

International
Institute of
Social Studies

The Erasmus logo, featuring a stylized, handwritten-style script of the word "Erasmus" in a dark grey color.

**Identifying the determinants of return migration among
Syrian refugees.
A comparative study between Turkey and Germany.**

A Research Paper presented by:

Nawras Al Husein
(Syria)

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Major: Economics of Development
(ECD)

Members of the Examining Committee:

Dr. Natascha Wagner
Dr. Matthias Rieger

The Hague, The Netherlands
November 2018

Disclaimer:

This document represents part of the author's study programme while at the International Institute of Social Studies. The views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute.

Inquiries:

International Institute of Social Studies
P.O. Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague
The Netherlands

t: +31 70 426 0460
e: info@iss.nl
w: www.iss.nl
fb: <http://www.facebook.com/iss.nl>
twitter: [@issnl](https://twitter.com/issnl)

Location:

Kortenaerkade 12
2518 AX The Hague
The Netherlands

Contents

List of Tables	v
List of Figures.....	v
List of Appendices	v
List of Acronyms	vi
Abstract.....	viii
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
Chapter 2: Context.....	2
2.1 Background	2
2.1.1 The conflict.....	2
2.1.2 Syrian refugees in Europe.....	2
2.1.3 Mass displacement in 2015	3
2.1.4 Ongoing refugee movement via the Mediterranean in 2018	3
2.2 Context in host countries	4
2.2.1 Syrian refugees in Germany.....	4
2.2.2 Syrian refugees in Turkey.....	5
Chapter 3: The Problem, Research Questions & Hypothesis	7
3.1 The current environment.....	7
3.1.1 Host country political environment toward refugees	7
3.1.2 The politics of reconstruction	7
3.1.3 Misrepresentation of returns so far	8
3.1.4 Research problem	9
3.1.5 Research question(s).....	9
3.1.6 Hypothesis.....	9
3.1.7 Positionality.....	9
Chapter 4: Definitions and Literature Review	11
4.1 Contribution	11
4.2 Definitions.....	11
4.2.1 Defining who is a refugee.....	11
4.2.2 Defining the concept of ‘home’	11
4.2.3 Defining the concept of return.....	12
4.3 Theoretical Framework.....	13
4.4 Literature Review.....	15
4.1 Overview	15
4.2 Variable categories	16
4.2.1 Contextual variables.....	16

4.2.6 Information and Government policy	18
Chapter 5: Data Collection and Methodology.....	19
5.1 Data Collection Planning	19
5.1.1 Geographical scope of research.....	19
5.1.2 Target population.....	19
5.1.3 Questionnaire	20
5.1.4 Sampling method	20
5.2 Methodology	20
5.2.1 Data collection methodology	20
5.2.2 The Model.....	21
5.3 Data collection fieldwork	22
5.3.1 Data collection in Germany.....	22
5.3.2 Data collection in Turkey.....	23
5.3.3 Data collection ethics	23
Chapter 6: Results and Analysis	24
6.1 Descriptive statistics for selected variables.....	24
6.2 Data analysis	24
6.2.1 ‘Return One day (R)’.....	24
6.2.2 ‘Timeframe of return’	26
6.3 The influence of key variables on the probability of return -‘Return One day (R)’.....	27
6.3.1 Socio-economic variables	27
6.3.2 Contextual variables	33
6.4 The influence of key variables on the probability of return ‘Return Safe (RS)’	38
6.4.1 Socio-economic and contextual variables	39
6.5 The effect of different scenarios on the returning decision.....	42
Chapter 7: Conclusion	44
Appendices	46
<i>Appendix 1: Further details on the background to the refugee crisis.....</i>	<i>46</i>
<i>Appendix 2: Further details on the concept of home</i>	<i>47</i>
<i>Appendix 3: Further details on the concept of return</i>	<i>48</i>
<i>Appendix 4: Differentiation between economic migrants and refugees</i>	<i>49</i>
<i>Appendix 5: Primary data variables.....</i>	<i>50</i>
<i>Appendix 6: Further details on contextual variables</i>	<i>51</i>
<i>Appendix 7: Analysis of refugee characteristics</i>	<i>52</i>
<i>Appendix 8: Materials used in the experiment on the influence of information.....</i>	<i>55</i>
<i>Appendix 9: Quotes from respondents.....</i>	<i>57</i>

<i>Appendix 10: Limitations</i>	<i>60</i>
<i>Appendix 11: Full empirical analysis</i>	<i>61</i>
<i>Appendix 12: Survey questionnaire (translated from Arabic)</i>	<i>73</i>
References.....	90

List of Tables

Table 1: Most common nationalities of Mediterranean Sea and land arrivals from Jan – Aug 2018

Table 2: Number of Syrian refugees in Turkey under temporary protection

Table 3: Overview of Responses on decision to ‘Return One day (R)’

Table 4: Respondent stated timeframes for return

Table 5: The influence of socioeconomic characteristics of Syrian refugees in Turkey on the probability of return one day (R)

Table 6: The influence of socioeconomic characteristics of Syrian refugees in Germany on the probability of return one day (R)

Table 7: The influence of integration variables on the probability of return one day (R)

Table 8: The influence of political and security variables on the probability of return one day (R)

Table 9: The influence of economic and development and social variables on the probability of return one day (R)

Table 10: The likelihood of return of Syrian refugees in Germany and Turkey in different return scenarios

List of Figures

Figure 1: European countries with the highest proportion of Syrian Asylum Seekers

Figure 2: Refugee arrivals to Europe (2015)

Figure 3: Main migration routes to Europe (2015)

Figure 4: Factors determining the decision to return

Figure 5: Destination of Syrian Refugees in Europe and countries bordering Syria as of February 2018

List of Appendices

Appendix 1: Further details on the background to the refugee crisis

Appendix 2: Further details on the concept of home

Appendix 3: Further details on the concept of return

Appendix 4: Differentiation between economic migrants and refugees

Appendix 5: Primary data variables

Appendix 6: Further details on contextual variables

Appendix 7: Analysis of refugee characteristics

Appendix 8: Materials used in the experiment on the influence of information

Appendix 9: Quotes from respondents

Appendix 10: Limitations

Appendix 11: Full empirical analysis

Appendix 13: Survey questionnaire (translated from Arabic)

List of Acronyms

AVRR	Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration
BAMF	Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in Germany
CMEC	Carnegie Middle East Center
DGMM	Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDP	Internally displaced person/people
IoM	International Organization for Migration
ISIS	The Islamic State of Iraq and Sham
LFIP	Turkish Law on Foreigners and International Protection
NELM	Neo-classical and new economics of labor migration
NGO	Non-governmental organizations
OECD	The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS	Ordinary least squares
SDF	Syria Democratic Forces
TL	Turkish Lira
TP	Temporary Protection
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USD	United States dollar
WFP	The World Food Programme
YPG	The People's Protection Units

Acknowledgement

Firstly, I want to thank Allah almighty who gave me power and capability to be part of this Master and to complete this research.

Secondly, I want to express my gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Natascha Wagner for her guidance during this research. Her valuable advice, mentorship, and support motivated and reassured me throughout the process, particularly during the field work. Thanks also go to my second reader, Dr. Matthias Rieger for his support, insightful comments, and guidance which contributed to the completion of this research. I also want to show appreciation for ISS for funding this research.

My sincere gratitude goes to the team of enumerators in Turkey and Germany who worked hard to collect the data in the shortest time and the best quality possible, in spite of many challenges. Importantly, to all those who accepted to be interviewed, sharing their stories, fears, and aspirations.

Finally, thank you to my family, friends and colleagues at ISS for the continuous motivation and support. Deep gratitude to my wife, Hannah Sanderson, for her tremendous contribution in helping me to reach this stage and for her love, support and patience.

Abstract

As a response to the Syrian refugee crisis and in order to contribute to the informing of refugee policy, this research aims to highlight the voice of Syrian refugees in the debate on migration, refugees and repatriation as a solution to the refugee cycle. It examines the extent to which Syrian refugees intend to return to Syria or not given the political, economic and security related circumstances. It identifies the micro-level socioeconomic and contextual determinants of their returning decisions and the differences between them in Germany and Turkey. It also examines the impact of the media and information on the returning decision by exposing respondents to negative and positive information on returning to Syria. The quantitative data was supported by in-depth conversations with Syrian refugee respondents in both Turkey and Germany.

Main findings include that the end of the war is not reason enough for people to return. That the decision to return is complex, inclusive of multiple socioeconomic and contextual factors and heavily vested in the reality of life in both the host and the home countries. We see that refugees in neighboring countries like Turkey are more likely to return compared to those further away in highly developed countries such as Germany, also that incentives do not influence the returning decision but that media and information can play a role. The research conclude that refugees can be influenced by the level of development in the home country (in this case Syria) but that this again depends on their individual situations and contextual circumstances. It becomes clear that investing in infrastructure and health and education systems in the home country are crucial factors that influence return decision making with a safe political environment coming top in the case of Syria.

Relevance to Development Studies

By understanding the decision-making process of refugee returns we can understand to what extent development and economic factors play role in forming such decisions, as a significant factor of this decision making is the comparison between development levels in the country of origin and the country of exile. We can also better understand what level of development is required by people to consider staying or returning and which elements are most important to them. Returnees also have a role to play as agents of development through commercial links with host countries and through the human capital developed during exile.

Keywords

Syrian refugees, returning, decision, determinants, development, asylum seeker, refugee voice, repatriation, returning incentives.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Now entering its eighth year, the Syrian civil war has resulted in approximately half a million civilian deaths, more than 6 million internally displaced people, and more than 5.5 million refugees (UNHCR, 2018a, 2018e). The majority of Syrian refugees are concentrated in the countries that border Syria with a significant number hosted in European countries. Although the Syrian crisis began in early 2012, its effect came to the world stage in 2015 as thousands of Syrian refugees were forced to make the dangerous and costly journey to Europe. ‘The Refugee Crisis’ is now one of the hottest topics in European politics with Europe struggling to stem the flow as well as to manage the economic, social and political ramifications of the large scale forced migration.

While the UN and some European host countries, as well as the Syrian Government, consider the return of refugees to their country of origin as the desired solution to this crisis, this research explores whether that can be assumed focusing on Syrian refugee perspectives of return, push and pull factors and whether the end of the war is justification enough for the returning decision.

The voice of Syrian refugees is, as yet, not a part of debates on refugee policy, which is currently significantly influenced by the vested interests of host countries and parties to the conflict (such as the Syrian Government and Russia). Another key barrier is the difficulty of accessing authentic perspectives of Syrian refugee communities due to cultural and language barriers as well as the sensitivity of the topic and the high level of fear and insecurity of refugees in host countries. In order to overcome these challenges, this research aims to highlight the wants, needs, aspirations and agency of Syrian refugees in decisions over their future. It focuses on to what extent Syrian refugees want to return, identification of the determinants of their returning decision, and to what extent incentives from the host country or post war Syria influence their decisions.

Chapter 2: Context

2.1 Background


2.1.1 The conflict

The war in Syria is considered to be a high complexity conflict due to the fluidity of changes of power and continuing emergence of new armed groups. The multitude of parties to the conflict include the Syrian Government, and its alliance¹, Syrian opposition groups, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF - a predominantly Kurdish militia), the People's Protection Unit (YPG), the international collocation led by the US, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) to name but a few (BBC, 2018). All are culpable in the killing of civilians, as well as the use of detention, torture and indiscriminate killing of opposing forces (UN Human Rights Council, 2016; 2018).²

2.1.2 Syrian refugees in Europe

As result of the high impact conflict civilians began to leave Syria in the early years of the war seeking the safety of neighboring countries. According to United Nations (UN) reports, the neighboring countries of Syria are currently hosting a total of 5,602,386 Syrian refugees with the following host country breakdown: Turkey - 3,589,327, Lebanon - 952,562, Jordan 672,578, Iraq - 250,184, and Egypt - 131,504 (UNHCR, 2018a). In 2015, due to intensifying conflict, people began to cross the sea seeking asylum in European countries. According to Eurostat (2018), Germany has received the highest number of Syrian refugees of all European countries with 533,890 obtaining refugee status by the end of 2017. Figure 1 shows the European countries receiving the highest proportion of Syrian refugees between 2011 and 2017 (Eurostat, 2018).

Figure 1: European countries with the highest proportion of Syrian Asylum Seekers.



Source: Eurostat, 2018. Figure developed by the researcher. Accessed 8/9/2018.

¹ The alliance of the Syrian Government includes Russia, Iran, Hezb Allah and groups of Shiite factions from Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen and Lebanon, and mercenaries from Yugoslavia, Russia and other places around the world.

² For supplementary background information see appendix 1.

2.1.3 Mass displacement in 2015


In 2015, as a result of intensified conflict in Syria and elsewhere, 911,000 refugees and migrants arrived in Europe with 3,550 losing their lives during the journey (Spindler 2015). This was the year when the highest number of people risked their lives on the journey to Europe which, as shown in figure 2, consisted of both land and sea journeys made by refugees.

Figure 2: Refugee arrivals to Europe (2015).



From the data below in figure 3, it is clear that Syrian refugees represented the largest share of the movement in 2015 representing 28% out of all refugees and migrants taking the Western Balkans route, 59% of the total traveling the Eastern Mediterranean route, and 57% of the total on the Western Mediterranean route (Gillard, 2015).

Figure 3: Main migration routes to Europe (2015)



Source: The Economist, 2015. Accessed 21/10/2018

2.1.4 Ongoing refugee movement via the Mediterranean in 2018

Despite 2015 being the peak year for refugee movement, the crisis is far from over. When looking at 2018 data on refugee movement by sea, Syrians represent the largest proportion of people moving via the Greece route; 5,750 individuals from Jan to July 2018 compared to 3,450 from Iraq, 2,450 from Afghanistan, 800 from DRC and 60 from Palestine (UNHCR, 2018c). Table 1 below shows the nationalities of the highest numbers of refugees and migrants arriving by sea and land from January to August 2018, (UNHCR, 2018b) with Syrian refugees taking the second place with 10.9% of total sea and land arrivals in 2018.

Table 1: Most common nationalities of Mediterranean Sea and land arrivals from January to August 2018

Country of Origin	Number of individuals	% of total
Guinea	8762	12.20%
Syrian Arab Rep.	7828	10.90%
Mali	6799	9.50%
Morocco	5962	8.30%
Iraq	5125	7.10%
Tunisia	4084	5.70%
Côte d'Ivoire	4028	5.60%
Afghanistan	3665	5.10%
Others	3137	4.40%
Eritrea	3027	4.20%

Source: UNHCR 2018b. Accessed 22/10/2018

2.2 Context in host countries

2.2.1 Syrian refugees in Germany

The right to asylum is guaranteed in Germany under German law and as part of the German constitution which states that people from other countries have the right to ask protection from terror, violence and persecution (BAMF, 2016). Germany is also a signatory of the Geneva Convention of 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees which states in Article 33 that “no contracting state shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened” (UNHCR, 1951).

Germany has a long history of receiving immigrants and refugees which has developed over time as a result of pro-immigration Government policy and national workforce strengthening (Constant and Massey 2002). According to the Federal Statistics Bureau, the total foreign population in Germany by the end of December 2017 was 10,623,940 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017a). Germany is one of the most popular asylum destinations in Europe due to its strong economy and open Government policies that welcome refugees. In turn, the presence of family and friends in Germany acts as a pull factor for new asylum seekers (Neumayer 2004). The number of asylum seekers in Germany has increased radically in the last few years, largely as a result of the war in Syria, with around 1.5 million asylum seekers arriving between 2014 and 2017, the majority from Syria, Afghanistan Iraq, and Eritrea (Grote 2018). In 2017, 94% of cases of Syrian nationals seeking asylum in Germany were approved (The Asylum Information Database AIDA, 2018 a) making Syrians the largest group among all other nationalities applying for asylum, as well as the third biggest community with a migrant background in Germany (Syrian, 698,950, Turkish, 1.5 million, and Polish, 866,000) (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017a).

Although the term refugee generally refers to those who fled their countries to another country, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in Germany (BAMF) differentiates between four categories of asylum; asylum seekers, asylum applicants, persons entitled to protection and persons

entitled to remain.³ An asylum seeker is a person who intends to apply for asylum. An asylum applicant is a person who has applied for asylum but is waiting for BAMF to decide on their application (BAMF, 2016). After receiving approval, an asylum seeker is granted either refugee status or a different status of asylum, or subsidiary protection when neither asylum nor refugee status can be given but the person cannot return home for reason related to his safety (Ibid). Some refugees are not entitled to any kind of protection but are permitted to stay in Germany under specific terms. This case is called 'ban on deportation' (Ibid). For the purpose of this research, the term 'refugee' refers to any and all of these statuses.

2.2.2 Syrian refugees in Turkey

Turkey is also a signatory of the 1951 Geneva Convention but in 2013 established a standalone legal framework for asylum in Turkey implemented by the Directorate General of Migration Management referred to as DGMM (The Asylum Information Database, 2018 b). This legal framework is based on the 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) which states that "entries of foreigners in Turkey to stay and exit from Turkey will be provided to foreigners who demand protection from Turkey...foreigners' business and transactions; at borders, at border gates Turkey or in individual protection will be provided upon the request of foreign international protection, they cannot be forced to leave and return to their country of mass coming to Turkey....(and that)...Includes temporary protection which shall be provided urgently to foreigners" (General Directorate of Migration Management, Government of Turkey 2013 - translated from Turkish).

Covered under this legal framework are some 3,589,327 registered Syrian refugees residing in Turkey (UNHCR, 2018 a). However, the Turkish Government does not use the term refugee to classify Syrians living in Turkey. Instead, it classifies Syrians who are hosted in Turkey as a result of the war in Syria as guests under 'temporary protection' (TP) as stated in the LFIP. According to UNHCR (UNHCR, n.d), this includes people coming to Turkey as a result of the war after 28th April 2011, guaranteeing protection from the Turkish authorities 'under normal circumstances. It is also stated that 'under normal circumstances' they are not forcibly repatriated. UNHCR also states that people registered under TP have the right to services and assistance in Turkey and specifically the right to stay in Turkey until 'a more permanent solution is found' (Ibid).

Not all Syrians in Turkey are included under the TP classification where you must specifically 'seek protection' from the Turkish Government. There are many Syrians living in Turkey based on a residency permit or a work permit who are not considered to be under TP, as well as an ongoing national process which is selecting Syrian nationals to be given Turkish nationality based on their skills and qualifications. There are also known to be a significant number of Syrians who remain unregistered for various reasons mainly related to illegal crossing into Turkey or other concerns related to their presence in Turkey (The Asylum Information Database AIDA, 2015).

³ There are differences between status of asylum, refugee subsidiary protection or ban of departure mainly in the areas of right to work and reunification of family. The last two categories of people are not entitled to work unless they obtain permission from BAMF and were, until recently, not entitled to reunify their families. Currently, people with subsidiary protection are permitted to reunify their families under certain conditions (BAMF 2018b).

According to DGMM data, the number of Syrians under TP in Turkey continues to increase as shown in table 2 below. A Turkish report in 2017 called the ‘Syrians Barometer’ highlighted that “the permanence of Syrians in Turkey and inevitability of social coherence are growingly becoming matters require urgent attention” noting that the number of Syrian births had exceeded 295.000, with 306 new births per day (Erdogan 2017).

Table 2: Number of Syrian refugees in Turkey under temporary protection

Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Number of Syrians in Turkey under TP	14,237	224,665	1,519,286	2,503,549	2,834,441	3,320,814

Source: Erdogan 2017

Chapter 3: The Problem, Research Questions & Hypothesis

3.1 The current environment

3.1.1 Host country political environment toward refugees

Europe does not want more refugees. The unprecedented flux of the last years has resulted in political, social, and economic challenges for host countries, with social tension rising in the wake of mass movement in 2015. A recent study in Germany by RAND cooperation provided an analysis of attitudes, beliefs, labor market integration, and behaviors across various countries and found that a proportion of EU citizens think that the increase in numbers of refugees could increase the risk of terrorism and reduce nationals chances of securing jobs or social benefits (Amaral et al. 2018). The study also found that the Turkish Government is under pressure to provide education, jobs, transportation and security services for refugees as existing infrastructure already struggles to support local communities. At the political level, discourse of the alleged threat that refugees pose to host communities is increasingly used by right-wing populist parties in Europe to win votes, playing on insecurity and fear and distracting the electorate from national issues and failures (Holmes and Castaneda 2016) despite evidence from a number of studies that show that refugees do not have a negative economic impact on the European economy but conversely could boost economies in the medium term (OECD, 2018).

In 2015, the EU put in place an agreement with Turkey to attempt to keep refugees from undertaking the dangerous journey to Europe and increasing the perceived burden on EU countries, but it remains to be seen how effective this agreement has been in enabling people to stay in Turkey. International governments had committed millions of euro in humanitarian and early recovery aid in Syria in a further attempt to encourage people not to move, funding which since 2017 has been subject to significant cuts as governments wait to see how the end of the war will play out in Syria and to what extent they will support reconstruction.

3.1.2 The politics of reconstruction

After seven years of war in Syria, the World Bank estimates that Syria's GDP dropped by 63% by 2016 compared to 2010 (World Bank, 2017). It also estimates a hugely significant negative impact particularly on infrastructure and basic services citing a 62.5% reduction in power generation in 2015 compared to 2010, 68% of health centers damaged, 53% of educational facilities partially damaged (with 10% destroyed), 32% of housing partially damaged or destroyed and a youth unemployment rate of 78% in 2015 (World Bank, 2017). This negative impact correlates with the estimated cost of reconstruction, at around \$250 billion according to Staffan de Mistura, the United Nations special envoy for Syria (Ibid).

Discussions on reconstruction in Syria are intrinsically linked to Syria's political future. EU nations are hesitant to commit in light of ethical issues related to being party to consolidating Assad's victory, as well as concerns over how reconstruction policies will be applied in Syria. The Syrian

Government has been discussing its plans for rebuilding Syria for some time now. As early as 2016, reconstruction deals have been agreed between Russia, China, Iran and Syria (Batravi, 2018). It remains to be seen whether investment from the Syrian Government alliance is sufficient to cover the estimated cost of reconstruction but it is doubtful considering the level of investment estimated.

Concerns related to the ethics of the reconstruction plans of the Syrian Government seem well founded. A report on urban reconstruction in Syria by Clingendael, The Netherlands Institute of International Relations (2018), highlights that, for example, the Syrian Government's urban reconstruction policy is "enabling demographic engineering, rewarding political loyalty, and privileging higher socioeconomic classes" using price manipulation, forced eviction and the seizure of refugee properties to bar certain strata of the population from accessing newly available housing (Batravi, 2018). The focus on reconstruction only for those close to the Government, as well as a history of aid diversion by the Syrian government, is unlikely to provide the type of 'safe' environment that the EU refers to when discussing reversing refugee flows nor to convince Syrians not within this group to return (Roth, 2018). The idea of reconstruction in Syria as a pull factor is examined in this research with results available in Chapter 6.

3.1.3 Misrepresentation of returns so far

Of the 5.5 million Syrian refugees worldwide, most of whom remain in neighboring countries, a very limited number have so far returned to Syria. The official stance of UNHCR is that it is not supporting voluntary repatriation because the conditions are not conducive yet for refugee returns (UNHCR, 2018d). In 2017, an estimated 840,000 people returned to their areas of origin in Syria, 77000⁴ of which are refugees and 764,000 IDPs (Ibid). However, there are doubts if these returns were purely voluntary, particularly from Lebanon where Government and host community pressure, as well as desperate conditions, act as push factors for some Syrian refugees (Human rights Watch, 2017). While the number of self-organized, spontaneous returns slightly increased from 2016 levels during the first nine months of 2017 (20% of total recorded returns), it is also clear that the overall conditions for safe, dignified and sustainable returns are not yet in place in many parts of the country (Economist, 2018).

