

# What explains the national foreign policy of EU member states towards Russia in light of the EU sanction regime?

A case study congruence analysis of ideational liberalism and commercial liberalism applied towards Estonia and Austria

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## **Abstract**

This thesis makes a contribution to the understanding of EU national foreign policy by analysing whether ideational liberalism or commercial liberalism better explain the national foreign policy outlook of Estonia and Austria towards Russia in light of the EU collective sanction regime. In answering this question, the thesis follows a case study research design in which it conducts a congruence analysis following a competing theoretical approach. Propositions focused on political ideology, as grounded in ideational liberalism, and trade linkages, as stemming from commercial liberalism, are being applied to the two ‘least-likely’ cases under analysis. This thesis argues that the national foreign policy of EU member states towards Russia in light of the imposed EU sanctions can better be explained via ideational liberalism, centred on political ideology. It hereby gives substances to the fundamental status of the IR liberalist paradigm when focused on ideational liberalism. In addition, this thesis’ central argument is in line with the apparent consideration that economic reasoning might not be the true underpinning of EU national foreign policy towards Russia.

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Quirine Hoogeveen  
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### **List of acronyms**

ÖVP	Austrian People's Party
CPT	Causal-process tracing approach
CP	Centre Party
CFSP	Common Foreign Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CON	Congruence analysis approach
COV	Co-variational approach
Council	European Council
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
FPÖ	Freedom Party of Austria
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IR	International Relations
MEP's	Members of the European Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
IRL	Pro Patria and Res Publica Union
RP	Reform Party
SITC	Standard International Trade Classification
SDE	Social Democratic Party
SPÖ	Social Democratic Party of Austria
TEU	Treaty on the European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialists Republic
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

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## 1. Introduction

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### 1.1 EU sanctions


According to the Council of the European Union (EU), the sanctions imposed by the EU have the essential objective to alter the behaviour of the object under target (Council of the EU, 2014). In this regard, the Council of the EU underlined that sanctions should not be considered a penal mechanism. In implementing their sanctions, the EU intends to secure that the effects of the sanctions are not harmful to the people nor to legitimate practices. The imposition of sanctions is considered a medium for the EU to foster the goals formulated within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The principal aims laid down in the CFSP are to secure the existence of a peaceful and democratic environment, in which international law, human rights and the rule of law are given adherence to. The execution of EU sanctions is connected to the sanctions of the United Nations (UN). If the UN Security Council (UNSC) determines to enforce sanctions, the EU follows this decision and put the sanctions into effect (Council of the EU, 2014; “Sanctions”, n.d.). In addition, the EU has the ability to strengthen the scope of the UN sanctions by fostering extra measures and imposing more rigid actions (Council of the EU, 2014). The EU possesses as well the capacity to implement sanctions on its own, independently from the UN.

### 1.2 Types of EU sanctions

In addition to the previous named differentiation between (1) EU sanctions carried out on the basis of an UNSC resolution, (2) the widening and strengthening of an imposed UN sanction regime by the EU and (3) autonomously implemented EU sanctions, the EU can choose among distinctive ‘sorts’ of EU sanctions (“Different types of sanctions”, 2017). In this regard, two types of EU sanctions are recognized (see Figure 1). The first category of sanctions addresses a specific policy domain, such as sanctions directed at combatting terrorism or ones focused on protecting human rights. The second category of sanctions is oriented towards a more concrete area and has two tenets: they can target diplomatic persons and linkages, or they can address specific persons, organisations or economic sectors. The latter can be divided into four distinctive sorts of measures (“Different types of sanctions”, 2017; Giumelli, 2013).

The first sort of measurements are arms embargoes, which implies putting a ban on the venture of weapons and a halt on services that facilitate an enforcement of the military power of individuals, organisations and states (“Different types of sanctions”, 2017; Giumelli, 2013). Arms embargoes could interrupt the availability of weapons and could function as a

“signalling” medium (Giumelli, 2013, p. 23), which in its basics can be explained as setting a spotlight on the issue under question. The second section encompasses travel bans, which entails that EU countries do not provide visas to specifically recognized people (“Different types of sanctions”, 2017; Giumelli, 2013). This measurement could impede the capacities of the involved people, could influence cost-benefit rhetoric and could serve as a “powerful ‘name and shame’ enforcement tool” (Giumelli, 2013, p. 23). The third group is an asset freeze which is a financial measure (“Different types of sanctions”, 2017; Giumelli, 2013). Financial measures could influence the outweigh of costs against benefits of the object under target (Giumelli, 2013). Additionally, it could be applied to the boycotting of commodities and for limiting the scope of manoeuvre for political authorities. The final section are economic measures which implies the stop of exchange in particular goods, services and technology (“Different types of sanctions”, 2017; Giumelli, 2013). Economic measures could impede the target’s economic initiatives (Giumelli, 2013). In addition, they could foster some level of compliance and could support a change in the national’s regime power structure.



**Figure 1.** The EU sanctions divided according to their focus (“Different types of sanctions”, 2017; Giumelli, 2013).

**1.3 Decision-making procedure of EU sanctions**

The decision-making procedure of EU sanctions is described in Article 30 and 31 of the Treaty on the EU (TEU) (“Consolidated Version of the TEU”, 2012). The European Council (Council) makes the decision to implement EU sanctions on the basis of unanimity (Council of the EU, 2014). This implies that each country could veto a decision from being executed. With regard to the sanctions directed at specific persons, organisations or economic sectors, the decision-making procedure is specific (“Different types of sanctions”, 2017). Concerning the imposition of arms embargoes and travel bans, the Council makes a decision that is of

immediate binding effect to its member states (Council of the EU, 2014). With regards to economic and financial measures, an additional Council regulation is needed in order to implement the Council's decision. As laid down in Article 215 par. 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the regulation is (under normal circumstances) accepted following the qualified-majority rule ("Consolidated Version of the TFEU, 2012).

#### **1.4 EU Sanctions to Russia**

In 2014, the EU implemented sanctions towards Russia within the context of the Ukraine crisis ("EU restrictive measures", 2018). The sanction regime towards Russia encompasses five tenets. Firstly, the EU executed diplomatic measures towards Russia, which implied for instance and exclusion of Russia from the G8 (now G7) meetings. The second pillar consists of restrictive measures targeting individuals and organisations. This pillar has two edges. In March 2014, the Council applied an asset freeze to those people that were involved in stealing from the Ukraine state, which is still in force today (European Council, 2014a; "EU restrictive measures", 2018). In response to the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the Council determined to apply travel bans and a freeze of assets to those accountable for impeding the territorial sovereignty, integrity and independence of Ukraine (European Council, 2014b; "EU restrictive measures", 2018). These measures are currently imposed on 155 individuals and three organisations ("EU restrictive measures", 2018).

The third tenet of the sanction regime covers economic relations and determines, among other measures, that commodities coming from Crimea and Sevastopol, excluding those certified by the Ukrainian government, are not allowed in the EU (European Council, 2014c; "EU restrictive measures", 2018). In June 2018, the Council expanded the period of enforcement of this measurement until June 2019 ("EU restrictive measures", 2018). When in 2014, Russia continued to bring insecurity in the region, the Council decided to implement economic sanctions ("EU restrictive measures", 2018). In July 2014, the Council put an arms embargo in practice and stopped the exchange of goods and technology that could be used for military purposes (European Council, 2014d) In addition, it put a halt to the exchange of facilities related to the retrieval and production of oil in deep water, the Arctic and in Russia. In August 2014, Russia reacted by no longer permitting EU products, such as milk, vegetables and meat, to enter the Russian market (Medvedev, 2014; "Executive Order", 2014). President Putin determined to continue the imposition of these measures for the year 2018 ("Executive Order", 2017). The imposition of economic sanctions by the EU are being prolonged as long as the Minsk agreements has not been fully implemented by the involved parties ("EU restrictive

measures”, 2018). The Minsk Agreements (protocol and package of measures) that aim to bring peace in the conflict areas, have been agreed upon in September 2014 and February 2015 by the Trilateral Contact Group, composed of representatives from Ukraine, Russia, the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) and the separatist groups (“Document retrieval”, 2014; “Protocol on the outcome of consultations”, 2015; “Package of measures”, 2015; “What are the Minsk Agreements?”, 2016). The OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine is charged with the supervision over the compliance to the Minsk Agreements by the involved parties (“The crisis in and around Ukraine”, n.d.). The final tenet of the EU sanction regime towards Russia is focused on (impeding) cooperation with Russia within the economic realm (“EU restrictive measures”, 2018). Programmes aimed at economic collaboration were for instance put on hold.



*Figure 2. Map of the Ukraine crisis (“Ukraine: Who controls what”, 2017)*

### 1.5 Research question

Considering the imposed EU sanctions towards Russia, this thesis maintains the central objective of providing an understanding of the national foreign outlook of EU member states towards Russia. Based on a case study analysis of Estonia and Austria following a congruence approach, it strives to determine whether the national foreign outlook upon Russia can better

be explained via political ideology, as stemming from ideational liberalism, or by trade linkages, following commercial liberalism.

Research question:

Does the ideational liberalism or the commercial liberalism better explain the national foreign policy outlook of Estonia and Austria towards Russia in light of the EU collective sanction regime?

### **1.5.1 Theoretical relevance**

Lehnert, Miller and Wonka (2007) explained that a research question is theoretically relevant when it generates a new edge to the comprehension of the phenomena under analysis. The research then provides a contribution to the present literature that addresses the issue under study. This thesis strives to provide an answer to a research question that is theoretically relevant, as it evaluates the explanatory capabilities of two competing theoretical variants belonging to the same fundamental IR paradigm.

### **1.5.2 Social relevance**

Lehnert, Miller and Wonka (2007) perceived a research question as socially relevant when it helps to (better) grasp the social and political issues societies are being confronted with. In addition, Lehnert, Miller and Wonka (2007) outlined that a socially relevant research question makes references to “*some* evaluative standard” (p. 27). The research question of this thesis possesses social relevance, as it aims to lay its finger on understanding the presence of divergent national political approaches among EU member states towards Russia. In 2007, the then EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson already marked the cruciality of this topic by stating that “the incoherence of European policy towards Russia over much of the past decade has been frankly alarming” (Mandelson, 2007). This thesis strives to explain why the EU struggles to speak with one voice towards Russia by determining what is the true underpinning of the national foreign policy towards Russia in light of the imposed sanction regime.

## **1.6 Structure of the thesis**

To answer the principal research question, this thesis is divided in eight chapters. After the introductory chapter, a literature review is conducted focused on the publications addressing principally the topic of EU sanctions and the national viewpoints taken by EU member states

towards Russia. The literature review ends with this thesis' contribution to the present literature, which is a macro-level International Relations (IR) theoretical explanation of national EU foreign policies towards Russia in light of the imposed sanction regime. The third chapter describes the theoretical framework and justifies why this thesis uses two variants belonging to the fundamental IR theoretical paradigm of liberalism. This chapter closes with the formulation of propositions based on political ideology, as stemming from ideational liberalism, and trade linkages, as grounded in commercial liberalism. The theoretical framework is followed by the research methodology chapter, in which the choice for applying a case study design following a congruence analysis approach is clarified and justified. The methodology chapter explains that this thesis encompasses two cases: Estonia and Austria, which are selected on the basis of their approach taken towards the West and their degree of trade linkages with Russia. Finally, the methodology chapter outlines how this thesis strives to secure a viable and reliable implementation of the research design and clarifies how the data needed, is aimed to be collected.

In the fifth chapter, the formulated propositions are being applied to the empirical cases under study, which are the national foreign policy outlooks of Estonia and Austria towards Russia in light of the EU collective sanction regime. The first proposition is evaluated by analysing the individual government parties' outlooks towards Russia during the period of January 2017-March 2017 and their collective outlook. In addition, the findings of Gressel (2017a; 2017b) for each individual party and the two countries are shown, which are based on survey' answers given by researchers. The second proposition is being examined via a study of statistics on export from Estonia and Austria towards Russia in light of the imposed EU sanctions and Russia's countermeasures. The thesis concludes by determining which of the two liberalist variants better explains the national foreign policy outlook of Estonia and Austria towards Russia considering the EU collective sanction regime. For the reader whose academic curiosity is triggered, a recommendation to further research is included in the conclusion. The thesis completes with the works cited list and the appendix.

## 2. Literature Review

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### 2.1 The effectiveness of EU sanctions

Portela (2014) analysed the effectiveness of EU targeted sanctions which were directed at Myanmar, Zimbabwe, Iran and North Korea. In Myanmar and Zimbabwe, the EU executed sanctions following mandatory UNSC resolutions, whereas in Iran and North Korea, the EU acted unilaterally. She argued that the EU sanctions were principally harmed in their efficiency because of an absence of supportive voices coming from important non-Western nations and regional bodies. The EU sanctions were strengthened in their effectiveness due to the leverage of the UN, as this led to the establishment of measures in a more rapid and solid way. In his book which was first published in 2013, Giumelli (2016) shed a light on “why sanctions are imposed despite the scepticism that surrounds them” by providing an understanding for the study of sanctions’ successes (p. 6). Drawn on the cases of EU autonomously implemented sanctions, Giumelli (2016) described nine lessons for determining the degree of successfulness of sanctions. The principal lesson he put forward is that sanctions are not solely executed to steer actions of the target country (coerce); sanctions have as well “constraining and signalling dimensions” (Giumelli, 2016, p. 12). Based on his analysis looking at the success side of sanctions, Giumelli (2016) argued that sanctions could function as a useful medium within the realm of foreign policy-making, this within its basics due to the flexible nature of sanctions.

### 2.2 Sanctions imposed to Russia in 2014: objectives and consequences

When focusing on the consequences and the realisation of the objectives of the sanction regime against Russia, among them the EU autonomously implemented sanctions, Moret et al. (2016) argued that the sanction left their mark most apparently in two domains. Firstly, it underlined the consequences a country (Russia) faces if it disrespects the principle of territorial integrity and if it disobeys international humanitarian law. Secondly, it brought international peace negotiations to the foreground. In addition, the authors observed that the sanctions had been able to impede the practices of Russia in Ukraine by increasing the cost of Russia’s actions if it would have continued its strategy in Ukraine. Though, meetings between trade delegations of the EU and Moscow obstructed the strength of the sanctions.

Christie (2016) examined the political and economic objectives of the economic sanctions imposed by the West towards Russia and the consequences they set in motion. With regards to the economic objective of the Western economic sanctions, Christie (2016) referred to ex-ante formulated criteria by Van Rompuy and Barroso, which recognized that Russia had

to suffer economic losses, though not excessively, and that the losses on the side of Russia had to be higher than the costs for the EU. When looking at data on real gross domestic product (GDP), Christie (2016) argued that these criteria were met. The GDP of Russia was estimated to decline with 1.5% in 2015 due to the sanctions<sup>1</sup>. Following a publication of the European Commission, the real GDP of the EU was expected to decrease with 0.25% in 2015, as a consequence of geopolitical uncertainties linked to the crisis in Ukraine and the implementation of sanctions towards Russia (Christie 2016; European Commission, 2015). Concerning the political objective of the Western sanctions to Russia, Christie (2016) stated that the sanctions led to a constraining of Russia's practices in Ukraine. However, the author considered that the economic sanctions might have steered Russia's actions more, if the economic sanctions were being implemented in immediate effect to the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014. In addition, Christie (2016) advocated an implementation of economic sanctions that were stronger in force at the initial phase of the sanction regime and perceived a missed opportunity of not having used the sanctions as preventive mechanism before the Ukraine conflict truly intensified.

