The impact of populist radical right parties on national immigration and integration policies in Europe

An analysis of Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands
The impact of populist radical right parties
on national immigration and integration policies in Europe

An analysis of Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands

Master thesis submitted to:
Department of Public Administration, Erasmus School of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of International Public Management and Policy (IMP)

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Word count: 23,751
Abstract

Populist radical right parties have emerged as an electoral force in Europe over the last three decennia. This has raised concerns among citizens, politicians, journalists and academia. However, scholars disagree whether or not populist radical right parties are able to influence policies. This thesis therefore examines the direct influence of populist radical right parties on immigration and integration policies by comparing the output of 17 cabinets of varying composition in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands between 2009 and 2016. A policy index has been developed to measure legislative changes with regard to citizenship and denizenship, asylum, illegal residence, family reunion and integration. The index showed that centre-right cabinets supported by populist radical right parties scored on average highest on the NIIP index, which means they succeeded best in producing restrictive immigration and integration legislation. The high score implied that populist radical right parties possibly had an impact on these introduced immigration and integration laws. However, the case by case analysis demonstrated that the direct influence of the populist radical right on these policies was only limited. The role of the populist radical right parties in the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Finland in pushing immigration and integration policies between 2009 and 2016 further in a restrictive direction was only marginal.
Acknowledgements

This is it. The thesis process has come to an end, as the last words have been written down and the lay-out has got its final touch. I always heard that thesis writing can be hard, as it is the largest individual research project in your studies. Honestly, the process has been quite challenging indeed. However, as with anything in life, everything proved to be okay in the end. I am proud that I carried through and happy that I (finally) made it. This would never have been possible without a number of people, whom I wish to thank very much. Firstly, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Haverland. His guidance, patience and advice throughout the research and writing process were very much appreciated and let me believe that the end would come in sight at some point. Secondly, I wish to extend my sincere thanks to my second reader Dr. Zhelyazkova for her constructive feedback and helpful comments which I hope have enhanced the quality of this master thesis. Besides my supervisors, I wish to thank my friends and family for their unconditioned help and (mental) support. My sincere gratitude goes to my parents, who were not only kind enough to endure my complaints, but also let me temporarily live with them again during the final part of the thesis process. I would like to thank them for their unfailing love and support throughout this past year, and always.

Aniek van Beijsterveldt

Eindhoven, August 2018
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Problem statement

During the past decades Western Europe has witnessed a rise of populist radical right parties. The new populist radical right party family emerged on the Western European political stage in the 1970s and has since become a serious challenge to the established mainstream political parties in several countries (Bale, Green-Pedersen, Krouwel, Luther & Sitter, 2010). Since the 1960s, their average vote share has more than doubled, rising from 5.1% to 13.2%, while their share of seats has tripled (Stockemer, 2017). In the first decade of the 21st century seven majority governments and three minority governments in Western Europe included a populist radical right political party. Examples of these are the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) in Austria, the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the Netherlands, and the Dansk Folkeparti (DF) in Denmark. In other countries, such as in France and Belgium, the populist radical right also broke through electorally into mainstream politics but was not yet able to reach participation in government coalitions (Mudde, 2013).

Developments such as the economic crisis and increase in terrorist attacks contributed to the success of the populist radical right in the 21st century. Both helped push populist movements to the center of European politics (Mudde, 2016). More recently, Europe’s refugee crisis played a significant role as well. During this crisis significant proportions of the European population were exposed to refugees from culturally-distinct countries. In many of these countries that experienced substantial refugee inflows populist radical right parties with anti-immigration agendas gained considerable support (Steinmayr, 2017). This trend was for example visible in Scandinavia, where the populist radical right party Sweden Democrats was very successful in the 2014 national election (Rydgren & Van der Meiden, 2016). Likewise, in Finland, the Finns Party won 17.7 per cent of the vote during the 2015 parliamentary elections and consequently entered government for the first time (Herkman, 2016). In Germany, the anti-immigrant party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) won seats in the German Bundestag in the 2017 parliamentary election (Döring & Manow, 2018).

However, despite its electoral successes, the rise of the populist radical right has not been welcomed by everyone. Ever since the emergence of the new political phenomenon its radical views have raised concerns among citizens and other commentators. When the FPÖ entered office in February 2000, the inauguration of the government was met with mass protests within Austria. The presence of this radical right party in a West European government was also criticized by other EU member states, which led to the enactment of unofficial sanctions against Austria until September
Political competitors as well have plenty times warned of the growing influence of populist radical right parties and the dangers they may cause to European democracy. They have argued that the populist radical right pushes European politics to the right by directly or indirectly influencing the positions and salience of the issues on the political agenda (Mudde, 2013). German Chancellor Angela Merkel in January 2018 warned against the ‘poison’ of populism, stating that the radical right’s ideas concerning nationalist policies risked fracturing international ties. Referring to the recent electoral breakthrough of the populist radical right in Germany, she said that her government was doing all it could to get the populist wave under control (“Germany’s Angela Merkel decries right-wing populism as ‘poison’ at Davos summit”, 2018). President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker stated in his address on the ‘State of the Union’ in 2016 that he had never seen national governments so weakened by the forces of populism. He added that the democratic nations of Europe must guard against populism and the problems it creates (Juncker, 2016).

The sense of a growing danger and influence of populist radical right parties is not limited to citizens and political competitors, however. The media are full of articles about the Europe’s populist radical right and its effects. For example, the Economist claims that ‘the nationalist right are changing the terms of European political debate’ (“Turning right”, 2014) and Time speaks of ‘Europe’s populist revolt’ (Shuster, 2016). Other actors like think tanks and other NGOs share these concerns. International affairs think tank Chatham House declares that the appeal of populist-authoritarian leaders and parties is a political challenge for the EU which is likely to remain on the landscape for many years (Raines, Goodwin & Cutts, 2017). In his keynote of Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2017, executive director Kenneth Roth described populism as a dangerous trend that attacks human rights values (Roth, 2017).

The great deal of attention devoted to the emergence of the populist radical right in Europe and its potential consequences by citizens, politicians, journalists and other actors raised the question among academics whether populist radical right parties truly have an impact on policy formation. Do populist radical right parties push European politics to the right? In the relevant literature, there seems to be a contradiction between depictions of a populist radical right with a discernable influence on policy (e.g. Howard, 2010; Williams, 2006) and a more skeptical view of their impact (e.g. Duncan, 2010; Akkerman, 2012; Mudde, 2007). This study therefore aims to contribute to this debate by examining the impact of populist radical right parties in the Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands. As populist radical right parties are increasingly entering governments (Mudde, 2013), this study focuses on the impact of populist radical right parties in office. The influence of populist radical right parties in opposition is not analyzed. More specifically, this thesis examines the impact of the populist right on immigration and integration issues. These are their core issues and the parties
present these as omnibus issues through which other concerns, such as crime and security, care for the elderly and health care, and European integration, can be funneled (Fennema, 1997; Mudde, 2007). Immigration and integration are not only key issues in populist radical right parties’ programmes, but these issues are also central to the concern of voters for these parties (Fennema, 1997; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mudde, 2007). Negative attitudes towards asylum seekers, legal and illegal immigration and multiculturalism prevail among populist radical right voters and are the main reason why voters support these parties (Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2000; Carter, 2005). Given the importance of immigration and integration issues to the populist radical right and their voters, and given the topicality of the subject, the impact of populist radical right parties in office on this key policy field will be the central object of analysis in this study.

1.2 Research focus

Following the problem statement, the aim of this research is to examine the impact of populist radical right parties in office on immigration and integration policies in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands. In order to analyze the impact of populist radical right parties in government, it is necessary to investigate whether policy results would have been much different if parties had remained in opposition. Therefore, a systematic and comparative assessment of the policy output of cabinets with and without radical right parties is needed. Over the past decade, the selected countries have all been faced with the emergence of populist radical right parties. In the Netherlands, the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) supported a minority cabinet between 2010 and 2012. The same went for the Danish People’s Party in Denmark, that supported minority coalitions in Denmark between 2001 and 2011 and in 2015 and 2016. The Finns Party entered the Finnish government in 2015. In Sweden the populist radical right party Sweden Democrats was very successful during the 2014 national election, receiving 12.9 per cent of the vote and thus seats in parliament. However, no populist radical right party was part of the Swedish government during the past years (Döring & Manow, 2018).

In this study, an index will be presented that measures and compares all changes to immigration and integration policies in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands in the period between 2009 and 2016. The index will show whether the immigration and integration policies have become more restrictive while the different cabinets were in power. After the presentation of this index, the potential impact of the populist radical right on these changes will be investigated through a case by case analysis of the cases that included a populist radical right party. Other cases, without a populist radical right party, will be examined in this case by case analysis as well if their scores are as high as that of cases that did include a populist radical right party. Indeed, if cases with and without
the populist radical right both score equally high on the index, this would imply that the implementation of more restrictive immigration and integration policies might be the result of other factors rather than the presence of the populist radical right in office. Conducting a case by case analysis is therefore necessary to gain more insight into the factors that contributed to the introduction of these policies. Hence, the research question of this study is as follows:

To what extent have populist radical right parties in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands between 2009 and 2016 pushed immigration and integration policies further in a restrictive direction?

In order to answer the central research question, the following sub questions are formulated to structure the study:

1. What are populist radical right parties?
2. How have immigration and integration policies in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands developed between 2009 and 2016?
3. Did populist radical right parties have an impact on the development of these immigration and integration policies?

1.3 Relevance

1.3.1 Academic relevance
Since the rise of populist radical right parties in Western Europe in the previous century the phenomenon and its potential impact have been subject to the work of many scholars. The studies differ in scope, as some academics only focused on the influence of one populist radical right party in a certain country during a specific period (e.g. the French Front Nationale (FN) in Schain, 2006; the FPÖ in Austria in Duncan, 2010), whereas others conducted cross-national studies in which the impact of the populist radical right in several countries was analyzed (e.g. Minkenberg, 2001; Akkerman, 2012; Han, 2015; Van Spanje, 2010). While in this respect some scholars did not focus on the impact on one policy field in particular (e.g. Minkenberg, 2001; Schain, 2006), others did. Many of them specifically examined the influence of populist radical right parties on immigration or integration policies (e.g. Akkerman, 2012; Han, 2015; Van Spanje, 2010).
The conclusions on the impact of populist radical right parties in Europe differ. Some of the academics suggest that the populist radical right is an important factor in contemporary European politics. These studies have frequently highlighted the direct influence of such parties on public policy (Howard, 2010; Marthaler, 2008; Schain, 2006; Williams, 2006). However, the presumed influence of the populist radical right in Europe has also been questioned (Duncan, 2010; Akkerman, 2012; Mudde, 2007; Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008). Hence, there seems to be a contradiction in the relevant literature between depictions of a populist radical right with a discernable influence on policy and a more skeptical view of their impact, their ability to function in office and their influence on immigration and integration policies. The most elementary question academics have disagreed about is whether policy results would have been much different if radical right parties had remained in opposition.

This study aims to contribute to the academic debate in two ways. First, this research focuses on a period of time that has not been systematically assessed before. Earlier work examined the impact of the populist radical right between 1980 and 2010. The time period of subject in this study runs from 2009 to 2016. As such, the findings of this study will contribute to the existing knowledge base as this research analyzes new empirical data. Second, this study contributes to the academic debate as alternative explanations are tested as well, which has not regularly been done in previous studies.

1.3.2 Societal relevance

The subject of this study is very topical. As already became clear in the problem statement, the upswing of the populist radical right is very high on the political and societal agenda of Europe, raising concerns among media, politicians and citizens. This is especially true for the past few years, during which Europe encountered a refugee crisis that provided an ideal climate for the growth of populist radical right parties (Raines, Goodwin & Cutts, 2017). Many accounts in both academia and the media warn of the growing influence of populist radical right parties, the so-called ‘verrechtsing’ (or right turn) of European politics. According to some scholars, the parties can realize both powerful direct and indirect effects on politics in EU states, fundamentally reshaping patterns of political competition by pushing the mainstream parties rightwards (Mudde, 2013). The concerns for this right turn are not unwarranted given the radical views and popularity of the populist radical right. The rise of the populist radical right has made citizens and experts fear historical recurrence. In Germany, the AfD, a populist radical right party who claimed that Germany should be proud of its soldiers in both world wars (Reuters, 2017), in 2017 was the first far-right party to enter parliament since the 1960s (Döring & Manow, 2018). However, the empirical evidence for the actual impact of the populist radical right on public policy is not convincing. The knowledge produced by this study has societal value since it can
contribute to the current societal debate about populist radical right parties. The findings of the research can show whether populist radical right parties truly bring about a ‘verrechtsing’ of politics.

1.4 Research outline

This study is divided into seven sections. This first chapter articulated the problem statement, the research objective and questions and the relevance of this study. In the following chapter, previous work on the impact of the populist radical right is reviewed. Chapter three then deals with the conceptualization of the main variables of this research, after which the theoretical framework underlying this study is formulated. In chapter four, the research design and used methods are presented. Chapter five gives an overview of the research findings. Chapter six, the conclusion, provides an answer to the main research question by summarizing the main findings. Furthermore, this chapter states the academic and societal implications of the study, its limitations and recommendations for further research.
Chapter 2: Literature review

The influence of populist radical right parties has been investigated by several scholars. This part of the study gives an overview of the current state of knowledge and reviews the relevant existing academic literature. Moreover, the chapter will show how previous research leads to this study and the chosen methodology in this thesis.

2.1 Previous work

The growing number of populist radical right parties also raised the attention of the academic world. While most scholars examining the radical right have concentrated on the causes of their emergence and the determinants of their electoral success, studies have increasingly focused on the effect of these parties on policy and other parties. Many of them examined the influence of populist radical right parties on immigration or integration policies in particular (e.g. Akkerman, 2012; Han, 2015; Van Spanje, 2010; Duncan, 2010). Studies have generally focused on either the indirect effect of populist radical parties, by shifting the policy agendas of mainstream parties, or direct effect, by gaining policy-making capacity as part of the government.

According to Bale et al. (2010), the electoral success of populist parties can lead to a growing pressure on other parties to reconsider their policy agendas with respect to the key issues that radical right parties have successfully politicized. In this way, populist radical right parties can have an indirect effect on policy agendas and possibly even on policy output. Following this theory, some scholars argue that mainstream parties have adopted a more restrictive position on immigration and integration issues during the past decades as a reaction to the electoral success of the radical right (Minkenberg, 2001; Marthaler, 2008; Schain, 2006; Williams, 2006). This view is not shared by everyone. Other researchers claim that mainstream parties had changed course before and independently of the electoral rise of radical right parties (Money 1999; Van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008). Finally, Bale et al. (2009) found out that other parties mix and match their own positions and that of the radical right rather than that they adopt them.

Turning to the studies on the direct effect, some academics have argued that where the radical right made the transition to government, they shaped, at least to some extent, government policy on immigration (Bale, 2003; Schain, 2006; Williams, 2006; Zaslove, 2004a). Other writers, however, have expressed greater skepticism about the populist radical right’s political influence (Mudde, 2013; Akkerman, 2012; Duncan, 2010; Givens & Luedtke, 2004; Schain, 2009). Some of them showed similar developments in countries without such parties in government, and sometimes even in parliament,
indicating an EU-wide convergence of stricter immigration policies (Schain, 2009; Givens & Luedtke, 2004). In addition, restrictions from governments including a populist radical right party could be the result of the ideology of the mainstream-right coalition partner that precedes coalition formation with the radical-right (Duncan, 2010; Akkerman, 2012). Other scholars have blamed the populist radical right itself for their limited influence, emphasizing that radical right parties tend to perform weakly in office due to difficulties they have organizationally in making the step from opposition to government (Heinisch, 2003; Akkerman, 2012; Mudde, 2007).

2.2 Literature gap
The existing academic work almost exclusively bases its observations of the policy influence of populist radical right parties on qualitative case studies on specific parties, such as the Front National in France (Marthaler, 2008; Schain, 2006), the FPÖ in Austria (Duncan, 2010; Heinisch, 2003) and the Lega Nord in Italy (Zincone, 2006). These studies provide detailed insights into particular populist radical right parties in different country-specific contexts. However, as became clear in the previous paragraph, the results of these studies strongly differ. Some authors claim that populist radical right parties do have an impact on policies, whereas other authors argue that this is not the case. Furthermore, the studies grapple with assessing whether the observed restrictive policy changes would have happened in the absence of a populist radical right party. A notable exception is Akkerman (2012), who investigates the direct influence of populist radical right parties on immigration and integration policies by systematically comparing 27 cabinets from nine European countries from 1996 to 2010. The results demonstrate that the policy outputs of cabinets with the participation of a populist radical right party do not significantly differ from mainstream-right cabinets; they only differ from left-wing governments. This is not to say that the populist radical right parties have not indirectly contributed to shifting policies to the right. However, the comparison is descriptive and does not control for alternative explanations of policy outputs. In addition, no study has systematically and comparatively assessed the impact of populist radical right parties after 2010, whereas the increase of their electoral success has not ended.

This study will therefore contribute to the existing knowledge base by comparatively and systematically assess the direct impact of the populist radical right on immigration and integration policies in the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Finland in the period between 2009 and 2016. A case by case analysis will be conducted to gain more insight into the role of the populist radical right parties on these policy changes. In this process, alternative explanations will be tested as well.
Chapter 3: Theoretical framework

In this chapter the main concepts of these thesis and the perceptions of these concepts in the literature are discussed. First, the chapter starts with an overview of the existing literature on the concept of populist radical right parties in order to answer the first subquestion *What are populist radical right parties?* Subsequently, the populist radical right party’s pathways to influencing policy are discussed and the concepts of immigration and integration policy are introduced. Finally, it will become clear how these concepts are placed in the conceptual model that is used in this study.

### 3.1 Populist radical right parties

Since the emergence of the populist radical right in the past century many political scientists have devoted attention to this new party family. There is a near consensus on which parties belong to the category, although scholars have used different labels when referring to it. Examples range from ‘extreme right’ (Ignazi, 1992; Mudde 2000) to ‘far right’ (Bale, 2003) and ‘radical right-wing populist’ (Betz, 1993; Taggart, 1995). However, the literature lacks consensus on a core definition. For instance, Ignazi (1992) distinguishes between two forms of extreme parties: (1) parties with direct links with inter-war fascism; and (2) a new post-industrial extreme right. The latter comprises recently-born parties with no fascist associations, but with a right-wing antisystem attitude. Betz (1993) and Taggart (1995) introduced the concept of populism. Each in their own manner, they argue that the successful right-wing parties (unlike traditional fascist or Nazi parties) were populists, mobilizing voter resentment towards political elites. According to Taggart, populism constitutes a political ideology in which the authentic heartland is mobilized by charismatic leaders against political and economic elites (Taggart, 2004). Betz (1993) defines the right-wing populist as parties that combine a classic liberal position on the individual and the economy with the sociopolitical agenda of the extreme and intellectual new right, and deliver this mixture to those disenchanted with their individual life chances and the political system. Following Eatwell (2000) and Zaslove (2004b), radical right-wing parties normally operate within the constitutional framework and accept democratic institutions and procedures, but oppose liberal features, such as guarantees for minority rights, checks on executive authority, social equality and the acceptance of multiculturalism. Extreme right parties are more extreme in their party positions and might embrace violence. Mudde (2007) argues that the new right-wing political parties are radical and not extreme. He states that they challenge liberal democracies, especially through their opposition to pluralism; however, they should not be classified as extreme in so far as they are not anti-constitutional per se. They are populist, but not uniquely populist since they
possess an ideology based upon core concepts such as nationalism and authoritarianism. Mudde (2007) labels this new party family as the populist radical right as opposed to radical right populism.

In sum, scholars conceptualize the new party family in different ways. Broadly speaking, despite some conceptual differences, most scholars agree upon the populist radical right’s basic features: the parties are nativist, authoritarian and anti-establishment.

3.1.1 Nativism

According to Mudde (2007), nativism is the ultimate determinant of membership of the populist radical right party family. Mudde (2007) perceives nativism as an ideology that holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state. This builds on the idea of ethno-pluralism. According to the notion of ethno-pluralism, it is necessary to keep the unique national characters of different people separated in order to preserve them. In this doctrine, chances for individual change and ingroup variation are believed to be slight (Rydgren, 2007). In other words, the populist radical right stresses the value of ethnic and racial homogeneity. Consequently, the parties are eager to engage in culture wars and debates of historical revisionism. Populist radical right parties are reluctant to observe political taboos and comply with a national consensus. Hostility to political compromise as well as a sense of ideological mission are therefore both common for the populist radical right (Heinisch, 2003). By using the ethno-pluralist ideology, the populist radical right aims at protecting the cultural identity. The populist radical right therefore wishes to strengthen the nation by making it ethnically homogeneous. The parties believe this is necessary due to several “threats” against their national identity. The alleged invasion of immigrants is the most important among these threats (ibid.). Others are supranational entities such as the European Union and, increasingly, multinational corporations and economic globalization, as well as cosmopolitan elites, and other processes believed to foster universalization and homogenization (Betz & Johnson, 2004; Zaslove, 2004a).

