Network Governance
in Integration Policy:

The cases of
The Netherlands, Sweden
and Denmark

Ilse Groot

443634

Summer '18

Word Count: 24,995

First reader: Prof. K. Stapelbroek

Second reader: Dr. M. Onderco

Abstract

The integration of migrants has become an increasingly salient problem, most notably since the migration crisis of 2015. While governments have attempted to develop policies to integrate migrants as much and as soon as possible, the quality of such integration policies has not directly accounted for the actual successes or failures of integration. While the reasons for successful integration outcomes have remained unclear, since 2001 the concept of network governance has increasingly become a more popular method of governance. This new method includes the management of a network of actors that cooperate in either policy-making or policy implementation. Yet, insights into the effects of network governance in integration policy have remained limited. Therefore, using the cases of The Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark through a multiple-case study analysis, this thesis aims to discover whether network governance is an additional cause in explaining the level of successful integration. The results have shown that indeed a number of elements of network governance, which include the number of actors, alignment of goals, and trust, positively influence the levels of integration in the aforementioned cases. In contrast, the elements of communication and leadership within the network have shown to not influence integration levels.

Acknowledgement

I look back at the process of thesis writing in a surprisingly positive way. Although the process has certainly included moments of hardship and stress, I cannot say that I have not personally and professionally grown from the experience.

Cooperation, whether in integration policy or in any other topic, brings us to greater results and outcomes than we could achieve by ourselves. And, for that reason, I need to thank everyone who has helped and cooperated with me during the process of writing this thesis. So, thank you Professor Stapelbroek for keeping me on track during my periods of stress and indecisiveness, and thank you to my peer students in my thesis circle who have forced me to 'let it go' and who have made this process incredibly fun. Thank you to all my other peer students who have made sitting in the library all day bearable, and last but definitely not least, thanks to all my friends and my family who all have shown and provided me with their unconditional support.

Ilse Groot

Index

List of Tables

List of Figures

Introduction

The migration crisis of 2015 has continuously put pressure on both the European Union (EU) and its individual Member States. Although migration policy has overshadowed the EU agenda for several years, the problem of integrating these migrant groups has presented new challenges. While successful integration is key to maximizing "the contributions that immigration can make to EU development", unsuccessful integration can lead to social and economic challenges such as high unemployment, economic and political costs, and discrimination (European Commission, 2017b, n.p.; Gurría, 2016).

On 7 June 2016, the European Commission adopted the Action Plan on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, which provides an idealistic framework for its Member States to develop and strengthen their integration policies (European Commission, 2017a). This action plan further reestablishes the support of the EU to prior documents that call for specific action on integration, like the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy of 2004 and the Common Agenda for Integration in 2005. Despite the 2017 action plan, Member States are still individually responsible for their national integration policy, which has led to highly differentiated integration policies within the EU.

Within EU Member States, integration policies are considered to be either favorable or unfavorable for migrants (Huddleston et al., 2015). One way to assess whether a country pursues favorable or unfavorable policies is through the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX); a public index set up by different research institutions but funded by the EU. A rating is provided based on multiple national policies that relate to integration, and as such determines for each country to what extent a favorable policy for the integration of migrants is pursued. For example, a high rating is provided when migrants have immediate access to the labor market, while a lower rating is provided when access is not immediate. Likewise, a high rating is provided when migrants faced with discrimination are protected by the law, while a low grade is provided when such institutions are not in place. Because MIPEX ranks countries based on their favorable integration policies and also publishes these scores, countries aim to have favorable integration policies as it provides them with 'high' scores and recognition, or, contrastingly, 'low' scores and disapproval (Huddleston et al., 2015). Therefore, favorable integration policies have a normative charge to it.

As MIPEX rates countries based on their 'performance' in terms of favorable integration policy, it would be expected that countries with the highest MIPEX scores are also the countries with the highest integration success rates. Yet, while Sweden is known for its favorable migration policies, it received low integration scores from both the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Eurostat research (2015; 2015). In contrast, Denmark is rated relatively low on favorable integration policies, but scores slightly better than Sweden (OECD, 2015). Although scoring between Denmark and Sweden concerning favorable integration policies, The Netherlands scores amongst the highest in actual integration results, as researched by the OECD (2015). Hence, favorable integration policies do not always correlate with successful integration. This finding is problematic, appears to be paradoxical, and it can therefore be argued that favorable integration policies alone do not provide sufficient explanation for successful integration.

It seems, therefore, that the success of integration is also influenced by additional factors. For example, the structure of governance has been argued to be of importance and even critical to performance (Edwards and Clough, 2005). Theories including 'multi-level governance', 'network governance', and 'collaborative governance' have received an increasing amount of attention for influencing the performance levels of organizations and policies (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Provan and Kenis, 2008; Ansell and Gash, 2017; Foss and Mahoney, 2010).

MIPEX scholars have recognized that both states and local governments deal with multiple challenges of integration, which have to do with the cooperation between different actors. First, there is a need for "different stakeholders to be more active in the design and decision-making process of policies for the integration of migrants and refugees" (Juzwiak, McGregor and Siegel, 2014 p. 1). Here, public institutions can benefit from greater capacities and knowledge provided by their network of stakeholders to develop integration policy. Secondly, a public institution can take advantage of competing businesses that have coinciding interests in integration policy (Juzwiak, McGregor and Siegel, 2014). Oftentimes, the organization and implementation of integration policy are inefficient, and so by utilizing businesses, governments are able to improve the infrastructure of integration policy. Again, the use of the network of a public institution can be utilized for the benefit of both public institutions and businesses. In doing so, the outcome of the policy – in this case successful integration – is positively influenced (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016).

Thus, if network governance does indeed positively influence the effectiveness of a policy, we should see higher integration scores in countries in which network governance is successfully applied. In contrast, lower integration scores should be perceived when network governance is not or unsuccessfully applied. Because the term 'network governance' is more all-encompassing than multi-level governance and focuses on the management of cooperating with stakeholders rather than the cooperation itself, this thesis will focus specifically on the effect of network governance.

Problem Statement

The motivation of this research resulted from the finding that the relationship between favorable policies towards integration and successful integration was found to be problematic, as shown by the examples of Sweden, Denmark and The Netherlands. This is an area of concern because the intention of integration policy, namely to improve the results of integration, is not directly related to its intended effect: higher integration levels.

A second area of concern relates to the effect of network governance on integration policy. While the main academic field of network governance is directed towards the creation and use of networks in policy implementation, this thesis is specifically directed towards the influence of network governance in a specific policy field. Following on from the proven effects of network governance in other policy fields, it would be expected that network governance has an influence on integration policy. Yet, whether network governance indeed has a positive influence on successful integration has not yet been established in academic research.

Research Goal and Research Question

It is this thesis' goal to determine whether the alternative factor of network governance can account for the mismatch between favorable integration policies and integration success. Although more factors could have an effect, previous studies have indicated the critical effect of governance structures on performance, while MIPEX has indicated challenges related to network governance. Thus, network governance is: a) a theoretical approach as academic literature argues that the use of network governance positively affects policy outcomes, and b) a practical application of a governance structure. Therefore, this thesis aims to discover whether, following the argumentation of the theoretical approach, network governance as a practical governance structure has an influence on the success of integration. Thus, this thesis

aims to examine whether the argumentation of academic literature on the positive effect of network governance indeed holds true for the case of integration policy.

Corresponding to the problem statement and the research goal, the following research question has been established:

> *"Does network governance in the field of integration policy contribute to successful integration in the cases of The Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark?"*

These cases of The Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark have been chosen because while they vary in policy score and integration outcome, they are very similar concerning other variables. A further explanation of this is provided in the case selection section of the research methods chapter.

In order to answer this research question, a number of sub-questions[1] have been established to serve as a guiding mechanism throughout this thesis:

1. How can successful integration be measured?
2. How is the complex concept of network governance composed?
3. Does the alignment of goals within a governance network contribute to integration outcomes?
4. Does the number of actors within a governance network contribute to integration outcomes?
5. Does trust within a governance network contribute to integration outcomes?
6. Does greater communication and coordination between actors in a governance network contribute to integration outcomes?
7. Do leadership activities within a governance network contribute to integration outcomes?

Relevance of the Research

The relevance of answering this research question is two-fold, in that it holds both theoretical and societal relevance.

---

[1] Sub-questions 3,4,5,6, and 7 have been established based upon the theoretical framework

Societal

The societal relevance of this research is related to the current challenges of integration within the European society. Not only are policies of multiculturalism deemed to have failed in countries like The Netherlands, all EU countries are currently facing the need to integrate migrants because of the migration crisis (Wiesbrock, 2011). Therefore, this research is especially relevant to policy-makers that design integration policy on EU level and that of individual Member States. In this way, policy-makers are more aware of the possible effect of additional factors, such as network governance, on integration. Consequently, this thesis can contribute to an increased level of integration, and, as such, in the words of the European Commission, contribute to the maximization of opportunities of legal migration within the EU (European Commission, 2017a).

Theoretical

The use of network governance has proven to be successful in other policy fields such as education, healthcare and transportation (O'Toole and Meier, 2004; Ball, 2009; Lewis, Baeza, and Alexander, 2008; Provan and Kenis, 2008; Mu and de Jong, 2015). Yet, in spite of the many accounts that list its success in the aforementioned fields, the influence of network governance in integration policy has not yet been examined in recent research. This highlights a gap in the literature; when concluding that favorable integration policies do not directly relate to successful integration, there must be other factors that influence integration levels as well. Therefore, this thesis addresses a double gap in the literature; the effect of network governance on integration policy, and the identification of an additional factor that can explain the levels of integration. Thus, this thesis contributes both to the network governance and integration policy literature.

Moreover, there is a lack of research on identifying successful integration policies and on the workings and successes of the engagement of other stakeholders (King and Lulle, 2016). Therefore, this research as well contributes to the understanding of such workings and network governance successes, specifically in the field of integration policy.

Structure

This thesis addresses both theoretical and empirical sections. Chapter 2 provides a literature review while in Chapter 3 a theoretical framework is provided in which the five most important elements of network governance are highlighted as identified by the literature.

Consequently, a research design, research methods, the operationalization and the introduction to the cases are provided in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 respectively. Thereafter, in Chapter 8 an analysis is provided in which the five elements of network governance are applied to the three cases. Finally, the conclusion in Chapter 9 brings together all aspects, and in Chapter 10 a discussion on the research is provided.

Literature Review

In order to answer the research question, this thesis will conduct a systematic literature review in which first the meaning of successful integration and its relation to integration policy is discussed. Second, this literature review will discuss the concept of network governance as a governance structure by analyzing a number of academic works of leading scholars in the field of network governance. Lastly, different kinds of networks and different network governance types will be outlined.

Integration Policy

According to Borkert and Penninx (2011) the EU and its Member States have traditionally seen migration as a one-off movement, yet, due to the consistent influx of migrants over the last few decades, they have developed new practices in integration policy. With the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the EU directed attention towards third-country nationals for the first time, while the European Commission issued its first communication only in 2003 that focused solely on inter-governmental coordination by sharing best practices (Süssmuth and Weidenfeld, 2005). Since 2003, the focus on integration policy has only intensified with Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in 2004, A Common Agenda for Integration in 2005, and recently the Action Plan on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in 2016.

The academic field on the topic of integration has directly followed migration trends and their political, economic and social consequences. It established quickly when it became evident that guest workers were continuing to reside in their host countries (Borkert and Penninx, 2011). Although the first wave in the 1990s focused on economic integration, increasingly attention shifted to the political participation of migrants (Zincone and Caponio, 2006). The third wave of integration research started to focus on the processes of how integration policies were developed, operationalized, and implemented (Borkert and Pennix, 2011). Currently, because of the migration crisis of 2015 and an increased interest of policy-makers on the matter, research has focused on the integration policy effectiveness. An overview of research on this relationship is provided later in this literature review. First, a definition needs to be provided on migration and migrants.

Integration policy of both the EU and that of its individual Member States is specifically directed towards third-country nationals, as identified by the EU Action Plan on the

Integration of Third-Country Nationals (European Commission, 2017c). When mentioning third country nationals, the EU refers to people from "a country that is not a member of the Union" (Eurofound, 2007, n.p.). As such, this includes both legal migrants and refugees that are inside the EU. Although integration policy is directed towards both legal migrants and refugees, there is a crucial difference between the two concepts. Whereas a refugee is "fleeing armed conflict or persecution … [and needs to seek] safety in nearby countries" a migrant "chooses to move … to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases education, family reunion, or other reasons" (UNHCR, 2016, n.p.). As EU and Member States' integration policy is directed towards both legal migrants and refugees, this thesis refers to 'successful integration' when the successful integration of third-country nationals, or, in other words, legal migrants and refugees, is meant.

In order to answer the research question on whether network governance contributes to the successful integration of legal migrants and refugees, the first step is to establish a definition of what integration is, and more importantly, what *successful* integration is. Thus, identifying integration as a concept is the first step in identifying the goal of integration policy. In this thesis, the definition of integration is taken from the 2011 International Organization for Migration (IOM) glossary on migration that defines integration as

> "the process by which migrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups. … [Integration] refers to a two-way process of adaptation by migrants and host societies. … It [implies] consideration of the rights and obligations of migrants and host societies, of access to different kinds of services and the labor market, and of identification and respect for a core set of values that bind migrants and host communities in a common purpose" (Perruchoud and Redpath-Cross, 2011 p. 51).

In addition to the focus on acceptance through a two-way adaptation, this thesis also emphasizes integration as a process. Therefore, when referring to integration, this thesis also takes into account that "Integration takes place simultaneously at the individual, family, and general community and State levels, and occurs in all facets of life: in fact integration can easily span a generation or more" (Council of the European Union, 2004 p. 15).

Successful Integration

Policy-makers design integration policy to deal with integration issues, and, as such, integration policies aim to have a positive impact on the integration of migrants. This is done through, among others, providing equal socio-economic rights, work-related trainings, and

anti-discrimination laws (Huddleston et al., 2015). MIPEX is set up to reflect on eight different indicators that identify whether a country pursues favorable or unfavorable integration policies: labor market mobility, education, political participation, access to nationality, family reunion, health, permanent residence, and anti-discrimination.

MIPEX bases its scores on the adherence of the country to international conventions, Council of Europe Conventions and EU Directives (MIPEX, n.d.). Whether countries adhere to these conventions and directives is determined by a first independent expert who fills in a questionnaire listing a total of 167 policy indicators in 8 policy areas, which is subsequently reviewed by a second independent expert (MIPEX, n.d.). When countries meet the best practices of the conventions and directives in such policy indicators, they receive the maximum score of 3 (MIPEX, n.d.). When countries are halfway there they receive the score of 2, and when a country does not meet the best practices at all the least favorable score of 1 is received (MIPEX, n.d.). This scoring, which is based on best-practices, has been criticized by several scholars, arguing that it is excessively normative and that it is mostly based on a European 'ideal', in which it is unclear why a selected policy receives more points than other policies (Bilodeau, 2016; Howard, 2009). Moreover, since best-practices are based on Council of Europe Conventions and EU Directives, survey questions are based on European policies and systems of governance, which do not necessarily directly translate to the ranked policies of countries are outside the EU (American Immigration Council, 2011). Yet, MIPEX scores have been proven to be highly reliable, as several tests have indicated that MIPEX scores directly match with alternative indicators of favorable integration policies that are only available for a limited time and for a limited number of countries (Bilodeau, 2016; Dronkers and Vink, 2012). Therefore, although MIPEX does have its limitations, it is a dataset that provides both reliable and the most complete data to determine whether countries pursue favorable policies for integration.

Whether or not integration policies actually positivey affect integration is extensively discussed and disputed in academic literature. Although many scholars take on different methodologies to determine this relationship, Bilgili, Huddleston and Joki (2015) argue that research that links MIPEX scores of specific policies one-on-one with OECD integration outcomes – for example, labor market policies and immigrant unemployment rates – are most fit to identify a direct relationship between integration policy and integration policy outcomes. This one-on-one relationship between favorable policies and integration outcomes can be

established by linking the data of the MIPEX favorable policies with the OECD Integration Outcomes, as can be seen in Table 1.

MIPEX Favorable Policies	OECD Integration Outcomes
Labor Market Policies	Unemployment / Income
Education	Education & Training
Health	Health
Political Participation	Civic Engagement
Anti-Discrimination	Social Cohesion
Permanent Residence	*Housing*
Access to Nationality	
Family Reunion	

Table 1. Relationship Variables of Favorable Policies and Integration Outcomes

Most indicators of favorable integration policies can be directly linked to integration outcomes. For example, integration policies focused on the labor market should result in a lower level of unemployment among migrants. However, permanent residence, access to nationality, and family reunion do not have a direct or complete counterpart in integration outcomes. This could be explained by, although these three factors do provide for favorable integration policies for migrants, they cannot be utilized to directly measure integration outcomes.

Looking back at the definition of integration, the aim of integration policy can be regarded as the acceptance of migrants into society. This aim, 'the acceptance of migrants into society' can thus be seen as the general definition of successful integration. Following on from the research of the OECD, it is seen how this acceptance is supported by policies on, amongst others, employment and education to, so to say, close the gap of differences between migrants and the host society. This adds to the definition of successful integration. Successful integration thus entails the acceptance of migrants into society through the six indicators of the OECD: to relieve unemployment, provide education and health services, motivate civic engagement, develop a high level of social cohesion and to provide for housing.

The Relationship between Favorable Integration Policies and Successful Integration

The relationship between integration policies and successful integration is problematic. To provide further evidence and to further expand on this problematic relationship, the six indicators of the OECD Integration Outcome and their direct linkage to the indicator of the MIPEX Favorable Policies will be discussed.

For labor market integration, Bilgili, Huddleston and Joki (2015) stated that over eight studies that utilized MIPEX, they did not find a direct relation between integration policy in general and improvements for third-country nationals in the labor market. Yet, Aleksynska and Tritah (2013) find that in European countries where market access is equal for third-country nationals and nationals, immigrants find more jobs that match their qualifications. Similarly, for education policy Bilgili, Huddleston and Joki found in their literary research that "neither the general integration policy for non-EU adults nor the targeted educational policies seem to be a major factor determining immigrant pupils' outcomes" (2015, p. 17). As such, for certain indicators like labor market policies and education, a high number of researchers did not find a direct relationship between favorable integration policies and successful integration[2].

On the other hand, Aleksynka (2011) did find a direct correlation between policies focused on political participation and a higher civic engagement of immigrants. However, this outcome has been contested by several scholarly articles, which found no direct relation (Andre, Dronkers and Need, 2009; Voicu and Comsa, 2014). For social cohesion, Ziller (2015) found that immigrants in EU Member States that have strong anti-discrimination laws are more aware of their rights, and are thus more likely to take action when faced with discrimination. Yet, according to Bilgili, Huddleston and Joki (2015), anti-discrimination laws are not directly linked to increasing social cohesion, because their specific goal is to promote justice rather than decreasing the perception of discrimination levels.

To conclude, whilst for some of the 6 indicators as defined by the OECD a direct relationship seems to exist towards supporting successful integration, for other indicators this relationship has been strongly contested in the literature.

---

[2] See for example Cebolla-Boado and Finotelli (2014) for labor market policies and Schlicht-Schmalze and Moller (2012), and de Heus and Dronkers (2008) for education related policies.

Network Governance

Not only governments but also businesses and civil society are increasingly faced with complex societal problems. In order to deal with such problems, public organizations have attempted to cut through their traditional jurisdictions and move towards horizontal and vertical cooperation. In this way, public organizations have looked for innovation in, amongst others, the move from government to governance, and the inclusion of private and societal actors in policymaking and policy implementation (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016). Rather than maintaining their traditional top-down approach to solve issues, public organizations have started to utilize actors in their network to tackle societal problems (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016).

Networks, as defined by O'Toole and Meier, are "structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof … [and] exhibit some structural stability but extend beyond formally established linkages and policy-legitimated ties. The institutional glue congealing networked ties may include authority bonds, exchange relations, and coalitions based on common interest, all within a multi-unit structure" (2011, p. 55). Therefore, public organizations can take part of, and utilize networks, in order to solve issues that are in a common interest for other actors within the network. The term that is specifically related to such networks in which public organizations are involved to tackle a societal issue is 'governance networks'. Governance networks are defined as "more or less stable relations between mutually dependent actors, which cluster around policy problems, a policy program and/or a set of resources and which are formed, maintained, and changed through one or more series of interactions" (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016, p. 11).

The term network governance originates from the management of such governance networks. It is generally considered as a form of governance in which decision-making takes place within the networks of public organizations (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016). Klijn and Koppenjan define network governance as "the set of conscious steering attempts or strategies of actors within governance networks aimed at influencing interaction processes and/or the characteristics of these networks" (2016, p. 11). This focus on governance, according to Provan and Kenis, "involves the use of institutions and structures of authority and collaboration to allocate resources and to coordinate and control joint action across the network as a whole" (2008, p. 231). Through its use, as such, it is possible to address conflict, develop the efficient use of resources and ensure supportive cooperation between network

members (Imperial, 2005). Yet, to achieve this, the management of the governance network plays an especially large role, as it is able to advance and facilitate further cooperation and coordination between actors.

