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Non-Traditional Military Interventions and its Relationship
to Development in Conflict Affected Areas: A Focus on the
Provinces of Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi (BaSulTa)

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Disclaimer:

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List of Acronyms

AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFPCGSC	Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and General Staff College
ARMM	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
BaSuLTa	Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi
CMR	Civil Military Relations
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DAP	Development Academy of the Philippines
DSSP	Development Support and Security Plan
IPSP	Internal Peace and Security Plan
LCE	Local chief executives
LGU	Local government unit
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
NGO	Non-governmental Organizations
NSC	National Security Council
NSP	National Security Policy
NSS	National Security Strategy

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Abstract

Development and security are inextricably linked. This paper looked at how the non-traditional interventions of the military affect the development in the conflict affected areas of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. The study focused on how the military understood their changing roles in the development framework of the government. The study used qualitative research methods and employed in-depth interviews to gather data. Participants of the study are military officers and representatives from civil society organizations that were assigned or is currently assigned in the provinces of BaSulTa. The results of the interviews were supported by secondary data taken from government policy documents, books, journals and media articles.

The study uses civil military relations, securitization theory, militarization and the nexus of development and security in the interpretation and analysis of data. The findings of the study showed that: (1) the development issues in the area makes the people more vulnerable to security threats likewise the presence of security threats impede development in the area, (2) the whole of nation approach of the government is used by the military in their strategies however the implementation of such is dependent on the commander on the ground and on his views on the roles that the military should take in development efforts, (3) being in a conflict affected area affects how the people look at militarization in their community, and lastly, (4) there is a need to acknowledge the authority of local chief executives in the area over the military.

Relevance to Development Studies

The role of the military in the Philippines in internal defense has always been a point of debate in the country. The counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism strategies are likewise placed under scrutiny. The whole of nation approach used in the recent campaign plans espouses military engagement in development activities. These new campaign plans were also questioned by different sectors. Development studies has always been focused on the perspective of the civilians on these issues. This study will put emphasis on the perspective of the military on how they position themselves in the issues of militarization and securitization. The study hopes to provide a more objective perspective of how the military performs their new roles and provide an insight on the difficulties that the military organization is facing in the implementation of these new roles and framework of operation.

Keywords

Civil-military relations, Whole of nation approach, securitization, militarization, nexus of development and security, Armed Forces of the Philippines

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Context of the Problem

The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was established through the Republic Act No. 6734 on August 1, 1989 as part of the agreement of the government with the secessionist group Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). “The ARMM is composed of the provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi and the cities of Marawi and Lamitan”. (‘ARMM History’ 2017)

The ARMM was established primarily to address the conflict in the region. However, this did not end the conflict and has continued up to the present. In her report, Strachan stated that “the conflict situation in Mindanao is multi-faceted, involving numerous armed groups, as well as clans, criminal gangs and political elites. While the government is actively trying to resolve these conflicts, the degree of violence and unrest in the ARMM serves as a major obstacle to achieving sustainable peace in the region.” (Strachan, 2015: 2)

In her paper, Hall mentioned that the peace agreements signed between the government and the MNLF does not guarantee that the actors on the ground will abandon both their arms and political claims. (Hall 2017:2)

Strachan further states that, “the absence of state services in the ARMM also contributes to fragility and instability in the region. Regional government spending on services is low, and the provision of healthcare and education in the region is inadequate” (Strachan, 2015: 3).

As part of the ARMM, the provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi has always been plagued by conflict. The poverty index of the Philippines shows that these three provinces are likewise among the poorest in the country. It’s distance from the mainland where the seat of regional government further aggravated the situation in the area. Hall (2017:1) states that “in the Bangsamoro periphery, the Philippine government's reach through its bureaucratic and security agents has been historically weak and strongly contested. Formal rules and institutions patterned after centralist templates carry little traction in these areas.”

Ilagan (2017:93), reiterates the effects of the conflict in the development of ARMM by stating that “conflict areas are underserved because external change agents hesitate to bring in development inputs pending improvements in community security. There often is a need for the military to assure development initiators - from both the government and the non-government sectors - that it is safe to work in these areas. Conflict affected areas thus lag behind in terms of social and economic improvements”.

The ARMM and the whole of island of Mindanao was placed under martial law in 2017 as a response to the terrorist attacks in the city of Marawi in May 2017. Despite the end of the war in Marawi City, “Congress overwhelmingly granted President Rodrigo Duterte’s request to extend martial law in the whole of Mindanao for a period of one year – from January 1, 2018 up to December 31, 2018” (Roxas 2017). Although, Congress agreed to the extension of the martial law for another year, the Filipinos are divided on the issue given the bad history of the country in terms of martial law.

The Philippines was under martial law from 1972 to 1981 with a history of human rights violation by the military. In line with this, the military controlled most of the government positions where there was a lot of issues of corruption.

In a paper written by Acop, he stated that during martial law “there were active-duty military officers who occupied what used to be elective or bureaucratic posts within the

civilian government. Some officers sat as directors and managers of government owned or controlled corporations while concurrently occupying line or staff positions in the AFP. Still other officers performed as diplomats in Philippine embassies and consulates and listening posts overseas for years”. (Acop 2013)

The era of the Marcos martial law is seen as dark time in the history of the country. In line with this, there are some people who are still wary of the military and has difficulties in working with them until the present times. The continuing conflict in the ARMM has furthered the distrust between the military and the civilians in the area. The recent declaration of martial law revived the fear of human rights abuses by the military, police and paramilitary groups. Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana tried to allay these fears and in one interview stated that, *“The Filipino people can rest assured, however, that if martial law is extended, they can continue to trust their defense and security establishments since every decision we make and operation we undertake is anchored on the rule of law and respect for human rights”* (Mangosing 2017).

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has always been considered a game changer in the politics of the country. They have been instrumental in toppling presidencies in the country. Their withdrawal of support to then President Marcos during the EDSA Revolution in 1986 ended his more than two decades of presidency. The same incident happened when they withdrew their support from then President Estrada in 2001. It is not surprising that the government has always wooed the military to ensure their support.

Retired military officers have always occupied cabinet positions of different presidents. The current administration has more than 60 former military officers in the Cabinet and different key government offices. The current president justified his appointments of retired military officers by stating that they get the job done, and they do it very well. The military is also not new to politics with several of them running for office after retirement. The country had former military officers in the House of Representatives, Senate and even one President who used to be the Chief of Staff of the armed forces.

Despite their involvement in politics, the AFP has always been traditional in their strategies and operations against insurgency and terrorism. The success of military operations equates to number of enemies killed and number of areas cleared and secured. However, in the last administration under President Benigno Aquino, there was a decision to shift the framework of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts of the military. The decision to use the framework of the Whole of Nation approach is “based on the recognition that the AFP cannot single-handedly solve the internal peace and security concerns of the country...this can only be attained through a sustained multi-stakeholder effort borne out of partnerships with different government institutions, non-government stakeholders such as NGOs and CSOs and the local communities.” (AFP 2010: 25)

The military drafted the campaign plans Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan¹ 2010 – 2016 and the Development Support and Security Plan (DSSP) Kapayapaan² 2017 – 2022 that utilizes the whole of nation framework of the past and current administration. These campaign plans are the strategies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for their counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. Both campaign plans highlighted the non-traditional roles that the military employ in their strategies to address insurgency and terrorism issues. Likewise, the campaign plans stressed the need for a partnership with the civilian sector which includes government agencies, private sector and civil society organizations.

Both campaign plans were drafted by the armed forces in close coordination and cooperation with various government agencies, local government units, civil society organizations (CSOs) and the academe (AFP 2010; AFP 2017). This is to ensure that the goal of inclusivity

¹ Bayanihan is a Filipino word that means a spirit of cooperation and community

² Kapayapaan is a Filipino word that means peace

in the whole of nation approach will be achieved in the implementation of the programs and operation of the military.

1.2 Research Objectives and Questions

The main objective of this research is to understand how the military perceive their changing roles and how they manage these shift in their roles from traditional warfighting to a more inclusive approach in nation building. Specifically, it aims to do the following:

- a) To find out the changing roles of the military in nation building under the past and present government administrations;
- b) To determine how the AFP perceives their involvement in development efforts vis-a-vis focusing on warfighting; and,
- c) To investigate how the AFP manages the impact to the other sectors of society of their involvement in development efforts.

This paper will seek to answer the question, **how does the non-traditional interventions of the military affect development in the conflict affected areas of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi?**

Specifically, it will answer the following questions:

- a) How does the military describe the security and development concerns in the provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi?
- b) How does the military situate their role in the whole of nation approach of the current government in development?
- c) How does the perception of militarization of conflict areas by the local community, government offices, private sector, and NGOs/ CSOs shape how the military deals with them?
- d) How does the military manage the power relations between them and the civilian government in the conflict affected provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi?

1.3 Scope, Limitations and Organization of the Paper

The research will focus on the military officers and representatives of civil-society organizations as primary respondents. Since the research was conducted remotely, the participants were chosen due to easier accessibility given that the researcher has previously worked with the military institution. Confidentiality of some materials and of military operations may be a limitation in the conduct of this research. Likewise, the participants from the CSO may not be as diverse as desired.