3.1.2 Authoritarianism

With regard to the second element, academics state that populist radical right parties hold an authoritarian position on sociocultural issues (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2007; Heinisch, 2003). Populist radical right parties want their society to be strictly ordered. Law and order are therefore deemed highly important. Furthermore, the populist radical right argues that violations of the rules should be punished severely (Mudde, 2007). This law-and-order doctrine and authoritarian conception of the state is directed not only against external threats such as immigrants and asylum
seekers and criminal elements, but also against critics and political opponents (Heinis, 2003). This position stands in some contrast to the radical right’s embrace of economic liberalism. It is therefore that Kitschelt and McGann (1995) argue that the formula for electorally successful populist radical right parties includes an ability to combine economically rightist positions with socio-culturally authoritarian standpoints. The authoritarian position in sociocultural issues also tends to include pro-military, traditional family values, and skepticism towards gender equality and gay rights (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014).

3.1.3 Anti-establishment

The third and final core feature, the feature that makes radical right parties populist, is that they are anti-establishment. Mudde (2007) perceives populism as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people. In the populist democracy, nothing is more important than this “general will” of the people, not even human rights or constitutional guarantees. Populism functions as an appeal to “the people” against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society. Within democratic systems this often means an attack on the established parties, the political and economic establishments but also at opinion-formers in the academy and the media (Canovan, 1999). Populist ideology cherishes the “common sense” of the people, or of “the heartland” (Taggart 2004). Taggart (2004) argues that the heartland is a past-derived vision projected onto the present as that which has been lost. The essence is that the heartland is the good life that has already been lived and so shown to be feasible. This assumes or asserts that there was a good life before the corruptions of the present. The language is carefully chosen: the term heartland is used because a heartland is felt rather than reasoned, and something that is shrouded in imprecision. The variety of versions of the heartland explains why populism is attached to some very different ideological positions from the left to the right within politics. Populists react against elites and institutions. Since the nature of these vary, so the nature of populism varies with them. The lack of core values basically means that populism tends to be highly chameleonic. The attributes of the context in which populism occurs are therefore very important, since these will spill into the form that populism takes.

Another facet of populists is that they see themselves as true democrats, voicing popular grievances and opinions that are systematically ignored by governments, mainstream parties and the media. Many of them favor ‘direct democracy’ like political decision making by referendum and
popular initiative. Their declared aim is to trade democracy’s promise of power to the people (Canovan, 1999). However, their campaigns rarely get anywhere near attracting a majority of votes. Still, their use of all these various forms of appeal to the people underlines the extent to which they rely upon a framework of legitimacy provided by notions of popular power: this is, in other words, an idea of democracy (Canovan, 1999). Mudde (2015) explains this ambiguous relationship between populism and democracy by stating that populism is pro-democracy, but anti-liberal democracy. Populists support popular sovereignty and majority rule, but reject pluralism and minority rights.

When it comes to the organizational, operational and discursive practices of populist political groupings, two principles appear to be key: one is the fact that populist parties seek to retain the character of a movement, the other one is authoritarian leadership (Heinisch, 2003).

3.1.4 Conclusion
This subchapter aimed to provide an overview of the existing literature on populist radical right parties in order to answer the first subquestion What are populist radical right parties? Despite some conceptual differences, most scholars agree that populist radical right parties have three core characteristics: they are nativist, authoritarianist and anti-establishment populist. The overview showed that nativism can be described as an ideology which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state. Authoritarianism entails that society needs to be strictly ordered. Finally, anti-establishment could be seen as a set of ideas according to which the “good people” are betrayed by an “evil” elite. To summarize, in this thesis, populist radical right parties are regarded as parties that are nativist, authoritarian and anti-establishment. This is in line with the definition of Mudde (2007).

3.2 Populist radical right parties and their effect on public policy
Scholars that study the impact of populist radical right parties on public policy have operationalized this impact in different ways. According to Minkenberg (2001), political impact by populist radical right parties in public office cannot simply be measured in terms of their direct participation in the government. Agenda-setting and policy effects are mediated at several levels through interaction with established political parties, parliamentary presence and executive action. The structure of party competition or systemic variables shape these effects only in combination with political-cultural variables. Other authors make a distinction between the direct and indirect impact of populist parties on public policy.
3.2.1 Direct impact

In the article of Akkerman (2012), direct influence is conceived as having two dimensions. It is direct in relation to its object, which is policy output in its final and decisive stage. It is also direct in relation to other actors, in the sense that this influence is not enacted through an intermediate actor or a chain of actors. Effective input in negotiations about coalition agreements, for instance, may be seen as direct with regard to the actor, but this influence is indirect in the sense that these agreements are intermediate steps in the process of policymaking. To be specific, Akkerman (2012) speaks of direct influence when parties gain office. Whether radical right parties will manage to deliver the promised goods once they are in office depends on gaining the crucial ministerial posts and on the performance of their ministers. This is in line with Schain (2006), who states that radical right parties have potentially direct influence over policy output when they have policy-making possibilities. An example of this is provided by Bolin, Lidén and Nyhlén (2014), who argue that holding seats in decision-making assemblies must be regarded as a position where impact could be obtained.

3.2.2 Indirect impact

However, real and substantive policy effects do not only result from populist radical right parties’ participation in the executive. The parties can also affect policies if they remain in opposition (Minkenberg, 2001). In this regard, Schain (2006) speaks of indirect impact on policy through the impact on the party system itself. This can occur when political parties achieve an electoral breakthrough that is sufficient to have an impact on the variation of support within the party system. The electoral breakthrough can be achieved in two ways: through conversion of voters who had previously voted for other political parties, or through mobilization of either new voters or voters who had previously been abstainers. In some cases established parties have attempted to isolate and more or less ignore the challengers (ibid.). However, the electoral success of populist parties may also lead to a growing pressure on other parties to reconsider their policy agendas with respect to the key issues that radical right parties have successfully politicized (Bale et al., 2009). If other parties decide to compete by adapting their positions in the direction of the populist parties, the indirect effect may be that policy agendas and eventually policy output will shift towards policy favored by radical right parties (Bale et al., 2009). In this way, if co-optation has been successful, this has impact on the structure and support of other political parties, as well as the priorities of the political agenda of both parties and government. Furthermore, by altering the issue agenda, co-optation alters the terms of conflict among political parties, and, potentially, the electoral cleavages and divisions (Schain, 2006).
Although purely indirect forms of influence, through other actors and on policy agendas rather than policy output, are prevalent when radical right parties operate outside the executive arena, Akkerman (2012) argues that these indirect forms of influence may remain important mechanisms once populist radical right parties have entered office.

### 3.2.3 Conditions for policy adoption

Whether the established parties adapt their policy positions after the electoral success of populist parties may depend on several factors. According to Bolin et al. (2014), established parties change their policies in hope of winning votes. This is in line with Van Spanje (2010), who understands the co-optation of a populist party’s policies by a rival party as an inter-party electoral strategy. This builds on the landmark theory electoral competition developed by Anthony Downs (1957). Down’s theory (1957) takes into account the relevant actors at elections: voters on the one hand and parties on the other. The electoral process is described as an electoral market with parties on the ‘supply side’ and voters on the ‘demand side’. Parties are perceived as rational actors involved in competition for votes along a (one-dimensional) spatial continuum, and voter preferences are distributed along this dimension as well. According to the Down’s theory (1957), parties will strategically adapt their positions in attempts to attract more voters. If a particular competitor performs well in particular elections, such as a populist party, it is reasonable for the other parties to expect many voters to be close to their competitor’s position on the continuum. These established parties will therefore expect to attract more voters by moving closer to their competitor’s position. Throughout the years, other authors have further developed Down’s spatial theory. One of the most important new insights was that parties compete not just by taking a position on a specific issue, but also by emphasizing particular issues more than others. In addition, Meguid (2005) presents a ‘modified spatial theory’ that improves upon the standard spatial models, among other things, by adding the insight that parties may influence the salience of particular issues. Consequently, this means that, when an anti-immigration party enters the political scene the other parties may react by copying the anti-immigration stance (what Meguid calls an ‘accommodative’ strategy), by taking up a radically different position (‘adversarial’), or by not taking any stance at all (‘dismissive’). Second, this means that not only the mainstream right, but also ‘non-proximal’ parties, can influence the salience of the immigration issue. Meguid empirically demonstrates that the three types of strategy waged by both proximal and non-proximal parties affect the electoral fortunes of green and anti-immigration parties.

According to Akkerman (2012), the pressure of indirect impact is weighing most on centre-right parties, because the appeal of radical right parties is most tempting for voters on the right side
of the political spectrum. Besides, social democratic parties are also assumed to have been pressed by the electoral success of radical right parties to follow a tougher line on immigration and integration issues. However, parties do not adopt policy positions without thorough consideration. Both Han (2015) and Bale et al. (2009) argue that if the rise of populist radical right parties is associated with a real and immediate threat to the standing of a mainstream party in overall party competition, it will be willing to take risks and respond to the threat by shifting its position. However, if there is no real and immediate threat, the party may not want to take risks and shift its position. The decision of party positions is an outcome of intensive and careful information-gathering, investigation, tests, and reviews. Voters’ opinions and past election results are also essential information used in the process. Political parties, at least left mainstream parties, listen to their own supporters and respond more to their opinions than to those of the general public (Han, 2015). Furthermore, Han (2015) states that populist radical right parties, or niche parties in general that have extremist positions on an issue such as multiculturalism and ecology, can benefit from their own electoral success by dragging mainstream parties towards their own positions, although their influence, particularly on left-wing parties, can be limited by party competition environments. The position adjustment of mainstream parties that are on the other side from niche parties on the ideological spectrum regarding a particular issue (e.g. left mainstream parties regarding multiculturalism and right mainstream parties regarding ecology) are less directly affected by the rise of the niche parties because of ideological commitment and strategic constraint (Han, 2015). Because of ideological commitment to multiculturalism and the lack of issue ownership and credibility regarding multiculturalism, left mainstream parties may be more reluctant to adopt restrictive positions in these fields than right-wing mainstream parties even in the face of rising populist radical right parties (Bale et al., 2010). Hence, the impact of niche parties can be asymmetric between political parties with different ideological dispositions and strategic opportunities.

3.2.4 Organizational capacities

Although even short-term breakthrough can have a significant impact on public policy if established parties change their agendas in reaction to this success, most parties that achieve short-term success only infrequently have long-term electoral impact. Organizational development of a party can contribute to structural electoral success. In this way, the process of party construction is likely to have an impact on the ability of the party to participate directly and indirectly in the policy-making process (Schain, 2006). The electoral breakthrough generally enables a party to organize a network of elected officials and party activists based on success and patronage. Organizational development, in turn, stabilizes electoral success through a growing capacity to mobilize voters around issues and
personalities. As a party builds its organization, penetrates the political system with elected officials, and gains greater media exposure, the potential of its partisan and legislative impact should increase. One of the reasons for this is that elected officials are often capable of attracting the resources necessary for the development of party organizations. Furthermore, electoral success frequently proves attractive for ‘conversions’ from established parties, both of candidates and of party workers. The impact of this development of organizational networks is related to the structure of political and electoral systems in the particular country (ibid.).

3.2.5 Conclusion

The paragraph showed that populist radical right parties have two options to influence policy: they can directly influence policy if they are a member of the government and indirectly by affecting the policy agenda of the parties in office. Following Akkerman (2012), in this thesis, populist radical right parties are perceived as having direct influence if they manage to deliver their promised goods by gaining the crucial ministerial posts and have a well-performing minister. Indirect influence is seen here as being able to shift the policy agendas of mainstream parties to the right (Schain, 2006).

3.3. Immigration and integration policy

Immigration and integration are the key issues in populist radical right parties’ programmes and these issues are also central to the concern of voters for these parties (Fennema, 1997; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mudde, 2007). Negative attitudes towards asylum seekers, legal and illegal immigration and multiculturalism prevail among populist radical right voters and are the main reason why voters support these parties (Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2000; Carter, 2005). The concept of immigration and integration policy will further be operationalized in paragraph 4.3.1.
3.4 Conceptualization

Figure 1 shows the model based on the theories and concepts as discussed in this chapter.

Figure 1: Model presenting the theoretical direct and indirect effect of populist radical right parties

Applying the theoretical model to this thesis results in the model presented by figure 2. The independent variables in this thesis are the populist radical right parties in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands between 2009 and 2016. These are the Finns Party in Finland, the Sweden Democrats in Sweden, the Danish People’s Party in Denmark and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands. As this study only focuses on the direct impact of these parties, the indirect impact has been left out of the conceptual model. The Sweden Democrats was not part of a government in Sweden between 2009 and 2016 and has therefore been left out of the conceptual model. Implemented immigration and integration policies in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands between 2009 and 2016 are the dependent variables in this thesis.
Implemented immigration and integration policies in the Netherlands

Direct impact

Implemented immigration and integration policies in Denmark

Direct impact

Implemented immigration and integration policies in Finland

Direct impact

Figure 2: Conceptual model as applied in this thesis
Chapter 4: Research design and methods

This chapter deals with the design of the study and the methods used to conduct the research. The research strategy will be presented, as well as the methods that are used to collect and analyze the data. The consequences of these choices for the reliability and validity of this study are discussed in the last paragraph of the chapter.

4.1 Research strategy

This study uses a case study strategy with a co-variational approach. The case study is a suitable research strategy to understand social phenomena in a real-life context, whereby the researcher has little control over events (Yin, 2009). This research strategy is therefore appropriate for this study, as populist radical right parties can be defined as actual social phenomena whose actions cannot be controlled by a scholar. The co-variational approach to case study research, that is applied in this research, typically aims to investigate whether a specific factor makes a difference: this kind of research is interested in the effect of a specific independent variable. It is therefore that these studies are often categorized as X-centered research (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). This approach fits this study, since the aim of this research is to examine whether one variable influences another variable. In this study, the independent variable (X) is the populist radical right party, whereas immigration and integration policies can be perceived as the dependent variable (Y). Case studies can include qualitative as well as quantitative evidence (Yin, 2009). The data collected and examined in this study are of a qualitative nature.

4.2 Research design and case selection

4.2.1 Most similar systems design

As stated in the introduction to this study, populist radical right parties are on the rise. Since the beginning of this century several populist radical right parties have participated in national governments in European countries. The cases for investigation in this study can however not be selected randomly. In a research using the co-variational approach, the selected cases must vary with respect to the main independent variable of interest, and they must be as similar as possible with regard to variables associated with other potential explanations. In this way, it can be assured that the other potentially influential variables had no effect on the observed outcome. This design is described as the ‘most similar systems design’ (Przeworski & Teune, 1970). A precise application of a ‘most similar system design’ in this study therefore requires to select cases that are similar in the control variables
and different with regard to the independent variable under study (populist radical right parties). Hence, in order to discover whether policy results would have been much different if populist radical right parties had remained in opposition, it is necessary to assess the policy output of cabinets with and without populist radical right parties.

4.2.2 Cases

This study focuses on cabinets in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands that were in office between 2009 and 2016. As the case serves as the main unit of analysis in a case study design (Yin, 2012), the main unit of analysis in this thesis is the cabinet. The rationale behind the case selection is as follows. The political, social and economic contexts in the selected countries are very similar. The countries are all small parliamentary democracies with coalition governments and fragmented party landscapes in northern Europe, with a high degree of pragmatism in policy-making (‘consensus democracies’) (Lijphart, 1999) and strong similarities among their welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1999). The time frame of 2009-2016 was chosen because of the presence of the populist radical right in this period in the selected countries. In Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands populist radical right parties have participated in national governments, either as a coalition partner or as a recognized supporter of a minority government. To avoid selective bias Sweden has been added, in which the populist radical right has not been in office yet. It is relevant to also examine a country in which no populist radical right party was in office during the period, as this can show whether the implemented immigration and integration policies in Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands were the result of the populists being in the government or whether these policies rather were the result of other factors. Indeed, if the policy outputs in Sweden in the selected period were as restrictive as those in Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands, this might imply that the influence of the populist radical right on the policy changes in these countries was only marginal. Sweden is regarded as a comparative benchmark as the political, social and economic contexts are comparable to that of the other countries. Moreover, the control variables, that will be discussed in the next paragraph, apply to both Sweden and the other selected countries. Table 1 (on the next page) lists the cases and includes an overview of the parties that are regarded as being populist radical right parties. Caretaker periods are included. The table shows that seventeen cases have been selected for analysis in this thesis, of which six cases included a populist radical right party. In these cases, the populist radical right acted as a “full-fledged” coalition partner or as a supporting party to a minority government. As has also been confirmed in the theoretical framework, in order to label parties as being populist radical right parties the definition of Mudde (2007) is followed. In table 1, populist radical right parties are printed in bold. Parties that provided external support to a minority government are placed between brackets.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period in office</th>
<th>Cabinet name</th>
<th>Cabinet composition*</th>
<th>Classification based on political ideology**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2007 – 2010</td>
<td>Vanhanen II</td>
<td>KESK, KOK, RKP-SFP, VIHR</td>
<td>CL + CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2010 – 2011</td>
<td>Kiviniemi</td>
<td>KESK, KOK, RKP-SFP, VIHR</td>
<td>CL + CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2011 - 2014</td>
<td>Katainen</td>
<td>VAS, KD-F, KOK, RKP-SFP, SSDP, VIHR</td>
<td>CL + CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2014 – 2015</td>
<td>Stubb</td>
<td>KD-F, KOK, RKP-SFP, SSDP, VIHR</td>
<td>CL + CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2015 – 2017</td>
<td>Sipilä</td>
<td>KESK, KOK, SP</td>
<td>P***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2006 – 2010</td>
<td>Reinfeldt I</td>
<td>C, FP, KD, M</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2010 – 2014</td>
<td>Reinfeldt II</td>
<td>C, FP, KD, M</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2014 - incumbent</td>
<td>Löfven</td>
<td>MP, SAP (Vp)</td>
<td>CL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2007 – 2009</td>
<td>Fogh Rasmussen III</td>
<td>V, KF (DF)****</td>
<td>CR, supported by RR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2009 - 2011</td>
<td>Løkke Rasmussen I</td>
<td>V, KF (DF)</td>
<td>CR, supported by RR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2011 – 2014</td>
<td>Thorning-Schmidt I</td>
<td>RV, SF, Sd (EN-O, IA, Jf and Si)</td>
<td>CL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2014 – 2015</td>
<td>Thorning-Schmidt II</td>
<td>RV, Sd (EN-O, IA, Jf, Si and SF)</td>
<td>CL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2015 – 2016</td>
<td>Løkke Rasmussen II</td>
<td>V (DF, NLA and KF)</td>
<td>CR, supported by RR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2016 - incumbent</td>
<td>Løkke Rasmussen III</td>
<td>KF, NLA, V (DF)</td>
<td>CR, supported by RR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2007 – 2010</td>
<td>Balkenende IV</td>
<td>CDA, PvdA, CU</td>
<td>CL + CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2010 – 2012</td>
<td>Rutte I</td>
<td>VVD, CDA (PVV)</td>
<td>CR, supported by RR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2012 - 2017</td>
<td>Rutte II</td>
<td>VVD, PvdA</td>
<td>CL + CR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Full names: KESK=Keskusta; KOK=Kansallinen Kokoomus; RKP-SFP=Ruotsalainen Kansanpuolue; VIHR=Vihreä Liitto; VAS=Vasemmisto-liitto; KD-F=Kristillisdemokraatit; SSDP=Suomen Sosialidemokraatit; csp|P=Perussuomalaiset; C=Centerpartiet; FP=Folkpartiet; KD=Kristdemokraterna; M=Moderaterna; MP=Miljöpartiet de Gröna; SAP=Socialdemokraterna; Vp=Vänsterpartiet; V=Venstre; KF=Konservative Folkeparti; DF=Dansk Folkeparti; PVV=Partij voor de Vrijheid.