The use of networks has been recognized by scholars and professionals due to the advantages related to expertise and resource-sharing (Provan and Kenis, 2008; O'Toole and Meier, 2011; Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). Other advantages that have been recognized include the increasingly efficient use of resources, increased competitiveness, greater amounts of capacity, and the enhancement of learning for both public and private organizations (Provan and Kenis, 2008; Alter and Hage, 1993, Brass et al., 2004; Huxham and Vangen, 2005).

As identified by Lecy, Mergel and Schmitz (2014), scholarly research has been focused on three spectrums of network governance and their overlap: policy formation networks, governance networks, and policy implementation networks. Figure 1 provides an oversight of the fields of network governance research and their overlap. Where policy formation research focuses on policy-making processes and the mobilization of actors, research on policy implementation analyzes the coordination between actors in the implementation phase (Lecy, Mergel and Schmitz, 2014). Lastly, research on governance networks specifically focuses on the use of governance networks in a field of policy (Lecy, Mergel and Schmitz, 2014).

Policy Formation   Governance Networks   Policy Implementation Networks
Networks

Figure 1. Current research focus Network Governance

Note: Adapted from "Networks in Public Administration: Current Scholarship in Review" by J.D. Lecy, I.A. Mergel and H.P. Schmitz, 2014, *Public Management Review,* 16(5), p. 649

Because this thesis specifically focuses on the use of network governance in the field of integration policy, the rest of this literature review focuses on the academic scholarship on the

middle field of research of 'governance networks' that address the use of network governance in public policy.

Network and Network Governance Types

Because the networks utilized by different public institutions never look the same, network governance similarly does not look the same. The way in which a network is constructed, or built up, is defined by the way the network is organized. According to Provan and Kenis (2008), network governance can be organized in three different ways, which are referred to as participant-governed networks, lead organization-governed networks, and network administrative organization. Table 2 provides an oversight of these types of network governance and the characteristics related to it: the level of trust, the number of participants, the goal-consensus within the network, and the need for network-level competences.

Network Governance Type	Trust	Number of participants	Goal Consensus	Need for Network level competences	Matching figure
Participant-governed network	High density	Few	High	Low	
Lead Organization-governed network	Low density, highly centralized	Moderate number	Moderately low	Moderate	
Network Administrative Organization (NAO)	Moderate density, NAO monitored by members	Moderate to many	Moderately high	High	

Table 2. Types of Network Governance

Note: Adapted from "Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness" by K.G. Provan and P. Kenis, 2008, *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,* 18(2), p. 237. And "Het Network-Governance Perspectief" [The Network-Governance Perspective] by P. Kenis and K.G. Provan, 2005, in T. Wentink (ed.) *Business Performance Management,* p. 301.

The main distinctions that define the types of network are based on how the network is arranged and negotiated by the network initiator, and secondly, whether the network is governed by its participants or an external actor (Provan and Kenis, 2008). For the participant-governed type, a network is governed by participants themselves with equal positions (Provan and Kenis, 2008). Yet, still, one of the participants can take the lead and become the main organizer. A lead organization-governed network is a network in which one of the network participants has a greater amount of power (Provan and Kenis, 2008). For example, in a network of businesses, a business with a significantly larger amount of resources can take the role of lead organizer. Here, decisions and activities that are key to the network are all coordinated by the lead-organizer (Provan and Kenis, 2008). Contrastingly, in a Network Administrative Organization (NAO) a separate actor or entity is set up solely to coordinate and govern the network, such as a government entity or a not-for-profit

organization (Provan and Kenis, 2008). According to Goldsmith and Eggers (2004), NAOs that are governed by a government entity are generally established to achieve broad objectives and are set up when the network is still forming in order to promote the growth of the network.

The way in which a network is build up is defined by the way the network is organized. According to Daugbjerg and Fawcett (2017), following from the three types of network governance as identified by Provan and Kenis (2008), four specific types of networks arise. These types are identified in Table 3, where the type of network is based on the capacity of the state to 'meta-govern', or, in other words, to manage its network, and secondly whether the network is inclusive or exclusive.

		Network Structure	
		Exclusive	**Inclusive**
State's Capacity to Meta-Govern	**High**	**I.** *State-Centered Exclusive Governance:* Medium input legitimacy High output legitimacy	**II.** *State-Centered Inclusive Governance:* High input legitimacy Medium output legitimacy
	Low	**III.** *Society-Centered Exclusive Governance:* Low input legitimacy Medium output legitimacy	**IV.** *Society-Centered Inclusive Governance:* High input legitimacy Low output legitimacy

Table 3. Four Types of Networks

Note: Adapted from "Metagovernance, Network Structure, and Legitimacy: Developing a Heuristic for Comparative Governance Analysis" by C. Daugbjerg and P. Fawcett, 2017, *Administration and Society*, 49(9), p. 1230.

Daugbjerg and Fawcett (2017) refer to the capability of the state to influence, steer and manage the network when defining the capacity of a state to meta-govern, which links to the types of network governance as indicated by Provan and Kenis. When determining whether the network structure is inclusive or exclusive, Daugbjerg and Fawcett (2017) look at the possibilities for access of actors inside a network structure.

In a State-Centered Exclusive Governance structure, the state is able to regulate and amend the network, which leads to a medium level of input legitimacy but a higher level of output legitimacy as decisions are made effectively (Daugbjerg and Fawcett, 2017). In a State-Centered Inclusive network, despite a high input legitimacy, it is likely that the high number of actors hinders the efficiency in decision-making (Daugbjerg and Fawcett, 2017). In a Society-Centered Exclusive Governance network, societal actors take on a central role, leading to low input legitimacy due to the limited autonomy of the state and the exclusive network (Daugbjerg and Fawcett, 2017). Lastly, the Society-Centered Inclusive network has low output legitimacy due to instability as a consequence of the high number of participants (Daugbjerg and Fawcett, 2017).

It is important to be aware of the differences between network governance and network structure for multiple reasons. By looking at different structures and types of network governance and networks, this thesis is able to highlight the complexity of network governance as a concept. Additionally, as will be addressed in the theoretical framework, these concepts can have an influence on network governance effectiveness.

Theoretical Framework

In this section, a theoretical framework is provided that will further guide the research on the effects of network governance. First, a model of effective network governance is introduced to portray the interconnectedness of the actors involved and the different types of elements involved in a governance network. In addition, the role and the elements of network governance are discussed respecting their influence on the effectiveness of network governance. Second, the most recognized and important elements of network governance are identified, briefly analyzed and related to the literature.

An (Effective) Network Governance Model

Provan and Milward (2001) have developed a model on how to evaluate network governance efforts of a public institution, which can be found in Figure 2. According to them, in order to establish the level of network effectiveness, three levels of analysis need to be made: a community level analysis, a network level analysis and an organization/participant level analysis (Provan and Milward, 2001). These three levels of analysis can be seen as three overarching concepts that divide specific elements of network governance into the three respective fields. Proven and Milward (2001) specifically highlight the interrelation between the different levels and argue that the combination of all three leads to effective network governance. Additionally, all levels directly relate to the key stakeholders: principals, clients and agents. Consequently, network level effectiveness is intertwined not only with different actors regarding key stakeholders, but also through the different levels of analysis.

A model that determines the effectiveness of network governance is highlighted because we are looking to answer the question of whether network governance has an influence on integration policy outcomes. Therefore, if the theory of network governance holds true - that it positively affects policy outcomes -, we should see improvements in policy outcomes when network governance is effective. Effectiveness is as a result defined as "the attainment of possible network outcomes that could not normally be achieved by individual organizational participants acting independently" following the definition of Provan and Kenis (2008, p. 230). As such, this model not only recognizes the interconnectedness between the elements of network governance and the actors involved, but the elements that are identified by this model can also be utilized to research whether the network governance efforts of governments are both present and effective.

Community Level
Effectiveness

Key Stakeholders:
Principals

Clients   Agents

Organization / Participant
Level Effectiveness

Network Level Effectiveness

Figure 2. Network Governance Model: Relationships between Effectiveness at Different Levels of Network Analysis and Influence by Key Stakeholders

Note: Retrieved and adapted from "Do Networks Really Work? A Framework for Evaluating Public-Sector Organizational Networks" by K.G. Provan and H.B. Milward, 2001, *Public Administration Review*, 61(4), p. 421.

As Klijn (2008a) argues, there are three kinds of analysis that can be used to analyze a network and network governance: one that analyzes the actors, one that analyzes the game and one that specifically analyzes the network. In this way, the model of Provan and Milward (2001) is able to do all three; it analyzes not only the actors through the participant level effectiveness, it also analyzes the network through the network level effectiveness, and the game through the interaction of stakeholders. In comparison, the more recent model of Ojo and Melloui (2016), as illustrated in Figure 3, solely analyzes the network, making the model of Provan and Milward more all encompassing. Consequently, this thesis takes the model of Provan and Milward (2001) as a starting point to analyze network governance, its effectiveness and consequently its effect on integration.

Figure 3. Analytical Network Governance Model

Note: Retrieved and adapted from "Deploying Governance Networks for Societal Challenges" by A. Ojo and S. Melloui, 2016, *Government Information Quarterly*, p. 3.

Elements of Network Governance

Aside from the different levels of effectiveness that the model of Provan and Milward (2001) provide, the specific elements of network governance also need to be defined. In this thesis, elements are defined as the combination of specific fundamental requirements that together make up the concept of successful network governance. As a high number of elements of network governance have been established in the literature, Table 4 is utilized to identify the most pressing elements of network governance to limit the scope of this thesis. By identifying these elements, it becomes possible to identify network governance efforts within integration policy and ultimately establish the relationship between network governance and successful integration.

The horizontal axis lists the authors that have identified elements of effective network governance. They are identified by numbers that match with those numbers listed below Table 4 to identify the authors and year of publication. This thesis utilizes both recent and older articles, as long as the articles are highly recognized within the literature. The elements in the vertical axis are divided by category as identified by Provan and Kenis (2008). An 'X' in a certain field identifies which author has identified what elements as an important element for effective network governance. Finally, the 'total' refers to the number of times the element has been mentioned by different scholars. For example, if 'trust' has been mentioned by 7 different academic authors, the total score is 7. This total defines and indicates the importance of network governance elements.

Authors / Elements	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	Total
Community level																
Cost to community	X															1
Building social capital	X			X	X	X	X		X		X					7
Public perception issue is solved	X															1
Network Level																
Alignment of goals	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	14
Number of actors	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X		X	12
Trust (building)	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	14
Network organization (NAO etc.)	X		X		X	X	X		X			X		X		8
Communication / coordination	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	13
Maturity of the network (history)	X		X	X	X		X		X		X			X		8
Commitment	X			X	X						X	X		X	X	7
Task competencies	X	X	X		X							X		X		6
Learning		X	X	X			X			X	X	X				7
Accountability			X	X	X	X		X	X	X			X		X	9
Mutual dependency (resources)			X		X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	9
Organization/ Participant Level																
Build legitimacy	X	X		X				X	X	X	X		X			8
Manage conflict	X			X					X		X					4
Leadership	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	15
Access to network	X	X		X												3
Cost of services	X		X	X		X	X									5

Table 4. Elements that have the Ability to Influence outcomes of Network Governance
Note: 1. Provan and Milward (2001); 2. Provan and Kenis (2008); 3. Ojo, Janowski and Estevez (2011); 4. Klijn and Koppenjan (2016); 5. Agranoff and McGuire (2001); 6. Scharpf (1994*); 7. Meier and O'Toole (2007); 8. Bryson (2004); 9. Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006); 10. Christensen and Laegreid (2006); 11. Emerson et al. (2011); 12. De Vries, Bekkers and Tummers (2016); 13. Rhodes (n.d.); 14. Johnson et al. (2003); 15. Drost and Pfisterer (2013).

Table 4 presents an overview of the importance of network governance elements based on the literature. Five factors from the table are mentioned most often in the literature to enhance network governance effectiveness and its outcomes: alignment of goals, number of actors, trust (building), communication/coordination, and leadership. As such, these five factors will be utilized to research the effect of network governance on successful integration. Table 5 presents an overview of the chosen elements, a definition, and their indicated importance by the network governance literature.

Academic importance	Element	Definition
14/15	Alignment of Goals	All actors have a shared understanding on what they collectively want to achieve
12/15	Number of Actors	The amount of active actors in a governance network
14/15	Trust (building)	The development of a perception of trust where actors believe other actors to be reasonable, dependable and predictable
13/15	Communication / Coordination	Active communication and coordination within the network
15/15	Leadership	The presence of a leader that actively performs activities to initiate and facilitate network cooperation

Table 5. Most important Network Governance elements based on literature

In order to define expectations from the five elements, each element will be briefly discussed after which an expectation will be formulated.

Alignment of Goals

In the words of Provan and Kenis (2008): "the general argument has been that consensus in goals and 'domain similarity' allows organizational participants to perform better than when there is conflict" (p. 11). Thus, not only must actors within a network adhere to goals that have been set by their own organization, but they also need to be responsive to the goals of the entire network. The first alignment of goals on a network level relates to the exact agreement of the problem, or in other words, the problem definition (Bryson, Crosby and Stone, 2006). Yet, when a problem has been recognized by a larger amount of actors beyond the public institution, the plurality of perceptions on how that problem should be solved still needs to be dealt with (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016). Additionally, when cooperating through a network, a consensus has to be found as well when determining the goals of cooperation.

Through network governance, multiple steps can be undertaken to secure the alignment of goals, such as managing network members with similar goals and processes within the network as well as the utilization of the intertwinement of goals between actors (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016; Provan and Kenis, 2008). As such, innovative solutions such as an integrated design, the creation of package deals, the mitigation of measures, the optimization of the scope and the development of multiple objectives through cooperation need to be taken up by the management of the network (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016).

The alignment of goals can have a large impact on the effectiveness of the network, and as a result, on the outcome. Not only does an agreement in this sense help to identify the stakes or interest of an organization, it also portrays the need of the network to cooperate in order to solve the problem that has been defined (Bryson, Crosby and Stone, 2006; Isett and Provan, 2005). Lastly, a high level of goal alignment even contributes to the commitment of actors to the goals that are set on the network-level (Provan and Kenis, 2008).

Following from the research on the importance of goal consensus in network governance and taking our cases into account, expectation (E1) has been established:

E1: *The alignment of goals within an integration governance network has a positive effect on integration policy outcomes*

Number of Actors

According to Provan and Kenis (2008), a fundamental problem of network governance is the accommodation of the activities, needs and goals of multiple actors. Although there is no set optimal number of actors for a governance network, "inter-organizational policy-making requires correct identification of necessary participants and a lack of opposition from other actors with the ability to block the initiative" (Klijn, 2008, p. 12; Rhodes, n.d.). As a result, when the number of organizations that are participating in a governance network is high, the network can become difficult to manage and govern due to sub-groups of organizations with their own individual interests and the need to accommodate all such interests in the inter-organizational policy-making process.

Because an actor can be defined as an individual, a group, or an entire organization, difficulties can arise to establish which groups or sub-groups are acting independently and out of their own interests (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016). For example, a government can be

recognized as one actor, but different ministries or different layers of government can have different policy interests. In line with this, some actors might be perceived as more critical due to their large amounts of power, authority or resources that can heavily influence cooperation (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016).

According to Ojo, Janowski and Estevez (2011), there is a need to develop a governance structure and mechanism to determine the number of actors that is optimal for a certain network. Provan and Kenis (2008) argue that the effectiveness of a network is dependent on the match between the number of actors and the organization of the network. They argue that a large network of more than 10 organizations is more effective when governed through a broker organization that is either a lead organization or has a NAO-structure (Provan and Kenis, 2008). On the other hand, when a network is small with less than 10 actors, a participant-governed network is more effective (Provan and Kenis, 2008).

Because there is never a 'correct' amount of participants within a network, and when keeping the research question in mind, expectations (E2 and E3) have been established:
E2: *A participant-governed network has a positive effect on the outcome of integration policies when there are less than 10 actors active in a governance network.*

E3: *A broker organization has a positive effect on the outcome of integration policies when there are 10 or more actors active in a governance network.*

Trust (Building)
The presence of trust not only consistently lowers transportation costs through the efficient exchange of resources, but also information from actors that are trusted is seen to be more reliable (Imperial, 2005). Additionally, trust within a network develops the relationships between members of a network and can thereby improve cooperation.

Trust has often been discussed in the literature on network governance (Provan and Kenis, 2008; Edelenbos and Klijn, 2007). It is considered to be a key issue and is defined as "the willingness to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations about another's intentions or behaviors" (McEvily, Perrone and Zaheer, 2003, p. 93). Key concepts that are often mentioned in the literature that relate to trust are 'vulnerability', 'predictability' and 'risk'. In order to build trust within a network, actors need to be willing to put themselves in a

vulnerable position and have a susceptible attitude. By taking on such a stance, actors risk suffering from opportunistic behavior of other actors. Consequently, the predictability of behavior plays a large factor in the development of trust within a network.

Klijn, Steijn and Edelenbos (2010) developed five indicators of trust within a network and their effect on the performance of the network: agreement trust, benefit of the doubt, reliability, absence of opportunistic behavior, and goodwill trust. Through the use of these indicators, a strong correlation has been found between trust and network performance by Klijn et al. (2015). First, agreement trust refers to the trust that is established when all actors involved are complying with the agreements that have been made within the network (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016). Secondly, 'benefit of the doubt' trust refers to a kind of trust where actors simply believe other actors based solely on their word (Klijn, Steijn and Edelenbos, 2010). Thirdly, reliability means that actors take the intentions of each other into account. Fourthly, for the absence of opportunistic behavior, actors within the network do not misuse the input of other actors for their individual benefit (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016). Lastly, for goodwill trust, actors within a network are convinced of and trust in the good intentions of other actors (Klijn et al., 2015).

Following the argument of Provan and Kenis (2008), trust should not only occur between actors individually within the network but should also occur throughout the network as a whole. According to them, it is not necessary for this network-level trust to be deep as the network will still function, but that a dense web of trusted connections provides a broad and stable basis for cooperation within the governance network (Provan and Kenis, 2008).

Following from the literature on trust within network governance, expectation (E4) has been established:
E4: *A basic level of trust between actors in an integration governance network has a positive effect on integration policy outcomes*

Communication / Coordination
A fundamental problem of network governance is the coordination of activities, needs and goals of participants in a governance network (Provan and Kenis, 2008; Johnson et al., 2003). Communication and coordination not only facilitates relationships between participants and the network as a whole, but is also helpful to assign roles and to create consensus within a

network (Isett and Provan, 2015). Yet, again, communication is also dependent on the network structures and organization (Provan and Milward, 1999). In formal and public-sector networks a broker or lead organization is often utilized which guides and coordinates communication.

To deal with issues of coordination, Johnson et al. (2003) argue that policy-makers can improve their coordination through pre-planning and the involvement of key actors in the decision-making process. They argue that by communicating about issues, every participant is at least aware of the problems at play within the network (Johnson et al., 2003). As a result, by updating the participants, miscommunication can be prevented. To guarantee this, not only direct communication (such as via meetings or e-mail) is necessary, but a personal relationship should also be maintained and promoted (Johnson et al., 2003). Following this argument, Imperial (2005) argues that a high frequency of interaction between members of the network leads to a better common understanding and thus improves performance. Additionally, Emerson et al. (2011) argue that it is the quality of the communication that positively affects performance, as it is efficient in resolving conflicts. Consequently, communication should involve active listening, thoughtful examination of problems within the network and open and inclusive communication for all members (Emerson et al., 2011).

As a result, expectation (E5) has been established:

E5: *Frequent and qualitative communication within an integration governance network has a positive effect on the outcome of integration policies.*

Leadership

A vast majority of the literature on network governance argues that leadership is a crucial element for innovation and performance, and as such a variety of leadership qualities have been identified (Ricard et al., 2017; Johnson et al., 2003; Tummers and Knies, 2013). Leadership is defined as "the presence of an identified leader who is in a position to initiate and help secure resources and support [for the network]" (Emerson et al., 2011, p. 9). Johnson et al. (2003) argue that in order to break through issues within the network and to secure successful cooperation between different actors, strong leadership is necessary.

