Why is Russia's Arctic policy failing? A case study

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Abstract

The thesis examines a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy. The paper aims to explain this phenomenon, applying three theories from a public policy perspective—rationalism, elite theory and the advocacy coalition framework. Rationalism emphasizes on the cost-benefit analysis, elite theory looks at elite’s preferences and the focus of the advocacy coalition framework is the competition between coalitions in Russia’s Arctic policy. The study represents a qualitative in-depth research, and congruence analysis is conducted to better achieve the research goal. The expectations from rationalism, elite theory and the advocacy coalition framework are derived. After that, these expectations are tested in the empirical part of the research. The study of the governmental documents is a primary method while the analysis of the media, newspapers, scientific journals and relevant sources from academic think tanks is an additional method of the study. The analysis has demonstrated that all three theories are relevant to the case. The research has concluded that rationalism and elite theory provide the best explanation on a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy.
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Abbreviations
ACF Advocacy coalition framework
EU European Union
NSR Northern Sea Route
US United States
1. Introduction

In this Chapter, I will introduce my research. It consists of problem statement which will lead to the research question. I will also present the research structure which can be helpful for the reader.

1.1. Introduction

The Arctic is a unique region. Climate conditions are severe, and ecosystems are fragile. The pace of climate change in the Arctic on average is higher than in the rest of the world (Ronson, 2011). Rapid ice melting in the Arctic Ocean causes serious risks for the existing unique biological species (polar bear, seal, walrus, etc.) as well as for the traditional way of life of indigenous people. Possible active exploration of oil reserves on the continental shelf in the Arctic can create serious environmental risks such as the oil spills, which need a high level of preparedness to respond to environmental emergencies in the Arctic Ocean. While providing economic opportunities, it can also stimulate certain territorial tensions between stakeholders in the region. Nevertheless, environmental protection and sustainable development remain central issues among national governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, business and civil society. Apart from the environmental risks, climate change also brings new opportunities. Gradual ice melting in the Arctic Ocean makes it possible to navigate via transport routes in the High North.

The Russian Federation is an Arctic state which is to address environmental issues as well as to take advantage of opportunities. Indeed, Russia holds the biggest part of the Arctic and its part is the most populated, accounting for around 2.37 million of people – that is more than a half of the whole population in the region (around 4 million people) (Rosstat, 2017). The Arctic region accounts for 10% of Russian GDP (Putin, 2017, March 30). In 2014, Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, declared that “Russia has been increasing its presence in the Arctic for decades, and this direction in public policy must be clearly and consistently maintained” (Putin, 2014, April 22).

The adoption of important normative documents has officially made Arctic policy one of the central issue in the Russian politics (The Russian Government, 2008; The Russian Government, 2013). Oil exploration projects on the continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean are potentially significant and beneficial for the Russian export-oriented economy (The
Russian Government, 2008). The success of such projects is crucial as it allows Russia to keep its leading position as an energy giant in the world (The Russian Government, 2008). The Russian Federation also focuses on the development of Northern Sea Route (NSR) and expects that the shipping along the NSR will become accessible and profitable soon (Putin, 2018). It is supposed to serve as an additional impulse for the development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation.

Russia also pays much attention to the successful development of military capabilities in the Arctic region (Shoygu, 2017, December 22). Since 2013, the intensive modernization and the deployment of new armed forces have been maintained in the High North. Sergey Shoygu, Minister of Defence, admits that no other country has ever tried to execute such massive military deployment in the Arctic (Interfax, 2018). The Russian authority also considers environmental protection as an important task in the Arctic (The Russian Government, 2008). To sum up, the Arctic is a policy priority for the Russian authority.

Given the fact that the Arctic is a policy priority for the Russian Government, I will analyse its degree of implementation as plans might not always be executed completely in practice. The application of public policy theories will help to identify causal relationships in Russia’s Arctic policy. The analysis will be valuable for policy-makers, government officials and consultants while evaluating policy implementation. As a result, it might have a positive impact on future policy implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy.

1.2. Problem statement and research question
Despite the relative success in some policy fields in the Arctic, the overall implementation of the Russia’s Arctic project often faces difficulties and poses many questions. Indeed, a set of important documents has been adopted by the Russian authority since 2008 (The Russian Government, 2008; The Russian Government, 2013). After that, the public program of social-economic development in the Arctic was also adopted in 2014, yet, the funding was not granted for this program (The Russian Government, 2014). Finally, the same public program was again revised and updated in August 2017, and the financial resources from the Federal Budget were allocated for the activities in the region (The Russian Government, 2017).

However, given the salience and many political declarations and goals of the Russian Government, the plans were not implemented at a sufficient level as it was initially conceived. It was noticed that there were many controversial aspects and inconsistencies
in Arctic policy for the last decade (2008-2017). Even government officials claim that Russia’s Arctic policy might be characterized as a slow and not coherent, with many delays in its realization (Medvedev, 2017, April 21; Sokolov, 2017, April 21; Rogozin, 2016, May 24; Public Commission on Arctic development, 2017, March 24). Researchers also highlight that there is a lack of implementation in mining operations in the Arctic as well as suspension and cancellation of some public programs in environmental protection and development of the Northern Sea Route (Adams et. al, 2015; Ampilov, 2015; Tkachuk, 2018; Zolotukhin, 2014).

The pre-analysis of such official documents as “The principles of the Russian Federation public policy in the Arctic until 2020 and beyond”, “Strategy of development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and the provision of national security until 2020” and “Social-economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” shows that, on the one hand, the Arctic is a region of high strategic significance for the Russian Federation (The Russian Government, 2008; The Russian Government, 2013; The Russian Government, 2014). On the other hand, there is a poor implementation of Arctic policy that presents the gap which can be analysed. It will be interesting and useful to find theoretical explanations why there is a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy.

Therefore, the central research question is the following:

**Which public policy theory best explains a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy?**

1.3. **Research structure**

I will present my research in the following structure. Chapter 2 will provide the literature review in which I will bring a comparative element through the consideration of Arctic policies of other countries. Chapter 3 will outline the theoretical framework in which I will present public policy theories and develop expectations from them. In Chapter 4, I will provide the research design in which I will discuss internal and external validity, theoretical and social relevance. Chapter 5 will present the empirical analysis in which I will set the stage and analyse the degree of implementation of Russia’s Arctic policy in each field. In Chapter 6, I will conduct the congruence analysis, testing theoretical expectations on empirical data. In Chapter 7, I will discuss the findings of congruence analysis, answer to the research question, discuss the limitations of the research and outline some possible directions for future research.
2. Literature review

This Chapter will provide a literature review. I will start with the consideration of Arctic policies of related to Russia countries and continue with the literature review on Russia’s Arctic. Before concluding, I will also discuss the existing approaches in the literature on Russia’s Arctic policy.

2.1. Introduction

Global warming and climate change have made the Arctic a region of international cooperation between Arctic nations, non-Arctic states and NGOs (Byers, 2013). Eight Arctic nations (Canada, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands) and the United States) are principal actors in Arctic cooperation and politics. They also compose the Arctic Council that maintains and develops cooperation on the main Arctic issues, especially environmental protection and sustainable development (Arctic Council, 2018). Despite the common commitment to environmental discourse, these countries have different interests and power in the region.

In order to better understand Russia’s Arctic policy, I will bring a comparative element through the examination of Arctic policies of other countries.

2.2. Arctic actors and their policies

This section will provide a review of Arctic policy of Arctic nations and non-Arctic actors. The Arctic is a region of international cooperation (Byers, 2013); therefore, the brief outline of Arctic and non-Arctic actors is valuable and useful for this research. The first group of countries will be Arctic nations which have their own strategies and clear objectives in the region. I will provide a brief outline of Arctic policies of Norway and Finland as countries which share a border with Russia in the Arctic. The US’s strategy in the Arctic will be observed as it has a “great power” status in the world.

The second group of countries will be non-Arctic states which have interests in the region. China’s approach is crucial to observe as this country is an emerging developing country. China also sees Russia as an important trade partner and encourage cooperation with it on a wide spectrum of issues, including Arctic issues. The EU’s Arctic policy will be considered as it represents common interests of 28 EU countries many of which are Russia’s important economic partners.
2.2.1. Norway’s High North policy

Norway identifies the Arctic as a prioritized foreign policy field (Norway’s Arctic Strategy, 2017, 2). 10% of Norwegian population lives north of the Arctic Circle (Norway’s Arctic Strategy, 2017). The Norwegian Government prioritized five fields – international cooperation, business development, knowledge development, infrastructure and environmental protection and emergency preparedness (Norway's Arctic Strategy, 2017). The vision of Arctic Norway is a peaceful, innovative and sustainable north (Norway's Arctic Strategy, 2017). Jensen & Skedsmo (2010) point out that the Arctic agenda has appeared since 2005 when the Norwegian Government started to promote consistently its country as a small state in the Arctic with energy-driven aspirations. Norway pays special attention to bilateral relations with Russia as Norway shares a border with this country and has many joint projects. It is said that Norway wants predictable and good relations with the Russian Federation (Norway’s Arctic Strategy, 2017). Norway is perceived as a leader in Arctic diplomacy, investing much efforts to organize the annual international «Arctic Frontiers» conference which gets together important stakeholders from academia, business and government to discuss salient Arctic issues (Arctic Frontiers, 2018). An interesting approach is offered by scholars who argue that the High North has three dimensions in Arctic strategy of Norway: an arena for great power politics; a place for cooperation with Russia; a national priority (Honneland & Jensen, 2015). G. Hønneland (2017) argues that there is no tangible division between domestic and foreign policies in the Norway’s High North Strategy. He also points out that a current dimension of Norway’s High North policy is circumpolar as, besides a special focus on relations with Russia, cooperation with other members of the Arctic Council has gained more importance than ever before in the region (Hønneland, 2017, 18). Norway’s Arctic policy is peculiar since the Arctic is a policy priority and the country does not clearly distinguish between their domestic and foreign Arctic policy dimensions.

2.2.2. Finland’s strategy for the Arctic

Finland is not a coastal Arctic state; however, it has land in the region. Despite a small size of territory, Finland plays an important role in Arctic issues, being an advanced scientific and pro-environmental actor in the region. Its Arctic strategy emphasizes four pillars such as Arctic country, Arctic expertise, Sustainable development, Environmental considerations and International cooperation (Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region,
Kazakov & Lystsev (2014) consider the Finnish Arctic strategy as a very elaborate and well-organized document with a clear identification of national interests and linking Finland as a member of the EU. Authors think that Finland aims to boost its position in the Arctic through the recognition by the EU as an expert-country on Arctic issues (Kazakov & Lystsev, 2014). Indeed, in the updated version of the Arctic strategy from September 2016, it says that Finland wants leadership in the EU Arctic policy and it is eager to be a central provider of solutions to challenges and issues in Arctic development (The Government's strategy session, 2016). S. Konyshev indicates that Finland lacks political instruments to promote its interests in the region, however, it uses regional (the EU) and international (the UN) institutions to compensate it (Konyshev, 2011, 106). Finland aims to be an Arctic expert and uses soft power mechanisms to promote its interests in the region.

2.2.3. The US's Arctic policy

The Arctic was the region of high geopolitical significance for the US during the Cold War in terms of nuclear deterrence of Soviet Union. After that, the US’s Arctic policy has become a “proactive, rigid and piecemeal” (Huebert, 2013). Wegge (2010) argues that the US is not an Arctic superpower since it has not enough military capabilities (small number of icebreakers) and a lack of political willingness to execute it. The US is the only country in the region which has not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which is the main legal document for the Arctic Ocean (UNCLOS, 2018). It weakens the American position in the Arctic and this fact is criticized by Borgerson (2008) who assumes that the US should change its “isolationist approach” to the Arctic. Huebert (2013) also refers the US as a “reluctant Arctic power”. However, it has started to change since 2009 when the National Security Presidential Directive concerning the Arctic was published (National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, 2009). This document outlined the US’s interests in the region such as national security, Arctic environment, sustainable resource management, international governance (National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, 2009). Apart from that, the implementation measures were also listed.

In 2013, the “National Strategy for the Arctic region” was announced and three key fields were listed: advancement of the US’s security interests, responsible Arctic region stewardship and strengthening of international cooperation (National Strategy for the
Arctic region, 2013). In December 2016, the new report on Arctic policy was published by the International Security Advisory Board (Report on Arctic policy, 2016). It consisted of six recommendations, one of which was to develop a special approach to Russia’s interests and policy in the Arctic (Report on Arctic policy, 2016). Nonetheless, a group of scholars (May, et al, 2005) noticed that there is a lack of coherence in the US’ Arctic policy. Within the American political system, many departments and agencies are responsible for Arctic policy that leads to “the lack of stable policy subsystem for the Arctic” (May, et al., 2005, 41). Authors conclude that the US’s Arctic policy is a component-driven policy with the lack of coherence and its policy environment is characterized as a “policy environment for which the politics of particular issues dominate Arctic policymaking” (May, et al., 2005, 56). The US is a strong power with broad interests and ambitions in the Arctic, yet, it has the limited capabilities and its Arctic policy lacks coherence.

2.2.4. China’s Arctic policy

As a growing Russia’s geopolitical partner and a developing country, China has aspirations in the High North that are inextricably linked with Arctic cooperation with Russia. By January 2018, China has issued its White Paper on the Arctic strategy in which it has officially outlined its interests which have been purely crystalized for last years (China’s Arctic Policy, 2018). China considers the Arctic as a region that belongs to the whole world and it is “a common heritage of mankind” (Bertelsen & Gallucci, 2016, 240). China implies that the whole world is responsible for the Arctic and should be involved in Arctic issues. China calls itself “near-Arctic state” and underlines that climate change has a direct impact on China’s climate system (China’s Arctic Policy, 2018). Apart from climate change and environment, China’s interests in the region are “scientific research, utilization of shipping routes, resource exploration and exploitation, security, and global governance” (China’s Arctic Policy, 2018).

China’s policy goals in the Arctic are: to understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic that will safeguard the common interests of all countries and international community in the Arctic (China’s Arctic Policy, 2018). It also aims to promote sustainable development in the region (China’s Arctic Policy, 2018). The principles of Chinese engagement in the Arctic is respect, cooperation, win-win result and sustainability (China’s Arctic Policy, 2018).
Liu (2017) considers that China’s intention to become a more active actor in the Arctic is achieved only through collaboration mechanisms. China does not see itself as a “challenging partner” in the Arctic and participates in the existing governance regimes (namely, the Arctic Council, the UNCLOS) in the region and sovereignty of Arctic nations (Liu, 2017, 55). Moreover, scholars point out that China is a salient actor that is heard in the Arctic governance even though it has not a direct geographic access into the Arctic Ocean (Lasserre, et al., 2017). Cooperation with Russia might help to increase China’s influence in the Arctic as Russia is a powerful Arctic player and can serve as a gatekeeper for China (Røseth, 2014). Russia’s approach towards China is not strategic, but pragmatic because Russia needs cooperation with China on shipping activities in the NSR, energy projects and investments in infrastructure to implement its ambitious Arctic project (Røseth, 2014).

