Gaining access to the EU institutions

Three case studies of diffuse interest representation

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Rotterdam, 14-08-2008
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Abstract
This short chapter is intended to function as an outline for my master thesis. During the course of this project, I have studied the subject of interest representation in the European Union. The purpose of my research is to find out if access theory explains the degree of access of diffuse interest representation to the three major EU institutions in the EU energy sector. In order to answer this question, I have developed an access theory for diffuse interest representation. This theory covers the exchange relationship between the three major European institutions (the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers), and diffuse interest representatives, such as environmental organizations in the European energy sector. The institutions, in exchange for three different kinds of information or access goods, grant access to those organizations seeking it. Each institution has a critical access good, which is determined by its role in the EU legislative process. It will grant the highest degree of access to the actor that provides this critical access good. For each institution, hypotheses on a ranking of dependencies for access goods are established. Conversely, diffuse interest representatives can organize themselves in different organizational forms. For my thesis, I make a distinction between individual organizations, national associations and European associations. Each organizational form is better equipped to provide certain access goods, and therefore supposed to have a higher degree of access to certain institutions. To find out if my hypotheses could be confirmed, I conducted 14 semi-structured interviews with respondents from each of the EU institutions. They were asked, among other things, to provide a ranking of their preference for each one of the organizational forms of diffuse interest representation. My research findings show that the hypotheses about the relative access of diffuse interest representation to the Council of Ministers were confirmed. In the case of the European Commission, the hypotheses on the relative access were disconfirmed. For the European Parliament, neither the hypotheses on access, nor on their ranking of dependencies were confirmed. My research-findings show that individual organizations enjoy the highest degree of access to the Parliament, European associations the highest degree of access to the Commission and national associations the highest degree of access to the Council. Ultimately, it can be concluded that access theory has a potential to explain diffuse interest representation to the three major EU institutions, however additional research needs to be done to ultimately confirm this.

Word count 26.411
Acknowledgements
From the get go, it was clear to me that producing this thesis would be challenging, and I therefore welcome the opportunity to express my gratitude to the people that supported me throughout the process of writing. First and foremost, I want to thank my supervisor, Markus Haverland. When we first met, all I had was a general notion about what I wanted to accomplish and 500 words to illustrate my thoughts. I want to take this opportunity to thank you for guiding me in the process of discovering how to transform ideas into a mature work of academic standards. I also want to thank my second reader, Frank Boons, for challenging me to rethink the outcome of my research findings. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my thanks to the fourteen participating respondents. Without them, I would not have been able to conduct my research.

The IMP staff created an environment in which it was possible for me to finish my masters. Because of that, they deserve all the credit I can give them. Sonja thanks for continuously encouraging me to keep going. Mr. Blatter, thank you for the memorable tequila shots and good times in Budapest. They won’t be forgotten any time soon. Professor van Nispen, thank you for your, above all, non-judgmental support throughout the IMP program. It got me on the right track and helped me stay there.

Mom, thank you for not sending me to Schoevers after all, but supporting me throughout my active student life. Dad, thanks for supporting me in your own way. Peter, I am glad you came into my life 17 years ago. I hope you will always stay there. Kees, thanks for your helping me out with my subject and with everything else. I realize that being surrounded by idiots must be difficult for you. Grandma, your insights have guided me through some of the most difficult decisions I have made over the past few years. Thanks for all the advice you have given me. Last but not least, Justin, thank you for believing in me. It means more to me than words can say.
1. Introduction

1.1 Problem analysis

On March 8th 2006, the European Commission published a Green paper on developing a common, coherent European Energy Policy. The following consultation round provided an excellent access point to the EC for all interested parties, business and non-business actors alike. However, lobbying the EU multilevel system is almost never as straightforward as responding to a call for consultation. It is no easy task to influence the EU policy-making process in a specific sector, or even to gain access to this process. What is the best way for private interests to gain access to the three major EU institutions? This is the question Pieter Bouwen posed before developing a theoretical framework to explain the access of different organizational forms of business interest representation to the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. For this purpose, he developed a theory of access, which explains the degree of access in terms of the supply and demand for access goods. Bouwen claims that access goods concern information that is crucial in the EU policy-making process. According to his theory, business interests have to provide the access goods demanded by an institution in order to gain access to it.

This research project will address the congruent issues that arise with non-business or diffuse interests seeking access to the institutions. According to Pollack (1997), protecting diffuse interests has long been recognized as a central challenge in any system of governance, and has proven problematic in the European Union as well. Indeed, there have been arguments that EU is a businessman’s Europe, where there is little room for diffuse interests such as environmentalists, consumers and women (Pollack 1997, p572). Statements like these fuel a desire to compare the access of business and non-business interests. Therefore, for my master thesis, I will be developing and testing a theory of access for non-business interests empirically. I will examine the subject of access of non-business interests by lobbying the three major EU institutions on the subject of energy at the EU level. One reason for my interest in this field is the fact that I have personal affinity with the subject of lobbying. This affinity stems from another piece of research I’ve conducted: my bachelor thesis. The process of lobbying allows citizens to make an attempt at influencing the EU decision-making process in a very direct and focused manner. In a sense, it gives people a set of tools to reach the goals they have set themselves. In studying the way interest groups use these tools, I aim to make recommendations for improving them. This is why I have a general interest in this subject and it is also why, in my opinion, the matter is worth researching.
The aim of this project is to conduct a piece of research that is both theoretically as well as socially relevant. So, does my subject have scientific and social relevance as well as just being a general interest? Theoretical relevance refers to the analytical value a research question adds to the scientific discourse of the sub-discipline it addresses. Socially relevant research furthers the understanding of social and political phenomena which affect people and make a difference with regard to an explicitly specified evaluative standard (Lehnert, Miller and Wonka, 2007). I will expand on both dimensions in the following section.

**Theoretical relevance**

Theoretically relevant work helps us to arrive at a better understanding of the phenomena that we study theoretically or empirically. The theoretical relevance of a research question can only be assessed with regard to the scientific discourse, which deals with the subject to be studied. This discourse mainly takes place in the scientific literature. It is of fundamental importance that a research contribution is tied to the pertinent body of literature. This supports the cumulative character of research and improves our overall understanding of particular phenomena (Lehnert et al, 2007). In my literary review on the subject of interest representation (see chapter 2), I describe the current state of affairs in the literature on my subject, and state how my thesis contributes to this body of literature.

In their work on theoretical and social relevance in political science, Lehnert, Miller and Wonka describe a set of criteria for increasing theoretical relevance. According to these authors, a researcher looking to formulate a relevant research question can do so by applying one (or more) of these criteria to his or her research question. One of the criteria for formulating a relevant research question is that if an existing theory can be meaningfully applied to empirical phenomena not covered by the respective theory up to this point. In this case, the author contributes to a research community’s knowledge about the degree of a theory’s general character (Lehnert et al, 2007). For my master thesis, I will be applying an existing theory to a new empirical domain. More precisely, I will be applying Bouwen’s access theory in a specific EU policy area for business interests to non-business interests. This provides my research project with the necessary theoretical relevance.
Practical relevance

Practically and socially relevant research furthers the understanding of social and political phenomena that affect people and make a difference with regard to explicitly specified evaluative standards. Lehnert, Miller and Wonka provide three questions that help the researcher improve the social relevance of her contribution. The first is who is affected?

A researcher should try to find out what effect the answer to his or her research question might have on the affected. In this piece of research, the affected are the European citizens who are active in representing diffuse interests through lobbying. Also, the diffuse interests they represent are indirectly affected by their actions. Since my research is aimed at improving these lobbying activities, it is aimed at positively affecting the citizens involved.

The second question is: can the results be evaluated? An author ought to be able to state in which way people are affected and why they should care. For every research project intended to be socially relevant, a researcher needs to consciously search for a suitable evaluative standard, and, if there are more, consciously make a choice. This standard needs to be made explicit. My research is aimed at discovering how diffuse interests gain access to the three major EU institutions. Gaining access does not necessarily mean exerting influence, but without gaining access, interest groups can hardly be expected to gain influence. This project is relevant, because it has the potential to improve the way in which diffuse interest lobby by improving the way they seek and gain access to the EU institutions. By doing so, it indirectly contributes to the causes that diffuse interest groups represent, such as environmental protection, consumer protection, equal opportunities between men and women, and civil liberties (Pollack 1997, p572). The evaluative standard I will measure my research by is therefore: do my research findings and contribute to the causes that diffuse interest groups represent?

The third question is: what advice can be offered? Lehnert, Miller and Wonka (2007) argue that any contribution to a body of scientific knowledge becomes more valuable when there is something practical to learn from it. As stated earlier, this project is aimed at making recommendations to diffuse interests on how to reach their own lobbying goals by improving the ways in which they seek access to the three main EU institutions. I intend to make these recommendations as practical as possible. To sum up, what is the practical relevance of this research project? First, it will provide the theoretical basis for interest groups to devise or improve strategies for lobbying the European arena. Second, the improving the access of diffuse interests to the EU institutions might contribute to the legitimacy of the European Union. In her work on lobbying and democracy, Bleijenberg (2005, p71) lobbying was found to have an overall positive effect on democracy in the EU.
Improving lobbying activities has the potential to address legitimacy issues in the form of a democratic deficit. These issues arise from the transfer of political decision-making power from the national to the European level, where the European institutions lack national institutions democratic features (Horeth 1999). Finally in this thesis, the energy sector is to be investigated. Although all three institutions are concerned with energy issues, the EU does not yet have a common energy policy. Therefore, this sector is not fully part of the legislative process of the EU. However, this does not exclude the sector from being studied. On the contrary, it makes for a fine research subject, because many actors, business and non-business alike are trying to influence the outcomes of the debate on energy. At this point in time, opinions are formed, statements are made and interest groups have every reason to concern themselves with accessing this process.

1.2 Research question
From the theoretical background of access theory, I have constructed the following central research question and sub-questions.

Central research question: “Does access theory explain the degree of access of diffuse interest representation to the three major EU institutions in the EU energy sector?”

1.3 Sub-questions
Sub-questions:
1. What is the content of Bouwen’s access theory?
2. How can access theory defined for diffuse interests?
3. What are the main issues in EU’s energy sector?
4. To what extent does access theory explain the degree of diffuse interest access to the EU institutions?

1.4 Structure of thesis
This section is included to guide the reader through the rest of my work and to explain the structure I used to present my research findings. As shown, this first chapter is used to give an introduction to my research topic and to present my research questions. Section 1.1 presents the problem analysis for my project and presents the theoretical and social relevant aspects of my work. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 are devoted to the presentation of my central research question and sub-questions. Chapter two gives a literary review of the issues surrounding my subject. This literary review provides my work with the necessary background and explains its relevance.
In chapter three, my theoretical framework is expanded upon. In this chapter, I first elaborate on a theory of access for business interests, formulated by Pieter Bouwen. I go on to formulate an access theory for non-business interest. The fourth chapter of my thesis gives an account of the way my research is designed and of the methods I have used to conduct it. Chapter five aims to provide some background information on the current state of affairs on energy in the European Union. It also gives three examples of three important players in the field of energy lobbying. These three simultaneously represent the three organizational forms I have selected for my project. They are discussed to illustrate this decision and to give the reader an example of each of the organizational forms. This way, the theoretical basis of the access theory as discussed in chapter three, is linked to the empirical application of that theory. In chapter six, the empirical evidence in the form of the results of my interviews is described. Finally, chapter seven presents the conclusions drawn from this piece of research by answering the central research questions and sub-questions.

2. Literary review

2.1 Introduction
To underline the theoretical relevance of this research project, I have examined the current body of literature on lobbying and interest representation. This examination will allow me to check where there is room for new or additional research. Through literature study, my contribution will be tied to the pertinent body of literature. The review will undoubtedly be incomplete, as it doesn’t cover all the entire body of literature written on the subject. I am confident however, that it does cover the main authors in the area of literature that is tied to my subject.

2.2 Access
Examining the literature that is out there at the moment, I’ve noticed a lot of research being conducted on the subject of access to the European Union. Pieter Bouwen (2002, 2004a, 2004b) for instance, has written a number of papers on the subject. In his papers on corporate lobbying (2002, 2004b), he develops a theoretical framework in order to explain the access of business interest to the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The degree of access to these institutions is explained in terms of a theory of demand and supply of access goods. These goods concern information that is crucial in the EU policy-making process. According to Bouwen, in order to gain access to an EU institution, business interests have to provide the access goods demanded by that institution.
His framework thus seeks to contribute to the debate about the unequal access facilities of interest
groups to the EU institutions (Schmitter 2000). It also addresses the traditional research question
in European interest politics literature concerning the use of different channels to lobby the EU
institutions (Bouwen, 2002). According to Bouwen, it would be interesting to investigate whether
the framework could be useful for the study of non-business interests or non-legislative lobbying.
Here, he points towards the work of Pollack (1997) on the representation of diffuse interests in
EC policy making. In addition to this, Bouwen (2004a) has also written a piece on the logic of
access to the European Parliament in particular, instead of access to all major EU institutions.
Drawing on the work of Bouwen and Pollack, Beyers (2004) writes on the subject of voice
(which refers to public political strategies) and access (which Beyers sees as synonymous with
inside lobbying). He aims to examine to what extent European interest associations combine
public strategies with traditional forms of inside lobbying or the seeking of access to public
officials. His research findings show that the institutional supply of access favors specific
interests: the European Union contains important institutional opportunities for diffuse interests
that aim to expand the scope of political conflict or signal policy concerns by using political
strategies.

In 2007, Eising drawing on a survey of 800 business associations seeks to explain why interest
groups lobby the EU institutions and what groups maintain contacts with them. Rooted in
organizational theory, he argues that four main dimension influence access patterns: institutional
context, resource dependencies, interest group organization and strategic choices. Eising states
that up until this point, no coherent picture has yet emerged as to what determines the access of
interest groups to the EU institutions. He recognizes the work of Bouwen, which stresses the
organizational features of interest groups, particularly emphasizing their control of policy
information. He also recognizes the work of others, such as Schmidt (1999) and Falkner (2000)
who respectively highlight the importance of systematic factors and sectoral characteristics in
gaining access. Eising, however, seeks to integrate these studies in a consistent explanation of
interest group access to the EU institutions, thus aiming at the consolidation and modification of
our established understanding. Drawing on the organizational theory of resource dependencies, he
suggests that the EU institutional context, the resource dependencies between state and business,
as well as the interest groups’ structures and strategies shape access to EU policy-makers.
The empirical evidence Eising has collected comes from business associations. Therefore, it
presents us with access information on solid interests (Pollack, 1997), not diffuse ones.
This again leaves room for additional research on how access to EU policy-makers is shaped for diffuse interest, as Bouwen suggests in the closing remarks of his 2004 paper on business lobbying access. Eising himself states that the focus of EU interest group studies needs to be broadened to incorporate the study of social movements, political cleavages and political parties, which are all part of the political space in which interest groups are situated. According to Eising, this might help place political scientist in a position to come to terms with major aspects of the cleavage structure and the democratic quality of the European polity. Kriesi et al (2007) study the action repertoires of Western European Collective Political Actors and state that as a result of the Europeanization of politics and the increasing role of the public sphere, political actors in Western Europe are currently facing a double strategic challenge. Based on the data from seven West European countries and the European Union, they analyze how state actors, political parties, interest groups and social movement organizations cope with this challenge at both the national and the supranational level. One of their most interesting findings is that domestic actors attempts to influence the political process at the EU level are heavily intervening in the national public sphere and in the national public arenas to influence decision-making in Brussels. According to Kriesi et al., the importance of national access is linked to the lack of a European public sphere and to the remoteness of the political process at the EU level. They see their work as a drawing of a general map of the kind of strategies that political actors in Western Europe currently use to influence political decision-making. This map shows that the national route should not be forgotten, and that access to Brussels sometimes means access to The Hague, Berlin, and Paris etc.

2.3 Diffuse versus solid interests

In much of his work, Mark Pollack focuses on diffuse interests, sometimes called collective interests held by large numbers of individuals such as environmental protection, consumer protection, equal opportunities between men and women, and civil liberties. According to Pollack, the institutions of the European Community present opportunities as well as risks for diffuse interests such as environmentalists, consumers, and women. In particular, the institutions provide diffuse interests with multiple points of access, which they have used effectively to secure the adoption and implementation of EC policies in the areas of environmental protection, consumer protection and women’s rights. In addition to Pollack’s work on non-business access, Bouwen (2004a) has also written a piece on the logic of access to the European Parliament in particular, instead of access to all major EU institutions.
2.4 Lobby systems

Examining the work delivered by Broscheid and Coen, we can observe a focus on lobby systems. In their work on insider and outsider lobbying of the European Commission (2003), they propose an informational model of lobbying to understand macro-characteristics of lobby systems. They seek to explain the post-Maastricht lobbying boom in the European Union and the accompanying establishment of the European Commission forums for interest representation.

They have particular interest in the number of lobbyists in a system, and the distinction between insider and outsider lobbyists. In conclusion, they propose three different categories of lobbying systems. Their work is linked with Bouwen’s (2004a) on the subject of information, with respect to the decision-making process of the European Commission. Broscheid and Coen state that as a non-majoritarian institution, the European Commission has had to rely on consultation with private interests to create input legitimacy for its decisions. At the same time, it has a high demand for specialist information from private actors, because its own resources are severely limited. They conclude by stating that the European Commission uses institutional engineering in service of political entrepreneurship.

Another piece of their (unpublished) work on lobbying systems is a quantitative study in the European Union (Broscheid and Coen, 2004). In this paper, they try to answer the questions why some lobbying subsystems are larger (i.e. contain more actors) than others, and what explains the presence, and number, of lobbying insiders in a subsystem? This piece of work supports Richardson vision that new research in the field of interest representation in the European Union will be more quantitative and more methodical, rather than radically different.

