is formally a system with two determining principles. In the case of democracy, it consists of 'will' and 'opinion'. On the one hand 'will' refers to "the procedures and institutions that regulate the making of authoritative decisions", on the other hand 'opinion' refers to "the extra-institutional domain of political opinions".[25] Urbinati argues that these are the two powers of the sovereign people. Not only, in the much more traditional sense, do the people have to formally 'authorize', a ruler through consent to the political order, but there is the deliberative aspect of 'opinion' as opinion formation as well. They are two different powers, and according to Urbinati, "they are different and should remain distinct, although in need of constant communication".[26] While the distinction of the two

[21] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.18
[22] Idem, p.1
[23] Accetti et al, Debating representative democracy, p.12
[24] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.1
[25] Ibid.
[26] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p. 2

powers seems pertinent, Urbinati does not immediately go into how and in what shape this constant communication can take place. Furthermore, Urbinati claims that these traits apply in particular to 'representative democracy', as a specific system of democracy in which an "assembly of elected representatives, rather than citizens directly, is endowed with the ordinary function of making laws".[27]

One major question arises out of this description of democracy's diarchy and its exemplary application to representative democracy, namely: what is the role of, and thus where can we locate, representation? One of the main aims of this chapter is to attempt to localize representation, which is seemingly so central in Urbinati's model of democracy. This is a much more poignant question than Urbinati seems to allow for. At times, she alludes to the idea that representation, as a part of representative democracy, encompasses the diarchy, that it can be seen as equal to the totality of the diarchy, or even used as an overlay, a greater whole. This comes in part from the line she set out with her previous work, *Representative Democracy*, in which she argues that political representation entails more than just an authoritative function.[28] Political representation, according to Urbinati, is more a political process than just its moment of decision. However, representation could also be seen as merely part of the will, as one of the democratic procedures that enables authoritative decisions, merely emanating towards the opinion side. This seems to be in contradiction with what Urbinati herself says about representation, as it is not merely restricted to will, but the entire democratic diarchy can be applied to it, and representation is the system that makes political ideas recognizable in their embodiments by candidates, which in turn makes them "objects of judgment on the part of the voters", thus of opinion.[29] Can representation then be that which both separates will and opinion, but keeps them in constant communication? This would place representation either outside will and opinion, right in between them, or at least only partially merge it with both of them simultaneously, without making 'will' and 'opinion' collapse. Should we then view representation as the rope bridge between two cliffs? Or is representation more like a process of soldering? Of fusing two materials by adding a third, which subsequently bridges it, but is also 'merged' with the two materials? The problem of the latter conception is that it becomes hard to describe it as keeping the two powers separate.

This 'locating' of representation is not only important for conceptual clarity itself, but also to situate the three forces Urbinati argues disfigure the democratic diarchy. In what way do they disfigure the diarchy? Urbinati herself claims that these forces operate within the power of 'doxa', the opinion side of the diarchy. They operate as a conquering force, as capturing and freezing the,

[27] Idem, p.22
[28] Urbinati, Representative Government, p.5
[29] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.26

otherwise, open and contestable 'doxa'. They do so either by [1] transforming the public forum to exclude opinion, [2] creating a strong hegemonic opinion, which aspires to embody the ruling class, or [3] transforming opinion to an aesthetic spectacle without any real input from the citizens. However, depending on the localization of representation, in what way do they affect representation? Surely, we can hardly maintain that the mechanism of representation is unaffected by these forces? That it merely serves as a corridor linking 'will' to a domain of conquered 'doxa' without being affected by it? Can representation itself even serve as a means to conquer the 'doxa'? Urbinati remains vaguely uncommitted to applying the diarchy and its disfigurations to representative democracy, even though she clearly claims representative democracy as the normative point of departure.

Democracy's diarchy

To start answering the questions I have asked above, we must first tend to the main concept in Urbinati's work, the diarchy of democracy. As stated before, this diarchy is made up of 'opinion' and 'will'. Urbinati conceptualizes 'will' as the "procedures, rules, and institutions", with which she proclaims to place herself in the tradition of both theorists of sovereignty like Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Rousseau, as well as the tradition of what she calls "theorists of constitutional government in the early nineteenth and the twentieth century", meaning the theorists of most modern constitutions or their precursors.[30] She subsequently identifies the 'procedures, rules, and institutions' as the "normativized set of behavior that gives birth to and implements the law".[31] In a more general sense, we can identify this as the more common approach to sovereignty, in devising the political institutions according to certain principles. In a seemingly playful manner, Urbinati identifies this 'will' at one time with merely the concept of 'votes', thereby placing it as only the actual moment of decision. But, taking this playful usage too literally would be a reduction of her conception of 'will', even though it is hard to pin down exactly what is entailed by her conception of 'will', as she never gives us an exhaustive list of the characteristics or components of the concepts 'will' and 'opinion'. Generally, she speaks of it in more abstract terminology, such as the 'institutions' and 'rules'. In a certain sense, this is understandable as it is Urbinati's idea that there are several configurations of democracy and its institutions and rules. In this sense, the diarchy of democracy is not tied to representative democracy as a specific form of democracy. Keeping the terminology somewhat abstract, leaves the concepts open to a myriad of concrete forms. But, this separation is difficult to maintain throughout her work and she sometimes goes into more specific

[30] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.22
[31] Ibid.

institutions of representative democracy, instead of mere democracy. For instance, Urbinati once identifies political parties and parliaments as 'intermediary institutions', seemingly accepting representative democracy as the standard form. Claiming political parties and parliaments as intermediary institutions does blur their localization, as it can be interpreted as at once part of the will, but also between will and opinion, as intermediaries.[32] If we interpret her usage in the Rousseauian way, as she places herself, we should understand 'will' as all the formal acts of the sovereign, being the laws, and the resulting institutions which were given life through those laws. In that sense, the very law by which parliament is instituted, as well as the institution itself, and even the discussions within that institution, are part of the 'will'. Thus, also, all the substantive outcomes of the procedures and rules, such as majoritarian decision, one-man-one-vote, etc. seemingly are part of the 'will'. This fits with her conception of the diarchy on the more abstract level of democracy. In a Hegelian sense, I opt to call this the objective side of sovereignty.

However, her claim is that sovereignty is never merely 'will', never merely the objective side in the form of its decisions and institutions, but rather always also 'opinion', the subjective extra-institutional, located in the minds of the people. Even though opinion has no authoritative power, as it is outside of the 'will', it still "partakes of sovereignty".[33] But, in what way does 'mere' opinion do so? First, it is important to understand how Urbinati identifies 'opinion'. Urbinati suggests identifying public opinion as a "plural space that is composed of several kinds of opinion".[34] Within this plural space she distinguishes three kinds of opinions: [1] general, [2] political, and [3] private (or personal). The first kind she identifies is the general opinion, somewhat comparable to and based on the Rousseauian "l'opinion générale", as it is effectively an integrative force.[35] It serves as a base belief through which citizens of a political body are bound together. It can be seen as the implicit consent by which citizens accept political decisions they oppose, in light of the entire system itself. To give an example found in Hegel's philosophy of right, it serves as the recognition by which two people who trade with each other want opposite ends, but recognize the system of rights that is behind the trading itself.[36] In a break with Rousseau, Urbinati detaches general will from reason itself, in that her general will does not have a necessary substantive component and is not served best by some council of wise men.

A second kind is the opposite of the 'general opinion': the private opinion, or rather the personal interest. This kind of opinion seeks to bypass the 'good for the people' in favor of some

[32] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.8
[33] Idem, p.22
[34] Idem, p.40
[35] See: Rousseau, the social contract, Book II, chapter XII, where the opinion of the people is the essential keystone, the true constitution of the state, in the hearts of the citizens.
[36] Hegel, Philosophy of right, §§72–81

personal gain. These private opinions are unsuitable bases for action in the political arena and "the main factors of corruption when they claim representative hearing in government".[37] However, Urbinati is most interested in yet another kind of opinion, a middle road in that it is not general, or private, opinion, but rather 'political opinion'. With this third kind of opinion, Urbinati refers to the divided opinions "among citizens in the name of political programs that combine together their interests as socially situated beings and the interest of the nation".[38] In this sense, both the general and the political opinions are 'political', while the private opinion is not.

As I claimed just now, her typification of 'opinion' can be seen as, in a Hegelian sense, the subjective side of sovereignty, but it is more complicated. With the advent of representative democracy, opinion moves past an abstract general good. It also entails the reflections and judgments on the work(s) of the government.[39] However, a true Hegelian subjective side to state reasoning is the insight of the people into the reasonableness of the state. While general opinion gained a concrete dimension in the form of the state, meaning that the people can somehow grasp the reasoning of the state and criticize it when it is 'irrational', the location of this political judgment with Urbinati is difficult to determine. She explicitly aims to stay away from the trap of reason into which, according to her, Rousseau and Kant fell. In fact, when she quotes Hegel, she quotes him on his stance regarding 'public opinion' as the field in which "the eternal, substantive principles of justice, the true content and result of legislation, the whole constitution, and the general position of the state" meets the "accidents of opinion".[40] Furthermore, this field of political opinion is defined by its divisions, by the differences between different people's political programs. In this sense, it serves as the combination of the people's interests "as socially situated beings and the interest of the nation".[41] Thus, Urbinati is not just interested in the capability of people to consent or grasp state reasoning, that seems to be more commonplace in the general opinion. Urbinati is more interested in the political opinion, the reflection on the work(s) of government which gives the people ammunition to think government differently, to come up with political programs. This kind of opinion she calls "political and public, but not general".[42] While other contemporary political theorists dismiss this type of opinion as being partial, partisan, and dangerous, Urbinati argues that this is exactly the type of opinion that she aims to rehabilitate.[43]

Political opinion is, thus, both admired and treated with caution. It is seen as a 'negative' power, as "a prerogative of the liberty of the individual to pressure the government and seek

[37] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.44
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Hegel in Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.40
[41] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.44
[42] Idem, p.45
[43] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.46

protection against it".[44] But in the face of the diarchy of democracy, the freedom of 'opinion' has a second function, or is, as Urbinati herself says, "Janus-faced", as it is both 'negative', and 'positive', in that it constitutes the formation of political opinions.[45] Political opinion at once thereby has an integrative force of legitimacy, as well as a critical and controlling force. In this sense, Urbinati sees both general opinion and political opinion as two kinds of public opinions, each with their own functions. While the 'negative' conception of opinion as protection against government is a more known, republican, conception, the refinement in her approach is the inclusion of the 'positive' power. Both these dimensions together ensure that government is limited and based on liberty. Furthermore, they enable the publicness of public deliberation, which both renders the common interest as a collective construction, but also never pins it down to a single unchangeable outcome. The public forum has both the role of "egalitarian dispersal" and "inclusive common discourse".[46]

According to Urbinati, these specific functions are exactly what separate opinion, both political and private, from other types of judgment. This is because, first, political judgment doesn't relate to any true/false distinction, they deal in the verisimilar, and second, that it is aimed at "the course of actions that would be good for them [the people] to take or avoid taking".[47] In what way then does opinion partake in sovereignty, or to put it differently, in what way is representative government "government by means of opinion"?[48]

As a government by means of opinion, representative democracy utilizes the platform of the public forum as a means to keep state power under scrutiny. Furthermore, the state power itself is public, both in that it is performed for the people, and that it doesn't belong to anybody, the seat of power is always temporarily occupied and symbolic by nature.[49] Urbinati herself makes a clear distinction in political judgment. The political judgment she is here referring to only occurs in the informal world of opinion formation. As soon as political judgment occurs in the world of the political institutions, it becomes at once part of the 'will'. Thus, the free and open debates in Parliaments are themselves not part of the public forum, although they can be a subject of debate. This means that the force of opinions is external to the institutions and its power is not directly translatable into laws. Thereby, not only the decision itself is important, as expressed through the political institutions, but also the opinion formation of "those who obey".[50] However, there is a need for affirmative action by the institutions of 'will', as they need to protect the sovereign power

[44] Ibid.
[45] Idem, p.48
[46] Baker in Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.50
[47] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.23
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.22

of 'opinion' from being captured by relations of inequality and un-freedom. The question which arises then: what form does the conquering of opinion take according to Urbinati?

Three disfigurations of 'opinion'

Opting for opinion as a second source of power for the sovereign enables Urbinati to both signify and understand the current dangers to the diarchy of democracy, what she calls disfigurations, 'democratic extremes' other authors cannot address. Urbinati argues, in line with Kelsen, that a proceduralist democracy, such as representative democracy, doesn't just have specific demands on the procedures and institutions, but also entails a specific demand on opinion, a free and open forum of opinion formation.[51] An unprotected open forum of opinion formation leaves it open to three disfigurations, [1] unpolitical democracy, [2] populist democracy, and [3] plebiscite democracy. Two of them, populist and plebiscite democracy, are, each in their own way, aimed at the collapse of the diarchy of 'will' and 'opinion'. The two powers of the democratic diarchy, will and opinion, are separate and should remain distinct on a normative basis, because we don't "want the opinion of the majority to become one and the same thing with the 'will' of the sovereign, and we do not want our opinions to be interpreted as passive reactions to the spectacle leaders put on stage".[52] The first refers to the desire of populist democracy, the latter to the desire of plebiscite democracy. Finally, the third disfiguration aims to keep opinion unpolitical, in the hands of the competent and knowledgeable few, who alone can come to the right outcomes. It aims to immunize opinion from the political, thereby securing the translation of certain values into 'will'.

Urbinati is able to identify these three disfigurations due to the inclusion of 'opinion' as a power of the sovereign. According to Urbinati, these disfigurations exclusively operate in the domain of 'opinion', meaning that they do not alter the actual institutions of democracy, but rather the informal extra-institutional process of opinion formation. They conquer the domain of opinion and disfigure through the breaking with equal liberty of citizens in the public forum. It is important to understand this specific claim of Urbinati, and I will therefore shortly treat the three disfigurations in their capacity as posited by Urbinati, as forces that conquer *doxa,* i.e. opinion.

[1] The unpolitical democratic force in the diarchy works towards an unpolitical, or de-politicized, "reinterpretation of the procedural system of democracy".[53] Urbinati both identifies the extension of the unpolitical fields, which we should understand as the encroachment of the economical or the judicial on the political, and reviews the legitimacy of democratic institutions in

[51] Idem, p.20
[52] Idem, p.23
[53] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.81

light of its (substantive) outcomes. Democracy is not judged by its procedures or its process, but rather through reference to certain depoliticized values, which are extra-institutionally grounded. Politics then, against its very nature, becomes instrumental for some values that are legitimized outside of politics. As Urbinati puts it, the diarchy of democracy is transformed from 'will' and 'opinion', to 'will' and 'truth'.[54] In sum, the problem of the unpolitical democratic force is the shrinkage or disappearance of the domain of opinion in the diarchy.

[2] The force of populist democracy works to centralize a social and ideological unity of (a part of) the people and make it "the norm of true representation".[55] The populists attempt to do so by making the opinion of a part of the people synonymous with the 'will', thereby rejecting the notion of politics as a field of compromise, of bringing together different interests and parties, and consequentially resulting in an impatience with the "party divisions in elected bodies".[56] The force of populist democracy presupposes a pre-procedural, or pre-representational, 'people'. Furthermore, whereas populism is a diffuse concept, Urbinati is clear to distinguish certain properties of populism from the force itself. Essential to populism is that it is more than rhetoric and political protest, it wants "to occupy the representative institutions and win the majority in order to model the entire society to its ideology".[57] There is thus a government aspect to the force of populism, in which part of the 'will' is reclaimed in the name of (some) opinion.

[3] Finally, the force of plebiscite democracy works to "restore the notion of the people as a meaningful concept of collective identity within contemporary political life […] by rendering it in its collective capacity 'a mass spectator of political elites'".[58] Plebiscitary democracy thereby deforms the role of opinion, in that it limits opinion in its capacity to move beyond mere dismissal or approval. It separates the people into two groups with their own functions. On the one hand an elite, which can act politically, and on the other hand "an anonymous mass of viewers"[59], which can only watch and can never participate in the game of politics, thereby stripped of any political agency. What is left for citizen's political participation is merely "the electoral selection of the elite".[60] Plebiscitary democracy undercuts the formation of opinion in the public forum and instead overloads the public with imagery and information, which 'forces' the people to reduce their opining to a rapid-fire of judgments on the political spectacle that is playing out in front of their eyes.

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[54] Idem, p.83
[55] Idem, p.128
[56] Ibid.
[57] Idem, p.130
[58] Green in Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.171
[59] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.207
[60] Ibid.

According to Urbinati, the solution, considering opinion as one of the two poles of democratic participation as a power of the sovereign, entails that "political representation must attend to the question of the circumstances of opinion formation, an issue that pertains to political justice, or the equal opportunity citizens should have to meaningfully enjoy their political rights".[61] Urbinati subsequently mentions several measures that mostly entail media, communication and the disbarring of a translation of inequality within other domains into the political. But, is Urbinati right when she claims that the disfiguration merely occurs on the side of opinion? As we have been wondering with the model of the diarchy itself, where can we find representation? The notion of political representation remains conspicuously absent, as if we are operating within a Platonic dialogue, even though it is 'sensed' everywhere in this analysis.

Representation as the key feature of modern democracy

Before I attempt to localize political representation in the democratic diarchy, it is important to consider political representation itself. Why is the concept of political representation important in the first place? This is because modern Western states are characterized by the synthesis of representation and democracy. Even though we could argue that these concepts have been around in various forms and practices throughout history, I argue we should treat the modern period of representative democracy as a practice on its own. For instance, it is often argued that democracy has its roots in Ancient Greece and specifically in the city state of Athens. However, given the differences in practice between the democracy of the city states of Greece and the eventual democratic foundations of our modern states, I argue that a comprehensive treatment of these early beginnings of democracy is not relevant for this thesis. The democratic practice of Athens involved sortition, which is not a common element to any modern practice of democracy.[62] On the other hand, representation has quite a complex history of its own, given the various fields through which the concept has been deployed. Representation is not merely a political idea like democracy. Nonetheless, while democracy, as an original political concept, has had a privileged position over representation in political theory and political science, this is unjustly so. As any modern contemporary democracy is defined by representation, so representation becomes the key feature of our modern democracies.

Any analysis of the forces at play in our contemporary representative democracy must thus have in mind the diverse historical practices within which these forces have come to the fore. The

[61] Idem, p 28
[62] For a much more elaborate explanation of this practice, see: Herman, H. M. (1999). The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes.

starting point for such an analysis can only be the emergence of political representation as the key feature of modern political life. However, in between the French Revolution, as the starting point of representative democracy, and our current era, there are several breaks in which the prevailing relations between democracy, representation, and sovereignty, no longer seem possible. With each of these breaks, and the ensuing new situation of representative democracy, we see the forces active within democracy shape the practice of democracy itself. Following Manin's analysis of the 'metamorphoses of representative democracy' I identify three ideal types of practices that can be claimed to have existed in some form throughout the history of representative democracy.

Manin uses the term ideal types in two ways. First, he claims that the ideal types are an analytical tool for comparing the various practices on specific characteristics. Second, what Manin also seems to mean with ideal types, is that at one time we can never claim that such a practice is working completely and fully in that form within democracy. Even though he distinguishes three types of representative democracy, the constitutive forces all work within the other as well. In some sense, these ideal types are always products of unstable forces, ever fluctuating and changing. Manin, with his identification of ideal types, attempts to identify in what direction the forces push in specific periods within representative democracy.

In a similar vein, I would opt to call these ideal types, types of 'stasis' or coagulation, states in which the forces at play seem to temporarily cancel each other out, thereby creating the appearance of stability. But, they can never be frozen in form forever, as they are always products of several forces at play in representative democracy, and therefore will always unfreeze and liquefy again. Nonetheless, following Manin's ideal types, I identify three moments of representative democracy: [1] parliamentarism, [2] party democracy, and [3] audience democracy.[63] Within each of these moments, we can identify certain dominant modes of political representation, which are themselves products of the forces at play. Regarding the relation between the representative and the constituency, Manin's analysis shows us that the dominant form changes from individualistic in parliamentarism, to social cleavages in party democracy, to audiences in audience democracy. In the following three chapters I will go into more detail considering the transformed processes of political representation, but for now, it is important to realize the importance of political representation as the central tenet in representative democracy. What does this mean then, for the democratic diarchy of Urbinati?

[63] Manin, The principles of representative democracy, p.202

Localizing representation

In this section, I want to re-introduce the notion of political representation into the model of democratic diarchy. On representation, Urbinati herself states the following: "representation doesn't change the opinion-based nature of democracy; if anything, it makes it even more pronounced. In fact, the representative system gives the forum a determinant role because it entails putting politics in public, as citizens are required to judge and choose politicians according to what they say and do or exercise their prospective and retrospective judgment on them".[64] Turning to the location of representation within the democratic diarchy then, representation doesn't seem to merely lie within the domain of 'will'. It also doesn't function as an overlay or as synonymous to the diarchy. Rather, it seems political representation is the very mechanism by which 'opinion' and 'will' are separated and bridged. Representation keeps the two poles from collapsing into a single domain, like in a situation of direct-democracy, but it also keeps them in constant communication, as the representative is both constitutive of and responsive to his constituency. In a model of the democratic diarchy, we have to put representation between the two. It serves as the very gateway through which the one can see or hear the other, and vice versa. While Urbinati utilizes the concept of 'voice' as the right metaphor for the people and the representatives, signifying the importance of being heard and hearing, I opt to view the representational relation as a lens. 'Will' and 'opinion' are as projections separate, but co-constitutive. The lens of representation thus projects the political order in two directions. If we look through the lens on one side, we can see the democratic ideal of self-rule projected as representation. On the other side, we can see the people being created through being represented by political institutions. At once, opinion as a domain is coherently bound by the institutions of the will, which ultimately transform opinions into decisions. In order to better understand this model and the effects of the 'disfigurations' on this model, I have attempted to clarify the model through several visualizations. Each figure depicts a state of the diarchy, as effected by a certain proportion of the political forces discussed above, and the corresponding (disfigured) mechanism of representation, which serves as the locus of the disfigurations in my model.

[64] Manin, The principles of representative democracy, p.25



Figure 1 Democratic diarchy of representative democracy

In this first visualization, I aim to clarify the operations of representation itself. The lens model of the democratic diarchy in representative democracy seemingly breaks with a model based on 'voice', making it based on sight, but I argue that we should interpret the lens in a communicative manner. Entailing all that is encompassed by communication, as part of the manner in which things pass through from the one side to the other. Furthermore, the lens of the democratic diarchy of representative government is a special one, in that it doesn't function like a normal lens where there is an object plane, and an image projected. There is no single object plane, no pre-existing source in the representational relation. Both powers of the diarchy are at once projected, meaning that the poles of will and power, in this form, constitute each other. A change in the one projection, means a change in the other, and vice versa.

The lens model has both in it this responsiveness, the relation between the two poles, but also clearly places them apart. It simultaneously upholds, what Urbinati calls, the proximity principle and the distance principle.[65] The proximity principle, according to Urbinati, requires there to be a sufficient level of proximity between the institutions and the citizens, citizens need to be able to recognize the 'will' in order for there to be what Urbinati calls "constitutional legitimacy".[66] The distance principle requires there to be sufficient distance between institutions and citizens for there to be (public) space in which opinion formation can occur. The consequences are that institutions cannot "violate the constitutionalized rights and rules", but at the same time "decisions

[65] Urbinati in Accetti et al, Debating representative democracy, pp.36-37
[66] Idem, p.36

made by institutions are never consonant with what people judge and want".[67] What then does this remodeling of the democratic diarchy, localizing representation as the central mechanism, mean for the disfigurements of democracy?

