No Formalities Please!
A Study of Informal Institutions & Broker Practices in Municipal Governance of New Delhi

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Disclaimer:

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Contents

List of Tables v
List of Figures v
List of Maps v
List of Pictures v
List of Acronyms vi
Acknowledgements vii

Introduction 1
1.1 Background 1
1.2 Political Clientelism 5
1.3 Bureaucratic Mediation 6
1.4 Informal Brokers (opportunity for profit) 6
1.5 Problem Statement 8
1.6 Research Question 9
1.7 Structure of the paper 9

Chapter 2: Conceptualising Informal Institutions & Access to Public Service Delivery in India 11
2.1 Informal Institutions 12
2.2 Informal Local Governance Institutions (ILGIs) 14
2.3 ILGIs in India 14
2.4 Access to Bureaucracy and its Responsiveness 15
2.5 Patronage and Clientelism 16
2.6 Good Governance 17
    2.6.1 Accountability 18
    2.6.2 Transparency 18
    2.6.3 Effectiveness 18
    2.6.4 Efficiency 18

Chapter 3: Methodology 19
3.1 Working with Texts 20
3.2 Qualitative Interviewing 21
3.3 Participant Observation 22
3.4 Vignettes 23
3.5 Quantitative Survey 23
3.6 My Position & Ethical Considerations 25
3.7 Challenges 26
# Chapter 4: Findings

4.1 Sub Research Question 1: The Mediators  
   4.1.1 The People (Brokers)  
4.2 Sub Research Question 2: Nature of service seeking practice  
4.3 Sub Research Question 3: Institutional Response  
   4.3.1 Institutional Response I: No Response  
   4.3.2 Institutional Response II: E-Governance in MCD  
   4.3.3 Institutional Response III: Doorstep Delivery of Public Services by the Government of Delhi

# Chapter 5: Analysis

5.1 Where do experts place informal institutions in the matrix  
5.2 Where do service seeking citizens place these brokers in the matrix  
5.3 Where does the Delhi government place brokers on the matrix  
5.4 Where do brokers place themselves in the matrix  
5.5 Where do I place brokers based on my observation  
5.6 Good Governance Analysis  
   5.6.1 Accountability  
   5.6.2 Transparency  
   5.6.3 Efficiency  
   5.6.4 Effectiveness

# Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1 Policy Recommendations  
6.2 Scope for further research  
   6.2.1 Administrative Reforms in Delhi  
   6.2.2 Evaluation for GNCTD Doorstep Service  
6.3 Concluding Statement

# Annexure 1: Interview Guide(s)

# Annexure 2: Quantitative list

References
List of Tables

Table 1: Distribution of Services among State, Centre and MCD 3
Table 2: Typology of Informal Institutions 13
Table 3: Mapping Sub-Research Questions to Method(s) 20
Table 4: Overview of Respondent Type in Interviews 24
Table 5: Codes for qualitative interviews 25
Table 6: Expert Opinion on Informal Institutions in MCD 45
Table 7: Citizen Opinion on Informal Institutions in MCD 46
Table 8: Opinion of GNCTD on Informal Institutions in MCD 46
Table 9: Opinion of Brokers on Informal Institutions in MCD 47
Table 10: My view on Informal Institutions in MCD 48

List of Figures

Figure 1: Governance Framework in New Delhi, India 2
Figure 2: Services Available through Citizen Services Bureau (CSB) Centre 5
Figure 3: Citizen-State relationship in a broker mediated transaction 8
Figure 4: Summary of Service Seeker Data based on quantitative survey 34
Figure 5: Reasons for Seekers not using online services 38
Figure 6: Flowchart of Doorstep Delivery Mechanism by GNCTD 41
Figure 7: Summary of Doorstep Delivery within 2 weeks of launch 42

List of Maps

Map 1: Map of Delhi with Zonal Distribution 19

List of Pictures

Picture 1: CSB at Lajpat Nagar Zone, SDMC (Interior) ........................................4
Picture 2: CSB at Lajpat Nagar Zone, SDMC (Exterior) .................................4
Picture 3: Four brokers and myself at the NDMC office, Karol Bagh Zone 26
Picture 4: NDMC Zonal Office Exterior Look ..................................................27
Picture 5: SDMC Zonal Office Exterior Look ...................................................27
Picture 6: Broker outside NDMC Zonal office calculating property tax ........28
Picture 7: Broker outside SDMC Zonal office under a tree ......................28
Picture 8: Brokers’ visiting cards as consultants .........................................30
Picture 9: Service seeking behavior at SDMC zonal office ..........................33
# List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MCD</td>
<td>Municipal Corporation of Delhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSB</td>
<td>Citizen Service Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIC</td>
<td>Public Information Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNCTD</td>
<td>Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCT</td>
<td>National Capital Territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDMC</td>
<td>North Delhi Municipal Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDMC</td>
<td>South Delhi Municipal Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDMC</td>
<td>East Delhi Municipal Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILGI</td>
<td>Informal Local Governance Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>Resident Welfare Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIMTS</td>
<td>Delhi Integrated Multimodal Transport System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUSIB</td>
<td>Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QSR</td>
<td>Quick Service Restaurant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLA</td>
<td>Member of Legislative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>No Objection Certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDC</td>
<td>Development &amp; Dialogue Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URJA</td>
<td>United Residents Joint Action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

Growing up in Delhi was nothing less than a living a case study. As the most primary civic problems are related to a municipal issue, citizens tend to develop a relatively good understanding of municipal functions (or not!). After learning and unlearning multiple such stories, I set out to find some more explanation around broker practices in the citizen service bureaus at the municipality of Delhi. While I don’t think I have successfully arrived at succinct solutions, I think I have made progress in unpacking the problem.

I would like to begin my acknowledgements with ISS, by thanking Dr. Joop de Wit, for meeting me in Delhi on a scorching summer afternoon, and inspiring me on how I was doing the right thing by moving towards a 2nd Masters, all my course staff, Georgina, for being the best course convener one could ever have, Peter, Sunil, Wendy and Roy, for making this academic journey so engaging that I ended up taking 100 credits of coursework, and finally, my supervisor, Dr Sylvia Bergh, for her impeccable guidance, comments and patience to go through my work multiple times, making it look like how it does now.

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Abstract

The Citizen Services Bureau (CSB) at the Municipality of Delhi (MCD) commenced in 2003 to provide basic administrative services like registrations, revenue collection, bookings etc. to facilitate with ease the most tangible interactions a citizen may have with the closest form of government. This included the installation of not just new infrastructural logics of public governance, but also a bid to reconfigure a new civic culture of accessibility, transparency, accountability and efficiency (Dudley et al, 2015). Under these conditions, access to citizen services often gets partially compromised due to private interests through informal means. This paper situates itself in the bewildering world of informal mediation peopled by brokers, touts, middlemen in New Delhi that has over the years embedded itself within the CSB initiatives. Located in this complex intersection between the State and these extra-state private players are the 'public', that interface with both. While interrogating these cultures of informality, this study probes the key motivations for brokers to engage (& sustain) in mediation work along with their legitimacy with service seekers, not to mention the different institutional and governmental responses (e-governance, doorstep delivery of services) to these practices.

The study findings were analysed under the Helmke & Levitsky (2014) framework on the interplay between formal and informal institutions and combined with an assessment against selected Good-Governance indicators to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of informal brokerage practices for (administrative) service delivery. The paper also provides some policy recommendations around e-governance and administrative reforms in Delhi.

Relevance to Development Studies

This research paper hinges on the understanding of governance as a key concept in Development Studies. The delivery of citizen services offered at the Municipality of Delhi (MCD) often gets compromised due to complicated design which gives room to informal, for-profit, brokers. The study seeks to understand their emergence, operations and sustenance along with service seekers’ behaviour and the institutional response(s). The paper visualises governance of service delivery through the framework of informal institutions and assesses the outcomes against the good-governance indicators of accountability, transparency, effectiveness and efficiency.

Keywords

Municipality of Delhi, informality, governance, bureaucracy, brokers, Citizen Service Bureau (CSB), New Delhi, institutions, India
Introduction

“History shows that where ethics and economics come in conflict, victory is always with economics. Vested interests have never been known to have willingly divested themselves unless there was sufficient force to compel them”

B.R Ambedkar

1.1 Background

New Delhi, also known as the National Capital Territory (NCT) of India, is a bustling iconic metropolis with a great historical legacy with nearly 17 million inhabitants (Census 2011). As one of the most important hubs of trade and commerce, the capital city draws more than 75,000 people every year, seeking better economic opportunities and to improve their lives. Delhi has one of the highest per-capita incomes at more than INR 0.2 million (EUR 3000) per year (2012-13) that is, more than 3 times the national average, with significant decline in poverty rates, mainly due to tight labour markets. While there have also been consistent improvements in health and education indicators, there is still some concern with respect to disparities in shelter and provision of basic services (Delhi Human Development Report, 2013).

Governance in Delhi is an area of much deliberation due to its position as the capital of the country. The region hosts the institutions of the federal government, the state government that is, the Government of National Capital Territory (GNCTD) and the municipal administration of 272 wards by means of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) which technically controls 94% of the geographic area (and 95% of the population). The other municipal divisions include the centre (NDMC- New Delhi Municipal Council), and the cantonment (under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence).