Ricard et al. (2017) differentiate between five different types of leadership: transactional leadership, transformational leadership, interpersonal leadership, entrepreneurial leadership

and network governance leadership. For this thesis, network governance leadership is of course the most interesting type of leadership. Ricard (2017) argues that a network governance leader is a facilitator that has the ability to bring actors together, arranges processes and sets ground rules, and ensures that within the network new content is created that is innovative and interesting for all actors. The main task of a network governance leader is to facilitate cooperation, to mediate between the different actors and to empower those participants to strive towards cooperation (Tummers and Knies, 2013; Ricard et al, 2017). According to Klijn, Steijn and Edelenbos (2010) and McGuire and Agranoff (2011), key concepts for network leaders are: examining available actors, connecting, facilitating, exploring, engaging, developing trust, cooperation, and openness to new ideas and perceptions on issues and solutions.

In order to be a successful network governance leader, multiple actors have identified the following qualities for a leader: communication, stakeholder management, commitment, problem-solving, a long-term perspective, mobilization, working collectively, and a neutral stance within the network concerning solutions and preferences (Johnson et al., 2003; Emerson et al., 2011; Bryson, 2004; Skogstad, 2003; Bryson, Crosby, and Stone, 2006;). Moreover, Emerson et al. (2011) highlight the need for either positive or negative incentives in order to motivate leaders and the participants within a network to engage in a network to solve collective issues.

As a result, from the literature on network governance leadership, expectation (E6) has been established:

E6: *The presence of a network governance leader that engages in leadership activities within an integration governance network has a positive effect on the outcome of integration policies.*

Research Design

In order to answer the research question on whether network governance in the field of integration policy contributes to successful integration, it is necessary to discuss the research design that fits best with the aims of this research. A research design not only "guides the investigator in the process of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting observations" it also "allows the researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under investigation" (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992 p. 77-78). Yet, in order for a research design to discipline the process of doing research it needs to match the aims of the research, based on the type of research question, whether the researcher has control over the unit studied, and lastly whether a contemporary or historical event is studied (Yin, 1994). First, this study aims to create an in-depth understanding of a specific phenomenon: the influence of network governance on integration policy. Moreover, because the effect and the application of the identified network governance elements to integration outcomes are specifically researched, a qualitative study was the better fit to address this context-specific research question. In addition, because the integration of migrants following the migration crisis of 2015 concerns a contemporary event and there is no control over the unit of analysis, the second decision towards a case study was taken.

Rather than a single case study analysis, however, a multiple-case study analysis has been chosen for a number of reasons. First, in a multiple case study analysis, a 'replication' logic is applied, in which is sought for a theoretical generalization, rather than a statistical generalization (Yin, 1994). Therefore, a multiple case study analysis increases the robustness of the study's external validity. This study originated from its interest in the disconnection between integration policy and integration success. Therefore, in order to explain this disconnection that can be found in Sweden, Denmark and The Netherlands, a multiple case analysis is necessary.

As with any other design, a case study design has its strengths and weaknesses regarding construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. Regarding construct validity, which is often a pitfall for case study research, it is necessary to define specific concepts used, to relate them back to the original goal of the research and to develop operationalization measures that link directly to the concepts defined (Yin, 2014). Where the concepts have already been defined and linked to the original goal of this research, the specific operationalization of these elements is provided in the section of operationalization.

To maintain internal validity, it is necessary to utilize the analytical tools of explanation building and pattern-matching (Yin, 2014). In pattern-matching, several parts of a case relate back and can be directly linked to a theoretical proposition (Yin, 1994). In this thesis is looked for 'patterns' within the three different cases that can be linked to the five selected elements of network governance. Explanation-building is a type of pattern-matching, where following the matching of patterns, patterns are utilized to provide an explanation for the case. Thus, when the elements of network governance are applied to the case, it can be established through an oversight of evaluations whether elements of network governance do indeed contribute to integration (Yin, 2014). A relationship can be established when, for example, through pattern-matching, it is concluded that in Sweden – while having a high level of favorable policies –, a low level of trust persists within its governance network and a low level of integration is found. Consequently, both pattern-matching and explanation-building are utilized. Thirdly, to strengthen external validity, instead of one case, multiple cases are analyzed. Therefore, although perhaps no statistical generalization is provided as in co-variational research, a multiple-case study analysis is able to provide analytical generalization. Lastly, every step has been taken as securely as possible and has been noted down in order to provide for reliability.

To conclude, a qualitative multiple-case study research will be conducted, in which three different cases with contrasting results but similar as possible in other perspectives need to be selected. By comparing the three different cases and by looking at the different elements of network governance, it becomes possible to determine whether the elements of network governance, and thus network governance as a whole, contributed to integration. These specific elements were deductively created from the literature on network governance in the theoretical framework. On the one hand, this thesis can be considered as theory testing as it tests whether the claim of network governance - that utilizing and managing the network of an organization positively influences performance – indeed holds and that in this case, performance, in terms of successful integration, is enhanced. On the other hand, it could too be argued that this thesis is theory building on network governance in integration policy specifically, and, as a result, has an inductive aspect.

Research Methods

This thesis addresses network governance, a meta-level concept in which the elements of leadership, alignment of goals, numbers of participants, communication and trust are difficult to be found within public policy documents and measured in specific data. Because the elements of network governance are abstract as a concept and subjective regarding measurement, different sources of information were utilized to check whether they would produce the same results. By utilizing different sources of information as such, triangulation of data takes place, which in turn increases the internal validity of this study.

A focus on three different perspectives or sources is taken to define for each case to what extent each concept of network governance is applied to the development and implementation of integration policy. First, the literature concerned with network governance and integration policy in the cases of Sweden, Denmark and The Netherlands has been utilized. This way, it is possible to stand on the shoulders of other scholars who have conducted interviews and generated more information through internal policy documents. Secondly, the policy documents that are publicly available and that are either in Dutch or English are utilized to further provide evidence for the five concepts of network governance. Lastly, the documents and information provided by Dutch, Swedish and Danish authorities and organizations are utilized to find further evidence for the conclusions developed from the literature and the publicly available policy documents.

Due to the availability of data, an emphasis has been placed on the effect of network governance on successful integration in The Netherlands. Firstly, the author is better able to read policy documents that have been written in Dutch and, secondly, it was also possible to interact more fluently with policy officers specialized in integration policy. As a result, the cases of Sweden and Denmark are analyzed in comparison to the Dutch case.

Due to the focus on The Netherlands, it was necessary to develop contact with different actors outside of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (SZW). Therefore, the agency of VluchtelingenWerk ('RefugeeWork') and the Stichting Nieuw Thuis ('Foundation New Home') were also contacted. In this way, a better overview of the network governance efforts of the public institutions of The Netherlands can be provided as it specifically addresses different perspectives and perceptions of different organizations.

In the analysis section, the data is provided per concept of network governance and showcased per case. For each case within each element of network governance, evidence is provided of scholarly literature, publicly available policy documents and internal documents of public institutions of Sweden, Denmark and The Netherlands. When evidence seems to favor either the presence or absence of one element of network governance, additional indicators are utilized to serve as proxies to provide clear indications of the network governance elements. This is further explained in the operationalization section. Finally, the reflection section provides some additional reflection on the research methods utilized.

Case Selection

In order to analyze the effect of network governance on integration policy outcomes, the selected cases need to fulfill four criteria. First, the cases need to be selected so that they "either (a) predict similar results or (b) produce contrasting results but for predictable reasons" (Yin, 1994, p. 46). Thus, for this research, out of the original interest for the contrasting integration results that integration policies produced, cases need to be selected in which a disparity between integration outcomes and favorable integration policies are found. Further, Yin recognizes the 'predictable' variable as the variable that is researched, which in this case is network governance. If all cases turn out as predicted, Yin (1994) argues that a theoretical replication has been established. In contrast, however, when not all cases turn out to be as predicted, no theoretical replication has been established.

In addition to selecting cases with differing results regarding a disparity between integration results and integration policy, to cover the broadest possible scope of a mismatch between the two variables, this thesis aims to research all three possible integration outcomes (low integration, intermediate integration and high integration outcomes). Thus, cases do not only need to show a disparity between integration policies and outcomes, each case must also represent a different integration outcome. In Appendix A, a table is provided in which the cases that are researched by both MIPEX and the OECD are presented. Because the OECD index on integration outcomes does not provide scores or a ranking similar to MIPEX, in this table, first, only the scores for favorable integration policies are laid out and divided into six sections: favorable, slightly favorable, halfway favorable, slightly unfavorable, unfavorable, and critically unfavorable policies. We see that only two countries score 'favorable', while only three countries score 'slightly unfavorable' or below. This leaves 28 countries in a middleground, in which, despite the highly differing scores, most countries are put together in

the same scoring box. Therefore, specifically for this middle ground, a new distribution has been created that has divided the countries that score between 41 and 79 into three equal sections: average-high, average, and average-low.

A second condition refers to the number of cases that need to be selected. In line with Yin's argument that the number of theoretical replications needs to be "related to your sense of the complexity of the realm of validity," this thesis has chosen for a smaller number of cases (1994, p. 50). Not only are there limitations concerning time and space within this research, this study remains a case study analysis that aims to create an in-depth understanding of the influence of network governance on integration policy. As such, by increasing the number of cases, the ability to provide an in-depth understanding of the five elements of network governance is decreased. For this reason, in combination with the aim to research all three possible integration outcomes and the necessity to select cases with a clear mismatch between favorable integration policies and integration outcomes, three cases will be selected: one where there are low integration outcomes but high favorable policy scores, one with intermediate integration outcomes and either higher or lower policy scores, and one case with high integration outcomes with a lower level of favorable policy scores.

When looking at the table in Appendix A, only the cases of Sweden and Portugal score high on favorable integration policy levels. A fourth requirement is used: a sufficient amount of data and information needs to be available for the case. After doing some research concerning network governance on the cases of Portugal and Sweden, the case of Portugal barely provides any information in English academic research and policy documents. In Table 19 in Appendix A, the Swedish levels of favorable integration policies have been laid out that are subsequently related one-on-one to integration outcomes regarding labor, education, health, civic engagement and social cohesion. As can be seen from this table, although Sweden has favorable integration policies, the OECD provides them with low integration scores. As a result, the first case chosen for this research is Sweden.

A fourth condition is set to increase the internal validity of this research. Following the 'method of difference' (Mill, 1875), the cases selected need to be as similar as possible on other variables. Because Sweden is the sole country that provides a clear contrast between high favorable policy scores and low integration outcomes while providing a sufficient amount of data, the case of Sweden is taken as a starting position. As a result, the two

remaining cases – where one case has a low favorable policy score and a higher integration outcome, and the other intermediate integration outcomes but either a higher or a lower favorable policy score – need to be as similar as possible to the case of Sweden, regarding for example, geography, socioeconomic conditions, political uprisings against migrants and the presence of similar immigrant groups. As a result, the cases of Finland (average-high), Norway (average-high), Denmark (average), The Netherlands (average) and Iceland (average-low) have been more closely examined.

The cases of The Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark have specifically been chosen because they are all positioned in the Northern part of Western Europe, they have all faced similar uprisings against migrants, have similar socioeconomic conditions, and lastly, the cases are all popular destination countries of both recent and humanitarian migration. Sweden represents the case with a low integration outcome and high favorable integration policies; The Netherlands represents the case of a high integration outcome and an average favorable policy score; while Denmark scores slightly below The Netherlands concerning favorable integration scores, it scores slightly higher than Sweden on integration levels. In Table 19 of Appendix A an oversight can be found of the countries' favorable integration policies related one-on-one with integration outcomes. Below, in Table 6, a short overview of the cases, their favorable integration scores, their success regarding integration and how the outcomes are differing can be found.

Case	Favorable Policy Score
Sweden	High
The Netherlands	Average
Denmark	Average (lower)

OECD Integration Outcome
High
Intermediate
Low

Table 6. Cases, Favorable Policy Scores and OECD Integration Outcomes

Data Collection, Selection and Analysis

As has already been discussed in the literature review, it is important to mention that MIPEX, despite its connection to the EU, has been criticized for its normative function and its representation of the European 'ideal' of favorable integration policies. Yet, despite these limitations, the data of MIPEX has proved to be reliable following the tests of several scholars. Additionally, because it is the most complete dataset available that indicates a clear

rating of favorable integration policy scores, it is the most suitable dataset for this thesis to identify whether a country maintains favorable integration policies or not.

Regarding the data utilized in the analysis, three different types of data are utilized to provide evidence from multiple perspectives: literature, publicly available documents and internal policy documents. The individual institutions provided the documents upon request of the author via e-mail. An overview of all data and documents utilized per casecan be found in Appendix B.

This thesis specifically follows a qualitative research design based on a multiple-case analysis as proposed by Yin (1994). Multiple content analyses have been conducted of scholarly research, publicly available documents and internal documents of public institutions of Sweden, Denmark and The Netherlands. For each element of network governance, expectations have been established in the theoretical framework. Consequently, each element has been operationalized through the theoretical framework and throughout the process of the analysis of the literature and documents, and also conforms to the method of latent coding as will be explained further in the operationalization sector. In the following chapter, the operationalization of each element is further elaborated on. The analysis establishes whether each indicator is present or not present in each case, by pattern-matching the evidence provided by the documents to the indicators of the operationalization section.

Operationalization of Elements

The aim of this section is to translate the elements of network governance into measurable units. Although the theoretical framework identified the alignment of goals as the first element of network governance, this operationalization will start with the element that focuses on the number of actors. This is because the number of actors directly portrays a clear overview of the actors involved, which provides a better basis to analyze the other elements of network governance.

Secondly, as this is a qualitative study, this thesis makes use of qualitative coding. Because concepts like the alignment of goals or trust are not directly tangible and are not easy to deduct into specific indicators, this thesis utilizes qualitative latent coding to define the underlying meaning of literature, public documents and received policy documents, and link that meaning to the five elements of network governance (Babbie, 2013). As such, the analysis provides phrases and contexts that highlight the presence or non-presence of a code. Evaluations are based on the context of all researched documents, in line with latent coding, which defines whether a code is present or not (Babbie, 2013). For all elements except for the number of actors, the total number of evaluations has been equally distributed to represent three possibilities: a high level, an intermediate level, and a low level. For example, in the case of trust, six evaluations concerning six codes are made in the conclusion. Therefore, if for zero, one or two evaluations the answer is 'yes', a low level of trust is found, while for three or four evaluations with 'yes', an intermediate level of trust is found, and finally, for five or six evaluations with a 'yes', a high level of trust is found.

It is important to note that when utilizing public documents, there is a need to utilize and identify proxies of elements such as trust, communication and leadership, as public documents do not directly address the level of trust or leadership within a governance network. Therefore, following the methodology of latent coding, not only are codes defined following the theoretical framework, new codes are also generated from the content of the available documents (Babbie, 2013). Because five elements of network governance are utilized in this thesis, it is important that there is no overlap between the elements as that case elements can influence each other. As a result, specifically for leadership, only direct leadership activities within the network are considered, while in other elements, activities that also indicate leadership are excluded.

Number of Actors

In the theoretical framework the following two expectations have been established:

E2: *A participant-governed network has a positive effect on the outcome of integration policies when there are less than 10 actors active in a governance network.*

E3: *A broker organization has a positive effect on the outcome of integration policies when there are 10 or more actors active in a governance network.*

As such, the operationalization of the number of actors needs to be organized in such a way that it identifies whether the governance network is participant-governed or has a broker organization, and secondly how many actors are involved in policy-making and implementation. In Table 9, codes have been identified based on the available documents and the theoretical framework that can identify the evaluation of the number of actors and the type of governance network. In the analysis, this thesis will look for the identified codes through latent coding.

Category	Code	Meaning	Evaluation Actors and Network Type	Evaluation Match
Number of Actors	Mentioning	How many other actors mentioned on websites, policy documents, and academic literature?	10 or more: high 5-9: middle 4 or less: low	There is a high match found between a participant-governed (broker organization) network and a small (large) governance network There is an intermediate match found between a participant-governed (broker organization) network and a small (large) governance network There is a low match found between a participant-governed (broker organization) network and a small (large) governance network
Governance Network Type	Platforms	On what platforms does cooperation take place?	When cooperation is centralized, organized by one organization and dependent on one actor who determines the organization of cooperation, a broker organization is recognized For the opposite, a participant-governed network is recognized	
	Organization Platforms	Is one actor determining whether cooperation is one-on-one or in a group?		
	Initiation	Is there one actor organizing cooperation?		
	Centralization	Is the platform centralized?		

Table 7. Operationalization of Element 'Number of Actors'

Alignment of Goals

In the theoretical framework the following expectation has been established:

E1: *The alignment of goals within an integration governance network has a positive effect on integration policy outcomes*

In order to operationalize the alignment of goals, codes for such alignent within a governance network have been identified in Table 10 based on the available documents and the theoretical framework. In the analysis, this thesis will look for the identified codes through latent coding. The number of evaluations of the codes has been equally distributed into three components: a high alignment of goals, an intermediate alignment of goals, and a low alignment of goals.

Category	Code	Meaning	Evaluation	Conclusion
Alignment of Goals	Goals	Are goals not highly differentiated among actors?	Yes/no	3 or more yes: A high alignment of goals is found
	Problem Statement	Do actors not recognize different problems?	Yes/no	2 yes: An intermediate alignment of goals is found
	Solution	Do actors not seek different solutions?	Yes/no	
	Process	Are no different opinions present on how to achieve the set solution?	Yes/no	1 or less yes: A low alignment of goals is found

Table 8. Operationalization of Element 'Alignment of Goals'

Trust

In the theoretical framework the following expectation was established:

E4: *A basic level of trust between actors in an integration governance network has a positive effect on integration policy outcomes*

In order to operationalize trust, codes for trust within a governance network have been identified in Table 11 based on the available documents and the theoretical framework. In the analysis, this thesis will look for the identified codes through latent coding. The number of evaluations of the codes has been equally distributed into three components: a high level of trust, an intermediate level of trust, and a low level of trust.

Category	Code	Meaning	Evaluation	Conclusion
Trust	History	Did actors cooperate before?	Yes/no	5 or more yes: A high level of trust is found
	New Cooperation	Did actors start new cooperation activities?	Yes/no	
	Agreement Trust	Do all actors comply with the agreements made within the network?	Yes/no	3-4 yes: An intermediate level of trust is found
	Benefit of the Doubt	Do actors believe each other on their word?	Yes/no	
	Absense Opportunistic Behavior	Do actors not misuse contributions of other actors for individual benefit?	Yes/no	2 or less yes: A low level of trust is found
	Goodwill	Are actors convinced of the good intentions of other actors?	Yes/no	

Table 9. Operationalization of Element 'Trust'

Communication / Coordination

In the theoretical framework the following expectation has been established:

E5: *Frequent and qualitative communication within an integration governance network has a positive effect on the outcome of integration policies.*

In order to operationalize communication and coordination, codes for communication and coordination within a governance network have been identified in Table 12 based on the available documents and the theoretical framework. In the analysis, this thesis will look for the identified codes through latent coding. To come at the conclusion, the number of evaluations of the codes has been equally distributed into three components: a high level of communication and coordination, an intermediate level of communication and coordination, and a low level of communication and coordination.

Category	Code	Meaning	Evaluation	Conclusion
Communication	Involvement	Are actors involved in decision-making?	Yes/no	3 or more yes: A high level of communication is found
	Direct communication	Does communication take place through mail and meetings?	Yes/no	2 yes: An intermediate level of communication is found
	Open & Inclusive	Is every actor able to provide their opinion?	Yes/no	
	Frequency	Is there regular communication between actors?	Yes/no	1 or less yes: A low level of communication is found

Table 10. Operationalization of Element 'Communication/Coordination'

Leadership

Lastly, in the theoretical framework the following expectation has been established for leadership:

E6: *The presence of a network governance leader that engages in leadership activities within an integration governance network has a positive effect on the outcome of integration policies.*

In order to operationalize leadership, codes for leadership within a governance network have been identified in Table 13 based on the available documents and the theoretical framework. In the analysis, this thesis will look for the identified codes through latent coding. The number of evaluations of the codes has been equally distributed into three components: a high level of leadership, an intermediate level of leadership, and a low level of leadership.

Category	Code	Meaning	Evaluation	Conclusion
Leadership	Leaders	Is there one and the same organization leading?	Yes/no	6 or more yes: A high level of leadership is found
	Facilitation	Does the leader facilitate cooperation?	Yes/no	
	Mobilization	Does the leader mobilize actors?	Yes/no	
	Process	Does the leader arrange the process of cooperation?	Yes/no	3 -5 yes: An intermediate level of leadership is found
	Ground Rules	Does the leader set ground rules?	Yes/no	
	New Content	Is there new content generated?	Yes/no	
	Commitment	Is the leader highly committed?	Yes/no	2 or less yes: A low level of leadership is found
	Long-term Perspective	Does the leader take a long-term perspective regarding cooperation?	Yes/no	

Table 11. Operationalization of Element 'Leadership'

Introduction to the Cases

A case study research is specific and therefore context sensitive. As such, a short overview of the integration policies in all three cases is provided below.