The Syrian Government has a vested interest in encouraging repatriation programs in order to re-enforce its victory and to solidify its legitimacy as the official leader of Syria by highlighting the 'war against terrorism' as the reason for displacement, not conflict between Syrian people and the Syrian Government. This tactic is mentioned by Black and Koser (1999: 4-6) regarding conflict affected countries of origin as well as the need of 'victorious' Governments to attract young men back to the country of origin to fulfill military conscription purposes. In addition, returning refugees could be used as bargaining instrument between the Government of Syria, its alliance (Russia and Iran) and refugee host countries as a means to encourage their funding of reconstruction in Syria in order to be able to repatriate Syrian refugees (The Economist, 2018).

⁴ 19,366 of which returned from Turkey in 2017 (UNHCR 2018d).

Given the complexity of the political environment and its potential negative effects on the lives of refugees, it is imperative to incorporate Syrian refugee perspectives on returning into policy decision making, including their wants, needs and a detailed understanding of the determinants of their returning decisions in order to clearly and morally inform policies on Syrian refugees in host countries.

3.1.4 Research problem

The focus of this research is centered on the below problems:

1. The potential negative effect of social and economic pressures and anti-refugee rhetoric on returnee policy decision making in Turkey and Germany.
2. The lack of ‘voice’ of Syrian refugees at host country policy level and the absence of consideration of the micro-complexities of the returning decision in policy making.
3. The potential for rhetoric of forced repatriation to become a reality in Turkey and Germany (despite stated commitments to the Geneva Convention) as a result of the misrepresentation of voluntary return and overestimation of the Syrian Government’s plans for reconstruction.

3.1.5 Research question(s)

1. Are Syrian refugees considering returning to Syria in the near future? Why, why not?
2. Is returning the only durable solution for the Syrian refugee crisis?
3. How and to what extent do the socio-economic and contextual determinants of Syrian refugees in Europe and neighboring countries of Syria influence the returning decision differently?
4. To what extent does government, media and other information influence refugee returning decisions?

3.1.6 Hypothesis

The factors affecting the decision to return depend on the specific context and environment of Syrian refugees in the host country, but also on the perceived potential for re-establishing their lives in Syria. This means that the end of the war is no guarantee that people will return. Overall, the absence of regime change in Syria will form an unsurmountable barrier for many Syrians when considering returning to Syria.

3.1.7 Positionality

As a Syrian national, directly affected by the war, but not a refugee, it is important to recognize and control for the bias of my own position and any potential effects it could have on this research. In order to minimize this, the key biases are stated here:

- This research is based on acceptance of the right of refugees to seek asylum in a host country under the Geneva Convention.
- It rejects any type of policy or action towards forced repatriation of refugees.

- It strongly recognizes the significant threats that exist for many Syrians upon returning to Syria ruled by the current Government.
- It takes into consideration refugees concerns regarding their position in host countries and their uncertainty that they will be treated according to the Geneva Convention.

Chapter 4: Definitions and Literature Review

4.1 Contribution

To the knowledge of the researcher, there is little existing academic literature that studies the determinants of the decisions to return, of Syrian refugees or refugees of other nationalities. Where studies exist, they tend to employ a qualitative approach while those using quantitative techniques focus on the use of short and limited survey questionnaires. This research paper has the potential to contribute to this gap in knowledge by providing a comprehensive quantitative analysis inclusive of behavioral experiments complemented by open-ended survey questions. In addition, it isolates the influence of the role of information on the perceptions and aspirations of participants.

4.2 Definitions⁵

4.2.1 Defining who is a refugee

This research study relies on the commonly accepted definition of the term ‘refugee’ from the 1951 UNHCR Refugee Convention which states that a refugee *“is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion”* (UNHCR, 1951). Although the use of this common definition simplifies the understanding of what a refugee is, the act of judging who falls under this definition in relation to Syrian refugees can be more complex. This is due to the multiple legal statuses of Syrian refugees in host countries.

This study considers Syrians in all categories of legal status as refugees, as long as they left Syria as result of war and/or persecution. This includes those who have been granted Turkish nationality who also fled the country due to the war and could still have the desire to return to their home of origin. Among Syrians in Germany and Turkey are people who left Syria before the war for economic and/or persecution related reasons. These people will be considered as refugees by this study if they are not able to return to Syria due to the risk of being killed or persecuted. In Turkey specifically, people who go to Syria to visit family during the Eid festival(s) will also be considered as refugees as visiting is an entirely different decision to returning.

4.2.2 Defining the concept of ‘home’

The question of whether returning home is the preferred solution to the refugee crisis calls for the need for an analysis of both the concepts of home and of return (for the sake of brevity, the analysis will be kept brief here with further details in Appendix 2). It is generally accepted at policy maker level that the most feasible solution to the refugees crisis is repatriation (over granting refugees nationality or permanent residence in the host country or supporting resettlement to a third country) and has even been heralded as a solution to ‘end the refugee cycle’ (Black and Koser 1999:4). The primary issue with this proposed solution is the assumption of the country of origin

⁵ For further details see appendices 1 and 2.

as home, particularly in the situation of refugees who have forcibly fled armed conflict where the idea of ‘home’ becomes a complex concept. In the case of Syria, physical mass destruction of infrastructure and housing, economic mass destruction of markets and institutions, and social mass destruction of social fabric, families and networks, demographic change has undoubtedly had significant consequences on the notion of home and perceptions of the possibility of return. Home can be a multitude of things; it can be the exact house, village, town or city that a person left behind (Warner 1994), it can be a country as a whole and not restricted to a person’s exact house, it can be a nostalgic notion or imaginary idea, and it can be the new host country where people have adapted to life in their new environment (Hammond 1999: 230). For the purpose of this research ‘home’ is defined as: *the exact place where refugees lived before the war unless they, (the refugees), choose somewhere else to be called home. A place where they feel safe and can live with dignity.*⁶

4.2.3 Defining the concept of return

Although the return home of refugees tends to be idealized by many scholars, practitioners and politicians and even sometime by refugees themselves, there is much evidence to demonstrate that the idea of return cannot be the solution to the refugee crisis or ‘the end of the refugee cycle’. The strongest of these, in addition the above arguments on the absence of a universal definition of home is the simple fact that after returning home, refugees can very well be forced to leave again or can struggle to reintegrate (Mohammadi et al. 2018). Hammond (1999: 229- 230) argues that idealization of the concept of returning or ‘the myth of return’ is based on an impossibility which is the return of the refugee to the situation before he/she left. In the case of Syrian refugees, this means before the war. This assumes that by returning, the refugee will be in the best possible place, not an accurate assumption from a human rights perspective, for example, in the case of Ethiopian refugees in Sudan who, upon return to Ethiopia, discovered that their quality of life had severely diminished in terms of basic needs, conditions and infrastructure (Hammond 1999:233). The idea that refugees will be in the best place if the return to the country of origin seems to be more about them being ‘back where they belong’ regardless of the conditions. For the purpose of this research the concept of return⁷ will be defined as *permanent, sustainable⁸, physical movement of refugees to the place that they themselves call home based on their own free will without coercion, directly or indirectly⁹, to a place where they feel safety and dignity.* The process of return is preferably to be facilitated with the support, supervision, and assistances of governments¹⁰ and of international NGOs and UN organizations such as UNHCR or IOM.

⁶ This definition reflects the understanding of the researcher and prioritizes the hopes and aspirations of refugees as a main driver and is not inclusive of the legal perspective.

⁷ The terms return and repatriation are used interchangeably for the purpose of this paper as it is hard to differentiate between them. The most important concept is voluntary return. Rosemary defines repatriation as the “preparation for return, process of return and the reception and arrangements for integration made immediately after arrival in the country of destination” (Preston 1999:25).

⁸ Definition and discussion of sustainable return is beyond the scope of this research.

⁹ Van Houte and Davids in their comparative study found that voluntary return happens when the migrant maintains permanent right to return to the host country in the case of European countries... “Return of migrants with a legal alternative to stay permanently in the European country of residence is the basis for calling return voluntary, while return of migrants without such legal alternative is defined as involuntary” (Van Houte and Davids 2014 :78). However, it should be noted that IOM is widely criticised for its consideration of some types of forced return (referred to as ‘voluntary under compulsion’) as voluntary (Koch 2014). It is imperative to mention that voluntary in this research means according to the full free will of refugees.

¹⁰ The mechanism for how return should happen is out of scope of this paper.

4.3 Theoretical Framework

Migration researchers have developed several approaches to the concept of 'return migration'. These approaches cover a spectrum of migrant types varying from economic migrants to refugees and asylum seekers. This links well with the focus of this research to identify the determinants of the returning decisions of Syrian refugees.

Cassarino (2004) has divided various theoretical frameworks on returning immigration into several categories. The first includes both neo-classical and new economics of labor migration (NELM). These two theoretical frameworks focus on the economic success or failure of returnees in making the returning or staying decision. For the new classical economists, migrants try to maximize their utility, represented by income, and they return when they fail. NELM sticks to economic variables such as insurance purchasing power and savings as determinants of the returning decision and considers that the returning decision will be resulting when these objectives are achieved. (Cassarino 2004: 254-283).

In the second division, Cassarino elaborates further on the other approaches such as the structural approach which argues that social and institutional variables in both host and source countries should be taken into account in analyzing the decision of returning. This means that returnees will calculate the opportunities expected in the home country and the opportunities that they have already in the host country and make their decision based on this comparison (Ibid).

The third and final division, according to Cassarino, is transnationalism and cross border economics and social network. These theories are both based on the idea that return is not the end of the migration cycle but it is part of the process which also includes the political, economic and social integration of the returnees in the country of origin. Transnationalism requires that returnees keep strong relation with home which helps reintegration in the future. In other words, family ties and nostalgic attachment to the homeland, in addition to social and economic variables are considered fundamental determinants of the returning decision while social, economic and institutional opportunities in the home country and returnee resources represent the main factors of the returning decision according to cross border economic and social networks theory (Ibid).

All theories above have added value in shedding the light on potential determinants of and the process for how the returning decision is made and why people decide to stay or return. However, given that making the decision relies on a complex process involving different dimensions such as economic, social, political and personal, it is challenging to capture the decision process in one framework.

In light of this challenge, this research study aimed to capture (to the extent possible) the maximum potential determinants across the main areas of economic, social, political, and safety and security. The choice of these areas was informed by the analysis that a 'normal' decision to return can be based on the assumption that refugees will make a rational decision based on comparison between the benefits and costs of returning and staying, in other words comparing their current economic

situation and their perception of the economic situation if they return¹¹. However, in the case of forced migration due to conflict we have to assume that the refugee's perception of the contextual variables like political and security situations could be crucial variables on influencing their decision to return.

This study also took into consideration that due to the complexity of returning decision making, especially in armed conflict contexts like Syria, where refugees have less power to choose compared to other types of migrants, a strong influence on the decision can be, in part, held by other parties such as the Government of the host country, the Government of the home country and also UN agencies. In their 2013 study, (Koser and Kuschminder 2015:45) found that the Government of the home country and IOM influenced the decision of 13% of respondents towards returning.

¹¹ This depends on the assumptions of Neoclassical and New Economic Theory regarding labor migration where different or even opposite effects of certain variables are hypothesized. This could help also to look at this model critically.

4.4 Literature Review

4.1 Overview

In reviewing the relevant literature, several studies were uncovered that focus on the identification of the determinants of the return decision but specifically of immigrants in general, including refugees. Other studies were located that similarly attempt to conceptualise forced migration and refugees within the wider concept of migration. In general, although these studies focus on different types of migrants (economic, refugees and asylum seekers) less research is identifiable specifically on refugee return.


Most studies tend to divide the factors involved in making the decision of return into;

- A) Socio-economic demographic characteristics of the refugees themselves for example age, gender, marital status.
- B) Contextual variables or elements in both the home country or the host country as such as political, economic, social, and community acceptance or integration.

There does not seem to be agreement in the literature on the extent of the influence of these factors or on which direction the influence will lead. Some studies conclude that the presence of a wife and children will influence the returning decision negatively (Constant and Massey 2003), others think that this could influence it positively. Kunuroglu et al. (2018) in their study about the motivation of Turkish migrants to return from Germany Netherlands and France found that having children represented motive of returning to Turkey for many Turkish families due the discrimination against children or for cultural protection. Moreover, related to the structural factors, there is no agreement whether pull factors from host country are those playing the most important role in the decision or the push factors from the host country. Some researchers found that the structural variables related to the country of origin do not have a big influence on the decision of returning (Koser and Kuschminder 2015) while, in other research they are central to formulating such decision. (Black et al. 2004) This contradiction is most likely due the heterogeneity of refugees as they have different motives and different conditions, although the source and host countries are where these studies were conducted are different. However, there are a set of factors that there is general agreement on among researchers which will be referred to as 'Contextual variables'. Further detail on these can be found in the following section.

Black et al. (2004) has developed model summaries of the main factors or inputs that could make the decision of returning possible. Black attempted to capture multiple possible factors in this model without quantifying the level to which people value the importance of each factor over the other. Figure 3 demonstrates this model and its factors which are divided into structural, individual, and policy, giving special importance to the flow of information.

Figure 4: Factors determining the decision to return



Source: Black et al. 2004, p. 13.

4.2 Variable categories

4.2.1 Contextual variables

As mentioned in the above section, this set of variables is commonly accepted in the literature as relevant for the analysis of returning migrants. There are five main variables within this set. This research aims to examine the influence of each of these variables, as well as the variables identified in relation to the suitability of returning and reintegration in the potential decision of return of Syria refugees and to quantify the level of influence exerted by each. Further details in addition to those below can be found in Appendix 5.

Political and security elements

Safety and security in the country of origin is often assumed to be one of, if not the most, important elements of the decision of return, particularly for refugees who fled their country due armed conflict or for political reasons. The definition of the concept of security can vary significantly from one person to another with some seeing it as the end of armed conflict, some as the eradication of political risks such as detention and others as the removal of forced political participation for example mandatory military service. A study was conducted with asylum seekers of eight nationalities in the UK. It found that safety and security and political stability in the country of origin were on the top of factors influencing the decisions of refugees, although the concept if security could vary from general aspect of safety and security and the political situation on the country level to a very individual level (Black et al. 2004 : 22-23). Similarly, Bloch and Atfield (2002:

41) in their study of Somalian refugees in London found that the majority of respondents wanted to return but also wanted assurance of their safety and security if they did so. However, Koser and Kuschminder (2015: 21) found that security in the country of origin could play a role, but also that security in the host country is a factor in making the decision of returning.

Economic and Development elements

As previously mentioned, immigrants in general are usually interested to maximize their economic interests. This usually consists of a comparison of cost and opportunity in both the country of origin and the host country (Koser 1997) as well as maximization of their utility by inclusion of other pure economic and non-economic factors such as wages and human capital accumulation of children and- the desire of parents to return home (Djajic 2008). After spending some time in exile, particularly for those in developed countries or living in better conditions than in the country of origin, refugees will try to rebuild their lives and replace what they lost in all aspects. Several empirical studies have found that this potential to compensate what was lost is vital for refugees when considering returning inclusive of economic opportunities and jobs, education of their children, functioning health system and ability to build their asset base, in particular housing (Kibreab 2003: 37). Omata (2013) found that the presence of secure shelter, education for refugees and their children, and job opportunities in the home country were highlighted as essential elements influencing the returning decision of refugees. (Al Ali et al. 2001) found similarly that although Eritreans refugees in UK showed a desire to return home low wages, no decent health system, lack of quality education, and lack of housing stopped them from doing so.

Social and Family elements

We find in the literature that family and refugee social networks are vital to the decision of return or non-return. The role that family can play varies and can have effects in both directions. Marriage and family reunification is a much cited reason to return in the relevant studies however, other social factors can encourage refugees such as staying in order to financially support the family back in the country¹² (Black et al. 2004:17-19). Another important factor is the contribution of family members to the decision of return (Al Mohammedi et al. 2018:263) which makes it important to understand intra-household priorities and perceptions of return.¹³

Socio-economic characteristics

The literature gives significant importance to the influence of socio-economic characteristics of refugees in relation to the returning decision such as age, gender, marital status, and ethnicity and education level. For example, people with higher education who are not working in the host country tend to return to find a higher position in country of origin (black et al. 2004 Mohammadi et al. 2018). In addition, women are less likely to return compared to men, especially to war torn countries after armed conflicts (Bloch and Atfield 2000; Koser and Kuschminder 2015: 44; Harild et al. 2015:13). Married people are less likely to return compared to singles according to (Black et

¹² Many refugees continue to send remittances back to their country of origin despite difficulty accessing formal work opportunities (usually from social benefits in the host country or informal work).

¹³ See appendix 10 for further details regarding related limitations of this research.

al. 2004). However, other empirical studies identified opposing evidence to the above in terms of to which direction demographics can influence the returning decision. For example, Black et al. (2004:18) found gender does not influence the returning decision in any direction and Koser and Kuschminder (2015) found no clear pattern of influence related to marital status.

4.2.6 Information and Government policy

Several programs led by host country governments or NGOs such as IOM¹⁴ and UNHCR have been implemented to encourage refugees to return voluntarily, mostly by giving financial incentives¹⁵ to start up life back in the country of origin to cover returning costs (Gerver 2017; Webber 2011 : 99). In the literature we find studies that highlight contrasting result of the impact of such programs on the decision to return. Several studies showed that these programs do not increase motivation of refugees to return and did not influence their decision (Black et al. 2004). They state that this approach will not be effective unless it is combined with 'stick forced deportation' where financial aid is the 'carrot' (Koser and Kuschminder 2015:44).

These programs are contested on another level for not actually taking the shape of the incentive, or the 'carrot' but being simply another way to force refugees to return (Webber 2011 : 99) and in some extreme cases refugees are threatened with detention if they do not accept to become part of 'voluntary repatriation' programs in Israel (Gerver 2017 : 638). These voluntary return programs primarily serve the interests of donors and host countries, not the interests of refugees themselves (Harild et al. 2015:7). The role of information is also important in this situation in terms of how informed refugees are about the programs, the process and the situation at home.

¹⁴ All programs in EU countries are run by IOM (Webber 2011 : 100) through a program called AVRR see (IOM,2018)

¹⁵ Specifically those who have legal status as refugees in the host country but, there have also been programs for those whose who had their asylum applications rejected (Gerver 2017; Webber 2011: 100).

Chapter 5: Data Collection and Methodology


5.1 Data Collection Planning

5.1.1 Geographical scope of research

The host countries of Germany and Turkey were selected for this research study for a number of reasons:

- They represent one European host country and one host country with a border with Syria.
- They represent the host countries with the highest number of Syrian refugees in their respective areas (see figure 4 below).
- They are the host countries playing the largest roles in policy level discussions and action on refugee management for example the EU Turkey Refugee and the EU Migrant Relocation and Resettlement scheme.

Figure 5: Destination of Syrian Refugees in Europe and countries bordering Syria as of February 2018.



Source: BBC, 2018. Accessed 02/11/2018

5.1.2 Target population

The population of study are Syrian refugees in the host countries of Germany and Turkey who moved there as a result of the war in Syria i.e. after 2011. Selection criteria for respondents included refugees over 18 years old with the autonomy to make the decision for themselves or themselves and their families to return to Syria or to stay in the host country. As a result of these criteria, the majority of respondents are male heads of household which is in line with dominant Syrian culture where the husband (or eldest male relative) is the overall decision maker for the family. There was no restriction on their date of arrival or their current status in the host country.

5.1.3 Questionnaire

A structured questionnaire was developed based on the literature, contextual experiences of the researcher of working with Syrian refugees and IDPs for 5 years, and informal discussions prior to fieldwork. By identifying the most relevant angles and factors that could influence the returning decision of Syrian refugees, key variables were established and questions and response options were developed. Data collection ethics were considered throughout development in terms of safeguarding privacy and anonymity of respondents, as well as consideration of sensitivity when asking about difficult or emotional topics. The questionnaire was developed in English and translated into Arabic ensuring that the language used was familiar and easily understandable for Syrian refugees.

5.1.4 Sampling method

Exponential non-discriminative snowball sampling was identified for use in the primary data collection as the most suitable method due to time and cost limitations as well as difficulties in locating refugee respondents within the different communities (Goodman 1961). A pre-defined target was set of 250 interviews per country based on cost and time limitations. The sampling starts with the team of enumerators and their networks of Syrian refugees. In order to try to randomize the selected respondents, enumerators who do not know each other, are from different backgrounds, and are living in different cities were selected. Data collection aimed for as high as possible number of respondents to increase the strength of the random selection. Of importance for this sampling method is the level of trust between the enumerators and the respondents as the sample is based on social networks which, given the sensitivity of the data being collected, relies on trust between the enumerator and the respondent in order for respondents to provide referrals to other respondents.

5.2 Methodology

5.2.1 Data collection methodology

The methodology of this study followed the below design.

A) Secondary data analysis – In order to establish the research question, required variables and data, and the scope, a desk review was conducted with various secondary data sources identified and analyzed. Explanatory and control variables were identified based on the literature.

B) Primary data collection - A total of 577 key informant interviews were conducted in a period of 3 weeks in Turkey and Germany. In Turkey, 336 interviews took place with 241 in Germany. The interviews were conducted by the researcher and multiple teams of trained enumerators with previous experience in data collection. They were trained by the researcher to collect data particularly for this questionnaire via the digital data collection platform Kobo Toolbox. The enumerators were all Syrian refugees themselves living in the local areas. The interviews were conducted privately to ensure confidentiality as well as avoid bias from the influence of others around the respondent. The following methods were utilized in primary data collection.

- Quantitative household questionnaire – The majority of questions asked to respondents were quantitative and closed-ended, with most likely response options listed and space to add ‘other’ responses and open ended questions which provided more insight into the logic of the responses.
- Vignette methodology – The survey included a section based on the Vignette method which presents a hypothetical situation, to which research participants respond thereby revealing their perceptions, values, social norms or impressions of events.
- Experiment on the influence of information – An experiment was applied to the data collection where respondents were randomly¹⁶ divided into 3 groups; 1) treatment group A which was exposed to a video with negative content on returning to Syria (the video lasted 2.7 minutes and was issued by Aljazeera news channel (see annex 8), 2) treatment group B which was exposed to a leaflet with positive or encouraging information on returning to Syria (developed by the researcher (see annex 8), and a control group which was directly surveyed by the questionnaire without any influence. All three groups were asked the same questions in the same order.¹⁷

C) Descriptive and econometric analysis – In order to model the process of the returning intention, a simple OLS regression was run to analyze two outcome variables using the mentioned controls, socio-economic and contextual explanatory variables. Regression is run for each country independently with comparative analysis between them. Robust standard errors are utilized and results are summarized in Chapter 6 including coefficients and standard errors in brackets. Several specifications were run and according to the division of the variables set to build the model step by step, $P > 0.00$ was received for all specifications, meaning that they are highly significant. The model is as below:

5.2.2 The Model

$$R = \beta_C X_C + \beta_H X_H + \beta_I X_I + \beta_P X_P + \beta_D X_D + \beta_S X_S + \beta_T T + \varepsilon \dots\dots\dots(1)$$

X_C : vector of control variables

X_H : vector of socioeconomic Characteristics

X_I : vector of integration variables in host country

X_P : vector of contextual Political and social variables

X_D : vector of contextual economic and development variables

X_S : vector of contextual social variables

T : represent the treatment

β : are coefficients requested to estimate and

ε : represents unobservable factors that could influence returning decision.

¹⁶ The experiment was designed so that the first interviewee of each enumerator is the control, the second is the negative treatment, and the third is the positive treatment, repeated for all their respondents.

¹⁷ The respondents were exposed to the video or leaflet after collecting the socioeconomic data and before answering the questions about returning.

The first outcome variable is 'Return One day (a. at any point of time in the future and b. within specific timeframes) (R)' and the second is 'Return Safe (under specific conditions such as degrees of safety and with financial incentive) (RS)'.

