ERASMUS UNIVERSITEIT ROTTERDAM

FSW / FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

MASTER INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC MANAGEMENT & POLICY
2007/2008

Master Thesis

"YOU CANNOT AFFORD BEING TOO GREEN [...]."
-
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND CO2 EMISSIONS FROM CARS

STEFANIE ERDMANN

315974

Erdmann.Stefanie@gmx.de

1ST SUPERVISOR: DR. M. HAVERLAND

2ND SUPERVISOR: DR. F. VAN NISPEN

DATE: 19 AUGUST 2008

WORD COUNT: 27019

Table of Contents

1 Introduction

The European Union (EU) is a complex entity with a particular multi-level and *sui generis* character. Somewhere between a nation-state and a supranational institution, the degree of integration differs from policy to policy and so do the respective decision-making procedures. In the process of European integration, institutions have been created, modified and expanded their powers. Amongst them, the European Parliament (EP) started off as a consultative assembly without any say in the decision-making at the emerging European level. Without a clear-cut blueprint, the EP became the only directly elected institution in 1979. But only after the 1986 Single European Act and the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, the EP moved beyond its weak advisory role towards an actor almost on par with the Council through the co-operation procedure. The 1996 Treaty of Amsterdam even upgraded EP's standing through the new co-decision procedure.

Being the second important legislative actor concerning first pillar policies,, literature considers the EP as eager to respond to environmental, social and consumer interests (Mazey & Richardson, 1993; Kohler-Koch, 1997; Greenwood, 2003; Richardson, 2006). Since these *diffuse* interests suffer from high organizational costs and fail to provide sufficient incentives for individual mobilization (Pollack, 1997, p. 573), they need powerful legislative allies that are prone to take up their goals. In return, institutions like the EP receive public attention and boost their legitimacy: For instance, the EP is enabled to present itself as advocate of the consumers and the weak against capitalism (Kohler-Koch, 1997, p. 7). One of the policies that represent diffuse interests will be in the center of this research: environmental policy. In general, environmental policy has been increasingly understood as a separate policy since the 1970s thanks to the Brundtland Report. The particularity of environmental policies and politics is their long-term and cross-sectoral character which contradicts political tactics steered by re-election prospects. Moreover, the public-/common good *problématique* calls upon the responsibility of policy-makers and triggers normative discussions about the orientation of policy, especially with regard to alleged trade-offs or diverging interests between ecology and economy.

In line with the foregoing remarks, the EP "[…] has often taken a 'greener' line than either the Commission or the Council" (Sbragia, 2000, p. 302) in environmental policy. Nowadays, this practice raises expectations as global warming caused by carbon dioxide CO2 emissions[1] is on the spot of media, politicians, businesses and consumers: The reports of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize winning International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) caused a sensation and put pressure on all parties to continue the Kyoto Process. The IPCC reports emphasize the human factor in global warming and call for a world-wide reduction in CO2-emissions (International Panel on Climate Change, 2007).

In this context, the Spring European Council underscored "[…] the leading role of the EU in international climate protection […] through setting out an ambitious EU objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 30% by 2020" in March 2007 (Council of the European Union, 2007, p. 11). Although these statements suggest

[1] As known as CO2 emissions.

that environmental policy is a pivotal issue in EU policy-making, it may not be the only top-priority on the EU Agenda. The 2000 Lisbon Agenda (European Council, 2000) has set out the way to ensure and enhance the EU's competitiveness and employment, a topic also touched in this thesis. Along this line, business interests play an integral part in the aforementioned March 2007 Presidency Conclusions which sketch *both* global warming and business competitiveness as linchpins and pressing factors in EU policy-making (Council of the European Union, 2007, p. 13). With regard to the EP's role, the President of the EP, Hans-Gert Pöttering (EPP-ED), recently commented on the main focus of parliamentary work in 2008:

> "The imperatives of climate and environmental protection will have a decisive bearing on our legislative work this year. In that connection, as legislators we have a major responsibility to protect our climate and our environment, on the one hand, and to safeguard European competitiveness, including our jobs, on the other. Together, we must strike a responsible balance between economics and ecology"(European Parliament, 2008).

Clearly, the EP's president does not promote environmental goals over business interests. Instead, he calls for a balance between business and diffuse interests. An example in this political debate deals with CO2 emissions from passenger cars: The Commission of the European Communities (the Commission henceforth) envisages CO2 standards for new passenger cars put on the European market to avoid distortions in the single market while forcing manufacturers to produce environmentally friendly cars. As early as in 1995, the Commission already set out a strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from cars. After some debate within the Council of Ministers (the Council henceforth) and the EP, a framework was established. It relied merely on a voluntary pledge of the automotive industry to deliver significant CO2 reductions to 140g CO2/km by 2008 or 2009. In 2005, the Commission became engaged with the automotive industry within a framework called "Competitive Automotive Regulatory System for the 21st century" (CARS21). Thereby, the issue of CO2 reductions was addressed and a target of 120g CO2/km for the new car fleet from 2012 was discussed. Reviewing the progress made by the European manufacturers, but also Japanese and Korean car-makers, the Commission concluded in 2007 that the automotive industry failed to achieve the goals under the voluntary agreement. The Commission therefore suggested a legislative act. In February 2007, the Commission published its plans for an integrative approach that unites a CO2 reduction target of 130g/km in motor technology and complementary measures that further reduce 10g CO2/km by 2012.

Although the two Commission documents ("communications") presenting the approach only had a non-legislative character, the European Parliament commented on them with two separate own-initiative reports. In the first parliamentary resolution dated from October 2007, the EP dealt with the outcome of its 1995 Community strategy to reduce emissions from passenger cars. Acknowledging the failure of the voluntary agreement, the EP set out a 2015 timeframe and a reduction target of 125g CO2 while additional measures proposed by the Commission shall ensure the overall target of 120gCO2/km. The committee responsible was the Committee for Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI). Almost at the same time, the Committee for Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) prepared a report on the CARS21 initiative outlining Parliament's view on the CARS21 findings, conclusions and recommendations. In the corresponding resolution dated from January 2008, the

Parliament calls for more time (2015) and a less tight reduction target (125g CO2/km) for the car industry. Interestingly, the resolution does not refer to the initial Community goal.

Bearing in mind both parliamentary reports, two facts are striking: First, the Parliament adopts two resolutions that water down the initial ideas of the Commission. Second, this result is not what used to be expected from the EP having a traditionally strong stance on protecting the environment. Although both resolutions are legally non-binding, observers attribute a signal effect to them: On 19 December 2007, the Commission tabled a proposal for a regulation setting emission performance standards for new passenger cars (Commission of the European Communities, 2007). Without any changes with regard to its communications published in February 2007, the Commission proposes a limit of 120gCO2/km as average emissions from the new car fleet placed on the market in 2012. In line with the integrative approach, improvements in motor technology should lead to an average emission target of 130gCO2/km; another 10g CO2 shall be reduced by means of political measures to be adopted by the Member states including taxation. The importance of this step is not to be underestimated as it took the Commission until 2007 to be able to present legally binding emissions targets using a so-called 'command and control'- approach.

Bearing in mind the EP's resolutions on the previous Commission's communications, what might happen to the prospects of the legislative proposals? What are factors that could have influenced the EP to abandon its green line? This research aims to answer this question by looking at factors that have an impact on elected politicians during decision-making procedures. Accordingly, the thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 problematizes the issue and discusses the relevance of the topic. Chapter 2 also introduces the research question. Subsequently, chapter 3 gives basic background information about the EP as well as about EU Environmental and Industrial Policy. Against this background, chapter 4 introduces decision criteria for politicians. It also elaborates on the theoretical framework. Chapter 45 explains the research design and elaborates on the methods. Particularly, it contains the review of the relevant literature on MEP and the EP's internal mechanisms that result in hypotheses. The definition of indicators and operationalization follows in chapter 6. The research findings are presented in chapter 7 and discussed in chapter 0. Eventually, chapter 9 comprises a concluding section, recommendations and an outlook.

2 Research goal and research questions

2.1 Problem statement and research object

Environmental protection has been anchored in the political and public debate since the emergence of an environmentalist movement and the formation of green parties in the industrialized states in the 1970s and 1980s. The EU has demonstrated a deep interest in taking up a leadership role through adopting strict environmental standards and a future oriented environmental policy in many areas. Although the scientific dispute about the concrete mechanisms and consequences of global warming is still ongoing, the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change and follow up conferences targeted a reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG). In particular, the now-binding 1997 Kyoto Protocol set out that high income countries and former Socialist countries reduce their total emissions of GHG by 5% relative to 1990 levels. The reduction is scheduled for 2010 with each country being allocated a specific target. At that time, the energy-intensive sectors were asked to contribute to the reduction; international aviation and shipping are still not covered by Kyoto. Thereby, the EU forces energy intensive sectors such as energy production and manufacturing to reduce their emissions by 60% or more based on 1990 levels by 2050.

The current debate on climate change caused by human activities and especially CO2 emissions centers around the IPCC reports. Their findings have exacerbated the situation and are pressing politicians to take actions against global warming. It goes without saying that uncertainties remain when projecting future environmental situations und that the discussion about environmental policies involves normative questions to a high degree. In political science, discussion about norms, values and the allocation of resources lay at the very heart of the discipline. Research about environmental policies and politics therefore imply a high degree of social relevance. Drawing on Lehnert, Miller and Wonka (2007, p. 32), “[s]ocially relevant work focuses on phenomena which affect people, and discuss their impact with regard to specified evaluative standards”. As EU environmental policy affects all citizens in the member states of the EU, if not world-wide, research on this topic has an inherent *raison d’être*. The conflict between environmental protection and maintaining a certain living standard in industrialized countries leads to disagreement among parties and member states about policy norms and values. Social relevance is reflected in questions about the direction the EP and, moreover, EU politics and policy take in environmental policy. Researchers should keep track of these developments to inform the public and as such the voters about them and possible changes. Besides, it is worthwhile asking whether the EU and especially the EP lives up to their own standards and stick to self-defined environmental commitments.

Nevertheless, these statements shall only provide for an overall framework for this thesis. The thesis refrains from discussing normative questions about how environmental and industrial policy shall look like in general and in the EU, in particular. Furthermore, a review on all recent EU activities in the field of environmental policy is far beyond the scope of this paper. Also, this thesis focuses on one actor in European policy-making, leaving aside the Commission and the Council that are involved in the decision-making processes as well. It goes without

saying that environmental policy has a cross-cutting character and affects more policies in the first pillar, but this thesis concentrates on a specific policy output: a way to regulate the EU single market of passenger cars according to CO2 emission standards. Further examples for CO2 reduction measures are the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) that covers CO2 emissions from energy-intensive industrial installations across the EU (Directive 2003/87/EC, 2003). Only recently, the Council and the EP agreed on the details on how to include aviation into EU ETS (European Parliament, 2008).

Other issues related to the ecological performance of cars such as NOx emissions will be neglected. Moreover, this thesis leaves out a discussion of the technical details and an evaluation which measures and stipulations contribute most to environmental protection. Instead, this research uses the CO2 targets and schedule brought forward by the different documents of the Commission and the EP as a reference point when scrutinizing when and why those two numbers were changed. They help to structure the interim stages and to evaluate in which direction the new numbers differ from the initial goals. To conclude, this thesis focuses on the internal processes within the EP and those mechanisms that affect MEPs and that therefore determine policy outputs.

There are two fundamental restrictions: First, both reports are legally non-binding and therefore do not lead to actual legislation. The positive side-effect is that both reports can be regarded as internal documents of the EP that reveal Parliament's internal search for a common position on that issue. Second, the proposal for a regulation is still under scrutiny and has to be left aside in this research. When both reports were adopted, the work on the actual legislative proposal had only just began. Still, the author includes as much information as possible and available at the point of writing to link the non-binding reports to the legislative proposal.

2.2 Purpose statement

In order to identify the influences on MEPs, this thesis screens literature on public policymaking to extract possible factors taken into account by politicians in decision-making. In a second step, these potential influences are linked to the literature on the EP's internal mechanism and MEPs' voting behavior. As such, this thesis designs a very broad theoretical framework embedding various possible factors influencing MEPs. In terms of theoretical relevance, this paper is of particular interest as it reviews a diverse range of literature and derives hypotheses on the basis of various theoretical reflections and previous research. The available body of knowledge will be tested against a real life phenomenon in a congruence analysis.

Next to these theoretical ambitions, this thesis aims to highlight these factors in order to shed light on the motivations of politicians that are elected representatives of their constituencies. It is a legitimate and socially relevant question to ask which factors influence MEPs and why. The author is aware that case studies do not allow for considerable external validity and generalizability (see below); still, the results of this thesis provide some preliminary insights that can be validated by further investigations.

2.3 Research question and sub-questions

This thesis strives for the descriptive explanation of the policy outputs and aims to highlight the causes of effects. Against this background, the central research question of this thesis is:

Which factors explain the industry-friendly policy outputs of the European Parliament?

These factors will be subsumed under three groups, namely institutions, ideas/ideology and interests. Starting out from these three angles, a variety of factors is listed by literature that influences MEPs in their involvement in decision-making. Thereof, this thesis scrutinizes if institutional factors such as the committee type or the rapporteurs, or the MEPs responsible for a report, play a role. It therefore asks, first, how the rapporteurs of both reports influenced the policy output that eventually had an industry-friendly character, and, second, whether it played a role which committee was responsible for the report. Talking about ideas, the policy output might be inspired by scientific input that contradicted the Commission's propositions. Another possible factor is party ideology and an ideological conviction towards the issue. Thus, it is worthwhile asking whether the current composition of the Parliament is characterized by an industry-friendly majority. Apart from party ideology, constituency, interests might have induced MEPs from member stateswith an important automotive industry to vote in favor of business interests. Another kind of interest is represented by the lobbying activities of the car manufacturers. Their lobbying might also have affected MEPs voting behavior.

In order to answer this central research question, several sub questions have to be answered:

1. Which factors can influence policy-outputs in general?
2. Which institutional factors can shape policy in the EP?
3. What kinds of interests play a role in EP policy-making?
4. How can ideas affect policy outputs by the EP?
5. Which of these factors affected the policy output in the two cases at hand?
6. What do these factors reveal about internal mechanisms in the EP?
7. What recommendations are to be drawn from the research findings?

3 Background information

3.1 The European Parliament

What is now the EP started off as the “Common Assembly” of the European Coal and Steal Community in 1952. Its responsibilities at the time included discussing and scrutinizing legislation without having any institutionalized powers in shaping or influencing them. Neunreither (2000, p. 133) explains that “[i]n Jean Monnet’s vision, it [the EP] was, together with the European Court of Justice, an institution of control and scrutiny, not of decision-making”. Back then, its members had a double-mandate which meant that all Euro-parliamentarians were also members of national parliaments - a practice that has been abolished only in 2002 (Nugent, 2006, p. 270). It was only in 1979 that MEPs were directly elected from their constituencies albeit the Rome Treaties had already called for an elected institution in 1957. Yet, member stateshad feared a powerful institution on the nascent European level that could base its claims for more powers on its democratically legitimate status. This assumption is explained by Katz and Wessels (1999, p. 10): “In the European tradition, parliaments are the central institutions for political legitimacy.” In theory, the EP connects the people to the EU and helps legitimizing the exercise of a European public authority.

A symbolic act also played in the hands of the member statesand undermined the EP’s work: Owing to the hostile past between France and Germany, Strasbourg was chosen to host the meetings of the Assembly while Brussels has emerged as the operating center of European integration. Although the EP has decided to build a ‘dependance’ in Brussels in 1985, it still convenes in Strasbourg once a month for a four-day Plenary session. Parliamentary work therefore takes place in both cities, a situation that hampers the smooth running of the EP’s activities, that implies the costly duplication of facilities and that demands MEPs to dedicate a lot of time to travelling between Strasbourg, Brussels and their constituencies (Scully, 2007, p. 176). In addition, its administrative center is headquartered in Luxemburg. Nugent concludes:

> “If the EP had just one base, and especially if it was Brussels, it is likely that the EP’s efficiency, influence and visibility would all be increased. However, the Council has the power of decision on that matter, and hard lobbying from the Luxembourg and French governments has ensured that arguments for ‘sense to prevail’ and a single site to be agreed have not been acted upon” (Nugent, 2006, p. 272).

3.1.1 Legislative powers

However, the Assembly that renamed itself in 1962 has grown substantially in size and powers: The EP started off with 78 MEPs in 1952, a number that has increased tenfold by 2007: 785 MEPs are currently working in the EP. McCormick calls it “the only directly elected international legislature in the world” (2005, p. 94) whose members are elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term. The number of seats for every country is loosely modeled on the national population, a fact that results in an over-representation of small countries in comparison to underrepresented big countries (Nugent, 2006, p. 258).

Its legislative powers deserve a short presentation. In the 1970s, the EP's budgetary powers increased significantly similarly as its right of consultation. Under the *consultation procedure*, the EP gives advice while the Council and the Commission shape legislation. Nowadays, this procedure only applies to agricultural policy as well as political and judicial cooperation. The 1986 Single European Act brought about the *assent procedure* and the *cooperation procedure*: The EP was granted 'assent' power in matters of association agreements and certain other international agreements whereas the cooperation procedure gave EP greater scope for designing laws concerning the internal market. In detail, the EP became partly able to veto Commission legislation. Yet, its decision could still be overruled by the Commission and the Council. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty expanded the scope of cooperation through introducing the *codecision procedure*, which has been strengthened by two follow-up treaties (the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and the 2001 Treaty of Nice). The new framework of *codecision* made a difference in two respects: Legislation under this procedure is made in the name of the Council and the Parliament. If the Council and the EP failed to agree on a common text after a second reading, the matter is referred to the 'conciliation committee' composed of representatives of both institutions. If this committee fails to reach an agreement, legislation is simply dropped. The Amsterdam Treaty even strengthened the Parliament's position *vis-à-vis* the Commission that doesn't have a say any more in the conciliation phase. Also, Amsterdam basically abolished the cooperation procedure and increased the number of areas under *codecision* from 15 to 38. Besides, the EP gained considerable power over the appointment of the Commission's president and the entire team of commissioners. Since the Maastricht Treaty, around half of EU laws are processed under the *codecision procedure* (for a detailed overview of legislative procedures see Corbett, R.; Jacobs, F.; Shackleton, M., 2003, pp. 172-211).

