



Sustaining the Peace?

A Content Analysis of the First 18 months of the Colombian Peace Agreement

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Summary

This is a case study on the peace agreement that was signed on November 24, 2016, to end the 52-year conflict between the Colombian government and Colombia's largest insurgent group, the left-wing guerrillas *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC). This research has three main aims. First, it seeks to address the existing gap in the literature regarding the assessment of the existing determinants and aims at creating a synthesis of the existing determinants. Second, it aims at assessing the first 18 months of the recent Colombian peace agreement using the existing theoretically embedded determinants for sustaining the peace. Third, it helps identify the possible source(s) of failures of the Colombian peace agreement and provides possible guidelines into how to address them.

The results of the content analysis of the peace agreement document (the Final Agreement) and the 18 months period after its signing, revealed the following conclusions. The analysis suggests a high probability of sustainability because 16 out of the 22 determinants were present in the case. However, the six missing determinants and case-specific determinants, the prevalence of violent criminal organisations and the lack of proper political and societal integration of FARC members, have the possibility of greatly weakening the stability of the peace agreement.

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Daniela Ramos

1. Introduction

“To end.. civil wars the members of the two sides must live side by side and work together in a common government to make the country work.” (Licklider, 1993, p.4).

Civil wars have become the most deadly and frequent type of conflict in the international system (Hartzell, 1999; Mason et al. 2011; Trei, 2002; Wallensteen, 2014). Between 1945 and 1999, 25 interstate wars killed 3.3 million people, while in the same period 127 civil wars killed 16.2 million people (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Understandably, this increase of civil wars sparked scholars interests regarding the causes of civil wars (Oshlon, 2008), how to end civil wars (Licklider, 1993), how to successfully achieve of peace (Galtung, 1996) and the factors that sustain peace (Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, 2001).

Civil wars have three possible endings, either the government or the belligerents win or, through a peace agreement (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1997). The high tendency of ending civil war through negotiated settlements and the increase in scholarly interest has generated a fair amount of determinants of civil war causes, relapses its sustainment. Despite the increased amount of researchers that address all phases of civil war there are still a limited amount of single case studies that reveal the causal mechanisms of the existing determinants (Hartzell, 1999). In this regard, this thesis seeks to address the gap in the literature regarding the assessment of the existing determinants through a single-case study. It is especially interested in the factors that sustain peace through negotiated settlements. In light of this argument, this research aims to, on the one hand, synthesise the existing determinants, and on the other hand assess the recent Colombian peace agreement using these as necessary conditions for sustaining the peace. In other words, this thesis aims at assessing the implementation process so far to provide early insights that support the sustainment of peace in Colombia throughout the years.

1.1. Case Description

The Colombian government and the FARC have been in civil war for 52 years. The civil war has caused 220,000 deaths and displaced seven million people (Amnesty International, n.d.). Finally, on December 1, 2018, the Final Agreement was ratified that aims to put an end to the most protracted intrastate war in the western hemisphere (Segura and Mechoulan, 2017). The Final Agreement is composed out of six accords that focus on specific issues. These accords were individually discussed in the years before the signing of the Final Agreement. Figure 1 lays out the timeline that identifies the most influential events until the ratification of the Final Agreement.




Figure 1. The Colombian Peace process Timeline. Adapted from BBC, 2016

As can be seen in Figure 1 the peace process started with some secret and exploratory negotiations, initiated by the Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, where representatives of both parties took part in every step of the process. Finally, after four years of painstaking negotiations in Havana, Cuba, the two parties signed the First Agreement on 24 of August 2016 in Cartagena. The First agreement rejected in the October 2nd referendum. The Colombian president had to renegotiate a new agreement that incorporated 50 out of the 500 recommendations given by the opposing parties and other stakeholders. The new agreement (from now on referred to as the Final Agreement or the Agreement) was signed on November 24, 2016, in the capital of Colombia Bogotá and voted upon by the Colombian Senate a couple of weeks after. The ratification by the Colombian senate solidified the Agreement, despite the abstention of the opposing parties (Wade, 2016).

The Agreement and the corresponding withdrawal of the FARC as a criminal organisation shakes the power and social structures that Colombia has known for more than two generations. This power vacuum is known to have caused one of the many challenges that the implementation phase of the Agreement has been facing since its ratification. As the quote at the beginning of the introduction correctly states the ultimate goal of a post-conflict society like Colombia is to make a country work.

This thesis aims at revealing the factors that might prove crucial to the achievement of this goal, namely sustaining the peace agreement between the Colombian government and Colombia's largest insurgent group, the left-wing guerrillas *Fuerzas Armadas revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC). From this phenomenon the following research question is derived:

How sustainable is the Colombian peace agreement signed by the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) on November 24, 2016?

In order to answer the central question stated above this research is guided by the following sub-questions:

1. What are the theoretical characteristics or determinants that influence the sustainment of peace?
2. What are the arrangements made through the Colombian peace agreement?
3. Can these characteristics be located in the Colombian peace process until May 2018?
4. What are the case-specific factors that can have a negative effect on the sustainment of the peace?

The first sub-question will be addressed in the literature review and theoretical framework. The first paragraph of the case analysis will provide a summary of the arrangements made which answers the second sub-question, while the rest of the analysis answers the third sub-question. The fourth sub-question will be answered at the end of the analysis and are addressed as 'possible Colombian determinants'. At the end of the conclusion, one can find the answer to the central question.

1.2. The relevance of this research

According to King, Keohane and Verba (1994), a theoretically relevant contribution helps to provide a deeper understanding of the phenomena under study. Researches that are socially relevant further the understanding of the political and social phenomena that affect individuals (Lehnert, Miller and Wonka, 2007). This paragraph presents the societal and theoretical relevance of this research.

1.2.1. Societal relevance

The societal relevance of this research is embedded in the consequences of a failed or successful Agreement of the FARC and the Colombian National government. This research aims at identifying the presence of the empirically embedded and the emerging case-specific determinants of peace that were not identified before analysing the Colombian case. This aim brings about two valuable aspects of this contribution. First, content analysis allows both an inductive and deductive approach which makes it essential for identifying the early obstacles of the sustainment of peace. By utilising the

deductive approach, one can offer insights regarding which parts of the existing theories are not present in the Colombian context.

By employing the inductive approach, one can write practical recommendations that might be helpful for everyone that is affected by the Agreement especially for the relevant parties, the Colombian government, the FARC, the implementation officials and the international community. This means that this research serves as an early theoretical and practical assessment of the 18 months implementation process that reveals on what issues the concerning parties are to focus more energy on, to sustain the peace agreement even after these 18 months.

Second, one can argue that the recommendations that this research produced can help to prevent a blame game outburst that would result if the Agreement fails to be sustained. This blame game would concern most of the relevant actors such as the government, the FARC, the international community and the citizens of Colombia. In the case that the FARC resumes the civil war, all actors will be pointing at each other as the guilty party. However, conducting this type of research with small yearly intervals provide a comprehensive picture which can help identify the potential fallacies in the implementation process.

Also, the outcomes of this research can help achieve better outcomes regarding the negotiations that the Colombian government started with the other active guerrilla organisation in Colombia the ELN (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*). Hence, this research helps identify the possible source(s) of failures of the Colombian peace agreement and provides guidelines into how to address them.

1.2.2. Theoretical relevance

This research is theoretically relevant for the following reasons. First, despite the increased interest of scholars in the concepts of civil war and the sustainment of peace, it is generally recognised that theory on civil war is lacking (Agambden, 2015). Although the progress made regarding the identification of the needs of post-conflict societies, the empirical data is still inconclusive (Kreutz, 2014). Kreutz (2014) asserts that this problem is due to the recent trend that scholars focus more on researching peace processes and, therefore, neglect researching conflict recurrence, how to peacefully end civil wars and how to increase the durability of peace (Gartner and Melin 2009, as cited in Hoffman & Bercovitch 2011).

Therefore, this research aims to increase the knowledge regarding the achievement and sustainment of peace in the 21st century. By applying the existing determinants to the context of the Colombian peace agreement, one can identify where the existing theory might be lacking and thus becomes possible to provide suggestions regarding further research areas which will enrich the theoretical knowledge regarding the sustainment of the peace.

The preliminary research revealed that until 2007 there was no study published that explored the aggregated implementation of the agreement provisions. Joshi and Quinn (2015a) assert that this lack of studies can be accounted to the scholarly focus on power-sharing arrangements. The attention and resources dedicated to the negotiations of a peace agreement are more significant than that dedicated to the implementation phase (Joshi and Quinn, 2015). Mason (2007) was the last recorded comprehensive attempt to bring together most of the determinants for the sustainment of peace that had been identified until then in his memoir “Sustaining the peace after civil war.”

The lack of research that focuses on the effects of the aggregated implementation of the determinants of sustaining the peace and the lack of a more recent trustworthy outline of all the existing determinants are at the centre of the theoretical relevance of this research. As a consequence of this, this contribution aims to synthesise the different theories into *the Model for Sustaining Peace* that can be applied to the Colombian case and because of its deductive underpinnings has the potential to be explored in other contexts as well. Hence, this thesis will benefit this subfield as it might expand the extant theoretical and empirical knowledge by applying it in a local context (deductive part), while at the same time staying alert to alternative explanations (inductive part).

2. Literature review

This chapter reviews the existing empirical and theoretical literature on the sustainment of peace after civil war. This review focuses on identifying the similarities and dissimilarities regarding the determinants for sustaining the peace from the different scholars in this field of study. This means that this section will not go into detail on the causes and types of civil war (see, for example, Wallensteen, 2014) nor the details regarding how to end civil war through negotiated peace settlements (for example, Licklider, 1995). Moreover, it does not cover the literature on post-conflict justice and reconciliation (for example, Lederach, 1997). Since peacebuilding is a relatively new concept, this section does, however, briefly present the development of the field of peace and conflict studies. Hence, even though war-to-peace is an intertwined process, this section focuses solemnly on the determinants for the sustainment of peace, which is the last stage of conflict.

2.1. The development of the field of civil war and peace

First, it is important to mention that there is no consensus on the definition of civil war. Civil war is the presence of a combination of political goals, organised actors and violence (Singer 1972; Gantzel 1981; Heldt 1993 as cited in Kreutz, 2014). Civil wars are distinguished from other forms of internal armed conflict by the requirement that state violence should be sustained and reciprocated and that the war exceeds a certain threshold of deaths (typically more than 1,000 per year.) (Small and Singer, 1994).

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a striking shift in the study of war and peace away from interstate wars towards intrastate conflicts (Wallensteen, 2014; Jackson, 2014). One-fourth of these intrastate conflicts ended through a negotiated agreement (Licklider, 1995). For instance, Kreutz (2010) found that between 1999 and 2005 there was an increase in ending a civil wars through peace settlements (18.4 per cent) and a decrease of military victories, while during the Cold War there were only 12 wars that ended through peace settlement (also referred to as negotiated settlement). This increase in ending civil wars through negotiated settlements can be accounted to, among other reasons, the notion that the international community has become more willing and competent at mediating conflicts (Mack, 2008). This increase of civil war resulted in the rapid growth of robust systematic and statistical studies on civil wars in the first decade of the 2000s (Wallensteen, 2014).

2.1.1. The first conflict dataset and early civil war studies

Despite the increase in numbers of intrastate wars and sparked scholarly interest in intrastate war and peace, datasets on conflicts were still a relatively new phenomenon. Conflict datasets did not emerge until the 1960s with the Correlates of War project (COW) led by Small and Singer (1994) (Clayton,

2014). The COW dataset includes all international and civil wars for the years 1816-1992 and have since been hugely influential in this field and is to this day the most frequently used dataset (Eck, 2005; Sambanis, 2004). Recently, scholars have devoted more studies to the factors that determine the stability of peace settlements. These studies can be divided along two lines; while some scholars focused on finding an array of factors that make war recurrence more likely using large datasets, others have focused on the relationship of one or more factor(s) in case studies (Hartzell, 1999).

The quantitative studies conducted are, for example, Hampson (1990) focused on the effects that the post-Cold War had on intrastate conflicts. Other authors have explored third-party guarantors (Walter, 1997) and the influence that economic conditions have regarding agreements stability (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; De Soto and del Castillo, 1994) and the importance of identity and ethnicity in conflicts (Licklider, 1995). Maynes, (1993) conducted a qualitative analysis that focused on the role of exogenous actors such as regional and international organisations (Maynes, 1993). According to Licklider (1995) and Walter (1997) sustainable peace is achieved when there is no relapse of war with the same parties for five years after the signing of the agreement.

Still, Hartzell (1999) criticises the conducted case studies because they have primarily relied on successful peace agreements which results in a lack of information of the settlements itself in the large data sets. Until 1999 the existing research could not generate compelling results about the impact that the terms agreed between the warring parties have on settlement stability which resonates with Hartzell's (1999) criticism on the studies made so far. Hartzell (1999), therefore, vigorously argued that granting institutional safeguards that address the crucial security concerns of the antagonists, supports the sustainment of the agreement. She concluded this by analysing 23 intrastate wars that remained stable for more than five years in the post-World War II era (between 1945 and 1997). Her main arguments are in line with those of Gurr (1990) (as cited in Hartzell et al., 2001) and Licklider (1993) all of whom argue that the stakes in politico-economic conflicts are lower than in identity wars. These results imply that the type and the costs of civil war matter for sustaining peace.

2.1.2. Early researches on the determinants for sustained peace

Three years later, Caroline Hartzell together with Matthew Hoddie and Donald Rotchild (2001), conducted one of the pioneering works in this subfield by sensitising scholars and practitioners to the types of determinants that influence the sustainment of peace agreements. Their quantitative research involved analysing 38 civil wars (using the COW project database) that ended through a negotiated settlement from 1945 to 1998. In this comprehensive research, they further identified the

factors that might heighten security concerns that in return could impede the successful application of the peace settlement by the antagonists and their leaders such as *state fragility* (capacity and leadership) (Huntington as cited in Hartzell et al., 2001), and *minority representation* (Hartzell et al., 2001).

In the research stated above, Hartzell et al. (2001) divided the determinants that sustain the peace into two categories: *settlement environment* and *settlement provisions*. The first, *settlement environment*, regards the “environment in which a settlement is negotiated” (p.188) and has been drawn from the following three analytical levels: the characteristics of the conflict itself, the characteristics of the country in civil war and the international system. The operationalisation was divided into the following five variables: international system structure, previous regime type, conflict issue, conflict intensity and conflict duration. The second, *settlement provisions*, concerns the variables that are “features of settlement arrangements” (p.187) such as territorial autonomy and third-party enforcers.

This research identified that the previous regime type has a positive influence on the stability of settlements (see Table 1). If the previous regime was democratic, the chance of civil war relapse decreases by 90 per cent. Similarly, a peace agreement made after an “intense” conflict, operationalised in the number of battle deaths in each month of the war, is more likely to fail than agreements made after less violent civil wars. Consequently, the conflict duration variable proved that the more extended the war, the more likely it is that the peace will be sustained. However, this research was not significant when analysing the international system structure or the conflict issue. (Hartzell et al., 2001).

Table 1. Results of Hartzell et al., 2001

Environment settlement variables	Description	sustained peace
International system structure	International wars	No data
Previous regime type	Democratic	Increases chances
Conflict issue	Politico-economic or identity conflicts	No data
Conflict intensity	Relatively less intense conflicts	Increases chances
Conflict duration	Relatively longer period of civil war	Increases chances
Settlement provisions variables	Description	sustained peace
Territorial autonomy	Inclusive political decision-making	Increases chances
Third-party enforcement	International or regional support	Increases chances

Note: Adapted from Hartzell et al., 2001

In 2007 Michael Quinn, David Mason and Mehmet Gurses also presented a model that aimed to explain which civil war characteristics and post-civil war environment characteristics have an impact on sustained peace. Their quantitative study also researched civil wars between 1944 and 1997, however, instead of using the COW project dataset, as used by Hartzell et al. in 2001, they used the other largely used dataset from Doyle and Sambanis (2000). They also only focus on the conditions of the post-civil war environment that have a positive impact on sustaining the peace. These post-conflict conditions are subcategorised in *structure* and *agency* elements.

Here, *structure* regards their argument that the outcome of the former civil war has an impact on the sustainment of peace after civil war and to what extent the related condition of *dual sovereignty* (Tilly, 1978) persists post-civil war. Tilly (1978) calls the presence of ready-to-mobilise-groups “dual sovereignty” because the nation-state regime was unable to completely demobilise the rebel group at the end of a civil war leaving the group susceptible to reorganisation. On the other hand, *agency* refers to the post-conflict environment that influences former combatants’ cost and benefits analysis of sustaining peace versus resuming the conflict. For this quantitative research, they analysed 111 civil wars with four categories of variables and one control variable. Table 2 depicts an overview of the categories of variables and their outcomes.

Table 2. Results of Quinn et al. 2007

Category	Variable	Description	Durable peace
Outcome	Rebel Victory	Dual sovereignty	Increases chances
	Agreement w/PKO	Presence of peacekeeping operations (PKO)	Increases chances
	Agreement w/out PKO	No presence of peacekeeping operations (PKO)	Decreases chances
Type of conflict	Secession	Identity wars	Not significant
	Ethnic Revolution	Ethnic wars	Not significant
Costs of Conflict	Fatalities (ln)	The more fatalities of civil war “revenge”	Decreases chances
	Army Size (% of the population)	The larger the army size of the government	Increases chances
	Duration (ln)	The longer the war “war weariness effect”	Increases chances
Post-Civil war Environment	Democracy (2yr. post)	Democratic regime after civil war	Not significant
	GDP/capita	Measurement of general level of economic development	Increases chances
	Infant Mortality	Lower infant mortality rate	Increases chances
	Population (ln)	Large population	Decreases chances
Time Controls (Constant)	Years since last war ended	The longer the peace agreement can be sustained	Increases chances

Note: Adapted from Quinn et al. (2007)

Some findings from this research are worth highlighting. For instance, the outcome of the variable 'fatalities' provided the insight that the more casualties that the civil war has endured, the more likely it is that civil war will relapse. With these results, Quinn et al. (2007) support Walter's (2004) *revenge* hypothesis. Quinn et al. (2007) argue that trust between previous adversaries is more challenging to achieve with a high number of civil war fatalities negatively influencing the sustainment of peace.

The second noteworthy result offers a discrepancy between the results of Quinn et al. (2007) and Hartzell et al. (2001). Quinn et al. (2007) do not provide data that a previous democratic regime has a positive impact on sustaining the peace. Regarding this variable, there have been more mixed outcomes. For instance, both Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) did not provide empirical data that democracy has an impact on sustained peace. Contrastingly, Krain and Meyers (1997) together with Henderson and Singer (2000) (as cited in Quinn et al. 2007) and Hartzell et al. (2001) did find empirical support for the influence of democratic regimes on sustaining the peace.

Furthermore in their research, Quinn et al. (2007), also added some variables such as army size, GDP/capita, infant mortality and population to the quest for determinants of sustaining the peace. There is one fundamental difference between these two studies. The study conducted by Hartzell et al. (2001) exclusively analysed civil wars that ended through a peace agreement while Quinn et al. (2007) analysed the following four possible outcomes of civil wars; government victory, rebel victory, the signing of a peace agreement with peacekeeping missions (w/PKO), and the signing of a peace agreement without the peacekeeping missions(w/out PKO).