2.2.5. EU’s Arctic policy

The EU has a strategic interest in the Arctic and wants to keep it as a low-tension area (Shared Vision, Common Action, 2016). The EU acknowledges that Arctic states are primarily responsible for the region. Yet, the EU advocates for development of regional and international cooperation that can help to address issues more effectively in the region (European Union External Action, 2017).

In 2016, the Commission prepared the Joint Communication “An integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic”. It was a logical follow-up to the evolution of Arctic policy which was consistent in its formulation. As a result, three priority areas were outlined: advancement of international cooperation, combatting the climate change and promotion of sustainable development (High Representative and the European Commission, 2016). From the Joint Communication (2016), the EU presents a soft-power approach to the Arctic, confirming that research, science and innovation are declared to be the main instruments for the implementation of the EU Arctic policy (Perez & Zhaklin, 2016).

Meanwhile, a better interinstitutional coordination and the division between Circumpolar and European Arctic issues are problematic aspects for the EU (Stepien, 2016). Indeed, the harmonization of interests of Member States and a difficult bargaining process within the EU institutions and between the EU and Member States are still prominent issues in the EU Arctic policy (Offerdal, 2011).
The EU is vital for the Arctic region itself as it is a huge single market for goods and resources from Arctic nations (Schönfeldt, 2017). Mutual interests between the EU and Arctic states encourage the development of a more elaborate Arctic policy, however, different positions of Member States do not accelerate a policy-making process. The Arctic is only 0.1% out of the total EU population (European Parliament, 2016). Only three EU Member States have territories and stable interests in the High North – Denmark, Finland and Sweden. They have their own national Arctic policy that closely corresponds with the EU’s proclaimed goals (Governments of Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, 2011; Government Offices of Sweden, 2011; Prime Minister’s Office of Finland, 2013). Such EU Member states as France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the UK have scientific interests in the Arctic and they are granted observer status in the Arctic Council (Arctic Council, 2018).

The development of the EU Arctic policy has been going on since 1989 when the Arctic was firstly briefly mentioned in EU’s official documents (European Communities, 1989). The existing Arctic policy has strengths such as stable and high funding, consistent environmental focus, encouragement of Arctic research and science. The promotion of entrepreneurship and innovation are vital for EU’s Arctic policy (Stępien & Koivurova, 2017). However, a current policy also has weaknesses such as a lack of interinstitutional coordination within the EU, a lack of policy coordination between the EU and Member States. It substantially decreases the efficiency of implementation. For example, there is no single body that can provide information, or which would be responsible for common Arctic policy. Additionally, there are no special approaches to Canada or Russia which are key and influential players in the region (Dohrmann, 2016). Meanwhile, Russia considers the EU as an inconvenient actor in the Arctic (Duncan & Tulupov, 2016).

The literature review of current Arctic policies has demonstrated that countries have different interests and specific features in their Arctic strategies. It allows the reader to better understand the overall context of Arctic politics before analysing Russia’s policy. Table 1 summarizes the interests of arctic actors.
Table 1. Arctic actors and their interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arctic actor</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>International cooperation, business development, knowledge development, infrastructure and environmental protection, emergency preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Arctic expertise, sustainable development, environmental considerations and international cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>National security, responsible Arctic region stewardship, international cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Scientific research, utilization of shipping routes, resource exploration and exploitation, security, global governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>International cooperation, climate change, sustainable development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The Table is compiled by the author.

2.3. Russia in the Arctic

This section will provide a literature review on Russia’s role in the Arctic. Russia is one of the key players in Arctic politics. Within academic discussions, there are two dominant perceptions of Russia in the Arctic – Realist perspective and Neoliberal Institutionalist (Devyatkin, 2018). The Realist school think that Russia is an assertive power in the Arctic and it promotes aggressively its national interests (Borgerson, 2008; Cohen, 2010). Russia’s deployment of armed forces in the Arctic is a demonstration of power politics that is part of overall Russia’s foreign policy (Giles & Smith, 2007). Therefore, Russia’s presence in the Arctic is an integral element of being a great power (Piskunova, 2010). The huge investments in the construction of new icebreakers by the Russian Government is perceived as an attempt to get back in time of “great Soviet Union” dominance in the Arctic (Josephson, 2014). P. Baev (2010) considers that Russia plays a “power game” in the region and wants the development of the Arctic for patriotic reasons rather than economic calculations. The possession of more territories, “conquer the north” and “expansion in the harsh Arctic Ocean” are narratives of great appeal for Russian people (Baev, 2010, 25). S. Medvedev (2016) also highlights the Arctic importance as a symbol of great power status. To sum up, military security, patriotic rhetoric and the status of great power are the key for understanding of Russia in the Arctic from the Realist perspective.
Neoliberal Institutionalist group of researchers (Alexandrov, 2009; Lasserre, et al., 2012) points out that Russia is a pragmatic and rational actor and it has clear economic interests in the High North, calculating its costs and benefits. Russia is inclined to respect the rules of games in the Arctic and keep the status-quo in the region. Konyshev & Sergunin (2014) argue that the development of abundant gas and oil projects on the continental shelf is a number one priority for the Russian government while the militarization in the Arctic is a planned program of modernization of armed forces that is quite small in scale. Keil (2013) provides the evidence that Russia accounts for 52% of oil and gas reserves in the Arctic, however, it cannot lead to any geopolitical competition for resources or conflict in the region. To sum up, Neoliberal Institutionalism presents that cooperation, stability and economic interests are central for the analysis of Russia’s role in the Arctic.

As we can see, many scholars analyse Russia as a foreign policy player in the Arctic. While Realism-oriented scholars consider Russia as an assertive actor with patriotic rhetoric, Neoliberal school highlights that Russia is a cooperative actor with strong economic interests in the Arctic.

2.4. Russia’s Arctic policy as domestic policy

This section will provide a literature review on Arctic policy as a domestic dimension. Scholars (Baev, 2010; Medvedev, 2016) acknowledge that the Arctic project is an integral part of domestic policy. However, some researchers (Zhuravlev, 2013; Medvedev, 2016) point out that external factors (e.g. external shocks on Russia’s economy) was an obstacle to develop a more elaborate domestic Artic policy. Within the domestic dimension, there are two main group of scholars who observe it from a social-economic approach, mostly covering issues of regional development in the Arctic, and those who mostly analyse its legal and regulatory framework.

Within the social-economic dimension, Sinenko (2016) analyses the indicators of social-economic development in the High North regions and the evolution in Arctic policy since its adoption in 2008. She also identifies the social-economic issues in the Arctic such as a decline in the standard of living, an outflow of qualified workforce, a low productivity and innovation potential (Sinenko, 2016). Kondral & Morozov (2016) discuss the spatial-territorial development of Arctic regions and point out to a low quality of decision-making process in public management. They criticize a current Arctic policy for the perception of the Arctic as a resource base, the authors also propose to consider Arctic
regions as social formations (Kondral & Morozov, 2016). Markin & Silin (2017) have developed the methodology of socio-spatial and socio-territorial development, namely the agent-based model. It is to help the authority to monitor and manage a human and social potential of neo-industrial development of the Russia's Arctic. Korchak (2013) highlights the significance of indigenous people and recommends that a comprehensive approach to the social-economic development of indigenous people should be applied in the Arctic. This approach consists of social, economic and environmental dimensions (Korchak, 2013). Gushchina & Polozhentseva (2016) provide the findings of surveys in which the authors analyse public opinion on social-economic policy in Russia's Arctic.

Other group of scholars mostly focuses on the analysis of regulatory and legal framework of Russia's Arctic. Avtonomov, Malko & Nemchenko (2016) argue that an effective Arctic policy needs a systematic science-based legal policy. They also propose to develop a legal Arctic vocabulary of special terms (Avtonomov, Malko & Nemchenko, 2016). Startsev (2016), applying the normative analysis of Arctic policy for 2000-2016, concludes that current plans and declared normative principles aim to develop the Arctic as a resource base; regional development remains a secondary task for the Russian government. Kokis (2015) examines the legal evolution of Arctic policy and its current issues while Sharapova (2015) focuses on the legal foundation of the Northern Sea Route. Tamizky (2012) analyses public policy from a historical perspective and highlights several stages of its evolution. While noting the significant development of legislative framework, Tamizky (2012) criticizes a current Arctic policy for its fragmented approach and a lack of long-term strategy. Leksin & Porfiriev (2015) identify a lack of research capacity which can bring an evidence-based aspect in Arctic policy. Zhiltsov & Zonn (2015) analyse the evolution of laws in the Arctic and highlight main economic issues in Russia's Arctic policy (e.g. a lack of technology for oil and gas extraction on the continental shelf) (Zhiltsov & Zonn, 2015). The attraction of foreign investors to joint projects in the Arctic Ocean was an important part of Arctic strategy for the Russian Government. However, scholars point out that all oil and gas joint projects with foreign companies on the continental shelf have been suspended after the imposition of sanctions and deterioration of political relations with Europe and the US (Zhiltsov & Zonn, 2015).

Arctic policy as a domestic dimension is closely connected with Russia's activities as a foreign policy actor in the region. Nonetheless, there are two dominant approaches to
analyse Russia’s domestic policy in the Arctic: social-economic and legislative framework approaches. They are useful to gain insight into the current dynamics of Arctic social-development process and Arctic law-making process. However, they are not applicable and relevant for the case under consideration.

2.5. Conclusion

The existence of Arctic policies among Arctic nations and even non-Arctic states demonstrates that Arctic politics is a complicated interconnectedness of many strategies and interests in the region. In the most of Arctic countries, Arctic policy is mostly scrutinized from the International Relations perspective and it is a part of foreign policy. Russia in the Arctic is also analysed by scholars through classical questions in the field of International Relations – cooperation or conflict. Yet, in the Russian-language literature, Arctic policy is considered as an important domestic dimension in which social-economic development and legislative framework approaches are dominating. However, both perspectives have a weak explanatory power to identify causal relationship on a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy.

I agree with Russian scholars (Baev, 2010; Medvedev, 2016) that Russia’s Arctic policy is much more a domestic policy than for other Arctic nations because, first of all, the Arctic sector of Russia accounts for 45% of the Arctic Ocean and the Arctic zone of Russia is 18% of total Russia’s territory (Arctic Sector of Russia, 2017; Rossiiskye vladeniya v Arktike, 2018). Secondly, 2.37 million of people live in Russia’s Arctic that is more than a half of the overall Arctic population which is around 4 million people (Rosstat, 2017; Rossiiskye vladeniya v Arktike, 2018). Thirdly, the Arctic is a conscious policy priority for the Russian Government unlike other Arctic countries, except Norway (Medvedev, 2016). Fourthly, the Arctic project is quite politicized in Russia and is used as a political symbol (Baev, 2010). Finally, the Arctic is considered by the Russian Government as a national project that can bring economic wealth and open new opportunities for the whole country (The Russian Government, 2013). Therefore, Russia’s Arctic should be scrutinized from a public policy perspective that has not widely been applied before for the Russia’s case. This thesis will fill this research gap in the study of Russia’s Arctic policy.
3. Theoretical framework

Theoretical framework will provide the research with public policy theories which are relevant and applicable to the purpose of research. This Chapter will provide a summary of rationalism, elite theory and the advocacy coalition framework, their limitations and a set of expectations.

3.1. Introduction

As proposed in Chapter 2, public policy theories will be applied to analyse Russia’s Arctic policy. In the realm of this research, public policy is defined as “a relatively stable, purposive course of action or inaction followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern” (Anderson, 2011, 6).

Social scientists have developed different approaches to analyse public policy: rational and political perspectives, elite theory, constructivism and institutionalism (Bekkers, Fenger & Scholten, 2017). However, this study will not use an institutional approach since legal aspects or informal practices and habits are not a focus of this research. Constructivism can be useful for learning intersubjective meanings, language and symbols of public policy that is not helpful to answer the research question.

However, rational perspective will be relevant for this study because it can help to better explain main preferences of actors through the cost-benefit analysis. Elite theory will be applicable as the Russia’s political system has a democratic deficit and the influence of elites on the public policy-making is strong enough. Political perspective will also be relevant because it might provide the understanding of power struggle and political bargaining in Russia's Arctic policy. Within the political perspective, the advocacy coalition framework will be chosen as a specific theory to analyse Arctic policy. All three perspectives and theories are relevant to gain insight into the Russian Arctic policy that is the focus of this research.

3.2. Rationalism

The rational perspective is a classical approach to public policy. It assumes that actors are rational. Therefore, rationalism states that people can engineer policy to find the best solutions to address societal problems (Bekkers, et al., 2017). Therefore, policy-makers should identify factors, instruments and actions that can “ideally” solve societal problems (Bekkers, et al., 2017).
Rationalism states that a starting point of policy is the formulation of goal (Bekkers, et al., 2017). Policy-makers set the goals and implement them through means or instruments (Bekkers, et al., 2017). Policy instruments can be distinguished as communicative, economic and regulative (Bekkers, et al., 2017). Apart from selected policy instruments, adopted public plans and programs should have further detailed actions. Only a well-designed policy can be successfully implemented. If there was a policy failure, the selection of policy instruments had been inadequate (Bekkers, et al., 2017). Political preferences and beliefs are not relevant because public policy-making is a cold-minded and impartial process. The main indicator of the most appropriate policy instrument is a degree of contribution to the fulfilment of goal (Bekkers, et al., 2017).

Scientific knowledge and information are vital for the rational perspective (Bekkers, et al., 2017). An evidence-based policy can justify policy change or advocate for the status-quo. When policy-makers design a policy, they must be capable to assess the impact which a policy may have on different societal groups (Bekkers, et al., 2017). The expertise and knowledge allow to expect that selected instruments will lead to a successful policy (Bekkers, et al., 2017). It means that policy-makers engineer a policy, therefore, they can control and predict a policy outcome.

According to the rationalist perspective, the cost-benefit analysis is a universal tool that policy-makers can apply to select the best policy option. Before making a decision, policy-makers weigh each option and calculate expected consequences and outcomes. After that, the option with the least costs and the most benefits can be adopted (Anyebe, 2018). Otherwise, it is not rational for policy-makers. Besides that, a causal link is a central for policy-makers. If actors take the efforts to carry out a policy, it has to address a problem in an intended way (Bekkers, et al., 2017).

Rationalism also highlights that a policy is cyclical. It means that public policy-making is made within several discrete stages. Lasswell (1971) defined 7 stages of policy process in which intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination and appraisal were included. Gary Brewer (1974) modernized stages of policy process and invention/initiation, estimation, selection, implementation, evaluation and termination were six stages of policy process.