**CL+CR=centre; CR=centre-right; CL=centre-left; RR=radical right; CR+RR=centre-right+radical right

***Parties printed in bold letters represent populist radical right parties.

****Parties in brackets represent parties providing external support to a minority government.

Source: Döring & Manow (2018) and author’s interpretation (the classification based on political ideology)

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1 Please note that the legend provides the original names of the political parties. In the “List of political parties” on page 9 English names are included as well.
A classification of the cabinets based on their political ideology has been created in order to be able to systematically compare cabinets with different ideologies. For this classification, data was retrieved from the ParlGov database (Döring & Manow, 2018). In their database, Döring and Manow (2018) categorize parties in a left/right dimension on a 0 – 10 scale. In this regard, 0 represents the most left ideology, whereas 10 represents the most right ideology. For this categorization they rely on several academic sources such as Castles and Mair (1984), Huber and Inglehart (1995), Benoit and Laver (2006) and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2010). However, the ParlGov database (Döring & Manow, 2018) merely categorizes political parties, and does not place cabinets on a left - right political spectrum. Therefore, for the creation of the classification of cabinets based on political ideology used in this study, the data on party ideology has been interpreted as shown in table 2.

| Cabinets including solely parties with ParlGov score between 0 - 5 | Centre-left (CL) |
| Cabinets including solely parties with ParlGov score between 5 – 10 | Centre-right (CR) |
| Cabinets including parties with varying ParlGov scores | Centre (CL + CR) |
| Centre-right cabinet (CR), supported by a populist radical right party according to the definition of Mudde (2007) | Centre-right, supported by radical right (CR, supported by RR) |
| Centre-right cabinet (CR), including a populist radical right party according to the definition of Mudde (2007) | Centre-right, including radical right (CR + RR) |

Source: Döring & Manow (2018) and author’s interpretation.

In table 2, five cabinet categories are distinguished: centre-left (CL), centre-right (CR), centre (CL+CR), centre-right, supported by radical right (CR, supported by RR), and centre-right, including radical right (CR+RR). If a cabinet, that is part of the selected cases as presented in table 1, includes solely parties that are categorized in the ParlGov database (Döring & Manow, 2018) on the left/right scale between 0 and 5, this means that these parties are all regarded as having a leftist ideology. Such a cabinet is labeled centre-left (CL) in this study.

If a cabinet, that is part of the selected cases as presented in table 1, includes solely parties that are categorized in the ParlGov database (Döring & Manow, 2018) on the left/right scale between 5 and 10, this means that these parties are all regarded as having a rightist ideology. Such a cabinet is labeled centre-right (CR) in this study.

If a cabinet, that is part of the selected cases as presented in table 1, includes both parties that are categorized in the ParlGov database (Döring & Manow, 2018) on the left/right scale between 0 and 5, and parties that are categorized between 5 and 10, the first mentioned set of parties is regarded as
having a leftist ideology, whereas the second mentioned set of parties is regarded as having a rightist ideology. As this cabinet includes parties with both leftist and rightist ideology, such a cabinet is labeled \textit{centre (CL+CR)} in this study.

If a cabinet, that is part of the selected cases as presented in table 1, is labeled \textit{centre-right (CR)} following the above described method, and is formally supported by a party in opposition, which is a populist radical right party according to the definition of Mudde (2007), such a cabinet is labeled \textit{centre-right, supported by radical right (CR, supported by RR)} in this study.

Finally, if one of the parties of a cabinet, that is part of the selected cases as presented in table 1, and is labeled \textit{centre-right (CR)} following the above described method, is a populist radical right party according to the definition of Mudde (2007), such a cabinet is labeled \textit{centre-right, including radical right (CR, including RR)} in this study.

For the sake of clarity, in the following the labeling of the Finnish Vanhanen II cabinet will be described in detail as an example of how all selected cabinets have been categorized. As can be seen in table 1, the Vanhanen II cabinet comprised four parties: KESK, KOK, RKP-SFP, VIHR. In the ParlGov database (Döring & Manow, 2018), KESK scores 5.8 on the left/right scale, KOK 7.2, RKP-SFP 6.4 and VIHR 3.6. Hence, the Vanhanen II cabinet includes both parties that are categorized in the ParlGov database (Döring & Manow, 2018) on the left/right scale between 0 and 5 (VIHR), and parties that are categorized between 5 and 10 (KESK, KOK and RKP-SFP). The Vanhanen II cabinet has therefore been labelled \textit{centre (CL+CR)}.

\subsection*{4.2.3 Alternative explanations and control variables}

To isolate the causal effect in COV-analysis, the selected cases must vary with regard to the independent variable but show similar values for the other potentially influential variables (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). In other words, in assessing the impact of populist radical right parties on immigration and integration policies, one need to make sure that the policy changes are not due to other factors. Zooming in on the countries and relying on immigration policy theory, there are three variables that are relevant in this study and that therefore need to be controlled for.

First, populist radical right parties are not the only political parties that deem immigration and integration as important issues. Centre-right parties such as Christian Democratic and Conservative Parties are also preoccupied with restricting immigration. Restricting immigration is important to them, as their ideological raison d’être is to defend national security and national communitarian values (Bale, 2008). Policy differences regarding immigration and integration between the mainstream
and populist radical right can be perceived as a matter of degree rather than as outcomes of diverging ideological perspectives (Akkerman, 2012). This entails that both centre-right parties and populist radical right parties are willing to introduce restrictive immigration and integration policies and that restrictive policy outputs of cabinets including these parties therefore might be the result of efforts of both centre-right parties and populist radical right parties. Following this theory, the centre-right cabinets (CR), the centre-right cabinets, supported by populist radical right (CR, supported by RR) and the centre-right cabinet, including a populist radical right party (CR + RR) might all have implemented more restrictive immigration and integration legislation. In order to prove the direct effect of the populist radical right on this policy output in the CR + RR case and the CR, supported by RR cases, it is necessary to control for the influence of the centre-right parties in these cabinets on the introduction of these policies. This will be done by analyzing how the policy changes were established and what the role of the centre-right party in the cabinet concerned in this was. This control variable applies to all selected countries, as all countries delivered one or more CR, CR + RR, CR, supported by RR or CR + RR cabinets, as can be observed in table 1.

Second, issue salience might also affect immigration laws and push them in a restrictive direction. As issue salience goes up, and media coverage of asylum increases, immigration laws get more restrictive (Givens & Luedtke, 2005). This seems to be a relevant alternative explanation, as the selected countries all had to deal with a refugee crisis during the years under study. Almost two million people filed for asylum in Europe in 2014 and 2015, compared to 1.6 million during the previous five years (Steinmayr, 2017). In Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, the number of asylum seekers doubled in 2014 compared to 2013. Finland saw an increase of almost 20 per cent (Eurostat, 2015). It is therefore expected that this issue stood high on the political agenda of the cabinets under study and hence had an influence on the introduction of more restrictive immigration and integration policies. In particular, following this theory, cabinets that were in office in 2014 and later are expected to have produced more restrictive policy outputs. However, the number of migrants is in itself not able to capture the public’s attention. It also needs a major party to get the issue onto the political agenda. Immigration’s saliency level therefore generally rises when major mainstream parties pay more attention to it (Christiansen, 2017). All in all, the alternative explanation described above implies that if the cases in this thesis implemented more restrictive immigration and integration laws, this might have been caused by issue salience rather than by populist radical right parties. It is therefore necessary to control for the political agenda. Thus, in the analysis, the rationale behind the implementation of policy changes will be examined to find out whether societal and political debate about immigration and integration were the reason for the introduction of these changes.
Third, Finnish, Swedish and Dutch national immigration policies can be influenced by developments at the EU level. Since the addition of the ‘justice and home affairs’ pillar by the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has adopted many proposals for legislation or measures implementing legislation in the area of immigration and asylum law. Whether European legislation brings about new domestic legislation depends on what kind of legislation this is. For instance, a European regulation is a binding legislative act and needs to be applied in its entirety across the EU. A European regulation does not need to be transposed into national law. However, this is different if the introduced European regulation concerns a directive. A European directive is a legislative act that sets out a goal that all EU member states must achieve. However, it is up to the individual member states to devise their own laws on how to reach these goals (Hix & Høyland, 2011). Whether these directives make national legislation more restrictive therefore depends on the domestic policies that are already in place. The potential influence of EU regulation does in principle not apply to the Danish cases, as Denmark has an opt-out on Justice and Home Affairs cooperation in the EU, including on migration and asylum affairs since 1999 (Peers, 2016). The influence of EU regulation on national immigration and integration legislation in Denmark is therefore expected to be minor. In sum, EU directives might cause the introduction of new national immigration and integration policies, which might push the policies into a restrictive direction, depending on the policies in place. EU directives therefore need to be controlled for. Hence, in this study, it will be analyzed whether the legislative changes in the field of immigration and integration policies were implemented to bring domestic legislation in line with EU legislation. This would mean that the policy changes were caused by EU regulation rather than by the populist radical right.

4.3 Measuring the impact of the populist radical right

The assessment of the impact of populist radical right parties on immigration and integration policies in this study consisted of two steps. First, it was necessary to gain insight into the development of these policies in the selected countries during the chosen time frame. Subsequently, the role of the populist radical right in this process has been examined.

4.3.1 Nationalist Immigration and Integration Policy index

In this study, a policy index is used to systematically measure the legislative changes regarding immigration and integration policy between 2009 and 2016. The development and analysis of a policy index allows researchers to examine multiple cases (both across space and time) and, hence, produce more generalizable assumptions and conclusions than can be achieved if only one case is analyzed. In
addition, indices enable scholars to collect data across political science subfields and in this manner build generalizable insights, offering new perspectives (Goodman, 2015). Using a policy index also increases the reliability of the research, since other investigators can review the evidence directly and draw independent conclusions about the study (Yin, 2009). The use of a policy index is a commonly applied method in immigration and citizenship research. Examples of existing indices vary from comparative examinations of citizenship (European Union Democracy Observatory [EUDO] on Citizenship, 2013; Howard, 2009), whereas others concentrate on immigration and integration policy (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013; Koopmans, Michalowski, & Waibel, 2012; Akkerman, 2012; MIPEX, 2015). However, none of these existing policy indices provide all data that are necessary for conducting this research. MIPEX (2015) is the index that was published most recently, but it only analyzes policy changes before January 2015. It was therefore essential to develop a new index that covers all immigration and integration laws introduced between January 2009 and January 2017.

Many of the existing policy indices do not build on previous or contemporaneous work, but instead consistently try to reinvent the wheel. As a result, there are at least ten indices that overlap to some degree on immigration, citizenship, and integration policy. This significantly muddles conceptual distinction (Goodman, 2015). In order not to contribute to this tendency, the policy index in this study applies the same method and approach that was used by Akkerman (2012) in developing her Nationalist Immigration and Integration Policy (NIIP) index. Akkerman’s (2012) NIIP index qualitatively measures to what extent new immigration and integration legislative output has a programmatically (radical) right-wing character. Drawing on the claim of Bauböck and Helbling (2011) that simple indicators are quite adequate to measure immigration policies, the index includes only the most straightforward indicators, focusing on policy output – excluding policy outcomes - and involving only legal aspects. The indicators used in the NIIP index have been derived from the ideological characteristics the (radical) right-wing party family has in common. The index therefore measures policy changes with regard to citizenship, asylum, family reunification, illegality and integration, all key issues to populist radical right parties (Akkerman, 2012). In measuring the amendments, positive scores are given to policy changes that push immigration and integration legislation in a restrictive direction. These scores range from + 0.25 for minor changes, to + 0.5 for moderate changes and + 1 for major changes. Legislative output gains a negative score if it makes rules more liberal. These scores range from – 0.25 for minor changes, to – 0.5 for moderate changes and – 1 for major changes. For an overview of the indicators and an explanation of how policy change has been measured, see the codebook in Appendix III.

After the measurement, the score of each case is divided by the amount of years that the cabinet was in office. This made it possible to compare the scores of the cases, as the government
terms of the cabinets differed in length. With regard to these final scores, Akkerman (2012) makes a
distinction between cabinets that achieved remarkable policy gains in a radical right direction (with a
score higher than 1.00 on the index), cabinets with moderate results (with a score between 0.5-1.00)
and cabinets with minimum results (scores between 0.00–0.5).

Out of the existing policy indices, Akkerman’s (2012) method was chosen for two reasons. First,
the scope in terms of policy fields fits this research best. Most other indices use a narrow scope,
 focusing only on one or two aspects of immigration, integration and citizenship policies. In this way,
some policies that are important to populist radical right parties are left out. The NIIP index (Akkerman
2012), on the contrary, focuses on all parts of immigration and integration policies that are deemed
important by populist radical right parties. Second, Akkerman (2012) examines policy changes rather
than policies itself. Other indices study the laws that exist at a certain moment and compare these to
the policies that apply a certain number of years later, without taking into account specific policy
changes that occurred in the time between. Analyzing these changes as well is important in this
research to gain insight in the factors that influenced the development of the immigration and
integration policy in the country. By doing so, the direct role of the populist radical right in this can be
analyzed.

The codebook of the policy index is presented in Appendix III. This codebook is largely based
on the codebook that Akkerman (2012) used in her research. However, in order to be entirely clear
about the way Akkerman’s (2012) method was applied, some clarifying notes were added to the
existing codebook by the author of this thesis. These notes can be recognized as they are printed
in blue. Note that none of Akkerman’s (2012) codes have been eliminated; the notes only concern some
additions. Policies for target groups, concerning one group of immigrants, have been left out, just like
pilots and technical and institutional amendments. Policies for target groups have not been included
as these policies do not apply to the entire target population, which are all immigrants, refugees and
newcomers in a country. Therefore, if policies for target groups would be included, the conclusions
drawn from this measurement would not be valid for the entire target population. This would harm
the measurement validity of this thesis. The same holds for pilots, as these do only apply to all
immigrants, refugees and newcomers in a country either, but instead affect only part of this group. In
addition, pilots are generally conducted temporarily. Technical and institutional amendments have not
been included in the measurement either. Generally, these amendments do not aim at changing the
content of policies. An example of this is when the responsibility for immigration and integration policy
is shifted from one ministry to another. It is hard to observe whether this kind of amendments makes
policies more restrictive, which is the reason why technical and institutional amendments have not
been examined in this research.
4.3.2 Case by case analysis

Next, the study proceeds with a more detailed analysis of developments. In a case by case analysis, the cabinets that included a populist radical right party or were supported by one are examined to provide more insight into the respective roles of the centre-right and radical right parties in the development of these policies. Other cases, without a populist radical right party, will be examined in this case by case analysis as well if their scores are as high as that of cases that did include a populist radical right party. Indeed, if cases with and without the populist radical right both score equally high on the index, this would imply that the implementation of more restrictive immigration and integration policies might be the result of other factors rather than the presence of the populist radical right in office. Conducting a case by case analysis is therefore necessary to gain more insight into the factors that contributed to the introduction of these policies. The case by case analysis focused on the most direct forms of influence that can be exerted by parties in office. To this end, the rationales behind the implemented laws and the policy context have been analyzed and compared to the policy ambitions of the other political parties in office. In addition, the analysis controls for the alternative explanations.

4.3.3 Data collection

This study draws on a variety of primary and secondary sources. The data for both the policy index and the case by case analysis have been collected by conducting desk research. With respect to the policy index, ideally only primary legislative sources would have been scrutinized. However, the options to do so were limited as the legal texts concerned were not all available online. Besides, the laws that could be found on the internet were often only accessible in the original language (Finnish, Swedish, Danish, Dutch), not providing an English translation. Due to the absence of knowledge of these languages, apart from Dutch, on the part of the author, and as the quality of online machine translation systems like Google Translate has been questioned in several studies (Groves & Mundt, 2014; Sheppard, 2011; Van Rensburg, Snyman & Lotz, 2012; Austermühl, 2011; Kit & Ming Wong, 2008), secondary English literature has been consulted as well. Moreover, secondary sources were used for contextual information. The literature that has been relied on included research articles, policy evaluations, reports of international organizations like the OECD and publications of ministries and other official authorities. For policy changes that took place before 2015 the MIPEX index (2015) has sometimes been consulted as well, mostly to cross-check data. Important sources, providing much information, were the annual reports on developments in migration and asylum policy presented by the countries to the European Migration Network. In these reports, the National Contact Points for the
European Migration Network (often part of the Ministry of Interior or Immigration Service) give insight into the most significant political and legislative developments, as well as public debate in the area of migration and asylum. The National Contact Points collect the information from official sources and responsible authorities.

The data for the case by case analysis have been collected by conducting desk research as well. In order to gain insight in the policy context and the rationales behind policy changes, several kinds of literature have been used. These included primary sources like publications of ministries and other official authorities such as government programs and coalition agreements, but also secondary sources like news websites and research articles. For the data on the policy ambitions of the political parties in office and opposition has been relied on party manifestos and other publications and announcements produced by the parties. However, these sources were not always available in English. For the same reasons as stated above, secondary sources have been used as well. The consulted literature for both the index and the case by case analysis was found by using Google, Google Scholar and applying a “snowball technique” (pursuing references of references), an effective method for identifying sources (Greenhalgh & Peacock, 2005).

Information on the composition and duration of the cabinets has been derived from the ParlGov database (Döring & Manow, 2018) and the Political Data Yearbook, a dataset part of and containing data of the European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbooks.

4.4 Validity and reliability

In this thesis, several measures have been taken that aimed at increasing the validity and reliability of the study.

4.4.1 Validity

Validity is concerned with the integrity of the conclusions that are generated from a study (Bryman, 2012: 47). Three types of validity are relevant in this thesis: measurement validity, internal validity and external validity.

First, measurement validity is specifically concerned with the question of whether operationalization and the scoring of cases adequately reflect the concept the researcher seeks to measure (Adcock & Collier, 2001: 529). To make sure this study really measures what it wants to measure, tested methods have been used. The concepts have been operationalized based on earlier studies to the same concepts, which have proven to work. For instance, the use of a policy index is a
commonly applied method in immigration and citizenship research to systematically measure legislative changes regarding immigration and integration policies (Goodman, 2015). The policy index in this study applies the same method and approach, using the same code book, that was used successfully before by Akkerman (2012). In this study Akkerman (2012) also aimed at analyzing the direct effect of populist radical right parties on immigration and integration policies. Similar to Akkerman (2012), a case by case analysis has been conducted in order to gain more detailed information. In addition, for all parts of the study a variety of sources has been used. By drawing on various sources of evidence converging on the same set of facts or findings and by cross-checking these data, the risk of measurement error should have been eliminated. This method, called data triangulation (Leuffen, Shikano & Walter, 2010), also contributes to the measurement validity (Yin, 2009: 114). Nevertheless, in spite of the efforts described above, there is a possibility of measurement error in this thesis. The coding of the policy changes might allow for subjectivity of the researcher, as this process is dependent on the researcher’s interpretation. Multiple coding, which involves the cross-checking of coding strategies and interpretation of data by independent researchers (Barbour, 2001: 1116), could have been a solution. However, applying multiple coding was not possible in this thesis due to practical constraints. Therefore, to limit the risk of harming the measurement validity as much as possible, the codebook has been meticulously followed and the researcher has repeated the scoring procedure in order to make sure that scores were assigned in a consistent manner.

Second, internal validity relates to whether a conclusion that incorporates a causal relationship between two or more variables holds water (Bryman, 2012: 47). Testing rival explanations enhances the internal validity of the research (Yin, 2009: 41). Therefore, in this study, theories that claim that other factors rather than populist radical right parties push immigration and integration legislation into a restrictive direction have been listed in the research design, and these alternative explanations are controlled for in the case by case analysis.

Third, external validity is concerned with the question of whether the results of a study can be generalized beyond the specific research context (Bryman, 2012: 47). The external validity of this research will be assessed in Chapter 6: Conclusion.

4.4.2 Reliability

The reliability of a study relates to the question of whether the results of the research are repeatable (Bryman, 2012: 47). In order to be replicable, the measurements should be conducted consistently and systematically. Moreover, the researcher should be as clear as possible about his or her indicators and the rationale for scoring the variables in a certain case (Blatter & Haverland, 2012: 67). In this thesis,
the following measures have been taken to enhance the reliability: the steps and decisions made are outlined in a structured and detailed manner. Furthermore, the concepts have been systematically operationalized and the measurement method has been made transparent, which allows other researchers to scrutinize the procedures. For instance, an overview of all policy changes in the field of immigration and integration policy, the coding strategies and interpretations of the data are all included in the appendices of this thesis. The fact that a policy index has been used also increases the reliability of the research, since other investigators can review the evidence directly and draw independent conclusions about the study (Yin, 2009).
Chapter 5: Analysis

**Figure 3: Means of index scores* of each cabinet category**

![Graph showing means of index scores for each cabinet category]

*As was also discussed in the research design, positive scores are given to policy changes that push immigration and integration legislation in a restrictive direction, while legislative output gains a negative score if it makes rules more liberal.

** CL=centre-left; CL+CR=centre; CR=centre-right; RR=radical right, CR+RR=centre-right+radical right

5.1 Comparison of policy output

5.1.1 Means of the immigration and integration policy output

Figure 3 shows the means of the immigration and integration policy output per cabinet category. The mean of all individual cabinets is +0.43, which means that between 2009 and 2016 the countries have moved their policies into a right direction. However, following the distinction made by Akkerman (2012), a score of +0.43 is a minimal result.