Three disfigurations of representative democracy

With the introduction of representation as the key enabler of representative democracy, as the mechanism on which the separation and communication between 'will' and 'opinion' hinges, we have to adapt the disfigurations of representative democracy. Contrary to Urbinati, I argue that they do not simply disfigure opinion, but rather they disfigure the gateway, the mechanism of representation, in its capacity to both project 'will' and 'opinion', thereby affecting both of them. The effects on 'will' and 'opinion' follow from the tampering with the mechanism, but this mechanism is itself a product of specific forces within representative democracy. Furthermore, there is no standard situation, or rightful mechanism of representation, by which we can judge the disfigurement of the representational relation, except only insofar as we can accept the values on which we aim to base the mechanism itself. In the case of Urbinati: equality and liberty. This simultaneously solves and creates problems. On the one hand, it becomes clear now what Urbinati meant by investigating the conditions under which representation is democratic, namely insofar as they establish both equality and liberty in political life, but then why should we investigate representation in light of equality and liberty at all? I will leave this question, even though it is a fundamental and important one, for another time, as it falls squarely outside the scope of this thesis. Another problem though, does fall within the scope of this thesis, namely: how much equality and how much liberty should be established by representation? This problem refers to the problem of positivizing I have mentioned earlier. It seems that the only certainty we have in reviewing the representational relation referring to equality and liberty, is that we can show the limits of when equality and liberty are absolutely violated, when we cannot speak of a representative democracy at all anymore. Therefore, I will now go shortly into the three forces as discussed by Urbinati and translate them back into how these forces structure the lens of representation, as they will show us the outer limits of representative democracy.

First, the unpolitical force attempts to depoliticize the opinion, but it does so by insulating 'will' from 'opinion', either by placing the domain of politics into the domain of economics, or other disciplines, or by reviewing politics in light of outcomes, referencing external benchmarks. If we take up our model of the lens of representation, we can better explain what this force aims to do. It looks to blacken the lens of representation, thereby disconnecting part of the will and/or

[67] Urbinati in Accetti et al, Debating representative democracy, p.37

opinion from mutual communication and leaving will instead up to deliberation in depoliticized forums, which can be identified as institutions that are not connected to the public opinion in any way. Depending on the degree to which this is done, and here I argue against Urbinati, democracy itself will be dissolved, or dismantled. If we take the depoliticization to its extreme, making the blackening of the lens of representation complete, we end up with the figure below. Then, 'will' has to somehow institute itself, or through some unpolitical source, and 'opinion' as a power of the sovereign has dissolved, it is no longer in connection to 'will'.[68]



Figure 2 The unpolitical disfiguration

Second, regarding the populist force, Urbinati herself already contradicts her own assumption that its effect, or method, is merely contained within or aimed at the 'opinion' when she states: "populism is a call for concentration of voice and power, will and opinion, and to overcome the diarchy by blurring the border that keeps the people and the state, the opinion and the will, separate although in communication"[69], and thus "populism competes with representative democracy on the meaning of representation".[70] The populist force aims to identify part of the 'opinion' with the 'will', through a different form than representation. For there to be representation, there has to be difference, and where there is mere identification, there is no

[68] We can compare this to representation as devised by Hobbes. See for instance: Leviathan, second book, chapter XVIII, in which Hobbes states: "for they are bound, every man to every man, to own, and be reputed author of all, that he that already is their sovereign, shall do, and judge fit to be done"
[69] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.157
[70] Idem, p.134

representation. The populist force wants to transform the connection through representation, to one of identification, thereby solidifying and merging 'opinion' and 'will'. Furthermore, it reconstitutes the fields of opinion and will as not being projected by the mechanism of representation, but rather stipulates the existence of a pre-political people, thereby establishing a pre-representational 'opinion'. 'Will' on its turn is only ever legitimate if it reflects precisely that part of 'opinion'. In sum, for populism, representation is problematic in that it stands in the way of the translation of (a part of) opinion into will.



Figure 3 The populist disfiguration

Finally, there is the third disfiguration: the forces of plebiscite democracy. Like Urbinati argues, I agree that it renders the public into an audience, leaving them with limited capacity to participate in the political process. However, like with the previous two disfigurations, I argue that the locus is not with opinion, but rather with the mechanism of political representation. The lens of political representation is rendered a screen instead of a lens, projecting what is occurring on the side of the 'will' to be viewed by the people. Like the lens, the screen thereby makes visible the operations of the political institutions, in fact, it might do so much more in detail and similarly continuously, but like a screen on which television programming is broadcast, there is no actual participation from the public except for the limited capacity in which they can change the channel. Plebiscitary democratic forces aim to make the electoral selection of elites the primary function of political representation in the way in which one can flip through the channels of their television broadcast

receiver. In that sense, the projection of the lens is flipped into receiving a broadcast emanating from the domain of 'will' itself. The political institutions themselves are the creators of political programs, which they subsequently show the public for (dis)approval. But, contrary to Urbinati, I think we should push this even further. Not only is the public demoted to a negative role, but rather, as I tried to show in the model below, there is even a disconnect between the institutions of will and opinion-formation if we take the model to the extreme. This is when, expressing it in the metaphor of Urbinati, you don't even have a working remote control to change the channels, but instead are desperately clicking the remote, as if it were out of batteries, increasingly getting frustrated with the lack of responsiveness of the political elite.



Figure 4 The plebiscite disfiguration

Genealogical method

Each of the previous 'disfigurations', or rather forces in democracy, breaks with the model of representative democracy when they are pushed to their radical limits, all three of them through the transformation of the process of political representation. These radical limits can be said to break with their democratic embedment, if we review political representation as the process which separates, but keeps in connection, the two powers of the sovereign, 'opinion' and 'will', in light of both equality and liberty. However, these models are situations in which a specific force, unpolitical, populist, or plebiscitary, is overpowering the others, thereby creating an undemocratic, either illiberal or unequal, 'stasis' or coagulation: a temporary freezing of the ongoing tensions within a

democracy. Following the distinction of Manin in the history of political representation, I couple these periods with the 'disfigurations', and, in this sense, the 'disfigurations' might be called ideal types, as in 'real' democracies these forces respond to each other in a much more dynamic manner, even feeding off of each other. One could see the populist force as a reaction to the unpolitical force, as a frustration with the privilege some politicians give themselves to ignore the people's input. On the other hand, we could see the plebiscite force as a reaction to the populist force, not seeking legitimacy outside of the representative system per se, but rather manipulating this mechanism so that there is no representation outside of the simple act to vote, to dismiss or approve. Manin's distinctions therefore, I argue, should be seen as emblems given to periods in time within which the forces within representative democracy move within the bandwidth of that configuration.

In the next three chapters, I will go more into depth on each of these forces and their emergence within representative democracy, the modern synthesis which defines most Western states. I will investigate the specific practices in which these forces arise, not through their origins, which are impossible to detect, but through their 'situatedness' in the specific practice as produced by the various forces at play, as emergence. Concerning populism, Urbinati herself shows that certain 'characteristics' of the force, such as demagoguery, are already embedded in some form in classical antiquity, but this does not mean that demagoguery serves as some logical predecessor. She is right to treat demagoguery and populism as separate forces within separate practices, demagoguery in classical antiquity, and populism within representative democracy.[71] My aim is to further what Urbinati herself starts, and expand upon her framework. The ensuing analysis is both archeological, as in defined by breaking points which separate practices like objects found in different layers of soil signifying different time periods (and thus different practices), and genealogical, in that the very breaking points with which we deal are not the product of some rational trajectory of a concept, but rather defined by the very contingency, mundaneness, and complexity by which these practices succeed each other.

This leads me to a final remark on the limitations of the genealogical approach and assumptions in this thesis. Throughout my description of the several practices within representative government, there is an external force which intersects with those practices: the force of emancipation. I will give this force more attention in the chapter on audience democracy, because it becomes clear then in what way we can re-describe the practices of representative democracy as responses to the breaks in which the relations between democracy, representation, and sovereignty, no longer hold up. The breaks themselves can be seen as being constituted partly by the societal

[71] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, pp.138-139

force of emancipation, which emerged during the enlightenment. However, the emancipatory force is not simply tied to representative democracy, unlike the other forces which will be discussed. Emancipation is not antagonistic towards representation, but rather representation seems to be an expression of emancipation, as it makes possible democracy, the political instance of autonomy, and thus of emancipation. In this sense emancipation itself simultaneously becomes a concept subsumed under the forces described by Urbinati, in that they each have their own idea of what this emancipation should look like, as well as operative outside the forces in their interactions, in that the breaks within society are never completely identical to the emancipatory ideals within the forces. This leaves me with two limitations, which simultaneously emerge as fields of further research. The first being the relation between democracy/emancipation as a societal force, and the forces operative within representative democracy. My hunch here is that we can in fact posit different forces for different practices and aspects of life. It might be that emancipation is a political force in itself, but not merely operative in the practices of representative democracy, making it seem external to it. Or, it could simply be identical to democracy or democratization, giving democracy as a concept itself a forcefulness, a push and pull. It would be an interesting follow-up to investigate these relations in further research. A second limitation can be derived from the Hegelian notion that we can only philosophically assess, or understand, that which is at least nearing its completion as a development. This not only means that the third within this thesis, audience democracy, is described on a provisional basis, but also that any future practice is unforeseeable, and any possible constitutive forces are undetectable, even though the dialectical framework forces me to assume that while they may be undetectable, they can be operative already. Here as well, future research might be able to shed more light on operative forces within representative democracy, in this case however, the future might be a little further away.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to localize political representation in the re-interpretation of sovereignty as both will and opinion and the subsequent re-application of several disfiguring forces in society. I have argued that we should see political representation as the very mechanism by which the 'will' and 'opinion' of the sovereign are both separated and brought in constant communication. It is the very lens through which both the people as a certain unity is possible, and democratic rule can be executed. Furthermore, I have 're-interpreted' the disfigurations as forces within representative democracy, something Urbinati herself seems to allude to, but never explicitly states. This was possible due to the re-localization of political representation and the subsequent re-

application of the disfiguring forces onto this very relation. Only then can we explain these forces as 'disfiguring', but what I mean by disfiguring, is much more radical than Urbinati makes it out to be. As Urbinati places her model of the diarchy within the broader context of democracy, she talks of disfiguration to allow for multiple models of democracy to exist, nonetheless with a negative verdict of any model that deviates from the diarchy itself. I re-interpret her use of 'disfiguration' and argue that, in fact, these 'disfigurations' of the diarchy, through the effect they have on political representation as the mechanism by which democracy is possible, undermine democracy itself. Taking these forces to their radical limit, we break with the model of democracy, and are left with something else entirely, as it effectively takes the power away from citizens, thereby going against the very principle of self-rule.

Chapter II: The unpolitical force at the advent of representative democracy

"As soon as public service ceases to be the principle concern of citizens, and they prefer helping with their wallets rather than with their persons, the State is already on the brink of ruin. Must they march to battle? They pay troops and stay at home. Is it necessary to go to the council? They appoint deputies and stay at home. Because of indolence and wealth, they ultimately create soldiers who enslave their country and create representatives who sell it."

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du Contract Social, book III, chapter XV

Parliamentarism and the unpolitical force

In this second chapter, the first on the genealogy of the forces within representative democracy, I will historicize the unpolitical force as described by Urbinati, by situating it within the practice of parliamentarism in which, I argue, it emerges. After the establishment of representative democracy in many Western countries right after the revolutionary era, the first identifiable practice of the representational relation can be termed: 'parliamentarism'. By this term, I mean the specific practice that takes shape within the first decades of the rise of modern parliaments, not the more neutral usage found within political science as signifying the existence of a role of parliament within the political system. However, before I can historicize the unpolitical force, I will first have to expand on it further. What is meant by the unpolitical force? How does it operate?

The unpolitical force

Urbinati is very clear in her analysis of the unpolitical force. According to Urbinati, democracy is essentially about its procedures. Thus, following the correct procedures related to democracy makes a society democratic, rather than that democracy "delivers some substantive (or desirable) outcomes".[72] The force of the unpolitical democracy aims to intervene in the democratic process in light of a specific outcome, thereby disassociating the legitimacy of democracy from its process of deliberation, dispute, disagreement, and changeable decisions. They do so by either [1] "extending the domains in which non-partisan decisions are made" or [2] "advanc[ing] a conception of democratic authority that receives legitimacy from the quality of the outcomes that its procedures allow".[73] Urbinati is right to invoke the French revolution and the subsequent reactions to it, as the first instances of this type of criticism within the representative democracy. Not just because the French revolution represents in many ways the birth of representative democracy, but also that given the change in relations, coping mechanisms were developed in order to deal with the democratization of societies. Since its emergence, the unpolitical force has resurfaced in different practices, but Urbinati maintains the aim is the same, and it is against this strand of arguments that she intends to defend democracy's diarchy. In her own words, she treats "the allegation of politicization raised from within democratic theory as an exemplary case of violation of the diarchic nature of democracy by annulling or narrowing the domain of *doxa*".[74] Now, as I have tried to show in the previous chapter, Urbinati is wrong to conceptualize the unpolitical force solely in terms of its capturing of the *doxa*, of transfiguring the public forum,

[72] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.81
[73] Ibid.
[74] Idem, p.91

instead of through its disfigurement of the representational relation, and I will expand more upon this and the historical dimension in this chapter. But, before I do, I want to briefly discuss the concept of the unpolitical with reference to the three authors Urbinati uses as her self-proclaimed antagonists. These are: Estlund, Rosanvallon, and Pettit. Each of these authors represents, according to Urbinati, a different type of allegation of the unpolitical type. But, whereas Urbinati uses the term unpolitical as a negative typification, these authors don't necessarily do so. It is their aim to feed an unpolitical force in democracy, something Urbinati reclassifies as a juridical type of judgment which assumes a certain impartiality of those involved in the judgment making. However, according to Urbinati, this is essentially impossible, for all political judgment, thus political judgment itself, is not aimed at the impartial, but the general. This means that we cannot ask those participating in the judgment to step outside the society they are necessarily part of, and by virtue of the political, bound to. Urbinati thereby seems to allude to a separation of politics, or political judgment, with that of juridical judgment, the procedures in courts. However, she does not address their relation, she only focuses on the domain of doxa in political decision-making and warns for the encroachment of juridical judgment. Nonetheless, Pettit, Rosanvallon and Estlund deploy the unpolitical, each with their own antagonism in mind, in at least a partly positive fashion.

According to Urbinati, we can typify David Estlund's unpolitical project as the epistemic theory of democracy. This strand of democratic theory is characterized by attempting to move beyond mere proceduralism; it ascribes to democracy, or rather to its citizens, the virtue of producing the right decisions. Thus, decisions aren't 'correct' in that we have come to them using procedures agreed upon; rather, the procedures themselves are 'correct' only when they produce certain 'correct' outcomes. In other words, democratic procedures should be designed in a way that they push citizens to come to correct decisions according to "independent standards".[75] These independent standards would subsequently serve as the "objective standards for the evaluation of social choices that are above political communication and its procedures".[76] Estlund judges that democracy otherwise, if merely procedural, is not of enough value to its citizens, that it merely becomes an indifferent formalism, devoid of meaning, of 'truth'. Estlund, thereby examines the proceduralist theory of democracy in its barebones form as a functionalist method, a purely strategic format, without any normative interest.

Second, Urbinati identifies a revived republican tradition exemplified in contemporary thought by Philip Pettit. He puts forward two strategies attempting to contain democratic institutions, due to democracy's rootedness in the politics of passion. First, he separates

[75] Pettit in Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.95
[76] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.95

deliberation from decision-making. Parliament, as the representative of the people, should only function as the final judge, as the giver of consent; the preparation of cases and the drafting of the pieces up for judgment should be devised in deliberative fora and expert committees. Second, Pettit aims to further develop the legal avenues through which citizens can "monitor and challenge the outcomes of decision-making bodies through strategies that are purely procedural and nonpartisan, similar in kind to those that instantiate expertise decision and judicial verdicts".[77] Through these two strategies, Pettit gives a greater role to so-called depoliticized bodies to draft legislation and be politically active, and reduces the role of the democratic institutions to either a simple yes-no decision, or unpolitical forensic judgments. The goal of these strategies is to further the reasonableness of the political decisions and safeguard the process of political decision-making from passions which are conceived of as poisonous to the political process. It is this aspect which I will further investigate in this chapter, this aspect of the republican tradition in the late 18th and early 19th century, which from then on serves as a force within representative democracy to depoliticize democracy itself.

Finally, perhaps the most interesting account of an unpolitical force, and perhaps the one most native to democracy, comes from Pierre Rosanvallon. He aims to identify the centrality of informal public activities, activities "by means of which citizens check the work of democratic institutions and peacefully subvert the established order".[78] This is because according to Rosanvallon, this checking of power, negative judgment, has become more important than the positive political action that is constructive of those decisions. Domains that have traditionally been seen as limiting democracy, like bureaucracy, serve in fact as essential components to democratic legitimacy. Bureaucracy serves both as a 'force of integration' and the harbinger of impartiality. While Rosanvallon is aware of the risks of depoliticization, he nonetheless advocates that both the ideas of citizen-judge and bureaucracy, can serve as an anchor of solidarity and stability, and as a counterweight to hyper partisanship.[79]

Urbinati's response to each of them comes down to the following: partisanship is an essential component in political judgments "that try to be consistent with or pursue the ideal of the general interest, rather than be an unfortunate accident that good deliberation should wash out".[80] For Urbinati, this comes down to the fact that while judges in a court-setting aim to produce decisions that are definitive, this is essentially untrue for democracy. It is in the democratic character for decisions to be always open to revision. Furthermore, in a democracy, representatives

[77] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.120
[78] Idem, p.106
[79] Idem, p.111
[80] Idem, p.126

should not so much be impartial - stay away from the emotional or opinionated knowledge - as willing and able to inform themselves about the variety of opinions and perspectives that exist within a society. Here, I would go even further than Urbinati and claim that it is not just desirable to have a partisan politics, but that given political opinion, we have no other choice. When it comes to affairs of the public, we should flip the saying famously attributed to Woodrow Wilson: "there is no republican way to build a road", to say: *there is no non-partisan way to build a road.*[81]

Thus, the problem of the unpolitical force is that, while it is inevitably a part of the democratic institutions themselves, as we have discussed with Rosanvallon's approach, it can nonetheless be weaponized into an undermining force which goes against the openness of political decision-making. In light of the equal liberty in which the citizens should participate in democracy, the unpolitical force can only play a limited role, suspending the representational relation together with the populist and plebiscite forces.

In the following sections, I will investigate the emergence of the unpolitical force by situating it between the birth of modern representative democracies and the end of the era of 'parliamentarism'. Parliamentarism is the name given to the form of parliamentary politics, starting right after the Napoleonic wars (1815) up until around the 1870s, centered around an individual relation between representative and represented. It was the parliament of Great Britain that served as the primary guide and icon of parliamentarism. As becomes clear in the sections below, the primary relation between the representative and the represented is presumably built on personal trust. It is primarily through individuality that representatives gain success, not through their connection to a political organization. This trust is supposed to either be based on shared interests, or shared (geographical) background through constituency or nation, next to competence or expertise of those elected. I will also give special attention to the French Revolution, both showing the incredible contingencies leading to the outburst itself and how these changed circumstances have allowed for the emergence of the unpolitical force as the dominant molder of the political practice.

Representation as a political concept

Unlike the concept of democracy, representation is not an inherently political concept. The term 'represent' has its roots in Latin, where it was used as a term for something like display, or to stand for. In Latin, as 'repraesentare', it corresponded more to what we would now simply refer to as: 'to present', as in paying something immediately, or presenting something in person, mostly when

[81] While the exact quote cannot be found in Wilson's 1887 essay: the study of administration, it nonetheless propones exactly this: an impartial administrative body only occupied with the detailed execution of political plans.

presenting oneself to another. A general or politician could (re)present himself in front of a crowd. In a different practice however, the mechanisms of representation already existed. In Roman law, one could have an actor, or procurator.[82] It was here that one could have someone represent oneself in a court of law. The procurator was able to speak for and defend civilians and their interests. In the Middle Ages, representation emerged in a symbolic sense. Medieval canonists developed the notion of the cathedral chapter as a moral and corporate entity which could be understood as being represented by its head, the bishop. However, the bishop did not represent the chapter by decision of the members, but rather his authority or representative powers came from God. They were unlimited.[83] This type of representation can hardly be conceived of as political.

Representation as a modern political concept only really emerges in the late eighteenth century, and it is accompanied by one of the most vehement denunciations of representation in one of the most influential political works in philosophy ever written, Rousseau's 'Du Contrat Social' (1762).[84] In this work, Rousseau argues for the inalienability and indivisibility of the sovereign, and against the possibility of representing this sovereignty.[85] Sovereignty, for Rousseau, was connected to the notion of the general will, as in a singular will of 'the people'. It is important to understand that while the general will needs an embodiment by a single 'prince', a head of state, charged with the administration of the political body, this embodiment is not a representation of the sovereign.[86] Rousseau makes it a key point of his work to denounce the notion of political representation: "I say, then, that sovereignty, being nothing but the exercise of the general will, can never be alienated, and that the sovereign power, which is in fact a collective being, can be represented only by itself; power indeed can be transmitted, but not will".[87] Saying further that: "Sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot be alienated; it consists essentially in the general will, and the will cannot be represented; it is itself or it is something else; there is no middle ground".[88] Rousseau thereby takes the notion of sovereignty as the body politic, Montesquieu's synthesis of self-governance with direct-democracy, to its political end.[89]

Part of why Rousseau is so determined in his denunciation of the concept of political representation is because he is responding to the works of Hobbes.[90] Hobbes has been credited

[82] Runciman & Vieira, Representation, p.8
[83] Idem, p.11
[84] 'The Social Contract'
[85] Interestingly, Rousseau, in general, is much more complicated to dub than this singular work. See for instance chapter two of Urbinati's 'Representative Democracy', in which the complex relation between Rousseau and representation is further discussed through some of his later works.
[86] Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book II, Chapter I, II, III; Book III, Chapter I
[87] Idem, Book II, Chapter I
[88] Idem, Book III, Chapter XV
[89] Urbinati, Representative Democracy, p.7
[90] Runciman & Vieira, Representation, p.27

with being the first to secularize the notion of representation and grounding authority within it, thereby turning a concept once merely used in a theatrical or religious sense into a political mechanism. Although he may not actually have been the first,[91] Hobbes' work is remarkable in a number of ways. In chapter 16 of part I of *Leviathan*, Hobbes, citing the work of Cicero, identifies the notion of representation with 'personation', the idea of 'playing another's part', derived from the theatrical notion of personation.[92] Hobbes reconceives this notion of personation as a notion of contractual authorization, whereby one, the represented, takes on the actions of the representative as if they were his own. Hobbes argued that because the sovereign needed absolute authority to enforce contracts in every way, he needed to own "anything and everything the sovereign does in their name".[93] Representation became a political vehicle of authorization instead of an artistic expression or a religious embodiment.

For Hobbes, this relation of representation between the sovereign and the people is not a relationship between individuals; I do not send a representative in my name, but rather it is the state which represents the sovereign, the political body. Skinner provides us with some insight into the exact advances that Hobbes is trying to make considering his polemics with parliamentarian adversaries of the Stuart monarchy around the time of the English civil war. Hobbes argued, against those parliamentarians, that subjects could not enter a relation with a King, nor negotiate and hold such a King to the terms of a contract, but rather that each individual member could only give himself fully to each other in the form of the contract of the Leviathan, thereby equalizing, unifying, and giving ownership of the actions of the sovereign to the people.[94] With the creation of a unified state, the sovereign creates a real political unity, from an otherwise unbound collection of individuals Hobbes called: multitude.[95] The state is the principle that unites the people as if they were a single person, albeit a fictive one. Hobbes, here, borrowed from the Roman legal idea of the corporation and the medieval concept of corporate identity, which paved the way for a collective legal entity.[96]

Representation, then, became both constitutive, and an instrument, of power for Hobbes, and his conception of 'politics of popular consent' entailed an obligation through ownership, from the represented to the representative, of the actions of the representative, that "when a sovereign

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[91] Skinner, Hobbes on representation, p.155; Hanna Pitkin makes this point in her work: The concept of representation, however Quentin Skinner places this claim in a different context when he argues that Hobbes is actually responding to a range of already existing ideas of representative government.
[92] Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, Chapter 16; Skinner, Hobbes on representation, p.168
[93] Shapiro, Stokes, Wood & Kirshner, Political Representation, p.18
[94] Skinner, Hobbes on representation, p.155
[95] Idem, p.172
[96] For a more thorough account of Hobbes' concept of representation, see: Shapiro, Political Representation, chapter 1.

representative acts on our authority, we own whatever he does and are bound by its consequences".[97] The main insight that Hobbes provided us with is that representation can be an inherently artificial concept, there was nothing natural about it, and representation could not precede government.[98] Rousseau both rejected and acknowledged these particular advances made by Hobbes.