The paper is composed of five chapters. Chapter one provided an overview of the problem, the research objectives and questions and the scope, limitations and organization of the paper. Chapter 2 discussed the research methodology used in the paper. Chapter 3 is composed of the concepts and theories applied in the analysis of the study. Chapter 4 is the main part of the paper and consists of the presentation of the findings and the corresponding analysis done. Lastly, chapter five presents the conclusion of the paper.

Chapter 2 Research Methodology

This chapter will discuss the research methods and techniques used in this study and how these techniques were able to respond to the objectives of the paper. It likewise highlights how the participants of the study were selected and the various difficulties that the researcher faced in the conduct of the study. Furthermore, it will also discuss how the positionality of the researcher affected and was managed throughout the data collection and the writing of the paper.

2.1 Research Method and Techniques

This research used qualitative methods. Hennink, Hutter and Bailey (2011:8-9) defines qualitative research as “an approach that allows you to examine people’s experiences in detail, by using a specific set of research methods...one of the main distinctive features of qualitative research is that that approach allows you to identify issues from the perspective of your study participants and understand the meanings and interpretations that they give to behaviors, events or objects”. This paper aimed to look and understand how the military perceive their changing roles and how they manage these shift in their roles from traditional warfighting to a more inclusive approach in nation building. Thus, a qualitative approach through interviews are appropriate to gather the insights of the participants of the study.

The researcher used both primary and secondary data. The primary data for this study is collected through interviews with military officers and from civil society organizations who has worked in the provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. The primary data gathered was complemented by secondary data collected from government policy documents, books, journals and news articles.

The research used two kinds of interviews: first, is the traditional face-to-face interview and second, is computer-assisted interviews. Both types of interviews used a structured set of interviews questions.

The researcher employed the computer-assisted interviews for the military participants of this study primarily because it is more convenient for both researcher and interviewees to send the interview questions through email and facebook messenger than to schedule face-to-face interviews. One, because the researcher is based in The Hague. Two, most of the participants are in remote areas of the Philippines where there are ongoing military operations. Three, the participants are busy and are not able to sit for a long interview. One of the advantages of using computer-assisted interviews “is that they are self-transcribing in the sense that the written text itself is the medium through which researcher and respondents express themselves, and the text is thus basically ready for analysis the minute it has been typed”. (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 149)

The interview questions³ were sent to the military respondents through email and facebook messenger. A structured set of interview questions were crucial since the research participants were only asked to give written answers to the questions sent and it will be difficult to explain or clarify questions in case they were not easily understood. The structured flow attempted to make the interview questions easier to understand by providing the participants with the following: an introduction of the purpose of the study and an assurance of the confidentiality of the data, general questions on the background of the participant including date of their assignment in the area of the study, key questions that support the research questions, and a section for other comments. The interview questions were given in English

³ see Annex

since it is the primary language for formal communication in the Philippines. However, the participants were encouraged to answer in the language they are more comfortable with in the accompanying email sent to them. It is noted that all the participants who filled out the forms answered in English. Upon receipt of the filled-out interview questions, a follow up conversation with some of the participants was done through facebook messenger for clarification on some of their answers.

Another set of interview question was sent to possible participants from the civil society organizations. However, only one person filled out the form. Hence, a face-to-face interview was done with two members of CSOs who are currently in The Hague. The face-to-face interview used the same set of structured interview guide but used a combination of English and Filipino during the conversation.

2.2 Background and Selection of Participants

The participants of the study are mostly from the military. The military participants were graduates of the Master in Public Management major in Development and Security (MPM-DevSec) conducted by the AFP Command and General Staff College (AFPCGSC) and the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP) from 2009 to 2016. These participants were chosen primarily because of accessibility by the researcher. As the former Program Manager for this program, the researcher had access to the class directory and was regularly updated of the positions and status of the graduates. The research design initially indicated a target of 12 military participants. The interview questions were sent to 50 possible participants who were assigned or currently assigned in the provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. Most of the possible participants are still assigned in the field where there are ongoing operations which made the data collection challenging. Internet connectivity is erratic in the areas of assignments of the participants and communication was only through facebook messenger. Finally, ten military officers participated in the research.

On the other hand, the target participants from the CSOs were those who officially partnered with the military their activities and those who have minimal interaction with them. Getting participants from the CSOs was difficult because unlike the military participants there was no prior relationship between the researcher and the possible CSO participants. One of the participants was from a social enterprise group based in Zamboanga City and works in different parts of the Zamboanga Peninsula and ARMM to include Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. The group focuses mainly on leadership formation of schools, communities, and other institutions and has worked closely with the military especially in the ARMM. The other two participants were from the current (2018-19) batch of Filipino ISS students. One of the them worked with an NGO that focuses on capacity building, development planning, and advocacy on disaster risk reduction management. His organization worked with the Office of Civil Defense which is under the defense department and they regularly coordinate with the military for their activities. The third CSO participant worked with a human rights groups that give human rights education to the indigenous people, youth and other vulnerable sectors. They also document human rights violation cases of different sectors. She stated that the engagement of their group with the military is very minimal and is limited to furnishing copies of human rights violation reports to the main headquarters for action. She further states that this limited interaction is to avoid associating their group with the military by human rights violation victims and to encourage the victims to be more open in sharing their experiences.

The following are the profiles of the participants of the study:

Table 2.1
Participants from the Armed Forces of the Philippines

No.	Branch of Service	Interviewee Code	Interviewee's Profile	Date of Interview/ Receipt of Response
01	Philippine Army	MIL-1	Male; Lieutenant Colonel Date Assigned in BaSulTa: 2016 to 2017	6 September 2018
02	Philippine Navy (Marines)	MIL-2	Male; Colonel Date Assigned in BaSulTa: 1993, 1997, 2007 to 2009, 2011 to 2015	11 September 2018
03	Philippine Navy	MIL-3	Male; Lieutenant Commander Date Assigned in BaSulTa: 2017 to Present	11 September 2018
04	Philippine Navy (Marines)	MIL-4	Male; Colonel Date Assigned in BaSulTa: 1991 to 1993	11 September 2018
05	Philippine Army	MIL-5	Male; Colonel Date Assigned in BaSulTa: 2016 to Present	11 September 2018
06	Philippine Army	MIL-6	Male; Colonel Date Assigned in BaSulTa: 1997, 2013 to 2015, July 2018 to Present	11 September 2018
07	Philippine Army	MIL-7	Male; Lieutenant Colonel Date Assigned in BaSulTa: 2014 to 2016	14 September 2018
08	Philippine Navy (Marines)	MIL-8	Male; Colonel Date Assigned in BaSulTa: 1990 to 1992, 1995 to 2000, 2005 to 2010, 2017 to Present	04 October 2018
09	Philippine Navy (Marines)	MIL-9	Male; Colonel Date Assigned in BaSulTa: 1994, 1996 to 1997, 2005 to 2010	04 October 2018
10	Philippine Army	MIL-10	Male; Colonel Date Assigned in BaSulTa: 2008 to 2009	16 October 2018

Table 2.2
Participants from the Civil Society Organizations

No.	Office	Interviewee Code	Interviewee's Profile	Date of Interview/ Receipt of Response
01	Task Force Detainees of the Philippines	CSO-1	Female; Date Assigned in BaSulTa: 2007 to 2017	14 September 2018
02	Center for Disaster Preparedness	CSO-2	Male; Date Assigned in BaSulTa: 2017 to 2018	15 September 2018
03	ABA Trainings, Inc.	CSO-3	Female; Date Assigned in BaSulTa: 2015 to Present	17 September 2018

2.3 Ethical Considerations

The participants of the study were informed through email and subsequent conversation of the purpose of the study. They were likewise assured of the confidentiality of the data collected. Their anonymity was also guaranteed to ensure that they can speak freely their opinions for and against the current framework of the government. Also, permission to reflect the names of the offices of the participants from the CSOs were requested.

The participants were also assured that the study will reiterate that the data collected from them are solely their opinions and does not reflect the stand of their respective agencies.

2.4 Positionality

I am a former government employee who has worked with the defense/military establishment for more than a decade. I started out as a researcher and training officer for the National Defense College of the Philippines. One of my primary responsibilities is the conduct of short courses on national security that not only bring together military officers, civilian government employees, local government executives, private sectors and CSOs but also encourages them to work together in the implementation of their programs. Likewise, I was a program manager for a masters' program for the military, police, coast guard, fire officers, jail wardens and intelligence officers. One of the concepts of this masters' program is the active involvement of the members of the traditional security sector in development work.

I have always worked at a government institution and with the security sector. This experience helped contribute in the writing of this paper because it was easier to understand the responses of the participants. The experience gave me familiarity on the concepts and terms used in the study. Throughout the writing of this paper, I have endeavored to maintain objectivity.

Chapter 3 Conceptual Framework

The paper will take off from the original debates on civil and military relations as discussed by Huntington particularly on subjective and objective civilian control. It will discuss how the theories on civil-military relations relates to the current implementation of the Philippine military campaign plan and its framework of whole of nation approach. The discussion will tie up with how the shift to non-traditional roles of the Philippine military and the emphasis towards partnership with civilian organizations can be seen as a securitizing mechanism as espoused in the securitization theory.