3.1.2 Implications and consequences of the legislative powers

Although the EP, once labeled a 'multilingual talking shop', has increased its powers, it stands back in comparison to national parliaments:

> "[…] [W]hile the EP is still far from enjoying many of the powers that are usually associated with domestic parliaments, the institutional set-up of the Union allows the EP to have a significant influence over the EU legislative process. The strong policy-influence is in turn facilitated by a quite effective and innovative parliamentary organization." (Bergman & Raunio, 2001, p. 116)

The EP is different in many aspects from national parliaments. A major difference resides in the scope of competencies. Nowadays, the EU institutions issue binding legislation in areas such as external trade, the internal market, the Common Agriculture Policy, environment, health and regional policies that are in some cases complemented by national policies. Some EU legislation only provides a framework for coordination; some policies such as income taxation leave out the EP. The EP also lacks influence in parts of the European Monetary Union , the Common Foreign and Security Policy and in parts of Justice and Home Affairs. So to say, its 'negative' legislative role is restricted since it can only exercise veto power under *codecision* and assent procedure. The EP lacks the formal right to initiate legislation and does not have a fully 'positive' legislative role. Yet, the EP has two possibilities to requests the Commission to act: At the one hand, own-initiative reports express the view and concerns of the EP but the Commission is not obliged to follow the Parliament's

suggestions. On the other hand, the absolute majority of MEPs might invoke Art. 192 TEC to force the Commission and the member statesto take legislative action – although this procedure has been rarely applied (Nugent, 2006, pp. 241,247).

Second, it is the member statesand the national parliaments that control the EU's public spending. What is more, institutional arrangements and treaty provisions on EU level are subject to national parliaments' scrutiny and decisions. The EP is voiceless in these matters, even if treaty reforms affect its powers and institutional future. Last but not least, the EP is not in a position to fully exert power regarding executive accountability: Although the EP is allowed to dismiss the Commission, the Council and the European Council are out of reach and cannot be overthrown (Bergman & Raunio, 2001, p. 217).

Still, the EP is free from two major problems that national parliaments have: Domestic parliaments are constrained by strong party loyalties and the inescapable task to either support or oppose a government. MEPs lack a comparable government and their 'natural opponents' are the other European institutions. Thus, institutional self-interest is at the core of the EP's logic. Fighting for recognition, the EP has adopted several strategies to increase its stance especially *vis-à-vis* the Council: The work of the legislatures is structured around committees to enhance sectoral specialization. This increased policy expertise of the MEPs "is particularly important given the superior administrative resources of the Council and the Commission" (Bergman & Raunio, 2001, p. 124). The main function of the EP is therefore content-related; thus, it emphasizes detailed legislative work during policy-shaping.

To successfully adopt a position, MEPs seek compromises. As many decision rules require an absolute majority, cohesive party groups and coalition building are pivotal. Additionally, broad majorities are necessary if the EP wants to send a strong signal to both the Commission and the Council (Bergman & Raunio, 2001, p. 125). As a side-effect, party competition is therefore rather low and the EP can be described as a parliament of consensus: "Although the party groups are ideologically based, intergroup relations in the Parliament have traditionally rested on cooperation rather than confrontation" (Scully, 2007, p. 181). As a result, the EP avoids a clear-cut left – right division; an alliance of Center-Left and Center-Right (EPP-ED; PSE; ALDE) votes as a grand coalition on about two-thirds of the acts (Judge & Earnshaw, 2003). Before the voting, the EPP and the PSE form an agreement so that a report can pass in Plenary. But if consensus or absolute majorities are not compelling, both parties turn towards their natural allies on the Right or the Left spectrum. Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) or the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens) might become 'king-makers' (Corbett, Jacobs, Shackleton, 2003, pp. 19-150).

3.1.3 Internal politics

The parties in the EP deserve special attention since it operates in a multinational, multilingual and multiparty political environment. The EP consists of European Political Groups (EPGs) that pool more than 100 separate national parties from the 27 member states. Individual national party delegations therefore make up the EPGs that centers on political ideology. As groups benefit in organizational and material terms from their status, national parties gather to form European party groups –

although all groups are characterized by significant internal division in view of national and ideological issues (Nugent, 2006, p. 265). MEPs are members of both a national party and an EPG which demands from MEPs to please different constituencies. The basic dilemma for MEPs is situated between their national interests or traditions and their membership in an EPG. In addition, there are other factors impeding party cohesion: As the EU lacks a clear government, the EP and therefore its party groups lack this uniting factor for or against a ruling party, an automatic reflex known from domestic parliaments. Second, structural reasons weaken party groups since national parties nominate candidates for the EP elections and national delegations still remain a major focal point for MEPs. Third, MEPs have claims on their votes by interest groups, their constituencies and the governments of their member states, to name but a few (Nugent, 2006, p. 266).

The two largest groups in the chamber are the conservative Christian Democratic party European People's Party and European Democrats (EPP-ED) and the center-left Socialist Group in the European Parliament (PSE). Bergman and Taunio mention the Liberals and the Greens as the other two important party groups in the EP. Until the 1999 elections, the PSE had outnumbered all other parties, but it lost its majority to the EPP-ED (2001, p. 125). As election results are translated into seats by the help of proportional representation, many small parties succeed in winning seats and allow multiparty groups (McCormick, 2005, p. 97).

The EPGs have several means to control this internal EP work: They appoint committee seats and chairs allocated according to their share in the parliament. In the committee's daily work, coordinators represent party groups, shape group positions and oversee the work of the MEPs. Scully concludes that compromise and coalition-building are essential to the EP's proceedings to run the EP as are subtle political skills of individual members in powerful positions:

> "But this sort of environment also grants individual parliamentarians who possess such political skills greater scope to achieve substantive policy objectives in the EP than their national counterparts can achieve in most other parliamentary institution." (Scully, 2007, p. 182)

The Presidents of the party groups are members of the Conference of Presidents that heads the parliamentary hierarchy. Together with the President of the EP and his or her 14 Vice-Presidents, they deal with the parliamentary schedule and the allocation of positions. The Conference of Presidents decides on the legislative planning, own-initiative reports as well as competences of permanent committees, temporary committees of inquiry, standing or *ad hoc* delegations. Looking at an EP calendar, it is striking how tightly organized it is – literally down to the minute. Apart from the Plenary's Strasbourg sessions and its mini-sessions of two days in Brussels, two weeks are usually foreseen for committee work. Some time is reserved for party group meetings and constituency visits.

3.1.4 Working Parliament

The committee system of the EP has evolved since the inception of European integration. The original Common Assembly of the European Communities started off with seven committees (McElroy, 2006, p. 8), a number that has increased to 23 in the current parliamentary term (2004-2009). The EP's plenary is the main decision-

making body, having the final say on legislative matters. Despite this formal pre-eminence, the vast majority of parliamentary work takes place in the specialized committees (Neuhold, 2001, p. 3). Investigating committees is an attempt to determine who actually exercises the power of formulating the EP's legislation (Benedetto, 2005, p. 68). The underlying principle is that "[c]ommittees form the backbone of most modern legislatures, screening, drafting, amending an even, in some cases, approving legislation" (McElroy, 2006, p. 6).

After the Commission has proposed legislation, parliamentary committees come into play: Prior to the actual reading in the EP's plenary, the expert committee considers the proposal. The committee chair and the group coordinators allocate the rapporteurship according to an auction-like points system. Once a political group "wins" the report and appoints the rapporteur, the other groups nominate "shadow rapporteurs" that monitor the work of the actual rapporteur. Other committees may draft opinions about the leading committee's reports. Still, it is up to the leading committee whether it includes their suggestions or not.

Basically, the rapporteur's task is to write a report containing draft amendments to the Commission's proposal, a motion for a parliamentary resolution and an explanatory statement, varying according to the legislative act. S/he is thereby supported by own resources such as assistants, policy advisors of the respective political group, the respective committee's secretariat, the Commission, think tanks and research institutes (Kaeding, 2005, p. 85). Lobbyists also provide MEPs with information.

Elaborating on the Commission's proposal includes discussions within the committee and amending the rapporteur's text. At this stage, all committee members are allowed to introduce amendments. Following the vote in the committee, the report is presented by the rapporteur before the plenary of the EP. Albeit amending a committee report is still possible, it is only the political groups or at least thirty-seven MEPs that can table a draft amendment. Whereas detailed scrutiny and discussions happen during the committee period, Plenary sessions are characterized by long voting times and hardly any debate on issues.

After its adoption, the final document is transmitted to the Council. If it disagrees, a second reading principally repeats this process. Another failure to look for an agreement leads to the official convening of the aforementioned Conciliation Committee. Nonetheless, informal meetings known as the 'trialogue' brings together the responsible representatives and advisers of all three institutions at earlier stages of the legislative process (Shackleton & Raunio, 2003).

Table 1: MEPs by Member State and political group – sixth parliamentary term (Source: European Parliament 2008)

Country	Group of the European People's Party and European Democrats (EPP-ED)	Socialist Group in the EP (PSE)	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)	Union for Europe of the Nations Group	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)	Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left	Independence /Democracy Group	Non-attached Members	Total
Belgium	6	7	6		2			3	24
Bulgaria	5	5	5					3	18
Czech Republic	14	2						3	24
Denmark	1	5	4	1	1	1	1		14
Germany	49	23	7		13	7			99
Estonia	1	3	2						6
Ireland	5	1	1	4		1	1		13
Greece	11	8				4	1		24
Spain	24	24	2		3	1			54
France	18	31	10		6	3	3	7	78
Italy	24	17	12	13	2	7		3	78
Cyprus	3		1			2			6
Latvia	3		1	4	1				9
Lithuania	2	2	7	2					13
Luxembourg	3	1	1		1				6
Hungary	13	9	2						24
Malta	2	3							5
Netherlands	7	7	5		4	2	2		27
Austria	6	7	1		2			2	18
Poland	15	9	6	19			3	2	54
Portugal	9	12				3			24
Romania	18	10	6		1				35
Slovenia	4	1	2						7
Slovakia	8	3						3	14
Finland	4	3	5		1	1			14
Sweden	6	5	3		1	2	2		19
United Kingdom	27	19	11		5	1	8	7	78
Total	**Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats**	**Socialist Group in the European Parliament**	**Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe**	**Union for Europe of the Nations Group**	**Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance**	**Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left**	**Independence /Democracy Group**	**Non-attached Members**	**Total**
	288	**217**	**100**	**43**	**43**	**41**	**22**	**31**	**785**

Table 2: An overview of the committees – sixth parliamentary term (Source: European Parliament 2008)

Standing committees	
AFET	Foreign Affairs
DROI	Human Rights
SEDE	Security and Defence
DEVE	Development
INTA	International Trade
BUDG	Budgets
CONT	Budgetary Control
ECON	Economic and Monetary Affairs
EMPL	Employment and Social Affairs
ENVI	Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
ITRE	Industry, Research and Energy
IMCO	Internal Market and Consumer Protection
TRAN	Transport and Tourism
REGI	Regional Development
AGRI	Agriculture and Rural Development
PECH	Fisheries
CULT	Culture and Education
JURI	Legal Affairs
LIBE	Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
AFCO	Constitutional Affairs
FEMM	Women's Rights and Gender Equality
PETI	Petitions
Temporary committees	
CLIM	Climate Change

(source: European Parliament 2008)

3.2 The EP on EU Environmental & Industrial Policy

European industrial policy goes hand in hand with the completion of the single market. It is used to enhance the competitiveness of the European industry as a common market for industrial goods provides for economies of scale. Practices such as the introduction of CO2 standards for cars might constitute a barrier to trade, if they are not applied to trading partners. In the EU, the common market reduces these barriers as it allows for a European-wide standardization. Product innovation and manufacturing excellence are the positive side-effects of trading in a single market. The EU set out underlying principles of its common industrial strategy, inter alia the consistency to other common policies, including environmental policy (Moussis 2005, pp. 285.312).

Why does the protection of the environment constitute a special policy problem? The environment and related problems feature a public good character: A public good is a commodity that can be provided to anyone while it is impossible to exclude somebody. As a result, “free riding” occurs. The result is a market failure as individuals do not have appropriate incentives to produce public goods while national

governments cannot fully capture all the benefits of investments in (global) public goods. Another problem is uncertainty when calculating social damages from pollution as it implies evaluating the survival of certain species or even the value of human life. A sound environmental analysis is the linchpin, but also the current weakness of every calculation. As a third factor, externalities come into play: An externality either imposes costs or benefits on others or implies effects that are not completely reflected in prices and market transactions. Usually, producing firms do not include the abatement of their pollutions in their price and production calculations; they will determine their most profitable pollutions levels by equating the marginal private benefit from abatement with the marginal private costs of abatement. A considerable amount of pollution will remain; the society has to bear those costs ("social costs").

Industrial policy and environmental policy are linked as they are the two sides of the coin called economic policies: Economic policies leads to two different results – efficiency or redistribution. As mentioned in the first section, it increases efficiency to set technical standards such as the CO2 emission standards for cars, both for the manufacturers and the consumers on the market. Yet, environmental standards aim at redistribution in the sense of a reallocation of values. The value in that sense concerns the preservation of the environment. Hix labels this "re-regulation" via positive integration (Hix 2005, p. 251). In practice, the European response to the aforementioned market failures via several instruments, from eco-labelling to establishing the European Environment Agency (EEA) and the inclusion of principles to protect the environment in EU legislation. Environmental legislation is based on the standards of the advanced countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries and exceeds the levels that the failures stemming from the internal market. The reasons are that the Commission and those member states with a strong environmental record push forward tight legislation. So-called laggards accept higher standards for their governments are aware of the public support for environmental matters. In addition, the environmental movement is highly active at EU level, probably enjoying the same access to legislators and regulators. Against this background, Hix identifies considerable power of the EP especially in the area of environmental policy: He cites the establishment of the EEA, the directive on genetically modified micro-organisms and their release as well as the 1991 directive on car emissions as cases in which the EP tightened the environmental standards *vis-à-vis* the Council. In those publicly acclaimed cases, the EP asserted tougher stipulations than envisaged by the Council at the first place (Hix 2005, p.106). Similarly, Krämer (1996 in McCormick 2001, p. 131) describes the EP's role towards environmental proposals as very distinct: "[…] [I]t routinely urges the Commission and the Council to be more ambitious, and to develop more progressive and efficient legislation, it rarely challenges proposals that are more technical in nature; it is a champion of NGO participation in the decision-making process; it is more active than the Commission or the Council in introducing an environmental element into proposals in other areas, such as agriculture, regional issues and the internal market […]".

3.3 Climate change international politics and cars

Climate change, also known as global warming or the greenhouse effect, is caused by a disproportionate number of gases such as chlorofluorocarbons, methane and

carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere. Thereby, CO2 constitutes the main problem as it causes 50% of the global warming and is a byproduct of burning fossil fuels. Despite the continuous scientific dispute about the concrete mechanisms and about the consequences of global warming, the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) followed a precautionary approach and targeted a stabilization of CO2 at 1990 levels by 2000. The EU countries decided to take even further action: The March 1997 Environment Council set out a reduction of 15% of the CO2, nitrous oxide and methane emissions by 2010, taking a 1990 baseline. On a worldwide scale, the 1997 Additional Protocol to the UNFCCC, the famous Kyoto Protocol, set out that high income countries and former Socialist countries reduce their total emissions of GHG by 5% relative to 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012, with each country being allocated a specific target. Nevertheless, the North-South cleavage and criticism from the USA hampered the Kyoto process. Currently, negotiations on a follow-up agreement for the post-Kyoto period are under way (McCormick 2001, pp. 262-290).

According to its self-professed leadership role, the EU's 2007 energy and climate change package and the 2007 Spring European Council, the EU agreed on an overall objective: to limit the global temperature increase to a maximum of 2℃. Thus, EU leaders agreed on a 20-30% reduction in GHGs by 2020.

Cars & Climate Change

Mobility lies at the heart of European integration. Being a prerequisite both for economic and social interaction, transport policy is a cross-cutting topic that involves a variety of aspects: employment and economic growth, technological development, international trade, safety and environmental considerations.

At the same time, transport is the sector that performs worst under the Kyoto stipulations and jeopardises compliance with their requirements. CO2 emissions from intra-EU transport activities have increased by 32% between 1990 and 2005. In contrast, oher sectors have reduced their emissions by 9.5% on average over the same period. The share of transport in CO2 emissions was 27% in 2005. Emissions from so-called "light duty vehicles" such as passenger cars and vans make up approximately 50% of this (European Federation for Transport and Environment 2007, p.1).

Within the framework of the EU Community strategy, the reduction of CO2 emissions from cars has been following a threefold approach since 1995: voluntary commitments from the automotive industry, fiscal measures to promote more fuel efficient cars and enhanced consumer information. Originally, the target date agreed was 2005. Already in 1996, the Environment Council opened the possibility of a postponement to 2010. In 1998, the car industry agreed to cut emissions to 140g CO2/km by 2008/2009. As a result, vehicle engine technology made considerable progress in fuel efficiency between 1995 and 2007. However, this progress was partly neutralized by the rising demand for larger vehicles. Against this background, the June 2006 European Council and the Parliament set out a new long-term emission reduction goal of 120g/km of new passenger cars from 2012 on. In the subsequent 2006 Energy Efficiency Action Plan and the 2007 package on Energy and climate, the Commission reiterated its readiness to introduce legislation and announced the

communication at hand. In 2006, it became clear that industry falls short of its pledge (Commission proposal, T&E). According to a German lobbyist, the automotive industry became aware of the fact that a legislative proposal was to be expected. At that point of time, the car industry denied the target of 120g CO2/km since it has experienced a shift in consumer behavior towards vans and off-road vehicles and tighter securety standards. As a result, cars gained weight and emitted more CO2 (VDA, 2008). The EU follows other regions in its command and control approach to implement legislative standards as similar different regimes exists worldwide to tackle the impact of CO2 emissions from cars: The first of the two following tables sketches possible policy instruments[2] whereas the second table indicates which instruments are currently used in different regions or states.