As I stated earlier, Rousseau denounced representation in this new 'political' manner for being precisely a removal from the true political experience in the represented, in the people. Representation, for Rousseau, created something like a further solidification of the autocratic rule. Democracy and representation were opposite concepts for him, making Rousseau one of the first and most pronounced proponents of the so-called incompatibility theory between democracy and representation.[99] However, this doesn't mean that Rousseau did away with all advances by Hobbes. He did take up the notion of a secular 'corporate identity', as it were, of a political unity which both bound, and was constituted by, the citizens of a state. For Rousseau however, this unity was the general will, which was impossible to represent in any way. The general will could only ever be represented by itself, making it unknowable.

The French Revolution

While Hobbes' and Rousseau's work dealt with representation both in favor and against it, it can hardly be seen as the cause of the political turn of representation. Rousseau himself even explicitly denounced the possibility of representation through a parliament. Rousseau is often seen as a harbinger of the French Revolution, but the most we can say is that his works were appropriated by the leading figures of the revolution. Philosophically, one of the leading figures of the French Revolution is Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (1748-1836), more frequently referred to as Abbé Sieyès. Sieyès is probably most known for his pamphlet from January 1789, entitled: *Qu'est-ce que le Tiers-État?*.[100] In this essay, Sieyès' main concern is the rightful political place of the third estate, meaning 'the people', as opposed to the first and second estate, the clergy and the nobility. This structure is more generally known as the ancien régime. Sieyès argued that while the first and second estate held all the political power, the third estate was responsible for all the economic productivity. On top of this, the third estate was the only estate based on equality, the others were based on privilege. Nonetheless, the people, the third estate, were insufficiently represented in government, and,

[97] Runciman & Vieira, Representation, p.25
[98] Skinner, Hobbes on representation, p.170
[99] Urbinati, Democratic Representation, p.7
[100] 'What is the Third Estate?', see for an English translation: Sieyès, E. J., & Sonenscher, M. (2003). What Is the Third Estate? (1789). *Sieyès, Political Writings*, 134.

therefore, effectively powerless. Sieyès argued for the third estate to seize the political power through a 'new' mechanism of representation as this estate was the only estate that rightfully could represent the people at all. Part of what makes Sieyès interesting is his unique blend of views on political representation. Sieyès rejected both Montesquieu's respect for the nobility, as well as Rousseau's denunciation of representation.[101] However, this does not mean that he rejected all of Rousseau. What Sieyes retains, in his own fashion, is the possibility of a unity outside of the representational relation, what he called 'la nation' – referring to something like Rousseau's general will. However, Sieyes also recognized Hobbes' notion that without representation national politics wasn't possible at all, on the grounds of technical barriers - the populations of modern states were too large to function politically, i.e. act collectively, without representation.[102] For Sieyès, only the political will of the nation could make representation legitimate. The problem is then that through representation some preceding unity must be reconstructed, a nation cannot act without representatives, but the representatives need the nation to be justified in their action.[103] This type of relation led to a paradox in which power lay with the self-proclaimed representatives of the people, given that their claim of 'the nation' was outside of representation, which means they also decided who belonged to the people and who didn't, thereby creating a closed self-sustaining notion of legitimation. It is tempting to assume that when the Third Estate pronounced themselves the 'Assemblée nationale' on June 17th, 1789, they were, at least in some ways, influenced by the pamphlet of Sieyès.[104] However, if we take a closer look at the situation of France before the revolution, there is a much more complex set of events that have contributed to the breaking out of the revolution. While it is outside the scope of this thesis to go on in depth on the forces at play in society before the French revolution, I imagine we must call such a force either emancipating or democratizing, but what I can briefly address is the contingency, complexity, and banality of historical conditions which allow for a certain force to emerge. Besides the polarizing pamphlet wars of which Sieyès's pamphlet was, perhaps, the most important one, I will treat several.[105]

One of those factors lay in the domain of economics and the food supply. France had a relatively stable food supply from the beginning of the 18th century up until the late 1760s. Despite low productivity and the lack of improvement, the French agricultural sector benefited from good harvests. This streak of, in part, good luck, started to end in the 1760s, when the harvests started fluctuating immensely, and problematically, the historically stabilizing supplementary wine crops

[101] Runciman & Vieira, Representation, p.71
[102] Idem, p.37
[103] Ibid.
[104] 'National assembly', currently the name of the body functioning as the house of representatives in France.
[105] See for instance, on the usage of pamphlets and intensification thereof during the 18th century.: Margerison, K. (1998). Pamphlets & Public Opinion: The Campaign for a Union of Orders in the Early French Revolution. Purdue University Press.

fluctuated with it. By the 1780s cattle owners had to either slaughter their livestock for food, or sell them at bottom prices because all the cattle owners were doing the same.[106] This had an impact throughout the economy of France. When harvests went down, as farmers were both producers and to a large extent the consumers, so did the demand for entire industries. On top of these fluctuations, in 1783, the Icelandic volcano called 'Laki' erupted, which had a widespread effect on mainland Europe, including France. France was already dealing with harvest shortfalls and resulting riots throughout its country, like in Normandy in 1784 and 1785, but when the effects of the eruption changed the El-Nino cycle, it led to the especially meager harvests and harsh winters of 1788 and 1789[107] – 1789, obviously, being the year in which the revolution broke out.

Next to this, France, throughout the second half of the 18th century, started amassing a certain amount of debt, in part due to the economic trouble derived from the fluctuating harvests. However, in the 1770s, France further increased its debt by aiding the British colonies, what would later become the United States of America, in their war for independence from Great Britain. While both of the European nations were left with great debts after the war, France lacked the fiscal measures to regain its economic strength, despite being the 'wealthier' nation, and when it did push through reforms, it was too little, too late.[108]

Yet another major contribution to the breaking out of the revolution was the very incompetence of King Louis the XVI himself, who, after not being able to persuade the nobility and clergy on the fiscal reform that was deemed necessary to replenish the treasury – by moving toward a practice like that in place in Great Britain, which itself had a higher debt than France – called upon the Estates General to come up with a solution for the deadlock. Different from what Louis expected, the Third Estate seized this opportunity to declare itself the Assemblée Nationale and managed to amass popular support for it. Thus, what is considered to be one of the founding moments of our modern representative democracies, was a product of a complex set of factors, incredibly bad luck, and opportunism from the side of the Third Estate.

Dawn of the Modern State

Nonetheless, the French Revolution did represent a radical break from the old relations, the ancien régime, and the beginning of a new practice of democracy. Whereas privilege and class served as the basis for the previous system, the declaration of the Assemblée National meant that political

[106] Doyle, the oxford history of the French revolution, p.12
[107] Idem, p.22; For the effects of volcano Laki, see: Wood, C. A. (1992). Climatic effects of the 1783 Laki eruption. The year without a summer, 58-77.
[108] Idem, pp.68-70

representation truly took center stage as not only the core legitimization process within democracy, accompanying it was a sense of accountability, of expected responsivity. However, we have to be precise here why the French revolution is different from social upheaval, uprisings, or coups before it. The novelty of the late 18th century is the emergence of political culture, which although exemplified by France, wasn't contained to it.[109] The Netherlands, for instance, knows a fierce pamphlet war as well.[110] As such, the late 18th century is marked by all kinds of revolutions, but why then is the French revolution unique? Whereas we find pamphlets, political discourse, debates, and public opinion formed in most of the countries going through social peril, the complete rejection of an ancien régime, not in its capacity as simply 'the old rulers', but in its capacity as an argument in favor of some traditional rule, often seen as a necessity to return to antiquity, is unique to the French.[111] Thereby, Furet speaks of a new democratic sociability, a national ideology of democracy, which has become the way in which society recomposes itself.[112] And, what is perhaps more important, and a testament to Urbinati's insight, is that opinion is added as a form of sovereign power, which reflects on the role of the political debate. In the words of Furet himself: "speeches, motions, and newspapers ceased to be aimed at the education of the people, and were henceforth submitted to the judgement of the 'people'".[113]

'But wait!' you might say. What about the American Revolution and the declaration of independence of 1776? Why isn't this the kickstart for our modern representative democracy?[114]At around the same time the French revolution is only about to start, on the other side of the Atlantic the American Constitution was already being ratified by the members of the new independent colonies. The young nation that would later become the United States of America, begun this process of drafting a constitution way before the French revolution, right after the American revolution and the declaration of independence of 1776. The American Revolution is even said to have started in 1765 with the Stamp Act congress arguing the now famous position of 'no taxation without representation'. After the British empire passed legislation concerning several new taxes on their colonies, partly to make up for their losses in the wars past, several states of the American Colonies met in New York city to discuss their lack of political representation in the British

[109] In her work Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, Lynn Hunt discusses several new tools of the political repertoire in France, such as: ideologies, propaganda, mass political parties, etc. However, while I read these novel tools as springing from the French revolution, given the radical break with the ancien régime, they aren't quite dominant in shaping the political practice as of yet. Many of these concepts only really start taking up a dominant position in the next practice of representative democracy.
[110] See for instance: Van Sas, De metamorfose van Nederland.
[111] Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, p27; Hunt, following Francois Furet, calls this the 'mythic present', the attempt to create a new present in light of a literally unprecedented social contract.
[112] Furet. Interpreting the French Revolution, p.26
[113] Idem, p.46
[114] See for instance the weight Jonathan Israel gives the American Revolution in: Israel, J. (2017). The Expanding Blaze: How the American Revolution Ignited the World, 1775-1848. Princeton University Press.

parliament, at first without any plans of independence. In short, the overseas colonies opposed the new 'Stamp Act taxes', the first direct taxes on colonial soil demanding the usage of so-called stamped paper, and the overseas colonies had no 'legitimate' political means to counter the decisions of the British parliament, as they had no seats in this Parliament. The Stamp Act congress in New York thus marked the first political congress not authorized by the Crown, and marked the first act in what would later be called the American revolution.

While it is true that the American revolution preceded the French revolution, I would refrain from signaling it as the beginning of a new practice of representative democracy. In diametrical opposition to Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), I wouldn't call the American Revolution a political one. Arendt argues that we should make a distinction between social and political revolutions, assigning the social to the French and the political to the American revolution, because the French revolution was about the changing of the social relations within the nation and the American revolution was about the foundation of a new body politic.[115] I would argue that the American Revolution wasn't political at all, but, in fact, merely economic. The establishment of a new body politic, due to the unwillingness to pay the overseas taxes, didn't lead to a revolution. What was established in the colonies was a copy of the British state, only with a different political elite. The American state assumed the model of the British state and did not seek to re-invent the social relations in the country at all, it did not seek to break with the ancien régime. If anything, in terms of Arendt, the American Revolution was more of a coup d'état, a power grab by a different elite.[116] Thus, it wasn't the American revolution that entailed the new practices of centralizing political representation, as it retained the more classical British function of a parliament, as representing the power to the people. I will come back to this issue later in the next section. One clue to this aspect is the relative peace that the United States had known until its civil war. Up until the civil war, an outburst of counter-forces concerning unaddressed issues in the social order of the United States, the only conflicts they knew were border conflicts, not civil unrest. How different was the ever-tumultuous France, where social relations kept changing, like countershocks to the revolution, right up until the current Fifth Republic?[117]

[115] Arendt, revolutions: spurious and genuine, II, III
[116] Idem, p. I
[117] Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, pp.3-5; Furet even sees the entire 19th and early 20th century as being marked by the French revolution. Making it the implicit topic of political debate up until the First World War.

The emergence of the unpolitical force

After the 'founding' of the first major modern states, the first modern discussions about political representation emerged, and with it, the unpolitical force. While the American revolution didn't itself start a new practice of democratic relations, the foundation of a new body politic was accompanied by a discussion, a struggle for power, between several forces in their society, which itself was influenced by what was happening in France. It was, for instance, in the aftermath of the American revolution and the drafting of the American constitution that we find the discussion between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. The Federalists, most notably represented by the authors of the Federalist papers: Alexander Hamilton (1755/57-1804), James Madison (1751-1836), and John Jay (1745-1829) – although Hamilton is a bit of a special case – argued for, what has been later dubbed, 'substantive representation'. The notion that the representatives should be the best and brightest of the nation, and should be of a formidable moral and intellectual capacity, or in other words a reasoned elite. This was, according to them, necessary to protect the people from itself, to act in the people's best interest, without requiring that the people are able to know what would be in their best interest. The anti-Federalists, on the other hand, argued for a 'descriptive representation'. This meant that for representatives to 'best' be able to understand what the people wanted, they must come from the people. The core relation here is the resemblance between the people and its representatives. This relation requires the representative pool to be a mirror of society, meaning that people from all ranks, classes, and orders needed to have seats in parliament, effectively meaning that farmers, merchants, mechanics, gentry, etc. all had their representatives. This relation is something Ankersmit would much later dub 'mimetic representation'.[118]

It is on the side of the Federalists that we find an instance of the unpolitical force in representative democracy. Runciman & Vieira argue that we should see their stance as more revolutionary and forward-thinking than their Anti-Federalists counterparts. According to them, the Federalists didn't limit the representative capacity by a notion of resemblance, thereby opening up the concept of representation for future relations in society. However, I doubt the intent of the Federalists was to make political representation progressive or revolutionary. Nonetheless, I do agree with Runciman & Vieira that the portrayal of the federalists in an elitist role is in part due to their being maneuvered into such a position by the anti-Federalists. In fact, I would argue that the Federalists aimed at a more controlled representation, not connected to the demand of

[118] Ankersmit, Political Representation, pp.107-112

resemblance, possibly opening it up to forces outside of their control, but also as protection against sublation under a single uniting principle, like a king.

Hardin goes even further in his assessment of the Federalists, and particularly Madison, saying that Madison was not elitist, like his antagonists argued, but rather believed in representing moderately large communities, in order for the representatives not to focus on too narrow a set of issues. Madison, in this aspect, was unlike his anti-Federalist counterparts who argued for small communities with small constituencies.[119] However, in this conception of a representative lies the idea that the representative is in a certain sense, as Hanna Pitkin puts it, a 'delegate'.[120] Madison argued that the representative should act as a delegate for his constituents, or in crude terms: somebody who listens carefully to the desires of his public. Madison had a specific idea that the representative could somehow aggregate the diverse interests of his constituency. In the terms of Hardin, 'Madisonian' representatives would be driven to adhere to the interests of their communities, not because they share these, but because they would be rewarded for doing so, or at least would expect such a reward.[121] Nonetheless, what is unpolitical is exactly the senatorial depiction of the representatives as the few wise men, who know better than the constituency itself what is good for it, for society.

In order to situate this debate further, it is important to go back to the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, to Great Britain where Edmund Burke (1729-1797) played a prominent role in the British parliament. The Thirteen Colonies which declared independence from Britain still did so coming from an inherently British tradition, both socially and politically. Thus, showing the special case of Great Britain, as opposed to France, sheds some more light on the so-called American Revolution. The British parliament, through its previous incarnation in the form of the English parliament, is often quoted as the mother of all parliaments – the model for representative organs found in countries such as the United States, Canada, Ireland, Scotland, etc. – and yet, I have not mentioned the parliament up until now. I haven't done so because unlike France, the British parliament, for a myriad of specific reasons, does not attempt to radically break with its past. Instead, their parliament is host to one of the most powerful voices and sources for the unpolitical force. And, it is in the unpolitical force we find coping mechanisms spring into action in trying to deal with the emergence of representative democracy. The British/English parliament itself, up until the end of the 18th century, has mostly had a medieval role of representing the King to its people, instead of the other way around, even formally so at least until the 1689 Bill of Rights. The English parliament, installed per the Magna Carta of 1215, was, at the time of its conception, mostly

[119] Hardin, Representing Ignorance, p.83
[120] Pitkin, The concept of representation, pp.191-192
[121] Hardin, Representing Ignorance, pp.84-85

a council of nobles, which proved vehicles for the King's power towards the people.[122] It is noted that the earliest functions of these parliaments were primarily [1] the administration of justice, and [2] the changing of laws or drawing up of a new ordinance, with the king's consent.[123] Moreover, the determination of whether a particular gathering of the King's council, consisting mostly of the baronage, high clergy, and, later, the occasional knights, was considered a 'parliament', primarily hinged on the execution of the previously mentioned functions of the gathering.[124] This partly contributed to the term parliament being thrown around rather arbitrarily. Furthermore, while the procedure of election has, by then, already had a decently long history, these early parliaments of the 13th century did not depend on the absence or the presence of the commons, those who elect. The presence of popular representation doesn't have nearly the same significance as it has now.[125] However, by the time Burke joined the Rockingham Whig party as a secretary in 1765, popular representation had at least some role, which partly impacted the status of the parliament as well, coming together at regular intervals since the Triennial Act of 1641.[126] In 1766, Burke successfully ran on a specific opposition platform and got elected to parliament. This parliament was not the same as the medieval council it used to be, but it also wasn't quite like our contemporary parliaments. The King and the notion of the parliament had a character of representation of the realm. At first, merely through the interests of the King as the embodiment of the realm, which were reflected in the realm. In many respects the King was called upon as the empty vessel of the realm, ally and protector of the commons. This led theorists such as Thomas Smith (1513-1577) to claim that the idea of the king-in-parliament was a symbolic representation of the entire realm. The parliament came to symbolize the entire realm. And it is to this tradition that Edmund Burke refers when he makes his points about the role of the representative in the British parliament of the late 18th century.

Burke's claim was that political representation was a matter of trust by the constituency in the judgment of the representative. Burke himself was a parliamentarian for the district of Bristol, a role about which he famously argued that every member of the parliament is not there for their constituency, but rather for the entire realm – the wider national interests. If we compare Burke with Madison, two differences in the conception of a representative come to light. First, whether being a representative is primarily about judgment or about the 'will' of the constituency, and second, whether what is being represented is a 'national interest' or the 'interests' of the constituency.

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[122] Runciman & Vieira, Representation, pp.22-29
[123] Richardson & Sayles, The English Parliament, XXVI, p.2
[124] Idem, p.7
[125] Pitkin, The concept of representation, p.175
[126] O'Gorman, The Long Eighteenth Century: British political and social history, I, p.221

In a post-French Revolution world, where the third estate demanded more political clout, the old estates, which provided the majority of the members of parliament, needed a strategy to retain power. Burke's argument to view the representatives as 'trustees' is perhaps the most radical in this way. But, Burke was hardly the only political thinker of this time to argue in this way. Even Madison has a certain unpolitical element in his call for the best and brightest to enter parliament, retaining the unpolitical as reasonableness. Nonetheless, Burke did take it a step further. For instance, Burke argued that anyone who had the interest of the realm at heart would be represented by those in parliament. For Burke, representation was not attached to persons - the representative did not represent the interests of a select group of people known as his constituents - but to the national interests. For Burke, political representation in the British parliament always already entailed what he called 'actual and virtual representation'.[127] Those who didn't have a direct, actual, link to a representative through a vote, would have a virtual link to the representative through the pursuit of the national interests.[128] However, what Burke means by these interests seems to be mostly economic in nature. Here, we must not take up the older medieval notion of national interest embodied by the King, as a singular shared by all, but rather the classification of interests. For instance, imagine a certain constituency as a port city, and further imagine that its members could not elect a representative into Parliament. This would effectively mean that they have no direct, actual, representation in Parliament. But, argues Burke, their interest as a port city can be virtually represented by the representative from another port city that has shared interests precisely as a port city.[129] Now, while some might view this concept as being progressive in that everybody could be represented, Pitkin is already keen to notice that it can be used to enforce a certain monarchical style of rule. The legitimation for the King as ruler comes from the shared national interests he embodies, in this sense, the notion of virtual representation seems to inherently dissolve the need for something like an election, connecting the representative to a constituency.[130]

What is most interesting about Burke's notion of representation is precisely his idiom that a representative owes his constituents a "devotion to their interest" instead of a "submission to their will".[131] This type of representation would eventually be dubbed 'trusteeship' by Pitkin.[132] The core of this trusteeship is that the people need to have faith in their representatives as they might not be saying what you'd like to hear, but it will always be in their best interest, or at least, it should be. This brings us to another philosopher who had deep ties with both the revolutions and a link

[127] Pitkin, The concept of representation, p.173
[128] Runciman & Vieira, Representation, p. 43; Obviously, in the time of Burke, not every person had a vote, Great Britain still knew limited suffrage, it seems that Burke's argument was also in favor of keeping this limited
[129] Pitkin, The concept of representation, p.175
[130] Idem, p.177
[131] Burke in Pitkin, The concept of representation, p.176
[132] Pitkin, The concept of representation, p.172

to Great Britain: Thomas Paine (1737-1809). Paine was born in Great Britain, played an important part in both the American and French revolutions, and died in the United States of America. Paine is considered the author of the constitution of Pennsylvania, which served as a model for Condorcet, with whom he co-edited a journal as well.[133] Paine also served as one of the nine members in Condorcet's Committee of Constitution. However, whereas Condorcet was considered the most democratic in his views, Paine was more a republican. Thus, where Sieyès instigated the turn to a liberal-monarchical constitutionalism, Paine and Condorcet powered the movement toward a democratic republicanism.[134] In his main work *The Rights of Man* this is signified by the two-part division. The first part endorses the ideological turn instigated by Sieyès, the second part is where Paine attempts to steer the movement towards a democratic republicanism, a turn Urbinati describes as "the first conscious attempt to give a democratic foundation to representation".[135] It is this second part which is often read as a direct counter-argument to Burke. But Urbinati stresses its importance as a counter-point against Sieyès as well, due to the anti-monarchical character. This is due to the character of sovereignty that Paine upholds. Other than the Rousseauian general will as sovereign, which Sieyès builds upon, which has a locale in the public and can be embodied in a certain way by the 'empty' Prince or monarch, Paine argues for sovereignty as the 'res publica' – the 'public affair' from which the concept of Republic derives – without any physical or existential connotation. In the 'res publica', power is not possessed, figurated or personated by an individual or a mass. The representatives or even other magistrates instead do not possess power, but exercise it through the temporary office they hold which relates them to the people. This means that sovereignty is not a matter of will or something prior the relation as defined by the political bounds, but rather the "complex and persistent work of unifying political opinion through the criterion of the general interest and consented procedures".[136] Paine is even the first to coin the notion of the 'representative democracy'. But even though Paine's conception remains at this time a minority position, Paine has a depoliticized notion of the public interest, as something which only the representatives need to attend to. Such a depoliticized notion of interest is exactly what binds all the authors we have discussed so far, from Rousseau, who forbids the public to discuss their interests, to Burke, who explicitly states that the public shouldn't provide the input for their own interests, to Madison, who also argues for the best and brightest to understand what is in the interest of a specific constituency 'better' than they do.

[133] Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy, p.167
[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Idem, p.168

The golden age of parliamentarism

The emergence of the unpolitical force within the first practice of representative democracy and the debate on the role of the representative doesn't end with Burke, Paine, and Madison. In fact, throughout the 19th century, but especially in its first half, there were many debates on the then newly found role. It is in this light that we should see the contributions to political representation such as those by Benjamin Constant (1767-1830), and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Constant became a prominent French intellectual after his observations and denunciation of the terror and his defense of a bi-cameral system and admiration of the British parliamentary system, the same one Burke held a seat in. He was appointed by Napoleon to the Tribunat, a political forum containing mostly nobles, and requested to write a constitution for Napoleon. However, due to his criticism of Napoleon, he didn't hold this position for very long, being ousted in 1802 by Napoleon himself. It was in light of his criticism of Napoleon that Constant wrote one of his more pointed political works, the *De l'esprit de conquête et d'usurpation dans leurs rapports avec la civilisation actuelle.*[137] Constant was of the opinion that in order for there to be freedom from oppression, it would not be enough to merely mention or write a constitution or declaration, but rather that to keep power in check; the people, those being represented, must remain vigilant. The people must pay attention, discuss, and judge their political leaders. It is what Constant himself called 'surveillance'.[138] Constant, in this sense, already seems to allude to something like a diarchy of democracy, being not just aimed at the moment of decision, but also at the paying attention outside of the moment of election, perhaps now best described as being in the 'opposition'.