As the capital city, there are many observed redundancies in planning service provision in terms of accountability across departments. Issues related to land; police and public order are under the purview of the Lieutenant Governor (LG) appointed by the President of India and are considered to be issues vested under the central or federal government. The GNCTD that came into
power since 1993 overlooks matters related to transport, health, family welfare, food and supplies. It is of use to understand that the GNCTD has put into action numerous autonomous agencies responsible for delivery of certain essential services like water (Delhi Jal Board- DJB), electricity (Delhi Vidyut Board- DVB), transport (DIMTS- Delhi Integrated Multimodal Transport System) and slum maintenance (Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board-DUSIB). All other services related to solid waste management, garbage disposal, upkeep of commercial areas, maintenance of parks and green spaces, licencing of commercial activity, registration of birth and death and other citizen services are managed by the Municipality of Delhi (MCD) that recently got trifurcated in 2012 by the state government of Delhi owing to the burgeoning pressure of geographical spread and population influx in the capital city in the past couple of decades (Delhi Citizen Handbook 2016). Please refer to figure 1 for a block diagram of the governance structure in Delhi.

Figure 1: Governance Framework in New Delhi, India

![Governance Framework in New Delhi, India](source)

1 The 69th constitutional amendment Act 1991 followed by the National Capital Territory of Delhi Act declared the union territory of Delhi, better known as the National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi.
2 The Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act 2011’ was issued on 29 December 2011 to create the three new Corporations, namely, North Delhi Municipal Corporation (North DMC), South Delhi Municipal Corporation (South DMC) and East Delhi Municipal Corporation6 (East DMC).
While the MCD is mainly responsible for operational civic services as mentioned above, there are numerous other administrative services offered to the general public including birth and death registration, property & estate matters, addressing local grievances (pothole, street repairs, mosquito/monkey menace etc.), community centres for public use, provision of trade licences and also to keep citizens informed about recent tenders and rollouts. Table 1 below shows the distribution of services amongst centre, state and the municipality in Delhi.

Table 1: Distribution of Services among State, Centre and MCD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DTC (Delhi Transport Corporation)</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pollution</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water supply</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewage</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ration Shops</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footpaths</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garden</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storm Water Drainage</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) Related</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Management</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals/Dispensaries (Health Care)</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drainage</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>License</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuisance due to stray dogs, monkeys, etc.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pest control</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosquito nuisance &amp; Fogging</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid Waste Management</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naming/Renaming of Roads/Chowks/ Monuments/ Buildings/ Stations</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slaughter House related</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town Planning</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment Management Services</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shop and Establishment</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Delhi Councillor Handbook, 2017 PRAJA: 3

It is important to understand the existing urban local governance characteristics juxtaposed within the larger political economy of the city and the country and how the different layers of government structures may impede
systematic provision of basic services in the city. The intersection within the governance framework of Delhi is quite complex owing to the special status of Delhi being at the juncture of local, state and national jurisdictions (Sheikh et al, 2015). This is explained better by the figure above that helps visualise this confusion that the citizen faces to understand who is responsible for which service.

The Municipality of Delhi, as one of local administrative units performs multiple duties ranging from operational tasks like Construction, maintenance and cleansing of drains and drainage works and of public latrines, urinals and similar conveniences to preparation of plans for economic development and social justice. The municipality also holds a rich database of its inhabitants and collect periodic property tax and also hosts a centre for certain primary citizen services. This centre is known as the Citizen Services Bureau (CSB).

The purview of this research is limited to the activities within the Citizen Services Bureau (CSBs) present in every municipal zone that are primarily responsible for all public interactions related to payment of property tax, licencing, booking of municipal halls/parks for community events and for birth & death registration. The images below show a sneak peak of the exterior and interior look of a typical CSB centre in SDMC.

These CSBs started were initially known as ‘Sugam Kendras (Easy-Access Centres)’ when they were launched in 2003. These CSBs hold a lot of commu-

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4 A total of 12 municipal zones are there within 3 municipalities in Delhi. A map is given in the methodology chapter.
nity data and is its operations are usually contracted out to third party IT players and most of these services are also available online. The CSBs provide access to basic, yet important municipal administrative services at a nominal fee, except in cases that have a differential fee band (based on size of transaction) like trade penalty, property tax etc. The figure below lists down the host of services currently offered by the South Delhi Municipal Corporation for instance.

Figure 2: Services Available through Citizen Services Bureau (CSB) Centre

![Services Through Citizen Service Bureau (CSB) Centres](image)

Source: www.mcdonline.gov.in

While most of these services are available online and are backed by the requisite technical back-end, the realisation of these services is still relatively off-line, pertaining to many reasons like the lack of IT literacy amongst the main target audience of the CSBs, complexity of the procedure and server malfunction, in spite of several initiatives under the ICT initiatives taken by most state and central governments (Sony et al, 2015)

The inconvenience regarding access thus demands assistance with respect to citizen-state interaction. The terms citizens and state suggest a false dichotomy of rather bounded yet opposing entities (Nugent, 1994:69) and on ground it is next to impossible to demarcate between the two boundaries (Gupta, 1995). The delivery of service continues to prevail by means of local ad-hoc arrangements in the form of mediators, agents, consultants, touts or fixers (De Wit 2016). These important transactions that take place at the grassroots by the following three means:

1.2 **Political Clientelism**

Political clientelism primarily refers to the act of providing administrative support to service seeking citizens that flow from a position of power and in-
fluence, over the institutional custodians of the services like jobs, school admissions, certificates of identity etc. in exchange of electoral support or votes. Politicians in India operate as mediators between state institutions and citizens. Political mediation is deeply entrenched in the procedures, policies and habits that guide the daily functioning of state institutions. The institutionalization of political mediation is the outcome of dialectic between the limited capacity of the state to provide public services and the strategies that local politicians employ to win elections. The limited capacity of the state to provide basic services, as discussed by Migdal creates a political arena where access to these services get monopolised by political mediators, which reinforces the limited capacity of the state to provide these basic services (Barenschot, 2018; Barenschot, 2010; Migdal, 2001).

1.3 Bureaucratic Mediation

Access to basic services for citizens is usually a function of how the system or bureaucracy responds to the needs of the people. The service providers usually monopolise provision of these services and weak institutional vigilance creates permanent ‘windows of opportunity’ to by-pass accountability. Bureaucratic mediation refers to access driven by patronage networks lying within the system, and usually does not qualify as corruption as the latter is usually an impediment towards service delivery while patronage drives better service delivery. The systemic mediation may usually involve the participation of an administrative ‘gate-keeper’ who may block or expedite access based on the payment of a fees based on his/her special position as an access provider, not usually sanctioned by his authorities reflecting weak institutional links (Kumar & Landy, 2012: 130-131).

1.4 Informal Brokers (opportunity for profit)

As mentioned in a working paper by De Wit (2008: 12) that even though governments create ‘robust’ systems of public service delivery, the context in the case of developing economies is set by the brokers/intermediaries who become the first point of contact for the citizens. The informal institutions are set between “public users and services in public transport, customers,
administration, local taxation, public procurements, justice and public health services – including the issuing of birth certificates” (Blundo, 2006: 806). The informal brokers also gain acceptance or informal legitimacy\(^5\) from the community of service seekers to continue operations and sustain themselves. However, the legitimacy of informal mediation may get contested in contexts where rules become formalised over time (Ananthpur, 2004:10).

These informal means of facilitation that emerge due to a multitude of factors sometimes fill the important governance gaps in order to enable better access to these municipal (or even parastatal services). These informal institutions pronounce a new set of shared rules and understanding amongst the service seekers that accommodate these mediators who may be explained by on any of the three means mentioned above.

Amongst these three types of mediation, there is substantial literature that emphasize on the first two means of informal institutions within urban local governments (Barendschot, 2010:888, Blundo, 2006, Copus et al, 2013, De Wit et al. 2009, Schindler et al, 2016) but the informal brokers who emerge due to an opportunity for profit is relatively under-studied (Jones et al, 2014: 35). The broker system of public service delivery is a privatisation of street level bureaucracy where the brokers serve as an usher for the seekers that takes them (or their file) through the maze of actual public officials in return of a going-rate for these services (De Wit 2008).

While it is not easy to comment on the degree of corruption in these situations (CSB operations) as it usually involves low-ticket transactions, one cannot ignore relatively low capacities and monolithic institutional policies that drive monopolistic misuse of office, fuelled by the lack of accountability and transparency. Much of anecdotal evidence suggests private actors and bureaucrats collaborate and fill these governance gaps to seek profits and these service officials also often tolerate these brokers as the latter tends to form a protective shield for their misdeeds and convolute accountability. The more reliable brokerage relation is much popular today where people seek out spe-

\(^5\) Legitimacy refers to the rightfulness of rules in these broker practices. “Legitimacy rests with the leaders of that group, not with the state authorities” (Clements, 2014:15)
cialised agents who provide institutional linkages with officials, especially for the poor in conditions of insecurity, need and crisis (De Wit, 2016: 41).

Based on literature, Figure 3 below explains the usual citizen state interface via broker. The anticipated collusion between the broker and state is kept out of the scope of this study.

Figure 3: Citizen-State relationship in a broker mediated transaction

The figure above is a representation of mediated services in a broker driven institutional space. The service seeker approaches the broker for correct documentation, immune from any kind of rejection from the office holder in exchange of a small fee. The seeker then makes the application in the office and pays the official fee for the required service. The seeker, in some cases may require extended support from the broker and requests him (brokers are usually men) to also submit documentation to the particular institution in exchange of a premium fee. This extended support may suggest a sense of collusion as there is a possibility that the broker shares a portion of the premium fee with the office holder at the institution. However, in order to limit the scope of this study, this aspect is not further examined here.