Table 3: Policy measures

Measures to promote fuel-efficient vehicles around the world

Fuel efficiency approach	*Measures/forms*	*Country/region*
Fuel economy standards	Numeric standard in mpg, km/L, or L/100-km	United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, China, Taiwan, South Korea
GHG emission standards	Grams/km or grams/mile	European Union, California
High fuel taxes	Fuel taxes at least 50% greater than crude oil base price	European Union, Japan
Fiscal incentives	Tax relief based on engine size, efficiency, and carbon dioxide emissions	European Union, Japan
R&D programs	Incentives for particular technologies and alternative fuels	United States, Japan, European Union
Economic penalties	Gas guzzler tax	United States
Technology mandates and targets	Sales requirement for ZEVs	California
Traffic control measures	Hybrids allowed in HOV lanes; ban on SUVs	Several U.S. States (hybrid HOV lanes); Paris (SUV ban)

Note: This list is not exhaustive.

[2] http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Fuel%20Economy%20and%20GHG%20Standards_010605_110719.pdf

Table 4: Measures put in place world-wide

Fuel economy and GHG standards for vehicles around the world

Country/region	*Type*	*Measure*	*Structure*	*Test method*[a]	*Implementation*
United States	Fuel	mpg	Cars and light trucks	U.S. CAFE	Mandatory
European Union	CO_2	g/km	Overall light-duty fleet	EU NEDC	Voluntary
Japan	Fuel	km/L	Weight-based	Japan 10-15	Mandatory
China	Fuel	L/100-km	Weight-based	EU NEDC	Mandatory
California	GHG	g/mile	Car/LDT1 and LDT2[b]	U.S. CAFE	Mandatory
Canada	Fuel	L/100-km	Cars and light trucks	U.S. CAFE	Voluntary
Australia	Fuel	L/100-km	Overall light-duty fleet	EU NEDC	Voluntary
Taiwan, South Korea	Fuel	km/L	Engine size	U.S. CAFE	Mandatory

After an unusual public argument between the two Commissioners Mr. Dimas (responsible for the Environment) and Mr. Verheugen (Industry) in early 2007, the Commission decided to introduce legislation and presented its design in February 2007. In order to reach the overall target of 120g/km CO2 limit in 2012, the Commission set out an integrated approach that combines provisions for the car industry concerning motor technology and additional measures. In detail, the Commission's idea requests car manufacturers to reach a reduction to 130gCO2/km for the *average new car fleet* by improvements in vehicle motor technology. A further CO2-reduction of 10g/km is to be achieved by *additional measures* such as improved air-conditioning systems and tires, gear shift indicators and the increased use of bio fuels [COM(2007)22: 10]. Moreover, the Commission encourages demand oriented measures by member statesand consumers striving for influencing the purchasing behavior of consumers.

The automotive industry had to realize that the target of 120g CO2 became a political commitment of the EU that could not be changed any more. Although, the industry eventually accepted the CO2 target, the details became subject to discussion. Especially the integrated approach as a compromise between the two commissioners on how to achieve the CO2 reduction provoked criticism. German car manufacturers criticized that politicians dictate the terms to the industry while the industry knows better how to produce cars. In detail, the German industry discusses with the Commission about which measures are cited under additional measures and generally prefers that manufacturers find their own way to achieve the 120g CO2 without rigid stipulations on how to do it. Furthermore, the industry only learnt the details of the later on proposed legislation only at the beginning of 2007. Considering a production cycle of seven years, any deadline before 2015 is considered impossible. Although the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) assembles important European car manufacturers and represents their interests vis-

à-vis the EU institutions, ACEA's members were too split to develop a common position. In particular, the differences between the German and the French manufacturers were irreconcilable (VDA, 2008; position paper). The underlying reason is the strong support that the German government offers to German car manufacturers who produce larger and heavier cars on average (EurActiv 2008).

4 Theoretical framework

4.1 Introduction: decision criteria for politicians

Policy analysis frames this scrutiny of two cases, i.e. two specific policy outputs. Taking a political systemic perspective, policy outputs are the immediate products of the processes inside the system. As policy output can also describe the operational measures initiated by policies, Andersen uses the alternative term “policy statements” to depict all “formal expressions or articulations of public policy” such as decisions or laws (Andersen, 2000, p. 6). Although both reports are legally non-binding, the own-initiative reports at hand “serve to highlight the European Parliament’s position on specific policy matters and to orient the European Commission’s work in view of future legislative proposals” (European Parliament, 2007). Thus, both outputs are reckoned as pre-legislative reports and feed back to the first stage of another, yet closely linked policy process that deals with the legally binding proposal (see Annex 1).

However, the thesis (at hand) formally can be associated with the second stage of the policy process or cycle, the *formulation*, which includes developing concrete proposals. Literature offers a considerable amount of possible factors or decision criteria for MEPs or politicians in general when formulating policy. They can be summarized as follows:



First and foremost, every politician has values that help him or her to structure and judge with regard to contents and ways of doing things. Anderson (2000, p.25) distinguishes four different kinds of values: personal, organizational, policy-wise and ideological. Personality is a key criterion as well as ideological convictions. In addition, every organization that MEPs or politicians in general are part off have a statute or mission that lays it its self-image. In line with this, sociological institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 946-950) predicts that, broadly speaking, members of institutions adopt a certain behavior and even conviction that is

“appropriate” for the institution. Patterns of identification and adoption play a role. Also, certain policies evoke a certain behavior *per se* as they are politically sensitive or demand a certain political responsibility. Environmental policies or health care issues might illustrate this thought/perception. As another factor, decision rules refer to the formal proceedings within a political system that impinges upon the tactics and behavior of politicians. The different legislative procedures illustrate this factor as they sometimes empower the EP to be on a par with the Council, but not always.

In addition to the individual politician, fellow politicians form party groups that structure/shape the political landscape. Their rationales and obligations put constraints on all members of the party. What is more, legislators and executives struggle over the content and the design of policies, each pursuing their personal self-interest. These arguments are located within the framework of formal and informal institutions. Dye argues that institutions are structured to facilitate certain policy outcomes and to obstruct others; they may give advantage to certain interests in society. He even emphasizes that the impact of institutional arrangements on public policy is a salient issue that deserves investigation (Dye 1995, p. 19). Another institutional factor is related to the different positions that politicians are able to occupy within the political system. To be precise, that position adds up to aforementioned factors in a sense that key players in eminent positions are in different situations compared to anyone else. Assuming certain responsibilities hence impinges upon the respective politician. For instance, the President of the EP might have a personal opinion about a topic. Nevertheless, his prominent role prevents him from articulating an extreme stance as his responsibilities demand representativeness from him.

Dye (ibid., p. 8) mentions “unofficial participants” during policy formulation: Interest groups and think tanks. The idea of involving interest groups draws loosely on Lindblom’s idea that regular consultations with stakeholders are a major part in policy-making, this thesis focuses on the participants in the formulation in their institutional setting. Also group theory pictures policy as an interaction between different groups that close the gap between legislators and citizens (ibid., p. 24). Group theory has become a source of theoretical inspiration since the debate about lobbying in the EU is considerable. Similarly, research organizations or think tanks provide politicians with expert knowledge that treats policies in an unbiased way – without taking into consideration political interests or party positions. Especially in questions of high uncertainty, so called *epistemic community* help politicians to understand a problem and to interpret it according to their own values (see above). For example, environmental policies are subject to uncertainty so that actors have difficulties in defining their opinion and interests. In Radaelli’s terms, high uncertainty and high salience of an issue lead to an involvement of epistemic communities (Radaelli, 1999, p. 763, see also Haas, 1992).

Anderson (2000: 62) adds communications media/public opinion and the individual citizen as decision criteria for politicians. As politicians are elected by ordinary citizens, they have an inherent interest in pleasing their constituencies in order to be reelected. This idea can be subsumed under the notion “constituency interests”. As most citizens are not informed about the daily work of their representatives or the political system in general, they heavily rely on the information that is provided by

mass media such as newspapers, television or the world wide web. Accordingly, the way problems and political decisions are transmitted via media influences the public opinion.

Hence, a variety of factors exists that might have influenced MEPs to vote in favor of industry-friendly reports. The following chapters present literature on the aspects covered in this thesis. It goes without saying that a complete analysis of all factors is beyond the scope of this work. Instead, the author preselected some possible factors for further scrutiny while leaving others aside. For example, the public opinion and political salience of the topic will be subsumed as antecedent variable. Their discussion is left for further research. Furthermore, this thesis waives the claim to present an exhaustive scrutiny of the individual motivations of all 785 MEPs in that respect.

4.2 Competing theories

4.2.1 Institutions

Committees

Despite their largeness, unwieldy parliaments are able to increase their efficiency and by delegating policy-making tasks to specialized committees. The resulting division of labor leads to gains from the specialization of parliamentarians, but might also trigger the domination of partisan interests in a committee. In fact, the key question in committee studies is whether committees mirror the (political) composition and interests of the parent chamber. Conventional wisdom claims "[…] that the committees are not ideologically representative of the parent chamber" (McElroy, 2006, p. 7). Having evolved from studies about the US congress, theoretical approaches to legislative organization suggest two types of committees (for an overview of the literature, see (Kaeding, 2004): *distributional* and *informational* committees.

The *distributional* type consists of parliamentarians that self-select committees in order to influence policies under the committee's jurisdiction disproportionally. These members act as *high demand preference outliers* that do not represent the interests of the Assembly taken as a whole. Following the distributive approach, re-election is the legislator's driving force for committee selection. MEPs therefore choose committees in accordance with their constituents' interests. Conventional wisdom might suggest this committee type and therefore implies that the EP's environmental committees is more "green"/left-wing and focuses on advancing environmental-friendly legislation. In contrast, an industry-related committee brings forward industrial interests. This assumption is backed when taking a social institutionalist perspective. The membership in a particular committee and internalizing its specific responsibilities can affect the understanding, the preferences and even the identity of individual actors. Rooting in social constructivism, sociological institutionalism depictures individuals as being embedded in an environment full of formal and informal institutions including culture and social practices. In compliance with these institutions, individuals interpret a situation and act following the logic of (social)

appropriateness (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 946-950). To illustrate this, ENVI clearly states on its website its commitment to environmental protection[3] whereas ITRE is "responsible for the Union's industrial policy and the application of new technologies, including measures relating to SMEs; […]" (European Parliament) .

The alternative, the *informational* committee, enhances efficiency through specialization in sub-fields while the political representativeness of the committees is ensured. Therefore, political preferences and party affiliations in an *informational* committee reflect those of the parent chamber. Kaeding (2004; 2005) refers to the value of information in this kind of committee: Natural political opponents argue about specific topics and thereby ensure a critical approach to the respective topic as they reflect the political spectrum as a whole. Non-committee members of the Assembly are enabled to have confidence in the work produced in the "microcosms of the house" (Krehbiel, 1991, p. 155). The MEPs' asset and most powerful weapon is their specialization in policy areas

Recent empirical works in this field brought about an ambiguous picture: In her study on the composition of EP committees, McElroy (2006) concludes that committee seats are assigned in accordance with partisan and national proportionality. Therefore, committees can be regarded as "smaller" versions of the EP, in accordance to Rule 177:1 of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure (European Parliament, 2008): "The composition of the committees shall, as far as possible, reflect the composition of Parliament." In addition, McElroy and Benoit (2007) demonstrate that policy preferences throughout all committees relate to the classic left-right competition in the EP. These researchers argue that EP committees are informational.

In contrast, Bowler & Farrel (1995, pp. 231-234) demonstrate that "occupational or interest-group attachments […] are the only consistently significant determinants driving committee membership". According to Kaeding (2004, p. 357), a self-selection process substantiates the idea of distributional EP committees. This approach is consistent with the actual determination of committee membership. Whitaker (2001) finds enough evidence that MEPs self-select committees according to their own policy preferences. Still, their EPG exert considerable influence and intervene if other MEPs possess more expertise and if the party group decides to ensure the coverage of committees that are of particular political importance. MEPs are therefore restricted in their freedoms by their EPG.

Therefore, the central hypothesis concerning the committee type as institutional factor is:

---

[3] "Committee responsible for: […] environmental policy and environmental protection measures, in particular concerning: a. air, soil and water pollution, waste management and recycling, dangerous substances and preparations, noise levels, climate change, protection of biodiversity, b. sustainable development, c. international and regional measures and agreements aimed at protecting the environment, d. restoration of environmental damage, e. civil protection, f. the European Environment Agency; […]." ((European Parliament)

H1: The committee type determined the provisions on CO2 emission targets and schedule.

The roles of MEPs

MEPs have different roles and affiliations: First, MEPs are members both of their national party and a party group in the EP (European party group, EPG) revealing their **ideological** position. Second, MEPs represent their countries as they are elected by **national** constituencies. Third, MEPs also serve as representatives of the EP as an institution *vis-à-vis* the European Commission and the Council of Ministers during legislative processes (Rasmussen, 2008, p. 11). Fourth, MEPs can assert influence from an institutionalist angle in the sense that they occupy different positions in the internal hierarchy of the EP: president, (shadow) rapporteur, (group) coordinator and chair(wo)man, each fulfilling a specialized task.

Leaving aside the factors ideology and nationality, MEPs assume offices and special tasks in the legislative process. Owing to a certain division of labor, it is evident that some MEPs are more involved than others apart from the fact that all vote upon a piece of legislation. Committee chairmen, rapporteur, and group coordinators are pivotal positions within committees (Neuhold, 2001). But how can these key players influence reports?

Owing to their role as “legislative entrepreneurs”, Benedetto (2005) describes rapporteurs as the most powerful parliamentarians in terms of influencing legislative outcome (similarly: (Bowler & Farrel, 1995). Depending on the legislative procedure applied, the rapporteur’s task is to comment, amend and elaborate on legislative proposals tabled by the commission. S/he reviews their content, applicability and political feasibility. In practice, rapporteurs accompany a legislative proposal until its adoption. Since the bulk of EU legislation is rather technical (Greenwood & Aspinwall, 1998), rapporteurships are usually assigned to MEPs with respective policy expertise. As Mamadouh & Raunio point out, their position as negotiators with the Council and the Commission certainly play a part in contributing to their prominent role (2003, p. 334).

Although rapporteurs are supported from different sources and are the principal responsible for a report, working on a report is also an ambitious venture: Rapporteurship implies that other institutions, be it other committees, be it the Commission or the Council contact the rapporteur and even “lobby” him/her. Likewise, interest groups of all shades seek appointments and influence (Crombez, 2002). Moreover, the rapporteur might encounter difficulties, even controversy due to diverging opinions among his/her party group or fellow nationals.
Exposed to these various sources, rapporteurs may adjust or even change their initial references in the course of the time-consuming legislative process. Moreover, “[t]he onus is on the rapporteur[s] to be above party if they hope that what they draft will be acceptable to a broad majority in the Parliament” (Benedetto, 2005, p. 71). Hence, a rapporteur’s influence depends on his/her ability to bridge partisan divides and to build alliances.Thus, the rapporteur should avoid the prevalence of biased interests, but produce a text with majority appeal.

Kaeding (2004; 2005) has a more critical view: Instead of the mediating role or the 'honest broker' foreseen by Benedetto, he claims that rapporteurs have a high demand for a certain policy in their jurisdiction. Inferring from studies on the allocation of rapporteurship, he points at imbalances and disproportionality in this process that coincide remarkably with peculiar national interest (Kaeding, 2005, p. 98). Although these findings question other study findings (see: (Mamadouh & Raunio, 2003), they do not totally contradict the role of the rapporteur. Even if rapporteurs are driven by individual preferences, this does not necessarily lead to a report that truly reflects their policy goals. However, individual motivations may be as important as expertise and political prestige (Neuhold, 2001).

Yet, a single focus on the rapporteur as key player disregards two other pivotal positions within a committee: Collins, Burns and Warleigh (1998) point out the position of the chairman who oversees the work of the committee and who therefore becomes the focal point for lobbyists. Neuhold (2001) adds that committee chairs act as porte-paroles for the committee and preside meetings. Therefore, they influence agenda-setting and procedural questions such as speaking time. In case of conflict, it is mostly up to them to facilitate a consensus within the committee. Whitaker (2001) contrasts the role of the committee chair with the group coordinators: Coordinators do not only allocate reports but decide upon the party group's line and ensure voting behavior within the political group. Acting as the agents of the political group, they ensure party control in a committee-based legislature. Besides the pure committee work, coordinators organize their own meetings in order to prepare the committee's future agenda and discuss emerging political problems. Whitaker states that both positions are able to influence the outcome of committee meetings but underlines, referring to a survey amongst MEPs, that personality matters as well (2001, p. 79).

H2: The rapporteurs had the power to steer the industry-friendly policy outputs.

4.2.2 The European Parliament and interest groups

Interest groups and lobbying are long-standing topics in the study of EU politics. On the one hand, it is the *empirical* story of a flourishing activity of interest groups in Brussels since the 1980s. Some 20,000 lobbyists seek to influence political decision-makers in Brussels. As a comparison: The Commission and the EP officials add up to 15,000(European Parliament, 2007, p. 3). On the other hand, it is the *theoretical* endeavor to grasp the rationales, actors, mechanisms and tools used to "shoot where the ducks are" (Richardson, 2006, p. 232). Quite surprisingly, literature on lobbying has either dealt with interest mediation at the European level which refers to the pluralism vs. corporatism debate or lobbying specific institutions, especially the European Commission. Thus, the EP has rarely been subject to empirical studies (the rare exceptions are (Bouwen, 2004; Kohler-Koch, 1997; Katz & Wessels, 1999).

Bearing in mind the state of economic integration with its visible outcome, the Single Market, business representatives have a logical interest in lobbying at EU level to ensure a corporate-friendly environment. Specifically, the EU acts as a regulatory authority (Majone, 1994) that allows access to the single market under the condition

that fundamental public requirements are protected (Commission of the European Communities). Still, also diffuse interests have found their way to lobby the EU: According to Smith, the EP acting as the direct representation of the European people offers an important venue for the promotion of diffuse interests (Smith, 2008, p. 68).