Howlett (2009) proposed a contemporary model of policy cycle: 1) agenda-setting, 2) policy formulation, 3) decision-making, 4) policy implementation and 5) policy
evaluation. The agenda-setting is a process during which issues are becoming salient for the authority (Howlett, 2009). Policy formulation explains how different alternatives and ways are formulated within the government. The decision-making stage implies that a concrete set of actions is adopted as a law or treaty. An inaction of the authority (non-decision) can also be a form of decision by a government. Execution of policies and putting them into effect occur at the policy implementation stage. Policy evaluation refers to the process when outcomes and outputs are monitored and critically examined (Howlett, 2009, 12). In order to maintain a proper policy-making, it should go sequentially and in order (Bekkers, et al., 2017).

However, this model has its limitations as it simplifies the reality of complex public policy-making process which can sometimes ignore this “natural” order (Peters, 2015). This model is also quite descriptive, and it fails to explain how and why policy issues follow the policy cycle. Nevertheless, the “policy cycle” concept is a sequential model that describes public policy-making from the emergence of policy issue to its evaluation.

To sum up, the goal rationality, means and instruments as well as the cost-benefit analysis and the policy cycle form an evidence-based public policy-making in which knowledge and information play a crucial role. However, decisions can be also irrational because the behaviour of actors can sometimes be characterized by bounded rationality that means, in some cases, actors have only a limited amount of information and time that prevents them from making purely rational policies (Simon, 1957). Nonetheless, policy-makers are intended to be rational as much as it is possible.

The rational perspective can probably be relevant for Russia’s Arctic policy. I expect that the Russian authority might set the goals, developed instruments and actions for the implementation of Arctic policy. Russia’s public policy-makers might have scrutinized much information to select the best evidence-based options. Based on the rational perspective, the following expectation is formulated:

**Exp1:** A lack of implementation in Arctic policy can be explained by a rational decision of the Russian authority which came to the conclusion that costs of Arctic policy outweighed benefits.
3.3. Elite theory

Given the political regime of the case under consideration, it is important to include the elite theory in a theoretical framework. A lack of democratic procedures and weak participation of people in decision-making process require to apply elite theory to the case.

The main assumption of elite theory is that preferences of people do not determine public policy, yet, it is made by the ruling elite whose preferences turn into decisions (Anderson, 2011). According to elite theory, society consists of a few who have much power and masses that have a weak say in politics. Therefore, masses are governed by elites and the mindset of elites is different from typical attitudes of masses (Dye & Zeigler, 1996). Elite theory assumes that stability is important for elites, therefore, policy change can be only incremental, not dramatic (Dye & Zeigler, 1996). The ruling elites have a consensus on basic common values. Non-elites who want to have access to the governance process must share the basic elite consensus (Dye & Zeigler, 1996). Elites can initiate reforms or public programs since such strategy will help them stay in power and preserve stability. Elites have a huge impact on the masses while the masses have a weak power over elites (Dye & Zeigler, 1996). Masses are apathetic and misinformed that limits their participation in a political life and, as a result, makes them powerless in public policy-making.

Policy reflects preferences and values of elites. Economic and political elites often get together and exchange relevant information or resources which allow them to gain influence and control (Peters, 2015). In some regimes, elites can even control media that helps them manage the agenda and filter information (Carnes, 2013). In these cases, elites can actively have an impact on national mood, using news media and/or propaganda. It helps elites preserve the status-quo and manage national mood (Gul, 2009). Elites can consist of different groups of people (mostly, elected and high-ranked executive officials, some CEOs of big private or state-owned companies, wealthy people, academia, policy analysts, etc.) Despite the presence of consensus among elites on common basic values, leadership plays a significant role in public policy-making (Kraft & Furlong, 2010).

To sum up, elite theory states that public policy-making is a process that reflects interests and preferences of elites. Elite theory has a strong explanatory mechanism to understand the decision-making process; however, it ignores the dynamics and uncertainty of policy
process. Elite theory also significantly underestimates the impact of non-governmental organizations which, for instance, may narrow down the range of possible decisions made by elites.

Elite theory is applicable to understand which elites occupy dominant positions in Russia’s Arctic policy. I presume that Russia’s public policy might be a product of elites and the nature of political regime might be undemocratic where elites determine the outcome of policy-making. The stability of Russia’s political system might be vitally necessary for elites to remain in power indefinitely. Therefore, the strategy of “the least policy change” can probably be a guiding principle for Russia’s ruling elites. Consequently, the second expectation is formulated:

**Exp2:** A lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy can be explained by the ruling elite who is reluctant to accept policy changes.

### 3.4. The advocacy coalition framework

The political perspective emphasizes that different values can be promoted using power in politics. Different actors have interests which formulate a policy in a certain way. Each actor has its own strategy how to pursue interests and have a strong impact on a concrete decision (Bekkers, et al., 2017). Actors advocate for their different ideas and values that causes power struggle and a permanent competition of ideas (Bekkers, et al., 2017). Actors perceive the power as an instrument to promote their interests. The struggle between different political groups can characterize public policy-making process (Dahl, 1961). Coercion, compromise, exchange, negotiation and persuasion are types of interactions that might emerge between various interest groups, political parties, elite groups or other stakeholders (Bekkers, et al., 2017). Actors use information as a resource which can help them advocate their interests (Bekkers, et al., 2017). The final political decision may indicate that certain political actors dominate and have a decisive influence on a certain policy issue.

In the contrast to a rational approach, the political perspective states that even when the decision is made, policy implementation can remain a political ground in which some actors are for while others can be against the implementation of plan (Bekkers, et al., 2017). Political struggle between different actors can explain a lack of policy implementation. The political perspective on public policy also highlights the role of bureaucracy which is officially neutral, and *de jure* implements political decisions,
However, de facto it has its own interests which can change an initial policy plan (Bekkers, et al., 2017). To sum up, according to the political perspective, public policy is determined by power and interests of actors who safeguard their values deploying different strategies in a competing political arena. The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) is a specific theory within the political perspective on public policy. The ACF assumes that public policy-making is a sophisticated process in which different actors can be involved in. Each policy issue has a different salience – from very technical issues to ones in which many actors are stakeholders (Cairney, 2014). According to the ACF, the central concept is the policy subsystem that is composed of not only government officials, but also various private actors and other stakeholders who are concerned about some policy issues (Sabatier, 1998). Municipal, regional and national level of governments can be active actors of policy subsystems. Different states, non-governmental and international organizations, researchers and even journalists can be involved in a policy-making process within a certain policy domain (Sabatier, 1998). According to the ACF, public policy reflects the belief system that presents a broad picture, including priorities, values, cause/effect relationships (Sabatier, 1998). Therefore, if we know political preferences of different stakeholders and groups, we can evaluate their impact on a final policy decision. To sum up, belief systems are translated into public policy in the form of a public program.

Figure 1 presents the overall structure of the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1998). It consists of the policy subsystem in which decisions are made and two sets of external factors which influence the policy subsystem (Sabatier, 1998). “Relatively stable parameters” are hard to change and are rarely the focus of advocacy coalitions. The second set of external factors is “external events” which have much more impact on a policy subsystem (Sabatier, 1998, 102). They include social-economic factors, public opinion, electoral processes and changes in other policy subsystems (Sabatier, 1998).
The policy subsystem consists of different public and private actors who compose advocacy coalitions (at least two actors). Members of advocacy coalition share a similar set of beliefs and possible solutions on a certain issue and they are in consistent coordination between its members over time (Sabatier, 1998).

The belief system of advocacy coalition is composed of deep core, policy core and secondary aspects. Deep core are a normative and ontological beliefs of the coalition (Sabatier, 1998). Policy core beliefs include the understanding of causal relationships, priorities and strategies (covering instruments, the level of government, etc.). They can be changed easier than deep core values. Secondary aspects are the least important for advocacy coalitions (for example, instrumental decisions, budgetary allocations). They are composed of policy preferences which can be changed if new information or data emerge (Sabatier, 1998).
Different advocacy coalitions have different strategies to pursue their interests. However, there is a policy broker who is to find some compromise and mediate between conflicting advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1998). The result of competition between different advocacy coalitions can be a decision (e.g. new public program, resources allocations, appointments) that is aimed at addressing some public problem (Sabatier, 1998). However, even after the government is made a decision, advocacy coalitions continue to act, and they can also change their perceptions, mostly on secondary aspects of a policy issue.

Policy-oriented learning is a significant aspect of policy change in an advocacy coalition. Policy learning deals with long-term changes of behavior or thinking on policy goals that is caused by new information (Sabatier, 1998). Actors are more likely to agree with the information they have already known than with the new information which can challenge their ideas. It can happen rather in policy core than secondary aspects because policy core learning comes most of the times from actors within their own coalition (Sabatier, 1998).

To sum up, the policy subsystem, the belief system and an advocacy coalition compose the advocacy coalition framework. Yet, the ACF was mostly applied for developed countries with the culture of open public debates and transparency. Political culture was an important prerequisite for the application of the ACF in developed countries (Peters, 2015). Therefore, it can be noted as a relative limitation for the Russia’s case, given the fact that Russia’s political regime is not completely plural. Nonetheless, the focus of the ACF is power struggle between different coalitions that brings the theory a strong explanatory power and relevance even for Russia’s case with some democratic deficit.

The ACF states that there are many coalitions within the Arctic policy subsystem. They might balance, and the shift of dominant advocacy coalition creates policy change and development (Bennett & Howlett, 1992). Russia’s political system might be characterized by strong presidential power. It might make President of Russia a principal sovereign within the Arctic policy subsystem. There are also government officials (ministers, advisors, etc.) and different stakeholders who can probably form various advocacy coalitions. The head of the Russian Government might be a policy broker who mediates between conflicting coalitions which compete for the influence and a final decision of President of Russia on Arctic issues.
However, I propose that Russia's Arctic policy might have not been balanced as the degree of implementation could probably vary among different policy fields. It might have shown that the power of advocacy coalitions was not similar. I also expect that there might have been a predominant advocacy coalition in 2008-2017 that could lead to an imbalance in Russia's Arctic policy. Based on the advocacy coalition framework, the following expectation can be formulated:

**Exp3:** A lack of implementation can be explained by the dominance of one advocacy coalition over the others, which has led to the imbalance in Russia's Arctic policy.

### 3.5. Conclusion

In this Chapter, a rational approach, elite theory and the advocacy coalition framework on public policy are presented. Based on their main theoretical grounds, three expectations have been developed and they offer different explanations on a lack of implementation in Russia's Arctic policy. Table 2 summarizes three theoretical frameworks. On the one hand, it can be caused by rational calculations of policy-makers, while, on the other hand, the reluctance of the elites to accept policy changes is the cause of a lack of implementation in Russia's Arctic policy. The ACF emphasizes a predominance of one coalition over others that might lead to an imbalance in Russia's Arctic policy and a lack of implementation in the case under consideration. Apart from that, a set of limitations of selected theoretical framework is formulated.

*Table 2. Theoretical framework and explanatory mechanism*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical framework</th>
<th>Explanatory mechanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rationalism</td>
<td>Cost-benefit analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite theory</td>
<td>Elite's preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The advocacy coalition framework</td>
<td>Competition between coalitions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The Table is compiled by the author.
4. Research design

This Chapter will outline the methodology of analysis, the research goal and the research question. I will also provide the selection of theories and the case. The research design will elaborate upon the collection of data and analysis, theoretical and social relevance. Consequently, the internal and external validity and limitations will be outlined in this Chapter.

4.1. Methodology

The research is a single case study and uses congruence analysis which aims to test public policy theories, using a big amount of observations for one case – Russia's Arctic policy (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). Congruence analysis implies that a researcher compares several theories on their relevance and applicability to empirical reality (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). The research strategy for congruence analysis is that a researcher develops expectations from certain theories and then compare them on a broad set of observations (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). If there is more evidence that confirms a theory A more than a theory B and a theory C, it means that the theory A has stronger explanatory power than the theory B and the theory C for the selected case. In theoretical framework, three different theories are chosen to identify which one of them fits the most for this case. Congruence analysis can show not only the match between a theory and empirical reality, but it might also predict the dynamics of empirical process for the case (Blatter & Haverland, 2014).

The advantage of the application of congruence analysis to Russia’s Arctic policy (three theories and one case) is that it allows to analyse the phenomenon in-depth and determine more precisely causal relationship in Russia’s Arctic policy case. The selection of three theories to one case can possibly lead to contradictory conclusions, yet, it increases the validity and reliability of findings. It will help to identify only the most relevant and crucial features of the Russia’s Arctic policy case.

The limitation of the case study design is that research findings are barely possible to generalize to other cases that diminishes external validity. Moreover, congruence analysis as a specific qualitative tool has a disadvantage: it can make only relative evaluation on explanatory power of theories (Wauters, 2016). Congruence analysis aims
to compare theoretical explanations for selected case(s), yet, not to identify an absolute causal mechanism (Wauters, 2016).

4.2. Research goal and question

The aim of research is to explain a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy through the testing of three public policy theories. The expected research outcome is that the applicability of these theories to Russia’s Arctic policy case will be compared. It is important to have a clear, relevant and “why” research question that means it must have an explanatory power (Lehnert, Miller & Wonka, 2007). For this case, the research question is an outcome-oriented as it focuses on the explanation of outcome (a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy). As it is a congruence analysis, the following research question is formulated:

**Which public policy theory best explains a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy?**

Each theory in turn will be tested in congruence analysis. In order to guide the research and make it appealing to the reader, the following set of subquestions is developed:

1. How strong is the explanatory power of a rational perspective on a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy?
2. How strong is the explanatory power of elite theory on a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy?
3. How strong is the explanatory power of the ACF with regards to a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy?

Based on the research question, three expectations are developed, and they might provide explanations for the given case. The next section will outline the selection of theories and the case, including three derived theoretical expectations.

4.3. Selection of theories and the case

Theories play a crucial role for congruence analysis (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). In literature review, a broad set of different theories was observed to structure scientific discourse in the field of Arctic studies (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). The literature review has shown that an International Relations perspective, social-economic development and legislative approaches are the most common to analyse Arctic policy.
However, the established theories have a weak explanatory power to study a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy. Since dominant theories are insufficient to explain the case, there is a need to apply new theories. Therefore, the Russian Arctic will be scrutinized from a public policy perspective that has not been widely applied before for Russia’s case. This research aims to fill in the research gap in the field of Russia’s Arctic policy and bring theoretical innovations in the study of Arctic policy of the Russian Federation.

Specifically, rationalism, elite theory and the advocacy coalition framework are selected to conduct the research. It means that three theories are selected for congruence analysis that is a crucial condition for this type of case study (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). It is important that these theories are not overlapping and provide the research with competing insights of empirical reality (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). Based on these three theories, the following expectations have been formulated:

**Exp1:** A lack of implementation in Arctic policy can be explained by a rational decision of the Russian authority which came to the conclusion that costs of Arctic policy outweighed benefits.

**Exp2:** A lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy can be explained by the ruling elite who is reluctant to accept policy changes.