Similar to Moret et al. (2016) and Christie (2016), Scazzieri (2017) mentioned the extend the EU sanctions have been effective in reaching their central aim. However, he stressed that the aim of his article is not to examine the degree the EU sanctions obtained their goal; he strived to put the EU-Russia case in a broader perspective by evaluating the strategy of the EU behind the imposed sanctions. Scazzieri (2017) argued that in addition to the EU's central goal of making Russia withdrawn from Ukraine, the aim of the EU's strategy towards Russia was twofold: securing that the crisis would not intensify and protecting the linkages between the EU and Russia. However, these two aims were not working in harmony with each other and obstructed the effectiveness of the strategy. Scazzieri (2017) stated that the strategy of the EU did not lead to a removal of Russian troupes from Ukraine territory. In addition, the relation, between the EU and Russia was hampered, which contributed to a heightening of tensions.

### **2.3 National and sectoral economic consequences for the EU of the imposed sanctions**

As touched upon briefly in the analysis of Christie (2016), the imposition of the EU sanctions to Russia generated economic losses to Russia and to the economy of the EU. In his article published in 2017, Giumelli surpassed the macro-level and examined the economic consequences of sanctions and Russia's countermeasures on individual EU member states and

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<sup>1</sup> Christie (2016) acknowledged that this is a "broad-brush picture" (p. 58).

market sectors. Even though, after the implementation of the sanctions, each individual EU member state saw their export to Russia declining, not every country faced the same amount of economic losses. At the aggregate level, winning countries encountered less negative consequences in their total exports to Russia and losing countries faced a considerable shortfall in their export. On a sectoral level, winners saw their exports enlarging and losers perceived a decline in exports. In his conclusion, Giumelli (2017) placed his findings in a broader policy-making perspective by arguing that economic costs might not be the determinant factor for the EU's countries national approach towards the EU sanctions: whereas Germany, one of the losing countries, was advocating the sanctions, Greece, one of the countries on the winning side, was not. Moret et al. (2016), a publication to which Giumelli contributed and in which reference is made to his study of 2017, argued as well that “there is little correlation between economic costs suffered during sanctions impositions and the policy of that member state towards sanctions” (p. 18). They considered that the approach by EU member states towards the sanctions stems from other considerations, such as security or political reasonings.

#### **2.4 A glance at national foreign approaches towards Russia before the implementation of the EU sanctions in 2014**

In a policy paper for the *European Council on Foreign Relations*, Leonard and Popescu (2007) shed light on EU-Russia relations. When outlining the side of the EU, the authors stated that the most crucial challenge the EU faces, is the formulation of a unified approach towards Russia. The authors argued that distinctive perspectives on Russia are perceivable within the EU and emphasized that this occurs on a level that exceeds the classification of ‘older generation EU countries’ versus the ‘younger generation EU member states.’ Leonard and Popescu (2007) categorized the EU countries in five different groups according to their national foreign outlook upon Russia, ranging from “Trojan Horses” to the “New Cold Warriors” (p. 2). The five categories could broadly be divided in two segments: countries who consider Russia a potential partner in future affairs and ones who feel intimidated by Russia. The first view upon Russia might be too tolerant as it does not obey Russia to established rules, such as human rights, and the second perspective could be too harsh as it does not leave space open for a mutual understanding with Russia. The authors advocated a vision in which the different EU member states find common ground with each other and suggested in this regard a “rule of law paradigm” (Leonard and Popescu, 2007, p. 3).

In addition to Leonard and Popescu (2007), Schmidt-Felzmann (2008) referred to the disunity of approaches among EU member states to Russia. In a similar vein as Leonard and

Popescu (2007), she argued that that these distinctive outlooks cannot be simply put in the boxes of ‘old EU countries’ and ‘new EU countries.’ However, Schmidt-Felzmann (2008) opposed the five categories made by Leonard and Popescu (2007) claiming that their rhetoric does not address the actual underpinnings of the differentiation in the EU countries perspectives. She considered that the difficulty to establish a shared strategy is to be found in different outlooks by EU members on two stands. Firstly, there is a discrepancy in EU countries’ considerations whether Russia is more leaning to become a democracy, or whether the country is turning into an authoritarian regime. Secondly, EU members’ perceptions differentiate regarding the degree of respect Russia should pay to EU values before establishing intensive linkages. Some countries prefer to see the EU building ties with Russia and consider that the EU’s values, such as democracy and rule of law, will enter Russia progressively. Other EU countries maintain a firm standpoint on this issue and consider observance of EU values a prerequisite to build further ties with Russia.

In their edited book *National Perspectives on Russia: European foreign policy in the making*, David, Gower and Haukkala (2013a; 2013b) examined as well the national foreign perceptions of EU member states on Russia and the considerable consequences upon the creation of a collective EU approach to Russia. In this respect, David, Gower & Haukkala (2013b) spoke of “a universe of national perspectives” (p. 257) and considered that national interests (rather than Russia’s) steer the relation between EU members and Russia. They acknowledged that they hereby oppose to an extend the notion of Trojan horses by Leonard and Popescu (2007). However, they perceived that the engagement between EU countries and Russia based on economic and political reasonings is of importance, though these considerations are not perceived as more crucial than the other national economic and political interests.

In addition to naming the presence of national interest in the approaches by EU member states, David, Gower and Haukkala (2013a; 2013b) outlined that the outlooks towards Russia are not stable over time, nor secured towards particular policy areas. Concerning the implications for the EU’s collective approach, the editors believed that the EU’s national outlooks (except for the Baltic states) are not in opposition to the strategic aims of the EU’s collective approach towards Russia; only the perceptions upon ‘how’ and ‘when’ differentiate. In their analysis, the editors emphasized as well the cruciality of positioning the EU member states within the system of the EU and noticed distinctive forms of Europeanization. The final component of their analysis focused on the implications of bilateralism on multilateralism. The editors argued that an absence of a united approach towards Russia might occasionally be

helpful to the EU, as bilateral engagement with Russia could be used tactically to the benefit of a common EU approach.

In their study, Leonard and Popescu (2007) and Schmidt-Felzmann (2008) touched upon a division between the old and new EU member states. Though, they considered other factors as more explanatory when analysing the divergent approaches taken by EU member states towards Russia. Carta and Braghiroli (2011) determined on the basis of “an index of friendliness toward Russia” (p. 271) that the distinctive approaches among EU member states follow the East-West division. Additionally, the index largely confirmed their hypothesis that economic and energy linkage determine perceptions, and that member states perceive these interlinkages differently. New EU members perceive absolute economic ties and energy dependence as a considerable superiority of Russia, whereas old members perceive this a “relative asset” (Carta and Braghiroli, 2011, p. 269). The authors concluded that the new EU members who maintain relatively high economic and energy dependence with Russia, are relatively critical towards Russia, the ones who are less dependent have a friendlier approach. In a similar vein, the older EU countries that are relatively less dependent upon Russia, have a rather unfriendly outlook and the ones that possess a relative high dependence, are relatively milder. In the second part of their study, Carta and Braghiroli (2011) analysed the perspective of Members of the European Parliament (MEP’s) to determine whether national outlooks influence decision-making on a European level. Their study showed that those MEPs coming from the extreme-side countries tend to follow national perspectives, rather than the parliamentary groups perspectives. “The cleavages which affect the Member States also trouble the MEPs” (Carta and Braghiroli, 2011, p. 283).

## **2.5 Post-2014 context: Trojan horses, anti- and pro-Western political parties and divergent EU citizens’ perceptions towards the imposed sanctions**

Whereas the previous discussed articles, policy paper and edited book were written before the implementation of EU sanctions towards Russia in 2014, Orenstein and Kelemen (2017) shed a theoretical light on the appearance of Russian Trojan horses within the EU focused on the imposed sanction regime of 2014. Orenstein and Kelemen (2017) perceived the CFSP as possessing “a specific form of institutional disaggregation” (p. 88) and argued that Trojan horses could emerge in this institutional ‘gap.’ The notion of Trojan horses in this context implies that there are EU countries who are inclined to implement foreign policies that are in line with the Russia’s interests, which is detrimental for the EU common approach and the unity inside the EU. These countries, such as Greece and Hungary, create a win-win

situation for themselves by receiving benefits from the EU for supporting the sanction regime and from Russia by making the (implicit) appearance to follow the Russian preferences. According to Orenstein and Kelemen (2017), Russia is maintaining an anti-EU approach as it opposes the EU's democratic strives. More especially, it applies "divide-and-rule tactics" (p. 91), which entails that Russia is focused on bilateralism, positions more spies in Brussel and supports political parties inside the EU that follow an anti-EU view. Though, in light of their analysis, the authors considered that the most crucial consequence of Russia's tactic is the creation of Trojan horses in the EU.

Orenstein and Kelemen (2017) shortly referred to the support provided by Russia to certain political parties who raise their voice against the EU. In his policy brief, Gressel (2017a; 2017b) evaluated the ideology of political parties regarding 'the West' on a national and European level. He analysed, among other party outlooks, the viewpoints upon further integration of EU and the imposed sanctions. Based on his study, Gressel (2017a) ranked 181 political parties from "hard core anti-Western" (p. 3) to "pro-Western" (p. 4). Additionally, by analysing the rhetoric of national parties and their influence within national parliaments, the author ranked the national political systems of EU countries according to their perspective to the West. One essential finding he came across, is that ideologies inclined towards Russia which regularly stem from an anti-Western rhetoric, are practiced by both populist parties as mainstream political parties.

Instead of outlining the ideology of political authorities, Onderco (2016) transferred the scope of attention to what the citizens within the EU think. By examining the public opinion on the imposed sanctions towards Russia in ten European countries during June 2014, Onderco (2016) maintained the principal objective to clarify why the sanctions are encountered differently on an individual level within the EU. By approaching the question from a geopolitical, economic and ideational angle, he argued that geopolitical reasonings are the most determinant, whereas economic considerations have the least influence. He outlined that the way EU sanctions are encountered on an individual level, is influenced by how EU citizens perceive the EU and the US. An individual who maintains a negative perspective towards the EU or the US tends to disagree with the imposition of EU sanctions towards Russia, whereas somebody who is supportive of the EU or the US advocates the execution of the sanctions.

## **2.6 How did the EU sanction regime towards Russia come into being?**

The preceding section highlighted that although all EU member states agreed on implementing the EU sanctions, they could continue to follow their own foreign policy path; a

path at which they could be awaited by Russia. In addition, it outlined the presence of divergent approaches taken towards Russia by political authorities and touched upon the outlook of the EU citizens towards the implemented sanctions. Following these observations, the question could be posed how the EU countries were able to succeed in reaching an agreement to implement the sanctions to Russia in the first place. In their article published in 2017, Sjursen and Rosén (2017) aimed to answer this question. According to the authors a sense of social unity, belonging to constructivism, could not account for the formulation of the collective approach. Neither the external security reasoning or the role played by the powerful EU member states, as included in realism, could provide an explanation. Instead, the authors believed that the deliberative perspective clarifies why the EU countries were able put all heads in the same direction. In line with constructivism, the deliberative approach outlines that “normative convergence” (Sjursen & Rosén, 2017, p. 23) could occur, which leads to a shared understanding that could result in an agreement. However, the deliberative approach distances itself from the constructivist perspective by arguing that norm adherence stems from a rational-based process. According to the authors, the EU member states were able to implement a collective sanction approach as they all valued the principles of sovereignty and self-determination highly. This commitment was based on the rational impartial reasoning and not due to an ideational unity among the EU member states. However, Sjursen and Rosén (2017) did recognize the perception of viewing Ukraine as EU’s neighbourhood and the people involved in the conflict as ‘Europeans,’ as having played an additional role in the capability of the EU to reach an agreement.

## **2.7 (Theoretical) approaches towards understanding the (national) foreign policy outlook of EU member states towards Russia against the background of the violence in Ukraine**

Within the previous sections, distinctive authors have been identified that referred to the different approaches towards Russia, or towards the implemented sanction regime specifically within either the pre- or the post-2014 context. Based on this observation, the attention could be directed at how the literature has strived to understand the national foreign policy outlooks of EU member states towards Russia against the background of the Ukraine crisis. The authors included in the policy paper edited by Forbrig (2015) identified distinctive factors that influence the divergent national foreign perspectives of ten Central European countries towards Russia within the context of the conflicts in Ukraine. Mihaylova and Dimitrov (2017) zoomed in on Bulgaria and Romania and made a comprehensive study of the countries outlooks upon Russia in light of the Ukraine crisis. The actors perceived the states as rational actors operating within

the framework of the EU. Among other factors, they outlined that the (historical) engagement between the countries and Russia played an essential role in the formulation of their outlook. Other authors aimed to explain the national foreign perspective from an (IR) theoretical perspective. Raik (2016) evaluated whether the IR approach relating security to democracy (democratic peace) and to commercial exchanges (liberal interdependence) or the realist notion of power maximization (geopolitics) could explain the ideational basis of the engagement between the EU and Russia and the Baltic states and Russia. Forsberg (2016) aimed to explain the considerable change within the outlook of Germany towards Russia with an eye on the Ukraine crisis. In this regard, he examined the power relation between Germany and Russia and the influence of national political authorities, interest groups and the public opinion. In addition, he took into consideration how the German and Russian elites acted towards each other. Naumescu (2017) applied a discursive theoretical view on the EU's national outlook towards Russia in light of the Ukraine crisis and its consequences for the unity within the EU. The author divided the political perspective according to factors such as political ideology (left/right) and national interests. Finally, in the book co-edited with Casier, DeBardeleben (2017) approached the relationship between the EU and Russia via a constructivist theoretical lens covering a bilateral, regional and multilateral level and enclosing the period from 1993 towards the post-2014 years. The author examined hereby for instance how human rights and sovereignty are perceived within the context of the Ukraine crisis by both EU and Russian representatives.

## **2.8 This thesis' contribution to the present literature**

The literature review started with a general outlook upon the effectiveness of sanctions and the study of sanctions' successes. In consequence, it narrowed the attention to the effects of the imposed sanction regimes both for Russia as the EU. The authors agreed that the sanctions did contribute to a change in the actions of Russia inside Ukrainian territory, however they identified as well shortcomings (or misfortunes) in how the sanctions were being implemented. In consequence, the focus was directed at how national EU foreign policy towards Russia had been addressed within the literature. Publications written before the imposed sanction regime agreed that there was no united approach visible among the EU member states towards Russia. However, there is an absence of a consensus among these authors concerning the determinant factor(s) contributing to the divergent national foreign approaches towards Russia. Is it due to the presence of Trojan Horses? Is it the perception towards the political structure (democratic/authoritarian) in Russia, or the importance attached to EU values? Is it the consequence of a focus on national interests? Does the concept of

Europeanization play a role? Does the distinction between old-versus-new EU member states have an influence?

The literature published after the implementation of the sanction regime addressed as well the perceptions towards Russia in general or towards the imposed sanctions specifically. The possibility for EU member states to foster their own national foreign policy approach within the institutional framework of the CFSP has been remarked. In addition, distinctive political ideologies towards the West (and thereby Russia) among political parties inside the EU has been identified, and an explanation for distinctive approaches towards the sanctions by the general public in the EU is apparent within the post-2014 literature. In consequence, even though the EU countries did find common ground in 2014 by their shared respect to sovereignty and self-determination, the reviewed literature highlighted the continuing presence of distinctive voices towards Russia and/or the imposed sanctions inside the EU. Several authors have strived to explain the underpinnings of national foreign policy of EU member states towards Russia against the background of the Ukraine crisis. In addition, it has been remarked that the degree of national and sectoral economic losses was not in line with the approach taken towards the sanctions, and that reasonings, among them security/political interests, might explain the approaches taken towards the sanctions. In consequence, this thesis will contribute to this discussion by putting forward a macro-level IR theoretical explanation for national foreign policies of EU member states towards Russia considering the EU collective sanction regime. More especially, it will apply two variants belonging to one of the most fundamental theoretical paradigms within the field of IR and test their power to provide an understanding for the national foreign policy of EU member states.