Theoretical frameworks are rare, with the exceptions of Bouwen (2002); Broscheid & Coen (2003) and Crombez (2002). Bouwen explains that the particular challenge of studying lobbying is how to measure *influence* (2002, p. 366). Knowledge of the original genuine preferences of both actors is essential to draw conclusions about the influence of one actor over another (Dahl, 1991). In practice, the question is whether lobbyists altered the policy preferences of politicians or if their preferences clashed or coincided. Since this study's aim is to determine causes of effects, it is of outmost importance whether lobbying changed MEPs' policy preferences.

The rational actor model has substantially contributed to our understanding of interest representation at the EU level (Richardson, 2006, pp. 232-235). Literature argues that the very starting point for this is the exchange of information. Interest groups usually are well-informed about issues and have an incentive to shape the single market whereas legislators – especially in the EP – lack the knowledge, have an institutional self-interest and strive for transparency, efficiency and legitimacy of political decisions. Especially, the EP attracts special attention from lobbyists as it is known for being the "most open of all European institutions" (Greenwood, 2003, p. 33). Its democratic credentials and the resulting responsiveness to any issue invite outsiders to approach it. Furthermore, its standing in legislation has become stronger due to the co-decision procedure which provides a very rational incentive to lobby MEPs (Kohler-Koch, 1997, p. 7).

In this respect, Smith's notion of *asymmetry* in lobbying (Smith, 2008) is useful to picture the fact that the EP has been prone to support public or diffuse interests (Sbragia, 2000; Kohler-Koch, 1997). The discourse of the EU's democratic deficit has certainly contributed to an advantageous position of public interests in overall EU policy-making. The inclusion of public interests such as consumer interests or highly salient environmental interests is intended to maintain or even strengthen a broad support among European citizens for European integration (Greenwood, 2003, p. 11). In the area of environmental policy, Greenwood even traces back a shift in the belief system of both policy-makers and in the strategic direction of businesses to the actions of environmental interest groups (*ibid*., p. 189). In the case at hand, private interests compete with diffuse interests for access to MEP's as policy-makers. Business interests have begun to establish relations to the EP only recently (*ibid*., p. 63) but diffuse interests are said to maintain a comparative advantage over them.

In this context, Bouwen has developed a rational *logic of access* (2002): Bearing in mind the *problématique* of measuring influence, he points out that access to EU institutions is a precondition for exercising influence in legislative process (*ibid*., p. 366). The need to exchange information results in a market-like situation where interest groups supply technical, but also political information to the demand side, the political decision-makers. The parties trade access in exchange for access goods, i.e.

information whereby the demand side determines whom access is granted (*ibid*., pp. 368-372).

H3: The industry-friendly policy output can be explained by the better access of industry lobbyists to MEPs.

4.2.3 National interests vs. party cohesion

This section refers to the determinants of MEPs' policy preferences. Competing or complementary factors are the party affiliation and nationality. Literature offers insights from both theoretical and empirical research: Based on the analysis of roll call votes, basic assumptions about MEP's voting behavior have been recently developed. First, EPGs display a considerable amount of internal cohesion during voting. Hence, transnational party federations such as EPP, PSE, ALDE or the Greens can fall back on cross-country consent in a majority of issues (Faas, 2003; Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2002; Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2006; Kreppel, 2000; Noury, 2002) Consequently, the impact of national affiliation is considered rather marginal.

Nevertheless, national parties have power over selection procedures to the EP elections. Thereby, they determine who enters the Parliament. EPGs wield power for the "insiders", i.e. elected MEPs and control the allocation of committees and assignments of special posts such as committee chair and rapporteurships (Mamadouh & Raunio, 2003). Also Hix et al. (1999) point out that legislators' main interests are re-election, office and policy with re-election being the primary goal. The national party decides the recruitment and therefore (re-)election of candidates and is therefore the MEP's first principal. The second principal, the EPG, determines offices and enables MEPs to exert influence (Hix, 2002).

Accordingly, MEPs should opt for national preferences as their national roots decide upon their most precious goal, their re-election. From interviews with Danish MEPs, Rasmussen learnt that national affiliation plays a significant role, but national positions matter only in areas that are of pivotal importance to the respective country (Rasmussen, 2008, p. 13). In these cases, MEPs deliberately deviate from the position of their EPG thereby weakening the unity within their political group.

If the automotive industry constitutes a pivotal interest in a member state, MEPs from that country are more inclined to act in favor of industry-friendly legislation. If no special role of the car industry can be determined, MEPs adhere to the position of their EPG contributing to party cohesion in the EP.

H4: MEPs voted in favor of the industry-friendly reports in accordance to their national economic interests.
H5: MEPs voted in favor of the industry-friendly reports in accordance to their party position.

4.2.4 Ideas

The influence of ideas and knowledge has been on the rise. Haas embraces this phenomenon in his concept of *epistemic communities* that he first presented 1992 (Haas, 1992). Bringing in the notion of ideas and knowledge in this paper allows for the inclusion of expert knowledge and persuasion by expertise. The section about institutions scrutinizes intrinsic factors to the institutional structural and lead to a specific policy outcome. The lobbying part reflects the idea that policies are shaped by different actors trying to maximize their influence on politicians. The arguments used for persuasion are biased and favor particular interests. This section covers the involvement of expert knowledge that stands above political and partisan quarrels. According to Haas, politicians seek advice from a knowledge-based group, the epistemic community, which influences their way of interpreting a social problem. In Haas' terms, politicians learn new patterns and are encouraged to induce policy change.

According to Hass, epistemic communities distinguish themselves from other groups or collective actors by four features: First, the members of an epistemic community share norms and valued principles. As a second step, they have a similar approach reflecting their convictions about causalities. Third, the members of an epistemic community use similar approaches to validity and, fourthly, they agree on the tools used to address the policy problem (*ibid*., p. 3). The concept of epistemic communities has been developed in the arena of International Relations and stresses the role of experts in cases of high uncertainty. Uncertainty refers to unclear consequences of political actions and the lack of adequate as well as sufficient information about interrelations between issues. Environmental policy is mentioned as one of the major examples for a policy under uncertainty (Haas, 1992, p. 13; Radaelli, 1999). Applied to the case at hand, it is uncertainty about the necessary reduction of CO2 emissions in order to combat climate change that upgrades the rather technical, regulatory standards for new cars.

Remarkably, Haas restraints his understanding of epistemic communities to experts, i.e. think tanks and professional experts. Marier (2008) challenges this assumption by claiming that also politicians can form an epistemic community. Haas excludes them due to their partisan interests. Marier argues that especially politicians have the resources and their knowledge in order to overcome constraints that impede the implementation of new ideas. They know how to translate the goals of epistemic communities into actual legislation. Whereas scientists lack the knowledge about the political arena, politicians can influence the policy process, deliberate and argue with other actors involved. Although politicians are rarely ascribed a certain expertise, Marier argues that a politician's position and function, associated with prior skills or interests in a certain topic, qualify him or her as a member of an epistemic community. This depends also on regular access to expert networks. These experts, in turn, should seek contact to relevant politicians and present their ideas in an appealing manner (ibid: p. 219). This assumption plays in the hands of the specialization issue in the EP whose main weapon is knowledge albeit MEPs cannot rely on the same support as the Commission and the Council do. Gaining expertise, working in an area for more than one issue and enjoying a network to experts are

certainly crucial factors in MEPs struggle for power, be it within the EP or against other institutions.

H6: The industry-friendly stipulations of the parliamentary resolutions stem from the cooperation between experts and MEPs within the framework of an epistemic community.

The following graph summarizes the factors that will be scrutinized:



5 Research design and methodology

5.1 The Cases

5.1.1 Introduction

In 2005, the European Commission launched an initiative called “CARS 21”. Bringing together representatives from the automotive industry, trade unions, NGOs, consumers, EU member states, the Commission and the EP, a high level group was set up to boost the EU car industry’s competitiveness (Commission of the European Communities, 2005). After additional consultations of interested stakeholders in 2005 and 2006 (Commission of the European Communities, 2005; Commission of the European Communities, 2006), the Commission published a communication on its position on the high level group’s final report on 7 February, 2007 [COM (2007)0022] (Commission of the European Communities, 2007). This report outlines the direction in which the Commission plans to guide the future automotive policy in the EU.

Besides improvements in the regulatory environment, trade issues and R&D, the Commission addresses the issue of environmentally sustainable road transport: In particular, the Commission stressed the need for reducing CO2 emissions from cars. It underlined its readiness to achieve the EU objective of 120g/km CO2 by 2012 through a combination of EU and member states’ activity. To attain this goal, the Commission’s legislative framework will entail mandatory reductions of CO2 emission of new passenger cars. Hence, incentives for technological improvements of the vehicle motors lead to a reduction to 130g CO2/km. The remaining 10g CO2/km shall be reduced by additional measures such as an increased use of bio fuels or carbon taxes. In addition, the Commission declared that this strategy might be supplemented by further measures taken within Member States and by the consumers (*ibid.*, pp.10-11).

These announcements are especially interesting in the light of another piece that was published on the same day: another communication from the Commission outlining the “Results of the review of the Community Strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars and light-commercial vehicles” [COM(2007)0019] (Commission of the European Communities, 2007). Initially proposed by the Commission in 1995, the strategy has been partly based on the voluntary commitment of the European, Japanese and Korean car manufacturers’ associations to reach a target of 140g CO2 emissions per km by 2008 or 2009. Another pillar comprises the implementation of fiscal measures aiming at the promotion of fuel efficient cars. In its communication, the Commission stated that “[t]he progress achieved so far goes some way towards the 140 g CO2/km target by 2008/2009, but in the absence of additional measures, the EU objective of 120 g CO2/km will not be met at a 2012 horizon” (*ibid.*, p.6). In addition to the apparent failure to meet the target, member states had adopted only limited measures, if any. Therefore, the Commission reiterated its goal to achieve a new car fleet average of 120g CO2/km by 2012 while bearing in mind a long term goal of 95gCO2/km in 2020. As a result, the Commission reiterated its integrated approach.

5.1.2 The European Parliament on the Community strategy

Taking initiative

The Environment Committee took the initiative to issue a report and to submit a motion for a parliamentary resolution since policies on reducing CO2 lies within its competence. As the communication did not ask for a response, the report is categorized as “own-initiative”. According to Rule 45 of the EP’s Rules of Procedure (European Parliament, 2008), the Conference of Presidents authorized ENVI to take action. In addition, the Conference applied Rule 47 and decided that the subject also lies within the competence of ITRE. The responsible committee, i.e. ENVI nominated coordinator Chris Davies (ALDE, UK) as rapporteur whereas ITRE selected a draftsman, Rebecca Harms (Verts/ALE, D). Interestingly, Harms also serves as a substitute in ENVI. Both MEPs worked together within the procedure of associated committees. It was only IMCO that wished to deliver an opinion under Rule 46. Nonetheless, opinions generally entail merely additions that can be amended if the committee responsible decides to put them to vote. As a preparation, ALDE had organized a public hearing on "EU legislation on CO2 and cars” in January 2007 under the aegis of Chris Davies (ALDE, 2007).

ENVI’s report

Following the draft report [PE390.556] (European Parliament, 2007), ENVI underscored the importance of the 120g CO2/km emissions target in its final report [A6-0343/2007] (European Parliament, 2007). In the light of the failed voluntary commitment, ENVI called for binding annual emission targets from 2009 on. The committee also stated that the CO2 emissions from new passenger cars must not exceed 120g/km from 1 January 2012. An additional amount of 10 g CO2/km should be reduced with the help of complementary measures. ENVI also envisaged a 95g CO2/km target for 2020 while an even longer term target strives for 70gCO2/km by 2025.

Plenary’s non-legislative resolution

One month after the Committee decision, the Plenary watered down the ENVI proposal: Binding annual emissions were called for only from 2011 on. The final report agrees with the final EU objective of 120g CO2/km, but does not confirm the initial deadline of 2012. What is more, new passenger cars placed on the EU market only in 2015 must not exceed CO2 emissions of 125g/km. The parliamentary resolution [T6-0469/2007] (European Parliament, 2007) invites the Commission to suggest further measures within the framework of an integrated approach so that another reduction of 10g CO2/km could be achieved. Nevertheless, the non-legislative resolution still comprised the long-term goals of 95gCO2/km from 2020 on and 70g CO2/km by 2025.

5.1.3 The European Parliament on CARS21

Taking initiative

Two month after the publication of the respective Commission's communication, ITRE and ENVI worked again together under the procedure with associated committees. But this time, ITRE took the lead in drafting an own-initiative report. Therefore, Jorgo Chatzimarkakis (ALDE, D) became ITRE's rapporteur while Rebecca Harms (Verts/ALE, D) assumed the role of draftsman. Strikingly, both key players have the same nationality (German) and, what is more, Harms has already served as draftswoman for the abovementioned report. Moreover, the chairwoman of ITRE, Angelika Niebler, is also German (EPP-ED) whereas ENVI is chaired by Miroslav Ouzký (MEP, EPP-ED, CZ).

ITRE's report

In view of the draft report [PE391.934] (European Parliament, 2007), the rapporteur's political group, ALDE, organized a public hearing "Cars of the Future" in July 2007 (ALDE, 2007). In December, the committee voted upon the final report [A6-0494/2007] (European Parliament, 2007). Of particular interest is the section about a substantial reduction of CO2 emitted by cars: ITRE's report requests the Commission not to set any mandatory CO2 targets before 2015. It considers an average target of 125g CO2/km achievable, but only from 2015 onwards. Without addressing the long-term targets set out by the Commission, the report invites the Commission to elaborate on "more ambitious long-term" goals concerning the reduction of CO2 in the car industry.

Plenary's non-legislative resolution

Reiterating the committee's report, the plenary rebukes the Commission "to set ambitious but realistic targets" in the field of CO2 reduction. In this resolution [T6-0007/2008] (European Parliament, 2008), the Plenary follows ITRE's argumentation that fleet renewal cannot keep up with the targets envisaged by the Commission. Adopted by roll call vote, the final report repeats ITRE's CO2 reduction target of 125g/km starting in 2015 only. The resolution stresses the issue of vehicle affordability and concludes that the automotive industry should be granted more time in order to adapt to the mandatory ambitious targets.

5.2 Case study

In the two cases at hand, the undoubtedly industry-friendly reports contradict the statements in chapter 3 that the EP pursues a rather green approach to policies. Whereas in an ordinary co-decision procedure the Council plays a part in the legislation and both institutions have to find a compromise, it was only the Parliament this time that tried to take a position on the CO2 issue. In the two cases, the non-legislative reports commented on Commission plans for future legislation. Therefore, they had a pre-legislative character to be interpreted as the EP's internal struggle to obtain a majority for a certain position.

Case study as a method

In order to explain the policy-outputs, the author opted for the case study approach: Case studies belong to the panoply of research tools in qualitative research and allow for "an in-depth explanation and interpretation of social and political structures and processes" (Blatter, Janning, & Wagemann, 2007, p. 127 [translation S.E.]). According to Goertz (Goertz in Blatter, Janning, & Wagemann, 2007, p. 55), case studies pave the way for a quasi-complete explanation of particular events and results. Hence, they are able to highlight the "causes of effects" contrary to quantitative studies that focus on the universal effects of certain factors of influence ("effects of causes"). In the thesis at hand, the author strives to pinpoint the causes of effect, i.e. the factors that help to explain certain policy outputs.

The major advantage of case studies is that they allow for an understanding of the meaning of internal processes and interactions between actors and structures. This is in line with Yin's definition of a case-study (Yin, 2003, p. 13):

> "A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident."

The research question demands an in-depth scrutiny of the case and the testing of different factors or independent variables that the author considers worthwhile taking into account. Therefore, the causal analysis is based on the congruence between theoretical expectations and empirical data.

Summing up, the case study approach seems to be the most appropriate means to answer the research question: In the course of a case study, explanations and profound insights are generated while different theoretical concepts are applied which can be specified or combined. Case studies also allow for a deterministic and combinational understanding of causes (Blatter, Janning, & Wagemann, 2007, p. 130) – a view that allows considering different possible factors.

Internal validity

In the paper, internal validity is ensured by congruence analysis. Congruence analysis is based on the ontological assumption that social phenomena are diverse and heterogeneous. Causality is determined by a set of factors. The first step of a congruence analysis is the reflection about different factors that is inspired by the discussion of more than one theory. Different theoretical approaches are specified and translated into a set of indicators that need to be observed to determine a causal link (Blatter, Janning, & Wagemann, 2007, p. 151). Put differently, congruence analysis is a theory-driven, deductive procedure that implies the review of theoretical literature in order to formulate assumptions and hypotheses about causes.

As a second step, congruence analysis "aligns all observations, which can be used to draw (confirming and disconfirming) inferences to a specific theory and therefore presents the findings as 'different' cuts of the case" (Blatter & Blume, 2007, p. 14). The plurality of theoretical lenses leads to either a competing or a complementary framework that provides for understanding and explaining the cases. Causality

derives from the ability of certain theories to explain phenomena. While using more than one theory, there are more aspects of the phenomenon that can be covered. An alternative possibility would be to conduct a process analysis. Yet, a process analysis demands even more data than the congruence analysis in order to re-tell the complete story. Process analysis approximates the actual course of events more while taking into account exogenous factors. Still, congruence analysis allows for a pre-selection of allegedly important angles – a point of view that reflects the discussion in the literature about the EP and the EU in general: For instance, lobbying has been a long-standing issue in the area of EU politics. The question whether or not business lobbyists have influenced MEPs and therefore decision making is therefore salient – both in view of social and theoretical implications. Another major point of discussion is the gap between constituency – and therefore national - interests and European interests, to name not all but two examples. A congruence analysis allows for picking several theoretical questions considered relevant while acknowledging that the explanation is only one facet/part of the truth. As the preceding paragraph suggests, this paper pursues a congruence approach in order to answer the central *research question*: Which factors explain the industry-friendly policy outputs of the EP? The paper groups the different stimuli in a roster of ideas, institutions and interests. Accordingly, a review of the literature helps in determining independent variables. Subsequently, these independent variables or factors are operationalized.