The analysis included several controls.¹⁸ The first was the respondent's governorate in Syria which was controlled for by creating dummy variables to indicate governorates. The second is the region in the host country which was also controlled for by using dummy variables representing four locations in Turkey and three in Germany. Third was the duration in the host country in months, as well as the full set of demographic characteristics which are considered here as explanatory variables.

Socio-economic characteristics of the refugees include age, gender, education, marital status, economic background, current income in the host country, source(s) of income, and asset base in Syria. *Integration variables* include legal status of refugees, local language proficiency, feeling welcomed in the host country and the loss of family member in the war). *Security and political variables* include the level of existing of armed groups, threat of detention, crime, freedom of speech and freedom to elect a political leader and Bashar Al Assad not being President. *Economic and Development variables* include key services, education, health and infrastructure, availability of housing, and availability of job opportunities. *Social and family variables* include the presence of family in exile, the presence of family members in the host country and the presence of social forums.¹⁹ Presence of family in the host country is also used as control variable.

In order to understand how information from the media affect decision making two treatment groups were initiated as part of the aforementioned experiment with one group exposed to a video with negative information about Syria and the other exposed to a leaflet with positive information about Syria.

5.3 Data collection fieldwork

5.3.1 Data collection in Germany

Data in Germany was collected in North-Rhine Westphalia state, Germany which is the most populated state in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016) hosting the highest number of Syrian refugees (84,261) (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017 a). Two main locations were selected, Essen, and Bocholt, with a small number of interviews held in cities around Essen such as Dortmund, Duisburg and Hamm. These locations can be said to be representative of the Syrian refugees in Germany as there is no self-selection bias as the German authorities use The EASY quota system calculated on an annual basis by the Federation-Länder Commission which regulates the allocation of asylum-seekers among the Federal Lands (BAMF 2018d). This means that refugees are allocated proportionately to the local population. Data collection in Germany lasted for 20 days from the 8th of August 2018 until the 27th August 2018. It was conducted by the researcher and eight male enumerators, all of Syrian nationality.

¹⁸ The coefficient of control variables are shown in the table in appendix 11.

¹⁹ Like women's groups or youth groups/clubs.

5.3.2 Data collection in Turkey

In Turkey, location selection was approached differently as there is relative freedom for refugees to choose the governorate they wish to reside in. However, Syrian refugees usually prefer to locate themselves in the cities which are close to the Syrian border, as well as Istanbul. According to The Turkish Directorate of Immigration in 2018, the main cities hosting Syrian refugees in Turkey are Istanbul 563,963, Şanlıurfa 469,215, Hatay 442, 091 and Gaziantep 392, 998 (Mülteciler Derneği, 2018). In terms of the proportion of Syrian refugees in each city/governorate, it is commonly understood that Syrians generally prefer to stay in the Turkish Province which is closest to the Province where they are coming from in Syria. This has resulted in governorates such as Hatay being dominated by Syrian coming from Idleb, Hamah and Latakia Governorates, Gaziantep being dominated by refugees who are coming from Aleppo Governorate, Şanlıurfa governorate is mainly dominated by Syrian refugees who are coming from Alraqa and Deir Alzor, while Istanbul includes a selection of all of the above and more but also is dominated by Syrian refugees who are originally from Damascus. Based on the above, data was collected from four Turkish cities Istanbul Gaziantep Şanlıurfa, and Antakya where more than half of the Syrian refugees in Turkey are located (Ibid). Data collection in Turkey lasted for 13 days from the 15th August 2018 until the 27th August 2018. Interviews were conducted by the researcher and 4 teams of enumerators, 16 in total; 12 male, 4 female (Sanliurfa 3 enumerators, Istanbul 3 enumerators, Antakya 6 enumerators, Gaziantep 5 enumerators).

5.3.3 Data collection ethics

Considering the sensitive topic of the survey and the emotional and personal nature of some questions, as well as the level of unease of Syrian refugees (often based on past experience) related to sharing information, ethical data collection was a key priority for this study. Consent was obtained from all respondents and included assuring participants that their data would be anonymized, would not have any effect on their position in the host country, and would not be used to create any negative implication for them or in general. Enumerators were trained on how to ask questions sensitively and how to put respondents at ease during the interview. Interviews were conducted in participant's residences to ensure comfort and privacy. Data was collected through a digital data collection platform (Kobo toolbox) using smartphones to assure data quality and to ensure that personal data could not be misplaced along the data flow pathway. An effort was made to recruit female enumerators in Germany to interview female respondents but remained a challenge to identify women who were willing and able to participate as volunteers.

Chapter 6: Results and Analysis

This chapter discusses an overview of refugee characteristics in Turkey and Germany and descriptive, overall findings from the two key outcome variables outlined in the previous section. It also outlines key findings of the influence of socio-economic characteristics on the two variables and lastly, examines the influence of the identified contextual factors on each variable.

6.1 Descriptive statistics for selected variables

The sample is majority male (92% Germany, 73.5% Turkey). It is a relatively young sample with an average age of 34 years in Germany and 31 years in Turkey. The majority of the sample are married (70% in Germany, 57% in Turkey). There is no difference in the lower education levels between countries the two until the university level where we see 33.6% of respondents in Germany and 42.9% in Turkey. 99.2% of respondents in Germany and 58% in Turkey earn an income over 300 Euro (considered here as average) but when we pass the average the differences grow, for example, 45.3% of the sample in Germany earn more than 1000 Euro income with only 1% earning the same in Turkey. Family size is the same on average at 3.5 for both countries. On average, 33.1% do not have assets in Syria (Germany and Turkey) and 8.3% reported themselves as poor in both countries. 80% in Germany and 72% in Turkey said they are not poor and not rich, and 16% reported themselves as rich in both countries. Appendix 7 provides further details on the descriptive characteristics of the refugee sample.

6.2 Data analysis

6.2.1 'Return One day (R)'

A key focus of this research was to directly assess Syrian refugee intentions towards returning to Syria. The question was "Have you made any concrete decision about returning?" as well as asking respondents why they took this decision. Table 3 below summarizes the results. Direct quotes from respondents that aid interpretation of these findings can be found in appendix 9.

Table 3: Overview of Responses on decision to 'Return One day (R)'

Have you made any concrete decision about returning?	Germany	Turkey
Return under any condition	3.3%	1.5%
Return under certain conditions	19.9%	46.4%
Not to return	56.0%	19.3%
Undecided	16.6%	30.4%
Go to third country	1.7%	1.2%
Do not want to answer	2.5%	0.9%
Other	0.0%	0.3%

Source: Data collected by the researcher

The majority of respondents in Germany (56%) state that they will not return. This percentage is smaller in Turkey at 19.3% and confirms the common thought in the literature that refugees hosted

in highly developed countries are less likely to return compared to those in less developed or neighboring countries see (Dadush 2018:39). Distance should also be considered in that those hosted by Turkey have easier access back to Syria than those who made the long, expensive and often dangerous journey to Germany. It is also interesting to note that a large proportion of respondents are undecided, more so in Turkey, which corresponds with the higher likelihood of return from Turkey than from Germany meaning that refugees are more likely to consider return from a neighboring country.

Respondents were asked to state their reasons for making the decision of no return from which a variety of answers were received which have been categorized as follows; safety and security, regime related and political situation, education and the future of children, aspiration and better life in exile, and having no ties with Syria. 385 (out of 577) respondents provided in-depth explanations of their responses (206 in Turkey, 179 in Germany).

The two most frequently cited reasons for no return were ‘the security situation in Syria’ with 168 citations (61 in Germany 107 in Turkey), and ‘The Regime’²⁰ with 146 citations (61 Germany 85 in Turkey). Many respondents stated a lack of trust in relation to Assad’s Government and linked it to repression, injustice and fear. They stated that as long as the current Government remains in Syria they do not believe the situation will improve and they will not return. Many respondents found it difficult to separate safety and security from the Assad Regime. They struggled to consider safety in Syria as not linked to the continuation of Assad’s Government. This indicates the level of influence that the political situation in Syria has over the idea of safety for Syrians who are not part of Assad’s supporters. For many people, Assad’s Government equals insecurity and a lack of safety and overrides all other considerations which may be linked to building safety in Syria.

One of the most cited reasons of respondents who do not want to return is related to the education of their children or a better future for their children (88 citations). In general, Syrians place a high value on building human capital and education, however, the chances in Syria to do this are very limited due to the war and Government monopoly of opportunities. A recent report from the Human development index, which includes Education systems as one of its key criteria, highlights that Syria dropped from 122 in the world in 2012 (out of 189) to 155 in 2017. Germany is ranked fifth in the index with Turkey at 65 (Human Development Index, 2018). This gives an indication as to how poor education and opportunities are in general in Syria, even before the war. In the literature, education is one of the most frequently cited reasons to not consider returning (Omata 2013; Al Ali et al. 2001; Black et al. 2004).

After examining those who stated they would not return we move to look at those who said that they want to return under any condition. This groups were a small proportion, 3.3% in Germany and 1.5% in Turkey but their reasons for their response give insight into their individual situations. A 40 year old man in Germany said *“It is difficult to start everything from zero at my age”*. A 34 year old man in Turkey mentioned that Syria is cheaper than Turkey and more profitable for him. Finally,

²⁰ Syrian people usually use the term ‘Regime’ to refer to the Government of Bashar Al Assad and his supporters. It is a term used to differentiate those who control Syria politically from the state of Syria as they there is no separation in political life.

it is important to mention that contrary to a number of empirical studies, 89% of respondents stated that their return would be to their place of origin, not to somewhere else in Syria.

6.2.2 ‘Timeframe of return’

This research also captured the timeframe that respondents allocated to their returning decision in order to understand any interlinkages between these two elements. Table 4 highlights the survey results against this question in both host countries.

Table 4: Respondent stated timeframes for return

How likely would it be that you would return to Syria in the following timeframes?	Germany			Turkey		
	Likely	Not Sure	Unlikely	Likely	Not Sure	Unlikely
Less than 6 months	2.1%	3.3%	94.6%	2.4%	6.0%	91.7%
From 6 months to 1 year	2.1%	3.7%	94.2%	8.3%	5.4%	89.3%
From 1 to 2 years	2.9%	7.5%	89.6%	8.0%	15.2%	73.8%
After 2 years	12.9%	16.2%	71.0%	50.3%	20.8%	28.9%
Not returning ever	44.8%	25.3%	29.9%	23.8%	13.1%	63.1%

Source: Data gathered by the researcher.

According to the results, the percentage of people who want to return increases in parallel with the increase in the timeframe, for example in Germany, 5 respondents (2.1%) reported that they are likely to return in 6 months’ time with 8 respondents in Turkey (2.4%) stating the same. When we look at the next two timeframe options there is no significant change to the percentage of people who are likely to return in Germany until the final two response options of more than two years and not returning where we see significantly higher responses (12.9% and 44.8% respectively). Contrastingly in Turkey, the percentage increases at an earlier stage, rising to 8.3% of respondents by the second response option of 6 months to 1 year and dramatically rising at the more than two years option to 50.3%. For both host countries the rate of those unlikely to return decreases with the increase of time which could indicate that people actually do have hope that the situation in Syria will improve with time, although seemingly more strongly in Turkey than in Germany with 71% in Germany stating they would be unlikely to return after two years compared to only 28.9% in Turkey. However, by asking if they will never return we find that 44.8% in Germany stated that it is likely that they will never return while a smaller but still significant percentage in Turkey (23.8%) stated that they will never return. This leaves only 63.1% in Turkey who state that they will return one day to Syria, which drops to only 30% of Syrians in Germany. The figure of 63% intending to return in Turkey is mirrored by a study from UNHCR on refugee intentions to return from Egypt, Jordan and Iraq found that 63% of respondents hope to return one day (UNHCR 2018d). Despite this interpretation, the proportion of refugees who state that they will never return to Syria is large in Germany and relatively large in Turkey given the size of the refugee population hosted there.

We see that the more time passes, the more people express that they are likely to return, particularly in Turkey which could indicate an estimation of the time needed for Syria to be politically and economically ready for people to return. However, we should take into account that responses by respondents to this survey were expressing their future intentions which, as King (2001) states, weaken the longer the migrant is in exile. Our next step below is to examine how the identified socioeconomic and contextual factors influence the decision of returning.

6.3 The influence of key variables on the probability of return - 'Return One day (R)'

To undertake this analysis regression has been utilized with the findings below in two sections, socio-economic and structural factors for each host country separately. Only the significant results will be analyzed for each host country (meaning that they may differ). The aim is to further understand which factors influence the returning decision and to what extent. All the coefficients are significant to the standards level unless opposed is mentioned. See the full results presented in appendix 12.

This analysis relates to the question, "How likely is it that you will never return?"²¹ with response options of likely, very likely, not sure, unlikely, and very unlikely. To produce binary outcome variables, unlikely and likely have been grouped for analysis to take value (1) and likely, very likely, and not sure grouped to take value (0). The analysis begins below with socio-economic results and analysis for each host country separately, followed by contextual results and analysis for each host country in parallel.

6.3.1 Socio-economic variables

²¹ For ease in analysis, these variables have been converted to be positive sentences rather than using 'never return'. It is now, 'how likely is it that you will return one day?'

Turkey

Table 5: The influence of socioeconomic characteristics of Syrian refugees in Turkey on the probability of return one day

Turkey Return one day (R)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Male	0.139** (0.063)	0.144** (0.059)	0.115* (0.060)	0.162*** (0.061)	0.133** (0.061)
Age	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.003++ (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
Family presence	0.101+ (0.065)	0.094++ (0.067)	0.078++ (0.066)	0.131** (0.063)	0.101+++ (0.063)
Marital status widowed/divorced	-0.198 (0.176)	-0.157 (0.151)	-0.200 (0.164)	-0.119 (0.151)	-0.167 (0.160)
Marital status single	-0.002 (0.067)	-0.040 (0.065)	-0.002 (0.066)	-0.034 (0.064)	-0.005 (0.064)
Education secondary/vocational	-0.069++ (0.066)	-0.070 (0.064)	-0.077 (0.066)	-0.051 (0.062)	-0.066 (0.064)
University and above	-0.144** (0.068)	-0.115* (0.064)	-0.129* (0.069)	-0.177*** (0.068)	-0.158** (0.066)
Poor	0.275*** (0.094)	0.284*** (0.092)	0.305*** (0.095)	0.196** (0.089)	0.296*** (0.092)
Not poor not rich	0.148** (0.071)	0.144** (0.067)	0.155** (0.068)	0.091++ (0.067)	0.151** (0.069)
Income average in turkey	- 0.086+++ (0.051)	-0.078+ (0.053)	-0.118** (0.054)		
Treatment negative	-0.068* (0.058)	-0.087+++ (0.057)	-0.087+++ (0.058)	-0.026 (0.057)	-0.052 (0.057)
Treatment positive	-0.026 (0.058)	-0.054 (0.056)	-0.062 (0.057)	-0.002 (0.058)	-0.007 (0.056)
No assets in SYR	- 0.238*** (0.060)	-0.243*** (0.059)	-0.250*** (0.061)		
Income from formal work		0.042 (0.091)			
Income from informal work		0.208*** (0.080)			
Government benefits		-0.049 (0.058)			
N	324	324	318	332	332
R ²	0.126	0.200	0.201	0.187	0.172

Standard errors in parentheses. Source Data collected by the researcher

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ ++ $P < 0.20$ +++ $P < 0.15$. This table represents the effect of different variables on the decision of returning one day. building the model step by step. The rest of variables in specification 3,4,5 are presented separately below. The control variables are presented in appendix 5.

Turkey - Significant results

Gender

Men in Turkey are 11.5 to 16.2 percentage points more likely to return to Syria compared to women. This holds over several specifications. This result is in line with several studies confirming that women are usually less likely to return especially in reference to a conflict context as they priorities stability and the future of their children, health level while men priorities the economic opportunities see (Stepputat 2004; Black et al. 2004; Koser and Pinkerton 2002) Female respondent's most frequently cited reasons to not return were the Assad regime, lack of stability, insecurity, and concerns over the education of children. The Syrian Government was at times mentioned explicitly while others stated related issues such as detention and another group referred to general security. The prioritization of education was category of as a key issue for women in a recent study titled 'Understanding the Aspirations of Syrian Refugees in Turkey' by SEEFAR organization (2017). For further discussion see appendix 9.

Education Level

The results show that respondents with higher education are less likely to return to Syria compared to those with primary or no education by 11.5 to 17.7 percentage points which holds over several specifications. This result contradicts the findings of several studies which illustrate that educated refugees are more likely to find work and reintegrate economically into the home country (Mohammedi et al. 2018; Black et al. 2004). This could be because educated Syrian refugees are well integrated within the Turkish community, finding economic opportunities whereas they do not perceive there to be opportunities for themselves in Syria. It could also be related to the Turkish Government policy of naturalizing Syrian refugees with higher education.

Economic background

Respondents classifying as poor are more likely to return to Syria compared to those who classify themselves as rich by 19.6 to 30.5 percentage points (which holds in different specifications). This indicates that poor people think that in Syria they could be better off but also that rich people tend to prefer more a stable and developed environment. Similar results were captured for respondents classifying themselves as not poor and not rich who are more likely to return to Syria by 14.4 to 15.5 percentage points compared to those classifying themselves as rich (this holds across all specifications except for specification 4 where the level of significance was 12.4 but is still considered significant).²² The findings here correspond with the findings from SEEFAR's (2017) study which found that the most marginalized categories in society are more likely to return to Syria

Respondents allocated to the poor category stated that they may accept to return under certain conditions including safety and security, the absence of The Regime, and the presence of job opportunities. Those classifying themselves as rich reported that they do not want to return due

²² The researcher will accept a higher risk of committing type 1 error due to the limitations of the number of observations.

to safety and security, lack of stability, political situation (Assad regime), lack of political freedom, and the future of their children. People who reported themselves as not poor and not rich reported similar reasons for not returning focusing on concepts such as the absence of freedom and the presence of the Assad Regime. They also expressed that they do not think the situation will change and that the education of their children is crucial. A 29 year old man in Turkey said, *“I do not think Syria will be as it was before in less than 20 years. I do not want to bring my children up in an unstable country.”*

Income variables have been divided based on the average income level in Turkey; less than 300 Euro or more 300 Euro a month. Results showed that those who earn income more than 300 Euro a month are less likely to return to Syria by 8.6 percentage points compared to those who earn income less than 300 Euro a month. However, income was considered as a control during the analysis of contextual factors which, when controlling for economic variables in the host country lost significance. Overall it can still be considered as significant as the level is 0.14²³ and in the same direction but with a smaller effect to 7.8 percentage points. When controlling for the integration variables, income demonstrated significance again at 11.5 percentage points but is not significant when controlling for contextual political and security variables. It may be that in the context of refugees, security and political variables overwhelm the economic variables in case of refugees. Finally, those who do not have assets in Syria are 23.9 to 25 percentage points less likely to return compared to those who have any kind of assets such as land, car, house or machinery. This finding is confirmed through the SEEFAR report (2017) which found that Syrian refugees in Turkey with assets in Syria were more likely to return. However, assets could be a proxy for owning a house.

Sources of income

Sources of income analysis identifies whether or not receiving income from a particular source has an influence on the decision to return (in other words, comparing respondents earning income from particular sources against respondents who are not). This is necessary due to the existence of multiple sources of income. In Turkey, results showed that earning income from Government assistance (social benefits) does not have impact on the intention to return. This is the same for respondents earning income from formal work but differs for those respondents earning income from informal work who are 21 percentage points more likely to return verses those who do not earn income from informal work. This could indicate that those in informal work feel less table in Turkey and still hope for better economic opportunities in Syria. The prevalence of Syrian refugees in the informal labour sector in Turkey is confirmed by a paper by Erdogan (2017 :10) which found that out of between 800,000 to one million Syrians in the work force in Turkey, only 10,000 got work permit based on the protection card until 2017.

²³ This may be related to the size of the sample. With a larger sample, we would expect to see income as significant to the usual levels.

Germany

Table 6: The influence of socioeconomic characteristics of Syrian refugees in Germany on the probability of return one day

Germany Return one day (R)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Male	-0.249** (0.111)	-0.254** (0.113)	-0.279** (0.121)	-0.241** (0.111)	-0.175+++ (0.118)
Age	0.008+++ (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.008+++ (0.005)	0.009* (0.005)	0.005 (0.006)
Family presence	-0.216** (0.086)	-0.187** (0.088)	-0.239*** (0.087)	-0.215** (0.088)	-0.204** (0.088)
Marital status widowed/divorced	-0.168 (0.232)	-0.188 (0.224)	-0.224 (0.233)	-0.109 (0.238)	-0.183 (0.234)
Marital status single	-0.180** (0.091)	-0.188** (0.093)	-0.179* (0.094)	-0.214** (0.096)	-0.167* (0.098)
Education secondary/vocational	-0.043 (0.087)	-0.054 (0.087)	0.035 (0.091)	-0.066 (0.090)	-0.074 (0.086)
University and above	0.163* (0.093)	0.181** (0.090)	0.221** (0.096)	0.0964 (0.099)	0.126+++ (0.096)
Poor	0.151 (0.149)	0.165 (0.141)	0.128 (0.150)	0.056 (0.156)	0.085 (0.144)
Not poor not rich	-0.048 (0.109)	-0.046 (0.108)	-0.058 (0.107)	-0.082 (0.108)	-0.087 (0.101)
Income average in Germany	-0.040 (0.078)	0.009 (0.079)	-0.055 (0.081)	-0.050 (0.079)	-0.011 (0.081)
No assets in SYR	-0.162** (0.080)	-0.125+++ (0.080)	-0.149* (0.082)		
Treatment negative	0.006 (0.076)	0.051 (0.076)	-0.005 (0.077)	0.004 (0.077)	0.003 (0.076)
Treatment positive	-0.014 (0.076)	0.014 (0.077)	-0.028 (0.077)	-0.0111 (0.077)	-0.013 (0.076)
Income from formal work		-0.429*** (0.103)			
Income from informal work		0.034 (0.137)			
Government benefits		-0.537*** (0.153)			
N	234	234	233	234	234
R ²	0.236	0.280	0.262	0.239	0.312

Standard errors in parentheses. Source: Data collected by the researcher

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ ++ $P < 0.20$ +++ $P < 0.15$

This table represents the effect of different variables on the decision of returning one day, building the model step by step. The rest of the variables in specification 3,4,5 are presented separately below. The control variables are presented in the appendix 5.

Germany - Significant results

Gender

In table 6 above we notice that results on gender for Germany are the opposite of those for Turkey with men less likely to return by 17.5 to 27.9 percentage points in different specifications compared to women. It is difficult to identify the exact reason for this, particularly considering that the balance between male and female respondents was not representative. All women stating a preference for return made this conditional to the presence of safety and security in Syria (as well as the absence of The Regime mentioned by some respondents).

Age

Age did not show clear significance in all specification it was on the level of (0.144) for the first specification and 0.234 in second 0.129 in third 0.083 in the fourth 0.392 in the fifth. So it will not be analysed also it has very small influence on the returning decision with every year older the respondents are, they are less than one percentage point more likely to return according to different specification

Family presence

If the family is present in Germany, the likelihood of return is reduced by 18.7 to 23.9 percentage points compared to those who do not have their family with them. This holds over all other specifications. Black et al. (2004), in studies of refugees in the UK found that one of the main motivation for return is reunification with family. Constant and Massey (2003) found that immigrants in Germany who have immediate family in Germany are less likely to return opposed to those who immediate family at home.

Marital status

Single respondents are less likely to return from Germany compared to the married respondents by 16.7 to 21.4 percentage points and it keep significance over all the specifications where the. As single respondents tend to be younger in age, this indicates that they can more easily break ties with the country of origin due to less attachment and less responsibility.