**Exp3:** A lack of implementation can be explained by the dominance of one advocacy coalition over the others, which has led to the imbalance in Russia’s Arctic policy.

A rational perspective explains that a lack of implementation is a pragmatic and the most beneficial decision. Reluctance of elite to accept policy change is highlighted as a possible explanation, deduced from elite theory. A dominance of one advocacy coalition over others is an explanation, derived from the advocacy coalition framework. The congruence between these explanations and the case under consideration will be tested empirically.

The unit of analysis is Arctic policy. The selected period is 2008-2017 because the first strategic governmental document was released in 2008 (The Russian Government, 2008). Since that time, we can argue that the Arctic field has gained a strategic importance for the Russian authority. To sum up, Russia’s Arctic policy as the unit of analysis will be examined from 2008 to 2017.
4.4. **Collection of data and analysis**

A systematic comparison of data with expectations is a basic operation to conduct congruence analysis. In social sciences, different data and methods of its collection are applied for this purpose (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). The study of the governmental documents will be a primary method for this research. It includes different types of official documents – strategy, policies, public programs, speeches, minutes from the meetings and sessions, conferences and other relevant events concerning Arctic policy. The study of the media, newspapers, scientific journals and relevant sources from academic think tanks will be an additional method of the study. It helps to increase the insight of the given case and the quality of research.

The congruence analysis implies a step-by-step approach. The first step is to compare empirical reality with expectations from theories. It can lead to the following outcomes: (a) the observations confirm the expectations; (b) the observations provide the opposite evidence with the expectations; (c) the observations do not fit with the deduced expectations (no confirmation, no contradiction) (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). In this research, the first step will be to test rationalism, elite theory and the advocacy coalition framework. The findings will be grouped in a number of arguments in line and in contradiction to each theory.

The second step focuses on the comparison of the results of congruence of these theories with empirical reality (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). It means that the explanatory power of three selected theories will be discussed. If the testing of all three theories shows that they do not explain the phenomenon under consideration, it means that for future research it is necessary to find other theory that can explain the case (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). However, the selection of three theories is expected to increase the probability that, at least, one theory can be relevant and supportive for the case. The outcome of the research is the identification of theory which has the most explanatory power on a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy.

Congruence analysis implies a step-by-step approach to collect and analyze the data (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). The empirical analysis and the following discussion will allow to conclude which theory is the most relevant, applicable and has the most explanatory power for the case under consideration.
However, the number of observations for congruence analysis should be sufficient that gives the researcher freedom to decide whether the amount of data is enough to conclude about the explanatory power of theories (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). It might introduce the subjectivity during the data collection stage.

The reliability of the research can probably be diminished, since the researcher is an instrument to collect the data in congruence analysis (Brink, 1993). In order to increase the reliability, the author is conscious of the possibility to be biased while conducting the research (Brink, 1993). Furthermore, the author reassesses the data several times before the final collection (Brink, 1993). What is more, the data collection process is carried out through several stages over a long period of time (Brink, 1993).

4.5. Theoretical and social relevance

Theoretical and social relevance are two important and indispensable dimensions of scientific research (Lehnert, Miller & Wonka, 2007). Theoretical relevance includes the contribution of the researcher to the academic discussion and discourse. The science has a cumulative nature. Therefore, the literature review was conducted to base the research on the findings of the previous researchers in the given field (Lehnert, Miller & Wonka, 2007). At the same time, the research is intended to bring theoretical innovations through the application of public policy theories to Russia’s Arctic policy case. There is no research which tested the same theories and expectations for the case on empirical reality. Therefore, the emergence of confirmed or unconfirmed expectations will be a contribution to empirical knowledge in the Arctic studies (Lehnert, Miller & Wonka, 2007). What is more, if theories are confirmed, it might produce some new understanding of Russia’s Arctic policy. If the strong explanatory power of one of the confirmed theory is identified, it might help to predict the internal dynamics of Russia’s Arctic policy for a couple of years.

Apart from theoretical relevance, the research must be socially significant that means the production of knowledge can have a societal impact on citizens, governments, international organizations, policy-makers, etc. (Lehnert, Miller & Wonka, 2007). 2.37 million of people live in the Russian Arctic and they are highly dependent upon the governmental support (Rosstat, 2017). An active participation of the government in the region is vital and necessary due to the harsh climate conditions. Therefore, the findings of this research can be potentially useful for policy-makers to improve the quality of
policy-making, planning and decision-making process. It will probably contribute to the improvement of the degree of implementation of Arctic policy. The expected outcome of the research is to explain a lack of implementation in Arctic policy of the Russian Federation. The findings of research might be valuable and useful for international environmental organizations, Arctic-oriented governments or national actors who want to influence or lobby in this field.

To sum up, theoretical relevance of this research can be assured through the examination of earlier studies in the literature review and the application of new theories to Russia’s Arctic policy. Social relevance might be provided by potentially high significance of the research for policy-makers, society and different stakeholders. Nevertheless, this research is mostly theoretically-oriented, therefore, theoretical relevance can probably outweigh social relevance, yet, the latter is also strongly assured (Lehnert, Miller & Wonka, 2007).

4.6. **Internal and external validity**

Internal and external validity are important indicators of research design. Internal validity can be understood through the “four hurdles” concept that basically presents valid criterions for strong causal relationship (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013). A lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy is a factual outcome and possible theoretical explanations can be developed to explain the causes of phenomenon. Therefore, in the case, cause will precede the factual outcome (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013). Expectations, derived from selected theories, will be assumed to correlate with empirical reality as three public policy theories have an explanatory power on a lack of implementation that is a focus of this research. A credible causal mechanism is also assured through a careful selection of specific theories and the case among other all possible options at an early stage of research. However, during the congruence analysis, different observations will be collected and many of them might be beyond the explanatory power of selected theories.

External validity concerns the possibility to generalize the findings of research. The ultimate focus on one case makes the findings hardly generalizable. Moreover, the purpose of congruence analysis is to compare the applications of theories to the case, not to extrapolate the findings to other cases. To ensure relevance and strength of selected
theories for empirical reality is a more important aspect of congruence analysis than the generalization of findings (Blatter & Haverland, 2014).

To conclude, the research design has its strengths and weaknesses. Internal validity of this research is quite high while external validity is weak that can be explained by the selection of a small-N research strategy.

4.7. Conclusion

The purpose of the research is to identify which theory has the most explanatory power on a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy. Therefore, congruence analysis has been chosen and its methodology has been elaborated in this Chapter. The research strategy has been critically considered from social and theoretical relevance, internal and external validity. Low external validity and relatively weak social relevance are the limitations of selected research design.
5. Empirical analysis

This Chapter deals with the empirical analysis. I will outline four main policy fields in
Russia’s Arctic policy, provide contextual information which sets the stage for the
congruence analysis. I will also analyse the degree of implementation in each policy field
that will also have the implications for the congruence analysis.

5.1. Russia’s Arctic policy: development and key policy fields

Before starting the empirical analysis, it is necessary to briefly describe Russia’s Arctic
policy – its main fields, goals and priorities. It will help the reader to better understand
the context and subject of the study.

Researchers in the field of Arctic policy consider that the establishment of Russia’s Arctic
policy occurred in 2007 when the scientific expedition «Arktika-2007» was conducted
(Zhiltsov & Zonn, 2015). The goal of this expedition was to collect the evidence in support
of that the Lomonosov ridge is a natural extension of Siberian continental plate. In case
of successful collection of the data, Russia can include the Lomonosov ridge to its own
territory and has a legal right to become a developer of fossil fuels on the continental shelf
(Sorokina, 2007). Moreover, the political significance of the expedition was that the
Russia’s flag was established on the bottom of the North Pole to demonstrate its Arctic
ambitions (Sorokina, 2007).

In 2008, D. Medvedev – then President of Russia, signed the conceptual document
“Principal’s of public policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to
2020 and beyond”. It should be noted that Russia was one of the first country which
adopted a long-term strategy to develop the Arctic. Extreme climate conditions, low
density of population living in the Russia’s North and a high concentration of industrial
and economic development in large cities characterize the Arctic as a region (The Russian
Government, 2008). Big distance from major industrial centres and high resource
dependence of the region as well as vulnerability of Arctic ecosystems make the Arctic
zone of the Russian Federation a special component of public administration (The

The document clearly identifies Russia’s national interests in the Arctic:

(a) use of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base of the
Russian Federation, contributing to socio-economic development of the country;
(b) preservation of the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation;
(c) environmental protection of unique ecological systems in the Arctic;
(d) development of the Northern Sea Route as a national unified transport route of the
Russian Federation in the Arctic (The Russian Government, 2008).

The Russian authority also developed a long-term Arctic strategy which consists of the
following stages:

1) 2008-2010 – implementation of measures which are to provide the evidence to define
the borders of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, development of international
cooperation and implementation of public programs and projects;

2) 2011-2015 – international legitimation of external border of the Arctic zone of Russian
Federation, development of infrastructure of the Northern Sea Route, restructuration of
the economy of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation;

3) 2016-2020 – to make the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation a leading strategic

This document has become a starting point to form Arctic policy and the Russian
authority has declared that the Arctic is a policy priority for the upcoming decade. In
2013, President of Russia signed the document «Strategy of the development of the Arctic
zone of the Russian Federation and the provision of national security for the period up to
2020». It outlined instruments, mechanisms and stages of implementation of Arctic
policy. According to the Government’s Strategy in the Arctic (2013), the following priority
fields in the Arctic are highlighted:

(a) integrated socio-economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation;

(b) development of science and technology;

(c) establishment of modern information and telecommunication infrastructure;

(d) environmental security;

(e) international cooperation in the Arctic;

(f) military security and protection of border of the Russian Federation in the Arctic (The
In April 2014, the public program "Social and economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020" was launched by the Russian government. It served as mechanism to implement Russia’s Arctic policy. The main idea of this program was to increase socio-economic development in the Arctic through the improvement of quality of public administration (The Russian Government, 2014). As a result, in March 2015, the Public Commission on Arctic Development was created to increase coordination between ministries, regional and municipal authority (The Russian Government, 2015).

In May 2014, Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, signed the Executive Order on the Land Territory of the Russian Arctic zone (President of Russia, 2014). It was a significant normative act which clearly defined the territory of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation. Before that, there have been questions which territory should be considered as the Arctic. A clear definition of the object of public policy was a necessary step in the development of Russia’s Arctic policy.

In August 2017, the public program “Social and economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020” was prolonged until 2025 and the name was changed into “Social and economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” (The Russian Government, 2017). The indicators of implementation of the program were added in a new edition of the document. Most importantly, the public program has become to be supported financially – around 12 billion rubles have been allocated for that from Russia’s federal budget (The Russian Government, 2017). Before that, the public program had mainly only an analytical dimension.

The overview of principles, strategy, public program and Presidential Orders allows to briefly highlight the development of Russia’s Arctic policy in 2008-2017 that is a focus of research. Principles of formulation of Arctic policy has been defined and formalized. The stages of implementation of Russia’s Arctic policy has been outlined. The analysis of official governmental documents has showed that the Russian authority clearly understands its own national interests in the Arctic.
**Table 3. Key policy fields in Russia's Arctic policy in 2008-2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy field</th>
<th>Key actors</th>
<th>Major risks and issues</th>
<th>Expected outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mining operations in the Arctic</strong></td>
<td>Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation, Public Commission on Arctic Development, Public company «Gazprom», Public company «NK Rosneft»</td>
<td>• Low efficiency of resource extraction in the Arctic;</td>
<td>• To make the Arctic a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of technology, capabilities and equipment for work in harsh climate conditions;</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Legal difficulties with the status of external border of continental shelf;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Monopolization of Gazprom and Rosneft on the extraction of resources on the continental shelf;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Low investment attractiveness of the Russian Arctic for foreign companies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military security</strong></td>
<td>Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>• Difficulties with public funding in the context of economic crisis and austerity;</td>
<td>• To increase military presence of Russia in the Arctic;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Pressure of international society on Russian politics of militarization in the Arctic</td>
<td>• To ensure military security of Russia in the Arctic zone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Environmental protection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation on the Issues of Environmental Activities, Environment and Transport (S.B. Ivanov), Special Representative of the Russian President for international cooperation in the Arctic and AntArctic (A.N. Chilingarov), Public Commission on Arctic Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• High level of accumulated environmental damage in the Arctic; • Increasing negative anthropogenic and technological impact on the Arctic environment; • Strengthen environmental collaboration with Arctic countries; • To ensure environmental security in the Arctic zone and in areas of the Arctic Ocean; • To ensure sustainable development in the Arctic; • To develop international environmental cooperation in the Arctic between Arctic and non-Arctic countries</td>
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### Development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR)

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<tr>
<td>• Lack of infrastructure capabilities to use the NSR; • High risks of navigation in the Arctic; • Need for the construction of new icebreakers and development of small aviation; • To increase the level of shipping via the Northern Sea Route; • To make the NSR a national and unified transport route</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3 provides a systematic overview of the efforts of the Russian authority in 2008-2017. I have confirmed that the governmental actions were not always consistent with its plans and intentions that caused a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy. For
instance, the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation points out that the goals and objectives of public program “Social and economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” are not consistent with another governmental document “Principles of public policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic up to 2020” (the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, n.d.). Another example is that direct funding for the federal public program “Social and economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” was not planned (The Russian Government, 2014). Nevertheless, the financial resources were planned to be allocated starting from 2017 (the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, n.d.). However, the public program has been revised only in 2017 and federal funding will be allocated starting from 2018 (The Russian Government, 2017).

All in all, four key policies in Russia’s Arctic policy have been identified which are mining operations in the Arctic, military security, environmental protection and development of the Northern Sea Route. Major risks and threats for these policies are factors that can become a starting point for the analysis of a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy. They will help to conduct the following empirical research.

5.2. Setting the stage

Before continuing further, it is important to outline the economic situation in Russia between 2008 and 2017. The GDP and state of federal budget will be considered. It will help to set the stage for the empirical analysis.

In 2008-2017, Russia’s economy did not demonstrate steady growth. The data from the World Bank are presented in Figure 2 which shows the dynamics of Russia’s GDP in 2008-2016. It is clear from this Figure that there was neither an upward nor a downward trend in Russia’s GDP in the selected period. In 2008-2009, there was an economic decline. After that, Russia had a gradual growth of the GDP from 1,223 trillion of USD in 2009 to 2,297 trillion of USD in 2014. In 2014-2016, Russia’s GDP was gradually decreasing, reaching 1,283 trillion of USD in 2016 that is only a little more than in 2008 (1,661 tn of USD). As we can see, by 2016, the Russia’s GDP has not dramatically changed since 2008 that resulted in almost 0% growth of the GDP in 2008-2016. The trend line confirms that there was neither rapid growth nor dramatic decline. However, in 2017, Russia’s GDP growth was 1.5% (Rosstat, 2017).