1.5 Problem Statement

Planning, provision and access of services across the state of Delhi and in the country at large are far from seamless. A multitude of factors, as studied in the upcoming chapters cause the presence of a parallel form of service delivery mechanism that facilitates informal governance in the city. The problem thus identified reflected the nature of service seeking behaviour and how that
gets impeded through an inadequate supply side apparatus along with factors that create a conducive environment for intermediaries in the form of brokers to function and sustain. In light of this, it further raises questions on institutional responses to these practices and how the prevailing administrative ecosystem corresponds with good governance. The CSB services that were initially intended to be studied in detail were that of ‘Registration: Birth, Death and the ‘Licencing for Commercial Practice’ but it was later understood that the intermediation was not specific to certain specific services and was better studied as a modus-operandi of citizen-state interaction.

1.6 Research Question

How do informal mediation channels facilitate service delivery in the Citizen Services Bureau (CSB) at the MCD and what are the main institutional responses to this mediation? Also, how does this reflect on good governance principles?

We can understand the dynamics of the informal institutions in the MCD by answering the following sub-questions:

1. Who are these informal mediators and how do they ensure their sustenance and acceptance amongst service seekers?

2. How do service seekers access services from the CSBs at the municipality of Delhi?

3. How do formal institutions perceive and respond to these informal mediation practices?

1.7 Structure of the paper

Chapter 1 has the outline of the research problem, namely the role of brokers or touts in the delivery of administrative services that come under the Citizen Services Bureau (CSB).

Chapter 2 will provide a literature review of key concepts that are important to understand the dynamics of prevalence of informal institutions in accessing services, and their typologies, which together make up the conceptual framework that will be applied to the findings.
Chapter 3, on methodology details out the key tools operationalised for obtaining important data, based on the nature of research questions along with tables that hold the list of respondents.

Chapter 4 and 5 present the findings and analysis when the insights, are juxtaposed on the conceptual framework to make sense of it and gives us succinct responses to the research question. The same section holds boxed information as vignettes or reflections of two brokers who were followed through the course of data-collection and I was allowed to see their operations closely. Finally, Chapter 6 will provide conclusions and lay out some avenues for further research.
Chapter 2: Conceptualising Informal Institutions & Access to Public Service Delivery in India

One of the primary functions of any government is to ensure seamless provision of services that make public life less complex. This is usually done by collecting taxes from citizens that are used for public services. These services may vary based on extent of revenue generation and most governments may use assistance from complementing actors such as the private sector and/or civil society for governance (Paul et al, 2005).

In the Indian context, the democratic state puts a new government in office every five years that represent the people by means of political parties and coalitions. These governments are also defined by exclusive elections at the state (provincial) and local (municipal) levels that enjoy a negotiated degree of autonomy. While the government of India has been investing in infrastructure it has also started emphasizing on service delivery often at times with the help of the private sector, especially in the past couple of decades since the liberalization reforms in the country.

Citizen services at the local level are of much importance considering the high population base, especially in the major cities (> 10 Million). The diversity of these services and coordination problems point towards issues of access, productivity, personalisation, quality of these services and interaction. These issues usually receive limited attention (Paul et al 2005:2-5 and World Bank 2017). These inconsistencies often give rise to means of sustenance of certain local informal methods that fulfil the access to public service delivery gap. Scholars also deliberate on validating the inevitable interdependence of formal and informal governance institutions that leads to ‘multi-centric’ or ‘poly-centric’ governance as patterns and sources of authority are complex (Khan, 2016: 6; Hooghe, 2003: 234).

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* Negotiation of administrative power and top-down resource allocation
2.1 Informal Institutions

Institutions, as defined as the ‘rules of the game’ often begin with an informal, communal approach, created, communicated and enforced outside sanctioned channel (Hodgson, 2006). These informal rules of the game in some cases eventually become organisational; legally binding policies that are systematically weaved into the administrative fabric of governments.

The emergence of informal institutional practices within formal governmental structures is often witnessed in relatively weak state institutions and operates in the form of a dizzying arena of personal networks, clientelism, corruptions, clans & mafias, civil societies, traditional culture and a variety of judicial and bureaucratic norms. These are further defined by Helmke as “socially shared rules usually unwritten that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels. Informal institutions are not weak institutions and weak institutions don’t always justify the presence of informal structures” (Helmke et al, 2004: 725).

These shared values within an informal institutional framework create a common understanding of socially acceptable behaviour and stimulate the guided practice within these institutions. These formal and informal institutions are either deemed competing or complementing on the basis of the outcomes and effectiveness of formal rules. While one camp treats informal institutions as functional (convergent), that solves problems related to interface and coordination while the other camp considers informality in service delivery as dysfunctional (divergent) and impeding. Under the light of recent studies, it is however contextual and that it depends on how a particular stakeholder views it, i.e. whether informal institutions reinforces or substitutes the formal institutions. Helmke et al, (2004: 728) came up with a 2x2 matrix as a typology of functional and competing modes of formal-informal institutions.
This matrix is used in the analysis section to assess how the practical cases seen on the ground apply within this framework from a multi-stakeholder perspective. The typology provided by Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 728) is based on the outcomes of informal and effectiveness of the formal rules in a given context. The outcome variables dictates whether the result of these rules are in line or against what one may expect from strict adherence of formal rules. The effectiveness variable on the other hand is the extent to which these the formal rules are realised in practice. It is understood that where the rules and procedures are ineffective, the probability of enforcement will be low (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 728).

Complementary Informal Institutions, a result of convergent outcomes and effective formal institutions, usually fill in essential governance gaps and may often enhance efficiency in service delivery. In situations of rush caused by technology malfunction, approaching deadline dates for applications, and new incentive/subsidy schemes etc. the informal systems usually fix contingencies and enhance citizen interaction towards completion of service requests. Accommodating institutions in table 2 arise in situations of strong formal systems but divergent informal outcomes, where the formal institutions makes way for the latter. Accommodating institutions are often created by actors who dislike formal structures and outcomes but use these rules for their advantage without really violating them. The formal systems withstand or accommodate these institutions in light of future contingencies and are considered to enhance stability, if not efficiency (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 730).

In case of ineffective formal institutions, the rise of competing informal institutions tend to violate rules, reflecting divergent outcomes by structuring incentives that are incompatible with formal rules. The most familiar examples
may include clientelistic politics, patrimonialism, clan-politics etc. that subvert
the interest of the formal public body for private gains.

The substitutive informal institutes emerge where they tend to replace
formal institutions that do not perform well, but the informal institutes con-
structively complete the expected outcomes of the formal institutes. In rural
India, where local community leaders have high familiarity with village dwell-
ers, they tend to become the most trust-worthy access points for seeking public
services, due to high trust based on social legitimacy of these figures, and the
lack of connectivity with state machinery. The rules set by these figures of in-
fluence, become the norm for the on-ground users or beneficiaries. The next
section will further contextualise the understanding of the Helmke et al matrix
with local governance institutions (ILGIs) and funnel down to the case of New
Delhi in India.

2.2 Informal Local Governance Institutions (ILGIs)

Across the world, the official state institutions are responsible for key gov-
ernance functions including service delivery, dispute resolution and electoral
representation but they are sometimes facilitated or influenced by institutions
that operate completely or partly outside formal structures of the state. ILGIs
are thus delegated three primary characteristics according to studies: (1) state-
like traits to the extent they enjoy territorial authority; (2) intermediation be-
tween its ‘population’ an external world (or formal institutions); (3) their posi-
tionality of relationship with the state apparatus as ambiguous, contested and
variable. Conceptually, ILGIs are understood to influence votes, mediate dis-
putes, regulate citizen access to services and mediate interaction with local
government, affecting access to information and participation in deliberative
forums (Mohmand, 2016: 7).

2.3 ILGIs in India

It is interesting to observe why we have so many informal institutions in
the Southern countries. The major arguments that emerge from scholarly re-
views claim that regions especially colonised by the European rule remained
superficially ruled by these western agencies as it was unviable to penetrate proper bureaucracies down to the village and so most of these powers operated through the village feudal structures, especially in the country side, by recruiting intermediaries in the form of influential families, kings in order to collect revenues. These traditional, local authorities appointed by the colonisers combined monopolistic and exhibited exclusionary powers stemming from stronger upward linkages (Cohn, 1971).

Not only are Informal Local Government Institutions (ILGI) prevalent in India, but they are also highly institutionalised. They further embody stable, recurring and valued behaviour patterns (Huntington 1965, as seen in AnanthPur, 2004: 402). AnanthPur further assesses that ILGIs are quite diverse in structure and function and may exhibit progressive as well as oppressive features and are “not linearly declining or shrinking in the face either of modernity in general, or of more modern elected local councils in particular. Instead, they interact with these formal, local governance institutions (FLGIs), often in a positive way [...] contrary to widespread belief, ILGIs are not shrinking or fading away as elected local government institutions become more institutionized and influential. ILGIs not only continue to perform a wide range of functions, but they are also continuously finding new avenues of influence” (Copus et al, 2013: 53-54). The explanation of ILGIs and more so in case of urban India, further creates room for introducing the conceptual understanding of ‘access’, which further defines the public interaction with state machinery and the responsiveness of the latter.

2.4 Access to Bureaucracy and its Responsiveness

The citizen-state interface is usually not as simplistic and it is important to understand why it is essential for citizens to have easy access to bureaucrats or administrative machinery for a smooth public life. A few words by Perumal CA (1988: 581) reinstate the dichotomy of a state operated by forces of representation (politicians) and the executives. Where the former will view the state apparatus as convenient tools to achieve success toward social policies, the latter may first take responsibility towards this disposition, but emphasize more on the current policy through normative rules and command. This is so as they
have to keep operating programmes and administer agencies, even after the political birds of passage have left.