### 3. Theoretical Framework


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*The previous chapter identified the contribution of this thesis to the present literature by providing a macro-level IR theoretical explanation for EU national foreign policy towards Russia in light of the EU sanction regime. The objective of this third chapter at hand is to identify the IR theory most appropriate to function as theoretical framework for this thesis.*

#### **3.1 IR theories and levels-of-analysis: the basics**

Before providing an overview of the main theories within the field of IR, the focus is directed at what the study of IR implies. Following the book by Kaufman (2013), written for the audience of undergraduate students, the study of IR can be defined as the analysis of the ‘preceding’ before a decision is taken, the actor that takes the decision, the decision itself, and the effects the decision set in motion within the area of international politics. ‘Actors’ in this sense are both states as non-state entities/individuals. On the basis of IR theories, which encompass predictions or thoughts, real state of affairs falling within the domain of IR are being analysed, aimed to be understood and treated as indicative for possible future occurrences that take place against a similar background. Essential to note hereby is that IR theories are not ‘static boxes’, as they are being applied to a dynamic environment. Within the study of IR, the “levels-of-analysis framework” (Kaufman, 2013, p. 11) is being applied for structuring the approach towards the empirical phenomenon. This could be explained and illustrated by the perspective outlined by Singer (1961). The author outlined the system and the sub-system levels of analysis, as he perceived these as commonly used, and made claims regarding their capacity to designate an empirical phenomenon, to explain it and to make suggestive future claims using the empirical affair as fundament. Figure 3 describes the focus points of each level of analysis and their capacities, as derived from Singer (1961).

As the levels of analysis have their own focus points and capabilities, the framework functions as guidance for determining the research’s scope of attention to answer the central research question (Singer, 1961; Kaufmann, 2013). However, Kaufmann (2013) outlined that the level of analysis could stem as well from the principal question being posed (Kaufmann, 2013). Following this latter point of perspective, Figure 3 depicts as well the relevance of the level of analysis for this thesis aim. In describing the fundamental IR paradigms and justifying which paradigm is chosen (see section 3.3), specific attention is paid to the paradigms’ focus points as stemming from the level of analysis and the implications for answering the thesis’ principal research question.



**Figure 3.** Two commonly used levels of analysis and their capacities (Singer, 1961)

### 3.2 Fundamental IR paradigms

Despite the fact that distinctive IR theories have appeared over time, the IR paradigms realism, liberalism and constructivism possess a fundamental status within the academic literature. The authors Gallarotti (2010) and Paul (2012) for instance both defined the IR paradigms of realism, liberalism and constructivism as “leading” in their analysis (p. 5; p. 6). In consequence, while acknowledging that there are distinctive theories present within the domain of IR, the following analysis of IR theories capability to function as theoretical framework, is limited to these three IR paradigms.

#### 3.2.1 Realism

Morgenthau (1973) described the international political theory of realism as grounded in six core principals. Firstly, realism considers that “objective laws,” which stem from human nature, are guiding politics (Morgenthau, 1973, p. 4). Secondly, realism perceives states as following their own interests, i.e. power. In this regard, realism observes the strive for power as universally perceivable, though the political and cultural environment determines the connotation given to power. Fourthly, realism considers that states do not follow moral principles unconditionally, as states need to first evaluate the political effects which the moral principles set in motion. In addition, realism outlines that each state tries to secure their interest and therefore they are able to ‘read’ other states behaviour. In consequence, states aim to

implement policies that secure their own interest, while minding the strives of others. Finally, realism considers that human nature has distinctive ‘dimensions’ which can be of economic, moral and religious nature. However, as realism only aims to understand the political side, it studies this in isolation from the other dimensions.

Even though the classical realists, such as Morgenthau (1973), could not be considered as unified in each aspect of their approach, numerous classical realists found common ground on five propositions (Holsti, 1995). Firstly, classical realists are principally focused on the analysis of the factors that contribute to the existence of war and peace. Secondly, they trace back the underlying reason for why particular occurrences happen within IR principally to the system which they define as an anarchical situation in which nations strive for relative gains within a “self-help system” (Holsti, 1995, p. 37). Thirdly, classical realist perceive states practices as rationally driven by the pursue of their national interests. Finally, the classical realists take nations as essential unit of analysis, which they treat as one entity, whose practices principally stem from the international system, as opposed to rooted in the domestic realm.

The classical realists were being confronted with distinctive critical voices (Holsti, 1995). One of the most influential critique was given by Kenneth Waltz (2010). In his book *Theory of International Politics*, which was originally published in 1979, Waltz (2010) highlighted the difference between an “international-political theory” and a “theory of foreign policy” (p. 72). According to Waltz (2010), the first is a system level theory which presupposes that the (limiting) factors of the system determine the behaviour of states, how they act towards other states and the international ‘outcomes’ they engender. Waltz (2010) discerned a theory of foreign policy a unit level theory, i.e. “reductionist” (p. 18), which focuses on the distinctive actors and different practices within the domestic (national and individual) domain. In *Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory* (1995), firstly brought out in 1990, Waltz outlined his critique towards individual classical realists and highlighted the four principal tenets in which neorealism varies from the rhetoric of classical realism.

The first principle on which neorealism differentiates itself from classical realism, is grounded in Waltz’ definition of a theory of international politics. The system resembles an anarchical situation in which capabilities (power) are being spread among entities. Within this structure of anarchy, the strive for self-help determines action. The second way in which neorealism varies from classical realism is the perception towards causality. Classical realists considered that only the practices of states and the way they behave towards each other explain international affairs, whereas neorealists perceive this cause-effect as functioning bi-directionally. The third difference is their perspective towards power. The author believed that

classical realists consider power as the ultimate goal strived after, whereas neorealists perceive power as a manner to reach the ultimate aim of security. Finally, Waltz (1995) outlined that as neorealism is focused on the structure of the system, it defines states as units and does not take into consideration where the state is composed of, whereas classical realists do take into consideration the formation of the unit.

The third generation of the realism school of thought is neoclassical realism (Rose 1998). Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell (2016) aimed to surpass Waltz' (2010) distinction between theories of foreign policy and international politics by putting forward a neoclassical perspective. The authors considered that the structure has influence upon domestic level considerations and actions, though domestic occurrences do have an effect upon the structure as well. Despite the fact that neoclassical realism incorporates domestic level variables, Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell (2016) underlined that neoclassical realism remains a system level theory, as they attached most explanatory power to systematic factors.

### **3.2.2 Liberalism**

Kegley Jr. (1995) outlined that the realist school of thought was especially dominant in their explanatory power during the period of 1939-1989. However, both the classical realists and the neorealist were not able to foresee the development of the state of affairs within the post-Cold War period. Critique towards the realist school of thought is visible within the pioneering book *Power and Interdependence* by Keohane and Nye Jr. (2012) which was originally published in 1977. Contrary to the expectations of the neorealists, the end of the Cold War did not give rise to “a struggle to balance power” (Keohane & Nye Jr., 2012, p. XXIX) within Central Europe. In contrast to the post-WW I and WW II period, stability was present. The authors acknowledged that their publication was not able to forecast the post-Cold War situation either, though they underlined that a research' focus on the presence of interdependence, a diversification of communication media and institutions, such as NATO and the EU, would have hinted at the occurrence of a political situation dissimilar from ones visible during the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century. The viewpoint set out by Doyle (1983) can be related to the approach taken by the previous authors. According to him, liberalism perceives power balance<sup>2</sup> as incapable for providing an explanation for IR.

According to Keohane (1990), liberalism is an “approach to the analysis of social reality” (p. 174) which focuses on individuals aiming to unravel collective decision-making and

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<sup>2</sup> According to Waltz (2010) balance of power is present within an anarchical situation in which the units are principally focused on surviving.

the manner individuals behave towards each other within group compositions. Individual rights and human development are core features of this approach (Keohane, 1990). With regard to the outlook upon IR, liberalism differentiates itself on three standpoints from realism. First of all, liberalism considers collectively organized group of individuals as principal actors, who operate both internationally as domestically and are analysed as acting in interdependence with states. Secondly, rather than following the realist emphasis on military capabilities, liberalism centres on the manner individuals with distinctive preferences are capable to find common ground in pursuing their interests. Liberalism recognizes that within these collective endeavours, economic efficiency is strived after and conflict is aimed to be circumvented, while maintaining respect for the economic and political liberties of the individuals. Finally, liberalism maintains a progressive outlook upon development, whereas realism a conservative.

In 1986, Doyle argued that there is no document that defines liberalism in its generality. Keohane (1990) referred in a similar vein to the absence of a single IR liberalist theory. Due to this apparent absence, Zacher and Matthew (1995) strived to identify an independent liberalist theoretical framework for IR and concluded that liberal IR scholars share the rhetoric that “international politics is about the changing interests of the inhabitants of states (or other entities) and that the underlying forces of change are creating opportunities for increased cooperation and a greater realization of peace, welfare, and justice” (p. 140). This conclusion can be related to the approaches of Keohane and Nye Jr. (2012), Doyle (1983) and Keohane (1990). Although, Zacher and Matthew (1995) were able to recognize a central factor that ‘binds’ liberal IR scholars, they remained sceptical about the question whether IR scholars perceive liberalism as a true ‘theoretical paradigm.’

Within his article *Taking Preferences Seriously: a Liberal Theory of International Politics*, Moravscik (1997) aimed to demonstrate that liberalism is a true IR theoretical paradigm. According to the author, the liberal IR theoretical approach links the manner states behaves to its domestic social domain and the international social arena in which it operates. Liberalism perceives the way a state acts within the international political system as influenced by state preferences which are defined by societal interests and institutions. Moravscik (1997) highlighted that liberalism might be criticized for maintaining a sole focus on the domestic level of analysis, rather than the system, and thereby being considered as reductionist. Though, according to the author, this critique is false on two grounds. Firstly, state preferences are determined by both the domestic as the international social order. Secondly, liberalism does not position states within isolated boxes; liberalism treats states as being part of an international ‘web’ of state preferences. In consequence, “liberalism’s systematic, structural quality” could

provide an explanation for both the objectives of states within the domain of foreign policy as the result of interstate behaviour from a systematic point of perspective (Moravscik, 1997, p. 523). Although Moravscik (1997) shed a new paradigmatic light on liberalism, his definition of the liberal IR theoretical approach could be brought in line with the perspectives of the previous named authors

### **3.2.3 Constructivism**

In the book *World of Our Making*, Onuf (1989) laid the groundwork for constructivism within the field of IR. According to the author “people always construct, or constitute, social reality, even as their being, which can only be social, is constructed for them” (Onuf, 1989, p. 1). Ruggie (1998) identified three streams of constructivism: neo-classical, post-modernist and a variant possessing a place in the middle. Ruggie (1998) recognized the author Kratochwil as belonging to neo-classical constructivism. In his book published in 1989, Kratochwil analysed the influence of norms and rules on decision-making within the international domain from a rather philosophical point of perspective. Kratochwil (1989) argued that norms should not only be considered as mechanisms that help to make rational choices; they are as well means for understanding (reasoning) when choices are being made, depending upon the context they are embedded. Following this perspective, Kratochwil (1989) stressed thoughts of consideration and interpretation. For the study of IR this implies that the system cannot alone provide an explanation for international affairs; norms and their influence upon reasoning needs to be taken into consideration as well. With regard to the postmodernist variant of constructivism, Ruggie (1998) perceived Ashley as setting the stage. Ashley (1987) applied a genealogical approach towards international politics in which he aimed to unravel the cumulated layers of arbitrary interpretations. According to Ruggie (1998), one essential difference between these two streams, is that the first essentially focuses on the underpinnings of established meanings, whereas the latter is principally centred on ‘unpacking’ the linguistics via discourses.

In his article *Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics*, Wendt (1992) aimed to provide a place where both modernist constructivists and postmodernists could meet. Due to the principality attached to Wendt within the school of constructivism, the remainder of this section will be devoted to Wendt’s essential work (Viotti and Kauppi, 2009; “Most influential scholars”, 2016). In his article. Wendt (1992) argued that a state’s identity and interest find their origin within the system states operate. Wendt (1992) distanced himself hereby from the rationalist rhetoric of neorealism and neoliberalism, who both consider that the identities and interests are “simply given exogenously by the structure of


the state system” (p. 396). In explaining his argument, Wendt (1992) mirrored his own thoughts upon the neorealist perception that “self-help and power politics” (p. 395) stem from the structure.

Based on the first principle of constructivism which presupposes that behaviour flows from attached meanings, Wendt (1992) outlined that the manner in which states behave follows from the comprehension about themselves and others. Wendt (1992) termed this “social definition,” i.e. identity (p. 398). The author continued by outlining that an institution encompasses distinctive identities and interests, and perceived self-help within anarchy as such an ‘institution’. Due to this connotation given to self-help, it cannot be seen in separation from the actors (states) understanding of the world. As within a structure of anarchy the creation of identity is principally centred on establishing a secure self, the meaning given to the concept of security is dependent on the identification of the self and the other. Via making reference to the second principle of constructivism, which is that meanings arise out of interaction, the author explained that it is not only that an actor’s *own* understanding of its identity and interests will sustain; the manner in which an actor defines its own identity and interests “tend to “mirror” the practices of significant others over time” (Wendt, 1992, p. 404). Wendt (1992) perceived the “self-help security systems” as emerging from these interactions (p. 406).

In his article, Wendt described himself as a “statist” (p. 424) and explained that he applied a systematic approach. Regarding the statist reasoning, Wendt (1999) argued that sovereign states sustain their principality within the international political domain as they ‘mediate’ transformations within the international system. This, despite the upcoming presence of non-state actors. In his book *Social Theory of International Politics*, Wendt (1999) outlined more in depth his systematic approach. He explained that he focuses on international politics and therefore directs its attention to the system level of analysis. “I am interested in international politics, not foreign policy” (Wendt, 1999, p. 11). The author underlined hereby that although he does highlight the endogeneity of state’s interests and identity; he does not aim to define state’s interests and identity. The second implication of the focus on the system by Wendt (1999) draws on, and simultaneously distances itself from, the “systemic-reductionist distinction” (p. 12). As touched upon earlier, the systematic approach perceives international politics as stemming from the structure, whereas reductionists trace the origin to the interaction between states and their capabilities. Wendt (1999) had the principal objective to apply a systematic theoretical perspective to global politics, although he did incorporate reductionist factors in his analysis, as he made evidently clear in his argument “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992, p. 395).

### 3.3 The most suitable IR paradigm to function as theoretical framework

In order to determine which of the previously described IR paradigms of realism, liberalism and constructivism is most suitable to serve as theoretical framework in this thesis, Figure 4 summarizes the different focus points of the IR theoretical paradigms following the levels-of-analysis framework and the implications for answering the principal thesis question.



**Figure 4.** Summary of the discussed IR theoretical paradigms following the levels-of-analysis framework and the implications for answering the principal thesis question.

As realism and constructivism focus principally on systematic variables and liberalism on domestic variables (influenced by both the domestic and international society), this thesis will use liberalism as theoretical framework, as its focus is most in line with this thesis' research aim to explain national foreign policy-making.

### 3.4 A focus on two variants within the IR theoretical perspective

Since Moravscik (1997) brought liberalism to the level of an IR theoretical paradigm, the scope of attention will be limited to the three variants of liberalism he puts forward: ideational liberalism, commercial liberalism and republican liberalism. Ideational liberalism considers that state preferences stem in principal from social identities and values present within the domestic domain. Commercial liberalism assumes that the way states act stems from "the patterns of market incentives facing domestic and transnational economic actors" (Moravscik, 1997, p. 528). Republican liberalism centres on those organisations operating within the

domestic arena which establish political policies on the basis of societal demands. It is crucial in this regard whether the institutions adhere to social demands that are representative for the society or biased. As in all the EU countries democratic institutions are present and required following art. 2 of the TEU and the presence of the Copenhagen Criteria, republic liberalism could not provide an explanation for the principal research question posed in this thesis (“Consolidated Version of the TEU, 2012; “Accession Criteria”, 2016). Therefore, within the following section, only propositions stemming from ideational liberalism and commercial liberalism are formulated.