2.5 Different theoretical approaches

Access to EU policy-makers is not the only subject being studied when it comes to interest representation. In his work on organized interests in the European Union (2005), Richardson makes an attempt to describe the current state of affairs in research being conducted on this subject. He starts off by stating that the EU is a policy making state where there has been a transferring of power to a new venue (the EU level) and this transference is the starting point for all studies of EU interest groups. He goes on by stating that academic studies of interest groups in the EU have, first, tried to describe what is going on (adopting a fairly light theoretical touch) and, secondly, in later phases develop some more robust and better specified tools to explain it (Richardson, 2005). A central argument in his work is, however, that more recent studies are merely echoing in a more formal way, the implicit theoretical assumptions of earlier studies.
He goes on by classifying the body of literature on the subject into different theoretical approaches. He identifies the rational actor approach, which assumes that groups act rationally to maximize their influence by directing their lobbying resources in an intelligent and informed way. He names the neo-functionalist approach as the second of key theoretical building blocks of EU interest group studies. Thirdly, he identifies pluralism as an important theoretical strand. Fourthly, he names corporatism as a theoretical approach.

The final strand he identifies is the institutional approach. In his final statements, Richardson concludes that over the last decade, one can detect a clear trend, namely towards a much more explicit specification of theoretical assumptions, a clearer specification of research questions, and more attempts to quantify evidence as a means of theory testing. He is, however, worried that we are not witnessing an accumulation of major blocks of new knowledge, but merely a better methodology for telling us what we have known for a rather long time. Pointing towards the work of Broscheid, Bouwen and Coen, he does conclude that important questions are being asked, but new research is likely to be more finely grained than earlier work, rather than radically different (Richardson, 2005).

2.6 Conclusion

From this literary review, it can be concluded that there is indeed room for my research project. Although there have been studies done on the subject of diffuse interest access to European institutions, there is room for additional research. First of all, there have not been studies comparing the access of diffuse interests to the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers. Instead, many studies have focused on the access seeking process to the EC (Bouwen 2002). Also, the literature discussed in the previous section tends to focus on points of access or on influence, instead of actually trying to measure access (Smith 2008). Concluding, it can be stated that a project that develops a theory of access for diffuse interests to the three major institutions, adds to the existing body of literature.

3. Theoretical framework

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will be devoted to describing and explaining the theoretical foundations of this research paper. The theoretical framework will serve as a basis for the analysis of my research findings, which are to be discussed in chapter 6. Before addressing the theory, the general structure of the chapter will be presented here.
The main theory of access is described in sections 3.2 and 3.3. The first section describes a theory of access for business interests as developed by Pieter Bouwen. The section starts off with laying the foundations for a theory of access, and includes a background perspective. It goes on to introduce the concept of access goods and critical access goods. It then links the supply and demand side of access goods, to conclude with a general overview of generated hypotheses. In section 3.3, I will present my access theory for non-business interests. This theoretical framework will serve as the basis for the analysis of my research findings. The section begins with a definition of diffuse interests. It goes on to classify these interests into different organizational forms. Then, the access goods for diffuse interests are specified and linked to the exchange relationship between diffuse interests and the EU institutions. Finally, an overview of generated hypotheses for this research project is depicted.

3.2 A theory of access for business interests
Pieter Bouwen developed a theoretical framework on the subject of business interest access to answer the following research question:

“What determines the degree of access of business interest to the European institutions?”

A distinction needs to be made between access and influence. They are not the same. Gaining access does not necessarily mean exerting influence, because it is possible to gain access without exerting influence (Bouwen 2004, p337). Without access however, exercising influence in the EU legislative process is impossible. Studying access is therefore likely to be a good indicator of influence (Austen-Smith 1995; Coleman and Grant 1988; Hansen 1991; cited in Bouwen 2004).

Foundations for a theory of access
Exchange theory and resource dependency theory are the heart of Bouwen’s theoretical framework. He argues that the relationship between business interest groups and the three major EU institutions should be viewed as an exchange relationship between two groups of interdependent organizations (Bouwen 2004, p339). The organizations involved in the exchange make an implicit or explicit cost benefit analysis on the basis of which they decide with whom to interact (Bouwen 2004). According to Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976, p.83 cited in Bouwen 2004), in the context of the EU decision-making process, actors become interdependent because they need resources from each other.
The crucial resource required by private actors is access to the European institutions. In return, the EU institutions demand resources that are crucial for their own functioning (Bouwen, 2002, p368). Bouwen has named these crucial resources access goods.

Access goods
Definition: “Access goods are goods provided by interest groups to the EU institutions in order to gain access to them. Each access good concerns a specific kind of information that is important in the EU decision-making process. The criticality of an access good for the functioning of an EU institution determines the degree of access that the institution will grant to the interest representatives.”

Bouwen defines three different access goods. All three of them have one common characteristic, namely that information is the basic good. According to Bouwen (2004), information is the most important resource in the exchange between business interests and the EU institutions. The three access goods can be specified as follows:

1. Expert Knowledge (EK).
   “This is the expertise and technical know-how required from the private sector to understand the market. This kind of information is indispensable in developing effective EU legislation in a particular policy area. Example: The technical expertise provided by Barclays Bank to help EU officials and politicians understand the particularities of new capital adequacy rules for commercial banks (Bouwen 2004, p340).”

1. Information about the European Encompassing Interests (IEEI).
   “This is the information required from the private sector on the European Encompassing Interests (EEI). In Bouwen’s sectoral approach, the EEI relates to the aggregated needs and interests of a sector in the European the so-called internal market. Example: The information provided by the European Banking Federation on the needs and interests of its members with regard to new capital adequacy rules for commercial banks (Bouwen 2004, p340).”
2. Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (DEI).

“This is the information required from the private sector on the Domestic Encompassing Interest (DEI). In Bouwen’s sectoral approach, the DEI concerns the needs and interests of a sector in the domestic market. Example: the information provided by the Belgian Bankers’ Association on the needs and interests of its members with regard to new capital adequacy rules for commercial banks (Bouwen 2004, p340).”

The importance of expert knowledge in the EU decision-making process has been widely acknowledged in the literature (Bowen 1997; Buholzer, 1998; Pappi and Henning 1999; Raedelli 1995; Truman 1951; Van Schendelen 1994 cited in Bouwen 2004). However, the two so-called ‘encompassing access goods’ have not been identified previously. Therefore, Bouwen (2004) explains the meaning of the concept ‘encompassing interest’ in the following way.

Definition: “An interest is more encompassing when more interested parties are involved in the formulation of the interest. So, an aggregation of individual interest or interested parties has to take place. When this aggregation of interests takes place at the national sectoral level, the Domestic Encompassing Interest is involved. When it takes place at the European sectoral level, we speak of the European Encompassing Interest (Bouwen 2004, p341).”

The ‘encompassingness’ of interest groups and their representativeness are positively correlated (Salisbury 1979, p222 cited in Bouwen 2004, p341). The highest degree of access is granted to the actors that can provide the so-called critical resource. The criticality of a resource is the extent to which the organization requires the resource for continued operation (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, p46-7 cited in Bouwen 2004).
The supply and demand scheme for access goods

Figure 1 displays the variable scheme, or the supply and demand scheme of access for business interests.

The dependent variable \( Y_{An} \) indicates the extent to which business interests have access to EU institution \( n \). The supply of access goods, \( Y_s \), and the demand for access goods, \( Y_{Dn} \), are the independent variables. It can be concluded that, in order to explain the variation of \( Y_{An} \), both \( Y_s \) and \( Y_{Dn} \) have to be studied (Bouwen 2004, p342).

The supply of access goods

Being able to provide access goods is crucial for business interests who want to establish an exchange relationship with a targeted institution at the EU level. However, not all actors have the same capacity to provide these access goods. According to Bouwen, the crucial variable determining the kind of access goods that can be provided is organizational form. The main organizational forms in interest representation are presented in table 1.
### Table 1: Organizational forms of interest representation

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Individual action</th>
<th>Collective action</th>
<th>Third party action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National level</strong></td>
<td>Individual national action</td>
<td>National association</td>
<td>National consultant</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>European level</strong></td>
<td>Individual EU action</td>
<td>European association</td>
<td>Brussels consultant</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Three important variables determine organizational form. They are depicted in figure 1. The first one is size. Large organizations have enough resources to lobby individually. However, smaller ones often have to rely on collective action to undertake action at different levels in the EU multi-level system (Bouwen 2004, p343). Economic strategy is the second variable. The different market strategies of national niche players and large internationally oriented firms require different political strategies (Bouwen 2004, p343). The third variable is the domestic institutional environment (Beyers 2002, p590 cited in Bouwen 2004, p342). A close working relationship between state administrative elites and private interests at the national level might, for example, create a form of hierarchical interaction that undermines the incentives of private interests to act directly at the European level (Bouwen 2004, p342).

### Table 2: The supply of access goods (Bouwen 2004, p343)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Best provided access good</th>
<th>Ranking of capacities to provide access goods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual firms</strong></td>
<td>EK</td>
<td>EK &gt; IDEI &gt; IEEI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>European associations</strong></td>
<td>IEEI</td>
<td>IEEI &gt; EK &gt; IDEI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National associations</strong></td>
<td>IDEI</td>
<td>IDEI &gt; EK &gt; IEEI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consultants</strong></td>
<td>(EK)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EK=Expert Knowledge;
IDEI=Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest;
IEEI=Information about the European Encompassing Interest

### The demand for access goods

The formal powers of each institution in the EU legislative process and the timing of their intervention in the process, largely determine the institutions’ demand for access goods (Bouwen 2004, p344). EU institutions are not all equally interested in the three different access goods. For each EU institution, a number of dependencies can be identified (Bouwen 2004, p344). According to Bouwen (2004, p344), the demand for access goods is based on the EU institution’s role in the legislative process.
Therefore, he claims that the most problematic dependency will correspond to the demand for the access good most critical for the fulfillment of the institution’s formal legislative role. In table 3, Bouwen establishes the ranking of dependencies for each of the three EU institutions and identifies the critical resource.

Table 3: Demand for access goods (Bouwen 2004, p345)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Critical resource</th>
<th>Ranking of dependencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>IEEI</td>
<td>IEEI&gt;IDEI&gt;EK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>EK</td>
<td>EK&gt;IEEI&gt;IDEI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Ministers</td>
<td>IDEI</td>
<td>IDEI&gt;IEEI&gt;EK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EK= Expert Knowledge;  
IDEI=Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interests;  
IEEI=Information about the European Encompassing Interests

The Parliament particularly needs information that allows it to assess the legislative proposals made by the European Commission. The specific information it requires for this assessment is information about the European Encompassing Interests (EEI). This is the Parliament’s critical resource, because it provides encompassing sectoral information about needs and interests in the EU internal market. Members of Parliament also need information about Domestic Encompassing Interests (DEI). This access good provides them with information about the needs and preferences of their voters, which is something they need to increase their chance for re-election (Bouwen, 2004 p345-346). The Parliament’s demand for Expert Knowledge (EK) is limited. It does need some basic EK, but at this stage of the legislative process, the Commission has already drafted a detailed and often highly technical proposal with the help of detailed EK (Bouwen, 2004, p345).  

The EC is considered to be the most supranational institution in the EU decision-making process. It plays a central role in the EU legislative process. The EC works on promoting common European interests, as well as promoting its own position (Rometsch and Wessels 1997, p214 cited in Bouwen 2004, p346).

Bouwen states that the Commission needs information about the European Encompassing Interests (EEI) to play its role in the legislative process. It has a substantial interest in this access good, because it can help to identify common European interests. Because of understaffing and severe budget constraints, the EC is dependent on external resources to obtain the necessary expertise to be able to propose legislation. Expert knowledge is therefore the critical resource for the Commission’s legislative work (Bouwen 2004, p346).
The Domestic Encompassing Interest is not defined as a primary interest to the EC, because the domestic interests have not yet been identified at this stage in the legislative process. Also, the EC is aiming towards developing common European Interest, instead of concentrating on a whole set of national interests.

The Council of Ministers is the most intergovernmental institution in EU’s legislative procedure. The influence of national interests prevails in the Council. The different Council configurations are made up of the European Ministers responsible for the areas concerned. It is crucial for the Member States to identify their national or domestic interests, so they are able to represent them in the different Council configurations. This means the Council’s critical resource or critical access good is information about the Domestic Encompassing Interests (DEI). This access good gives the Member States information about the needs and interests of the domestic market (Bouwen, 2004). The Council also has an interest in information about European Encompassing interests. This is because its secretariat and presidency, which embody a sense of collective purpose and commitment, give the Council a supranational flavor (Würzel 2002 cited in Bouwen, 2004). The individual Ministers do not always act solely on behalf of the Member States they represent. They can sometimes switch position in order to reach a compromise, or to forge an allegiance with other Member States on a specific topic. When it comes to decision-making in the Council, a proposal has already been carefully worked out technically. This means that the demand for Expert Knowledge is substantially reduced for Council members. As a result, Bouwen ranks it as the information the Council is least dependant on (see table 3).

**Combining supply and demand**

Explaining interest group access involves linking the supply and demand side of access goods. Pfeffer (1982, p193 cited in Bouwen 2004, p348) argues that organizations will be more responsive to the demand of the group or organization in its environment that controls its most problematic dependency. The implications of this argument are, that an EU institution will respond more and give more access to the interest that controls the institutions most problematic dependency or critical resource (Bouwen 2004, p348). From this ‘logic of access’, Bouwen has specified a number of hypotheses about access.
Table 4: Overview of generated hypotheses by Pieter Bouwen

| 1. Access to the European Parliament | EA>NA>IF |
| 2. Access to the European Commission | IF>EA>NA |
| 3. Access to the Council of Ministers | NA*>EA>IF |

*National associations and national champions

EA=European Associations
NA=National Associations
IF=Large Individual Firms

3.3 A theory of access for non-business interests

Business interests and non-business interests are not the same. Where business lobby groups represent their own interests, non-business lobby groups represent collective interests. These interests may range beyond the scope of the members of non-business organizations. In other words, you don’t have to be a member of friends of the earth or Greenpeace to support them or to reap the benefits of their actions. Diffuse interest lobby to address collective problems. These kinds of problems affect citizens collectively. They’re not limited to affecting only sub-groups within society. I have to closely examine the differences and similarities between business and non-business interests, if I want to successfully create an access theory for this new empirical domain. By doing so, I will be looking at the supply side in the exchange relationship between diffuse interests and the EU institutions. For the purpose of this research project, the demand side, the side of the EU institutions, will remain unchanged. The reason that I will only examine the supply side of access goods in this section is as follows. The EU institution’s demand for access goods originates from their institutional characteristics. These characteristics are relatively fixed, and therefore the demand side of access goods is the same for business and non-business interest alike. So, the first step to take in this section is to categorize diffuse interest groups according to organizational form and capacity to provide access goods. Defining these access goods for diffuse interests is the second step that needs to be taken. Finally, I will combine the supply and demand side in order to come to a set of hypotheses for diffuse interest access to the EU institutions.

Diffuse interests

Definition: “Diffuse interests are collective interests held by a large number of individuals, such as environmental protection, consumer protection, equal opportunities between men and women, and civil liberties (Pollack 1997, p572).”
So, what makes diffuse interests different from business interests? And do these differences have an effect on organizations and their capacities to provide access goods? Also, do differences have an effect on the categorization of organizational forms of diffuse interests? The representation of diffuse interests is difficult even in domestic systems of governance. Difficulties arise because individuals sometimes lack the incentive to mobilize in defense of such interests. The free-rider issue in collective problems causes this lack of incentive. Also, diffuse interests face high organizational costs in doing so, compared to more concentrated interests such as business groups (Olson 1971 and Vogel 1993 cited in Pollack 1997, p573). Gaining access to the Commission, the Parliament and the Council is a challenge for diffuse interests as well as for business or solid interests. This research paper is used to examine just how diffuse interests representatives can gain access. Ultimately it is aimed providing them with advice on how to improve this ‘access seeking process’. Examining which organizational forms are better equipped to provide certain access goods than others, will help provide interest groups with advice on how to gain more access to the EU institutions.

Classifying diffuse interests

Interest representation can be classified in different ways. Bouwen has chosen to make a clear distinction between interest representation on the national and the European level. For the purpose of my research, it is important to keep in mind that the different organizational forms are directly related to the ability of interests to provide specific access goods.

Bouwen also distinguishes between individual, collective and third party action (see table 5). From this arrangement, he has chosen to classify the organizational forms of business interest representation in the following manner. He distinguishes between individual firms, as well as European and national associations. Besides these three categories, he has added a fourth one, that of the consultant (see table 2). These categories correspond with the aforementioned types of action that can be taken by interest representing organizations. Bouwen is not alone in his claim. Eising (2007), for example argues that political access results from the institutional context, resource dependencies and related structures and strategies. In his paper, he too arranges business interests at the national and the European level, as well as making a distinction between individual and collective action.

Table 5: Organizational forms of interest representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Individual action</th>
<th>Collective action</th>
<th>Third party action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National level</td>
<td>Individual national action</td>
<td>National association</td>
<td>National consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European level</td>
<td>Individual EU action</td>
<td>European association</td>
<td>Brussels consultant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The categories have to be converted for the purpose of my thesis. I will attempt to do so in the following section. The categories are fundamentally the same for both types of interests. Diffuse interests organize themselves at the national, as well as the European level. They can also take individual, collective or third party action, the same way business interests can. However, when it comes to third party action, diffuse interests hardly ever take it. This has to do with the nature of diffuse interest organizations. Environmental groups, the relevant type of diffuse interest in this research project, are usually non-profit organizations. They tend not to hire (often expensive) consultants to represent them, because their financial resources are limited. So, because of the nature and affiliated characteristics of diffuse interest organizations, their use of third party representatives is limited. Three respondents confirmed this in exploratory interviews about non-business lobbying in the EU (see chapter 5 on empirical evidence). Because of this, I have decided for the purpose of my research, to exclude consultants from the categories of organizational forms for diffuse interests.