Case selection

The author opted for the report on the Community strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars and the report on CARS21 since both reports are interlinked both content- and time-wise. Scrutinizing these two cases enhances internal validity: Both reports were adopted under the same procedure (own-initiative) and within the same parliamentary term which excludes a change in composition or powers of the EP. Both cases were intensively discussed in 2007 and at the beginning of 2008, which is a factor also controlling the influence of external circumstances or antecedent variable/s. Still, the reports vary with regard to the several aspects (Committee type, rapporteur) so that variation highlights the different functioning of factors. As such, many factors or possibly intervening variables are held constant: Some of them are power of the EP and the political salience of the issue, given the media and public attention to environmental topics at that time. Also, the European quest for economic competitiveness plays a role in both cases, with the Lisbon agenda being in place since 2000. Thus, this case study follows a most similar systems design.

Generalizability or external validity

This considerable internal validity nevertheless means a trade-off in terms of generalizability: Both reports deal with a specific topic (CO2 emissions from passenger cars) so that a generalization even towards other issues involving CO2 reduction is hardly feasible. Besides, non-binding reports lack the reality appeal of legislative reports that turn into official legislation. Still, both communications present the integrated approach as the eventual legislative proposal. According to an expert from the ITRE secretariat, the EP's decision to react on communications from the

Commission with the help of own-initiative reports has strategic character: Both communications have a pre-legislative character and the Parliament was eager to give its opinion (Administrator, 2008). Hence, non-legislative reports serve as an indicator for the Commission highlighting agreement or disagreement on the general approach as well as legislative details. They also give an idea about the majority situation. This information helps the Commission to discuss with MEPs, to anticipate upcoming problems with its proposal and to adjust it if necessary.
Yet, practical reasons hindered the author to scrutinize other current proposals in the legislative process: At the time of data collection and planning this thesis, only the two non-legislative reports on CO2 emissions from passenger cars were adopted while the corresponding legislative proposal had only begun its institutional way and the directive about including aviation activities had been discussed in second reading.

To conclude, this research allows for a detailed, but narrow snapshot of the EP's struggle for a position in an issue that juxtaposes efforts to combat climate change and the maintenance of (industrial) economic growth and employment. In Ragin's words, both cases are studied because the author considers them politically significant (Ragin, 2004, p. 127). It goes without saying that the political implications of the cases are assumed and cannot be analyzed neither within the framework of the congruence analysis discussed above nor with the help of two cases dated from the period 2007/2008. In order to explain variance, past cases would be necessary. Still, future research might examine the case of emissions from other sectors or the actual proposal as well as other examples of industrial policy. As a matter of course, the theoretical framework refrains from claiming completeness and perfection. As explained in chapter 4.1, only some possible factors can be selected in this research. Follow up research might expand the number of factors; introduce different indicators or alternative ways of operationalization.

5.3 Data Collection

5.3.1 Desk research

Desk research was needed for the thesis to give a general picture of the state of the art in EU environmental and industrial politics. A bulk of literature deals with these issues (see chapter 3). A considerable amount of monographs and collected volumes deals with the EP and its internal mechanisms (see chapter 3.1 and 4). As an important additional source, journal articles discuss, complement and specify respective mechanisms or even identify new ones (see chapter 5, too). Information about the cases was offered by the homepages of the European Parliament, the European Commission, and to a lesser extent by the Council: press releases, MEMOs, documents such as draft reports and textualizations of plenary debates. Fortunately, those internet sites are well-structured and the documents are numbered systematically so that the information is both reliable and official. Due to the topicality of the reports, the scientific world did not yet deal with the cases – a fact that contributes to the unique and innovative character of this thesis.

The data collected from the desk research allows for a process of "soaking and poaking" (Georg/Bennett in (Blatter, Janning, & Wagemann, 2007, p. 180) that

familiarized the author with the status quo in European environmental and industrial politics but also with the basic information about the cases. Based on these insights, the author could locate gaps and missing information that was needed to conduct the case studies. In order to fill these gaps, further methods of data collection were deemed necessary.

5.3.2 Interviews

The aforementioned missing gaps demanded interviews with experts, i.e. persons that were involved in the genesis of the reports. Within the scope of such a thesis, interviews cannot cover all individuals due to limited resources. Nevertheless, the theoretical framework and the respective parts on operationalization will introduce the key actors and potential experts irrespectively of these constraints. It goes without saying that the choice for certain literature and – more generally – specific independent variables implies leaving out certain experts that other researchers might deem indispensible.

Qualitative interviews facilitate a more thorough picture of the cases: They lead to detailed information about the participating actors, the discussions about policy options, the information available and constraints with regard to possible action. Also in this thesis, the theoretical reflection and pre-studies on the cases decide upon possible interview partner and the respective questions for them. On the basis of those deliberations, a guideline for the interviews was developed comprising a number of open questions. Those questions were in direct relation to the theoretical approaches and the respective indicators. Most of the questions asked for background information such as personal motives, informal cooperations and evaluations that were needed to reconstruct the political decision-making processes. The specific questions will be presented in the respective sections on operationalization. In line with the course of the interview, the author could fall back on the questions that suited best the statements made by the interviewees. Still, the semi-structured list entailed all questions deemed relevant and allowed for flexible adjustments in terms of order (Blatter, Janning, & Wagemann, 2007, pp. 60-66).

5.4 Data analysis

In line with congruence analysis, the data collected will be subject to a comparison with specific patterns extracted from literature. After screening different theories, the author develops indicators and determines patterns that the data has to show in order to verify the matching between theory and data. Every hypothesis will associated with indicators. Thus, the subsequent chapter entails an elaboration on the indicators and the to-be expected patterns.

6 Conceptualization and operationalization

6.1 Institutions

H1: The committee type determined the provisions on CO2 emission targets and schedule.

Indicators & Operationalization

This hypothesis implies that the Plenary's preferences differ from the preferences of its committees. Therefore, committees of the EP are not representative for the Assembly taken as a whole. As the indicator to determine a difference in preference, the author considers the CO2 emission targets and schedule as useful. Two different committees produced two reports that were voted upon in the Plenary. To test the representativity of the reports, it is important to find out whether the provisions of the committee reports were waived through by the Plenary or not. Content analysis helps to determine the CO2 provisions in terms of target and time schedule from the committee reports and the final Parliamentary resolutions. If the provisions of the reports from both committees differ from the Plenary's report, the the hypothesis is refuted. As there are two types of committees (ITRE and ENVI), the hypothesis has to be tested for both of them.
If the Plenary's stipulations differ from those in the Committee reports, the idea of distributional committees is put forward, at least considering the cases at hand. However, if the Plenary agrees with committee reports, it relies on the idea that a politically balanced discussion had taken place at the committee stage and that the resulting report reflects a compromise between the political groups.

H2: The rapporteurs had the power to steer the policy outputs.

Indicators & Operationalization

In order to test this hypothesis, a comparison of the initial preferences in terms of time frame and emission target seems useful. Concerning the rapporteur, the information can be derived from the first draft report that he/she presented to the committees. As the procedure was enhanced cooperation, the rapporteurs and draftsperson are defined as the key players. The same applies to the policy preferences of the chair(wo)man and the group coordinators. Due to a lack of time, the author had to do without on interviews with the chair(wo)man and the group coordinators.

To complement the rapporteurs view, interviews will be also conducted with the responsible officers from the committee secretariat of ENVI and ITRE as those were the committees involved. Committee officials serve as a vital source for scientific, technical and political information. Neunreither (2006) presents the secretariat as central in providing legislative assistance. As the Parliament's non-partisan civil service, the secretariat excels *inter alia* the secretariats of the political groups in supporting the work of the rapporteur. Nevertheless, the author is also interested in

the parties' influence on the rapporteurs and therefore contacted the secretariats of the four main parties (EPP-ED, PSE, ALDE and the Greens/EFA).

Following Benedetto (2005), a qualitative analysis tests the hypothesis with the help of interviews with the target group of rapporteurs and officials from the secretariats. The semi-structured interviews will focus on several aspects that help to trace back the “story” of the reports:

-initial policy preferences and debates
-main cleavages in the committee: in national and partisan terms
-the cooperation between the rapporteur and the draftswoman
-consideration of opinions tabled by other committees
-lobbying exerted by other institutions (Council, Commission)

The aim of this qualitative analysis is to trace back the history of the report without concentrating only at the initial policy preferences, but also on their adjustments and the reasons for them. Special attention will be devoted to the actions and efforts of the rapporteur.

6.2 Interest groups

H3: The industry-friendly policy output can be explained by the better access of industry lobbyists to MEPs.

In order to grasp the notion of “access” granted to private and diffuse interest groups, the following three indicators help to determine the (relative) access (loosely adapted from (Bouwen, 2004, pp. 486-489):

a) regularity /frequency of contacts to private/diffuse interest groups;
b) usefulness of contacts to private/diffuse interest groups;
c) importance of contacts to private/diffuse interest groups

In accordance with the target group defined for hypothesis 2, a part of the semi-structured interview will deal with these indicators. All interviewees were asked to estimate the contacts with private interest groups in comparison with green NGOs. The goal is to assess the indicator, access. The relevant interview questions will address the regularity, importance and usefulness/professionalism of the lobbyists. Besides, industry lobbyists and lobbyists from a green NGO will be asked about their interaction with key players. The author acknowledges that the theoretical framework covers the access and doesn't allow for a clear statement on the impact lobbying actually had – and which side had more influence. Yet, Bouwen's model is used in the absence of a more appealing alternative. Also in the discussion of this hypothesis, CO2 targets and schedules will serve as a “supporting” indicator. Comparing and keeping track of the policy preferences of important NGOs and industry organizations allows for the depiction of their goals which in turn can be compared to the CO2 figures in the draft reports, the committee reports and the Plenary resolutions. Differences indicate less access; congruence proves high and better access.

6.3 Voting behavior

H4: MEPs voted in favor of the industry-friendly reports in accordance to their national economic interests.

H5: MEPs voted in favor of the industry-friendly reports in accordance to their party position.

Indicators & Operationalization

Rasmussen suggests that national affiliation matters if specific issues enjoy high public awareness in a country or belong to a country's political identity. MEPs from member stateshaving a significant automotive industry should vote in favor of car industry's interests.
Hypothesis 4 will be tested by a linear regression analysis (Schnell, Hill & Esser, 2005, pp.455-457; Kromrey, 2006, pp. 502-515) illustrating both cases with voting behavior serving as dependent variable. In order to test the national economic interest, the national economic interest is defined as direct employment in all 27 member states. The numbers date from 2007 (ACEA, 2008, p. 27). In the Annex, a table shows how the data was transformed in an index. In both analyses, the index represents the national economic interest. Concerning hypothesis 4 and 5, the data on the votes stem from the Minutes of the respective Plenary session of the EP. Both votes were added and treated equally.

In order to identify the relevant vote out of the considerable list of tabled amendments, the author opted for the following amendment/paragraph in accordance with the identified point of discussion, the CO2 limits and schedule:

Concerning the report on CO2 emissions from passenger cars, ENVI issued the following as paragraph 3 in its final vote:

> "[…]§3Proposes that binding annual emissions targets should be set with effect from 1 January 2009 with the objective of promoting technical improvements to vehicles in order to ensure that, by these means alone, average emissions from all passenger cars placed on the EU market from ***1 January 2012*** do not exceed **120g CO2/km**; […]".

In a cooperation, ALDE and the EPP-ED tabled an amendment to the Plenary that was approved. The new paragraph 3 is as follows:

> "[…] Proposes that binding annual emissions targets should be set with effect from 2011 with the objective of promoting technical improvements to vehicles in order to ensure that, by these means alone, average emissions from all passenger cars placed on the EU market in ***2015*** do not exceed ***125g CO_2/km***; [...]".

Considering the Plenarfy vote upon the CARS21 report, paragraph 38 of the Committee report seems interesting the most as it was approved after a roll-call vote:

> "§38. Believes that an average target of 125g/km of CO2 emissions for new passenger cars for 2015 should be achievable; stresses that the Commission should work on more ambitious long-term reduction targets for CO2 emissions

in the automotive sector; considers it crucial in this connection that the target values should be graduated according to the weight of the vehicle;".

MEPs that participated in the vote form the relevant group. Their names and the results of the final vote in the Plenary are indicated in the minutes and final reports of the respective Plenary session as both votes were roll-call votes. Their number is restricted to the MEPs from EPP-ED, PSE, ALDE and the Greens/EFA as the author had only access to resources and position papers from these parties. This operationalization is based on the information confirmed in several interviews that EPGs work with voting instructions. Hence, the author looked for the position papers of the four party groups and compared their stance towards CO2 emission targets to the proposed amendment or the paragraph in question,

In order to prove the national economic interest, all pro-industry votes ("for") will be counted according to the nationality. The share of MEPs voting in favor of both amendments will be associated with the respective country's index.

Hypothesis 5 will be tested by comparing the share in percentage of outlying MEPs of the four big party groups. The respective data stems from the minutes, too; this time the abstentions and the deviant votes will be subtracted from the total number of MEPs of a party group present during the voting. In order to determine a deviant vote or outliers, a simple pattern matching shows the party's position on the topic and indicates a expected voting result (either pro or against) in relation to the amendment or paragraph in question (see above):

	Voting instruction (+/)	Votes (=expected outcome if party cohesion = 100%)	Actual result (+/-/0)	Cohesion: share of MEPs of the party group voting in accordance to the party's voting instructions
EPP-ED				
PSE				
ALDE				
Greens				

6.4 Ideas

If the concept of epistemic communities in any sense applies, the reports of the committees must have been influenced by a small number of experts (Haas, 1992, p. 27). In terms of this case study, possible members belonging to the epistemic communities are the rapporteur that has policy expertise enabling him to deal with expert knowledge. As pointed out earlier, the rapporteur performs a key function in the policy process that he must be a part of the epistemic community. Furthermore, the rapporteurs possess the weapon of specialization that complements their political insights into how to translate ideas into concrete policies.

In his/her position asking for information, the rapporteur has to consult a selected number of persons that provide unbiased, in-depth information about the problem, policy solutions, trade-offs and conflicts (ibid. pp. 14-15). In accordance with Neunreither (2006), rapporteurs usually have some sources of unbiased information at their disposal: the EP/committee secretariat and independent experts such as think tanks. Therefore, rapporteurs' close interaction with either representatives from the Committee secretariat or think tanks points at an epistemic community. Ideally, think tanks have produced studies or reports that question the goals of the Commission and advance another approach to the issue.

Still, the problem of initial preferences is evident, as discussed in the lobbying section: Since no rapporteur lives and drafts a report in a vacuum, s/he is not in a position to be totally immune to influences from the outside world. Policy preferences of the EPG and influence attempts from lobby groups probably get through to the rapporteur. Nevertheless, an explicit and deliberate exclusion of lobbyists during the drafting process allow for the picture of an epistemic community (for a similar argumentation, see Marier 2008).

The political part as well as the repercussions of rapporteur's work on the political decision-making process might be at odds with the picture of a consensual group with shared beliefs. Nevertheless, the rapporteur is able to uphold this idea under certain conditions: First, s/he promotes the arguments and beliefs featuring the epistemic community and uses them when negotiating committee members and the outside world. This correlates with a rapporteur's must have, his/her ability to bridge partisan divides and to persuade different stakeholders. Second, the rapporteur must have a compelling image and powerful standing with regard to the issue at stake so that fellow MEPs trust his or her opinion.

Taking a look at the substantial requirements, the group of rapporteur, draftswoman, experts and think tank(s) need to agree on the following: The basic consensus is that CO2 emissions from cars have to be reduced. As a second step, they all should agree on how to reduce the emissions (regulatory approach, how to integrate member states' actions). Haas' third precondition requires all members to have expert knowledge or to be at least well grounded in Marier's sense. Taking up the challenge, the group must develop a goal for an ideal policy proposal and push it through despite hurdles from institutions, political parties and interest groups.

H6: The industry-friendly stipulations of the parliamentary resolutions stem from the cooperation between experts and MEPs within the framework of an epistemic community.

Indicator & Operationalization

A truly epistemic community would require that the rapporteur uses information from independent research institutes. In the best case, the author locates a scientific consensus on the issue of CO2 emissions from passenger cars that feeds back to the draft reports, if not parliamentary resolution.

Following the aforementioned considerations of the role of the rapporteur, the author assumes that the rapporteur must have been a part of the epistemic community, if it existed. Drawing from interview with him, s/he might reveal the way the stipulations of his/her report were designed. A close cooperation with think tanks and meetings with fellow politicians having expertise in the field contribute to the picture of an epistemic community. Two public hearing has been organized by the Parliament, a possibility for many stakeholders and scientific researchers to present their views.

7 Research findings

7.1 Institutions

7.1.1 Hypothesis 1: Committee type

Communication on reduction of CO2 emissions

Chris Davies (ALDE, UK) was appointed rapporteur for the ENVI committee. and he proposed clear technical targets for the industry: Abandoning the idea of the integrated approach, he brought forward the idea of reducing average emissions to 120g CO2/km by 2015 by technical means only (Paragraph 3, Draft Davies Report).. According to Mr. Davies, he would have introduced a much tougher limit and schedule on the industry, but three factors prevented him from doing so: First, he accepted the industry arguments of production cycles that last five till seven years. Therefore, he opted for the year 2015, a compromise favoring the industry. Second, he feared the reluctance of his ALDE colleges: “You cannot afford being too green [in this party].” And third, every parliamentary report need the support of a majority (Davies, 2008).

During the vote in the committee, no less than 16 amendments dealt with this paragraph. Eventually, the committee adopted a report calling for an average car fleet CO2 target of 120g/km from 2012 on to be achieved only by technical means. Moreover, ENVI called for the Commission to propose complementary measures leading to a reduction of further 10gCO2/km (Paragraph 4, final ENVI report). ENVI therefore sent a report with a clear environmental mission to the Plenary.

However, the rapporteur repudiated from his own report during the debate prior to the vote:

> “There is a debate in this Parliament about whether, in a pre-legislative report of this kind, environmentalists should be pressing to send a strong signal to the Commission to be tough, or whether we should try to be realistic in framing measures which might actually be those that end up close to the final form at the end of the day. That is why I am asking Parliament to break from the Commission position and recommend that the target for average emissions from new cars should be set not for 2012 but for *2015* and should be *125* g to be achieved by technical means alone” (EP Plenary Debate).