Education Level

Contrary to results for Turkey, respondents with higher education in Germany are more likely to return by 12.6 to 22.9 percentage points compared with those with primary or no education. This holds with other specifications when different variables are added, except for the forth specification including political and security variables. This could be due to the inability for those with higher education to find work in Germany related to their specialization as a result of difficulties in comparability of their degrees with foreign Higher Education Qualifications, in addition to the language barrier. Conversely, Constant and Massey did not find any influence of education on the decision to return of immigrants in Germany (Constant and Massey 2003).

Assets in Syria

Similarly, to the result for Turkey, a lack of assets in Syria reduces the probability of return by 12.5 to 16.2 percentage points compared to those who have any type of assets. The coefficient of 12.5 is considered as significant although it shows a significance level of 0.12.²⁴ It is important to note that income level and wealth classification did not show any significance for respondents in Germany. Which is opposed to the new classical theory of immigration which compares wages between the destination country and home country (Cassarino 2004: 254-283). Gibson, & McKenzie (2011) in their study of the determinants of returning highly skilled migrants found that income played a very limited role in the returning decision compared to family or life style.

Sources of income

In Germany, respondents who reported that earning income from formal work are 43 percentage points less likely to return compared to those who do not make any income from formal work. Similarly, respondents who reported depending on income from Governmental assistance are 54 percentage points less likely to return. This category of respondents were the largest in the research with only 22 out of 241 reporting that they do not receive Government assistance. In conclusion, informal work in Turkey positively influences the decision to return whereas in Germany, Governmental assistance and formal work negatively influence the decision to return.

6.3.2 Contextual variables

Integration variables

Table 7: The influence of integration variables on the probability of return one day (R)

Integration variables Return one day (R)	Turkey	Germany
Not Feel welcomed	-0.146** (0.070)	-0.103 (0.080)
Language	0.065 (0.059)	-0.167* (0.091)
Legal status Work permit Turkey /refugee status for Germany	0.042 (0.093)	0.013 (0.091)
Legal status Nationality Turkey/asylum status Germany	0.024 (0.095)	-0.107 (0.140)
Lose family member in war	0.005 (0.061)	0.148* (0.083)
<i>N</i>	332	234
<i>R</i> ²	0.172	0.312
Standard errors in parentheses source: data collected by the researcher		
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ ** $P < 0.20$ *** $P < 0.15$		

²⁴ The researcher will accept a higher risk of committing type 1 error due to the limitations of the number of observations

Turkey

Despite the presence of 32 respondents who were awarded Turkish nationality in the sample, this factor did not show any significance on the decision to return at one point in future as compared with other legal status such as temporary protection cards or work permits. Correspondingly, Black et al (2004) also did not find any impact of legal status on the decision to return.

Similarly, local language proficiency did not show any significance as a determinant of the returning decision perhaps because in Turkey it is not mandatory to speak a certain level of Turkish before entering the labour force or as a result of the prevalence of Syrian networks in the cities surveys where refugees can get by without speaking Turkish. Moreover, Syrians tend to be able to find work without a real need for speaking Turkish. Finally, respondents who did not feel welcomed are 17 percentage points more likely to return compared to those who felt welcomed, although the percentage of Syrians in Turkey who do not feel welcomed is small at 19%.

Germany

As in Turkey, legal status did not influence the returning decision although in the literature multiple scholars argue that the legal status of refugees has an influence on migrant returning decisions although this influence is debated as it could make the refugee settle in the host country but also it could encourage refugee to return as they know if they have nationality or permanent residency they can return in any time (Al Ali et al. 2001; Koser and Kuschminder 2015; Black and Gent 2006). Absence of influence could be as a result of the hypothetical nature of this study where decision to return is actually intention to return. Where studies are based on actual returning decisions, so the influence could become clearer over time.

Not feeling welcomed in the host country also did not influence the decision of returning in Germany. This could be due to the high cost of reaching Germany and the level of financial and physical risk invested by refugees as well as the good conditions they found there (benefits, education etc.).

Contrastingly to the results for Turkey, proficiency in the German language is essential for work and for obtaining permanent residency which corresponds with finding that respondents who reported they have average or above level of proficiency of Germany language are 16.7 percentage points less likely to return compared to those who reported poor or non-existent German. It is useful to note that from the sample of 241 observations, more than half (127) reported studying German at the time of interview.

Although it was surprising to see the result that those who lost family member in the war are 14.8 percentage points more likely to return compared to those who did not, when consulting the data, we see that those respondents in questions stated that they will only return under certain conditions, namely when Syria is safe, including a change in political power.

Political and security variables

To understand how respondents conceptualize security and political variables and the level of influence on their returning decision we asked about the security level in the area that they will

return to, if they return. The responses of ‘low’ and ‘not existing’ have been grouped together into the response of ‘not existing’ and take the value (0) and the answers of ‘moderate’ and ‘high’ are grouped into the response of ‘existing’, taking the value (1). By running these dummy variables, results showed the following.

Table 8: The influence of political and security variables on the probability of return one day (R)

Political variables Return one day (R)	Turkey	Germany
Detention threat	0.039 (0.065)	-0.008 (0.114)
crime	-0.104* (0.055)	0.102 (0.123)
Armed group	-0.091*** (0.057)	-0.084 (0.099)
Political parties	-0.087 (0.096)	-0.019 (0.121)
Freedom speech	0.009 (0.124)	0.344** (0.153)
Freedom to elect	0.259* (0.156)	-0.140 (0.158)
Bashar Assad not president	0.103* (0.059)	0.048 (0.074)
<i>N</i>	332	234
<i>R</i> ²	0.187	0.239

Standard errors in parentheses. Source: Data collected by the researcher

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ ** $P < 0.20$ *** $P < 0.15$

Turkey

Respondents considering returning to places that reported existing crime reduce the likelihood of returning by 10.4 percentage points compared to the areas that reported no crime. Armed groups were reported as making people feel insecure where the likelihood of returning will be reduced by around 9 percentage points in the areas with reported presence of armed groups. The significance level of this variable was 0.11 but it is considered as accepted for this research as it could be simply a result of a lack of a larger sample size. Respondent freedom to elect political leaders increased returning likelihood by 25.9 percentage points showing that respondents in Turkey value democracy as a factor of returning.²⁵

These findings are confirmed by a number of studies about returning refugees where security is found to be the most highly ranked variable influencing their decision to return (Black et al. 2004; Omata 2013; Mohammadi et al. 2018). In addition, two recent studies on Syrian refugees in neighboring countries confirm the importance of feeling secure as a main determinant of the returning decision (SEEFAR, 2017). A similar result was also found in recent research by Carnegie Middle East Center (CMEC) on Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan where it was established

²⁵ The concept of safety and security could be not captured fully through the qualitative analysis as it covers a wide spectrum of meanings for Syrian refugees, although the qualitative conversations and comments from interviewees gave more insights about the importance of security factors. However, as previously explained these two factors are very much interlinked to the level that sometimes mean the same thing for many people.

that security and political factors are one of the most important areas that Syrian refugees consider related to return (Yahya et al. 2018).

When analyzing the returning decision in the case that Bashar Al Assad is not President, the results saw an increase in the likelihood of return by 10 percentage points compared to the contrary. Although this variable is significant by a level of 0.10, the coefficient is not large despite the fact that 75% of respondents in Turkey reporting high influence of this variable on their return decision. It seems that after leaving Syria, the set of standards that Syrian refugees now have in terms of what they will accept in Syria after the war is more comprehensive than only a change in political power.

Germany

None of the previously mentioned security and political variables were significant in Germany except for freedom of speech where the likelihood of returning increased by 34 percentage points when freedom of speech was reported existing in the return destination compared to places where it is reported as not existing. This shows a value being given to something that was not present in Syria even before the war and could indicate that Syrian refugees in Germany are less likely to return due to the absence of certain factors in Syria. Whether the lack of freedom of speech was a key factor in their decision to leave is irrelevant as they now have a new situation in exile where they are able to value this factor and develop new aspirations and motivation which was crucial in influencing returning decision in several studies see (Omata 2013; Van Hear 2003:7).

Economic and development and social variables

Table 9: The influence of economic and development and social variables on the probability of return one day (R)

Economic variables Return one day (R)	Turkey	Germany
Job opportunities	0.013 (0.061)	-0.240** (0.095)
House in Syria	0.159*** (0.057)	0.182** (0.073)
Water electricity	0.145** (0.071)	0.084 (0.118)
Health service	-0.052 (0.065)	0.109 (0.127)
Schooling	0.041 (0.079)	0.008 (0.123)
Legal services	0.018 (0.062)	0.071 (0.096)
Social forum	-0.049 (0.054)	-0.063 (0.081)
Family inside SYR	-0.000 (0.0542)	0.231*** (0.0752)
N	332	234
R ²	0.172	0.312

Standard errors in parentheses. Source: Data collected by the researcher

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ ** $P < 0.20$ *** $P < 0.15$

Turkey

Owning a house in Syria increases the likelihood of returning by 15.9 percentage points, a result that is confirmed by several studies highlighting the importance of shelter as motivation the

decision of returning (Omata 2013). Owning a house was a major factor influencing the integration of Afghan returnees in study by Mohammadi et al. (2018).

When the level of infrastructure is considered to be high or moderate in the destination of return, the likelihood of return is increased by 14.5 percentage points compared to places where the level of infrastructure is low or is not existing. This shows the importance of investing in infrastructure as part of reconstruction.

Other variables such as education and health services and the availability of job opportunities are not significant for Turkey, although when asked to rank how important these variables are to respondents in making the return decision, 74% of respondents in Turkey rated education as 6 or above out of 10 (where 10 is the most important), 75% rated health as 6 or above out of 10 and 85% rated the availability of job opportunities as 6 or above out of 10.

It is important to mention that out of 206 respondents in Turkey who accepted to give in-depth comments, the lack of education system and services for them or for their children was the third most cited reason for why they do not want to return to Syria after issues related to safety and security and the presence of Bashar Al Assad in power.

Germany

Respondents who own a house in Syria are 18.2 percentage points more likely to make return compared to those who does not have a house. The variable for job opportunities has a negative influence for people in Germany as it shows as 24 percentage points less likely to return to the area reported with high and moderate levels of job opportunities. This could be because the most common areas with high employment opportunities tend to be Government held areas of Syria such as Damascus and Aleppo, areas which many refugees are afraid to return to due to retribution from the Syrian Government.

Interestingly, none of the contextual development and infrastructure variables (for the home country) showed any significance in influencing the decision of return for respondents in Germany although, when asked to what extent these variables are important for the returning decision a functioning education system received 75%, functioning health system 75% and functioning infrastructure 83.82%. This could indicate that the small proportion of refugees in Germany who consider returning are focusing on reasons other than these variables or could indicate the strength of the host country level of development as a comparison to the home country.

This seeming contradiction in the Germany data actually corresponds to the literature where a number of scholars state that development projects in the home country do not influence the decision to return, especially from developed countries (Dadush 2018:12). On the other hand, others argue for the importance of development projects in the country of origin, for example Al Ali et al. (2001:582) who found in the Bosnian context that the lack of reconstruction in infrastructure, economically and socially reduced the probability of sustainable return. Similarly, Harild et al. (2015:29) examined the experience of refugee in Afghanistan and demonstrates that development and reconstruction support which addresses the needs of particular categories of refugees can be conducive to sustainable return. For Syria this is not yet clear but the findings in Germany correspond with the findings of Dadush (2018) and show little value of potential reconstruction as part of the returning decision. However, we have previously seen in the case of

Turkey that reconstruction and infrastructure has higher value to the refugee returning decision. This highlights the importance of investing in infrastructure for those who want to return from neighbouring countries.

The analysis in this research also demonstrates that the value shown to reconstruction in the home country also depend on the host country level of development. Several scholars have emphasised this idea focusing on the strength of the influence of the comparison made by refugees of host and home countries, particularly after a long duration of exile when new utility functions are developed in the host country (Koser 1997; Stepputat 2004; King 2001). Surviving is no longer what drives refugee decisions.

For this category who do not want to return either because they do not have any hope for positive change or they simply want a better life, repatriation is not a solution. It would be infinitely better to make efforts to integrate them within the host community (Koser and Black 1999: 16). As a 43 year old man in Germany said *“It is declaring a new war against us if they send us back,”*

The presence of family inside Syria increases the likelihood of returning for refugees in Germany by 23 percentage points compared those who do not have family members in Syria. This correspond with several studies that illustrated the importance of social networks in integration back into the home country (Harild et al. 2015; Al Ali et al. 2001).

Experiment

Neither of the two treatment groups (one exposed to negative video and one exposed to positive leaflet) showed significance difference from the control group related to the returning decision. This could mean that the influence of media on refugee perceptions is not strong or that those who have decided not to return (the majority in Germany) cannot be swayed by information from the media.

6.4 The influence of key variables on the probability of return 'Return Safe (RS)'

$$RS = \beta_C X_C + \beta_H X_H + \beta_I X_I + \beta_P X_P + \beta_D X_D + \beta_S X_S + \beta_T T + \epsilon \dots\dots\dots(2)$$

The second outcome variable entailed returning under a particular scenario which intended to measure the influence of incentives on the returning decision. The scenario was provided by the researcher's question which was whether respondents would return if Syria became safe again as it was before the war, their returning cost was covered, they received start-up money for each member of the family older than 15 years old, there are job opportunities and reconstruction has started. The questions began by stating the financial amount available as 150 euro for each family member older than 15 and incrementally increased the amount until the scale ended at 2000 Euros for each family member. Those who did not choose to return under this scenario were asked if there was a certain amount of money they needed to return under this scenario or they just do not want to return. Those who defined a certain amount are considered potential returnees, those who refused return under any of these scenarios were given the value (0) and the others who accepted to return with incentives given the value (1). This generated the outcome variable run against the

same explanatory and control variables mentioned before. The results are presented in the below analysis with difference regarding the previous model discussed. For the sake of brevity, extensive details are not provided, simply a focus on variables that are still significant and noting of those that are not. For the full results, see appendix 11.

6.4.1 Socio-economic and contextual variables

Turkey

In the model of return safe, the following set of variables remain significant with an influence on the decision of returning in the same direction; level of higher education, wealth classification of poor, and not poor, not rich, asset base of zero assets, not feeling welcomed, freedom to elect political leaders, Bashar Al Assad is not president,²⁶ and owning a house in Syria. This demonstrates the influence of these variables on the returning decision of refugees in Turkey. The following variables are not significant in the new model while they were in the return one day model; Gender - male, crime, source of income from informal work and above average income. New variables became significant in the new model where they were not in the first model including obtaining host country nationality, losing a family member in the war, having family inside Syria, the availability of legal services in Syria, returning places having functioning health system in Syria (negative influence), freedom of speech in Syria (negative) and presence of family in Turkey. These findings inform how changes in the home country can influence the determinants of return despite lack of change in variables in the host country, for example, in the case of infrastructure and freedom of speech, respondents are less willing to return to areas in Syria with good infrastructure but low reported freedom of speech (assumed to be Syrian Government held) but also less willing to return to areas with low infrastructure and higher freedom of speech (assumed to be opposition held). In both cases, the variable of freedom of speech shows a negative value (see appendix 11 for detailed results). The below section highlights key details of analysis for some newly significant variables.

Family presence in Turkey and Syria

These two variables demonstrate the importance of family in making the decision to stay or return even if conditions are safe. Having family in Turkey reduces the likelihood of returning by 9.5 to 19.5 percentage points in different specifications (the p value for the fourth specification is 0.142). The presence of family in Syria increases the likelihood to return by 10 percentage points (p value is 0.106) Harild et al. (2015: X) explained that the returning process usually starts by depending on social networks and exploratory visits. Usually families send someone to check the situation or utilised a family member in the country of origin to aid reintegration similar finding in (Omata 2013; Mohammedi et al. 2018; Koser and Kuschminder 2015).

²⁶ The researcher will accept a higher risk of committing type 1 error due to the limitations of the number of observations

Having Turkish nationality²⁷

Respondents who were awarded Turkish nationality are 16 percentage points less likely to return compared to those with any other type of status. They are less likely to return even if conditions are safe in Syria. P value is 0.154.

Experiment

As previously mentioned, the purpose of the experiment was to identify the influence of the media and information on the decision to return (see Chapter 5 for details). In this model, it was clear that the category that was exposed to the negative video was less likely to return by 11.5 to 15.7 percentage points in different specifications compared to the control category. The category that was exposed to the positive leaflet did not show any significance but interestingly, it also appeared in a negative direction indicating that people perceived this leaflet as negative sign related to returning. From enumerator observations, it seems that the leaflet made respondents uncomfortable and resulted in a cautious response linked to perceived possibility of being repatriated against their will. This finding sheds light on the importance of information in refugee decision making.

In forming the variable of return safe there were a number of respondents who did not want to answer. In order to perform analysis this group was excluded. However, when running a regression of this group alongside the explanatory and control variables used in the analysis, data highlighted that the only significant variable for none respondents in Turkey was the threat of detention and the loss of a family member and for Germany was the threat of detention. This indicates that this group represents those who are either traumatized by past experiences and, or have a strong fear of the Syrian Government (including a specific fear of detention).

Germany

In Germany, the following variables remained significant in the same direction as the first model; the presence of family in Germany, having no assets in Syria, receiving Government assistance in Germany,²⁸ the loss of a family member in the war, and owning a house in Syria. These variables were not influenced by the changes in scenarios.

The following variables were not significant in the first model for Germany but are significant in this model. Education level of secondary or vocational school reduces the likelihood of return under safe conditions by 12.1 to 14.2 percentage points compared to those respondents who do not have any education (all specifications are significant except for the third with p value = 0.254). Respondents classifying themselves as poor are less likely to return to Syria even when it is safe compared to those in the rich category by 22.5 to 33.8 percentage points. This means that incentives have less influence on the people who classified themselves as poor compared to rich

²⁷ Level of significance of this variable is 0.154 but the researcher will accept a higher risk of committing type 1 error due to the limitations of the number of observations.

²⁸ The level of significant here is 0.13 but the researcher will accept a higher risk of committing type 1 error due to the limitations of the number of observations.

or those who reached high school compared to those who have primary or no education. Refugees who were poor in Syria before the war are less likely to want to return from Germany as returning means going back to a significantly lower standard of life.

A 33 year old divorced woman stated that she does not want to return saying, "*Germany is better for my children*". A 32 year old married man in Germany who came from Lebanon through a UN resettlement program said, "*I got very tired working in Lebanon. I do not want to return to Syria. There is nothing there for my children and my family's future.*" For this category of refugees, integration programs represent a solution as they have made a firm decision that they will not return to Syria.

Moreover, the scenario Bashar Al Assad being removed from power increases the likelihood of return by around 20 percentage points. It is important to mention that there is a category of Syrian refugees of approximately 20% who do not mind returning under certain conditions which specifically relates to the removal of Bashar Al Assad as President, the initiation of democratic political processes and the start of reconstruction programs including infrastructure and job opportunities. However, even for those who fled Syria for political reasons, the removal of Assad represents the starting point for them to considering returning, indicating that the majority will not voluntarily return in the near future. This finding could seem normal in refugee situations as similarly Zimmermann (2010) found that both Somali and Afghani refugees who fled initially due to security reasons were not willing to return after the hostilities finished.

The experiment was not significant in the case of Germany which shows once again that refugees in Germany are less influenced by the media and that those who made the risky journey to Europe are predominantly those who will choose not to return.

6.5 The effect of different scenarios on the returning decision

Table 10: The likelihood of return of Syrian refugees in Germany and Turkey in different return scenarios					
Outcome Variables	Germany	Turkey	Overall Mean	P value of difference	N
Intend to return now if given money to cover the return cost and start-up	0.067	0.127	0.100	0.036	439
Intend to return after the war finish and Syria become safe if given money to cover return cost, start up	0.227	0.658	0.479	0.000	499
Intend to returner if Syria safe but health sector not functioning properly	0.104	0.271	0.201	0.000	577
Intend to returner if Syria safe but Education sector not functioning properly	0.149	0.321	0.250	0.000	577
Intend to return if u got host country nationality	0.133	0.333	0.250	0.000	577
Intend to return one day	0.552	0.762	0.674	0.000	577
Source: Data gathered by the researcher					
The fourth column of the table reports the p-value for a two-tail t-test. The null hypothesis is equality of means.					

Table 10 outlines the proportion of Syrian refugees stating their level of likelihood to return to Syria in different scenarios. There are clear differences between Germany and Turkey across all scenarios. Response options for this question were very likely, likely, not sure, unlikely, and very unlikely. Likely and very likely were grouped to take value (1) and not sure, very unlikely and unlikely were grouped to take value (0). The first scenario is providing financial support as an incentive for return, including travel costs for those who want to return now. In Germany, only 6.7% of respondents said they will return in this case, often stating large sums of money. In Turkey, 12.7 % state they are willing to return if they receive financial incentive. A recent study in Turkey also showed a small number (2.7%) of interviewees (Syrian refugees) were willing to return now but without assistance (Erdogan 2017 p38). In relation to the scenario of the end of the war when the safety level has returned to pre-war levels, job opportunities are available due to reconstruction, and with the provision of financial support, the percentage of respondents stating likely to return increases in Germany to 22.7%. In Turkey, it increases to 66%. It is important to note here that the majority of respondents mentioned that they understand the end of the war to mean the removal of Al Assad as President. This means that the respondents stating likelihood of return in this scenario still do not want to return to a situation in Syria where things are as they were before the war.

We can conclude that the rise in percentage of returnees in this scenario, despite being small for Germany, is due to the positive nature of the scenario itself as opposed to the inclusion of incentive. This is because respondents who want to return mentioned that they were already thinking about it, when the conditions are suitable and those who do not want to return mentioned that it is not a matter of money. It is important to note that, on average, the cost per household of arrival to Germany is 4500 Euros, more than twice what was hypothetically offered to respondents in the survey experiment.

In the following three scenarios, respondents were asked about the possibility to return under certain conditions. The first was if Syria is safe and they have job opportunities but the health sector is not functioning properly. 10.4% in Germany and 27% in Turkey stated being willing to return under this scenario. This is a significant drop from the previous scenario and indicates respondent value of health care over financial incentives. Similarly, for the next scenario where the education system is the thing that is not functioning, 15% from Germany and 32% from Turkey

stated likely to return, still lower than those who stated the same in the scenario of Syria being safe, with job opportunities and the provision of financial incentives. In the next scenario where there is no fighting taking place in Syria and the security situation has returned as it was before the war, the political situation is still as it is but the respondent has the host country nationality 13.3 % in Germany and 33.3% in Turkey are willing to return. Finally, as explained before, the scenario of returning one day is without timeframe or particular conditions. Here, 55.2% stated they will return from Germany and 76.2% in Turkey, leaving 44.8% in Germany and 23.8 % in Turkey who will never return. Erdogan (2017) found only 16.3% who will never return from Turkey. This means that having safety and security, (interlinked with political change), in addition to having means of life such as education, health, and jobs is crucial to the returning decision of refugees, particularly from Turkey.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Understanding the returning decision, particularly in the case of refugees, is a complex process involving many factors including socioeconomic characteristics of refugees and contextual factors (as outlined) in both Syria and host countries. This research attempted to demystify the complexity of the returning decision in the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey and Germany in order to highlight their voice at policy making level. A quantitative analysis supported by in depth conversations was applied with sampled refugees in both host countries. It also examined the impact of media and information on the returning decision by exposing respondents to a video of negative information or a leaflet with positive information about returning before interview.

When asked to give a timeframe for their return to Syria within a positive scenario (as compared to current and slightly more positive scenarios), we noticed a difference in key factors influencing respondents decisions, indicating the contextual nature of the returning decision. We saw that refugees are more likely to return from neighbouring countries compared to more developed countries situated further away from Syria and that even when asking about returning at an undefined point in the future, 45% of respondents in Germany and 24% of respondents in Turkey state that they never want to return. This clearly indicates that the end of the war, and even political change, is not enough for all refugees to consider returning. As a result, host countries should invest in integrating this category of refugees into the host population rather than taking the stance that their presence is temporary.