The Netherlands

In The Netherlands, asylum applications increased by 84% between 2014 and 2015, leading to over 43,000 asylum applications in 2015 (Eurofound, 2016; Kraaij, 2017). Hence, an increased amount of political and scientific attention has been dedicated to the integration of such migrants. According to Scholten et al. (2017), The Netherlands has mainstreamed its integration policy since the 2013 Civic Integration Act, thereby focusing on all third-country migrants rather than refugees only.

According to Fischler (2015), because the law is not specific, the Dutch government was able to create a more strategic approach that focused on participation. It aimed for an individual approach and directed attention towards citizenship, where language and societal courses had priority (Scholten et al., 2017). Migrants are first and foremost taught the core values of The Netherlands and are expected to actively "contribute to social cohesion and demonstrate involvement and citizenship" (Rijksoverheid, 2011). The Dutch government justifies this demand by arguing that they have similar demands towards their own citizens (Rijksoverheid, 2011). In addition to its focus on Dutch core values, the new law focuses on employment, criminality, and directs attention towards discrimination (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2013).

Furthermore, the 2013 law actively increased the responsibility of municipalities (Scholten et al., 2017). Although the general implementation of the Civic Integration Act has been centralized and migrants themselves are held financially responsible for the direct costs of their integration, municipalities increasingly carry out tasks in the development of integration policy, the individual contact with migrants, and the specification of integration policies that are locally carried out (Parlementaire Monitor, 2002). As such, to guarantee a higher level of efficiency, the Dutch government aimed to promote greater exchange of information and greater coordination between the actors involved (Fischler, 2015). Furthermore, municipalities have received an additional budget for housing, participation, integration, social security and healthcare of migrants (Kraaij, 2017).

Sweden

While Sweden had a consistent amount of asylum applications of around 24,000 until 2009, this number has grown to over 43,000 in 2012 and 162,877 in 2015, thereby covering 12.4% of all asylum applications within the EU, and is therefore now considered one of the main destinations for asylum seekers (Parusel, 2016; Endersson and Ehlers, 2017).

Swedish integration policy has progressed over three phases. The first phase in the 1990s was influenced by economic crises and a large inflow of refugees from former Yugoslavia (Riniolo, 2016). A highly decentralized policy was pursued where migrants were dispersed throughout the country and where municipalities were directly responsible for integration (Riniolo, 2016). The second phase until 2006 was characterized by the creation of the so-called "Integration Board", a government agency that centralized integration policy (Riniolo, 2016). In the third phase, between 2006 and 2014, the center-right government pursued a restructuring of integration policy where the Public Employment Service (PES) increasingly took over responsibilities of municipalities (Riniolo, 2016). From 2010 on, the PES emphasized integration into the labor market as a priority (OECD, 2014). Moreover, the newly established Swedish Migration Agency took upon the introduction responsibilities, while the Integration Board was discontinued. Since January 2017, this agency also took over the responsibility from the PES to allocate migrants throughout Sweden.

The aim of Swedish integration policy is based on diversity and multiculturalism (Riniolo, 2016; Solano, n.d.). Through diversity, the Swedish government believes that migrants are encouraged to contribute and partake in society both culturally and economically (Regerinskansliet, 2002). Unique to the Swedish case is the recognition that integration occurs on two levels: both individually and at a community level (Regeringskansliet, 2002). This means that above all, the role of Swedish society is recognized to play its part in the integration of migrants. Integration policy is not as focused on language and civic society as such courses are not mandatory to take (Riniolo, 2016). Rather, migrants are faced with an open and favorable labor market with no waiting time (Parusel, 2016; OECD, 2014). The two-year 'integration plan' does include the ability for students to finish their degree and the opportunity to partake in internships or education on-the-job (Parusel, 2016).

Denmark

The number of asylum-seekers in Denmark increased from 7,557 in 2013 to over 21,000 in 2015 (European Commission, 2016b). As integration costs have tripled over the last years, a Danish Liberal minority government installed new policies in 2015 that aimed to reduce the number of immigrants coming to Denmark whilst simultaneously stimulating the integration of those migrants already in Denmark (European Commission, 2016b).

According to Mouritsen and Jensen (2014), immigration has always been politically salient in Denmark, where in the 1950s a negative connotation arose between immigrants and the increasing Muslim population. Around the 1960s and 1970s, labor migrants from Turkey, Pakistan and Yugoslavia did not return as anticipated, and as a result integration efforts began to develop to a focus on employment and language in the 1980s (Mouritsen and Jensen, 2014). In the 1990s, the focus shifted towards active citizenship in both the political and cultural spheres. As such, integration policies aimed to provide cohesion in Danish society (Mouritsen and Jensen, 2014). The Danish Integration Act that was established in 1999 aims to not only contribute to migrants' ability to participate equally in political, economic and cultural life in Denmark, but also aims to provide tools to become financially self-reliant (Mouritsen and Jensen, 2014).

The Danish Integration Act is still the center on which integration policy in Denmark is built. Since the new integration policies of 2015, links between migrants and the Danes were still pursued, while developing a new integration plan with greater responsibilities for municipalities (Ministry of Immigration and Integration, 2016). In 2016, the government started the initiative 'united for better integration' and called for municipalities and social partners to help develop a successful integration strategy (Ministry of Immigration and Integration, 2016). From this initiative, the government signed two agreements with its partners, which led to increased responsibility of municipalities and social partners (Mouritsen and Jensen, 2014).

Findings and analysis of elements

This thesis will start with the 'number of actors' instead of 'alignment of goals'. Hereafter, the elements of alignment of goals, trust, coordination and leadership will be examined. For each element, first the case of The Netherlands will be examined, then the case of Sweden and lastly the case of Denmark. As concluded in the research methods, focus will be given to the case of The Netherlands.

Number of Actors

For the number of actors, the connection between the number of actors and the type of network governance (participant-governed or broker organization) will be sought. The number of actors is identified by drawing upon literature and policy documents. Moreover, to define the network governance type, this thesis looks for the ways in which cooperation is organized: by whom is cooperation organized, on what platforms cooperation takes place, how the cooperation relationship is characterized, and whether or not the platform is centralized.

The Netherlands

There has been a high overturn of responsible Ministries regarding integration. Over a period of 15 years seven different ministries were responsible. Currently, the Ministry of SZW is responsible for integration policy (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2017). Although the Ministry has final responsibility, many other organizations are involved in the integration progress as well, of which an overview can be found in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Positioning of a migrant in a network of integration actors
Retrieved from "Inburgering: Eerste resultaten van Wet Inburgering 2013" [Integration: The first results of the Civic Integration Act of 2013] by Algemene Rekenkamer, 2017, p. 7.

The public organizations are indicated by text in bold. Municipalities, indicated with a '1', provide societal guidance of migrants and are financed by the Central Organ for Asylum Seekers (COA), responsible for the pre-integration as identified by '2'. As identified by number 3, 4, 5, and 6, the Service Education Administration (DUO) provides information regarding integration, provides loans for integration courses, organizes integration exams, and monitors the implementation of integration policy. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND), indicated by the numbers 7 and 8, decides on the asylum-status and sanctions migrants if they stay despite a negative decision.

According to a policy officer of 'VluchtelingenWerk', a NGO that defends the rights of refugees, cooperation with the Ministry SZW to develop integration policy happens on multiple platforms (E. Lensink, personal communication, 9 May, 2018). First, the Taskforce Employment and Integration of Refugees is a platform set up by the Ministry of SZW to develop policy plans to foster faster integration with relevant and involved parties (E. Lensink, personal communication, 9 May, 2018). This Taskforce consists of 19 participants in total that include employment organizations, employee organizations, the temporary employment sector, the Social Economic Council (SER), the Institute for Employee Insurance

(UWV), the social services of municipalities (Divosa), the association for Dutch municipalities (VNG), a NGO for Refugee Students (UAF), the Refugee Organizations Netherlands (VON), VluchtelingenWerk, the secondary vocational education council (MBO-raad), the association of the four biggest municipalities (G4), and the Ministry of Security and Justice, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of SZW (Rijksoverheid, 2016).

Secondly, cooperation takes place on a level where involved actors can respond to a legislation proposal. For example, in a draft law regarding the "Amendment to the Civic Integration Act and some other laws in connection with the addition of the participation declaration to the civic integration examination and the legal recording of the social supervision", a list of organizations have provided advice and comments on the draft law (Officiele bekendmakingen, 2016). These actors included the Advice Commision for Foreigners Affairs (ACVZ), DUO, VNG, the implementation panel of municipalities, VluchtelingenWerk, Foundation 'Blik op Werk', the Council for Financial Relationships, and the Personal Data Authority (Officiele bekendmakingen, 2016). During publication is noted what has been done with the advice, whether it has been accepted, and if it has not been accepted the publication provides an explanation as to why it has not been included in the law (E. Lensink, personal communication, 9 May, 2018).

Lastly, there is often individual communication with the Ministry of SZW, both on the management level as on civil service level (E. Lensink, personal communication, 9 May, 2018). In these meetings, often policy, implementation, organization, and bottlenecks in the law are discussed (E. Lensink, personal communication, 9 May, 2018). Such individual communication also takes place between actors like the volunteer organization Humanitas, Knowledge Platform Integration and Society (KIS), the International Organization for Migration, through their European Network, individual municipalities, individual foundations and NGOs, and individual employers.

To conclude, the Ministry of SZW makes use of a network that consists of at least 28 organizations. According to Provan and Kenis, "although there are specific reasons for choosing a lead organization over an NAO and vice versa, when the governance of relationships becomes complex owing to increased numbers of diverse participants, either form is more likely to be effective in accomplishing network-level goals than self-

governance" (2008, p. 239). As such, following the argumentation of Provan and Kenis (2008), if the network governance of The Netherlands conforms to the network governance type that has either a broker organization or an actor that functions as a broker in place, a match between the number of actors and the type of network governance is found.

Indeed, because all major activities are organized through the Ministry of SZW as a sole actor, the Ministry can be recognized as the lead organization of the governance network. Additionally, the network is highly centralized because the Ministry takes on the organization of all major activities. Moreover, all key decisions are made by the Ministry itself and are solely coordinated to the other network members. Lastly, the Ministry is the organization that facilitates network activities in all three platforms. After all, without the initiative of the Ministry to develop a taskforce or the possibility for network members to respond to draft policies, cooperation between the different actors would not take place. As such it can be argued that indeed the Ministry of SZW is a broker organization in the governance network on integration policy that consists of a minimum number of 28 network members. Consequently, it can be argued that a high match is found between the number of network participants and the type of network governance.

Sweden

Although the Ministry of Employment and Integration has direct responsibility for the integration of migrants and maintains strict control over decision-making in integration policy, the Ministry of Justice and Health, the Ministry of Education and Research, and the public Swedish Migration Agency also share responsibility (European Commission, 2016a). Additionally, despite the fact that the Public Employment Service (PES) has developed a coordination responsibility regarding introduction, the municipalities still have responsibilities related to reception, education and housing (Wiesbock, 2011). Therefore, the stakeholders in integration vary heavily per municipality; whereas in some cases the PES acts as a lead stakeholder, in other municipalities, the municipalities themselves or even NGOs are lead stakeholders (European Commission, 2016a). Consequently, in addition to the need for strong coordination and cooperation between different ministries and organizations for each municipality, there is also a high variability in the quality of the provided services (European Commission, 2016a). Lastly, public organizations like the Swedish Migration Agency also make use of their own network that consists of migration courts, county administrative

boards, county councils, the police, volunteer agencies, and, for example, the Ombudsman for Children (Swedish Migration Agency, 2015).

In addition to the Ministry of Employment and Integration working with different ministries, municipalities and public organizations, they also signed an agreement with civil society organizations (CSO) to provide better access to cooperation (European Commission, n.d.). However, although the government took the first step to strategically strengthen the capacity of the state for implementation, it still needs to truly open up the process of cooperation in policy-making (Pierre, Jochem and Jahn, 2016). Additionally, civic society has solely played a role in providing job-training while remaining inactive in fields like mentorship programs and, in general, local community initiatives (Liebig, 2017). Lastly, the Swedish PES, while responsible for helping migrants find employment, has no vast employer network because the organizational model is constructed in such a way that the PES and employers do not have a relationship that is continuously maintained (OECD, 2014). This makes it difficult for the PES to, for example, link qualified migrants to the right job.

To conclude, the integration governance network of Sweden consists of a high number of actors. Not only are different Ministries involved, actors like the PES, the Swedish Migration Agency, municipalities, NGOs, and their individual networks also play a part in policy-making or policy implementation. Yet, because a clear Taskforce or Working Group that facilitates cooperation between all actors in policy-making and policy-implementation is lacking, it can be argued that the Ministry of Employment and Integration cannot be directly seen as a broker organization. Although the Ministry maintains strict control over decision-making, a different network is at play in each municipality, suggesting that despite the high number of involved actors, a participant-governed network is active in Sweden. As such, it can be argued that a low match is found between the number of network participants and the type of network governance.

Denmark
In 2001, the Ministry for Refugees, Immigrants and Integration took over the responsibilities of municipalities, the Danish Refugee Aid organization and the Ministry of the Interior, to strengthen the focus, management and coordination of integration (Jensen et al., n.d.). Moreover, the Danish Institute for Human Rights and the Board of Equal Treatment are involved in advising all Ministries, parliament, municipalities, civil society initiatives and

private organizations, and try all national laws against racism and discrimination (Jensen et al., n.d.).

As mentioned prior, the Danish Government aimed to develop a new integration program that was to be carried out by municipalities, and in order to develop that new program, the government called for municipalities and social partners to advise for its development (Ministry of Integration and Immigration, 2016). Thereafter, the government signed two agreements with its partners to provide two platforms for negotiation. In the first platform, the municipalities and the National Association of Municipalities (NAM) negotiate the distribution of refugees among municipalities with the Ministry for Refugees, Immigrants and Integration, which are finally assigned by the Immigration Service (Thorgaard and Vinther, 2007). Secondly, three-party negotiations take place between the central authority, trade unions and employer organizations (Kvist, 2016). Sectoral agreements are often negotiated between the Ministry and specific sectors, like the finance sector, to promote integration programs (Jorgenson, 2014).

In addition to the two negotiation platforms, the Ministry organizes cross-level meetings in each of the five regions in Denmark (Jorgenson, 2014). Such meetings are organized six times per year among the Ministry, municipalities, municipality mid-level and high-level managers, practitcioners, and Local Government Denmark, which is a municipality-level interest group (Jorgenson, 2014). A Task Force is organized on the topic of integration in which best practices are shared among municipalities, the private sector and NGOs (Jorgenson, 2014).

The Ministry gave municipalities a high responsibility for the integration of migrants (Ministry of Integration and Immigration, 2016). Municipalities were free to develop their own integration programs as long as they did not clash with the national goals and as long as individual integration contracts are concluded with migrants in which a plan of action is worked out (Kvist, 2016; Mouritsen and Jensen, 2014; Thorgaard and Vinther, 2007). In this process, especially in bigger municipalities, integration councils are often in place, which have an advisory role for municipalities to develop integration programs. Additionally, municipalities often cooperate with umbrella organizations of civil society to promote integration (Mourtisen and Jensen, 2014). For example, the Association New Dane is involved in the integration of migrants into the labor market (Thomson, 2014).

Although the Ministry maintains strict control over decision-making, different platforms are utilized for cooperation and negotiation in which at least twelve different types of actors are involved. Thus, it is the Ministry that sets the grounds of cooperation despite the development of specific integration programs is highly decentralized. Consequently, it can be argued that the Ministry can be seen as a broker organization that facilitates the governance network in Denmark. On the other hand, for implementation of integration programs, municipalities themselves can be regarded as broker organizations. Consequently, because there are multiple broker organizations in place with a high number of actors involved, it can be argued that there is an intermediate match found between the number of network participants and the type of network governance.

Alignment of Goals

To determine the level of alignment of goals, this thesis compares the goals of different organizations in their public policy documents. Are different Ministries, public agencies, social partners, municipalities or the public sector describing different problems and different solutions, and do they have different opinions on how to achieve the defined solution?

The Netherlands

The main goal of integration policy of the Dutch Ministry of SZW is the promotion of social cohesion and social stability through the participation and integration of everyone with a migrant background (Regioplan, 2016). On a meta-level, the goals of the Ministry of SZW include the prevention of social tensions, the striving towards an equal position and participation of all Dutch citizens (Regioplan, 2016). In 2014, the Ministry specifically looked at the following indicators which for them resembled the accomplishment of set goals: the difference in percentage of net labor participation of migrants and the Dutch, the difference in percentage of the basic qualification between migrants and Dutch natives, and the difference in percentage between the number of criminal suspects within a group of 10,000 migrants or Dutch natives (Regioplan, 2016).

According to the ACVZ, however, there is a mismatch between the starting point of providing assistance and shelter to migrants and goals concerning housing and integration (ACVZ, 2017). Where on the one hand the starting point for asylum-seekers who do not yet have a residence permit is maintenance without efforts to integrate, the Ministry of SZW simultaneously aims for integration as quickly as possible (ACVZ, 2017). As such, this

starting point directly contrasts the goals of the Ministry concerning integration. Consequently, goals within the Ministry and throughout the whole government can be argued to be, in fact, contradictory.

On the other hand, most institutions that cooperate with the Ministry of SZW have goals that are overall in alignment with the general goals of the Ministry. According to Foundation 'Nieuw Thuis', the goals of the Ministry were in line with their own goals, and a large part of their input in policy was respected and integrated (Goedhoop, personal communication, 23 May, 2018). Likewise, the main goal of the Foundation 'Blik op Weg' is to ensure better participation in society by guaranteeing that organizations that offer sustainable labor participation and integration are providing services and products with high quality ('Blik of Weg', 2018). The goals of the municipalities like The Hague are also almost entirely aligned with the goals of the Ministry: to realize the social integration of new migrants through labor participation (Gemeente Den Haag, 2013). Moreover, for all Divosa, VNG and KIS it is especially important to focus on cooperation with an integrated approach of fast information-sharing among actors (Rozenberg, Kahman and de Gruijter, 2017; KIS, 2018).

Yet, although Foundation VluchtelingenWerk largely agrees with the goals of the Ministry, some disagreements remain. For example, VluchtelingenWerk disagrees with the negative sanctioning of integration and argues that it is not reasonable to expect from migrants to be completely responsible for their own integration (VluchtelingenWerk, 2018). Although they agree on the main goals, they do find that migrants need to be able to integrate as soon as possible. This does not necessarily need to happen within two years, but each individual case needs to be assessed (VluchtelingenWerk, 2018).

As such, although there is a contradiction within the Dutch government between the reception of migrants and direct integration, the goals within the governance network on integration are mostly aligned. Although actors do not necessarily agree on the starting point of the national policy, they do agree on new goals and the ways to move forward to improve integration policy. Thus, it can be argued that a high alignment of goals is persistent within the governance network of The Netherlands.

Sweden

It has been argued before that the Swedish Ministry cooperates little with both civil society and private organizations, even though in some municipalities such actors are perceived as network leaders. Although public actors like the PES and the Ministry of Employment and Integration have aimed for cooperation, collaborative initiatives have remained limited (Qvist, 2017). Rather than cooperating via Taskforces or working groups, the Swedish government has initiated cooperation solely through agreements, which were utilized more as a platform to communicate the government's vision rather than a platform of cooperation (Qvist, 2017).

Yet, despite responsibilities shifted from municipalities to the PES, over 170 municipalities did maintain local agreements in 2015 (Qvist, 2017). These agreements with private and civil society actors created both a structure for cooperation and legitimacy for information-sharing (Qvist, 2017). Yet, these platforms are perceived as the sole way to influence policy according to a policy officer of the Swedish Migration Agency, who mentioned that "all efforts have to be coordinated [through these agreements] and … this is what we talk and talk about. … It is the only way we can have an influence: to reason, to show 'best practice', to support good ideas so that they start working with them" (Qvist, 2017, p. 505). In addition to the difficulties of aligning goals in general integration policy through the agreements, labor programs are, for example, negatively involved by multiple agencies that lack shared goals and shared performance measures (Qvist, 2015). Because the private sector is not directly involved in local cooperation efforts - as they are managed at an arm's length and their different opinion on goals are barely heard - it can be argued that there is a lack of alignment of goals.

In addition to the lack of alignment within the network, different opinions exist between different organizations. While it is the main goal of the PES is to "promote [the] quick and efficient introduction of newly arrived immigrants to the labor market" and as such is clearly focused on labor, the Swedish Migration Agency aims to "ensure a long-term, sustainable migration policy … and promote a needs-driven labor immigration while utilizing and considering the development effects of migration, and furthering European and international cooperation" (PES, 2018, n.p.; Swedish Migration Agency, 2018, n.p.). Thus, while PES is focused on quick integration, the Swedish Migration Agency aims for long-term integration through European cooperation. Additionally, neither organization has a clear overview on how to achieve their goals. In contrast, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and

Regions (SALAR) does have a clear focus on achievement that is directed towards a shared vision and coordination between actors, the sharing of knowledge, and an equal distribution of migrants (SALAR, 2017).