During the exploratory interviews however, a fourth actor in the representation of diffuse interests did come up. This is the scientific institute. An example of a scientific institute is ‘Natuur en Milieu Plan Bureau’, which is a Dutch research institution. Within these institutions, there is a lot of expertise on environmental issues. This is valuable information for the EU institutions. Keeping in mind the organizational forms of interest representation shown in table 5, I have chosen not to include these research institutes in my research project. Although they might help the promotion of diffuse interests, they are a completely separate from the organizational forms I am studying. This paper’s focus lies with active lobbying and by lobby groups. Even though these research institutes have contacts with the EU institutions, these contacts cannot be characterized as lobbying activities. Another reason for not including the institutes is to keep this project clear and researchable. I will however, make statements about these actors in chapter 5 when discussing the interviews and in chapter 6, when I make recommendations for further research.

Taking the foregoing information into account, I have classified diffuse interests in the following manner. I distinguish between individual interest groups and national and European interest group associations (see table 3). As I already established in the section above non-business interests are different from business interest. And there are a number of remarks that need to be made before moving on. Since organizational form is the crucial variable determining the kinds of access goods that can be provided (Bouwen 2004, p341), it is of fundamental importance to describe the organizational traits of diffuse interest groups. For the purpose of my research, is also necessary to compare them with the organizational traits of solid interests.
If we go back to figure 1, we can see that there are three variables that determine the organizational form that is chosen for lobbying activities. These variables are size, economic strategies and domestic structures (Bouwen 2004, p342). Looking at the variable size, Bouwen states that large individual players have enough resources to lobby the European institutions on their own. Smaller actors often do not have extensive resources. Therefore, they benefit by combine forces with other actors, joining in collective action to lobby the EU multi-level system (Bouwen 2004, p342). So when discussing individual interest group acting, I am actually discussing large individual interest group action. This distinction is important, and is reflected in the hypotheses summed up at the end of this section. (Economic) strategy, the second variable, can have an impact on the way an interest group chooses to organize itself. For example, if a small interest group’s strategy is to target the European level with lobbying activities, it can choose to join a network of congenial groups. The third variable of influence is the domestic institutional environment. For example, a close relationship between an interest group and national administrative elites might make the need for ‘going the European route’ less pressing. These three variables size, strategy and domestic structure, determine organizational form for both business and non-business interests.

**Diffuse interest access goods**

Bouwen has developed a new theoretical concept involving the process of resource exchange between private and public actors at the EU level. The resource required by interest groups is ‘access’ to the European institutions. In return for access to the EU agenda-setting and decision-making process, the EU institutions demand certain goods that are crucial for their own functioning. Bouwen calls these crucial goods ‘access goods’. He claims these goods have a common characteristic, namely information. He distinguishes three different kinds of access goods for business interests, specified below.

For the purpose of my research, it is crucial to find out whether non-business interests possess the same or comparable access goods as business interests do. A comparison between the two results in the following observation:
### Table 6: Comparison of access goods for business and non-business interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access good</th>
<th>Business interests</th>
<th>Non-business interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expert Knowledge</strong></td>
<td>The expertise and technical know-how required from the private sector to understand the market. This kind of information is indispensable in developing effective EU legislation in a particular policy area.</td>
<td>The expertise and technical know-how required from diffuse interests on environmental issues. This information is indispensable in developing effective EU legislation in a particular policy area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information on European Encompassing Interests</strong></td>
<td>The information required from the private sector on the European Encompassing Interests (EEI). In the sectoral approach, the EEI relates to the needs and interests of a sector in the European economic arena, i.e. the so-called Internal Market.</td>
<td>The information that diffuse interests posses on the needs and interest of its members. It specifically relates to the environmental needs of the European public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information on Domestic Encompassing Interests</strong></td>
<td>The information required from the private sector on the Domestic Encompassing Interest (DEI). In the sectoral approach, the DEI concerns the needs and interests of a sector in the domestic market.</td>
<td>The information that diffuse interest posses on the needs and interests of its members. It specifically relates to the environmental needs of the national public.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As explicated earlier, information is the basic element in all three access goods. When converting this typology from business interests to diffuse interest, information remains the main characteristic of access goods:

**EK:** Both business and diffuse interests possess expert knowledge on the field that they’re specialized in. In practice, this means that for example environmental organizations will independently conduct research and gain expertise in their field. With this expertise and know-how, they can give concrete and tangible advice to the European institutions. In fact, many of their lobbying activities consist of providing the institutions with documents concerning specific environmental topics.

**IEEI:** Diffuse interests possess information on the needs and the interests of their members. In other words, they represent a part of the European population. As mentioned earlier in this section, the scope of people they represent is larger than the immediate members of their organizations. This is important to keep in mind with respect to EU institutions political interest in gaining knowledge about their constituency.
IDEI: Diffuse interests possess information on the needs and the interests of their members, for example the UK renewable energy association members. In other words, they represent a part of a national population. As mentioned earlier in this section, the scope of people they represent is larger than the immediate members of their organizations. This is important to keep in mind with respect to EU institutions political interest in gaining knowledge about their constituency.

Besides assuming that the interests are able to provide these goods, Bouwen also assumes that different organizational forms are better equipped to provide certain goods than others. The ranking of diffuse interest capacities to provide access goods can be found in table 7.

*Table 7: The supply of access goods by diffuse interests*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Best provided access good</th>
<th>Ranking of capacities to provide access goods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual organization</strong></td>
<td>EK&gt;IDEI&gt;IEEI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>European association</strong></td>
<td>IEEI&gt;EK&gt;IDEI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National association</strong></td>
<td>IDEI&gt;EK&gt;IEEI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For individual organizations, Expert Knowledge is the best provided access good. That’s because large individual organizations spend a lot of resources on research and development (Bouwen 2002, p25). Also, the hierarchical decision-making structure of individual organizations furthers the efficient provisions of this access good to the EU institutions (Bouwen, 2002, p25). Large individual organizations, adopting a national strategy are likely to be listened to by their national government or national MEPs. When the interest group has a national basis, it represents the diffuse interests of at least a part of that national base. Therefore, the individual interest group is able to provide information on the Domestic Encompassing Interest. It is difficult however, to determine the scope of the encompassingness for diffuse interest representation.

The nature of diffuse interests makes this difficult. Let me explain. Not only have the members of an environmental organization supported their interests. If an organization is lobbying to promote a cleaner living environment, all citizens will benefit from the affects of these lobbying activities. They don’t have to be member of an environmental organization to share its needs and interests. That is why the encompassingness of diffuse interest representation is very hard to grasp. I will address this subject further in chapter 6, where I make recommendations for further research. For the purpose of this research project however, I will accept that national actors possess the Domestic Encompassing Interest, even though I cannot elaborate on the scope of this access good.
It needs to be mentioned that this access good is linked to political and constituency interests, especially from the Council and the Parliament. These two institutions are, especially during elections, looking for information about the preferences held by the general public. The DEI is ranked second behind EK. Information on the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI) is provided the least by individual organizations, because they are the furthest removed from the European level and only one organization is involved in the articulation of the interest (Bouwen 2002, p25).

For national associations, information about the National Encompassing Interests is the best provided access good. They represent their member organizations and therefore provide high quality Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interests (IDEI). Because national associations have to deal with many policy issues, they are generalists rather than specialists (Bouwen 2002, p25). Therefore, they are not great at providing Expert Knowledge. It is their second best provided access good. Last in the list is Information on the European Encompassing Interests. Again, since the national association has a national base, it cannot very well claim to represent a European constituency. The scope of encompassingness of interests is unclear for associations as well, although it is deemed to be greater for national and European associations than it is for individual organizations. European associations are mostly located in Brussels. They are not as good as individual organizations in providing Expert Knowledge, because they have fewer resources and at the same time have to deal with more issues (Bouwen 2002, p25). European associations are specialized in channeling the different opinions of their members (Bouwen 2002, p26). Their best provided access good is therefore Information about the European Encompassing Interests. Their second best provided interest is Expert Knowledge. Although, the European associations are distant from research in the field, they are close to the three European institutions. This makes them easily accessible and very knowledgeable on how the EU multi-level system works (see also the in-depth interview with the EP section 5.2). Their least provided access good is Information on the National Encompassing Interest, because they do not directly represent a national group of interests. Only through their national members, they are able to obtain and provide this access good.

Hypotheses
To conclude this extensive section, all the information given has to be distilled into hypotheses that can be tested. Following the work of Pieter Bouwen, there are a total of nine hypotheses to be tested in this project. They are separated into three categories.
European Parliament
1. European associations have the highest degree of access to the European Parliament
2. National associations have less access to the EP than European associations do
3. Large individual interest groups have the lowest degree of access to the Parliament

European Commission
1. Large individual interest groups have the highest degree of access to the Commission
2. European associations have less access to the EC than individual firms do
3. National associations have the lowest degree of access to the European Commission

Council of Ministers
1. National associations have the highest degree of access to the Council of Ministers
2. European associations have less access to the Council than national associations do
3. Large individual interest groups have the lowest degree of access to the Council

3.4 Conclusion
This lengthy chapter presented the theoretical background needed to carry out my research. Section 3.2 gives an ample description of the first the foundations and then all other aspects of Bouwen’s access theory. The concept of access goods is introduced. The section goes on to combine the supply and demand side of the exchange relationship surrounding access goods. Finally, Bouwen’s hypotheses on access are expanded upon. Section 3.3 covers my own theoretical framework, an access theory for diffuse interests. The section starts with a definition of diffuse interests and a classification of their organizational forms. It goes on by defining diffuse interest access goods. Finally, it presents a total of nine hypotheses about the relative access of diffuse interests to the three major EU institutions.
This second part of the chapter is essential for the empirical data I have gathered in the interviews, on which I will expand in chapter 6. It is also the basis for the concluding chapter of this research paper, chapter 7.
4. Research design and methodology

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is dedicated to the description of the research design and the research methods that were used to answer the central research question and sub-questions posed in the first chapter. I will start the chapter off with section 4.2 about the different variables used in my research paper. Section 4.3 presents the three different case studies I will be researching. The seeking of access to each of the major EU institutions is a different case to be studied in this thesis. Section 4.4 gives reasons for choosing the energy sector as my designated policy area. The next section, section 4.5 expands upon the fifteen interviews I conducted in order to gather the necessary empirical data for my project. It provides the reader with an insight into the methods used to obtain clear and valid information from the chosen respondents. It covers subjects such as sampling from different populations and interviewing methods. In section 4.6, I describe the way in which I will analyze the data obtained through the interviews. Finally, section 4.7 is used to look at the limitations of my methods of inquiry. Section 4.8 summarizes and concludes the chapter.

4.2 Variables

My research is founded on a number of variables. The variable scheme for this research project is depicted below. It serves as the framework for this research project.

*Figure 2: Variable scheme*

\[ n1 = \text{European Parliament} \]
\[ n2 = \text{European Commission} \]
\[ n3 = \text{Council of Ministers} \]
The access of diffuse actors to the EU institution \( n \) (\( Y_a \)) is the dependent variable. Since this research project covers three institutions, three dependent variables can be distinguished. Dependent variable \( Y_a \) Parliament when \( n=1 \). Dependent variable \( Y_a \) Commission when \( n=2 \). And dependent variable \( Y_a \) Council when \( n=3 \). These three dependent variables indicate the extent to which diffuse actors have access to institution \( n \).

The supply of access goods (\( Y_s \) for supply) and the demand for access goods (\( Y_d \) \( n \) for demand) are the independent variables. Changes in these independent variables are expected to vary the value of the dependent variables. So, if the supply of access goods is adjusted, changed, a shift in the level of diffuse interest access to the EU institutions is expected to occur. The same holds true for a change in the other independent variable, the demand for access goods \( Y_d \) \( n \). The \( n \) stands for each institution \( n \). For all three institutions, a specific demand for access goods is identified. There is the demand of the Parliament, the demand of the Commission and the demand of the Council. In order to explain the variation of the dependent variable, access, both the supply and the demand for access goods have to be studied. It should be clear that the variable scheme used here is based on the variable scheme as used by Pieter Bouwen.

4.3 Case study research

For my research project I am conducting case study research. For the purpose of my work, Bouwen’s theory of access for business interests is converted to a theory for non-business interest. Subsequently, it is applied to the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers. The aim of this project is to gain a better understanding of the access of diffuse or non-business interests to the EU. The analysis of access of non-business interests in each of the three EU institutions constitutes a separate case study (Bouwen, 2004, p349).

As I mentioned earlier in my literary review, the fact that I am not solely focusing on the European Commission, is not in line with much of the traditional literature on EU interest politics. Instead, I am doing research on all three major EU institutions. Applying the theoretical framework to the three main institutions allows a comparative analysis of the three cases. In order to understand the logic of interest politics at the European level, it is appropriate to analyze the three EU institutions simultaneously (Bouwen 2004, p349). The combined results of the three case studies make it possible to analyze the data from a comparative inter-institutional perspective (Eckstein 1975, p85 cited in Bouwen 2004, p349).
4.4 Choice of policy area

This chapter wouldn’t be complete without some attention paid to the energy sector being the policy field of choice for this project. As we know, Bouwen conducted his research in the EU financial services policy area. For my subject, however, this policy area would not be the first choice. In order to maximize the potential outcome of my work, I have chosen a policy area in which diffuse interests are quite active. Diffuse interests are representing collective interest. One of the major examples of diffuse interest representation is the environmental protection movement (Pollack 1997, p573). EU’s energy policy area is an area where environmental groups are actively lobbying. The reason behind these lobbying activities is, amongst other things, the fact that the EU currently does not have a common European energy policy. However, important steps are taking to the creation of such a policy. For lobby groups, this is an excellent opportunity to ‘get on board’ in the early stages of the creation of a new common EU policy area. Functionally, this means environmental groups are participating in Green paper consultations issued by the EC. They are lobbying members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in the committee for Research, Industry and Energy.

And they are trying to get a foot in the door with member of the Council on Transport, Telecommunications and Energy. Important to note with regard to the chosen policy area, or sector indirectly influences the theoretical framework (Bouwen 2002, p197). This happens because sectoral specificities enter the framework by influencing the variables size, economic strategies and domestic structures (Bouwen 2002, p197). Since my focus is on a different sector, namely EU’s energy sector, the three variables are bound to differ as a result. However, this is a bit like comparing apples and pears. If my thesis would have been about comparing business interests in two different sectors, the sectoral specifics would have been a major part of my research focus. Now that my focus lies with diffuse interests, however, my research interest is shifted towards clarifying the differences between business and non-business lobbying. However, I will expand on the EU energy sector in chapter 4.

4.5 Interviews

In order to gather the empirical data I need for my research, I will be conducting fourteen telephone-based interviews with the three EU institutions. Four to five interviews will be conducted per institution. From those interviews, one for each institution will be a semi-structured in-depth interview. The other interviews will be somewhat shorter, semi-structured interviews.
The aim of the semi-structured interviews is to gather comparable data. Therefore, the methodological instrument for data collection in my research project is the semi-structured interview. I will expand on the content of the interviews in the following sections.

Semi-structured interview

By conducting semi-structured interviews, I am avoiding the pitfalls usually found in quantitative research. These pitfalls are related to either the closed interview or the questionnaire. Both of these forms of data collection use a fixed set of closed questions. These types of questions force the respondent to fit their knowledge into the researchers categories (Robson 2002, p269-272). For my research paper, due to limited time and resources I am only able to conduct a relatively small number of interviews. Therefore, the focus of these interviews should not be purely quantitative. I am not able to collect large amounts of statistical data. Instead, during the semi-structured interviews, I will be collecting both qualitative and quantitative data. I am combining a set of structured and closed questions with open-ended questions. This way, I can quantify a part of the data, and at the same time generate more qualitative, in-depth information. To start off, before conducting any other interviews, I will conduct three more informal, conversational in-depth interviews with three respondents.

The first respondent will be an assistant to a member of the ITRE committee within the European Parliament. The second will be a member of the DG TREN within the European Commission. The third respondent will be a policy staff member working for a member of the Council of Ministers. The reason for having these three interviews, before conducting the other ones, is to gather information on diffuse interest lobbying. Whilst applying the access theory for business-interests to non-business interests, I have attempted to convert the main concepts he uses in his theory to a different kind of organization. These three exploratory interviews will help me in refining the adjustments that have to be made to access theory, in order to successfully apply it to diffuse interest.

Devising and conducting the interviews

The interviews are the major data-collecting tool for this project. Through the interviews, I had to get all the data about how the institutions ranked the three organizational forms. Following Robson’s suggestions on devising and conducting interviews (2002, p227-291), a lot of care and consideration went into the phrasing and sequencing of the interview questions. This helped to ensure that respondents were able to answer not only how often they interacted with diffuse interests, but also take the usefulness of these interactions into account.
At the centre of the schedule lies a fixed set of structured questions used to obtain the proportion of quantitative data. These questions were also posed to the three respondents during the abovementioned in-depth interviews. The set of closed questions is needed to compare the three different case studies of the three institutions. A number of open-ended questions are asked to supplement the core of closed ones. It needs to be said that the questions were not used as a fixed questionnaire that had to be completed during the interview. I rephrased open questions wherever I saw it fit to do so during the interviews. The closed questions, used to gather statistical data, were always asked and never changed. Also, the order of these questions was not changed during the interviews. The manner in which the interview schedule is designed is that certain earlier questions introduce later ones. So, to make sure each question was properly introduced, it was important not to change the questioning sequence. The core of my interview schedule can be found in annex III.