The results of this research show that socioeconomic characteristics influence the returning decision. However, this influence can be both positive and negative depending on the nature of the situation in the host country. It can also change when the contextual scenario in the home country changes. This research highlighted the characteristics of classifications of refugees that are more likely to return which clearly shows that there can be no ‘one size fits all’ approach applied to refugee policy. Refugees are not a homogenous category and refugees of different socioeconomic backgrounds respond differently to contextual variables in both home and host countries.²⁹ Governments should integrate this understanding into their policies and approaches to refugee management and base policy decisions on micro-level evidence, such as this research.

Incentives do not influence the returning decision as indicated in the results. Other factors such as security, the political situation, and the level of functioning infrastructure have a stronger influence on the returning decision of Syrian refugees, particularly from neighbouring countries. This finding suggests that Government, UN and NGO reconstruction strategies and projects should be directed towards investing in development projects to rebuild infrastructure, housing, and education and health systems over giving financial incentives.

In depth conversations with Syrian refugees captured aspirations for a better future for families and their children as a main driver of the returning decision. It is the responsibility of host country Governments to invest efforts to support refugees to realise their aspirations by contributing to

²⁹ For example, refugees with higher education are more likely to return from Germany than Turkey while people classifying themselves as poor are more likely to return from Turkey than from Germany.

reconstruction in Syria and organised return procedures for those who wish to return or facilitating integration and opportunities in the host country for those who wish to stay.

Syrian refugees make their decisions based on complex analyses of different factors in host and home countries. In Germany, respondents were not affected by positive or negative information or media but in Turkey, those who are planning to return show an influence from the negative video. This could indicate that their decision is more fluid than those in Germany who took significant risks in travelling to Germany aiming for a better quality of life. It also demonstrates that information campaigns on return in European host countries are likely to be ineffective.

Finally, the Syrian refugee crisis is first and foremost a humanitarian issue, although it was created by political root causes. In light of this, fostering a humanitarian understanding of how people's lives were and continue to be affected by the war and how they believe they can recover is crucial to the reconstruction of Syria, as well as the reconstruction of the Syrian people's lives and dignity. This research aimed to provide a channel for Syrian refugees to voice this, as well as their wants, needs and aspirations for their and their children's futures. Listening to those affected by the war and basing solutions on their perspectives is the only credible and ethical way to move forwards.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Further details on the background to the refugee crisis

Pre-war Syria

Syria, before the war, was classified as a middle income country with increasing growth performance in 2010, with population of 21,019,000 and a GDP of 59, 15 Billion USD in 2010 (World Bank, 2018). The country has a rich history of more than 6000 years (Mark 2014) and a strategic location on the Eastern side of the Mediterranean Sea, it has borders with Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea from the West. Palestine and Jordan from the South, Iraq from the East and Turkey from the North.

The ‘Arab Spring’ and war in Syria

In 2011 a wave of protests hit a number of Arabic countries as part of what was later referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’. This was a social movement across several Arabic countries demanding increased freedom and better living conditions and opportunities. This movement began in Tunisia, moving to Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria. Demonstrations against Bashar Al Assad’s regime began in the South of the country, spreading to cover many of the Syrian Governorates by the end of 2011 (International Crisis Group, 2011). Although the protests were initially sparked by the arrest and torture of children in the Southern city Daraa (Ibid). Protests quickly began to call for freedom, democracy, justice, and the overthrow of oppression and eradication of corruption, high unemployment rates and low living standards (Ibid). These protests were countered with excessive violence by the Syrian Government including the detention of people from their workplaces, universities and from the street in 2011 and onwards. Syrian Government violence against arrested citizens increased severely with 5000- 13000 people executed only in one prison run by the Syrian Government between 2011 and 2015 (Amnesty International 2017:6). The situation gradually turned to civil war close to end of 2011 and since then more than 500.000 Syrians were killed or had disappeared (BBC, 2018) In 2016, the war in Syria was classified as the worst humanitarian situation since the end of the cold war with Filippo Grandi, UN High Commissioner for Refugees stating “Syria is the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time.” (UNHCR, 2016) with most fighting taking place in cities and villages pushing more than 6.3 million Syrian people to become internally displaced with 13.5 million in need of humanitarian assistance (UNHCR, 2017).

Appendix 2: Further details on the concept of home

No overall agreement is found in the literature on this topic instead, a number of questions commonly occur such as, is home the place where you were born and raised before the war? Or is it the place where you were living before becoming a refugee? Does it refer to the country as whole where refugees are coming from, no matter which part of that country they belong to or it is just a nostalgic notion? Or can home be the place where you feel safe and protected, regardless of nationality, culture or history? Warner (1994) states that repatriation (or voluntarily return) does not merely mean to return to the country of origin but to return to home and community. For Warner, home is the “*association of an individual within a homogeneous group and the association of that group with a particular physical place*” (ibid). However, returning home could also include return to the geographic area that is called the home country, but not necessary to the exact location from which you fled. This could be either because it is not possible to return exactly to the place of origin or because it is economically not viable to return to that area (Black 2002; Kibearb, 2003: 30-39). Black elaborates further on the challenges that prevent people from returning to the exact house that they left before the war, making use of the Bosnian case and the fact that usually civil wars involve demographic and geopolitical changes. These challenges can include the threat of persecution of minorities in the country of origin, the potential for becoming a persecuted minority in the new host country, and the fear of suffering from insecure housing which applies to both the country of origin and the host country (Black 2002).

The concept of home is not only related to geographical boundaries in a war torn country like Syria where many people fought for the very notion of home and, as result, found themselves in a foreign country with the concept of home reduced to nostalgia for somewhere that, in most cases, either they cannot return to or no longer exists. Arasheed (1994) in her article on Iraqi refugees in London explains that the concept of home goes beyond the geographical location from which the refugees originated but also includes a “strong emotive element”. The most important thing about territory is its symbolic aspect that drives exiled communities to maintain their ties with that geographic location as a “sacred habitat, a homeland” Arasheed (1994). For young or new generations in particular who do not have the memory of the old home, the idea of home could change over time and could be something different in few years of living abroad where the new location could come to represent home more strongly (Hammond 1999:230).

Appendix 3: Further details on the concept of return

Through discussing the myth of return in the context of Iraqi refugees in London, Alrasheed rejects that the idea of return can be universally applied to all refugees. She argues that refugees themselves are not a homogenous group and therefore do not have the same level of longing to return home (Alrasheed 1994). This idea applies strongly to the case of Syrian refugees who cannot be considered as one identical group due to the high level of diversity in ethnicity, religion, sect, ideology, political stance, and personal experience of the war. These factors influence each individual's perspective on and personal feelings of the idea of being Syrian. For example, minority groups such as the Yazidis who suffered marginalized pre-war in Syria and groups claiming unacknowledged rights such as the Kurds will likely have profoundly different feelings towards the idea of Syria as a home even pre-war to those from a majority group who did not suffer any particular injustice before the war (other than the widespread injustices suffered by the majority of the population).

Given that there are 6.6 million Syrian internally displaced people in Syria as of April 2018 (UNHCR, 2018e) returning refugees to a place other than their own house, street or village cannot be considered as return unless the refugees themselves have chosen this option. This is because this action could generate more problems than it solves by simply moving the 'problem of refugees' to become a 'problem of IDPs'. Considering the high level of destruction, looting and possession of private homes across Syria, (including reports of private homes taken by the Syrian Government and by rebel opposition groups for military and repossession purposes), as well as the already high population density of the few areas considered 'safe' in Syria, the idea that people can return to their own homes is not likely for the majority.

Appendix 4: Differentiation between economic migrants and refugees

In addition to the factors already outlined in the literature review, we understand that the returning decision is intimately linked to the suitability of returning and reintegration which, as Stigter (2006:111) states, goes beyond humanitarian assistance to involve three main elements of social networks, means and prospects to start and sustainable livelihoods, and the possibility of the returnee to practice his or her civil rights politically and socially (Ibid). These elements have also been included in this research.

Finally, in the literature on returning migrants there is a clear division between refugee migrants and economic or other types of migrant returnees. The main differences between them are their reasons for leaving the country of origin, their legal status in the host country, and the length of time that they remain out of the country of origin (Dadush 2018:13). Other differences can be their experience of pre- and post-leaving (in terms of hardship and trauma – although not always different) and their ability to return to a safe environment (again, not always different). In addition to these differences, it is useful to understand the wider picture, beyond these key differences and factors that motivate a person to return, particularly from a developed country to a developing country as, in some cases, the concepts of economic migrant and refugee can only be distinguished by the policy of the host country. For example, Pakistan and Iran, as well as some European countries at one point stopped considering Afghan migrants as refugees and refused to allocate them with refugee status (Stigeter 2006:111; Van Houte and Davids 2014:78) despite the ongoing instability and danger to life in Afghanistan.

Appendix 5: Primary data variables

	Variables to be measured	Explanatory variable	Dependent variable
Outcome variables (intend to return)	Intend to return after 6 months		Yes
	Intend to Return after 2years		Yes
	Neve Intend to not return		Yes
	Intend to return now if was given consolation, cover the return cost and start-up money		Yes
	Intend to return after the war finish and Syria become safe if was given consolation, cover the cost, start money		Yes
	Intend to returner if health sector not functioning although the country is safe		Yes
	Intend to return if the country is safe but education system not functioning		yes
	Intend to return if u got host country nationality		yes
Socio economic background	Age	Yes	
	Gender	Yes	
	Education	Yes	
	Previous Economic situation in Syria	Yes	
	Current Income	Yes	
	Household member lived with you in Syria	Yes	
	Family member live with you here	Yes	
	Marital status	Yes	
Situation in Syria	Safety and security	Yes	
	Political variables	Yes	
	Economic variables	Yes	
	Social variables	Yes	
Controls	Location of the interview	Control	
	Place of Origin in Syria	Control	
	The duration spent in host country	Control	
	Turkey or Germany	Control	

Appendix 6: Further details on contextual variables

Political and security elements

Political conditions in the home country could be a reason to attract certain groups of people to return over others as these groups could be given special privileges as a result of serving the political agenda of those who are in power. Returnees to the former Yugoslavia is a good example of this situation (Harvey 2006). Returning could become a political tool in the hand of the Government for augmenting their army or changing the demographics of certain areas, examples from Bosnia and Croatia (Black 1999:11).

Moreover, safety and security could form other kinds of threats rather than active fighting such as being detained by the government. Graham and Shahram (1997: 121), in a study about the Iranian diaspora in Sweden found that Iranian refugees do not consider returning home, even if they suffer economic pressure in the host country, due to the absence of trust with the Government. Also, being from a particular ethnic group or a particular gender can affect your decision to return. Omata (2013: 1291) in his study on Liberian refugees in Ghana found that women returnees were particularly afraid to return due to the threat of being hunted by war lords.

Economic and Development elements

However, some empirical studies found, contrastingly, that although economic factors are essential in the returning decision they play a stronger role in the country of destination over the country of origin. In their study, Koser and Kuschminder (2015: 21) interviewed respondents across origin, transit and destination countries to understand what makes the decision to return. They found that difficulty of finding employment/no right to work in destination country and job opportunities was the top factor to influence the decision. Correspondingly, Daudush (2018) states that refugees returning as result of development projects in the host country is very much contextual and that it is unlikely that development projects in the country of origin would attract refugees to return in most cases, unless the country of origin has big potential. He believes, particularly about the case of Syria, that development projects could induce refugees in neighboring countries to return to Syria, but Syrians in developed country will not return for this reason as such (Dadush 2018:38.).

Appendix 7: Analysis of refugee characteristics

Explanatory Variables	Germany	Turkey	Overall mean	P value of difference	STD	N
Control variables						
Refuge duration (Month)	35	41	39	0	14	576
Cost to arrive to the host country	4401	548	2158	0	2651	577
Socioeconomic Variables						
Male	0.921	0.735	0.813	0.000	0.390	577
Age	34.170	31.074	32.367	0.000	9.909	577
Marital status (single)	0.274	0.399	0.347	0.002	0.476	577
Marital status (married)	0.705	0.577	0.631	0.002	0.483	577
Education primary or no education	0.282	0.223	0.248	0.106	0.432	577
Education secondary or vocational education	0.382	0.348	0.362	0.409	0.481	577
Education university and above	0.336	0.429	0.390	0.025	0.488	577
Average incomemore than 1000 Euro	0.453	0.009	0.195	0.000	0.397	564
Average income more than 300 Euro	0.992	0.579	0.752	0.000	0.432	564
Family members live with you now	3.559	3.436	3.486	0.526	1.981	438
Household members who lived with you in Syria	5.436	6.345	5.965	0.000	2.920	577
Assets in Syria (1 no assets)	0.324	0.336	0.331	0.751	0.471	577
Economic status (poor)	0.075	0.089	0.083	0.532	0.276	577
Economic status (not poor not rich)	0.801	0.723	0.756	0.032	0.430	577
Economic status (rich)	0.124	0.188	0.161	0.042	0.368	577
Integration variables						
Legal status Temporary protection card	0.000	0.803	0.464	0.000	0.499	571
Legal status (refugees' status)	0.809	0.000	0.342	0.000	0.475	571
Legal status Asylum 2 years	0.058	0.000	0.025	0.000	0.155	571
Legal status Protection 1 year	0.100	0.000	0.042	0.000	0.201	571
Legal status Work permit residency	0.033	0.100	0.072	0.002	0.258	571
Legal status got the nationality	0.000	0.097	0.056	0.000	0.230	571
Local language proficiency (good average and very good	0.780	0.661	0.711	0.002	0.483	577
Not Feeling welcomed in the host country	0.195	0.170	0.180	0.435	0.385	577
Loss of family member	0.197	0.233	0.218	0.301	0.413	574
Experment						
Treatment (Negative video)	0.344	0.312	0.326	0.421	0.469	577
Treatment (Positive leaflet)	0.290	0.295	0.293	0.913	0.455	577
Treatment (Control)	0.365	0.393	0.381	0.500	0.486	577

source : Data collected by the author.

Note: : The fourth column of the table reports the p-value for a two-tail t-test. The null hypothesis is equality of means

In the above table we can see the general characteristics of refugees interviewed in both countries. It is important to note that majority of respondents were male, particularly in Germany with 26.5% of total respondents as female in Turkey and 8% in Germany. This was due to the targeting of the survey towards the main decision maker in the household, which in Syrian communities tends to be the male head of household. The female respondents who were interviewed as part of this research represent either female heads of household or they reported autonomy in making their decision. In Turkey it was possible to reach more women due to the higher saturation of Syrian refugees in Turkey and the relative ease of identifying female enumerators (as it is culturally inappropriate for men to interview women in Syrian culture).

The average age of respondents is young at 32.36 years (34,17 in Germany and 31.07 in Turkey) which corresponds with national level data on Syrian refugees in both countries where 53% of Syrian refugees in Turkey are between 18-59 years old (UNHCR, 2018f) and 80% of Syrian refugees are between 20 -40 years old (Neske 2017).

Respondent's refuge duration in Turkey is on average 3.5 years (41.3 months) and in Germany the duration is almost 3 years (34.4 month). This difference in duration enforces the idea that refugees first fled to neighboring countries and afterwards to Europe. It also tells us that the sampled interviewees are well settled in the place of refuge and not newly arrived from Syria. Finally, it confirms that many refugees arrived in Germany around 2015 during the peak of refugee movement to Europe. The cost of arriving to the host country was 4401Euro per household in Germany³⁰ and 548 Euro per household for refugees in Turkey.

Married respondents represented the highest proportion in both countries with on average 70% of respondents in Germany stating their marital status as married and 27.4% single. In Turkey, 57.7% reported that they are married and 40 % single. This bias towards those who are married is a result of the respondent targeting criteria which required respondents who were able to make the decision to return or stay on behalf of themselves and any other person. This excluded potential respondents who were single and part of a household and who would not be the overall responsible for making that decision. However statistics available about Syrian refugees in 2016 in Germany saying that 56.5% in 2017 the percentage was 64.7% of Syrian refugees are married (Schmidt 2018; Rich 2016).

The average number of people per household is 4.5, lower than the generally accepted average household size of 6 in Syria (WFP Turkey, 2016). This could be due to family separation as a result of the war and migration or to the loss of family members. McNatt and Boothby (2018) found that almost 36.5% of Syrian refugees registered in Jordan are separated from at least one member of their families.

The education background of the sample shows almost equal distribution between the three categories with a slight increase in respondents with a university degree or currently at university. 39% of the total sample had a university degree or above (33.6 % in Germany and 42.9% in Turkey)³¹ with 25% (28.2% in Germany, 22.3% in Turkey) with no education or primary education and finally 36% (38.2% in Germany, 34.8% in Turkey) who had reached secondary school. Access to slightly more respondents with a University education may have been due to the network approach of the sampling methodology meaning that the most similar type of respondent will have the highest access, making the sample no representative in terms of education. We see from German national statistics that this % of Syrian refugees with a University degree is estimated lower at in the national data with only 23% of Syrian Asylum seekers stated to have a University degree or equivalent (Konle-Seidl 2018:17).

The sample reflects the differences between the average income in Turkey and Germany³². As we can see in the table, on one hand only 0.8% of respondents in Germany reported that their income is less than 300 Euro while in Turkey, 42% of respondents reported this level of income. Conversely, 45.3% of respondents in Germany reported that their income is higher than 1000

³⁰ According to a study in 2016, the average cost for Syrian refugees to arrive Germany was 5,556 Euro (Brücker 2016) <http://doku.iab.de/kurzber/2016/kb2416.pdf>

³¹ An annual statistics summary from BAMF on asylum seekers shows that these findings on marriage, age and education are representative. See (Schmidt 2018; Rich 2016; Neske 2017).

³² For ease, the nominal value of income is used to measure average income in both countries not purchasing power parity.

Euro a month³³ while only 0.9% of respondents in Turkey reported that their income is higher than 1000 Euro a month. This shows the disparity between the two host countries in terms of social benefits and ease of finding informal employment, although the difference in exchange rate and costs of living should also be taken into consideration. At the time of this survey 1 Euro was equal to 7.3 Turkish Lira. National statistics estimate the average per capita income for Syrian refugees in Turkey at approximately 302 Euro per month with 42% of the survey respondents falling in this category (Trading Economic, 2018). In Germany, the average household net disposable income per capita is 2471 Euro (OECD better life index, 2018).³⁴

Respondents were asked to classify themselves before the war as rich, poor, or not poor and not rich. In Germany, 80% of the sample reported themselves as not poor and not rich with 7.5% reported themselves as poor, 12.5% reported themselves as rich, around. In Turkey, 9% of the sample reported themselves as poor and 72% reported themselves as not poor and not rich and around 19% reported themselves as rich. It may be that the level of people fitting into the poor classification is underestimated as generally, it is not common for Syrian people to openly identify themselves as being poor. On average, 22% of respondents reported that they lost a family member in the war 33.1% do not have any assets in Syria.

84.3% of respondents in Germany are unemployed compared with 48% in Turkey which is logical bearing in mind that in Germany refugees can only work under certain conditions (including passing a German language test) and depend mostly on social benefits whereas the informal labour market in Turkey is much larger than in Germany with Syrians also working in professional jobs (mostly NGOs). In relation to the legal status of respondents in Germany, the majority (80%) have the status of refugee, temporary protection (10%), asylum status (5.6%) and a work permit (3.4 %). In Turkey, the majority have a temporary protection card (10 %), work permits and some have the Turkish nationality (9.7%). 78% of respondents in Germany reported that they have an average or good level of proficiency in German with 22% reporting little or no ability. This high percentage could be related to the need to speak German to be able to work but also in order to get permanent residency or nationality. In Turkey, only 66% of respondents reported average or good proficiency of Turkish which could be due to the high number of Syrians in Turkey which has created a type of closed economy negating the need to learn Turkish. As well as the lack of requirement for Turkish proficiency with regard to Turkish residency or nationality.

19.5% of respondents reported not feeling welcome in Germany, 9.5 % stated they did not want to answer (and were therefore grouped in analysis with the former response) compared to 17% reporting not feeling welcomed in Turkey with 7.14% refusing to respond. However, the majority of respondents (80.5% in Germany and 83 % in Turkey) of respondents feel welcomed.³⁵

³³ Including rent paid by the German Government.

³⁴ The average household adjusted net of disposable income per capita is 33,652 Euro per year. It was converted from dollar to Euro and divided by 12.

³⁵ Many variables were assessed in the survey but only a restricted set showed significance in analysis. Therefore, some variables were excluded as they do not have influence on the results. For brevity, not all findings are discussed here.

Appendix 8: Materials used in the experiment on the influence of information

Link for the video include negative information

<http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2018/8/3/-العودة-ورعب-الوطن>

The leaflet represents positive information

Financial support in case of voluntary repatriation

In the past there has been support for the return of refugees from different countries when their countries became safe, including money, travel and settlement.

If you would like to return, there could be similar programs in the future for Syrians who are willing to return voluntarily when the war in Syria ends.

If you are interested in getting more information, you should check the website for answers to your questions or call the phone number.

For more information:

+49 911 943-0

<https://www.returningfromgermany.de/en>

Settlement of the conditions of those people wishing to return

Syrian embassies in Berlin and other countries are ready to settle the situation of Syrian refugees wishing to return, regardless the reason of the asylum.

Turkey pledges reconstruction

Media reports reveal the readiness of Turkey and international organizations to develop and set up plans and projects for the reconstruction of Syria after ending the war. Such as building universities, schools and infrastructure such as electricity, water and roads.

The European Commission is ready to support the reconstruction of Syria

A document attached to the proposals by the European Commission said that one of the steps that Brussels city could take was to mobilize funding to support reconstruction efforts, including assistance in security, demining and ceasefire control.

The EU Federica Mogherini spokeswoman said that the EU had already raised approximately 9.4 billion euros, including approximately 1 billion euros spent on humanitarian missions inside Syria.

According to the document, the EU can help restore basic services of water, health and education, to demonstrate peace advantages.

The document added that “The EU can support the drafting of a new constitution and organization special elections by supporting elections management and make an EU electoral mission.”

الدعم المالي في حالة العودة الطوعي

في الماضي كان هناك دعم للعودة للاجئين من دول مختلفة عندما أصبحت بلدانهم آمنة تتضمن مبالغ مالية وتسهيلات سفر وتسوية أوضاع
اذ كنتم تودون العودة يمكن ان يكون هناك في المستقبل برامج شبيهة للسوريين الراغبين في العودة بشكل طوعي عندما
تنتهي الحرب في سوريا
اذا كنتم مهتم في الحصول على معلومات اكثر عليكم مراجعة الموقع للحصول على إجابات عن الأسئلة التي لديكم او
الاتصال برقم الهاتف
لمزيد من المعلومات

<https://www.returningfromgermany.de/en>

تسوية أوضاع الراغبين في العودة

السفارات السورية في برلين وبلدان أخرى مستعدة لتسوية أوضاع اللاجئين السوريين الراغبين بالعودة بغض النظر عن
سبب اللجوء

تركيا تتعهد بإعادة الاعمار

تقارير إعلامية تكشف عن استعداد [تركيا](#) ومنظمات دولية لوضع وإعداد خطط ومشاريع من أجل إعادة إعمار سوريا بعد
مشاركة الحرب على نهايتها.
مثل بناء الجامعات والمدارس والبنية التحتية مثل الكهرباء والمياه والطرق

المفوضية الأوروبية تبدي استعداد في دعم إعادة اعمار سوريا

جاء في وثيقة مرفقة بالمقترحات قدمتها المفوضية الأوروبية أنه من بين الخطوات التي يمكن أن تتخذها بروكسل حشد
التمويل لدعم جهود إعادة الاعمار بما في ذلك المساعدة في احلال الأمن وإزالة الألغام ومراقبة وقف إطلاق النار.