To the surprise of his draftswoman, Ms. Harms, and the Green party group (The Greens/EFA Policy Advisor ENVI, 2008), he had tabled a respective amendment on behalf of the ALDE group and the EPP-ED together with the EPP-ED shadow rapporteur, Mr. Callanan. With a majority of 397 votes against 296 and 20 abstentions, these groups successfully amended the report during a roll call vote requested by GUE/NGL, the EPP-ED and the Greens.

In the case of the ENVI committee, Plenary disagreed with the committee report. The majority of the Plenary supported different, more industry-friendly stipulations. Therefore, the committee type made a difference in that case in the sense that ENVI appears to be a committee staffed by outliers.

CARS21

Mr. Chatzimarkakis (ALDE, D) became the rapporteur of the own-initiative report for the ITRE committee. Compared to the Davies report, the schedule was one month behind. Thus, the developments and results of the Davies report served as a reference point, a fact underscored by Mr. Chatzimarkakis, before the Plenary in January 2008: Reminding the MEPs that the Commission had proposed its legislation in the meantime, he draws a line between the Davies report, the legislative proposal and his CARS 21 report:

> "The public is therefore naturally interested to see how the European Parliament will react to this proposal and the extent to which the decisions by Parliament are consistent with others that have been adopted more recently."(Chatzimaraki, Plenary Debate, CRE14/01/2008 – 14) .

Mr. Chatzimarkakis sets out in his draft report that the 120gCO2/km threshold requires additional measures, complementing advancements in motor technology: According to the German rapporteur, only a reduction up to 135gCO2/km is achievable by motor technology (paragraph 17, draft report). In addition, any mandatory target before 2015 is not realistic (paragraph 15). In his view, 2015 is a workable deadline for car manufacturers and 15gCO2/km have to be reduced by measures other than motor improvements.

The rapporteur's paragraph allowing manufacturers for a generous CO2 limit of 135g/km was eliminated during the committee vote in November 2007. Instead, the motion for a parliamentary resolution stated 125gCO2/km as the basic emission target, but confirmed the deadline for the manufacturers to 2015 (also: Chatzimarkakis, Plenary debate). During the plenary voting, the political group of the Greens/EFA Group unsuccessfully tried to amend the paragraphs proposing a 2015 schedule and 125gCO/km targets. In a roll call vote requested by them, the targets of the committee report were confirmed by 409 votes in favor, 276 against and 12 abstentions. Thus, the Plenary confirmed the stipulations suggested by the ITRE committee. Consequently, ITRE's work was more approved than the one of ENVI.

Table 5: Timetable of the leading committees in the cases of CARS21, CO2 emissions and the proposal

	Community strategy	CARS21	Legislative Proposal
February 2007	7.2.2007: Commission Communication COM(2007)0019	7.02.2007: Commission Communication COM(2007)0022	(announced)
March 2007	6.3.2007 (ENVI): Mr. Davies appointed as rapporteur		
April 07	12.4.2007 (ITRE): Ms. Harms appointed draftswoman	12.4.2007 (ITRE): Mr. Chatzimarkakis appointed rapporteur	
June 2007	8.6.2007 (ENVI): draft report; 25.6.2007 (ENVI): consideration of draft report	8.6.2007 (ENVI): Ms. Harms appointed draftswoman	
July 2007		16.7.2007 (ITRE): draft report	
(August 2007)			
September 07	12.9.2007 (ENVI): adoption in committee	12.9.2007 (ITRE):consideration of draft report	
October 2007	24.10.2007: adoption in Plenary		
November 07		12.11.2007 (ITRE): adoption in committee	
December 2007			19.12.2007: Commission poroposal COM(2007)0856
January 2008		15.01.2008: adoption in Plenary	
February 2008			26.02.2008 (ENVI): Mr. Sacconi appointed rapporteur
March 2008			04.03.2008 (ITRE): Mr. Langen appointed draftsman
(April 2008)			
May 2008			8.5.2008 (ENVI): draft report
(June 2008)			
July 2008			14.7.2008 (ENVI): consideration of draft report
(August 2008)			
September 08			8.-10.9.2008 (ENVI): adoption in committee

7.1.2 Hypothesis 2: the role of the rapporteur

Community strategy

As the author learnt from the interview with Mr. Davies, he has had a long-standing interest in the issue, repeatedly asking the Commission for legislation on the issue. His position as a coordinator certainly helped him to take over the report he wanted although he lacks experience in the field is and underlines that he's far from being an expert. Usually, coordinators assume rarely rapporteurship due to time constraints and their special functions within a committee (Davies, 2008).

Following the Conference of Presidents decision, ITRE became involved within the framework of the procedure called enhanced cooperation and appointed Rebecca Harms (Greens/EFA, D) as draftswoman. The decision for the cooperation of both committees is easily comprehensible since regulations concern the single market and EU's industrial policy whereas the measures clearly stem from an environmentalist ambition. Accordingly, the parties were split about certain parts of the report. Among others, the CO2 reduction limit as well as the time schedule soon became a key issue in the debate. Especially, the burden for the car manufacturers provoked disagreement: Shall the car manufacturers improve their motors so that, by these improvements alone, CO2 targets are met? Or may additional measures relieve the industries obligation and supplement their R&D measures, as proposed by the Commission? Clearly, additional measures such as the compulsory usage of bio fuels release certain manufacturers from a feared duty to produce less-emitting cars.

During the interview, Mr. Davies explained his action by stating that environmental policies and the work of ENVI have to be ambitious, but also realistic. The costs for the industry and consumers as well as a possible majority in the legislative chamber do play a role when designing environmental policies.

To build up a majority, Mr. Davies had been seeking compromises before the Plenary vote: As his cooperation with his draftswoman, Ms. Harms, had not brought about any agreement, he could not rely on the votes by the Greens. Likewise, the PSE insisted on a starting date of 2012. Trying to back up his report, he turned to the EPP. As stated by an internal briefing paper by the EPP-ED group, Mr. Davies negotiated a compromise amendment with Mr. Callanan (EPP-ED, UK; EPP-ED, 2007). Part of the arrangement was that the rapporteur gave in concerning the car manufacturers' CO2 limit that was raised to 125g/CO2. Another 5gCO2/km therefore should be reduced by additional measures. Still, 2015 remained the starting year.

Mr. Davies shares this view in his terms: Although the issue of CO2 emissions from cars has been considered as very ambitious, even controversial, he successfully build up a parliamentary majority and a schedule and limit that is still demanding for the industry. He underlined his fight for ambitious long-term targets as proven in his report: He had introduced two long-term targets - 95gCO2/km in 2020 and 70gCO2/km - in his draft report that remained part of the EP resolution (Paragraphs

5&8 of the final report). In his view, he still made a strong stance in favor of environmentally friendly cars in the future. Besides, Mr. Davies was able to find a compromise with Mr. Chatzimarkakis who was working on his CARS21 report at that time. Although they cooperated only very little, they agreed on the CO2 schedule and target (Davies, 2008) – although Mr. Chatzimarkakis has a slightly different view on this cooperation (see below).

The German lobbyist commented on these long-term goals that the industry welcomes long-term goals since multi-billion Euro investments demand planning security but that those goals are illusionary: First of all, the number lacks scientific or political substantiation. The 95g CO2 has never been scrutinized by a study or impact assessment; Mr. Davies randomly decided for these numbers. Second, 100g CO2 mean a certain threshold bearing in mind the available technology. Cars are still dependent on fossil energies, alternatives such as electric motors or hybrid motors require energy. The complete switch to such a motor technology doesn't solve the problem of CO2 emissions. Although the actual emissions from cars might be cut, the generation of electric energy via nuclear power plants, for example, causes emissions, too. The lobbyist recommends an in-depth scrutiny of the alternatives and a visionary approach to future energy supply. Third, bearing in mind the technology currently available, 100gCO2/km constitutes a physical and engineering threshold whose lower deviation is unrealistic.

Concluding, the rapporteur Mr. Davies failed to push through his initial policy preferences. In order to build a majority, he had to form a coalition with one of the bigger parties, the EPP-ED. He therefore only indirectly steered the content of the report.

CARS21

Mr. Chatzimarkakis (ALDE, D) became the rapporteur of the own-initiative report for the ITRE committee. During an interview, he stressed that he has a huge personal interest in that topic. But the leader of his group, Mr. Graham Watson, at first did not grant him the rapporteurship due to his nationality. While the PSE kept a low profile (see above), the EPP showed interest in the position of the rapporteur. Yet, Mr. Chatzimarkakis had a reputation that convinced the EPP to support him in his aspirations (Chatzimarkakis, 2008). In a decision similar to the Davies report, the conference of Presidents granted ITRE the report but this time brought in the environmental committee. Yet, the parts were changed with ITRE being the leading committee. ITRE had decided to become active since the CARS21 communication addresses issues at the core of ITRE's responsibilities and many issues raised implied future legislation. Moreover, ENVI secured the comfortable position of being the leading committee in the case of the Community strategy. ITRE also wanted to get involved in the questions how to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars. In formal terms, the procedure of enhanced cooperation allows the leading committee to adopt amendments from the associated committee more easily. The associated committee's position is therefore more comfortable compared to ordinary opinion-giving committees whose amendments might be tabled by the leading committee. Thus, a report stemming from enhanced cooperation gives its content more political weight towards the Plenary and also actors outside the Parliament such as the Commission or the Council (Administrator, 2008).

The case of ALDE is more complex since both rapporteurs belonged to this group: In his draft report, Mr. Davies clearly states that technical improvements shall lead to cars whose average emissions don't exceed 120gCO2/km when placed on the EU market. He therefore abandoned the Commissions twofold approach of reducing car emissions to 130g CO2/km by improved motor technology while other technical improvements or the use of biofuels add up to another reduction of 10gCO2/km (Davies draft report). In contrast, Mr. Chatzimarkakis sets out in his draft report that the 120gCO2/km threshold requires additional measures, complementing advancements in motor technology: According to the German rapporteur, only a reduction up to 135gCO2/km is achievable by motor technology (paragraph 17, draft report). In addition, any mandatory target before 2015 is not realistic (paragraph 15). In his view, 2015 is a workable deadline for car manufacturers and 15gCO2/km have to be reduced by measures other than motor improvements. Interestingly, these stipulations correspond to the position of the German car industry since it softens the rigid equation of 130gC2 from the motor, complemented by additional measures. Chatzimarkakis therefore shared the view that the industry should be granted more leeway to achieve the emission target of 120gCO2 (VDA, 2008; VDA position paper).

Mr. Chatzimarkakis confirmed the author's impression that most of the stipulations from the reports were not controversial at all due to their technical character – all but the CO2 question that provoked discussions. He added that especially the topic of CO2 emissions and climate change are rather thrilling for MEPs these days and that he himself enjoyed working on it since he gained an insight in the pressing issue (Chatzimarkakis, 2008).

According to Mr. Chatzimarkakis, he contacted Mr. Davies very soon after his appointment in order to find a common ground for the ALDE group in both interlinked reports. Since Mr. Davies is of British origin, the two do not necessarily agree on issues: "The liberals in the UK resemble the German Green party." In order to convince him and to find a common position, Mr. Chatzimarkakis used "male methods" to convince Mr. Davies. His methods included common leisure activities and a close cooperation with Mr. Davies' shadow rapporteur, Mr. Callahan (Chatzimarkakis, 2008). Apparently, Mr. Chatzimarkakis was very eager to ensure a consensus first within the group and then in the Parliament, a consensus that undermined the initial goals of Mr. Davies.

As the representative of the Greens to whom Mr. Chatzimarkakis did hardly have contact (Chatzimarkakis, 2008) explained during the Plenary debate, the allegedly same reports of Davies and Chatzimarkakis differ significantly: Whereas Mr. Davies distributed the 120gCO2 target among the manufacturers (motor improvements leading to 125gCO2 emissions by 2015) and additional measures, Mr. Chatzimarkakis' committee report sets out only an integrated target of 125g (Turmes Plenary debate). This new target would not only undermine the community target of 120gCO2/km emissions from new passenger cars, let alone the 2012 starting date, but it leaves ample room for manufacturers. Additional measures could counterbalance CO2emissions caused by insufficient motor technology. Although Mr. Davies mentioned an agreement between both rapporteurs and although Mr. Davies, Mr. Chatzimarkakis as well as other MEPs underlined the consistency of both reports in their speeches before the plenary, the actual stipulations in CARS21 report (ITRE's

final report and the Plenary's final report) leave enough room for interpretation (a view confirmed by a German lobbyists and also easily understandable when referring to table 1). In addition, the Chatzimarkakis report never made any reference to long-term CO2 reduction targets, an achievement that Mr. Davies was proud of, as he revealed during the interview. Both rapporteurs apparently also disagreed concerning the definition of value targets: Not only starting date and CO2 limit, but also the questions whether weight or footprint will be the basis for the targets. Hence, the adjured agreement among the rapporteurs appears not convincing.

During the interview, the member from the ITRE secretariat that had worked closely together with Mr. Chatzimarkakis gave the following explanation: In the meetings with the shadow rapporteurs, it became clear that a compromise was needed. In contrast to the Davies report where a majority agreement was only reached prior to the Plenary vote, the parties sought for an agreement before the committee vote. Also, the PSE changed its attitude and tried to get more involved than in the Davies report. Still, the opinions differed and Mr. Chatzimarkakis opted for the vague formulation "[…] an average target of 125g/km of CO2 emissions for new passenger cars for 2015 should be achievable" (§38 draft report and resolution). This wording allows for different interpretations by the parties: According to the ITRE expert, the PSE interpreted the 125gCO2/km as target for the manufacturers to be complemented by other measures whereas Mr. Chatzimarkakis understands it as the overall target of the CO2 reduction from cars (Interview ITRE).

The rapporteur did steer the content of the report, but was not able to pursue its initial policy preferences. As his initial preferences corresponded to the EPP-ED's preferences, he was able to work actively together with its EPP-ED shadow rapporteur in order to ensure the adoption of his report.

7.2 Interests

7.2.1 Hypothesis 3: access of industry

Community strategy

Mr Davies remembered being contacted by stakeholders such as car industry, manufacturers, trade associations, green NGOs and the Commission. He also explained that hearings have a more informational character; he invited the participants so that the public receives information about the current state of the art. Mr. Davies confirmed that he has had regular and useful contacts to the car industry and green NGOs, notably T&E; apparently the industry succeeded in changing his mind about the starting date. He commented: "I accepted the industry argument about the development cycle with cars."

CARS21

Mr. Chatzimarkakis pointed out that only meeting all stakeholders allows for a comprehensive picture. In a case like this, with the national industries having a clear, but distinct interest, lobbying is a crucial aspect. During the Plenary debate, Mr. Turmes (Greens(EFA) accused Mr. Chatzimarkakis that he as "[…] an FDP politician

has naturally fallen into line behind the German car lobby." Mr. Chatzimarkakis later on reacted at that: "It is not all about running after some lobby group or other. It is about fighting fervently for a policy that represents a key market for us in Europe." He also praised Mr. Davies for "[t]here is no one in the ALDE Group who is greener or more ecologically minded than Chris Davies. Nonetheless, he has had the sense of proportion in his report to call for practical limits and deadlines"(Plenary debate). In the interview, he confirmed that he met lobbyists but also green NGOs. But he underscored that he had his own vision, for example the long term goal of reducing CO2 emissions to 0 by 2050.

The PSE official concluded that usually opinions from all sides are welcome and the input from the car industry was as useful as the material and meetings with green NGOs. Besides, the VDA and TE confirmed contacting the "usual" suspects during the preparation of a report: rapporteurs, shadow rapporteurs, chairmen &-woman, coordinators.

7.2.2 Hypothesis 4: National economic interest

To evaluate the national economic interest, the author sampled data from the two votes together. The votes were edited according to their industry-friendly character and associated with the nationality of the MEP voting. Therefore, the y-axis displays the share of industry-friendly votes of all votes made by MEPs of the same nationality. The x-axis demonstrates the national economic interest of the different national economies, expressed by the share of employment in the automotive sector in the overall employment. The index (see appendix 1) was used to make the shares comparable.

The analysis of the linear regression shows a clear argument against the assumption that MEPs vote in accordance to their national economic interest. The slope is negative (-0.036) pointing at a negative proportionality of the two factors. Therefore, the link between both factors as laid out in this study is not significant. The graph shows that most points are centered in a cloud, whereas Germany is an extreme outlier. Thus, the graph illustrates the independence of both variables. The R2 value of 0,0238 confirms this view; as R2 is close to the value "0", the share of industry-friendly votes varies independently from the national economic interest.

Graph: Regression Analysis



7.3 Ideas

7.3.1 Hypothesis 5: Party ideology

Under this hypothesis, all votes taking into consideration are sorted according to the party roster. The three possible votes are counted as follows: “+” indicates in favor, “-“ against and “0” abstention. Drawing from the position papers and statements by policy advisors, the voting instruction was determined. Therefore, the votes corresponding to the voting instruction are expressed as the cohesion within the four party groups.

This pattern matching reveals a high degree of party cohesion. Although interview partners estimated a high agreement within the Greens/EFA and the PSE, those parties have lower levels of cohesion than the EPP-ED and ALDE. Surprisingly, quite some members of the Greens/EFA deviated from the party position; likewise, PSE members did not followed the voting instructions. In contrast, ALDE and the EPP-ED have very high values in terms of party cohesion.

Table 6: Party cohesion

	Voting instruction (+/)	Votes (=expected outcome if party cohesion = 100%)	Actual result (+/-/0)	Cohesion: share of MEPs of the party group voting in accordance to the party's voting instructions
EPP-ED	+	497	460/36/1	92,55%
PSE	-	370	43/310/17	83,78%
ALDE	+	183	170/9/4	92,89%
Greens	-	79	7/70/2	88,60%

7.3.2 Hypothesis 6: epistemic communities

As the hypothesis focused on the rapporteur, both rapporteurs were asked whether they had contact with an epistemic community. The goal was to find out whether they also formed a part in a epistemic community, following Marier's elobarations (2008). To summarize, both MEPs didn't mention scientific studies as sources of information; the only evidence of contact to a scientific community was a statement of Mr. Davies: He recalled that the materials he received might have entailed scientific input. Still, this very vague statement does not provide for sufficient hints. In contrast, science or scientific material did not play any role in the work of Mr. Chatzimarkakis.