3.1 Civil-Military Relations

Huntington's paper on *The Soldier and the State* pioneered the discussions on civil-military relations. In his paper, he mentioned that "civil military relations is one aspect of national security policy" and that the "aim of national security policy is to enhance the safety of the nation's social, economic, and political institutions against threats arising from other independent states." (Huntington 1957:1)

Huntington further states that "the role of the military in society has been frequently discussed in terms of civilian control" And in relation to this he discussed two ways in which the military power can be minimized. One is through 'subjective civilian control' which maximizes civilian power while the other is 'objective civilian control' which maximizes the professionalism of the military. "Subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state." (Huntington 1957)

Burk critiqued Huntington's theory by stating that the theory "presumes that there is a clearly delineated military sphere defined by war fighting that is independent of the social and political sphere". He further states that the theory argued "as if democratic civil-military relations are confined to relations among soldiers and civilians within a sovereign nation state...reasonable in the mid-twentieth century and before...since then has become increasingly less tenable...the theory treat only part of the problem that a democratic theory of civil-military relations confronts." (Burk 2002:11)

Bruneau and Matei highlighted the necessity of democratic civilian control and mentions that maintaining and ensuring that the armed forces are under democratic civilian control concerns most newer democracies. They further mentioned the recent cases of internal wars in Colombia, Nepal and the Philippines where "there are economic, political, and social causes behind the conflicts and the security forces alone cannot resolve them" (Bruneau and Matei 2008). In relation to this, Schulzke discussed in his paper how the military was losing the war against terrorists and insurgent because they keep on "focusing on fighting rather than earning the people's trust" (Schulzke 2010:328)

Angstrom also mentioned that the typical theories of civil military relations focus on the narrower control of the military and devise different strategies and theories for this control (Angstrom 2013:225). He further provided the following five categories of civil-military relations:

- Civilian supremacy over the military wherein the military should be held accountable to, and be subordinate to, democratic, civilian leadership;
- Military supremacy over the civilians which is a traditional military dictatorship;
- Civil and military parity which suggests a more nuanced picture of decision-making before and during war, where the military takes part in the decision-making process before

war...while the civilians also have a significant impact on choice of military strategy with which to conduct the war;

- Intertwining of civil and military where there is a distinction of civil and military, and the decision-making process allots different roles to civilian or military bureaucracies.; and,
- Dissolution of civil and military where civil and military become meaningless terms. (Angstrom 2013:229-231)

The category of intertwining of civil and military was considered by Angstrom as the ideal type of civil-military relations because it utilizes and maximizes the competence of both civil and military. He relates this to Huntington's 'subjective control', where the military is controlled through a set of institutions, decisions-making processes and legal frameworks. (Angstrom 2013)

In the discussions of civil-military relations, Bruneau and Matei mentioned how "security sector reform was developed as a reaction to the limitations of CMR and is now being utilized by governments and international organizations to further their abilities to develop effective ways of delivering security assistance. (Bruneau and Matei 2008:912)

SSR has made conceptual contributions as it fills in some of the gaps in the traditional concept of CMR which include the following:

- The SSR agenda moves away from considering the military to be the sole security provider of a nation, and proposes a broad concept of a uniformed/ non-uniformed sector or community whose members must work together to achieve security;
- It takes into account the contemporary interchangeable roles and missions of the security sector components; and,
- A SSR conceptualization explicitly links security sector reform directly to broader efforts toward democratization, human-rights promotion, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. (Bruneau and Matei 2008:913)

The definition of security has evolved through time, from the traditional idea of security equating to defense and is very state- and military-centric to a more human-centered definition. Salih, describes human security as "about protecting and empowering citizens to obtain vital freedoms from want, fear and hunger, as well as freedom to take action on one's own behalf, including, among other things, creating the building blocks for human flourishing, peace with dignity and a secure livelihood". (Salih 2008: 171)

As cited by Kienscherf, the Commission on Human Security defines human security as the "processes for protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations and for creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity". (Kienscherf 2011: 521)

With the evolution of the definition of security, the roles of the military in the Philippines has likewise evolved from the traditional warfare to being educators, builders, health workers, aid workers and policing. It is through these "non-traditional" roles that the military are trying to paint a different picture from the military of the 1970s era of martial law. There have been efforts to shift from resolving conflicts through guns alone towards peacebuilding through support to development and stakeholder engagement. In ARMM, where conflict has been a part of everyday life, the people of ARMM has tried to adapt with the limitations of delivery of services of state institutions. Since the military are already present in the area, they have taken on some of the roles of state institutions and has partnered with the local government units and various CSOs and NGOs.

Hall (2017:11), mentioned two different takes of the military on civil-military operations. According to Hall, there are military commanders who looked at CMO as a means of

gathering intelligence that can be further used in combat operations however there are also those that looked at CMO as part of a whole-of-government approach.

In 2016, then newly elected President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued a directive to “stream-line and re-engineer government development and security effort to ensure that government resources are spent wisely, and the outcomes are felt on the ground” (Office of the Executive Secretary, 2016). This directive prompted a collaboration between the National Security Council and the National Economic Development Authority in the crafting of the key national policy and plan of the current government, the Philippine Development Plan, National Security Policy and the National Security Strategy. These documents provided a mechanism for a more active role of the security sector, including the military, in development and nation building.

The AFP in turn drafted a new campaign plan, the Development Support and Security Plan, that is anchored on the three national documents. The campaign plan strengthened the roles of the military in support to development initiatives of the government which was started in their previous 6-year campaign plan, the Internal Peace and Security Plan. Both campaign plans highlighted the role of the military in domestic security.

Likewise, the campaign plans seek to bridge the gap between the military and the people and to allay the fears of human rights abuses that has plagued the organization. “One of the gains of the IPSP Bayanihan plan is the institutionalization of a strict adherence to Human rights, International Humanitarian Law, and Rule of Law by the military and are now firmly embedded in the doctrines and tactic, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of the AFP, and the AFP Transformation Roadmap.” (AFP 2017: 12).

After 6 years of implementation of the IPSP Bayanihan, a social weather survey on the trust ratings of the AFP in the whole of the Philippines was conducted with the “resulting net trust rating scores were a record-high very good +66”. The survey results showed trust ratings from 1998 to 2016. In 2005, the trust rating of the AFP was very low with +12 and increased to +49 in 2012, +64 in 2014 and +66 in 2016. In Mindanao, where the provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi, the AFP trust ratings is +69. (Social Weather Station 2017:1-5)

Mendoza, in her article also highlighted the following lessons learned from her years of work in the province of Sulu: “Multi sectoral involvement, community relations and beyond: innovative approaches, community relations for empowerment and institutional strengthening.” (Mendoza 2017:40-42)

This paper tries to use the concept of civil-military relations in looking at the whole-of-nation approach used by the military in their campaign plans and how it shifted the military to take on non-traditional roles to address the different development and security concerns in the conflict affected areas of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. Furthermore, the different types of civil-military relations are used in looking at how the military partners with different actors and stakeholders of development in the area.

3.2 Securitization Theory

Swarts and Karakatsanis describes “...securitization as the process by which political elites frame an issue as involving fundamental issues of security and survival against an existential threat...the issue (e.g. migration) may have no... obvious connection to security...”. (Swarts & Karakatsanis 2013:98)

Many people are not keen on the idea of securitization. Roe states that “the undesirability (as opposed to ineffectiveness) of securitization is the result of the ‘failure to deal with

issues as normal politics...although Wæver is by no means categorical in the claim that securitization is invariably worse than politicization, his thinking nevertheless suggests that securitizing problems may not always result in better outcomes...this is not to say that *all* issue areas are rendered less effective by securitization, but rather that some are better politicized (desecuritized) than others”. (Roe 2012)

Eroukhmanoff pointed out that the national security policy of each country is discussed and designated by politicians and decision makers and that “securitisation theory challenges traditional approaches to security...asserts that issues are not essentially threatening in themselves; rather, it is by referring to them as security issues that they become security problems”. (Eroukhmanoff 2017: 104)

Floyd, on the other hand, provided “three criteria that determine the moral rightness of securitization: there must be an objective existential threat, which is to say a threat that endangers the survival of an actor or an order regardless of whether anyone has realized this, the referent object of security must be morally legitimate, which is the only when the referent object is conducive to human well-being defined as the satisfaction of human needs, and the security response must be appropriate to the threat in question, which is to say that (a) the security response must be measured in accordance with the capabilities of the aggressor and (b) the securitizing actor must be sincere in his or her intentions” (Floyd 2011:428).

Floyd argued “that by framing an issue in security mode, the securitizing actor does something insofar as her or she issues a warning to the aggressor and/or promises protection to the referent object of security. A securitization is complete only if the warning/ promise made in the speech act is followed up by a change in relevant behavior by a relevant agent that is justified by this agent with reference to the declared threat.” (Floyd 2011:427 – 428)

She further argued that “a just securitization theory...renders securitization theory more policy relevant, and that such a theory has the potential to democratize the process of securitization” (Floyd 2011:437)

In line with the discussions of securitization is the concept of militarization. Bernazzoli and Flint (2009:450) states that “securitization certainly bears a significant relationship to militarization, but it allows for a broader range of actors and arenas, as it does not limit the scholar to exclusive consideration of the formal military institution. Militarization stresses the military as a primary actor, and thus poses the danger of obscuring the larger, more overarching upheavals of which it is but one part”.