Population
In the next section, I will identify the relevant population of each of the EU institutions. Because the analysis of access in each of the three EU institutions constitutes a separate case study, I will be examining three populations. These are the population of the European Commission, the European Parliament and that of the Council of Ministers. Let’s take a closer look, starting with the European Parliament. The relevant population does not consist of the entire body of Members of Parliament (MEPs). There are some parts of the EP, which are more relevant to this research paper than others. According to Bouwen, within the range of the plenary session, the specialized committee system is the most relevant part of the Parliament for studying lobbying. Bouwen comes to this conclusion after a detailed investigation. He states that, despite the fact that the plenary session has final say on legislation, most of its work takes place in specialized committees. He goes on to conclude that it constitutes the supranational assembly’s most important point of access (Bouwen 2004, p22). For the purpose of my research, I will accept this to be the case for the subject of energy as well. On energy issues, one specific EP committee is relevant. This is the committee for Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). The committee consists of 106 members, of which 54 are full members. The full members of the committee are the relevant population to be investigated.

The European Commission is divided up into various Directorate-Generals. The DG for Energy and Transport is the leading Directorate-General in the subject of energy. Besides the DG, there are a number of consultative committees as the most important access point for diffuse interests.
In contrast with expert and Comitology committees, individual firms and interest groups are allowed to participate directly in these committees (Schäfer, 1996). However, because of time and resource limitation, I will not be taking these consultative committees into account when investigating and sampling the EC population. Instead, I will give the DG for Energy and Transport my full attention. This is the population for the European Commission.

The Council is made up of the ministers of the EU member states. There are nine different Council configurations, each discussing a different topic. In the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council (TTE), issues concerning energy are discussed (www.consilium.europa.eu, accessed 03-06-08). Therefore, the TTE Council is the designated population for the Council of Ministers.

**Sampling**

As explicated in the previous section, the three populations I am studying are relatively small. Because of time and resource limitations, I am unable to select a large sample from these populations. In order to make a generalization from a sample to an entire population, a truly random sample and representative sample should be taken. The larger the sample, the lower the likely error in generalizing (Robson 2002, p260-267). A truly random sample avoids selection biases. More importantly, random samples are related to quantitative research methods, and allow for statistical analysis. I have chosen to use purposive sampling as my selection tool. In purposive or purposeful sampling, the principle of selection is the researcher’s judgment as to typicality or interest (Robson 2002, p265). Purposeful sampling is used to choose cases that are particularly rich with information.

These cases are chosen in order to obtain as much input as possible, even when a sample is relatively small. In addition to using this qualitative selection method, I attempt to select a stratified random sample from each of the populations (Robson 2002, p260-267). Each of the three populations can be divided into smaller groups or strata. For example, the MEPs in the ITRE committee can be divided into a number of different sub-groups. Within ITRE there representatives from different countries and different MEPs represent different political parties. There are more characteristics of MEPs that separate them into different strata. More information on the selected samples can be found in chapter 5, where the empirical evidence of this project is discussed. The foregoing section about selecting samples brings me to the following dilemma. My sample of four to five from each of the populations is not random. It is to some degree representative, because I have used stratified random sampling along side purposive sampling methods.
However, the sample is in fact too small to confidently make generalizations about the entire population. Because of the nature in which the sample is acquired, it is not really suited for statistical analysis. The possibility of generalizing my research findings is limited by the composition and size of my sample. Nevertheless, I will use the data I collect through my sample to draw conclusions in the final chapters of my research paper. An in-depth address of the limitation of my research project can be found in section 3.5.

Response rates
The response rate is the number of those persons agreeing to be interviewed as a proportion of the number of persons contacted for an interview. Within this response rate, the number of ‘non-obtainables’ is not included. ‘Non-obtainables’ are persons who have proven to be impossible to contact. Because they were never contacted in the first place, they are not part of the list of respondents contacted for the interview. According to Breakwell (1990, p74) acceptable response rates for large-scale survey research involving interviewing is anything over 60%, for smaller-scale studies, the response rate should be even higher. Beyers (2000, p117) recognizes that the response rate of MEPs tends to be lower than the response rate of Commission and Council officials. The response rate of MEPs in his research amounts to 56%. For Commission officials, this is 82%. For Council officials this is 100%. Table gives an overview of the population, sample and response rate of my project.

4.6 Data analysis
The way in which data is analyzed is evidently related to the way in which it is collected. Since I am using multiple methods of data collection, I will also use multiple methods of data analysis. Exploratory work in the three more informal, in-depth interviews is used to collect qualitative data. This data is used to map out the way in which Bouwen’s access theory should be converted from business interests to non-business interests. On the other hand, these interviews are used to get quantitative data as well. This statistical information is used to answer the hypotheses generated in chapter 3. These hypotheses are generated about the relative access of actors to the three EU institutions. And they are tested on the basis of ordinal data (Bouwen 2004, p350). This means that during the fifteen semi-structured interviews, the respondents were asked to establish a ranking of their contact with the different organizational forms. The respondents had to indicate which of the four organizational forms the organization with which they had contacts belonged. In this, they also took the usefulness and regularity of the contacts into account.
The resulting rankings indicate which organizational forms the respondents chose as their first, second and third choice (Bouwen 2004, p350). The exact phrasing of the questions that were asked in the interviews can be found in annex III.

The weighted sum of rank values
Bouwen uses two methods for the analysis of the statistical data he obtains from his interviews. The first method is that of the weighted sum of the rank values. To test the hypotheses described earlier, the individual rankings given by respondents from the same institution have to be combined to obtain an overall or composite ranking of an institution (Bouwen 2004, p350). The easiest way of obtaining complete composite ranking of the four organizational forms is to use the weighted sums of the rank values (Guilford, 1954:180, Cooper and Emory, 1995:145 cited in Bouwen 2004, p351).

For my research project, rank numbers are given to each of the different organizational forms by respondents. The highest rank is 1, than 2, and so on. When the statistical data collecting in the interviews is processed, these numbers are replaced by their rank values. These are ranked in the reversed order, number 3 having the highest value, than number 2 and then number 1. In order to obtain the composite ranking, the resulting rank values (3,2,1) are weighted for each organizational form with the frequencies the respondents chose the organizational form as their first, second and third choice (Bouwen 2004, p351).

Rank values, however, are strictly ordinal numbers. Therefore, the numerical meaning of the weighted sums of these rank values is not entirely clear. Confusion might arise, because there is an implicit assumption that the distance between the different ranks and the rank values is equal. When the weighted sums of rank values are calculated, there is an implicit assumption that the distance between the different ranks, and thereby the rank values themselves, are equal (Bouwen 2004, p351). Respondents might have different intensities of preferences for different organizational forms. These differences in preference or the distance between ranks is not taken into account by this method. Therefore, a second method for analysis is used to take this fact into account.

The method of paired comparison
The method of paired comparison is otherwise known as Thurstone’s law of comparative judgment. The method of paired comparison is a one-dimensional scaling method that allows ordinal scale values to be converted into interval scale values (Guilford 1954, p154 and Swanborn 1993, p31 cited in Bouwen 2004, p352).
In this method, the different organizational forms of interest groups have to be evaluated by the respondents in all the possible pairs. The result of this evaluation is a number of comparative judgments. On the basis of these judgments, Bouwen determined the proportion of times each organizational form is chosen over the other two forms (Bouwen 2004, p352).

This method allows us to gather information about the intensity of the respondents’ preferences when ranking the different alternatives. The calculation of the interval scale values is based on this additional data (Bouwen 2004, p352). So, not only does the method of paired comparison establish the composite ranking it also contributes to the more precise determining of the different degrees of access of the different organizational forms to the three EU institutions (Bouwen, 2004). It has to be made clear that respondents were not directly asked about paired comparison of the three organizational forms. Instead, they were asked to establish a ranking of the organizational forms. From this ranking, comparative judgments for all pairs of organizational forms can be derived. For example, if the four organizational forms are ranked in the order given six comparative judgments can be deduced. This approach is called the pair-comparison treatment of complete ranks (Guilford 1954, p 183 cited in Bouwen 2004, p352).

4.7 Research limitations

The research I am conducting for my project is limited in a number of different ways. These limitations make generalization difficult to say the least. First of all, my sample size is a factor of limitation. For example, when comparing my research to that of Pieter Bouwen, it is clear that there are some major differences. Bouwen was able to sample the entire population of respondents he was investigating. He was also able to plan and take the time to conduct all his interviews in an in-depth, face-to-face manner. This results in the conclusion that Bouwen’s research outcomes can be generalized. Due to time and resource limitations, I had to take a small sample of five cases from each of the three populations. This sample isn’t random; therefore it is not genuinely suited for statistical analysis. The possibility of generalizing my research findings is limited by the composition and size of my sample.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter gave an overview of the design of my research and the methods used. My main investigative tool is the semi-structured interview. Fifteen semi-structured interviews are conducted for the purpose of answering my research questions. Section 4.5 discusses the sampling, populations and response rates for this project. The statistical part of the data gathered during the interviews, is subjected to a set of quantitative analyzing methods.
These are the weighted sum of rank values and the method of paired comparison. The first method is used to rank the organizational forms of diffuse interests. The second examines the distance between the rank values. Qualitative data gathered with the interviews is interpreted for non-statistical purposes. Finally, the research limitations of this project are summed up in section 4.7. It is clear that, because of a number of limitations, it will be difficult if not impossible to make any generalizing statements about the populations from my samples.

5. Energy and interests in Europe

5.1 Introduction

This first empirical chapter serves as a description of the background against which this research is set. As explicated in section 4.3, the chosen policy area indirectly influences the theoretical framework by influencing the three variables that determine organizational form. Consequently, I have chosen to dedicate this chapter to a description of the sector. I will attempt to give a description of the major traits of EU’s energy sector. In doing so, I will shed some light on the background against which this research project is set. The knowledge about issues in the energy domain is also lays the foundation for the interviews. The issues discussed in the sections below, are subjects of discussion in the interviews. They often serve as examples or reference points when discussing the access of diffuse interests to the EU institutions. Later on in the chapter, I will also devote a section of this chapter to the access seeking side of the framework. Although I have chosen to focus my data gathering entirely on public actors, I do shortly want to address the reality of diffuse interests in EU’s energy domain. So, the chapter starts off with a description of the subject of energy in the European Union. Section 5.2 will give a very brief description of the historical developments in EU energy. Section 5.3 discusses the main issues and the current state of affairs on energy. Finally, section 5.4 pays attention to the diffuse interest involved in lobbying EU’s energy domain. Section 5.5 is used to summarize the chapter.

5.2 History

The history of energy policy in the EU can be characterized by a common policy on the one hand, and national policies on the other. Andersen (2000) recognizes four stages in the development of EU energy policy. In the first stage, from 1946 to 1957, energy came mostly from indigenous coal. Energy supply was a major issue for the six members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).
Cooperation in this field eventually fuelled wider economic and political cooperation. The second period, from 1957 to 1972, can be described as one where energy was not of major concern. During these times, cheap imported oil replaced coal and the closer cooperation in other areas did not spill over to the energy sector. From 1972 to 1985, energy was back on the EU agenda as result of the 1973 oil crisis. The last stage, from 1986 to the present day, represents revitalization in attempts to introduce a common EU energy policy. Up until the present day, the EU does not have a common energy policy. However, the EC has been active in promoting a common policy. Renewed proposals started with a number of Green Papers, issued by the EC in 2005, 2006 and 2007 (S.S. Andersen, Arena Working Papers website, 2008).

5.3 Current state of affairs
The website of the European Union describes six key topics, around which all legislation on the subject of energy is assembled (EU summary of legislation website, 2008). In this section, I will briefly discuss these six topics or areas, whilst given a concise overview of the main legislation accompanying the area.

A common energy policy for Europe
This area concerns the initiatives put forward by the European Union to obtain a common energy policy for the entire EU. As shown in the previous section, energy policy was at the foundation of the ECSC Treaty in 1951. In 2007, the European Commission proposed a new common energy policy for the EU. Reasons for promoting such a common policy are the desire to take on current energy challenges in a collective fashion, combining the strengths of each individual member state. These energy challenges originate from the EU’s desire to become a low-energy economy. This evolves conquering energy challenges like making the energy that is consumed more secure, competitive and sustainable. The goals of the common policy are supported by a number of financial and technological measures. These are taxes and subsidies, the use of Community financial instruments and the development of energy technologies. Practical expressions for this aim of creating a common energy policy for Europe is also the Green Paper issued on the subject on March 8th 2006, named ‘A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy’. All information in this section was retrieved from the EU summary of legislation website, 2008.
The internal European energy market
Through the creation of an internal energy market, EU is aiming at improving the security of energy supply. Also, the internal market is aimed at improving competitiveness and diversification. It will do so by creating a market that is accessible to all suppliers and thereby giving consumers a choice between different suppliers (EU summary of legislation website, 2008).

Energy efficiency
With improving the efficient use of energy, the EU aims to remain competitive and to ensure security of supply. Also, energy efficiency goals need to be met to ensure the commitments made on climate change under the Kyoto protocol. In 2006, EU set goals for a reduction of primary energy consumption by 20% by the year 2020. In practice, the efficient use of energy is promoted by mobilizing public opinion. Also the EU is working on minimal energy efficiency standards, rules and regulations on the labeling of products, services and infrastructure. Policies on this subject were introduced in a Green paper on energy efficiency, issued on June 22nd of 2005, and in several action plans. All information was retrieved from the EU summary of legislation website, 2008.

Renewable energy
With renewable energy sources, the EU wants to create alternatives for fossil fuels as a basis for energy. By using these alternatives, EU aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. These alternatives are also aimed at reducing the dependence on external energy sources from outside EU borders. In 2020, 20% of the market share should be coming from renewable energy sources. All information was retrieved from the EU summary of legislation website, 2008.

Nuclear energy
Nuclear energy is viewed as an energy source that is viewed favorable by the European Union in the fight against climate change, and the ensuring of security of supply. This comes from the fact that nuclear energy produces low carbon levels and has relatively stable costs. Nevertheless, EU is not in charge of making decisions on the pursuit of nuclear power, the Member States are. EU does play a role in this field through the European Atomic Energy Community, EURATOM for short. This agency which is part of the European Commission works on cooperation and security issues, rather than promoting the use of nuclear energy. All information retrieved from the EU summary of legislation website, 2008.
Security of energy supply

The security of energy supply is important to the European Union. This can be observed when goal is linked to several of the other key topics on EU energy, as described in the foregoing section. In order to achieve this security, the EU wants to involve and cooperate with developed and developing countries. It is also important to the EU to promote efficiency and consistency by speaking with one European voice on the subject of energy. Practically the plans for increasing security of supply are expressed in a number of policy documents, such as the Green paper ‘Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply’. This Green paper was issued on November the 29th of the year 2000. All information mentioned in this section was retrieved from the EU summary of legislation website, 2008.

Figure 3: Graphics on EU-25’s energy consumption and production

The legend of figure 3 can be found in annex IV. Both the graphic and the legend come from the fact sheet accompanying the Green paper on energy, which was drawn up by the EC in March 2006 (European Commission website, 2008).
5.4 Main players in energy lobbying

This section is used to illustrate the representation of diffuse interests. Especially in the first three chapters, diffuse interests are described in a fairly anonymous way. This section aims to present examples of each of the three organizational forms used in the theoretical framework. This way, the reader is to get an idea of what kind of players can be found in the energy sector. The description of these three organizations also strengthens the categorization of diffuse interests I made in section 3.3. However, it needs to be made clear that the three organizations described in this section are examples of organizational forms. In practice, many different variations to these forms exist, and each different organization may be organized in a different manner.

To be clear, the diffuse interests studied in this project are environmental organizations. These can be one-issue organizations, or broadly oriented ones. I will present three major players in EU’s environmental lobbying arena. I will also give an account of their activities on lobbying with regard to energy issues in the European Union. This is done to illustrate the link between the chosen policy area and the research subject. The environmental organizations described in this section, were found through the European Commissions voluntary register of interest representatives, which is part of the European transparency initiative. Also, they were found through examples of organizations given by respondents during the interviews. (Register of interest representation website of the European Commission, 2008).

Greenpeace

Greenpeace is possibly the most widely and well-known environmental organization there is. It is also a difficult organization to fit into the categories of organizational forms I described in section 2.5. This is why I have chosen Greenpeace as the example of an individual organization. I will come back to this categorization problem later. First, let’s take a look at the organization itself. Greenpeace was founded in 1971. Their first activity was the signature-mark boat ride to stop nuclear test being conducted by the US government. Greenpeace uses this type of non-violent, witness bearing action to attract attention to environmental issues around the globe. Greenpeace is a global, independent organization, active in over 40 countries. It has national offices around the world. Its International headquarters, the ‘Foundation Greenpeace Council’, is located in the city of Amsterdam. So, the organization is active at both the global and the national level. The national departments are mostly independent in that they have the autonomy to carry out global campaign strategies in ways that seem fit for their national circumstances. Besides on the national and the international level, Greenpeace also operates on the European level, with a European unit located in Brussels. As mentioned earlier, Greenpeace is an independent organization.
This means that they rely solely on financial contributions made by members and private donors. The organization has five core values and principles, which are the foundation of the work that they do. These statements, as explicated on the Greenpeace website are:

1. Greenpeace ‘bears witness’ to environmental destruction in a peaceful and non-violent way.
2. Greenpeace uses non-violent confrontation to raise the level and quality of public debate.
3. Greenpeace refrains from forging permanent alliances or adversaries in exposing threats to and finding solutions for the environment.
4. Greenpeace remains financially independent from both political and commercial interests.
5. Greenpeace looks for solutions to promote open and informed debate about society’s environmental choices.