وقالت مونيكا دي ميستورا الممثلة العليا للاتحاد الأوروبي إن الاتحاد الأوروبي جمع بالفعل نحو 9,4 مليار يورو من بينها نحو
مليار يورو انفتحت على المهمات الإنسانية داخل سوريا. وبحسب الوثيقة فإن الاتحاد الأوروبي يمكن أن يساعد في إعادة
الخدمات الأساسية من ماء وصحة وتعليم، لإثبات فوائد السلام. وأضافت الوثيقة أن "الاتحاد الأوروبي بإمكانه أن يدعم
صياغة دستور جديد وتنظيم انتخابات خاصة من خلال المساعدة في إدارة الانتخابات وتشكيل بعثة انتخابية تابعة للاتحاد
الأوروبي."

Appendix 9: Quotes from respondents

Quotes on the analysis of 'Return One day'

As long as the current Government remains in Syria respondents do not believe the situation will improve and they will not return.

"Syria did not give me anything. In my youth I did not see any respect to human beings from The Regime... My parents and my husband are with me in Turkey. Nothing ties me with Syria." (A 22 year old woman in Turkey).

"I do not trust the situation in Syria will be any better. Our area was taken by Iranians and Hezb Allah.³⁶ We have nowhere to return to." (A 47 year old man in Germany).

An indication as to how poor education and opportunities are in general in Syria, even before the war.

"I started to establish my children's education here... (in Turkey)... I have no house, no work in Syria. I cannot provide a good life for my children there." (A 28 year old woman in Turkey).

"The problem is the absence of security in Syria because of the regime and militia affiliated with it. I took my children to Jordan and then brought them to Germany to protect them and to get them a better future. It is not for me." (A 45 year old man in Germany).

Quotes on the influence of socio-economic characteristics on 'Return One day'

Gender

An interesting reason mentioned by some female respondents interviewed in Turkey was related to increased social freedom after coming to Turkey.

"In Turkey I can decide independently about my life compared to in Syria. I can bring up my children in the way that I want, not in the way my mother or my mother in law wants. And they ... (the mother and mother in law)...are less strict with me... (in terms of traditional customs and rules)... Traditions are how dead people control those who are alive." (A married 27-year-old woman in Turkey).

We can speculate on a number of reasons for the above, for example, that some traditions are followed in Syria as a result of community pressure to conform or to maintain certain community perceptions which are diluted when leaving the home country and/or the extended family setting. Perhaps also the absence of older relatives in Turkey allows for rejections of some traditional customs. In addition, after moving to Turkey many older Syrian refugees lost their status as head of the family due to a weak economic position and became more dependent on the younger generation who are more able to adapt and engage economically in Turkey. A recent study in

Turkey found that the majority of female Syrian refugees in Turkey fall in the age group of 18-24, are those who least want to return to Syria. (Erdogan 2017:39).

Wealth classification

Respondents classifying themselves as rich reported that they do not want to return due to safety and security, lack of stability, political situation (Assad regime), lack of political freedom, and the future of their children.

"I am a trader. I make more money in other countries compared to Syria." (A 27-year-old man in Turkey).

Influence of contextual factors

Reflection insights about why refugees stated not wanting to return can be interpreted from the below quotation.

"If I wanted to return I would not have sold my house, which was all that I had in Syria, in order to come ... (to Germany)... The problem is not only about the war ending. There are other matters negatively influencing whether I want to return, crime, the future of my children. The most important is to live without feeling that you are owned by a Government or by anybody." (A 32 year old man in Germany).

When consulting the data it is clear that the intention to return is according to certain conditions including presence of safety and security and the removal of Bashar Al Assad and his Regime.

"I do not want to return because of the Assad Regime. I was arrested, my brother died under torture. How can I go back as long as the regime still exists there?" (A 28-year-old man in Germany).

Political and security variables are interlinked, particularly in the context of armed conflict.

"We want a free Syria in which we live a safe and dignified life and have the full freedoms that the people deserve, without the regime of Basbar Assad and his intelligence gangs." (A 35-year-old man in Turkey).

The complexity of the returning decision means that it is not significantly influenced at the macro level but instead is nuanced according to the micro factors at the individual level. This idea is echoed several times in the interviews for example in the below quotation.

"I will not return unless the regime of Assad falls and dismantles all armed groups and improve the health care and education situation." (A 23 year old man in Turkey),

For others, the removal of Al Assad's Governments enough to rethink about returning.

"Because I want to return only in the event of the fall of the regime which means if the war ends but the regime does not fall, I do not want to return." (A 32 year old female in Turkey).

Whether the lack of freedom of speech was a key factor in their decision to leave or not seems to be irrelevant as refugees in exile now have a new situation where they are able to value this factor and develop new aspirations and motivation (Omata 2013; Van Hear 2003:7).

"If Syria is safe or not I do not want to return. I lost years of my life and do not have a future. If was forced to return I will go to Lebanon not to Syria as it is better for me. But if it is up to me I will stay here to

continue what I already started. I will finish my studying and get University degree in Germany.” (A 27 year old man in Germany).

The analysis in this research also demonstrates that the value shown to reconstruction in the home country also depend on the host country level of development. New aspirations evolve, complex to the level that refugees themselves cannot identify what and how. This was, to some extent, captured through respondent elaboration on their interview answers.

“Simply, I felt my value as human being in this community ... (Germany...) much more than where I am coming from, home. I respect this host country very much and appreciate their respect.” (41 years old male in Germany).

One male respondent explained that if he were in Syria, even before the war, he would not be able to afford to secure things for his children as he can in Germany.

“There is someone to help me to build their future. This forces me to stay and not think to return, whatever he I will be offered.” (A42 year old man in Germany).

It is important to mention that there is a category of Syrian refugees of 20% who do not mind returning under certain conditions, which specifically relate to the removal of Bashar Al Assad as President, the initiation of democratic political processes and the start of reconstruction programs including infrastructure and job opportunities.

“It is not about money. I will not return until the war finishes completely and safety and security returns as it was. That includes having a civil, independent state. These are things that are not going to happen in the coming years.” A 25-year-old man in Germany.

Appendix 10: Limitations

Although substantial clear and useful findings were generated by this research, which are found to be mostly in line with the literature, there are some limitations that deserve to be mentioned.

Due to time and cost restrictions and to the size of the refugee populations in Turkey and Germany, a limit had to be set at 250 interviews per country. In order to overcome the limitations of relying on quantitative data, limited information from in-depth conversations was considered in analysis (limited due to time and cost restrictions).

Lack of access to significant numbers of female respondents, particularly in Germany has an influence on the ability of this research to consider the influence gender differences related to intention to return. In addition, the strategy of targeting the head of household as respondent results in a lack of understanding of intra household dynamics on returning decision making. However, this targeting strategy was designed based on a common understanding of the Syrian family structure and an assumption that these intra-household discussions are included in the head of household's perspective.

Interviewing actual returnees could have added validity to this research. However, the lack of contacts within Government held areas of Syria and the overall difficulty to reach out to returnees in Syria made it difficult to cross check current results with actual returnee decisions. In spite of this, the research conducted seems to be in line with similar research findings from other studies demonstrating a certain level of validity of results.

Understanding the limitations of the applied sampling methodology, which is most commonly used for qualitative studies, is important however, measures were taken to guarantee the random selection of respondents (as mentioned in Chapter 5).

This study did not take into account any policies or potential policies from the home country Government that could encourage or discourage refugees to return based on the significant distrust between Syrian refugees and the current Government in Syria.

The behavioural experiment was based on using video as an impactful means of communication. However, it was not possible to find a video with positive content on the situation in Syria making it necessary to develop a leaflet with positive information. This leaflet was less impactful than the video and caused a negative reaction from the respondents indicating a lack of trust regarding positive information about Syria (particularly in relation to return).

Data collection challenges included the sensitive nature of the topic with some respondents afraid to declare any information which could be used against them, over utilizing the 'prefer not to answer' option. Enumerator turnover was challenging in terms of maintaining the momentum of the data collection as well as having to provide continuous training on the survey. The timing of survey was not ideal being at the time of the Eid festival, making it more difficult to identify both enumerators and respondents.

Appendix 11: Full empirical analysis

Turkey Return one day (R)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Aleppo	-0.233*** (0.087)	-0.216** (0.089)	-0.175* (0.091)	-0.195** (0.084)	-0.180* (0.102)
Rural Damascus	-0.254*** (0.097)	-0.171 (0.104)	-0.154 (0.110)	-0.306*** (0.097)	-0.102 (0.110)
Deir Ezzor & Al Raqqa	-0.094 (0.091)	-0.104 (0.097)	-0.087 (0.101)	-0.084 (0.0854)	-0.025 (0.108)
Hama	-0.220* (0.114)	-0.192 (0.117)	-0.229* (0.121)	-0.193* (0.111)	-0.116 (0.128)
Homs	-0.161 (0.113)	-0.125 (0.121)	-0.124 (0.125)	-0.155 (0.106)	-0.094 (0.129)
Idleb	-0.103 (0.097)	-0.150 (0.102)	-0.139 (0.106)	-0.086 (0.093)	-0.033 (0.115)
Alhaskah	-0.037 (0.142)	-0.016 (0.139)	-0.00815 (0.137)	0.00454 (0.126)	-0.0154 (0.132)
Latakia	-0.150 (0.188)	-0.139 (0.198)	-0.161 (0.204)	-0.104 (0.175)	-0.0248 (0.217)
Daraa	-0.391 (0.301)	-0.461 (0.301)	-0.356 (0.306)	-0.399 (0.270)	-0.353 (0.319)
Istanbul	0 (.)	0.132 (0.0921)	0 (.)	-0.0543 (0.0984)	-0.0711 (0.0986)
Gaziantep	0.0586 (0.0770)	0.238*** (0.0911)	0.0363 (0.0759)	-0.0885 (0.0907)	0.0156 (0.0858)
_Sanli Urfa	-0.150* (0.0893)	0 (.)	-0.192** (0.0970)	-0.251** (0.0968)	-0.227** (0.108)
Hatay	0.0587 (0.0997)	0.234** (0.106)	0.0503 (0.0978)	0 (.)	0 (.)
Refuge duration (Month)	-0.00187 (0.00163)	-0.00124 (0.00163)	-0.000539 (0.00173)	-0.00185 (0.00161)	-0.000970 (0.00154)
Male	0.139** (0.0630)	0.144** (0.0593)	0.115* (0.0600)	0.162*** (0.0611)	0.133** (0.0615)
Age	-0.000385 (0.00275)	-0.00395 (0.00291)	-0.00247** (0.00298)	-0.0000338 (0.00266)	-0.00194 (0.00277)
Family presence	0.101+ (0.0652)	0.0939** (0.0673)	0.0778** (0.0664)	0.131** (0.0635)	0.101*** (0.0636)
Marital status divorce/widowed	-0.198 (0.176)	-0.157 (0.151)	-0.200 (0.164)	-0.119 (0.151)	-0.167 (0.160)

Marital status single	-0.00237 (0.0665)	-0.0406 (0.0649)	-0.00242 (0.0657)	-0.0337 (0.0645)	-0.00488 (0.0643)
Education secondary/vocational	-0.0692 ⁺⁺ (0.0655)	-0.0703 (0.0637)	-0.0769 (0.0660)	-0.0512 (0.0623)	-0.0659 (0.0637)
University and above	-0.144 ^{**} (0.0678)	-0.115 [*] (0.0644)	-0.129 [*] (0.0694)	-0.177 ^{***} (0.0684)	-0.158 ^{**} (0.0658)
Poor	0.275 ^{***} (0.0935)	0.284 ^{***} (0.0915)	0.305 ^{***} (0.0952)	0.196 ^{**} (0.0894)	0.296 ^{***} (0.0921)
Not poor not rich	0.148 ^{**} (0.0711)	0.144 ^{**} (0.0671)	0.155 ^{**} (0.0682)	0.0912 ⁺⁺ (0.0666)	0.151 ^{**} (0.0689)
Income average in turkey	- 0.0857 ⁺⁺⁺ (0.0513)	-0.0778 ⁺ (0.0528)	-0.118 ^{**} (0.0540)		
Treatment negative	-0.0682 [*] (0.0582)	-0.0873 ⁺⁺⁺ (0.0568)	-0.0874 ⁺⁺⁺ (0.0576)	-0.0261 (0.0569)	-0.0516 (0.0572)
Treatment positive	-0.0257 (0.0575)	-0.0543 (0.0559)	-0.0616 (0.0573)	-0.00233 (0.0577)	-0.00650 (0.0557)
No assets in SYR	- 0.238 ^{***} (0.0596)	-0.243 ^{***} (0.0587)	-0.250 ^{***} (0.0613)		
Income from formal work		0.0418 (0.0914)			
Income from informal work		0.208 ^{***} (0.0802)			
Government benefits		-0.0491 (0.0576)			
Not Feel welcomed			-0.146 ^{**} (0.0701)		
Language			0.0648 (0.0594)		
Legal status Work permit			0.0418 (0.0927)		
Legal status Nationality			0.0244 (0.0945)		
Lose family member in war			0.00463 (0.0612)		
Detention threat				0.0392 (0.0650)	
crime				-0.104 [*] (0.0551)	
Armed group				-0.0910 ⁺⁺⁺ (0.0571)	

Political parties				-0.0875 (0.0960)	
Freedom speech				0.00924 (0.124)	
Freedom to elect				0.259* (0.156)	
Bashar Assad not president				0.103* (0.0595)	
Job opportunities					0.0125 (0.0607)
House in Syria					0.159*** (0.0567)
Water electricity					0.145** (0.0710)
Health service					-0.0517 (0.0649)
schooling					0.0410 (0.0789)
Legal services					0.0179 (0.0618)
Social forum					-0.0493 (0.0543)
Family inside SYR					-0.0000753 (0.0542)
_cons	0.838*** (0.161)	0.727*** (0.208)	0.996*** (0.187)	0.879*** (0.187)	0.707*** (0.206)
N	324	324	318	332	332
R ²	0.126	0.200	0.201	0.187	0.172

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ ++ $P < 0.20$ +++ $P < 0.15$

Germany Return one day (R)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Aleppo	0.0600 (0.0932)	0.0656 (0.0937)	0.0516 (0.0931)	0.0880 (0.0999)	0.0591 (0.0988)
Rural Damascus	-0.149 (0.123)	-0.0275 (0.122)	-0.174 (0.121)	-0.115 (0.128)	-0.149 (0.122)
Deir Ezzor & Al Raqqa	-0.177 (0.143)	-0.183 (0.141)	-0.241 (0.152)	-0.160 (0.153)	-0.155 (0.156)
Hama	0.131 (0.146)	0.121 (0.156)	0.135 (0.151)	0.193 (0.160)	-0.0444 (0.155)
Homs	-0.0746 (0.138)	-0.0650 (0.138)	-0.0901 (0.136)	-0.0598 (0.142)	-0.0918 (0.132)
Idleb	0.00486 (0.146)	0.00432 (0.144)	-0.0561 (0.155)	0.00783 (0.149)	0.00263 (0.142)
Alhaskah	-0.00824 (0.109)	0.0245 (0.104)	0.0158 (0.111)	0.0887 (0.117)	-0.00248 (0.127)
Latakia	0.386 (0.259)	0.372 (0.267)	0.440* (0.248)	0.446 (0.276)	0.202 (0.231)
Daraa	-0.0864 (0.193)	-0.0746 (0.191)	-0.138 (0.190)	-0.0331 (0.199)	-0.120 (0.206)
Essen	0.189** (0.0872)	0.177** (0.0845)	0.158* (0.0920)	0.160 (0.100)	0.129 (0.104)
Cities around Essen	0.130 (0.146)	0.0367 (0.171)	0.120 (0.159)	0.121 (0.150)	0.142 (0.148)
Refuge duration (Month)	0.00468 (0.00351)	0.00473 (0.00354)	0.00534 (0.00347)	0.00327 (0.00384)	0.00521 (0.00337)
Male	-0.249** (0.111)	-0.254** (0.113)	-0.279** (0.121)	-0.241** (0.111)	-0.175+++ (0.118)
Age	0.00755+++ (0.00515)	0.00592 (0.00495)	0.00791+++ (0.00519)	0.00916* (0.00527)	0.00479 (0.00558)
Family presence	-0.216** (0.0862)	-0.187** (0.0882)	-0.239*** (0.0873)	-0.215** (0.0885)	-0.204** (0.0876)
Marital status divorce/widowed	-0.168 (0.232)	-0.188 (0.224)	-0.224 (0.233)	-0.109 (0.238)	-0.183 (0.234)
Marital status single	-0.180** (0.0906)	-0.188** (0.0930)	-0.179* (0.0943)	-0.214** (0.0963)	-0.167* (0.0978)
Education secondary/vocational	-0.0432 (0.0869)	-0.0542 (0.0866)	0.0346 (0.0910)	-0.0662 (0.0899)	-0.0741 (0.0858)
University and above	0.163* (0.0869)	0.181** (0.0866)	0.221** (0.0910)	0.0964 (0.0899)	0.126+ (0.0858)

	(0.0926)	(0.0897)	(0.0965)	(0.0986)	(0.0960)
Poor	0.151 (0.149)	0.165 (0.141)	0.128 (0.150)	0.0556 (0.156)	0.0850 (0.144)
Not poor not rich	-0.0480 (0.109)	-0.0460 (0.108)	-0.0580 (0.107)	-0.0824 (0.108)	-0.0872 (0.101)
Income average in Germany	-0.0404 (0.0781)	0.00883 (0.0787)	-0.0553 (0.0811)	-0.0498 (0.0792)	-0.0113 (0.0814)
No assets in SYR	-0.162** (0.0801)	-0.125+++ (0.0800)	-0.149* (0.0817)		
Treatment negative	0.00611 (0.0761)	0.0509 (0.0758)	-0.00536 (0.0773)	0.00451 (0.0767)	0.00296 (0.0756)
Treatment positive	-0.0138 (0.0765)	0.0137 (0.0766)	-0.0283 (0.0763)	-0.0111 (0.0786)	-0.0128 (0.0764)
Income from formal work		-0.429*** (0.103)			
Income from informal work		0.0335 (0.137)			
Government benefits		-0.537*** (0.153)			
Not Feel welcomed			-0.103 (0.0800)		
Language			-0.167* (0.0912)		
Refugees legal status			0.0129 (0.0908)		
Asylum legal status			-0.107 (0.140)		
Lose family member in war			0.148* (0.0831)		
Detention threat				-0.00749 (0.114)	
crime				0.102 (0.123)	
Armed group				-0.0839 (0.0995)	
Political parties				-0.0193 (0.121)	
Freedom speech				0.344** (0.153)	

Freedom to elect				-0.140 (0.158)	
Bashar Assad not president				0.0482 (0.0746)	
Job opportunities					-0.240** (0.0946)
House in Syria					0.182** (0.0734)
Water electricity					0.0837 (0.118)
Health service					0.109 (0.127)
schooling					0.00840 (0.123)
Legal services					0.0714 (0.0965)
Social forum					-0.0628 (0.0808)
Family inside SYR					0.231*** (0.0752)
_cons	0.547** (0.256)	1.071*** (0.307)	0.675** (0.285)	0.483* (0.278)	0.354 (0.261)
N	234	234	233	234	234
R ²	0.236	0.280	0.262	0.239	0.312

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ ++ $P < 0.20$ +++ $P < 0.15$

Turkey Return Safe (RS)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Aleppo	0.005 (0.145)	0.036 (0.148)	0.011 (0.151)	0.032 (0.153)	-0.052 (0.163)
Rural Damascus	-0.312** (0.156)	-0.209 (0.170)	-0.178 (0.176)	-0.381** (0.171)	-0.246 (0.181)
Deir Ezzor & Al Raqqa	0.172 (0.151)	0.186 (0.154)	0.161 (0.161)	0.175 (0.160)	0.080 (0.176)
Hama	0.007 (0.166)	0.055 (0.165)	-0.001 (0.171)	0.013 (0.169)	-0.057 (0.182)
Homs	0.046 (0.172)	0.075 (0.179)	0.062 (0.185)	0.032 (0.180)	-0.051 (0.190)
Idleb	0.127 (0.148)	0.112 (0.155)	0.058 (0.156)	0.138 (0.158)	0.068 (0.179)
Alhaskah	0.176 (0.179)	0.201 (0.183)	0.187 (0.172)	0.288* (0.174)	0.127 (0.184)
Latakia	0.113 (0.210)	0.139 (0.202)	0.043 (0.222)	0.097 (0.213)	0.043 (0.233)
Daraa	-0.670*** (0.161)	-0.692*** (0.165)	-0.666*** (0.167)	-0.665*** (0.168)	-0.715*** (0.172)
Istanbul	0 (.)	-0.129 (0.097)	-0.167* (0.090)	-0.137 (0.106)	-0.014 (0.102)
Gaziantep	-0.0368 (0.0887)	-0.125 (0.0965)	-0.181** (0.0889)	-0.184* (0.0993)	0.0183 (0.114)
_Sanli Urfa	-0.043 (0.100)	-0.177 (0.120)	-0.190 (0.122)	-0.184 (0.117)	0 (.)
Hatay	0.096 (0.098)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0.224* (0.121)
Refuge duration (Month)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Male	0.0375 (0.073)	0.042 (0.073)	0.002 (0.075)	0.057 (0.071)	0.0436 (0.072)
Age	0.005 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.005+++ (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Family presence	-0.123* (0.0640)	-0.142** (0.0670)	-0.193*** (0.0667)	-0.0953+++ (0.0647)	-0.139** (0.0675)
Marital status divorce/widowed	-0.155 (0.201)	-0.179 (0.189)	-0.101 (0.183)	-0.178 (0.197)	-0.140 (0.190)
	0.020	-0.008	-0.004	-0.024	-0.004

Marital status single	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.079)	(0.081)
Education secondary/vocational	-0.046 (0.072)	-0.066 (0.073)	-0.076 (0.071)	-0.020 (0.072)	-0.070 (0.069)
University and above	-0.200*** (0.077)	-0.206*** (0.077)	-0.193** (0.077)	-0.218*** (0.082)	-0.212*** (0.077)
Poor	0.296** (0.119)	0.276** (0.122)	0.281** (0.117)	0.226* (0.126)	0.314*** (0.116)
Not poor not rich	0.191** (0.079)	0.178** (0.079)	0.180** (0.079)	0.151* (0.079)	0.189** (0.075)
Income average in turkey	0.046 (0.063)	-0.023 (0.065)	0.027 (0.069)		
Treatment negative	-0.138** (0.065)	-0.157** (0.064)	-0.143** (0.063)	-0.115* (0.062)	-0.130** (0.065)
Treatment positive	-0.022 (0.070)	-0.040 (0.069)	-0.023 (0.0710)	-0.016 (0.070)	-0.025 (0.069)
No assets in SYR	-0.189** (0.074)	-0.191** (0.074)	-0.167** (0.073)		
Income from formal work		0.108 (0.098)			
Income from informal work		0.098 (0.092)			
Government benefits		0.003 (0.068)			
Not Feel welcomed			-0.166** (0.075)		
Language			0.084 (0.073)		
Legal status Work permit			-0.050 (0.111)		
Legal status Nationality			-0.159+++ (0.111)		
Lose family member in war			-0.105+++ (0.067)		
Detention threat				0.084 (0.074)	
crime				-0.062 (0.063)	
				-0.020	

Armed group				(0.064)	
Political parties				-0.110 (0.101)	
Freedom speech				-0.402*** (0.093)	
Freedom to elect				0.425*** (0.105)	
Bashar Assad not president				0.096++ (0.072)	
Job opportunities					0.057 (0.070)
House in Syria					0.138** (0.066)
Water electricity					0.006 (0.086)
Health service					-0.160** (0.080)
schooling					-0.117 (0.089)
Legal services					0.118* (0.070)
Social forum					-0.074 (0.060)
Family inside SYR					0.101+++ (0.061)
_cons	0.623*** (0.205)	0.843*** (0.251)	0.969*** (0.249)	0.721*** (0.249)	0.603** (0.255)
N	285	285	279	289	289
R ²	0.239	0.264	0.296	0.291	0.290