This paper uses securitization theory in looking at how the identification of development and security concerns in the provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi can be monopolized by the military. Also, given that the island of Mindanao is under martial law (including ARMM), securitization theory can be used to look at how the Philippine government has ‘securitized’ development issues that has been plaguing the area. Other than addressing the conflict in the island, part of the decision to declare martial law is to ensure that development efforts are fast-tracked. Balzacq sees this as an attempt by “securitizing actors to align on a security issue to swing the audience’s support toward a policy or course of action” (Balzacq 2005: 173). Relatedly, the concept of militarization will be used to look at how the shift to non-traditional roles of the military under the new campaign plans can affect the relationship of the military with different actors on the ground.

3.3 Development and Security Nexus

Development has always been viewed in the economic lenses. Parallel to discussions of human security, economic development has also shifted to a more encompassing human development. The discussion of development in this paper referred to the development approach of interlinking of the discourses of human development, human security and human rights. In his paper, Gasper stated that “human development discourse has connected to human rights discourse notably in the Human Development Report 2000 and the spawning of human security discourse. The HDR 2000 presented ‘human development’ as a justification principle for rights, and human rights language as an essential format in policy operationalization.” (Gasper 2007: 11)

This shifts in the discussion of development and security further strengthened the link between the two concepts. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as cited by Stern and Ojendal states that, “development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop. Extreme poverty and infectious diseases threaten many people directly, but they also provide a fertile breeding ground for other threats, including civil conflicts. Even people in rich countries will be more secure if their Governments help poor countries to defeat poverty and disease by meeting the Millennium Development Goals. (Stern and Ojendal 2010:5)

Kienscherf cited the Moshtarak operation in Afghanistan that was based on a “counter-insurgency-style clear-hold-build model that was aimed at providing security, development and good governance to the local population...this pacification effort hinges on providing security to the local population while (re)building the politico-economic infrastructure that would ultimately enable the so-called host nation to govern itself. Moreover, the provision of security and development is supposed to occur against the backdrop of an overall battle over perceptions to be waged through effective information operations”. (Kienscherf 2011)

Duffield, as cited in Kienscherf, stated that “security and development have merged into a potentially global strategy for the management of at-risk and risky populations – a biopolitical containment strategy that seek[s] to restrict or manage the circulation of incomplete and hence potentially threatening life”. (Kienscherf 2011: 518)

The concept of merging security and development was exploited in counter insurgency frameworks of militaries around the world. The criticism of the Philippine military campaign plans stems from the idea that the security sector is using the guise of development efforts to justify the militarization of the region.

The paper tries to use the concept of the nexus of development and security will be used to look at how the lines between development and security concerns can be blurred. Also, the paper tries to use the concept as it studies the changing roles of the military in nation building espousing the whole of nation approach of the government. The paper also tries to see the detriments to society of the nexus of development and security particularly in conflict affected areas.

Chapter 4 Synthesis and Analysis of the Findings

This paper looked at how the military perceive the impacts of their performance of non-traditional roles in winning the peace to the dynamics of development in conflict areas in the Philippines particularly in the conflict-affected provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

4.1 Development and Security Concerns in the Provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi

This section aimed to provide an overview of the security and development situation in the area as it looked at how the military balances its roles in both security and development efforts of the government. The provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi (BaSuTa) is a conflict area which make it difficult for non-residents to come in and provide an assessment of the security and development situation in the area. In a country like the Philippines where poverty incidence is very high particularly in the rural areas, there are certain places that are less accessible because of the lack of infrastructure development. Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi are island provinces in the Sulu Archipelago and is mainly accessible only through ferries from Zamboanga City. However, even when you reach the capital of the provinces there are still areas where it is difficult to reach. In some instances, one must cross the rivers and climb mountains just to reach certain barangays. On top of these infrastructure concerns, general safety of the people is a great concern in trying to reach these areas. As an active conflict area, there are still ongoing military operations against threat groups in the provinces.

In line with this, the military is considered a constant presence in the presence and as such are considered a credible source of overview of the development and security concerns faced by the people in the area. In the cases of some of the military participants of this study, they were assigned in various years in the area. Some were assigned during their younger years and was re-assigned again in more recent years. In this regard, they were able to provide a comparative view of the development and security situation across the years.

These factors that limit the accessibility of the area provided the military a monopoly of providing an assessment of the situation on the ground, seemingly making them experts on identifying both development and security concerns in the conflict affected areas. This can result to the military controlling the narrative of what is actually happening in the area which in turn can impact the government policies and programs that are implemented. However, it should be noted that a military officers' viewpoint of the situation may be limited given that he is only assigned in an area for a limited time. Also, soldiers are only observers in the area and most of the time does not have a historical, cultural and social know-how of how the actual community lives. Their strong presence can at times cause the people in the community to instead take on the position of observers in their own area. Despite attempts of consultations done by the government with these people in drafting plans and policies most of the time the louder and stronger voices of the military are given more premium. This is particularly because of the popular support that the military receives from policymakers. This is consistent with securitization theory where the military are considered the securitizing actors that identifies these different issues as a potential threat to the existence of the people.

The National Security Policy (NSP) 2017-2022 identified the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) as one of the primary threat groups in the area. It defines the "ASG as an extremist organization known for its bandit-like tactics and notorious for beheadings and kidnap-for-ransom

activities in Mindanao” and identifies it as the “foremost terror group inflicting severe socio-political and economic disruptions” (NSC 2017: 11). The ASG is described in a study by the Center for Naval Analyses:

While at times the group has carried out ideologically-based operations focused on the establishment of an autonomous Muslim state in the Philippines governed according to Sharia law, it has also conducted attacks with the sole purpose of banditry and criminality. Over time, however, the group has remained fundamentally radically Islamic. ASG is largely funded through kidnapping for ransom operations and extortion. It has also received external funding through other extremist groups, such as JI, and oversea remittances. (Hammerburg and Faber 2017:4)

The group continued to be a persistent threat since its inception in the 90s. This was reiterated by military participants of this study where they mentioned that they were already fighting the ASG when they were young lieutenants during their first assignment in the area and was still fighting the group when they returned as senior officers. Despite the continuous operations and different strategies by the military to address the threat posed by the ASG, they continue to exist and has even flourished throughout the years. Participants from the CSOs concur with the observation of the military that among the violent extremist groups in the BaSulTa area, the ASG remains to be the primary threat.

The threat posed by the ASG to the people in the area is further aggravated by the presence of other terrorist groups in the area. Among those mentioned by the participants are the rogue Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Daesh-inspired local and foreign terrorist groups. They also identified other lawless groups such as illegal loggers, smugglers and conflict between powerful clans (RIDO) as elements that contribute to security issues in the area. The terrorism problem in the island of Mindanao is an offshoot of the global war against terrorism. In the recent war in Marawi City, the local terrorist group raised the ISIS flag and pledged their allegiance to the group. The terrorism problem is both an internal and external security concern of the country. As part of the external defense role of the military, they have engaged in bilateral and multilateral military exercise with other countries. Likewise, the Philippines has always been active in sending military troops in various peacekeeping operations all over the world.

It is noted that the military participants of the study readily stated the various terrorist groups as primary security concerns in the area. This implies that despite the move towards human security in their campaign plans, the military still focuses on the more traditional security threat groups. In line with discussions of evolution of the definition of security, the identification of these terror groups is a traditional approach to security wherein the referent object is the state and the terrorism concerns is a threat to the existence of the people in Mindanao and in effect, the nation as well. This can imply that although the military participants recognize the impact of development issues to the lives of the people in the area, they do not consider these issues as an existential threat.

On the other hand, CSO participants looked at security more in the human security lens. One definition of human security given by Benedek (2008:9) is “the security of people against threats to human dignity”. This can be reflected in how the participants from the CSOs identified the presence of too much military and police checkpoints as a security issue. Emphasizing that although they agree that checkpoints were put in place to mitigate terrorist groups especially since carrying of firearms was considered a normal scene in the three provinces, they pointed out that the presence of these checkpoints are in themselves considered a security threat.

Citing a report by International Alert, Strachan stated that the proliferation of firearms is a problem in ARMM. She further states that “in Mindanao, there are estimated to be about 500,000 illegal firearms in the hands of civilians...half of which are found in ARMM”

(Strachan 2015:16). The Sulu Archipelago has been a conflict area for decades that the people in the community grew up seeing military operations against different threat groups throughout the years. The people saw a need to arm themselves to protect their families and livelihood against different threat groups in the area and as such has taken for granted the presence of firearms in their community. This desensitization of the people to the proliferation of firearms in their community implies that they have accepted the security threats identified by the military and in turn, of the government.