As mentioned earlier, the ‘Foundation Greenpeace Council’ heads Greenpeace at the international level. In practice, this foundation consists of the seven members of Board of Directors of Greenpeace International. They are appointed for a period of three years. Their main tasks are the approval of the annual budget and the appointment the international executive director. The board also monitors the rest of the organization. It decides on organizational policy, it approves the start of new campaigns and it determines the voting status of lower level offices in the Annual General Meeting (AGM). This AGM fulfills a supervisory role to the entire organization. Its members are representatives from the national and regional departments. Decisions made by the AGM have to be ratified by the Board of Directors.

On the national and regional level, a similar board of directors also heads Greenpeace. A collective of volunteers and activist, who represent the local community, elects the members of these boards. Greenpeace develops lobbying activities on all four levels. Lobbying takes place at the nearest level, so if Greenpeace is interested in lobbying the European institutions, the European Unit heads this undertaking. At the national, national units and carry out action and so on. Lobbying on energy topics takes place as part of Greenpeace’s anti-climate change campaigns. Returning to the statements made earlier in this section about the difficulties with placing Greenpeace into one of the three categories of organizational forms, I will say the following. An individual organization can operate on the national, European or global level (Beyers 2004, 590). Greenpeace is an organization that operates on all three levels, four if you count the regional level as well.
Nevertheless, it remains a single organization, be it a very large and extensive one. It does, however, need to be recognized that for organizations of Greenpeace’s caliber, the terms and conditions for providing access goods don’t really apply. In access theory, Expert Knowledge is assumed to be the best provided access good for individual organizations. However, for example Greenpeace Europe might be even better at providing information about the European Encompassing Interest. Another example of a single interest group of this caliber is Friends of the Earth. This subject was discussed with many of the respondents during the interviews and as a result, I have decided that the European branches of major organizations, like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth should not be rigidly put into the IO category. Instead, they are considered to be a part of the European associations (EA). Also, since these organizations usually have national departments as well, this categorization fits in the sense that they are a federation of multiple national organizations. All the information described here was found on the Greenpeace website, www.greenpeace.org, accessed 04-06-2008.

*Bond Beter Leefmilieu (BBL) Vlaanderen*

An example of a national association of environmental organizations is the Flemish BBL. This is a pluralistic and independent federation of over 140 Flemish environmental organizations. It was first founded in 1970, and started off as an elitist group. It then transformed into a militant organization. Now, the BBL is a grown up, politically independent federation. The BBL website (accessed 3rd June 2008) states that its mission is to promote a better, cleaner living environment not just for the Flemish, but for everyone. The BBL hopes to achieve this goal through three fields of activity.

1. Supporting their member organizations through their so-called ‘covering-service’.
2. Influencing governments and social organization through their so-called ‘policy workings’.
3. Influences the public’s behavior towards a more durable attitude through projects and campaigns.

The highest organ within the BBL is the General Assembly. The Assembly meets biannually and is authorized by both Belgian law and BBL’s own regulations. The General Assembly has 130 members, of which about half have voting privileges. Besides the General Assembly, the BBL has a Board of Directors. The Board meets every six weeks, deciding on BBL’s long-term strategies.
It consists of maximally twenty members. BBL’s daily, managing Board consists of a managing director, a policy coordinator, a business coordinator and a project coordinator. The members of the BBL are a diverse group of about 140. The BBL covers large regional and national organizations. Other members might be very small, local ones.

Through the second field of activity, the BBL engages in lobbying activities. The organization is active on different levels, from the local to the European Commission. They occupy a position in which they are a link between European policies on the one hand, and it’s execution on a provincial and local level on the other hand. In order to fulfill this role competently, the BBL works closely with their member-organizations on these different levels. Main focal points in his close working-relationship are exchange, coordinating positioning, developing common campaigns, removing overlap between members and expanding complementarities between members. The BBL actively influences governments and target groups. In order to accomplish this, they maintain structural contacts with a range of political parties form both the Belgian government and the opposition. Also, they are in direct contact with several Belgian Ministers to promote their goals. Finally, the BBL uses legal action as a means to enforce the execution of specific pieces of legislation. These legal actions have been very useful for the BBL. It has helped them to force governments to keep their promises. On the EU level, the BBL sees a potential to increase their activities. This lies mainly in expanding lobbying activities in areas where policies are in the process of development, as well as in areas where existing policies are implemented. On the subject of energy, the BBL has deemed climate and energy one of their main focal points. All the information on the BBL was found on the BBL website, 2008.

The European Environmental Bureau

Finally, the European Environmental Bureau, EEB for short, is an example of a European association of environmental organizations. The EEB is a federation of environmental organizations with a 143 member organizations from 31 different countries. Its mission is to promote environmental policies and sustainable policies on the European level. The EEB is organized in the following manner. The organization is structured around a number of working groups. These groups consist of members of EEB affiliated organizations. There are twelve working groups active at the moment. Each of them specializes in specific topics. EEB lobbying activities consist of maintaining intensive contacts with the EU institutions. It does so in a formal and informal way. The EEB has consultative status with all three European institutions. The organization is headed by a Board, which consists of the executive committee members.
On the subject of energy, the EEB mainly focuses on tackling climate change issues. The EEB is working with the Climate Action Network Europe to make sure the EU will fulfill the implementation of the Kyoto protocol. Also, the EEB is actively promoting the need for environmental fiscal reform, in order to improve energy efficiency. All the information in this section was found through the EEB website, 2008.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have made an attempt to draw attention two topics that are important to this project, but which are not its main focus. To start with, I gave a brief description of the general development of the energy sector from the moment the ECSC was founded, until the present day. Subsequently, I gave an overview of the major current issues in EU’s energy sector. I concluded the chapter with an overview of three important players in the field of energy lobbying. This concludes this first empirical chapter and brings us to the next one, where the research findings of this project are discussed.

6. Empirical Evidence

6.1 Introduction

This second and final empirical chapter is used to show the research findings for this project. I will start by discussing the findings for all three of the EU institutions. Each section begins with a description of the population, sample and response rates for the institution concerned. Then, the quantitative data gathered in the interviews is submitted to statistical analysis and than discussed. Subsequently, the qualitative part of the date obtained from the interviews is addressed. Finally, a conclusion about the relative access of diffuse interests to that particular institution is drawn, based upon the quantitative and qualitative data presented earlier. Ultimately in section 6.5, the results from the three different case studies come together in a comparative case study analysis. The chapter finishes with a conclusion about the empirical evidence that was gathered for this thesis.

6.2 The European Parliament

The first case study to be discussed is that of the European Parliament. Let’s start by examining the population.
**Population, sample and response rate**

In table 8, the population, my sample of it, and the response rate for the European Parliament, as well as for the other two institutions are shown.

*Table 8: Population, sample and response rate for the EP, the EC and the Council*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Response Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Ministers</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As specified earlier, the population for the European Parliament consists of the 54 full members of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). Within each Parliamentary Committee, there are substitutes and full members. I have chosen to include only full members in the population. Each MEP in the European Parliament is a full member of one or more specialized Committees, such as ITRE (www.europarl.europa.eu, accessed 01-06-08). Besides full membership, Parliamentarians are also often substitutes in one or more other committees. The difference between full members and substitutes is that substitutes only have full voting rights when they can vote in the place of an absent full committee member of the same political group (European Parliament website, 2008). The voting rights of MEPs are laid down in the Rules of Procedure for the European Parliament, which can be found on the EP website. Besides the fact that substitutes are prohibited from voting when all full members are present, they have similar rights to full members. For example, substitutes as well as full members can be ‘rapporteur’ on committees (European Parliament website, 2008). However, if we look at the work being done in the committees, only a seventh of all reports are drawn up by substitutes (Corbett 1995, p111 cited in Bouwen 2002, p102). This indicates that the involvement within a committee largely depends on whether or not the MEP is a full member. Therefore, I have decided for ITRE, to identify the population as the 54 full members of the committee. Against my expectations, it proved not to be very difficult to contact MEP offices or to schedule appointments for interviews. It did, however prove very difficult if not impossible to gain access to the MEPs themselves. For my project, I therefore conducted all five telephone based interviews with the MEPs first assistants.

Since I invited five MEP offices to participate in my query, and obtained five interviews from those invitations, the response rate for the European Parliament is 100%. This result is surprising, based on Beyers recognition that MEPs response rates tend to be lower than Council and Commission officials response rates (2000, p117).
In both Beyers as well as Bouwen’s work, the Parliament provided much lower response rates than the Commission and the Council, respectively 56% and 60%. The fact that I achieved such a high response rate might have to do with the fact that my sample is relatively small. A larger sample may have provided a different response rate, however this is difficult to assess. Moving on to the interviews themselves, it needs to be mentioned that the respondent’s answers were sometimes socially desirable and politically correct. As one of the respondents put it;

“As a member of the European Parliament you need to look at both the national and the European aspect. On the one hand you’re representing your country and your constituency back home. But on the other hand, you don’t want to lose sight of the fact that you’re making decisions that affect Europe as a whole.” (C. McHugh, EP, 1st July 2008)

Four out of the five respondents mentioned the fact that they had a ‘dual purpose’ in the Parliament, representing both national as well as European interests. This could have a distorting affect on the collected data and be grounds for respondent bias. Perhaps the most striking example here is one respondents refusal to rank the organizational forms because, as the respondent put it;

“I have no preference. Everyone is free to contact our office. And we appreciate all contacts equally, whether it is an individual citizen calling us, or an international organization like Greenpeace” (own translation). (A. Leger, EP, 4th July 2008)

I will take these preconditions into account whilst analyzing the data in section 6.6.

Testing hypotheses
During the five interviews, respondents were asked to rank the categories of non-business or diffuse interests. They were asked to do so, whilst taking the usefulness and regularity of their contacts with these three categories into account. Table 9 shows the answers that were given by the five respondents to this question. Table 10 shows the same information, now expressed in percentages.
Table 9: The ranking of organizational forms by the European Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational form</th>
<th>First Choice</th>
<th>Second Choice</th>
<th>Third Choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual organization</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Association</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Association</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: The ranking of organizational forms by the European Parliament in percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational form</th>
<th>First Choice</th>
<th>Second Choice</th>
<th>Third Choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual organization</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Association</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Association</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So, let’s compare these preliminary results with the hypotheses posed on the access of non-business interests to the European Parliament. The hypotheses put forward by the theoretical framework are:

1. European associations have the highest degree of access to the European Parliament
2. National associations have less access to the EP than European associations do
3. Large individual interest groups have the lowest degree of access to the Parliament

At first glance, the three hypotheses about the relative access of non-business interests to the EP seem to be disconfirmed. None of the respondents ranked the European Association as their first choice. Both individual organizations (IO) and national associations (NA) are preferred over European associations (EA), both being ranked before all others twice. It is clear that these rankings do not support any of the hypotheses put forward here. However, it would be premature to draw conclusions based solely on the rankings provided in the first column of table 9 and 10. The other columns have to be taken into account as well, including the distance between the different columns. In order to achieve statistical results from which conclusion can be drawn, the EP rankings have to be subjected to the methods of analysis described in the chapter on methodology.
The weighted sum of rank values

As described in section 4.6, the weighted sum of rank values is used to get the complete composite ranking of the organizational forms. The following table displays the weighted sum of the rank values for each organizational form.

Table 11: The weighted sum of rank values for the European Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual organization</th>
<th>National association</th>
<th>European association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(2 x 3) +</td>
<td>(2 x 3) +</td>
<td>(0 x 3) +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2 x 2) +</td>
<td>(1 x 2) +</td>
<td>(1 x 2) +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0 x 1)</td>
<td>(1 x 1)</td>
<td>(3 x 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 10</td>
<td>Total 9</td>
<td>Total 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this table, the following composite ranking of the three organizational forms is deducted: IO>NA>EA. The overall ranking of the organizational forms also completely disconfirms all three hypotheses on relative access to the European Parliament. Rather than having the best access to the Parliament, in this sample European associations have the least access. Instead, individual organizations enjoy the highest degree of access to the Parliament. National associations closely follow them. The distance between the weighted sum values for these two organizational forms is very small. This would indicate that these two organizational forms are almost similar in the degree of access they obtain to the EP. However, we need to keep in mind here that the meaning of these weighted sums is unclear. When looking at the numbers obtained here, we assume that the distance between the ranks is and therefore the rank values are equal for each respondent. However, this might not be the case. In order to factor this in, Thurstone’s law of comparative judgment is applied to the ranking.

Thurstone’s law of comparative judgment

The aim of applying this ‘method of paired comparison’ is to focus on the distance between the rankings. The method of paired comparison allows ordinal scale values to be converted into interval scale values (Swanborn 1993, p31). In order to achieve this, the different organizational forms have to be evaluated in all the possible pairs by the respondents (Bouwen 2002, p107). Doing so will result in a number of comparative judgments. This evaluation of all possible pairs is obtained from the rank-order of organizational forms. To demonstrate how this works, I give the following example. If an MEP ranks the three organizational forms IO>NA>EA, the following comparative judgments can be derived: IO>NA, IO>EA, NA>EA.
This method is called the pair-comparison treatment of a complete rank (Guilford 1954, p183). The interval scale values are based on the data from these paired comparisons. They should therefore better reflect the distance between the intensities of MEPs’ preferences for organizational forms (Bouwen 2002, p107). The exact way in which these interval scales are calculated, can be found in annex III.1. The interval scales values for the organizational forms, based on the method of paired comparison and composite ranking are:

Individual organizations 0,98
National associations 0,82
European associations 0,00

From this data, the overall composite ranking of the organizational forms is: IO>NA>EA. Again, the three hypotheses generated about the European Parliament are disconfirmed. The degree of access of both national organizations and individual organizations come close in this sample. The results however, are not so close as to say that the degree of access is similar. Nevertheless, these figures clearly show that both IOs and NAs enjoy a much higher degree of access to the EP than the European Associations do.

Comparing both methods
Because we want to compare the results of both the methods described in the previous part, the results of the sums of the weighted rank values need to be divided by the number of respondents who ranked the organizational forms. In order to get comparable results, the value zero needs to be given to the lowest ranked organizational form. In this case the European Association. Then 1,25 needs to be subtracted from the other two as well, since this the value of EA to zero.

IO 10/4 = 2,50 – 1,25 = 1,25 against 0,98
NA 9/4 = 2,25 – 1,25 = 1,00 against 0,82
EA 5/4 = 1,25 – 1,25 = 0 against 0

If we compare the results from both methods, it is clear that the European association enjoys the least access to the European Parliament in this sample. Both the individual organization and the national association enjoy a higher degree of access. The overall ranking is IO>NA>EA. Although the degree of access is not exactly similar, the organizational forms are both valued on a higher level than the EA.
So, what do these results say, other than the fact that they disconfirm the hypotheses about the relative access to the EP? What do these results say about the access goods provided by the different organizational forms, and what do the results say about the demand of these access goods?

*Analyzing the demand for access goods*

It is now time to move away from the quantitative data gathered in the interviews, and to focus on the more qualitative evidence. The answers given by the respondents to open questions and their own added remarks may possibly shed some light on the quantitative results described in the foregoing section. Let’s take a look at the underlying assumption that forms the base of hypotheses about the EP. It was hypothesized for the European Parliament, that EAs would have the highest degree of access to the EP, because they possessed the critical access good for the EP. The critical access good for the EP was defined as being Information on the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI). The EPs ranking of dependencies is IEEI>IDEI>EK. As discussed in section 3.2, the ranking of access goods is based upon the institutions role in the legislative process. Let’s compare this ranking with the information acquired through the interviews.

*Expert knowledge versus the encompassing access goods*

When asked, all five respondents indicated that they were interested in requiring both expert knowledge as well as information about the encompassing access goods as defined in section 3.3 from the three organizational forms. All respondents also pointed out that they were looking for different kinds of information, depending on the situation at hand. Sometimes this would be a piece of expertise, at other times this would information about the opinion of an organization.

“We need both here at the Parliament. Lobby groups give us information about cases they’re working on. And then we also get informed about their opinions on the subject. Both pieces of information are equally as valuable to us.” (B. Roberts, EP, 3rd July 2008).

From this qualitative information, it seems that the assumption that MEPs are first and foremost looking for IEEI, does not seem to be holding up. When we compare the encompassing interests to expert knowledge, it can be concluded that in this sample the respondents have similar needs for both kinds of information.
Domestic versus European encompassing interests

Again, when comparing the domestic and the European encompassing access goods, the assumptions made in section 3.2 don’t hold up. Instead of a focus on the European level, the respondents from this sample tend to focus more on the national level. One of the respondents told me:

“The MEPs first goal is to protect the national interests, the European ones come second”.
(C. McHugh, EP, 1st July 2008)

Critical access good

From the aforementioned information on the demand of access goods, the critical access good for this sample cannot be defined, because the respondents have no preference for either EK or the encompassing access goods. It can be concluded that IDEI is favored over IEEI. The ranking of dependencies for this sample from the EP population is therefore EK&IDEI>IEEI. This ranking of dependencies does correspond with the overall ranking IO>NA>EA of the organizational forms for the EP.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that all three hypotheses on the relative access of diffuse interest representatives to the EP have been disconfirmed on the basis of both the quantitative and the qualitative data. In fact, exact opposite of what was hypothesized, can be concluded. Not European association but individual organizations enjoy the highest degree of access to the EP. National associations are ranked second. They closely follow the individual organizations. European associations follow only after a good distance. The ranking of dependencies for the sample is EK&IDEI>IEEI instead of IEEI>IDEI>EK. This disconfirms the hypotheses about the demand side of access goods. This ranking of dependencies does correspond with the overall ranking IO>NA>EA of the organizational forms for the EP. So in this case study, the link between the best-provided access goods and the organizational forms does hold up.