### **3.4.1 Ideational liberalism**

Moravcsik (1997) argued that ideational preferences could find their origin in three distinctive forms of identity: national identity, socio-economic identity and political identity. National identity focuses on the voices raised from society regarding the nation. The distinction between ethnicity (ethnic group) and nationality (nation) plays hereby a role (Moravcsik 1997; Moynihan, 1993). The difference among the two is to be found in the ‘degree’ of ethnicity, as the “nation is “the highest” form of ethnic group” (Moynihan, 1993, p. 4). According to Moynihan (1993), a nation aims to possess an independent territory and the author perceived conflict to occur among ethnic groups rather than nations. Though, following art. 2 and art. 3 of the TEU, EU countries maintain the fundamental view of establishing a society of inclusion and equality (“Consolidated Version of the TEU”, 2012). In consequence, this thesis does not evaluate a proposition on the basis of national identity

Economic identity highlights the demands coming from society about the “nature of the legitimate socioeconomic regulation and redistribution” (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 527). In this perspective, when the realization of the social preferences about the socioeconomic actions within one society has an effect upon other states, the preferences could be of influence the way states interact with each other. However due the development of the single market within the EU, as laid down in art. 26 of the TFEU, the economic identity among EU member states is not considered a differentiating factor in explaining the national foreign policy outlook among EU member states towards Russia (“Consolidated Version of the TFEU, 2012; “Single Market Act”, 2018). Therefore, no propositions are formulated on the basis of economic identity either.

Therefore, only political identity, which centres on “the commitment of individuals and groups to particular political institutions” functions as fundament for formulating a proposition as stemming from ideational liberalism in this thesis (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 527).

### ***3.4.1.1 A proposition based on ideational liberalism as reflected in political identity***

In order to analyse the political commitment within society, the political ideology of parties could be brought into focus. A political ideology could be defined as a systematic dividing of the “political, economic and social goals and values of political actors” (Hofmann, 2012, p. 15) and the translation of these values in preferred policies. Hofmann (2012) considered that a political ideology finds their origin within a “value system” in which the values are reflective of the “desirable” (p. 15). The values provide guidance to the implementation of political practices and the most principal values mark the red lines. Based on this definition of political ideology, Hofmann (2012) stated that “ideologies are empirically ascertainable attitudes and preferences towards political issues” (p. 15). In order to explain the national foreign policy of EU member states towards Russia, as stemming from political identity, this thesis analyses the ideology of political parties within EU member states towards the West (anti/pro). In examining this political ideology, the focus is directed as those components of the ideology that make either direct or indirect reference to Russia.

Proposition I based on ideational liberalism as stemming from political identity:

Based on ideational liberalism, a proposition could be formulated that foreign policy of EU member states towards Russia springs from the political identity of the citizens, which is reflected within the ideological viewpoints towards Russia of the governing parties.

### **3.4.2 Commercial liberalism**

Commercial liberalism presumes that the economic interconnectedness is of influence on the presence or absence of coercive behaviour among states (Moravscik, 1997). The linkage between economic interdependence and peace could broadly be explained via three set of reasonings (Mansfield & Pollins, 2001). Firstly, intensive economic exchanges have changed the cost/benefit rhetoric of the implementation of coercive measures (Moravscik, 1997; Kaysen, 1990). Kaysen (1990) outlined that fighting wars had become more expensive due to industrialisation and it led to loss of resources, among those that could have generated economic development. On the benefit side, Kaysen (1990) put question marks to the retrieval of long-term economic advantages following a hostile occupation. The second linkage between economic interdependence and trade takes place on the level of social connection (Mansfield

& Pollins, 2001). Finally, societal actors, who rely on foreign economic relations, demand their government to abstain from the use of coercive measures. The government strives to listen to these pressures to stay in office and to foster national economic development in their country.

According to Keohane (1990), a nuance should be put to the relation between economic interconnectedness and peace in order to avoid a commercial liberalist depiction of a fully harmonious international political system. Based on his interpretation of the work by Staley (1939), Keohane (1990) considered that commerce does not automatically create peace, though it could occur in an open international domain with regulations and rules. According to Ikenberry (2018), the Western liberal order (to which Europe belongs) provided a “vision of open and loosely rules-based order” (p. 8) and maintained liberal democracy as its core pillar. Although Ikenberry (2018) outlined that the liberal order might need to be redefined in light of the current day issues, the author did not provide a concrete new definition, except for his consideration that international liberalism should embrace social democracy, solidarity and non-Western democracies. Since it is too early to say how the ‘new’ international liberal order will be within its most concrete form, this thesis will follow Ikenberry’s initial definition. This perception falls within the scope of an international environment that creates a potential for peaceful coexistence on the basis of commerce, following the interpretation of Staley (1939) by Keohane (1990).

#### ***3.4.2.1 A proposition based on commercial liberalism as mirrored in the linkage between economic interdependence and peace***

In order to explain the national foreign policy of EU member states towards Russia as grounded in commercial liberalism, trade linkages between the EU countries and Russia are the central issue under analysis. It is assumed that economic interdependence increases the possibility for peaceful engagement (declines the potential for the use of coercive measures), which in this thesis is designated as the presence of an anti-Western ideological rhetoric. To determine whether considerations based on trade linkages explain the potential for peaceful engagement, this thesis uses data on economic interdependence as starting point and analyses the economic effects related to the implemented sanctions.

Proposition II based on commercial liberalism as reflected in trade linkages:

Based on commercial liberalism, a proposition could be formulated that foreign policy of EU member states towards Russia stems from the degree of commercial interdependence. Economic interdependence increases the potential for peaceful co-existence (reduces the likelihood of applying coercive measures) within an international liberal order.

## 4. Research Method

*The previous chapter outlined that the research question of this thesis is theoretically approached via an analysis of the political ideology of EU member states towards Russia (ideational liberalism) and via a study of the (changing) trade relations between the EU countries and Russia (commercial liberalism) in light of the imposed sanction regime. The fourth chapter explains which specific research method is applied and why.*

### 4.1 A case study research design

Research methods can broadly be divided in “large-N studies” (Blatter and Haverland, 2012, p. 1) and “small-N research designs” (p. 6). As the quantity of cases encompassed by a small-N analysis is limited, the cases could be studied within a detailed manner. This creates the essential advantage to “reflect intensively on the relationship between empirical observation and abstract concepts” (Blatter and Haverland, 2012, p. 144). In this thesis, a case study research design is applied and the justification for choosing this research method stems principally from the thesis’ central objective.

The first reason for choosing a case study search design is derived from the perspective of Yin (2009). In his explanation for why a case study could be chosen as research method, Yin (2009) contrasted the method to four others principal ways of doing research. The table shown by Yin (2009) is displayed in Figure 5 to provide a systematic overview of the principal differences between the five methods of research. Following

METHOD	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Form of Research Question	Requires Control of Behavioral Events?	Focuses on Contemporary Events?
Experiment	how, why?	yes	yes
Survey	who, what, where, how many, how much?	no	yes
Archival Analysis	who, what, where, how many, how much?	no	yes/no
History	how, why?	no	no
Case Study	how, why?	no	yes

*Figure 5. “Relevant situation for different research methods” (Yin, 2009, p. 8)*

the viewpoint of Yin (2009), a case study is most suitable when (1) the research question follows a relatively high explanatory format (e.g. how, why?), (2) it is not needed to account for control variables and (3) the focus of the research is directed at current affairs. The three crucial characteristics (conditions) of a case study research method could be brought in line with the research objective of this thesis at hand. Firstly, despite the fact that this thesis research question

does not start with either ‘how?’ or ‘why’, its aims to explain an empirical phenomenon by asking ‘does (...) or (...) better explain (...)?’ This in contrast to questions that are more exploratory (e.g. ‘what’) or ones that are either descriptive or predictive (e.g. ‘what’, ‘who’, ‘where’, ‘how many’, ‘how much’). Secondly, as this thesis analyses national foreign policy that has been decided on, it is simply impossible to manipulate (control) the variable under study, i.e. the past behaviour of the decision-makers. Thirdly, the focus is directed at providing an understanding of a contemporary (as opposite to a historical) empirical phenomenon. The second reason for applying a case study research method is that the focus on a small number of cases generates the possibility to apply complex theories as it creates the opportunity to collect the detailed data needed to empirically test the theories (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). Since this thesis strives to answer the research question using the theoretical framework of ideational liberalism and commercial liberalism, a case study design method is perceived as most suitable.

#### **4.1.1 Distinctive case study designs**

Blatter and Haverland (2012) outlined that within a case study design three ways of doing explanatory research are perceivable, each possessing their own principal research objective. The first research approach within a case study design is the “co-variational approach” (COV) (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 23). This approach has the essential objective to evaluate which independent factor contributed most evidently to the occurrence of a phenomenon. The second perspective is the “causal-process tracing approach” (CPT) (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 24). which brings the outcome to the foreground and aims to lay its finger on the process that created the specific outcome. A crucial difference between the CPT and the COV is that the CPT perceives the factors as creating a *cumulative* effect, whereas the COV treats the factors as *independent* forces. The final viewpoint that could be practised is the “congruence analysis approach” (CON)” (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 24). Instead of laying the emphasis on either the independent factor or the outcome, the CON strives to generate new insights to the apparent theoretical discourses. As this thesis aims to make an academic contribution via evaluating whether national foreign policy is rooted in either ideational liberalism or commercial liberalism, this thesis applies a case study design following the CON. In the following section a closer look is taken at how the CON is put into practice.

### **4.1.2 Applying a CON**

Within the CON, different theories are positioned against each other to determine which theory is best capable of explaining an empirical state of affair (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). Since both ideational liberalism and commercial liberalism provide a distinctive understanding of national foreign policy-making, this thesis has the principal objective to analyse which liberalist variant *better* explain the national foreign outlook of EU member states to Russia. In consequence, this thesis is guided by a “competing theories approach”, rather than a “complementary theories approach” (Blatter and Haverland, 2012, p. 145). In order to evaluate the explanatory capability of the distinctive theories, the CON applies a two-step analysis. The first step entails the narrowing down of broad theories to specific propositions and the second step encompass the testing of the formulated propositions in their accordance with explaining the empirical affairs. The theory which presents the set of predictions that are mostly in line with the actual phenomena has the highest explanatory capability.

## **4.2 Case selection**

Blatter and Haverland (2012) outlined that when using a CON, the case selection occurs within the most ideal situation after the theories have been put forward and the propositions have been deduced. Blatter and Blume (2008) took a firmer viewpoint on this issue, as they stated that “the selection of cases within a CON approach is theory-driven” (p. 346). The selection of EU member states within this thesis follows from the political ideology of EU countries towards Russia (as grounded in ideational liberalism) and the degree of economic interdependence between the member state and Russia (as emanated from commercial liberalism).

### **4.2.1 Political ideology of EU member states towards Russia**

To evaluate the political ideology of EU countries regarding Russia, this thesis follows the study in a policy brief for the *European Council on Foreign Affairs* by Gressel (2017a; 2017b). Following an own conducted survey, Gressel (2017a, 2017b) categorized 181 European and national political parties based on their perception towards the West. Essential to underline is that Gressel (2017b) based his study on “ideological affinities” (p. 3) and *not* on political policies. The author explained this choice by stating that “ideology and domestic communication are used to rally supporters, mobilise the electorate, and attract members and donors, ideology and domestic signalling reveals much more about the mood and attitudes of the political, social, and economic groups the parties represent in those countries” (Gressel,

2017b, p. 3). Gressel (2017b) assessed the ideological standpoints of the political parties towards the West based on twelve questions which were evaluated by researchers during the period January 2017 and March 2017. Table 1 shows the topics of the twelve question that were included in the survey and the respective pro-Westerns and (radical) anti-Western political party approaches.

<b>Topic:</b>	<b>Pro-Western political party approach</b>	<b>(radical) Anti-Western political party approach</b>
1. <i>“The ‘finality’ of the EU”</i>	Advocates European integration, including enlargement	Opposes a supranational EU, could even encompass view of stopping the EU or leaving the EU
2. <i>“Liberalism as a European value”</i>	Accepts this and the “ideological heritage of the enlightenment”	Refuses this, as it is “Anglo-Saxon” or even “elitist”
3. <i>“Secularism as a European value”</i>	Accepts this, in order to distance from “religious bigotry”	Refuses this, as “Christian roots” are crucial, could even fear for ‘invasion by other religions
4. <i>“European security order”</i>	Advocates this, as security should be provided by the EU and NATO	Refuses this, as it is more open towards “Russia and other authoritarian systems”, could even prioritize this and put a halt to existence of NATO
5. <i>“Transatlantic relations” (with President Trump)</i>	Support this, notwithstanding Trump as “anti-Western president”	Opposes this, could support a “Trumpian or Bannonist worldview” instead
6. <i>“Free trade and globalisation”</i>	Advocates an open economy and international organisations in this regard	Advocates a more closed economy and “national workers and trade union rights” in this perspective
7. <i>“Relations with Russia”</i>	Perceives Russia a “revisionist power”	Considers Russia a “‘normal’ great power”, or even “strategic partner”
8. <i>“Sanctions on Russia”</i>	Advocates continuation of sanctions	Opposes continuation of sanctions
9. <i>“Support for Ukraine”</i>	Yes, “as long as Ukraine is committed to Westernisation”	No, “Moscow’s interests” precedes self-determination
10. <i>“Refugees and migration”</i>	Perceives this an EU responsibility	Perceives this as threat to Europe
11. <i>“War in Syria”</i>	Perceives that a representative government is needed in Syria	Considers that Syria can “only be ruled with an iron fist”, advocates involvement of Russia
12. <i>“Party’s links to Russia”</i>	Abstains from engagement with Russia, “and/or they support Russian civil society and opposition movement”	Strives after closer connections with the Kremlin

**Table 1.** The topics of the twelve questions included in the survey done by Gressel (2017b) and the corresponding pro-Westerns and (radical) anti-Western political party approaches (p. 2, 3)

Gressel (2017b) underlined that an anti-Western party is not automatically in favour of Russia. Though, he included questions within his survey that “directly relate to Russia” (see questions on “relations with Russia”, “sanctions on Russia”, “party’s links to Russia” in Table 1) and that “indirectly relate to Russia” (see questions on “European security order”, “support for Ukraine” and “the war in Syria” in Table 1) (Gressel, 2017b, p. 4). The findings of Gressel (2017b) showed that the party outlook on “relations with Russia” had a correlation with the party perspectives on “sanctions on Russia” and “support for Ukraine.” Though, the question on “relations with Russia” had the strongest correlations with questions on “European security order”, “transatlantic relations” and “free trade and globalisation.” These latter correlations insinuate that a political party who maintains a rather opposing view towards Russia, advocates a continuation of the sanctions, supports the transatlantic engagement and prefers an open economy. Vice versa, a political party that possesses a ‘Russian-friendly’ outlook, advocates a stop to the execution of the sanctions, distances itself from the US and is inclined towards a more closed economy. Gressel (2017) found as well that question on “relations with Russia” correlated, although slightly weaker, with questions on “the ‘finality’ of the EU” and “the war in Syria.” In consequence, as the survey by Gressel (2017a; 2017b) included question that either directly or indirectly relate to Russia and that there are distinctive correlations to be found between “pro-Russian stances on individual items and anti-Western attitudes” (Gressel 2017b, p. 5), this thesis treats an anti-Western rhetoric as a perspective *open* towards Russia. In addition, it considers a political ideology open towards Russia as providing the fundament for potential peaceful behaviour towards Russia.