Centre-right cabinets supported by populist radical right parties scored on average highest on the NIIP index. Generally, they succeeded best in pushing immigrant and integration policies to the right. The centre-right cabinet including a populist radical right party gained the second highest score. The immigration and integration legislation passed by centre-left cabinets deviated ideologically from those of centre-right and populist radical right parties in government, which resulted in the lowest score. The centre cabinets scored mainly positive, whereas the average total score of the centre-right
cabinets was negative. The figure shows that there is a substantial difference between the policy outputs of right-wing and left-wing cabinets.

**Figure 4: Policy output* of cabinets**

![Policy Output Diagram](image)

* Output of each cabinet in proportion to the amount of years that the cabinet held office (including caretaker periods). The scores can also be found in Appendix I. For a detailed overview of the policy changes and coding per cabinet, see Appendix II.

** CL=centre-left; CL+CR=centre; CR=centre-right; RR=radical right, CR+RR=centre-right+radical right

### 5.1.2 Comparing the absolute scores

The absolute scores of the cases, as shown by figure 4, give more insight in the differences in scores between and within the categories. The centre-right parties in office, supported by populist radical right parties, scored on average highest on the NIIP index. The Danish cabinet Løkke Rasmussen II (2015-2016) stands out as the coalition government that succeeded best in shifting immigration and integration legislation to the right. One of the main contributing factors to this was Law No. 102 amending the Danish Aliens Act, that was passed in February 2016. The law severely limited the rights
of asylum seekers and immigrants. The new policy included, among other things, more restrictive rules for acquiring a temporary and permanent residence permits and stricter family reunification legislation. Another, more remarkable policy change was the fact that authorities were granted the right to search and seize funds and assets from asylum seekers in order to cover the costs of the asylum seekers’ stay. The policies were introduced as a response to the massive influx of asylum seekers during Europe’s refugee crisis. The first Løkke Rasmussen cabinet (2009-2011) scored high on the NIIP index as well. This cabinet also introduced restrictive policies with regard to family reunification and obtaining a permanent residence. The score of the Dutch Rutte I cabinet (2010-2012) was lower, but this government pushed immigrant and integration legislation in a right direction too. For example, new policies stated that only married or couples in a registration partnership could apply for family reunification. Before, family reunification also applied to couples in a relationship. Another important factor was the introduction of the Civic Integration Act 2013, that obliged all immigrants to pay for their civic integration themselves. The two other centre-right cabinets, supported by radical right, Fogh Rasmussen III (2007-2009) and Løkke Rasmussen III (2016-current date) both scored 0 on the index. No immigration and integration legislation passed under these cabinets in the time period that is subject to this research (January 2009 – December 2016).

The output of the centre-right cabinet, including a populist radical right party, resulted in a second highest average score. The cabinet concerned, Sipilä (2015-2017) in Finland, for example introduced amendments to the Aliens Act that restricted the rights of asylum seekers to legal aid. Another policy measure was that family reunification criteria were tightened. The policy changes were implemented after the number of asylum seekers increased due to the refugee crisis.

On average, the centre-left parties in office scored negatively on the NIIP index, which means that they passed immigration and integration legislation that was liberal rather than restrictive and assimilationist. The Danish centre-left cabinet Thorning-Schmidt I (2011-2014) scored the highest negative score. The government abolished barriers to social assistance for immigrants and loosened family reunification legislation and citizenship policies. The second Thorning-Schmidt cabinet (2014-2015) received a negative total score as well. One of the main policies of this cabinet included the allowance of multiple nationalities. In contrast, the centre-left Löfven cabinet (2014-current date) in Sweden scored 0 on the index. The cabinet introduced restrictive policies as well as liberal immigration and integration laws, resulting in a balanced score.

The output of centre cabinets, including centre-left and centre-right parties, scored on average positive, but the absolute scores of the cabinets within this category varied. The output of the Kiviniemi cabinet in Finland (2010-2011) is the most remarkable of its category, as it was the only centre cabinet
receiving a positive total score. Another striking fact is that this was the third most positive score compared to the output of all other cabinets. During their one year in office, the government introduced several policies restricting the rights of immigrants and asylum seekers, for example regarding family reunification and their right to work. The Finnish Vanhanen II cabinet (2007-2010)\(^2\) scored 0 on the index. The government passed both restrictive and liberal legislation, resulting in a balanced score. All other centre cabinets received a slightly negative total score, with outputs between 0 and -1.09.

The centre-right cabinets received a negative total score. Both cabinets, Reinfeldt I (2006-2010) and Reinfeldt II (2010-2014) in Sweden, made immigration rules more generous. For example, Reinfeldt II introduced a policy which provided free health and dental care to illegals, effectively an admission they could stay. The negative score of the centre-right Reinfeldt cabinets in Sweden is striking. According to literature by Bale (2008) and Akkerman (2012), as discussed in paragraph 4.2.3, centre-right parties are mostly in favour of restricting immigration.

5.1.3 Output of countries

Figure 5 (on the next page) shows the policy output of the cabinets categorized per country. Comparing the output of the countries, the following observations stand out. The patterns of development of immigration and integration legislation in Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands show some similarities, although there are large differences in the height of the scores. In the countries, restrictive policies were implemented by the around 2010 and 2011. After these years, a period followed during which liberal immigration and integration laws were introduced. Subsequently, in Finland and Denmark policies were pushed into a more restrictive direction in 2015 and 2016. In the Netherlands, the centre Rutte II cabinet was still in office during that period, which tended to introduce liberal policies rather than restrictive ones. The similarities in the patterns of development could indicate that policies are a result of general European trends.

However, the policy outputs of the Swedish cabinets show a different course of development of immigration and integration legislation. Different from the other countries, no positives scores can be observed in Sweden. Even the centre right Reinfeldt cabinets produced liberal policies. As the Swedish Reinfeldt cabinets are the only centre right (CR) cabinets under study in this thesis, it is hard to tell whether the policy outputs of these cabinets are a result of country specific circumstances or part of another European trend of centre right parties (without the support or inclusion of a populist

\(^2\) Note: In this study, only policy changes introduced during 2009 and 2016 are taken into account.
radical right party) with liberal policy outputs. Nevertheless, it should be stated that the centre-left Löfven cabinet in the period 2014-2016 received a balanced score, which means a break from the years before and could indicate the influence of the refugee crisis. This is also more or less in line with the trend observed in Denmark and Finland, although the differences in scores between Sweden on the one hand and Denmark and Finland on the other are large.

5.1.4 Conclusions

All in all, three noteworthy conclusions can be drawn from this initial analysis. First, on average the cabinets that included a populist radical right party or were supported by one achieved higher policy scores than the other cabinets. The highest mean score on the NIIP index was reached by centre-right parties in government that were supported by the populist radical right (+ 2.34). Note that the centre-
right cabinets, supported by populist radical right parties and the centre-right cabinet including a populist radical right party have here been regarded as two separate categories, but even if the two categories would have been considered as one, the mean would still be the highest (+2.13). Following the distinction made by Akkerman (2012), this mean score would fall into the ‘high-score’ category, as this score is above 1.00 on the NIIP index. The high score implies that populist radical right parties possibly had an impact on these introduced immigration and integration laws. Second, according to the measurement by the NIIP index, gaining a high policy score is not limited to cabinets involving a populist radical right party. The Finnish centre Kiviniemi cabinet (2010-2011) also scored remarkably high (+3). Third, the NIIP index shows that the cabinet in which the populist radical right acted as a “full-fledged” coalition partner, the Sipilä cabinet, did not produce the most restrictive policy output. This implies that a populist radical right party has more leverage to influence immigration and integration legislation as a supporting party than as a member of government. In the next section, a case by case analysis will be presented to provide more insight into the developments that brought about the above written conclusions and implications.

5.2 The impact of the populist radical right

By conducting a case by case analysis, the cabinets that included or were supported by a populist radical right party will be examined more closely to provide more insight into the role of the radical right parties and other factors in the development of these policies. To this end, the rationales behind the implemented laws and the policy context are analyzed and compared to the policy ambitions of other political parties in office. In addition, the analysis also controls for alternative explanations, in order to be able to draw valid conclusions. The Danish Fogh Rasmussen III (2007-2009) and Løkke Rasmussen III (2016-incumbent) have been excluded. Both scored 0 on the NIIP index, as only respectively three months and one month of these cabinet periods were measured due to the scope of this thesis. The cabinets did not enact any immigration policy changes during these months and the measured time periods are deemed too short to investigate further. The governments that are studied in the case by case analysis are the Danish Løkke Rasmussen I (2009-2011) and II (2015-2016) cabinets, the Dutch Rutte I cabinet (2010-2012) and the Finnish Sipilä cabinet (2015-2017). Moreover, the Finnish centre Kiviniemi cabinet (2010-2011) will be analyzed in detail as well, as this cabinet achieved a remarkable high score on the NIIP index, similar to the policy scores of cabinets that did include a populist radical right party or were supported by one.
5.2.1 Løkke Rasmussen I (2009-2011)

The first Løkke Rasmussen cabinet scored high on the NIIP index (+3.6), which means the government pushed immigration and integration legislation in a restrictive direction. The high score was mainly due to two laws that increased respectively the requirements for obtaining a permanent residence and for family reunification. Other policy changes were the introduction of an immigration test for foreigners applying for reunification with a spouse or partner, restrictions to the right to vote, restrictions to child- and youth benefits for immigrant families, the introduction of fees for residence permits and family reunification and restrictions to the amount of public assistance that a spouse living in Denmark can have received prior to the application of his spouse/partner. In the next section, the factors that contributed to the introduction of these measures will be analyzed.

The Løkke Rasmussen I government was a minority cabinet consisting of the liberal Venstre Party and the Conservative People’s Party and was supported by the Danish People’s Party (Döring & Manow, 2018). The Danish People’s Party did not deliver any ministers. The cabinet was not formed after elections but started its period after a new Prime Minister was appointed. Former Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen left the office for the position of NATO Secretary General in spring 2009. As there was no majority against the government continuing, Finance Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen succeeded Fogh Rasmussen as Prime Minister on April 5 (Bille, 2010). As no elections were held before the cabinet period started, the positions of the government parties and the populist radical right party presented during the campaign for the 2007 elections have been examined. The Danish People’s Party advocated the most restrictive immigration and integration policies. Among other proposals, the party suggested to limit labour migration to qualified workers that could only move to Denmark if they would fill gaps in the labour market for which no Danish labour force was available. In addition, the party stated that asylum seekers should not have the right to work or to education, and people with refugee status should only be granted temporary residence. On integration, the party stressed the importance of fundamental Danish values. The manifesto of Venstre promoted immigration and integration laws that were much more liberal. The party saw labour migration as an important issue and welcomed labour immigrants as they were regarded valuable for the Danish economy. With respect to asylum and family reunification policies, Venstre wanted to uphold the strict policies that were already in place. It was only on integration that the party pointed out a number of problems that should be dealt with by implementing measures. The Conservative People’s Party was on the same line as Venstre (Christiansen, 2017). Hence, the governmental parties did not propose much restrictive policy measures. This changed in 2010.

During his first year as Prime Minister Løkke Rasmussen had not initiated major policy changes. However, in the beginning of 2010 he carried out a major reshuffle of his cabinet and in connection to
This the government presented its new program ‘Denmark 2020 – knowledge > growth > prosperity > welfare’ (Bille, 2011). The program included ten political objectives and 76 concrete proposals in different policy areas for how Denmark could escape the financial crisis. In the plan, the cabinet stated that the government had pursued a firm and fair immigration policy in order to promote integration since 2001. The government wanted to retain and strengthen the basic elements of the existing policy, but also carry out a renewed check of the immigration and integration legislation and make necessary adjustments which built on the lessons learned from the past. The program also included specific policy changes. For instance, acquiring a permanent residence permit was to be linked to a points system, in which the ability to integrate, for example by means of employment or education, was rewarded, whereas a reluctance to integrate meant that points were deducted. The government also wanted to strengthen education in Danish culture and society for newly arrived adult immigrants in order to improve the individual immigrant’s opportunities to participate actively in community life (The Danish Government, 2010). The points system passed parliament with support of the Danish People’s Party in March 2010. The members of the other parties voted against the changes. The rationale behind the policy reform was that immigrants should prove to have a good will to integrate, for which they wanted took personal responsibility (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2010). In addition, a politician of the Danish People’s Party argued that the aim of the policy was to attract immigrants to Denmark who could contribute to society ("Dramatic drop in number of residence permit approvals", 2011).

In April 2010, a bill passed parliament by which an immigration test for foreigners applying for reunification with a spouse or partner was introduced. However, this policy change cannot be credited to the Løkke Rasmussen I government, as already in 2007, before the cabinet entered office, was decided to introduce this test (Ersbøll & Gravesen, 2010).

In spring 2010 it became clear that the Danish economy was facing short-term and long-term challenges. In order to deal with these challenges, the government presented a ‘Recovery Package’ which aimed to freeze total public spending until 2013, suspend the automatic increases to welfare benefits and delay the implementation of tax cuts for two years. The cabinet had to negotiate with the Danish People’s Party in order to ensure majority support for the package. The Danish People’s Party voted in favour of the package, and in return the cabinet promised to establish a ceiling regarding the annual amount a family could receive in family allowance. This measure affected a disproportionate number of families with an ethnic minority background. In autumn 2010 a similar kind of construction was used in order to get the Danish People’s Party on board in the budget negotiations. The Danish People’s Party provided support in exchange for further restrictions regarding family reunification legislation. The declared intention was to limit immigrants from non-Western countries (Bille, 2011).
Applicants must now score a certain number of points in a system that rewarded language skills, business experience and education together with a deposit demonstrating financial security (Bowlby, 2011).

The analysis shows that the high policy score of the Løkke Rasmussen I cabinet was partly due to the direct influence of the Danish People’s Party. Some of the introduced immigration policies should mainly be credited to the government. The cabinet initiated several policies itself, such as the point system for acquiring permanent residence. The analysis of the party positions demonstrated that this policy was in line with the government party’s ambitions in the field of integration. In addition, the policy was introduced as part of the plan to deal with the economic crisis. However, other laws would not have existed if the Danish People’s Party had not proposed them. In two cases, the government needed the support of the Danish People’s Party to get economic policies passed. This gave the Danish People’s Party power to demand for specific policy measures, which resulted in the point system for family reunification and the ceiling for family allowance.

5.2.2 Løkke Rasmussen II (2015-2016)

The Danish Løkke Rasmussen II cabinet scored highest on the NIIP index, with a score of + 6.18. The cabinet introduced three laws that resulted in this high score. One law lowered the integration allowance for refugees. By another law, the grounds on which asylum seekers could be detained were increased. Finally, the third law entailed a large amount of policy changes, all aimed at restricting the rights of asylum seekers and immigrants. Among other policies, the conditions for acquiring permanent residence and applying for family reunification for asylum-seekers became stricter and the authorities were granted to search and seize funds and assets from asylum seekers. The rationale behind these new laws and context in which they were introduced will be investigated in the following paragraph to understand which factors contributed to their realization.

The Løkke Rasmussen II cabinet was a one-party minority cabinet consisting of the liberal Venstre party. The cabinet was supported by the Danish People’s Party, the New-Liberal Alliance and the Conservative People’s Party (Döring & Manow, 2018). The cabinet took office after elections in 2015. Highest on the political agenda during the election campaign were economic issues and employment, but immigration also played a significant role (Kosiara-Pedersen, 2016a). An analysis of the party positions for the election shows that the Danish People’s Party advocated the most restrictive measures concerning immigration (Christiansen, 2017). The party called the Islam “the greatest threat to our civilization” (Billing, 2015). Furthermore, the party’s immigration policy proposals included a plan to reduce public funds for asylum seekers and for international development policies (Kirk, 2015).
and policies to regain control of Denmark's open borders (Brabant, 2015). Venstre was also in favour of restrictive policy changes. Long before the general elections of 2015 were called Venstre had presented its hard stance on immigration, asylum and integration. Over time, voters had even found it harder to distinguish between DF's views and those of Venstre. For example, in Summer 2014 Venstre suggested that the government should adopt an immigration approach that made it easier to come to Denmark and integrate for Westerners and harder for Muslims (The Local, 2014). Venstre maintained this attitude during the election campaign. In anticipation of the general elections of 2015 the party on multiple occasions advocated that it wanted to bring down the number of asylum seekers. For instance, Venstre party leader Rasmussen stated that Denmark had a problem with integration and he pointed to the potential impact of mass immigration on Denmark's universal welfare state (Martyn-Hemphill & Westland, 2015). The Social-Democrats also advocated stricter immigration legislation, stating that Denmark was a small country with limits as to how many foreigners could be accepted. Former Prime Minister Thorning Schmidt argued that it was because of the increase in asylum seekers that her second cabinet had tightened asylum rules. Shortly before the election took place, Venstre put forward an eight-point plan that included measures such as the reduction of social benefits paid to asylum seekers and the obligation of having a job and speaking Danish in order to remain permanently in the country (Deloy, 2015; The Local, 2015a). According to the party, the plan aimed at putting an “immediate halt” to the “massive influx” of asylum seekers coming to Denmark since 2014. The amount of people that sought asylum in Denmark in 2014 was nearly double the number from the year before and an almost fourfold increase from 2009. The Conservatives, the Danish People’s Party and New-Liberal Alliance openly supported Venstre’s plan and they even joined forces in a collective advertising campaign saying that Denmark’s “foreigner policy needs to get back on track” (The Local, 2015a). The four parties achieved a tiny majority in parliament after the elections of 18 June 2015. The Danish People’s Party performed better than ever, winning the highest number of seats within this so-called “blue bloc” of the four right-wing parties. Nevertheless, the party still supported Løkke Rasmussen to become Prime Minister, and it did not join the single-party government formed by Venstre at the end of June (Christiansen, 2017). The Danish People’s Party believed that staying outside the coalition would allow sufficient leverage without the responsibility for unpalatable decisions (Kosiara-Pedersen, 2016b). The government declaration of the one-party government largely resembled what was stated by Venstre in the eight-point plan. The new declaration was even more specific and somewhat stricter in tone. The general message emphasized the fact that the government wanted a strict and consistent immigration policy to secure an open Denmark for those who can be and want to be part of the country. However, the door should be closed for those who do not (Christiansen, 2017).
In July 2015, shortly after the cabinet was installed, it announced its first policy measure. The unemployment welfare benefits that asylum seekers coming to Denmark were entitled to under the previous government would be replaced by a new – and significantly lower – so-called ‘integration benefit’. The legislation passed with support of the Danish People’s Party, the New-Liberal Alliance and the Conservative People’s Party ("Denmark to cut asylum-seeker benefits under new leaders", 2015). In connection to the introduction of this policy measure, the Venstre government even published adverts in four Lebanese newspapers in which readers were informed about the policy change and were discouraged to come to Denmark (Taylor, 2015).

The next policy change followed in October 2015, when Venstre reached an agreement with the Danish People’s Party, the New-Liberal Alliance and the Conservative People’s Party to tighten the citizenship legislation. The new citizenship rules included more stringent Danish language requirements, increased demands for financial self-reliance and a more difficult citizenship exam. It would also be harder to obtain citizenship for applicants who had a criminal record (The Local, 2015b). In November 2015 more proposals followed, when Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Integration Minister Inger Støjberg and Justice Minister Søren Pind announced 34 initiatives aimed at further discouraging asylum seekers from coming to Denmark (The Local, 2015c). One part of the plan was already approved by the parliament as an “urgent” proposal one week after the announcement (Barrett, 2015). This bill included measures that granted the authorities to detain asylum seekers to determine their identity, to suspend the time limit for detention, and to suspend the time limit for asylum seekers’ right to judicial review of detention (Seymat, 2016). In December and January, the parliament discussed the rest of the proposals. Already in early December, the Venstre government reached an agreement with support parties the Conservative People’s Party and New-Liberal Alliance, along with primary opposition party Social Democrats. The Danish People’s Party refused to fully back the deal after its initiative for even stricter measures was rejected (Manion, 2015). Finally, after weeks of heated debate and criticism, Venstre, the Danish People’s Party, the Conservative People’s Party, New-Liberal Alliance and the Social Democrats voted in favour of the proposal in January 2016. The new law introduced a large number of severe measures for asylum-seekers and other immigrants. For example, the bill extended the period that refugees needed to wait before they could apply for family reunification from one to three years. In addition, the law contained the so-called ‘jewelry proposal’ that gave the Danish authorities the right to seize refugees’ valuables upon arrival in the country to help cover expenses related to their stay in Denmark. Moreover, the bill also tightened the rules on getting permanent residency in Denmark and included a 10-percent reduction on benefits for asylum seekers and the abolition of the possibility for asylum-seekers to live outside of asylum centres (Rychla, 2016). The Danish People’s Party stressed it had played a crucial role in the negotiations, noting that it
was the first party in parliament to raise the issue of whether migrants' valuables could be used to pay for their stay in asylum centres (The Local, 2016).