So far, this literature review shows that researchers have identified numerous determinants for the sustainment of peace after civil war throughout the years. In 2007 David Mason aimed to provide a conceptual framework that endows the identification of the factors that influence the sustainment of peace in his monograph "Sustaining Peace after Civil War." He asserts that many of these determinants are "policy manipulable variables" (p. vii) which means that these factors are policy tools that can be used by the international community to help protect war-torn nations against the recurrence of civil war. Mason (2007) brings together previous research and categorises the following four types of determinants (see Figure 2); (1) the characteristics of the nation, (2) the outcome of the previous civil war, (3) characteristics of the conflict, and (4) characteristics of the post-civil war environment. These four types of determinants mostly encompass the determinants that this subfield has identified until 2007. As one will read in the following paragraphs, many scholars aim to determine the chance of the sustainment of peace by also researching the risk of war recurrence, which is contrary to the sustainment of peace.




Figure 2. Mason's Determinants for Durable Peace. Adapted from Mason, 2007

2.2. First comprehensive list of determinants

This paragraph focuses on the typology of determinants identified by Mason (2007) and is supplemented by recent findings of scholars that support Mason's categorisation or other determinants that have not been taken into account by Mason (2007).

2.2.1. Characteristics of the Nation

Some previous research defines what characteristics of the country make the nations susceptible to the recurrence of civil war (Hartzell et al., 2001; Mason, Gurses, Brandt and Quinn, 2011). These national characteristics are (1) the level of economic development, (2) the type of political regime, (3) the degree of ethnic and religious fractionalisation, and (4) the resource curse.

Economic development

This national characteristic has robustly and consistently been identified as a predictor of civil war recurrence across civil war empirical studies. Economic development as a determinant has been measured as the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, life expectancy or infant mortality. Scholars such as Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Sambanis (2004), Quinn et al. (2007), and Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2008) have found that this relationship between economic

development and the durability of peace holds strong. According to these quantitative studies, it seems that the lower the GDP, the lower the costs that rebel organisations face for recruitment, which makes it easy to recruit individuals into an armed group (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998).

Similarly, according to the quantitative study of Fearon and Laitin (2003), there is an 18 per cent chance that the poorest 10 per cent of countries will experience an occurrence of civil war, while only 1 per cent of the wealthiest 10 per cent of countries have a chance of experiencing an outbreak of civil war. These findings support the quantitatively tested grievance-based theories of civil war that states that if governments can address people's grievances by achieving a decent level of economic well-being can avoid civil war recurrence (Mason et al., 2011). However, neither when economic development was researched using infant mortality rate in a quantitative manner (Mason et al., 2011) nor when the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database was used (Dahl and Hoyland, 2012), was there data that supports the economic wellbeing as a determinant for durable peace. This discrepancy within results weakens the relationship between these two variables.

Type of political regime

According to Theda Skocpol (1979), the risk of civil war occurrence and recurrence is also influenced by the type of regime. It is generally accepted that weak states are more susceptible to civil war and other violent oppositions and that democracies are the least susceptible because the opposition is allowed to mobilise into political parties, to have their concerns accommodated (Mason, 2007; Mason et al., 2011). In a quantitative study, Goodwin (2001) identified five characteristics of weak states that make them more prone to armed opposition. The first weak state characteristic is when states make unpopular economic and social arrangements. For instance by sponsoring certain ethnic groups in return for their support.

Secondly, the exclusion from state access and the violent repression of mobilised groups further exacerbates the opposition. Third, weak states tend to radicalise the opposition by responding with unplanned repressive violence. Fourth, weak states enable belligerents to establish their territories within the jurisdiction of the state by weak infrastructural power and policing practices. Lastly, Goodwin (2001) further asserts that arbitrary and corrupt rule by dictators is prone to weaken, divide and alienate external supporters and elite groups which makes the state regime lose strength to repress rebel groups.

Ethnic and religious fractionalisation

Collier and Hoeffler (1998) argue in their quantitative study that highly fractionalised societies are not more prone to war than homogeneous ones. However, their findings affirm that the risk of civil war is 50% higher when the society is polarised into two groups than when the society is either highly fractionalised or homogeneous. Similarly, the findings of the quantitative studies of Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002), Ellingsen (2010), Reynol-Querol (2002) support this relationship between the size of an ethnic group, the amount of co-existing ethnic groups, and the outbreak of civil war. However, Mozaffar, Scarritt, & Galaich, 2003 contend that the fewer the number of different ethnic groups and the existence of one larger group that aspires ethnic hegemony, the higher risk of civil war occurrence because the fear of subordination by the other ethnic groups might result in civil war. Contradictory, the quantitative studies of Fearon and Laitin (2003) did not find support for the relationship between the probability of civil war and the degree of ethnic fragmentation.

The resource curse

This national characteristic implies that nations that depend on the export of oil and other lootable resources, such as drugs and gems, for income are more susceptible to civil war. This notion is in line with the theory that civil war can be caused by greed (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Mason, 2007).

2.2.2. Civil war outcome

There are three ways in which a civil war can come to an end: rebel victory, government victory or civil war ended through a negotiated settlement. Since this thesis focuses on sustaining the peace after a negotiated settlement, the other two will not be discussed. According to the quantitative study of Mason et al. (2011), peace acquired through a negotiated settlement is not necessarily more fragile than peace attained through a decisive military victory. Peace achieved through a negotiated settlement is initially more fragile but is more durable with time. This determinant resonates with the *structure* elements that according to the quantitative study of Quinn et al. (2007) influence the sustainment of peace.

2.2.3. Conflict Characteristics

Duration of conflict

Mason and Fett (1996) found in their quantitative study that the most likely war outcome in a long civil war is a negotiated settlement. Civil wars that do not end in the early years will drag on and will most likely not burn out by itself and end in a hurting stalemate, where no party can defeat the other, the warring parties opt for ending the conflict through a negotiated settlement (Mason, 2007). In other

words, the *war weariness* effect means that the longer the civil war has lasted, the more likely it is that peace will prevail (Hartzell et al., 2001; Quinn et al., 2007; Mason et al., 2011). Similarly, Mason et al. (2011) found data that for every additional year that the civil war lasted, the probability of peace failure diminishes by 10% because a long-lasting civil war diminishes the incentives of belligerents to resume the conflict (Mason et al., 2011). According to the COW project, a civil war lasted an average of 1,665 days (Brandt, Mason, Gurses, Petrovsky, & Radin, 2008).

Conflict intensity

This characteristic has been added to the characteristics given by Mason in his memoir because of the wealth of data that supports the effect that the number of casualties has on the sustainment of peace. Therefore, the *revenge* indicator increases the risk of civil war recurrence because of the hardened distrust between former antagonists (Hartzell, Hoddie and Quinn, 2001; Quinn et al., 2007; Mason et al., 2011). The higher the casualty rate during the conflict the higher the risk of civil war recurrence. However, Kreutz (2010) did not find empirical data that supports this claim when he revised these findings utilising the UCDP conflict termination dataset. Hartzell et al. (2001) measured conflict intensity by dividing the number, in thousands, of war-related deaths by the duration of the conflict in months.

2.2.4. Post-war Environment Characteristics

Agency cost-benefit analysis

These characteristics are more focused on the factors that affect the sustainment of peace in the post-civil war period. This *agency cost-benefit analysis* has previously been presented in the research by Quinn et al. (2007). The expectation that a civil war will recur after a negotiated settlement has been signed rises if *dual sovereignty* prevails in the post-civil war environment, and the expected benefit from resuming armed conflict is higher than the expected benefit of sustaining the peace, for at least one politically engaged group (Mason, 2007; Mason et al., 2011).

Third-party mediation and peacekeeping

The possibility of ending a civil war through a negotiated settlement when the conflict is “ripe for a solution” is more likely when a third-party is the mediator and enforces the terms of the agreement (Walter, 1999; Hartzell et al., 2001; Collier et al., 2008; Kreutz, 2010). Third-party mediation and peacekeeping operations help resolve the security dilemmas that the parties have after signing a peace agreement. Mediators make the benefits of coming to a peaceful agreement more attractive than the benefits of continuing war. Introducing peacekeeping operations at any time after the civil war

dramatically decreases the risk of peace failing by 74% when the peacekeeping operations are constant, and 71% the peacekeeping operations vary in time (Fortna, 2004; Hartzell et al., 2001; Mason et al., 2011)

Power-sharing

It is generally accepted that settlements that include various dimensions of power-sharing mechanisms are more durable (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Hartzell, 2009). Power-sharing mechanisms are in place when both protagonists have adequate representation and presence in the critical decision-making procedures. Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) acknowledge three forms of power-sharing namely, political, territorial and military. The least costly power-sharing form, military power-sharing, means the integration of former antagonist's combatants into a new national army. More costly is the territorial autonomy power-sharing form, from which the government can regain control of the region over time. The most costly is the political power-sharing form. In this form, the ruling power is shared by the former adversaries (DeRouen, Lea and Warrenstein, 2009). According to Mattes and Savun (2009), power-sharing mechanisms have the most effect on reducing the risk of civil war recurrence.

Peace spoilers

Peace spoilers occur when parts of the factions of the warring parties do not agree with the peace agreement or part of the agreement. When parties do not agree on the contents of the agreement, dissent is more likely and implementing the peace agreements more difficult. Radicals among the rebels or hardliners in the government who are against the peace agreement can spoil the peace process and implementation by reigniting the armed conflict (Mason, 2007).

2.3. Recent determinants

This section focuses on the determinants that have recently gained the attention of scholars. These studies have been conducted after Mason (2007) wrote his monograph on this subject and thus reveal other determinants.

Degree of implementation of the agreement

Joshi and Quinn (2015) revealed in their quantitative study that peace agreements are implemented at various rates. According to the findings of Joshi and Quinn (2015), the expectation of the durability of a peace agreement is two and a half times greater when 80 per cent of the agreement has been implemented, than when the agreement has only been implemented with a 40 per cent average. Additionally, implementing the agreement will not only support the sustainment of peace between

the warring parties but also promote peace between the government and other adversaries outside of the signed agreement. The average implementation rate is 54% based on the research conducted by Joshi and Quinn (2017).

Agreement design

Even though there were earlier studies conducted on the importance of agreement design (see, for instance, Hampson, 1996) this determinant is classified as a more recent determinant because the interest of scholars in these determinant has recently increased. Hampson (1996) defined in a quantitative study that agreements that contain power-sharing arrangements, third-party arrangements, provisions for reviewing the arrangement during the implementation phase and agreements that are crafted by the involved parties, as good agreements. Fortna (2004) identified strong agreements like those that have large peacekeeping missions, confidence-building measures, arms control arrangements and are detailed and formal. According to the quantitative study of Mattes and Savun (2009), cost-increasing provisions such as separation of forces and fear reducing provisions, such as third-party guarantees and power-sharing mechanisms, reduce the risk of civil war recurrence.

These studies reiterate the notion that the design of the peace agreement is crucial to the sustainment of peace. In this regard, Hoffman and Bercovitch (2011) wanted to determine whether there are structural components within a peace agreement that affect the sustainment of peace by summarising some arrangements within peace agreements that are crucial for a good agreement (see Table 3).

Table 3. *The Thirteen Arrangements of Good Peace Agreements*

Arrangements	Scholar
1. They are crafted by the warring parties	(Hampson, 1996)
2. They contain power-sharing provisions	(Hampson, 1996)
3. They have provisions for third-party mediation and renegotiation during the implementation phase	(Hampson, 1996)
4. They call for peacekeeping missions to be established	(Fortna, 2004).
5. They call for the withdrawal of troops	(Fortna, 2004)
6. They call for the establishment of demilitarised zones	(Fortna, 2004)
7. They are specific	(Fortna, 2004)
8. They are formal	(Fortna, 2004)
9. They settle the political issues	(Fortna, 2004)
10. They channel the struggle for power into nonviolent mechanisms and processes	(Hoffman, 2009 as cited in Hoffmann and Bercovitch 2011)
11. They are balanced (not favouring one party over the other)	(Hoffman, 2009 as cited in Hoffmann and Bercovitch 2011)
12. They contain an explicit or well-understood third-party guarantee of peace	(Fortna, 2004; Toft, 2010)
13. They call for ongoing dispute resolution in the form of joint commissions between the parties	(Fortna, 2004)

Note: Adapted from Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011 p. 413

The findings from their cross-case comparison research revealed that the two most crucial arrangements are *balance* and *renegotiation*. In this regard, a peace agreement is most durable when it is open to review and is a so-called “living document” (Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011).

2.4. Sub-conclusion

Within this literature review, one can conclude that over the past two decades determinants for the sustainment of peace have mushroomed and that the many qualitative and quantitative studies reveal that there are a great variety of specific factors that influence the durability of peace.

3. Theoretical framework

This theoretical framework provides the analytical tools used to conduct the analysis. However, the literature review has shown that scholars in this subfield do not have the same approach nor the same definition of the concepts. Therefore, to create this theoretical framework only clearly defined concepts, together with their respective attributes and their empirical scope have been utilised because according to Lehnert et al. (2007), specified theoretical concepts serve as stable bridges between real-world social processes and social science theory framework.

The theories that form the conceptual basis for this research are drawn from the theories presented in the literature review. To determine which theories and determinants are appropriate to study the selected case, the existing determinants will be analysed together with preliminary research on the case of Colombia. This preliminary research revealed that not all the theories presented in the literature review could be used in this theoretical framework because the fundamentals of the theories do not adequately fit with the case.

The following determinants have been excluded from the *Model for Sustaining the Peace*: civil war outcome, territorial autonomy, agency cost-benefit analysis and religious fractionalisation. First, the civil war outcome determinant has been ruled out because this case analysis focuses on a civil war that was ended through a negotiated settlement, which according to the theory already has more chances at being sustained than a *government- or rebel victory outcome* (Mason et al., 2011). Second, the *territorial autonomy* determinant suggests that federalist arrangements can prolong peace. This determinant has not been taken into account in this case study because Colombia governmental system is centralised with separation of powers (Embassy of Colombia. N.d.).

Another determinant that is excluded from this research is the determinant of *agency cost-benefit analysis* because the definition of this determinant overlaps with the *economic development* determinant and, the *political and territorial power-sharing mechanisms* determinants. Fourth, the religious part of fractionalisation was not taken into account because Colombia is overwhelmingly Christian with 90% of the population being Christian (Elisha Sawe, 2017a). If these determinants would be taken into account for this research, the results will be distorted because it might have wrongly alluded to a stronger or weaker peace agreement. It is important to highlight that these 'unfit' determinants can, however, have a greater significance when researching them in quantitative studies.

As the literature review has shown, different scholars have different names and types of determinants which at first glance seem to be two different determinants. However, when analysing the core definition of these concepts, it became clear that there is much overlapping and ambiguity between concepts. For instance, in the typology of Mason (2007), both third-party mediation and power-sharing can be categorised in the post-war environment. However, it can be argued that the presence of these determinants in the post-war environment can be based on whether they are present in the agreement itself or not.

In light of this argument, it can be asserted that the *settlement arrangement* and *settlement environment* categorisation (Hartzell et al., 2011) is the theory that mitigates the overlapping of concepts the most. Therefore, this categorisation has been chosen as the central categorisation of this thesis because it correctly lays out a mutually exclusive definition of the types of arrangements. In other words, to avoid such conceptual overlapping, all 15 types of determinants identified in the literature review were carefully reorganised and synthesised into these two subcategories. This synthesis of the existing determinants of sustaining the peace encompasses *the Model for Sustaining the Peace* (see table 4).

Since this model is based on the theories explained in the literature review, these concepts will not be discussed further in this section to avoid redundancy and because of the limited space available for this contribution. Please see, Table 5 and Table 6 for the complete operationalisation of the concepts of *the Model for Sustaining the Peace*. It is important to emphasise that the concepts that have been utilised in *the Model for Sustaining the Peace* have all been empirically tested in a quantitative study. This means that these determinants that affect (positive or negative) the stability of a peace agreement have robustly been tested. Consequently, the operationalisation of *the Model for Sustaining the Peace* has also been extracted from the theoretical concepts of the corresponding theory.

However, all determinants have been translated in a way that the assessment is based on a positive influence for the sustainment of peace. For instance, instead of putting the theoretically embedded term “duration of conflict” it was translated in the assessment needed for the determinant to have a positive influence on the sustainment of peace, which is in this case “long duration of conflict”. By utilising the empirically based *Model for Sustaining the Peace* to assess the 18 months of peace agreement this thesis provides insights early in the implementation process that helps the sustainment of peace throughout the years.

Table 4. *Model for Sustaining the Peace*

Settlement Arrangements	Settlement Environment	
Agreement design	Country characteristics	
The agreement: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Is crafted by the parties 2. Contains power-sharing mechanisms 3. Has provisions for third-party renegotiation during the implementation phase (<i>excludes the use of troops</i>) 4. Calls for peacekeeping missions to be established (<i>includes UN monitoring, unarmed missions and the use of troops</i>) 5. Calls for the withdrawal of troops 6. Calls for the establishment of demilitarised zones 7. Is specific 8. Is formal 9. Settles the political issues 10. Channels the struggle for power into nonviolent mechanisms and processes 11. Is balanced (<i>not favouring one party over the other</i>) 12. Contains an explicit or well-understood third-party guarantee of peace (<i>excludes all UN missions</i>) 13. Calls for ongoing dispute resolution in the form of joint commissions between the parties 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 14. Higher economic development 15. More democratic and stable type of regime 16. No ethnic polarisation 17. No resource curse 	
		Conflict characteristics
		18. Long duration of conflict
		19. Low conflict intensity
		Agreement implementation outcomes
		20. Few peace spoilers
		21. High degree of settlement implementation
		International involvement
		22. High degree of third-party enforcement

Note: This model comprises the theoretical synthesis made by the author. For a detailed source description, please see Appendix 2

4. Methodology

This chapter presents and justifies the choices of research design and methods utilised to assess the non-recurrence of conflict of the first 18 months of the peace agreement signed between the National Government of Colombia and the FARC and to identify possible difficulties to the further sustainment of the peace agreement.

4.1. Case selection

This intrinsic and unique case of the Colombian peace agreement with the FARC was chosen for various reasons. It is vital that the chosen case showed some characteristics that make them substantially and theoretically important (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). In this regard, many peacebuilding experts have applauded the Colombian peace agreement since it ended the most extensive conflict in the western hemisphere (Segura and Mechoulan, 2017). This peace agreement also broke new ground by, for instance, laying the groundwork for increasing legitimacy and confidence in the process (Nylander, Sander and Tvedt, 2018).

Furthermore, the fact that this analysis is conducted relatively recently after the ratification of the peace accord allows the identification of the determinants that were present or absent at the beginning of the implementation, which is when a peace agreement is at its weakest state (Hartzell et al., 2001). Therefore, this thesis aims to reveal which determinants of sustained peace were present in the Colombian peace agreement 18 months after its official ratification on May 24th, 2018. This time frame was chosen because it is crucial to conduct this analysis based on the most recent data. The early assessment of the implementation phase is crucial because according to Hartzell et al., (2001) the memories of the civil war have more political meaning in the period immediately after the civil war than after some time. Second, over the years it is also likely that the effects of the institutional arrangements change. Finally, as more time passes, it will be more challenging to analyse the stability of peace because the nature of civil conflict itself might have changed (Hartzell et al., 2001).

Lastly, it is noteworthy to mention that this case was also chosen based on the keen interest that the researcher has with this topic and specific case given that she was born in Colombia. The primary goal of this thesis is to explain and evaluate whether the peace agreement is likely to hold stable over the years and whether some case-specific determinants can be influenced to sustain the peace for future generations.