Thus, not only are goals highly differentiated among actors, there is also a persistent difficulty for other actors to deliver their opinions, which makes the alignment of goals through a process weak. Additionally, as different goals are stated, it is likely that different actors recognize different problem definitions. For example, the PES focuses on a quick introduction while the Swedish Migration Agency is focused on long-term integration. Consequently, it can be argued that there is a low level of goal alignment within the integration policy network in Sweden.

Denmark

The goals of integration are set at the Ministerial level, in which municipalities and social partners provide advice (Ministry of Integration and Immigration, 2016). Thus, for national integration policy, it remains the Ministry that has a pivotal role in decision-making regarding the goals, while local municipalities can still pursue their own direction because much discretion is provided regarding implementation. Where it is the main goal of the Danish government to ensure that migrants are partaking in economic activities as fast as possible, the goal of the Municipality of Aarhus is for example to "strengthen the cohesion of the Aarhus community and to form active citizens – regardless of ethnicity or cultural background – with respect for fundamental democratic values" (European Commission, 2016b; Rosevaere and Jorgensen, 2014; Aarhus Municipality, 2007, p. 3). Consequently, although shared goals are created on a national level, municipalities can add individual goals within the implementation. Here, the Municipality has included education and active citizenship in addition to the focus on labor market integration of the Ministry.

Moreover, where goals between the Ministry and municipalities are reasonably aligned due to the discretion provided, the NAM recognizes that civil society is needed to provide migrants with equal opportunities, to ensure that diversity is accepted as a natural part of Danish society and to ensure that migrants respect the fundamental Danish values (NAM, 2010). In this way, the NAM recognizes that integration is a multiple-way process in which the complete society of municipalities needs to participate. The NAM collected 25 proposals from different municipalities to further increase flexibility for municipalities (NAM, 2016).

In his research, Damgaard and Torfing (2010) found that stakeholders involved in Local Employment Councils (LEC) agree that joint goals are achieved through the LECs. Yet, although shared objectives are set in LECs, participants do not always agree on the way in which the shared goals should be reached (Damgaard and Torfing, 2010). Moreover, 62% of members within LECs believe that "the LECs have the possibility of pursuing other goals and tasks than the ones defined by the Ministry of Employment" (Damgaard and Torfing, 2010, p. 257). Consequently, although the Ministry sets out the general lines of the integration programs, a majority of LEC participants believe that they are able to pursue other goals, therefore recognizing different goals and solutions than those prescribed by the Ministry.

To conclude, although national goals are set with the advice of societal and private actors, many municipalities still pursue additional individual integration goals. Moreover, in local networks there are, despite the agreement on local goals, still many disagreements on how to achieve the set goals. As such, because within the networks alignment of goals is persistent, some differences still persist between local and national goals, and because within local networks there can be disagreements on how the aligned goals are to be realized, it can be argued that on an overall level there is an intermediate level of goal alignment.

Trust

For the level of trust, this thesis looked at public documents and personal communication to identify experiences in cooperation and trust within the governance network. Specifically, this thesis looks to answer the following questions: did actors cooperate before, did new cooperation activities start, did actors comply with agreements made, did actors believe each other on their word, did actors not misuse contributions for individual benefit, and lastly, were actors convinced of the good intentions of other actors?

The Netherlands

A long history of cooperation persists in the Netherlands in integration policy. A good example of this is the Agenda for the Future of 2000, where the Ministry of SZW already set clear agreements with over ninety companies, and the four and twenty-six biggest municipalities in The Netherlands (Leerkes and Scholten, 2016; Parlementaire Monitor, 2002). Additionally, the Taskforce Integration was introduced in 2002, although at that time it was solely used for the sharing of good-practices (Parlementaire Monitor, 2002). According to ECOTEC, the covenants with other actors "have created an atmosphere of trust … [which]

has increased the base of support for certain new policies considerably" (2006, p. 114). Not only do these activities prove for a history of cooperation, but it is also an indicator for the absence of opportunistic behavior, as actors would have been less likely to cooperate intensively over time when such behavior had been taking place.

The interests of actors like COA, Rotterdam Municipality and the Foundation 'Nieuw Thuis' are intertwined with each other, which creates dependency and vulnerability (Goedhoop, personal communication, 23 May, 2018). Moreover, Mullins and Jones mentioned that trust within this network is recognized when other actors provide funding, because "when you have funding [with] which some people trust you, you have a free hand" (2007, p. 118). This highlights a basis of trust where it is believed that actors will comply with their agreements, that actors have good intentions, and that actors within the network can be trusted on their word.

Although new cooperation activities are taking place, it can be argued that cooperation also persists out of necessity and that, therefore, the level of trust does not necessarily have to be high. For example, KIS saw that it was necessary to create new agreements with the Ministry in order to receive information prematurely (Berenschot, 2017). Moreover, although VNG recognizes cooperation based on honesty and trust, there were some hardships (ACVZ, 2017). VNG policy officers argued that information was shared among ministries but not shared with VNG, which was later confirmed by a policy officer of the Ministry of SZW who argued that it was difficult to share information openly during budgetary discussions (ACVZ, 2017). Additionally, some VNG respondents identified mutual distrust with COA as they thought that COA had double loyalties that influenced overall cooperation (ACVZ, 2017).

To conclude, the level of trust within the network is difficult to establish, as each individual actor within the network perceives trust differently. Yet, it can be argued that at least there is a minimum level of trust as cooperation is based upon honesty and history, and as such, it can be concluded that there is an intermediate level of trust within the Dutch network.

Sweden

Since the 1990s, there has been a system in place that determined how to deal with asylum-seekers which has gradually improved through experience (European Commission, 2016a). Over the years, this system has developed a strong tradition of decentralized decision-making

and collaborative governance (Qvist, 2015). According to Qvist (2015), the relationship between municipalities and other actors is characterized by dialogue, negotiation and reciprocity. Yet, although cooperation between municipalities, PES and the Swedish Migration Agency has been highly detailed in agreements, actual cooperation is less developed (Lyden, Nyhlen and Nyhlen, 2015). This argument is accompanied by a statement of a Swedish Migration Agency policy officer who states that "if we can get cooperation going in four or five years, we will have done well" (Lyden, Nyhlen and Nyhlen, 2015, p. 478). This indicates that practical cooperation between the different agencies has been lacking.

Additionally, according to the Swedish Migration Agency, NGOs have been active but less involved in formal structures (Qvist, 2017). Consequentally, this has led to non-legally binding cooperation in which uncertainty is consistent concerning agreement compliance (Qvist, 2017). Uncertainty plays a role between the Migration Agency and the Ministry, as a representative acknowledges: "I feel that this is an area where there is such a lack of knowledge, and unfortunately also some lack of interest. Maybe that's why we have been fairly independent." (Qvist, 2017, p. 506). That actors feel a lack of interest from the government does not portray a high level of trust because, after all, lack of interest does not indicate a high level of commitment. Yet, according to Myrberg (2014), this uncertainty could have resulted from the lack of financial resources and clear authority, despite the clear agreements. This indicates only a basic level of agreement trust and little benefit of the doubt due to non-legally binding agreements and the lack of follow-up on resources.

Although trust remains subjective, it can be argued that actors do believe in the good intentions of other actors and that there has been a long tradition of cooperation on paper, but that there has been a lack of actual cooperation, that there is uncertainty in terms of agreement trust and that there is no real benefit of the doubt. As such, it can be argued that there is a low amount of trust present within the governance network of Sweden.

Denmark
There has been a long history of strong integration policies in Denmark, and a tradition of corporatist cooperation at both the national and local level (Scholten et al., 2017; Sorenson and Torfing, 2017; Thorgaard and Vinther, 2007). Because of this history, trust has been developed while many conflicts during cooperation with different stakeholders have already

been resolved in the past (Damgaard and Torfing, 2010). Despite this history of cooperation, however, Damgaard and Torfing (2010) have identified that within LECs there is a high overturn of representatives. As a result, this high rate of replacement is likely to negatively affect the levels of trust, as it not only creates uncertainty about how new actors behave but it can also disturb patterns of cooperation (Damgaard and Torfing, 2010).

The municipalities in Denmark are however entrusted with one of the highest levels of political, fiscal, and administrative autonomy in comparison to other countries (Emilsson, 2015). Therefore, although traditionally integration policies have been created at a national level, cities have become increasingly dynamic and have developed their own networks (Thorgaard and Vinther, 2007). Thus, it is rather the city and the NAM that are responsible for the integration of migrants, rather than the counties or national government. This level of entrustment to municipalities - similar to the financial autonomy in the case of The Netherlands - can be argued to be a basis of trust that actors will comply with the agreements made. Additionally, because of this responsibility, actors in Denmark have developed process ownership (Careja, 2018). Consequently, it becomes more likely that actors comply with the agreements made and that no opportunistic behavior will take place.

According to Thorgaard and Vinther (2007), the cities often cooperate with trusted actors of civil society, and that the history of public-private partnerships has led to a level of trust in which it can be argued that actors benefit from a benefit of the doubt. Yet, despite this trust, there has never been an effective semi-official or state-sponsored channel of cooperation for consultation and communication. As such, it can be argued that not all parties are trusted with direct access to the network.

To conclude, there has been a long tradition of cooperation where there is agreement trust, an absence of opportunistic behavior and actors generally enjoy a benefit of the doubt. Yet, new actors are not easily offered access to cooperation, while for example the high overturn in LECs has negatively influenced the level of trust. Therefore, it can be argued that there is an intermediate amount of trust present within the governance network of Denmark.

Communication / Coordination

To determine the level of communication and coordination, this thesis especially looks to identify whether key actors are involved in decision-making, through what methods

communication takes place, whether all actors feel able to provide their opinion, and whether there is frequent communication between the actors.

The Netherlands

Since the mainstreaming of integration policy, commitment and coordination have become increasingly necessary (Leerkes and Scholten, 2016). Leerkes and Scholten (2016) identify the aligning and the coordinating of policies as central to the success of integration policy. Yet, such communication and coordination have proved to be problematic. First, communication with COA has proven to be difficult as their messages have been perceived as unclear and because actors like municipalities and the local community have been excluded from decision-making to, for example, determine the location of a new refugee center (Leerkes and Scholten, 2016). Moreover, policy officers at VNG argue that both the Ministry of SZW and COA have not succeeded in updating several stakeholders, and that as a result, such actors had to resort to reading in the newspapers that plans were to be discontinued (ACVZ, 2017). Similarly, knowledge-platform KIS sent out a public announcement without the approval of the Ministry of SZW (Regioplan, 2016). Therefore, although actors are free to participate, when individual decisions are made other actors are at times excluded and sometimes not even informed of the decision.

Often, actors like KIS felt excluded from information-sharing and decision-making. Although they actively promoted communication through meetings and approaching stakeholders, KIS recognized an unclear division of tasks within the network which led to unnecessary e-mail coordination between different actors (Regioplan, 2016). They additionally felt that only a limited amount of policy officers from the Ministry of SZW were aware of the tasks that KIS conducted which led to slow and arduous information-sharing (Regioplan, 2016). Moreover, about 50 percent of the municipalities reported that communication with the Ministry of SWZ was difficult (Significant, 2010). Especially the smaller municipalities did not have direct communication lines, which limited direct communication mostly to the biggest 52 municipalities (Significant, 2010). As such, not only did actors like the Ministries provide contradictory information, actors like the Ministries VNG also fell short by not consistently updating network participants (ACVZ, 2017).

While different ministries have taken an active stance in communication, messages have at times been contradictory (Leerkes and Scholten, 2016; ACVZ, 2017). One example of this is

when the Ministry of Internal Affairs sent urgent letters that called upon municipalities to continue opening up new asylum centers as agreed, while a few weeks later the Ministry of Security and Justice announced that these exact agreements would be revised due to the reducing number of asylum applications (ACVZ, 2017).

Yet, individual projects with municipalities have been highlighted as successful due to short communication lines, personal contact and frequent meetings (Rozenberg, Kahman and de Gruijter, 2017). Where employers were involved at an early stage and received frequent information about the possibilities to hire asylum-seekers, the Municipality of Zaanstad highlights their success in making clear agreements with COA to share information (Gemeente Zaanstad, 2017).

To conclude, although there were some local successes with cooperation, there was little involvement within the governance network, and there was contradictory or no direct communication that lacked frequency and inclusiveness. Thus, it can be argued that there is a low level of communication and coordination found within the governance network of The Netherlands.

Sweden

Due to the variation of leading stakeholders locally, the European Commission (2016a) highlights the need for frequent and high-quality coordination to avoid the duplication of actions and ensure resource efficiency. Additionally, to locally altering network leaders, confusion often arises due to an overlap of the responsibilities between PES and the counties. PES is responsible for coordination of networks while counties are responsible for facilitating cooperation (Lyden, Nyhlen and Nyhlen, 2010). County policy officers have stated that there is a lot of disagreement regarding responsibility, which leads to a lack of clarity within the network (Lyden, Nyhlen and Nyhlen, 2010).

Government reports consistently mention that local actors have too much discretion in terms of autonomy and handling networks, which they identified as causes of shortcomings in coordination and accountability (Sorenson and Torfing, 2017; Myrberg, 2014). Yet, the difficulty in coordination can also be attributed to frequent reorganizations (Lyden, Nyhlen and Nyhlen, 2010). Similarly, a Swedish Migration Agency head of department indicated that cooperation with national organizations was easier than with local organizations. This was

due to a commitment to national policy lines without incorporating local needs which led to differing results and outcomes in municipalities (Lyden, Nyhlen and Nyhlen, 2010).

The central agreement's aim was to share information rather than shared decision-making, which, despite not giving real influence to other actors, did lead to many high level meetings where members provided their opinions through recommendations and reports (Emilsson, 2015; Qvist, 2017) Such high-level meetings and conferences facilitated open and inclusive communication to the government and between actors. Yet, where communication between the PES and municipalities was frequent and personal, the PES, as a highly hierarchical organization, pursued vertical and impersonal communication with employers (Qvist, 2015). Moreover, municipalities also indicated that communication and coordination with the PES decreased as the number of working groups decreased from four to one (Qvist, 2015).

To conclude, although there has been direct communication and both open and inclusive communication in conferences, involvement has been lacking and the frequency of interaction has also decreased over time. As such, it can be argued that an intermediate level of communication and coordination is found within the governance network of Sweden.

Denmark

Since the 1998 Integration Act, municipalities have been primarily responsible for implementing the integration objectives of the central government (Emilsson, 2015). Despite the high level of discretion in implementing integration policy based on local influences, policies cannot contradict the national policy framework. While, for example, the Municipality of Aarhus took on a mainstreamed approach, the Municipality of Copenhagen focused on the inclusion of all citizens (Scholten, Collet and Petrovic, 2017). Although Emilsson (2015) argues that this decentralization was meant to improve coordination and management of integration, coordination challenges were highlighted by policy officers from both Municipalities (Jorgenson, 2014).

Additionally, Mouritsen and Jensen (2014) argue that local and national consultation platforms have not been affected because real channels of communication with civil society have never been pursued. Despite the intentions of public organizations to reach out, CSOs have lacked methods to communicate with them and have thus often been excluded from decision-making (Aarhus Municipality, 2017). In addition to the exclusion of civil society

organization, municipalities have often failed to communicate their approach to implementation integration not only to their relative stakeholders but also between local departments (Jorgenson, 2014).

In contrast, municipalities have attempted to improve political communication and have increasingly attempted to open-up participation through town-hall meetings and consultations (Sorenson and Torfing, 2017). According to Sorenson and Torfing (2017), about half of the Danish municipalities pursue such initiatives, where citizens are recognized as stakeholders who need to be actively involved in decision-making through open and direct communications.

LECs have fostered social interaction leading to direct, open and frequent communication within the local councils (Damgaard and Torfing, 2010). Yet, as a downfall, stakeholders have identified that, because of the personal interaction, truly strategic coordination has been lacking (Damgaard and Torfing, 2010). Additionally, local stakeholders have identified that there are too few projects that attempt to improve coordination at an operational level (Damgaard and Torfing, 2010).

To conclude, on a national level, problems with coordination and communication have persisted due to a lack of involvement, and frequent and direct communication. Yet, LECs and municipalities have increasingly opened-up direct, open and inclusive communication and participation. Therefore, it can be argued that there is an intermediate level of communication and coordination found within the governance network of Denmark.

Leadership

To determine the level of leadership, this thesis looks to answer the following questions: is the same organization leading cooperative efforts, does that organization facilitate cooperation, does it mobilize actors, does it arrange the process of cooperation, does it set the ground rules, does the network as a whole generate new content, is the leader committed, and lastly whether or not the leader takes a long-term perspective.

The Netherlands

The Ministry of SZW, and specifically its Minister, is responsible for integration policy and is tasked to facilitate, stimulate, regulate and sanction (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2017). The

Ministry specifically facilitates cooperation via the establishment of the Taskforce, which is assigned to generate new content, such as creative measures to coordinate supply and demand, to develop agreements with employer organizations and to facilitate cooperation between municipalities and organizations like VluchtelingenWerk (Leerkes and Scholten, 2016). By taking on a multi-actor governance strategy, Breugel and Scholten (2017) argue that the Dutch government has developed into an actor that facilitates a cooperative network. Additionally, the Ministry has a facilitating role to accommodate cooperation between municipalities and COA (Scholten et al., 2017).

Although the Ministry of SZW takes on a leadership role within the Taskforce, several actors have highlighted the lack of leadership in other aspects of integration policy. For example, Berenschot (2017) comes to the conclusion that the Ministry did not give clear directions to KIS in the process of cooperation, and that only on the initiative of KIS, the Ministry has been more involved as an advisor. Additionally, the OECD (2017) argues that instead of the national government, cities have started acting as enablers of cooperation and have provided strong local leadership activities. They have, for example, been actively involved in mobilizing civil society actors by developing platforms of cooperation (Kos, Maussen and Doomerik, 2016).

Yet, following several reports that indicated obstacles in communication and cooperation between the Ministry and municipalities, the Ministry has developed a number of measures (ACVZ, 2017). Not only has the Ministry attempted to improve the process of cooperation, the renewed commitment of the Ministry led to a recognition of VNG that integration was in fact a societal issue rather than solely a security issue (ACVZ, 2017). Consequently, many actors have realized that a shared commitment is necessary to deal with the issue of integration (ACVZ, 2017).

Lastly, according to ACVZ (2017), the Ministry of SZW has provided the space for all actors to collectively determine how cooperation should look like. VNG (2017) argues that this approach was the best method to move forward as in any other way it could have led to resistance from other actors. Yet, although the actors collectively determined the manner of cooperation, it was still the Ministry that had set this ground rule.

Despite some leadership difficulties outside of the Taskforce, it can be argued that through the Taskforce, the Ministry of SZW has facilitated cooperation, mobilized actors to come together, has set ground rules, has developed a common long-term commitment, and that new content is generated. Therefore, it can be argued that within The Netherlands a high level of leadership is found within its governance network.

Sweden

Since 2001, the Swedish Migration Agency has initiated a strategy of cooperation and coordination of integration policy (Myrberg, 2014). This strategy followed the surge of agreements between different actors on different governance levels that had been concluded after national government organizations issued broad guidelines of cooperation agreements (Myrberg, 2014). Yet, this initiative on cooperation still did not deliver them a leadership position within the governance network, especially because facilitating cooperation was still the responsibility of the PES and the local counties. A Swedish Migration Agency head of department stated: "We are the ones who take initiatives and push the process ahead. I think that we have been appreciated for this. Not as someone who controls or interferes, hopefully, but as someone who shows possible ways ahead based on factual knowledge, someone who seeks collaboration and boosts collaboration" (Qvist, 2017, p. 506). They additionally recognized that for cooperation, they are indeed dependent on the PES, counties, municipalities and CSOs (Qvist, 2017). Thus, while the Swedish Migration Agency does recognize that they are not the leadership organization, they do take action in facilitation, process, mobilization, the generation of new content and commitment.

Additionally, within the cooperation process actors are not necessarily perceived as equal because of the exceptional position of PES as an organization responsible for mobilization (Lyden, Nyhlen and Nyhlen, 2015). Because of this position, as Lyden, Nyhlen and Nyhlen (2015) argue, the PES does not always recognize shared objectives, while the steering of cooperation is perceived to be strict and direct, leaving little space to other actors to cooperate.

Moreover, mainly the public organizations have been active in the policy-making process within the integration network, especially because civil society actors have been more involved in the provision of services (Qvist, 2017). Yet, the non-binding agreements with such civil society actors have been perceived as providing a lack of guidance in both

developing and implementing integration policy (Qvist, 2017). According to Qvist (2017), the municipalities often referred to this framework created by national public organizations as 'fuzzy' and 'vague'. Nevertheless, municipalities such as the one in Malmö do pursue an active stance on improving cooperation with civil society. Although many CSOs recognize the efforts of such municipalities, they also highlight insufficient commitments, as agreements only last one year (Lukic, n.d.). Despite these obstacles, however, municipalities such as Malmö have started to take on an active stance in involving local citizens with decision-making by promoting different opportunities for citizens to engage (Lukic, n.d.).