Country	National index	Approach
<i>Hungary</i>	-9,32	Relatively most anti-Western approach
<i>Austria</i>	-6,39	
<i>Greece</i>	-5,74	
<i>Slovak Republic</i>	-4,71	
<i>Bulgaria</i>	-3,8	
<i>Netherlands</i>	9,33	Relatively most pro-Western approach
<i>Portugal</i>	11,12	
<i>United Kingdom</i>	11,84	
<i>Slovenia</i>	16,32	
<i>Estonia</i>	16,58	

**Table 2.** The ten countries possessing relatively the most anti-/pro-Western approach following the national index by Gressel (2017a, 2017b)

Of special relevance considering this thesis' aim is that Gressel (2017b) established a national index of political party outlooks. This index is based on the influence the parties have in their national parliament and creates the possibility to make a cross-country comparison. The national index varied from “Anti-Western Stalwarts” (Gressel, 2017a, p. 5) to the “Resilient Rest” (Gressel, 2017a, p. 8). Following this national index, Hungary, Austria, Greece Slovakia and Bulgaria have the most anti-Western national political systems, whereas Estonia, Slovenia, the UK, Portugal and the Netherlands have the most pro-Western national parliaments (see Table 2).

#### 4.2.2 Degree of economic interdependence between EU member states and Russia

In order to examine the trade linkages between the countries positioned on the extreme side of Gressel (2017b) national index and Russia, the sum of the import from and export to Russia concerning all products is calculated in percentage of GDP on the basis of data from *WITS World Bank* (see Table 3, and for more elaborated calculation see Table 17 and 18 in appendix). The year 2014 is chosen as in this year the EU member states implemented the sanctions towards Russia.


Country	National index (Gressel, 2017)	Sum import (US\$) from and export to Russia (all products) in percentage of GDP (current US\$)
<i>Hungary</i>	-9,32	7,24%
<i>Austria</i>	-6,39	1,20%
<i>Greece</i>	-5,74	2,92%
<i>Slovak Republic</i>	-4,71	9,22%
<i>Bulgaria</i>	-3,8	10,54%
<i>Netherlands</i>	9,33	3,69%
<i>Portugal</i>	11,12	0,53%
<i>United Kingdom</i>	11,84	0,56%
<i>Slovenia</i>	16,32	4,02%
<i>Estonia</i>	16,58	17,68%

**Table 3.** The sum import (US\$) from and export to Russia (all products) in percentage of GDP (World Bank Group, n.d.) of the ten countries possessing relatively the most anti-/pro-Western approach following the national index by Gressel (2017a, 2017b)

### **4.2.3 Case selection based on political ideology and degree of economic interdependence**

Blatter and Haverland (2012) explained that the cruciality of cases stem from the likelihood the formulated expectations (propositions) based on the theories are in line with the empirical phenomenon under study. On the basis of this outlook, Blatter and Haverland (2012) named two publications that are being considered as important: one research which rejected a highly likely case and one other study which confirmed a very unlikely case. Considering the fundamental position the IR paradigm of liberalism has within the field of IR, this thesis conducts the selection of cases on the basis of the rhetoric of 'least likeliness'. This implies that this thesis does *not* chose those EU countries which possess a national foreign policy in line with the formulated propositions, i.e. countries who are relatively highly economic interdependent with Russia and behave in a rather 'peaceful' way with Russia (in this thesis anti-Western) and vice versa. Instead, this thesis chooses those countries that maintain relatively high trade linkages with Russia, while engaging in relatively less peaceful behaviour towards Russia (in this thesis pro-Western) and/or countries that are relatively less economic interdependent with Russia, while act peacefully (anti-Western) to Russia. Most ideally, if the unlikely cases both confirm the formulated propositions, this thesis would make an important contribution to the theoretical discourse by giving substance to the fundamental status of liberalism within IR.

When projecting this thought upon Figure 6, which shows the relation between the five extreme anti-/pro-Western countries and their trade linkages with Russia, the EU countries Estonia and Austria capture the attention. In consequence, in order to test the explanatory capabilities of both ideational liberalism and commercial liberalism with regard to the national foreign policy of EU member states towards Russia, this thesis uses Estonia and Austria as cases following the rhetoric of 'least likeliness'. Though, as underlined by Blatter and Haverland (2012), the findings of the research ultimately decide whether cases are crucial or not in light of the already present literature.



**Figure 6.** The sum import (US\$) from and export to Russia (all products) in percentage of GDP (World Bank Group, n.d.) of the ten countries possessing relatively the most anti-/pro-Western approach in relation to the national index by Gressel (2017a, 2017b)

### 4.3 Validity of the research design

Kellstedt and Whitten (2009) referred to the validity of a research design by arguing that “a valid measure accurately represents the concept that it is supposed to measure” (p. 94). The concept of validity has two edges: “internal validity” and “external validity” (Kellstedt and Whitten, 2013, p. 89). Yin (2009) outlined that the internal validity focuses on securing the causal relationship between the studied variables and external validity concentrates on the possibly to make claims about cases other than the ones analysed.

#### 4.3.1 Internal validity

In a CON the “epistemological relativism” (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 146) is secured via a vertical and horizontal control component. The vertical control element encompasses the formulation of concrete theoretical propositions and the application of these to empirical, as explained previously. The horizontal control part entails the evaluation of the explanatory capabilities of one theory *relative* to a different theory. The horizontal and vertical controls lay down the two ‘hinders’ a theory needs to overcome in order to be identified as the

theory that possesses the most explanatory capabilities. Blatter and Haverland (2012) stressed the use of at least two distinctive theories, in which it is possible to examine distinctive theories belonging to the same paradigm. The number of distinctive theories chosen in the end, is contingent on the value attached by the researcher to either the vertical or horizontal way of control.

#### **4.3.2 External validity**

Within a CON, it is not possible to generalize the results to a “population of similar cases” (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 197). Instead, the generalization of findings are the implications for the theoretical discourse. Within this thesis, the external validity entails the consequences of the research findings for the (hegemonic) place of liberalism in the theoretical discussion.

#### **4.4 Reliability of the research design**

A research can be defined as reliable when a person taking the exact same ‘research path’ as the researcher followed, receives similar results (Yin, 2009). In order to secure reliability, Yin (2009) suggested to “make as many steps as operational as possible and to conduct research as if someone were always looking over your shoulder” (p. 45). Blatter and Blume (2009) explained that within a CON the reliability is strived after as the formulation of the theoretical predictions precedes the analysis of the empirical phenomena.

#### **4.5 Data collection**

In order to test the two formulated predictions empirically within a case study design, this thesis uses a variety of sources. This variety is highlighted by Yin (2009) as one of the crucial principles of conducting case study research. To evaluate the first prediction, this thesis will use documentation, one of the ways to retrieve information as identified by Yin (2009). The documentation covers the period from the start of the violence in Ukraine in 2014 until most recent texts published in 2018 as the enforcement of the EU sanctions (and Russia’s countermeasures) continued. The thesis will analyse statements made by distinctive individual political elites published on official state-owned websites or cited in newsletters, such as *Politico* and *EUobserver*. In addition, the thesis examines individual political party programmes, the document *Basic Principles of the Government Coalition*, a foreign policy report and the findings of the study by Gressel (2017a; 2017b). Additional information about individual party outlook has been retrieved via interviews, another source of information named

by Yin (2009). These interviews occurred via e-mail correspondence with representatives from the distinctive political parties in which the principal question was asked if the representatives could describe the party's outlooks upon seven established focus points (see Figure 7) derived from the study by Gressel (2017a; 2017b). Whereas most of the representatives shared information related to the focus points, one representative sent in addition a document about the party's outlooks and one other representative shared just a document containing information about the party's viewpoints. With regard to the evaluation of the second prediction grounded in economic interdependence, this thesis uses the recognized information source by Yin (2009) of archival records. It examines statistics on GDP and foreign trade provided by *WITS World Bank* and *UN Comtrade*. It includes data from the year before the violent occurrences in 2014 until a few years after the outbreak of the violence.

## 5. Empirical Analysis

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*The preceding chapter explained that this thesis follows a case study research design in which it conducts a CON. In the fifth chapter propositions deduced from the liberalist variants are being applied to Estonia's and Austria's national approach towards Russia in light of the EU collective sanction regime. The principal objective hereby is to determine whether the factors underpinning the national foreign policies can best be captured by ideational liberalism or commercial liberalism.*

### 5.1 The political ideology towards Russia in practice

On the basis of political identity, an ideational liberalist proposition has been formulated that assumes that national foreign policy-making is determined by political ideology. In order to evaluate this proposition, the political ideology towards Russia is evaluated. As explained in the previous chapter, the selection of cases is partially based on the political ideology as set out in the national index of Gressel (2017a, 2017b). Since Gressel (2017a, 2017b) conducted his survey during the period January 2017-March 2017, the ideology of the political parties that were part of the national government that time, are being analysed. In order to secure that the scope of attention is narrowed down to those components of the foreign outlooks that clarify the viewpoints towards Russia, the topics Gressel (2017a; 2017b) identified as maintaining a direct focus on Russia (relations with Russia, the sanctions and the party linkages) and indirect (security order, support for Ukraine)<sup>3</sup>, are taken as focus point within the analysis of the political ideologies. Though, as referred to in the methodology chapter, the results of Gressel (2017b) showed distinctive correlations between the question capturing the relations with Russia and other questions (see section 4.2.1). Several of the previous named topics were included in these correlations. However, as the topics transatlantic relations and European integration were part of the correlations as well, these subjects are additionally recognized as focus point.<sup>4</sup> Figure 7 shows all the seven focus points that will be used in the analysis of the political ideologies. In addition to using the seven topics as focus points in the study of the party outlooks upon Russia, the “item values” determined by Gressel (2017b, p. 4) of the seven issues are shown for each

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<sup>3</sup> “War in Syria” indirectly relates to Russia as well. However, as this thesis aims to explain the national foreign policymaking *in light of* the EU sanction regime, “war in Syria” is not a focus point.

<sup>4</sup> “War in Syria” correlates as well with “relations with Russia”, though following the explanation given in the previous note, the Syrian war is not a focus point. In addition, “free trade and globalisation” correlates with “relations with Russia”, though as this analysis focuses on *political identity* (in contrast to *economic identity*), “free trade and globalisation” is not a focus point.


individual party and both countries. These values range from -3 (or even -4), which reflects the extreme anti-Western position, to +3, which is illustrative for the extreme pro-Western position.

- 
- “The ‘finality’ of the EU”
  - “Views on the European security order”
  - “Views on transatlantic relations”
  - “Relations with Russia”
  - “Sanctions on Russia”
  - “Support for Ukraine”
  - “The party’s links to Russia”

*Figure 7. The seven focus points in analysing the political ideology towards Russia as derived from Gressel (2017b, p. 2, 3)*

## **5.2 The economic interdependence with Russia in practice**

A commercial liberalist proposition has been formulated that presupposes that economic interdependence increases the potential for peaceful engagement between countries. In order to evaluate this proposition, the degree of economic interdependence between the EU countries and Russia in 2014 is taken as starting point, followed by a closer look on the changes in the trade relations. The EU sanctions towards Russia brought especially implications for the involved economies when the Council carried out economic measurements in July 2014 and Russia decided to implement countermeasures (European Council, 2014c; Medvedev, 2014; Giumelli, 2017). A manner to shed light on the economic impact of the sanction regime is to examine statistics on export since the flows of export are directly influenced by the implemented sanctions (Giumelli, 2017). In addition, exports are indicative for the linkages present among countries. Moreover, as the sanctions under analysis are targeting specific components of the involved economies, the examination of statistics on export provide the opportunity to analyse the effects of the sanctions along the line of economic constituents. The analysis of the trade linkages in this thesis does not include trade diversion as a response to the implemented sanctions, nor indirect economic multipliers of the sanction regime. One essential remark needs to make concerning the analysis of the export data. The changes in export towards Russia cannot be solely attributed to the EU sanctions (Moret et al., 2016). Other factors that have been recognized as playing a detrimental role are the decline in the oil price and the weakening of the Russian economy (see Figure 8).



**Figure 8.** The GDP of Russia in current US \$ (Trillion) for the period 2002-2016 (World Bank Group, n.d.)

Despite the fact that the EU sanctions might not only explain the changes in the export to Russia, Giumelli (2017) pointed to the difficulty to isolate the economic consequences of the sanctions<sup>5</sup>, a viewpoint repeated by Moret et al. (2016). A possible solution to this is the application of theoretical models capable to isolate the economic consequences of the sanctions, such as the Gravity Model used in a study requested by the Committee on International Trade of the European Parliament. However, as this thesis aims to draw conclusions based on data most in line with real state of affairs, it will follow the export statistics rather than a theoretical model and speaks of the economic losses *related* to the EU imposed sanction regime, rather than *as a consequence of*.

### 5.3 Case study I: Estonia

#### 5.3.1 Estonia as member of the EU and NATO

Estonia became a member of the EU in 2004 and joined the Schengen three years later (“Estonia”, 2018). In addition, Estonia has been part of the Eurozone since the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2011. For Estonia, the road to EU membership was a rather bumpy one (Ehin, 2013). After the regime of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) fell, Estonia had to structure their society from the fundamentals onwards. Since the Baltic states were closely located to the centre of the USSR regime, they were hit hard by the chaos that was set in motion after the collapse

<sup>5</sup> Giumelli (2017) does not treat the EU sanctions and the Russian countermeasures as independent from each other.

of the regime. The fact that Estonia neighboured Russia over a 334-kilometer border did not put the country in a positive daylight for receiving a possible future EU or North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) membership. Moreover, EU countries did not have any knowledge about Estonia, except for defining it a “former Soviet republic” (Ehin, 2013, p. 218). Though, Ehin (2013) underlined that these challenges did not refrain Estonia from continuing the way to EU membership. Estonia worked hard, and with success, to meet the annexation criteria and strived to overcome the negative label attached to post-Soviet countries. It ran a propaganda with the essential aim to spread a positive image about the country. Only shortcomings in administrative capabilities and expertise caused impediments.

When Estonia celebrated their 10<sup>th</sup> year inside the EU, the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed the positive effects of EU membership for Estonia (“Estonia – Ten Years in the European Union”, 2014). The Ministry praised the Schengen, the growth in national stability and the economic development that followed from the country’s entrance to the EU. In addition, they are thankful for the fact that the EU is a platform for Estonia to led its voice hear. Finally, they recognized that there is more trust among the members of the EU, which contributed to more efficiency and fostered progress inside the EU. The Ministry acknowledged as well that being a member of the EU calls for constant process of work, in which responsibility and a proactive approach is demanded from the members. According to the Ministry, Estonia has built up the capacity to declare their viewpoints in those areas that are deemed crucial to the country.

In the same year as Estonia became an official member of the EU, it was included as member to NATO (“Estonia and NATO”, 2017). This marked the realization of an essential objective within the domain of (international) security and defence. Already before it became a formal member of NATO, Estonia helped in NATO’s military missions, such as Afghanistan in 2003 and Kosovo in 1999. When Estonia was formally included to NATO, it continued with providing support to NATO’s missions. Essential to underline is that in 2017 Estonia was one the few countries that met the desired objective by NATO to direct at minimum of 2% of the GDP to defence resources (“Defence Expenditure of NATO countries”, 2017).