Although the number of asylum seekers decreased, in August 2016 the government presented a new policy plan with even more restrictive measures (Clante Bendixen, 2016). However, the proposed policies did not pass while the Løkke Rasmussen II cabinet was in office. In November 2016, the cabinet period came to an end when Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen reshuffled the cabinet when the New-Liberal Alliance and the Conservative People’s Party accepted the Prime Minister’s invitation to join Venstre in office. Venstre deemed it necessary to form a new coalition as the New-Liberal Alliance in recent months had threatened to bring down the government because of disagreements over tax cuts, immigration and welfare policies.

In sum, the analysis shows that the direct influence of the Danish People’s Party on the cabinet’s shift to the right was only limited. As the party had a supporting role and did not deliver any ministers, the party could only affect policies through agreements with cabinet party Venstre. Although the Danish People’s Party did initiate the policy that made it possible to confiscate asylum seekers’ valuables, the vast majority of the policies were initiated by Venstre, who had advocated for most of these measures already before the election. The role of the other support parties should also not be underestimated. As Venstre formed a single-party cabinet, it had to rely on other parties next to the Danish People’s Party to pass legislation. This support was not evident, as both the New-Liberal Alliance and the Social Democrats had advocated more liberal immigration rules in anticipation of the previous election (Christiansen, 2017). However, as the number of asylum seekers increased due to the refugee crisis and the issue became more salient, their positions shifted to the right. Hence, the influence of the refugee crisis seems to have been quite large in this case. The NIIP index also shows that whereas the first Thorning Schmidt cabinet produced highly liberal policies (-4.29), the output score of the second cabinet was already much higher (-1.06), as the Social Democrats tightened asylum regulation in February 2015. All in all, the high score of the Løkke Rasmussen II cabinet was caused by a combination of factors. The share of the Danish People’s Party in this regard was only marginal.

5.2.3 Rutte I (2010-2012)

The Dutch Rutte I cabinet (2010-2012) pushed immigration and integration legislation in a restrictive direction, as it scored +1.92 on the NIIP index. The cabinet introduced three policy changes: first, the scope of the return decision and entry ban was enlarged. Second, family reunification legislation was restricted. Among other measures, family reunification was limited to the spouse and minor children and was only possible if the partners were married. Third, the immigrant became responsible for his
or her integration program. In the next section, the developments that led to the introduction of these measures will be analyzed.

The Rutte I cabinet was a minority cabinet consisting of the liberal VVD and the Christian-Democratic CDA and was supported by the populist radical right PVV (Döring & Manow, 2018). The Rutte I cabinet was formed after general elections in 2010. During the election campaign, the parties primarily fought along traditional left-right lines, with the country’s financial crisis highest on the agenda (Van Holsteyn, 2011). Immigration and integration were not regularly discussed during debates, although all parties comprehensively discussed the topics in their manifestos (Van der Laan, 2010).

In its 2010 party manifesto the PVV presented highly restrictive policy proposals. Among other proposals, the PVV called for greater national control over migration and argued that there should be a complete ban on immigrants from Islamic countries. The party also argued that the quota for asylum-seekers needed to be lowered to 1,000 per annum and it demanded that migrants must have lived and worked for ten years in the Netherlands before they would become able to claim social benefits. Illegality should become criminal offence (PVV, 2010). The liberal VVD also presented restrictive views in its 2010 manifesto. Among other proposals, the party argued that new policies should aim at attracting highly skilled migrants, whereas low skilled migrants should be kept out. With regard to family reunification, the party stressed that limits should be imposed on marriage migration and family reunification should only be possible for the spouse and children under 16. In terms of integration, the VVD stated that newcomers must ensure that they take part in society and the party emphasized the immigrant’s own responsibility in this regard (VVD, 2010). The CDA’s positions regarding immigration and integration were also restrictive. The party stated that it supported the protection of refugees, but that it was also in favour of a selective immigration policy. Family migration fraud should be combatted while language requirements for ‘marriage migration’ should be increased. The party also emphasized the importance of integration and stressed that newcomers should make an extra effort to find their place in society. Society should provide opportunities and space for this. In addition, learning Dutch, education, and participation in the labour market were also regarded as important means (CDA, 2010). Compared to their positions on immigration and integration before the election in 2006, the positions of the VVD and CDA had become more restrictive towards the 2010 election. The proposals of the PVV, on the contrary, were in line with the party’s earlier proclamations (Van Klinger, Zaslove & Verbeek, 2017).

Both the VVD and the PVV could be regarded as ‘winners’ of the 2010 election. The VVD became the largest party with 31 seats. The PVV largely expanded, resulting in 24 seats. The CDA lost

53
half of its voters and reached 21 seats (Lucardie & Voerman, 2011). Following the Dutch tradition, the largest party VVD took the lead in the cabinet formation. The first option that was explored was a right-wing coalition of VVD, CDA and PVV. Already after a week it became clear that this would not work, given the reluctance of the CDA. Two other options were investigated, but all negotiations failed. To overcome the deadlock in the formation process, the VVD and CDA agreed to form a minority cabinet with majority support of the PVV on major issues. The PVV did not deliver any ministers (Van Holsteyn, 2011). CDA and VVD agreed on a government programme, while the PVV signed a short parliamentary support agreement, a ‘gedoogakkoord’ (Kranenburg, 2010). PVV’s willingness to support budget cuts was linked to the nature of agreements made on immigration, integration and asylum, public safety, and care for the elderly. The parliamentary support agreement of the cabinet advocated restrictive asylum and migration policies, aiming at a substantial fall in the influx of immigrants. The parties stated that immigration needed to be urgently restructured, controlled and reduced. Achieving this was one of the government’s main policy objectives. Policy plans included, among other things, restrictions to family migration, limitations to the admission of immigrants without prospects, promotion of integration and making illegality a criminal offence. The government also intended to amend EU directives and possibly, if there proved to be no alternatives for important measures and in consultation with other member states, to amend treaties and conventions (VVD-PVV-CDA, 2010; EMN National Contact Point the Netherlands, 2011).

In December 2011 the first restriction of immigration policy was implemented. The scope of the return decision and entry ban was enlarged to comply with the EU Return Directive (Act of 15 December 2011 amending the Dutch Aliens Act 2000). A few months later, the first promise from the parliamentary support agreement was implemented. Family reunification policy was restricted. The amendment included, among other policies, that family reunification was only possible for partners who were married or who had a registered partnership, and only the spouse and minor children, no other family members, were allowed to come to the Netherlands (Decree of 27 March 2012 amending the Dutch Aliens Decree 2000, the Dutch Decree Modern Migration Policy and the Dutch Decree Integration). On 1 January 2013, the Civic Integration Act 2013 entered into force. As of this moment, migrants who were obliged to participate in a civic integration programme had to arrange and pay for their civic integration themselves (Kamerman, 2012).

The Rutte I cabinet did not sit out the regular term to the end. The cabinet already fell in 2012, when the PVV left the government (Otjes & Voerman, 2013).

Looking back, the PVV did not make a bad bargain at the start of the Rutte I cabinet. The support of the PVV to the minority coalition of VVD and CDA was needed to reach a majority in
parliament and the three parties delivered a quite extensive and restrictive policy program. However, the influence of the PVV on this should not be overrated. Both the VVD and CDA had restrictive party manifestos as well. Out of the introduced policies, two policies – restricting family migration to only the spouse and children, and making the immigrant responsible for his/her integration - were explicitly mentioned as policy ambitions in the manifesto of the VVD (2010). In addition, CDA had advocated for restrictive and selective immigration and integration policies in its manifesto as well, although not explicitly for the measures that were implemented during the cabinet period. The third introduced policy – the enlargement of the scope of the return decision and entry ban - was implemented to comply with the EU Return Directive; this was no promised policy. In sum, the direct influence of the PVV was only marginal.

5.2.4 Kiviniemi (2010-2011)
The score of the Kiviniemi cabinet on the NIIP index was remarkable, as it was the only centre cabinet receiving a positive total score (+ 3). The score was even the third highest compared to the output of all other cabinets, while no populist radical right party took part in the coalition or supported the government. The cabinet introduced several restrictions to family reunification legislation, the asylum seeker’s right to work and a deadline for voluntary return for persons subject to a decision on the refusal of entry or removal. In the next section, the developments that led to the introduction of these measures will be examined in order to find out how it was possible that the cabinet scored this high score without the direct influence of the populist radical right.

The Kiviniemi government started its period in office not as a result of elections, but after a change of Prime Minister. Prime Minister Vanhanen stepped down as the chairperson of the Centre Party in December 2009, after which it soon became clear that he would also resign from his position as Prime Minister. Vanhanen was succeeded by Mari Kiviniemi, the vice chair of the party, and in June 2010 the cabinet investiture took place. Both the composition of the cabinet and its program remained unchanged (Sundberg, 2011). Note that although the Vanhanen II and Kiviniemi cabinets have been regarded as separate cases, in order to gain insight into the factors that brought about Kiviniemi’s restrictive measures, the manifestos of the parties prior to the 2007 elections and the Vanhanen II government program that was presented after the 2007 elections have been analyzed as well, as the Kiviniemi continued to implement this program.

Immigration was not a hot topic during the 2007 election campaign. In the 2007 manifestos, most of the parties mentioned very little or nothing at all about immigration. The few that refer to it, were in favour of liberal policies. The mainstream parties SSDP (Social Democratic Party) and KESK
(Centre Party) included a couple of statements in support of labour migration and improving integration policies, associating benefits with immigration. The KOK party (National Coalition Party) advocated a liberalization of naturalization policies by suggesting a reduction in the residence requirements from six to four years. The populist radical right Finns Party, on the contrary, was the only party preferring less liberal immigration and integration policies. Although its manifesto did not mention labour migration, family reunification or integration, it communicated a strongly restrictive position on asylum, voicing a desire to have the refugee quota reduced (Nygård & Kuisma, 2017). After the 2007 parliamentary elections, the centre Vanhanen II cabinet was formed, including the mainstream parties KESK, KOK, RKP-SFP (Swedish People’s Party) and VIHR (Green League). The Finns Party won 4.1 per cent of the vote and was the smallest party in the parliament with five seats (Döring & Manow, 2018). The new government presented its program for the upcoming period right after its installation in April 2007. The program aimed at promoting work-related immigration with due regard to the demographic trends in Finland and within the EU, and the related need for labour. For example, the government stated that the period of residence required for Finnish citizenship would be shortened (Finnish Government, 2007). The proposed immigration and integration measures were liberal rather than intolerant, and the restrictive measures implemented during the cabinet period of Kiviniemi that were measured by the NIIP index were not reflected in the government program of 2007. Apparently, throughout the cabinet periods of Vanhanen II and Kiviniemi other determinants must have caused the policy changes.

By examining the rationale behind the introduced restrictive laws and diving into the policy context, the following developments seem to have been of influence. First, one of the restrictive measures was implemented in order to bring national policy in line with the EU Return Directive. A deadline for voluntary return was introduced for persons subject to a decision on the refusal of entry or removal. Second, the influx of asylum-seekers started to increase significantly in 2008 and as a result immigration and integration became a highly debated topic in Finnish society. Whereas immigration and integration was no key theme during the 2007 elections, this changed as the number of immigrants grew and became a more visible part of society. In 2009, the public discussion concerning immigration to Finland snowballed in politics, civil society and media. The debate became more politicized than ever (EMN National Contact Point Finland, 2010). A crucial actor in this debate was radical anti-immigration and anti-islam blogger Jussi Halla-aho, an independent member of the Helsinki City Council elected on the Finns Party’s ticket. On his blog he sought to expose failings in Finland’s immigration policies and the way immigrants are integrated into Finnish society (Keskinen, 2012).

Critical public dialogue on immigration and integration of immigrants into Finnish society even increased in 2010 and it became the main theme in the campaign towards the elections of 2011 (EMN
The government had already after the sudden increase of asylum-seekers in 2008 started to conduct research on the differences between Finnish legislation and immigration and integration policies in other Nordic countries. This led to the proposal for more restrictive immigration legislation. Among other policies, the cabinet wanted to tighten the asylum-seekers’ right to work and make the conditions for family reunification stricter (UNHCR, 2011). After intensive debates in media, the cabinet introduced the restrictive immigration legislation in summer 2010 (Keskinen, 2012).

In conclusion, the restrictive policy output of the Kiviniemi cabinet was mainly a result of issue salience. During the election campaign and in the government program of 2007 the parties that were part of the government had advocated liberal policies rather than restrictive. This changed after the number of asylum-seekers increased in 2008 and immigration came high on the societal and political agenda. The fact that a politician of the Finns Party with his blog contributed the intensity of the debate, does suggest that the populist radical right influenced the introduction of the restrictive policies indirectly. This would mean that the cabinet parties adjusted their political agenda as a reaction to the potential electoral success of the Finns Party. However, as this study only focuses on direct influence of the populist radical right, this case analysis cannot confirm this presumption.

5.2.5  **Sipilä (2015-2017)**

The Sipilä cabinet scored positively on the NIIP index, meaning that the government pushed immigration and integration legislation in a restrictive direction. The cabinet implemented the following four restrictive measures: the grounds for asylum were tightened, family reunification legislation became stricter, the rights of asylum seekers to legal aid were restricted and new provisions on residence requirements were adopted. The Sipilä cabinet consisted of the Centre Party (KESK) and National Coalition Party (KOK), both centre-right parties (Döring & Manow, 2018). In contrast to the other cases involving a populist radical right party, the Finns Party participated as a real coalition partner in this cabinet, not as a supporting party. According to the theory, parties in government with access to ministerial posts have more possibilities to directly influence policies than supporting parties. Considering this, one would expect the Sipilä cabinet to score highest on the NIIP index. However, out of the ‘high-score’ group the Finnish Sipilä government was the cabinet with the lowest score (+ 1.11). Why did the populist radical right Finns Party so far not manage to make a difference in office? In the following paragraph the developments in the field of immigration and integration legislation will be examined to provide more insight.
The cabinet was formed after the 2015 election. Against the background of the deteriorating Finnish economy the electoral campaign had revolved largely around traditional socioeconomic issues such as employment, the public debt and economic growth (Jungar, 2016). The Finns Party was the only party that fully engaged with the immigration issue. Its 2015 election manifesto was full of populist and nationalist rhetoric and aimed at a decrease of immigrants, which was seen as a burden on the public economy and the welfare state. The manifesto therefore included proposals such as the introduction of economic support requirements for family reunification and a lengthening of the period of residence in Finland before citizenship could be acquired (Finns Party, 2015). In contrast to this, the National Coalition Party only briefly mentioned immigration, by stressing the importance of labour migration. This kind of migration was regarded as beneficial for the Finnish economy, since immigrants, if successfully integrated into society and into the labour market, could contribute to the workforce and help to rebalance the dependency ratio. The Centre Party hardly addressed immigration in its manifesto (Nygård & Kuisma, 2017).

The Centre Party won the election and formed a government with the National Coalition Party and the Finns Party. The Finns Party received four ministerial portfolios in a government with a total of fourteen portfolios: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Social Affairs and Health, and Justice and Employment (Jungar, 2016). On 29 May 2015, the government presented its governmental program. Despite the limited attention to immigration and asylum in their manifestos, the government parties did mention the issue in their program. The cabinet argued that it wanted to encourage an open debate about migration policy. Moreover, it wanted to promote work-related migration, as the cabinet expected that this would enhance employment in Finland, boost public finances, improve the dependency ratio and contribute to the internationalization of the economy. Furthermore, the government wanted the number of quota refugees to be maintained at least at the same level to participate in the international sharing of burdens. Lastly, an independent study of the costs of migration and its impact on Finnish society would be conducted to enable facts-based discussion, better integration policies and better decision-making (Finnish Government, 2015). Clearly, the governmental program advocated liberal rather than restrictive language on immigration and integration.

However, in the months that followed the government introduced several restrictive measures. The amount of asylum seekers rapidly increased in 2015 due to the refugee crisis. This took the Finnish authorities by surprise and crystallized debates about immigration. Overall, the immigration issue was perceived as a possible threat to the financial sustainability of the welfare state due to the higher socio-economic costs that this would bring about (Nygård & Kuisma, 2017). Already on 11 September 2015, the Finnish Government presented a migration plan which was a reaction to
the increase in the number of asylum seekers both in Finland and at the EU level. In the plan, the government emphasized that uncontrolled migration must be disciplined. The cabinet highlighted the need for quick practical measures to save lives and to manage migration as well as the need for long-term measures with which the situation was to be brought sustainably under control (EMN National Contact Point Finland, 2015). In December 2015, the cabinet announced that requirements for family reunification would be tightened in anticipation of the expected flood of applications from refugees hoping to live with their families. The bill proposed to introduce an income requirement for the applicant. In addition, the bill stated that the application would become subject to a fee ("Stricter requirements for family reunification coming: must speak Finnish, have a good job and a home", 2015). The law passed parliament in June 2016 ("Parliament passes tougher family reunification rules", 2016).

In May 2016, an amendment to the Aliens Act took effect by which residence permits would no longer be granted on the basis of humanitarian protection ("Finland says Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia now safe, tightens residence permit requirements", 2016). A few months later, the Minister of Justice, Jari Lindström of the Finns Party, introduced reforms which imposed stricter conditions on asylum decision appeals. Furthermore, the reforms shortened the window for appeal. The ministry aimed to reduce the pressure on tribunals caused by an increasing number of asylum seeker applications ("Justice Ministry tightens rules on asylum decision appeals", 2016).

Lastly, in December 2016 a legislative proposal was approved by the Parliament providing for a residence obligation, meaning that a foreign national who had applied for international protection could be ordered to live in and report to a certain reception centre for administrative reasons (European Commission, 2017a).

In conclusion, at first sight the Finns Party seems to have had an important influence on the implementation of the restrictive policies. One of the introduced measures – the tightening of family reunification - was explicitly mentioned in the party’s election manifesto for 2015. In addition, as a full-fledged coalition partner with four ministers the party had the opportunity to directly influence the political agenda. Minister of Justice, Jari Lindström of the Finns Party did so by introducing a policy that imposed stricter conditions on asylum decision appeals. However, another, external factor had a share in the restrictive policies too. The amount of asylum seekers increased due to the refugee crisis and the issue became more salient, which fueled the Finns Party’s anti-immigrant rhetoric and made the Finnish mainstream more willing to implement restrictive immigration and integration policies. Before the dramatic increase in asylum seekers the three mainstream parties had been reluctant to address issues relating to immigration (Nygård & Kuisma, 2017). Hence, as the Finns Party was able to influence immigration policy, partly due to issue salience because of the refugee crisis, the party cannot be blamed for the fact that the Sipilä cabinet did not produce the most restrictive policy output in terms of a score on the NIIP index.
5.3 Conclusion

Three noteworthy conclusions could be drawn from the NIIP index. First, on average the cabinets that included a populist radical right party or were supported by one achieved higher policy scores than the other cabinets. Second, gaining a high policy score is not limited to cabinets involving a populist radical right party. The Finnish centre Kiviniemi cabinet (2010-2011) also scored remarkably high (+ 3). Third, the NIIP index showed that the cabinet in which the populist radical right acted as a “full-fledged” coalition partner, the Sipilä cabinet, did not produce the most restrictive policy output.

The case by case analysis demonstrated that the direct influence of the populist radical right on immigration and integration policy change was limited. In most cases, the populist radical right only had a supporting role and did not have access to ministerial posts. As a result, they could only affect policies through agreements with the coalition. The policy changes in these agreements were often initiated by the coalition, whose party positions in many cases had already shifted to the right before the cabinet was formed. The impact of issue salience on policy change should also not be underrated, as many cabinets implemented restrictive policies when the number of asylum-seekers increased and immigration became a ‘hot topic’ in society, for instance during the refugee crisis that emerged in 2014. Cabinets did so even when they had advocated liberal immigration and integration policies in their manifesto. This was for example visible in the Sipilä case, where the increase in asylum seekers fueled the Finns Party’s anti-immigrant rhetoric and made the Finnish mainstream more willing to implement restrictive immigration and integration policies, but issue salience also had influence in the case of the Løkke Rasmussen II cabinet, that scored highest on the NIIP index. Due to the refugee crisis and increasing salience of this issue, even liberal and left parties became in favour of restrictions to immigration policies. However, the issue salience in the field of immigration and integration was not limited to the refugee crisis around 2015. The case of the Kiviniemi cabinet, that was in office from 2010 to 2011, showed that issue salience can even bring about policy change if the populist radical right is in opposition and not a formal support party of the government. Furthermore, the analysis showed that the influence of EU legislation on the introduction of restrictive immigration policy is very limited.

However, the analysis also highlighted that populist radical right parties do have direct influence if their support to the cabinet is extremely crucial to pass certain legislation. In the case of Løkke Rasmussen II, the cabinet needed the Danish People’s Party seats in parliament to get a majority for both the “Recovery Package” and the budget of 2011. This gave the Danish People’s Party leverage to demand for specific policies.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

In the following, an answer to the main research question of this study is formulated. Next to this, the theoretical and societal implications of the findings are presented. Furthermore, the validity and reliability of the findings are scrutinized and the potential for generalization is discussed. Avenues for further research are outlined throughout the chapter.