Moving to access, bureaucratic power differential dilutes responsiveness, accountability and impedes access as bureaucrats often get sandwiched between the inherited issue of responsibility and the acquired problem of responsiveness.

Opacity in terms of governmental access is often frowned upon as it reflects illicit activity caused by deliberate inclusion of impediments to access. Access further gives rise to exclusion (or priority inclusions), coercion and in some cases violence to simple administrative transaction depending upon the nature of relationship between people who manage the transactions (intermediaries) and the state institutions and the people often excluded (Schaffer 1986).

Intermediaries become a part of formal institutions and this usually reflects the state’s incompetency to manage its affairs on its own. Further discussion on e-governance as an institutional response, without taking into account citizen readiness on its access and use, is an important reflection of these administrative reforms and more so of public funds. While I’ve discussed access, it is extremely important to also have a sound conceptual understanding of patronage and clientelism that helps examine mediation as an informal means of transaction in the given context.

2.5 Patronage and Clientelism

The sovereignty of the Indian state is highly fragmented and most of state operations get taken over by political mediation, triggered by these informal, politically resourced operations (Fuller & Harriss 2001:1-31). As already mentioned in the introductory chapter, numerous brokers or ‘fixers’ of such informal systems for access to public services prevail in the form of party representatives, community leaders, traditional notables and even private profit seekers. Political brokers are usually the most common who interact with the state machinery and mediate with bureaucracies that ensure quick delivery of services to the citizens, often to retain access to political office, displaying accountability to the public. It is however important to distinguish between the use of two very similar terms of patronage and clientelism. Patronage is where state re-
sources are eventually exploited for electoral benefits while clientelism is merely an exchange of material benefits for political advantage (Berenschot et al 2017: 7). Patronage pre-dates industrialisation & democracy and is enforced endogenously, upheld by mutual agreement amongst social actors, even though the relation is exploitative. The relationship is based on a power difference that usually ensures widespread construction and maintenance of social inequality (Wit and Berner, 2009: 932). This can further be explained by citing the example of how the poor, squatting in cities face problems of recognition, stability that further get aggravated due to weak institutional links in need of housing, health emergencies, employment etc. Since demand for these services is always more than its supply, shortages lead to bureaucratic management, administered by brokers, party workers and/or NGOs or CBOs. De Wit (1996) points out three key reasons for inability to access in such situations namely illiteracy, lack of information and confidence.

Patronage and clientelism relate better with political machine where politicians employ institutional resources to bind voters through disbursements of large scale material inducements. Scott (1978) mentions how politicians after coming to power utilise state resources to further private agenda of business elites, usually donors of the incumbent political party while passing on a part of the gain to the voters to whom they ‘rent’ their authority (Scott, 1978: 555-56).

The study finally attempts to understand how the mediation reflects on good governance and its key principles in order to claim much merit of these informal systems in place.

### 2.6 Good Governance

Good Governance can be understood as a normative conceptualisation (mostly donor driven) of how governance should be realised and how a set of social actors should engage towards it, in any given context. “Good governance has 8 major characteristics including: participative, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective, efficient, equitable & inclusive and follows the rule of law” (UNESCAP: 1 & Gisselquist, 2012). For the purpose of my study, I decided to map the broker scenario in MCD on some selected Good Governance characteristics namely:
2.6.1 Accountability

An organisation, institution or an individual is generally accountable to those who will be affected by the decision or actions one takes. This ensures actions and decisions are subject to oversight by key stakeholders and that it responds to the needs of the community.

2.6.2 Transparency

This means that all activities and actions made by an institution or organisation are recorded and available to the stakeholders who are expected to be affected due to the actions.

2.6.3 Effectiveness

This corresponds to the extent to which actions or development interventions conducted by the institutions are able to achieve its objectives (SIDA, 2007: 27)

2.6.4 Efficiency

This means that the processes used to produce effective results utilise minimal resources at their disposal and justifies the cost of a development intervention (SIDA, 2007: 27)

The genesis of the concepts defined in this chapter lies in how well they lay down a theoretical understanding for the given context. Acknowledging the importance of informal local governance institutions, and how they emerge alongside formal rules, in a specific setting is of prime importance. The acceptance of these informal rules, Patronage & Clientelism amidst formal institutions usually has a formidable impact on how governance is realised at the Citizen Service Bureaus in Delhi.
Chapter 3: Methodology

The fieldwork was conducted from August 01, 2018 to September 04, 2018 in New Delhi, India. The last week of July was utilised in seeking appointments from key respondents. The study began by approaching experts in the field from NGOs working in local governance issues namely United Resident Joint Action (URJA) and PRAJA (Means Citizens). This was followed by insightful interactions with two research fellows from the Centre for Policy Research, Delhi (CPR) in the Urbanisation division. These institutions helped me create a roadmap for the coming month of fieldwork in Delhi.

The next three weeks were spent on the field outside Zonal MCD offices in the South and North MCDs as South Delhi was where I live and NDMC was recommended by the brokers at SDMC office, where I could see more brokers. I did not choose to go with the East Delhi Municipal Corporation for reasons related to redundancy and time constraints. Map 1 below shows map of Delhi, with municipalities and the location of the zonal office I visited in NDMC and SDMC.

Map 1: Map of Delhi with Zonal Distribution

Source: PRAJA Foundation, Delhi Councillor Handbook, 2018: 5

The findings were verified by interaction with the Development Dialogue Commission (DDC), a think-tank arm of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) as they had just recently advertised for a ‘Door-

7 There are in all 12 Zonal offices in MCD (4 zones in each MCD)
step delivery of public services’ to commence from September 10th. A more detailed take on that is provided later.

The methodology for this study is planned in a way that helped me arrive at the answers to all the sub-research questions and eventually the main research question. I used mixed-methods in this research, mapped against all sub-research questions. The methodological tools deployed extracts the most critical information regarding the nature and stimulus for these informal institutions that exist in the given context (CSBs) of municipal administration in New Delhi. The research questions are set to particular method(s), as shown in the table below.

Table 3: Mapping Sub-Research Questions to Method(s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question</th>
<th>Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who are these informal mediators and how do they operationalise their sustenance and acceptance amongst service seekers?</td>
<td>Secondary Literature + Qualitative Interviewing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the nature of service seeking practice at the CSBs at the municipality of Delhi?</td>
<td>Qualitative Interviewing + Ethnographic Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the institutional response to these informal mediation practices?</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The key methods used are explained briefly below:

### 3.1 Working with Texts

Texts are an important starting point for any research as it gives a definite direction to one’s approach towards the problem being studied. The initial stages of any research involve working with texts to create a foundation by understanding the background of the problem. Texts also often validate your findings based on primary data collection (or vice versa) (Waliman 2011:78-85). The secondary information utilised for the purpose of my study here was confined to academic literature by scholars who have studied institutions (also informal) and organisations, public administration, democracy and politics. The other secondary information was in the form of institutional reports and research studies in the context of Delhi & India. This information was obtained
in order to collate all factual information about governance in Delhi, administrative jurisdiction, structure and role of MCD and the administrative deliberation in Delhi. There was also some information taken from recent media reports with respect to the recent door-step delivery scheme of administrative citizen services in the capital. While most of the academic literature was elicited from known journals, some of the municipal delivery information was from institutional or NGO reports who work around these issues due to the absence of much official documentation in this space.

3.2 Qualitative Interviewing

The need for primary research methods such as qualitative interviewing is triggered by gaps around information and on-ground context, which may not always be recorded in literature. There is thus need for more specificity in terms of the broader concept being studied. The nature of qualitative interview usually varies with the focus and clarity of objective in mind based on the subject of the research. While an interview may be linearly structured with specific, close ended questions, it may also be conversational and open ended, and snowballs into a structure based on the information provided by the respondent in preceding questions. It is however imperative to keep in mind the informed consent of the respondent that will be taken in advance in the case of my study as well (O’leary, 2014: 216:218). For the purpose of this study on intermediaries and informal institutions, I conducted around 17 semi-structured interviews with actors operating in the municipal space including experts from think-tanks, NGO practitioners, key informants like RWA representatives, local political representatives (councillors), officials and bureaucrats working at MCD and officials of the GNCTD. Considering that the topic of research was deemed sensitive, as it reflects weakness of public institutions and possibilities of corruption, rather than having questions, I relied more on the snowballing method of interaction, where you begin a conversation and manoeuvre it in your direction by slipping in the context you are interested in.

As one of the main data collection methods, qualitative interviewing provided a lot of information about the evolution of public sector institutional spaces, bureaucratic behaviour, corruption and the emergence of brokers for
citizen services. Almost all types of respondents came under this method and I recruited most of them using the snowballing approach.\footnote{An approach used when you are not sure of the next respondent but ask other experts or key respondents on the suitability of the best respondents based on the context of the research}

### 3.3 Participant Observation

As one of the most sensitive methods of the study, it helped me define a clear context. Ethnography accounts for people’s actions and behaviour that are observed over-time (as an experimental set-up) and usually combined with an existing data collection method like an interview or a focus group discussion. The observations help in better interpretation of the information available, functions, motivations and consequences of people’s actions and how they can be implicated in local and also in wider contexts (Hammersely, 2007: 3). I further employed the ‘shadowing technique\footnote{A technique that “involves a researcher closely following a member of an organization over an extended period of time” (McDonalds, 2005: 456)}’ with brokers outside municipal offices by following their experiences as ‘service providers’ while making fieldnotes on place, people and action along with frequent clarifications on inconsistent behaviour\footnote{If the on-ground behaviour differed from what was reported by other actors (experts, NGOs etc.)}

This method was able to extract a few important insights around the operations of these brokers, which was difficult to achieve by asking them questions around the same. The method is an important tool to set the context that helps the reader imagine an on-ground reality that helps understand the study better. The introduction to this section and findings was largely possible because of close and deliberate observation of the setting and broker practices. The description of the setting of the office space, its surrounding, the various types of people (Brokers, service seekers, officials etc.) along with the modus operandi (getting access to brokers, officials etc.) of how a day at the municipality looks like, are further mentioned in the findings section.
3.4 Vignettes

Vignettes are social research techniques that can elicit a deeper understanding from story like perceptions, beliefs, attitudes etc. based on narratives created by interviews and observation. This method allows the participant define situations on their own terms (Barter et al, 1999: 3). The two vignettes that are seen in the next chapter are created as a result of extensive interaction with two brokers and that is able to represent my interpretation of their motivation to become brokers, to answer a part of the first sub-research question.