One of the participants of the study is from a CSO that monitors the human rights violations in the Philippines. She highlighted that the presence of numerous checkpoints made the people in the community feel more insecure since they feel that their rights are being violated. This was further aggravated during the early days of the declaration of martial law in 2017 where both police and military will roam around public places with high-powered firearms. However, CSO-2 pointed out that after some months into the martial law, the number of checkpoints was slowly lessened. It is noteworthy to mention that what was considered by the military as a deterrent to security threats in the area was considered a source of high insecurity by other stakeholders like CSOs.

During the interview, CSO-1 was warier of discussions about the military especially the issue of martial law. This was evident when she discussed how they have less cases of reported human rights violations in the area but attributed it to less access to the people due to the declaration of martial and the possible fear of the people in reporting the actual violations. This supports arguments of how human rights and human security are interlinked concepts. As stated by Owen (2002:125), “human security is thus a broader concept, comprising fundamental rights as well as basic capabilities and absolute needs...human rights are part of human security”. Relatedly, the securitization of the issues in these provinces allowed bypassing of normal procedures, depoliticizing of issues and the lack of room for exercise of rights.

In line with these security threats, there are significant development issues that affect the general well-being of the people in the area. All the participants (*both military and CSO*) of the study emphasized the need for the improvement of the delivery of basic and social services in the area as the primary development issue faced by the archipelago. Access to these basic government services are lacking even in the capital cities of the provinces and is even worse in the far-flung barangays in the archipelago. Hence, one of the main infrastructure concerns identified by the participants is the absence of roads especially towards the inner areas of the province emphasizing that this will facilitate an easier flow of goods in and out of the area. Building of roads are deemed crucial in development efforts. In an article written by Berg, she states that “Roads are the arteries through which the economy pulses. By linking producers to markets, workers to jobs, students to school, and the sick to hospitals, roads are vital to any development agenda” (Berg 2015). However, in an area where governance is a concern, building of roads can be leveraged for political power. There are instances in the Philippines, particularly in rural areas, where only half of the roads will be finished because the family that lives on the other side did not vote for the current local chief executive. Also, in ways that roads can bring services closer to people, it can also facilitate easier transport for threat groups in the area.

In terms of the health sector, there is a lack of facilities with very limited public hospitals in the provinces. This forces the people to travel to nearby provinces for medical attention especially for specialized medical conditions. Also, since the provinces are known to be an active conflict area it is difficult to attract doctors and other health workers to stay in the area. This results to a lack of monitoring of performance of government health personnel making it easier for corruption cases. CSO-2 cited cases where doctors issue prescription for

medicines that are not needed for additional hospital stock and then sold it to patients. Conflicts affect the economic dynamics of the people. Depetris Chauvin states that,

The presence of conflict affects people's economic incentives. Some sectors of activity flourish, while others suffer...we predict that for moderately destructive conflicts labor-intensive sectors are most affected by fighting, while for highly destructive conflicts capital-intensive sectors suffer most. (Depetris Chauvin and Rohner 2009:2)

Another key development concern identified by the participants is with regards to the education sector, pointing out that there is also a lack of facilities and personnel in this sector. There are not enough school buildings to accommodate the population of the school children in the area. Likewise, as in the case of attracting health personnel, there is also a difficulty in getting more teachers in the area. CSO-2 observed that there were teachers who travel to the province of Basilan only once a week to give homework and exams and then stays in Zamboanga City for the rest of the week. The issues with the educational system resulted to an increase of out of school youth which made them an easy target for recruitment by violent extremist groups. Children and youth are the most vulnerable group in terms of recruitment by extremist groups. There are instances wherein joining these groups are preferable than doing small paying jobs given that they do not have access to education that can open more opportunities for them. The right to education is a basic human right but the people in conflict affected areas are at times deprived of this. Although, "education cannot prevent an individual from committing a violent act in the name of a violent extremist ideology but the provision of relevant education of good quality can help create the conditions that make it difficult for violent extremist ideologies and acts to proliferate" (UNESCO 2017:22).

This is an example of how development and security are inextricably linked. A significant development issue such as access to education may have a long-term effect to potential security issues. In this case, the inaccessibility of quality education to the youth in the Sulu archipelago can lead to a bigger security problem of exploitation and recruitment by violent extremist groups.

Another concern mentioned is the recent cocolisap⁴ problem that affected the coconuts in the three provinces. As an agricultural region, this problem greatly affected the source of livelihood of the people. Coconuts are one of the main sources of income of the people in the area hence while the problem is yet to be addressed, there is a need for alternative livelihood for the people. Rubber production, which is another source of livelihood of the people, has seen a decline in the recent years. The lack of livelihood and the difficulty in finding work in the area led some young people to travel to the cities to look for better opportunities. CSO-1 cited a case during the early months of the recent martial law wherein their group was requested to intervene in a case where a group of young men who travelled to Manila for work were arrested as suspected terrorists when police found out that they were from the BaSulTa area. Upon coordination with the group they found out that these young men were recruited to work in the capital. Again, these types of cases highlight how the lack of economic development makes the people more vulnerable to security threats.

CSO-2 highlighted how security threats in turn affects development when he stated that "when there is terrorism, development is halted in the area". Relatedly, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007:144) states that:

⁴ Cocolisap or coconut scale insects are pests that are common in coconuts as its name suggests but in severe infestation could spread to perennial fruit trees. Damages to leaves, stalks and branches cause stunt growth, defoliation and dieback. Damages to fruits cause blemishes, deformed and unmarketable. (<https://www.scribd.com/doc/236784784/What-is-Cocolisap>)

While the causality links between war and underdevelopment still remain to be fully explored, evidence confirms that the economic, social, political and environmental costs of war can slow down, hold or even reverse development processes.

In trying to find out the security and development situation in the archipelago, some governance issues also surfaced which the participants deem as affecting both development and security concerns. They pointed out that elected government officials of the three provinces are from the powerful political clans of the area. Political dynasty is a norm in the region. Participants also mentioned that the poor local governance results to a very unresponsive delivery of basic services. MIL-6 mentioned the need for a “functioning good governance in some municipalities, particularly at the barangay/ grassroots level”. The presence of good governance serves as a harmonizing element in managing the security and development concerns in the area. In the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2018, it is stated that “bad governance and structural inequalities have impeded economic progress and continue to demand priority attention, effort and resources from government” (NSS 2018:33). Also, a strong local government institution can take the lead in partnering with different stakeholders from both security and development sector.

The security and development concerns identified by the participants revealed a link between the two concepts. The concerns identified are in some ways relate and affect each other. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007:115-116) states that:

Human development and human security are indistinctly linked given that progress in one enhances the choices of progress in another, while failure in one increases risk of failure of another...human development and human security are both concerned with human freedoms, and they both seek to address the same root causes: horizontal inequalities, human insecurities...human development and human security thus appear as two parallel processes that go hand in hand. Progress in one enhances the chances of progress in the other, when failure in one enhances the chances of failure in the other. Human security and human development are therefore overall sister concepts with mutually beneficial cross-contributions.”

4.2 The Military in the Whole of Nation Approach

This section focuses on how the military understands and implements the notion of the whole of nation approach that the government is employing in their strategies. Understanding this is essential because this framework thrusts them towards another direction in how they perform their functions. In working with the military for 15 years, the researcher has observed a varying degree of understanding of government policies across the ranks. Furthermore, other than merely understanding the framework of government, this study looked at how the military sees their position in implementing this framework. It looked at how the military perceives the effect it has on the performance of their responsibilities.

The whole of nation approach is defined in the IPSP Bayanihan as an approach that “seeks to bring about a concerted effort towards national peace and security. It must be clarified that this approach is not just about burden sharing. It is about a concept and understanding of security that is shared not just among security forces and government institutions but also with civil society and the communities” (AFP 2010:25).

One military participant of the study defined the whole of nation approach simply as a collective effort of all stakeholders to address security concerns. Emphasizing that the whole of nation approach stemmed out from the understanding that security is a shared responsibility by stakeholders which include all government institutions (national and local government agencies and local government units), civil society organizations, private sector and the

local community. Although the ten military participants of the study stated their definition differently, the heart of their statements is the cooperation and collaboration of all sectors of society. As mentioned in Chapter 3 of this study, security has evolved through time, from the traditional state security towards a more human-centered definition of human security. In the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2018 discusses national security as “equated not only to the traditional notions of national defense and regime survival, but also the overall well-being of the citizens, the promotion of economic development and the protection of the environment and natural resources” (NSS 2018:3).

MIL-5 stated that the whole of nation approach is “anchored on the belief that insurgency is a problem that is not borne on the domain of the military but a problem that entails multi-disciplinary approach by the government”. This is supported by MIL-9 wherein he mentions that the military has been focused on dealing with the actual conflict only and does not have the capacity to address the root causes of the conflict on its own. He further states that “...to solve the problem is to address its root cause. The root cause [of conflict] is complex and multi-dimensional and the solution must be multi-dimensional.”