4.2. Research methods

This research is a single-case study given that it focuses on the Colombian peace agreement with the FARC (McNabb, 2010). A case study is where the researcher focuses on details within each case when investigating one or a small set of cases in their specific context (Yin, 2009; Neumann, 2014). In order to answer the research questions, this case study employed the qualitative data collection method: content analysis. A content analysis is the analysis of recorded human interactions and comprises the examination of written documents such as newspapers, web pages, speeches (Babbie, 2010)

This thesis is also both an interpretative and evaluative research (McNabb, 2010; Thomas, 2010). First, this study aimed to find the theoretical causes of sustained peace. Second, the process of the sustainment of the peace after 18 months of its signing was assessed by applying these conditions to the case. Third, this thesis also wanted to determine how likely it is that the Colombian peace agreement will be sustained (Thomas, 2010). In other words, it was not only relevant to check the existence of theory in the case, but it was also essential to be open to other possible determinants that might provide some new aspects to the existing theories.

4.3. Research process

It was crucial to that the research was conducted in a precise and transparent manner. For this reason, the research process is guided by the theoretical underpinnings of the *Model for Sustaining the Peace*. The *settlement arrangements* and *the settlement environment* provide a clear distinction between the type of sources that were used for gathering data, data analysis and the way that the data was presented.

The analysis of the *settlement arrangements* concerns the Final Agreement and the 18 months period after the signing is the analysis of the *settlement environment*. The analysis of the Final Agreement was divided into each chapter in order to provide a more detailed analysis. The shorter paragraphs 'preamble' and 'introduction' were analysed as one. To provide a more in-depth, chronological and systemised analysis of the sources used for researching the *settlement environment*, the 18 months were separated further into two periods of nine months. The first nine months 'Period 1' contains the data gathered from November 24, 2016, to August 23, 2017. The second period 'Period 2' runs from August 24, 2017, to May 24, 2018. Some determinants did not surface in the sources analysed chronologically and, therefore, were individually researched and are referred to as 'underexposed determinants'

The research process, as mentioned before, involved both the deductive approach and the inductive approach. The inductive approach was mainly employed during the operationalisation of concepts. The inductive part was employed during the analysis of the sources by staying alert to patterns that might reveal the case-specific determinants that had not surfaced when conducting the literature review.

4.3.1. Operationalisation and data gathering

The literature review helped to answer the first sub-question that regards identifying the theoretical characteristics of the determinants that influence the sustainment of peace. These determinants and their conceptual explanations serve as the concepts and variables that were tested in this case study. For instance, the concept of *power-sharing mechanisms* was based on the three forms of power-sharing specified by Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) that result in the following three indicators: (1) *political power-sharing*, (2) *military power-sharing* and (3) *territorial power-sharing*.

See Table 5 for the operationalisation of *the settlement arrangements* and Table 6 for *the settlement environment*. For the complete sources of the operationalisation, please see Appendix 1. An excel sheet (see Appendix 2) was used to record the concepts, the variables and the analysis of the data. Manifest coding was utilised to extract the 'visible, surface content' such as how many times a certain word was mentioned in the text. Latent coding was used to extract the underlying and implicit definitions, and manifest coding to establish the general concepts' existence within the data (Babbie, 2013). Latent coding also helped reveal the terms that can be used to execute manifest coding properly.

Operationalisation

Table 5. Operationalisation of the Settlement Arrangements Category

Settlement arrangements			
Agreement Design			
Variable	Indicator	Explanation	Assessment
1.Crafted by the parties	The existence of written signs that the agreement is crafted by the FARC and the Colombian government	The agreement is crafted by the FARC and the Colombian government. Wording such as both, we, together, jointly, mutual. Based on Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011	Yes/no
2.Power-Sharing	The existence of (a) Military power-sharing	The least costly power-sharing form. Means the integration of FARC combatants into a new national army. Wording such as military integration, military training of the FARC. Based on DeRouen, Lea and Warrensteen, 2009	Yes/no
	The existence of (b) Territorial power-sharing	More costly power-sharing form. The government can regain control of the region over time not immediately. Based on DeRouen, Lea and Warrensteen, 2009	Yes/no
	The existence of (c) Political power-sharing	The most costly power-sharing form. The ruling power is shared by the FARC and the National government. Wording such as Political integration of the FARC, FARC politically active. Based on DeRouen, Lea and Warrensteen, 2009	Yes/no
3.Third-party renegotiation	The existence of provisions for third party renegotiation during the implementation phase	The Agreement calls for the establishment of provisions for third party renegotiation. Words as renegotiation, revision, international, third-party. Excludes the use of troops. Based on Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011	Yes/no
4.Peacekeeping missions	The existence of a call for the establishment of peacekeeping missions	The Agreement calls for the establishment of Peacekeeping missions that can include all UN missions, unarmed missions and the use of troops. Based on Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011	Yes/no
5.Withdrawal of troops	The existence of a call for the withdrawal of the FARC troops from the regions that they control	The Agreement calls for the withdrawal of the FARC troops from controlled regions. Based on Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011	Yes/no
6.Demilitarised zone (DMZ)	The existence of a call for the establishment of DMZs	The Agreement calls for the establishment of zones where no military activity takes place. Based on Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011	Yes/no
7.Specific	The existence of specific arrangements in the Agreement	The Agreement contains specific arrangements in terms of clauses and in terms of language. The less vague the better. Based on Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011	Yes/no
8.Formal	The existence of a written statement that the FARC accepts the ceasefire and will lay down its arms	The Agreement has a written statement of the formal acceptance of the ceasefire and laying down of arms of the FARC. Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011	Yes/no
9.Political issues	The existence of arrangements that aim to settle the political issues over which the war was fought	The Agreement settles political issues over which the war was fought. Based on Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011	Yes/no
10.Power struggles	The existence of mechanisms that aim at channelling power struggles and normalising the relationship between the FARC and the government	The Agreement channels power struggles between the FARC and the government and aims at establishing mechanisms that normalise their relationship such as working commissions. Excludes dispute commissions. Based on Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011	Yes/no
11.Balanced	The existence of a fairly equal amount and weights of benefits and sacrifices for both the National Government and the FARC	The Agreement has a fair amount of equal benefits and sacrifices for both parties. Not only the amount is looked at but also the weight of each benefit or sacrifice. Based on Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011	Yes/no
12.Third-party guarantee	The existence of third-party guarantors	The agreement contains an explicit or well-understood third-party guarantee of peace. Excludes all UN missions. Based on Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011	Yes/no
13.Dispute resolution	The existence of ongoing dispute resolution commissions	The Agreement calls for ongoing dispute resolution in the form of joint commissions between the parties. Wording such as tripartite, settlement of issues, dispute resolution. Based on Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011	Yes/no

Table 6. Operationalisation of Settlement Environment Category

Settlement Environment			
Country Characteristics			
Variable	Indicator	Explanation	Assessment
14. Higher economic development	The existence of (a) Higher GDP	Higher Economic development after the Agreement was signed. Based on Mason et al., 2011.	Yes/no
	The existence of (b) Higher stock prices	Higher stock prices after the signing of the agreement.	Yes/no
15. Stable more democratic regime	The existence of mechanisms that focusses on (a) no group exclusion.	When there is no one group that is preferred by the state to receive sponsorship or support. When this happens other groups are excluded for benefits. Based on Goodwin, 2001	Yes/no
	The existence of (b) State access for the FARC	The FARC is granted state access and can participate in political debates and given political voice. Based on Goodwin, 2001	Yes/no
	(c) No violent repression	No use of violence to repress the unarmed opposition. Based on Goodwin, 2001	Yes/no
	(d) Insurgents do not hold territory	The FARC have to give previously control territories to their rightful owners. Based on Goodwin, 2001	Yes/no
	(e) Large army size	Army size base on army population ratio and world ranking. Based on Quinn et al. 2007	Yes/no
16. No ethnic Polarisation	The existence of more than two ethnic groups	When there are more than 2 ethnic groups and there are no two groups of similar size. Based on Hoeffler and Collier, 1998	Yes/no
17. No resource curse	The absence of lootable natural resources such as, gems, oil, illicit crops	When there is no illicit activities that are related to the natural resource of the country. Based on Collier and Hoeffler, 2004	Yes/no
Conflict characteristics			
18. Long duration of conflict	A longer duration than the average of 1,665 days (4 years and seven months)	The amount of months that the conflict endured. 'War weariness effect' the longer the civil war has lasted, the more likely it is that peace will prevail. 10% decrease in war recurrence chance for every year. Based on Quinn et al. 2007	Yes/no
19. Low conflict intensity	The conflict has endured less than 2,000 battle related death per year.	The amount of casualties that the conflict produced based on the minimum of 1,000 battle related deaths per year for the conflict to be labelled as a civil war. Based on Hartzell et al. 2001	Yes/no
Agreement implementation outcomes			
20. Few peace spoilers	The absence or a relatively low amount of dissident	The absence of FARC dissidents that are actively trying to sabotage the Agreement using violence	Yes/no
21. High degree of implementation	An implementation rate higher than the average of 54% in the first two years	A high degree of implementation of the Agreements arrangements. Based on Joshi and Quinn, 2015	Yes/no
International involvement			
22. High degree of third-party enforcement	The presence of continuous support from the international community	Actual international financial, technical or procedural support of the peace agreement.	Yes/no

Gathering the data

The following data gathering system was set out to identify the principal sources that provide the most comprehensive picture of the case and helps ensure the repeatability, and through it, raise the reliability of this case study. The only source used to collect data regarding the *settlement arrangements* (agreement design) was the official document of the accord translated in English titled "*The Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace*". However, a broader array of sources were consulted to identify the presence of the *settlement environment* determinants to construct a complete storyline by incorporating various perspectives. The following sources were used for the analysis of the *settlement environment*: official websites of the Colombian government and the FARC, news articles, research articles, evaluation studies, and websites dedicated to the case of the 'Colombian peace accord' such as Colombiapeace.org. Statistics and databases were only consulted if a determinant was not present in the aforementioned sources used for the chronological analysis.

A reasonably neutral source was utilised to provide a comprehensive timeline of the crucial events after the signing of the accord. The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) is a leading research and advocacy organisation advancing social justice and human rights in the Americas and provide reasonably neutral reports regarding the Colombian peace process. The WOLA operates a blog that provides monthly –and sometimes weekly- reports on the Colombian peace process, where some are summaries of the week and others are articles written by noticeable scholars. For these reasons, WOLA's Colombiapace.org served as the main timeline that guided the analysis. Other sources have been analysed and used to triangulate the information and timeline to assure that no crucial facts or events were missed by the WOLA peace blog.

The researcher took the following steps to conduct the analysis. First, the 22 determinants and their conceptual explanations were memorised so that the texts could efficiently and adequately be coded during the open coding phase (Babbie, 2010). Afterwards, all texts sources were read, and notes were kept about which sentences from which specific sources appeared to have a specific determinant. Then, all the sources that alluded to the presence of determinants were recoded, without looking at the first notes to compare notes and check if the same assessment was made regarding that determinant. The ultimate coding was transcribed into an excel sheet (see Appendix 2). The last adjustment to the analysis of the data was made when the data of each chapter or period was put into an overview of all chapters (see Table 9).

4.3.2. Analysing and presenting the data

The analysis and presentation of the data were also divided into the *settlement arrangements* and the *settlement environment*. The assessment of each determinant was based on a five points degree scale. This means that if a determinant was valued as (0), this determinant was **not present**. Consequently, value (1), **insignificant presence**, means that there is a very low amount of data that directly or indirectly alludes to a certain determinant. Value (2), **slight presence**, means that there has been more data that refers to a certain determinant than value (1), but it is not sufficient to state the determinant as present. However, when multiple chapters and both periods were assessed as value (1) or (2) on the same determinant, this might mean that the determinant is present, on the base of accumulation. With enough data assessed with value (3), **intermediate presence**, or value (4), **present**, one could assess the determinant as present in the case. However, value (3) shows that there is less data or less strong data present than when a determinant is assessed with value (4). Therefore, when a

determinants' value is (4) one can state that the determinants are present with more certainty because there was enough strong data.

Which value is given to a determinant was based on whether the data was **sufficiently** present or **strong** enough to assess the determinant as present. For **sufficiency**, some determinants need to be present, with values (2), (3) or (4), in more than three chapters or both periods for it to be present in the case. However, **strong** data means that an assessment of value (3) or (4) in one chapter or one period can be enough for the determinant to be assessed as present in the case (see Table 7).

Table 7. Assessment of Each Determinant

Settlement Arrangements		Settlement Environment	
Agreement design		Country characteristics	
1. Crafted by the parties	Strong	14. Higher Economic development	Strong
2. Power-sharing mechanisms	Sufficient	15. More Democratic stable type of regime	Strong
3. Third-party renegotiation in implementation phase	Sufficient	16. No ethnic polarisation	Strong
		17. No resource curse	Strong
4. Peacekeeping missions	Strong	Conflict characteristics	
5. Withdrawal of troops	Strong	18. Long duration of conflict	Strong
6. Establishment of DMZs	Strong	19. Low conflict intensity	Strong
7. Specific	Sufficient	Agreement implementation outcomes	
8. Formal	Strong	20. Few peace spoilers	Sufficient
9. Settle the political issues	Sufficient	21. High degree of implementation	Sufficient
10. Channel the power struggle	Sufficient	International involvement	
11. Balanced	Sufficient	22. High degree of third-party enforcement	Sufficient
12. Explicit third-party guarantee	Strong		
13. Dispute resolution in commissions	Strong		

Once the data was gathered, the findings were analysed, and a system of presentation was constructed that avoided redundancy, fitted within the limited space available for this research and that ensured a clear presentation. For instance, the analysis of Final Agreement can also include determinants from *settlement arrangements*, but the sources used for analysing the two periods cannot be used to assess *the settlement arrangements*.

Second, not all determinants were discussed in each chapter. The determinants that were discussed was based on whether it was noteworthy to the understanding of the case. This means that the determinants were not exclusively present in the chapter or period in which they are mentioned but might have been present in other chapters or periods as well. Therefore, to provide the most

comprehensive picture of which determinants were present in each chapter and period, the assessment was visualised (see figure 4- 13 and 17). Also to raise the transparency of this research, the complete first 10% of the data gathered is shown in Appendix 3 to provide enough insights into the argumentation process behind the analysis of the data.

4.3.3. Inductive approach

It is important to emphasise that the aim of the inductive part of this research is not to form a new theory but is rather to unravel the case-specific determinants that might have a negative effect on sustaining the peace agreement and to shed some light on what determinants could be researched further. In other words, any conclusions that are drawn from the inductive part of the research cannot be seen as a new theory.

The inductive part of this research was used simultaneously with the deductive part of this research. The inductive approach was deployed when reading the sources used for the analysing the *settlement environment*. First, each source was sought for data that seemed to have a negative tone regarding the peace agreement, but that did not relate to any of the determinants in the *Model for Sustaining the Peace*. After each data collection session, the 'results' were recorded using coding and memoing and were constantly compared to other surfacing data (Matthews and Ross, 2010). When a general pattern could be recognised, data from different sources were compared in order to triangulate the emerging patterns. The researcher also sought for negative cases, and if these were found, the possible case-specific determinant was researched further until data saturation had been achieved (Matthews and Ross, 2010).

4.4. Reliability & validity

The reliability of this research was guaranteed by applying the following research techniques. First, the theoretical concepts have been clearly defined and operationalised. These definitions are unambiguous, concrete and theoretically embedded, which increases consistency of the research process (Neumann, 2014). Furthermore, some variables have been tested using multiple indicators which allows for a more reliable measurement of the conditions (Neumann, 2014).

On top of this, the intra-coder reliability of this research was measured for both the deductive and the inductive approach. The researcher analysed the same sources multiple times and organised the information in various ways to make sure that the data mostly led to the same conclusions, which provides consistency to this research (Stemler, 2001). The guidelines used for the analysis were first

tested as a pilot so that the researcher could critically reflect on the assessment of the data and whether the scale values properly match the data, which also raises the consistency of the research (Stemler, 2001). Hence, the fact that content analysis data can be coded and recoded multiple times strengthens the reliability (Babbie, 2010). Moreover, the level of replicability of this research was raised by using WOLA, a reasonably neutral source, as the main timeline of the analysis.

By relying on a single-case analysis, this case study exchanges the external validity for the internal validity because of the inability to generalise the findings to a population of similar cases (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). The Internal validity is higher because all conditions and definitions have been made unambiguous in the operationalisation model, which makes it unlikely that one would measure the wrong conditions (Neumann, 2014). The triangulation of sources also adds to the internal validity of this research (Neumann, 2014).

4.5. Bias control

Since the researcher is Colombian and thus has a strong personal connection with this case, it is crucial to address the possibility of bias and thereby strengthen the credibility of the findings. First, the triangulation of sources and information makes it difficult for the researcher to ignore other opposing perspectives (Thomas, 2010). Second, given that the data that is collected through content analysis is not random and is theoretically embedded, it is difficult for the researcher to favour one data over the other. Third, the researcher shows the complete analysis of the first 10% of the document to reveal her train of thought to the reader (see Appendix 3). Fourth, determinants such as GDP and army size are based on facts which cannot be distorted. Fifth, the researcher adopted a self-critical stance for both the deductive and the inductive approaches of the analysis, assessments, assumptions, and conclusions to raise the credibility of this thesis. Lastly, the researcher also used bracketing for both approaches to improve the rigour because the researcher consciously and continuously laid aside any preconceived ideas or previous knowledge about the case (Burns and Grove, 2003).

The bias control of the inductive part was mainly done by employing triangulation of sources and data saturation (Matthews and Ross, 2010). It was also a condition that the possible determinant fits with the phenomenon under examination, that it could provide more understanding and that it has the potential to fit in a wide variety of contexts (Matthews and Ross, 2010; Strauss and Corbin, 1990 as cited in Matthews and Ross, 2010).

5. The case analysis

This chapter aims to answer the second, third and fourth sub-question. The first part provides a summary of *The Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace* that was signed on the 24th of November, 2016, by Juan Manuel Santos, President of the Republic of Colombia, and Timoleón Jiménez, Commander-in-Chief of the FARC-EP (The final agreement, 2016), which answers the second sub-question. Afterwards, the in-depth analysis of the Final Agreement and the first 18 months will be presented to answer the third and the fourth sub-question of this thesis.

5.1. The Final Agreement

5.1.1. Summary of the Final Agreement

As it was mentioned in the case description, the Final Agreement is a composition of six individually discussed accords that concentrate on specific issues. The first chapter focuses on the *Comprehensive Rural Reform* (CRR) of the countryside that aims to close up the differences that exist between urban and rural areas of Colombia and on creating better conditions of quality of life and well-being of the rural population. Chapter two, *Political Participation: A democratic opportunity to build peace*, aims at extending democracy in Colombia by incorporating new forces on the political scene, thereby enriching debate, deliberation, and political inclusion and participation.

Chapter three regards the three accords; (1) *Agreement on the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities and Laying down of Arms*, (2) *Reincorporation of the FARC into civilian life* and (3) *Security guarantees and the fight against criminal organisations including FARC dissents and for the prosecution of criminal conduct* that threatens the implementation of the Agreement. The first accord concerns the definitive end of the hostilities between the parties. The second accord seeks effective reincorporation of the FARC into the social, political and economic life of Colombia. The third accord includes measures, among others, such as *the National Commission on Security Guarantees; the Special Investigation Unit; the Elite Corps of the National Police and Measures for the Prevention and Fight against Corruption*.

Chapter four, *Solution to the Illicit Drugs Problem*, includes new approaches to address the problem of the use of drugs, crops made for illicit use and organised crime associated with drug trafficking. These new approaches are equity-based and gender-based and ensure public health and general human rights.

The *Victims* agreement, chapter five, creates the *Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparations and Non-Recurrence* which contributes to the fight against impunity and puts in place Judicial mechanisms that allow the investigation and sanctioning of severe violations of human rights and infringements of the international humanitarian law.