3.5 Quantitative Survey

In order to understand the demand-side dynamics and how the service seekers access citizen service, I decided to go with a set of closed questions in the form of a survey, directed at 15 respondents in two municipalities each (North & South MCDs). The sampling for recruitment was kept random and I picked a respondent after an interval of 3 service seekers who approached the broker, over 3 days of spending 2-3 hours with the broker at each municipality. This sample may not be statistically representative as 25-30 people come to a broker every day.

The purpose of this survey emerged from a need to identify the profile of the service seeker and the factors responsible to push them to an intermediate for support. This exercise was important as I intended to know more about the service seeking behaviour and how that fuels the sustenance of the brokers. A quantitative survey was used as I was aware of the few questions around this sub-question with discrete possible responses. I already had an expectation around the nature of service seeking behaviour and wanted to test the same by operationalising a survey to come up with a deductive conclusion (Newman et al: 1998: 5).

While it is important to articulate the need of certain specific methods for specific research objectives, as in the table 3 above, one needs to further justify the extent to which tit must be followed. Thus, it is important to rationalise how many people were interviewed and why so many. In my case, as in the table 4 below, I interviewed a total of 17 people in Delhi and it was based on
the initial 3-4 interviews that I decided this number. This is also rationalised based on time-span of fieldwork and the resources available.

Table 4: Overview of Respondent Type in Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. No</th>
<th>Respondent Type</th>
<th>No of Interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Qualitative</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Experts: Civil Society, Think Tank, Academician</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RWA representatives</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Brokers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Municipality Office Holders</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>GNCTD representatives</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Service Seekers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Qualitative</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Quantitative (South and North MCDs)</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The respondents, being so many are coded in the table below and cited wherever any information is used in the forthcoming chapters. The code-book is an important tool to compress the sample distribution of your survey and makes it easier to analyse your data. While that is more common in quantitative studies were the data is required to be processed in a software, in qualitative studies too, it is beneficial in tracing back the responses to the body of information. The codes for the various set of respondents quoted in the text appear in table 5 below.
Table 5: Codes for qualitative interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No</th>
<th>Respondent Type</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>United Residents Joint Action (URJA)</td>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>E1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>PRAJA</td>
<td>Project Officer</td>
<td>E2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Centre for Policy Research (CPR)</td>
<td>Research Fellow</td>
<td>E3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Research Director</td>
<td>E4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
<td>SDMC</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>KI 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
<td>SDMC</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
<td>KI 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
<td>SDMC</td>
<td>Councillor’s Manager</td>
<td>KI 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
<td>SDMC</td>
<td>Commissioner (Bureaucrat)- Licencing</td>
<td>KI 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
<td>RWA- SDMC (rich community)</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>KI 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
<td>RWA 2- SDMC (poor community)</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>KI 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
<td>NDMC</td>
<td>Commissioner- Licensing &amp; Registration</td>
<td>KI 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
<td>GNCTD- DDC</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>KI 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
<td>SDMC</td>
<td>Service Seeker</td>
<td>KI 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
<td>NDMC</td>
<td>Service Seeker</td>
<td>KI 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
<td>NDMC</td>
<td>Service Seeker</td>
<td>KI 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
<td>SDMC</td>
<td>Broker 1 (Pawan)</td>
<td>B1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
<td>NDMC</td>
<td>Broker 2 (Pankaj)</td>
<td>B2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.6 My Position & Ethical Considerations

As an academic researcher in the field, I was supposed to meet respondents at government offices, Director level officials from NGOs and think-tanks and also the ordinary citizens who queued next to a broker to get an application typed. It was thus extremely important for me to be sensitive about my approach and introduction. While a few brokers initially thought I was a broker, I finally broke ice after wearing a dual hat of that of a student researcher who also represented the NGO named URJA. My capacity as a student from Netherlands worked well with NGOs, think tanks and government officials, but I had to be careful about my approach towards the service seekers and brokers. This was the situation as these people would feel the burden to just entertain someone during their time of work, and that is when I intended to meet them.
The picture below shows me in the capacity of a student research cum NGO representative at the NDMC office.

![Picture 3: Four brokers and myself at the NDMC office, Karol Bagh Zone]

The only ethical consideration that came my way was the fact that I had to position myself more as an NGO representative than a student researcher due to my own gut feeling of not being entertained at all. Further to this, there were cases that I had to buy them lunch on various occasions, through the few interactions, to keep them interested in me. There was no other tangible incentive that they could foresee otherwise in entertaining me for all those days.

## 3.7 Challenges

It was a little discouraging to see that none of the respondents out of the 17 interviewees allowed me to record conversations, probably due to sensitivity of the subject being discussed. I also received biased responses as many actors insinuated other group of actors being responsible for the improper functioning of the institutions. And finally, my fieldwork was just 5 weeks long and this seemed like less time for a more representative body of knowledge. This may have included a pre-fieldwork to get a more nuanced understanding of the operations at the MCD offices, a better rationale for selecting a particular office space, and not just based on the recommendation of the brokers in SDMC. Although this did not really make me alter the research questions, I had to in some ways compromise on the depth of research, for instance delving in deeper on how the e-governance system works in the MCD office, the IT infrastructure, etc.
Chapter 4: Findings

My fieldwork commenced by visiting one of the four zonal offices at the South Delhi Municipal Corporation (SDMC) offices in Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi. The first couple of days were mainly spent in understanding the physical space, positionality of various departments and people who administered them. It was important to understand the citizen-state interface and how it operates in this space. The South Delhi Municipal zonal office was relatively well maintained and cleaner in appearance (as compared zonal offices in other municipalities). The images below show the initial look of the two office spaces.

![Picture 5: SDMC Zonal Office Exterior Look](image1)

![Picture 4: NDMC Zonal Office Exterior Look](image2)

There were visibly around 30 service seekers outside the premises (that is less for a working day rush at a public institution in Delhi based on my experience) and a better managed (than NDMC) Public Information Centre (PIC). The PIC is the first window or gateway to the municipal administration in any zone that any citizen is expected to go to in order to navigate through the zonal office and its departments. I too went there first to inquire about the birth/death registration and licencing departments. I was told that birth/death registration happens just next to it at the Citizen Service Bureau (CSB) centre while licencing (although happen online) queries will be entertained on the second floor (SDMC).
4.1 Sub Research Question 1: The Mediators

After understanding the physical positioning of the various departments, I went to have a look at the CSB, to see that there were around 30 people inside the room, queuing mainly for birth and death certificates (an average daily estimate for South Delhi zones). A couple of officials were sitting separately in another corner of the room guiding people how to fill the application form and if there was a need to have any additional documentation. These officials although guide citizens with applications, but do not have the time to assist them with application work. This usually makes the citizens either take a second trip with correct documentation or go to the brokers sitting outside the premises usually under a tree or a make-shift space assisting people with all these documentation, in exchange of a nominal fee.

I met two such brokers each in the South and North MCDs who had a make-shift office space outside the offices, helping people with any query, bridging the gap and ensuring that the job gets completed in the same visit. These tasks usually included making a typed application, filling of an application form for birth/death registration, change or addition of name etc. The image on the right shows one such make-shift arrangement at the SDMC zonal office. Although these services were also available online but the common people either did not know that these services were available online, or were not IT savvy enough or the online systems were usually down (Based on interviews with service seekers KI 13 & 14). A few people also did not have

\[\text{Make shift space can either be under a tree, in a corner with foldable table or on a table made with construction bricks with a bamboo-stool}\]
the time to invest in understanding how the system works and relied completely on these brokers who would do their work in exchange for a nominal fee. The image below is that of a broker at NDMC office.

In South Delhi, there were just two brokers (as only two were outside the office) who I met through the course of the three days that I spent with them. The public dealing in these offices were till 1300 hours and so these brokers also stayed for half a day. One of them did basic typing work for any application that a service seeker had to make either for the purpose of birth, death or licencing or in some cases even assisted in calculation of property taxes. This broker usually charged a nominal fee of INR 30 (EUR 0.40) for filling up application forms and around INR 250 (EUR 3) for property tax calculation, mainly as the ticket value\(^{12}\) of this task was higher. The other broker in the SDMC office used to go a step further than that and took a lump sum from you to even make the application inside on your behalf and charged a premium for that (INR 100 or EUR 1.5). There was usually a fixed rate for each of the services offered and it operated like a micro-marketplace\(^{13}\). The overall claim by the South Delhi brokers was that people were more aware about these services being available online and so their work had considerably gone down since 2013-2015 when these services became online. The South Delhi brokers further suggested me to go to the North Delhi Municipal offices to see a higher degree of broker prevalence as they realisation of online services was rather low and also the technology back-end that supports online services wasn’t maintained well.