The military is but one component in this whole framework of the government. In terms of the role that they should play, the military participants agree and emphasize that the military should only play support in development efforts and their efforts should be complementary to the effort of the government and other sectors of the society. In local government units (LGUs), the local chief executives should always take the lead in government efforts. Again, the importance of good governance was reiterated by the participants for this framework to work. MIL-6 pointed out that:

as the military addresses the threat posed by armed groups in the area, it should be complemented by the local government units in addressing the developmental needs in the area and the exercise of a good, functioning governance. The government agencies should likewise function to ensure the [delivery of] basic social services of the community.

However, as in most programs of the government it all boils down to the implementation. MIL-4 stated that the whole of nation approach is an ‘ideal’ approach that is not actually implemented in the ground. “It remains superficial particularly in cases where the implementors are myopic on the approaches that they employ”. MIL-10 agrees with this and stated that the whole of nation approach is “easier said than done”.

One of the main points of contestation in the whole of nation approach is the debate on whether the military should be involved in development work and whether they should be taking the lead or merely supporting the government efforts. Likewise, whether this additional mandate of involvement in development efforts side tracks the military from their primary mandate.

Some participants highlighted that in the case of conflict areas, such as the area of this study where the security situation is highly volatile, the military is critical in the development agenda. In this situation, the military needs to perform dual roles: traditional role of protecting the people and the non-traditional role of partnering in development. MIL-2 mentioned that other than providing security, they should provide the avenue for different stakeholders to come together as a support to the development efforts in the community. In conflict areas, it is at times difficult to identify the actual development needs of the people. As mentioned above, the military can provide a situation report on the development needs in the area because their frontline units are in far flung hard to reach areas. They can likewise assist in ensuring that these development projects are implemented without interference from armed threat groups.

The notion of the whole of nation approach is a means towards ‘winning the peace’. Peace is described in the national security policy and in the military campaign plans as the absence of internal strife. The idea of peace in these security documents always go hand in

hand with the concept of security. Also, in the first state of the nation address of President Duterte last July 2016 he stated that, “peace can be attained only if we meet the fundamental needs of every man, woman and child”.

Peace is a fluid concept. It can be defined simply as the absence of war or as discussed by Doyle in his paper can be defined as liberal peace that embodies the following pillars: “republican representation, an ideological commitment to fundamental human rights and transnational interdependence” (Doyle 2005:463). It has always been said that peace is elusive in the island of Mindanao. The traditional military operations focused on defeating the enemies through armed solution in order to stop the fighting and to achieve peace. The recent campaign plans and security policies assert that the government and the military is veering away from this idea.

The whole of nation approach employs a synchronized approach in peace and development. The participants define it as shift in mindset of the military from ‘defeating the armed threat group’ to ‘winning the peace’. The concept of winning the peace is part of counterinsurgency doctrines espoused by different militaries all over the world. “Counterinsurgency is thus essentially a tactical framework for winning the hearts and minds by engaging in violence against insurgents with minimal civilian casualties, delivering public services to civilians, and instigating government reform” (McKenzie 2014).

The AFP campaign plan, IPSP Bayanihan reiterates how the ‘winning the peace’ concept provided the framework for the military’s new approach to peace and security and facilitated the shift from the highly militaristic solution to a more people-centered strategy. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of different stakeholders taking active roles in the pursuit of peace and security. One of the main ideas of the whole of nation approach in winning the peace is ensuring the support of the people to the government.

MIL-7 pointed out that “insurgency is a tug of war of people support between the government and the insurgents; whoever gets the strong people support wins the war”. The military sees their involvement in development efforts as a means to win the support of the people. In an area where poverty incidence is very high, the people are more concerned on ensuring that their basic needs are met rather than on who is providing these needs. MIL-9 states that the involvement in development work of the military in the archipelago “changed the people’s perception of the military from that of the warfighters whose concern is the destruction of the enemy who were also their brothers and someone most of them feared to that of a nation builder, partner and ally who are also concerned for human development”.

However, all the military participants emphasized that should they be involved in development efforts then their role should be limited to development support only. They should not take the lead role in development projects. One participant mentioned that participation in development work, especially those where the military are forced to take the lead, drain the limited resources of the military.

On the other hand, some military participants do not agree with the involvement of the military institution in development work mentioning that it is beyond the expertise of the military. MIL-4 feels that the military should not be compelled to perform development works, emphasizing the need for inter-agency cooperation where the military is just but one small part. He further mentions that the military should only be involved in security matters and in its primary mandate of warfighting. MIL-6 also mentioned that the downside in the involvement of the military in development is that there is a danger that they may be performing the roles that should primarily be the responsibilities of civilians.

Relatedly, as mentioned in Chapter 3 of this paper, Huntington discussed the concept of civilian control and identified two types, subjective civilian control and objective civilian control. In a critique of Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State*, Mandelstam stated that

“objective civilian control relies primarily on an autonomous military ethic of expertise, political neutrality, and professional competence. In this scheme, civilian control derives from the transformation of the military into a tool of the state. The military’s role is to develop and apply the ways and means to implement ends, goals, and objectives defined by civilian political leadership. In contrast, subjective civilian control of the military results from civilianizing the military; that is, giving the military an independent role in setting national priorities. In subjective control, the military is one among other groups contending and competing for influence in setting policy and ranking national priorities” (Mandales 2009: 3-4). In implementing the whole of nation approach in their campaign plans, the role of the military has evolved from merely a tool of the state to being a strong voice influencing policies and programs of the government. Particularly in conflict affected areas, where as discussed above the military have a seeming monopoly in providing a situationer of the scenario on the ground. This leads to a great deal of influence in policy making.

The varying views on military role in development highlights the importance of the involvement of other agencies and individuals in addressing security and development issues. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007:18) states that

Human security posits that security is not just the end of war, but also the ability to go about one’s business safely, in a safe environment – to have a job, to participate in political processes, to have choices for the education of one’s children, to live a healthy life and to do all this with the knowledge that one’s family is safe and unharmed. Insecurity, therefore, is not only a problem of physical safety, but also of deprivation and restricted access to health and education facilities, legal and political rights and social opportunities. Hence, insecurity should not be dealt with through short-term military solutions, but a long-term comprehensive strategy that abodes by promises of development and promotion of human rights. It should promote public policy and state-building efforts that reduce local incentives that trigger insecurities in the first place.

Most of the military participants think that the involvement of the military in development efforts, works hand-in-hand with their primary role of warfighting. Although, warfighting remains as the primary role of the military, all the security effort of the institution should be aligned with the development plans of the local government unit in the area.

The participants of the study believe that the military can balance their warfighting function and the involvement of the institution in development work because it is an organization that is trained to adapt to the situation. However, they think that although it might not affect their warfighting function, increased role in development may reinforce the perception of failed government service in the conflict areas which again raises the importance of good governance. Some participants mentioned that the involvement of the military in development work may be attributed to the prevalence of poor governance in the provinces. The presence of the military can project a semblance of the presence of a strong government in the conflict areas and public goods provisioning by the state. However, this may lead people to think that there is militarization in the area. Particularly when the military starts to take the lead in tasks that should naturally be done by the civilian government offices. This can be a downside in the concept of nexus of development and security when there is no civilian government or civilian authority that supervises or manages the implementation of government programs including that of the military.

Also, the island of Mindanao has been a prevalent recipient for development aid and as such various local and international development NGOs have implemented aid programs in the area. In some ways, this can also lead to dependence of the community to these NGOs and deters them from being self-sufficient in their development efforts. Tadjbakhsh and

Chenoy (2007:100) states that “traditional development can also undermine human security by setting up a dependent relationship vis-à-vis donors, by undermining local capacities and forcing tradeoffs in social and human spending under the weight of conditionalities”. This may also be the case with too much involvement of the military in development programs. MIL-5 pointed out that if the local community becomes used to this type of service from the military they might become dependent to the military even with other tasks that should be performed by other agencies of the government.

The military is an agency that is trained primarily to follow orders. Despite varying sentiments on the involvement of the institution in development efforts of the government, the military will always do as instructed. Some will establish partnerships with all stakeholders of development and even go the extra mile of initiating development programs where there is an evident absence of such in an area. However, there are those who will continue doing the traditional role of warfighting and will only provide the minimum participation in development efforts of the government which at times is relegated to providing physical security and use of military resources by different stakeholders if it does not interfere with what they feel as the primary responsibility.

4.3 The Military, Its Partners and Militarization

The military has been working with various stakeholders in the performance of its mandate. Even before the implementation of the two campaign plans which highlighted the need for more stakeholder engagement, the military was already working with stakeholders particularly in conflict areas. Stakeholders in the ground include the local community, local government agencies, the private sectors and various NGOs/ CSOs. However, the necessity of military presence and involvement in non-security related activities has always been questioned. This study looked at how the military views their partners and the relevance of the need to work with them. Likewise, the study wanted to look at how the military views the concept of militarization.

Militarization is defined as “military build-up [*which is*] the process of creating or increasing military capability through the gathering of arms and the raising of troops with the aim of waging military action” (Naidu 1985: 9). On the other hand, militarization was defined by the participants of the study as the process by which some areas are controlled by the military and wherein they are imposing their will on the people to achieve advantage. Furthermore, it is defined as a situation when the military forcibly intervenes in the functions, affairs and decisions of the civilian authorities, entities and communities.