Figure 3 illustrates Russia’s GDP growth in 2005-2017 and green ticks depict key decisions in Russia’s Arctic policy. In 2005-2008, the pace of Russia’s GDP growth was more than 6% annually and, in 2008, the "Principles of public policy in the Arctic up to 2020 and beyond" was adopted. Then, there was a 5-year delay until 2013 when the strategy of development of the Arctic zone was released (The Russian Government, 2013). A steady GDP growth in 2009-2013 proceeded this governmental decision, made by the Russian authority. Next year, in 2014, the public program on social and economic development was adopted (The Russian Government, 2014). Finally, in 2017, this public program was revised while the GDP growth became positive again after two years of decline in 2015-2016. Other words, there is a correlation between the time of delay and economic decline. The Russian authority have made key decisions in Arctic policy when there was a supportive economic situation (GDP growth).

The next aspect will cover the state of Russia’s federal budget in 2008-2017. Financial sustainability is an important feature of any public program or project. Even though the Russian authority paid attention to Arctic policy in public sphere, the financial resources were not allocated to implement ambitious goals in the Arctic (The Russian Government, 2014). Russia’s political declarations were not supported by financial provisions (the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, n.d). Since private actors are minor players in the Arctic and the development of Arctic policy is mostly determined by budget capability of the Russia’s state, it is important to analyse Russia’s budget.

Figure 4 presents balance of Russia’s federal budget in 2008-2017. It is evident that the Russian authority ran a surplus budget only in 2008 and 2011 while the Russia’s federal budget has been running mainly at a deficit during this decade. Obviously, the Russian Government had to conduct austerity policy in 2008-2017. It might make the Russian government postpone the allocation of financial resources into Arctic project. For example, it can explain why the public program “Social and economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” was not funded (The Russian Government, 2014). A steady budget deficit in 2008-2017 was also a negative factor for the development of Arctic policy.
To sum up, there was an unstable economic situation in Russia in 2008-2017. Therefore, it might make the Russian authority calculate its decisions and rationally allocate money through the federal budget. Moreover, Figure 3 demonstrates that Russia’s Arctic policy was mainly developed when there was a supportive economic situation. Nonetheless, there was a lack of federal budget resources that was also a serious obstacle in the development of Russia’s Arctic policy.

The analysis of economic situation provides a general understanding of context in which Russia’s Arctic policy has been implemented by the Russian Government in 2008-2017. In the context of unstable economic situation and scarce Russia’s federal budget, the Russian Government was barely able to actively develop any public policy. The next section will analyse whether it was a case in the Arctic.

5.3. Mining operations in the Arctic

Active discussions on mining operations in the Arctic have started in 2011-2012. The Russian Government wanted to benefit from the Arctic. As it is stated in the official document, by 2020, the Russian authority will have expected that the Arctic will become a leading strategic resource base of the Russian Federation (The Russian Government, 2008). The Russian Government anticipated that the development of mining operations in the Arctic would become profitable. The logic was that it would produce additional
revenues to Russia’s federal budget and, on the whole, it would accelerate the development of the Arctic zone (The Russian Government, 2013).

Nevertheless, plans of the Russian authority were not actively implemented. By 2018, only four huge Arctic projects on mining operations have been launched: YAMAL LNG (launched in 2017), Novoportovskoe mestorozdenie (launched in 2016), Bovanenkovskoe mestorozdenie (launched in 2012), The Prirazlomnoye Project (launched in 2013) (Gazpromneft, 2018; Gazprom, 2018; Yamal LNG, 2018).

It was observed that an active involvement of foreign companies (BP, Total, ExxonMobil) in Arctic mining projects was a result of Russia’s policy of cooperation in 2009-2010 (Zhiltsov & Zonn, 2015). Deals with foreign companies were concluded on the principle: the Russian Government granted an access for foreign companies to mine fossil fuels in the Arctic while foreign companies invested money and provide technology for deep-sea drilling (Gorokhova, 2018; Zhiltsov & Zonn, 2015). On the one hand, foreign companies required transparency and clear partnership conditions, and, on the other hand, the Russian Government was not agile in its decisions and could not create transparent legal conditions for investors (Medvedev, 2013). These circumstances slowed down the development of Arctic projects (Zhiltsov & Zonn, 2015).

However, the situation has changed dramatically after imposing sanctions on Russia in 2014 (Voronkov, 2016). For instance, the joint project in the Kara Sea between Rosneft and ExxonMobil was stalled in 2014 (Adams et al., 2015). Most importantly, after imposing sanctions on Russia, foreign companies have stopped making plans to develop joint Arctic projects with Russian companies (Adams et. all, 2015). The sanctions against Russia have also caused the withdrawal of foreign companies and investors from the ongoing Arctic projects (Adams et. all, 2015). As a result, since 2014, sanctions have made Russia’s ambitious plans on the mining operations on the continental shelf hardly possible to be implemented.

In 2011-2012, oil prices were extremely high (110$ per barrel) that opened a way for Arctic projects with high risks (Average annual Brent crude oil price from 1976 to 2018, 2018; Adams et al., 2015). Yet, in 2014-2015, there was a sharp fall in oil prices and shale revolution in the world (Average annual Brent crude oil price from 1976 to 2018, 2018; Adams et al., 2015). It made the majority of mining operations projects less profitable since they required much investments and time (Adams et al., 2015; Public Commission
on Arctic development, 2015, March 26). For example, the development of Shtokmanovskoye field was suspended due to insufficient gas demand and shale revolution in the US (Topalov & Tkachenko, 2012). However, in 2012, President of Russia, Vladimir Putin stated that the Shtokmanovskoye field would be launched by 2017, yet, the joint project of «Gazprom» and French «Total» has not been renewed again (President of Russia, 2012). The Shtokmanovskoye field is expected to be launched by 2025, however, the gas extraction in this area is still considered unbenefficial and has high environmental risks (Ampilov, 2015).

It is also important to underline that the majority of mining projects on the continental shelf are highly beneficial but only in the medium term (Voronkov, 2016). It means that all of them require long-term investments, time, however, they have also uncertain risks. It is also worth mentioning that, in 2014, oil extraction on the continental shelf in the Arctic accounted for modest 3% of total oil extraction in Russia (Voronkov, 2016). It meant that oil and gas production on the continental shelf were largely potential and ambitious projects in the future for the Russian Government.

Nevertheless, the Prirazlomnoye Project has become the only successful project on the Arctic continental shelf (Zolotukhin, 2014). Long-term and enormous public funding, and domestic technology are key factors for its successful implementation (Zolotukhin, 2014). However, the Prirazlomnoye Project is rather an exception than a rule as other fields on the continental shelf (Shtokmanovskoe, Leningradskoe, Rusanovskoe) have not been developed.

It is observed that the development of oil and gas production has been suspended after 2014 when the external environment has changed dramatically. Empirical observations allow to identify a set of factors which can explain a lack of the development of mining operations in the Arctic:

- low energy prices have made Arctic projects unprofitable (Adams et al., 2015; Tkachuk, 2018);
- environmental risks in the context of fragile Arctic ecosystems (Knizhnikov, 2011; Dudin et al., 2017);
- insufficient level of technology for mining operations on the continental shelf (Zolotukhin, 2014; Ampilov, 2015; Tkachuk, 2018);
• inability to attract foreign companies to develop Arctic oil and gas projects (Primakov, 2014);
• absence of mechanism of public-private partnership (Briksenkov, n.d.);
• unappealing tax regime for private companies to invest in Arctic projects on the continental shelf (Donskoy, 2013; Medvedev, D., 2013).

All in all, the analysis showed that mining operations in the Arctic as Russia's policy field lacked implementation. It is observed that most Arctic oil and gas projects have been suspended or cancelled. The overall implementation of this policy field is poor.

5.4. Military security

Military security is an important field within Russia's Arctic policy (Putin, 2017). The Russian authority basically considers that, in order to develop mining operations in the Arctic, it is necessary to ensure military security in the region (Putin, 2017). Vladimir Putin also declared that politico-military, economic and environmental security are concentrated in the Arctic (Putin, 2014, April 22). Vladimir Putin during the meeting of the Security Council has acknowledged that military security is significant as it protects oil installations, port infrastructure and pipelines in the Arctic from external threats (including potential terrorists) (Putin, 2014, April 22).

An active stage of implementation of this policy field in the Arctic has begun in 2014. Then, the new united strategic command “North” was established to operate military forces from Murmansk to Anadyr (Ministry of Defence, 2017, December 15). In December 2014, the Northern Fleet was also created as a special military region with a purpose to protect Russia's public interests in the Arctic (Ministry of Defence, 2017, December 15). This decision has demonstrated the assertiveness and a high strategic significance of the Arctic Ocean for the Russian authority.

S. Shoygu, Minister of Defence, considers that military presence in the Arctic is an issue of national security (Shoygu, 2015, February). The development of military infrastructure in the Arctic is a policy priority for Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (Shoygu, 2015, February). Indeed, in 2016-2017, two new military bases were built in the Arctic: «Severnyj Klever» on Kotelny Island and «Arctic trefoil» on Alexandra Land (Grishhenko, 2017; Ministry of Defence, 2018; Staalesen, 2016). In addition, by 2018, Ministry of Defence has set the goal to create a self-contained group of Russian troops in the Arctic (Pettersen, 2015). A military expert, Viktor Litovkin thinks that Arctic military bases are
necessary for ensuring security in the Northern Sea Route, defending the state border, protecting natural resources and facilities where oil and gas extraction are produced (Litovkin, 2017).

The analysis of the data from the official website of Ministry of Defence was carried out. The following observations have been drawn. Sufficient food provision for army, stable provision of equipment and health care for the military staff in the Arctic have been observed (Ministry of Defence, 2015, March; Ministry of Defence, 2015, April; Ministry of Defence, 2016, February; Ministry of Defence, 2016, April; Ministry of Defence, 2016, May). Series of training military exercises and expeditions in the Arctic have also been observed. Moreover, the number of military exercises has been increasing from year to year (Ministry of Defence, 2015, September; Ministry of Defence, 2015, October; Ministry of Defence, 2017, January; Ministry of Defence, 2017, April; Ministry of Defence, 2017, August). For instance, in 2015, the landing of Arctic moto-rifles on Novaya Zemlya was held which is illustrated on Figure 5 (Ministry of Defence, 2015). Another example is a training of the Northern Fleet on the protection of the coast of Russia’s Arctic zone in 2016 (Ministry of Defence, 2016, September 17). Moreover, the military personnel have been actively involved in ecological clean-up in the Arctic (Ministry of Defence, 2015, September; Ministry of Defence, 2015, October; Ministry of Defence, 2016, August; Ministry of Defence, 2016, September; Ministry of Defence, 2017, May; Ministry of Defence, 2017, July; Ministry of Defence, 2017, November).

Figure 5. Arctic moto-rifles of the Northern Fleet landed on Novaya Zemlya. Reprinted from Arctic, Ministry of Defence, 2015, Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12059754@

According to the report of Ministry of Defence, in 2012-2017, 425 facilities with a total area of more than 700 thousand square meters were built (Shoygu, 2017, December 22).
1000 military personnel live there, and special weapons and equipment are deployed on these territories (Shoygu, 2017, December 22). The construction of innovative airfield on the archipelago Novaya Zemlya is in progress (Shoygu, 2017, December 22). Between 2012-2017, the Russian Armed Forces also cleaned up around 100,740 square meters in the Arctic (Shoygu, 2017, December 22). They collected 16,000 tons of scrap metal, 10,000 tons of which have been removed by Ministry of Defence (Shoygu, 2017, December 22). The Armed Forces were actively involved in rehabilitation of environmental damage (Ministry of Defence, 2017, December 22). What is important, the Arctic is highlighted as a priority area in this report by Minister of Defence (Shoygu, 2017, December 22). To sum up, the report of Minister of Defence shows that the development of military infrastructure in the Arctic has been successfully implemented. As a result, there has been a trend towards the militarization of Russia's Arctic since 2012.

I have already mentioned earlier that Russia's federal budget was in deficit in 2012-2017. However, there was no reduction of defence expenditure in this period (Dergachev, 2016). Moreover, despite the economic crisis in 2014-2016, defence spending has been even increased from 2,3 trillion of rubles in 2014 to 2,8 trillion of rubles in 2018 (Dergachev, 2016; Putin, 2017). Therefore, there has been stable financial flows on military security in the Arctic.

The empirical analysis of military security in the Arctic showed that there was quite effective implementation of this policy field. The most observations confirmed that the implementation of this policy field went consistently and was successful in general.

5.5. Environmental protection

The preservation of unique ecological systems is an important task of the Russian authority in the Arctic (The Russian Government, 2008). Global climate change and the consequences of active economic activities in the High North are salient issues of environmental security for the Russian Federation (The Russian Government, 2008). A Special Presidential Representative for Environmental Protection, Ecology and Transport, Sergei Ivanov, believes that environmental protection and ecology are issues where there are no foreign policy contradictions (Ivanov, 2017). International environmental cooperation is necessary to protect Arctic environment effectively (Ivanov, 2017).
Russia’s efforts on environmental protection in the Arctic have its own results. The rehabilitation of environmental damage in the Arctic has been started since 2012 (Donskoy, 2016, May 20). More than 35,000 tons of waste were removed in 2012-2015 from the islands of Franz Josef Land (Donskoy, 2016, May 20). More than 6,000 tons of waste were removed from the archipelago Novaya Zemlya (Donskoy, 2016, May 20). As a result, the quality of water in this area was improved and it was later acknowledged by specialists (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, 2016, December 14). Also, 41,2 tons of waste were utilized in Chukotka (Donskoy, 2016, May 20). In Nenets Autonomous Okrug, 100 tons of water were cleaned in 2012 and 3,500 tons of waste were removed from the “Nenetsky” reserve (Donskoy, 2016, May 20). In general, 24 projects on rehabilitation of environmental damage in the Arctic were executed in 2012-2016, and 12 projects are currently under way (Donskoy, 2017, August 28). In addition, there was an involvement of Ministry of Defence in environmental clean-up in the Arctic (Ministry of Defence, 2015, September; Ministry of Defence, 2015, October; Ministry of Defence, 2016, August; Ministry of Defence, 2016, September; Ministry of Defence, 2017, May; Ministry of Defence, 2017, July; Ministry of Defence, 2017, November). To conclude, there was a number of activities concerning the rehabilitation of environmental damage in the Arctic.

Another result of environmental activities in the Arctic is the creation of specially protected natural areas (The Russian Government, 2018, April 11). The national park “New Siberian Islands” was organized and created in the Arctic in 2018 (The Russian Government, 2018, March 2; Kerimov, 2017, March 29). A number of other national parks and protected areas such as Beringia National Park, Onizhskoye Pomorye National Park were created in 2012-2016 (The Russian Government, 2013, January 17; The Russian Government, 2018, April 11). The territory of “Russian Arctic National Park” was expanded in 2016 (The Russian Government, 2016, August 25). To sum up, a number of national parks were created in 2012-2016.