In Karol Bagh, New Delhi, at one of the North Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC) zonal offices, where I visited the subsequent week I saw a slightly different picture. The office was located in a crowded place (Karol Bagh is anyways considered to be an old, bustling marketplace in Delhi) and the physical appearance seemed relatively unkempt. It was difficult to differentiate between an employee and a ‘fixer’. It was here that I learnt that many departments in the MCD are operated by 3\(^{rd}\) party vendors whose employees sit

\(^{12}\) Official cost of transaction

\(^{13}\) Services offered in oligopolistic competition with few service providers and high barriers to entry
within the MCD premises and assist the main MCD employees with service
delivery. These people don’t qualify as fixers as they are still a part of the sys-
tem and operate by the rules of the same institution.

The office set up at NDMC was poorly managed as compared to SDMC
and it took me two days to get an appointment from any official. Appoin-
tments do not work by means of phone/internet and the only means to meet
them is to go and request for a short meeting to the assistant sitting outside
their office, where they take your name, designation and purpose of visit on a
slip and take it inside to the senior official (bureaucrat). The latter based the
priority he/she wants to give to your ‘purpose of visit’ may give you a time
(usually on the same day) to meet briefly. I sent my slip at 1100 hours and was
given time to meet at 1430 hours. I spent that time with the brokers sitting
outside on stone blocks with a bag containing all documents in a thick file. The
other bureaucrat at NDMC- Karol Bagh who agreed to meet me was because
his daughter also wanted to apply for Master’s education abroad, and a large
part of the interview went in providing him with that information. There will
be more from this interaction in the subsequent section on institutional re-
sponse to the brokers.

4.1.1 The People (Brokers)

The brokers outside the office spaces sat there for a minimum of 7 years
with the most experienced broker sitting there for the past 15 years. They pre-
ferred referring to themselves as ‘Consultants’ and operated based on the cus-
tomer’s needs and requirement from the public institution. I was able to forge
a healthy camaraderie with these brokers in a couple of days of interaction
even though there was a risk of not being entertained. My initial interaction
with one of the brokers at the Karol Bagh office made his suspicious if I was a
journalist. These brokers usually sat together and had a seemingly healthy sense
of competition. The image below holds visiting cards of these brokers as ‘con-
sultants’ below.

Picture 8: Brokers’ visiting cards as consultants
My positioning as a social researcher associated with a local NGO gave me access and I wanted to understand the documentation and process to obtain a licence for a small kiosk as a Quick-Service-Restaurant (QSR). I was told that it would require multiple documents and he could prepare a file\(^{14}\) for me for INR 3,500 (EUR 50) for the same. He further claimed that after a successful application, an inspector will visit your shop for inspection, and he can be expected to find out faults based on minor compliances, and you may have to offer a bribe in the range of INR 20,000 (EUR 250) to INR 75,000 (EUR 100) to make him pass the file. So if one needs strong documentation, they must get the file prepared by a broker. I made a decision to ‘shadow’ one broker in each of the locations (SDMC & NDMC) due to limited time of fieldwork (5 weeks) and my need to also meet other stakeholders as well, even though I met more brokers (2 in SDMC; 4 in NDMC) in these locations.

More information about how these brokers emerged and operated are in the boxes below as vignettes.

**Box 1: Vignette for Pankaj Sharma, NDMC, Karol Bagh Zone Delhi**

Pankaj Sharma, 36, have been sitting on a boulder or under a tree for the past 15 years helping people complete their documentation for any work they may have at the zonal office of NDMC in Karol Bagh. He likes to be known as a Consultant who also files his own income tax, often more than what is applicable to build a strong official income base for getting a loan from a bank easily in the future. He wants more stability and intends to have a new venture soon. A father of two girls, Pawan’s journey as a broker began after completing his graduation, where he was left literate & skilled, but without a job. He came in this line of work by accident, when he was trying to help a friend who operated a telephone booth at the MCD office, and soon after the new property tax norms were introduced, there was a huge influx of applications that required help. “It was during that time that my friend asked me to come and help these property tax applications for people ie, filling the forms, calculations and preparing paper-work and we made a good INR 100 in 2003 for every case”. Pawan made a good grip in this line by gradually gaining familiarity with all departments and operations and became a viable bridge for all service seekers who came to the NDMC zonal office in Karol Bagh.

**Box 2: Vignette for Pawan Singh, SDMC, Lajpat Nagar Zone Delhi**

Pawan Singh, a broker outside the SDMC office in Lajpat Nagar does the mediation work on a part time basis. He claims that although he is working here for the past 7 years, his work got highly affected due to the digitization of these citizen services around 2013. While he used to pursue these services on a full time basis earlier, be now stays only for half a day and then goes on to work in his brother’s chocolate wrapping workshop. “I have been here for the past 5 years now and it started with multiple visits for getting the licence for my dad’s shop that made me have multiple visits as paper-work wasn’t complete; I started assisting the main tout here and started getting opportunities to earn an extra buck as I was jobless after college”. He says his rates are usually fixed or else the next broker may get the assignment. He is also not quite content with his job and wants to move on, but hasn’t quite figured out the way forward yet.

\(^{14}\) A collection of all the required documents in the right format and order
While these brokers condoned and dis-regarded being associated in any corruption themselves, they claimed that the officials inside do seek rent in different ways, that one may encounter once they have direct contact with them. As a whole, it so emerged that these brokers were well integrated within the systemic citizen-state governance gap through the past decade and a half. These brokers usually emerged due to unemployment and a distinct familiarity with the municipal processes that provided them with the advantage, which was commodified as a consulting or support service in exchange of a nominal fee.

4.2 Sub Research Question 2: Nature of service seeking practice

Right from my first day at either municipality offices that I visited, I observed people queueing up at the CSBs, surrounding the brokers, and also a few who were at the public information centre trying to understand where to go for their job. A few were just at the gate asking random people of where to go for this task.

An old lady outside the SDMC office, 75+, unaccompanied, asked me where she needs to go to transfer the pension scheme from municipal to state government. As I had already seen a few cases like this on the 2nd floor (licensing department), I told her she could go there. As a follow up question, the moment I asked her about her problem, there was an outburst in the form of a 5 minute monologue narrating me the entire ordeal related to her name being wrong in the previous pension scheme offered by the municipality and now that is getting discontinued from there and commencing via GNCTD MLA (Member of Legislative Assembly\(^{15}\)) scheme. To avail the new scheme, she needs to produce a No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the current MCD office and show that to the MLAs office to get this pension continued from there, but they say there is a mistake in her name on her ID cards as compared to what they have in their records. So she needed an affidavit (undertaking) and declare her real name, complete those formalities. She wanted to know the procedure for this and was feeling lost. As I knew that brokers do this job of making affidavits I directed her to one of them and felt accomplished.

\(^{15}\) An MLA is an elected representative of a state government in India
Upon further interaction with a few service seekers (KI 13-15) at both South and North MCDs I inferred that there is a huge trust factor that operates in this space, even though there is no legal accountability associated with the promise of service delivery by the broker to the service seeker. The service seekers have high expectation from these brokers (usually as the only hope), which can expedite their job at the municipality office, as the former have low confidence on their own efforts of filling a particular form correctly, for instance. The citizens who approach these brokers also endorse these services by word of mouth to others and that gets snow-balled into self-advertisement for the brokers. The image below shows how service seekers queue up at the broker’s ‘office’ for mediation or documentation support.

I further collected some data from a few service seekers (especially visiting the CSB) to understand the basic service seeking behaviour and what is it that prompted these people to approach the broker. I observed that even though most of these services were available online, they still required a certain threshold level of seeker education and awareness to be able to access these services on their own. There were some natural barriers like the complexity of the system, IT illiteracy of the seeker and the lack of time and patience that pushed these people to the brokers. This emerged as the key insights from my quantitative survey of 30 respondents (15 each) across North and South Delhi Municipal Corporations.

Upon asking the people on the nature of the interaction with the local councillor and if there was any political support in these matters, it emerged that there was some degree of interaction with the local councillors but not for low-ticket affairs like these. Political assistance was usually of help in matters that required collective action, like sealing of commercial establishments by the MCD bureaucracy due to a Supreme Court ruling based on a monitoring committee of the Delhi Master Plan 2021 (India Today, 2018). One of the politicians interviewed (KI 2) on the contrary claimed that people came to them
for every possible query (South Delhi) and that they were the very first point of contact even before the police in some cases of emergency. The councillors in the NDMC area were relatively less pro-active and gave a generic picture of how they helped people, and had other ‘meetings’ lined up for the day. Upon as king his team, they said that it was the contractor who the councillor (NDMC) had to meet. Such frequent meetings with the contractors indicate possibilities of some ‘big-ticket’ mediation as cited by Wit (2016) in his book on informality and everyday politics in Mumbai, dealing with politicians dealing with commercial contractors in exchange for political funding.

A summary of the data obtained by doing a small survey of 30 participants across the SDMC and NDMC offices, as we can see in the figures below, projects more information on the service seeker profile and the reason for approaching a broker that reflects the degree of self-sufficiency in terms of access to basic citizen services within a municipality. While a majority were from a lower-middle income level with graduate level education, the attitude towards these brokers was relatively positive and there was less confidence to complete documentation that rationalised a genuine need for ‘support’, particularly attributed to complexity of procedure and support for application work.