The military has always been plagued with accusations of militarization. However, MIL-6 pointed out that the military can only be accused of militarization if their actions are done unilaterally without proper consultation with stakeholders. Also, in cases of conflict affected areas like the BaSulTa area, the military participants of the study feel that the stakeholders welcome the presence and active involvement of the military because it gives them a sense of security during undertaking development projects. However, this may not be the total sentiment in the ground. In the case of CSO-1, during the interview she was hesitant to discuss the relationship of her group with the military. She mentioned that their group was tagged by the military as left-sympathizers. During the interview the researcher sensed a certain degree of fear from the military which was validated when CSO-1 stated that she received death threats during the recent martial law in the country. Contrary to this, CSO-2 was more open in the discussions of partnerships with the military and the accusations of militarization given the declaration of martial law. He mentioned that although there was fear at the onset of martial law he saw the gradual acceptance of the people of the situation. He further stated that there was simply a need to strictly follow the rules which he feels is needed. This

openness to the military presence in the area may be attributed to the familiarity of CSO-2 with the military given that his office works directly with the military through the Office of Civil Defense.

Placing the island of Mindanao, including the Sulu Archipelago, can be alluded to a militarization of the area. However, the military participants reiterated that this is not the case. Stating that despite the increased presence of the military in the area the decisive powers of the local government is not impeded by military leadership. Despite being placed under martial law, the local government units are still performing and are still playing an active role in the area and is in fact preparing for elections in 2019. Wolpin (1986:2), stated that “the mere existence of armed forces does not itself mean that a state is either militaristic or embarked upon a course of militarization”.

One of the main issues and concerns in the BaSulTa area is the absence of national government agencies because it is part of the ARMM. Interaction is always limited to the regional government. However, the relationship between the military and the regional government agencies is very cooperative. Having a good working relationship with the regional government agencies in the BaSulTa area was relatively easier given that the military is a very hierarchical institution. All directives emanate from the defense department which is their mother agency and thus all coordination for project involvement is coursed through the bureaucracy and cascaded as a directive to the military on the ground.

There is a robust interagency relationship that is very cooperative and has synchronized actions towards the implementation of the development projects in the area. The regional government gave various projects in the conflict affected areas and would coordinate with the military primarily for security to ensure the safety of their personnel and equipment. They in turn welcome inputs from the military and is open to suggestions made by military commanders to employ the local workforce.

The need to work with the local community is recognized by the military with participants mentioning that that the locals know better the social issues in the area. The participants of the study highlight the need for trust in the relationship with the community. This takes considerable effort because the people in the area are victims of generational conflict. However, the military believes in the importance of building a strong rapport because they can serve as dependable partners in securing the area. This brings us back to the context of winning the hearts and minds of the people. Some of the military participants of the study believes that they already have a healthy relationship with the local community. However, they pointed out that there is a need for the military to participate in more community relations training with the local community to address the biases and to ensure better understanding between them.

In some areas in the three provinces, particularly in far flung and very active conflict areas, the local community views the military as the representative of the government expecting them to function as health workers, teachers, police, agriculturist, social workers and peacekeeper. This again highlights the need for better local governance to ensure that the proper civilian government agency is performing their function.

Another key stakeholder in the whole of nation framework of the military is the private sector. They add strength to the convergence of the initiatives in the area. The private sector provides assistance in development efforts of the government through their corporate social responsibility (CSR). The private sector sponsors community-based projects that can benefit the community. Establishing a partnership with them likewise helps bring the military closer to the people in the community. However, the participants of the study stressed that although it is important to have a healthy relationship with the private sector the military is cautious in seeking assistance from them. The private sector support should always be voluntary to avoid misinterpretation that the military is taking advantage of the relationship and vice versa.

During the administration of President Arroyo, the government including the military has espoused a whole of government framework in its programs. Each agency and bureau engage in interagency coordination in implementing its development and security programs. The key difference of the whole of nation framework is the inclusion of the CSOs in the implementation of government programs. In drafting the IPSP Bayanihan in 2010, the military partnered with Bantay Bayanihan which endeavored to monitor the implementation of military operations in the country. The military recognizes that the CSOs play a critical role in the development initiatives in the area and acknowledges that they are key stakeholders in the community. Benedek (2008:11) highlighted that “NGOs and civil society in general play a major role in the study of, and advocacy on, human security concerns. NGOs are involved in practically all human security issues.”

The participants of the study mentioned that during their assignment in the area, they have very good relations with CSOs that is anchored on mutual trust and commitment to pursue development initiatives. The partnership was collaborative wherein both CSOs and military participates and supports each other’s projects.

The CSOs in the BaSulTa area complements the efforts of the government through various forms of intervention such as community-based projects, medical/ dental missions, feeding programs, reorientation/education on the true tenets of Islam. In most of these projects they work with the military in the area. Also, one of the key roles that the CSOs play that the military acknowledges is providing advice, feedback and critic on the civilian government’s governance function and in the military operations.

Despite being under martial law, the military participants stated that they feel that the local populace and local government welcome the deployment of troops in the area. However, some participants acknowledge that when the military is being sent to augment the existing troops in the area, most of the people will feel that their area is being militarized. In cases such as this, it is imperative that the military understand the perspective of the local community.

Participants from the civil society organization on the other hand cited that people conflict affected areas are so used to the presence of the military in the area that they have accepted it as a norm. One key points in securitizing an issue as discussed in the securitization theory is ensuring that the audience accept that it is such. CSO-2 mentioned that the ongoing conflict in the archipelago forces the actors, or in this case the military to adapt its strategies. He stated that “in an ideal world, the military should not be involved in development projects however since there is an ongoing conflict, we are constrained to work with them in the implementation of our development projects”. They continue to work with the military because they feel that they do not have a choice which at times lead to cases of human rights violations.

The military campaign plans put premium on stakeholder engagement and thus encourages the military on the ground to nurture partnerships with various government agencies, the local community, the private sector and the civil society organizations. However, the researcher has observed that there are varying degrees of interaction and cooperation of the military with different organizations. In the implementation of the IPSP Bayanihan, a group of CSO called Bantay Bayanihan worked closely with the military in monitoring the implementation of the program. However, as pointed out by CSO-1 her group is tagged by the military as left sympathizers and hence do not have a robust relationship with them. It can be noted that in both military campaign plans, IPSP and DSSP, statements about CSO engagement are very general. There is no discussion on how to deal with groups that are critical to the government more so with groups that are tagged as left sympathizers.

4.4 The Military and the Local Chief Executives

The local government units are considered by the military as indispensable partners for any initiatives. They have mutual respect and the relationship is stable as long as the military remains apolitical. Because of the interagency approaches employed by the government, there are established coordinating platform and mechanisms in the BaSulTa area with respect to partnership with local government units. The military are part of the Peace and Order Council of the LGU which serves as an avenue to ensure that the security plans of the military are in line with the medium- and long-term development plans in the area.

MIL-6 noted that he observed a very proactive, collaborative and supportive relationship between the military and the LGU. MIL-5 pointed out that this may be the case because in conflict affected areas, the LGU needs the military to ensure that security so that they are able to perform their function and mandate. The relationship with LGUs and the military is likewise observed by the study participants from CSOs where CSO-2 even pointing out that the LGUs and the military share resources in implementing projects. CSO-1 mentioned that the friendly relations with LCEs are observable. However, she mentioned that at times, because of this friendly relation the military are used as private escorts by the LCEs.

In maintaining a relationship with LGUs it is imperative that the military has an amicable relationship with the local chief executives regardless of political party affiliations. In most conflict affected areas, the LCEs are the ones that request the military to put up camps in their locality. Also, as with the local community, most of the LCEs in conflict affected areas are used to having military presence in the area. However, there are still some instances where the LCEs are threatened by the military presence. MIL-10 stated that LCEs are only threatened when they are involved with illegal activities such as selling of illegal drugs and firearms. Hence, when more troops were deployed in the area it served as a detriment to their illegal activities.

MIL-5 highlighted the need to recognize the authority of the LCEs in the area. Military commanders should realize that they are there simply to augment the security needs of the locality. Respect should be given to the LCEs as the duly elected official by the people. The military should ensure that they are not considered as threats to the leadership of the LCE and should remain non-partisan.

The good working relations of the military with the local chief executives can have both good and bad effects. The role of the military as a securitizing actor is reinforced by these LCEs who supports the assessments done by the military on the security and development situation on the ground thus strengthening their role in influencing policies pertaining to these conflict affected areas. Likewise, this be the other way around when LCEs identify a development concern as a 'security threat' then it can be validated by the ground commanders because they have a 'friendly' relationship.

Chapter 3 presented Angstrom's five types of civil-military relations. Ideally, since the Philippines is a democracy then there should be civilian supremacy over the military but since the provinces of BaSulTa and the whole of Mindanao is under martial law then there may be cases wherein there is military supremacy over the civilians. This is reiterated with a statement by MIL-6 that "while the martial law is in effect, the AFP units **allow** the LCEs and LGUs to continue performing their functions.

Chapter 5 Conclusion

This paper aimed to determine how the non-traditional interventions of the military affect the development in the conflict affected areas of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. Likewise, the paper attempted to answer the following questions:

- a) How does the military describe the security and development concerns in the provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi?