### **5.3.2 Estonia’s reaction upon the Ukraine crisis and the EU’s collective sanction regime towards Russia**


In response to the outbreak of the protests in Kiev on the 18<sup>th</sup> of February 2014, the then Estonian President Thomas Hendrik Ilves demanded the parties involved within the conflict to stop their violent actions and urged them to find common ground via peaceful means (The

Office of the President, February 18<sup>th</sup>, 2014). In a similar vein the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Urmas Paet declared his opposing view to the violence within Ukraine and underlined that Estonia would be willing to implement measures targeting the people that bear the responsibility to the conflict (Republic of Estonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014, February 19<sup>th</sup>). The imposition of measures directed to the responsible individuals was repeated by Ilves on the 20<sup>th</sup> of February 2014, to which he added that the EU must act within the Ukraine crisis giving full adherence to the EU's values (The Office of the President, February 20<sup>th</sup>, 2014). In March 2018, the current Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sven Misker proclaimed that Estonia continues to support the EU sanction regime, hereby making direct reference to the non-accomplishment of the Minsk Agreement (Republic of Estonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018, March 20<sup>th</sup>).

### **5.3.3 The national foreign policy of Estonia towards Russia as grounded in ideational liberalism or commercial liberalism**

#### ***5.3.3.1 Applying proposition I as grounded in the political ideology of Estonia's government towards Russia***

The Riigikogu is the national legislative power of Estonia, which seats 101 elected individuals during a period of four years ("What is Riigikogu?", 2016). In the case not one individual political party receives a majority of 51 seats within the Riigikogu, the government is formed out of distinctive factions, which exist out of people belonging to the same political party ("What is Riigikogu?", 2016; "Factions", 2017). As shown in Figure 9, the current XIII Riigikogu is composed of six different factions, following the national elections of 2015 ("Riigikogu (Parliamentary) Elections", n.d.; "Factions", 2017). Two seats within the Riigikogu belong to individuals who do not participate in any factions ("Factions", 2017).



**Figure 9.** The division of XIII Riigikogu (“Factions”, 2017)

After the national elections held in 2015, a coalition agreement was established between the Reform Party (RP), the Social Democratic Party (SDE) and the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL)<sup>6</sup> (King, 2016). However, in November 2016, the coalition fell apart when the opinion of SDE and IRL was no longer in line with the outlook of the RP (Cooper, 2017). *EUObserver* noted that the viewpoints differentiated on the subject of economic policies and *Politico* outlined that they disagreed as well in their educational, social and regional outlook (“New three-party centre-left government in Estonia”, 2016; King, 2016). The new government included the Centre Party (CP), the SDE and the IRL (“New three-party centre-left government in Estonia”, 2016). Jüri Ratas, member of the CP, became Prime Minister on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of November 2016 (Republic of Estonia Government, n.d.). The new coalition partner CP has been termed a “friend of the Kremlin” and received support from the Russian ethnic minority living in Estonia (Cooper, 2017; King, 2016). On the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2016 approximately 25% of total inhabitants living in Estonia belonged to the Russian ethnic minority (“Population by ethnic nationality”, 2017). Around 70 per cent of the Russians living in Estonia declared their support to the CP during the 2015 national elections (Hyndle-Hussein, 2015). The RP proclaimed that Estonia’s behaviour would incline more towards Russia, a statement which was

<sup>6</sup> In May 2018, the party name has been shortened to Pro Patria (*Isamaa*) (“Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL) changes party name”, May 6<sup>th</sup>, 2018). However, as this thesis is focused on the period before May 2018, it uses the previous party name.

disregarded by the leading representative of the SDL (Cooper, 2017). In order to bring light in this disputation of perceptions, the following section analyses the individual outlooks of the CP, the SDE and the IRL towards Russia and their collective Russia approach for 2016-2019. In addition, the item values by Gressel (2017a; 2017b) are shown.

#### *5.3.3.1.1 The political ideology of the SDE towards Russia*

The SDE was formally established in 1990 out of a fusion of four distinctive political parties (“Social Democratic Party Faction”, 2018). The party maintains a left-wing perspective, though on a moderate basis. It considers that it is the principal responsibility of the state to look after the economy, (social) security, education and the (social) environment. Concerning the party’s outlook upon Russia, following the established seven focus points (see Figure 7), information has been acquired via email correspondence with Madis Roodla, who is a counsellor to the current Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sven Mikser. The SDE maintains a positive outlook on the first focus point of the EU’s political integration process. It perceives the enlargement of the EU as well as a way to strengthen the EU’s economic influence. Concerning the perspective upon the security provision, it discerns the EU of principal importance for generating financial security and NATO for presenting hard security. The SDE prefers to foster cooperation with both organisations within the realm of security. Regarding the outlook upon the political relations between Estonia and the US, the SDE appreciates the valuable engagement between the two countries. When focusing on the fourth focus point, the perception upon ties with Russia, the party maintains the principal viewpoint that partnership between Estonia and Russia could exist within the future on the condition that Russia puts an end to its aggressive behaviour. The SDE underlines in this regard the importance of a world order that is grounded in established rules. When centred on the outlook upon the imposed sanction regime towards Russia, the SDE is advocative of this initiative and is satisfied to see its considerable effectiveness. Concerning the vision upon providing support to Ukraine, the SDE implicitly sides with Ukraine by stating that Russia should put a halt to its aggressive practices. With regard to the final focus point, the presence of linkages among the SDE and Kremlin, the party outlines that it abstains from moving in the direction of Kremlin as long as Russia violates international law.

Gressel (2017a; 2017b) identified the SDE as a pro-western political party and placed it on the 171th position on his political party index, ranging from most anti-Western political party (1<sup>st</sup> position) to most pro-Western political party (181th position). Table 4 shows the SDE’s value items Gressel (2017b) attached to the seven focus points on the basis of his study.

As explained previously, the values differ from -3 (or even -4) to +3, in which the first marks the extreme anti-Western position and the latter is representative for the extreme pro-Western position

	“The ‘finality’ of the EU”	“Views on the European security order”	“Views on transatlantic relations”	“Relations with Russia”	“Sanctions on Russia”	“Support for Ukraine”	“The party’s links to Russia”
SDE	2	3	2	2	2	2	2

**Table 4.** The value items for SDE as derived from Gressel (2017b, p. 2, 3)

*5.3.3.1.2 The political ideology of the CP towards Russia*

The CP was formed in 1991 and originated from the Estonian Popular Front (“Our History”, 2017). The CP, as its name expresses, positions a place in the middle of the ideological spectrum present in the national parliament (“Estonian Centre Party Faction”, 2018). The CP advocates the presence of a social market economy and strives to create an equalitarian society via a tax system on progressive basis (“Party Platform”, 2017). In addition, it raises its voice for Estonia as nation of inclusion and values the ecology highly. With regards to the CP perspective towards Russia, keeping the seven identified focus points in mind (see Figure 7), the CP advocates the entrance of new countries to the EU, following the Copenhagen Criteria. Concerning the second focus point, the perception towards European security provision, the party favours the initiatives of the EU and advocates intensive collaboration between the EU and NATO within the realm of defence. The CP hereby proclaims that 2% of the GDP needs to be reserved for defence resources. The third focus point, that addresses the viewpoint towards the US, is absent within the foreign policy outlook of the CP. Regarding the focus point of the party’s perspective upon relations with Russia, the CP considers that economic, cultural and environmental engagement with Russia, guided by core human and European values, is fruitful to secure stability within the democracy and to foster international relations. The CP does not specifically name their viewpoint upon the implemented sanction regime, nor do they frame an opinion about supporting Ukraine. Though, one component that is included in their vision and that could be related to Ukraine is their strive for stability within the EU’s neighbourhood. The party does not name possible connections between the party and Russia within their foreign policy outlook.

However, with regard to the latter component it essential to note is that the previous leader of the CP, Edgar Savisaar, who declared his support to the Crimea annexation, agreed on a protocol with Vladimir Putin’s party United Russia in 2004 (Martyn-Hemphill, 2016; Nielsen, 2015). The protocol determined the initiation of committees covering the domains such as culture and economy (Gunter, 2004). In addition, it centred on bilateral engagement and it was aimed at fostering linkages among the political party members. Savisaar advocated the protocol on the ground that it would be to the benefit of Estonia’s preferred stakes in Russia. However, the current elite of the CP, the Prime Minister and Chairman of the party Jüri Ratas, and the Deputy Chairman Mallis Reps, both stated that no actions have followed from the protocol and as the protocol is not in-working, it is not going to be officially put to an end (Cavegn, 2017; Vahtla, 2016). Reps explained that the Russian ethnic minority attaches symbolic value to the protocol (Vahtla, 2016). This could be related to the consideration that the protocol was a way for the CP to win votes among the Russian minority (Gunter, 2004; Cavegn, 2017). However, Ratas firmly underlined that the protocol’s status will remain ‘off’, as long as Russia keeps abstaining from adhering to international law, hereby referring to the Ukraine crisis (Martyn-Hemphill, 2016).

Gressel (2017a) designated the CP as a “moderate pro-Western” political party (p. 11) and put it on the 64<sup>th</sup> position on the list numbering 181 political parties. Table 5 demonstrates the CP’s items value for each of the seven focus points.

	“The ‘finality’ of the EU”	“Views on the European security order”	“Views on transatlantic relations”	“Relations with Russia”	“Sanctions on Russia”	“Support for Ukraine”	“The party’s links to Russia”
CP	1	- <sup>7</sup>	1	-	0	1	-2

**Table 5.** The value items for CP as derived from Gressel (2017b, p. 2, 3)

#### 5.3.3.1.3 The political ideology of the IRL towards Russia

The IRL was founded in 2006 and was the outcome of a merger between the political parties Pro Patria Union and Res Publica (“Our History”, 2018). The IRL possesses a right-wing and conservative perspective (“Isamaa Faction”, 2018). The IRL supports the market economy

<sup>7</sup> For particular political parties Gressel (2017b) was not able to determine the item value “as none of the researchers was able to judge the respective party’s position on an item – because it is not discussed in that party or not discussed at all in that particular nation” (p. 5).

and the entrepreneurial spirit (“Our Policies”, 2018). In addition, it lays the principal responsibility in the hands of the Estonian citizen to determine over their own life. With regard to their foreign policy outlook of IRL towards Russia bearing the seven focus points in mind (see Figure 7), information has been acquired via e-mail correspondence with Veiko Lukmann, who is the contact for international affairs of the political party. Regarding the first focus point, the viewpoint taken towards the integration process of the EU, the IRL stresses that there should be prospect for cooperation between the EU and its neighbours. However, the IRL perceives that the EU is currently not strong enough for coping with the inclusion of new EU member states due to internal challenges and ones related to the EU’s neighbourhood. Concerning the outlook upon security issued by Europa, the IRL advocates the assistance of both the EU and NATO and raises its voice for meeting the challenges both organisations are facing. When highlighting the viewpoint upon the US, the IRL maintains a most positivist outlook upon ties with the US and perceives it as Estonia’s most crucial partner. Concerning the perspective upon engagement with Russia, the IRL is of the opinion that their rest preferred potential in being good neighbours with Russia. Though, it perceives the current relationship with Russia of tense nature as Russia directs its resources in opposition towards the West. The IRL stresses in this regard the importance of Estonia’s geographical location. With respect to the EU sanctions, IRL advocates the continuation of the sanctions as long as Russia does not meet its international responsibilities, nor stops its aggressive behaviour within sovereign territories. Concerning the sixth focus point, the perspective upon supporting Ukraine, the IRL viewpoint is suggestive for siding with Ukraine as it values international responsibilities. With regard to the last focus point, the IRL explains that it does not maintain any linkages with Kremlin. More especially, Russia forbid two IRL politicians to enter Russian territory.

Gressel (2017a; 2017b) determined that the IRL is a pro-Western party and put the party on 172th position, directly after the SDE. Table 6 displays the IRL’s value items centred on the seven focus points under analysis.

	“The ‘finality’ of the EU”	“Views on the European security order”	“Views on transatlantic relations”	“Relations with Russia”	“Sanctions on Russia”	“Support for Ukraine”	“The party’s links to Russia”
IRL	0	3	3	3	3	3	3

**Table 6.** The value items for IRL as derived from Gressel (2017b, p. 2,3)

#### 5.3.3.1.4 The collective approach of the current Estonian government towards Russia

The three parties discussed above, formed a coalition and set out their aimed collective initiatives for the period of 2016-2019 (Republic of Estonia Government, 2016). When reflecting the first focus point (see Figure 7) upon *Basic Principles of the Government Coalition*, it appears that the three parties do not specially name their preferences on the integration of the EU. Concerning the outlook upon the availability of European security services, the three parties perceive NATO and the EU as essential organisations. They are willing to spend 2% of GDP to defence purposes and strive to meet the other financial standards as established by NATO. In addition, the government advocates the more intensive deterrence practices by NATO and the allied military forces that are based within Estonia. Concerning the collective vision upon engagement with the US, the governing coalition identifies the bilateral ties as important for the protection of Estonia’s security interests. The fourth focus point, the perspective upon relations with Russia, is not included in the document. Though, the coalition does strive to secure good ties with their neighbouring countries in order to create a region where stability and security prevails. Within the context of the Ukraine crisis, the government coalition supports the sanctions implemented towards Russia. They underline that as long as Russia continues to disrespect international law, the sanction regime should remain in place. The three parties consider the territorial sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine of crucial importance, which is indicative for supporting Ukraine. The final focus point, touching upon the linkages between the coalition and Russia, is not present within the document.

Table 7 shows Estonia’s value items focused on the seven focus points under analysis.


	“The ‘finality’ of the EU”	“Views on the European security order”	“Views on transatlantic relations”	“Relations with Russia”	“Sanctions on Russia”	“Support for Ukraine”	“The party’s links to Russia”
Estonia	1.02	2.2	1.82	2.05	1.84	2.32	1.08

**Table 7.** The value items for Estonia as derived from Gressel (2017b, p. 2,3)

#### 5.3.3.2 Applying proposition II as stemming from the trade linkages between Estonia and Russia

Table 3 showed that Estonia was relatively high economically dependent with Russia in the year the violence broke out in Ukraine and the EU decided to implement sanctions. In order to determine whether considerations based on a high economic interdependence explain the

engagement between Estonia and Russia, the economic impact related to the EU sanctions are analysed more in detail. Figure 10 illustrates that after the initiation of the sanction regime, the export from Estonia to Russia fell. Table 8 zooms in on the years 2013-2016 and shows the nominal and percental decline in export from Estonia to Russia in comparison with the previous year. As displayed in Table 9, Russia became a less crucial export trading partner for Estonia after the sanction regime was set in motion.



**Figure 10.** The export from Estonia to Russia regarding all products in US\$ (Thousand) during the period 2002-2016 (World Bank Group, n.d.)


	2013	2014	2015	2016
Nominal changes in export from Estonia to Russia in US\$ (Million) in comparison with the previous year	93,81 M	-800,77 M	-1.127,71 M	-38,98 M
Percental changes of export from Estonia to Russia in comparison with the previous year	2,95%	-24,46%	-45,59%	-2,90%

**Table 8.** The nominal development of exports from Estonia to Russia regarding all products in US\$ (Million) during the period of 2013-2016 and the percental change of exports (World Bank Group, n.d.)

	2013	2014	2015	2016
Estonia export partner share % Russia	17,90%	14,16%	9,68%	9,36%

**Table 9.** The development of Estonia percental export partner share Russia during the period of 2013-2016 (World Bank Group, n.d.)

Since the sanctions under study are targeted to distinctive components of the economy, the following figure and table shed light on the specific sectors of the Estonian economy following the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) categorizations of commodities (Rev. 3) as derived from the *UN Comtrade* database (“EU restrictive measures”, 2018). When comparing the value for the year 2015 with 2013, each of the ten SITC faced a decline in their export, as shown in Figure 11 and Table 10 (see Table 19 in Appendix for yearly data). When focusing on the trade value of 2015 in comparison with the year before, the export in each SITC sector declined as well, with the exception of SITC 3 which increased (see Figure 11 and Table 19 in Appendix).