Chapter six regards the agreement on Implementation and verification mechanisms, which creates a *Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement*, composed of representatives from the national government and the FARC. The aim of this commission is, among other things, to monitor components of the Agreement, verify its compliance, serve as a forum for dispute resolution and the promotion, and monitoring, of the implementation of laws. Furthermore, the international community is also involved through, among others, the guarantors Cuba and Norway, the observers Chili and Venezuela and two international spokespersons.

5.1.2. Analysis of the Final Agreement

This section presents the determinants that are essential in each chapter. The Last sub-paragraph emphasises the determinants that were present over the whole scope of the document and are referred to as ‘overarching determinants’.

Preamble and introduction




Figure 3. Visualisation Preamble and Introduction

The statement “*We, the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People’s Army, have agreed as follows*”, affirms that the parties jointly (1) *crafted* the Final Agreement. Consequently, manifest coding revealed that this sentence was repeated 135 times in the rest of the document. This determinant is, therefore, assessed as (4) present because this data is already sufficient for confirming the presence of this determinant in the agreement design.

Another determinant that seems present in the preamble is the (12) *explicit or well understood third-party guarantee of peace* because the second paragraph shows that Cuba and Norway are not only the guarantors but they also actively participated in the negotiation process. Also, Chili and Venezuela are stated as observers. This determinant is assessed with value (4) for this chapter because this is a strong statement that supports the presence of this determinant. However, this analysis will still seek to find more data for instance about the specifics regarding the role of Cuba and Norway as *third-party guarantors* and of Chili and Venezuela as observers for it to be assessed as (4) present in the case.

The preamble also revealed the presence of determinant (8) *a formal acceptance of cease-fire proposal or agreement* with the statement “*to sign this Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace*”(p. 5). The presence of this determinant, value (4), was given because it gives away that signing the Agreement will result at the end of the armed conflict by laying down their arms.

One could argue that this quote also covers the determinant that (10) *channels the power struggles* between adversaries in a nonviolent way. It is important to mention that the key difference between determinant (8) and (10) is that, while for the first determinant a mere statement is sufficient, the latter requires the actual instalment of a mechanism for normalising the relationship between the FARC and the Colombian government. Therefore, determinant (10) is assessed as (1) slightly present because it affirms the will that these former adversaries have to end the violence and normalise their relationship after civil war but is not sufficient to confirm it. More information regarding the components of the mechanisms used to *channel the power struggles* is needed to assess this determinant as present.

Chapter 1 Towards a New Colombian Countryside: Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR)




Figure 4. Visualisation of Chapter 1

The central goal of the CRR is to overcome inequality and poverty by closing the gap between the rural and urban areas of Colombia and is believed to be the primary (9) *political issue* of the FARC. At the beginning of this chapter, the opinion of the FARC further specified that the CRR measures should address “*the historical causes of the conflict*”. This confession regards the perspective of the FARC’s principal issues and gives the analytical reasoning needed to connect the (9) *political issues* that the FARC wants to be resolved and the proposed solution that comes from the Agreement. This determinant is, therefore, assessed as (4) present in this chapter as it reveals a sufficient connection between the issues that need to be resolved and how these issues will be addressed.

“*The establishment of departmental and municipal food and nutrition councils, with representatives from the government and broad representation of society and communities*” (The Final Agreement, p.33). This quote accurately depicts the presence of determinant (10) that *channels the power struggle between former adversaries* (10) by instilling institutions that normalise the relationship between former adversaries. This determinant is, therefore, assessed as (4) present. However, this data is not sufficient to assess this determinant as present in the case because it should be present in at least three out of the six agreements.

Furthermore, the quote “the National government and the FARC-EP both wish to reverse the effects of the conflict, to achieve restitution for the victims of dispossession and forced displacement and the restoration of land rights to communities, and will promote the voluntary return of displaced men and women” (The Final Agreement, 2016 p.18), affirms the presence of determinant (9) *political issues*. Also, this quote suggests the presence of a stable political regime regarding the indicators (15d) where *belligerents do not hold territory* because the belligerents cannot keep their previously controlled territories. However, the determinant (15) *stable and more democratic type of regime* is assessed as (2) slightly present because there is not enough data regarding the other four indicators of this determinant in this chapter.

Chapter 2. Political participation




Figure 5. Visualisation of Chapter 2

This chapter focused its energy on “*political participation*” through the expansion of democracy by allowing new forces to participate in debate and deliberation, and therefore achieving a political plurality. After a comprehensive analysis, one can state that there are some determinants present in this chapter. The first determinant that is assessed as (4) present is (2c) *political power-sharing mechanisms*. This chapter of the Agreement presents the reasons why this type of *power-sharing mechanisms* are necessary and also how they will be provided. For instance, after the FARC lay down their arms, they will be assigned a sum equivalent to 7% of the annual budget allocation for the operation of political movements and parties. Also, the FARC will be guaranteed a minimum of five

seats in both the Senate and in the House of Representatives for the following two elections. These assigned seats will include those obtained by the ordinary voting rules.

The Agreement also states that the national government will implement "safeguards for the organisations that rose up in arms to transform into a political party, play an active part in shaping and control of political power". This concerns the equal distribution between political parties and the promotion of respect for the opposition. In order to facilitate the transition of the FARC into a legal, political party, the Agreement put in place special rules. These rules are, among others, that the eligible candidates have to have lived in the region, that 60 members of the FARC will form the liaison with the national government, and that ten members of the FARC will form the liaison at municipal and departmental level. Herewith, indicator (15b) *state access* is present in this chapter. This chapter also shows the presence of the indicators (15a) *no group exclusion* by emphasising the inclusion of, among others, ethnic minorities, rural population and the LGBTI population. However, this chapter does not provide data regarding the other three indicators of determinant (15). This determinant is, therefore, assessed as (2) slightly present.

Chapter 3. Ceasefire, Reincorporation and Security




Figure 6. Visualisation of Chapter 3

At first sight, one would be inclined to foresee the presence of (2a) *military power-sharing mechanisms* in this chapter. However, the only data regarding this determinant found in this chapter was that the National Government of Colombia will create a sub-directorate within *the National Protection Unit*

(NPU), which specialises in security and protection of the members of the new political movement or party that emerges from the transition of the FARC to legal activity. Here *the Security and Protection Corps* will consist of trusted personnel from the former FARC, which will coordinate and have direct contact with the Colombia National Police. This chapter reveals that there is a role for former FARC combatants in the national security programmes. However, it only regards the security and protection of the emerging FARC political movement or party and not the integration of the former FARC combatants into the National army. It is, therefore, evident that there are no significant *military power-sharing* mechanisms. For this reason, this determinant (2a) is assessed as (0) not present.

However, the determinant which (5) *calls for the unilateral withdrawal of the troops* from territory captured during the war seems to be (4) present. This determinant, in this case, goes hand-in-hand with the determinant which (6) *calls for the establishment of a demilitarised zone (DMZ)*. All FARC combatants are to move into 20 demobilising camps that have been set up in different regions of Colombia. The Agreement only mentions that each camp will have a security zone of between 500 metres to 1 km, a reception area and a local *Monitoring and Verification Mechanism* base outside the security zone. Besides the DMZs (in the Agreement called *Transitional Local Zones for Normalisation [TLZNs]*), there will be seven *Transitional Local Points for Normalisation (TLPNs)*. Despite that there is no exact number regarding the size of the camps because it is dependent on the number of FARC members that each camp will host, these determinants are assessed as (4) present. The data presented in this chapter is strong enough to support this claim.

Although chapter 6 of the Agreement is entirely dedicated to the monitoring and verification missions, this chapter also alludes to the presence of the determinant which (4) *calls for the establishment peacekeeping missions*. In this chapter, the United Nations (UN) serves a prominent role in the disarmament process. This is made clear by the following statement “*the United Nations (UN) receives all FARC-EP weaponry*”(p.58) and by the other disarmament role that the UN plays, such as the guarding and controlling of the container in which FARC will deposit their weapons before leaving the TLPNs. This data is strong enough to assess this determinant as (4) present in this chapter.

It is noteworthy that this the only chapter that alludes to the presence of determinant (11) *balance*. Here, the perceived *balance* is assessed as (2) slightly present because this chapter has the specifications of the demobilisation of the FARC as an illegal armed group. The fact that they have to lay down their arms, move into reintegration camps and are not allowed to show outside of the transitional zones in their combatant's clothing, displays the efforts that have to be made by the FARC in return for the rest of the arrangements of the agreement.

Chapter 4. Solution to the Illicit Drugs Problem




Figure 7. Visualisation of Chapter 4

This chapter reveals that Colombia does indeed suffer from a high presence of *the resource curse*. Therefore, determinant (17) *no resource curse* is assessed as (0) not present. This assessment is based on the fact that this whole chapter is devoted towards finding solutions to this drug problem. This chapter puts in place mechanisms that are interlinked with all other chapters, such as rural reform from the first chapter, to counter drug trafficking.

Moreover, the Agreement states that the war has many other reasons but that the availability of these illicit crops fuelled and financed the conflict. Therefore, determinant (9) is also assessed as (4) present because this chapter provides information into how the parties will settle *the political issues*. In this case, it is safe to assert that one of the issues over which the war was fought was that the FARC was producing illicit crops.

Determinant (3) *third-party negotiation in the implementation phase* seems to be present because the Agreement calls for a “*Participatory review and adjustment of the public policy to combat illicit drug use*” (p.125). This programme will use the international and national recommendations to review the tactics to combat the production of illicit crops. However, this determinant is assessed as (3) intermediate presence because the use of the words “participatory” and “recommendations” may suggest that the national government still has the final say but that third-parties do play an active role.

It notable that this determinant also only seems resnet in this chapter but it is not sufficient to state this determinant as present in the case.

Chapter 5. Agreement regarding the Victims of the Conflict




Figure 8. Visualisation of Chapter 5

This chapter highly contributes to the existence of the determinants that (9) *settles political issues* and (10) *channels powers struggles*. This chapter has created many institutions and mechanism to address the rights of the victims of the conflict, normalise the relationship between the affected individuals and settle political issues. For instance, the *Truth, Coexistence and Non-Recurrence Commission* has been put in place to uncover and learn the truth about what happened during the conflict. These two determinants are, therefore, assessed as (4) present.

This chapter also states that “*the international mechanism supporting the Tribunal for Peace in verifying compliance with the sanctions*”(p.177) is to be fulfilled by the UN once their role in the demobilisation of the FARC has been concluded. Based on this quote determinant (4) *peacekeeping missions* is also assessed as (4) present.

Chapter 6. Implementation, verification and public endorsement




Figure 9. Visualisation of Chapter 6

It is important to mention that this chapter concerns the implementation of all the prior agreements and, therefore has a relatively high presence on most of the arrangements. This is because there is a constant reference to the five previous arrangements. The analysis of this chapter alludes to the presence of all three determinants that concern third-party renegotiations, mediation and peacekeeping. Before starting the analysis, it is essential to mention the discrepancies between the determinants (3) *provisions for third-party renegotiation mechanisms* during the implementation phase, determinant (4) that *calls for the establishment of peacekeeping missions* and (12) that *calls for an explicit or well-understood third-party guarantee of peace*. The discrepancies are that determinant (3) excludes the use of troops, determinant (4) includes UN monitoring, armed and unarmed missions (includes the use of troops) and determinant (12) excludes all UN missions.

In this chapter, determinant (3) has shown the weakest data because, when using manifest coding, the text showed signs of its presence by words such as “reviews”, “suggestions” and “adjustments” together with some international accompaniment mechanisms. However, there was not an explicit or implicit statement that third-parties would be allowed to negotiate any changes in this chapter. Therefore, determinant (3) is assessed as (0) not present.

Determinant (4) *peacekeeping missions*, is most remarkable in this chapter because of its focus on the verification and the implementation. Many countries and organisations have expressed their support

towards assuring the success of the Agreement. This chapter makes clear how the government want the support of third parties (see Table 8) and is, therefore, assessed as (4) present. This table also affirms the presence of determinant (12) *third-party enforcement* because it provides sufficient information regarding non-UN third-party enforcement.

Table 8. *International accompaniment to the Implementation*

Agreement	Agency providing International accompaniment
1.Towards a New Colombian Countryside: Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR)	-European Union
	-Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
	-International Peasant Movement
	-United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
2.Political Participation: a democratic opportunity to build peace	-The Union of South American Nations (USAN)
	-Switzerland
	-Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD)
	-Carter Centre
3.2. Reincorporation	-European Union
	-UNESCO
	-UNDP
	Latin American and Caribbean Continental Organisation of Students (OCLAE)
The National government shall review the situation of persons deprived of their liberty, held for trial or sentenced because of membership of or collaboration with the FARC	-Office of the High Commissioner of the United Nations for Human Rights (OHCHR)
3.4.Combating and dismantling criminal organisations	-United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
	-United States of America
3.4. Special Investigation Unit	-United States of America
	-European Union
3.2 Security Guarantees	-United States of America
	- Office of the High Commissioner of the United Nations for Human Rights (OHCHR)
4.Solution to the illicit drug problem	-UNODC
	-Global Commission on Drug Policy
5.Victims; Human rights of the victims	- Office of the High Commissioner of the United Nations for Human Rights (OHCHR)
	-International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
	-International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
	-United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
	-Sweden
Unit for the Search for the Persons deemed Missing	-Sweden
	-ICRC
	-International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP)
Gender-based Approach	-UN Women
	United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict
	-Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF)
	-Sweden

Note: Reprinted from *The Final Agreement, 2016*

Determinant (13) regards the *call for continuing dispute resolution* in the form of joint commissions between the parties. Although it is present in various forms throughout the various dispute solving commissions in the Agreement, this determinant is most prominent in this chapter. “*Verification: shall be rigorous in the determination of the status of the implementation and points of discussion and dispute*” (p.222). This quote reveals that this chapter is mainly dedicated to providing various mechanisms to solve disputes peacefully. Determinant (13) is, therefore, assessed as (4) present.

Annexes, protocols and appendix




Figure 10. Visualisation annexes and protocols

Figure 10 shows that the last section of the Agreement also has a high degree of presence on most of the agreement design determinants because it concerns the various protocols of the previous agreements. The Final Agreement document has 20 protocols and one appendix. These documents are relevant as they greatly support the argument that this peace agreement is (7) *specific* because these protocols regard some of the guidelines of the implementation of the Agreement. The information written in this part of the Agreement provides enough data to state that this determinant is (4) present.

Overarching determinants

There were some determinants that were present in all chapters. These determinants are: (1) *crafted by both parties*, (8) *formal*, (9) *settling of political issues*, and (10) *channelling power struggles* through institutions. For instance, manifest coding revealed the presence of determinant (1) because the

document had been signed both by the President of Colombia and the FARC leader, which assures that *both parties crafted the Agreement*. Also, the whole agreement is based on the clause that nothing will be further implemented until the disarmament of the FARC takes place. On top of that, this document is drafted to end the 52-year conflict between the National Government of Colombia and the FARC. Therefore, one can argue that the primary purpose of this document is to (9) *settle the political issues* and (10) *channel the power struggles* between the parties. See Table for an overview of all determinants and all chapters.

Table 9. Overview of the assessment of the Final Agreement

Determinant	Preamble and Introduction	CH1 Rural Reform	CH2 Political Participation	CH3 Ceasefire and Reincorporation	CH4 Drugproblem	CH5 Victims	CH6 Implementation and Verification	Annexes and Protocols
1. Crafted by the parties	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
2. Power-sharing mechanisms	3	0	4	0	0	1	4	0
3. Third-party renegotiation in implementation	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
4. Peacekeeping missions	0	0	0	4	0	4	4	4
5. Withdrawal of troops	1	0	3	4	1	0	0	4
6. DMZs	0	0	0	4	0	0	4	4
7. Specific	2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
8. Formal	4	0	4	4	4	4	4	4
9. Political issues	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
10. Channels power struggle	1	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
11. Balanced	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
12. Explicit third-party enforcement	4	0	2	4	1	1	4	4
13. Dispute commissions	0	4	2	2	0	4	4	4
14. Higher economic development	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15. Stable more democratic regime	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	0
16. No ethnic polarisation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17. No resource curse	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18. Long duration of conflict	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19. Low Conflict intensity	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20. Few peace spoilers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21. Low implementation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22. High third-party enforcement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Note: 0= Not present 1= Insignificant presence 2=Slight presence 3=Intermediate presence 4= Present

Source: The analysis of the Final Agreement, 2016

5.2. The months after Bogotá

This paragraph presents the analysis of 18 months after the Final Agreement was signed. The aim here was to construct a complete storyline that helps reveal which determinant from the *settlement environment* are present and which case-specific determinants surface in the case. This part of the analysis only regard the *settlement environment* determinants (14) through (22) because (1) through (13) were dedicated to the design of the Agreement.

5.2.1. Analysis of Period 1




Figure 11. Visualisation Period 1

First, it is important to mention that the first six months were crucial because many of the arrangements of the Agreement are based upon the fulfilment of the disarmament of the FARC. The disarmament was to be completed in 180 days (D+180). The D day (the first day of the countdown to complete disarmament) is the day that the Congress officially ratified the agreement, December 1, 2016, and not the day it was signed, November 24, 2016 (Presidencia de la Republica, 2016). The FARC disarmed on August 15, 2017 (the Observatory for the Follow-up of the Agreement's Implementation [OIAP], 2018).

Second, the analysis of this period made clear that Colombia does indeed suffer from the *resource curse*. A combination of its fertile ground, difficult to reach rural areas, and the state's incapacity to secure these regions makes Colombia vulnerable to the cultivation of illicit crops. The sizes of the illicit cultivations have widely been estimated differently. For instance, the UN estimated 159,000 hectares while and the Government of the United States of America (The U.S.) estimated 180,000 hectares of coca planted in Colombia in 2015. Despite the discrepancy in these estimates, there is a growing trend

of illicit crop cultivation (Isacson, 2017). Therefore, determinant (17) *no resource curse* is assessed as (0) not present in the case because this data provides hard numbers regarding the size of the Colombian illicit crop cultivations. This might have an adverse effect on the sustainment of peace.

This period also revealed the commitment of the international community to actively support the peace agreement which sheds the first insight into the presence of the determinant (22) *high third-party enforcement*. For instance, two former presidents, José Mujica of Uruguay and Felipe González of Spain were named as international representatives to *the Committee of Oversight, Stimulus, and Verification of Implementation (CSIVI)* of the peace agreement. This body was created to evaluate both sides' compliance with the agreement on a regular basis. Mujica and González arrived in Bogotá on March 29, 2017, to take on their duties in the CSIVI (Molano Jimena, 2017).

Furthermore, the U.S. stated that they would provide \$450 million to the post-conflict aid package which also enforced the implementation of the Agreement in this first period and an additional \$78.8 million military and police aid through the Department of Defence's counter-drug budget (WOLA, Colombia Peace, 2017). The European Union (EU), another key actor, established *the Trust Fund for Colombia*, in December 2016, of €95 million from the EU budget and from 19 Member States, to support the implementation of the peace agreement. An extra €40 million will be provided for critical elements of the peace process from the Trust Fund. This Trust Fund is referred to by the EU as *the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)*. This evidence is sufficient to state that this determinant is (4) present in this period. However, in order to state that determinant (22) *high third-party enforcement* is present in the case it this determinant should be present in both periods of time.