The study showed that in the three provinces, development and security concerns are inextricably linked with one reinforcing and affecting each other. The findings of the study showed that the different identified development concerns in the three provinces makes the people more vulnerable to security threats and likewise, security issues affect the development.

The study also showed that despite using the concept of human security in its campaign plans, the military still identifies the traditional security threats as primary security issues. Implying that although they consider the development issues as threats to the people in the area, it is not an existential threat and thus should not be considered a security threat.

Another, key finding of this study is that the inaccessibility of the conflict affected areas can result to a monopoly of the military in identifying various development and security concerns. This in turn can result to the military having a powerful voice in policy making and for programs to be implemented in the areas. Likewise, good governance is deemed a key factor in managing and addressing development and security concerns.

- b) How does the military situate their role in the whole of nation approach of the current government in development?

Findings of the study highlights that the situation in BaSulTa are unconventional hence actors in the ground tend to perform unconventional roles. This unconventional situation is utilized by the military in employing the whole of nation approach to defeat the enemy using the concept of winning the peace. The study likewise reiterates how the military acknowledges the importance of partnership with different stakeholders in the community (*government agencies, local communities, private sector and civil society organizations*) particularly in the whole-of-nation approach of the government.

However, the military is divided in terms of engaging in development work under the whole of nation approach. Although the study showed that the military agreed with the notion of multi-sector collaboration but are divided whether they should take a lead or only support roles in development.

- c) How does the perception of militarization of conflict areas by the local community, government offices, private sector, and NGOs/ CSOs shape how the military deals with them?

The study showed that despite being placed under martial law, the military participants of the study feel that there is no militarization in the area which is contrary to some definitions of militarization in various literature. This statement that militarization does not exist in the area maybe attributed to the recognition that the Local Government Units remain to be the key institutions in the success of development and security programs.

However, the study also showed that being in a conflict affected area affected how the people reacts the presence of the military in their community. This may imply that the people has accepted that there is an existential security threat in their community that justifies the long-term presence of the military in the area.

- d) How does the military manage the power relations between them and the civilian government in the conflict affected provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi?

The study showed that the military acknowledges the need to recognizes that the local chief executives should be the primary authority in the ground and that the military should always play a supporting role only. Anchored on the belief that the local government are key institutions in the success of development and security programs. Also, the showed that the military should remain professional and needs to be apolitical and should establish an amicable relationship the LCE regardless of party affiliations.

In sum, the extent to how the various roles that the military take affect the development in the ground cannot be measured but being a powerful tool of the state, they are bound to affect the dynamics of the processes with their mere presence in the area. The military can control the narrative of the various threats in the three provinces which in effect has implications on policies and the implementations of programs. Furthermore, how the military relates to the different actors, which includes LGUs, government agencies, private sector, and CSOs, likewise affects the delivery of services on the ground. Lastly, good governance is a key factor in how the actions of security forces impacts development of the area.

Appendices

Appendix 1 Interview Questions for the Military

1. Respondents Profile

NAME:
CURRENT POSITION:
CURRENT OFFICE:
PREFERRED MODE OF COMMUNICATION:
(E-mail, FB Messenger, Viber, WhatsApp)
EMAIL ADDRESS:
MOBILE NUMBER:

2. Background

- a. Were you assigned in Basilan? Sulu? Tawi-tawi? If yes, when were you assigned in the area?
(Please indicate the province and the inclusive years you were assigned in the area)
- b. What are the security concerns that you observed when you were assigned in the area?
- c. What are the development concerns/needs that you observed in the area?

3. The Military and the Whole of Nation Framework

- a. What is your understanding of the whole of nation approach of the past (PNoy) and the current (PRRD) administrations?
- b. Do you think the military should be involved in development work? Why or why not?
 - b.1. If yes, what do you think are the roles/functions of the military in this whole of nation approach?
 - b.2. If no, do you think that the military is compelled, in a way, to take on more civilian roles in this whole of nation approach?
- c. How does the involvement of the military in "development" work affect your performance on your primary role of warfighting?

4. Militarization and military partnerships

- a. Have you worked with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) when you were assigned in the area?
 - a.1. If yes, how would you describe your relationship/ interaction with these CSOs?
 - a.2. If no, what prevented you from working with CSOs?
- b. Have you worked with the local community when you were assigned in the area?
 - b.1. If yes, how would you describe your relationship/ interaction with the local community?
 - b.2. If no, what prevented you from working with the local community?
- c. Have you worked with the private sector when you were assigned in the area?
 - c.1. If yes, how would you describe your relationship/ interaction with the private sector?
 - c.2. If no, what prevented you from working with the private sector?
- d. Have you worked with the regional offices/field units of national government agencies (NGAs) when you were assigned in the area?
 - d.1. If yes, how would you describe your relationship/ interaction with the regional offices/field units of national government agencies?
 - d.2. If no, what prevented you from working with the regional offices/field units of national government agencies?
- e. What is your understanding of the concept of militarization?
- f. Did the accusations of militarization affect your relationship with the CSOs, local community, private sector and regional offices of NGAs?
 - f.1. If yes, in what way has it affected your relationship?
 - f.2. How did you manage the accusations of militarization in your area?
- g. Have you or anyone in your group been accused of human rights violation when you were assigned in the area?
 - g.1. If yes, did these accusations of human rights violations affect your relationship with your partners? In what way?
 - g.2. What actions did you take to address this issue?

5. The Military and the Local Government Unit (LGU)

- a. Have you worked with the LGUs when you were assigned in the area?
 - a.1. If yes, how was the partnership initiated?
 - a.2. How do you describe your relationship with them?
- b. Do you think that there are instances when the Local Chief Executives (LCEs) were threatened with the presence of the military in their area? Why or why not?
 - b.1. If yes, do you think that there were instances when the LGU felt/thought that you have overstepped your boundaries in your partnership with the LGU?
 - b.2. If yes, how did you manage the perception of the LCEs that the military is a threat to their leadership?

6. Other comments.

Appendix 2

Interview Questions for the Civil Society Organizations

1. Respondents Profile

NAME:
CURRENT POSITION:
CURRENT OFFICE:
PREFERRED MODE OF COMMUNICATION:
(E-mail, FB Messenger, Viber, WhatsApp)
EMAIL ADDRESS:
MOBILE NUMBER:

2. Background

- a. Have you worked in the provinces of Basilan, Sulu or Tawi tawi?
 - a.1 If yes, please indicate the province and the inclusive years that you have been working in the area
 - a.2. If yes, did you work on an individual capacity?
 - a.2.1 What is the scope of your work in the area?
 - a.3. If yes, did you work as part of an organization?
 - a.3.1 Can you tell me about your organization and the scope of work that they do in the area?
- b. What are the security concerns that you observed when you were working in the area?
- c. What are the development concerns/needs that you observed when you were working in the area?

3. The Military and the Whole of Nation Framework

- a. Have you heard about the whole of nation approach of the past (PNoy) and the current (PRRD) administrations in relation to the armed forces?
 - a.1. If yes, what is your understanding of the concept?
 - a.2. If not, what is your opinion on the definition embodied in the AFP Campaign Plan where it is defined as follows: *"Whole of Nation approach is based on the recognition that the AFP cannot single-handedly solve the internal peace and security concerns of the country. This can only be attained through a sustained multi-stakeholder effort borne out of partnerships with different government institutions, non-government stakeholders such as NGOs and CSOs, and the local communities"*.
- b. Because of this mandate to the military, they have been working with stakeholders in development work. Do you agree that the military should be involved in development work?
 - b.1 If yes, what do you think should be the roles/functions of the military in this whole of nation approach? What are the boundaries that they should limit themselves to?
 - b.2. If no, why shouldn't they be involved in development work?

4. Militarization and military partnerships

- a. Have you worked with the military when you or your organization was working in the BaSuITa area?
 - a.1. If yes, how would you describe your relationship/ interaction with them?
 - a.2. If no, what prevented you from working with the military?

- b. What is your understanding of the concept of militarization?
- c. Have you heard of accusations of militarization in the BaSulTa area?
- d. Have you or your organization ever accused the military of militarization in the BaSulTa area?
- e. Did the accusations of militarization (either by your group or by other organizations) affect your relationship with the military? In what way?
- f. Have you heard of human rights abuses committed by the military when you were working in the BaSulTa area?
 - f.1. If yes, can you give some background on this?
 - f.2. If yes, did these accusations of human rights violations affect your relationship with the military? In what way?
 - f.3. What actions did your group take to address this issue?

5. The Military and the Local Government Unit (LGU)

- a. Have you observed partnerships between the military and the LGU in the BaSulTa area?
 - a.1. If yes, how would you describe their relationship?
- b. Do you think that partnership with LGUs play an important role in implementing development projects in the BaSulTa area? Why or why not?
- c. Do you think that there are instances when the Local Chief Executives (LCEs) were threatened with the presence of the military in their area? Why or why not?
 - c.1. If yes, do you think that there were instances when the LGU felt/thought that the military have overstepped their boundaries in your partnership with the LGU?

6. Other comments.

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