To conclude, there is not one organization that guides cooperation; it is facilitated by different organizations and actors are mobilized through agreements. Although new content is not necessarily created and cooperation with civil society is limited to one-year agreements, ground rules of cooperation are clearly set out by the PES and through the agreements. Therefore, although it is on the low end of the spectrum, it can be argued that an intermediate level of leadership is found within the Swedish governance network.

Denmark

Because of the Danish activation reforms of the 1990s, negotiation space has started to open up between public and private actors (Damgaard and Torfing, 2010). They argue that the consequent cooperation can as well be regarded as a side-effect instead of a deliberate action by the Danish government to open up interaction (Damgaard and Torfing, 2010). Although it might have been originally unintended, the Danish government is currently seeking active cooperation and aims to mobilize a higher number of civil society actors (European Commission, 2016).

In contrast to the recent action in national cooperation, LECs have already facilitated cooperation between counties, the private sector and civil society actors (Damgaard and Torfing, 2010). Additionally, Damgaard and Torfing (2010) argue that LECs have much freedom in developing local integration policy and to make clear decisions, which makes it attractive for other actors to cooperate. This freedom implies space for actors to provide their opinion and to collectively develop new content. The sole ground rule for cooperation on a county level is that it should not contradict the national policy framework. Yet, Damgaard and Torfing (2010) note that central authorities have barely set any constraints on topics for counties and municipalities to decide upon. These new ideas and proposals are thereafter

delivered to municipalities, which in turn implement these plans to a large extent (Damgaard and Torfing, 2010). Due to their limited resources, municipalities often engage civil society and utilize NGOs as a strategy within their network to implement integration policies (Scholten et al., 2017).

Concerning process, the LECs benefit from institutional norms that regulate the decision-making in such a way that conflict is prevented. Votes are barely conducted due to the consensus-based decision-making (Damgaard and Torfing, 2010). Moreover, LECs clearly structure the interactions between different organizations during its discussions and when there is a high level of objection against a proposal, the decision itself is postponed until it has been revised by a greater number of network participants (Damgaard and Torfing, 2010).

Because there are many different levels that make use of their networks, there is no one clear network leader. Although all leaders do aim for facilitation and mobilization, this is mainly successful at the municipal and county levels. While a clear set of ground rules are developed, new content is solely created at the LEC level. Therefore, it can be argued that an intermediate level of leadership is found within the Danish governance network.

Conclusion

It has been established that the relationship between favorable integration policies and successful integration is problematic, and that as a result, favorable integration policies do not provide enough explanatory power for the level of successful integration. Following the identified positive effect of network governance in other policy fields and the structural challenges in integration policy related to network governance, it was this thesis' goal to discover whether network governance has an influence on the success of integration. Fitting with the research design, the problem statement and the research goal, the following research question was established:

> *"Does network governance in the field of integration policy contribute to successful integration in the cases of The Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark?"*

In order to answer this research question, sub-questions were established that were used as a guiding mechanism throughout this thesis:

1. How can successful integration be measured?
2. How is the complex concept of network governance composed?
3. Does the alignment of goals within a governance network contribute to integration outcomes?
4. Does the number of actors within a governance network contribute to integration outcomes?
5. Does trust within a governance network contribute to integration outcomes?
6. Does greater communication and coordination between actors in a governance network contribute to integration outcomes?
7. Do leadership activities within a governance network contribute to integration outcomes?

Where sub-question 1 has specifically been answered in the literature review, the rest have been established following the identification of network governance elements and their subsequent expectations in the theoretical framework. These expectations have been tested against the cases of The Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark in the analysis. Finally, this section provides an answer to the question of whether these expectations have been either confirmed or disconfirmed.

In line with the research question, if the theory of network governance holds true – that network governance activities positively affect policy outcomes, in this case successful integration – we should see higher outcomes of integration in those cases where network governance is effective. To provide an answer to whether this is indeed the case, it is not only necessary to look at the expectations individually but to also consider all expectations together as a whole, because it is the combination of all elements that defines the complex concept of network governance. As such, in the following section the individual expectations are either confirmed or disconfirmed. Thereafter, all expectations are taken together in order to collectively contribute to answer this thesis' research question.

Conclusion Individual Expectations

Conclusion Expectation 2 and 3

From the analysis on the number of actors and the type of network, the following conclusion can be made, as summed up in Table 14.

Country	Evaluation Analysis Number of Actors	Evaluation Analysis Type of Network	Conclusion Analysis Match Number of Actors and Type of Network	Favorable Integration Policy	Successful Integration
Netherlands	High	Broker Organization	High	Average	High
Sweden	High	Participant-governed	Low	High	Low
Denmark	High	Multiple broker organizations	Intermediate	Average (low)	Middle

Table 12. Conclusion Number of Actors

From the table it can be argued that when there is a match between number of actors and the type of network, the more successful integration outcomes are. Thus, it can be argued that E2 and E3 hold:

E2: *A participant-governed network has a positive effect on the outcome of integration policies when there are less than 10 actors active in a governance network.*

E3: *A broker organization has a positive effect on the outcome of integration policies when there are 10 or more actors active in a governance network.*

Conclusion Expectation 1

From the analysis made on the level of alignment of goals in the cases of Sweden, The Netherlands and Denmark, the following conclusion table can be made.

Country	Favorable Integration Policy	Conclusion Analysis Level of Alignment of Goals	Successful Integration
Netherlands	Average	High	High
Sweden	High	Low	Low
Denmark	Average (low)	Middle	Middle

Table 13. Conclusion Alignment of Goals

From the table it can indeed be argued that the more goals that are aligned within the network, the more successful integration outcomes are. As such, it can be argued that E1 does hold:

E1: *The alignment of goals within an integration governance network has a positive effect on integration policy outcomes*

Conclusion Expectation 4

From the analysis on the level of trust in the cases of Sweden, The Netherlands and Denmark, the following conclusion table can be made.

Country	Favorable Integration Policy	Conclusion Analysis Level of Trust	Successful Integration
Netherlands	Average	Middle	High
Sweden	High	Low	Low
Denmark	Average (low)	Middle	Middle

Table 14. Conclusion Trust

As mentioned in the literature review, according to Provan and Kenis (2008) it is not necessary for network trust to be deep, but that a basic level of trust within the network does lead to a stable basis of cooperation in which a network can work effectively. Bearing this in mind and drawing from the table, it can be argued that when there is a lack of trust, integration can be negatively influenced, and that, as such at least an intermediate level of

trust is indeed necessary to maintain or even improve outcomes of successful integration. Therefore it can be argued that E4 holds:

E4: *A basic level of trust between actors in an integration governance network has a positive effect on integration policy outcomes*

Conclusion Expectation 5

From the analysis on the level of communication and coordination in the cases of Sweden, The Netherlands and Denmark, the following conclusion table can be made.

Country	Favorable Integration Policy	Conclusion Analysis Level Communication and Coordination	Successful Integration
Netherlands	Average	Low	High
Sweden	High	Middle	Low
Denmark	Average (low)	Middle	Middle

Table 15. Conclusion Communication/Coordination

Following from the table it can be argued that communication and coordination does not have an influence on successful integration outcomes, whether positively or negatively, therefore E5 does not hold:

E5: *Frequent and qualitative communication within an integration governance network has a positive effect on the outcome of integration policies.*

Conclusion Expectation 6

From the analysis on the level of leadership within the integration governance networks of Sweden, The Netherlands and Denmark, the following conclusion table can be made.

Country	Favorable Integration Policy	Conclusion Analysis Level of Leadership	Successful Integration
Netherlands	Average	High	High
Sweden	High	Middle	Low
Denmark	Average (Low)	Middle	Middle

Table 16. Conclusion Leadership

Following from the table, it can be argued that leadership seems to have had an influence, yet for the cases of Sweden and Denmark this does not hold. As such, it can be argued that E6 does not hold:

E6: *The presence of a network governance leader that engages in leadership activities within an integration governance network has a positive effect on the outcome of integration policies.*

Further Comments

It has first been established that the alignment of goals, a match between the number of actors and the type of network governance, and a basic level of trust, have a positive influence on integration. As such, for a network leader it is not only important to define a shared problem and set shared goals in order to secure a positive influence on outcomes. A network leader should also set up a network governance structure in line with the actors involved and should foster and promote at least a minimal level of trust. On the other hand, however, this thesis found that frequent and qualitative communication, and secondly the presence of a clear network governance leader that engages in leadership activities do not have a positive influence on integration. The presence of one organization that mobilizes actors to develop new content and the fact that all actors are involved in decision-making through open, inclusive and frequent communication does not necessarily influence integration outcomes positively. Although it can be argued that the lack of these elements can be perceived as unfavorable within the network, it does not necessarily hamper the successful integration outcomes. Thus, in short, out of the total of six expectations, the four expectations of alignment, the two matches between network type and the number of actors, and trust do hold, while the two expectations of communication and leadership do not hold.

Conclusion Collective Expectations

In Table 19 all scores of network governance elements are portrayed and subsequently averaged out, concluding in a single level of presence of the network governance elements. Thereafter, this average has been set against the level of favorable integration policies and successful integration outcomes. In the case of Denmark, the average level of network governance matches one-on-one with integration outcomes. Although the cases of The Netherlands and Sweden do not perfectly link one-on-one, the scores of the average level of network governance do provide an indication of successful integration outcomes.

Countries / Conclusions	The Netherlands	Sweden	Denmark
Conclusion Analysis Match	High	Low	Middle
Conclusion Analysis Alignment	High	Low	Middle
Conclusion Analysis Trust	Middle	Low	Middle
Conclusion Analysis Communication	Low	Middle	Middle
Conclusion Analysis Leadership	High	Middle	Low
Average Level Elements of Network Governance	Middle-high	Middle-low	Middle
Favorable Integration Policies	Average	High	Average (Low)
Successful Integration Outcomes	High	Low	Middle

Table 17. Conclusion Network Governance, Integration Policies and Integration Outcomes

As a result, to conclude from both the individual elements of network governance and the elements combined to encompass the complex concept of network governance as a whole, it can be argued that in the field of integration policy, network governance contributes to a certain extent to successful integration. Where some elements of network governance can clearly contribute to the performance of the network in terms of successful integration, it seems that network governance as a whole can, to a certain extent, influence the outcomes of successful integration.

Reflection

In this section, first the conclusion and some of the findings will be discussed. This will be followed by some reflection on the methods used concerning reliability as well as internal and external validity. Lastly, this will section provide recommendations for further research.

Although the network governance elements have been operationalized so that there is no overlap in measurement, the elements are related to each other. For example, when there is a low quality in communication where not every actor is involved and kept up to date, the level of trust is, in turn, also negatively affected. Additionally, when a network is poorly matched between the number of actors and the organization of the network, this also affects the ability of a network to align goals and to communicate efficiently. Accordingly, it can be argued that some elements of network governance are more crucial than others. Especially the element of the match between the number of actors and the type of network governance seems to have a large impact on the other elements like trust and leadership.

What is especially interesting is that while the 'match' element seems fundamental, the 'leadership' element seems to have little effect. This while, regarding types of network governance, having a broker organization or a lead organization does imply having one actor determining how cooperation is started and organized, thus showing leadership activities. Although these leadership activities are different than showing leadership activities within the network, it remains interesting that guidance in terms of determining the structure of cooperation seems to be more effective than actively guiding cooperation within the network through mobilization and clear facilitation in the process.

It is also important to reflect on the methods that have established the outcomes. At first, because the elements of network governance are subjective, this thesis at first opted to conduct interviews with public policy officers with a specialization in integration policy in Sweden, Denmark and The Netherlands. However, it proved to be too difficult to find the right people with the right specialization who were able to do an interview, and as such the alternative of looking at internal policy papers was chosen. Yet, the internal policy documents in Sweden and Denmark were written in languages that were not fluently understood by the author, and policy documents of all cases were difficult to retrieve. Therefore, internal policy documents were not the only source for which evidence for the elements of network governance was considered. Rather, as a blessing in disguise, by utilizing multiple

perspectives throughout the literature, public policy documents and private policy documents from different actors involved within the networks, data has been triangulated and therefore increasined the internal validity. As such, although not as originally intended, the data was still able to provide a good image of the situation within the governance networks of Sweden, The Netherlands and Denmark.

For external validity this thesis relied on theoretical generalization rather than statistical generalization. Although it is not possible to generalize the findings to Member States of the EU or even beyond the EU, it has given an interesting insight of the influence that network governance can have and as such provides a basis for further research.

Lastly, for reliability, this thesis has argued that every step has been noted down as securely as possible. Yet, a clear weakness is that latent coding is subjective, which can lead to a situation where other authors that utilize the same documents can come to different conclusions. In order to reduce this vulnerability as much as possible, this thesis has not only made use of different documents and perspectives, but also an abundance of quotations and paraphrases of documents to show the reader how the evaluation has been established. Moreover, this research has been very secure with referencing to enhance its reliability.

Finally, some points towards future research in the field of network governance in itself or in relation to integration policy are provided. This thesis has not only been a first in attempting to provide another explanation for successful integration rather than successful integration policies, it has also been a first to identify the effect of network governance on integration. Although there have been some promising outcomes following from this research, it would be interesting to research the effect of network governance as a moderating variable of integration policy to explain the outcomes in terms of integration. In order to do this, it would be interesting to conduct a quantitative research where first the exact relationship between policies and outcomes is established via a regression analysis. However, until now no database for network elements or the overall level of network governance exists, which has also been one of this thesis' hurdles. So, it would be necessary to conduct such a database to conduct a quantitative research. Subsequent research could then discover the potential relationship between favorable policies and successful integration with network governance serving as a moderating variable.

Additionally, this thesis has not made a clear distinction between researching the policy-making and policy implementation phase, while there could be a difference in how network governance influences either phase and how that influences policy outcomes. Moreover, network governance is only one of the possible explanations for successful integration. Factors like the levels of political will or levels of accountability, media and framing, as well as individual codes like the history of cooperation can have an influence on successful integration. Therefore, although this thesis has come to some promising results, it is definitely not the end of researching network governance, successful integration, and the combination of both.

Bibliography

Aarhus Municipality. (2007). *Integrationspolitik: Medborgerskab skaber sammenhængskraft* [Integration politics: creating coherence with citizenship]. (Policy Report). Aarhus: Aarhus Municipality. Retrieved from https://www.aarhus.dk/~/media/Dokumenter/Borgmesterens-Afdeling/Byraadsservice/Politikker-og-planer/Integration/Integrationspolitik-juni-2007.pdf

Aarhus Municipality. (4 December, 2017). Integration. Retrieved from https://www.aarhus.dk/da/politik/Politikker-og-planer/Mangfoldighed-ligestilling-og-integration/Integration.aspx

ACVZ. (2017). *Pieken en dalen: Naar een duurzaam systeem voor opvang van asielzoekers en huisvesting en integratie van vergunninghouders* [Peaks and valleys: to a sustainable system for the reception of asylum-seekers and of the housing and integration of permit-holders. (Advice Report No. 46-2017). The Hague: ACVZ. Retrieved from https://acvz.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/70519-14961-Pieken-en-dalen-web-2.pdf

Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2001). Big questions in public network management research. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 11*(3), 295-326.

Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2010). *Collaborative public management : New strategies for local governments.* Washington : Georgetown University Press,. Retrieved from Ebook Library http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=516803;

Aleksynska, M. (2011). *Civic participation of immigrants: Culture transmission and assimilation.* (Report). MPRA. Retrieved from https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7674/1/MPRA_paper_7674.pdf

Aleksynska, M., & Tritah, A. (2011). *Occupation-education mismatch of immigrant workers in europe.* (Report No. 2011-16).CEPII. Retrieved from CEPII Retrieved from http://www2.cepii.fr/PDF_PUB/wp/2011/wp2011-16.pdf

Algemene Rekenkamer. (2017). *Inburgering; eerste resultaten van de wet inburgering 2013* [Integration: the first results of the 2013 Integration Act]. (Progress Report). Den Haag: Algemene Rekenkamer.

Alter, C., & Hage, J. (1993). *Organizations working together*. Newbury Park, Calif. : Sage Publications,.

American Integration Council. (2011). *THE MIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY INDEX (MIPEX III) what the results mean for the U.S.* Unpublished manuscript. Retrieved 3 July, 2018, Retrieved from https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/MIPEX_Fact_Sheet_050911.pdf

Andersson, T., & Ehlers, L. (2017). *Assigning refugees to landlords in sweden: Efficient stable maximum matchings.* (Research Report). Lund: Lund University. Retrieved from http://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/wp16_18.pdf

André, S., Dronkers, J., & Need, A. (2009). *To vote or not to vote? electoral participation of immigrants from different countries of origin in 24 european countries of destination.* (Research Paper). Paris: Sciences Po-CNRS. Retrieved from http://www.harryganzeboom.nl/isol/isol2010a2-andre_dronkers_need.pdf

Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative platforms as a governance strategy. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 28*(1), 16-32.

Babbie, E. (2013). *The practice of social science research* (13th ed.) Wadsworth Cengage Learning.

Ball, S. J. (2009). Privatising education, privatising education policy, privatising educational research: Network governance and the 'competition state'. *Journal of Education Policy, 24*(1), 83-99.

Berenschot. (2017). *Evaluatie kennisplatform integratie en samenleving (KIS).* (Evaluation Report No. 56311). Den Haag: Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid.

Bijl, R., & Verweij, A. (2012). *Measuring and monitoring immigrant integration in europe.* (). Den Haag: The Netherlands Institute for Social Research. doi:ISBN 978 90 377 0569 0

Bilgili, Ö., Huddleston, T., & Joki, A. (2015). *The dynamics between integration policies and outcomes: A synthesis of the literature.* Barcelona/Brussels: MIPEX. Retrieved from http://mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/files/mipex_literature-review_the-dynamics-between-integration-policies-and-outcomes.pdf

Bilodeau, A. (2016). *Just ordinary citizens? : Towards a comparative portrait of the political immigrant*. Toronto ;: University of Toronto Press,.

Blik op Weg. (2018). Missie [Mission]. Retrieved from https://www.blikopwerk.nl/over-blik-op-werk/missie

Borevi, K., Kriegbaum, K., & Mouritsen, P. (2017). The civic turn of immigrant integration policies in the scandinavian welfare states. *Comparative Migration Studies, 5*(9), 1-14. doi:DOI 10.1186/s40878-017-0052-4

Borkert, M., & Penninx, M. J. A. (2011). Policymaking in the field of migration and integration in europe: An introduction. In G. Zincone, R. Penninx & M. Borkert (Eds.), *Migration policymaking in europe: The dynamics of actors and contexts in past and present* (pp. 7-17). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Retrieved from https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/1165480/101964_Pages_from_migration_policymaking_in_europe_introduction.pdf

Brass, D. J., Galaskiewicz, J., Greve, H. R., & Tsai, W. (2004). Taking stock of networks and organizations: A multilevel perspective. *Academy of Management Journal, 47*(6), 795-817.

Bryson, J. (2004). What to do when stakeholders matter. *Public Management Review, 6*(1), 21-53.

Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Stone, M. M. (2006). The design and implementation of cross-sector collaborations: Propositions from the literature. *Public Administration Review, 66*(Supplement 1), 44-55.

Careja, R. (2018). Making good citizens: Local authorities' integration measures navigate national policies and local realities. *Journal of Ethnic and Minority Studies,* , 1-18. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2018.1441613

Cebolla-boado, H., & Finotelli, C. (2015). Is there a north-south divide in integration outcomes? A comparison of the integration outcomes of immigrants in southern and northern europe. *European Journal of Population, 31*(1), 77-102.

Clark, Richard W. Rutgers (1998). Collaboration: What makes it work? *Journal of Nutrition Education,* 30(5), 349-359.

Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2007). The whole-of-government approach to public sector reform. *Public Administration Review, 67*(6), 1059-1066.

Council of the European Union. (2004). *press release 2618th council meeting justice and home affairs.* (Press Release No. 14615/04). Brussels: Council of the European Union. Retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/82745.pdf

Damgaard, B., & Torfing, J. (2010). Network governance of active employment policy: The danish experience. *Journal of European Social Policy, 19*(5), 248-262. doi:DOI:10.1177/0958928709XXXXXX

Diaz Andrade, A. (2009). Interpretive research aiming at theory building: Adopting and adapting the case study design. *Qualitative Report, 14*(1), 42-60.