This, in part, leads Constant to advance what can be seen as a sophisticated iteration of the unpolitical force by expanding on the idea of the representative taken up by Sieyès, the inversion of the political logic up until that time, that not autonomy, but rather coordinated interdependence was freedom.[139] Constant argued that the relation between the represented and the representative is comparable to that of the rich or noble individuals and their personal assistants, their 'stewards'.[140] According to Constant, the important balance within this relation lies between the activity and inactivity of the rich or noble individual. The point of hiring a 'steward' in the first place, is to free oneself from attending something too intensely, in this case from political decision making. On the other hand, Constant warned that being too careless, or rather too trusting, towards your steward is just as, possibly even more, dangerous. To Constant, the danger ultimately comes

[137] Constant, political writings, p.289; 'The spirit of conquest and usurpation'
[138] Ibid.
[139] Urbinati, Representative Democracy, p.145
[140] Urbinati, Representative Democracy, p.324

from a negative conception of human nature, namely that if the steward is left unattended he will not keep the interest of the individual he serves at heart, but rather stray back to his own interests.

Constant's notion of the representative has a certain attractive aspect; the freedom for the represented not to have to invest in political issues all the time, and I would argue Constant is right to claim that nobody wants to be preoccupied by political issues all day and every day. The notion of a 'steward' is tempting in this sense. But, Constant's reading of the role of the representative has much in common with that of an unpolitical 'expert', who mostly needs to be trusted, and only checked upon every now and then, thereby marginalizing the role of the people to the occasional correcting of the representatives.

This notion of the depoliticization of the representative, a product of its time, which I have tried to discuss through various authors, emerges most prominently after the final collapse of the First French Empire and the end of the Napoleonic wars, when the unpolitical force becomes dominant in shaping the political system. This system is defined by representatives in parliament who entertain individual relationships with constituencies, as described and debated upon by Burke, Madison, Constant, and others. While this system already has some history in the United Kingdom, it soon spreads across Europe in various degrees. The British and American parliaments serve as a guide for the war-torn European continent, which is slowly attempting to rebuild its national political systems. Constant's most important contributions in respect to representation he wrote about in his work *Principes de Politique Applicables a Tous les Gouvernements.*[141] In a key passage of this work, Constant states his attack not against the idea of representatives or even monarchs, but rather against the degree of power that is entrusted to such 'holders', saying: "it is against the weapon, not against the arm holding it, that it is necessary to strike ruthlessly".[142] Typical of the unpolitical force is that it argues for the unpolitical as the solution to the hyperpolitical. Constant, for instance, warns against the notion of unlimited sovereignty, thereby outright contradicting the notion of sovereignty we find with Rousseau (and Hobbes). Constant even argues that it is this mistake that made *The Social Contract*, even though written in the name of freedom, such a formidable ally to despotism.[143] Thus, part of the reason for why politics in some sense needs to be unpolitical, is because the political cannot be too powerful.

As the last in a line of mostly British thinkers with a 'healthy' skepticism towards the 'democratic tyranny of the majority', John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) might also be one of the most eloquent.[144] Seemingly echoing the notions mentioned by Burke and Madison more than half a

[141] Constant, Political Writings, p.170; 'Principles of government applicable to all governments'
[142] Idem, p.176
[143] Constant, Political Writings, p.177
[144] Runciman & Vieira, Representation, p.50

century ago, Mill, in his considerations on representative government from 1861, comes up with another iteration of the idea that the best and brightest of the nation are best suited to voice the considerations of the people. Like for Burke, political representation was not a case of will, but rather of judgment, and those best suited to judge, would be most suited to represent. However, Mill does not argue for a complete disconnect between the represented and the representatives. He lays the proverbial 'burden of proof' with the representatives in arguing to his own constituents why he thought best to go against their 'will', but nonetheless deserves their trust.[145] Mill argues this stance most prominently in his work *Considerations on Representative Government* from 1861, at the end of the so-called 'golden age of parliamentarism', the period in which the British parliament is used as the prime example of parliamentary democracy. This parliament, according to Mill, was supposed to act as a 'congress of opinions', within which all sorts of interests were to be voiced, both national, as well as regional or private interests. It was in discussion in parliament that the representatives could come to decisions about whether or not certain interests were to be pursued or not. Mill saw the logical base for such a congress of opinions in a system of proportional representation, namely the notion that every single vote counts to the election result, which was a direct criticism of the British district system. For every vote to count directly toward the election result, there could only be a single voter district – something which is commonplace amongst most contemporary democracies outside of the Anglo-Saxon models. Mill questioned the notion of a representative being bound by a territory, something that Burke took as evident over half a century ago.

However, while this seems a very democratic criticism of the political system, Mill coupled this notion of proportional representation with a certain dismissal, or even fear, of mass-participation in democracy. In his earlier works, Mill argues that mass-participation in the political arena is problematic due to two major shortcomings of the mass, namely ignorance and incapacity.[146] Thus, a radically egalitarian approach to representation would all too probably lead to a tyranny of the majority, in which minority opinions, or interests, would be suppressed. Therefore, in order to prevent this tyranny, Mill sought to preserve 'elite' competence, whereby the majority needed to understand its own incompetence and defer to elite authority. This was, in Mill's conception, a matter of faith, belief in the authority of the elite. While this can be read as undemocratic, I argue that he thereby depoliticizes the political, making it merely the subject of 'expert' knowledge, which makes it unpolitical as well.

[145] Idem, p.50
[146] Krouse, Two Concepts of Democratic Representation: James and John Stuart Mill, p.521

It would be a caricature to leave Mill with these statements, because while he argues for the necessity of a competent elite, he also claims that this is not sufficient for a functioning democracy. Especially in his later work, the 'considerations on representative government', Mill's view on representative government changes. Mill adds a participating mass to the competent elite. In order for the mass to defer when appropriate, they need to be capable of self-government when necessary. Therefore, most importantly, and in the same vein as Rousseau once wrote, one of the most important objects of democracy is the education of the people. This in part also leads the people to more capable self-defense, which Mill thought was necessary given that humans were only really safe from other people's wrongdoing insofar as they could defend themselves.[147] This, however, still leaves intact the core notion of the unpolitical force: the handing off of autonomy to an expert few, a competent elite.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have tried to situate and explain the emergence of the unpolitical force found within representative democracy. The core notion operative within this force is the depoliticization of authority into a matter of competence or knowledge. Many of the authors that I have treated, who argue for a certain relationship between the representatives and the represented, emphasize the supposed rationality or expertise representatives have. With the emergence of modern representative democracy and the shift of the source of authority from God, or the King, to the people, there emerges the first coping mechanisms in the form of depoliticizing political matters. Many of the authors discussed feared the people in their capacity as political actors, and instead opted for an elite to rule, no longer in an overtly aristocratic manner, but through the mechanisms of representative democracy itself. The dominance of the unpolitical force thereby shaped the relation between representatives and represented.

What this fear at once shows us, is that the unpolitical force is mostly concerned about too little space between representatives and the represented, or too close a proximity between will and opinion, for that matter, and it also immediately shows us the problems of too much distance. Taking the unpolitical to its extreme, as I have shown in the explanation of the disfigurations in the previous chapter, the connection between representatives and represented is lost. Thus, what this exercise can to the very least show us, is a limit to the distance between will and opinion. In some sense, we thereby refer to one side of the famous paradox that Pitkin already alerts us to. Urbinati herself also formulated principles by which she believes representation must adhere, and

[147] Krouse, Two Concepts of Democratic Representation, p.528

it is with the unpolitical force that we discover the limit of the distance principle and have to refer to the proximity principle, namely that the represented need to be in connection with representatives. Not merely through votes, but through a responsiveness on the side of the representative, which leads to identification and understanding on the side of the represented.

However, this does not mean that a society without depoliticization is desirable or even possible. As comes to light in the discussion of Urbinati and her depiction of Rosanvallon, where the vagueness of Urbinati's usage of the unpolitical force comes to the fore. The unpolitical does in some sense serve as an anchor, not just of values per se, but of the political system itself. I agree with Urbinati that what marks representative democracy, and is perhaps its greatest strength, is changeability, also of the shape and form of its procedures. However, Urbinati is also right in claiming that her system of the democratic diarchy is aligned with a 'full' form of democratic proceduralism. This means that the procedures themselves, but also the institutions derived from them, appear to us in some ways as unpolitical, and the process of decision-making can be checked against these procedures, thus the rationale of certain institutions and the derived reasonableness of aspects of the political process, play a major role still. At the same time, this makes the unpolitical force embedded within the practice of representative democracy itself. This is not a problem in itself, but it is problematic that Urbinati never addresses the difference between expert committees which take over political decision making, and, for instance, judges reinforcing institutionalized political values, which to me are clearly different practices.

In the next section, I will treat the next force Urbinati identifies as constitutive of the democratic diarchy, and perhaps also identifiable as the counterpart of the unpolitical force: the populist force. As discussed earlier in this thesis, the unpolitical can be seen as the counterforce to the hyperpolitical, to what characterizes the populist force.

Chapter III: Party politics and the emergence of the populist force

"The party is created as a means to secure an end. Having, however, become an end in itself, endowed with aims and interests of its own, it undergoes detachment, from the teleological point of view, from the class which it represents. In a party, it is far from obvious that the interests of the masses which have combined to form the party will coincide with the interests of the bureaucracy in which the party becomes personified."

Robert Michels, Political parties; a sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy, p.371

Party democracy and the populist force

In this chapter, I will examine the populist force and its emergence within the practice of party politics. Whereas the unpolitical force was dominant in the practice of parliamentarism, the populist force, as a reaction to the dominance of the unpolitical force, is constitutive of a new type of politics, of party democracy.[148] This means that from around the 1880s onwards, the prevailing relation between democracy, representation, and sovereignty is again under pressure, now from the hyperpolitical. The projection of social cleavages onto society, entails the creation of a preprocedural people, as a social ontology, which is subsequently represented. Next to the operations of the populist force, which I will discuss in the next section, it is important to emphasize the definitive break with the previous practice of parliamentarism after the First World War and the emergence of the new practice of representative democracy dubbed by Manin as: party democracy.[149]

The populist force

The populist force, in opposition to the unpolitical force, expresses a hyperpolitical attitude. The problem for the populist force is not politics getting in the way of reason, like with the unpolitical force, but rather compromise, or reason, getting in the way of politics. The populist force refers to the rise of parties that aim to represent the people, in contradistinction to parties that represent specific social ideologies or interests. In this context, Urbinati claims we can identify both of these forces, unpolitical and populist, as critical of the central process in the representative democracy of compromise, of making "politics a terrain of bargaining among a plurality of interests and parties".[150] According to Urbinati, the impact of the populist force on the democratic diarchy entails the making of "the opinion of one part of the people merge with the will of the state", which in turn results in an impatience with inherent divisions in elected bodies.[151] I agree here with Urbinati that the element which sets apart the populist force from mere popular movements, or populist rhetoric, is populism's predication on democracy and its attempted appropriation of the representational relation.[152] Populism seeks to politically reorganize the state, which itself is aimed, according to Urbinati, at: "centralization of power, weakening of checks and balances,

[148] While Urbinati herself already says something about the interaction of the two forces, this dynamic is proposed as a continuous interaction by Rummens, S. (2016). Wat een theater! Politiek in tijden van populisme en technocratie. Pelckmans Pro.
[149] Manin, The principles of representative government, p.206
[150] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.128
[151] Idem, p.128
[152] Idem, p.133

strengthening of the executive, disregard of political oppositions, and transformation of election in a plebiscite of a leader".[153] The distinction Urbinati makes is thus summarized as between 'movement form' and 'government form', wherein 'government form' represents full-blown populism. Populism is thereby "more than a form of denunciation".[154] For the following analysis, this means that I will not go into depth on the supposed origins of populism much, the Narodniki, the US people's party, or Boulangism, as they never presented themselves in the full 'government form', instead I will focus on the post-World War I practices of Fascism and National Socialism, because of their ascension to power.[155]

Urbinati singles out the concept of ideology as the binding force between the leadership and the people within the populist force, however the concept is not limited to the populist force. In fact, Urbinati doesn't aim to do away with 'ideology' at all. She recognizes it as the basis for any political interpretation of the social and political complexity of society. However, concerning the populist ideology, Urbinati agrees with Margaret Canovan that populism is not concerned with the people itself, but with the ideology of the people, in that it aims to ideologically simplify and thus unite the people. Before I go on, I want to make a short remark on this statement. In Canovans distinction between the people itself and an ideology of the people, there looms an implicit assumption that there is such a thing as 'a people' itself. However, this seems to contradict the notion Urbinati herself endorses, that there is no pre-procedural people, no social ontology. Thus, I favor to still speak of an ideology of the people, but not as opposed to the people itself, but as opposed to other political ideologies or interests in society.

Urbinati subsequently sums up the contents of the populist force when she discusses the themes of what she calls the populist ideology. One of the themes is the one mentioned above already, the positing of the unity of the entire people, against the notion of compromise. It also appeals to the right and legitimacy of the people against specific minorities. It attempts to create an 'us' versus 'them' discourse, which is powered by the unity and homogeneity of the people as a whole versus any specific part of it.[156] There is another element which pertains specifically to the democratic diarchy and representation. According to Urbinati, the populist force aims to delegitimize the representational relation as the outcome of election in favor of a 'deeper', ideological, unity between the people and its leaders.[157] This relation is, in this sense, based on acclamation. The ideology in question serves as the basis for unification.

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[153] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.129
[154] Idem, p.151
[155] Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo, and Ostiguy, The Oxford Handbook of Populism, pp.3-4.
[156] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.151
[157] Idem, p.152

Urbinati posits her view on populism against Ernesto Laclau's (1935-2014). Laclau's work builds on the theory of hegemony, as first developed by Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), wherein hegemony signifies the imposition of a certain worldview, which manufactures the people's consent to the political order, or as Laclau puts it: "that peculiar combination of consensus and coercion that Gramsci called hegemony".[158] The scope of this thesis doesn't allow me to treat Gramsci, or Laclau's interpretation of Gramsci concerning the concept of hegemony, but I will go in detail more on two aspects of populism in which Urbinati and Laclau disagree. First, Laclau, in his work 'on populist reason', states that the populists always need an excess, a section of the people "the totality expels from itself in order to constitute itself".[159] Second, they disagree concerning, what Urbinati calls, 'the destination', the logical ends, of populism with regards its 'leadership'. The central distinction is that Urbinati, against Laclau, posits that populism always tends to a single authoritarian 'personator' of the people. She prepares this claim, by claiming first that while Laclau posits the normative necessity for populism of an incomplete occupation of the place of power, she herself claims that this is merely a material imperfection. While I agree with Urbinati that populists do seek total power, she misunderstands Laclau when he argues that they normatively can't. Populists always need something to agitate against, and even when they obtain total power, they need to posit something outside it, something causing the 'problematic' situation which needs to be agitated against. Urbinati, following Dahl, states that populism seeks to give the demos final and total control over the political order, or more plainly: the majority.[160] This doesn't, however, contradict Laclau's notion of a normative externality. Urbinati derives from this totalitarian destination the personation of the people in the form of a 'Caesar', the identification of a people under a leader, an embodiment of the people. For Laclau, however, populism is politics in its purest form, and Caesarism is always externally tied to populism by way of its convenience for the goals of populism: to polarize society.

This difference in opinion is, in large part, caused by the different appraisal of the notion of polarization. Laclau argues that politics is always inherently polarizing and this is simply the differentiating principle working, not unlike the (projected) social cleavages on which party politics from the mid-20th century are 'based', and entails thereby true majoritarian decision-making.[161] Urbinati argues that polarization, through its domination of the discursive practices of the politics within a nation, brings about not the manifestation of pluralism, but rather its replacement with a trench war between two unified, concentrated, sides.[162] But Urbinati seems to leave unaddressed

[158] Laclau, On Populist Reason, p.60
[159] Idem, p.70
[160] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.132
[161] Idem, p.160
[162] Ibid.

the fact that Laclau is exactly looking for an integration of different marginalized groups through what he calls 'chain of equivalences', without losing the uniqueness of the demands – that is why he uses the term equivalence.[163] In the distance between the privileged group and the specific disadvantaged groups, the disadvantaged groups can find each other and form a coherent block against the privileged group. Urbinati doesn't address this claim directly, but merely states the opposite, that political struggle doesn't allow, at least in this polarizing, unifying way, for the plurality of demands that Laclau wants to link up. Polarization and simplification prove to her to be the vehicles by which the populist leader creates the public, his or her own constituency. They produce what Urbinati calls the verticalization of political consent, the "unification of the masses under an organic narrative and a charismatic or Caesarist leader personating it".[164] The argument between Urbinati and Laclau comes down to the following question: can we unify different demands in the political arena, without losing their difference? Laclau himself already states the dangers of this unification, of the possibility that some demands get lost in the chain. He therefore states that these demands need some space in between, not too far apart, as they need to be linked up, but not too close as they might damage each other.

Urbinati and Laclau seemingly do not disagree on the taxonomy of demands; both understand that singular demands can more effectively be integrated than grouped demands. Urbinati does take up Laclau's own worry, that, in the unification of demands, there will be always the risks that certain demands will be put on hold while others can become prominent. They differ on how to act given this mechanism. Laclau is looking for a way to integrate demands, which thereby become 'popular demands', as a group of demands united by the chain of equivalence, and implement them as a whole, without the loss of demands.[165] He thus attaches to the chain of equivalence the construction of an internal difference in society, an antagonistic frontier, to challenge the dominant social arrangement, the hegemony. His aim is exactly this: to challenge the hegemony. Single demands, not part of the equivalential chain, can be integrated into the hegemonic formation, thereby leaving it intact, but a chain of equivalent demands, the popular demands, cannot be integrated and thus it poses a challenge to the hegemonic formation. Urbinati is not aiming at challenging this hegemony, but rather wants to integrate a plurality of demands into the hegemonic formation. To her, the problem of populism is that it always posits the people as a unity, whereas the notion of pluralism demands the people not be posited as a homogenous unity, but rather as a potentially conflicting composite. Unification of demands thereby, according to Urbinati, poses a challenge to the character of democracy, the plurality of demands in society.

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[163] Laclau, On Populist Reason, p.73
[164] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.131
[165] Laclau, On Populist Reason, p.77

The two previously discussed aspects, power verticalization, as the concentration of power in one leader, and personalization, together constitute what Urbinati calls the 'mono-archic emendation of democracy'.[166] The goal of the populist force is the removal of the representational relation as illegitimate, through the collapse of will and opinion. To sum up Urbinati's approach to populism: populism is the unification of the people, thereby positing a specific ideological framing of the people, under a Caesarist leader who personates this unity. Or as Urbinati also posits it: "the populist imagination portrays the people as a political actor that asserts its sovereign authority by remaining in a permanent state of mobilization. It does so by propelling ideological polarization".[167]

Urbinati pits herself against many of the contributions on populism. Not in the sense that she necessarily equates populism with other ideologies, such as Fascism, Nationalism, or Nazism, but in that she does posit the inherently negative aspect of populism concerning democratic politics.[168] Urbinati, as a proceduralist, argues for the value of the procedures of democracy, which is the very thing populism turns against, the relation of representation within the institutions. But, the phenomenon of populism expresses itself differently in different times and different localities.[169] It is thus helpful to keep in mind Cas Mudde's interpretation of populism as a 'thin ideology', as opposed to a full ideology, which subsequently couples itself with other ideologies (such as National Socialism, Fascism, etc.). There are then at least two problematic aspects in discussing populism. First, it is problematic that many possibly exemplary regimes qualify for several labels; the overlap of ideologies - populism and an extra other - makes the analysis of the practice difficult, as there is always the danger of conflation. Second, the variety in which populism has offered itself both over time and across different locales, creates a 'stripped down' common denominator. If we accept the characteristics put forward by Urbinati, they do not necessarily rule out the characteristics of other ideologies. For instance, one could identify the regime of Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) as both Fascist and populist. Fascist in that it had a nationalist-expansionist outlook on Italy, but populist in that it pitted the united people against an 'other', first socialists and communists, and later Jews.

In the next sections, I will attend to the genealogical investigation of the emergence of populism as a force within representative democracy. Like in the previous chapter, I will incorporate some of the leading up, a break, and the new relations within which representative democracy plays out. My aim with this short analysis is to show how on the one hand some of the

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166 Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.153
167 Idem, p.166
168 See for the differences of populism and fascism: Eatwell, R. (2017). Populism and Fascism. The Oxford Handbook of Populism, 363.
169 See for instance Cas Mudde's chapter in: Freeden, M., Sargent, L. T., & Stears, M. (Eds.). (2013). The Oxford handbook of political ideologies. OUP Oxford.

crucial events before and during the First World War happen unguided, and second how these changed circumstances allow for the emergence of new dominant political practice. This time in the party-political era of representative democracy, labelled by Manin as: party democracy.

Changing relations

After Napoleon was definitively defeated in 1815, and the victorying nations came together to settle upon new borders, there came a period of relative calm called the European 'balance of powers'. While there was a so-called balance of powers, Europe was constantly changing, with the year 1848 being especially salient for the various revolutions and several constitutional changes that took place. This included, but is not limited to, the introduction of the constitution of the Netherlands, the March revolution in the German states, the February revolution in France, and extreme civil unrest in Austria-Hungary. Great Britain had known relative quiet after it experienced the first industrial revolution and entered a period known as "splendid isolation".[170] Although Great Britain was faring well industrially, this cut them off from influencing foreign powers. In continental Europe, the unrest during the late revolutionary era was fueled by rising nationalism, which in its turn, was a tool for the political elite of a nation to rally its population for its own purposes. France was a special case. When Napoleon the III (1808-1873), through a coup d'état, took power in 1852, he proclaimed the second French empire. Napoleon the III aimed to re-establish France's influence over Europe which it lost from the French revolution onwards, due to its more inward focus on national politics. But, as François Furet (1927-1997) claims, the whole of the 19th century can be seen as a battle between what Furet calls the force of revolution and the force of restoration.[171] However, Napoleon the III didn't just mean a victory for the monarchists, the restorative force, within France. During his regime Napoleon the III assisted Italian unification, both to promote Italian nationalism, but also to annex the regions of Savoy and Nice. On the other hand, from 1866 onwards, Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898) was aiming to unite the German states under Prussian leadership. Napoleon the III and von Bismarck eventually clashed with the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, which both rulers thought they could win and use to their advantage. Von Bismarck manipulated the French into declaring war, through the mistranslation of what was known as the Ems telegram, which affected public opinion in France as the people took it as a slap in the face. When the French declared war on Prussia, the southern German states sided with Prussia, much to Von Bismarck's expectation. Napoleon the III was defeated and the republicans in France took

[170] See for a more thorough treatment: Charmley, J. (1999). Splendid Isolation? Britain and the Balance of Power 1874–1914. Sceptre

[171] Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, p.4

the opportunity to solidify what was perhaps already the promise of the French revolution, the Third Republic. The Third Republic is the longest post-ancien régime structure of government in France, and meant the victory of the revolutionary force, in the terms of Furet, but it does not mean that it was meant to be. It was, to a large extent, opportunism of Adolph Thiers (1797-1877). Thiers had, at that point, been the leader of France on several occasions, and when he pushed down the Commune of Paris with the help of German soldiers, he solidified his own position as the leader of France after the fall of the Second French Empire. Thiers led the peace negotiations with the then unified German Empire. After which he becomes the first temporary president of the republic, but only because the monarchic majority could not agree on the new king. There were no less than three monarchic factions, the Orleanists, the Legitimists (Bourbon), and the Bonapartists.[172] The Third Republic was supposed to be a temporary government, and the Orleanists, the more liberal of the monarchists, could therefore agree with the foundation of the state. Eventually they found peace with the temporary government, even though the Republic had to weather many storms over its seventy-year existence. Nonetheless, the Third Republic served as the framework within which a parliamentary system with a strong party-political basis emerged.