In 2017, the Year of Ecology was held in the Russian Federation (Kerimov, 2017). A set of activities was dedicated to the Arctic. As a result, the rehabilitation of environmental damage, oil response exercises in the ice and clean-up from scrap metal have been implemented in the Arctic (Kerimov, 2017). In addition, private companies introduced the management system of greenhouse gas emission (Kerimov, 2017). The creation of
specially protected natural areas in the Arctic have been also executed in frames of Year of Ecology in Russia (Kerimov, 2017). For example, an oil response exercise nearby to the Prirazlomnoye Platform was held and, as a result, the methodological guidelines in case of oil spillover were developed (Donskoy, 2017, October 31). Also, in 2017, around 18,5 tons of waste have been eliminated from the Arctic that improved the life of 1 million people (Donskoy, 2017, March 3). The Chairman of the Parliament's Committee on Ecology and Environmental Protection concluded that the activities on the Arctic were successfully implemented since they were personally controlled by President of Russia (Burmatov, 2017).

However, S. Donskoy, Minister of Natural Resources and Environment has acknowledged that there are many cities with extremely high level of air pollution in the Arctic (Donskoy, 2015, January 23). Some factories still employ unclean technologies in their production processes (Donskoy, 2015, January 23). S. Donskoy also added that there are difficulties with the allocation of financial resources from the federal budget for public programs of Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (Donskoy, 2015, January 23). Many secondary programs were reduced or even suspended (Donskoy, 2015, January 23). The terms of implementation of many environmental programs have been expanded from 3 years to 5 years (Donskoy, 2015).

The analysis of environmental protection as a policy field in Russia's Arctic policy showed that the overall implementation was at a sufficient level. Even despite a few cancelled programs and plans on environmental protection in the Arctic, the majority of empirical observations confirmed that the implementation in environmental protection was at moderate level.

5.6. Development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR)

Maritime transportation in the Arctic is an important policy field for the Russian authority (Sokolov, 2017, April 21). The Russian Government considers that the Northern Sea Route is expected to become an alternative route to Suez Canal (Kadochnikov, et al., 2015). If the route from Murmansk to Yokohama via the Suez Canal takes 24,000 km, the navigation via the Northern Sea Route can take only 11,000 km (Kadochnikov, et al., 2015). Therefore, the Russian authority considers the Northern Sea Route as a potential and beneficial project in the nearest future.
Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation is a key structure in the development of the Northern Sea Route. 16 maritime ports in the Arctic provide 7% of total cargo of Russian ports (Sokolov, 2017, April 21). Oil, coal, ores, containers, general cargo and petroleum products are transported via the Northern Sea Route (Sokolov, 2017, April 21).

In 2013, the Administration of the Northern Sea Route was established (The Russian Government, 2018, April 11). It controls the location of ships in the NSR, provides information about ice, navigational and hydrometeorological conditions on the Northern Sea Route (Sokolov, 2017, April 21). In 2015, the Russian Government approved the document “Integrated project on the development of the Northern Sea Route” (The Russian Government, 2015, June 8). It aimed to ensure maritime activities in the Arctic Ocean, construction of new icebreakers, development of sea ports, development of marine engineering (The Russian Government, 2015, June 8).

Hydrographical research has been developing in the Northern Sea Route. 287 objects of navigation are technically equipped (Sokolov, 2017, April 21). However, the overall technical equipment is only 40%, yet, the indicator continues to grow (Sokolov, 2017, April 21).

Icebreakers are vital for the development of the Northern Sea Route. As a result, in 2015-2016, new diesel-electric icebreakers «Murmansk», «Vladivostok», «Novorossijsk» were built (The Russian Government, 2018, April 11). In 2017, an icebreaker «Viktor Chernomordyn» was also launched (The Russian Government, 2018, April 11). Currently, there are eight icebreakers, four of which are nuclear («50 let Pobedy», «Jamal», «Tajmyr», «Vajgach») and other four are diesel-electric («Admiral Makarov», «Krasin», «Kapitan Hlebnikov» and «Kapitan Dranicyn») (Sokolov, 2017, April 21; The Russian Government, 2018, April 11).

The development of port infrastructure is necessary to ensure maritime activities in the High North. In 2016, the reconstruction of the biggest Murmansk port in the Arctic was completed (The Russian Government, 2018, April 11). As a result, the total volume of cargo in Murmansk port was more than 38 million of tons in 2016 that showed a 40% growth in comparison with 2015 (Sokolov, 2017, April 21). This is a result of new launched projects on transportation of oil and increase of transhipment activities in Varandej port (Sokolov, 2017, April 21). In 2016, the reconstruction of seaport station in
Murmansk was finished (The Russian Government, 2018, April 11). The ports of Anadyr', Pevek and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskij are currently being reconstructed (Sokolov, 2017, April 21). Also, four Arctic base points were created in ports in Dikson, Tiksi, Pevek and Providenija (The Russian Government, 2018, April 11).

The Sabetta port was partly put into operation in 2017 (The Russian Government, 2018, April 11). It is planned to transport around 16.5 million of tons of liquefied gas per year via this port (The Russian Government, 2018, April 11). The investments of Russia’s federal budget in the Sabetta port project was more than 70 billion of rubles when the overall investments were around 108 billion of rubles (Sokolov, 2017, April 21). The development of this port was highly dependent upon the development of mining operations in the Arctic (Sokolov, 2017, April 21).

It is to be noted that foreign companies from China and India (Tata) are also interested in investing in the development of port infrastructure. It is said that many port projects are discussed, however, their implementation is difficult due to the lack of investments and scarce resources from the federal budget (Sokolov, 2017, April 21).

![The transportation of goods via the NSR, millions of tons](http://government.ru/info/32205; http://expert.ru/northwest/2016/03/kogo-sogreet-holodnyij-shelko-vyij-put/media/276195)

*Figure 6. The transportation of goods via the NSR, millions of tons*

Nonetheless, the development of the Northern Sea Route has resulted in a gradual increase in the total volume of the transport of goods in 2012-2017 (The Russian Government, 2018, April 11; Kurkin, 2015, December 21). Figure 6 shows that there is a
dramatic growth in transport of goods via the NSR since 2014 when it has reached 4 million of tons. In 2015, the total volume of the transport of goods via the NSR was 5,4 million of tons, in 2016 – 7,5 million of tons (The Russian Government, 2018, April 11). Finally, it has reached a new record in the history of shipping via the NSR – 9,9 million of tons (The Northern Sea Route Administration, 2018, January 12). To sum up, there has been a clear upward trend in transportation of goods via the NSR since 2014.

It is also important to underline that the development of the Northern Sea Route is Russia's project which is to ensure logistics for other investment projects, mainly on mining operations in the Arctic (Donskoy, 2014, December 8). The development of the Northern Sea Route is to provide the transportation of goods from producers (oil, ores and other fossil fuels) to clients. It means that a possible breakdown or decline in mining operations in the Arctic might have a negative impact on the development of the Northern Sea Route since there would be nothing to transport via the NSR. In this case, there would be no point in building new icebreakers or ports to develop the Northern Sea Route. It means that the development of the NSR can be highly dependent upon the overall progress in Russia’s Arctic policy.

A set of observations shows that the development of the Northern Sea Route has become a key policy field in the Arctic for the Russian authority since 2016 (Rogozin, 2016, May 24; Medvedev, 2017, April 21). The Russian authority considers the development of the NSR as a beneficial and dynamic project that can give additional revenues to the federal budget (Public Commission, 2018, May 19). In March 2018, President of Russia, Vladimir Putin declared that the Northern Sea Route is a key project in the Arctic (Putin, 2018, March 1). Vladimir Putin has set the ambitious goal that the total volume of transport of goods via the NSR will reach 80 million tons by 2024 (Putin, 2018, March 1).

However, despite the salience and a relative success in 2014-2017, there was a lack of implementation in the development of the Northern Sea Route. The Russian authority acknowledged repeatedly that much more projects on the NSR could be implemented in 2012-2017 (Medvedev, 2017, April 21; Sokolov, 2017, April 21; Rogozin, 2016, May 24). Moreover, some projects have been cancelled or, what is more common, postponed until funding is secured (Public Commission on Arctic development, 2017, March 24).
The lack of implementation in development of the NSR could be caused by the following issues:

- scarce financial budget resources and the lack of foreign investments (Medvedev, 2017, April 21; Sokolov, 2017, April 21; Rogozin, 2016, May 24; Public Commission on Arctic development, 2017, March 24);
- absence of mechanism of public-private partnership (Briksenkov, n.d.);
- dependence of the Northern Sea Route on the success of other investment projects in the Arctic (Donskoy, 2014, December 8; Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 2016, October 17);
- poor and depleted port infrastructure makes the NSR unattractive for shipping and further investments (Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 2016, October 17; Public Commission on Arctic development, 2017, April 10);
- lack of icebreakers to meet the growing demand from companies to use the NSR (Kireeva, 2017, April 10; Public Commission on Arctic development, 2017, March 24).

The development of the Northern Sea Route is an ambitious project with high expectations from the Russian authority. The ongoing rapid growth of the total volume of transportation of goods via the NSR promises many economic profits for the Russian Government. However, many empirical observations confirmed that there was a set of constraints to develop the NSR at a higher rate. To sum up, the analysis showed that the overall implementation of this policy field was moderate.

5.7. Conclusion

The analysis of four Russia's policy fields in the Arctic has showed that the overall implementation is not sufficient. However, the degree of implementation depends on a policy field. While military security in the Arctic has been successfully carried out, mining operations in the High North has been poorly implemented. Environmental protection and development of the Northern Sea Route have been carried out at a moderate level, yet, some programs and projects have been reduced or even postponed. To sum up, a lack of implementation as well as a relative success in different policy fields in the Arctic have been identified.
6. Congruence analysis

This section will deal with the congruence of public policy theories and empirical reality of Russia’s Arctic policy. I will start with the implications of empirical analysis and then proceed with the congruence analysis that is organized by selected three theories.

6.1. Introduction

The empirical analysis in Chapter 5 showed that there was a lack of implementation in mining operations, environmental protection and development of the NSR. However, the findings of the analysis were also that military security in the Arctic as a policy field has been successfully implemented. Therefore, this policy field will be used only additionally for the congruence analysis. The expectations, derived from rationalism, elite theory and the advocacy coalition framework, will be mainly tested on mining operations, environmental protection and development of the NSR as policy fields of Russia’s Arctic policy.

6.2. Implications of the empirical analysis

The empirical analysis in Chapter 5 showed that mining operations in the Arctic was the most unsuccessful policy field in Russia’s Arctic policy in 2008-2017. Environmental protection and development of the NSR have been carried out at a moderate level. It means that the implementation in these policy fields has been moderate, yet, it has had some drawbacks. Military security as a policy direction was also analysed, however, I can conclude that the degree of implementation was quite high, and this policy field will be out of my focus. However, the data from three other policy fields (mining operations, environmental protection, development of the NSR) will be used for the congruence analysis.

The analysis of four policy fields has also showed that they are not similar in scope and relevance. The key policy field in Russia’s Arctic policy was and still is mining operations in the Arctic. However, it has also become the most unsuccessful one since different internal and external factors have changed it dramatically. As a result, mining operations in the Arctic has become, on the one hand, the most ambitious and important, and, on the other hand, the most unsuccessful policy field.

Environmental protection and development of the NSR are supplementary and have been implemented to support the achievement of primary objective of the Russian
Government – to make the Arctic a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation (The Russian Government, 2008). The projects on mining operations must be developed only if they meet high environmental standards (Putin, 2014, April 22). The NSR is to operate the transportation of mineral resources (Donskoy, 2014, December 8). It is to be noted that development of the NSR has been gaining more and more significance for Russia’s Arctic policy since 2016 (Putin, 2018, March 1).

Military security can be outlined as an independent and special policy field in Russia’s public policy in general. I might assume that the success in this area can be better understood while analysing the development of Russia’s military policy rather than within Russia’s Arctic policy. Although this policy field is quite successful, it will be included in congruence analysis to see whether the connection is not spurious that increases the validity of findings.

To sum up, all four policy fields – mining operations, environmental protection, development of the NSR and military security will constitute the empirical data for the congruence analysis.

6.3. **Rationalism and Russia’s Arctic policy**

Rationalism states that the use of cost-benefit analysis is an effective instrument of public policy. I expect that the Russian authority has concluded that the costs have outweighed benefits in the Russian Arctic. Therefore, there is a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy since it might have become the most pragmatic option for the Russian authority. In this section, an expectation, derived from rationalism, will be tested.

**Exp1:** A lack of implementation in Arctic policy can be explained by a rational decision of the Russian authority which came to the conclusion that costs of Arctic policy outweighed benefits.

The Russian Government had high expectations about the development of resource potential in the Arctic (The Russian Government, 2012, August 2). However, the analysis showed that since 2014, it has become disadvantageous and irrational to develop mining operations on the continental shelf in the Arctic. Based on empirical observations, the following arguments can be presented in support of the statement that costs outweighed benefits in Arctic policy.
Argument 1. Russia had a lack of financial resources to invest in the Arctic. It was observed in oil and gas production, suspension or even cancellation of public programs on environmental protection (Donskoy, 2015, January 23) and development of the NSR (Medvedev, 2017, April 21; Sokolov, 2017, April 21; Rogozin, 2016, May 24; Public Commission on Arctic development, 2017, March 24). Indeed, the Russian authority had a lack of financial budget resources and economic difficulties in 2008-2017 which were presented in section 5.2. Moreover, Russia was not able to attract foreign investments to develop oil and gas production projects in the Arctic (Primakov, 2014). Finally, weak public-private partnership schemes and an unappealing tax regime for investors has also led to a lack of financial resources (Briksenkov, n.d.; Primakov, 2014; Medvedev, D., 2013).

Argument 2. Russian gas and oil industry has an insufficient level of technology to mine in the Arctic, especially on the continental shelf (Zolotukhin, 2014; Ampilov, 2015; Tkachuk, 2018). Therefore, the Russian Government planned to attract foreign companies to have joint projects in the Arctic (The Russian Government, 2012, August 2; Primakov, 2014). However, political plans failed since imposing sanctions against Russia in 2014 prohibited foreign companies to participate in the joint projects in the Arctic (Adams et al., 2015; Voronkov, 2016).

Argument 3. Low energy prices in 2014-2017 have made Arctic projects unprofitable (Adams et al., 2015; Tkachuk, 2018). For example, the average annual OPEC crude oil price was around 60 U.S. dollars per barrel in 2014-2017 (Average annual OPEC crude oil price from 1960 to 2018, 2018). Experts consider that the Arctic oil projects, especially on the continental shelf, can be profitable only if oil prices are 100$ or higher (Adams et al., 2015; Ampilov, 2015).

Argument 4. High environmental risks could make the mining operations in the Arctic irrational and too perilous for the Russian authority (Knizhnikov, 2011; Dudin et al., 2017). What is more, the oil-spill response management and operations have not been developed at a sufficient level in the Arctic (WWF, 2011).