Divosa. (7 June, 2018). Wat hebben gemeenten nodig? [What do municipalities need?]. Retrieved from https://www.divosa.nl/bijeenkomsten/statushouders-op-weg-naar-werk-hoe-krijgt-u-dat-voor-elkaar/wat-hebben-gemeenten-nodig

Dronkers, J. & Maarten Peter Vink. (2012). Explaining access to citizenship in europe: How citizenship policies affect naturalization rates. *European Union Politics, 13*(3), 390-412.

Drost, S., & Pfisterer, S. M. (2013). *How to make cross-partnerships work? critical success factors for partnering.* Unpublished manuscript. Retrieved 5/22/2018 5:08:45 AM, Retrieved from Item Resolution URL http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77619

ECOTEC. (2006). *A study on policies for involving the social partners in the integration of people at a disadvantage in the labour market.* (Report). London: DG Employment and Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities of the European Commission.

Edelenbos, J., & Klijn, E. H. (2007). Meta governance as network management. In E. Sorenson, & J. Torfing (Eds.), *Theories of democratic network governance* (pp. 199-214). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Edwards, M., & Clough, R. (2005). *Corporate governance and performance an exploration of the connection in a public sector context.* (Project Report No. 1). Canberra: University of Canberra. Retrieved from www.canberra.edu.au/corpgov-aps

Emilsson, H. (2015). A national turn of local integration policy: Multi-level governance dynamics in denmark and sweden. *Comparative Migration Studies, 3*(7), 1-16. doi:DOI 10.1186/s40878-015-0008-5

Emerson, K., Nabatchi, T., & Balogh, S. (2012). An integrative framework for collaborative governance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 22*(1), 1.

Eurofound. (11 June, 2007). Third country nationals. Retrieved from https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations-dictionary/third-country-nationals

Eurofound. (2016). *Approaches to the labour market integration of refugees and asylum seekers.* (Report No. TJ-04-16-956-EN-N). Brussels: Eurofound. doi:10.2806/18416 Retrieved from https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef1646en.pdf

European Commission. *EWSI analysis on voluntary and citizens' initiative: Sweden.* (Factsheet). Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission. (2016a). Key policy messages from the peer review on 'Labour market inclusion of international protection applicants and beneficiaries'. Paper presented at the *Labour Market Inclusion of International Protection Applicants and Beneficiaries,* Madrid. 1-31. Retrieved

from http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1047&newsId=2475&further
News=yes

European Commission. (2016b). *Recent danish migration and integration policies.* (Flash
Report No. 2016/14). Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission. (2017a). The action plan on the integration of third-country nationals.
Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-
migration/integration/action-plan-integration-third-country-nationals_en

European Commission. (2017b). *Integration – migration and home affairs – european
commission*. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs-what-we-do/policies/legal-
migration/integration_en

European Commission. (2017c). EU policy framework for migrant integration. Retrieved
from https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/the-eu-and-integration/framework

European Commission. (5 April, 2018). Integration. Retrieved
from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-
migration/integration_en

Eurostat. (2015). Database. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/database

Fawcett, Paul & Carsten Daugbjerg. (2017). Metagovernance, network structure, and
legitimacy: Developing a heuristic for comparative governance analysis. *Administration
& Society, 49*(9), 1223-1245.

Fischler, F. (2015). *Researching third country nationals' integration as a three-way process -
immigrants, countries of emigration and countries of immigration as actors of
integration: Integration policy netherlands country report.*(Research Report No.
RR2014/15). London: INTERACT. Retrieved
from http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/32657/INTERACT-RR-2014%20-
%2015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Foss, N. J., & Mahoney, J. T. (2010). Exploring knowledge governance. *International Justice
Strategic Change Management, 2*(2/3), 93-101.

Freeman, P. L., & Millar, A. J. (2017). Valuing the project: A knowledge-action response to network governance in collaborative research. *Public Money & Management, 37*(1), 23-30.

Gemeente Den Haag. (2013). *Voortgangsrapportage integratiebeleid* [Progress report integration policy]. (Progress Report No. BOW/2013.575). Den Haag: Municipality of The Hague. Retrieved from https://denhaag.raadsinformatie.nl/document/3373865/1/RIS268891%20Voortgangsrapportage%20integratiebeleid

Gemeente Zaanstad. (2017). *Voortgangsrapportage uitvoeringsprogramma vluchtelingen: Vluchtelingen doen meteen mee* [Progress report implementationprogram refugees: refugees take part immediately]. (Progress Report No. 2017/54246). Zaanstad: Zaanstad Municipality. Retrieved from https://zaanstad.raadsinformatie.nl/document/6015906/1/Bijlage_Voortgangsrapportage_uitvoeringsprogramma_vluchtelingen

Goldsmith, S., & Eggers, W. D. (2004). *Governing by network : The new shape of the public sector*. Washington, DC : Brookings Institution Press,. Retrieved from http://site.ebrary.com/id/10077282;

Gurría, A. (7 Oktober, 2016). The integration of migrants and refugees: Challenges and opportunities. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/migration/integration-of-migrants-and-refugees-challenges-and-opportunities.htm

Heus, M. d., & Dronkers, J. (2010). De schoolprestaties van immigrantenkinderen in 16 OECD-landen . de invloed van onderwijsstelsels en overige samenlevingskenmerken van zowel herkomst- als bestemmingslanden. *Tijdschrift Voor Sociologie, 31*(3), 260-295.

Hollstein, B., Matiaske, W., & Schnapp, K. (2017). *Networked governance : New research perspectives*. Cham, Switzerland : Springer,. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1496698;

Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2001). Types of multi-level governance. *European Integration Online Papers, 5*(11), 1-24.

Hoppe, R., Woldendorp, J., & Bandelow, N. (2017). *Sustainable governance indicators 2017: Netherlands report.* (Report).SGI Network. Retrieved from http://www.sgi-network.org/docs/2017/country/SGI2017_Netherlands.pdf

Howard, M. M. (2009). *The politics of citizenship in europe*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,.

Huddleston, T., Bilgili, Ö., Joki, A., & Vankova, Z. (2015). *Migrant integration policy index.* (Report). Barcelona/ Brussels: Barcelona Center for International Affairs and Migration Policy Group. . (Integration Policy: Who benefits?)

Huxham, C., & Vangen, S. (2005). *Managing to collaborate : The theory and practice of collaborative advantage*. London : Routledge,. Retrieved from Inhaltsverzeichnis http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=015050252&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA; http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0418/2004013650.html;http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0651/2004013650-d.html

Imperial, M. (2005). Using collaboration as a governance strategy. *Administration & Society, 37*(3), 281-320.

INTERACT. (2014). *Integration policies sweden country report.* (Research Report No. 14). INTERACT. Retrieved from http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/32656/INTERACT-RR-2014%20-%2014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Isett, K. R., & Provan, K. G. (2005). The evolution of dyadic interorganizational relationships in a network of publicly funded nonprofit agencies. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 15*(1), 149-165. doi:10.1093/jopart/mui008

Jensen, T., Schmidt, G., Torslev, M., Vitus, K., & Weibel, K.*Denmark: Analysis of integration policies and public state endorsed institutions at national and regional levels in denmark.* (Working Paper). Copenhagen: The Danish Centre for Social Research. Retrieved

from https://www.ces.uc.pt/projectos/tolerace/media/WP2/WorkingPapers%202_Denmark.pdf

Johnson, L. J., Tam, B. K. Y., Zorn, D., Lamontagne, M., & Johnson, S. A. (2003). Stakeholders' views of factors that impact successful interagency collaboration. *Exceptional Children, 69*(2), 195-209.

Jorgenson, M. (2014). *Decentralising immigrant integration: Denmark's mainstreaming initiatives in employment, education and social affairs.* (Research Report). Brussels: Migration Policy Institute.

Juzwiak, T., McGregor, E., & Siegel, M. (2014). *Migrant and refugee integration in global cities: The role of cities and businesses.* (). The Hague/Maastricht: The Hague Process on Refugees and Migration. Retrieved from http://thehagueprocess.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/MigrantRefugeeIntegrationGlobalCities.pdf

Kallas, K., & Kuldur, K. (2007). *Integration policies and measures: Case study of good practices in sweden, denmark and great britain.* (Research Report No. 034118). Tartu: Institute of Baltic Studies.

Kenis, P. N., Provan, K. G., & Wentink, T. (2008). Het network-governance-perspectief. *Business performance management. sturen op prestatie en resultaat, 296 - 312* () Boom Academic, 2008.

Kickert, W. J. M., Klijn, E. H., & Koppenjan, J. F. M. (1997). *Managing complex networks : Strategies for the public sector.* London : Sage,. Retrieved from http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=007856350&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA

King, R. and Lulle, A. (2016). *Research on Migration: Facing Realities and Maximising Opportunities.* Brussels: European Commission, pp. 1-160.

KIS. (2018). Over ons [About us]. Retrieved from https://www.kis.nl/over-ons

Klijn, E. H. (2008a). Chapter 5: Policy and implementation networks: Managing complex interactions. In S. Cropper, M. Ebers, C. Huxham & P. Ring (Eds.), *Handbook of InterOrganizational relations* (pp. 118-146). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Klijn, E. H. (2008b). Governance and governance networks in europe: An assessment of 10 years of research on the theme. *Public Management Review, 10*(4), 505-525.

Klijn, E., & Koppenjan, J. F. M. (2016). *Governance networks in the public sector*. London ;: Routledge,.

Klijn, E., Steijn, A. J., & Edelenbos, J. (2010). *The impact of network management on outcomes in governance networks*. Unpublished manuscript. Retrieved 5/22/2018 9:06:07 AM, Retrieved from Item Resolution URL http://repub.eur.nl/pub/31233; http://worldcat.org/search?q=on:QGQ+http://repub.eur.nl/oai+DCG_ENTIRE_REPOSITORY+CNTCOLL

Klijn, E. H., Sierra, V., Ysa, T., Berman, E., Edelenbos, J., & Chen, D. Y. (2016). The influence of trust on network performance in taiwan, spain, and the netherlands: A cross-country comparison. *International Public Management Journal, 19*(1), 111-139.

Kos, S., Maussen, M. J. M., & Doomerniks, J. M. J. (2016). Policies of exclusion and practices of inclusion: How municipal governments negotiate asylum policies in the netherlands. *Territory, Politics, Governance, 4*(3), 354-374. doi:10.1080/21622671.2015.1024719

Kraaij, M. (2017). Integration policy of in the netherlands. Paper presented at the *The Implementation of the EU Action Plan on Integration. Feedback from the Member States, Regional and Local Authorities,* Brussels, Belgium. 1-19. Retrieved from https://www.ies.be/files/MinistryofSocialAffairsandEmploymentoftheNetherlands.pdf

Kvist, M. (2016). *Recent danish migration and integration policies.* (Factsheet No. 2016/14). Brussels: European Commission.

Lecy, J. D., Mergel, I. A., & Schmitz, H. P. (2014). Networks in public administration: Current scholarship in review. *Public Management Review, 16*(5), 643.

Leerkes, A., & Scholten, P. (2016). *Landen in nederland: De vluchtelingenstroom in integratieperspectief.* (Research Report). Den Haag: Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid.

Lewis, J., Baeza, J. I., & Alexander, D. (2008). Partnerships in primary care in australia: Network structure, dynamics and sustainability. *Social Science & Medicine, 67*, 280-291.

Liebig. (2017). Labour market integration of refugees and the role of pes issues and challenges. Paper presented at the *World Association of Public Employment Services,* Oslo. 1-20. Retrieved from http://wapes.org/fr/system/files/dag1_thomas_liebig_updated.pdf

Lukic, M. *Spaces and narratives of integration and intercultural dialogue in malmö, sweden.* (Unpublished Msc). Lund University, Lund. Retrieved from http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=5205614&fileOId=5205616

Lyden, G., & Nyhlen, J. (2012). Refugee policy and local decision making: Comparative case studies from sweden. Paper presented at the *XXI NORKOM, the Nordic Municipality Research Conference,* Oslo. 1-16. Retrieved from http://www.uio.no/forskning/tverrfak/demokrati/aktuelt/arrangementer/konferanser/2012/papers/lid%C3%A9n_j.nyhl%C3%A9n.pdf

Lyden, G., Nyhlen, J., & Nyhlen, S. (2015). Forced cooperation from above: The case of sweden's establishment reform. *Policy Studies, 36*(6), 468-486. doi:10.1080/01442872.2015.1089983

Martimiello, M. (2005). The links between academic research and public policies in the field of migration and ethnic relations: Selected national case-studies. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies, 7*(1), 1-83.

McEvily, B., Perrone, V., & Zaheer, A. (2003). Trust as an organizing principle. *Organization Science, 14*(1), 91-103.

McGuire, M. and Agranoff, R. (2011). The limitations of public management networks. *Public Administration, 89*(2)

Meier, K., & O'Toole, L. J. (2007). Modeling public management: Empirical analysis of the management-performance nexus. *Public Management Review, 9*(4), 503-527.

Mill, J. S. (1875). *A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive : Being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation* (9th ed. ed.). London : Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer,. Retrieved from PsycBOOKS, v.1 http://content.apa.org/books/2009-12702-000; PsycBOOKS,

Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid. (2013). Wet inburgering [Civic Integration Act]. Retrieved from http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0020611/2018-01-01

Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid. (2016). *Voortgangsrapportage agenda integratie per december 2016* [Progress report agenda integration per December 2016]. (Progress Report). Den Haag: Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid.

Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid. (2017). *Kamervraag cie SZW beleidsdoorlichting artikel 13 integratie en maatschappelijke samenhang* [Parliamentary Questions Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment policy review article 13 and social cohesion]. (Parlementary Questions No. 30982-31). Den Haag: Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal.

Ministry of Immigration and Integration. (2016). *International migration – denmark: Report to the OECD.* (Evaluation Report). Copenhagen: Ministry of Immigration and Integration.

MIPEX.Play with the data. Retrieved from http://mipex.eu/play/

Mouritsen, P., & Jensen, C. (2014). *Integration policies in denmark.* (Research Report No. RR2014/06). Aarhus: INTERACT. Retrieved from http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/32020/INTERACT-RR-2014_06.pdf

Mu, R., & de Jong, M. (2015). A network governance approach to transport-land use integration: Evidence from urumqi, china. *Policy and Politics Journal of Bristol University,* , 1-26.

Mullins, D., & Jones, T. (2009). Refugee integration and access to housing – A network management perspective. Paper presented at the *Institutional and Organisational Change in Social Housing Organisations in Europe,* Rotterdam. 2-21.

Myrberg, G. (2014). Organizing refugee reception: The case of the swedish introduction reform. Paper presented at the *ECPR Joint Sessions Conference,* Salamanca. 1-28. Retrieved from https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/82ea46f5-1443-44de-beee-a8be145d48a0.pdf

NAM. (10 February 2016). 22 nye forslag til smidigere integration [22 proposals for a smoother integration]. Retrieved from http://www.kl.dk/Integration/22-nye-forslag-til-smidigere-integration-id197263/

NAM. (2010). *Integrationspolitik* [Integration politics]. (Policy Report No. BIR/BIH 000193124).National Association of Municipalities. Retrieved from http://www.kl.dk/ImageVaultFiles/id_41232/cf_202/KL_politik_-_integration.PDF

Nachmias, C., & Nachmias, D. (2000). *Research in methods in the social sciences* (6th ed. ed.). New York : Worth Publishers,.

OECD. (2014). *Finding the way: A discussion of the swedish migrant integration system.* (Research Report). Paris: OECD Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/migration/swedish-migrant-intergation-system.pdf

OECD. (2015). *Indicators of immigrant integration 2015: Settling in.* Paris: OECD/European Commission. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264234024-en

OECD. (2016). *International migration - denmark.* (Report).The Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration.

OECE. (2017). *Local and central government co-ordination on the process of migrant integration: Good practices from selected OSCE participating states.* (Policy Study Report). Warsaw: OECE. Retrieved from https://www.osce.org/odihr/367041?download=true

Officiele Bekendmakingen. (2016). Wijziging van de wet inburgering en enkele andere wetten in verband met het toevoegen van het onderdeel participatieverklaring aan het inburgeringsexamen en de wettelijke vastlegging van de maatschappelijke begeleiding [Amendment to the Civic Integration Act and some other laws in connection with the

addition of the Participation Declaration component to the Civic Integration Exam and the legal recording of social counseling]. Retrieved from https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-34584-3.html?zoekcriteria=%3fzkt%3dUitgebreid%26pst%3dParlementaireDocumenten%26vrt%3dwetsvoorstel%2bparticipatieverklaring%2b%26zkd%3dInDeGeheleText%26dpr%3dAlle%26kmr%3d%26sdt%3dKenmerkendeDatum%26isp%3dtrue%26pnr%3d5%26rpp%3d10%26_page%3d6%26sorttype%3d1%26sortorder%3d4&resultIndex=54&sorttype=1&sortorder=4

Ojo, A., Janowski, T., & Estevez, E. (2011). Whole-of-government approach to information technology strategy management : Building a sustainable collaborative technology environment in government. *Information Polity, 16*(3), 233-251.

Ojo, A., & Mellouli, S. (2016). Deploying governance networks for societal challenges. *Government Information Quarterly,*

O'Toole, L. J. (2015). Networks and networking: The public administrative agendas. *Public Administration Review, 75*(3), 361-371.

O Toole, L. J., & Meier, K. J. (2004). Public management in intergovernmental networks: Matching structural networks and managerial networking. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 14*(Part 4), 469-494.

O'Toole, L.J. & Meier, K. J. (2011). *Public Management: Organizations, Governance and Performance.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Osborne, S. P. (2010). *The new public governance? : Emerging perspectives on the theory and practice of public governance*. London ;: Routledge,. Retrieved from http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=018880767&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA

Parlementaire Monitor. (2002). Nota "integratie in het perspectief van immigratie" [Nota "Integrtion in the perspective of immigration"]. Retrieved from https://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vvij5epmj1ey0/vi3ak9faqwzr

Parusel, B. (2016). (2016). Refugee arrivals and integration policy in sweden. Paper presented at the *International Metropolis Conference 2016,* Aichi-Nagoya. 1-11. Retrieved from http://www.iomvienna.at/sites/default/files/Refugee%20Integration%20in%20Sweden_PARUSEL.pdf

Perruchoud, R and Redpath-Cross, I. (2011). *Glossary on migration.* (No. 25). Geneva: International Organization for Migration. Retrieved from International Migration Law Retrieved from http://www.epim.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/iom.pdf

Penninx, R. (2009). *Decentralising integration policies: Managing migration in cities, regions and localities.* (Paper). London: Policy Network. Retrieved from http://www.policy-network.net/uploadedFiles/Publications/Publications/Decentralising%20integration%20policies%20FINAL%20%28Rinus%20Penninx%29.pdf

PES. (2015). *Arbetsförmedlingen annual report 2015.* (Annual Financial Report). Stockholm: Arbetsförmedlingen.

PES. (2018). About us. Retrieved from https://www.arbetsformedlingen.se/Globalmeny/Other-languages/About-us.html

Pierre, J., Jochem, S., & Jahn, D. (2016). *Sustainable governance indicators 2016: Sweden report.* (Research Report No. SGI2016).SGI. Retrieved from http://www.sgi-network.org/docs/2016/country/SGI2016_Sweden.pdf

Provan, K. G., & Kenis, P. (2008). Modes of network governance: Structure, management, and effectiveness. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18*(2), 229-252.

Provan, K.G. & Milward, H.B. (1999). Do networks really work?: A framework for evaluating public-sector organizational networks. *Academy of Management Proceedings & Membership Directory.*

Qvist, M. (2015). Activation reform and inter-agency co-operation – local consequences of mixed modes of governance in sweden. *Social Policy & Administration, 50*(1), 19-51. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12124

Qvist, M. (2017). Meta-governance and network formation in collaborative spaces of uncertainty: The case of swedish refugee integration policy. *Public Administration, 95*, 498-511. doi:DOI 10.1111/padm.12310

Regeringskansliet. (2002). *Swedish integration policy for the 21st century.* (Factsheet). Stockholm: Swedish Government. Retrieved from http://www.temaasyl.se/Documents/%C3%96vrigt/Engelskt%20material%20om%20Sverige/integration%20policy.pdf

Regioplan. (2013). *Inburgering en participatie: de bijdrage van inburgering aan de participatie van migranten in de Nederlandse samenleving* [Integration and participation: the contribution of integration to the participation of migrants in the Dutch society]. (Policy Report). The Hague: Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.

Regioplan. (2016). *Synthesestudie beleidsdoorlichting integratiebeleid.* (Research Report No. 16035). Den Haag: Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid.

Rhodes, R. A. W. (2000). Governance and public administration. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/profile/R_A_W_Rhodes/publication/246335680_Governance_and_Public_Administration/links/5a11be7d458515cc5aa9c6a9/Governance-and-Public-Administration.pdf

Rhodes, R. A. W. (2017). In Rhodes R. A. W. (Ed.), *Network governance and the differentiated polity*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Ricard, L. M., Klijn, E. H., Lewis, J. M., & Ysa, T. (2017). Assessing public leadership styles for innovation: A comparison of copenhagen, rotterdam and barcelona. *Public Management Review, 19*(2), 134-156.