Going further, the author added questions concerning scientific input to all her interviews. The EPP-ED policy advisor explained that a scientific study is hardly possible in the EP's daily work as it takes too much time and legislative proposals have a tight schedule, as does the EP in general. Yet, the Green party group comissioned a study on the issue on which its position was based on. Its policy advisor underscored that MEPs have gained expertise in this long-standing issue. Similarly, the ITRE administrator benefited from his five years of experience, workshops and informal meetings. Apparently, the groups rely on the work of internal working groups, seminars and roundtables that bring together experts from the fields and the MEPs. These meetings, nevertheless, do not exclude the possibility of stakeholders meeting up with politicians individually.

Table 7: Summary of Hypothesis, variables, indicators and empirical data

Angle	Hypothesis	variable	indicator	empirical data	
				CARS 21	Community strategy
Institutions	The committee type determined the provisions on CO2 emission targets and schedule.	Committee type	differences between the stipulations on CO2 target and schedule in the committee reports compared to the Plenary report	corresponding stipulations	no corresponding stipulations
Institutions	The rapporteurs had the power to steer the industry-friendly policy outputs.	MEPs position	comparison of initial preferences as to the stipulations on CO2 target and schedule with committee and Plenary reports	giving in from initial preferences that benefit the industry	tight initial stipulations watered down
Interests	The industry-friendly policy output can be explained by the better access of industry lobbyists to MEPs.	Lobbying	contact of lobbyists with rapporteurs	good access	good access
Interests	MEPs voted in favor of the industry-friendly reports in accordance to their national economic interests.	voting behavior	votes in line with national economic interest	no link between voting behavior and national economic interest identified	
Ideas	MEPs voted in favor of the industry-friendly reports in accordance to their party position.	voting behavior	votes in line party position	high party cohesion	
Ideas	The industry-friendly stipulations of the parliamentary resolutions stem from the cooperation between experts and MEPs within the framework of an epistemic community.	epistemic community	collaboration of rapporteur with scientific actors	no collaboration identified	

8 Discussion of the findings

8.1 Institutions

Committee type

If ENVI is a distributional committee, is ITRE than an informational committee? In other words: Does a green-oriented committee fail to deal with issues in a balanced way? Is it too green or left wing to be able to represent the Plenary? Is ITRE, in turn more representative for the EP? It seems like ITRE's preferences correspond more to the ones in the Plenary. Albeit the hypothesis proves right, what's the reason for that? Sociological institutionalism is able to explain the differences between the two committee reports – a view supported by interview partners: The Green administrator confirmed that the committee makes a difference: ENVI is the committee that is *per se* responsible for environmental issues and has a stronger interest in pushing environmental issues. Also the official from ITRE pointed out that the committee makes a difference since the responsibilities differ. Here, further research in the form of in-depth interviews or questionnaires is needed to confirm the argument of distributional committees. Also quantitative research about the backgrounds of individual MEPs and the representation in terms of parties and nationalities can contribute to answering the distributional vs. informational debate. However, it is striking that the studies of McElroy (2006; McElroy and Benoit, 2007) followed this approach and concluded that committees are informational. This research left out a regression analysis since it's aim was to determine a difference in qualitative terms. In other words, the committee type that was in the center of attention, not which factors influence the composition of a committee; still, the discussion about the committee type doesn't allow for inferences concerning the behavior of the Plenary.

Interestingly, Nugent (2006, p. 277) stated that if committee members are more united for a certain goal, they might have a greater impact than those who are internally divided. He mentioned highly politicizing issues such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)in the Agriculture Committee that is composed of supporters and critiques of the CAP. Its internal divisions weaken its influence while the development committees (DEVE) is able to bring forward pro-development aid policies also in the Plenary. Nugent's remark doesn't seem very plausible, since outlying or internal cohesiveness apparently didn't necessarily translate in major influence of ENVI, for example. It is particularly interesting that ENVI couldn't influence the final parliamentary resolution – while ITRE could - although both committees are considered the two most influential ones (McElroy, 2006, p. 15).

The hint that ITRE might be more representative with its concerns about the industry for the Plenary than is ENVI deserves some special attention: Regarding the ecological-economical divide, qualitative research with all MEPs might highlight which preferences MEPs pursue. Taking into account the negotiations and agreements between the parties, the committee reports don't seem to have a major influence on the Plenary but serve only as a reference point in the pre-Plenary session discussions; still, two cases are not enough to draw conclusions about the committee-Plenary interactions. More content-analysis and quantitative research

could reveal whether some committees are more in line with the Plenary than others or whether Plenary shuffles all reports again.

Role of the rapporteur

As this research focused on the rapporteurs, there is an ambiguous conclusion to be drawn. Although both rapporteus managed to secure a majority in both the committees and the Plenary, they started off with rather different preferences. Whereas Mr. Davies is said to have a rather green approach to policies, Mr. Chatzimarkakis drafted very industry-friendly stipulations is his draft report. Mr. Davies's ambitions were approved by his committee. Yet, the committee even tightened the particular requirements on the industry. Mr. Davies knew that this committee report won't be approved by a majority in the Plenary. He therefore sought a coalition with the EPP-ED although this coalition was indirectly imposed on him via his shadow rapporteur alongside his fellow ALDE member, Mr. Chatzimarkakis. Albeit Mr. Davies successfully built an alliance, this alliance doesn't correspond to his policy preferences: Mr. Davies had a green attitude, he moved in his position towards 2015 while sticking to the 120gCO2/km target since industry convinced him and his own party didn’t allow him to ignore the industry input. Due to political reasons, he watered down his position in order to ensure a parliamentary majority. In the end, he did two favors to the industry: He supported the postponement of the start (from 2012 to 2015) *and* gave his blessing to 125gCO2/km to be achieved by improved motor technology only (he started off with a tighter limit: 120g).

In contrast, Mr. Chatzimarkakis started off with 135gCO2 and compromised only to 125g, due in the preferred year (2015). Both being rapporteurs from a smaller party, they apparently felt the need to collaborate with one of the big parties to ensure the adoption of the report. Yet, the concessions of Mr. Davies surpass those of Mr. Chatzimarkakis. The personality and the ties to fellow party members and MEPs reveal another striking difference between the two: Chatzimarkakis brokered a deal with both Davies and EPP and turned out to be a dynamic, driving force behind the scenes. In contrast, Mr. Davies had to be convinced that the committee report can only be successful when ALDE works together with the EPP. Mr. Davies appears as an outlier in his own party that serves in an outlying committee (see above). Although the hypothesis proves mainly right, the findings reveal a mixed picture when applied to the cases. Without the support of the party and without a possibility to form a coalition, the rapporteur is powerless. In the course of ensuring a majority, his or her initial preferences may fall by the wayside.

8.2 Interests

Lobbying

Taking into consideration the findings of this research, the hypothesis proved wrong as all interview partners confirmed useful and regular contacts to lobbyists from both industry and green NGOs. Yet, there are several limitations: First of all, not all MEPs were contacted; the author could only speak with the rapporteurs while the draftswoman didn't find the time for an interview. Second, it might be politically correct to state meetings with both sides of the spectrum while it might happen *pro forma*. The representative of the green NGO “T&E” substantiated this view: Although

he meet all “important people”, the draft reports and documents are self -explaining and are far from showing green influence. A comparison of the policy preferences (see table in appendix 3) reveals that the MEPs didn't include considerations of the green spectrum – apart from the green party. In addition, the author addressed the issue of lobbying while talking to all interview partners. The answers reveal that also the supportive people involved meet up with lobbyists: The EPP-ED expert on that field confirmed that he himself met representatives from the German, Italian and French car industry. The administrator of the ALDE group confirmed that he himself was lobbied by his national car industry while he got “maybe input from green NGOs etc. but I cannot really remember”. In this line, the support staff of the Greens stated that the EP is becoming less green because the industry has good access to EPP-ED and ALDE while green issues are discriminated.

Using the theoretical approach by Bouwen, the influence of lobbyists could not be successfully captured: Although Bouwen provided for a logical framework for approaching lobbying, access alone cannot be considered a convincing indicator, especially in a politically sensitive debate that fluctuates between two poles. Also, in-depth interviews with key players play a role. Yet, bearing in mind the long-term character of EU policy-making, it might appear absurd to concentrate on access for a specific case at a particular point of time. MEPs are involved in policy-making for years, debates have a long-term perspective. Thus, the focus on access is unable to grasp the information, influences and opinions that MEPs are exposed to. Even in-depth interviews might not reveal the very source of insights on a particular topic.

National economic interests

Although the findings contradict the hypothesis, a closer look reveals another ambiguous picture: In the case of the car industry, the author could not prove a link between national economic interests and voting behavior, taking into consideration all 27 member states. Nevertheless, the outlier country (Germany) proves a significant link between its industry and voting behavior. Therefore, German MEPs voted in favor of industry-friendly stipulations since the automotive industry is important in their constituency. This observation is substantiated by the German lobbyist: According to him, the VDA has experienced that German MEPs are open to issues that are of Germany’s pivotal interest. Germany being the biggest industrial nation in the EU has certain national interests that German MEPs cannot deny. In view of the EP, the VDA representative makes clear that the goal was to convince the PSE members whereas the EPP already worked together with the industry.

To conclude, national differences and national industrial policy do play a role in the EP. Also Mr. Chatzimarkakis pointed out that the groups usually follow the advice of their shadow rapporteur. But all MEPs take into consideration their (national) interests. “The Council represents states whereas the second chamber, the Parliament, speaks for the European peoples.” The German MEP underscored his ambition to ensure job security and the economic well-being of his fellow nationals. To conclude, it was only the Germans that voted according to their national interests; MEPs from other member states didn't show a comparable strong link although countries like the Czech Republic, Sweden and Italy also have a high index. Yet, the automotive industry is not present in all member states and the national industries

were affected to a different degree by the stipulations. It became soon clear that mainly the German car industry would suffer from tight CO2 regulations. Therefore, industry did not speak with one voice – a view that the VDA confirmed.

Further research might complement the national economic interest with national positions on environmental policies. Although Germany is an outlier and has a very high index rate, it was roughly two-thirds of German MEPs that voted industry-friendly. So, what were the driving forces behind the remaining 33 per cent?
In addition, the issue of national interests cannot be ignored: Not only do recent literature, election rules *and* interview partners confirm MEPs' orientation to national interests; the outlying case of Germany also proves this assumption. Case studies on the basis of basic national interests might help to shed more light on their importance.

8.3 Ideas

Party cohesion

The ideological factor, translated into party cohesion, proved right. The numbers are striking; all interviewees confirmed the existence of voting instructions. In that respect, the shadow rapporteur is as important as the one of the rapporteur: Those eminent MEPs basically shape the group's position. Interestingly, the work of the group secretariats is important which contradicts the work of Neunreither: All secretariats confirmed a close cooperation with the shadow rapporteurs, with the notable exceptions of the rapporteurs Mr. Davies and Mr. Chatzimarkakis. Nevertheless, this research offers only two cases to draw conclusions from, but they show that the work of party group is intense and has an impact on MEPs. Exceptions might root in divergent political opinions or working styles.

Epistemic communities

The influence of science in the two cases was negligible. Although one political group did order a study and two hearings took place, the author could not determine any sign of an epistemic community. The hearings included only stakeholders instead of independent experts. The author learnt that scientific studies are not very common in the EP. Although this depends on the issue: Whereas literature suggest that politicians turn towards researchers in cases of high uncertainty, this did not happen in this case that is a prominent example for environmental policy. Interestingly, the author found a scientific report requested by the EP – on lobbying. Nevertheless, these two case studies didn't reveal any political interest in scientific advice. Instead, the policy formulation oriented by Lindblom's model of stakeholder meetings; rival opinion are transformed into a politically feasible compromise.

9 Conclusions and outlook

This research reflected on factors that are able to influence policy-outputs. Literature suggests a wide array of possible factors, including media, personal values, constituency and institutional interests. The author restricted her research on institutional factors, interests and ideas. Those were applied on the context of the EP. Thus, the type of committee and the rapporteurs were treated as institutional factors; national economic interests and lobbying were subsumed under the title “interests” whereas party ideology and scientific input or the influence of epistemic communities is treated as ideational factors.

In the cases at hand. institutional factors did play a significant role: The research showed that the rapporteurs have a pivotal position in steering the content of the report, Yet, they are also subject to the democratic principle of majority ruling. And a majority of ALDE and the EPP-ED put forward an industry-friendly approach. Ensuring a majority is therefore a major task for rapporteurs, sometimes at the expense of their own preferences (see Mr. Davies). Yet, it became apparent in the course of this research that a small number of MEPs is responsible for the content of the report. This group includes the rapporteur, but also the shadow rapporteurs and the officials from the secretariat. The shadow rapporteurs are delegated from the midst of the parties that do not delegate the rapporteur. This group of MEPs influences the content of reports. This insight draws from the role of the EPP-shadow rapporteur that influenced Mr. Davies and brokered a deal. Admittedly, literature suggested some more key players whose role couldn’t be addressed in the course of the research. Still, it might be worthwhile to target the decision-makers in the EP in more cases.

Overall, the weapon of specialization and the division of labor have led to a system of small experts that steer the work of the EP and its policy. Party groups rely on their shadow rapporteurs and the coordinators, as literature suggests, in order to discipline their MEPs. Although the findings do not clearly support view that the national interests can influence MEPs to deviate from the party position, it cannot be rules out. What is more, several interview partners confirmed this view. As a result, national interests and party position seem to be the main points of reference for MEPs in their voting behavior. It is highly questionable whether this attitude leads to the best policy.

The same applies to the sources of information that MEPs rely on: Apparently, stakeholders such as industry lobbyists and NGOs are both granted access, although this evaluation is not supported by the Green policy advisor. Comparing position papers and following the expert from the green NGO, diffuse interests lose touch with the EP. Interestingly, the policy advisor for the Greens/EFA pointed out that EPP-ED and ALDE are more industry-friendly. Combined with a high party cohesion and a majority bloc, both parties are able to direct policy outputs in an industry-friendly way. It gives cause for concern that the pattern of party cohesion stems from the fact that the EP has once pursued – first and foremost – its institutional self-interest. Building majorities served to demonstrate the unity of the institution that was lagging behind in terms of powers. It is questionable whether this pattern is still up-to-date with the EP being on par with the Council in many respects. The EP is still not a house whose

members fight over the best policy. In that sense, sociological institutionalism might be seen at work – not only with respect to the committees, but also when asking MEPs about their main opponents. Probably, those are still the other institutions rather than politicians from within the EP.

How to improve this situation? The sources of information are a major aspect: Facing a heavy overload of legislations, the division of labor minimizes the actual amount of MEPs involved in the process. When legislating, the MEPs gather information from the outside, from stakeholders. Although this is a desirable approach, MEPs lack an unbiased source of information. As showed in the case studies, they do not consult think tanks or research information for information. Although their policy might be a compromise and strengthen the institutional standing of the EP vis-à-vis other institutions, it is not the struggle for the best policy. A scientific service supporting MEPs such as the “scientific service” or “wissenschaftlicher Dienst” of the German Bundestag might enhance the quality of the content-related debates. Also, the compulsory conduct of studies, maybe organized by the committee secretariats, could enhance the professionalism of the discussions. The situation of an understaffed EP should end and the EP should emerge as a powerful institution of its own that fals back on its democratic legitimacy. National parliaments could support this development: As pout forward by the Lisbon Treaty, subsidiarity and proportionality should be at the core of EU legislation, with the national parliaments having more rights to influence EU law-making, As a control element, national parliaments could – via their mandates given to governments – contain the Council. Thus, the parliaments could fulfill one of their major functions in democratic systems: control of the executive branch.

To conclude, institutional factors and party ideology led to the industry-friendly policy output of the EP: the EPP-ED and ALDE majority as well as the rapporteurs. The committee type did influence the committee reports; yet the committee type alone cannot explain the vote of the plenary. Nevertheless, the research highlighted the *problématiques* of interests and the non-input of scientific or epistemic communities. Further research might focus on these points, probably including more cases. Juxtaposing cases from different areas could highlight differences, even among cases that touch upon other areas of diffuse interests such as consumer protection. Thus, the EP’s traditional green stance does not hold true any more – as the institutional factors and the EP’s composition do not change within a period. Nevertheless, this research tackled only a small snapshot of the EP’s work in the current term. The way the EP dealt with a problem is subject to many factors of which not all were scrutinized. Media attention and public opinion, the importance of cars in daily life and an unbiased view on the topic were left out in this research. Also, only few MEPs found the time for an interview. To grasp the values and decision criteria of MEPs, more interviews or surveys are pivotal, especially with regard to their positioning in the ecology vs. economy debate and their sources for information. It remains to be seen in different case, if Lenschow proves correct: She predicted that an increased political visibility and power within the framework of the co-decision will force the EP to abandon its green mind and to enter Realpolitk. (Lenschow 2005, p. 316).

10 References

Administrator. (2008, July 4). Administrateur in the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (EP). (S. Erdmann, Interviewer)

ALDE. (2007). *Briefing Note.*

ALDE Policy Advisor ITRE (2008, June 24). (S. Erdmann, Interviewer)

ALDE. (2007, January 31). *Public Hearing on "EU legislatation on CO2 and cars"*. Retrieved May 15, 2008, from ALDE. Home.News: http://www.alde.eu/index.php?id=42&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=8300

ALDE. (4. July 2007). *Public Hearing: Cars of the Future*. Retrieved 16. April 2008: http://www.adle.eu/index.php?id=42&L=3&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=8747

Anderson, J. (2000). *Public Policymaking* (4th Edition ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Benedetto, G. (2005). Rapporteurs as legislative entrepreneurs: the dynamics of the co-decision procedure in Europe's parliament. *Jouranl of European Public Policy , 12* (1), 67-88.

Bergman, T., & Raunio, T. (2001). Parliaments and policy-making in the European Union. In J. Richardson, *European Union: Power and policy-making* (2nd Edition ed., pp. 116-134). London, New York: Rouledge.

Blatter, J. K., Janning, F., & Wagemann, C. (2007). *Qualitative Politkanalyse. Eine Einführung in Forschungsansätze und Methoden.* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Blatter, J., & Blume, T. (2007). In search for Co-variance, causal processes or congruence? Towards a plural understanding of case study research. *unpublished manuscript* .