6.3 The European Commission

This section discusses the second case study, namely the European Commission. I will start by describing the EC’s population, sample and response rates for this research project.
**Population, sample and response rate**

The population for the EC is defined as the Directorate General on Transport and Energy (TREN for short). Within the TREN, two directorates cover the EU energy domain. These are TREN C on security of supply and energy markets and TREN D new and renewable sources of energy, energy efficiency and innovation. This information was obtained through the EC website 2008. From this population, I took a sample of five policy officers to interview for the purpose of my research. Unfortunately, the response rates for the Commission were not as high as for the other two institutions. Two officials, who were approached, refused to be interviewed. Because of that, the response rate for the EC comes to 71.4%. This is lower than the response rates achieved by both Bouwen and Beyers for the EC, respectively 76% and 82%. Nevertheless, the rate is higher than 60 %, which is the minimum rate expected for interview based studies (Breakwell 1990, p74).

*Table 12: The ranking of organizational forms by the European Commission*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational form</th>
<th>First Choice</th>
<th>Second Choice</th>
<th>Third Choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual organization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Association</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Association</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 13: The ranking of organizational forms by the European Commission in percentages*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational form</th>
<th>First Choice</th>
<th>Second Choice</th>
<th>Third Choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual organization</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Association</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Association</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hypotheses generated about the European Commission are:

1. Large individual interest groups have the highest degree of access to the Commission
2. European associations have less access to the EC than individual firms do
3. National associations have the lowest degree of access to the European Commission
The first row of tables 12 and 13 seem to indicate a preference amongst Commission officials for European associations and less preference for individual organizations. At first glance this disconfirms the first two and confirms the third hypotheses on the EC. However, before jumping to conclusions, the data presented here needs to be subjected to a more detailed statistical analysis.

*The weighted sum of rank values*

The weighted sum of rank values calculated to obtain the composite ranking for the European Commission.

*Table 14: The weighted sum of rank values for the European Commission*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual organization</th>
<th>National association</th>
<th>European association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1 x 3) +</td>
<td>(0 x 3) +</td>
<td>(4 x 3) +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0 x 2) +</td>
<td>(5 x 2) +</td>
<td>(0 x 2) +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4 x 1)</td>
<td>(0 x 1)</td>
<td>(1 x 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 7</td>
<td>Total 10</td>
<td>Total 13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this table, the following composite ranking of the three organizational forms is deducted for the European Commission EA>NA>IO. When the weighted sum of rank values is applied, the European associations instead of the individual organizations are ranked first. In fact, since individual organizations are ranked last and national associations second, all three hypotheses seem to be disconfirmed for this sample. Moving on, I will apply Thurstone’s law of comparative judgment to the ranking.

*Thurstone’s law of comparative judgment*

By applying this method of analysis, I will focus on the distance between the rankings provided by the Commission officials. The method of paired comparison allows the ordinal scale values obtained through the weighted sum of rank values, to be converted into interval scale values (Swanborn 1993, p31). In order to achieve this, the different organizational forms have to be evaluated in all the possible pairs by the respondents (Bouwen 2002, p107). This will result in a number of comparative judgments. The evaluation of all possible pairs is obtained from the rank-order of organizational forms. The interval scale values are based on the data from these paired comparisons. It should therefore better reflect the distance between the intensities Commission official’s preferences for organizational forms (Bouwen 2002, p107).
The interval scales values for the organizational forms, based on the method of paired comparison and composite ranking are:

Individual organizations 0,00 n  
National associations 0,56  
European associations 1,12

From this data, the overall composite ranking of the organizational forms is determined: EA>NA>IO. This ranking disconfirms all three hypotheses for the European Commission. Also, the interval scale values are of equal distance between all three organizations. This suggests that none of the organizational forms enjoy similar access to the Council. From this data, it can be concluded that there is a clear preference within the samples response.

**Comparing both methods**

In order to compare the results of both the methods described in the previous part, the results of the sums of the weighted rank values need to be divided by the number of respondents. In order to get comparable results, the value zero needs to be given to the lowest ranked organizational form. In this case the individual organization. Than, 1,50 needs to be subtracted from the other two as well, since subtracting 1,50 brings the value of IO to zero.

\[
\begin{align*}
IO & \quad \frac{7}{5} = 1,40 - 1,40 = 0,00 \text{ against } 0 \\
NA & \quad \frac{10}{5} = 2,00 - 1,40 = 0,60 \text{ against } 0,56 \\
EA & \quad \frac{13}{5} = 2,60 - 1,40 = 1,20 \text{ against } 1,12
\end{align*}
\]

From this comparison, it is clear that all three hypotheses about the relative access of diffuse interests to the European Commission are disconfirmed for this sample. Instead of the highest degree of access, individual organizations enjoy the least amount of access to the Commission. National associations enjoy more than individual organizations, but less than European ones, who receive the highest degree of access. However, refinements have to be made to these statements. The qualitative data collected from the respondents will serve as a basis for these nuances.
Analyzing the demand for access goods

Looking at the underlying assumption that forms the base of hypotheses about the Commission, it was hypothesized that IOs would have the highest degree of access. Reason was because they possessed the critical access good for the EC, which was defined as Expert Knowledge. The ECs ranking of dependencies is determined, EK>IEEI>IDEI, bases on the ECs role in the legislative process. Since the quantitative data seems to disconfirm the hypotheses about the EC, let’s compare this ranking with the information acquired through the interviews.

Expert knowledge versus the encompassing access goods

When asked about their preference for either expert knowledge or the encompassing access goods, the five respondents in the sample gave diverse answers. Two preferred only expert knowledge; one only encompassing information and two of said they required both. From this, it can be concluded that, within this sample, no uniform need for one particular kind of information rises to the surface. Instead, preferences differ. Also, the respondent’s views on who might be best equipped to provide information differ. One of the respondents, who indicated a preference for expert knowledge said:

“I prefer having contact with the European associations. Overall, they are more professional and have more expertise than the other two (categories, red).” (I. Samouilidis, EC, 01st July 2008).

From this qualitative information, it seems that the assumption that Commission members are first and foremost looking for expert knowledge, has to be refined. Four out of five respondents value EK and one doesn’t. And two out of four have an equal preference for both EK and the encompassing access goods.

Critical access good

From the aforementioned information on the demand of access goods, the critical access good for this sample is defined as EK. The respondents to indicate that they have a preference for the European access good over the domestic one, which results in the following ranking of dependencies: EK>IEEI>IDEI. This ranking of dependencies does not correspond with the overall ranking EA>NA>IO.
Conclusion

It can be concluded that the hypotheses about the rankings of the organizational forms for the EC are all disconfirmed. However, the ranking of dependencies is confirmed for the Commission. To conclude, for this sample the respondents do have the preference for information they were expected to have. However, these preferences for information do not correspond with the assumptions on which organizational forms are best equipped to provide them with this information.

6.4 The Council of Ministers

The following section will discuss the research findings for the case study of the Council of Ministers. I will start by describing the population, my sample and the response rates for this institution. I will go on by discussing the quantitative data gathered from the respondents. I will apply both methods for comparison to the data and discuss my findings. I will then cover the qualitative data obtained from the respondents. Finally I will draw conclusion on the hypotheses about the relative access of the three organizational forms to the Council of Ministers.

Population, sample and response rate

The population for the Council of Ministers has proven to be somewhat problematic, because it is very resource intensive. In fact, it includes the group of national officials responsible for energy within all 27 national administrations. In order to keep the population manageable, I chose to focus on the population for the Council in a single country, namely the Netherlands. The Ministry responsible for issues concerning energy is the Ministry of Economic Affairs, headed by Minister Maria van der Hoeven. Minister van der Hoeven represents the Dutch government in the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council. Within the Ministry, Directorate for Energy and Durability was defined as the relevant population for this research project. However, as established earlier, the actual population for the Council is at least 27 times larger than this sub-population. Therefore, conclusions drawn from my sample are not to be generalized to the entire EU population. The sample I took, consist of four policy officers working at the Directorate for Energy and durability. The initial sample would have been five, but during the interviews with the respondents it became clear that these four were the only persons within the Directorate who actually had contact with diffuse interests. Therefore, my sample is made up out of four instead of five respondents. The response rate for the Council is 100%. All the persons that were invited to respond did so. Therefore the response rate is 100%, just as it is in the EP.
Testing hypotheses

The respondents for the Council were asked, in the same fashion as officials form the other two institutions, to rank their preferences for the three organizational forms. The results are depicted in tables 15 and 16.

Table 15: The ranking of organizational forms by the Council of Ministers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational form</th>
<th>First Choice</th>
<th>Second Choice</th>
<th>Third Choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual organization</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>2,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Association</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Association</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>2,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,0</td>
<td>4,0</td>
<td>4,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16: The ranking of organizational forms by the Council of Ministers in percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational form</th>
<th>First Choice</th>
<th>Second Choice</th>
<th>Third Choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual organization</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Association</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Association</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First off, let’s take another look at the hypotheses posed about the Council. The hypotheses formulated by the theoretical framework are:

1. National associations have the highest degree of access to the Council of Ministers
2. European associations have less access to the Council than national associations do
3. Large individual interest groups have the lowest degree of access to the Council

A first look seems to confirm the third hypothesis about the relative access of IOs to the Council. The first and second hypothesis are neither confirmed nor disconfirmed. Both organizational forms are chosen as preferable over the others by two of the respondents. But, as well as for the other two institutions, the other two columns have to be taken into account as well, including the distance between the different columns.
The weighted sum of rank values

The weighted sum of rank values calculated to obtain the composite ranking for the Council.

Table 17: The weighted sum of rank values for the Council of Ministers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual organization</th>
<th>National association</th>
<th>European association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(0 x 3) +</td>
<td>(2 x 3) +</td>
<td>(2 x 3) +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2 x 2) +</td>
<td>(2 x 2) +</td>
<td>(0 x 2) +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2 x 1)</td>
<td>(0 x 1)</td>
<td>(2 x 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 6</td>
<td>Total 10</td>
<td>Total 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this table, the following composite ranking of the three organizational forms is deducted for the Council of Ministers: NA>EA>IO. As can be observed, when the weighted sum of rank values is applied, national associations are ranked first. The European associations are ranked second. The overall ranking seems to confirm all three hypotheses about the relative access of diffuse interests to the Council. In this ranking, European associations indeed enjoy the highest degree of access, followed by the national associations. Individual organizations enjoy the lowest degree of access to the Council in this sample. To investigate the access of the organizational forms further, Thurstone’s law of comparative judgment is applied to the ranking.

Thurstone’s law of comparative judgment

As explained in earlier sections, the aim of applying this ‘method of paired comparison’ is used to focus on the distance between the rankings. It allows ordinal scale values to be converted into interval scale values (Swanborn 1993, p31). In order to achieve this, the different organizational forms have to be evaluated in all the possible pairs by the respondents (Bouwen 2002, p107). Doing so will result in a number of comparative judgments. This evaluation of all possible pairs is obtained from the rank-order of organizational forms. The interval scale values are based on the data from these paired comparisons. It should therefore better reflect the distance between the intensities of MEPs’ preferences for organizational forms (Bouwen 2002, p107). The interval scales values for the organizational forms, based on the method of paired comparison and composite ranking are:

National associations: 0.76
European associations: 0.38
Individual organizations 0.00
From this data, the overall composite ranking of the organizational forms is determined: NA>EA>IO. By this ranking, all three hypotheses on the part of the Council are confirmed. Also, the interval scale values are of equal distance between all three organizations. This indicates that none of the organizational forms enjoy similar access to the Council. From this data, it can be concluded that there is a clear preference within the samples response.

Comparing both methods

In order to compare the results of both the methods described in the previous part, the results of the sums of the weighted rank values need to be divided by the number of respondents. In order to get comparable results, the value zero needs to be given to the lowest ranked organizational form. In this case the individual organization. Than, 1,50 needs to be subtracted from the other two as well, since subtracting 1,50 brings the value of IO to zero.

IO 6/4 = 1,50 – 1,50 = 0,00 against 0,00  
EA 8/4 = 2,00 – 1,50 = 0,50 against 0,38  
NA 10/4 = 2,50 – 1,50 = 1,00 against 0,76

From this comparison, it is clear that all three hypotheses about the relative access of diffuse interests to the Council of Ministers are confirmed for this sample. Indeed, national associations enjoy the highest degree of access; the European associations follow them. Individual organizations enjoy the least amount of access to the Council in this sample. However, refinements have to be made to these statements. The qualitative data collected from the respondents will serve as a basis for these nuances.

Analyzing the demand for access goods

It was hypothesized for the Council that the demand of access goods would be ranked as follows: IDEI>IEEI>EK. Information about the domestic encompassing interests is assumed to be the critical resource of the Council, based on the institutions role in the legislative process. The overall ranking of the three organizational forms, NA>EA>IO, seems to confirm this. One of the respondents told me:

“You work for the Minister so you need to be aware what her national constituency wants and needs (own translation)” . (E. Sieders, Council, 23rd June 2008).
All four respondents indicated that they preferred to talk to and receive information from the national level. When asked to choose between expert knowledge and the encompassing access goods, the two respondents said to require both and two said just to be looking for encompassing interests. Within these encompassing interests, they all had a preference for the domestic encompassing interests. It can be concluded that IDEI is indeed the critical access good, and that the ranking of dependencies does hold up for the Council in this sample.

Conclusions
To conclude, it can be said that both the hypotheses and the ranking of dependencies for the Council hold for this sample. Indeed, the respondents had a preference for national associations, followed by European ones. Individual organizations were ranked last. The critical resource was confirmed to be information about the domestic encompassing interests, followed by the need for information about the European encompassing interest. Expert knowledge was ranked last by the respondents.

6.5 Comparative case study analysis
In this section, the relative access of diffuse interests to all three institutions will be compared. For the purpose of comparing the relative access of diffuse interests to the European institutions, the interval scale values need to be converted into relative access values expressed in percentages. This is done by dividing the interval scale values by the sum of all the values for the same EU institution. It needs to be noted that in each case, the lowest ranked organizational form has been given the interval scale value zero to get rid of the negative signs in the interval scale values. Because of this, it is impossible to calculate this organizational forms relative access value.

6.6 Explaining research findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EP</th>
<th>EC</th>
<th>Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IOs</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAs</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this comparative perspective, unfortunately, it is unclear if individual organizations have more access to the EC or the Council.
National associations however have more access to the Council (67%) and the European Parliament (55%), than to the European Commission (33%) in these samples. The first of these three results is to be expected, with IDEI being confirmed as the critical resource for the Council. The percentage of 45% for the EP stems from the fact that both EK and IDEI were ranked first in the ranking of dependencies for the European Parliament (no critical resource was determined for the Parliament). The 33% for the Commission is higher than to be expected, since IDEI is ranked last in the ranking of dependencies for the EC. European associations have the highest degree of access to the Commission (67%). Their access to the Council is much lower (33%). Their high level of access to the Commission can be said to be unexpected, since, IEEI is ranked second after EK in the ECs ranking of dependencies. Yet, a closer look reveals that the EC responses are geared towards a higher appreciation of the expertise provided by EAs, than the provision of IEEI by EAs. The level of access to the Council is to be expected, since both the hypotheses and the ranking of dependencies for the Council were confirmed.

Finally, I will try to give an explanation as to why these results are as such. Since not all hypotheses have been proven, access theory does not explain all my research findings. Yes, for the Council of Ministers, access theory explains my research findings completely. But this does not hold up for the EC or the EP. In the next section, I will make an attempt to explain the unexpected outcomes of my research. Starting with the European Commission, the hypotheses on its ranking of dependencies is confirmed, but the hypotheses on its preferences for organizational forms are disconfirmed. From these results, it has to be concluded that European Commission workers receive their preferred type of information, namely Expert Knowledge, from different types of organizations than was previously expected. As one EC policy officer noted:

“...They possess the most expertise; therefore I prefer to have contact with them” (I. Samouilidis, EC, 1st July 2008)

Instead of confirming my hypotheses, my research findings point towards the way organizational forms are perceived by the European Commission. It exposes a discrepancy between organizational forms capacity to provide access good and their perceived capacity to provide certain access goods. It seems that, in the opinion of my EC sample, not individual organizations, but instead European Associations are best at providing Expert Knowledge.
For the European Parliament, neither the hypotheses about the ranking of dependencies, nor the ones about the preferential organizational forms was confirmed. It is not possible to explain these results through access theory. The aforementioned discrepancy between capacity to provide access goods and perceived capacity to provide access goods can explain the results for the European parliament. For this institution however, something else might be a cause to these results. These might be due to the fact that a number of respondents seemed to be giving socially desirable answers. This makes the research findings for the EP questionable and could explain the ambiguous results.

6.7 Conclusion

This long chapter was used to give a detailed account of all the research findings for this research project. In this final section, I will summarize the results of my research once more.