Peace spoilers also seem to be present during the first six months. FARC dissidents have formed small organisations that aim to claim control over specific regions that are mainly related to the illicit crop cultivation or other vulnerable regions (Monsalve Gaviria, 2018). The national government estimated a 5% to 6% of dissent, because they refused to demobilise, and another 2% deserted the process (Monsalve Gaviria, 2017). In 2017 the dissident group "1st Front" in Guaviare counts roughly 110 members (Rendón Marulanda, 2017). Therefore, the determinant (20) *few peace spoilers* is assessed as present in this period because this data indicates that few dissent groups are forming.

According to the WOLA, the cause of the desertion of former FARC combatants could be ascribed to the miserable conditions of the transitional zones (TLNZs). By March 2017, no zone had reached 90% completion; many do not have adequate potable water, cafeterias, bathrooms, recreational facilities and other amenities (Portal and Wyss, 2017; WOLA, Colombia Peace, 2017).

5.2.2. Analysis of Period 2




Figure 12. Visualisation Period 2

El Espectador reported on January 12, 2018, that Colombia’s Defence Ministry had deployed the joint task force, “Hercules,” with about 9,800 soldiers, marines, airmen, sailors, and police stationed in Nariño. This joint task force is part of the Exodus 2018 operation whose aim is to coordinate efforts to bring to justice members of illegal armed groups, increase state presence by taking control of the region, protect the citizens and maintain the state sovereignty. The deployment of the “Hercules” task force depicts a strong effort by the national government to increase the presence of the determinant (15d) in which *belligerents do not hold territory* and is, therefore, assessed as (2) slightly present.

There was also data that supports the presence of determinant (15b) *state access* because the FARC officially became a political party on August 31st, 2017. The FARC leader Timoleón tweeted that the decision to keep the same FARC acronym for their political party was a majority vote within the FARC’s congress. The former guerrilla group is referred to as *La Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común* (FARC) - in English the *Common Alternative Revolutionary Force* (CARF)- (Jiménez, 2017). The FARC political party was planning on running with 51 candidates for the 172 seat House of Representatives and with 23 candidates for the 107 seat Senate. However, determinant (15) *more stable and democratic regime* is assessed as (2) slightly present because more information regarding the other four subcomponents is still needed to provide a higher assessment.

The most notable determinant in this period is the one that regards *peace spoilers* because of the increase in numbers of dissidents and violent attacks from these former FARC members. For instance, there were attacks to the police in two different parts of the Meta department, in the south-central Colombia, where six members of the police were injured by explosives that were detonated by the

dissident group 'the 3rd front' (El Tiempo, 2018). The most violently active dissident group is believed to be the one led by former FARC member of 'the 29th front' Walter Patricio Arízala Vernaza alias 'El Guacho' called *the Oliver Sinisterra* group. This dissident group is estimated to be 450-500 man strong and mainly operates in the coca-growing countryside of Tumaco near the border with Ecuador (Monsalve Gaviria, 2018). The car bomb that *the Oliver Sinisterra* group set off in January in Esmeraldas, Ecuador, wounded 28 people. *The Oliver Sinisterra* dissident group managed to kill three and wound eleven Ecuadorian soldiers by setting off a roadside bomb across the border in Ecuador on March 20 (El Universo, 2018). In the same month, they also kidnapped, and later killed, three Ecuadorian reporters (Daniels, 2018). The national estimate in February was 300 dissidents, and one month later, in March, this estimate grew up to 1.200 (U. S. News, 2018).

Another catalyst of dissent was the case of the FARC leader, Jesús Santrich, was arrested on April 9 for drug trafficking. Santrich played an essential role during the negotiations in Havana but faces the possibility of extradition to the United States. Because of his arrest Iván Márquez, Santrich's closest ally in the FARC leadership, claimed that he would not take one of the five assured seats in Colombia's Senate until Santrich was released from jail (El Especador, 2018). Also, Hernán Darío Velásquez, another key FARC leader, abandoned the transitioning zone site in Caquetá and stated that he would not return until Santrich was free (Dest, 2018). Therefore, this is strong enough to assess determinant (20) *few peace spoilers* as (0) not present because this data does not only confirm the existence of such dissent but also proves that the presence of *peace spoilers* has grown and that it can indeed hinder the sustainment of peace.

The presence of a (22) *high international enforcement* has also been reinforced in different forms in this period. The U.S. remains the principal international actor in Colombia (Gómez Ramírez, 2018). For instance, despite the proposed cuts by the Trump administration, the Republican-majority U.S. Congress extended their support into 2018. The U.S. ensured \$391 million towards *the Colombia Peace Aid Package* with the conditionality that Colombia reduces "overall illicit drug cultivation, production, and trafficking" (Isacson and Pachico, 2018). The amount provided for military and police aid is still to be decided but is already locked-in for 2018 (WOLA, Colombia Peace, 2017). Similarly, on 6 December 2017, the EU signed four gender and human rights projects for over €1.7 million. The EU focuses its aid on issues, among others, such as the reintegration of ex-FARC guerrillas into civilian life, victims' rights, land restitution, environment, conflict resolution and rural development (Gómez Ramírez, 2018).

Other forms of *international enforcement* were seen when the ambassadors of Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland sent a letter to the vice-minister of the Treasury Ministry voicing their concern regarding

the slowness and lack of transparency of contracting for projects funded by these three governments. This funding is of US\$200 million and was distributed through *the Sustainable Colombia Fund (FCS)* (El Tiempo, 2018b). This letter was the result of the alleged corruption and contract-favours within government agencies that administer the finances of the projects (WOLA, Colombia Peace, 2018).

The Ambassador Nikki Haley of the Permanent Mission to the United Nations expressed the explicit support of the U.S. to the Agreement calling its ratification a “historic achievement” and reassured that “*The United States is fully committed to supporting Colombia and the implementation of the peace accord*” (Haley, 2018). She not only reassured the support of the U.S. but also requested the international community to support the implementation of the Agreement by statements such as “*all of us have a role in ensuring that it succeeds*” and “*the success of the peace agreement is inseparable from our shared efforts against drug trafficking*” (Haley, 2018). These quotes and the data regarding the many funds that the international community has provided Colombia, make that determinant (22) *international enforcement* is assessed as (4) present in this period and is, herewith, also assessed as (4) present in the case.

5.2.3. Underexposed determinants

This section presents the analysis of the determinants that were not –or insufficiently- mentioned in the sources that were used to analyse the two periods. This part of the analysis was conducted by researching the presence of each underexposed determinant individually. Figure 13 includes the visualisation of the previously assessed determinants.




Figure 13. Visualisation of the Underexposed Determinants

(14) Economic development

According to the literature (see section 2.2.1.) economic development as a determinant of sustaining the peace is measured by the growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or by the infant mortality rate. However, the fact that this analysis was conducted over a timeframe of 18 months makes it too short to make reliable statements regarding actual economic development. Therefore, as predictors of economic development, the two indicators GDP and stock exchange prices have been chosen to analyse this determinant.

The indicator GDP was chosen because other scholars also utilised GDP as a predictor of economic development. However, in order to provide sufficient data, stock exchange prices were also analysed. The indicator stock exchange was chosen because economic theory suggests that stock price development is an indicator of economic growth (Harvey, 1989). Stock prices reflect the value of expected cash flows from economic activity. An increase in stock prices, therefore, serve as an indicator of an increase in expected economic growth (Harvey, 1989).

Table 5 shows the total GDP of Colombia from 2012 to 2018 (Banco de la República, n.d.) and the forecast of the total GDP until 2022 (Statista, n.d.). Since the Banco de la República and Statista provide data on total GDP in current US dollars, a statistical alteration was made to convert current US dollars to constant US dollars (2015 = 100). The data in current US dollars was adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Colombia (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2018). The output of the analysis can be seen in the figures below.

It is important to mention that this part of the analysis does not aim to provide proof that the economic development, growth in GDP or higher stock prices are caused by the signing of the agreement but this data is only utilised to assess whether there has been a higher economic development since the signing of the Agreement.

Table 10. Colombian constant GDP in Billion U.S. Dollar (2015 = 100)

Year	Value
2012	\$ 336
2013	\$ 353
2014	\$ 363
2015	\$ 293
2016	\$ 263
2017	\$ 280
2018*	\$ 283
2019*	\$ 289
2020*	\$ 297
2021*	\$ 305
2022*	\$ 314




Figure 14. Colombian total yearly GDP in Billion constant U.S. Dollars (2015=100)

Note: Sources of Table 10 and Figure 14: The GDP of 2012- 2017 is a statistical adaptation of the data from Banco de la Republica, n.d. The forecasts of 2018-2022 are adapted from Statista, 2018. All data was edited using CPI data from the IMF, 2018.

Table 10 and Figure 14 show that since the signing of the Agreement on November 24, 2016, the total GDP growth of Colombia was positive. According to Statista’s forecast, this trend continues further into the future. These statistics provided the data needed to infer that there is a possibility that economic growth will add to the sustainment of the Agreement.

Table 11. Colombian Quarterly Stock Exchange Prices in U.S. Dollars

Quarter	Value
2015 Q1	\$ 1,394
2015 Q2	\$ 1,331
2015 Q3	\$ 1,266
2015 Q4	\$ 1,182
2016 Q1	\$ 1,233
2016 Q2	\$ 1,323
2016 Q3	\$ 1,326
2016 Q4	\$ 1,341
2017 Q1	\$ 1,356
2017 Q2	\$ 1,416
2017 Q3	\$ 1,481
2017 Q4	\$ 1,501
2018 Q1	\$ 1,486




Figure 15. Colombian Stock Exchange 2016 Q2 -2017 Q4

Note: sources of Table 11 and Figure 15: adapted from Banco de la República Colombia., n.d.-a

Table 11 shows stock prices for the Colombian stock exchange, based on the COLCAP index. This index encompasses the 25 most liquid stocks traded on the BVA (Bolsa de Valores de Colombia) (Bloomberg, n.d.). The data in table 11 shows the value of the COLCAP index based on quarterly data. The quarterly data was calculated as the average of the first and the last trading day index value in a given quarter. As stock prices act as an indicator of future cash flows, this part of the analysis centred around the stock values observed around the signing of the Agreement because the returns on cash flows in future years are expected to be discounted in the observed stock value.

Figure 15 shows that after the signing of the Agreement, the rate at which stock prices increase accelerates. This serves as an indicator that after the signing of the Agreement, the expectations of the returns on future cash flows from economic activities in Colombia also increase. Data from the stock market thus shows an increase in expected economic activity, which supports the earlier data regarding GDP growth. Based on the data gathered above, determinant (14) *high economic development* is assessed as (4) because Colombia has recently seen a higher *economic development* which can have a positive effect on the sustainment of peace.

(15e) Large army size (type of regime)

This determinant, (15e) *large army size*, serves as a sub-indicator for the country characteristic related determinant (15) *stable democratic regime*. This determinant aims to evaluate the strength of the state and the type of regime. The Colombian military is divided into three parts: the Colombian Navy, the Colombian Air Force and the National Army of Colombia. The total population of Colombia is 46,736,728, of which 445,000 are active military members, and 62,000 are in the reserves (Star, 2017). When analysing Colombia's army size as 'population to military ratio,' they are ranked in the top 25% with a rank of 41 out of 136 (Global Fire Power, n.d.). When ranking Colombia's total active ready-to-fight army capacity, Colombia comes out in at number 15 and is the highest ranking Latin American country –with Brazil following at number 17- (Global Fire Power, n.d.-a). This data shows that Colombia has a (15e) *considerably large army*. This can have a positive influence on the sustainment of peace because the state can enforce its presence.

This indicator was the last to be assessed in order to have sufficient data regarding determinant (15) *stable and more democratic type of regime*. The presence of the indicator (15e) *large army size* means that the country characteristics of the Colombian regime can have a positive influence on the sustainment of peace. The indicators of this determinant were previously assessed. For instance,

determinants (15a) *no group exclusion*, (15b) *state access*, (15c) *no violent repression*, (15d) *belligerents do not hold territory* and (15e) *large army* have all been stated as present. This means that Colombia seems to have a (15) *stable and more democratic type of regime* and this determinant is, therefore, assessed as (4) present which can have a positive effect on the sustainment of peace.

(16) No ethnic polarisation

Table 12. *Ethnic Groups of Colombia*

Rank	Ethnic Group	% of Colombian Population
1	Mestizo	53.5%
2	White European Colombian	30.7%
3	African Colombian, Mulatto, Palenque, or Raizal	10.5%
4	Native South American	3.4%
5	Other Ethnicity	1.9%

Note: Reprinted from Elisha Sawe, 2017

Table 12 shows that there 4 pronounced ethnicities in Colombia. The biggest ethnic group is the Mestizo, with a 53.5% share of Colombia’s population. This group is a mixture of the Amerindian tribes with the Spanish conquerors. The second biggest ethnic group are the White European Colombians with a 30.7% of the Colombian population. (Elisha Sawe, 2017). This data shows that there is one large ethnic group, the Mestizos and that the other Ethnic groups are too small to be able to mobilise into an ethnically based armed group. With this data, one can argue that there is *no ethnic polarisation* in Colombia because the biggest ethnic group is almost twice as big as the second biggest ethnic group and because there are more than two ethnic groups coexisting in Colombia. The determinant (16) *no ethnic polarisation* is, therefore, assessed as (4) present which can have a positive effect on the sustainment of peace.

(18) Long conflict duration and (19) low conflict intensity

This peace agreement marks a huge milestone in ending the conflict between these two parties. Even though some sources refer to a 50-year-old conflict this thesis acknowledges that the conflict has endured for 52 years when taking the formal establishment of the FARC in 1964 into account (Casey, 2018). First, the determinant *conflict duration* is measured. The conflict endured 18,980 days (based on 52 years of conflict). Therefore, the determinant(18) *long conflict duration* is assessed as (4) present because it lasted around eleven times longer than the average of 1,665 days.

Second, Colombia's *Victim's Unit* indicated in 2017 that there had been a total 8,532,636 victims for the 52 years duration of the armed conflict. This includes 22,915 victims of sexual offences, 363,374 victims of threats, around 30,000 cases of hostage-taking, over 10,000 torture victims, 7,265,072 victims of forced displacement, 11,140 injuries due to anti-personnel mines and 167,809 people have been killed (Amnesty International, n.d.). The period from 1996 to 2002 was the conflict's most violent period (The Guardian, n.d.).

The determinant (19) *low conflict intensity* is measured by the number, in thousands, of war-related deaths, divided by the duration of the conflict in months (Hartzell et al., 2001). When dividing the total casualties 167,809 with 624 months, the monthly casualty rate is 269. This is a significantly high rate because it means that on average 3,227 people were killed on a yearly basis nine people were killed each day during the conflict. Based on this data, and one can state that this conflict was a *high-intensity* and *long-duration* conflict. This provides sufficient data to state that the determinant (18) *long duration of conflict* was present and according to the theory could have a positive effect on the sustainment of peace. However, determinant (19) *low conflict intensity* was not present in the case which could have a negative effect on the sustainment of peace.

(21) High degree of Implementation

On November 28, 2017, after months of procedural delay, Colombia's Senate and House of Representatives passed the law to implement the new transitional justice system *the Special Peace Jurisdiction* (SPJ). The passing of this law shows that some of the crucial arrangements were implemented. Around 3,491 ex-FARC members and 1,714 current and former security-force personnel had implied their intention to be tried within this new system (WOLA, Colombia Peace, 2017a).

However, a year after the Final Agreement was signed it seemed that implementation process in Colombia had not progressed smoothly. On January 5, 2018, *the Observatory for the Follow-up of the Agreement's Implementation* (OIAP) published their fifth report specifying how much of the Final Agreement arrangements had been implemented until then. The report provided a total percentage of the arrangements implemented and also a percentage for each agreement (chapter). The overview of these percentages can be seen in Figure 16. It is important to mention that the 18.3% is not a total sum the scores of all the agreements but is a weighted percentage from all implemented elements against all yet-to-be-implemented measures. The report "La Paz en Deuda" of the OIAP also further depicts the reasons behind the percentages (OIAP, 2018).




Figure 16. Colombia's Peace Agreement implementation progress. Reprinted from OIAP, 2018.

The following findings are highlighted because they provide insights into the presence of the determinant (21) *degree of implementation* and because they shed some light on the information that is important to provide a comprehensive storyline. As Figure 16 shows, the most progress was made in the implementation of agreement four *Ceasefire, Reincorporation and Security* with an average of 33%. This relatively high percentage is because 100% of the *Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities* (BDCCH) was implemented which had to be implemented within six months of the ratification of the Agreement.

The Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities (BDCCH) arrangement regards, for instance, that all arms have to be counted, marked and stored by the UN. The FARC handed 8,994 arms and 958 caches over to the UN which finalised its mission on August 15th, 2017 when they moved the arms out of the transition zones. However, out of the 26 transition zones, only seven were finished, and the other 19 were not finished. On the day that the UN disarmed the FARC – August 15, 2017- these transitional zones were to be transformed into reintegration camps. However, many of the former FARC members have left these camps due to their deplorable conditions. No running water, electricity or proper protection are among the reasons for their desertion (WOLA, Colombia Peace, 2017). This results in a 27% implementation rate for the arrangement that regards the transition and reintegration zones (OIAP, 2018).

The report “La Paz en Deuda” further advises that there must be a more integral, forceful, and intense implementation of the Agreement. Also that some of the most crucial reforms lack consolidation and that the victims are still being denied political participation. On top of that, communities and victims are yet to enjoy the rights derived from building peace, and new forms of urban and rural violence will

arise if the pending issues are not adequately addressed. Furthermore, this report affirms that these reforms are necessary for achieving a stable and durable peace and that the proper implementation of the Agreement is a commitment made by the Colombian government to the international community. This is sufficient data to state that there is not a (21) *high degree of implementation* of the Agreement in this case and is, therefore, assessed as (0) not present. This low *degree of implementation* can have an adverse effect on the sustainment of peace.

5.3. Possible Colombian determinants

This paragraph presents the determinants that were identified when utilising the inductive approach and helps to answer the fourth sub-question. These determinants are, on the one hand, strongly case-specific but, on the other hand, they can provide possible new insights into the existing theory.

Prevalence of criminal groups

The prevalence and rise of other criminal groups is the first notable factor that seems to have substantially influenced the implementation of the Agreement so far (Export.gov., 2017; Vargas, 2017). The withdrawal of the FARC is believed to have caused a power vacuum in vulnerable regions that are important to drug trafficking routes. The ELN, other paramilitary organisations and other criminal organisations are fighting to control these regions (Monsalve Gaviria, 2018). The ELN is the other dominant guerrilla group that is active in Colombia. The adverse consequences that result from this power vacuum continued over the first full 18 months of the implementation and seemed to pose a more significant factor in the second period.

Other criminal organisations such as the BACRIM are also challenging local authorities by taking over many of the regions that were once controlled by the FARC to illegally mine emeralds and gold and run cocaine labs. This becomes more alarming because these organisations do not adhere themselves to any specific political ideology as the FARC did and are, among others, Los Pelusos, Clan del Golfo, Los Rastrojos, and Los Urabeños. (Export.gov., 2017). This can have a negative effect on the sustainment of the peace.

Lack of proper political integration

The following data suggests that there is much uncertainty regarding the political integration of the FARC. First, it is striking that, on February 10, 2018, the FARC announced that it was suspending its campaign for the legislative elections that were held on March 11, 2018, and for the presidential elections that were held on May 27, 2018. The electoral candidates of the FARC have had to deal with

many threats and violence. Therefore, the FARC party leaders had withdrawn from the electoral race and expressed that it was because of the incapability of the national government to provide them optimal security (Casey, 2018).