However, there have been identified the empirical observations in contradiction to the rational expectation. The data are combined into the arguments which will be presented.
Argument 1. Arctic oil and gas projects are beneficial in the medium and long-term perspective (Voronkov, 2016). The Russian authority took into consideration the information from the reports and statistical forecasts that the Russian Arctic is extremely rich in mineral resources (Chemodanova & Zibrova, 2016; Kontorovich, 2015; Malysheva, 2012; President of Russia, 2017, March 29). This evidence could stimulate Russian policymakers to continue the development of oil and gas projects in the Arctic.

Argument 2. There has been a gradual reduction of mineral resources in discovered fields in Russia (President of Russia, 2017, May 13; Topalov, 2016). There is a great need to develop new oil and gas fields. Moreover, the geological exploration has not been actively carried out in the Arctic (Makova, 2017; Primakov, 2014). Therefore, Russia has good prospects of discovering new fields in this region. This argument also goes in line with the expectation of the Russian Government that the Arctic will become a strategic resource base for the Russian Federation by 2020 (The Russian Government, 2008).

Four arguments go in support of the expectation and two arguments are against it. Indeed, many costs and only a few uncertain and long-term benefits of mining operations in the Arctic have been identified during the analysis. Therefore, a lack of implementation in mining operations in the Arctic can be explained as a logical and rational decision, made by the Russian Government under those conditions. In Table 4, I summarize the results of congruence analysis for a rationalist approach.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arguments in line</th>
<th>Arguments in contradiction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of financial resources to invest in the Arctic</td>
<td>Arctic oil and gas projects are highly potential in the medium and long-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient level of technology</td>
<td>Gradual reduction of mineral resources in discovered fields in Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low energy prices in 2014-2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High environmental risks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The Table is compiled by the author.

All in all, the expectation that costs outweighed benefits in mining operations can be largely confirmed.
6.4. **Elite theory and Russia’s Arctic policy**

Elite theory assumes that public policy reflects the preferences of elite. These preferences can shine the light and explain a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy. It is very important for the elite to keep stability that helps them stay in power. Therefore, I expect that Russia’s elite refuses to take active steps in Arctic policy and it can explain a lack of implementation in Arctic policy. The preferences of Russia’s elite will be analysed in this section.

**Exp2:** A lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy can be explained by the ruling elite who is reluctant to accept policy changes.

The executive power dominates over the legislative power in Russia (Shestopal, 2016). Therefore, the Parliament is out the focus in this research. I will look at the preferences and values of the executive power in Russia on policy change.

The Russia’s ruling elite consists of the federal civil servants who make key decisions in public policy (Kryshtanovskaja, 2008). They are President of Russia and members of Security Council, high-ranked executive officials from the Presidential Administration and the CEOs of state-owned companies (Kryshtanovskaja, 2008). These officials have a dramatic impact on Russia’s public policy (Kryshtanovskaja, 2008).

The analysis of official governmental documents has showed that Arctic policy is a very important policy field for the elite (The Russian Government, 2008; The Russian Government, 2013; The Russian Government, 2014). Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, is personally involved in its implementation (Putin, 2014, April 22). However, the elite has its own perception on what should be implemented in Arctic policy. The elite considers military security in the Arctic as the most important policy field (Putin, 2014, April 22). Since the elite perceives it important, it has been granted a priority status. This can explain why the development of military infrastructure has been successfully implemented in the Arctic.

Some preferences of elite can explain a lack of implementation in the Arctic.

**Argument 1.** The thinking of elite is not strategical and situational (Shestopal, 2016). They are focused on fixing short-term problems, however, they are reluctant to develop consistently ambitious and long-term projects and public programs. This can explain the
fragmented and inconsistent implementation of Arctic policy (Rogozin, 2016, May 24; Tamizky, 2012).

From the very beginning (2008-2013), mining operations were prioritized as the aspiration to extract oil and gas in the Arctic was preferential and attractive for the elite (Donskoy, 2013; Medvedev, D., 2013). It could give them additional revenues and money that could be spent on public programs for masses. This can help them stay in power and prolong the mandate in office. Since 2014, military security and development of the NSR has become much more important for the Russian authority (Putin, 2014, April 22; Shoygu, 2015, February 25). Since 2016, Russia’s elite started to prioritize the development of the NSR more than other policy fields in the Arctic (Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 2016, October 17; Public Commission on Arctic development, 2017, March 24; The Russian Government, 2015, June 8). This frequent shift of priorities is to demonstrate a lack of strategical, yet, a situational thinking of elite in the implementation of Arctic policy.

Moreover, it can explain a lack of implementation in mining operations since it started to require too much time and strategical thinking. The situational thinking of elites towards mining operations in the Arctic can demonstrate that their ambitious plans can be easily changed due to the external environment.

Argument 2. The Russia’s elite is quite bureaucratic that means they are skilful and educated executives, however, they cannot adapt to changes (Shestopal, 2016). This was evident during the economic crisis in 2014-2015 when there was a need for leadership and initiatives among the elites (Shestopal, 2016). However, the elite preferred the status-quo, delaying the development of mining operations in the Arctic and waiting for better times. This way of thinking has led to a lack of implementation in Arctic policy.

Argument 3. The main values of Russia’s elite are materialistic and mercantilist (Shestopal, 2016). Human-oriented values (environment, education, freedom, etc.) are not significant for the Russian authority (Shestopal, 2016). This can partly explain the suspension, or even cancellation of public programs on environmental protection in the Arctic.

Argument 4. Anti-Western rhetoric among the core of elite ("siloviki") has resulted in the breakup with the European and US companies on mining operations in the Arctic.
This made cooperation with Western foreign companies hardly possible to proceed. As a result, joint Arctic oil and gas projects with foreign companies have been suspended. The political preference of elites that the West is an external threat has dominated over economic thinking (Kryshtanovskaya & White, 2005). Therefore, a failure of Arctic oil and gas projects can be explained through anti-Western preferences of core group (“siloviki”) inside the elite.

Yet, there is an argument which is in contradiction with the expectation, derived from the elite theory.

Argument 1. The elite can accept policy changes, but only if they perceive it important. Most of the elite has background in military, intelligence service or police units, and they share the basic consensus that security and sovereignty are the most important things in Arctic policy (Kryshtanovskaja, 2008; Putin, 2014, April 22; Volkov, 2015). Rivera, D. & Rivera, Sh. (2014, 29) state that there is such a phenomenon as elite militarization – “a massive influx of former KGB and military personnel – so-called “siloviki” – into positions of power and authority throughout the polity and economy”. Indeed, I have observed that elite’s preferences are usually formed in frames of security and sovereignty discourse (Putin, 2014, April 22). President of Russia and the Russian Government consider that investments in military security in the Arctic is always cost-effective and, even vital, for Russia’s national interests (Putin, 2014, April 22). The elite prefers that potential costs and risks in case of weak army and fleet in the Arctic can dramatically outweigh benefits of current savings from the underinvestment in military infrastructure. To sum up, a successful development of military infrastructure in the Arctic can be explained by pro-military preferences of elite.

**Table 5. Summary of arguments in line and in contradiction from elite theory**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arguments in line</th>
<th>Arguments in contradiction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thinking of elite is not strategical and situational</td>
<td>Russia’s elite can accept policy changes if it comes to military issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite is bureaucratic and not adaptive to changes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main values of elite are materialistic and mercantilist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Western preferences of elite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The Table is compiled by the author.
Table 5 presents a summary of arguments in support and in contradiction of elite theory. Four arguments go in support of the expectation and only one argument is against it. Indeed, the analysis has showed that Russia’s elite can be characterized by situational and not strategical thinking. It is also too bureaucratic, and its main values are materialistic. However, it has been found that Russia’s elite can accept policy changes if it comes to military issues. Therefore, the delay in Russia’s Arctic policy can be explained by the reluctance of elite to accept policy changes.

To conclude, the expectation, deduced from elite theory, can be largely confirmed.

6.5. The advocacy coalition framework and Russia’s Arctic policy

The advocacy coalition framework states that there are many coalitions within the Arctic policy subsystem. These coalitions compete between each other for the influence on the sovereign who makes a final decision. As a result, the coalitions can balance, and the shift of dominant advocacy coalition can create policy change. However, I expect that there is a predominant advocacy coalition that has led to a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy.

Exp: A lack of implementation can be explained by the dominance of one advocacy coalition over the others, which has led to the imbalance in Russia’s Arctic policy.

The Russian political system is characterized by strong presidential power. It makes the President of Russia (V. Putin) a principal sovereign within the Arctic policy subsystem. The Prime Minister (D. Medvedev) can play a role as a policy broker who mediates between competing coalitions inside the Government. The Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Defence industry (2011-2018) and the Chairman of Public Commission on Arctic development (D. Rogozin) can be also classified as a formal policy broker from 2015 to 2018. He coordinated the activities of different ministries and agencies to increase the efficiency of Russia’s Arctic policy (Public Commission on Arctic Development, 2018). There are also government officials (ministers, advisors, etc.) and stakeholders who form different advocacy coalitions.

Table 6 provides the information about actors and their affiliation with coalitions in Russia’s Arctic policy. Since my main method is the analysis of governmental documents, I searched for the data “Arctic”, “Arctic policy” on the official websites of President of Russia, the Russian Government, the Security Council, the State Duma and the Federation
Council (two chambers of Parliament). It was observed that the legislative power in Russia – the State Duma and the Federation Council play only a legislative role and they are excluded from the development of Russia’s Arctic policy (Matvienko, 2015, June 26). They basically transform the decisions of President of Russia, Security Council and Government into legislative acts. Therefore, the Chairwoman of the Federation Council, Valentina Matvienko, and, the Chairman of the State Duma, Sergey Naryshkin (2011-2016) and Vyacheslav Volodin (2016 – current) are not included as actors in Table 4. Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, is also not included in the list of actors. It has been observed that his statements and publications are strongly connected with international cooperation issues in the Arctic that is not a focus of my thesis.

Table 6 was formed on the following criteria. An actor was included if he or she participated in the sessions of governmental bodies or was actively consulted before making further decisions in Russia’s Arctic policy. Other words, the selected actors were mentioned once or more times on the official governmental websites concerning Arctic policy (President of Russia, the Russian Government, the Security Council, the State Duma and the Council of Federation). The official websites provide the data from different sessions, hearings, personal meetings, conferences and other events on Arctic policy. The selected actors compose a group of 20 actors who meet the criteria. They are the most influential actors who have a say in Russia’s Arctic policy and form different coalitions within Arctic issues.

The empirical analysis has shown that there are four main policy fields in Russia’s Arctic policy. Since these four policy fields have been identified, they can provide the basis to outline various advocacy coalitions. Based on the data from the sessions and meetings of President of Russia, the Russian Government and the Security Council, I have categorized key actors in Arctic policy by their values into different coalitions (Bortnikov, 2015, August 15; Patrushev, 2017, May 19; The Russian Government, 2017, April 14; The Russian Government, 2017, April 21; Putin, 2014, April 22; The Russian Government, 2017, March 31). However, if one actor belongs to some coalition, it does not mean that he or she does not support other policy fields in the Arctic. It only shows that an actor is mostly and actively involved in this or that policy field. It is to be noted that this classification is made by the author and cannot be completely fair.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>An actor</th>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Coalition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexey Knizhnikov</td>
<td>Head of Fuel &amp; Energy Sector Environmental Policy, WWF</td>
<td>Pro-environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexey Miller</td>
<td>The CEO of Gazprom (2001 – current)</td>
<td>Pro-mining operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artur Chilingarov</td>
<td>Presidential Representative on Arctic and AntArctic international cooperation (2016 – current)</td>
<td>Pro-environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dmitry Medvedev</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Russia (2012- current); President of Russia (2008-2012)</td>
<td>Pro-mining operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dmitry Rogozin</td>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister of Russia in charge of Defence industry (2011-2018); Chairman of Public Commission on Arctic Development (2015-2018)</td>
<td>Formal; Formal policy broker as Chairman of Public Commission on Arctic Development (2015-2018); Pro-military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igor Sechin</td>
<td>CEO of Rosneft (2012 – current)</td>
<td>Pro-mining operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igor Shuvalov</td>
<td>First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia (2008-2018)</td>
<td>Pro-mining operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Frolov</td>
<td>Director of Arctic and AntArctic institute (1992 – current)</td>
<td>Pro-environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonid Mikhelson</td>
<td>CEO of Novatek (2003 – current)</td>
<td>Pro-mining operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maksim Sokolov</td>
<td>Minister of Transport (2012 – 2018)</td>
<td>Pro-NSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikolay Kasimov</td>
<td>Deputy President of the Russian Geographical Society</td>
<td>Pro-environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikolai Patrushev</td>
<td>Secretary of the Security Council (2008 – current)</td>
<td>Pro-military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergei Ivanov</td>
<td>Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office (2012 – 2016); Presidential Representative on Environment, Ecology and Transport (2016 – current)</td>
<td>Pro-environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergei Kiriyenko (2007-2016)/Alexey Likhachev (2016 – current)</td>
<td>CEO of Rosatom</td>
<td>Pro-NSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergei Donskoy</td>
<td>Minister of Natural Resources (2012 – 2018)</td>
<td>Pro-environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergey Frank</td>
<td>CEO of Sovcomflot (2014 – current)</td>
<td>Pro-NSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergey Shoigu</td>
<td>Minister of Defence (2012 – current)</td>
<td>Pro-military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vagit Alekperov</td>
<td>President of Lukoil (1993 – current)</td>
<td>Pro-mining operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimir Putin</td>
<td>President of Russia (2012 – current); Prime Minister of Russia (2008-2012)</td>
<td>Pro-military; Sovereign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The data for actors and their affiliation with coalitions in Russia's Arctic policy, 2008-2017 was retrieved from the open-source data of websites of President of Russia, the Russian Government and the Security Council.
Table 7 summarizes the analysis of actors and their affiliation. As a result, we have four coalitions which have different number of actors. However, the number of actors is not the most important aspect since the power of actors is different in Russia’s Arctic policy.

Table 7. Number of actors per coalition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Number of actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-environmental</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-military</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-NSR</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-mining operations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The data for number of actors per coalition was retrieved from Table 6.

We can argue that Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, is the most influential actor in Russia’s Arctic policy and he belongs to a pro-military coalition. Its key values are security and sovereignty. D. Rogozin, Deputy Prime Minister of Russia in charge of Defence industry (2011-2018) and Chairman of Public Commission on Arctic Development (2015-2018) is the third most powerful official in Arctic policy. He also belongs to a pro-military coalition. Moreover, I have also observed that the Security Council and the Federal Security Service are the leading structures which contribute to the development of Arctic policy (Bortnikov, 2015, August 15; Patrushev, 2017, May 19). Finally, key decisions on Arctic policy are made during the meetings of Security Council which is a pro-military body (Putin, 2014, April 22). To sum up, a pro-military coalition is quite strong as it consists of powerful political actors and key decision-makers in Arctic policy.