6.1 Answering the main research question

The aim of this research was to examine the impact of populist radical right parties on immigration and integration policies in the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. More specifically, the study examined whether these parties pushed the immigration and integration policies into a restrictive direction. First, however, the concept of ‘populist radical right party’ was clarified. The theoretical framework made clear that these parties can best be perceived as political parties that are nativist, authoritarian and anti-establishment. Subsequently, an index was presented that measured and compared all changes to immigration and integration policies in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands in the period between 2009 and 2016. The index showed that centre-right cabinets supported by populist radical right parties scored on average highest on the NIIP index, which means they succeeded best in producing restrictive immigration and integration legislation. The high score implied that populist radical right parties possibly had an impact on these introduced immigration and integration laws. However, the case by case analysis demonstrated that the direct influence of the populist radical right on these policies was only limited.

In conclusion, the role of the populist radical right parties in the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Finland in pushing immigration and integration policies between 2009 and 2016 further in a restrictive direction was only marginal.

6.2 Implications

6.2.1 Theoretical implications

The analysis presented several findings, which have implications for the theoretical debate about the impact of populist radical right parties. First, the study has shown that the direct impact of the populist radical right on immigration and integration policies is limited. Policy changes in this field are mainly affected by the centre-right parties in office, who had often already adopted more restrictive positions before the cabinet was formed. This is in line with Akkerman (2012) and Duncan (2010). However, this is not to say that the populist radical right did not have influence at all. The Kiviniemi case showed that
the populist radical right might have had an indirect effect on the policy output, by influencing the policy agendas of the mainstream parties. Further research on the indirect effects of the populist radical right in the cases in this thesis should therefore be conducted in order to get a complete overview. Second, the analysis also demonstrated that issue salience is of influence, which is in line with Givens and Luedtke (2005), who argue that issue salience might affect immigration laws and push them in a restrictive direction. Third, the case of Sipilä showed that populist radical right parties do not necessarily have more influence on the immigration policy output as a full coalition partner than as a supporting partner. Many scholars argue that the organizational weakness of the populist radical right prevents them from using their possibilities to influence policy while in office (Heinisch, 2003; Akkerman, 2012; Mudde, 2007). The case of Sipilä contradicts this, however.

6.2.2 Societal implications
The findings also have a societal implication. The rise of the populist radical right has raised concerns, as people are afraid of a right turn in European politics. The analysis showed that the mean score of the policy output of all cases as measured by the NIIP index was +0.43. This indicates that immigration and integration policies have generally become stricter, which could be regarded as a push to the right. However, following the distinction made by Akkerman (2012), this increase is moderate. Moreover, the analysis demonstrated that the direct influence of the populist radical right on the shift to the right was only limited. This might contribute to reducing the concerns of the media and citizens regarding the rise of populist radical right parties.

6.3 Limitations
This study has some limitations that could be improved in future research. First, in this thesis only legal changes in immigration and integration policies have been measured. However, in order to get a complete overview of the policy developments in this field, one should also measure policy changes for which no legal amendments were needed, such as policy plans and guidelines. For practical reasons, it was not possible to include these in this study.

Second, the reader of this study should take into account that only the policy changes that were adopted between January 2009 and December 2016 were analyzed. Due to this scope, the research has analyzed both entire cabinet periods and parts of cabinet periods. Some of the cabinets under study had already started its period in office before 2009, but only the changes that were introduced after January 2009 were analyzed. The same goes for cabinets that were still incumbent after December 2016: only the policies before the end of 2017 were taken into consideration. This
implicates that the policy output and score on the NIIP index of these “overlapping” cabinets could have been different if the complete cabinet period would have been analyzed. This notion is especially important when reading the analysis of the Sipilä case. In this study, the policy output of the Sipilä cabinet did not score highest on the NIIP index, which was the expectation as this cabinet included a populist radical right party as a full-fledged coalition partner. However, if also the remaining months of the cabinet period were measured, the policy score on the index might have been different. Nevertheless, the study has largely resolved this limitation by dividing each policy score by the amount of years that the cabinet was in office.

### 6.4 Implications for the external validity

When generalizing the data found in this study, one should take into account the context from which they were derived. The measurement by the NIIP index demonstrated that on average, centre-right cabinets supported by populist radical right parties succeeded best in pushing immigrant and integration policies to the right. Remarkably, they did much better than centre-right cabinets without the populist radical right, which received a negative score, meaning that the cabinets pushed policies in a liberal direction. However, the two centre-right cabinets in this study are all Swedish. It is therefore uncertain whether the large difference in policy score of centre-right cabinets with and without the support of the populist radical right would also be the outcome if the same kind of research would be applied to cases in other countries.
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## Appendix I: Immigration and integration policy output of Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, 2009 - 2016

Table 3: Immigration and integration policy output of Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, 2009 - 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cabinet</th>
<th>Composition*</th>
<th>Classification**</th>
<th>Months***</th>
<th>Policy output****</th>
<th>Output/duration of cabinet in years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>19 April 2007 – 22 June 2010</td>
<td>Vanhanen II</td>
<td>KESK, KOK, RKP-SFP, VIHR</td>
<td>CL + CR</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>22 June 2010 – 22 June 2011</td>
<td>Kiviniemi</td>
<td>KESK, KOK, RKP-SFP, VIHR</td>
<td>CL + CR</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>+ 3</td>
<td>+ 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>22 June 2011 - 24 June 2014</td>
<td>Katainen</td>
<td>VAS, KD-F, KOK, RKP-SFP, SSDP, VIHR</td>
<td>CL + CR</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>- 0.25</td>
<td>- 0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>24 June 2014 – 29 May 2015</td>
<td>Stubb</td>
<td>KD-F, KOK, RKP-SFP, SSDP, VIHR</td>
<td>CL + CR</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>- 1</td>
<td>- 1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>29 May 2015 – 13 June 2017</td>
<td>Sipilä</td>
<td>KESK, KOK, SP</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>CR + RR</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>+ 1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5 October 2006 – 6 October 2010</td>
<td>Reinfeldt I</td>
<td>C, FP, KD, M</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>- 0.5</td>
<td>- 0.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|   | Country      | Start/End Dates                        | Government Leaders                      | Cabinet Support                        | Party Composition | Cabinet Name | Seats | Support
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6 October 2010 – 3 October 2014</td>
<td>Reinfeldt II</td>
<td>C, FP, KD, M</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>- 1.5</td>
<td>- 0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3 October 2014 - now</td>
<td>Löfven</td>
<td>MP, SAP (minority cabinet supported by Vp)</td>
<td>CL</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>23 November 2007 – 5 April 2009</td>
<td>Fogh Rasmussen III</td>
<td>V, KF (minority cabinet supported by DF)</td>
<td>CR, supported by RR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5 April 2009 - 3 October 2011</td>
<td>Løkke Rasmussen I</td>
<td>V, KF (minority cabinet supported by DF)</td>
<td>CR, supported by RR</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>+ 9</td>
<td>+ 3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3 October 2011 – 3 February 2014</td>
<td>Thorning-Schmidt I</td>
<td>RV, SF, Sd (minority cabinet supported by EN-O, IA, Jf and Si)</td>
<td>CL</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>- 10</td>
<td>- 4.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3 February 2014 – 28 June 2015</td>
<td>Thorning-Schmidt II</td>
<td>RV, Sd (minority cabinet supported by EN-O, IA, Jf, Si and SF)</td>
<td>CL</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>- 1.5</td>
<td>- 1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>28 June 2015 – 28 November 2016</td>
<td>Løkke Rasmussen II</td>
<td>V (one-party minority cabinet supported by DF, NLA and KF)</td>
<td>CR, supported by RR</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>+ 8.75</td>
<td>+ 6.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>28 November 2016 - now</td>
<td>Løkke Rasmussen III</td>
<td>KF, NLA, V (minority cabinet supported by DF)</td>
<td>CR, supported by RR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Years</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Score</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>22 February 2007 – 14 October 2010</td>
<td>Balkenende IV</td>
<td>CDA, PvdA, CU</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>14 October 2010 – 5 November 2012</td>
<td>Rutte I</td>
<td>VVD, CDA (minority cabinet supported by PVV)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+1.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>5 November 2012 - 26 October 2017</td>
<td>Rutte II</td>
<td>VVD, PvdA</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Döring & Manow (2018); Political Data Yearbook: Interactive (Dataset part of and containing data of the European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbooks) (accessed 28 May 2018)*

* Please note that the ‘List of political parties’ on page 9 provides for a legend of the abbreviations of the political parties.

** CL+CR=centre; CR =centre-right; CL=centre-left; RR=radical right; CR+RR=centre-right+radical right

*** In this study, only the months of the cabinet period between 2009 and 2016 are taken into account. The counting of the number of months therefore starts with January 2009 and ends with December 2016.

**** Positive scores are given to policy changes that pushes immigration and integration legislation in a restrictive direction, while legislative output gains a negative score if it makes rules more liberal.
## Appendix II: Policy indices of Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands

### Table 4: Policy index of Finland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislation category</th>
<th>Policy change</th>
<th>Description of change</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Asylum legislation  | Act adopted in February 2009 implementing the EU Qualification Directive | The Act implemented the EU Qualification Directive. The changes in legislation entered into force June the 1st 2009. The changes were as follows:  
  • In transposing the directive, the scope of the existing national legal provision for granting subsidiary protection was narrowed to meet the definition of subsidiary protection contained in the directive;  
  • However, in order to retain the level of protection granted, a new, third protection category (so-called humanitarian protection) was created. | + 0.5 | (EMN National Contact Point Finland, 2010) |
| Asylum legislation  | Act No. 86 adopted in March 2009 implementing the EU Asylum Procedures Directive | The Act implemented the EU Asylum Procedures Directive and came into force the 1st of July 2009. Amendments on cancelling an asylum application or dropping the processing of an application, as well as on asylum interview were made. These amendments increased the legal protection, equality of the applicants and the openness of the decision making. | - 0.5 | (EMN National Contact Point Finland, 2010) |
| Asylum legislation | Amendment to the Decree on living allowance of 26 January 2010 | Lowering of living allowance paid to asylum seekers: living allowance for an adult asylum seeker living alone would be €292.22 per month (compared to €375.11 previously). For asylum seekers that receive all daily meals at a reception centre, a 79% deduction would be made from the cash portion of the basic living allowance. The amendment of the Decree was based on the change to give a larger portion of the living allowance to asylum seekers in the form of commodities, such as opportunities to watch television and use internet free of charge at the reception centre. Asylum seekers can use their living allowance to buy meals, clothing and the minor healthcare expenses they may have. | + 0.5 | (EMN National Contact Point Finland, 2011) |

| Family reunification legislation | Amendments to the Aliens Act | The Aliens Act was amended with regards to the family reunification provisions concerning asylum seekers who entered the country as unaccompanied minors. The new measures entered into force on 1 August 2010. The new policy consisted of two measures:  
  • Under the amendments granting a residence permit to the family member of a sponsor of family reunification who was a minor was conditional on the sponsor being a minor on the date on which the decision on the family member’s residence permit is made. New provisions to the Aliens Act made possible that a medical age assessment could be conducted if there were apparent grounds to suspect the credibility of the information provided by the alien concerning his or her age. Participation was voluntary, but refusal to participate in the test without acceptable cause would result in treating the person concerned as an adult; | + 0.5 | (EMN National Contact Point Finland, 2011; OECD, 2011; MIPEX, 2015) |
A further condition to granting a residence permit in such cases was that the sponsor must have a residence permit on the date the case became pending.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family reunification legislation</th>
<th>Amendment to the Aliens Act</th>
<th>Another amendment to the Aliens Act that entered into force on 1 August 2010 was the following: a sponsor, who received international protection, was required to have secure income to be able to be reunited with his/her family if the family had been formed after arriving in Finland.</th>
<th>+ 0.5</th>
<th>(EMN National Contact Point Finland, 2011; OECD, 2011)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asylum legislation</td>
<td>Amendment, entered into force on 1 August 2010</td>
<td>Restrictions were made to the asylum seeker’s right to work. In the future, only asylum seekers with valid travel documents would have the right to work after a three months waiting period. Without a valid travel document, the waiting period was six months. In the event that an asylum seeker did not hold a valid travel document, he or she could engage in paid employment without a residence permit after residing in the country for a minimum of six months.</td>
<td>+ 0.5</td>
<td>(EMN National Contact Point Finland, 2011; OECD, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship legislation</td>
<td>Decree of the Ministry of Interior of December 2010</td>
<td>In December 2010 the Ministry of the Interior announced that the processing fees of the residence permit applications would be raised in the beginning of next year. The processing fee of the first-time residence permit would be raised from 225 euros to 350 euros. The processing fee of the first-time residence permit for an employed person would be 400 euros in the future.</td>
<td>+ 0.5</td>
<td>(EMN National Contact Point Finland, 2011; Finnish Immigration Service, n.d.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegality legislation</td>
<td>Act amending the Aliens Act, implementing the EU Return Directive</td>
<td>A legislative amendment that entered into force on 1 April 2011 resulted in new provisions being added to the Aliens Act concerning the EU Return Directive. The following measure is relevant for this research: a deadline for voluntary return was introduced for persons subject to a decision on the refusal of entry or removal. Those persons were then given 7-30 days to leave the country voluntarily. However, the option of</td>
<td>+ 0.5</td>
<td>(EMN National Contact Point Finland, 2012; EMN National Contact Point Finland, 2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
voluntary return was not offered to persons considered by the authorities to be flight risks or threats to public order or security.

| Citizenship legislation | Act No. 579 of 1 September 2011 amending the Nationality Act | The amendments to the Nationality Act aimed to improve the social cohesion and integration of immigrants by making naturalization more flexible. The policy change entailed the following measures:  
- The required period of residence to apply for Finnish nationality was shortened from six to five years. In addition, temporary residence in Finland would be partially taken into account. Moreover, any person who had lived in Finland for 4 years and could demonstrate sufficient command of Finnish or Swedish could obtain Finnish citizenship;  
- The language requirement for acquiring Finnish citizenship was revised and simplified so that the accepted certificates, with which the applicant could show his language skills, were listed exhaustively in the law. Finnish and Swedish sign language were added as accepted ways of showing the required language skills. Also the requirements/cases for exception from language requirement were listed more comprehensively. | - 0.5 | (MIPEX, 2015; EMN National Contact Point Finland, 2012; OECD, 2012) |
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family reunification legislation</td>
<td>Amendment to the Aliens Act that entered into force in the beginning of 2012</td>
<td>The new amendment obliged family members to submit their applications for family reunification personally at the nearest Finnish diplomatic mission abroad. Before this amendment, it was possible for the sponsor residing in Finland to submit a family reunification application in Finland.</td>
<td>+ 0.5</td>
<td>(EMN National Contact Point Finland, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family reunification legislation</td>
<td>Amendment to the Aliens Act that entered into force on 1 January 2012</td>
<td>Due to the amendment, the sponsor no longer had the right of appeal in matters concerning family reunification.</td>
<td>+ 0.5</td>
<td>(EMN National Contact Point Finland, 2015)</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship legislation</td>
<td>Amendment of 1 March 2014 to legislation pertaining to the registration of a foreign national</td>
<td>Legislation concerning the registration of foreign nationals was amended to simplify the process of receiving a personal identity number. As of 1 December 2014, foreign nationals could apply for a Finnish personal identity number in connection with their resident permit application and would receive it when they are issued with their first residence permit. Previously, foreign nationals had to apply for a personal identity number at the local register office after having received their first residence permit. Having a personal identity code makes it easier to use the available services in Finland. It was also in the interest of the authorities to have a person’s identity tied to an unequivocal code right from the start. This eliminated problems that could arise from a change of name or different ways of spelling a name. The legislative amendment applied to all residence permit applicants, including asylum seekers.</td>
<td>- 0.25</td>
<td>(European Commission, 2015; EMN National Contact Point Finland, 2015; OECD, 2015)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Cabinet: Stubb (24 June 2014 – 29 May 2015)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asylum legislation</th>
<th>Act of 2014 amending the Aliens Act, implementing the revised EU Asylum Procedures Directive</th>
<th>The legislative amendment concerned the implementation of the revised EU Asylum Procedures Directive. The basic characteristics of the Finnish asylum and reception system were already in line with the requirements stipulated by the directive. Nevertheless, amendments were made to the Aliens Act to improve the clarity and transparency of the asylum system and to promote the equal treatment of applicants for international protection.</th>
<th>- 0.5</th>
<th>(EMN National Contact Point Finland, 2015)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship legislation</td>
<td>Amendment to legislation</td>
<td>A legislative amendment that made it possible to submit a residence permit application abroad not only at a Finnish</td>
<td>- 0.5</td>
<td>(EMN National Contact Point Finland, 2015; OECD, 2015)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of 12 March 2015 diplomatic mission but also at a diplomatic mission of another Schengen State or with an external service provider entered into force on 1 June 2015. The possibility of submitting a residence permit application at a diplomatic mission of a Schengen State or with an external service provider is needed especially when there is a large number of applicants or a great wish to ensure the geographical coverage of the service. From the point of view of a residence permit applicant, the amendment made service clearer and faster. For Finland and the diplomatic mission network, the amendment provided the opportunity to receive residence permit applications more flexibly and efficiently

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cabinet: Sipilä (29 May 2015 – 13 June 2017)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asylum legislation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Asylum legislation | Amendment of April 2016 | In April 2016, the humanitarian protection as a residence permit category from Finnish legislation was eliminated, maintaining therefore two categories: asylum and subsidiary protection. The latter covered most of those who were eligible under the humanitarian category. | + 0.5 | (OECD, 2017; European Commission, 2017a) |
| Family reunification legislation | Amendments to the Aliens Act | Family reunification criteria were tightened in 2016. The measures were as follows:  
- Amendments introduced an income requirement for family members of those granted international protection (the one in Denmark who applied for family reunification). The amendment aimed to manage migration and to reduce the costs of immigration;  
- First residence permit applications lodged by the family members of those granted international protection became subject to a fee. | + 0.5 | (OECD, 2017; European Commission, 2017a) |
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship legislation</td>
<td>New Identity Card Act was adopted in August 2016</td>
<td>The new Identity Card Act was adopted in August 2016. This would facilitate the issuing of identity cards to foreign nationals.</td>
<td>- 0.25</td>
<td>(European Commission, 2017a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Asylum legislation              | Amendments to the Aliens Act and the Legal Aid Act that entered into force on 1 September 2016 | The amendments restricted the rights of asylum seekers to State-funded legal aid to only those situations in which it was absolutely necessary.  
Next to this, the same amendments also reduced the timeframe for appeals. | + 0.5 | (European Commission, 2017a; Finnish Ministry of the Interior, 2017) |
| Integration policy              | Amendments No. 1507 and 1508 of December 2016 | The amendments aimed at renewing basic education for immigrants who had passed the age of compulsory education. The renewed basic education aimed at improving learning abilities and enabling immigrants to receive a certificate of the completion of basic education, which enhanced their opportunities for further studies. | - 0.5 | (European Commission, 2017a) |
New provisions on residence requirements to the Aliens Act were adopted in December 2016. The aim was to expand the range of interim measures applicable to asylum seekers, to reduce the use of detention, to promote the smooth running of the asylum procedure and ensure the deportations of persons whose asylum applications are rejected. The new policy entailed that asylum seekers could be ordered to reside in a specific reception centre and to report there between one and four times a day if this was deemed necessary for investigating their right to enter or reside in Finland or for ensuring their removal from the country. The imposition of residence requirements would make it easier to locate asylum seekers when processing their application and especially for the purpose of inviting them to an asylum interview. In addition, the removal of unsuccessful applicants from the country would also become easier.

| Asylum legislation | Amendments to the Aliens Act of December 2016 | + 0.5 | (European Commission, 2017a; Finnish Ministry of the Interior, 2017) |
### Table 5: Policy index of Sweden