After Von Bismarck swiftly defeated Napoleon the III, he instigated what was known as a containment politics. This consisted on the one hand of complex alliances between several European nations, such as the Triple Alliance, but also through the destabilization and feeding of nationalism, and republicanism, in the countries around France. During the 1870s Germany actively intervened in the domestic affairs of several of France's neighbors, such as Belgium, Spain, and Italy, pushing domestic forces to support the left-leaning, republican, anticlerical movements within the countries. Von Bismarck was not only interested in destabilizing the countries, but he was also trying to diminish the power of the catholic church throughout Europe.[173] But, domestically Germany saw the rise of party politics as well due to the enactment of universal male suffrage by Von Bismarck himself.

From the 1870s onwards, the period now known as the second industrial revolution took shape. This process of industrialization, consisting both of technological advancements and the emergence of new industries, created more demand for work in the urban areas of Germany, France, Great Britain, and the United States, especially. The increased urbanization of the population, in turn, meant that there was a possibility of mobilization, as indicated by Von Bismarck's tactics of destabilization, of the people. On the political left side, this led to the foundation of the first socialist parties starting in the 1880s. These movements on the

[172] See René Rémord's Les droites en France for a more thorough treatment of these factions.
[173] Stone, Bismarck Ante Portas! Germany and the Seize Mai Crisis of 1877, pp.210-213

socialist/communist side, were however, not founded by members of the working class themselves. They were almost always founded by those of the so-called 'elites' who were unsatisfied with the treatment of the masses.[174] Together with the urbanization, there was also more gainful employment for the people, which thereby could more often achieve the necessary threshold to vote, mostly through paying taxes.[175] The industrialization and subsequent urbanization, meant as a push for socialist movements, which sought to further their influence by the implementation of universal suffrage, extending it from the universal male suffrage. In Germany, this was the main point of the Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeitsverein (ADAV)[176], founded already in 1863 by Ferdinand Lasalle (1825-1864). But, we need not be idealistic here, Lasalle saw the movement as a potential vehicle for his own rise to presidency.[177]

While the population able to vote steadily increased throughout Europe, it was still very limited overall. France and Germany by the 1870s were notable exceptions with their relatively progressive government systems, but even then, the steady increase of the voting population is considered by historians to be tactical moves by the elites to appease the people.[178] For most of Europe suffrage was bound still to the very notion by which the stamp act congress, more than a century before, based its rejection of the British rule on: 'no taxation without representation', which was now flipped into being the very condition by which one could vote, representation entails taxation. During the 1890s and early 1900s politicians started to see that stopping the democratization was becoming more and more difficult, and instead they now sought to control the constituencies themselves, through the manipulation of the boundaries of suffrage.[179] These restrictions stayed in place for much of the 19th and the early 20th century, right up until World War I.

The First World War

Now, I would like to stress here the incredible contingency of the First World War and especially the relation to universal suffrage. After World War I, everything changes. The balance of power, which I have just discussed, is shook, the European leaders are scrambling for recovery, and Germany is bound by harsh punitive measures for their aggressive approach to the war, mostly out of fear for Germany seeking revenge. But, more importantly, the First World War has an impact

[174] Michels, political parties, pp.232-233
[175] Katz & Mair, Changing models of party organization and party democracy: the emergence of the cartel party, p.9
[176] "General German Labor Union"
[177] Michels, Political parties, p.71
[178] Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire: 1875-1914, p.86
[179] Idem, p.87

on the census suffrage, in place since the mid-eighteenth-century in most Western European countries. While, as I just described, census suffrage was slowly being replaced or expanded upon before the First World War, it's hardly the universal suffrage we know in Western democracies today. Most of the suffrage, for instance, was solely based on male suffrage, thereby leaving out half the population already. Nonetheless, as Eric Hobsbawm (1917-2012) notes, no matter how the process of democratization advanced, it did, and in this sense the genie was out of the bottle.[180]

The outbreak of the First World War remains a terribly contingent event in its own right. What is often signaled as the direct cause of the First World War, the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, is itself, a happenstance of a series of unfortunate events. First of all, the tensions within the Austro-Hungarian empire were already at a high, but when the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne, chose a date for his visit to Sarajevo, he could not have picked a worse date, June 28th. On this date, St. Vitrus day, there was already increased tension as the commemorations reminded the Serbians that their empire ended with a decisive battle in 1389, which created the preconditions for their annexation by the Ottoman empire. Even more importantly, it was the first St. Vitrus Day celebration since the 'liberation' of Kosovo the previous year during the second Balkan War.[181] The arrival of the heir apparent in Sarajevo was an affront to Serbian ultra-nationalists, who saw it necessary to respond. But, for the Archduke and his wife, it was their wedding anniversary and Sarajevo seemed an excellent outskirt of the empire to celebrate it in. As Franz Ferdinand and his spouse rode through the city of Sarajevo in an open car, seemingly unconcerned, the seven Serbian ultra-nationalists are in place to assassinate him. The ultra-nationalists had explosives taped to their bodies and a fully loaded handgun with them, as they were spread across the city, along the route of the Archduke's motorcade as he made his way through the city, celebrating. After the first assassin froze up during the moment of truth, it was up to the second assassin along the route: Nedeljko Cabrinovic. Cabrinovic freed the explosive from his waist, threw the grenade, but missed. The archduke was unscathed and only minor injuries were sustained by those around him, such as a small wound by his wife, Sophie Chotek. The archduke decided to go on with the program, arrived at the destination, and gave a speech on the events and the visit itself, leading to the weird moment by which the mayor of the town, not having changed his speech, claimed that the population of Sarajevo joyfully received the archduke, to which the archduke replied: "yes, with bombs!"[182] Afterwards, the archduke insisted on visiting the wounded in a local hospital, instead of driving straight of the town. The original planning was for the archduke to visit a museum instead, and the drivers of the motorcade never received the

[180] Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, p.85
[181] Clark, The Sleepwalkers, pp.365-366
[182] Ibid.

changed itinerary, thus the drivers took a different turn, when an aide of Franz Ferdinand called out the mistake, the vehicles stopped. Unfortunately for the archduke, the vehicles at that time, did not have reverse gear. So, they had to disengage the engine, get out of the car and push it back up the other motorway. At this very moment, Gavrilo Princip, one of the other assassins, seized his moment, stumbling upon the slowly stopping car, recognizing the archduke immediately. While he couldn't disentangle the explosives, he grabbed his loaded revolver and shot twice, killing both Franz Ferdinand and his wife.[183] Exactly a month later, on the 28th of July 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia.

The assassination of Franz Ferdinand is itself an event full of '(bad) luck', of happenstance and coincidence, if the car hadn't taken the wrong turn, perhaps we wouldn't have had a First World War. However, while the assassination is often seen as the starting point, it is merely a single contingent event in a long list of factors. We should not forget the rising tensions due to the change of relations as I described earlier. France never forgave Germany for their defeat in the Franco-Prussian war, and the ensuing scramble for security from such a war, the entering into powerful alliances such as the Franco-Russian, contributed in large part to the combustive setting of 1914.[184] What this anecdote shows nevertheless, is how one of the big events which allows for the populist force to emerge and shape the political practice to come, came about not from some intentional steering of history, not from everything going according to plan, but in fact came from unforeseen consequences of randomly intersecting events, which become appropriated by forces on the European continent.

Political Parties as the new locus of power

After World War I, not only are many of Europe's countries shaken up, it also meant the downfall of the monarchies of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey. Furthermore, the atrocities of the First World War also meant that it seemed untenable for elites to ask so much of so many, without them having any say in the matter.[185] France is perhaps the only country for which the system from before the war, the Third Republic, 'stays intact', but the end of the First World War sees the introduction of universal suffrage in Russia, at least on paper, after the Russian Revolution in 1917, the establishment of what is now called the Weimar Republic in Germany, giving the

[183] Clark, The Sleepwalkers, pp.370-373

[184] See for a much more elaborate treatment of the complex causes of the first world war: Clark, C. (2012). The sleepwalkers: how Europe went to war in 1914.

[185] See for instance, on the role of women's suffrage movements, the following work: Jensen, K. (2008). Mobilizing Minerva: American Women in the First World War. University of Illinois Press. And for Great Britain: Gullace, N. F. (2002). The Blood of Our Sons. Men, women, and the renegotiation of British citizenship during the great war; Hobsbawm, the age of extremes: a history of the world, 1914-1991, p.26

parliament vastly more power and abolishing the position of the Kaiser, and more importantly the establishment of universal suffrage in Austria in 1918 and the Netherlands and Germany in 1919. Notably, these last three countries are among the countries that serve as the locus of the emergence of the system of party democracy.

Let's examine briefly again the characteristics of the populist force before I move on to couple them with the practice of party politics of the interbellum and beyond. Urbinati's addition to literature on populism is the addition of the personation of the unity of the people by a Caesar, thus populism for Urbinati entails: [1] the projection of a united multitude against a few, for instance, the people versus the elite, and [2] the personation of this unity by a Caesarist leader. While the populist force thus started to emerge in the late 19th century concomitant with the increased industrialization, urbanization, and democratization, it doesn't become the dominant force shaping the political practice of Western countries until after the First World War. The First World War offered an opportunity to some to control the political landscape, not through the containment of democratization, as we have seen with the unpolitical force, but rather through the manipulation of the masses.[186] As Urbinati posits in her description of the populist force, in opposition to the unpolitical force, it is a question of mobilization of the masses, which I argue is exemplified by the political practice after the First World War.[187] This mobilization implies the development of mass propaganda, mass media, mass movements, but more importantly, of mass parties.

While there have been parties in parliaments before the late 19th century, the federalists and anti-federalists formed what it is now known as the 'first party system' in the United States for example, their influence then, was marginal. At least up until the 1870s, the individual relationship between the representative and the represented was still the key feature of representation. The first parties that arose throughout Europe in the 19th century were what would later be labelled 'elite parties' – most prominently in the United Kingdom given their longer tradition, and in the United States, with the breaking up of the Republican-Democrats creating the 'second party system'.[188] These parties mostly 'accommodated' the individual relationships between the representative and the represented. The discussions taken up in the previous chapter take place in this practice, where political parties take a backseat to individual representatives. This relationship changes, especially after the First World War. With the introduction of the new political practice after the First World War, we see the emergence of a dominant position of the political party. Over the course of the

[186] Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, pp.87-88
[187] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.128
[188] Katz & Mair, Changing models of party organization and party democracy, p.20

late 19th century, a different type of political parties, which would later be dubbed 'mass-parties', emerged in the contained and relatively progressive political practices of France and Germany.[189]

With these new mass-parties, the so-called constituencies of the representative changed. The representational relation was no longer tied down by geographical interests or through a personal relation of trust, but rather, parties corresponded to (projected) social groups which fully permeated through the individual member's life, the first sign of the populist force emerging. Political parties were based on an ideological program through which the constituency could identify itself. Politics itself, and the parliament as its locus, could no longer simply be the discussion of interests in the 'congress of opinions'. The political parties came to serve as the tools for the identification of specific groups in society to compete for control over the state. These political parties served as a means to mobilize the 'large' groups of voters and they subsequently presented themselves as anti-elitist in character, the second sign in which the populist force made itself present. What distinguishes mass parties from populist parties, is that while every mass party has an ideology, the populist party has a specific ideology. They project the notion of a pure many against a corrupt few; they were specifically characterized by an 'ideology of the people'.[190] Sometimes, in the case of the United States and France, from a rural perspective, and sometimes, in the case of Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands, from an urban worker's perspective. However, mass-parties seemingly weren't merely anti-elitist in their political program, but also in the organization of the party itself, in the mechanism providing leadership. It seemed as if through their scope and mechanics, the political party could bring any person into office, as long as he or she worked their way up through the party. It led to the belief that it was the end of the elitism which characterized the parliamentarism of the period before.[191]

This aspect of dividing and projecting society into two 'homogenous' parts, characterized as the 'corrupt' few and the 'pure' many, does not occur only, as signaled above already, in the form of 'elite vs. people'. I agree with Laclau that what populism needs is to differentiate in society itself, positing one as a whole and the other as a subsection, thereby creating a front-line, but this can take up several forms. In the seminal work by Lipset and Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments', the concept of social cleavages, as the lines along which society can be broken into two, is explained from a historical comparative perspective.[192] The comparative-historical dimension was important, because these 'social cleavages', or rather ideological lines in the sand, expressed themselves very differently per country. In Great Britain, for example, the main

[189] Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, p.63
[190] A concept Urbinati herself uses, but is taken from: Canovan, M. (2002). Taking politics to the people: Populism as the ideology of democracy. In Democracies and the populist challenge (pp. 25-44). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
[191] Manin, The principles of representative government, p.206
[192] Lipset & Rokkan, Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments, pp.1-3

social cleavage was between the workers and the employers, a social cleavage which is a direct consequence of the industrial revolution. This cleavage can be interpreted from a populist perspective as the elite few employers versus the people as workers. In the United States, the main divide stemming from the collapse of the Republican-Democrats took the shape of several social cleavages over time and their system is still a two-party system, with what Kirchheimer (1905-1965) famously coined catch-all parties: parties which by their nature aim to overcome several cleavages in order to gain the most votes.[193] In the Netherlands, perhaps one of the most well-known subjects of the study of social cleavages, it took the shape of socio-economical and religious breaking lines, thereby creating multiple splits, each running the risk of being appropriated in a populist manner.

The Netherlands is perhaps an outlier concerning social cleavages, in that it successfully 'managed' the cleavages, as I will discuss shortly in the next section. What is important from the populist interpretation is the ideological positioning of an 'us', the workers, the farmers, or certain Christian denominations, against 'them', the big industrials, the nobility, or in the case of Nazism, the Jews. While the situation after the First World War presents the true inauguration of the populist force as the dominant molder of the political practice, it's interesting to have a quick look at some philosophers of pre-war Germany, who pick up on the early machinations of the populist force emerging. As the German states entered a union in the 1870s forming the German Empire under Emperor Wilhelm I (1797-1888), the change in the influence of the political parties already led Max Weber (1864-1920) to investigate the new practice. Weber argued that the newly functioning party system had changed the face of politics. Political parties were mechanisms in which politics itself became more 'interest' based, such as in the United States, where political parties designed their programs to win votes.[194] Given the opening up of politics to the masses, political parties could no longer consist of notables alone, without any leaders who present themselves to the public. The political party came to serve as the means to launch a charismatic leader, thereby demoting the rest of the party into followers. Weber can be placed in close proximity to authors such as Moisey Ostrogorsky (1854-1921), Robert Michels (1876-1936), and other classical elite theorists, as a 'proto-elite theorist'.[195] This new practice of elitism is best described by Michels in his 'iron law of oligarchy', when he states: "The democratic external form which characterizes the life of political parties may readily veil from superficial observers the tendency towards aristocracy, or rather towards oligarchy, which is inherent in all party organization. If we wish to obtain light upon this tendency, the best field of observation is offered by the intimate

[193] Katz and Mair, Changing models of party organization, p.7
[194] Weber, Political Writings, p.347
[195] Pakulski, The Weberian Foundations of modern elite theory and democratic elitism, p.38

structure of the democratic parties, and, among these, of the socialist and revolutionary labour party".[196]

For Michels, the democratizing forces in the party system become no more than a support system for a new elite, who are able to mobilize parties around them, and challenge the old elites.[197] Weber posits the necessity of Caesarism due to the political organization of the party itself. In order for the party not to become engulfed in their own bureaucracy, to become the well-oiled machine it needs to be in the new political practice, there is a necessity for a charismatic leader to emerge and carry the party.[198] Urbinati doesn't go quite as far as to attribute the verticalization of power to the organization of political parties, but she does argue for this tendency within the populist force. The leader of a party becomes the impersonation of the ideology, that which the party stands for. In the case of the populists, this entails the impersonation of the ideology of the people, an 'ami du peuple', or even a member of the people, who can battle the 'them' with the acclaimed force of the masses.

The relation of representation in the party-system-democracy changes. The political party now mediates the representational relation, and the core of the mediation is a projected ideological unity, in the specific case of the populists it is an 'ideology of the people', an us versus them. What binds the individual to a political party is thus bigger than the individual relation with the representative; it is an all-encompassing view on life, what Ostrogorsky called "integral association(s)", the person is enveloped by the party.[199] Also, no longer is party democracy about the will of the people, being expressed by the freely deliberating national parliament resulting in a single voice of the nation. Rather, in party democracy, the parliament becomes split, there is a party government, and there is an opposition. As Manin notes: "in contrast to parliamentarism, the freedom of opinion is thus displaced".[200] Furthermore, the debate on the role of the representative is profoundly changed by 'party discipline', in a sense an expression of the power verticalization that Urbinati refers to. The main point of debate in the parliamentarism-era concerned the responsiveness of the representative, of his or her normative commitment to either input from the constituency or his/her own judgment. In party democracy, a party member votes according to the party line, instead of his/her own personal judgment, thus the debate of the previous practice is pushed to the background, and instead the debate centers on the political ideologies in place, and much more profoundly on the legitimizing principle of representation. Only through the

[196] Michels, Political Parties: a Sociological Study of the Oligarchial Tendencies of Modern Democracy, p.21
[197] Manin, The principles of representative government, p.207; Michels, political parties, pp.372-373
[198] Weber, Political Writings, pp.339-340; see p.342 for a passage on the rise of charismatic leadership in the United Kingdom. Weber claims that the charismatic appeal of the leader proved the most important vehicle for power since the introduction of the caucus.
[199] Ostrogorsky in Manin, The principles of representative government, p.215 (brackets by me).
[200] Manin, The principles of representative government, p.216

invocation of ideology, something like acclamation can be perceived as legitimate at all. At the same time, whereas there is a claim of representation, the deliberative practices shift from inside the parliament, as representative members negotiating their respective positions, to within the party, making the resulting position more one-dimensional – only tied to the one specific ideology. The party leadership and its backbenchers now negotiate their party's position and are thereby constitutive for the ideology itself. What we can derive from this problematic position, is what Urbinati refers to as the distance principle, that there is a normative necessity for sufficient distance between the will of the people and the opinion of a part of it. Representation always entails that there is a difference between the represented and the representatives. Representation leaves space for the plurality in society to be expressed, something impossible in the case of identification. At the same time, like I have discussed in the previous chapter, we can see the limit of distance, the representatives cannot become completely detached or unresponsive, as there will not be any representation at all anymore. These two elements combined, distance and proximity, correspond to Pitkin's classic interpretation of the paradox of representation, and the balancing act which is required of the representatives.

Polarization and pillarization

In this final section of this chapter, I'd like to close off by addressing two practices that have been dominant in the party democratic era. The political practice after the first World War hinged on polarization. This either led to the creation of unified camps, or to the establishment of inward-looking subsections of society. Nonetheless, the political practice after the first World War is much more complicated than it appears at first, as this process occurred not only within a single country, but also globally. The Russian Revolution of 1917 for instance, not only has a significant impact on Russia, but up until 1923, the Russian Revolutionaries had all kinds of hopes that their communist counterparts in different European countries would be successful in taking power as well. Paradoxically, the political party is arguably even more the locus of power in the Marxist-Leninist system, than it is in the Western democratic systems. When Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, better known as Vladimir Lenin, called the 1917 referendum to legitimize the revolutionary coup d'état, it failed, and he proclaimed the 'dictatorship of the people' with a single 'communist' party at the helm. Lenin looked towards Germany, specifically Berlin, to fulfill its promise of communism (more so than Russia or Moscow). However, apart from the 'revolution' in Germany in 1918, which arguably had no lasting institutional impact, the communist revolution doesn't spread in Europe

as much as the Russian revolutionaries hoped (unlike in the rest of the world).[201] Furthermore, the political practice in Western democracies, as stated in an earlier section, became more and more obfuscated by the emergence of multiple radically right ideologies. The new political parties aren't only accompanied by the 'thin ideology' of populism, but are also in very different manners coupled with other ideologies. In Italy, Mussolini forms the self-proclaimed fascist party in 1919, and has fascists march onto Rome in 1922, the capital which houses the government, to demand the resignation of the liberal prime minister Luigi Facta. Mussolini's fascist ideology is merely a pragmatic collection of notions he either liked himself, or thought would work well with the people. This is exemplified by the absence of anti-Semitism in the Italian fascist party before 1938, but after being influenced by Adolf Hitler (1889-1945), Mussolini introduces it into fascism.[202]

Which brings us to another key figure of the interbellum, Hitler himself. Hitler was a populist, although his rise to power is a very peculiar story in its own right for which I have neither the time nor the space here.[203] In a way comparable to Mussolini, Hitler challenged representative politics. They both claimed their legitimacy outside of the political system they were supposedly operating in, both by acclamation. The Fascist party and the Nazi party never legitimately took to power in that they were never elected to form a government. They claimed the right to do so on different grounds, especially in the case of Mussolini. And, perhaps more importantly, Fascism in general hinged on the mobilization of the masses.[204] In fact, much to Urbinati's point on polarization, the Nazi party only really thrived because the middle classes eventually had to choose between the extreme right or the left, much to the Fascist liking. Either one became leftist to protect the liberal order, or one became a Fascist to protect the social order. Unfortunately, between 1930 and 1932, much of the center and right bourgeois middle classes did defect to the Nazi party.[205] Finally, if we add to this analysis the characteristic of Caesarism, it isn't hard to understand why so many see populism as the starting point for radical right ideologies like Fascism and Nazism, especially in Europe.

This brings us to another country which ultimately succumbs to Fascism in this period, Austria. A country in which the so-called 'social cleavages' and the party politics following from it are a well-described practice.[206] After the First World War, the first Austrian Republic was established and a new constitution was drafted up by the prominent legal and political philosopher Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) in 1920. It's the start of a new political practice in Austria, but the

[201] Hobsbawm, The age of extremes, pp.109-111
[202] Hobsbawm, the age of extremes, p.116
[203] See for a more elaborate treatment of Hitler's populist roots: Fritzsche, P. (1990). Rehearsals for fascism: Populism and political mobilization in Weimar Germany. Oxford University Press, USA.
[204] Hobsbawm, age of extremes, p.117
[205] Idem, p.123
[206] See Lipset and Rokkan, cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments, p.22

institutional framework itself doesn't last long as the constitution is amended in 1928, only to be reverted to a fascist system in 1933. While Austria doesn't serve as a prime example of a successful party system – at that time, at least – it does give insights into the system itself, especially through Kelsen. Kelsen serves as the most prominent legal and political philosopher of Austria at the time, being the architect of constitution and having a professorship at the University of Vienna during most of the 1920s when he writes his major works on the democratic practice of Austria.