Figure 4: Summary of Service Seeker Data based on quantitative survey
It is important to note at this point that all 30 of these respondents were unable to use any online service offered by the MCD largely because they did not know if these services were offered and their unfamiliarity with ICT, even when a large chunk of people visiting these offices were graduates (40%). It is interesting to map this against the total graduate percentage in Delhi that stands at 86% literacy (National Census Report 2011) that depicts how education does not determine IT literacy. A majority of the seekers also low-moderate incomes of INR 100,000 to 250,000 that is an income bracket kept tax free and it shows that low income people do visit these brokers the most. The brokers claimed that very few extremely poor people even visit the MCD as they are not aware of any government benefits and perpetuate to live a life in marginalisation.

A majority of service seekers approached the brokers for application work mainly due to the complex official procedures mainly for birth/death registration (30%) and matters related to property tax (20%) etc. While Delhi hosts a huge proportion of citizens (4 Million or 25%) in the informal, unauthorised colonies (Census 2011), the rest are either tenants or property title holders who are liable to pay property tax that is, out of a total of more than 2.5 million private properties in Delhi, only 1 million are on the municipal register (Bandyopadhyay, 2013). In a nut-shell, the main features of service seeking behaviour in the SDMC and NDMC offices was driven by the lack of knowledge about online services, lack of confidence and paucity of time in some cases. The seekers had faith in these brokers as they did not want to make a second visit and spend money on transport and a lose day’s worth of wage.
4.3 Sub Research Question 3: Institutional Response

The mediation practice is not considered to be an illegal activity in India as it operates just like any other ‘advisory’ or ‘consultancy’ where an agency or individual is hired for a particular service, even if consultancy practice wants to get itself registered as an official company. The same idea was echoed by experts E1, E3 and E5 where E1 claimed that it is just like a travel agency that a broker may operate so it is completely legitimate. E3 however claimed that while it is legitimate, it reflects an embarrassing capacity gap in the concerned public institution of not being able to create systems that citizens can cope. I observed three kinds of institutional response to these brokers, which will further be detailed below.

4.3.1 Institutional Response I: No Response

Under the light of the above information about how the government officials were affected because of the presence of these brokers (even if the officials regarded their work to be complementary), they were indifferent about the presence of these brokers and claimed to be self-sufficient. While the experts had informed me that the two groups often collude and share profits\textsuperscript{16} from the mediation transactions facilitated by brokers, these officials (KI 5 and KI 11) claimed that they operate independently (without any support from any broker) and that the resources deployed at the counters are well trained to guide all service seekers most efficiently. The officials further informed that although they acknowledge that these players outside are constructive in their actions, and may be complementary (KI 11), these players cannot be integrated or accommodated in the operations. The bureaucrat KI 4 at SDMC responded by claiming that these agents who operate from outside, they are out of ‘business’ now as the CSB is completely online and hardly has any service seeker queues. The analysis section holds greater evidence of the larger bureaucratic response on the brokers.

\textsuperscript{16} Rent or facilitation fee for providing support services; The bureaucrats inside the system lack cooperation with service seekers, making them vulnerable to approach the broker, who charges a fee and often share a portion of that with the official inside (Interview with Expert E1)
“I know that these touts are there outside the gate for years now. We do not care about them as long as they don’t open a physical office there as that will be illegal! It is a public space and people come here for official work and spend almost all of their day here. Anyone can help anyone and if they charge a fee for it, it is their business. The people (service seekers) must have faith in the way we offer services and ask for help. It is unfortunate if there is a trust deficit” - Commissioner, Department of Health Licence, NDMC

4.3.2 Institutional Response II: E-Governance in MCD

Even though I realised that the officials inside the system may turn a blind-eye to the mediation practice, I cannot ignore that e-governance initiatives at the municipal levels in Delhi had a lot to do with augmenting institutional capacities and offer simplified administrative services online. The e-governance stimulus in Delhi came about as a response to multiple problems associated with lack of internal capacity of institutions with respect to the burgeoning resident population, digitization of other services in the private sector and the availability of IT resources, high volumes of corruption and mediation at institutional premises, lack of information disbursement and poor grievance redressal to name a few. The e-governance initiative in the MCD were echoing the principles of the National e-governance Plan (NeGP) by the government of India in 2006, that aimed to ‘expedite deployment of Information Technology in governance with a vision to improve delivery of government services to citizens, business and other stakeholders’ (Sabharwal et al, 2014: 27)

The MCD had actually envisaged a portal around 2003 by empanelling Tata Consultancy Services, an Indian IT giant corporation to create an e-governance master plan for MCD based on a needs assessment exercise. The master plan eventually triggered the recruitment of another IT corporation (Tech Mahindra) to build a master web portal in 2011 that would automate numerous public service platforms and replace the humungous serpentine queues for all registration and licencing services. It further promised to avail 71 services across 40 departments and ensure transparent and accountable local governance in Delhi (The Hindu, 2011). The e-governance initiatives in MCD were triggered by a ‘mission for e-governance of Delhi’ based on a grey, planning document that aimed at the use of information technology to delivery good quality and efficient public services. The key objectives of this initiative
were to bring MCD closer to people and provide wider options to interact with MCD at a convenient time by means of the internet. It further aimed to create a digital community to encourage citizen involvement in municipal governance with more transparent, efficient decision making through a seamless information network. The digitization of the Citizen Service Bureaus was practically realised around 2013 as per the Brokers (B1 & B2).

In practice however, there are still only 13 Citizen Service Bureaus (CSBs) across Delhi under the MCDs which are catering to a population of more than 17 million (Census 2011 Delhi Population) with an extremely limited number of people aware of the digitization of these services, and those who do are unable to use it because of the complexity of its system or their lack of IT literacy. The service seeker survey indicated that 68% of all respondents were not aware of availability of these services online and the few who did know, had no knowledge of how the websites work or thought it was too complicated. A few even did not have access to a computer and only relied on smartphones with limited skill of how it works. A few even had no trust on the quality of website and its user-friendliness and claimed that the website is usually down. Figure 9 holds the spread of reasons why they could not use online services.

Figure 5: Reasons for Seekers not using online services

![Reasons for not using online services](image)

Source: Based on Quantitative Survey in North & South MCDs

It was also observed at the Regional Transport Office (RTO) in Delhi that while most services get digitised and are available online, people who are not confident about their IT skills often take help from these brokers from outside these offices. It can thus be deduced that the design of the digitization of most of these citizen services is also poor and in some cases the presence of the
broker is almost impossible to ignore (Based on RTO visit for personal work, Aug 22, 2018).

A few pockets, like in case of the Lajpat Nagar zone in SDMC are relatively well off with better realisation of taxes from its residents operated in a much more seamless manner as compared to the Karol Bagh CSB in the NDMC where most of the residents are small shopkeepers, usually insecure of frequent sanctions by the MCD on commercial activity and new forms of taxes and so the quality of citizen service provision was relatively poor.

Moving deeper into the e-governance institutionalisation, it was inferred through media reports that due to weak procurement and programme management, the private company (Tech Mahindra) responsible for the IT backend management for the MCD decided to retract from bidding for all e-governance projects with state institutions till the government agencies streamlined their procurement process, ensured timely delivery of payments along with designing of mutually acceptable contract terms, as per a media article from 2015 (Business Line, 2015).

Based on interviews with MCD officials (KI 4 & KI 5), it emerged that while up until a few years ago, most of the CSB services required the intervention of the brokers outside the office, but with the advent of the online services, their work has gone down tremendously. The same was corroborated by the broker B1 outside the zonal office at SDMC.

4.3.3 Institutional Response III: Doorstep Delivery of Public Services by the Government of Delhi

The GNCTD, in September 2018, came up with a pilot initiative of doorstep delivery of 40 administrative public services that are expected to weed out these intermediaries as they were perceived to have a coercive effect on the public (*Dy CM Manish Sisodia’s Press Conference on Door Step Delivery Of Public Services 2017*) who needed access to important government services and documents. Under this service, the government of Delhi facilitates doorstep delivery of these 40 services that come under the Delhi government through a third

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17 Caste certificate, income certificates, Driving licence, marriage certificates, ration cards, old age and handicap pension scheme, new water & sewer connections etc.
party private contractor as a Public Private Partnership (PPP) who send out executives, also known as ‘Mobile Sahayaks’ (Mobile Helpers) to people’s home with I card scanners, camera etc. to complete almost all formalities of the particular official exercise and charge a nominal fee of INR 50 (EUR 0.8) to operationalise these services (Times of India, 2018). This initiative is seen as a huge pilot initiative response to a perceived coercive effect of the brokers on vulnerable service seekers.

The same service is gradually expected to percolate to the municipal services (Interview with GNCTD Official, KI 12) as service delivery in both cases (GNCTD & Municipal) follow the same modus-operandi and suffers from the same issues. A media report, as a part of a post-release press conference stated that a total of 2.5 million people queue outside multiple offices in New Delhi in an year (The Indian Express, 2018), spend money on travelling and also suffer loss of pay for the day(s) they missed going to work.

This is a new and unique step initiated by the government of Delhi that is expected to enhance administrative efficiency, get rid of middlemen who may have a coercive effect on service seekers and also battle corruption (Afridi, 2017:10-11). These ‘Sahayaks’ also may not indulge in petty corruption due to a feedback rating system in place for the service seekers. The doorstep appointment may further be set up at a convenient time of the day (till 10pm) and operates every day. The current services are capped at 40, and are expected to reach 100 in the following months, as claimed by KI 12, a representative of the Development & Dialogue Commission, A think-tank within the Government of Delhi. Below is a flowchart of how the process of doorstep delivery of administrative delivery takes place.