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislation category</th>
<th>Policy change</th>
<th>Description of change</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cabinet: Reinfeldt I (5 October 2006 – 6 October 2010)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Family reunification legislation | Amendment to the Aliens Act, entered into force on 15 April 2010 | Two measures were introduced in the Aliens Act as a condition for family reunification.  
  - First, a financial support requirement was implemented. According to the requirement the applicant should have sufficient income to support him or herself and cover his or her own housing costs;  
  - Second, the new policy included the requirement that the migrant must have suitable accommodation for himself or herself and the family member. | + 0.5 | (EMN National Contact Point Sweden, 2011; MIPEX, 2015; Borevi, 2015) |
<p>| Family reunification legislation | Amendment to the Aliens Act, entered into force on 1 July 2010 | An amendment to the Aliens Act made it easier to apply for a residence permit on grounds of family ties after having entered Sweden. It was now possible, in certain cases concerning immigration on grounds of family ties where children are involved, to make exemptions from the requirement that a residence permit must have been granted prior to travelling to Sweden. The aim of this change was to prevent families from being separated. | - 0.5 | (EMN National Contact Point Sweden, 2011) |
| Asylum legislation | Amendment to the Aliens Act, entered into force on 1 August 2010 | Since 1 August 2010, asylum seekers were allowed to work from the first day they arrive in Sweden if they could prove their identity. | - 0.5 | (EMN National Contact Point Sweden, 2011; Swedish Migration Agency, 2018a) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integration policy</th>
<th>New law entered into force on 1 September 2010</th>
<th>A law entered into force which introduced a reward for newly arrived immigrants (a performance-based bonus) if they completed their studies in Swedish for Immigrants (the national free language course offered to most categories of immigrants) with a pass grade within 12 months.</th>
<th>- 0.5</th>
<th>(EMN National Contact Point Sweden, 2011)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Cabinet: Reinfeldt II (6 October 2010 – 3 October 2014)**

| Integration policy | Introduction Act entered into force on 1 December 2010 | A new law on the introduction of newly arrived immigrants entered into force. From now on, the introduction activities were coordinated centrally, by the Swedish Public Employment Service instead of the municipalities. The reform aimed to speed up the introduction of immigrants by strengthening personal incentives to find a job and to participate in employment preparation activities. The new Act entailed the following policy changes:  
  • A new benefit was introduced that was the same for everyone regardless of where in the country one lived. This benefit was paid to new arrivals when they actively participated in introduction activities.  
  • A new actor – an ‘introduction guide’ – was introduced to support the new arrival during the introduction period; | - 0.5 | (EMN National Contact Point Sweden, 2011; Swedish Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, 2010) |
| Illegality legislation | Act implementing the EU Return Directive, entered into force on 1 May 2012 | National legislation transposing the EU Return Directive into Swedish law entered into force. The new rules widened the possibilities of authorities to impose re-entry bans. Now, any third-country national who had been refused entry into Sweden or ordered to leave the country could be subject to a re-entry ban to Sweden and any other Schengen country and Romania and Bulgaria for a period of up to five years. | + 0.5 | (EMN National Contact Point Sweden, 2013) |
| Illegality legislation | Act on health and medical care for persons staying in Sweden without necessary permits entered into force on 1 July 2013 | According to the new Act, the County Councils were obliged to offer adult persons of this category the same subsidised health and medical care as adult asylum seekers. This meant one free health examination, health and dental care that cannot be deferred, maternity care, abortion care and contraceptive advice. Children who were residing in the country without permission were entitled to full health and medical care, including dental care | - 0.5 | (Swedish Ministry of Justice, 2015; Swedish Migration Agency, 2018a) |
| Asylum legislation | Act entering into force on 1 May 2014 | From 1 May 2014, refugees and persons eligible for subsidiary protection could be granted a long-term resident status in Sweden if they applied for this and fulfilled the conditions for such status. This also gave them the right to free movement within the European Union, if they fulfilled certain conditions. | - 0.5 | (EMN National Contact Point, 2015) |
| Family reunification legislation | Amendment to the Aliens Act, entered into force on 1 August 2014 | A change was introduced in the Aliens Act, regarding the granting of a residence permit for the parent who was the caregiver of a child with legal residence status in Sweden, and who lived together with this child. The aim of this change was to guarantee the best interest of the child. Previously, before the amendment, if there were no exceptional grounds at hand, these parents had to apply for a residence permit from abroad, i.e. before entry into Sweden, even when the child was already residing in Sweden. Due to the amendment, a parent could lodge an application for a residence permit also from within Sweden if there was a strong relationship with the child and it was unreasonable to demand that the parent left Sweden before applying. | - 0.5 | (EMN National Contact Point Sweden, 2015) |

| Citizenship legislation | Amendments to the Swedish Citizenship Act, entered into force on 1 April 2015 | The most important changes included:  
- Rules regarding the automatic acquisition of citizenship at birth changed: from that moment a child acquired Swedish citizenship at birth if one of the child’s parents was a Swedish citizen. Before the introduction of this measure, the child of a Swedish man and a foreign woman could not automatically become a Swedish citizen if the child was born abroad or the parents were not married; | - 0.5 | (EMN National Contact Point Sweden, 2016; focus Migration, 2015; Embassy of Sweden, 2018; Swedish Migration Agency, 2018b) |
| **Asylum legislation** | Legal changes implementing the revised EU Asylum Procedures Directive, entering into force on 1 January 2016 | In 2016, the revised EU Asylum Procedures Directive was implemented in Sweden. The following changes are relevant for this research:
- The respective legal changes included more specific rules regarding manifestly unfounded asylum applications;
- In addition, the legal changes included rules regarding the right to remain until a court had ruled on inhibition during the appeal of clearly unfounded decisions (and of subsequent applications). | - 0.5 | (EMN National Contact Point Sweden, 2017) |
| **Asylum legislation** | Act amending the Reception of Asylum Seekers Act, entered into force on 1 June 2016 | Several measures restricted the rights of asylum seekers. Before these measures came into force, an asylum seeker’s right to assistance normally ceased only after the person left the country, even if there was a refusal-of-entry or expulsion order that had become final and non-appealable. The policy change included the following measures: | + 0.5 | (EMN National Contact Point Sweden, 2016; Swedish Migration Agency, 2018a) |

- Children and young people’s possibilities to obtain Swedish citizenship were facilitated through shorter requirements for domicile and permanent residency in Sweden. Children of foreign citizens could now become Swedish citizens if they were under 18 years old and had resided in Sweden for at least three years with a permanent residence permit. Young people between 18 and 21 years could acquire Swedish citizenship if they had resided in Sweden with permanent residence since the age of 13;
- The possibility to recover Swedish citizenship for persons, who had lost their citizenship in accordance with an earlier law that sought to limit dual citizenship, was introduced without time limitations.
- An asylum seeker who had received a negative response to his/her asylum application lost the right to aid if he/she did not leave the country voluntarily;

- An asylum seeker who had received a definitive decision stating that he/she was to be expelled or deported lost the right to a daily allowance;

- In addition, the asylum seeker also lost asylum accommodation paid for by the Swedish Migration Agency.

| Family reunification legislation | New temporary law entered into force on 20 July 2016 | On 20 July 2016, a new temporary law entered into force, including several restrictions. It will be valid until 19 July 2019. The measures introduced under the law were the following:  
- Regarding family reunification legislation requirements, the temporary law demands that the sponsor must not only be able to support him-/herself but also his or her family members coming to Sweden; | + 0.5 | (EMN National Contact Point Sweden, 2017; European Commission, 2017b; Swedish Migration Agency, 2018a) |
- The opportunity for family reunification was restricted to those who had refugee status. Refugees must be able to support both themselves and their family who received a residence permit. It was also necessary for the family to have a residence of sufficient size and of adequate standard;

- Previous, all persons in need of protection generally received a permanent residence permit. Now, everyone who applied for and was given asylum received a temporary residence permit. Beneficiaries of subsidiary protection would receive residence permits for 13 months at a time, and refugees for three years.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislation category</th>
<th>Policy change</th>
<th>Description of change</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family reunification legislation</td>
<td>Act No. 400 of 21 April 2010 amending the Aliens Act</td>
<td>Introduction of immigration test for foreigners applying for reunification with a spouse or partner. Oral test, consisting of a Danish language test and a societal knowledge test. The test must be taken in Denmark after the applicant has received recognition in advance of his or her application for family reunification. A fee of DKK 3 000 (EUR 400) applied.</td>
<td>+ 0.5</td>
<td>(Danish Aliens Consolidation Act No. 863. Of June 25th 2013; Ersbøll &amp; Gravesen, 2010; Adamo, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship legislation &amp; Integration policy</td>
<td>Act No. 572 of 31 May 2010 amending the Aliens Act</td>
<td>Requirements for obtaining legal permanent residence were changed. Before this change, a foreigner could obtain legal permanent residence after seven years of residence, or five if the applicant was engaged in a working activity and had required a strong attachment to Danish society. A point system was introduced, requiring that immigrants obtained at least 100 points. There were three categories: basic requirements, active citizenship, and supplementary requirements. The basic requirements are mandatory; all have to be met. <strong>Basic requirements (70 points)</strong> Applicants must: 1. have resided legally in Denmark for at least 4 years continuously (instead of 7 as was the required period before);</td>
<td>- 1</td>
<td>(Danish Aliens Consolidation Act No. 863. of June 25th 2013; Ersbøll &amp; Gravesen, 2010; Adamo, 2012; OECD, 2011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>have no serious criminal record;</td>
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<td>+ 0.5</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>not have outstanding debt owing to the state;</td>
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<td>+ 0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>not have received economic support or social security benefits within the three years preceding submission of the application for a permanent residence permit;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>+ 0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>have signed a declaration on integration and active citizenship in the Danish society;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>+ 0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>have passed the D2E (level B1) or a Danish language test at a corresponding or higher level;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>+ 0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>have been employed in a full-time position in Denmark for at least 2.5 years out of the last 3 years before submitting the application for a permanent residence permit.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>+ 0.5</td>
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</table>

**Active citizenship (15 points)**

The active citizenship points can be reached either by showing involvement in a Danish organization such as a local association, or by passing the newly introduced ‘active citizenship exam’.

**Supplementary requirements (15 points)**

The applicant gained these points if one of the following integration-related requirements was met:

a) have been employed in a full-time position in Denmark for at least 4 years out of the last 4.5 years before submitting the application for permanent residence and still be in employment at the time when the permanent residence permit is granted, or
b) have completed a higher education programme, a professional bachelor’s degree, business degree or vocational upper secondary education at a Danish educational institution, or

c) have passed D3E (which is the language requirement for naturalization) or a Danish language test at an equivalent level (B2) or higher.

| Citizenship legislation | Act amending the Integration Act and other related laws | The right to vote and run for election on municipal and regional level was extended: immigrants and refugees received this right after four (previous three) years of legal residence. The policy change entered into force in August 2010. | + 0.5 | (Jensen, Schmidt, Tørslev, Vitus & Weibel, 2010) |

| Family reunification legislation | Act of 1 August 2010 | A spouse/partner living in Denmark must not have received public assistance for a period of three years prior to the application of his/her spouse/partner. This period was one year before. | + 0.5 | (OECD, 2011) |

| Integration policy | Act of 1 August 2010 amending the Integration Act | A course of Danish society and Danish culture and history was offered to all newly arrived refugees and immigrants covered by the Integration Act. In addition, municipalities should be able to offer employment-related activities to newly arrived refugees and immigrants who do not work and are supported by their spouse. | - 1 | (OECD, 2011) |

| Citizenship legislation | Act No. 1609 of 12 December 2010 | The Act introduced an earnings-principle, which was used to discriminate in the payment of child- and youth benefits to families in Denmark, effectively barring newly arrived immigrant families from receiving child- and youth benefits equivalent to that of ethnically Danish families until they had held residence in Denmark for 2 years. Newly arrived families only had the right to 25% of the benefits after 6 months, 50% of the benefits after 12 months, 75% of benefits after 18 months and 100% after 2 years. | + 0.5 | (MIPEX, 2015) |
| Family reunification legislation | Act No. 1604 of 22 December 2010 amending the Aliens Act | The Act included the following measures:  
- The Act introduced fees on applications for residence permits;  
- The Act introduced fees on applications for family reunification. | + 0.5 | (MIPEX, 2015; Jensen & Vedsted-Hansen, 2011) |
| Family reunification legislation | Act No. 601 of 14 June 2011 amending the Aliens Act and the Dissolution of Marriage Act | Restrictions to family regulation policies were introduced:  
- The application fee was raised from 5,975 DKK to 7,775 DKK;  
- The bank guarantee required for the couple to furnish in order to serve as security against any welfare payments was raised from 63,413 DKK to 100,000 DKK;  
- Tightening of the attachment requirement: the applying couple would be required to have ‘significantly greater ties to Denmark’ than to the home country. This entailed that the foreign spouse must normally have visited Denmark twice, and must have completed a Danish course at level A1. The other part must have resided in Denmark for 15 years and must have made an integration effort;  
- A new exam and points system was introduced requiring the foreign-resident spouse to have ‘integration-eligible’ qualifications. The applicant would be required to gain points (60 if both spouses were over 24, 120 if one or both were under 24 years of age), based on integration related qualifications such as language skills and degree of education and work experience, either abroad or in Denmark; | + 0.5 | + 0.5 | (Danish Aliens Consolidation Act No. 863. Of June 25th 2013; Adamo, 2012; Bech & Mouritsen, 2013) |
- The Danish-resident spouse, if not a citizen, would be required to fulfil all the requirements (existing since 2010) for gaining permanent residency, even if he/she had gained permanent residency under more lenient rules. + 0.5

| Citizenship legislation & Asylum legislation Act No. 1364 of 28 December 2011 amending the Integration Act and several other related acts | Act No. 1364 abolished the lowest social assistance benefits in response to growing concerns about rising poverty. The policy change included the following measures: • ‘Start-help’ was abolished and replaced with equal access to social assistance; • The ceiling on the cash benefit was eliminated, so that total benefits could no longer be reduced; • The so-called 500-kroner reduction was eliminated, so the cash benefit will no longer be lowered after six months; • The 225-hour rule of ordinary and unsubsidized work was lifted for couples. Previously, when a couple received social assistance benefits for two years it was a condition that they could both prove they had regular work in at least 225 hours per person. If not, the person most marginal to the labour market lost his/her social assistance benefit; • The introduction allowance was lifted allowing equal access for newly arrived foreigners on the introduction programme. | - 0.5 | (MIPEX, 2015; Greve, 2012; Blades, 2012) |
| Citizenship legislation Act of May 2012 amending | Through the implementation of this act, the points-based system for permanent residence introduced in June 2010 was abolished. Instead, the government returned to the integration requirements | + 1 | (MIPEX, 2015; OECD, 2013) |
that were in place before June 2010. In order to qualify for permanent residence, the immigrant must:

- Have already lived in Denmark legally for at least five years;
- Have no criminal record;
- Have passed a Danish language test;
- Hold regular full-time employment and/or being enrolled in an educational programme in Denmark for at least three of the five years.

**All other requirements implemented in June 2010 were withdrawn.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family reunification legislation</th>
<th>Act No. 418 of 12 May 2012 amending the Aliens Act and several other acts</th>
<th>Family regulation policies changed:</th>
<th>- 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The in 2011 introduced points system was abolished, instead the rule that both spouses must be 24 years old or older in order to qualify for spousal reunification was reintroduced;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The applying couple’s combined attachment to Denmark must be greater (and not significantly greater as was the case before) than the couple’s combined attachment to any other country. The attachment requirement would be waived if the spouse living in Denmark has had Danish citizenship for 26 years (previously this was set on 28 years). This would also be the case if the spouse living in Denmark had been residing legally in Denmark for 26 years and was born or came to Denmark as a young child;</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• The amount of collateral for a spouse was lowered (from DKK 100.000 to DKK 50.000 (2012-level));</td>
<td>- 0.5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Danish Aliens Consolidation Act No. 863. of June 25th 2013; Bech & Mouritsen, 2013)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislation Type</th>
<th>Act/Amendment Details</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship legislation</td>
<td>The Act ensured that foreigners achieved voting rights at local and regional elections after four years (previous three years). By virtue of this, foreigners residing in Denmark could also run for office in local and regional elections after three years stay.</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Danish Aliens Consolidation Act No. 863. of June 25th 2013; MIPEX, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship legislation</td>
<td>Act No. 1398 removed the earnings-principle for child benefits for refugee families.</td>
<td></td>
<td>(MIPEX, 2015; Blades, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum legislation</td>
<td>New possibilities to live outside the asylum were provided to asylum beneficiaries and international protection status holders. Accommodation outside an asylum centre could include: private lodging with family or friends, privately rented accommodation, or independent accommodation in connection with an asylum centre.</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Danish Aliens Consolidation Act No. 863. of June 25th 2013; European Commission, 2014; OECD, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum legislation</td>
<td>In addition, asylum seekers were now allowed to seek for employment if certain criteria were met.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
In May 2013 an amendment to the Integration Act was adopted comprising of two elements. The overall goal of the amendment was to enhance the integration efforts towards newcomers. Based on the amendment, as of 1st July 2013, municipalities were obliged – as soon as possible and within three months upon arrival in the municipality – to offer the following:

- An integration plan for newly arrived refugees and persons involving family reunification cases. This plan aimed to ensure a better coordination of all integration efforts concerning third country national migrants and their family. This included employment measures, language training, health care and initiatives to support active citizenship;

- A medical screening for newly arrived refugees and their family members. Medical screenings, which are carried out by family doctors, were activated as early as possible to provide adequate health treatment or social measures that would support successful integration of migrants and their family.

### Citizenship legislation

Since 1 September 2015, in Denmark it was legal to maintain multiple nationalities. Before this amendment, Danish nationals who acquired a foreign nationality lost their Danish citizenship, just as foreign citizens applying for Danish nationality were required to renounce their previous nationality.

### Cabinet: Thorning-Schmidt II (3 February 2014 – 28 June 2015)

| Citizenship legislation | Act No. 730 of 25 June 2014 amending the Citizenship Act | Since 1 September 2015, in Denmark it was legal to maintain multiple nationalities. Before this amendment, Danish nationals who acquired a foreign nationality lost their Danish citizenship, just as foreign citizens applying for Danish nationality were required to renounce their previous nationality. | - 1 | (Ersbøll, 2015; Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration, 2016b) |
### Citizenship legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acts of 2014 amending the Citizenship act</th>
<th>In 2014 Citizenship legislation was amended in several respects. This was already decided upon in 2013, by Act No. 1456 of June 2013. The amendments to the Citizenship Act were as follows:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• All children born of a Danish parent (father, mother, or ‘co-mother’) could now acquire Danish citizenship automatically at birth. Before the implementation of this measure, a distinction was made between children born in and out of wedlock when the child was born abroad. In that case, if only the father was a Danish national, the child had to be born in wedlock to acquire the Danish nationality by birth. As of July 1, 2014 a child acquired Danish nationality by birth if either the mother or the father is Danish, independently of whether the child was born in or out of wedlock;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Ius soli-based entitlement to Danish citizenship was reintroduced for the descendants of immigrant. Children of immigrants who were born in Denmark were now, under certain conditions, entitled to Danish citizenship by a declaration submitted before the age of nineteen. Apart from birth in the country, the main criteria were that the individual:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) had passed the school leaving exam with at least a grade point average at two or had turned eighteen;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) had not turned nineteen;</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) resided and had resided in Denmark for at least twelve years of which an aggregate period of not less than five years must have been within the last six years, and;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4) had not been convicted or charged with a criminal offence.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Asylum legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Act No. 153 of 18 February</th>
<th>A new temporary subsidiary protection status was introduced for refugees fleeing general violence and armed conflict in their home country. Under this provision, residence permits were initially</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ 0.5 (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017; Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.; MIPEX, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015 amending the Aliens Act</td>
<td>granted for a period of one year only, ensuring that cases are</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act of 19 February 2015 amending</td>
<td>On 27 January 2015 a broad political agreement was reached on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Aliens Act and Act on Passports for Danish Citizens</td>
<td>Act of 19 February 2015 amending the Aliens Act and Act on Passports for Danish Citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum legislation &amp; Citizenship legislation</td>
<td>Act No. 1000 of 30 Augustus 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and applied to all foreigners who had not resided in Denmark for seven out of the past eight years (including Danish citizens who had lived outside of the EU). The policy change included the following measures:

- The social benefits for refugees and immigrants were cut by 45%;

- Other support such as child care support and pensions for refugees were now graduated based on the length of the applicant's stay in Denmark;

- Instead, foreigners would receive a financial incentive to learn Danish;

- And those who passed the intermediate Danish language exam (Dansk 2) would receive a 1,500 kroner increase to their monthly integration benefit;

Asylum legislation Act No. 1273 of 20 November 2015 amending the Aliens Act

By this amendment, the grounds on which asylum seekers could be detained were increased. Asylum seekers could now be detained for the purpose of verifying their identity, conduct registration and establish the basis for his/her application. Furthermore, asylum seekers whose applications were refused could be held by the police pending their deportation.

(Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017; Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration, 2016a; Global Detention Project, 2016)
The amendment also included new rules on suspension of automatic access to judicial review within three days. The amendment authorized authorities, during periods of high numbers arrivals, to declare “special circumstances,” which temporarily suspended some safeguards. During the periods declared “special circumstances” a hearing did not take place within 72 following the arrest but “as soon as possible” and only at the request of the applicant. In this context, courts only assessed the legality of the detention, and did not rule on the duration of its possible extension. Following a decision on the legality of detention in a particular case, there was no right for another review within four weeks.

| Asylum legislation, family reunification legislation | Act No. 102 of 3 February 2016 amending the Aliens Act | A number of legislative changes in the field of migration and asylum were adopted and implemented:  
- Requirements for family reunification for asylum seekers with a temporary protected status were tightened: according to the new rules a reunification could be granted if the person living in Denmark has held a Danish residence permit granted on the grounds of temporary protected status for the past 3 years or more (instead of one year as was the case before);  
- The duration of initial residence permits was reduced from five years to two years (Convention refugees) and one year (protection status);  
- Introduction of stricter rules for acquiring a permanent residence permit:  
  Mandatory requirements (must all be met):  
  - Minimum 6 years of legal stay in Denmark – or 4 years if meeting all the supplementary requirements (this used to be 5 years); | + 0.5 | (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017; Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration, 2016a; Hofverberg, 2016; OECD, 2017) |
- Criminal offenses would lead to penalty period (raised by 50% from the previous level) and more types of crime would lead to permanent exclusion; + 0.5
- Passed exam of level Dansk 2 or similar (used to be Dansk 1); + 0.5
- Ordinary full time job for at least 2.5 years out of the last 3 years (education and part time jobs would no longer count). + 0.5

**Supplementary requirements (at least two had to be met as well):**
- Passed citizen test (which was a lighter version of the citizenship test);
- Proof of active citizenship during 1 year (for example, being a member of the school board);
- Ordinary full time job for 4 years;
- A yearly, taxable income of at least 270,000 DKR on average for the last 2 years. + 1 (0.5 per necessary requirement)

- Rules on revoking refugees’ residence permits were tightened: in the refugees’ passport a ban on entry the home country was marked, with a possibility to ban entry to other countries as well. A violation would lead to losing the residence permit. In certain cases it was possible to apply for a permit to entry on beforehand (for example to visit a funeral). + 0.5
• A fee for application for family reunification was introduced, as well as to convert temporary residence permit to permanent residence permit (applying for asylum remains free of costs):
  o Family reunification: 7,000 DKR
  o Extension of permit (not asylum): 1,800 DKR
  o Permanent residence permit: 3,700 DKR
  o Appeal to the Immigration Board: 805 DKR

• 10% reduction of the cash allowance for asylum seekers; + 0.5

• increase in threshold for how long an asylum seeker could be required to pay for his own housing; + 0.5

• Abolishment of coverage of the expense for transport for family reunification; + 0.25

• Authorities were granted to search and seize funds and assets from asylum seekers with an estimated value that exceeds DKK 10,000 (approximately EUR 1,350) in order to cover the costs of the asylum seekers’ stay. Assets with a particular sentimental value, such as wedding rings or religious artifacts, are exempt; + 0.5

• Introduction of requirement that asylum seekers live in special housing centers; asylum seekers were no longer permitted to find their own housing; + 0.5

• Changes were made to the selection criteria for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) quota refugees, with the reintroduction of the requirement that only refugees with the highest potential for integration into the Danish society would be accepted. + 0.5

Cabinet: Løkke Rasmussen III (28 November 2016 – now)
Table 7: Policy index of the Netherlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislation category</th>
<th>Policy change</th>
<th>Description of change</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship legislation</td>
<td>Decree of 15 September 2009 amending the Option and Naturalization Decree 2002</td>
<td>By this amendment, the policy for fees for naturalization was changed:  - Instead of a low rate for people with a low income (€243,- for one major applicant) and a higher rate for others (€366,- for one major applicant), from that moment only one rate was used;  - The new fee was higher than the previous fees, due to increased costs for naturalization. The new fee amounted €552,- for one major applicant (price before annual indexing);  - A fee was introduced for minor children that would be naturalized as a result of the naturalization of their parents. Previously, the naturalization of these children would be free. The new fee amounted €83,-.</td>
<td>+ 0.5</td>
<td>(Decree of 15 September 2009 amending the Dutch Option and Naturalization Decree 2002; Hirsch Ballin, 2008a; Dutch Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2011; MIPEX, 2015)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Asylum legislation | Act of 20 May 2010 amending the Aliens Act 2000 | The new asylum procedure, the ‘Improved Asylum Procedure’, entered into force. This procedure was meant to ensure a faster and more careful completion of asylum applications. The amendments were as follows:  
- The general asylum procedure in the application center was extended to a maximum of eight days, of which three were available for providing legal aid to asylum seekers. Previously this procedure lasted for a maximum of 48 hours of which 5 hours were available for legal aid;  
- Prior to the procedure, the asylum seeker would be given a period of rest and preparation, during which a medical examination could be performed to assess whether the (mental) health condition of the asylum seeker was good enough to start the asylum procedure. During this period the asylum seeker would also be identified. Where possible, an examination of the documents to substantiate the story told by the asylum seeker (such as arrest warrants, and judgments) would be initiated. During the period of rest and preparation, the asylum seeker would be prepared for the asylum procedure. | - 0.5 | (Act of 20 May 2010 amending the Dutch Aliens Act 2000; Decree of 23 June 2010 amending the Dutch Aliens Decree 2000; Research and Documentation Centre, 2014a) |
| Asylum legislation | Arrangement of 2 February 2010 amending the Arrangement benefits for asylum seekers and other categories of aliens 2005 | By this decree, the Cabinet increased the reception capacity for asylum seekers who had exhausted all legal remedies and who had submitted an application on medical grounds, and who were entitled to residence in the Netherlands. | - 0.5 | (Arrangement of 2 February 2010 amending the Dutch Arrangement benefits for asylum seekers and other categories of aliens 2005; EMN National Contact Point the Netherlands, 2011) |
procedure by a lawyer and by information from the Dutch Council for Refugees;

- A provision was included to make it possible for the Court in appeal cases to consider relevant new circumstances and policy changes;
- The procedure for second and subsequent applications was consequently simplified, as a result of which it would be possible to make decisions on second or subsequent applications within a shorter period of time;
- If an application would be rejected, the asylum seeker was given a departure period of four weeks. During this period, accommodation would be provided, from which location the rejected asylum seekers could work on their departure. At the end of the departure period, the rejected asylum seekers could also be placed at a center with restricted movement for a period of twelve weeks, where they would receive additional guidance in their return.
| Citizenship legislation | Kingdom Act of 17 June 2010 amending the Dutch Nationality Act with respect to multiple nationalities and other matters under national law | Several parts of the Netherlands Nationality Act were amended:  
• The rules regarding the renouncement of one’s nationality in the country of origin were tightened: The exception of the obligation to renounce the original nationality upon naturalization for applicants who had their main residence in the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, or Aruba prior to coming of age for an uninterrupted period of five years was cancelled. The obligation to renounce one’s nationality consequently started to apply in full for this group of people. In addition, persons who had held residence permits and had had their main residence in the Netherlands since the age of 4 years old and who wished to opt for Dutch citizenship were obliged to renounce their original nationality after the option confirmation;  
• The rules for acquiring Dutch citizenship by children born to a Dutch mother and a non-Dutch father before 1 January 1985 – the ‘potential Dutch citizens’ – were also amended. This category could still acquire Dutch citizenship through an ‘option procedure’;  
• The policies regarding the loss of nationality were supplemented as well. The Minister of Security and Justice could now decide to withdraw Dutch citizenship on the basis of crimes which were directed against the essential interests of the Kingdom and which were committed after the implementation of the amendment. In principle, re-acquisition of Dutch nationality was not possible after the withdrawal decision, except in the case of very special circumstances. | + 1 | (Kingdom Act of 17 June 2010 amending the Dutch Nationality Act with respect to multiple nationalities and other matters under national law; Hirsch Ballin, 2008b; EMN National Contact Point the Netherlands, 2011) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship legislation</th>
<th>Act of 7 July 2010 amending the Aliens Act and several other acts (Modern Migration Policy Act entered into force)</th>
<th>The Modern Migration Policy Act entered into force on 1 June 2013, including several changes. The most important change for this research was that the regular application procedures were simplified. The procedures changed as follows: the procedure for a regular provisional residence permit and the procedure for a regular residence permit were combined into a single entry and residence procedure.</th>
<th>- 0.5</th>
<th>(Act of 7 July 2010 amending the Dutch Aliens Act and several other acts; EMN National Contact Point the Netherlands, 2014; Groen, De Lange, Grootfaam, Kruidenberg &amp; Leeuwis, 2013)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Family reunification legislation | Decree of the State Secretary for Justice of 24 July 2010 amending the family reunification policy | The distinction applied by between family formation (with the family ties being established the moment that the principal person has principal residence in the Netherlands) and family reunification (with the family ties being established outside the Netherlands at a moment at which the principal person also did not have principal residence in the Netherlands) was considered in conflict with Direction 2003/86/EC (Family Reunification Directive) by the European Court of Justice, by judgment of 4 March 2010. By the decree of 24 July 2010, the family reunification policy was brought into line with the obligations ensuing from the aforementioned directive. The consequences of this were the following:  
- A decrease in the income requirement of 120% of the minimum wage, which had applied to family formation until then. The income requirement was reduced to 100%, which already applied to family reunification. | - 0.5 | (EMN National Contact Point the Netherlands, 2011; MIPEX, 2015) |
In addition, the distinction between the minimum age of the partners/marriage partners for family reunification (18 years of age) and family formation (21 years of age) was abandoned. From that moment on, the principal person as well as the family member requesting entry to the Netherlands must at least be 21 years of age, irrespective of whether it concerned family reunification or family formation. Hence, the minimum age for family reunification was raised with three years from 18 to 21 years.

| Illegality legislation | Act of 15 December 2011 amending the Aliens Act 2000, implementing the EU Return Directive | This Act provided for the implementation of the EU Return Directive. In order to implement the directive, a return decision and entry ban were introduced in the Netherlands. In terms of content, the return decision and entry ban were not entirely new, as the Dutch policy was already for a substantial extent in accordance with the policy goals that the Return Directive had established. However, the Act changed the existing policy in the following ways:

- The territorial scope of the entry ban was larger than the already existing policy in the Netherlands, as the entry ban was a ban to the Schengen area and not only the Netherlands;

- The entry ban could be imposed on more grounds than the previous policy could. | + 0.5 | (Act of 15 December 2011 amending the Dutch Aliens Act 2000, implementing the EU Return Directive; Research and Documentation Centre, 2014b; Hirsch Ballin, 2010) |
Family reunification legislation was amended in several ways:

- Family reunification and family formation became only possible for partners who were married or who had a registered partnership. One exception to this applies to partners for whom on grounds of legislation and regulations in the country of origin it was impossible to marry or enter into a registered partnership. These people could be eligible for a ‘temporary marriage permit’. Before this amendment, couples in an ‘unregistered’ relationship could also apply for family reunification;

- If the application for family reunification was accepted, only the spouse and minor children could enter the Netherlands. Before this amendment it was also possible to apply for family reunification with other family members;

- Foreigners could now only apply for family reunification after one year of legal residence in the Netherlands;

- The period for becoming eligible for an independent residence permit (for people that came to the Netherlands as part of family reunification) on grounds of continued residence was extended from 3 to 5 years.

(Decree of 27 March 2012 amending the Dutch Aliens Decree 2000, the Dutch Decree Modern Migration Policy and the Dutch Decree Integration; EMN National Contact Point the Netherlands, 2013)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integration policy</th>
<th>Act of 13 September 2012 amending the Integration Act and some other acts in relation to the strengthening of the own responsibility of the alien (Civic Integration Act 2013 entered into force)</th>
<th>On 1 January 2013, the Civic Integration Act 2013 entered into force. As of this moment, migrants who were obliged to participate in a civic integration programme had to arrange and pay for their civic integration themselves. Migrants who had a low income could take out a social loan (€10000,- for asylum status holders and €5000,- for other migrants) in order to finance their course and examination. If the migrants passed the exam before the deadline, the loan would be remitted for asylum status holders. The government had to make sure that enough qualified courses were available. Previously, municipalities were responsible for providing the civic integration programme and their costs. People who culpably did not pass the obligatory civic examination within three years ran the risk of losing their temporary residence permit. By an Act in 2015, the policy was amended: all migrants obliged to participate in a civic integration programme were now entitled to a maximum loan of €10000,- (previous, this was €10000,- for asylum status holders and €5000,- for other migrants) to spend on a civic integration programme. In addition, also family migrants could now get their loan remitted. Before this amendment entered into force, this measure only applied to asylum status holders.</th>
<th>Cabinet: Rutte II (5 November 2012 – 26 October 2017)</th>
<th>+ 1</th>
<th>(Act of 13 September 2012 amending the Dutch Integration Act and some other acts in relation to the strengthening of the own responsibility of the alien; EMN National Contact Point the Netherlands, 2014; Bonjour &amp; Scholten, 2014; Netherlands Court of Audit, 2017; EMN National Contact Point the Netherlands, 2016; Decree of 2 July 2015 amending the Dutch Integration Decree)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family reunification legislation</td>
<td>Arrangement of 25 January 2013 amending the Aliens Instruction 2000</td>
<td>The fees for the application for a residence permit for family reunification and family formation were lowered from € 1,250 to € 225. Furthermore, the fees for an application for an extension of the period of validity were lowered from € 375 to € 225.</td>
<td>- 1</td>
<td>(Arrangement of 25 January 2013 amending the Dutch Aliens Instruction 2000; EMN National Contact Point the Netherlands, 2013)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family reunification legislation</td>
<td>Decree of 24 May 2013 amending the Aliens Decree 2000</td>
<td>By this amendment, couples could qualify for family reunification if they could demonstrate that they had a long-lasting, exclusive relationship. Being married or having a registered partnership was no longer needed. As a result of this amendment, the policy that only married or registered couples could apply for family reunification was abolished.</td>
<td>- 0.5</td>
<td>(Decree of 24 May 2013 amending the Dutch Aliens Decree 2000; Dutch Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2013; EMN National Contact Point the Netherlands, 2014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family reunification legislation</td>
<td>Act of 25 November 2013 amending the Aliens Act 2000</td>
<td>The Act aimed at rearranging the grounds for asylum, as according to the Cabinet, several national policies were not necessary anymore due to increased EU legislation. The following measure was relevant for the scope of this research: The new Act changed the policy so that also the parents of an unaccompanied minors holding an asylum status were now eligible for a dependent asylum seekers’ permit. By the implementation of the measure, family members were also eligible for a derived asylum permit if the relationship was formed in a third country, for example, in a refugee camp outside the country of origin. The fact that the family members must had the same nationality as the principle migrant was also no longer applicable in order to be eligible for a family reunification permit.</td>
<td>- 0.5</td>
<td>(Act of 25 November 2013 amending the Dutch Aliens Act 2000; EMN National Contact Point the Netherlands, 2015; Dutch Council of State, 2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family reunification legislation</td>
<td>Arrangement of 22 August 2014 amending the Aliens Instruction 2000</td>
<td>The fee for submitting an application or extension of an application in light of family reunification or family formation for minors was reduced from €228,- to € 53,-. In addition, the applicable fee for minors who submitted an application for a residence permit as a long-term resident was reduced from €153,- to €53,-.</td>
<td>- 1</td>
<td>(Arrangement of 22 August 2014 amending the Dutch Aliens Instruction 2000; EMN National Contact Point the Netherlands, 2015)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration legislation/</td>
<td>Act of 20 March 2015 amending the Act on Labour</td>
<td>In the Netherlands, the Dutch Language Requirement Act, discussed in 2015 and approved in January 2016, provided that social assistance benefits could be curtailed if the recipient did not show sufficient command of the Dutch language.</td>
<td>+ 0.5</td>
<td>(Act of 20 March 2015 amending the Dutch Act on Labour and Assistance; EMN National Contact Point the Netherlands, 2016)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Asylum legislation | Act of 8 July 2015 amending the Aliens Act 2000, implementing the revised EU Asylum Procedures Directive | In 2015 the revised EU Asylum Procedures Directive was implemented in Dutch legislation. The following measures are relevant for this research:
• The directive required that the Dutch Immigration and Naturalization Agency, if deemed relevant for assessment of the asylum application, must arrange a medical examination for clues of past persecution or serious harm;
• The directive required that the third-country national should have a remedy at law that entails a full and ex nunc examination of both factual and legal grounds. Two important changes stemmed from this:
  o From marginal to full judicial review: in the past the court reviewed the Dutch Immigration and Naturalization Agency assessment about the credibility of the asylum claim with reticence (or marginally). After the implementation of the directive, the judicial examination had to be full, not marginal;
  o Moreover, the judicial ex tunc examination was replaced by an ex nunc examination, taking into account the situation at present. | - 0.5 | (EMN National Contact Point the Netherlands, 2016; Act of 8 July 2015 amending the Dutch Aliens Act 2000, implementing the revised EU Asylum Procedures Directive) |
| Family reunification legislation | Act of 7 October 2015 on Prevention of Forced Marriages entered into force | This law determined that partners must be at least 18 years of age to be able to get married in the Netherlands. Marriages concluded abroad with minor aged partners could only be acknowledged if both partners were at least 18 years old. Requests in the context of family reunifications would from that moment on be rejected if at least one of the (marriage) partners was younger than 18 years of age. | + 0.5 | (Dutch Act of 7 October 2015 on Prevention of Forced Marriages; Decree of 15 October 2015 defining date of entry into force of Dutch Act on Prevention of Forced Marriages; EMN National Contact Point the Netherlands, 2016) |
## Appendix III: Codebook Nativist Immigration and Integration Policy Index

### Table 8: Codebook Nativist Immigration and Integration Policy Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Immigration policy</th>
<th>Integration policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Citizenship legislation</td>
<td>Asylum legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subfield</strong></td>
<td>Residence requirements first generation</td>
<td>Application procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Measures</strong></td>
<td>Clean criminal record requirements</td>
<td>Rights to appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial means requirements</td>
<td>Children’s rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grounds for expulsion</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barriers for spouses (years of marriage)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fees</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fines</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dual nationality</td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase of requirements/restrictions for applicant</td>
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<tr>
<td>renunciation requirement</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Exceptions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jus soli for second or third generation at birth or after birth</td>
<td></td>
<td>Integration becomes immigrant’s own responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental residency requirements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic/cultural affinity as ground for access, residence or naturalisation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- **‘Citizenship policies’** - *all policies describing the immigrant’s duties and requirements regarding (permanent) residence/naturalization procedures*: An increase of residence requirements will result in + 0.5 (1-2 years) or + 1 (> 2 years). A stricter clean criminal record will vary from + 0.5 to + 1 depending on the sentence (two years or more = 0.5) and the sanction (temporary or permanent exclusion from naturalization). Reductions of requirements, easier procedures etc. will result in a deduction of 0 to 1 point *per measure, depending on the impact*. The introduction of *jus soli* will result in principle in -1, but when this legislative change has marginal impact only 0.5 will be deducted. *Vice versa, the introduction of jus sanguinis would result in + 1. Introduction of measures regarding double nationality would result in +1/-1.*
- **‘Asylum legislation’** – *all policies describing the immigrant’s rights and duties during the asylum procedure*: 0.5 will be added *per measure* with the introduction of more restrictive procedures, reduction of protection status, reduction of social assistance or more coercive measures such as detentions.
• ‘Illegality legislation’ – *all policies describing rights and duties of an illegal person*: Regularization or amnesty will result in a deduction of 0.5 to 1 point depending on the scale. Granting or withholding public health services, public education services, shelter etc. will result in adding or deducting 0.5, when children are involved an extra 0.5 may be added.

• ‘Family reunion legislation’ – *all policies describing the requirements and duties for an immigrant and their spouse to apply for family reunion*: the introduction of a minimal age requirement will result in + 0.5 (e.g. 21 years), or + 1 when the age requirement has been raised substantially (e.g. 24 years). *Increase/decrease of requirements/restrictions for the applicant or spouse will result in an addition/deduction of 0.5 per measure, or 0.25 when the change has limited impact.*

• ‘Civic integration legislation’ – *all policies regarding the immigrant’s integration requirements and duties*: the introduction of a language competency requirement at an elementary level will result in + 0.5. When the required language level is high at introduction 1 point will be added, or when raised from elementary to high 0.5. For the introduction of a loyalty oath, a cultural knowledge test etc., 0.5 point for each will be added. However, when these tests are introduced at entry level an extra 0.5 point will be added, because immigrants-to-be will have more difficulty in passing these tests (Goodman, 2010). *If integration becomes the immigrant’s own responsibility, 0.5 will be added. The introduction of a reward or other benefit would result in – 0.5.*

• *With regard to policy measures concerning changes to fees/allowances/financial compensation*: this entails an addition or deduction of 0.5, unless the concerning amount is (more than) doubled/halved: this would result in an addition or deduction of 1.

*Source:* Akkerman (2012) and author’s interpretations and addition as printed in blue.
References of appendices


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Political Data Yearbook