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ ++ $P < 0.20$ +++ $P < 0.15$

Germany Return Safe (RS)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Aleppo	0.097 (0.099)	0.088 (0.099)	0.129 (0.097)	0.054 (0.101)	0.130 (0.105)
Rural Damascus	0.016 (0.099)	0.048 (0.103)	0.037 (0.097)	0.023 (0.107)	0.043 (0.107)
Deir Ezzor & Al Raqqa	0.215 (0.155)	0.203 (0.154)	0.197 (0.160)	0.228 (0.155)	0.251 (0.169)
Hama	-0.227** (0.0929)	-0.215** (0.0949)	-0.180* (0.102)	-0.211** (0.0891)	-0.288** (0.113)
Homs	0.017 (0.105)	0.019 (0.104)	0.052 (0.0995)	0.006 (0.105)	0.041 (0.111)
Idleb	-0.080 (0.105)	-0.087 (0.0940)	-0.093 (0.103)	-0.108 (0.103)	-0.048 (0.113)
Alhaskah	-0.030 (0.108)	-0.036 (0.112)	0.007 (0.106)	-0.007 (0.126)	0.020 (0.128)
Latakia	-0.003 (0.174)	0.006 (0.179)	0.116 (0.189)	0.019 (0.185)	-0.027 (0.192)
Daraa	-0.175 (0.146)	-0.180 (0.152)	-0.152 (0.134)	-0.170 (0.141)	-0.133 (0.145)
Essen	0.200** (0.088)	0.197** (0.086)	0.140 (0.097)	0.142 (0.092)	0.189 (0.115)
Cities around Essen	0.143 (0.136)	0.080 (0.140)	0.073 (0.140)	0.219 (0.157)	0.182 (0.159)
Refuge duration (Month)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
Male	0.0923 (0.174)	0.0794 (0.177)	0.0397 (0.168)	0.104 (0.178)	0.125 (0.177)
Age	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.006)
Family presence	-0.155+++ (0.101)	-0.156+++ (0.103)	-0.173* (0.104)	-0.098 (0.100)	-0.129 (0.106)
Marital status divorce/widowed	0.258 (0.218)	0.259 (0.226)	0.157 (0.193)	0.348 (0.253)	0.284 (0.215)
Marital status single	0.151 (0.102)	0.144 (0.104)	0.141 (0.102)	0.128 (0.100)	0.143 (0.107)
Education secondary/vocational	-0.121* (0.073)	-0.135* (0.076)	-0.0855 (0.075)	-0.142* (0.077)	-0.126* (0.075)
University and above	-0.081 (0.0990)	-0.070 (0.0968)	-0.0402 (0.0948)	-0.103 (0.0990)	-0.146 (0.106)

Poor	-0.246** (0.122)	-0.225* (0.120)	-0.260** (0.123)	-0.338*** (0.126)	-0.278** (0.120)
Not poor not rich	-0.123 (0.108)	-0.113 (0.107)	-0.137 (0.109)	-0.164+++ (0.108)	-0.141++ (0.106)
Income average in Germany	0.009 (0.070)	0.021 (0.073)	-0.029 (0.066)	-0.013 (0.067)	0.004 (0.071)
No assets in SYR	-0.208*** (0.0787)	-0.214** (0.0821)	-0.184** (0.0802)		
Treatment negative	0.037 (0.068)	0.060 (0.067)	0.031 (0.066)	0.0274 (0.069)	0.014 (0.073)
Treatment positive	0.074 (0.068)	0.081 (0.070)	0.070 (0.070)	0.083 (0.071)	0.057 (0.073)
Income from formal work		-0.101 (0.087)			
Income from informal work		0.151 (0.137)			
Government benefits		-0.227+++ (0.152)			
Not Feel welcomed			0.078 (0.095)		
Language			-0.107 (0.078)		
Refugees legal status			0.011 (0.088)		
Asylum legal status			-0.084 (0.148)		
Lose family member in war			0.146* (0.081)		
Detention threat				-0.082 (0.110)	
crime				-0.026 (0.122)	
Armed group				-0.081 (0.088)	
Political parties				-0.126 (0.145)	
Freedom speech				-0.037 (0.182)	
Freedom to elect				0.095 (0.182)	

Bashar Assad not president				0.196*** (0.069)	
Job opportunities					-0.020 (0.099)
House in Syria					0.158* (0.081)
Water electricity					0.118 (0.131)
Health service					-0.188 (0.120)
schooling					0.086 (0.122)
Legal services					0.087 (0.096)
Social forum					0.028 (0.101)
Family inside SYR					0.052 (0.077)
_cons	0.570* (0.313)	0.780** (0.364)	0.590* (0.329)	0.399 (0.312)	0.321 (0.299)
N	202	202	201	202	202
R ²	0.213	0.226	0.259	0.239	0.220

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ ++ $P < 0.20$ +++ $P < 0.15$

Appendix 12: Survey questionnaire (translated from Arabic)

Question Type	Kobo Coding	Survey Questions With Choices: English
Group	Group	Consent
Note	Note	<p>Introduction: This survey is an anonymous survey. Your individual responses will not be shared with any entities. The survey team are volunteers for Erasmus University Rotterdam for Master degree purposes. We do not represent any Governmental or any political party. We are studying whether people are thinking to stay in the host country or to return to Syria and what their key priorities are in this situation. You were selected by chance to be interviewed for this questionnaire. The information you provide will be used to better understand the priorities of Syrian people living in host countries and to attempt to inform future policies on and programs for refugees. We assure you that whatever information you provide in this questionnaire will be kept confidential. The survey will last approximately 35 minutes and you are free to stop the interview at any time. You are also free to decline to participate.</p>
Select One	select_one agree_dont	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confirm willingness to answer questions • Confirm confidentiality of interview • Stress that interview is not to persuade people to return • Stress that interview and research will not have any influence on their legal status in the host country
Choices	1	Agree
Choices	0	Don't agree
Select One	select_one agree_dont	Would you like to help us with this research and participate in the survey?
Choices	1	Agree
Choices	0	Don't agree
Select One	select_one Survey_Country	Country
Choices	177	Turkey
Choices	65	Germany
Group	Group	General_questions
Date	date	Date of interview
Select One	select_one Survey_Country	Location of interview
Choices	Number	Select location
Select One	select_one en_Country_	Enumerator
Choices	Number	Select researcher
Group	Group	Demographics
Select One	select_one Yes_No	Are you the head of household?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
integer	integer	How old are you in years?
Select One	select_one Gender	Sex (enumerator to observe)
Choices	1	Male
Choices	0	Female
Select One	select_one ethnicity	What is your ethnicity?

Choices	0	Arab
Choices	1	Kurd
Choices	2	Turkman
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Other, please specify
Select One	select_one religion	What is your religion?
Choices	0	Muslim
Choices	1	Christian
Choices	2	Yazidi
Choices	3	Duriz
Choices	4	Ismali
Choices	5	Agnostic
Choices	6	Atheist
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Other, please specify
Select One	select_one marital	What is your marital status?
Choices	0	Married
Choices	1	Single
Choices	2	Divorced
Choices	3	Widowed
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Select One	select_one nationality_spouse	What is the nationality of your spouse?
Choices	0	Syrian
Choices	1	German
Choices	2	Turkish
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Other, please specify
integer	integer	How many household members lived with you in Syria before you left?
Select One	select_one Edu	What is your highest completed level of education?
Choices	0	None
Choices	1	Primary school
Choices	2	Secondary school
Choices	3	Vocational education
Choices	4	Undergraduate university
Choices	5	Master
Choices	6	PHD
Select One	select_one economic	How would you rate your economic situation in Syria before the war started?
Choices	1	Very poor
Choices	2	Poor
Choices	3	Not poor, not rich
Choices	4	Rich
Choices	5	Very rich
Select One	select_one lang	To what extent do you speak the native language of this country?
Choices	0	Not at all
Choices	1	Poor

Choices	2	Average
Choices	3	Good
Choices	4	Excellent
Group	Group	Movement_and_Status
Note	note	Where is your home location in Syria?
Select One	select_one Governorate	Governorate
Choices	Governorate	List of Governorates
Select One	select_one District	District
Choices	Districts	List of District
Select One	select_one Subdistrict	Sub district
Choices	Subdistrict	List of Sub district
date	date	Which month and year did you arrive in this country?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	Before coming here, did you live in any other country after you left Syria?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Select One	select_one countries	If yes, which country?
Choices	countries	List of countries
integer	integer	If yes, how long did you live there (in months)
Select One	select_one reached_living	How did you reach the country you are living in now?
Choices	0	Legally to turkey without visa
Choices	1	Official visa
Choices	2	UN relocation program
Choices	3	Oversea migration (Illegal migration)
Choices	4	Overland migration (Illegal migration)
Choices	5	Family reunification
Choices	98	Other
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Other, please specify
Text	text	Why do you not want to answer?
integer	integer	How long did you travel to arrive in this country (in days)?
integer	integer	How much did you pay to arrive here in this country?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	Do you have members of your family with you here?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Select Multiple	select_multiple family_with_you	How many people from your family are living in this country?
Choices	0	Spouse
Choices	1	Dependent children
Choices	2	Grown-up children
Choices	3	Parents
Choices	4	Other dependent relatives
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Choices	5	Other relatives

integer	integer	How many spouses?
integer	integer	How many dependent children?
integer	integer	How many adult children?
integer	integer	How many parents?
integer	integer	How many other dependent relatives?
integer	integer	How many other relatives?
integer	integer	How many of your family members previously mentioned are living with you now?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	Do you have direct family members (spouse or children) living in other countries who want to join you in this country?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Select One	select_one extent_living	If yes, to what extent is it likely that they will be able to join you in the near future?
Choices	0	Very likely
Choices	1	Likely
Choices	2	Unlikely
Choices	3	Very unlikely
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Choices	99	Don't know
Select One	select_one Yes_No_NT_Say	Did you lose any member of your family who was living with you in Syria during the war?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	enumerator Notes
Text	text	Why do you not want to answer?
Select One	select_one Yes_No_NT_Say	Did you lose any member of your family who was living with you while you were in transit to the host country?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Text	text	enumerator Notes
Select One	select_one legal_status	What is your current legal status in this country?
Text	text	Other, please specify
Text	text	Why do you not want to answer?
Select Multiple	select_multiple chose_country_tr	Why did you chose to come to this country?
Choices	1	Work opportunities
Choices	2	Relatives/friend present in host country
Choices	3	Chance to change nationality
Choices	4	Provision of assistance package
Choices	5	Because it has a border with Syria
Choices	6	Because Turkey is supporting Syrians
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Select Multiple	select_multiple chose_country_gr	Why did you chose to come to this country?

Choices	0	I was forced as it is the country where I gave my finger prints
Choices	1	Work opportunities
Choices	2	Relatives/friend present in host country
Choices	3	Chance to change nationality
Choices	4	Provision of assistance package
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Other, please specify
Text	text	Why do you not want to answer?
Group	Group	Employment_and_Income
Select One	select_one employment_type	What nature of employment did you have in Syria?
Choices	1	Employed and working public and privet sectors
Choices	2	self employed
Choices	3	Unemployed
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Select One	select_one employment_type1	What type of employment did you have in Syria?
Choices	0	High ranked managerial jobs
Choices	1	Professionals
Choices	2	Manual labour - unskilled
Choices	3	Skilled worker or craft
Choices	4	Skilled agricultural and fisheries
Choices	5	Teacher/education sector
Choices	6	Clerk or administrative job
Choices	7	Armed forces or police
Choices	8	Transportation
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Other, please specify
Select One	select_one employment_type2	What type of employment did you have in Syria?
Choices	1	Transportation
Choices	2	Skilled jobs but independent
Choices	3	Family farm
Choices	4	Shop owner or skilled craft
Choices	5	Business man trader
Choices	6	Unskilled labour
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Other, please specify
Select One	select_one employment_type3	What type of employment did you have in Syria?
Choices	1	Student
Choices	2	Housewife
Choices	3	Retired
Choices	4	Studying German
Choices	5	Looking for a job
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Other, please specify

Select One	select_one employment_type	What nature of employment you have in this country?
Choices	1	Employed and working public and private sectors
Choices	2	self employed
Choices	3	Unemployed
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Select One	select_one employment_type1	What type of employment do you have in this country?
Choices	0	High ranked managerial jobs
Choices	1	Professionals
Choices	2	Manual labour - unskilled
Choices	3	Skilled worker or craft
Choices	4	Skilled agricultural and fisheries
Choices	5	Teacher/education sector
Choices	6	Clerk or administrative job
Choices	7	Armed forces or police
Choices	8	Transportation
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Other, please specify
Select One	select_one employment_type2	What type of employment do you have in this country?
Choices	1	Transportation
Choices	2	Skilled jobs but independent
Choices	3	Family farm
Choices	4	Shop owner or skilled craft
Choices	5	Business man trader
Choices	6	Unskilled labour
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Other, please specify
Select One	select_one employment_type3	What type of employment do you have in this country?
Choices	1	Student
Choices	2	Housewife
Choices	3	Retired
Choices	4	Studying German
Choices	5	Looking for a job
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Other, please specify
integer	integer	Including yourself, how many members of your household are in formal employment in this country?
Select Multiple	select_multiple sources_of_income	What are your household's sources of income?
Choices	0	Formal work
Choices	1	Informal work
Choices	2	Seasonal work
Choices	3	Government benefits
Choices	4	Remittances
Choices	100	Do not want to answer

Text	text	Other, please specify
Select One	select_one monthly_income_tr	What is your current average monthly income from all sources?
Choices	0	Less than 1740 TL
Choices	1	Between 1740- 2900 TL
Choices	2	Between 2900-5800 TL
Choices	3	Between 5800 - 8700 TL
Choices	4	Between 8700 - 11600 TL
Choices	5	More than 11600 TL
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Choices	99	I don't know
Select One	select_one monthly_income_gr	What is your current average monthly income from all sources?
Choices	0	Less than 300 Euro
Choices	1	Between 300 - 500 Euro
Choices	2	Between 500 - 1000 Euros
Choices	3	Between 1000 - 1500 Euros
Choices	4	Between 1500 - 2000 Euros
Choices	5	More than 2000 Euros
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Choices	99	I don't know
Text	text	Why do you not want to answer?
Select Multiple	select_multiple asests_in_syria	What assets do you have in Syria?
Choices	1	Property
Choices	2	House
Choices	3	Agriculture land
Choices	4	Vehicle
Choices	5	Productive machines
Choices	6	Gold/cash
Choices	7	No assets
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Other, please specify
Select Multiple	select_multiple asests_in_syria	What assets do you have in this country?
Choices	1	Property
Choices	2	House
Choices	3	Agriculture land
Choices	4	Vehicle
Choices	5	Productive machines
Choices	6	Gold/cash
Choices	7	No assets
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Other, please specify
Text	text	Enumerator_observation
Select One	select_one Yes_No_NT_Say	Does your household have any debts owing?

Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why do you not want to answer?
Select One	select_one Dept_Value_tr	If yes, what is your overall debt level?
Choices	0	Less than 2900 TL
Choices	1	2900 -11600 TL
Choices	2	More than 11600 TL
Choices	99	Don't know
Select One	select_one Dept_Value_gr	If yes, what is your overall debt level?
Choices	0	Less than 500 Euro
Choices	1	500 - 2000 Euro
Choices	2	More than 2000 Euro
Choices	99	Don't know
Text	text	Why do you not want to answer?
Select One	select_one Dept_pay_month_tr	If you are indebted, how much are you spending to repay debt on average per month?
Choices	0	Nothing
Choices	1	Less than 1740 TL
Choices	2	Between 1740- 2900 TL
Choices	3	2900- 4060 TL
Choices	4	More than 4060 TL
Choices	99	Don't know
Select One	select_one Dept_pay_month_gr	If you are indebted, how much are you spending to repay debt on average per month?
Choices	0	Nothing
Choices	1	Less than 300 Euro
Choices	2	300 - 500 Euro
Choices	3	500 - 700 Euro
Choices	4	More than 700 Euro
Choices	99	Don't know
Text	text	Why do you not want to answer?
Matrix Question	Matrix Question	What are your main sources of information on the security situation in Syria? Rank the following list from 1 to 10 (10 being the most used source and 1 the least).
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Syrian Governmentnews TV channels
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Syrian Governmentnews websites
Matrix	select_one A_Z	International TV news channels
Matrix	select_one A_Z	International news websites
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Opposition TV news channels
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Opposition news websites
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Host country TV news channels
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Host country news websites
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Informal whats app news groups
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Facebook news pages

Matrix	select_one A_Z	Relatives and friends in Syria
Text	text	Other, please specify
Select One	select_one Yes_No	Do you feel welcome in the country you currently live in?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	If no, why?
Select One	select_one mot	Type of motive
Select One	select_one confirm	To enumerator - Do you confirm that you have not applied any treatment to this respondent?
Choices	1	Yes I confirm
Select One	select_one confirm	To enumerator - Do you confirm that you played the video for the respondent before continuing the questions?
Choices	1	Yes I confirm
Select One	select_one confirm	To enumerator – Do you confirm that you have distributed the publication to the respondent with an explanation of the publication before continuing the questions?
Choices	1	Yes I confirm
Group	Group	Perceptions of returning - Hypothetical
Note	note	The following questions relate to a hypothetical situation where you may think about returning to Syria (even if you have not or are not currently considering it)
Group	Group	Safety and security conditions
Matrix Question	Matrix Question	To what extent do you think the following are present in the areas that you may hypothetically consider returning to?
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Active fighting
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Presence of armed groups
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Criminality
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Threat of kidnapping
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Threat of detention
Matrix Choices	0	High
Matrix Choices	1	Moderate
Matrix Choices	2	Low
Matrix Choices	3	Not existing
Text	text	Other
Matrix Question	Matrix Question	On a scale of 10, with 1 being the least effect and 10 being the most, to what extent do these things have an effect on your willingness to return to Syria?
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Active fighting
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Presence of armed groups
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Criminality
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Threat of kidnapping

Matrix	select_one A_Z	Threat of detention
Text	text	Other, please specify
Group	Group	Economic conditions
Matrix Question	Matrix Question	To what extent do you think the following are present in the areas that you may hypothetically consider returning to?
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Job opportunities
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Secure housing
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Water, waste management, electricity infrastructure
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Functioning health services
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Functioning Education system
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Functioning key services like transport, banking,
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Functioning services for legal administration e.g. birth registration, passport etc
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Good access to essential items such as food, clothing, hygiene etc
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	NGOs delivering assistance inside Syria implementing development and reconstruction projects
Text	text	Other, please specify
Group	Group	On a scale of 10, with 1 being the least effect and 10 being the most, to what extent do these things have an effect on your willingness to return to Syria?
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Job opportunities
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Secure housing
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Water, waste management, electricity infrastructure
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Functioning, free health services
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Functioning, free education system
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Functioning key services like transport, banking
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Functioning services for legal administration e.g. birth registration, passport etc
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Good access to essential items such as food, clothing, hygiene etc
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Humanitarian assistance is available
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Re construction starts in Syria
Matrix Choices	0	High
Matrix Choices	1	Moderate
Matrix Choices	2	Low
Matrix Choices	3	Not existing
Text	text	Other
Group	Group	Political conditions
Note	Note	To what extent do you think the following are present in the areas that you may hypothetically consider returning to?

Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Freedom to select political leaders (through election or other mechanism)
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	The presence of multiple political parties
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Freedom of speech
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Strong civil society
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Freedom of belief
Matrix Choices	0	High
Matrix Choices	1	Moderate
Matrix Choices	2	Low
Matrix Choices	3	Not existing
Text	text	Other
Group	Group	On a scale of 10, with 1 being the least effect and 10 being the most, to what extent do these things have an effect on your willingness to return to Syria?
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Freedom to elect political leaders (through election or other mechanism)
Matrix	select_one A_Z	The presence of multiple political parties
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Freedom of speech
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Strong civil society
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Freedom of belief
Text	text	Other
Note	note	To what extent do you think the following are present in the areas that you may hypothetically consider returning to?
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Family and friends in Syria
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Social forums available e.g. mosques, community centres etc
Matrix	select_one rate_saftey	Social benefits (other than humanitarian assistance)
Matrix Choices	0	High
Matrix Choices	1	Moderate
Matrix Choices	2	Low
Matrix Choices	3	Not existing
Text	text	Other
Group	Group	On a scale of 10, with 1 being the least effect and 10 being the most, to what extent do these things have an effect on your willingness to return to Syria?
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Family and friends to return to Syria
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Social forums available e.g. mosques, community centres etc
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Social benefits (other than humanitarian assistance)
Matrix	select_one A_Z	Changes in German Governmentimmigrant policies making it more difficult to get permanent residency

Matrix	select_one A_Z	Inability to unify your family in the host country
Text	text	Other
Group	Group	Decision making about returning
Select One	select_one returning	To what extent have you and your family thought about returning to Syria?
Choices	0	Never thought about it
Choices	1	Thought about it
Choices	2	Actively looked into options
Choices	3	Registered with a return programme
Choices	4	Returned on exploratory visit
Choices	5	Planning to return without assistance
Choices	6	No but thought about going to a third country
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Other
Select One	select_one returning2	Have you made any concrete decision about returning? For response option 1 to 98
Choices	0	Not to return
Choices	1	Return under certain conditions
Choices	2	Return under any condition
Choices	3	Undecided
Choices	4	Go to third country
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Other
Select One	select_one returning3	If you returned, would you plan to return to your place of origin or another place?
Choices	2	Place of origin
Choices	0	Place of origin other place
Choices	1	Another home
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Select One	select_one Governorate	Governorate
Choices	Governorate	List of Governorates
Select One	select_one District	District
Choices	District	List of District
Text	text	Why?
Select One	select_one countries	If you thought about going to a third country, which country is it?
Choices	countries	List of countries
Text	text	Why?
Matrix Question	Matrix Question	How likely would it be that you would return to Syria in the following timeframes?
Matrix	select_one returning4	Less than 6 months' time
Matrix	select_one returning4	6 months to 1 year
Matrix	select_one returning4	1 to 2 years
Matrix	select_one returning4	After 2 years
Matrix	select_one returning4	not returning
Matrix Choices	1	Very unlikely
Matrix Choices	2	Unlikely

Matrix Choices	3	Not sure
Matrix Choices	4	Likely
Matrix Choices	5	Very likely
Matrix Question	Matrix Question	To what extent would the following influence your decision to return?
Matrix	select_one returning5	The end of the war
Matrix	select_one returning5	Bashar Al Assad is not President
Matrix	select_one returning5	Jobs are available
Matrix	select_one returning5	Establishment of a Kurdish autonomous area
Matrix	select_one returning5	Negative changes in the approach to Syrian refugees in the host country
Matrix	select_one returning5	Inability to find work in the host country
Matrix	select_one returning5	The norms of the host country do not match with my family's norms
Matrix Choices	0	Very little
Matrix Choices	1	Little
Matrix Choices	2	Not sure
Matrix Choices	3	Much
Matrix Choices	4	Very much
Text	text	Other
Group	Group	Return scenarios (Vignette methodology)
Select One	select_one Yes_No	Imagine you get professional counselling and support for relocating, would you go back to Syria if you were offered the travel costs for your whole family?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	If no: Imagine you get professional counselling and support for relocating, would you go back to Syria if you were offered the travel costs plus 150€ for every member of your family who is older than 15 years?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	If no: Imagine you get professional counselling and support for relocating, would you go back to Syria if you were offered the travel costs plus 300€ for every member of your family who is older than 15 years?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?