Table 19: Overview of generated hypotheses versus research findings on organizational forms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Found</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>EA&gt;NA&gt;IO</td>
<td>IO&gt;NA&gt;EA</td>
<td>Disconfirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>IO&gt;EA&gt;NA</td>
<td>EA&gt;NA&gt;IO</td>
<td>Disconfirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Ministers</td>
<td>NA&gt;EA&gt;IO</td>
<td>NA&gt;EA&gt;IO</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20: Overview of generated hypothesis versus research findings on ranking of dependencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Found</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>IEEI&gt;IDEI&gt;EK</td>
<td>EK&amp;IDEI&gt;IEEI</td>
<td>Disconfirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>EK&gt;IEEI&gt;IDEI</td>
<td>EK&gt;IEEI&gt;IDEI</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Ministers</td>
<td>IDEI&gt;IEEI&gt;EK</td>
<td>IDEI&gt;IEEI&gt;EK</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All three hypotheses on the relative access of the three organizational forms to the Parliament are disconfirmed, as well as the EPs ranking of dependencies. For the Commission, the three hypotheses about the relative access to it are disconfirmed for this sample. However, the ranking of dependencies is confirmed for the EC. For the Council, both the hypotheses about the relative access of the three organizational forms as well as the ranking of dependencies are confirmed for this sample.
When scrutinizing these figures in an inter-institutional comparison (section 6.5), we see that in line with these results, NAs enjoy the highest degree of access to the Council (67%). EAs have the highest degree of access to the Commission (67%). This is unexpected, since the critical access good for the Commission is confirmed to be expert knowledge. Nevertheless, this result is explained by the notion that a number of EC respondents conclude that EAs are best at providing this type of information. Individual organizations (54%) have highest degree of access to the Parliament. This is to be expected, because individual organizations are ranked first by the respondents in the sample. National associations closely follow them. This is foreseeable since the EP respondents rank both expert knowledge and IDEI as their premier access goods. It is not surprising that these two organizational forms are therefore ranked in a rather similar fashion by the Parliament.

7. Conclusions

In this final chapter, I will answer the central research question and sub-questions. I will go on to make recommendations to the organizations that represent diffuse interest, thus fulfilling the purpose of this project. Finally, I will make recommendations for further research on the subject. I will conclude the chapter and my thesis with a personal reflection on the project and its limitations.

7.1 Research questions

Answering the sub-questions:

1. What is the content of Bouwen’s access theory?

The essence of the content of his theory can be described as follows. Between the three major EU institutions and business interests exists an exchange relationship. The exchangeable goods in this relationship are access and information. Business interests can use three kinds of information (EK, IDEI and IEEI) as so called access goods. Each institution has an access good which is critical for its functioning. This is determined by the role it plays in the legislative process of the EU. In exchange for this critical access good the institution will grant access to the organization that provides it. This is the demand side of access goods. At the supply side, business interests provide the information (EK, IDEI and IEEI) to gain access. Their capacity for providing these goods is linked to the way that they are organized. Bouwen distinguishes individual firms, national and European associations and consultants in his theoretical framework. All four are specialized in the provision of one of the access goods. The full content of Bouwen’s access theory for business interests may be found in section 3.2.
2. How can access theory be defined for diffuse interests?
The access theory for diffuse interest representation is similar to the access theory for business interests. The differences lie in the provision of access goods and the definition of the organizational forms, which is shown in table 6. Although both provide the same type of access goods EK, IEEI and IDEI, they differ slightly. Also, in the access theory for diffuse interest representation, the organizational forms differ. Individual firms are substituted with individual organizations and the consultant group is excluded from the study. The complete answer to this sub-question can be found in section 3.3.

3. What are the main issues in EU’s energy sector?
The main topics on energy in the EU are covered by six areas, which are; a common energy policy for Europe, the internal European energy market, energy efficiency, renewable energy, nuclear energy and security of energy supply. A more in depth presentation of these subjects can be found in chapter four.

4. To what extent does access theory explain the degree of diffuse interest access to the EU institutions?
The results of my research show that the hypotheses about the relative access of diffuse interest representation to the Council of Ministers were confirmed. The ranking of dependencies was also confirmed for the Council. As a result, for this case study, the access to this institution is explained by access theory. In the case of the European Commission, the hypotheses on the relative access were disconfirmed. The hypotheses on the ranking of dependencies of the Commission were confirmed. Therefore, in this case study, access theory partially explains the access of diffuse interest representation. For the European Parliament, neither the hypotheses on access, nor on their ranking of dependencies were confirmed. Thus access theory does not explain the relative access of diffuse interest representation for this case study.
Answering the central research question:
The central research question for this research project is:

“Does access theory explain the degree of access of diffuse interest representation to the three major EU institutions in the EU energy sector?”

From the previous chapter on research findings and the answers to my sub-questions, it can be said that access theory has a potential to explain diffuse interest representation to the three major EU institutions. However, additional research will have to be done in order to provide a definitive answer to this question. From my research findings, the hypotheses about the relative access of diffuse interest representation to the Council of Ministers were confirmed. For this case study, the access of these interests to the institution is explained by access theory. In the case of the European Commission, the hypotheses on the relative access were disconfirmed. The hypotheses on the ranking of dependencies of the Commission however were confirmed. So, for this case study, access theory partially explains the access of diffuse interest representation. For the European Parliament, neither the hypotheses on access, nor on their ranking of dependencies were confirmed. Therefore, access theory does not explain the relative access of diffuse interest representation for this case study.

7.2 Recommendations
In this section of my concluding chapter, I will make recommendations to both diffuse interest representation and for further possible research topics.

Recommendations for diffuse interest representation
In their strategies for gaining access to the three major European institutions in the energy sector of the EU, there are a number of recommendations to be made on the basis of my research findings. The recommendations made here are aimed at improving the level of access that these diffuse interest representatives enjoy to the three institutions. I will make recommendations for the improvement of the level of access for each separate institution. It needs to be said that, because of my sample size, no generalization can be made to the entire population for these three institutions. Therefore, I will make recommendations based on the findings and conclusions for these three particular samples.
The European Parliament

In this sample, the EP does not have a critical resource, but has an equal need for expert knowledge and for information about the domestic encompassing interests. Individual and following closely, national associations enjoy the highest degree of access to the EP. My recommendation is that diffuse interest representatives take this into account when devising their lobbying strategies for the Parliament on energy issues.

The European Commission

The critical resource for the European Commission is confirmed to be expert knowledge. From this sample, it seems that the respondents prefer to get this information from European associations, followed by national ones. I recommend that this be factored in by organizations seeking access to the European Commission officials from TREN C and D. Their lobbying strategies should be adjusted accordingly.

The Council of Ministers

Finally the critical resource for the Council has been confirmed to be information on the domestic encompassing interests. National associations enjoy the highest degree of access to the Council. They are followed at a distance by European associations. From this information, it follows that diffuse interest representatives should organize themselves in those organizational forms, if they want to gain access to Council official working on energy issues. I therefore recommend that organizations take this into account when determining a lobbying strategy for gaining access to the Council of Ministers.

Recommendations for further research

On the whole, it can be said that in order to measure diffuse interest access to the European institutions, more extensive research needs to be done in order to fully address this question. In order to truly test the theory of access of diffuse interest representation to the EU institutions, first of all I highly recommend that it be studied with larger samples, preferable a sample with the size of the three populations. As was shown in chapter 6, the results drawn from the three samples in my research were sometimes ambiguous, because it was unclear if deviating opinions were extremes, or representative for parts of the population. This was a result of the fact that such small samples do not allow for generalization. So first and foremost, the samples need to be enlarged. A second recommendation would be to include taking a closer look at the organizational forms of actors that represent diffuse interest.
The classification of organizational forms I made in chapter 2 is both complete and incomplete. It is complete in the sense that, since interest groups can take a national and European route, it follows that there are national and European organizations to be found. Also, since there can be single, collective and third party action, there are single, collective and third party actors. Since third party representatives are seldom if ever found in the representation of diffuse interests, the classification is rather complete. However, as mentioned earlier in this project, there are others who sometimes represent diffuse interests.

These actors are research institutions like the Dutch Milieu en Natuur Plan Bureau, MNP for short. These institutions are very capable of providing the access good Expert Knowledge. They lack the domestic and European encompassing access goods, because they do not represent part of the population. So, these institutions can be very able advocates of diffuse interests, through their provision of Expert Knowledge to the EU institutions. Therefore, it might be interesting to examine their role in the representation of diffuse interests more closely. It would be interesting to study whether they might contribute to the wholeness of the theory of access for diffuse interests. Also, adding a fourth category of organizational form would allow for a more precise calculation of the compared relative access to the institutions (see section 6.5). Adding these institutions could potentially take away the non-calculable value zero for the other three organizational forms. A third recommendation would be to move away from the demand side of access goods, and by doing so to move away from the viewpoint of the European institutions. The reason for taking this route was the direct result of the choice to measure the relative access of diffuse interests. However, in closely examining one side of an exchange relationship, the other side is easily overlooked. During the process of writing this thesis, it dawned on several occasions that I was looking at the exchange of access goods from a relatively fixed point of view. Of course, I did pay attention to the supply side of the relationship, but my empirical data was gathered solely from the side of the European institutions. In my opinion, it would be interesting to turn the tables and collect data from the diffuse interests themselves.

Fourthly, a number of respondents observed a lot more interaction with business lobbies than with diffuse interests. A number of respondents made some comment or remark about this difference in lobbying frequency between business and non-business interests. It would be interesting to make a systematic inquiry into quantity as a variable. It would be interesting to investigate if and how it enters and affects the theoretical framework of access. Does the size of the representation field perhaps have effect on the way these interests organize themselves?
Some respondents indicated that they found it difficult to distinguish between individual organizations and national associations, because they were unable to immediately think of examples for both categories. Finally, it might be of interest to see how the theory holds up at the national or domestic, instead of at the European level.

7.3 General reflection

From the start, when I had decided to test a theory of access to the three major EU institutions, I realized this would not be an easy task. It would prove difficult to say the least, to obtain results that could be generalized from the samples to the populations.

Indeed in hindsight, this has proven to be impossible. The reason why I chose to carry out this type of research, examining three different case studies and combining quantitative and qualitative measures, was that I wanted to make a comparison. I felt it was more interesting to examine and then compare access to three institutions, than to study just one case and have no reference material for it. The result of this choice was that, due to time and resource limitations, I was unable to take larger samples or to conduct more in-depth research through more extensive interviews. However, each choice made, involves including and excluding certain aspects of a subject. Therefore, I will focus on the chosen subject, instead of looking at what might have been. In doing so, there are a couple of remarks I would like to make. The hypotheses put forward in chapter 3 about the relative access of diffuse interests to the three institutions are of a quantitative nature. Let me make myself clear. For each institution, it is assumed that the demand for information is similar. It is assumed that, although different persons with different backgrounds, specializations and different frames of reference, ultimately will act in similar ways. Whilst conducting my research, it became clear that the respondents I spoke with from time to time found it difficult to answer some of the questions. Sometimes, when they were asked to make choices and put one category in front of the other, they were in fact inclined not to choose and make that distinction. There was a sense of things being a combination of preferences, rather than a ranking. In my opinion, this observation only adds to the appeal of this research topic. It underlines my understanding of the fact that in social science, there are no complete certainties.

For my master thesis, I wanted to provide diffuse interests with advice on how to improve their lobbying activities. From my research findings and conclusions, I can provide diffuse interest groups with recommendations. But a recommendation would not be complete without recognizing its limitations as well.
7.4 Reflection on research limitations

Within the small samples I took from the three institutions, I spoke to respondents with complete opposite preferences and views about the information they felt they required for their job and the organizational form preferred to supply this type of information. In a larger sample, or when sampling the entire population, these respondents might turn out to be extremes. Having only these samples to go by, however, these responses seem telltale for something underlying this research subject. The fact that several individuals within an organization have certain preferences doesn’t mean that the entire population shares these beliefs. Diffuse interest representatives need to be aware of this. Therefore they need to keep re-assessing their access seeking activities at the EU level.

My research findings can aid them in composing general lobbying strategies for the three institutions. However at the same time, they should remain critical about their own strategies and adjust them if the situation at hand calls for a different approach. Ultimately it can be said that diffuse interest representatives need to be aware of their possibilities. As one respondent, working for the European Commission put it:

“In Albania, a nuclear power plant is being built on a wildlife conservation site. The reason for it being built there is that it is cheaper. If any environmental organization would have filed a formal complaint, I could have done something about it. But nobody did, so there’s nothing I can do”

(B. Devlin, EC, June 28th 2008).
Bibliography:


Smith, M.P. 2008. All Access Points are Not Created Equal: Explaining the Fate of Diffuse interests in the EU. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 10(1). 64- 83.

Annex I: List of abbreviations

AGM   Annual General Meeting
BBL   Bond Beter Leefmilieu Vlaanderen
Coreg Committee of the Regions
COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives
Council Council of Ministers
DG TREN Directorate-General for Energy and Transport
EA European Association
EC European Commission
EC European Community
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EEB European Environmental Bureau
EK Expert Knowledge
EP European Parliament
ESC Economic and Social Committee
EU European Union
Euratom European Atomic Energy Agency
Eurostat The statistical office of the European Communities
IEA International Energy Agency
IEEI Information about the European Encompassing Interests
IDEI Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interests
IO Individual Organization
ITRE Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
NA National Association
MEP Member of the European Parliament
RSPB Royal Society for the protection of Birds (and Wildlife)
TTE Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council
US United States (of America)
WEC World Energy Council
WWF World Wildlife Fund
Annex II: List of interviews

European Parliament

1. **Undisclosed.** Assistant to MEP Undisclosed. 27-06-2008. In depth
2. **Bourgois, Stephane.** Assistant to MEP Fiona Hall. 04-07-2008
3. **Leger, Anne.** Assistant to MEP Philippe Busquin. 04-07-2008
4. **McHugh, Clara.** Assistant to MEP Giles Chichester. 01-07-2008
5. **Roberts, Bethan.** Assistant to MEP Eluned Morgan. 03-07-2008

European Commission


Council of Ministers

1. **Mr. Sieders, Erik.** DG Energy & Telecom. Senior policy officer. 23-06-2008. In depth, face-to-face interview
2. **Mr. Blanson Henkemans, Maurits.** DG Energy & Telecom. Senior policy officer. 14-07-2008
3. **Mr. ten Elshof, Erik.** DG Energy & Telecom. Senior policy officer & coordinator. 14-07-2008
4. **Mr. Van der Heul, Willem.** DG Energy & Telecom. Senior policy officer & coordinator. 14-07-2008
Annex III: Interview schedule

Part 1: Introduction

- MASTER THESIS SCIENCE OF ADMINISTRATION EUR
- LOBBYING NON-BUSINESS GROUPS ON ENERGY
- DISCUSS INTERACTION WITH THESE GROUPS
- FIRST INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS, THEN MORE IN DEPTH
- CONTACT INFORMATION WILL REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL IF YOU WISH
- ANY QUESTIONS?

1. Could you tell me what kind of work you do for the INSTITUTION?

2. And how long have been working at the INSTITUTION?

Part 2: General questions about lobbying

3. Do you have regular contacts with non-business lobby groups?
   (Every day/every second day/every week/every month/less than every month)

4. Can you give examples of the organizations you come into contact with?

5. It is common knowledge that interest groups want to influence the legislation. But, why are you in turn interested in contacting interest groups during the legislative process?

6. What do you think about the following two possibilities?
   1. The need for expertise
   2. The need for information about the needs and interests of an organizations constituency?
   ANSWER: 1, 2 OR BOTH

7. I have divided environmental organizations in to three categories.

   1. Individual organizations (EXAMPLE COUNTRY RESPONDENT)
   2. National associations (EXAMPLE COUNTRY RESPONDENT)
   3. European associations (EXAMPLE EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL BUREAU)

   EXPLAIN: IF UNCLEAR, EXPLAIN THE CATEGORIZATION (EXAMPLES)

8a. When lobbying is taking place in the context of a legislative proposal you are working on, with which of the three previously mentioned categories do you prefer to have contact in general? Why?

8b. When lobbying is taking place in the context of a legislative proposal you are working on, with whom of the categories do you prefer not to have contact in general? Why?

9a. When lobbying is taking place in the context of a legislative proposal you are working on, with which of the categories do you have the most contact in general? Why?

9b. When lobbying is taking place in the context of a legislative proposal you are working on, with which of the categories do you have the least contact in general? Why?
10. Could you now rank the three categories of environmental organizations on the basis of your preference for having contact with them, taking the usefulness and regularity of these contacts into account?
   ANSWER:
   IO
   NA
   EA

11. Do you have anything to add to the subjects we discussed during the interview? Do you have any questions?
Annex IV: The method of paired comparison

Annex IV.1 European Parliament

The F matrix of frequencies

To obtain more detailed information on the distances between the ranked choices made by the EP officials, the method of paired comparison is applied to the collected data. To eventually convert the ordinal rank values to interval scales, I start by creating the F matrix (Swanborn 1993, p31-57). The F matrix (f stands for frequencies) holds all frequencies f_{ij} where f shows us the number of times that the organizational form in the column j is chosen during a confrontation with the organizational form in row i (Swanborn 1993, p37).

Since an organizational form cannot be ranked higher or lower than itself, the diagonal remains empty. The columns then have to be ranked from the smallest sum at the left to the highest sum of the rows at the right (Swanborn 1993, p37). In other words, the numbers in the F matrix give us the number of times the organizational form in the column was chosen over the organizational form in the row.