**Figure 11.** The export trade value in US\$ (Million) from Estonia to Russia as divided by the SITCS (Rev.3) during the period 2013-2015(UN Comtrade, 2016)

	Nominal change 2013-2015 in US\$ (Million)	% Change 2013-2015
SITC 0 Food and live animals	-132,82 M	-41,05%
SITC 1 Beverages and tobacco	-96,53 M	-56,66%
SITC 2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	-15,80 M	-38,12%
SITC 3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	-9,87 M	-26,69%
SITC 4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes	-3,39 M	-67,71%
SITC 5 Chemicals and related products	-120,25 M	-39,40%
SITC 6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material	-563,21 M	-75,03%
SITC 7 Machinery and transport equipment	-525,48 M	-53,85%
SITC 8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles	-459,54 M	-69,36%
SITC 9 Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SIT	-1,60 M	-59,86%

*Table 10. The nominal (US\$ Million) and percental change of export from Estonia to Russia as divided by the SITCS (Rev. 3) during the period 2013-2015 (UN Comtrade, 2016)*

#### **5.3.4 Preliminary results on Estonia's national foreign policy**

In order to examine proposition I, the previous section put forward an analysis of the individual and collective political ideology of the SDE, the IRL and the CP towards Russia, based on retrieved information on seven focus points. The analysis supports proposition I, as the parties act towards Russia following their political identity that is grounded in a pro-Western political ideology which distances itself from Russia. More especially, they agreed on a positive outlook upon security provision by the EU and NATO and bilateral engagement with the US in realm of security. In addition, they collectively support the imposed EU sanctions and hereby value Ukraine's territorial sovereignty and integrity highly.

To evaluate proposition II, the previous section highlighted that Estonia was relatively highly economic interdependent with Russia, and showed that Estonia encountered economic losses related to the EU sanctions. This provides evidence for a disconfirmation of proposition II, as Estonia was relatively highly economic interdependent with Russia, though it engaged less peaceful behaviour (supported coercive measures), which led to economic losses both on a national as sectoral level for Estonia following a decline in exports to Russia.

## 5.4 Case study II: Austria

### 5.4.1 Austria as member state of the EU and partner to NATO

Austria joined the EU on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 1995 and became part of the Schengen on the 1<sup>st</sup> of December 1997 (“Austria”, 2018). In addition, it was included in the Euro area on January the 1<sup>st</sup> in 1999. The year 2015 marked the 20<sup>th</sup> year anniversary of Austria as EU-member state (Kudrna, 2015). Throughout these twenty years, Austria quickly transformed to a country maintaining a position in the centre of the EU system. Austria’s entrance to the EU and the eurozone, and its development as EU member state, was guided by Austria’s definable governance structure of “social partnership” (Kudrna, 2015, p. 210). This system entails that distinctive segments of society are represented by democratic elected individuals, who are seated in chambers. Prior to the moment the government makes an official proposal for legislation, these individuals have consultative meetings with the government about economic and financial topics. The entrance of Austria to the Single Market occurred relatively smoothly for Austria, as the country already had established connections with other economies of the EU and it had experienced the “EU’s economic *acquis*” inside the European Economic Area (Kudrna, 2015, p. 211). Building public administrative capacities was the principal objective for improvement. The structure of social partnership faced considerable challenges, when Austria entered the EU. It had to give up for instance particular influence over policies to the EU and migration led to new voices which were not represented in the chambers.

In light of the twenty years membership of Austria inside the EU, the Austrian Federal Ministry of Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs shared their viewpoint upon Austria as member of the EU (“20 years Austrian EU membership”, 2018). The Ministry outlined that in order to secure that Austria’s priorities are adhered to within the area of the CFSP, EU-related subjects, such as human rights and disarmament, are firmly present within the Austrian national foreign policy outlook. With regard to the positive implications of EU membership to Austria, the Ministry recognized the benefits the internal market and the Monetary Union have generated for Austria, such as a growth in jobs and the ability to cope with the economic and financial crises. In addition, the Ministry shed light on the positive effects to the Austrian citizens, such as the advantages of the ‘absence’ of borders and the ability to study in a foreign country.

In contrast to distinctive other EU member states which are a member of NATO, Austria is since 1995 a partner to NATO under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework (“Relations with Austria”, 2018; “NATO Member Countries”, 2018). Within the PfP framework, a country works together with NATO on a bilateral basis (“Partnership for Peace programme”, 2017).

The security priorities are hereby collectively decided upon. Within this framework for cooperation, Austria delivered military assistance to NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996 and contributed with logistical capacity and expertise to the mission in Afghanistan in 2002 (“Relations with Austria”, 2018).

#### **5.4.2 Austria’s reaction upon the Ukraine crisis and the EU’s collective sanction regime towards Russia**


In response to the violence that occurred in Ukraine in February 2014, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Sebastian Kurz stated that “Europe must not turn a blind eye when people are shot in its immediate neighbourhood” and declared his support to the execution of targeted sanctions (Federal Ministry, 2014, February 19<sup>th</sup>). Within the same press release, Kurz underlined that he had shared his thoughts on the implementation of the sanctions with the then Austrian Federal Chancellor Werner Faymann and explained that their opinions were in line with each other. Kurz recognized the importance of the observation committee of OSCE who operates impartially and tries to seek dialogue between the actors involved within the Ukraine conflict (Federal Ministry, 2014, May 26<sup>th</sup>; “OSCE Special monitoring mission to Ukraine”, n.d.). Austria delivered representatives that functioned as observers in the committee (Federal Ministry, 2014, May 26<sup>th</sup>). When in 2017 Kurz received chairmanship over the OSCE, he underlined that Austria prioritized the aim to bring stability to the conflicts in Ukraine (Federal Ministry, 2017, June 7<sup>th</sup>).

When Kurz became the Federal Chancellor of Austria in December 2017, he explained that Austria remains an advocator of the EU implemented sanction regime (Zalan, 2017). With an eye on the Austrian presidency of the Council of the EU starting on the 1<sup>st</sup> of July 2018, Kurz explained in an interview in February 2018 that Austria was in favour of the sanctions, though underlined that “if we see substantial progress with respect to the implementation of the Minsk agreements, we should consider lifting some of the EU-sanctions currently in place” (As cited Kurz in “Sebastian Kurz: Long-term peace in Europe”, 2018). In light of his meeting with Putin on the 5<sup>th</sup> of June 2018, Kurz repeated this viewpoint and argued that “we think that a win-win situation is better for both sides than a lose-lose situation” (As cited Kurz in Karnitschnig, 2018, June 7<sup>th</sup>). In addition, Kurz clarified the future approach of Austria towards Russia by stating “we want to be a bridge between East and West and keep the lines of communication to Russia open” (As cited Kurz in Karnitschnig, 2018, June 5<sup>th</sup>)

**5.4.3 The national foreign policy of Austria towards Russia as grounded in ideational liberalism or commercial liberalism**

**5.4.3.1 Applying proposition I as grounded in the political ideology of Austria’s previous government towards Russia**

The national parliament in Austria exists out of a National and a Federal Council (“What is Parliament?”, 2018). The National Council is regarded as possessing the most influence within the parliament. This body consists of 183 members, which are directly elected by the Austrian citizens for a period of maximum five years (“How are Parliaments formed?”, 2018; “What is Parliament?”, 2018). After having received a total of 50.8 per cent of the votes during the national parliamentary elections of 2013 (see Figure 12), the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) and the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) formed a coalition (“Austria establishes grand coalition”, 2013; “Federal Elections in Austria”, 2013). Since the end of World War II, the two parties have constituted the coalition for 37 years, although not continuously (“Austria establishes grand coalition”, 2013).



**Figure 12.** The division of Austria’s National Council on the basis of the 2013 general elections (“Federal Elections in Austria”, 2013)

The Austrian electorate was supposed to vote for a next National Council during the national parliamentary elections planned in the autumn of 2018, five years after the initiation of the coalition government SPÖ-ÖVP (Knolle & Murphy, 2017). Though, as the ÖVP faced

internal dispute and could not find common ground with the SPÖ on the topic of reform policies, elections were held in October 2017 instead. Based on the result of these elections a new government coalition was formed between the ÖVP and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), who received together 58% of the votes and 113 seats in the national council (“Muted protests in Vienna”, 2017). Since the national index of Gressel (2017a; 2017b) follows the composition of the national parliament during the period January 2017-March 2017, the focus in this thesis is directed at the political ideology of the government coalition ÖVP-SPÖ.

#### *5.4.3.1.1 The political ideology of the ÖVP towards Russia during the Austrian government coalition of 2013-2017*

The ÖVP was established in 1945 with a principal focus on democracy via a parliamentary system and the “Austrian nation” (“The Austrian People’s Party”, 2018). The Party maintains a centrist (right-wing) perspective and aims to create a market economy that is both social and ecological sustainable. With regard to their foreign policy outlook towards Russia, following the Policy Statement of 2015 and taking the focus points as guidance (see Figure 7), only views upon the EU integration and European security provision were present (ÖVP, 2015). The ÖVP provided their support to further integration, on the condition that the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity are adhered to. The political party stressed that cooperation in those crucial areas where it is demanded, is as well of importance for the possible EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans. Concerning the security provision, the Policy Statement of 2015 underlined the importance of the EU for security assistance. It advocated the establishment of a collective European defence mechanism. In addition, the ÖVP considered the OSCE important and stressed in a similar vein Austria’s function as mediator and its focus on keeping the possibilities for dialogue open.

The approach by the ÖVP towards the focus points that were absent within the Policy Statement of 2015 (i.e. focus point 3 until 7) has been retrieved<sup>8</sup> via email correspondence with Karl Nehammer, who is the current Secretary General of the ÖVP. In light of the perspective upon relations with Russia, the ÖVP stressed the neutrality of Austria and its traditional function as mediator and ‘bridge-builder’ within Europe. The party underlined the cruciality of maintaining good ties with neighbours in the West and East, whereby the party made explicit reference to Russia. The ÖVP discerned that in order to guarantee security in Europe, as well with in light of the Ukraine crisis, collaboration with Russia should be strived after. With

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<sup>8</sup> With the exception of the viewpoints regarding relations between Austria and the US and the perspective upon ties with the Kremlin.

regards to the outlook upon the sanctions, the ÖVP advocated its support to the implemented sanction regime, as Russia violated international law, though stressed a focus on dialogue as well. Concerning the perspective taken towards the provision of support to Ukraine, the ÖVP underlined the sympathy it maintained towards Ukraine. In addition, the party emphasized the active diplomatic participation of Austria in the process of establishing stability within the region via peaceful means, hereby explicitly alluding to the endeavours of Kürz during his chairmanship of the OSCE.

Gressel (2017a; 2017b) identified the ÖVP as a party maintaining an anti-Western outlook on moderate basis. The ÖVP is placed on the 57<sup>th</sup> position on the list encompassing 181 European and national parties. Table 11 shows the item values for the ÖVP centred on the seven focus points.

	“The ‘finality’ of the EU”	“Views on the European security order”	“Views on transatlantic relations”	“Relations with Russia”	“Sanctions on Russia”	“Support for Ukraine”	“The party’s links to Russia”
ÖVP	0.47	0.33	0	-0.11	0.2	0.14	-1.67

**Table 11.** The value items for ÖVP as derived from Gressel (2017b, p. 2, 3)

*5.4.3.1.2 The political ideology of the SPÖ towards Russia during the Austrian government coalition of 2013-2017*

The SPÖ was established in 1888 and is considered a centrist party maintaining a left-wing perspective (“The Social Democratic Party of Austria”, 2014). The SPÖ centres on the principles of “freedom, equality, justice and solidarity” (“Das SPÖ Parteiprogramm”, n.d.). Concerning the party’s outlook upon Russia, following the seven focus points (see Figure 7), information has been retrieved via email correspondence with Ilia Dib, who is the current international secretary of the SPÖ. In addition, the document “SPÖ-Bundesparteivorstand” (n.d.) provided by Mrs. Dib is used. In this document the SPÖ’s outlook on international affairs in 2014 is written down. With regard to the first focus point, the outlook upon European integration, the SPÖ maintained a positive viewpoint upon European integration by supporting an EU enlargement to the Western Balkans. Concerning the outlook taken towards European security provision, the SPÖ was supportive to the CFSP. Within the framework of the CFSP, the SPÖ stressed the use of diplomatic and civilian power in order to stop crises from occurring

and to bring stability to conflicts. In addition, it valued the OSCE efforts undertaken in the Ukraine conflict. When focusing on the third focus point, the outlook towards relations with the US, the SPÖ mentioned that securing and strengthening the CFSP was of importance for engagement between the EU and the US. Regarding the perspective upon relations with Russia, the SPÖ perceived that cooperation with Russia was essential in order to secure peace and security within Europe. More generally, the SPÖ stressed the cruciality for both the EU and Austria of maintaining good ties with Russia and keeping the line of communication open. The SPÖ therefore valued the partnership with Russia both on multilateral as bilateral basis. With respect to the view upon the imposed sanction regime towards Russia, the SPÖ stressed that on the European level Austria should support the path the EU collectively follows. Concerning the sixth focus point, the outlook upon providing support to Ukraine, the SPÖ declared its opposition view towards Russia for not respecting the territorial integrity of Ukraine. In this vein, it implicitly sided with Ukraine. The SPÖ did not make any reference towards linkages between the party and Russia.

Gressel (2017a; 2017b) labelled the SPÖ as a moderate anti-Western party and placed it on the 45<sup>th</sup> position. In table 12 the SPÖ's item values for the seven focus points are displayed.

	“The ‘finality’ of the EU”	“Views on the European security order”	“Views on transatlantic relations”	“Relations with Russia”	“Sanctions on Russia”	“Support for Ukraine”	“The party’s links to Russia”
SPÖ	0.23	-0.33	-0.7	-0.71	-0.71	-0.71	-1.2

**Table 12.** The value items for SPÖ as derived from Gressel (2017b, p. 2, 3)

#### 5.4.3.1.3 The political ideology of the Austrian government coalition of 2013-2017

Since the coalition agreement was agreed upon before the outbreak of the violence in Ukraine and the implemented sanction regime by the EU, the collective approach of the SPÖ and the ÖVP is analysed via following the outlook as laid down in the Foreign and European Policy Report 2015 published by the then Austrian Federal Minister of for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs. With regard to the first focus point of European integration, the report stated that Austria should participate in the development of common policies on EU level (The Federal Minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, 2015). However, Austria valued the subsidiarity principle highly. Only those topics that demand a response on EU level need to

be addressed by the EU. Policies that can be decided upon by national and regional authorities should remain within the nation’s domain of influence. With regard to possible future EU enlargement, Austria was a profound supporter of including the Western Balkan countries with whom Austria has maintained close connections.

With regards to the outlook upon the security provision, the report stated that “Europe must be “big” on “big” issues” and proclaimed its support to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) while bearing the principle of subsidiarity in mind (The Federal Minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. V). Concerning the security resources of NATO, the report stressed the support delivered by Austria to NATO’s missions and underlined Austria’s role in determining the future path of the PfP. In addition, the report considered the practices of the OSCE in the context of the Ukraine crisis of crucial importance. When focusing on the third point of analysis, the outlook upon bilateral engagement between Austria and the US, the report shed a positive light upon the relationship between the two countries, especially within a multilateral context. In addition, the report highlighted that the US praised “Austria’s expert knowledge as an active political player” (The Federal Minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 133). When moving the attention to the direct outlook upon ties with Russia, the report firmly underlined the cruciality of maintaining communication with Russia. They repeated this viewpoint when declaring their support to the implemented sanction regime towards Russia, hereby making reference to their function as mediator. Regarding the viewpoints taken towards providing support to Ukraine, the report stressed the implementation of the Minsk agreements. The report does not make any explicit references towards linkages with Kremlin.


Table 13 demonstrates Austria’s value items on the seven focus points under analysis.