Select One	select_one Yes_No	If no: Imagine you get counselling and support for relocating, would you go back to Syria if you were offered the travel costs plus 450€ for every member of your family who is older than 15 years?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	If no: Imagine you get professional counselling and support for relocating, would you go back to Syria if you were offered the travel costs plus 600€ for every member of your family who is older than 15 years?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	If no: Imagine you get professional counselling and support for relocating, would you go back to Syria if you were offered the travel costs plus 750€ for every member of your family who is older than 15 years?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	If no: Imagine you get professional counselling and support for relocating, would you go back to Syria if you were offered the travel costs plus 1000€ for every member of your family who is older than 15 years?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	If no: Imagine you get professional counselling and support for relocating, would you go back to Syria if you were offered the travel costs plus 1250€ for every member of your family who is older than 15 years?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	If no: Imagine you get professional counselling and support for relocating, would you go back to Syria if you were offered the travel costs plus 1500€ for every member of your family who is older than 15 years?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	If no: Imagine you get professional counselling and support for relocating, would you go back to Syria if you were offered the travel costs plus 2000€ for every member of your family who is older than 15 years?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?

Select One	select_one ifno	If no to all of the above - How much would the country you currently live in have to give you for you to decide to go back to Syria now with all the people who are currently living with you?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?
integer	integer	How much?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	If Syria become safe like it was before the war and you were offered travel costs for all of you, would you return to Syria?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	If no: Would you return to Syria if it became secure, as it was before the war, and you were offered travel costs plus 150€ for every member of your family who is older than 15 years?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why ?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	If no: Would you return to Syria if it became secure, as it was before the war, and you were offered travel costs plus 300€ for every member of your family who is older than 15 years?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	If no: Would you return to Syria if it became secure, as it was before the war, and you were offered travel costs plus 450€ for every member of your family who is older than 15 years?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	If no: Would you return to Syria if it became secure, as it was before the war, and you were offered travel costs plus 600€ for every member of your family who is older than 15 years?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	If no: Would you return to Syria if it became secure, as it was before the war, and you were offered travel costs plus 750€ for every member of your family who is older than 15 years?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?

Select One	select_one Yes_No	If no: Would you return to Syria if it became secure, as it was before the war, and you were offered travel costs plus 1000€ for every member of your family who is older than 15 years?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	If no: Would you return to Syria if it became secure, as it was before the war, and you were offered travel costs plus 1250€ for every member of your family who is older than 15 years?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	If no: Would you return to Syria if it became secure, as it was before the war, and you were offered travel costs plus 1500€ for every member of your family who is older than 15 years?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?
Select One	select_one Yes_No	If no: Would you return to Syria if it became secure, as it was before the war, and you were offered travel costs plus 2000€ for every adult, would you return to Syria?
Choices	1	Yes
Choices	0	No
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Select One	select_one ifno	If no to all of the above - How much would the country you currently live in have to give you for you to decide to go back to Syria now with all the people who are currently living with you?
Choices	1	No, I do not want to go back to Syria
Choices	2	Yes, there is a specific amount
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Text	text	Why?
integer	integer	How much?
Note	note	Imagine the following situation: The fighting in Syria stops and there are no security concerns. It is as it was before the war. Many NGOs and companies have started reconstruction activities and job opportunities with good salaries are generated. However, schools are not functioning well as there is shortage in teachers and facilities. There are too many students in each classroom and some of the students attend the school without finding proper classrooms.
Select One	select_one returning4	In the case explained, above how likely is that that you would consider to return?
Choices	1	Very unlikely
Choices	2	Unlikely
Choices	3	Not sure
Choices	4	Likely
Choices	5	Very likely

Note	note	Imagine the following situation: The fighting in Syria stops and there are no security concerns. It is as it was before the war. Many NGOs and companies have started reconstruction activities and job opportunities with good salaries are generated. However, the health system is not functioning well as there are not enough doctors or hospitals.
Select One	select_one returning4	In the case explained, above how likely is that that you would consider to return?
Choices	1	Very unlikely
Choices	2	Unlikely
Choices	3	Not sure
Choices	4	Likely
Choices	5	Very likely
Select One	select_one scenario	Imagine the following situation: Back in your city, there is no fighting taking place anymore and the security situation is as it was before the war. You have a job opportunity and you are thinking about returning. What is the minimum level of monthly income which would allow you to return?
Choices	0	No return
Choices	1	<300
Choices	2	300-500
Choices	3	500-700
Choices	6	>700
Choices	100	Do not want to answer
Choices	99	I do not know
Note	note	Imagine the following situation: Back in your city, there is no fighting taking place anymore and the security situation is as it was before the war. The political situation has not changed but you have the Turkish/German nationality.
Select One	select_one returning4	In the case explained, above how likely is that that you would consider to return?
Choices	1	Very unlikely
Choices	2	Unlikely
Choices	3	Not sure
Choices	4	Likely
Choices	5	Very likely
Text	text	Enumerator notes

References

- Al-Ali, N., R. Black and K. Koser (2001) 'Refugees and Transnationalism: The Experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration studies* 27(4): 615-634.
- Al-Rasheed, M. (1994) 'The Myth of Return: Iraqi Arab and Assyrian Refugees in London', *Journal of Refugee Studies* 7(2-3): 199-219.
- Amnesty International (2017) 'Human Slaughterhouse: Mass Hangings and Extermination at Saydnaya Prison, Syria', No. MDE 24/5415/2017, pp. 6-1-43. London, UK: Amnesty International Ltd.
- Batrawi, S. (Last updated 2018) 'Drivers of Urban Reconstruction in Syria: Power, Privilege and Profit Extraction' (a webpage of Clingendael the Netherlands Institute of International Relations). Accessed 3 November 2018 <https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-01/PB_Drivers_Urban_Reconstruction_Syria.pdf>.
- BBC (Last updated 2018) 'Why is there a War in Syria?' (A webpage of BBC). Accessed 2 November 2018 <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229>>.
- Black, R. (2002) 'Conceptions of 'home' and the Political Geography of Refugee Repatriation: Between Assumption and Contested Reality in Bosnia-Herzegovina', *Applied Geography* 22(2): 123-138.
- Black, R. and S. Gent (2006) 'Sustainable Return in post-conflict Contexts', *International Migration* 44(3): 15-38.
- Black, R., K. Koser, K. Munk, G. Atfield, L. D'Onofrio and R. Tiemoko (2004) 'Understanding Voluntary Return', No. 50/04, pp. 1-43. London: Home Office.
- Bloch, A. and G. Atfield (2002) 'The Professional Capacity of Nationals from the Somali Regions in Britain', *Refugee Action & IOM*.
- Cassarino, J. (2004) 'Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited', *Diversity in the Asia Pacific Region and Europe* 6(2): 253-279.
- Constant, A. and D.S. Massey (2002) 'Return Migration by German Guestworkers: Neoclassical Versus New Economic Theories', *International Migration* 40(4): 5-38.
- Dadush, U. (2018) 'The Economic Effects of Refugee Return. Economics Discussion Papers, no 2018-22', Kiel Institute for the World Economy. <http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2018-22> Received February 14.
- Djajić, S. (2008) 'Immigrant Parents and Children: An Analysis of Decisions Related to Return Migration', *Review of development economics* 12(3): 469-485.
- Erdogan, M.M. (2017) 'Syrians Barometer-2017-Executive Summary: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey', pp. 2-46. Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Publishing.
- Ernesto F. L. Amaral, Mahlet A. Woldetsadik, and Gabriela Armenta (Last updated 2018) 'Europe's Great Challenge: Integrating Syrian Refugees' (a webpage of Georgetown Journal of International Affairs). Accessed 3 November 2018 <<https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition/2018/4/20/europes-great-challenge-integrating-syrian-refugees>>.
- Eurostat (Last updated 2018) 'Asylum and First Time Asylum Applicants by Citizenship, Age and Sex Monthly Data (Rounded)' (a webpage of Eurostat). Accessed 7 October 2018 <<http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do>>.
- Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) (Last updated 2016) 'the Stages of the German Asylum procedure, an Overview of the Individual Procedural Steps and the Legal Basis' (a webpage of Federal Office for Migration and Refugees). Accessed 3 November 2018

<http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Publikationen/Broschueren/das-deutsche-asylverfahren.pdf?__blob=publicationFile>.

Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (BAMF) (Last updated 2018b) 'Easy' (a webpage of Federal Office of Migration and Refugees). Accessed 4 November 2018 <<http://www.bamf.de/EN/Service/Left/Glossary/function/glossar.html?lv3=1504234&lv2=5832426>>.

Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (BAMF) (Last updated 2018 a) 'Family Asylum and Family Reunification' (a webpage of Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.). Accessed 5 November 2018 <<http://www.bamf.de/EN/Fluechtlingsschutz/Familienasyl/Familiennachzug/familienasyl-familiennachzug-node.html>>.

General Directorate of Migration Management, Government of Turkey (Last updated 2013) 'Foreign Law and International Protection Law' (a webpage of Legislation Information System.). Accessed 3 November 2018 <<http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.6458.pdf>>.

Gerver, M. (2017) 'Paying Refugees to Leave', *Political studies* 65(3): 631-645.

Gibson, J. and D. McKenzie (2011) 'The Microeconomic Determinants of Emigration and Return Migration of the Best and Brightest: Evidence from the Pacific', *Journal of Development Economics* 1(95): 18-29.

Gillard, J. (Last updated 2016) 'Why the Syrian Refugee Crisis is just the Tip of the Iceberg' (a webpage of World Economic Forum). Accessed 3 November 2018 <<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/03/why-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-is-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg>>.

Goodman, L.A. (1961) 'Snowball Sampling', *The annals of mathematical statistics*: 148-170.

Graham, M. and S. Khosravi (1997) 'Home is Where you make it: Repatriation and Diaspora Culture among Iranians in Sweden', *Journal of refugee studies* 10(2): 115-133.

Grote, J. 2018. 'The Changing Influx of Asylum Seekers in 2014-2016: Responses in Germany', the German National Contact Point for the European Migration Network (EMN) working paper No 79: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.

Hammond, L. (1999) 'Examining the Discourse of Repatriation: Towards a More Proactive Theory of Return Migration', in Black, R and Koser, K (eds) *The End of the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction* 4: 227-243.

Harild, N., A. Christensen and R. Zetter (2015) 'Sustainable Refugee Return'. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/542611468188337350/pdf/99618-WP-PUBLIC-Box393206B-Sustainable-Refugee-Return-15Sept-WEB-PUBLIC.pdf>

Harvey, J. (2006) 'Return Dynamics in Bosnia and Croatia: A Comparative Analysis', *International Migration* 44(3): 89-144.

Holmes, S.M. and H. Castañeda (2016) 'Representing the "European Refugee Crisis" in Germany and Beyond: Deservingness and Difference, Life and Death', *American Ethnologist* 43(1): 12-24.

Human rights Watch (Last updated 2017) 'Lebanon: Refugees in Border Zone at Risk: Areal Conditions Pressure them to Return to Syria' (a webpage of Human Rights Watch). Accessed 5 November 2018 <<https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/20/lebanon-refugees-border-zone-risk>>.

International Crisis Group (2011) 'Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People's Slow-Motion Revolution', Middle East/North Africa Report, No. N°108, pp. 1-30. Brussels: International Crisis Group (ICG).

IOM (International Organization of Migration) (Last updated 2018) 'Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration' (a webpage of International Organization for Migration). Accessed 10 October 2018 <<https://www.iom.int/assisted-voluntary-return-and-reintegration>>.

Jacobs, S., K. Adao Do Carmo, D. Petry and B. Nienaber (2017), *The changing influx of asylum seekers in 2014-2016: Member State responses (Country Report Luxembourg)*.

Juma, A. (Last updated 2018) 'Academic Degree Comparability and Mastering the German Language are the Two Big Challenges for Academic Refugees' (a webpage of Deutsche Welle). Accessed 22 October 2018 <<https://p.dw.com/p/2qkWx>>.

Kibreab, G. (2003) 'Citizenship Rights and Repatriation of Refugees', *International Migration Review* 37(1): 24-73.

King, R. (2001) 'Generalizations from the History of Return Migration.' in B. Ghosh (ed.) *Return Migration: Journey of Hope or Despair?* (ISBN 9789290680963 edn). pp. 7-55. Geneva, United Nations and the International Organization for Migration.

Koch, A. (2014) 'The Politics and Discourse of Migrant Return: The Role of UNHCR and IOM in the Governance of Return', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40(6): 905-923.

Konle-Seidl, R. (2017) 'Integration of Refugees in Austria, Germany and Sweden: Comparative Analysis', pp. 17. Brussels: European Parliament Committees. (Integration of Refugees in Austria, Germany and Sweden: Comparative Analysis).

Koser, K. and R. Black (1999) 'The End of Refugee Cycle', in K. Koser and R. Black (eds) *the End of the Refugee Cycle: Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction*, (Refugees and forced Migration studies edn). Vol. 4. pp. 2-17. Oxford: Berghahn.

Koser, K. (1997) 'Information and Repatriation: The Case of Mozambican Refugees in Malawi', *Journal of refugee studies* 10(1): 1-17.

Koser, K. and K. Kuschminder (2015) 'Comparative Research on the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration of Migrants', *International Organization for Migration, IOM Publications: Geneva, Switzerland*.

Koser, K. and C. Pinkerton (2002) 'The Social Networks of Asylum Seekers and the Dissemination of Information about Countries of Asylum'.

Kunuroglu, F., K. Yagmur, Van De Vijver, Fons JR and S. Kroon (2018) 'Motives for Turkish Return Migration from Western Europe: Home, Sense of Belonging, Discrimination and Transnationalism', *Turkish Studies* 19(3): 422-450.

McNatt, Z., N.G. Boothby, H. Al-Shannaq, H. Chandler, P. Freels, A.S. Mahmoud et al. (2018) 'Impact of Separation on Refugee Families: Syrian Refugees in Jordan': 3-25. <http://testsite.jordaninfoforum.org/wp-content/uploads/FMRsyria2018.pdf>

Mohammadi, A., M.J. Abbasi-Shavazi and R. Sadeghi (2018) 'Return to Home: Reintegration and Sustainability of Return to Post-Conflict Contexts', in G. Hugo, M.J. Abbasi-Shavazi and P. Kraly (eds) *Demography of Refugee and Forced Migration*, (International Studies in Population edn). Vol. 13. pp. 251-270. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Multeciler Derneği (Last updated 2018) 'Türkiyedeki Suriyeli Sayısı Ekim 2018' (a webpage of Multeciler Derneği). Accessed 3 November 2018 <<https://multeciler.org.tr/turkiyedeki-suriyeli-sayisi/>>.

Neske, M. (2017) 'Volljährige Asylersantragsteller in Deutschland Im Jahr 2016 Sozialstruktur, Qualifikations- Niveau Und Berufstätigkeit', BAMF-Kurzanalyse Ausgabe 2|2017 der Kurzanalysen des Forschungszentrums Migration, Integration und Asyl des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge, No. 210, 90461, pp. 1-13. Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF).

Neumayer, E. (2004) 'Asylum Destination Choice: What Makes some West European Countries More Attractive than Others?' *European Union Politics* 5(2): 155-180.

OECD (2018), *International Migration Outlook 2018*, OECD Publishing, Paris. Accessed 10 November 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2018-en

OECD Better Life Index (Last updated 2018) 'Income' (a webpage of OECD). Accessed 11 October 2018 <<http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/income/>>.

Omata, N. (2013) 'The Complexity of Refugees' Return Decision-Making in a Protracted Exile: Beyond the Home-Come Model and Durable Solutions', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 39(8): 1281-1297.

Preston, R. (1999) 'Researching Repatriation and Reconstruction: Who is Researching what and Why?', in Black, R and Koser, K (eds) *The End of the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction* 4(5.5): 18-36.

Rich, A. (2016) 'Asylerstantragsteller in Deutschland Im Jahr 2015 Sozialstruktur, Qualifikations- Niveau Und Berufstätigkeit', BAMF-Kurzanalyse Ausgabe 3|2016 der Kurzanalysen des Forschungszentrums Migration, Integration und Asyl des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge, pp. 1-13. Frankenstr. 210, 90461 Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF).

Roth, K. (Last updated 2018) 'Before we Pay \$250bn to 'rebuild Syria', we should Force Putin to Stop the Endless Death and Destruction' (a webpage of Independent). Accessed 6 November 2018 <<https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/russia-syria-war-refugees-funding-putin-conflict-idlib-a8507646.html>>.

Schmidt, H. (2018) ' Volljährige Asylerstantragsteller in Deutschland Im Jahr 2017: Sozialstruktur, Schulbesuch Und Berufstätigkeit Im Herkunftsland ', BAMF-Kurzanalyse Ausgabe 03|2018 der Kurzanalysen des Forschungszentrums Migration, Integration und Asyl des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge, pp. 1-13. Frankenstr. 210, 90461 Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF).

SEEFAR (Last updated 2018) 'Return, Stay, Or Migrate? Understanding the Aspirations of Syrian Refugees in Turkey' (a webpage of SEEFAR). Accessed 5 November 2018 <<https://seefar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Syrians-in-Turkey.pdf>>.

Spindler, W. (Last updated 2015) ' 2015: The Year of Europe's Refugee Crisis' (a webpage of UNHCR.org). Accessed 2 September 2018 <<http://tracks.unhcr.org/2015/12/2015-the-year-of-europes-refugee-crisis/>>.

Statistisches Bundesamt (Last updated 2017a) 'Foreign Population by Sex and Selected Citizenships' (a webpage of Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis)). Accessed 5 November 2018 <https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Population/MigrationIntegration/Tables_ForeignPopulation/Gender.html>.

Statistisches Bundesamt (Last updated 2017b) 'Migration.Integration.Regionen Gemeinsames Datenangebot Von Destatis, BA Und BAMF' (a webpage of Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis)). Accessed 4 September 2018 <https://service.destatis.de/DE/karten/migration_integration_regionen.html#AZR_ANT_SYRIEN>.

Statistisches Bundesamt (Last updated 2016) 'Regional Statistics: Population Updating' (a webpage of Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis)). Accessed 4 November 2018 <<https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/CountriesRegions/RegionalStatistics/RegionalStatistics.html>>.

Steputat, F. (2004) *Dynamics of Return and Sustainable Reintegration in a 'Mobile Livelihoods'-Perspective*. DIIS Working Paper.

Stigter, E. (2006) 'Livelihood upon Return: Afghan Migratory Strategies-an Assessment of Repatriation and Sustainable Return in Response to the Convention Plus', *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 25(2): 109-122.

The Asylum Information Database (AIDA) (Last updated 2018a) 'Statistics: Germany' (a webpage of The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE)). Accessed 3 November 2018 <<http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany/statistics>>.

The Asylum Information Database (AIDA) (Last updated 2018b) 'Introduction to Asylum Context in Turkey' (a webpage of European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE)). Accessed 3 November 2018 <<https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/introduction-asylum-context-turkey>>.

The Asylum Information Database (AIDA) (Last updated 2015) 'Overview of Main Changes since the Previous Report Update: Turkey' (a webpage of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE)). Accessed 6 November 2018 <<https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/overview-main-changes-previous-report-update>>.

The Economist 'The Way In. Main European migration routes.' (Image) (2015) Accessed 21 October 2018 <<https://www.economist.com/europe/2015/08/29/looking-for-a-home>>

The Economist (Last updated 2018) 'The Long Road Back: Refugees have Become a Pawn in the Struggle for Syria' (a webpage of The Economist). Accessed 5 November 2018 <<https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/08/02/refugees-have-become-a-pawn-in-the-struggle-for-syria>>.

The World Bank Group (Last updated 2018) 'World Bank Open Data Syria Arab Republic' (a webpage of the World Bank group). Accessed 10 August 2018 <<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=SY>>.

The World Bank Group (2017) 'The Toll of War. The Economic and Social Consequences of the Conflict in Syria', pp. 1-83 The World Bank Group.

Trading Economics (Last updated 2018) 'Turkey Monthly Average Gross Wage' (a webpage of TRADING ECONOMICS). Accessed 3 September 2018 <<https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/wages>>.

UN Human Rights Council (2016) 'Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic', Human rights situations that require the Council's attention, No. A/HRC/31/CRP.1, pp. 1-17. Geneva: OHCHR.

(UNHCR) United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (1951) 'The Refugee Convention, 1951' Accessed 11 November 2018 <<http://www.qp.alberta.ca/570.cfm>>

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) (Last updated n.d) 'Temporary Protection in Turkey' (a webpage of UNHCR.org). Accessed 4 November 2018 <<http://help.unhcr.org/turkey/information-for-syrians/temporary-protection-in-turkey/>>.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) (Last updated 2018f) 'Operational Portal Refugees Status, Syrian Regional Refugee Response, Turkey' (a webpage of UNHCR.org). Accessed 21 September 2018 <<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113>>.

UNHCR (Last updated 2018e) 'Syria Emergency' (a webpage of UNHCR.org). Accessed 6 November 2018 <<http://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html>>.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) (Last updated 2018d) 'Comprehensive Protection and Solutions Strategy: Protection Thresholds and Parameters for Refugee Return to Syria' (a webpage of UNHCR.org). Accessed 5 November 2018 <<https://data2.unhcr.org/ar/documents/download/63223>>.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) (Last updated 2018c) 'Desperate Journeys: Refugees and Migrants Arriving in Europe and at Europe's Borders' (a webpage of UNHCR.org). Accessed 5 November 2018 <<http://www.unhcr.org/desperatejourneys/>>.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) (Last updated 2018b) 'Sea and Land Arrivals Monthly' (a webpage of UNHCR.org). Accessed 22 October 2018 <<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean>>.

UNHCR (Last updated 2018a) 'Operational Portal for Refugee Response, Syria Regional Refugee Response' (a webpage of UNHCR.org). Accessed 3 November 2018 <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria#_ga=2.212902994.738650370.1535310081-842059014.1521129878>.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) (Last updated 2017) 'Syria is at a Crossroads' (a webpage of UNHCR). Accessed 3 November 2018 <<http://www.unhcr.org/sy/1046-as-war-enters-7th-year-unhcr-warns-syria-is-at-a-crossroads.html>>.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) (Last updated 2016) ' Syria Conflict at 5 Years: The Biggest Refugee and Displacement Crisis of our Time Demands a Huge Surge in Solidarity' (a webpage of UNHCR). Accessed 4 September 2018 <<http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2016/3/56e6e3249/syria-conflict-5-years-biggest-refugee-displacement-crisis-time-demands.html>>.

United Nation Human Rights Council (Last updated 2018) 'UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria: Amid the Ruins of Ar-Raqqah and Dayr Al-Zawr, Calls for Justice and Accountability by Victims and Families must be Urgently Addressed' (a webpage of OHCHR.org). Accessed 4 November 2018 <<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=22766&LangID=E>>.

Van Houte, M. and T. Davids (2014) 'Moving Back or Moving Forward? Return Migration, Development and Peace-Building', *NEW DIVERSITIES* 16(2): 71.

Warner, D. (1994) 'Voluntary Repatriation and the Meaning of Return to Home: A Critique of Liberal Mathematics', *Journal of Refugee Studies* 7(2-3): 160-174.

Webber, F. (2011) 'How Voluntary are Voluntary Returns?', *Race & Class* 52(4): 98-107.

Yahya, M., J. Kassir and K. El-Hariri (Last updated 2018) 'Unheard Voices: What Syrian Refugees Need to Return Home' (a webpage of CARNGIE Middle East Center). Accessed 5 October 2018 <<https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/04/16/unheard-voices-what-syrian-refugees-need-to-return-home-pub-76050>>.

Zetter, R. (1999) 'Reconceptualizing the Myth of Return: Continuity and Transition Amongst the Greek-Cypriot Refugees of 1974', *Journal of Refugee studies* 12(1): 1-22.

Zimmermann, S. (2012) 'Understanding Repatriation: Refugee Perspectives on the Importance of Safety, Reintegration, and Hope', *Population, Space and Place* 18(1): 45-57.