For the coming two elections the FARC benefits from these assured seats which somewhat stabilises the sustainment of peace. However, it is also uncertain what will happen in the elections of 2026 when the seats at the decision-making table are no longer assured to the FARC. The fact that less than 70% of Colombians in Bogotá stated that they would never to vote for the FARC (Al Jazeera, 2017) suggests that the FARC might not be able to attain enough votes to stay within the Colombian government. Also, the new administration after the May elections might pose another problem to the political integration of the FARC because it is uncertain what they will try to change in the Agreement. This might weaken the sustainment of the peace. The data gathered regarding this possible determinant suggests that a lack of political integration of the FARC in the future might weaken the sustainment of the peace.

Lack of proper societal integration

The integration of the 7000 demobilised FARC members into the Colombian society seems to be a huge problem (Otis, 2017). It is argued that the reintegration topic was not sufficiently addressed during the negotiation rounds because of the previously stated time constraints and because of the opposing perspectives between the parties on how to address it (Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt, 2018). It is also believed that many Colombians despise the FARC and that it will be difficult for ex-FARC members to find jobs, even if the government provides them with proper training, especially when jobs are already scarce. It is argued that it will be very challenging to persuade employers to hire ex-FARC members (Anderson, 2017)

Not only does it appears to be difficult for employers and Colombian citizen to accept ex-FARC members, but it also seems difficult for former FARC members to adapt to their new reality. Former FARC member Enrique Lozada (41) that once fled the guerrilla offers insight into this issue by stating that *“breaking out of the FARC was easy compared with breaking back into Colombian society “* because coming out of the jungle is very shocking and disorienting (Otis, 2017).

5.4. Findings

Table 13 shows a schematic overview of the findings that regard the *Model for Sustaining the Peace* and Table 14 shows a schematic overview of the case-specific determinants of the case analysis.

Table 13. *Findings of the Model for Sustaining the Peace*

Settlement Arrangements		Settlement Environment	
Agreement design		Country characteristics	
1. Is crafted by the parties	Yes	14. Higher economic development Based on (a) Higher total GDP (b) Higher stock prices	Yes Yes Yes
2. Contains power-sharing provisions Based on (a)military (b)territorial (c)political	Yes (a)No (b)No (c)Yes	15. A stable democratic regime (Type of regime) Based on (a)No Group exclusion (b)State access (c)No violent repression (d)Insurgents don't hold territory (e)Large army size 445,000 active 62,000 reserves	Yes (a)Yes (b)Yes (c)Yes (d)Yes (e)Yes
3. Has provisions for third-party renegotiation during the implementation phase (<i>excludes the use of troops</i>)	No	16. No ethnic polarisation 4 pronounced ethnic groups Mestizos 53% White EU Colombian 30%	Yes
4. Calls for peacekeeping missions to be established (<i>includes UN monitoring, unarmed missions and the use of troops</i>)	Yes	17. No resource curse 159,000 hectares of illicit crops	No
5. Calls for the withdrawal of troops	Yes	Conflict characteristics	
6. Calls for the establishment of demilitarised zones	Yes	18. Long duration of conflict 52 years = 624 months	Yes
7. Is specific	Yes	19. Low conflict intensity 3,227p/yr. = 269 deaths p/m	No
8. Is a formal acceptance of a ceasefire	Yes	Agreement implementation outcomes	
9. Settles the political issues	Yes	20. Few peace spoilers	No
10. Channels the struggle for power	Yes	21. High degree of settlement implementation 18.3%	No
11. Is balanced (not favouring one party)	No	International involvement	
12. Contains an explicit or well-understood third-party guarantee of peace (<i>excludes all UN missions</i>)	Yes	22. High degree of third-party enforcement	Yes
13. Calls for ongoing dispute resolution in the form of joint commissions between the parties	Yes		

Note: Overview on how the theoretical underpinnings of sustaining the peace apply to the case. For more information regarding the sources, please see analysis and Appendix 1.

Table 14. *The Case-specific Determinants*

Possible Colombian Determinants
1. Presence of other criminal groups
2. Lack of proper political integration of the FARC
3. Lack of proper societal integration of the FARC

Note: For source information, please see section 5.3 of the analysis

6. Discussion of the findings

When analysing how the Model for Sustaining the Peace was applied to the case of the Colombian peace agreement (see table 12), one can see that 16 out of 22 total determinants were assessed as present, and six were assessed as not present.

6.1. Discussing the findings of the analysis of the Final Agreement and Period 1 and 2

First, four out of the six absent determinants came from the *settlement environment* and two from the *settlement arrangements*. One can, therefore, argue that the designers of this agreement might have been aware of the best practices regarding what comprises a good and stable agreement. For instance, the negotiation process that led to the signing of the agreement consisted out of three distinct phases (Nylander, Sander and Tvedt, 2018). The first initial secret preparatory talks were held right after the inauguration of President Santos at the border with Venezuela in the spring of 2011. In February 2012, secret exploratory talks were held in Havana, Cuba. The official formal public negotiations that set off the four years of public talks started in October 2012, in Oslo, Norway.

This painstaking and lengthy process seems to be the reason why the negotiation process and contents of the Agreement has received much praise. For instance, according to Nylander, Sander and Tvedt (2018), who were part of *the Norwegian Special Envoy to Colombia* from 2010 to 2016, this agreement “broke new grounds”. This agreement broke new grounds because the talks demonstrated how a well-prepared, meticulous and robust process design could significantly contribute to the outcome of a negotiated agreement. This data shows that the high number of determinants present in the case can largely be attributed to the meticulousness of the negotiators and facilitators of the peace agreement that utilised best practices to ensure an agreement design of high quality in the *settlement arrangements*.

However, it is important to emphasise that according to Hoffman and Bercovitch (2011) the two most influential determinants are *balance* and *renegotiation*. Strikingly, both determinants seem absent from the case. When focusing on discussing the possible reasons why the two determinants were absent from the agreement design, there is some interesting information that has to be taken into account. First, the determinant that states that a good agreement (3) *has provisions for third-party renegotiation* during the implementation phase was absent in the document because there was insufficient data to indicate a strong inference. If one would base its information on the news, one could expect that the international community must have had a prominent role in the negotiations because of the many countries that expressed the need for the signing of a peace agreement (The Final

Agreement, 2016). However, when analysing the actual role of the international community one can argue that the international community had a more “restricted” role than it first appeared to have.

Segura and Mechoulan (2017) conducted the research “Made in Havana: How Colombia and the FARC Decided to End the War” by interviewing UN officials, government representatives, and experts regarding the negotiation process. According to their findings, there was a strategic use of the international community. This strategic use of the international involvement could be accounted to the “for Colombians, by Colombians” principle which guided the negotiation process. This means that the role of the international community was tightly controlled because the Santos administration did not want to grant external actors the traditional role of mediators (Segura and Mechoulan, 2017). Furthermore, the relationship between Colombia and the UN has been believed to be a “love-hate” relationship because Colombia is still resistant to what some perceive to be an “interventionist” approach by the UN (Segura and Mechoulan, 2017).

Even though the Colombian government did not want to grant external actors much say in the process, they still actively involve international institutions in the process and wanted the support of the international community. However, it is clear that the Colombian government is cautious in allowing third parties to play a crucial role in the process (Segura and Mechoulan, 2017). This data sheds some light regarding the reasons why the Agreement does not (3) *have provisions for third-party renegotiations during the implementation phase.*

The “for Colombians, by Colombians” principle also offers data that seems to contradict the previously gathered data that concerns the other three determinants that involve third parties. However, when analysing the discrepancies between these determinants and their presence in the case, it becomes clear that the determinants (4) *peacekeeping missions*, (12) *third-party guarantee of peace* and (22) *high international enforcement*, depict a more restricted role for the international community than determinant (3) *third-party renegotiation*. In other words, determinant (3) would guarantee third parties a role in renegotiations during the implementation phase, while the first three regard a more formalised and thus restricted role. For instance, the UN forms the special political mission to monitor and verify the laying down of arms, the tripartite monitoring and verification mechanism and the verification of the reintegration of ex-combatants, which alludes to the presence of (4) and (22). The roles that third parties have to play have been specified in the protocols of the Final Agreement and have been agreed by both parties.

Notably, despite that two of the power-sharing were missing determinant (2) *power-sharing* was still assessed as present. This assessment was based on the theoretical underpinnings that suggest, political power sharing is the most costly power-sharing mechanism among the three. Therefore the presence of this mechanism, in this case, weighs more than *military or territorial* power-sharing when assessing determinant (2) the existence of *power-sharing mechanism*.

Also, the analysis of this document, strikingly, revealed that the (11) determinant which calls for a *balanced* agreement is not present because of insufficient data to prove otherwise. According to Hoffman (2009), an unbalanced agreement has an adverse effect on the sustainment of peace. An agreement is unbalanced when it overly favours one party more than the other party because the disadvantaged party may choose to return to war rather than honour an agreement (Hoffman, 2009). The analysis of this document indicates that most of the arrangements stated in the Final Agreement seem to favour the FARC when based on the number of actions that both parties have to take. For instance, the government provides, among others, specific particular mechanisms, institutions, particular jurisdictions, amnesty, subsidies and security, while according to what is written in the Final Agreement FARC's actions are to demobilise, disarm, and reintegrate with society. Based on this data it seems that the Agreement states that the Government has to take more actions once the Agreement is signed.

The apparent unbalanced character of the agreement can also be noticed by the failed plebiscite of the First Agreement because, among other reasons, according to the opposition it was too lenient towards the FARC members who committed the worst war crimes (Mitchell, 2017). The opposition led by former president Alvaro Uribe, still strongly voiced their dissatisfaction regarding the Final Agreement, even though the amendments proposed by the opposition were incorporated in the Final Agreement (Mulholland, 2016).

There might be several reasons why the Final Agreement was still pushed forward and eventually ratified, despite the strong dissatisfaction of the opposition. First, some of the main reasons could be accounted to the *conflict characteristics*. For instance, one can argue that the (18) *duration of the conflict* and the failed attempts to end the conflict through military force, reassures that the Government could not defeat the FARC (The Conversation, 2016). Also, the fact that the 52-year conflict has taken approximately 220,000 victims, which makes this a *high-intensity conflict*, tremendously raises the salience of ending this conflict.

Although, the *revenge* theory dictates that the higher the casualty number, the less likely it is for the peace to be sustained. In this case, there was data that contradicts this theory. In the case of Colombia data has been found that states the people that resided in the areas that were most affected voted 'yes' to the First agreement, which means that they prefer peace over war (The Economist, 2016). Also one could argue that this data suggests that the determinant (19) *low conflict intensity* is more important than (18) *long conflict duration*. This can be seen because even though the conflict was of *high intensity*, the people that were most affected by the conflict did not want revenge, but wanted peace.

The second reason why the Final Agreement was still pushed for ratification might be because the ceasefire had become weaker as the negotiations were prolonged. The prolongation of the negotiations left the FARC members in a so-called legal and operational "limbo" because, since the referendum in October 2016, 7000 FARC members had been ready to demobilise. However, the demobilisation process would only start after the ratification of the Agreement (Brodzinsky, 2016). On top of that, just four days after the Agreement was signed two FARC members were killed by a security organisation, which further destabilised the ceasefire (The Guardian, 2016). Therefore, it can be argued that the prolonged ceasefire put enormous pressure on the parties to agree as soon as possible and that there was no time to investigate further how to incorporate provisions that were more *balanced*.

Third, it is clear that, despite that his firm pursuit of a peace agreement with the FARC posed a threat to his presidency, President Santos devoted his four-year term into reaching this Agreement. Therefore, it can strongly be argued that Santos did not want the negotiations of the Agreement to be extended because the May 2018 presidential elections were approaching. The failed plebiscite in October 2016 already shed some light into the preference of the majority of Colombians. It would, therefore, be logical to think that Santos feared that his hard work would be for nothing if they would not have signed the Agreement before the presidential elections. In other words, it is argued that the timing of the ratification of the Agreement was of great importance, which again left no additional time to draft a more *balanced* accord.

The analysis of the *country characteristic* also revealed some important details. First, it can be argued that in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the accord Colombia profited from a (14) *higher economic development*. However, one cannot base this economic development on the signing of the Agreement or state that this economic development will stay positive in the years to come. One can

argue that the forecast of the future economic development of Colombia is in line with theory and, therefore, is not likely to have a substantial adverse effect on the sustainment of peace.

The analysis of the determinant (15) *stable and more democratic type of regime*, argues that Colombia is indeed a democratic regime because, among other reasons, it does not seem to (15b) *exclude specific groups*, deny the FARC (15a) *state access* or violently (15c) *repress* them. However, it is noteworthy to mention that there were allegations of corruption in Colombia. For example, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland were concerned regarding the alleged corruption in allocating the Sustainable Colombia Fund (FCS) of US\$200 million (see analysis Period 2). This might have consequences for the sustainment of the peace in the long run because most of the support given is with conditionality. If corruption becomes a more significant problem, this support might be stopped which makes the implementation of the arrangements more difficult.

It is also striking that even though Colombia has a strong army when compared to the rest of the world, there is a low degree of state presence in the rural areas of Colombia. It could be argued that this is one of the reasons why Colombia fails to completely neutralise belligerency. For instance, the fact that the presence of violent dissident groups in regions that were previously controlled by the FARC has increased. In other words, although the indicators that are used to argue that Colombia is a stable democracy when further analysing the case, the contrary seems to be true because Colombia has problems enforcing state presence.

The analysis also showed that the determinant (16) *no ethnic polarisation* is present and that Colombia does suffer from *the resource curse* mainly due to the illicit coca production, which results in the absence of determinant (17) *no resource curse*. In light of the latter finding, it is important to emphasise that despite their violent and lucrative drug trafficking practices, when offered a peace Agreement the FARC did indeed demobilise. This could be because the FARC was at war these past five decades, not because of ethnicity or because of the economic benefits that the drug trafficking practices provide, but rather because of their extreme leftist political ideology. In its simplest form, the FARC can be seen as a peasant uprising (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2010). However, the availability of the coca crops together with the fact that Colombia's rural areas are difficult to reach for enforcing state presence and the lack of implementation of the *Comprehensive Rural Reform* seems to pose a threat to the sustainment of peace.

When focusing on *the agreement implementation outcomes*, one can see that determinant (20) *few peace spoilers* and (21) *high degree of implementation* were both not present. It is essential to discuss

the possible causes of the phenomenon of dissident groups. The emergence of the dissident groups seems to have four causes; the lack of proper implementation of the agreement, the resource curse, the power vacuum left by the withdrawal of the FARC, and the geographical conditions of the Colombian rural area. These violent dissident groups such as the *Oliver Sinisterra*, therefore, are the *peace spoilers* whom might have already started to provide difficulties to the sustainment of the peace.

Second, it was stated in January 2018, that the overall *degree of implementation* of the agreement reached 18.3%. Colombia appears to have a relatively low implementation degree because when compared to the implementation rate of the study conducted by Joshi and Quinn (2015), only six Agreements were below the 20% implementation mark within the first two years of implementation. It is argued that if the implementation of the Agreement stays below the 20%, it will make the sustainment of peace more difficult. However, in the same study, there was one case that did not result in line with this theory. This was the case of the peace agreement in Mali (1995) where the implementation rate stayed around 20% for almost four years before jumping to an 80% implementation rate five years after the signing of the agreement (Joshi and Quinn, 2015). Hence, even though the low implementation rate is believed to be harmful to the sustainment of peace, it is possible that the implementation can spike after some time passes.

One could argue that the main reason for this low *degree of implementation* is that the legislative system is slowing the implementation process by not providing the necessary legal conditions for the parties to implement the arrangements of the Final Agreement. For instance, the inability of the legislative system to apply the so-called “fast track” legislation, slowed the implementation even more and with this put pressure on the sustainment of the Agreement. One could also argue that the slow and low *degree of implementation* further fuels the opposition of the Agreement and adds to the insecurities of former FARC members regarding their reintegration to society.

To summarise, the main challenges that concern the implementation of the Agreement in the coming months are: providing security in many rural areas, convincing farmers to substitute illicit crops for licit crops and reintegrating former FARC fighters (Crisis Group, 2018).

6.2. Discussing the findings of the case-specific determinants

The findings that concern the case-specific determinants suggests that there are other active criminal groups, a lack of proper political integration and a lack of societal integration (see Table 13).

First, a case can be made that the presence of other criminal organisations lowers the sense of ‘peace’ for the Colombian society. The rise in these criminal organisations can be accounted to the power vacuum that resulted from FARC’s demobilisation. Despite the rise of the activity of other criminal groups, it is noteworthy, that according to the Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos the Christmas of 2017 was the most peaceful of many years. This refers to the fact that with 24 violent death cases per 100.000 inhabitants, 2017 had the lowest homicide rate in 42 years. This number is equal to the violent homicide rate of Washington D.C. (El Tiempo, 2018a).

Second, the lack of political integration might pose considerable challenges for the long-term integration of the FARC and the sustainment of the peace. It can be argued that if the political integration of the FARC fails, the possibility that the FARC return to their violent methods to fight for their political voice or become more violent than before the Agreement (Otis, 2017; Bierly, 2018). Although political integration as a strategy for conflict resolution is perceived to be a very successful method in sustaining peace, it is still a very fragile method that highly needs the cooperation from all levels of society on all sides of the process (Bierly, 2018).

Third, one could argue that the lack of societal integration strategy could be because of the duration of the conflict. The conflict between the FARC and Colombia is the most protracted war in the Western hemisphere as it continued for half a century (Walker, 2016). This could mean that, on the one hand, there is a lack of best practices regarding the reintegration of former rebels into society after a civil war that endured for so long. On the other hand, the fact that the Colombian conflict endured two generations makes it harder to construct a new reality for individuals who have a “guerillero” (guerrilla fighter) mentality. When an individual has a “guerillero mentality” it means that being part of the FARC is all that they have ever known. Also, for some of the former FARC members, drug trafficking might provide the only available work. Similar reintegration programs have largely failed in other Latin American countries where former combatants returned to militias because they could not find regular employment. According to FARC commander Carlos Antonio Lozada, *“Unless they have a very strong ideological understanding, some will be vulnerable to the appeal of the narco world”* (Lozada in Anderson, 2017).

7. Conclusion and reflection

This thesis aimed to answer the following central question:

How sustainable is the Colombian peace agreement signed by the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) on the 24th of August of 2016?

The quest for answering this question was guided by the sub-questions: (1) What are the theoretical characteristics or determinants that influence the sustainment of peace; (2) What are the arrangements made through the Colombian peace agreement? (3) Can these characteristics be located in the Colombian peace process until May 2018? (4) What are the case-specific factors that can have a negative effect on the sustainment of the peace?

7.1. Answering the sub-questions

7.1.1. The first sub-question; theoretical characteristics of sustaining the peace

This question was mainly answered through the information gathered in the literature review. First, since the end of the Cold War scholars have identified a wide array of determinants that influence the sustainment of peace because of the increase in intrastate conflicts. These determinants have been researched using various quantitative and qualitative methods. The literature review identified fifteen themes of determinants. One of these themes is the *agreement design* and consists of thirteen specific arrangements that affect the sustainment of peace, which makes a total amount of 27 determinants. Despite that, there were 27 determinants identified only 22 were chosen to comprise *the Model for Sustaining the Peace*. The choice for which determinants were going to be researched was made by looking at the plausibility of the case.