Kelsen attempts to defend a pluralist notion of politics. He saw proportional representation as a necessary feature of party democracy, because proportional representation gives the most accurate display of the forces at work in society, of the so-called cleavages and interests in society that are then subsequently reflected in the national parliament.[207] More idiosyncratically, Kelsen notes that it is even an advantage of parliaments like the Austrian that the main interests being reflected undistorted in parliament could lead to a consolidation of the two sides of the spectrum, a polarization into two camps, not unlike Laclau's idea, which is necessary for democracy to function.[208]

However, this polarization could lead to a complete schism in society, a civil war. Especially if it concerns an uneven split in society, where a specific group has the upper hand throughout the parliament, something not unthinkable in the situation of Austria with its history of ethnic minorities. The only solution to prevent such a schism is the idea of political compromise. For Kelsen, the idea of political compromise is the key notion of his theory of democratic representation.[209] Compromise, however, can only be achieved when the parties have some freedom in not implementing all of their policies, therefore trust (from the constituency) was a very important aspect of the party democracy. Manin argues that Kelsen leaves unnoted how compromise also influences the actions of the parties themselves. While these political parties have manifestos, which signify the very ideas and notions that bind the party members in the first place, it is up to the party leadership to judge the extent to which they implement policies from their manifesto, and thus also how much they leave out to cooperate with either opposition or allies.[210]

In the practice of party democracy, the emergence of the populist force becomes clear in the manipulation and mobilization of the masses. Through the usage of a binding ideology, political parties could rally their constituencies, which provided the hotbed from which an ideology of the people itself became possible. However, it would be a mischaracterization to claim that polarization in this sense was the only 'reaction' to the First World War, that is why before I end this chapter,

[207] Kelsen in Manin, representative government, p.212
[208] Manin, representative government, p.212
[209] Idem, p.213
[210] Idem, p.214

I would like to address one final practice, that of pillarization, which embedded the change to a party democracy without regressing into an extremely majoritarian politics.[211] While several countries can be viewed as having experienced a form of pillarization (Austria being one, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Belgium, and Switzerland as well), probably its most prominent example is the Dutch pillarized society. In the Netherlands especially, the so-called social cleavages or ideological differences on which the pillarization is based, are complicated through multiple alignments, starting with religious disputes.[212]

Before we get to these 'cleavages', it's helpful to quickly address the background of the Dutch state. While the Netherlands wasn't unaffected by the French revolution, and with the help of French militarists, declared itself the Batavian republic in 1795, it was the year 1848 that eventually led to a stable constitution. The year 1848 was a very important year for many of the now European nation-states, it was 'the spring of nations' no less, and as the call for liberal reforms became too much to bear for most European states, it was especially important for the young Dutch state. After the Napoleonic wars, the Netherlands formed the United Kingdom of the Netherlands with Belgium. However, in 1830, the Belgians were fed up with the lack of democratic and liberal influences on the new political institutions, not to mention the religious divide. The northern part, what would become the Netherlands, was much more conservative, while the southern part, what would become Belgium, had, in line with French influences, a much more radically democratic desire of their newly formed state.[213] Already then, there was talk of radical reform in the northern part as well, however, it took until 1848 for reform to take shape. The king of the Netherlands, with both the so-called Batavian revolution of 1795 and the Belgian revolution of 1830 in mind, felt the pressure to pursue liberal reform, which eventually culminated in the new constitution of 1848 written by a commission led by Johan Rudolph Thorbecke (1798-1872).[214]

It did not take another revolution for the Netherlands to implement this constitution. The King, William II (1792-1849), was afraid of the spreading wave of revolutions, and, notoriously, changed his stance on the apparent necessity of a new liberal constitution overnight.[215] The constitution of 1848, therefore, is the starting point for the 'parliamentarism' of the Dutch political system, but it doesn't last very long. In the 1860s, Dutch political parties, especially the Protestant party, start taking a harsher stance on several issues that have been splitting the society for a better part of the 19th century. I would argue here, that the very forces that have been injected into society

[211] Rummens, wat een theater: politiek in tijden van populisme en technocratie, p.48; Rummens identifies the pillarization as well, but situates it differently than I do.
[212] Lipset & Rokkan, cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments, p.15
[213] Van Sas, metamorfose van Nederland, pp.469-471
[214] Idem, p.476
[215] Ibid.

since the French revolution are at play here again. The political parties representing different ideologies from the ruling liberal class in the Netherlands aimed to emancipate themselves from the ruling order. In the case of the Protestants, this is most clearly articulated by Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920).[216]

The pressure on the issues of minority ideologies started rising after the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars led, at least partially, to the rise of the secular-liberal movements, which were in power most of the late 19th century. Next to this, the socialist and worker's movements in Europe were on the rise as well. Thus, in the 1860s, Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) organized several smaller Protestant movements and attempted to propose an alternative to the French radical model of popular sovereignty, which we already find with Rousseau, and the German notion of state sovereignty, found with Weber. Kuyper coined the term 'sphere sovereignty', the notion that sovereignty is not either fully with the state or the individual, but rather, that it is in specific capacities both with the individual and with the state, as well as with specific social spheres.[217] For Kuyper it was important, as a neo-Calvinist, to not lose religion to the sovereignty of the state or of the individual, by which of course he aimed to emancipate 'his religion', himself, from the possible denomination of the state. In fact, it meant that multiple faiths could equally share in sovereignty, never impeaching on the other, all interacting with an active, participating, but not unlimited, state. In the late 19th century, the Netherlands started forming a three-way split, which held out for decades and only fractionalized further after the second world war. These three pillars were: the orthodox Protestant column, the Roman Catholic column, and the socialist column. And accordingly, they had their own parties in the national parliament. The Netherlands in this capacity provided one of the first durable party systems which incorporates plurality, not polarized per se, but pillarized. While it wasn't a leading example like the British parliament was up until the 1870s, the Dutch parliament in pillarized form does become one of the most interesting and perhaps most prominent examples of 'successful' pluralist party democracy.[218] The only reason this type of politics remained stable was political compromise, especially by the elites from within the pillars. While it is tempting to view pillarization as a form of the elites coping with the effects of the populist force taking shape, the mobilization of the masses, as an analytical tool, it is helpful to understand what is undermined or neglected in populism. That is at first the recognition of pluralism in society, and second the political compromise one has to strike between those.

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[216] I take this hypothesis from Bax, E.H. (1988). Modernization and cleavage in Dutch society. A study of long term economic and social change, 164. But, my argument is philosophical in nature, it is a development inherent in the founding of representative government.

[217] Van Til, subsidiary and sphere Sovereignty, p.625

[218] See for instance the works of Arend Lijphart, who termed the style of democracy: consociational. Other smaller countries with pluralist parliaments later will be named after this Dutch example (Belgium, Austria, Denmark, etc.)

These practices of representative democracy, what I have termed polarization and pillarization, seem to point in the direction of Urbinati's claim concerning the populist force: it leads to power verticalization, extreme majoritarianism, and personation. The subtleties of Urbinati's claim come to the fore once we juxtapose this position to that of Laclau, who argues that populism doesn't necessarily lead to personation, and to that of an elite theorist like Weber, who argues that all party organization leads to power verticalization in a charismatic leader – otherwise described as personation. In the case of pillarized societies, we saw that when the populist force is kept in suspension, in part by the unpolitical force, the mobilization of the masses under political parties does not necessarily lead to personation or majoritarianism; here, space is left open for bargaining and coalition formation. At the same time, the world post-World War II is characterized by polarization, a product of the populist force. This is the case on the global level, between the communist states, headed by the Soviet Union, and the liberal states, headed by the United States of America. But it is also visible nationally, especially in the Anglo-American political system, where two parties dominated the political scene polarizing the nation itself. In these cases, charismatic leaders seem to emerge as the embodiment of the respective ideologies.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have coupled the emergence of the populist force with the emergence of party democracy as the dominant practice in representative democracy. The populist force within society, as defined by Urbinati, operates through polarization. It attempts to constitute an 'us' versus an, often dysfunctional, 'them', and as such utilizes an ideology of the people as its main tool of mobilization. Furthermore, Urbinati addresses the Caesarist tendencies in populism. The personation of the ideology of the people is aided by the power verticalization that is brought about through the polarization of society into the two homogenous camps. It means that the populist leader presents himself as the one true voice of the people, the 'us', and the only one who can take on the other, the 'them', in their name.

Populism presents itself as a 'thin' ideology; the 'us' and the 'them' can be filled in, in many ways. This is exemplified by the connection it had with Fascism and Nazism, as ideologies which easily integrated into the populist structure. These ideologies have different ways in which they fill in the splitting of society into two homogenous camps. Nowadays, we see a trend of anti-elitism or anti-establishment populism, speaking on behalf of the people often against their own representatives. But, Fascism is considered to be elitist itself, and filling in the dichotomy of 'us'

versus 'them', came in the form of anti-communism, anti-socialism, or anti-Semitism.[219] Nevertheless, the mass mobilization through such an 'us' versus 'them', came after the introduction of universal suffrage, after the First World War. The emerging practices of party politics allowed strategies of mobilization to be more effective than strategies of depoliticization.

Going back to the diarchic model and its disfigurations which I have discussed in chapter I, the extreme of populism, in opposition to the unpolitical force, shows us the normative necessity of distance between the representative and the represented – of not letting the opinion of a subsection of the people be promoted directly to the will of the people. The populist force attempts to transform the representational relation into an extra-institutional one. It attempts to do so by replacing the legitimacy of the procedures of representation, by which the people is constituted, with a representation of the people by acclamation, presupposing a social ontology of a united people. Populism thereby has to do the impossible: state a pre-procedural people. Furthermore, it has to rely on acclamation as the relation between representatives and the people, and finally, legitimize its rule through an extremely majoritarian view of democracy. While such an extremely majoritarian view is perhaps at most undesirable, the circumvention of the representational relation is self-destructive. Their aim is to make politics more democratic, give the power (back) to the people, but in their attempt, they bypass the condition by which democracy is possible at all.

In the next chapter, I will move on to the final, current practice of representative democracy: audience democracy. Within this practice, I situate the emergence of the plebiscite force, the making of the people into an audience of the political spectacle, thereby stripping them of their ability to be political actors, and in a more refined form, transforming the representational relation into a one-way street; the representative is the only visible actor.

[219] See, for instance, Roger Eatwell's chapter: Populism and Fascism, in the Oxford Handbook of Populism.

Chapter IV: Audience democracy, mass media, and the plebiscite of the people

"It is indeed escape, but not, as it claims, escape from bad reality but from the last thought of resisting that reality. The liberation which amusement promises is from thinking as negation. The shamelessness of the rhetorical question 'What do people want?' lies in the fact that it appeals to the very people as thinking subjects whose subjectivity it specifically seeks to annul."

Horkheimer & Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung, p.116

Audience democracy and the plebiscite force

In this fourth and final chapter on the genealogy of representative democracy, we enter the period dubbed by Manin as audience democracy. Within audience democracy I situate the emergence of the plebiscite force, the idea that the people are mere spectators of a show of political elites struggling for power. The plebiscite, as I will argue in the next section, is in a certain way a reaction to the previous two forces treated yet incorporating elements of both. The plebiscite force is close to the populist force in its Caesarism and its preoccupation with the masses. But while the populist force aims to mobilize the masses, the plebiscite force aims to demote them, seemingly taking from the unpolitical force the idea that the masses need to be limited in their role as political actors. However, I must be careful here, because as with the other practices, I am not referring to an intentional 'setting up' of the system. Rather, it is the new practice which brings with it a new set of winners and losers, the winners which Manin refers to as 'media experts'. Thus, I aim to situate this force within the current practice of representative democracy. I situate its 'beginning' in the 1970s and 80s, as the so-called competing ideologies slowly fall away. However, as this period is not closed off yet, we must remain careful in interpreting it, as, like Hegel poetically states in his "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts": "the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the falling of dusk."[220]

The plebiscite force

Urbinati attempts to clarify plebiscitarianism by comparing it with populism. What they share is the Caesarist tendencies, which I will discuss later, but what sets them apart is their treatment of the people. The appeal to the people in the plebiscite force is, like in populism, aimed at a unity of the people, but rather than mobilizing them, it demotes them to the role of spectator, thereby severely limiting the political agency of the people. In a plebiscite, the leaders go to the people directly, but in doing so, the leaders radicalize their positions and make bargaining nearly impossible, which in itself makes politics the terrain of leader activism, but not people activism.[221] Plebiscitarianism entails the circumvention of institutional legitimacy, and instead seeks the approval of the people in their capacity as audience of the political spectacle, or as Urbinati herself states it: "being under the eyes of the people is a plebiscitarian view that seeks to replace accountability by means of procedures and institutions with popularity".[222] Furthermore, the idea of public is thereby transformed from a public sphere wherein the people can interact and discuss,

[220] Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, p.16
[221] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.171
[222] Ibid.

to a notion of publicness in which the political elite merely displays itself and its ideas to which the people can only react as audience, as onlookers. Plebiscitarianism strips the people of its active power and leaves it with the passive 'negative' power of judgment.[223] The people are then metaphorically left only with the power to change the channels on the TV of politics, but they are always restricted to watching and can never create their own content. Whereas populism, and democratic politics, requires participation, plebiscitarianism wants transparency.[224] Urbinati is right to signify this type of plebiscitarianism, as embedded in the practice of representative democracy, as a "postrepresentative democracy […] because it wants to unmark the vanity of the myth of participation and to exalt the role of mass media as an extraconstitutional factor of surveillance".[225] The focal point in plebiscitarianism then is not the input of the people, the interplay between will and opinion, but rather the "quality of communication between the government and the citizens" as the one-way street in which the people has knowledge of the lives of their rulers.[226]

Urbinati acknowledges two things about plebiscitarianism. First, as a political concept it has its roots in the Roman practice of the plebiscitum, a yes-no vote by the plebs.[227] Second, the modern incarnation as a force within representative democracy, or rather the characteristics thereof, is described best by Jeffrey Edward Green.[228] Nonetheless, Urbinati also gives attention to earlier renderings of the plebiscitarian force, namely already in Weber, Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) and, to a lesser extent, Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950). I argue here however, that while we can say that these authors wrote of the plebiscite, they did not do so from the point of view of 21st century practice.[229] They spoke of the plebiscite as part of the populist force, in which a plebiscite of the leader is frequented, but in their time, the force of the plebiscite wasn't foundational for political practice. Thus, while I acknowledge these theoretical 'first steps', I will, to a degree, diverge from Urbinati and instead focus more on the practice of plebiscitarian democracy we see in the era of audience democracy.

Next to the notion that populism can be seen as a prefiguration of plebiscitarianism, I will show in a later section that this emergence is concomitant with the development of mass media. The populist force required the development of means to mobilize the masses, as I argued in the

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[223] This is, I believe, already a strong point, and is completely missed by Dutch political scientist Tom van der Meer in his pamphlet defending contemporary democracy: Niet de kiezer is gek (2017).
[224] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.172; See, for a treatment of this desire in contemporary society: Frissen, P. (2016). Het geheim van de laatste staat. Kritiek van de transparantie.
[225] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.172
[226] Ibid.
[227] The common folk who could 'vote' on a proposal by the tribune, a special 'representative' of the plebs.
[228] See: Green, J. E. (2010). The Eyes of the People: Democracy in an Age of Spectatorship. Oxford University Press on Demand.
[229] Weber, for instance, was looking to break the bureaucracy of the party with a strong leader, for which a plebiscite would be a useful tool. Schumpeter and Schmitt followed this anti-party bureaucracy tendency in their writings.

previous chapter. This, in part, led to the practices of state television and radio, used to talk to and mobilize the masses. While this element is partly retained in plebiscitarianism, the introduction of interactive media, most notable the Web 2.0, gave the plebiscite force the opportunity to use and transform this type of media into a tool of plebiscitarianism. To lift the veil on the argument a little, the emergence of the Web 2.0 has given the people as audience a false sense of influence. Liking, following, reacting, etc. all provide the audience with the idea that they somehow have a meaningful influence on the politics they watch, but they don't. Here, I diverge from the standard view of simply adding onto the populist force the notion of pseudo-participation.[230] I argue that it is significantly different and should, in fact, be seen as an exponent of a different force and practice entirely. In order to explain why this type of behavior has emerged and is so difficult to counter, I will use the concept of 'interpassivity' or 'interactive metal-fatigue' as developed by Van Oenen.[231] I will go into this more in the coming sections, but for now, let's get back to the depiction of the plebiscitarian force in contemporary society as depicted by Urbinati.

In what Urbinati calls the 'American renaissance of plebiscitarian democracy', she addresses the contemporary practice of plebiscitarianism in representative democracy.[232] The first feature she acknowledges is the detection and praising of the role of leadership in democracy (not against democracy), simultaneously problematizing 'constitutional legalism and parliamentary politics'.[233] Urbinati cites the work of Posner and Vermeule, *The executive unbound*, as an example of a plea for audience democracy. She paraphrases them as wanting to intensify the public opinion as a control on the executive, because the usual legal constraints are, in a sense, too effective. These legal constraints weaken the power of the executive to make decisions, thus they interrupt the process of decision-making, whereas the executive government should be swift and effective. The power Posner and Vermeule prefer is public opinion, and the demand on the executive government becomes 'transparency'.[234] We are then left with a minimum account of institutional restraints, such as term limits, and the public opinion is the primary control of power. To direct the leader toward the interests of the people, the appearance in public seems to be sufficient. Urbinati is quick to respond to this claim: media aren't 'neutral' and the people cannot be expected to process all the information necessary to monitor the politicians on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, the media are aimed at grabbing attention, not at scrutiny or monitoring, but at 'news', and politicians being aware of this can feed the machine. Urbinati cites Ackerman to state in a catchy sentence: "if 'news'

[230] See, for instance, Worsley in Laclau, On Populist Reason, p.16
[231] Van Oenen, G. (2011). Nu even niet! Over de interpassieve samenleving. Van Gennep.
[232] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.196
[233] Idem, p.197
[234] Ibid.

is what they want, 'news' is what politician/statemen will give them".[235] In this sense, the representational relation, the procedures which constitute both the people and their representatives, is transformed into election by ratings, by popularity. Furthermore, what this election by popularity leads to, is a further delegitimization of the procedures themselves, when they contradict the popular beliefs. For instance, plebiscitarian leaders often recoil against the procedures of courts, parliaments, and government in general. These elements of the unpolitical force as it were, the institutionalization of certain political procedural outcomes, are treated as illegitimate because of their direct contradiction with what they claim is the popular belief. We can, for example, illustrate this by the legal battles that figures like Trump and Wilders are continuously involved in.

The second author Urbinati uses as a reference point of modern plebiscitarianism is Green. For Urbinati, Green's plebiscitarianism is especially problematic since it replaces the verbal with the ocular. Unlike Posner and Vermeule, Green does not aim to place active leadership above democratic procedures, but rather, Green argues that placing democratic leadership before the eyes of the public is more powerful than a speech/writing-based monitoring. His main argument concerns the egalitarian force that imagery has. Visual appearance violates the aspect of equality less than speech. At face value, this seems like a powerful argument. Whereas speech is connected to understanding and thus leads to big differences in understanding and eloquence, everybody can see! Practices of deliberation and rhetoric mask, whereas placing the leader in front of the audience is more transparent and thus more democratic (even though it does nothing for participation).[236] Green gives the people the power of unveiling, the negative power to judge after watching. The audience is thereby equalized, as the watching many, while the public figures are imposed with extra burdens (of public exposure, of transparency). But, what Green doesn't seem to acknowledge, is that what the people see, is itself problematic. They only see appearances, show, spectacle, etc., which means that the representational relation itself is displaced, and 'will' and 'opinion' become disconnected. The opinion formed is not about the 'will', about the political direction of the nation-state, but rather about the spectacle the leaders put on, and they are judged merely on the appearances thereof.

What these two approaches have in common is that they divide the people in their capacity as sovereign in two distinct groups. The people as voters, with specific political intent and desire for power, and the people as audience, "an impersonal and totally interest-free unity that inspects the game of politics by imposing publicity".[237] The people always watch and can never participate

[235] Ackerman in Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.199
[236] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.205
[237] Idem, p.207

in the game of politics. Their role is demoted to that of a mere auditor of the political spectacle. According to Urbinati, it shows a "confidence in the constraining power of the market economy and the modern system of information and communication"[238], by which she seemingly means that both politics and communication is more and more structured like an 'open market', the neoliberal dream. I will argue in this chapter that audience democracy is perfectly compatible and even accommodated by the emergence of neoliberalism and its apparent lack of ideological binding we found in the party democracy era.

Urbinati's argument against this type of approach to politics is that the focus of politics is changed from deliberative practices, from understanding and reason, to the domain of the aesthetic and the irrational. Here, Urbinati's Habermasian influences come to light, and while one can agree with her argument that politics should be about deliberation and understanding, about rationality, here I would stress the aspect of participation even more.[239] While it can be argued that because of technological advancements, controlling the leaders of a state has become easier, that an educated and informed people has the time and the technological tools to monitor these leaders, I argue that this is exactly not possible. The overbearing demands from, amongst others, political institutions prove too much for the people. The people is both ever more asked to give input, and there is ever more information available for them to base their input on. The problem then, is not the unwillingness of the people, at least not in general, but this becomes too much of a burden even on the modern competent citizen. In light of the very principles of democracy, of self-determination, the process of democracy becomes too much for us to bear. The characterization of this process as 'interactive metal fatigue' or 'interpassivity' I take from Van Oenen.[240] The benefit of bringing in the interpassivity is that it also explains why the people itself is accommodating these plebiscitarian transformations of the public sphere and the political institutions. In this sense, Green is exemplary. Green does not aim to give up democratic principles, unlike authors turning against party democracy, such as Weber, but rather the ocular power is more democratic![241] I would argue that the people have the very same feeling, they believe they are participating and influencing the political leadership, actuating real change. However, while Urbinati stresses the inability of the people through their lack of understanding, which is a problem, my emphasis is on the displacement of the relation between opinion and will, with people who might even have an understanding of what is unfolding before them, but then still become overburdened by the overbearing demands on them. What these interactively 'over-exercized' citizens resort to then, are

[238] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.203
[239] Accetti et al, Debating representative democracy, p.15
[240] Van Oenen, Nu even niet, p.57
[241] Green, The Eyes of the People: Democracy in an Age of Spectatorship, p.5

minimal efforts to try and speak out their beliefs on a myriad of issues. This is especially problematic since the emergence of the Web 2.0, where user interaction has become the norm. The problem is that instead of actively engaging with a cause, putting time and effort into change or an ideal, one is seduced to 'like, share, and subscribe to' a goal.[242] Thereby participating in no meaningful way and only reinforcing one's own beliefs, creating what is now commonly referred to as: filter bubbles.

In the rest of this chapter I will develop this point further, in part by genealogically investigating the practice of audience democracy that has emerged, and within which we still currently live. Again, like the other chapters before this one, this genealogical investigation will have once more the description of an incredibly contingent event, which nonetheless meant the definitive breaking in of a new practice of representative democracy, in this case not the French Revolution, or the First World War, but the fall of the Soviet Union, and more specifically, the fall of the Berlin wall.

The dialectics of emancipation

Picking up where we historically left off in the previous chapter, the genealogical analysis of the emergence of the plebiscite force starts with the situation in which the populist force was still dominant. As I described in the previous chapter, Western democracies either polarized, creating two united camps on each side of the political spectrum, with the prime example being the United States, or pillarized, created smaller subsections of society with their own representation, the prime example here being the Netherlands. The dominance of the party was accompanied by the often-rock-solid adherence to a specific ideology, the very mechanism by which the parties were bound to their constituencies as the political parties personified their ideology. This situation, or relation, collapses under the pressure of emancipation, which re-emerges in the 1960s.[243]

Just like how I have proposed seeing the forces so far discussed, unpolitical, populist, and plebiscitarian, as inherent to representative democracy, so too, I agree with Van Oenen, we can see forces larger than merely the political domain as inherent to society in general. We have to remember that the very event that kickstarted the analysis in this thesis is itself a product of forces. The French revolution is the turning political of the forces of enlightenment, and within the enlightenment is encapsulated already, the emancipatory pressures enacted on society. Since Kant,

[242] I am using 'like, share, subscribe', the call to action most common to YouTube videos, as a stand-in for online activity. I include within these terms all activities on social media, such as: reacting, commenting, etc.
[243] This re-emergence is itself a very complex phenomenon. For one, the relative prosperity and the impact of the second World War partly shaped the perspective of the generation that demands more emancipation.

we see the enlightenment as people gaining autonomy, about breaking the shackles of 'unmündigkeit', the state of being unable to speak and think for oneself.[244] While the original turn of enlightenment was perhaps against the practices of religion, the French revolution and the practice of representative democracy are products of the forces of enlightenment as well, of autonomy translated in the political sphere: democracy. Van Oenen describes this force quite convincingly when he argues that the development of these practices should be conceived of as a dialectical movement, understood as the forces within a practice, which develop the practice itself through continuous interaction between them. In other words, that our understanding of the practice partly shapes the practice, and the continued interaction propels it.[245] This is the way in which I understand the forces that we have discussed so far concerning the representational relation, as I have said in the introduction already, but it is also the way in which I understand 'all' forces inherent to society.