Bouwen, P. (2002). Corporate lobbying in the European Union: the logic of access. *Journal of European Public Policy , 9* (3), 365-390.

Bouwen, P. (2004). The logic of access to the European Parliament: business lobbying in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. *Journal of Common Market Studies , 42* (3), 473-495.

Bowler, S., & Farrel, D. (1995). The Organizing of the European Parliament: Committees, Specialization and Co-Ordination. *British Journal of Political Science , 25* (2), 219-243.

Broscheid, A., & Coen, D. (2003). Insider and outsider lobbying in the European Commission. *European Union Politics , 4* (2), 165-189.

Chatzimarkakis, J. (10. July 2008). Member of the European Parliament. (S. Erdmann, Interviewer)

Collins, K., Burns, C., & Warleigh, A. (1998). Policy Entrepreneurs: The Role of European Parliament Committees in the Making of EU Policy. *Statute Law Review , 19* (1), 1-11.

Commission of the European Communities. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/regulation/index_en.htm

Commission of the European Communities. (2005). Abgerufen am 14. May 2008 von CARS21. Competitive Automotove Regulatory System for the 21st century. Public Consultation: The Automotive Regulatory Framework of the next 10 years: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/automotive/pagesbackground/competitiveness/stakeholder_consultation/index.htm

Commission of the European Communities. (2006). *Automotive Industry. Consultation of interested stakeholders on the CARS21 final report*. Abgerufen am 15. May 2008 von http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/automotive/pagesbackground/competitiveness/cars21_finalreport_consultation/index.htm

Commission of the European Communities. (kein Datum). *Codecision Procedure. Article 251. Scope following the implementation of the Treaty of Nice*. Abgerufen am 16. May 2008 von http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/procedure/legalbasis_en.htm

Commission of the European Communities. (7. February 2007). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council. A Competitive Automotive Regulatory Framework for the 21st century. Commission's position on the CARS21 High Level Group Final Report. COM(2007)0022.* Abgerufen am 4. April 2008 von http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0022:FIN:EN:PDF

Commission of the European Communities. (7. February 2007). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Results of the review of the Community Strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars and light-commercial vehicles. COM(2007)0019.* Abgerufen am 16. March 2008 von http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0019:FIN:EN:PDF

Commission of the European Communities. (13. January 2005). *EU car industry: Commission launches initiatives to boost competitiveness (IP/05/31)*. Abgerufen am 20. April 2008 von http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/31&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

Commission of the European Communities. (19. December 2007). *Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council. Setting emission performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the Community's integrated approach to reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicles.* Abgerufen am 30.

January 2008 von http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0856:FIN:EN:PDF

Corbett, R., Jacobs, F., & Shackleton, M. (2003). *The European Parliament* (5th edition Ausg.). London: John Harper Publishing.

Council of the European Union. (2007, May 2). *Brussels European Council 8/9 March 2007 Presidency Conclusions.* Retrieved January 28, 2008, from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/93135.pdf

Crombez, C. (2002). Information, lobbying and the legislative process in the European Union. *European Union Politcs , 3* (1), 7-32.

Dahl, R. (1991). *Modern political analysis.* Prentice-Hall International.

Davies, C. (2008, July 2). Member of the European Parliament. (S. Erdmann, Interviewer)

Directive 2003/87/EC. (2003, 10 25). Retrieved July 10, 2008, from Official Journal of the European Union: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:275:0032:0046:EN:PDF

Dye, T. R. (1995). *Understanding public policy.* 8th edition. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

EPP-ED. (2007). *Briefing Note.*

(2008, July 1). EPP-ED Policy Advisor ITRE. (S. Erdmann, Interviewer)

Euractiv (2008, June 10). Merkel and Sarkozy 'breakthrough' on car emissions. Retrieved July 10, 2008, from http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/merkel-sarkozy-breakthrough-car-emissions/article-173199

European Council. (2000, March 23 and 24). *Lisbon European Council: Presidency Conclusions*. Retrieved July 20, 2008, from http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm

European Parliament. (n.d.). Retrieved June 17, 2008, from Activities. ITRE. Introduction: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/homeCom.do?language=EN&body=ITRE

European Parliament. (2007, July 16). *Draft Report on CARS 21: A Competitive Automotive Regulatory Framework (2007/2120(INI)).* Retrieved May 17, 2008, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-391.934+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN

European Parliament. (2007, June 8). *Draft Report on the Community Strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars and light-commercial vehicles*

(2007/2119(INI)). Retrieved April 18, 2008, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-390.556+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN

European Parliament. (2008, May 8). *Draft Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council setting emission performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the Community's integrated approach to reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicles .* Retrieved June 15, 2008, from ENVI. Meeting Documents. : http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/pr/722/722785/722785en.pdf

European Parliament. (n.d.). *Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. Presentation and Responsibilities*. Retrieved June 25, 2008, from European Parliament. Committees: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/homeCom.do?language=EN&body=ENVI

European Parliament. (2008, January 15). *European Parliament resolution of 15 January 2008 on CARS 21: A Competitive Automotive Regulatory Framework (2007/2120(INI)).* Retrieved May 22, 2008, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=5484712

European Parliament. (2007, October 24). *European Parliament resolution of 24 October 2007 on the Community Strategy to reduce CO 2 emissions from passenger cars and light-commercial vehicles (2007/2119(INI)).* Retrieved May 20, 2008, from Legislative Observatory: Procedure files, legislative dossier: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=5484692

European Parliament. (2008, July 8). *European Parliament. Press Service. Press Releases*. Retrieved July 9, 2008, from Aviation to be included in the European Trading System from 2012 as MEPs adopt legislation: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/064-33577-189-07-28-911-20080707IPR33572-07-07-2008-2008-false/default_en.htm

European Parliament. (2007, December 4). *Report on on CARS 21: A Competitive Automotive Regulatory Framework (2007/2120(INI)).* Retrieved May 21, 2008, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=5484712

European Parliament. (2007, September 24). *Report on the Community Strategy to reduce CO 2 emissions from passenger cars and light-commercial vehicles (2007/2119(INI)).* Retrieved May 20, 2008, from Legislative Oberservatory: Procedure File, Legislative Dossier: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=5484692
European Parliament. (2008, February). *Rules of Procedure 16th edition.* Retrieved May 13, 2008, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+RULES-EP+20080218+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN

European Parliament. (14. January 2008). *Statement by the President of the European Parliament at the opening of the plenary proceedings*. Abgerufen am 5.

February 2008 von http://www.europarl.europa.eu/president/defaulten.htm?speeches#January%20-%20June&2008

European Parliament (2007). *Lobbying in the European Union.* Briefing Paper. DG Internal Policies, Policy Department C, Citizen Rights and Constitutional Affairs. PE.393.266. Retrieved July 3, 2008, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/download.do?file=18208

Faas, T. (2003). To defect or not to defect? National, institutional and party group pressures on MEPs and their consequences for party group cohesion in the European Parliament. *European Journal of Political Research , 42*, 841-866.

Greens/EFA, T. (n.d.). *Position Paper.* Retrieved on 2008

Greenwood, J. (2003). *Interest Representation in the European Union.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Greenwood, J. (2003). *Interest Representation in the European Union.* Basingstoke : Palgrave MacMillan.

Greenwood, J., & Aspinwall, M. (. (1998). *Collective action in the European Union: interests and the new politics od associability.* London: Routledge.

Haas, P. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. *International Organization , 46* (1), 1-35.

Hague, R., & Harrop, M. (2007). *Comparative Government and Politics. An Introduction* (7th [rev. and upd.] Edition ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
Hall, P., & Taylor, R. (1996). Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism. *Political Science* , 936-957.

Hix, S. (1999). Retrieved from European Parliament Research Group.

Hix, S. (2002). Parliamentary Behavior with Two Principals: Preferences, Parties, and Voting in the European Parliament. *American Journal of Political Science , 46* (3), 688-698.

Hix, S. (2005). *The political system of the European Union* (2nd Edition ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Hix, S., Noury, A., & Roland, G. (2002). *A "normal" Parliament? Party cohesionand competition in the European Parliament, 1979-2001.* Retrieved from European Parliament Research Group.

Hix, S., Noury, A., & Roland, G. (2006). Dimension of Politics in the European Parliament. *American Journal of Political Science , 50* (2), 494-511.

International Panel on Climate Change. (2007). *IPCC Reports. Forth Assessment Reports*. Retrieved May 17, 2008, from http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/assessments-reports.htm

Judge, D., & Earnshaw, D. (2003). *The European Parliament.* Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Kaeding, M. (2004). Rapporteurship Allocation in the European Parliament: Information or distribution. *European Union Politics , 5* (3), 353-371.

Kaeding, M. (2005). The world of committee reports. Rapporteuship assignment in the European Parliament. *The Journal of Legislative Studies , 11* (1), 82-104.

Katz, R., & Wessels, B. (1999). Introduction: European Parliament, National Parliaments, and European Integration. In R. Katz, & B. Wessels, *European Parliament, National Parliaments, and European Integration* (pp. 3-18). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kohler-Koch, B. (1997). *Organized Interests in the EC and the European Parliament (EIoP Vol.1, No.009).* Retrieved January 25, 2009, from European Integration online Papers (EIoP): http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-009a.htm

Krehbiel, K. (1991). Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers. *American Political Science Review , 84*, 149-163.

Kreppel, A. (2000). Rules, Ideology and Coalition Formation in the European Parliament. *European Union Politcs* , 340-362.

Kromrey, H. (2006). *Empirische Sozialforschung.* 11. Auflage.Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucies.

Lehnert, M., Miller, B., & Wonka, A. (2007). Increasing the Relevance of Research Questions: Considerations on Theoretical and Social Relevance on Political Sciene. In T. Gschwend, & F. Schimmelfennig, *Research Design in Political Science. How to Practice What They Preach* (pp. 21-38). Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Mamadouh, V., & Raunio, T. (2003). The Committee System: Powers, Appointments and Report Allocation. *Journal of Common Market Studies , 41* (2), 333-351.

Marier, P. (2008). Empowering Epistemic Communities: Specialised Politicians, Policy Experts and Policy Reform. *West European Politics , 31* (3), 513-533.

Marks, G., Hooghe, L., & Kermit, K. (1996). European Integration since the 1980s: State-Centric vs. Multi-Level Governance. *Journal of Common Market Stdies , 34* (3), 341-378.

Mazey, S., & Richardson, J. (. (1993). *Lobbying in the European Community.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McCormick, J. (2005). *Understanding the European Union: a concise introduction* (3rd [compreh. rev. and upd.] Edition ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

McElroy, G. (2006). Committee Representation in the European Parliament. *European Union Politics , 7* (5), 5-29.

McElroy, G., & Benoit, K. (2007). Party Groups and Policy Positions in the European Parliament. *Party Politics , 13* (1), 5-28.

Neuhold, C. (2001). *The "Legislative Backbone" keeping the Institutions uptight? The Role of European Parliament Committees in the EU Policy-Making Process.* Abgerufen am 5. May 2008 von European Intergartion Online Papers (EIoP): http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-010a.htm

Neunreither, K. (2006). Elected legislators and their unelected assistants in the European Parliament. *The Journal of Legislative Studies , 8* (4), 40-60.

Neunreither, K. (2000). Political Representation in the EU. In K. Neunreither, & A. Wiener, *European Integration After Amsterdam. Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy* (pp. 129-129). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Noury, A. (2002). Ideology, Nationality and Euro-Parliamentarians. *European Union Politics , 41* (2), 333-351.

Nugent, N. (2006). *The government and politics of the European Union* (6th Edition ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Policy-Advisor. (2008, June 30). The Greens/EFA Policy Advisor ENVI. (S. Erdmann, Interviewer)

Pollack, M. (1997). Representing diffuse interests in EC policy making. *Journal of European Public Policy , 4* (4), 572-590.
(2008, June 24). PSE Policy Advisor ENVI. (S. Erdmann, Interviewer)

PSE, P. d. (n.d.). Retrieved May 17, 2008

Radaelli, C. (1999). The public policy of the European Union: whither politics of expertise? *Journal of European Public Policy , 6* (5), 757-774.

Ragin, C. (2004). Turning the Tables: How Case-Oriented Research Challenges Variable-Oriented Research. In H. Brady, & D. Collier, *Rethinking social inquiry. Diverse tools, shared standards* (pp. 123-138). Oxford: Rowan&Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Rasmussen, M. (2008). Another Side of the Story: A Qualitative Case Study of Voting Behavior in the European Parliament. *Politics , 28* (1), 11-18.

Richardson, J. (2006). Organized Interests in the European Union. In K. Jorgensen, M. Pollack, & B. Rosamond, *Handbook of European Union Politics* (S. 231-246). London: Thousand Oaks.

Sbragia, A. (2000). Environmental Policy. In H. Wallace, & W. Wallace, *Policy-Making in the European Union* (4th Edition ed., pp. 293-316). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schnell, R.; Hill, P.B.; Esser, E. (2005). *Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung.* 7., völlig überarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage. München;Wien: R. Oldenbourg Verlag.
Scully, R. (2007). The European Parliament. In M. Cini, *European Union Politics* (2nd Edition ed., pp. 174-187). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shackleton, M., & Raunio, T. (2003). Codecision since Amsterdam: a laboratory for institutional innovation and change. *Journal of European Public Policy , 10* (2), 171-188.

Smith, M. (2008). All Access Points are Not Created Equal: Explaining the Fate of Diffuse Interests in the EU. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* , 64-83.

VDA, V. d. (2008, July 8). Representative of the German Car Industry. (S. Erdmann, Interviewer)

Whitaker, R. (2001). Party Control in a Committee-Based Legislature? The Case of the European Parliament. *The Journal of Legislative Studies , 7* (4), 63-88.

Yin, R. (2003). *Case Study Research. Design and Methods* (3rd Edition ed.). Thousand Oaks; London; New Delhi: Sage Publications.

11 Annex

Annex 1: Table indicating the national economic interests:

		employment 2007 (direct employment)	Index
Austria	AU	33,362	11,58403
Belgium	BE	45,998	15,97153
Bulgaria	BG	2,817	0,978125
Cyprus	CY	0,000	0
Czech Republic	CZ	125,300	43,50694
Denmark	DK	7,170	2,489583
Estonia	ET		0
Finland	FI	7,005	2,432292
France	FR	288,000	100
Germany	DE	861,817	299,242
Greece	GR	2,327	0,807986
Hungary	HU	60,025	20,84201
Ireland	IRE	4,026	1,397917
Italy	IT	168,435	58,48438
Latvia	LV	0,000	0
Lithuania	LT	0,000	0
Luxembourg	LU	0,000	0
Malta	MT	0,000	0
Netherlands	NL	22,654	7,865972
Poland	PL	122,900	42,67361
Portugal	PT	23,932	8,309722
Romania	RO	79,524	27,6125
Slovakia	SK	76,000	26,38889
Slovenia	SL	10,847	3,766319
Spain	ES	161,444	56,05694
Sweden	SW	79,273	27,52535
UK	UK	173,233	60,15035

Source:
http://www.acea.be/images/uploads/files/20080219_ER%200802%20CONSOLIDATED%20-%20website.pdf

Appendix 2: Overview policy cycle



Appendix 3: Positions on CO2 emission targets and schedule

	Starting date	CO2 threshold	integrated approach	long-term targets	document source & respective paragraphs
European Commission	**01.01.2012**	**120gCO2/km** -130gCO2 via motor technology -10gCO2 via additional measures	X	2020: 95gCO2/km	COM(2007)19, p.8,10; COM(2007)22, p. 10,11
PSE	**01.01.2012**	**120gCO2/km** -130gCO2 via motor technology -10gCO2 via additional measures	x	2020: 95gCO2/km	Draft Report Sacconi (2007/0297(COD)): Amendment 3 concerning Article 1
EDD-EP	**2015**	**120gCO2/km** -125gCO2/km via motor technology -up to 10gCO2/km via complementatry measures	x		EPP-ED: internal paper on the Davies report
ALDE					
1. Davies	**01.01.2015**	**120gCO2/km** =120gCO2/km via motor technology	o	2020: 95gCO2/km; 2025: 70 gCO2/km	Draft report Davies (2007/2119(INI)) as of 08.06.2007: paragraphs 2,3,4,5

Appendix 3: Positions on CO2 emission targets and schedule

2. Chatzimarkakis	**01.01.2015**	**120gCO2/km** -135gCO2 via motor technology -15gCO2 via additional measures [calculation S.E.]	x	(-)	Draft report Chatzimarkakis (2007/2120(INI)) as of 16.7.2007: paragraphs 13,15,16,17
Greens/Efa	**01.01.2012**	**120gCO2/km** =120gCO2/km via motor technology	o	2020: 80gCO2/km	Position Paper (Internet)
ENVI-final Davies report	**01.01.2012**	**120gCO2/km** =120gCO2/km via motor technology EXTRA: 10gCO2/km by complementary measures (without specifying time limit)	O (but extra measures)	2020: 95gCO2/km; 2025: 70gCO2/km	Motion for a Parliamentary Resolution (A6-0343/2007; 24.9.2007): paragraphs 2,3,4,5,8
Plenary-final Davies report	**01.01.2015**	**120gCO2/km** -125gCO2/km via motor technology -up to 10gCO2/km via complementary measures	x	2020: 95gCO2/km; 2025: 70gCO2/km	EP resolution of 24 October 2007 (T6-0469/2007): paragraphs 2,3,4,5,8

Appendix 3: Positions on CO2 emission targets and schedule

ITRE-final Chatzimarkakis report	**01.01.2015**	*125gCO2/km*	x	(-)	Motion for a Parliamentary Resolution (A6-0494/2007; 4.12.2007): paragraphs 35,37,38
Plenary-final Chatzimarkakis report	**01.01.2015**	*125gCO2/km*	x	(-)	EP resolution of 15 January 2008 (T6-0007/2008): paragraphs 35,37,38
VDA	**2015**	120gCO2/km -individual mix of improvements in mortor technology and additional measures (whereby the Commission acknowledges more measures to be taken into account)	x	(-)	Position Paper VDA