The chosen determinants that form *the Model for sustaining the Peace* is subdivided into two categories; *settlement arrangements* and *settlement environment*. *Settlement arrangements* contain the following thirteen agreement design determinants: that the agreement (1) is *crafted by the parties*, (2) *contains power-sharing provisions*, (3) *has provisions for third-party renegotiation* during the implementation phase, (4) *calls for peacekeeping missions* to be established, (5) *calls for the withdrawal of troops*, (6) *calls for the establishment of demilitarised zones*, (7) *is specific*, (8) *is formal*, (9) *settles the political issues*, (10) *channels the power struggle* into nonviolent mechanisms and processes, (11) *is balanced*, (12) *contains an explicit or well-understood third-party guarantee of peace*, (13) *calls for ongoing dispute resolution* in the form of joint commissions between the parties.

The *settlement environment* contains the following determinants: (country characteristics) (14) *higher economic development*, (15) *stable and more democratic type of regime*, (16) *no ethnic polarisation*, (17) *no resource curse*; (conflict characteristics) (18) *long duration of conflict*, (19) *low conflict intensity*; (agreement implementation outcomes) (20) *few peace spoilers*, (21) *high degree of settlement implementation*; and international involvement (22) *high third-party enforcement*.

7.1.2. The second sub-question; what is in the Final Agreement

This question was mainly answered in the summary of the Final Agreement and supplemented with the rest of the case analysis. The Final agreement is a 334 pages document that is divided into six chapters, each covering a different specific issue which was individually negotiated and agreed. Therefore, this document can be seen as a document that brings together six individual settlements.

The first chapter focused on the structural change in the countryside, *the comprehensive Rural Reform* (CRR), which aims to close up the differences that exist between urban and rural population. Chapter two regards political inclusion and participation. Chapter three regards the laying down of arms, the economic, social and political reincorporation of the FARC-EP into civilian life, security guarantees and the fight against criminal organisations. Chapter four focuses on the solution to the illicit drug problem. Chapter five concerns the victims of the conflict. Lastly, chapter six comprises the agreement on Implementation and verification mechanisms.

7.1.3. The third sub-question; theory and case matching

The findings of this research (see Table 9) indicate that 16 out of 22 determinants were found in this case. However, the indicators, (3) *provisions for third-party renegotiation* during the implementation phase, a (11) *balanced* agreement design, (17) *no resource curse*, (19) *low conflict intensity*, (20) *few peace spoilers* and (21) *high degree of implementation* don't appear to be present in the case. The absence of determinant (3) can be accounted to, among other reasons, the 'for Colombians, by Colombians' principle. The lack of *balance* can be attributed to, among other reasons, the time constraints that put pressure on the ceasefire and pushed the signing of the Agreement. The absence of determinant (17) *no resource curse* can be explained by a combination of reasons such as Colombia's fertile ground, difficult to reach rural areas, and the state's incapacity to secure these regions which make Colombia vulnerable to the cultivation of illicit crops. The high casualty rate that this conflict has endured explains the absence of determinant (19) *low conflict intensity*. Determinant (20) *few peace spoilers* was absent because of the increase of violent dissidents groups, especially in the second

period. The absence of (21) *high degree of implementation* can be accounted to, among others, the legislative inability to provide the necessary conditions for the implementation.

Furthermore, the findings of the analysis indicate that 16 out of the 22 determinants were present in the case. Please see Table 9 for all present determinants. However, it is important to highlight the following findings. The entire Final Agreement was a comprehensive effort of (1) *both parties* to (9) *settle political issues* and to (10) *channel the power struggles* into non-violent mechanisms that normalise the relationship of the FARC and the Colombian government. The most notorious *settlement environment* determinants are the problem of the (17) *resource curse* and (20) *peace spoilers* which seems to be exacerbated by the low (21) *degree of implementation* that has reached 18.3% in the first year. The illicit crop production still seems to be more fruitful for some former FARC combatants than adhering to the Agreement.

The (18) *long duration of the conflict* in combination with the high (19) *conflict intensity* left, on the one hand, many deeply rooted grudges, which makes it more difficult for the opposition of the Agreement to support the arrangements made, especially those that give impunity to the former FARC members. However, on the other hand, people that live in the affected areas by the conflict support the Agreement. Lastly, it was striking that Colombia has a relatively (15e) *large army size* and still lacks to enforce state presence in the rural areas.

7.1.4. The fourth sub-question; case-specific characteristics

The analysis revealed three possible determinants that can have a negative effect on the sustainment of the peace in the Colombian case. These factors are the prevalence of violent criminal organisations, the potential lack of proper political integration into the Colombian government and the lack of proper societal integration of FARC members into the Colombian society. The prevalence of other criminal organisations can be accounted to FARC's withdrawal from crucial regions for drug trafficking. The lack of political integration can be accounted to, among other reasons, FARC not taking part in the May elections which leaves their political duties unfulfilled. The lack of societal integration comes from both the Colombian society that does not seem to be willing to accept or tolerate former FARC members and from the "guerrilla" mentality of these FARC members that might make it difficult for them to integrate.

7.2. Answering the central question; How sustainable is the Final Agreement?

The analysis of this case has gathered data that provided insights into how likely it is that the Final Agreement will be sustained. The answers to the sub-questions provided vital information to give a well-argued answer to this central question.

If the answer to this question would be entirely based on the data provided in the deductive part of the analysis, one might be inclined to state that the Final Agreement has a high probability of being sustained because only six out of the 22 crucial determinants were missing or were not sufficiently present in the case. This relatively high rate of presence of the theoretically embedded determinants in the Colombian case shows that the designers of the Agreement might have utilised best practices to comprise the *settlement arrangements*. Also, five out of the nine *settlement environment* determinants were present in the case. Colombia has, for instance, most of the *country characteristics* needed and sufficient *international involvement* to sustain the peace agreement in the future.

However, the determinants that were not present in the case might have an adverse effect on the sustainment of peace and might, therefore, be crucial to this analysis. For instance, according to Hoffman and Bercovitch (2011), the most important *agreement arrangements* are *balanced* and *renegotiation* in the implementation phase. However, it is striking that these determinants are the only two *agreement arrangements* determinants missing in this case. The main issue of the parties that are against the Agreement appears to be that the government does indeed provide too many benefits to former FARC members, which is in line with the theory of Hoffman and Bercovitch (2011).

The absence of determinants *no resource curse*, *low conflict intensity*, *few peace spoilers* and a *high degree of settlement* might have a negative effect on the sustainment of the Agreement. There was, however, data that challenges the grievance theory of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) that states that the more casualties that the civil war has caused, the less likely it is for peace to be sustained. Contradictory, although this civil war produced 167,809 casualties, the most affected people still support the Peace Agreement. These findings might have a positive effect on the sustainment of the peace in the future.

On top of that, the inductive part of the analysis identified the case-specific determinants. These determinants are the prevalence of violent criminal organisations and the potential lack of proper political and societal integration of FARC members. These case-specific determinants also have the possibility of weakening the stability of the peace agreement.

All the influencing factors stated above reveal a more nuanced and complex answer to this central question because according to this thesis, the Colombian peace agreement has both strengths and weaknesses. While one cannot conclude by stating with absolute certainty whether the Agreement will be sustained, one can, however, provide the possible bottlenecks that need to be taken in to account in order for the peace to be assured after these 18 months.

7.3. Limitations

It is of utmost importance to mention the limitations of the conclusions drawn in this research. Section 4.4 and 4.5 address the reliability and validity issues of case studies. Therefore, this part focuses on the theoretical limitations and the limitations that rose when conducting this research.

First, there are theoretical limitations that stem from the discrepancies between the methods and definitions used by the scholars that identified the determinants of sustaining the peace. The discrepancies that have previously been presented in the literature review might distort the findings provided here.

Second, the *Model for Sustaining the Peace* is a synthesis of previously empirically tested determinants. However, these determinants have not been jointly tested. This thesis only focused on looking at whether these determinants were present or not. Therefore, one cannot say something about which determinant is more important than the other one.

Also, the measurements of these determinants were based as much as possible on the operationalisation of previous scholars. However, it is important to mention that it is possible that some information might have been interpreted slightly different and that the measurement is still a subjective process.

Consequently, this analysis relies entirely on reports, articles and news articles which means that the researcher relied on what has been written and was not present in the crucial events. However, this thesis aimed at revealing a sequence of events and uncovering which determinants were present in the case. Since the information needed is mainly based on facts, proper triangulation of sources mitigates this limitation. For instance, what happened when the FARC officially became a political party was widely covered by the news which makes it nearly impossible to distort the sequence of events.

Furthermore, it is important to mention that some sources were translated from Spanish to English because the researcher wanted to stay as close as she could to the context of the study. This also has implications because the meaning of the translated information can be interpreted slightly different than when reading the original text. In order to diminish these limitations, the researcher triangulated the sources used in this analysis and kept a critical stance throughout the whole process.

Lastly, utilising content analysis to gather the data makes the process inevitably somewhat subjective. The researcher constructed the coding scheme which is a highly analytical and contextual process. In other words, one researcher might assess some determinants as being (4) present, but another researcher might state that it is (0) not present. In order to mitigate the consequences of this issue, the researcher kept records of the assessment to provide transparency in the process, the sources and nature of the data (see, for instance, Appendix 2).

7.4. Further research and recommendations

The following recommendations stem from the theoretical and practical implications and limitations of this research. First, the analysis of this highly complex case provides new insights that have the potential to contribute to the existing theories of sustainment of peace agreements. This thesis revealed the importance of three factors that seem to have an adverse effect on the Colombian case. These determinants are the *presence of other armed groups*, *societal integration* and *political integration*. Even though these determinants are specific to the Colombian case, the fact that these determinants did not surface when conducting the extensive literature review, suggest that these determinants might be undervalued. Therefore, more qualitative and quantitative research in these three areas in the Colombian context can help unravel best practices that can be used in future peace talks in Colombia, such as the peace talks that the Colombian government started with the ELN or in other contexts as well.

Second, the possible lack of adequate successful reintegration research might be because the Colombian civil war was the longest civil war in the western hemisphere (Walker, 2016). This might mean that most of the existing research was based on shorter conflicts. However, post-conflict individuals have different needs after more protracted civil wars than after a relatively shorter one because for some of the FARC members war is all they ever knew. For this reason, it can be contended that more research is needed regarding the successful political and societal integration after more protracted civil wars.

Also, more research should be done regarding the ‘organised crime curse’ that results when a society has internalised organised crime which makes it more challenging to achieve peace. Although this study focuses on sustaining the peace between the FARC, more information should be gathered regarding how much influence the existence of other criminal organisations has in sustaining the Agreement.

Furthermore, it is advised to research what the best order is when implementing the arrangements of a peace agreement. Researching this might produce insights regarding what determinants should be implemented first and thereby relieving the pressure to implement all agreements at the same time. One could argue that it can be difficult for governments to implement all agreements at the same time or the same speed. For this same reason, this research should be conducted again on a yearly or bi-yearly basis. Doing so helps with providing a more comprehensive picture of the pitfalls or successes of these determinants and provides some insights regarding which ones are most crucial in sustaining the peace.

Moreover, it is advised to diminish the theoretical discrepancies between the types of determinants that exist. It can be argued that the typology offered by Hartzell et al. (2001) provide a flexible and comprehensive theoretical framework that encourages the process of reaching theoretical consensus. Their distinction between *settlement arrangements* and *settlement environment* has the potential to overarch most existing determinants. One could also establish a third dimension that encompasses the negotiation process and could be named ‘*settlement negotiation*’ to stay within the conceptual framework of Hartzell et al. (2001). *The Model for Sustainable Peace* would consist of three pillars: (1) *settlement negotiation* process (2) *settlement arrangements* and (3) *settlement environment* (see Figure 17). One could argue that by adding this third dimension, the proposed *Model for Sustaining the Peace* could encompass all three important factors of conflict resolution that provide a broad theoretical framework in which the pre- and post-conflict determinants can be categorised.



Figure 17. Proposed Model for Sustaining the Peace. *Adapted from Hartzell et al., 2001

The Colombian government should take all absent and case-specific determinants into consideration to increase the possibility of the peace accord to be sustained. Moreover, the FARC is advised to take the victims, the government's efforts, and their sacrifices into account when facing difficulties in sustaining their end of the bargain. Lastly, it is important to emphasise that peace will not be sustained without the backing of the Colombian citizens. As the quote in the introduction showed "*members of the two sides must live side by side and work together in a common government to make the country work*" (Licklider, 1993). Therefore, the essential recommendations go out to the citizens of Colombia, and especially to the victims and the critics of the Agreement. Given that this conflict has endured half a century and the fact that other solutions have failed, the only possible solution seems to be the sustainment of this Agreement. Both parties have to make sacrifices, work together, and to be more accepting and forgiving to achieve a more peaceful Colombia.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Summary of the sources of the *Model for Sustaining the Peace*

Settlement Arrangements	Scholars
Agreement design	
1. They are crafted by the parties	Hampson, 1996; Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011
2. They contain power-sharing provisions for winners and losers in the aftermath of elections	Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, 2001; Quinn, Mason and Gurses, 2007; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; DeRouen, Lea and Warrensteen, 2009. According to Mattes and Savun, 2009; Hartzell, 2009; Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011
3. They have provisions for third-party renegotiation during the implementation phase	Hampson, 1996; Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011
4. They call for peacekeeping missions to be established	Fortna, 2004; Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011
5. They call for the withdrawal of troops	Fortna, 2004; Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011
6. They call for the establishment of demilitarised zones	Fortna, 2004; Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011
7. They are specific	Fortna, 2004; Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011
8. They are formal	Fortna, 2004; Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011
9. They settle the political issues	Fortna, 2004; Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011
10. They channel the struggle for power into nonviolent mechanisms and processes	Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011
11. They are balanced (not favouring one party over the other)	Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011
12. They contain an explicit or well-understood third-party guarantee of peace	Fortna, 2004; Toft, 2010; Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011
13. They call for ongoing dispute resolution in the form of joint commissions between the parties	Fortna, 2004; Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011
Settlement Environment	
Country characteristics	
14. Economic development	Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Sambanis, 2004; Quinn, Mason and Gurses, 2007; Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 2008
15. Type of regime	Skocpol, 1979; Licklider, 1999; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, 2001; Goodwin, 2001; Quinn, Mason and Gurses 2007; Mason, 2007; Mason, Gurses, Brandt and Quinn, 2011
16. Ethnic fractionalisation	Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Mozaffar, Scarritt, & Galaich, 2003; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002; Ellingsen, Reynol-Querol, 2002
17. The Resource Curse	Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Ross, 2004;
Conflict characteristics	
18. Duration of conflict	Mason and Fett, 1996; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, 2001; Quinn, Mason and Gurses 2007; Mason, Gurses Brandt and Quinn, 2011
19. Conflict intensity	Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, 2001; Mason and Gurses, 2007; Mason, Gurses Brandt and Quinn, 2011
Agreement implementation outcomes	
20. Peace spoilers	Stedman, 1997; Mason, 2007
21. Degree of settlement implementation	Joshi and Quinn, 2015
International involvement	
22. Third-party enforcement	Walter, 1999; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, 2001; Fortna, 2004; Quinn, Mason and Gurses, 2007; Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom, 2008; Kreutz, 2010; Mason, Gurses, Brandt and Quinn, 2011

Appendix 2: Operationalisation and Coding analysis: The assessment of the data

This coding scheme is based on the theoretical underpinnings of each determinant see Appendix 1.

Variable	Indicator	Description	Coding Rules		Based on evaluation	Some findings
			Manifest (M)=Words used	Latent (L)=implicit meaning		
Agreement design						
1.Crafted by the parties	Crafted by both parties	Both parties have created the Agreement	M: Mentions both parties (The National Government and the Farc), Signature of both parties at the bottom of the agreement or words used such as both , we, together, jointly , mutual decision. L: That one can deduce that they both crafted the the agreement	Sufficient	Yes	The National Government and the FARC mentioned 135 times, jointly mentioned 37 times, signature at the bottom of the Agreement.
2. Contain power-sharing provisions	(a)Military power sharing	(a)The integration of former antagonists combatants into a new national army	M: Explicit military integration of former FARC in the national army L: The allowance of (some or all) former FARC trained combatants to train with the national army of Colombia	Sufficient	No	Security and protection Corps, Coordinate with the police
	(b)Territorial autonomy	(b)The government can regain control of the region over time (not immediately)	M: Explicit mention that the FARC can stay in the previously controlled regions L: That the FARC get appointed some land in which they can stay without adhering to the rules of the Colombian state	Strong	No	No findings that suggest territorial power-sharing
	(c)Political power sharing	(c)Ruling power is shared by the former adversaries	M: Explicit Political participation of the FARC L: A fair distribution of power in decision making that regard the policy making processes for the regions controlled by the former FARC and/or national politics settling disputes, submitting recommendations and generating reports.	Strong	Yes	Safeguards for the new political organisations. Play an active part in shaping the control of political power.60 members of the Farc= liaison with national government, 10 Farc members municipal and departamental level. Farc is assured seats in the government for the coming two elections.
3.Third-party renegotiation during the implementation phase	The existence of third party involvement in the renegotiation in the implementation phase	Third party renegotiation during the implementation phase excludes the use of troops	M: Explicit renegotiations clauses with the participation of third-parties. L: That other parties are actively involved in the renegotiation of implementation process and don't only focus on the implementing but have a say into the arrangements themselves.	Strong	No	Review mentioned 49 times, adjustment mentioned 34 times, International recommendations on illicit crops
4.Calls for peacekeeping missions to be established	The existence of a call for the establishment of peacekeeping missions	Includes United Nations missions monitoring, other regional (unarmed military organizations, and ad hoc peacekeeping observers) or peacekeeping missions forces (armed)	M: Explicit peacekeeping and monitoring missions L: an international, regional, military and non-military organization such as the UN and the EU is going to establish a mission to help the peace process.	Strong	Yes	Peace keeping, monitoring, UN role of disarming the FARC, IMVM (International Monitoring and Verification Mission) 8 regional and local monitoring, technical tripartite, United Nations mentioned 52 times
5.Calls for the withdrawal of troops	The existence of a call for the withdrawal of the FARC troops from the regions that they control	FARC withdraws the troops from previously captured regions. Includes unilateral and partial withdrawal of troops outside of the security zones	M: statemet for withdrawal of troops or words such as demobilise, retract from territory L: Withdrawal of the troops from territory captured in the war beyond the status quo ante.	Strong	Yes	Laying down the arms in the security zones. They stopped all criminal activities once the ceasefire started. Ceasefire was mentioned 53 times
6.Calls for the establishment of demilitarized zones (DMZs)	The existence of a call for the establishment of DMZs	Partial (not along full cease-fire line of 2 km) or demilitarized zone of at least 2 km	M: Demilitarized zone, security zones, transitional zones. L: A zone were no arms are not allowed.	Strong	Yes	20 Transitional Local Zones for Normalisation (TLZN), 7 transitional loca points for normalisation. Security zones was mentioned 21 times
7.Specific	The existence of specific arrangements in the Agreement	Number of words in agreement and how detailed each provision is described	M: Number of pages, names and dates make it more concrete. L: The detail in which the plans are presented. Amiguty will limit the presence of this determinants. The more specific the better.	Sufficient	Yes	335 pages, 3101 pharagraphs, 20 protocols.
8.Formal	The existence of a written statement that the FARC accepts the ceasefire and will lay down its arms	Formal acceptance of cease-fire proposal or agreement (written lawbinding statement)	M: Signature from both parties in the end of this Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and words such as acceptance of ceasefire, outlawing violence, laying down the arms L: No use of violence	Strong	Yes	outlawing violence, no use of violence
9.Settle the political issues	settlement imposed by force or unilateral action (de facto) or 2 settlement by agreement (de jure)	they settle the political issues over which the war was fought	M: Explicit layed out plans that reverses the effects of the conflict. This includes different types of arrangements that tackle local and regional issues- address the historical causes of the conflict. Wording such as overcome poverty and inequality,better the well-being, rural reform L: Both Farc and the Government address issues over which the war have been fought.	Sufficient	Yes	Overcome poverty was mentioned 32 times, inequality 5 times, better well-being 37 and quality of life 27 times.