Table IV.1: F matrix of frequencies for the European Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EA</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>IO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Σ</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The P matrix of proportions

The next step is to transform the F matrix of frequencies into the P matrix of proportions. We do this by dividing f_{ij} (the numbers found in the F matrix) by N, the number of respondents. In the case of the EP, this means dividing the outcomes presented in the F matrix by 4. The empty compartments found on the diagonal, become 0,5, since they represent the centre of the standard normal distribution (Swanborn 1993, p38). This results in the following P matrix.
As can be observed in table III.2, the P matrix for the EP holds three so-called extreme proportions. These are the numbers 0.00 and 1.00. To correct these extremes, the continuity correction is applied (Swanborn 1993, p47-49). In practice, this means that for these three values, p is replaced by:

$$F + 0.5 \times N \times 100\% \text{ when } F/N \leq 0.02$$

$$F + 0.5/N \times 100\% \text{ when } F/N \geq 0.02$$

For the answers given by the EP officials, this results in the following adapted P matrix, which is labeled the P’ matrix.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EA</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>IO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EA</strong></td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NA</strong></td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IO</strong></td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Σ</strong></td>
<td>0.875</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.875</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Z matrix

Finally the P’ matrix is transformed into the Z matrix. The Z matrix is ultimately used to the interval scales for the rankings provided by the EP. In order to achieve this result, the normal-curve tables need to be applied to the values obtained in the P’ matrix (Guilford 1954, p 161). When a p value is greater than 0.5, Zij gets a positive sign. When the p value is less than 0.5, Zij gets a negative sign. The right half of the Z matrix above the diagonal is identical to the lower half. The only difference is that the algebraic signs are reversed. Subtracting 0.5 from the p values is the first step in obtaining the z values. Than, these values are ready to be referenced with the normal-curve tables. This provided us with the z values.

After that, the sums of the columns need to be calculated. These values can be found in table III.4. The n, the means are calculated by dividing the sums of the columns with the number of rows in the table.
These means can now be used as scale values for comparison of the answers given by the respondents. However, to clarify the results, I want to remove the negative sign in the values. Therefore, the lowest stimulus (EA) needs to be given the value zero. In order to carry this through for the other categories as well, to each mean a positive number equal to the absolute value of the lowest stimulus needs to be added. In this case, that is +0,60. Finally, we now have the interval scale values from which conclusions about the preferences of the respondents can be drawn.

*Table IV.4: Z matrix for the European Parliament*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>+0,00</td>
<td>0,67</td>
<td>+1,15</td>
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<td>NA</td>
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<td>+0,00</td>
</tr>
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<td>+0,00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interval Scale</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>0,82</td>
<td>0,98</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Annex IV.2 European Commission

The F matrix of frequencies

To obtain more detailed information on the distances between the ranked choices made by the EC officials, the method of paired comparison is applied to the collected data. In order to eventually convert the ordinal rank values to interval scales, I start by creating the F matrix (Swanborn 1993, p31-57). The F matrix (f stands for frequencies) holds all frequencies $f_{ij}$ where $f$ shows the number of times that the organizational form in the column $j$ is chosen during a confrontation with the organizational form in row $i$ (Swanborn 1993, p37). Since an organizational form cannot be ranked higher or lower than itself, the diagonal remains empty. The columns then have to be ranked from the smallest sum at the left to the highest sum of the rows at the right (Swanborn 1993, p37). In other words, the numbers in the F matrix give us the number of times the organizational form in the column was chosen over the organizational form in the row.

Table IV.5: F matrix of frequencies for the European Commission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IO</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>EA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Sigma$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The P matrix of proportions

The next step is to transform the F matrix of frequencies into the P matrix of proportions. We do this by dividing $f_{ij}$ (the numbers in F matrix) by $N$, the number of respondents. In the case of the EC, this means dividing the outcomes presented in the F matrix by 5. The empty compartments found on the diagonal, become 0,5, since they represent the centre of the standard normal distribution (Swanborn 1993, p38). This results in the following P matrix.

Table IV.6: P matrix of proportions for the European Commission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IO</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>EA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>0,50</td>
<td>0,80</td>
<td>0,80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0,20</td>
<td>0,50</td>
<td>0,80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>0,20</td>
<td>0,20</td>
<td>0,50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Sigma$</td>
<td>0,90</td>
<td>1,50</td>
<td>2,10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Z matrix

Now the P matrix is transformed into the Z matrix. The Z matrix is ultimately used to the interval scales for the rankings provided by the Commission. In order to achieve this result, the normal-curve tables need to be applied to the values found in the P matrix (Guilford 1954, p 161). When a p value is greater than 0,5, Zij gets a positive sign. When the p value is less than 0,5, Zij gets a negative sign. The right half of the Z matrix above the diagonal is identical to the lower half. The only difference is that the algebraic signs are reversed. Subtracting 0.5 from the p values is the first step in obtaining the z values. Than, these values are ready to be referenced with the normal-curve tables. This provided us with the z values.

Subsequently, the sums of the columns need to be determined. The means are calculated by dividing the sums of the columns with the number of rows in the table. These means can now be used as scale values for comparison of the answers given by the respondents. However, to clarify the results, I want to remove the negative sign in the values. Therefore, the lowest stimulus (IO) needs to be given the value zero. In order to carry this through for the other categories as well, to each mean a positive number equal to the absolute value of the lowest stimulus needs to be added. In this case, that is +0,56. Finally, we now have the interval scale values from which conclusions about the preferences of the respondents can be drawn.

Table IV.7: Z matrix for the European Commission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IO</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>EA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>+0,00</td>
<td>+0,84</td>
<td>+0,84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-0,84</td>
<td>+0,00</td>
<td>+0,84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>-0,84</td>
<td>-0,84</td>
<td>+0,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∑</td>
<td>-1,68</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>+1,68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∑/#rows</td>
<td>-0,56</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>+0,56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interval Scale</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>+0,56</td>
<td>+1,12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex IV.3 Council of Ministers

The F matrix of frequencies

To obtain more detailed information on the distances between the ranked choices made by the Council, the method of paired comparison is applied to the collected data. In order to eventually convert the ordinal rank values to interval scales, I start by devising the F matrix (Swanborn 1993, p31-57). The F matrix (f stands for frequencies) holds all frequencies fi,j where f shows us the number of times that the organizational form in the column j is chosen during a confrontation with the organizational form in row i (Swanborn 1993, p37). Since an organizational form cannot be ranked higher or lower than itself, the diagonal remains empty. The columns then have to be ranked from the smallest sum at the left to the highest sum of the rows at the right (Swanborn 1993, p37). In other words, the numbers in the F matrix give us the number of times the organizational form in the column was chosen over the organizational form in the row.

Table IV.8: F matrix of frequencies for the Council of Ministers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IO</th>
<th>EA</th>
<th>NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∑</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The P matrix of proportions

The next step is to transform the F matrix of frequencies into the P matrix of proportions. We do this by dividing fij (the numbers in F matrix) by N, the number of respondents. In the case of the Council, this means dividing the outcomes presented in the F matrix by 4. The empty compartments found on the diagonal, become 0.5, since they represent the centre of the standard normal distribution (Swanborn 1993, p38). This results in the following P matrix.

Table IV.9: P matrix of proportions for the Council of Ministers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IO</th>
<th>EA</th>
<th>NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∑</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As can be observed in table III.9, the P matrix for the Council holds a so-called extreme proportions. These are the numbers 0,00 and 1,00. To correct these extremes, the continuity correction is applied (Swanborn 1993, p47-49). In practice, this means that for this value, p is replaced by:

\[F + 0.5/N \times 100\% \text{ when } F/N \leq 0.02\]
\[F + 0.5/N \times 100\% \text{ when } F/N \geq 0.02\]

For the answers given by the Council officials, this results in the following adapted P matrix.

**Table IV.10: P' matrix of proportions for the Council of Ministers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IO</th>
<th>EA</th>
<th>NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>0,50</td>
<td>0,50</td>
<td>0,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>0,50</td>
<td>0,50</td>
<td>0,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0,125</td>
<td>0,50</td>
<td>0,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∑</td>
<td>1,125</td>
<td>1,50</td>
<td>1,875</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The Z matrix**

Finally the P’ matrix is transformed into the Z matrix. The Z matrix is ultimately used to the interval scales for the rankings provided by the Council. In order to achieve this result, the normal-curve tables need to be applied to the values obtained in the P’ matrix (Guilford 1954, p161). When a p value is greater than 0,5, Zij gets a positive sign. When the p value is less than 0,5, Zij gets a negative sign. The right half of the Z matrix above the diagonal is identical to the lower half. The only difference is that the algebraic signs are reversed. Subtracting 0.5 from the P values is the first step in obtaining the Z values. Afterwards, these values are ready to be referenced with the normal-curve tables. This provided us with the Z values. Subsequently, the sums of the columns need to be calculated. The means are calculated by dividing the sums of the columns with the number of rows in the table. These means can now be used as scale values for comparison of the answers given by the respondents. However, to clarify the results, I want to remove the negative sign in the values. Therefore, the lowest stimulus (IO) needs to be given the value zero. In order to carry this through for the other categories as well, to each mean a positive number equal to the absolute value of the lowest stimulus needs to be added. In this case, that is +0,38. We now have the interval scale values from which conclusions about the preferences of the respondents can be drawn.
**Table IV.11: Z matrix for the Council of Ministers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IO</th>
<th>EA</th>
<th>NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>+0,00</td>
<td>+0,00</td>
<td>+1,15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>-0,00</td>
<td>+0,00</td>
<td>+0,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-1,15</td>
<td>-0,00</td>
<td>+0,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Σ</td>
<td>-1,15</td>
<td>-0,00</td>
<td>-0,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Σ/#rows</td>
<td>-0,38</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>0,38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interval Scale</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>0,38</td>
<td>0,76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex V: Legend figure 3

Legend:

1. **Gross Inland Consumption** – (Mtoe) – Gross inland consumption is the quantity of energy consumed within the borders of a country. It is calculated using the following formula: primary production + recovered products + imports + stock changes - exports - bunkers (i.e. quantities supplied to sea-going ships).

2. **Indigenous Production** – (Mtoe) – Primary energy production is the extraction of energy from a natural source. The precise definition depends on the fuel involved.

   - **Coal** - Quantities of fuels extracted or produced, calculated after any operation for removal of inert matter. In general, production includes the quantities consumed by the producer during the production process (e.g. for heating or operation of equipment and auxiliary) as well as any quantities supplied to other on-site producers of energy for transformation or other uses.
   - **Crude Oil** - Quantities of fuels extracted or produced within national boundaries, including off-shore production. Production includes only marketable production, and excludes any quantities returned to formation. Production includes all crude oil, natural gas liquids (NGL), condensates and oil from shale and tar sands, etc.
   - **Natural Gas** - Quantities of dry gas, measured after purification and extraction of natural gas liquids and sulphur. The production includes only marketable production, and excludes any quantities re-injected, vented and flared, and any extraction losses. The production includes all quantities used within the natural gas industry, in gas extraction, pipeline systems and processing plants.
   - **Nuclear** - Quantities of heat produced in a reactor. Production is the actual heat produced or the heat calculated on the basis of the gross electricity generated and the thermal efficiency of the nuclear plant. All nuclear production is set as fully indigenous.
   - **Geothermal** - Quantities of heat extracted from geothermal fluids. Production is calculated on the basis of the difference between the enthalpy of the fluid produced in the production borehole and that of the fluid disposed of via the re-injection borehole.
   - **Biomass/Waste** - In the case of municipal solid wastes (MSW), wood, wood wastes and other solid wastes, production is the heat produced after combustion and corresponds to the heat content (NCV) of the fuel. In the case of anaerobic digestion of wet wastes, production is the heat content (NCV) of the biogas produced. The production includes all quantities of gas consumed in the installation for the fermentation processes, and excludes all quantities of flared gases. In the case of biofuels, the production is the heat content (NCV) of the fuel. In the case of biofuels, the production is the heat content (NCV) of the fuel.

3. **Net Import** – (Mtoe) – All energy sources imported, excluding all nuclear set as indigenous.

4. **Import dependency (%)** - Import dependency shows the extent to which a country relies upon imports in order to meet its energy needs. It is calculated using the following formula: net imports / (gross inland consumption + bunkers).

5. **RES-E 2010 target (%)** - MS target for the share of electricity production from renewables according to directive 2001/77/EC


7. **Renewables**
   a. **Production**
      i. **RES-E** – (GWh) – All known RES electricity generation. Summary of all GWh figures, except "Small HPP" and "Biogas/other" are used all known data related to renewables for 2004 year. The figure sometimes differs from the figure "12b Power Generation - for RES". (See 12b).
         a. **Tide, Wave, Ocean** – (MW) - summary of electricity generated by power plants using Tide, Wave and Ocean energy
         b. **Wind** – (GWh) - electricity generated by onshore and offshore wind power plants. Figures are set for the end of 2004, while there was a significant increase of new installed Wind Power Plants in 2005.
         c. **Biomass** – (GWh) - electricity generated by all types of biomass plants includes biogas.
         d. **Solar PV** – (GWh) - electricity generated by photovoltaic
         e. **Geothermal el - (GWh)** – electricity generated by geothermal power plants
     ii. **RES Heat** – (TJ) - All known RES heat production. Summary of all TJ figures, except "Biogas".
         a. **Biomass th** – (TJ) - heat produced by all types of biomass plants includes biogas.
         b. **Solar Heating** – (TJ) - heat produced by all types of solar thermal devices
         c. **Geothermal th – (TJ)** - heat produced by all types of geothermal heating devices, exclude heat pumps
         d. **Heat Pumps – (TJ)** - heat produced by Heat Pumps
   b. **Installed Capacity - (MW)**
      i. **Total RES – (MW)** – summary of installed capacity of renewables
      ii. **Hydro – (MW)** – summary of installed capacity of Hydro power plants includes Small HPP and Pumping HPP as well. Tide, Wave and Ocean power plants are included as well, because Eurostat is using it in this way.
         a. **Tide, Wave, Ocean** – (MW) - summary of installed capacity of power plants using Tide, Wave, Ocean energy
      iii. **Wind – (MW)** – summary of installed capacity of Wind power plants
      iv. **Total Biomass – (MW)** – summary of installed capacity of Biomass plants
      v. **Solar PV – (MW)** – summary of installed capacity of PV plants
      vi. **Solar Heating – (MW)** – summary of installed capacity of Solar Thermal Collectors
         a. **Solar Thermal Collector's Surface - (m²)** - Surface of Solar Thermal Collectors, which are installed in Member States
   c. **Geothermal el – (MW)** – summary of installed capacity of Geothermal power plants
viii. Geothermal th – (MW) – summary of installed capacity of geothermal devices used for heating, exclude Heat pumps
ix. Heat Pumps – (MW) – summary of installed capacity of Heat pumps
1. HP Installed – (pc) - Number of Heat Pumps installed in Member States
8. Biofuels; Biodiesel – (tons), Bioethanol – (tons), ETBE – (tons)
10. Investment in Research – total amount used by MS in mEUR, and as a share in per cent of GDP.
11. Final Energy Consumption – (Mtoe) - Final energy consumption is the energy finally consumed in the transport, industrial, commercial, agricultural, public and household sectors. It excludes deliveries to the energy transformation sector and to the energy industries themselves.
   a. Subdivision by Sector
   b. Subdivision by Energy Source
12. Electricity – all 2004 data according Eurostat
   a. Installed Capacity (MW)
   b. Power generation (TWh) – For Renewables, these figures are preliminary figures from Eurostat for 2004.
13. Liberalisation of electricity and gas markets – 2005 data
   a. Market opening (%)
   b. Transmission System Unbundling – mode of Transmission System Unbundling of each Member State. Not possible for EU-25 table
   c. Distribution System Unbundling - mode of Distribution System Unbundling of each Member State. Not possible for EU-25 table
14. GIC per capita – (kgoe/cap) - Gross Inland Consumption per capita
15. Energy Intensity (toe/MPP) - energy intensity gives an indication of the effectiveness with which energy is being used to produce added value. It is defined as the ratio of Gross Inland Consumption of energy to Gross Domestic Product.
16. CO₂ Emissions per capita - (kg/cap)
17. Carbon Intensity – (toe/Capita)
18. CO₂ Emissions – (Mt)
19. Kyoto Target – (%). Target set in Annex 1 of the Kyoto Protocol
20. Proved reserves
   a. Crude Oil – (bbl) - from Oil and Gas Journal for 1.1.2006
   b. Natural gas – (bcm) from IEA, end of 2004
   c. Nuclear – (Mt) – all raw uranium, informational number from WEC from 2000
   d. Hard Coal – (Mt) – from IEA 2004
   e. Brown Coal – (Mt) – from IEA 2004
   f. Peat – (Mt) – only proved reserves, which are set as exploitable, informational number from WEC from 2000
22. Gas Stocks – (bcm) - according to IEA, end of 2004
23. Oil Storage Capacity
24. Gas Storage Capacity – (bcm) - according to IEA in 2004

Comments
(e) - estimated
(p) - provisional value
(s) - estimated by Eurostat

Abbreviations
bbl - barrel
bcm - billion cubic metres
cap – capita
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
GWh – Gigawatt hours
HP – Hydro Power Plant
kg – kilogram
kgoe – kilogram of oil equivalent
Mtoe – thousand tons of oil equivalent
m² – square metres
mEUR – million EUR
Mt – million tons
Mtoe – million tons of oil equivalent
MW – Megawatts
M€95 – million EUR in 1995 currency
n.a. - not available
pc – pieces
PV – photovoltaic
T€00 – tonne of CO₂
TWh – Terawatt hours

Sources
Data are mainly from DG TREN Pocket book and Eurostat if there were available. Some of data are from IEA, WEC and Oil and Gas Journal. All data are at least for 2003 include the basic statistic (Gross Inland Consumption, Indigenous Production, Not Import, Final Energy Consumption and Sustainable Development Indicators). Power Generation, Installed capacity and RES data are of 2004 data. Liberalisation market data are of 2005.