Rijksoverheid. (2016). *Taskforce werk en integratie vluchtelingen* [Taskforce Employment and Integration Refugees]. (Policy Document). Den Haag: Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.

Rijksoverheid. (June, 2011). Integration policy based on dutch values. Retrieved from https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2011/06/17/integration-policy-based-on-dutch-values

Rijksschroeff, R., Duyvendak, J. W., & Pels, T. (2003). *Bronnenonderzoek integratiebeleid* [Resource research integration policy]. (Resource research No. 07-0764). Utrecht: Verwey-Jonker Instituut. Retrieved from https://www.bvekennis.nl/Bibliotheek/07-0764_bronnenonderzoek_integratiebeleid_Nederland.pdf

Riniolo, V. (2016). *Sweden: A country of opportunities and constraints for migrant integration.* (Paper).ISMU. Retrieved from http://www.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Riniolo_Paper_2016_en.pdf

Roseveare, D., & Jorgenson, M. (2004). *Migration and integration of immigrants in denmark.* (Working Paper No. 386). Paris: OECD Economics Department. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/284832633602 Retrieved from OECD Publishing Retrieved from http://adapt.it/adapt-indice-a-z/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/roseveare_386.pdf

Rozenberg, I., Hahman, M., & de Gruijter, M. (2017). *Monitor gemeentelijk beleid arbeidstoeleiding vluchtelingen 2017: Vluchtelingen aan het werk, gemeenten in beweging* [Monitor municipal policy employment placement for refugees 2017: refugees at work, municipalities in action]. (Evaluation Report). Den Haag: Divosa. Retrieved from KIS Retrieved from https://www.kis.nl/sites/default/files/bestanden/Publicaties/monitor-gemeentelijk-beleid-arbeidstoeleiding-vluchtelingen-2017.pdf

SALAR. (2017). *SKL:S agenda för integration – uppföljning av våra förslag till staten, nov. 2017* [SALAR's agenda for integration – follow-up on our proposals to the state, November 2017]. Unpublished manuscript. Retrieved 7 June, 2018, Retrieved from https://skl.se/download/18.26dbf34715fdb7ccdd4340b4/1511338495737/Status%20SKLs%20agenda%20f%C3%B6r%20integration%2021%20november%202017.pdf

Scharpf, F. W. (1994). Games real actors could play positive and negative coordination in embedded negotiations. *Journal of Theoretical Politics, 6*(1), 27-53.

Schlicht-Schmälzle, R., & Möller, S. (2012). Macro-political determinants of educational inequality between migrants and natives in western europe. *West European Politics, 35*(5), 1044-1074.

Scholten, P., Collett, E., & Petrovic, M. (2017). Mainstreaming migrant integration? A critical analysis of a new trend in integration governance. *International Review of Administrative Sciences, 83*(2), 283-302.

Scholten, P., Baggerman, F., Dellouche, L., Kampen, V., Wolf, J., & Ympa, R. (2017). *Policy innovation in refugee integration? A comparative analysis of innovative policy strategies toward refugee integration in europe.* (Research report). Rotterdam: Dutch Department of Social Affairs and Employment.

Scholten, P. W., & A. (2013). Agenda dynamics and the multi-level governance of intractable policy controversies: The case of migrant integration policies in the netherlands. *Policy Sciences, 46*(3), 217-236.

Scholten, P. (2009). The coproduction of immigrant integration policy and research in the netherlands: The case of the scientific council for government policy. *Science and Public Policy, 36*(7), 561-573.

Scholten, P. (2011). Constructing dutch immigrant policy: Research–Policy relations and immigrant integration policy-making in the netherlands. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 13*(1), 75-92.

Significant. (2010). *Vrijwilligerswerk: Stimulans voor tijdige participatie en integratie? monitor- en evaluatie onderzoek vrijwilligerswerk door asielzoekers en statushouders die in de opvang verblijven* [Voluntary work: incentive for temporary participation and integration? Monitor and evaluation research voluntary work by refugees and permit-holders who reside in an asylum-seeker shelter]. (Monitor and Evaluation Report). Den Haag: Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid.

Skogstad, G. (2003). Legitimacy and/or policy effectiveness?: Network governance and GMO regulation in the european union. *Journal of European Public Policy, 10*(3), 321-338.

Solano, P.*Integration in sweden.* (Research Document No. 900-7063). Lund, Sweden: Swedish Development Partner. Retrieved from https://manniskohjalp.se/sites/default/files/integration_in_sweden.pdf

Sorenson, E. & Torfing, J. (2017). Metagoverning collaborative innovation in governance networks. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 47(7), 826-839. Retrieved from: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0275074016643181

Süssmuth, R., & Weidenfeld, R. (2005). *Managing integration: The european Union's responsibilities towards immigrants*. Online: Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved from https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/managing-integration-european-union%E2%80%99s-responsibilities-towards-immigrants

Swedish Migration Agency. (2015). Our mission: Cooperation with others. Retrieved from https://www.migrationsverket.se/English/About-the-Migration-Agency/Our-mission/Cooperation-with-others.html

Teisman, G. R. (2000). Models for research into decision-making processes: On phases, streams and decision-making rounds. *Public Administration, 78*(4), 937-956.

Tellis, W. M. (2015). Application of a case study methodology. *The Qualitative Report, 3*(3)

Thomson, T. (2014). Skilled immigrant labour market integration in denmark. Paper presented at the *Labour Migration and Transnationalism Conference 2014,* Tallinn. 1-17. Retrieved from https://www.norden.ee/images/regionaal/info/migra/conference_7032014/TrineLundThomsen_labmigr_7032014.pdf

Torfing, J. (2005). Governance network theory: Towards a second generation. *European Political Science, 4*(3), 305-315.

Thorgaard, V., & Vinther, H. (2007). *rescaling social welfare policies in denmark: National report.* (Working Paper No. 10:2007).Social Policy and Welfare Services. Retrieved from https://pure.sfi.dk/ws/files/236805/WP10_2007.pdf

Timmermans, A., & Scholten, P. (2006). The political flow of wisdom: Science institutions as policy venues in the netherlands. *Journal of European Public Policy, 13*(7), 1104-1118.

Tummers, L. G., & Knies, E. (2013). Leadership and meaningful work in the public sector. *Public Administration Review, 73*(6), 859-868.

Tweede Kamer. (2017). *Beleidsdoorlichting sociale zaken en werkgelegenheid* [Policy review social affairs and employment]. (Policy Review No. 30 982, nr. 31). Den Haag: Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal.

UNHCR. (11 July, 2016). UNHCR viewpoint: 'Refugee' or 'migrant' – which is right?. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html

van Breugel, I., & Scholten, P. (2017). Mainstreaming in response to superdiversity? the governance of migration-related diversity in france, the UK and the netherlands. *Policy & Politics, 45*(4), 511-526.

Vluchtelingenwerk. (2018). Visie op inburgering [Vision on integration]. Retrieved from https://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/sites/public/u895/Visie_op_inburgering_vluchtelingenwerk_nederland_2016.pdf

Vohra, V. (2014). Using the multiple case study design to decipher contextual leadership behaviors in indian organizations. *Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods, 12*(1).

Voicu, B. & Mircea Comsa. (2014). Immigrants' participation in voting: Exposure, resilience, and transferability. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 40*(10), 1572-1592.

VNG. (2010). *Handreiking Gemeente en ROC: Partner in participatie* [Reaching out between municipality and ROC: Partners in participation]. (Policy Report). The Hague: VNG and MBO-raad.

VNG. (2016). *Factsheet integratie en participatie voor gemeenten.* (Factsheet No. 20161213). Den Haag: VNG. Retrieved from https://vng.nl/files/vng/20161213-factsheet-integratie-participatie-gemeenten.pdf

VROM. (2007). Deltaplan Inburgering: vaste voet in Nederland [Delta plan civic integration: permanent in The Netherlands]. (Policy Report). The Hague: Ministry of Living, Neighborhoods and Integration.

Vries, H. A., Bekkers, V. J. J. M. & Tummers, L. G. (. (2015). *Innovation in the public sector: A systematic review and future research agenda.* Unpublished manuscript,

Retrieved

from http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78470; http://worldcat.org/search?q=on:QGQ+http://repub.e
ur.nl/oai+DCG_ENTIRE_REPOSITORY+CNTCOLL

Wiesbrock, A. (2011). The integration of immigrants in sweden: A model for the european
union? *International Migration, 49*(4), 48-66.

WRR. (2015). *Persbericht WRR-policy brief Nr. 4 Geen tijd te verliezen: van opvang naar
integratie van asielmigranten* [Press release WRR-policy brief nr 4 No time to lose: from
reception to the integration of asylum migrants]. (Policy brief). The Hague: Scientific
Council for Municipalities.

Yin, R. K. (1994). *Case study research : Design and methods* (Second edition, ed.). Thousand
Oaks, CA : Sage Publications,.

Yin, R. K. (2014). *Case study research : Design and methods* (Fifth edition, [second
printing]. ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications,.

Ziller, C. (2015). Ethnic diversity, economic and cultural contexts, and social trust: Cross-
sectional and longitudinal evidence from european regions, 2002–2010. *Social
Forces, 93*(3), 1211-1240.

Zincone, G., & Caponio, T. (2006). The multilevel governance of migration. In R. Penninx,
M. Berger & K. Kraal (Eds.), *The dynamics of international migration and settlement in
europe: A state of the art* (pp. 269-304). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press and
IMISCOE joint studies.

Appendix

Appendix A.

Country	Favorable Integration Score (MIPEX)	Favorable integration policy – high and low	Favorable integration policy – average: new distribution
Australia	66 (Slightly favorable)	-	Average
Austria	48 (Halfway favorable)	-	Average-low
Belgium	70 (Slightly favorable)	-	Average-high
Canada	70 (Slightly favorable)	-	Average-high
Croatia	44 (Halfway favorable)	-	Average-low
Cyprus	36 (Slightly unfavorable)		-
Czech Republic	45 (Halfway favorable)	-	Average-low
Denmark	59 (Halfway favorable)	-	Average
Estonia	49 (Halfway favorable)	-	Average-low
Finland	71 (Slightly favorable)	-	Average-high
France	54 (Halfway favorable)	-	Average
Germany	63 (Slightly favorable)	-	Average
Greece	46 (Halfway favorable)	-	Average-low
Hungary	46 (Halfway favorable)	-	Average-low
Iceland	46 (Halfway favorable)	-	Average-low
Ireland	51 (Halfway favorable)	-	Average-low
Italy	58 (Halfway favorable)	-	Average
Japan	43 (Halfway favorable)	-	Average-low
Luxembourg	60 (Slightly favorable)	-	Average
Netherlands	61 (Slightly favorable)	-	Average
New Zealand	70 (Slightly favorable)	-	Average-high
Norway	69 (Slightly favorable)	-	Average-high
Poland	43 (Halfway favorable)	-	Average-low
Portugal	80 (Favorable)		-
Slovakia	38 (Slightly unfavorable)		-
Slovenia	48 (Halfway favorable)	-	Average-low
Spain	61 (Slightly favorable)	-	Average
Sweden	80 (Favorable)		-
Switzerland	46 (Halfway favorable)	-	Average-low
Turkey	24 (Slightly unfavorable)		-
United Kingdom	56 (Halfway favorable)	-	Average
USA	62 (Slightly favorable)	-	Average
MIPEX Average	54 (Halfway favorable)	-	Average

Table 18. Case selection: favorable integration scores

Favorable Integration Score (MIPEX) Legend:

 80 – 100 = Favorable
60 – 79   = Slightly favorable
41 – 59   = Halfway favorable
21 – 40   = Slightly unfavorable
1 – 20   = Unfavorable
0   = Critically unfavorable

Favorable Integration Policy:

	80 – 100 = Favorable
	67 – 79 = Average-high
	54 – 66 = Average
	41 – 53 = Average-low
	20 – 40 = Slightly unfavorable
	0 – 19 = Unfavorable

OECD Integration Variable	MIPEX Score on OECD Variable	OECD Integration Outcome[3]			
		Country	Immigrant/native	Score	Integration Score
Unemployment	Sweden: 98	Sweden	16,2/6,5	= 9,7	[Low/red]
		The Netherlands	11,6/5,2	= 6,4	[High/green]
	The Netherlands: 73	Denmark	13,4/6,6	= 6,8	[Intermediate/yellow]
Quality of Jobs	Denmark: 79	Sweden	31,2/11,7	= 19,5	[Low/red]
		The Netherlands	22,9/14,5	= 8,4	[High/green]
		Denmark	23,6/10,0	= 13,6	[Intermediate/yellow]
Education and Training	Sweden: 77	Sweden-	-11,3/-2,5	= 8,8	[Intermediate/yellow]
	The Netherlands: 50	The Netherlands	-5,4/-15	= 8,5	[High/green]
	Denmark: 49	Denmark	-3/-14	= 11	[Low/red]
Health	Sweden: 62	Sweden	15,4/11,4	= 4	[Low/red]
	The Netherlands: 55	The Netherlands	0,76/0	= 0,76	[High/green]
	Denmark: 53	Denmark	5,6/6,6	= 1	[Intermediate/yellow]
Civic Engagement	Sweden: 71	Sweden	81,5/91,2	= 9,7	[Intermediate/yellow]
	The Netherlands: 52	The Netherlands	72,9/87,10	= 13,2	[Low/red]
	Denmark: 64	Denmark	84,8/94,7	= 9,6	[High/green]
Social Cohesion	Sweden: 85	Sweden	7,34/12,87	= 5,53	[Low/red]
	The Netherlands: 73	The Netherlands	17,51/19,11	= 1,6	[High/green]
	Denmark: 50	Denmark	12,69/14,98	= 2,29	[Intermediate/yellow]
Total	Sweden: 80	Sweden	-	= 57,23	[Low/red]
	The Netherlands: 61	The Netherlands	-	= 39,86	[High/green]
	Denmark: 59	Denmark	-	= 44,29	[Intermediate/yellow]

Table 19. Case selection: MIPEX scores and OECD Integration Outcomes in the cases of Sweden, The Netherlands and Denmark

Legend:	
[green]	High
[yellow]	Intermediate
[red]	Low

[3] As mentioned in the theoretical framework, integration is measured by the difference between native and immigrant. In the second column, the first score indicates the immigrant score on the OECD variable and the second score the native. The number in the third column represents the difference between the native and immigrant score. Therefore, the lower the final score, the better the integration levels, and vice versa.

Appendix B.

Author	Document Name	Year	Type Document
Parlementaire Monitor	Nota "integratie in het perspectief van immigratie"	2002	Public policy document
Rijksschroeff, Duyvendak and Pels	Bronnenonderzoek integratiebeleid	2003	Public research document
Gemeente Den Haag	Voortgangsrapportage integratiebeleid	2013	Public policy document
Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid	Voortgangsrapportage agenda integratie per December 2016	2016	Public policy document
Regioplan	Synthesestudie beleidsdoorlichting integratiebeleid	2016	Public research document
Rijksoverheid	Taskforce werk en integratie vluchtelingen	2016	Public policy document
ACVZ	Pieken en dalen: naar een duurzaam systeem voor …	2017	Public policy document
Algemene Rekenkamer	Inburgering: eerste resultaten van de wet inburgering 2013	2017	Public policy document
Berenschot	Evaluatie kennisplatform integratie en samenleving	2017	Public policy document
Gemeente Zaanstad	Voortgangsrapportage uitvoeringsprogramma …	2017	Public policy document
Rozenberg, Kahman and de Gruijter	Monitor gemeentelijk beleid arbeidstoeleiding vluchtelingen 2017: Vluchtelingen aan het werk, gemeenten in beweging	2017	Public policy document
VNG	Factsheet integratie en participatie voor gemeenten	2017	Public policy document
VluchtelingenWerk	Visie op inburgering	2018	Public policy document
Officiele Bekendmakingen	Wijziging van de wet inburgering en enkele andere wetten …	2016	Law
E. Lensink	-	2018	Personal communication
S. Goedhoop	-	2018	Personal communication
Significant	Vrijwilligerswerk: Stimulans voor tijdige participatie …	2010	Received policy document
VNG	Handreiking gemeente en ROC: partners in participatie	2010	Received policy document
Regioplan	Inburgering en participatie: de bijdrage van inburgering …	2013	Received policy document
WRR	Geen tijd te verliezen: van opvang naar integratie …	2015	Received policy brief
Leerkes and Scholten	Landen in Nederland: De vluchtelingenstroom …	2016	Received policy document
VROM	Deltaplan Inburgering: Vaste voet in Nederland	2017	Received policy document
ECOTEC	A study on policies for involving the social partners in …	2006	Literature
Mullines and Jones	Refugee integration and access to housing …	2007	Literature
Kos, Maussen & Doomerik	Policies of exclusion and practices of inclusion: how municipal governments negotiate …	2016	Literature
Breugel and Scholten	Mainstreaming in response to superdiversity? …	2017	Literature
OECE	Local and central government coordination on the process …	2017	Literature

Table 20. Oversight of documents analyzed: The Netherlands

Author	Document Name	Year	Type Document
Regeringskansliet	Swedish integration policy for the 21st century	2002	Policy document
European Commission	Key policy messages from the peer review on 'Labour market …	2016	Policy document
Parusel	Refugee arrivals and integration policy in Sweden	2016	Policy document
Liebig	Labor market integration of refugees and the role of PES and …	2017	Policy document
PES	Arbetsförmedlingen annual report 2015	2017	Policy document
SALAR	SKL's agenda för integration – uppföljning av våra förslag till …	2017	Policy document
Regeringskanseliet	Länsstyrelsens återrapportering av uppdrag om översyn av samhällsorientering för nyanlända	2018	Received polic document
Regeringskanseliet	Ett ordnat mottagande – gemensamt ansvar för snabb etablering eller återvändande	2018	Received polic document
Regeringskanseliet	Förordning om statsbidrag till verksamheter för asylsökande m.fl.;	2016	Received polic document
Regeringskanseliet	Förordning om länsstyrelsernas uppdrag avseende insatser för asylsökande och vissa nyanlända invandrare;		Received polic document
Regeringskanseliet	Förordning (2015:521) om statsbidrag till särskilda folkbildningsinsatser för asylsökande och vissa nyanlända invandrare	2015	Received polic document
Lukic	Spaces and narratives of integration and intercultural dialogue …	n.d.	Literature
Myrberg	Organizing refugee reception: the case of the Swedish …	2014	Literature
OECD	Finding the way: A discussion of the Swedish migrant integration …	2014	Literature
Wiesbrock	The integration of immigrants in Sweden: A model for the …	2014	Literature
Emilsson	A national turn of local integration policy: multi-level governance …	2015	Literature
Lyden, Nyhlen and Nyhlen	Forced cooperation from above: the case of Sweden's establishment reform	2015	Literature
Qvist	Activation reform and inter-agency co-operation – local …	2015	Literature
Pierre, Jochem and Jahn	Sustainable governance indicators 2016: Sweden report	2016	Literature
Qvist	Meta-governance and network formation in collaborative spaces …	2017	Literature
Swedish Migration Agency	Our mission	2015	Website

Table 21. Oversight of documents analyzed: Sweden

Author	Document Name	Year	Type Document
Aarhus Municipality	Integrationspolitik: Medborgerskab skaber sammenhægskraft	2007	Policy document
European Commission	Recent Danish migration and integration policies	2016	Policy document
Kvist	Recent Danish migration and integration policies	2016	Policy document
NAM	Integrationspolitik	2016	Policy document
Ministry of Integration and Immigration	International migration – Denmark: Report to the OECD	2016	Policy document
Thorgaard and Vinther	Rescaling social welfare policies in Denmark: National report	2007	Literature
Jensen et al.	Analysis of integration policies and public state endorsed …	2014	Literature
Jorgenson	Decentralising immigrant integration: Denmark's mainstreaming …	2014	Literature
Mouritsen and Jensen	Integration policies in Denmark	2014	Literature
Rosevaere and Jorgenson	Migration and integration of immigrants in Denmark	2014	Literature
Thomson	Skilled immigrant labor market integration in Denmark	2014	Literature
Emilsson	A national turn of local integration policy: multi-level …	2015	Literature
Damgaard and Torfing	Network governance of active employment policy: the Danish …	2016	Literature
Scholten, Collet and Petrovic	Mainstreaming migrant integration? A critical analysis of a new…	2017	Literature
Scholten et al.	Policy innovation in refugee integration? A comparative analysis …	2017	Literature
Sorenson and Torfing	Meta-governing collaborative innovation in governance networks	2017	Literature
Careja	Making good citizens: Local authorities' integration measures …	2018	Literature
Aarhus Municipality	Integration	2017	Website

Table 22. Oversight of documents analyzed: Denmark