10.Channels the struggle for power into nonviolent mechanisms and processes	The existence of mechanisms that aim at channelling power struggles and normalising the relationship between the FARC and the government	Clauses that aim to normalise relationships between the parties by instilling mechanisms so that the Farc does not have to use violence. excludes dispute commissions and plitical party related commissions.	M: set up mechanisms that provides framework for the Farc and the Government to work together (excludes dispute settlements) such as the creation of new intitutions or mechenasims, or the adjustment of existing ones, to allow the participation of the adversaries into all levels of state formation the creation of institutions . L: Laying down peaceful mechanisms for the Farc to adress it issues in a nonviolent way.	Sufficient	Yes	Set up mechanisms, create has been mentioned 65 times, commissions. Truth, Coexistence and Non-Recurrence Commission.Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement, High-level forum (Instancia Especial), Every ex-FARC combatant has right to 8 million pesos to start individual or collective socially productive project or housing, basic income 90 %minimum wage for 24 months after the TLZN
11.Balanced (not favoring one party over the other)	The existence of a fairly equal amount and weighs of benefits and sacrifices for both the National Government and the FARC Agreement.	Equality in arrangements between actions and sacrifices (wins and losses) of the National Government and the FARC EP	M: number of actions that only have to be taken by the FARC and number of Actions that only have to be taken by the National Government. L: The weight in of the actions that have to be taken by both parties as to how they raise or lower their security concerns.	Sufficient	No	The implementation of the 5 Agreements rest on th demobilisation of the FARC (D+ 180). Laying down arms, reintegrate and no more FARC combatnt visibility.
12.Contains an explicit or well-understood third-party guarantee of peace	Written statement in the agreement. Does not include peacekeepers, providing dispute resolution restraint, patron, mediation and so on or explicit or wellunderstood guarantee of peace	The existence of third-party guarantors and or support for the success of the Agreement. Excludes al UN missions.	M: witnesses, guarantors, observers, international accompaniment, international, international component of the monitoring, verification mechanism, United Nations L: Information regarding the measures that the international where international parties will be involded in.	Strong	Yes	International accompaniement list. Among others, Zwitzerland, EU, U.S, Netherlands institute for Multiparty Democracy
13.Calls for ongoing dispute resolution	The existence of ongoing dispute resolution joint commission of belligerents and the government	excludes peacekeepers, providing dispute resolution(Fortna, 2003)	M: The formation of commissions for dispute solving by both parties L:	Strong	Yes	Settle controversies, Implementation and verification mechanisms, dispute mentioned 23 times in Agreement, solving land-related disputes
Country characteristics						
14.Higher Economic development	(a) Higher GDP capita	The existence of a higher economic development after the signing of the agreement	M: Numbers regarding the economic growth L: economic growth, economic well-being	Strong	Yes	GDP growth and positive trend forecast until 2022
	(b) Higher stock prices	The existence of higher stock prices after the signing of the agreement	M: Number regarding the stock prices L: rust in the economy raises	Strong	Yes	Stock prices rise
15.Stable and more democratic type of regime	(a) No group exclusion	When there is no one group that is preferred by the state to receive sponsorship or support. When this happens other groups are excluded for benefits.	M: Includes all groups, minorities, women children, ederly, pregnant women, dissabled people L: Promotion of inclusive mechanisms	Strong	Yes	Participation mentioned 232 times in agreement, non-discriminatory 17 times, ethnic inclusion 59 times, LGBTI 19 times.
	The existence of (b) state access	The FARC is granted state access and can participate in political debates and given political voice.	M: review of the electoral process, fairer distribution of public resources for political movements, greater electoral participation requires additional measure for inclusivity in the affected areas. L: promotion of political participation	Strong	Yes	pluralism mentioned 14 times, participation mentioned 23 times
	(c)No violent repression by state	No use of violence to repress the unarmed opposition.	M: Use of force to repress the opposition L: No use of violence to stop passive protesting	Strong	Yes	No findings that suggests repression.
	(d)Belligerents do not hold territory	The FARC gives previously controlled territories to their rightful owners.	M: State presence, absence of belligerents in territories, deployment of troops, special units L: efforts are being made by government to enforce state access in vulnerale regions	Strong	Yes	Hercules joint task force, illicit crop irradiation
	(e)Large army size	How large is the army size	M: number of military personel based on population ratio and world and regional ranking L: No L coding	Strong	Yes	Number 15 in the global ranking, 445,000 active and 62,000, the seond biggest army of south american country (Brazil is #1)
16.No ethnic polarisation	The existence of more than two ethnic groups and that no two groups have similar (big) sizes	Number of Ethnic groups and size of ethnic groups	M: number of ethnic groups and how big these groups are. L: No L coding for this determinant	Strong	Yes	Worldatlas: 4 pronounced groups, Mestizos 53,5%, White European Colombians 30,7%, African decent (Mulatto, Palenque, Raizal) 10,5%, Native 3,4%, Other ethnicity 1,9%
17.No resource Curse	The absence of lootable sources	When there is no illicit activities that are related to the natural resource of the country. Lootable sources: illicit crops, oil, gems, gold, silver or other highly priced metals	M: Illicit crops, illicit economies, proper use of land L: The Implicit reference to illicit economies.	Strong	No	Whole chapter 4 is about solving the illicit drugs problem, "the productionand sale of illicit drugs and criminal economies have had a serious effects on the Colombian people, in both rural and urban areas, imparing their development..." p.104,

Conflict characteristics						
18. Long duration of conflict	The duration of the conflict based on the length of the conflict in months.	The length in years, months and days compared to the average length of 1,665 days (4 years and seven months)	M: length of the conflict in months. No L coding for this determinant	Strong	Yes	Cow data, 52 years, 624 months, 18,980 years
19. Low conflict intensity	The conflict has endured less than 2,000 battle related deaths per year	The number, in thousands, of war-related deaths was divided by the duration of the conflict in months. A high conflict intensity is more than twice the norm.	M: The number, in thousands, of war-related deaths was divided by the duration of the conflict in months. L: Deaths, kidnappings, extortions and other criminal activity that raises the conflict intensity	Strong	No	3,227 deaths per year. Total 8,532,636 victims. The period from 1996 to 2002 was the conflict's most violent period
Agreement Implementation Outcomes						
20. Few peace spoilers	The absence or relatively low amount of dissidents	That dissidents form a group and whether they actively try to reignite war. Dissidents: parts of the faction of the warring parties that don't agree with the peace agreement	M: the presence of mobilized groups that stem from the FARC EP, cases where these dissidents have tried to sabotage the implementation of the Agreement. L: The presence of not formalized groups that are against the Agreement. These non-formalized groups actively try to sabotage the Agreement	Strong	Yes	The Oliver Sinisterra dissident group is estimated to be 450-500. In February 2017 there were 300 dissidents, in March, this estimate grew up to 1.200.
21. High degree of settlement implementation	An implementation rate higher than the average of 54% in the first two years.	A high degree of implementation of the Agreements. Excludes the timing of the implementation	M: Implementation degree, achieved, reached L: What has or has not been implemented	Sufficient	No	18, 3% implementation rate in January 2018
International involvement						
22. High degree of third-party enforcement	The presence of third parties in Colombia excludes the observers and the guarantors stated in the agreement	Outside power sends troops to separate or protect civil war antagonists from one another, third-party helps the enforcement of the process (focus on the implementation phase)	M: aid, guarantee of peace, peacekeeping, country names, name of representatives, names of organizations. L: Countries that express their concern and take actions to help the implementation of the deal	Sufficient	Yes	U.S. Congress ensured \$391 million towards the Colombia Peace Aid Package, EU four gender and human rights projects for over €1.7 million, US\$200 million distributed through the Sustainable Colombia Fund (Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland)

Appendix 3: Lifting the veil of the Final Agreement

This appendix provides the in-depth analysis of the first 10% of the Final Agreement. This is only a transcript of the thought process of the researcher and is not meant to provide new information but merely to answer any question that the reader might have on 'how' the analysis was conducted.

Preamble

When analysing the preamble of this document (pages 1-5) one can identify the presence of some determinants. The very first paragraph of the Final Agreement states that the Agreement has been established "based on their mutual decision to bring the national armed conflict to an end". This shows that both parties created the Agreement which reveals the existence of the determinant (22) that states that a good peace agreement is *crafted by both parties*. On top of that, the preamble ends with "We, the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army, have agreed as follows", which affirms that the parties have crafted the Final Agreement. On top of that latent coding revealed that this sentence had been repeated 135 times in the rest of the document. This data is assessed with value 4 because it is already sufficient for confirming the presence of this determinant in the agreement design.

The other determinant that seems present in the preamble states that a good peace agreement must (13) contain an *explicit or well-understood third-party guarantee of peace*. This determinant is identified in the second paragraph “*before delegates from the Republic of Cuba and from the Kingdom of Norway, who also served as witnesses, and, since then, have accompanied the process as guarantor countries*” (p.1). This quote shows that Cuba and Norway are not only the guarantors but they have also actively participated in the negotiation process. Consequently, in the following paragraph, Chili and Venezuela are stated to be observers. This data is assessed with value 2 because it alludes to a slight presence of this determinant. However, this analysis will still seek to find more data for instance about the specifics regarding the role of Cuba and Norway as third-party guarantors and of Chili and Venezuela as observers for it be assessed with a higher value.

The 29th paragraph of the preamble reveals the existence of the (8) determinant that states that a good peace agreement is a *formal acceptance of cease-fire proposal or agreement* (Fortna, 2004) with the statement “*to sign this Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace*” (p. 5). This data gives away that the action of the parties signing the Agreement will result at the end of the armed conflict and is therefore assessed as intermediately present. However, more data should be provided than just a statement of intent in order for this data to be fully present in the case. One could argue that this quote also covers the determinant (10) that former adversaries will *channel the power struggles* between adversaries in a nonviolent way by installing mechanisms that normalise their relationship. However, the critical difference between determinant (8) and (10) is that the first is merely a statement of nonviolence and the latter requires installing actual nonviolent mechanism. Therefore this data is assessed with the value (2) because it affirms the importance of the fact that former adversaries have to end the violence in order to sustain the peace but is not sufficient to confirm it. Therefore, this determinant will be tested with further findings in this analysis that may reveal the more data on what mechanisms are put in place to *channel the power struggles* and to normalise the relationship between formal adversaries (Hoffman and Bercovitch, 2011).

Introduction

The eight-paragraph of the introduction seems to reveal an attempt to provide (2c) *political power-sharing* mechanisms with the statement “*reaching an overarching National Political Agreement designed to set out the institutional modifications and reforms that are needed to meet the challenges required by the peace, thereby implementing a new framework for political and social coexistence*” (p. 7). This quote sheds some light on the intent of the Colombian government to modify its institutions in order to provide “political “coexistence. However, this data is not strong enough to state that this

determinant is fully present and is assessed as (2) slightly present . Therefore, this analysis will search further for more data regarding political power-sharing mechanisms.

Chapter 1. Towards a New Colombian Countryside: Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR)

The central goal of the CRR is to, on the one hand, overcome inequality and poverty and achieve the wellbeing of the rural population, and on the other hand, closing the gap and the integration of the rural and urban areas. The thirteenth paragraph states that;

“The plans and programmes agreed as part of the CRR are to have a territorial-based, ethnic-based and gender-based perspective that will require the recognition and consideration of the economic, cultural and social needs, characteristics and peculiarities of Colombia’s territories, of women throughout their life-cycle, of rural communities and groups in vulnerable circumstances and guaranteeing socio-environmental sustainability” (p. 12).

This quote illustrates the degree to which the Agreement tackles the determinant (9) by *settling the political issues*. Here, the recognition of the different layers of the Colombian population, the different minority groups and territorial uniqueness are emphasized. In other words, this can mean that the CRR measures are tailor-made for every group and region. This is a way of solving the political issues because at the beginning of the same chapter it was specified that in the opinion of the FARC-EP the CRR measures should address “the historical causes of the conflict” such as land ownership, the exclusion of the rural population and the underdevelopment of rural communities, that especially affects girls, boys and women. This confession regarding the perspective of the FARC’s main Issues gives the analytical reasoning needed in order to connect the (9) *political issues* that the FARC wants to be resolved and the proposed solution that comes from the Agreement. This data reveals a strong connection between the issues that need resolving and the ways in which these will be addressed.

This statement is followed by the principles in which the solutions in the specific political issue CRR will rely on and in a way is a statement of intent from both parties that shows their commitment towards its implementation. The principles are:

“• Structural transformation

- Comprehensive development of rural areas*
- Equality and a gender-based approach*
- Well-being and quality of life*
- Prioritisation*

- *A comprehensive approach*
- *Reinstatement of the rights of the affected individuals and the reversal of the effects of the conflict and neglect of communities and territories*
- *Land titling*
- *The right to nutrition*
- *Participation*
- *Benefit, impact and measurement*
- *Sustainable development*
- *State presence*
- *Democratisation of appropriate use of and access to land”(p.12-14)*

These principles also provide the framework for how the parties will address this issues and thus further clarifies the specific problems that caused the civil war between the Colombian governments and the FARC. The principle “land titling” states that the unlawful possession of land will be combated “so that violence is never again used as a means of solving land-related disputes”(p.13), which can also be translated from the (10) determinant in which an agreement *channels the power struggle* using peaceful dispute resolution instead of violence. The fact that there will be clear measures that will mitigate the use of violence to settle a dispute make that this data has value (4) because it is already sufficient for affirming the presence of determinant (10).

The principle that calls for “active participation”, although not sufficiently, sheds some light into the determinant (15b) *Stable more democratic type of regime* which is accounted for country characteristics that can affect the sustainment of the Agreement. Here (15b) *state access* and transparency are supposedly guaranteed to the man and women in the affected communities. This observation is assessed as (1) insignificantly present because it is by far not sufficient to state this determinant as present yet. Furthermore, “State presence” can be seen as the contrary of belligerents retaining territorial control. This principle narrowly portrays the presence of (2b) *where belligerents do not hold territories*. The main difference between determinant (2b) and (15d) is that the first regards only wrote statements and the latter regards implicit data of the type of regime that Colombia has. This data is assessed with value 2. However, this data is not sufficient for confirming the presence of these determinants.

The following indentations concern the three subparagraphs that further specify the agreed goals of CRR. When analysing the first subparagraph, “access and use”, one can clearly see that these are mechanisms that aim at providing (7) *specific* information into how the (9) *political issues* are going to

be resolved. The strong presence of these determinants is laid out into 10 indentations that further specifies, among others, the source of land and beneficiaries of the 3 million hectares of land that will be distributed through the permanent “Land fund” within 12 years. The presence of these determinants is based on statements such as; *“priority is given to the victimised rural population, including associations of victims, rural women, female heads of households and displaced persons “* and *“also people and communities taking part in settlement and resettlement programmes”*, which further prioritizes the affected groups and former belligerents through which the (9) *political issues* are canalised. Here, determinant (7) is assessed as slightly present because this data is insufficient for granting a higher assessment and (9) is

Another determinant that has narrowly been shown in this part is (17) *no resource curse* that stems from the country characteristics. The statement that certain beneficiaries are to be prioritized for the purpose of *“protecting the environment, substituting crops used for illicit purposes and strengthening food production”*(p.16) confirms that there are illicit cultivations present in the Colombian rural regions and that there is a need for guidance in order for these practices to be substituted with legal cultivations. This data is assessed with value 1 because it indicates the importance of this determinant, however, is not enough for coding this determinant as present so far.

The quote *“the National government and the FARC-EP both wish to reverse the effects of the conflict, to achieve restitution for the victims of dispossession and forced displacement and the restoration of land rights to communities, and will promote the voluntary return of displaced men and women”*(p.18) reveals the presence of some determinants. First, it further affirms that the Agreement was (22) crafted by both parties (value 4). Secondly, it reveals that the provisions regarding the CRR are (11) balanced because both parties have to take actions in order to reverse the situation. This determinant is assessed with value 3 because this concerns only one of the six agreements which comprise the Final Agreement. This means that more data is needed to raise the value to a 4. The (11) balanced determinant would have to be present in all of the six agreements in order for it to be evaluated as fully present. Thirdly, one can clearly see that this is a call to resolve the (9) political issues that once led to the civil war (value 4). Lastly, this quote affirms the presence of a stable political regime regarding determinant (15d) where *belligerents do not hold territory* because the belligerents are not keeping their previously claimed territories and are encouraging the return of the displaced persons. However, this data is assessed only with value (2) because it requires further data to be conclusive about the presence of this determinant.

The section that states, for instance, that certain flexible and efficient mechanisms will be set up to resolve conflicts that regard the possession and use of land and the strengthening of food production largely depicts the presence of the determinants (10) *channelling power struggle* through institutions and (13) *joint dispute solving commission*. The determinant (15) *stable more democratic type of regime* also appears in this section because they promote the use of “*participative and decision-making spaces*” and “*set up mechanisms for social dialogue between national, regional and local authorities, small-scale farmer communities and also indigenous, black, Afro-descendent, Raizal and Palenquero communities, in addition to other communities where different ethnic and cultural groups coexist, and private-sector companies doing business in rural areas*” (p.19). In this regard, the belligerents are not excluded from state access which suggests that the Colombian government intend to broaden the use of their democratic institutions and aims at (10) *channelling the power struggles*. Determinants (10) and (15) were (2) slightly present because they provide clear guidelines for the parties to channel the power struggles and suggest that Colombia grants state access. However, this is not sufficient to assess them with a higher value. Determinant (13) was assessed as present.

In the prioritisation criteria regarding the structural transformation of all rural areas, there is another data that hints that the determinant (17) *no resource curse* is absent in the case of Colombia when stating that areas where “*illicit crop*” are present and “*other unlawful economies*” will be prioritized for transformation. Still, the assessment cannot be solemnly based on this data because from the summary one can see that there is one full chapter dedicated to this issue. Hat chapter will first be analysed before providing a verdict. Furthermore, the clauses that are specified in the “*participation mechanisms*” further support the data that this agreement provides arrangements that are in line with determinant (15b) that increases and broadens *state access* to all layers of the communities. Other arrangements illustrate that (9) *settle political issues* are the development of the irrigation infrastructure, the road infrastructure, electricity infrastructure and connectivity, with the focus on expansion and local prioritization. Others are social, health, rural education, housing, access to drinking water and poverty eradication. However determinant (15b) need more data for one its assessment to be raised from a (2) slight presence. This data also supports the assessment of determinant (9) *political issues* as being (4) present.

When delving into some of the conditions of these arrangements, it is noteworthy to mention that there is a great emphasis placed on equity, gender, persons with disabilities, ethnic groups and the specific need of the regions –the so-called territory-based approach- with special measures for women and children. This overall goal that has been identified so far exposes the presence of the determinant (15a) because there is no one group that is preferred by the state to receive sponsorship or support.

This indicator is assessed as (4) present because this data is based on the emphasis of the Final Agreement of the inclusion of all groups.

Another notion that has been identified, is that, for every specification on how the arrangement will be implemented there is almost always a statement that regards the “active participation of communities”, “technical assistance”, the promotion of proper application of the arrangement and in most cases the granting of subsidies for the purpose of the implementation of the previously mentioned set of arrangements. This supports the presence of the determinants (10) that *channels the power struggle* between former adversaries by installing peaceful institutions that regulate the relationship and the (15b) where the state grants *access* to the democratic processes to the regional population.