It is not surprising then, that we can read the political turns we have described so far as manifestations of emancipation. The resulting practices are all ways of having to cope with an emancipatory claim. After the emancipation of the Third Estate (and the making of the Third Estate), the representational relation of the political practice of the 19th century was mostly determined by the individual relation between representative and constituency, determined in part by the elites coping through the making unpolitical of political notions. Next, after the emancipation of several groups within that Third Estate, the workers and the different religious factions, the populist force determined the mobilization of these groups through the ideology of the political party in most of the 20th century. Finally, in the second half of the 20th century, this ideological glue is under pressure again, from the very same forces which set up the political party structure, the emancipatory forces. It starts especially in the 1960s, when the very principles upon which the French revolution rests, self-determination, gain 'societal reality', as Van Oenen puts it.[246] To re-describe this latest emergence of emancipation: the state is so successful in producing emancipated individuals, that these individuals now turn against the condition that made their emancipation possible, the state itself.[247]

The 1960s are a complicated time to characterize. Unfortunately, I do not have the time nor space in this thesis to treat all the movements and forces in play during this period in time. Let alone go into the causes and consequences of many of the events that occurred throughout the

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[244] Kant, Beantwortung der frage: was ist Aufklärung, p.1; "Answering the question: what is enlightenment?"; "immaturity"
[245] Van Oenen, nu even niet, pp.70-73
[246] Idem, p.79
[247] Weymans, Freedom through political representation: Lefort, Gauchet, and Rosanvallon on the relationship between state and society, pp.276-277; although Weymans himself seems to be a proponent of some version of this description, within this specific context he is showing the perspective of Marcel Gauchet.

60s. What I can only do, is give an impression of the 60s as a 'turbulent' time in the Western world. It is marked by Cold War tensions, the construction of the Berlin wall, the Cuba missile crisis and the Vietnam war, student revolts all over Europe and the United States, the civil rights movement, from the Greensboro sit-in to the Selma march, political assassinations, de-colonialization, sexual liberation, the emergence of television, and the invention of ARPANET, the early incarnation of the internet. It also featured the invention of the first interactive video game, which, symbolically, marks the beginning of the making interactive of all of society.[248] Fredric Jameson hails the 60s as the beginning of the humanization of the 'third world'. By which he means the start of the process of enfranchisement and attributing civil rights to minorities in First World countries, and the recognition of the former colonies as states in their own right. Whereas the First World War and the subsequent political practice concerned women's and thus universal suffrage, the practice after the Second World War is marked by the demand for equality, political and civil, by (all) minorities.[249] Jameson also notes that if any two countries can be made examples of the sixties, it would be the United States and France. While such a restriction doesn't do justice to all the events that happened in surrounding countries, the events in France and the United States are emblematic for the times. The hallmark of the sixties is perhaps the year 1968, the year of revolt, a year in which many of the previously described processes culminated, especially with the establishment of the Black Panther movement in the United States, the May '68 events in France, and a wave of anti-Vietnam war demonstrations among several countries.

However, the world in the 1960s was still very much characterized by inequality, in some countries by pillarization, and globally by polarization. After the second World War, the Soviet Union establishes itself as the countermodel of the Anglo-American liberal world. The Anglo-American world was politically and economically determined by the notion of classical liberalism, marked by civil liberties under the rule of law and a firm-belief in economic freedoms, otherwise known as the 'free' market. The communist world, spearheaded by the Soviet Union, was marked by centralized planning, both politically and economically. At least, this is how neoliberals of the 1980s and 1990s, drawing on the 1930s, characterized these 'opposite' economies. However, and this is not as trivial as it might seem, the economic model of the Soviet Union was not based on some Marxist-communist example. Karl Marx (1818-1883) never wrote about developments after the revolution, only about those before it, and logically so. Lenin, having to structure a society now under his 'control', looked towards the country he admired most, Germany, and thus implemented an economy very much like the war-economy of Germany during the First World War. Centralized

[248] A feat of humanity hilariously commented on by Science Fiction writer Frederik Pohl in: Spacewar, 1963. Retrieved from: https://archive.org/stream/Galaxy_v21n06_1963-08#page/n2/mode/1up
[249] Jameson, Periodizing the 60s, p.180

planning in this respect, was already a common variant of the liberal-capitalist economy in war-time.[250] Second, the postwar economies are mostly identified as mixed governments, having both elements of socialist planning and the free market, thus the positioning of neoliberalism as a third way, especially after the second World War, would have been deceiving, as it simply called for a return of the classical liberal values within these mixed economies.

What is a much more fruitful approach then, is the political-theoretical reading of forces within these society as Marxist and liberal.[251] Liberalism as the dominant political force within, at least, the Anglo-American political practices, posited the individual as the ontological atom of society. The market was seen as the ultimate measure through which the individuals of society could be serviced. Marxist criticism focused on exactly these kinds of presuppositions, emphasizing the social environment within which the individual is situated, further analyzing their social environments through historical material drivers as determining the subject. The market then isn't just the mechanism through which the individuals are serviced, but rather, and more importantly, it becomes the "generator of oppression and inequality".[252]

'Depillarization' or the revolutionary spirit

The resurfaced demand for self-determination meant that ideologies programs, the glue by which the constituencies were bound to their political parties, were losing ground. Whereas throughout the first half of the 20th century there was a period of 'electoral stability', also called the freezing hypothesis, this situation gradually changes after the 1960s.[253] Voting becomes once again volatile, and party affiliation is no longer a life-encompassing feature as Ostrogorsky argued 75 years before.[254] Whereas the program of a political party meant the materialization of the ideology shared by the constituency and the representative, no longer were the members of the constituency content with following such an ideology. Automatically following the party program came to be seen as a breach of self-determination. It was, as it were, as if the relations up until then were that the political party was above the individual in party democracy, at least for the constituency, but this relation was no longer tolerated after the sixties, and therefore flipped. The political party came

[250] See for instance Hobsbawm's chapter on the aims and influence of the Soviet Union, the world revolution, in: Hobsbawm, age of extremes, pp.55-84
[251] Dryzek, Honig & Phillips, The Oxford handbook of political theory, p.15
[252] Idem, p.15
[253] The term 'freezing' has been used first by Lipset & Rokkan but has been the subject of many studies since then. See for instance: Mair, P. (2001). The freezing hypothesis: An evaluation. Party systems and voter alignments revisited, 27-44.
[254] See for instance: Pedersen, M. N. (1979). The dynamics of European party systems: Changing patterns of electoral volatility. European Journal of Political Research, 7(1), 1-26.

to be seen not as the personification of a shared ideology, but in service of the constituency. Nonetheless, one must be careful with such a characterization.

However, this process of flipping didn't occur overnight. It emerged over the next decades. Interestingly, the countries in which pillarization had occurred showed the biggest change, aptly called 'depillarization'. Again, to return to the primary example of pillarization as put forward in the previous chapter, the Netherlands showed an astounding change from the 1960s onwards. As in many other countries in the sixties there were student revolts, most notably the movement of the Provo.[255] Provo was short for 'provocation', and like other movements in the sixties, it emphasized the autonomy of the citizen in the face of state power. The Provo-movement was exemplary for the emancipatory movement, it recognized its own temporality and plurality, and it aimed to describe itself as a shockwave, not an institution itself, but anti-institutional. It can be said that Provo influenced both the May 68 protests in France, and the Prague Spring, but much more importantly it unwittingly became the antecedent to the institutionalization of interaction and the so-called wave of revolutions in the late 80s and early 90s, which I will discuss in the next section. However, I am careful about the reasons to put Provo on such a pedestal. The movement itself, I argue, can only be interpreted as a success if we view Provo as the temporal expression of the demand for autonomy through interaction, as dismay over the apparently passive role of the citizens and the 'self-contained' machinery of government up until that point.[256]

Provo and the process of depillarization can clearly be seen as emancipatory, as liberating the people, the voters, from the ideological programs of the parties. But, as I said before, we can see both pillarization and depillarization as products of the same force of emancipation. The process of pillarization, as discussed in the previous chapter, came about when minority groups, Protestant, Catholic, and socialist workers, started to group themselves in opposition to the ruling liberal class in the Netherlands.[257] Depillarization occurred when the very same Protestants, Catholics, and socialist workers, wanted to emancipate themselves from the self-constructed social groups to which they had belonged for so many years.[258] The process of depillarization went hand in hand with the process of deconfessionalisation, and secularization. Whereas around 56% of the votes for the second chamber in 1948, at its peak, went to denominational parties, this was more

[255] See for a much more elaborate treatment of the several social movements in the Netherlands from the 60s onwards: Duyvendak, J. W. (1992). Tussen verbeelding en macht: 25 jaar nieuwe sociale bewegingen in Nederland. Sua.

[256] In its call for interaction the movement was 'progressive', but while it accurately recognized pollution of the environment as a major threat, in its aims to return to nature, to a pre-industrialized society, it misunderstood the society from which it sprung, it was regressive. In a similar sense, we cannot go back to the pre-interactive stage.

[257] Dekker & Ester, Depillarization, Deconfessionalization, and De-Ideologization: Empirical Trends in Dutch Society 1958-1992, P.329; Bryant, Depillarisation in the Netherlands, p.56

[258] See, for a more elaborate treatment of the complex factors facilitating depillarization: Bryant, C. G. (1981). Depillarisation in the Netherlands. British Journal of Sociology, 56-74.

than halved by 1994.[259] However, these themes and demonstrations, as mentioned before, weren't contained to the Netherlands. In fact, by the end of the 1960s, simultaneous with the movements of 'civil disobedience', a body of work emerged concerning the very same themes. For one, the legitimacy of the state, the limits of obligation, the nature of justice, and the claims of conscience in politics became theoretical concerns as well. The well-read literature of the time includes Marcuse's 'Repressive Tolerance' in Wolff, Moore, and Marcuse's 'Beyond tolerance' from 1965, but also Hanna Pitkin's 'Obligation and consent' from 1966, and Arendt's essay on 'Civil Disobedience' in 1969.[260]

Through the emancipation from the existing ideologies, the party programs, but also, in a sense, state authority itself, I argue that it only makes sense that the question for the institutions faced with civil unrest quickly became: what now? Given that the institutions could no longer simply follow the programmatic starting points which had bound them to the people for so long, they had to revert to a new source of 'starting points' of ideas. The political institutions had no other choice but to look towards the people themselves, not in pre-defined groups bound by an ideology, but as ad-hoc groups, instigated by the institution the people would face in that very moment. The political institutions of the state were becoming interactive.

The becoming interactive of the political institutions, or rather the institutionalization of emancipation, came about mostly in the seventies, eighties and nineties, as a consequence of the emancipatory wave of the sixties. As I have just described above, the institutionalization of emancipation was already carried within the notion of self-determination, as the alternative to the acceptance of the ideological program offered by political parties and the pillars. While I could discuss several practices, which show the general tendency to make institutions interactive - in the Netherlands this is perhaps best exemplified by the universities giving students a voice through participation councils - I opt here to take a different route. I'd like to point out the expression of the desire for interaction and the practices put forward concerning interactive government as found within the discipline of public administration, also named the network approach to governance. What they perhaps show more than the actual practices of interaction, is the shift in perspective on what these institutions entail, or rather should entail.

According to Erik-Hans Klijn & Joop Koppenjan, the network approach to governance views policy as the outcome of the process of interaction within the institutional context, by which they mean that the institution shapes the rules of the game of interaction.[261] Interaction becomes

[259] Dekker & Ester, Depillarization, Deconfessionalization, and De-Ideologization, p.330; Or see: Erik, H. (1988). Bax, Modernization and cleavage in Dutch society. A study of long term economic and social change, 164.
[260] Dryzek, Honig & Phillips, The Oxford handbook of political theory, pp.13-14
[261] Klijn & Koppenjan, Public Management and Policy Networks
Foundations of a network approach to governance, p.139

central within the institution, but we can be even more clear than this. Klijn & Koppenjan also mention that governing in the old way of top-down decision-making does not work anymore within this context.[262]. They also signal that unlike the anarchist desires of the Provo, co-creation within the policy network does not occur spontaneous or simple, it requires "game management and network constitution".[263] So there is an ambiguous tension within the interactive institution. It needs the input of the interdependent actors to come to a policy, but these interdependent actors cannot spontaneously come to co-creation, to policy. On the one side, the becoming-interactive shows a process of emancipation, of participation within policy, but on the other side, it shows, in Foucauldian terms, subjectivation, a disciplining institution.

Nonetheless, the key take-away, according to me, is the ascribed necessity of input from the actors, the plain citizens. When it comes to political parties, after the 1960s, no longer is the citizen just a member: he is now co-constitutive of the party program. This doesn't just happen with the institutions of political parties. Institutions of all kinds start this participatory trend, such as universities with their participation boards, or schools with their parental boards, but also city-initiatives, a sort of 'by citizens, for citizens' election of citizens-initiatives for projects in the city.[264] Policy has to come from bottom-up, otherwise people won't accept it. Again, there is a flipside, bottom-up also becomes a strategic tool to (not) address issues. If there isn't a citizen's initiative to tackle one of the issues at play in, for instance, the city, then this could also be identified as a lack of urgency or political grounds. The people do not only become co-owner of those issues they address, they also become responsible for those issues they don't address. In this sense, the people are 'responsibilitized' for their passivity, which is all the more problematic, as I shall later argue, as this passivity can be strategically aimed at by the plebiscitary force.

'Depolarization' or the autumn of nations

Given what I argued above, the question becomes: do we live in a post-ideological society now that the ideological programs of political parties no longer have much hold over society? Yes, and no. We live in a most ideological of times, not in the sense of a constant ideological contest, but in the complete permeation of a single ideological notion: (neo)liberalism. As I mentioned earlier, Neoliberalism as a force presented itself as a third way. The situation during much of the 20th century, was one between socialism/capitalism, at least this is how economists portrayed it.

[262] Klijn & Koppenjan, Public Management and Policy Networks, p.149
[263] Ibid.
[264] My hometown, Rotterdam, is very much influenced by this type of tool, with real material consequences as well, such as the luchtsingel which was selected and created in 2011: http://www.luchtsingel.org/over-de-luchtsingel/het-stadsinitiatief/

Neoliberalism sought to position itself between the two ends of the spectrum. However, Neoliberalism is merely the reintroduction of classical liberal doctrines within a more socialist society, a repackaging, as it were, of the very same principles of laissez-faire markets and restricted government. This becomes clear when we view the economical framing from the political perspective.

I will not repeat here the endless analyses of how neoliberalism has permeated our daily lives. I want to shortly treat its emergence in the late 70s and early 80s of the twentieth century, not as an inevitable result of the French revolution, or of emancipation, but rather of opportunism. Here, I agree with Van Oenen, that the forces of emancipation had in them already the unforeseen consequences of enabling neoliberalism.[265] But I also agree with Naomi Klein who in her work Shock Doctrine[266] proposes that neoliberalism uses the notion of crisis to push through neoliberal reform, all the while denying possible complicity in creating the crisis. In my view, liberalism in its form of neoliberalism was most successful in presenting itself as the accompanying context for the emancipated individual. In neoliberalism, the subject is presented as a super-subject, as the last atom in the post-ideological age. Which, in economic theory, in neoliberalism, is expressed as a matter of 'laissez faire'.

As David Harvey interestingly notes in *A brief history of neoliberalism*, it is possible that in the future we will view the emergence of neoliberalism, especially in the brief period of 1978-1980, as the new constitutive period of our era.[267] In 1978, Deng Xiaoping first pushed China towards to the blended market economy we know it as today, sometimes even being hailed as more capitalist than our own capitalist societies. In 1979, Margaret Thatcher prepared Great Britain for a major push for privatization. And in 1980, Ronald Reagan is elected president of the United States, perhaps best known for his Reaganomics, or trickledown economics.[268] What these pushes have in common is that they all repackage the societal goal of human wellbeing, as the removal of obstacles to individual freedom and determination, applied to the economic realm, as free markets, free trade, strong property rights, and liberating entrepreneurial freedom.[269]

I read neoliberalism thus, as an economic inflection of something else, the idea of accommodating and giving space to the emancipated subject, which I think is the reason why it wasn't the sheer force of the much older ideas of economic liberalism that convinced especially the social-democratic forces of the credibility of the neoliberal goals. Rather, it was the belief in the

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[265] Van Oenen, Nu even niet, p.88
[266] See: Klein, N. (2007). The shock doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism. Macmillan.
[267] Harvey, a brief history of neoliberalism, p.1
[268] I will not treat this in detail, but it comes down to tax-breaks for the wealthy, to let the free market of labor further employ and thus distribute the wealth.
[269] Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, p.2

emancipated citizen which accommodated the unforeseen consequences of the re-emergence of economic liberalism. In the western world, in both pillarized and polarized societies this has expressed itself in the emergence of a pragmatic center movement. In the United States, this is exemplified by the Bill Clinton presidency of the 1990s. Clinton was elected as a Democrat, the supposed left-wing political party in the United States, however, Clinton, in his policies, aligned himself with the center left and the center right, bipartisan in nature, to form what was later called 'the Washington consensus', a neoliberal outlook on public policy solidified by center support.[270] At the same time, in a pillarized country like the Netherlands, a similar process emerges. For the first time in so many years, the Dutch cabinet leaves out the strong center Christian Democratic Party, and instead forms what is known as a 'purple cabinet', purple in that is the result of the mix of the red social-democrats, and the blue liberals. Interestingly, one of the parties that made this coalition possible at all, is the Democrats '66, a relatively new democratic party founded in 1966, a clear product of the emancipatory wave of the sixties.

However, the definitive 'victory' of liberalism comes in the form of the fall of the Soviet Union, and more specifically, the autumn of nations, the revolutions of 1989 in which many of the satellite states of the Soviet Union, gained after the second World War, claim independence in some form or another. Like the causes of the French revolution, the causes of the fall of communism are plural, complicated, and contingent. Like in the other chapters, and as I announced in an earlier section, I will sketch briefly some of the factors that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and fall of the Berlin wall. Again, this description serves as an expression of the notion that the breaking into a new practice of representative democracy is in large part the unforeseen consequence of complicated, contingent, and mundane events, which allow for a configuration of representative democracy in which a specific force becomes dominant, thereby being both a product and a shaping force of that practice.

Whereas the Soviet Union and the satellite states were doing quite well right after the war, their economic growth started stagnating heavily by the 1970s. While this deserves an extensive treatment alone, Hobsbawm points towards some of the crucial factors. First, the rise of what is now known as *nomenklatura*, Russian for 'list of names', depicting the widespread system of corruption, patronage, and nepotism, which took hold of the Soviet Union after the Stalinist era, and second, the inability to isolate itself from the world economy (unlike what the Soviet Union was able to do in the interwar period).[271] The period was exemplified by the inability and unwillingness of the Soviet government, led by Leonid Brezhnev (1906-1982), to reform or

[270] Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, p.13
[271] Hobsbawm, the age of extremes, p.473

interfere with the economic model, and it subsequently became known as the 'era of stagnation'. Especially the economy of contemporary Russia was extremely dependent on the fossil fuels it provided to its satellite states. When the global market price for oils skyrocketed, a recurring feat in the '70s, so did the income of the Soviet Union, which masked the decline of the economy, provided grease for the stagnating Soviet economic machine, and more importantly gave Brezhnev the idea that he could compete in, and win, an arms race with the United States, plunging the Soviet Union into war with Afghanistan in 1979, a war which would deplete the Soviet treasury heavily throughout the '80s until the Soviet retreat of '89.

Politically, eastern Europe, the buffer zone between western Europe and the Soviet Union, was already problematic for the Soviet Union. Since the Prague spring of 1968, mentioned briefly already, the established Soviet satellite governments were struggling with their unpopularity. Again, we see here the impact of the '60s as a social movement. Mikhail Gorbachev, a reformist, came to power as the general secretary of the communist party in 1985, mostly to break the Brezhnev era, and he did so by propagating *perestroika* and *glasnost*, Russian for respectively restructuring and openness or transparency. Here, Gorbachev's focus on the Western world comes to light already, the emergence of the plebiscite force as expressed through the demand and strategic use of transparency for legitimacy. Gorbachev, like his social-democratic counterparts in Western Europe, thought the liberalization of the political system would establish a better socialism than the one found in the Soviet Union at the time.[272] However, exactly the combination of these two ideals led to a further exacerbation of the Soviet system. The way to change was still embedded in the nepotistic party-bureaucratic system, but transparency about this system destabilized support for it.[273] Eventually, the Soviet Union further disintegrated, until it lost most of its influence by 1989 and could no longer stabilize its satellite countries. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary all reform themselves in 1989, but the final blow, the fall of the Berlin wall, is as decisive as it is accidental.

When Hungary reformed and opened its borders with Austria, it marked a gap in the hitherto impenetrable 'Iron Curtain', the closed border between the Soviet world and the Western European world, splitting central Europe in two. Thousands of East-Germans, who were not allowed to travel to the West but could move freely within the Soviet sphere, used Hungary to get into Austria and move to the West. The East-German government, in an attempt to contain the migration stream, prevents its people from moving to Hungary, but allows people from Hungary to come back in. Protests break out all over the German Democratic Republic (GDR) of East-

[272] Hobsbawm, the age of extremes, p.480
[273] For a more thorough explanation, see: Hobsbawm, the age of extremes, pp.482-484

Germany, and initially the demands are aimed at opening the border to Hungary again, and force the government to stop its containment politics. Over time however, the demands change, and the aim of the protests changes to reforming the government of the GDR itself. Finally, the East-German government attempts to appease its protestors by new travel regulations, what they don't plan on however, is the fall of the Berlin wall on November 9th, 1989. The following passage I quote from a newspaper article Mary Elise Sarotte wrote for the Washington Post, simply, because I could not have told this story any better:

That night at 6 PM, Guenter Schabowski, a member of the East German Politburo who served as its spokesman, was scheduled to hold a news conference. Shortly before it began, he received a piece of paper with an update on the regulations and a suggestion that he mention them publicly. He had not been involved in discussions about the rules and did not have time to read the document carefully before starting. His hour-long news conference was so tedious that Tom Brokaw, who was there, remembered being "bored." But in the final minutes, an Italian journalist's question about travel spurred Schabowski's memory. He tried to summarize the new regulations but became confused, and his sentences trailed off. "Anyway, today, as far as I know, a decision has been made," he said. "It is a recommendation of the Politburo that has been taken up, that one should from the draft of a travel law, take out a passage. . ." Among the long-winded clauses, some snippets leapt out: "exit via border crossings" and "possible for every citizen." Suddenly, every journalist in the room had questions. "When does that go into force?" shouted one. "Immediately?" shouted another. Rattled and mumbling to himself, Schabowski flipped through his papers until he uttered the phrase: "Immediately, right away." It felt as if "a signal had come from outer space and electrified the room," Brokaw recalled. Some wire journalists rushed out to file reports, but the questions kept coming, among them: "What will happen to the Berlin Wall now?" Alarmed about what was unfolding, Schabowski concluded with more muddled responses: "The question of travel, of the permeability therefore of the wall from our side, does not yet answer, exclusively, the question of the meaning, of this, let me say it this way, fortified border." Furthermore, "the debate over these questions could be positively influenced if the Federal Republic [of West Germany] and if NATO would commit themselves to and carry out disarmament." As NATO was unlikely to disarm itself by breakfast, Schabowski clearly did not expect much to happen that night. But it was too late -- by 7:03 p.m., the wires were reporting that the Berlin Wall was open.[274]

[274] Sarotte, M.E., How an accident caused the Berlin wall to come down. *The Washington Post.* For a much more elaborate treatment, see: Sarotte, M.E. (2014). *1989: the struggle to create post-Cold War Europe.* Princeton University Press.

For the last time in this thesis, the contingency of history comes to light. The fall of the Berlin wall meant the definitive fall of socialism and the implementation of liberalism throughout Europe. It is both wildly entertaining and a little worrying that such a celebrated event hinged, at least for a small part, on the sleep-deprivation of a single politburo member.[275] In the next and final section of this chapter, I will highlight some of the main practices that have come to the fore after this decisive moment. However, as I have mentioned in the first section of this chapter, given that we are still currently well within this practice of representative democracy, it is impossible to give any definitive signification.