	“The ‘finality’ of the EU”	“Views on the European security order”	“Views on transatlantic relations”	“Relations with Russia”	“Sanctions on Russia”	“Support for Ukraine”	“The party’s links to Russia”
Austria	-0.09	-0.44	-0.51	-0.78	-0.76	-0.62	-1.45

**Table 13.** The value items for Austria as derived from Gressel (2017b, p. 2,3)

### 5.4.3.2 Applying proposition II as stemming from the trade linkages between Austria and Russia

Table 3 demonstrates that Austria was relatively less economic dependent with Russia during the outbreak of the violence in 2014 and the initiation of the sanctions. In order to determine whether reasoning following the degree of economic interdependence explain the approach of Austria towards Russia, the economic impact linked to the EU sanctions are analysed more in detail. Figure 13 demonstrates that the total value of the export from Austria to Russia for all products declined in the year 2014. Table 14 displays the nominal and percental decline of the exports for the years 2013-2015. In addition, Table 15 shows the decline of the export partner share of Austria towards Russia.



**Figure 13.** The export from Austria to Russia regarding all products in US\$ (Thousand) for the period 2002-2015 (World Bank Group, n.d.)


	2013	2014	2015
Nominal changes in export from Austria to Russia in US\$ (Million) in comparison with the previous year	508,18 M	-338,33 M	-2036,03 M
Percental changes of export from Austria to Russia in comparison with the previous year	12,65%	-7,48%	-48,64%

**Table 14.** The nominal development of exports from Austria to Russia regarding all products in US\$ (Million) during the period of 2013-2015 and the percental change of exports (World Bank Group, n.d.)

	2013	2014	2015
Austria export partner share % Russia	2,72%	2,47%	1,48%

**Table 15.** The development of Austria percental export partner share Russia during the period of 2013-2015 (World Bank Group, n.d.)

When focusing on the different sectors within the economy, following the SITC categorizations, it is visible that each sector declines its exports when comparing the data on 2015 towards 2013, with the exception of SITC 2 (see Figure 14 and Table 16). When comparing the changes in trade value of 2015 in comparison with the year before, each sector saw a drop in export, except for SITC 2 and 3 as shown in Figure 14 (and Table 20 in appendix).



**Figure 14.** The export trade value US\$ (Million) from Austria to Russia as divided by the SITCS (Rev.3) for the period 2013-2015 (UN Comtrade, 2016)

	Nominal change 2013-2015	% Change 2013-2015
SITC 0 Food and live animals	-176,48 M	-64,45%
SITC 1 Beverages and tobacco	-3,21 M	-23,31%
SITC 2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	3,17 M	15,99%
SITC 3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	-0,84 M	-19,19%
SITC 4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes	-8,02 M	-91,24%
SITC 5 Chemicals and related products	-525,30 M	-43,12%
SITC 6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material	-379,19 M	-57,81%
SITC 7 Machinery and transport equipment	-1054,67 M	-56,93%
SITC 8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles	-169,65 M	-46,28%
SITC 9 Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SIT	-60,16 M	-54,74%

**Table 16.** The nominal (US\$ Million) and percental change of export from Austria to Russia as divided by the SITCS (Rev. 3) during the period 2013-2015 (UN Comtrade, 2016)

#### 5.4.4 Preliminary results on Austria's national foreign policy

The previous section analysed the individual and collective political ideology of the ÖVP and the SPÖ towards Russia, based on acquired information on seven focus points. This evidence supports proposition I, as the parties acted towards Russia following the political identity that is grounded in a moderate anti-Western political ideology, which is open towards Russia. The parties advocated the integration of EU, on the condition that the principle of subsidiarity is met. In addition, they supported that the EU and NATO provide security, although Austria operated under the PfP framework. The coalition maintained a positive view upon the contributions made by the OSCE during the Ukraine crisis. In addition, they valued relations with the US. With regard to engagement with Russia, they stressed that they preferred to maintain the possibilities for communication with Russia open. Following from Austria's function as mediator, they underlined this view when declaring their support to the EU implemented sanction regime. Finally, they advocated the implementation of the Minsk Agreements within the context of the Ukraine crisis.

In order to test proposition II, the previous analyses outlined that Austria was relatively less economic interdependent with Russia and demonstrated that Austria faced economic costs that were related to the EU sanctions. This evidence is *partially* unsupportive as supportive to proposition II. The partial disconfirmation can be explained by the fact that whereas Austria was relatively less economically interconnected with Russia, it did act in a manner way open

towards Russia and therefore potentially peaceful. The partial confirmation can be explained by the fact that it remained supportive towards the EU sanctions from which it faced related economic losses.

## 6. Conclusion and Recommendation for Further Research

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*This thesis has the essential objective to determine whether the national foreign policy of EU member states towards Russia could better be explained via ideational liberalism (political ideology) or commercial liberalism (trade linkages). In order to make a concluding remark about the explanatory capabilities of both liberalist variants, the application of the two propositions for the two cases under analysis is shortly reviewed.*

### 6.1 Estonia: Proposition I

The current coalition government, existing out of two pro-Western political parties (the SDE and the IRL) and one moderate pro-Western European party (the CP), have agreed upon a collective approach towards Russia. The first component of the collective outlook towards Russia perceivable, is a positive view upon security assistance by the EU and NATO, a perspective which was as well shared by each party individually. The second component visible in the shared outlook, is their perception of viewing engagement with the US important for Estonia's security. This positive outlook upon the bilateral ties between Estonia and the US, is as well perceivable in the individual approach taken by the SDE and the IRL. The third component of the collective perspective towards Russia is that they aim to create a stable and secure region, with good ties with their neighbours. This implicitly shows the collective perspective towards ties with Russia. Both SDE and IRL individually underlined the potential of partnership with Russia, though discern this engagement as currently facing challenges. The CP stressed relations with Russia within the realm of the environment, culture and economy on the basis of EU and human values. The fourth constituent of the collective approach towards Russia that is visible in the coalition agreement is a shared support to the imposed sanctions, which was well perceivable in the party outlooks of the SDE and the IRL. The final component of the approach towards Russia present in the shared outlook is a support to Ukraine, by valuing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. This viewpoint was as well taken by the SDE and the IRL individually. The CP made reference to a stable EU neighbourhood in this regard.

Despite the fact that there might be a discrepancy visible among the three parties with regard to their outlook upon the West, the parties collectively support the security provision by the EU and NATO and the security relations with the US. In addition, they advocate the EU sanction regime and hereby side with Ukraine by attaching crucial importance to the country's territorial sovereignty and integrity. This evidence confirms proposition I and thereby demonstrates that the national foreign policy outlook of Estonia towards Russia of the current

government is grounded in the collective political identity of the coalition parties which maintains pro-West approach and distances itself from Russia.

### **6.2 Estonia: Proposition II**

The analysis of the export from Estonia towards Russia in light of the EU collective demonstrated that export from Estonia fell after the sanctions were imposed. This evidence does not support proposition II. Estonia was relatively highly economically connected with Russia, though it acted less peaceful behaviour. Estonia suffered from economic losses related to their approach taken towards Russia.

### **6.3 Austria: Proposition I**

The previous Austrian coalition government consisted out of two moderate anti-Western parties: the ÖVP and the SPÖ. The first component of the Russian outlook present in their collective foreign approach of 2015, is a support to further integration of the EU, on the condition that the principle of subsidiarity is followed. The ÖVP shared this vision as well and added the principle of solidarity. The SPÖ maintained a general positive outlook upon future integration of the EU to the Western Balkans. The second component included in their shared foreign perspective, was a positive stand on security provided by the EU and NATO. In addition, they deemed important the practices of the OSCE in the context of the Ukraine crisis. The parties individually maintained a positive view upon security provided by the EU, the ÖVP referred to a European army in this regard and the SPÖ named the CFSP specifically. Both highlighted as well the role played by the OSCE. Another constituent of the collective Russian foreign policy outlook, was a positive view on engagement between Austria and the US. The SPÖ advocated in this perspective for a fostering of ties between the EU and Austria.

The fourth component of the outlook towards Russia by the previous Austrian government, is the viewpoint towards relations with Russia. The parties collectively stressed to maintain dialogue with Russia. Individually, both parties shared the opinion that cooperation with Russia is a vital importance for creating security within the EU and take a positive viewpoint upon engagement between Austria and Russia. The SPÖ hereby referred to Austria as a neutral and bridge-building country both inside as outside the EU. The SPÖ stressed the role of communication. The collective foreign policy outlook included as well a pro-standpoint towards the sanctions, though underlined Austria's function as a mediator country and the related focus on dialogue. The ÖVP shared this rhetoric individually as well. The SPÖ outlined that in the imposition of collective sanctions Austria acts as a member of a wider organisation.

The final component of the collective outlook towards Russia underlined the implementation of the Minsk agreement. Individually, both parties sided in an implicit way with Ukraine, as the ÖVP considered that Russia's practices are in disrespect with international law and the SPÖ emphasized in general the principle of territorial integrity.

The previous summarised findings show that the national foreign policy outlook of Austria towards Russia stems from the collective political ideology of the previous governing parties towards Russia maintain a moderate anti-Western approach, and acted thereby open towards Russia. The parties were in favour of the EU, though firmly underline the principles of subsidiarity. In addition, they advocated security provision of the EU and NATO, though under the PfP framework. In addition, they appreciated the relations with the US. The coalition was as well supportive of the actions by the OSCE during the Ukraine crisis. In a similar vein, the parties valued the dialogue with Russia. They alluded to this view again in light of the EU implemented sanction regime, as stemming from Austria's mediation practices. Finally, they made explicit reference to the accomplishment of the Minsk agreements in their approach towards the Ukraine crisis. This evidence confirms proposition I based on ideational liberalism as grounded in political identity.

#### **6.4 Austria: Proposition II**

Austria was in general encountered with economic losses related to the imposed EU sanctions. This evidence partially disconfirms and confirms proposition II. Austria was relatively less economically interdependent with Russia, it did engage in peaceful behaviour. They encountered economic losses related to their behaviour towards Russia, that did include a support to the imposed sanctions.

#### **6.5 Final concluding remarks**

Based on the two case studies under analysis, this thesis argues that the national foreign policy of EU member states towards Russia in light of the imposed EU sanctions, can better be explained via political ideology, as stemming from political identity. Therefore, ideational liberalism, rather than commercial liberalism is best capable to explain the national foreign policy approach of EU member states towards Russia in light of the EU collective sanction regime. With regard to the external validity of this finding, i.e. the effects for the present discussion surrounding the IR paradigm of liberalism, this thesis confirms the fundamentality of liberalism, as one liberalist variant possesses the ability to explain the empirical phenomenon under analysis. More especially, by applying two competing liberalist variants towards two

cases following the ‘least-likely rhetoric’, this thesis confirm the fundamentality of the liberalist paradigm when focused on ideational liberalism.

The notion that the national foreign policy of EU member states towards Russia in light of the implemented sanctions, can better be explained factors other than economic considerations (in this thesis addressed via trade linkages), confirms the arguments made within the present literature. However, by determining that political identity is an factor that better explains the national foreign policy of EU member states towards Russia, it contributes to the understanding of national EU foreign policy. Thereby it is of added value to the identified phenomenon of different national foreign policies by EU member states towards Russia, despite an unanimously agreed sanction regime.

### **6.6 Recommendation for further research**

One limitation of this thesis is that the findings cannot be generalized outside the two cases under analysis. Therefore, no argument can be made that covers the entire EU. In order to make an argument which encompasses an EU wide approach, a quantitative analysis could be applied towards explaining the national foreign policies towards Russia in light of the EU collective sanction regime. This generates the possible to make an argument about the possible implications of the issue for the unity within the EU.

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## 8. Appendix

Country	Bulgaria	Slovak Republic	Greece	Austria	Hungary
<i>Year</i>	2014	2014	2014	2014	2014
<i>Import (US\$) from Russia (all products)</i>	5277678210	6530465618	6425370865	1076867649	7289267788
<i>Export (US\$) to Russia (all products)</i>	701330817	2757709822	474249829	4185551409	2799387154
<i>Som import (US\$) from and export to Russia (all products)</i>	597909027	9288175440	6899620694	5262419058	10088654942
<i>GDP (current US\$)</i>	56732006512	1,00761E+11	2,3608E+11	438376178526,317	1,39295E+11
<i>Som import (US\$) from and export to Russia (all products) / GDP (current US\$)</i>	0,105390403	0,092180631	0,029225802	1,20E-02	7,24E-02
<i>Som import (US\$) from and export to Russia (all products) in percentage of GDP (current US\$)</i>	10,5390403	9,218063129	2,922580176	1,200434539	7,242676651

**Table 17.** *The sum import (US\$) from and export to Russia (all products) in percentage of GDP (current US\$) of the five countries possessing relatively the most anti-Western approach following the national index by Gressel (2017a, 2017b)*

Country	Netherlands	Portugal	United Kingdom	Slovenia	Estonia
<i>Year</i>	2014	2014	2014	2014	2014
<i>Import (US\$) from Russia (all products)</i>	24155708182	943983212	10114257287	652702692	2160690012
<i>Export (US\$) to Russia (all products)</i>	8285445128	271091518	6641243963	1336742669	2473433736
<i>Som import (US\$) from and export to Russia (all products)</i>	32441153310	1215074730	16755501250	1989445361	4634123748
<i>GDP (current US\$)</i>	8,79635E+11	2,2963E+11	2,99883E+12	49530147016	26213940387
<i>Som import (US\$) from and export to Russia (all products) / GDP (current US\$)</i>	0,03688024	0,00529145	0,00558734	0,040166353	0,176780891
<i>Som import (US\$) from and export to Russia (all products) in percentage of GDP (current US\$)</i>	3,688024034	0,529145003	0,558733952	4,016635283	17,67808914

**Table 18.** The sum import (US\$) from and export to Russia (all products) in percentage of GDP (current US\$) of the five countries possessing relatively the most pro-Western approach following the national index by Gressel (2017a, 2017b)

	2013	2014	2015
SITC 0 Food and live animals	323,54 M	300,07 M	190,72 M
SITC 1 Beverages and tobacco	170,35 M	146,63 M	73,83 M
SITC 2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	41,45 M	40,55 M	25,64 M
SITC 3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	36,98 M	12,96 M	27,11 M
SITC 4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes	5 M	3,72 M	1,62 M
SITC 5 Chemicals and related products	305,18 M	292,51 M	184,93 M
SITC 6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material	750,63 M	392,10 M	187,43 M
SITC 7 Machinery and transport equipment	975,83 M	838,07 M	450,35 M
SITC 8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles	662,57 M	444,02 M	203,03 M
SITC 9 Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SIT	2,67 M	2,80 M	1,07 M

**Table 19.** The export trade value (\$) from Estonia to Russia as divided by the SITCS (Rev.3) during the period 2013-2015 (UN Comtrade, 2016)

	2013	2014	2015
SITC 0 Food and live animals	273,85 M	207,83 M	97,37 M
SITC 1 Beverages and tobacco	13,77 M	12,45 M	10,56 M
SITC 2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	19,83 M	18,66 M	23 M
SITC 3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	4,40 M	2,57 M	3,55 M
SITC 4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes	8,79 M	10,23 M	0,77 M
SITC 5 Chemicals and related products	1218,25 M	1260,30 M	692,95 M
SITC 6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material	655,93 M	553,13 M	276,74 M
SITC 7 Machinery and transport equipment	1852,57 M	1746,72 M	797,91 M
SITC 8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles	366,59 M	319,74 M	196,95 M
SITC 9 Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SIT	109,89 M	53,93 M	49,73 M

**Table 20.** The export trade value (\$) from Austria to Russia as divided by the SITCS (Rev.3) during the period 2013-2015 (UN Comtrade, 2016)