The next coalition is a pro-environmental one and, at present, Sergey Ivanov is a leader of this coalition. Its main values are environmental protection and clean-up in the Arctic (Ivanov, 2017). Minister of Natural Resources, WWF as an environmental organization and scientific units such as the Arctic and AntArctic institute and the Russian Geographical Society are part of a pro-environmental coalition. A. Chilingarov, Presidential Representative on Arctic and AntArctic international cooperation, promotes international environmental cooperation. This coalition has gained more influence and power than before since 2016 when Sergey Ivanov has been appointed as Presidential
A pro-mining operations coalition has a strong economic focus. It is composed of D. Medvedev, Prime Minister of Russia, the second official in Russia's political system and mostly the CEOs of big state-owned companies. The main activities of these companies are oil and gas production. The CEOs have an indirect influence on decisions, made by President of Russia and the Russian Government. This coalition was relatively strong to advocate its values in 2008-2013 when the sessions of the Russian Government was mostly dedicated to development of mining operations and potential of the continental shelf. The coalition is relatively strong as it is composed of Prime Minister and key CEOs of state-owned companies. It is to be noted that the main lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy is identified in mining operations.

There is also a pro-NSR coalition in which leadership is difficult to determine. Minister of Transport, Rosatom and Sovcomflot as state-owned companies are key actors in this coalition. However, they are not decision-makers since they are under the direct control of the Russian Government and President of Russia.

There has been observed that the most powerful coalition is pro-military. It is expected that an excessive attention was paid to the development of military infrastructure while other projects were granted a secondary status from the Russian authority. I will present the evidence in support of that there is a predominance of pro-military coalition in Russia’s Arctic policy that leads to the imbalance in Russia’s Arctic policy.

Argument 1. Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, personally supports the development of military infrastructure in the Arctic (Putin, 2014, April 22). The advocacy of President of Russia in a super-presidential republic has granted a privileged status for a pro-military coalition from the very beginning of implementation of Arctic policy.

Argument 2. Dmitry Rogozin who was Deputy Prime Minister of Russia in charge of Defense industry was also appointed as Chairman of Public Commission on Arctic Development in 2015-2018 (Rogozin, 2016, May 24). The assignment of Deputy Prime Minister with military portfolio in 2015 meant that a pro-military coalition officially gained its dominant position in Arctic policy.
Argument 3. Key strategical decisions on Russia’s Arctic policy were made during the sessions of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (Medvedev, 2008, September 17; Putin, 2014, April 22). I have also observed that the Security Council and the Federal Security Service are the leading and important structures which develop Arctic policy (Bortnikov, 2015, August 15; Patrushev, 2017, May 19). The mandate of both organizations is security.

As we can see, the dominance of pro-military coalition might lead to the imbalance in Russia’s Arctic policy. The analysis of different coalitions showed that the strongest priority was given to military security in Russia’s Arctic policy. Yet, I can also argue against the statement that only pro-military coalition was dominant in Arctic policy.

 Argument 1. Even though military security is the most successful policy field, an initial goal of the Russian authority towards the Arctic is to make the Arctic a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation (The Russian Government, 2008). This plan has never been changed since 2008 up to current time. Then it would be logical if a pro-mining operations coalition occupied a dominant position in the Arctic. Perhaps, a pro-military coalition is only informally dominant which goes beyond the explanatory power of the ACF.

Argument 2. I have not found the evidence that Russia considered Arctic policy from a military perspective in 2008-2013. The first references of military issues were identified only after 2013-2014. The Arctic issues were actively discussed from a perspective of possible mining operations by the Russian Government in 2008-2013 (Donskoy, 2013; Medvedev, D., 2008, September 17; Medvedev, D., 2013; The Russian Government, 2008; The Russian Government, 2013). The analysis also showed that, in 2008-2013, the actors from a pro-mining operations coalition were actively involved in the decision-making process of the Russian Government (Medvedev, D., 2013). I can link the evidence with the fact that D. Medvedev was in office as President of Russia (2008-2012). It should be reminded that he is part of a pro-mining operations coalition. Based on this data, I can argue that economic issues have remained more salient than military ones in Arctic policy in 2008-2013. To sum up, a set of observations is in contradiction with an expectation that there was a predominance of only one advocacy coalition in 2008-2017.

Three arguments go in support of the expectation while two arguments are in contradiction with a derived expectation. On the one hand, a personal support of
President of Russia towards the development of military security and an appointment of Deputy Prime Minister with military portfolio to coordinate Arctic policy can be the evidence in support of dominance of pro-military coalition over other coalitions. Moreover, a high significance of security bodies in the development of Arctic policy (Security Council and Federal Security Service) can also go in support of a dominant position of pro-military coalition. These arguments can explain that the predominance of pro-military coalition in the Arctic has led to the imbalance in Russia’s Arctic policy. Weaker coalitions for other policy fields could not advocate effectively their values and, as a result, a lack of implementation has been identified in mining operations in the Arctic as well as a suspension and cancellation of some public programs in environmental protection and development of the Northern Sea Route.

On the other hand, an initial goal of the Russian Government is *de jure* not to develop military infrastructure in the Arctic, but to promote mining operations in the region. Moreover, I observed that a pro-military coalition was not dominant in 2008-2013. These arguments are in contradiction with the expectation. Table 8 presents a summary of arguments in support and in contradiction of the advocacy coalition framework.

*Table 8. Summary of arguments in line and in contradiction from the ACF*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arguments in line</th>
<th>Arguments in contradiction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal support of President to develop military infrastructure in the Arctic</td>
<td>Initial goal of the Russian Government is <em>de jure</em> to promote mining operations in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The appointment of Deputy Prime Minister with military portfolio to coordinate Arctic policy</td>
<td>No military focus in Arctic policy in 2008-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key strategical decisions were made during the sessions of the Security Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The Table is compiled by the author.

To sum up, the expectation, deduced form the advocacy coalition framework, can be partly confirmed.

6.6. Conclusion

In this Chapter, the congruence analysis has been conducted. Three expectations, derived from rationalism, elite theory and the advocacy coalition framework, have been tested on
empirical reality. As a result, I have presented the arguments in support and in contradiction of expectations. The congruence analysis has showed that all theories are applicable and have a sufficient explanatory power on a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy. In Chapter 7, I will discuss the findings of research.
7. Conclusion

In this Chapter, I will discuss the findings of the congruence analysis. After that, the answer to the research question will be provided. I will also indicate possible directions for future research. Before concluding, the limitations of this research will be presented.

7.1. Discussion

The congruence analysis has showed that all three theories are relevant to the case – Russia’s Arctic policy, and provide explanations on a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy. Based on conducted congruence analysis, I present Table 9 which summarizes the findings of congruence analysis. The mark (+) indicates that a theory is strongly confirmed while (+/-) means that the degree of confirmation is medium.

Table 9. Number of arguments in support of confirmation and disconfirmation of expectation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Rationalism</th>
<th>Elite theory</th>
<th>The ACF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expectation</td>
<td>Costs outweighed benefits</td>
<td>Reluctance of elites to accept changes</td>
<td>Predominance of one coalition over others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of arguments in line</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of arguments in contradiction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of confirmation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The data for number of arguments in support of confirmation and disconfirmation of expectation was retrieved from the findings of congruence analysis in Chapter 6.

As we can see from Table 9, three expectations have a different degree of confirmation. I have found that the expectations, deduced from rationalism and elite theory, have higher degree of confirmation than from the advocacy coalition framework. I will present the evidence why I have come to such conclusion.

The application of rationalism to the case produced unique findings which explain a lack of implementation in Artic policy. This theory was especially useful in explaining the delay in the development of mining operation. Concerning rationalism, the analysis demonstrated that the Russian authority had a rational justification to delay the implementation of Arctic policy. The Government had high expectations about mining operations in the Arctic and this fact made Russia develop Arctic policy. However, I
identified a set of negative internal and external factors which turned mining operations into an unbefitting, unprofitable and hardly possible to realize a policy direction. They are a lack of financial resources, an insufficient level of technology, low energy prices in 2014-2017 and high environmental risks. The combination of these factors made the Government decrease the pace of implementation of Arctic policy. In addition to that, high potential of Arctic oil and gas production and a gradual reduction of mineral resources in discovered fields were identified. Nonetheless, the number of such observations was less than in support of expectation, deduced from rationalism. Therefore, a lack of implementation can be explained by rational thinking of the Russian Government. To sum up, the analysis of the data showed that costs outweighed benefits in Arctic policy and the expectation was strongly confirmed.

The application of elite theory showed that the elite preferred keeping the status-quo in Arctic policy. The evidence showed that its thinking was too situational and bureaucratic, and its preferences were too materialistic to take decisive steps in the development of Arctic policy. However, I have found that Russia’s elite can accept policy changes if it comes to military issues. Nonetheless, the reluctance of elite to accept policy changes in Arctic policy was evident from the empirical analysis. To conclude, the expectation, derived from elite theory, was also strongly confirmed.

Yet, the congruence between the advocacy coalition framework and empirical reality was controversial. I found the evidence which confirmed as well as contradicted with the expectation, derived from the theory. Indeed, the expectation that there was a predominance of one coalition (namely, pro-military) in Arctic policy was provided with sufficient evidence. Since there was a predominance of pro-military coalition, it has led to the imbalance in Russia’s Artic policy to the detriment of other coalitions. As a result, only military security has been successfully implemented while other policy fields have lagged far behind in Arctic policy. However, an initial goal of the Russian Government in the Arctic was and still is to develop mining operations in the region. Moreover, I have not observed a military focus in Arctic policy in 2008-2013. To sum up, a significant number of empirical observations in contradiction weakens this logic and substantially decreases the explanatory power of the ACF. Therefore, I can say that the expectation from this theory can be partly confirmed.
Before coming to answer the research question, I would like to discuss the difference between the elite and advocacy coalitions which might seem confusing for the reader. It is fair because both theories are part of a political approach to study public policy (Bekkers, et al., 2017). However, elite theory and the advocacy coalition framework focus on different aspects to explain a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy.

The basic difference between elites and advocacy coalitions is the degree of competition between actors. The elite has a low level of competition. To keep unity is much more important for it since the elite shared a basic consensus to avoid risks and instability to stay in power. Russia’s advocacy coalitions had different resources, strategies and they limitedly competed between each other to occupy a dominant position within the Arctic policy subsystem. The empirical analysis showed that there was a competition between actors, but it was limited. Therefore, it allowed to apply the ACF. In the meantime, the competition between actors was not open enough that allowed to use elite theory to study the case.

Applying elite theory, I studied the nature of power which had a democratic deficit, and patterns of elite behaviour (background, thinking, etc.) in Russia’s Arctic policy. There was identified that elite thinking and values were an obstacle to take active steps in implementation of Arctic policy.

The application of the ACF provided more complex understanding of Russia’s Arctic policy where different actors with plural preferences were included in a dynamic policy-making process. Besides, some included actors do not compose Russia’s elite, especially in a pro-environmental coalition. It was found that the coalitions competed between each other and there was a pre-dominance of pro-military coalition, but it had not a pronounced character.

Finally, the last point which should be addressed is authoritarian political regime in Russia (The Economist, 2018). It created a close connection between politicians, government officials and advocacy coalitions in Russia’s Arctic policy that became evident after the empirical analysis. Independent advocacy coalition without support from the authority had low chance and opportunity to promote effectively its ideas and values in Arctic policy. Meanwhile, Russia’s government officials have a determinant impact on the agenda-setting and policy implementation.
7.2. Answer to the research question

At the beginning of my research, I formulated the following research question:

**Which public policy theory best explains a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy?**

Based on the results of congruence analysis, I can state that rationalism and elite theory are best to explain a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy. These theories explain different aspects of the delay in Russia’s Arctic policy. Specifically, rationalism provided a valid explanation on the delay in mining operations in the Arctic. In the meantime, elite theory presented deep understanding of patterns of elite behaviour and thinking that hindered a better implementation of Russia’s Arctic policy. According to Blatter & Haverland (2014), these theories can be marked as complementary since they are mutually reinforcing each other, and it contributes to a better explanation of the case under consideration.

The advocacy coalition framework was also relatively confirmed. However, a significant number of data also provided findings which decreased the explanatory power of the ACF. Therefore, this theory is marked as (+/-) in Table 9 and it means that the theory moderately explains a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy.

To sum up, the answer to the research question is that rationalism and elite theory provide the best explanations on a lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy.

7.3. Limitations of the study

During the research, I have encountered several limitations. Firstly, the analysis of governmental documents as a method posed the limitation in the sense that I could use only the open-source data. Understanding that the electronic government in Russia is well-developed, but it may be not perfect, it could from the very beginning of research limit a possible range of the data which could be retrieved.

Secondly, a huge number of documents and information was still available in the public domain. It was difficult and time-consuming for me to choose which data is specifically relevant for my case under consideration. Perhaps, a wrong interpretation of data during its collection can occur on several occasions.

Finally, since Russia’s Arctic policy is quite young, there has not been much research conducted in this field. I expected that more analytical and fundamental research in Arctic
policy could be found. I could additionally use such findings as desk research for the con
cgruence analysis.

7.4. Future research
The conducted research brings theoretical innovations in the study of Arctic policy since it is mostly scrutinized from the International Relations perspective. The congruence analysis of public policy theories on the Arctic case has never been undertaken before. Therefore, it opens a promising way to further analyse Arctic policy from a public policy perspective.

One of the possible directions for future research can be a competing-theories congruence analysis in which a researcher can continue this research and focus on the comparison of two the most powerful theories for Russia’s Arctic policy: rationalism and elite theory. Perhaps, it can be useful to apply these theories to a broader context to analyse different aspects and issues in Arctic policy.

Another interesting opportunity is to test other prominent public policy perspectives such as institutionalism and constructivism on this case. They can be applied to analyse the same phenomenon as well as other issues in Russia’s Arctic policy.

The analysis of Arctic policy of other countries through a public policy perspective, especially Arctic states, can be probably fruitful. Moreover, a comparative analysis of Arctic policy of different countries, especially their degree of implementation, through the lens of public policy perspective can potentially lead to new interesting findings.

A lack of implementation in Russia’s Arctic policy can also be studied from a public management perspective. It might be useful to apply traditional public administration, new public management and new public governance approaches to find theoretical explanations from other angles.

Finally, researchers will be able to conduct a quantitative analysis of Russia’s Arctic policy since the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation has recently been recognized as a special statistical object (The Russian Government, 2013). By now, Rosstat, the official governmental statistics agency, has the available data for different indicators only for 2016 and 2017 years. In a few years, the amount of data will be sufficient to undertake a quantitative analysis of Russia’s Arctic policy.

All in all, a set of possible directions for future research has been outlined.
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