Audience democracy and mass media 2.0

For this final section, let's return to Urbinati's treatment of the plebiscite force. As mentioned, she leans heavily on the works of Green to both describe and understand what the force of the plebiscite does, or rather how it transformed the relation between the represented and the representative. However, Green, and subsequently Urbinati, focusses primarily on the visual aspect of mass media and in particular the transformative function of television. I would argue here, that this mischaracterization would lead to a misunderstanding of our contemporary society. It is not the active medium of radio or television itself, which has radically transformed the representational relation. Yes, these media have a gigantic reach and it might even be true that the substitution of audio and text with imagery has played into the subject's emotional desire more than his rational potential, but the mobilization and manipulation of the masses is a feature of populism, as we have already discussed earlier. While this might be a theoretical point, the problem is that the making of an audience of the people – or at least the argument that the substitution of speech by eye changes the mode of interference – clashes with the emergence of the interactive nature of society since the 1970s, the period of audience democracy.[276] This clash is in need of an explanation.

My argument is that the Mass Media 1.0, the media Green and Urbinati discuss, are still a product of the populist force, they are aimed at activating the people, albeit in a manipulative manner (one could argue activation is always manipulative). The media of our time however, are what I call Mass Media 2.0. Obviously, this term refers to the notion of the Web 2.0, the specific moment in which the emancipatory drive for interactivity had reached the internet. Not in the

[275] I do not mean to say that the Berlin wall only fell by the grace of this mistake, but rather that in a chaotic system such as the geopolitical system, these small events can have very big consequences, like the famed 'butterfly effect'. Given the position of the GDR and the possibility that they could prepare themselves differently if the wall didn't fall right there and then, but weeks or months later, they might have found ways of consolidating their hold on East-Germany. What would be the state of the European Union if Germany remained ununified until even the year 2000?
[276] Manin, The principles of representative democracy, p.218

technical sense, but rather in the lay-out of webpages, in the character of the usage of the internet. The Web 2.0 emerged around 2003, and is defined by the centrality of the user, and user-content.[277] An example of a web 1.0 type of website could be a news site, such as the New York Times. The focus of the website is not on user interaction, even though it might accommodate it, but rather on the Times content: the news articles. An example of the web 2.0 are the social media, within which the user profile, user content creation, and user activity, are the main drivers of the website. While especially the internet takes on this format, it has increasingly influenced other media as well. One cannot watch a television program without there popping up a hashtag with the implicit command of reacting to this program on the internet, which can then subsequently be shown as live results on the television again. At first sight, this seems like a democratization, a way for the actual input of users, or 'creators', to drive the medium.

However, I think we can find a parallel between the emergence of party democracy, and the audience democracy in the very same manner that Michels described about a hundred years ago: it is merely a veil of democratization. Whereas Michels recognizes the elitist tendency in party democracy, I argue that the plebiscitary force pushes the illusion of democratization into the era of Mass Media 2.0. The interaction of Mass Media 2.0 is illusory, and here I agree with Urbinati again, in that it replaces the terrain of actual interaction, the political institutions, with the terrain of insignificant interaction, with online activity, mostly in the form of 'slacktivism'.[278] The representational relation is, in a sense, undone, and the realm of opinion formation is displaced to a side-realm with no active connection to representation.

The increasingly overbearing demands of contemporary society lead the subjects to 'efficiently' spend their time. I am not blaming the subjects here, or even doubting their intentions. Subjects may have rightful intentions and may even believe that their 'likes, sharing, and subscriptions' somehow have true impact on society. But it seems very difficult for such movements to not lead to a dead-end or become appropriated by other forces. It mostly seems to give those participating the sense of having input or of inputting meaningful change into society, and the problem becomes that through the tiresome demands of the system, actual possibilities for input aren't treated as such. A side effect thereof seems to be that because this has become a standard mode of relating to the political realm, what is expected of the opposition or other political leaders, is mostly a condemnation through social media, instead of acting through the political institutions themselves. The political leaders nowadays mostly scrutinize each other in public on social media, and often we don't even expect more from our political leaders either. What makes

[277] Cormode & Krishnamurthy, key differences between web 1.0 and web 2.0; Kaplan & Haenlein, Users of the world, unite! The challenges and opportunities of Social Media, p.61
[278] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.227

our society plebiscitarian is that those in power, or those aspiring to be, know this. I want to put forward two examples here. On the one hand: Donald Trump. Trump is a 'master' of social media, but what is most important is not his apparent mobilization of the people, but rather his nothing-sticks persona. Trump has a low approval rating[279], signifying that his policies aren't supported widely by the people, but through his distraction of the people, by putting up a performance under the eyes of the people, he has still managed to implement reform without much hassle or protest, by whipping many members of congress to pass his legislation (aided of course by the current senate majority leader Mitch McConnell). The problem is best exemplified by the tip/request Robert Reich, former Treasury Secretary of the Clinton administration, often gives his followers: call your representative! Reich knows all too well that real political influence doesn't come from venting your outrage to those who already agree, to the so-called bubble, but instead comes from the interaction of 'will' and 'opinion', from calling your representatives and letting them know what you think, and acting upon their (un)responsiveness in the voting booth.[280]

The second and last example I give of the plebiscitarian force, is Dutch politician Thierry Baudet. Obviously, I am concerned in part because I come from and live in the country in which he is politically active, but more so than that, I am concerned by his cynicism. Trump in some ways is familiar in his populism, he claims massive rallies, boasts about his support, and touts values of the ordinary American, all the while being a clear product of 'audience democracy'. Baudet however has shed this populist veil, and whereas Trump still claims to represent the people (even though he clearly doesn't), Baudet is even openly elitist (only anti-establishment). Baudet doesn't even pretend to be outside the elites, but rather puts on the persona of the intellectual, which is deemed an attractive quality by his constituency. Incapsulated within this attitude is the idea that only those with his capacities are fit for political activity and the people should just take the backseat. In this sense, Baudet is the ultimate plebiscitarian politician, borrowing from old republican traditions to openly claim the political incapability of the people and demoting them to the role of audience, of spectators to his political show. No wonder the platform through which he rose to prominence was 'Forum for Democracy', an action group calling for referenda, the classical yes-or-no plebiscite tool for legitimizing political rule. The difference then between the populist force and the plebiscite force is that, while they both have a clear Caesarist tendency, the first aims to make the people active and mobilized, to manipulate them, and the second aims to demote them and make them into mere spectators. Given the emergence of political figures like Baudet, we can describe this

[279] Looking at the aggregate of approval ratings on RealClearPolitics, he currently, as of 2018, has a 54.1% disapproval rating. Data from: https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/president_trump_job_approval-6179.html

[280] See for instance his: 'the first 100 days resistance agenda', in which social media only plays a very small role and the emphasis is on the reconnection between opinion and will: http://robertreich.org/post/153401540180

best in the words of Marx that all world-historic facts or figures appear twice, first as tragedy, second as farce.[281]

Conclusion

In this chapter I have tried to situate the emergence of the plebiscitarian force within the practice of 'audience democracy'. The plebiscite force attempts to demote the people to a role as audience, as viewing the political spectacle played out by the elite, all the while leaving them with simply a negative power of judgment, or as I contend, even an illusory power of judgment. Like Populism, it is characterized by a Caesarist notion of a political strongman capable of leading government, only without the mass mobilization, but rather the people's 'passification'.[282] The main prop of the plebiscite force, I contend, is the web 2.0, or rather what I have termed: the mass media 2.0. Here I diverge from Urbinati, who instead claims the television as the plebiscite force's main symbol. While this doesn't seem very far off, there is a subtle difference in my claim. The web 2.0 is a consequence of the same force of emancipation which has been an intersecting driving force behind the breaks in the political practices of representative democracy since the French revolution. In fact, in this chapter I have even recast the breaks as products of emancipation, and I have shown that the resulting practices can each be seen as unforeseen consequences of a dialectical movement. However, as I have mentioned in the first chapter on the democratic diarchy, this recasting or intersecting, is something that needs further investigation.

For now, Audience democracy can be cast as an unforeseen consequence of the emancipatory force in play since the advent of popular sovereignty, gaining social reality in the 1960s, while eventually establishing the ever-interactive nature of our society. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the definitive coupling of liberalism with democracy, we are thoroughly submerged in the practice of audience democracy, aided by the technological advancements and the requirements of the same emancipatory movement for mass media to become interactive as well. This has affected the representational relation. This force, like the populist force, is attempting to make representative democracy more democratic. It is argued that the people through watching or, in my case, through interacting with social media can influence politics more; they can be more

[281] Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, I; the exact quote is as follows: "Hegel remarks somewhere [*] that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce".

[282] While I am aware that the spelling of 'pacification' is common use, I prefer the neologism of 'passification', to refer much more directly to the notion that the people become passive – or interpassive – and not conflate the other meanings of pacification as either peace treaty or police/military action. To pacific ultimately comes from the Latin *pax* meaning peace, but passive ultimately comes from the Latin *pati* meaning 'to suffer', referring much more to somebody undergoing something..

effective in providing input and judging representatives. However, Urbinati herself already makes the Habermasian claim that watching cannot be equated to understanding, which is a product of a deliberative practice, of reasoning. Watching, as an affective operation, disconnects the represented from the representatives. This however, I want to argue, is still a product of the populist force, of mobilizing the people through an aesthetic practice of politics by which the people are activated on the basis of their immediate perception. Rather, the real problem of the plebiscite force is the combination of distraction and the creation of a false sense of input, the call to action of 'like, share, subscribe!'. The people want to uphold their own democratic norms of having valuable input for democracy, but they can no longer manage to fulfill the overbearing demands society puts on them. Therefore, in an attempt to still fulfill these demands, the people resort to means outside the representational relation. People don't have the time or energy to speak to their representatives or work through the procedures anymore and instead resort to the fast clicks and likes that at least make them feel as if they are actively engaged in the political process. This has resulted in a disconnect between opinion and will, where the will is merely projected by the political elite, and the opinion is displaced to an insignificant side-realm without any interaction with the appropriate political institutions.

Conclusion: representation in suspense

My aim in this thesis was twofold: [1] to bring back political representation to the most promising model of (representative) democracy, and [2] to historicize the emergence of the forces within representative democracy and interpret the resulting practices of representative democracy. First, the model I am discussing is that of the democratic diarchy, the formulation of the sovereignty of the people as consisting of both 'will', the formal political institutions, and 'opinion', the extra-institutional opinion formation. I am greatly indebted to Urbinati for this model. However, exactly that which the model set out to do, to anchor the practice of representative democracy as the primary mode of democracy, it neglected to address. The representational relation is conspicuously absent from the work, which focuses mainly on the newly included role of 'opinion'. Urbinati thereby had a fine intuition of what the contemporary debates on democratic theory was lacking, the inclusion of the extra-institutional of representative democracy, but nonetheless omitted the most important condition of that practice: representation itself.

In the first chapter of this work, I set out to re-inject political representation into the democratic diarchy, by localizing it as the mechanism which separates, yet keeps in constant communication, the two powers of the sovereign people: 'will' and 'opinion'. In the concluding remarks of *Democracy Disfigured*, Urbinati addresses what she sees as the two major challenges of our time: [1] to keep separate, but in constant communication, 'will' and 'opinion', and [2] to recognize that representative democracy is government of opinion, recognizing 'opinion' as a power of the sovereign, and to acknowledge that the normative grounds which structure the 'will' should also structure the 'opinion' power of the sovereign.[283] By localizing the representational relation as the mechanism which tasks itself with the primary challenge of our contemporary democratic practice, I hoped to have partly focused the debate within political theory on this mechanism. However, this mechanism is, rightfully so, malleable. Furthermore, by discussing the three forces Urbinati addresses as inherent to representative democracy, I have tried to show that these forces put certain strains on the representational relation. These strains are not to be lifted or done away with; in fact, I would claim that this is even impossible. They present perspectives on the practice of representative democracy, and we can do no more than keep them balanced so that they do not become unbound and transform into their extremes. Like suspenders on a bridge, they can sway with the wind, rain, or snow, but if they snap like overstretched rubber bands, the bridge collapses, one way or another. To explain this, I have modelled the representational relation as a lens through which both the 'will' and the 'opinion' is projected. This special projector does not

[283] Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p.228

have a single object plane (no pre-existing source), but rather the images are co-constitutive of each other. Changes in the one are translated into changes in the other, the 'will' influences the 'opinion', and vice versa. In this model, we have to imagine representation as the mechanism through which the people is constituted, but through which the people can also influence the political order, the representative is thus constitutive of, and reactive to, his constituency.

What does this mean for the forces Urbinati herself already identifies? Here, I come to my second aim, historicizing these forces. As I already mentioned, each of the forces puts a certain strain on the representational relation. First, the unpolitical force attempts to absolve the representatives from the duty of being meaningfully reactive to the people. It does so by attempting to ground political ideas outside of the representational relation, namely through reason, either citing the superior judgment of the representatives, or demanding the expansion of other domains, such as the economical or judicial. I have situated this force in the era defined by Manin as parliamentarism, the era defined by the emergence of the unpolitical force, at the dawn of representative democracy, right after the French revolution. The emergence of this force I explained as the coping mechanism employed by elites who, since the French revolution, have to legitimize their rule to the people. They do so by claiming superior judgment. Nonetheless, it thereby blackens the screens of our double-sided projector of representative democracy, disconnecting will and opinion. I have related this back to one of two principles Urbinati herself posits in a discussion of her work. The extremis of the unpolitical force uncovers the demand on representation to be responsive, what Urbinati herself calls the proximity principle: the legitimacy of decisions depends on the closeness of institutional outcomes and citizens, the representative-constituency relationship.[284]

Second, I addressed the populist force in the era of party democracy, the period in which the populist force emerged. The populist force, in opposition to the unpolitical, recognizes the power of the people, and attempts to manipulate the people, to strategically deploy the people, to mobilize them. The strain on the representational relation is one of merging the 'will' of the entire political order with the 'opinion' of an, allegedly, pre-defined section of society, thereby subverting the representational relation itself. By making 'will' and 'opinion' one, the political order becomes extremely majoritarian, dismissing the composite plurality that is the reality of 'opinion' and thus of the people. The mass mobilization and the strategic deployment therefore is exemplified by the practice of party democracy, in which new 'elites' challenge old 'elites' through the fostered extra-institutional acclamation of legitimacy, as the leader who personifies the pre-defined subsection of the people. Crucial to this practice is the usage of ideology, and more specifically an ideology of

[284] Accetti et al, Debating representative democracy, pp.36-37

the people itself, to bind the people to a coherent whole, outside of the representational relation. The extremis of the populist force shows us the normative necessity of distance between (some of) the people and the institutional outcomes. Without distance, there is no space open for opinion formation, and the legitimacy of opinion thereby depends on this gap between 'will' and 'opinion'.[285] Whereas the representational relation, as we have seen with the unpolitical force, needs to retain some recognizability – a way for the citizens to understand and agree or disagree with decisions and the representatives that make those decisions in their name – it also entails a loss. Representation is not identification; citizens must understand that what they opine can never be translated directly into 'will'. In a sense, following Urbinati I have recast the paradox that Pitkin had already identified, except I place this tension not within the representative, but in the relation, which means that it doesn't merely have implications for the representatives themselves. Rather, it has implications for the understanding of the representational relation of both the representatives and the represented. It entails a mutual expectation and recognition of the other in their role.

Third, and finally, I addressed the plebiscite force. The force constitutive of our current era of audience democracy, which presents the unique strain of aesthetic distraction, of 'opinion' displaced onto an insignificant, and thus non-impactful, realm. This plebiscite force is to me the most complex force, in that it combines elements of the unpolitical and the populist force. On the one hand, it pretends to mobilize the people; plebiscitary political institutions hail the subject, which constitutes a definite departure from the unpolitical force. On the other hand, the hailing of the subject isn't aimed at the mobilization of the subject, but rather the 'passification' of the subject, thereby departing from the populist force. At once the people, as subjects, are both activated and pacified, engaged in a meaningless interaction with itself, without ever connecting the powers of the sovereign 'will' and 'opinion'. The projector turns into a one-sided screen, where the people can watch and discuss amongst themselves the activities of the projected representatives. But can't interact with them, as little as screaming to a television set constitutes interaction. The only thing that matters, is ratings, which can only lead to the cancelation of the projection but doesn't leave many options for political activity; for input by the people.

On this last force, and thereby our current era, I want to expand a little more. Apart from the point addressed by Urbinati, namely the demotion of the people to watching, I have supplemented an even worse aspect. By re-describing the driving force behind the stages of representative democracy as the emancipatory force within society, present since the manifestation of the enlightenment, a final element, at least up until now, comes to light. The demotion of the people to a role of watching can be explained through the notion of interactive metal fatigue, or

[285] Accetti et al, Debating representative democracy, p.37

interpassivity. Through our own enlightenment ideals of attempting to become autonomous citizens, we have taken on a load too big for us to carry. As a citizen in current society, it is simply impossible to fulfill the role of autonomous subject in the face of so many interactive institutions, of so many demands for input that is well thought through and reflected upon. Our own coping mechanism thus becomes either to attempt to minimally address those very norms by which we hold ourselves, in the hopes of doing just enough to be autonomous, or to outsource the upholding of those norms to the institutions themselves. This is brought to a new level with the technological advancements of the web 2.0, or what I have termed the mass media 2.0, making the demand for interaction even more pervasive. There is a reason, however, why this practice and the pull on the representational relation isn't thematized yet by, for instance, Pitkin already - why it doesn't simply fit within the principles we have set out before. Pitkin's work came too early, and this thesis has come too early for a 'complete' interpretation of the implications for a normative position on the representational relation as well. So far, it seems that the plebiscite force, unlike the unpolitical force, does acknowledge some form of proximity in requiring the presentation of political leaders to the people, but at the same time emphasizes a large distance between the representatives and the represented thereby limiting the influence of the people. The only way for the plebiscite force to accommodate both, a vast distance with a certain proximity, is by displacing the representational relation towards one of likes and popularity expressed in a side-realm disconnected from the institutions themselves.

In a certain sense, we should see the displacement stemming from the plebiscite force as 'interpassive'; it seems to try to retain the paradox of representation, thereby looking to comply to its own democratic norms, but nevertheless, it cannot. The representatives in the plebiscite are mostly concerned with competing with other representatives, not aimed at what the people opine, but aimed at how to be a more captivating representative than the next one. The represented nevertheless want to provide input, but because they are bound in a society with overbearing demands of interactivity, they struggle to effectively coordinate their efforts and influence political institutions. These two distortions on the side of will and opinion, affect each other in an exacerbating manner. The people have ever more representatives to choose between, by which their input becomes less and less fully-formed. This prompts the representatives to look towards other representatives for 'input' – ways of convincing the people of their supposed merit. What we seem to end up with is more candidates and more parties, ever more focused on refining their spectacles, but at the same time losing differentiating political programs.

Unfortunately, I cannot go beyond these first sketches of the problems of the plebiscite force in our contemporary practice of representative democracy. This is the fate of any philosophy,

it can only understand those developments which have been 'completed' and we are still very much in the middle of the current development, or so it seems. In a more general sense, I think there is something to say concerning the workings of the different practices. Such as explaining how political winners and losers emerge. I argue that each of the practices of representative democracy promotes specific strategic utilizations of the demands in society, ways in which to effectively address and 'represent' the people. Figures like Trump, although refining their strategies of spectacle and displacement of interactions towards the interactive mass media 2.0, have been operating in this sense for most of their lifetime. But it is only in the last twenty to twenty-five years that it has led to political success.[286] Thus, the practices of representative democracy each have certain winners and losers that bubble up – figures who, in some sense, could only win because of the specific practice they are operating in. This mechanism comes close to the principle described by Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941), when he stated: "what we see is that as there is a shift in the balance of political forces – when, that is, a need is felt that capacities different from the old should assert themselves in the management of the state, when the old capacities therefore, lose some of their importance or changes in their distribution occur – then the manner in which the ruling class is constituted changes also".[287] It is with this kind of principle in mind that Manin argues that "audience democracy is the rule of the media expert".[288]

I hope that these contributions have been of a sufficient scientific standard and of societal relevance. However, in this very last section of this thesis I hope you will indulge some final speculation. Can we not do anything against this more refined, pervasive, plebiscite force in the ever-more complex society in which upholding our own norms becomes increasingly difficult? My intuition here is hopeful. The very mechanism by which we are fatigued of interaction, also has redemptive potential. Through the outsourcing of our norms to institutions between the state and the individual, to latch on to the pluralist counter-argument, we can regain some control over upholding our own norms. To connect this to the forces of representative democracy, in a way following the likes of Rosanvallon[289], we need to understand the representational relation as being mediated, expanded, and bound by civil society, courts, oversight bodies, etc. These are part of the

[286] In the Netflix documentary Trump: an American dream, interviews of Donald Trump show that he has, for the large part, been using the strategy through which he became president already in the early 1980s in the real estate world. Furthermore, Trump has attempted on several occasions to run for political office, only succeeding in 2017 to become the 45th president of the United States.
[287] Mosca in: Bottomore, Elites and Society, p.56
[288] Manin, The principles of representative government, p.220
[289] Rosanvallon, Democratic legitimacy: Impartiality, reflexivity, proximity, pp. 9-11; Rosanvallon describes several legitimacies which present themselves as a check on democratic institutions such as the representational relation.

unpolitical force which in turn co-suspends the representational relation.[290] Rosanvallon identifies these institutions as gaining importance, especially over the last 40 years, coinciding with what I have been calling the era of audience democracy. Like Rosanvallon, I identify their presence, and with that their potential, for both supporting as well as disrupting the representational relation. Linking this to the potency of the unpolitical force, I claim that what we need is a strengthening of this force in the era of audience democracy. In some sense I hereby directly go against thinkers such as Laclau and Chantal Mouffe who aim to strengthen the populist force. What I have in mind here, with the strengthening of the unpolitical force, are intermediary associations which support citizens, subjects, by bundling and specializing knowledge to subsequently take over a specific task attached to the upholding of a norm. This role used to be filled in, at least partially, by organizations such as workers unions, which sought to combine and professionalize the efforts of workers thereby strengthening their position in the negotiations with employers and the state. However, the time of these unions has passed, as they no longer seem to be able to function as they have in the past. Other associations might be able to take up their role, at least in some respect. For instance, in the Netherlands, there are associations, often founded in the 1970s and 1980s (but later as well), such as the Consumer's Association, which help citizens defend their rights as consumers against both an absent state, and an unwitting or malevolent corporation. The Consumer's Association is a painful reminder of the marketized times it so clearly expresses, but I nevertheless think the principle upon which they are based is admirable. To come back to Rosanvallon, what is necessary next to the principle which introduces these intermediary associations, is a shift towards associations that consider other aspects of the modern citizen. For modern policy not to get stuck in the dimension of the economical, we require the incorporation and expansion of different scientific disciplines in the advisory bodies and other intermediary organizations as a source of counterbalance. In this sense I do not believe the Consumer's Association will be very helpful, at most it mediates the effects of the unequal relation between consumer and producer, but what we need is a critical investigation of the consumer-producer narrative, by other disciplines which are not entrenched in this logic. For instance, the problem with technocracy, all too often, is that it is based on a specific subset of the unpolitical, most often the economic. The problem with the technocratic institutions of our contemporary democracies is not that it has experts, but that it has only certain kinds of experts that dominate the bodies, and thus the logic of technocratic government.

[290] Bottomore, Elites and Society, pp.125-126; Notably Mosca and Raymond Aron (1905-1983) had similar conceptions, but it is expressed more pressingly and more refined by Bottomore, namely as seeking the conditions by which a large majority of citizens can take part in decisions through these associations.

In a sense, I am hopeful about the protection of the freedom of citizens, not simply through the protection of individual rights, but in terms of democracy, of collective self-determination. However, if we let the plebiscite force, which limits these freedoms of the citizens, pull much longer on the diarchy of representative democracy, without counter forces from the unpolitical, it might undo the force-field suspending representation, by which democracy, as collective self-determination, itself eventually becomes impossible.

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