Figure 6 below shows a flowchart of the doorstep delivery model used in the new scheme of the GNCTD.
While the services were launched on September 10, 2018, it is important to note certain operational issues it faced and also a few issues that I think are still not addressed so far, as far as available information in the public domain is concerned. The latter will be discussed briefly in the analysis chapter. The scheme received a massive response from the citizens of Delhi and more than 20,000 calls were received by the third day itself, out of which only 3500 calls could be answered and within a weeks time the number of operators had to be increased from 50 to 200 operating over 150 phone lines (Firstpost, 2018). The officials reported that calls that could not be answered were sent SMSs about their status and were called back at the earliest possibility. Below is an initial data summary of service delivery for the first two weeks as publicised in a known newspaper, The Indian Express (September 24, 2018).
Based on the figure above, the first two weeks of the service was full of fire-fighting with initial issues and an ad-hoc baseline evaluation of assessing demand for different kinds of services. As the Department of Revenue had the most queries, it is safe to assume that the MCD brokers too may be dealing the most with property and other local tax related issues, which may be plugged in best once this scheme comes to the MCD as well.

It is of use to note that due to the political situation in Delhi that is, its special status as the capital, and the union government also operating there, most of service related provisions were supposed to be approved by the Lieutenant Governor (LG), whose status and power is explained earlier. The doorstep delivery initiative was also delayed due to dis-agreements over the features of this scheme and the Delhi Government had to respond to a multitude of criticisms (Scroll, September 10, 2018) . The following main issues were posed by the office of the LG:

- Safety and security of senior citizen residents and women
- Non-usage of digital services (as 35 out of these 40 services are already available online)
- Need to open more service centres
- Threat of kick-back corruption
- Vehicular traffic and pollution
The government responded to these concerns claiming that doorstep logistics is the way forward in developing economies as it provides convenience and employment. While most of these services are available online, it completes the digital loop as most citizens may not always have all the equipment to scan documents share fingerprint etc. In some important cases, there will be a requirement to visit government office in person, e.g., driver’s licence, but most other cases are expected to be covered under this scheme. Opening more centres is operationally cumbersome as this has been tried before and almost always failed as front-staff fails to maintain continuity in training and the quality of service gradually becomes poor over time.

The lack of accountability and monitoring further incentivises rent-seeking behaviour by the officials of these kiosks, and governance gets adversely affected. The Doorstep delivery maintains accountability and quality of service as it is a PPP model, where training is provided by a 3rd party private player and there is a robust ground level corruption check, built into this scheme by means of a feedback rating via SMS system that goes from the citizen to the centralised data centre. Issues related to vehicular traffic and pollution were responded by claiming that it is going to be a lot lesser than what it was when people made visits on their own (Dy CM Manish Sisodia’s Press Conference on Door Step Delivery Of Public Services 2017).

The relevance of studying the institutional response at the level of Government of Delhi (GNCTD) reflects how it was also recognised as solution to the broker situation that shows the incompetence of the institutions that is, their ability to manage all cases in entirety. As these doorstep services are expected to soon come to the CSBs at the municipalities, after dealing with practical matters related to cost, function, procurement and accountability.
Chapter 5: Analysis

The following section depicts the analysis of the information gathered in the previous section, and how I mapped these findings on the framework proposed by Helmke & Levitsky (2004) on the basic typology of informal institutions and how these brokers or mediators comply with the same. A quick recap of the model tells that there are four types of informal institutions depending upon the ‘outcomes’ and ‘effectiveness’. While convergent outcomes are in line of expected behaviour, the informal institutions within this may be complementary (effective formal) or substitutive (ineffective formal), the divergent outcomes lead to accommodating and competing types of informal institutions (Helmke et al, 2004:728). The following part of this section will analyse the findings based on how the various stakeholders tend to perceive this informal institutionalisation of the broker culture in the municipality of Delhi.

5.1 Where do experts place informal institutions in the matrix

The experts (E1 to E4) who have, over the past few years interacted with formal institutions and have a good understanding of how informal institutions fit in the picture, commented on the nature of the latter as accommodative, that is, the brokers tend to maintain good effectiveness of service delivery but is based on incompatible (divergent) outcomes18 of the existing formal institutions (poor capacity of street level bureaucrats, poor turn-around time and corruption), which is the primary reason for their emergence. The accommodating nature of these institutions maintain (or in some cases enhance) the delivery of service. In the context of the CSBs at MCD, they tend to save trips (translates into monetary benefit) and usually ensures successful outcomes of the intended institutional visits.

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18 As informal institutions create incentives that alter the substantive effects of formal rules (without really violating them – It is not illegal to be a broker
Table 6: Expert Opinion on Informal Institutions in MCD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Effective Formal Institution</th>
<th>Ineffective Formal Institutions</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convergent</td>
<td>Complementary</td>
<td>Substitutive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergent</td>
<td>Accommodating</td>
<td>Competing</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Self Analysis based on opinions of ‘Expert’ respondent group

The accommodating nature of these informal institutions tends to abide systemic rules under the formal structure and incentivise complacency in the performance of these public institutions which they readily accommodate. This does not mean that the brokers are deemed legitimate by the state; they are just allowed to operate as long as citizens don’t protest.

5.2 Where do service seeking citizens place these brokers in the matrix

The service seekers who usually approach these brokers in the MCD, especially for the purpose of administrative CSB related work usually need simple guidance and navigation through the system. The services under CSB are usually small-ticket and are not very expensive to pursue. The survey with the service seekers found that a majority of the people approached these brokers for filling out of application forms, as they were not too confident about the correct responses, and wanted to be sure. The seeker opinion on placing these informal systems in the Helmke & Levitsky typology seemed to be under the ‘Complementary’ group, based on a constructive accommodation within the purview of the formal rules of the game as they tend to ‘fill in the gaps’ either by addressing contingencies not dealt with in the formal rules or by facilitating the pursuit of individual goals within the formal institutional framework. The service seekers further seem pretty satisfied with their (brokers) presence and say that there is no harm in receiving efficient service delivery upon payment of some ‘speed money’\(^{19}\) (Interview with Service Seeker KI 12).

\(^{19}\) Speed money is usually a premium payment within any service seeking activity that expedites and controls quality. It is considered as common understanding and rules
Table 7: Citizen Opinion on Informal Institutions in MCD

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
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<th>Ineffective Formal Institutions</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergent</td>
<td>Accommodating</td>
<td>Competing</td>
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Source: Self Analysis based on opinions of ‘Service Seeker’ respondent group

5.3 Where does the Delhi government place brokers on the matrix

It is important to note the opinion of the state in this case as the context of discussion revolves around ‘public’ institutions. As already discussed in earlier section on findings about the doorstep delivery of administrative services in the capital city of India, and that these services also follow the same modus-operandi as in the MCD CSBs, it is easy to deduce meaning out of the GNCTD opinion. This is based on my interaction with the representatives of the Development & Dialogue Commission (DDC) and a recent media report (The Guardian, 2018) that corroborate the need of these doorstep delivery of services, as a response to rampant corruption, latency and existence of touts that reflect systemic inefficiency.

Table 8: Opinion of GNCTD on Informal Institutions in MCD

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<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Effective Formal Institution</th>
<th>Ineffective Formal Institutions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convergent</td>
<td>Complementary</td>
<td>Substitutive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergent</td>
<td>Accommodating</td>
<td>Competing</td>
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Source: Self Analysis based on interaction with DDC & Media Reports

The state seems to look at these brokers as ‘institutional weeds’ and need to be removed as soon as possible as they can have a ‘parasitical effect’ (Interview with GNCTD official KI 12) on the service seekers, especially those that are

are usually not broken; it can be lower level corruption, tips or consultancy fee in case of brokers in the case discussed here.
vulnerable. It is this nature of these informal institutions, from the lens of the GNCTD that they fall under the ‘Competing’ group of the framework. This is so as these brokers undermine the effect of the public institution and dilute the credibility of the public institutions.

5.4 Where do brokers place themselves in the matrix

An account by one of the brokers at the North Delhi Municipal Corporation and other interactions with similar people helps one place these informal institutions as ‘Complementary’ just like how the service seekers feel.

“It is impossible for the MCD to operate without us as they are a corrupt bunch of professionals and will not move an inch without being offered a bribe. The administration has kept the systems deliberately complicated with minimal effort towards citizen education programmes. People feel more comfortable coming to us as we explain the process patiently. The poor attendant inside hardly has any time to deal with so many seekers, with so much interest together”.

The brokers thus rely on their familiarity with the formal institutional system and the delivery gaps due to the presumed lack of capacity of the public institutions. This lack of capacity reflects in the universal confusion or suffrage of the service seekers, coupled with their own lack of confidence (more than education), IT literacy and time constraints and creates an indispensable position for the brokers along with a business opportunity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Effective Formal Institution</th>
<th>Ineffective Formal Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convergent</td>
<td>Complementary</td>
<td>Substitutive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergent</td>
<td>Accommodating</td>
<td>Competing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Self Analysis based on interaction with Brokers

5.5 Where do I place brokers based on my observation

There were also a few other set of actors who I interacted with (RWAs, Councillors etc.), but due to the heterogeneity of their response, it is not sufficient
information to place within a particular category of this framework. Based on the analysis of my interaction with all these respondents, I am made to believe that these informal institutions are actually ‘Accommodative’ in nature as they undermine public institutions and hit their credibility, but are usually a success on the ground with the service seekers who do-not mind paying up a premium to expedite their job. The GNCTD, in my opinion have an impressive model in place but with less baseline research (available in public domain) that may rationalise such a bold step. It is unique and has a high recall value, assuming that seekers are exploited by these brokers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Convergent</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergent</td>
<td>Accommodating</td>
<td>Competing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s analysis based on interaction with all actors*

A step further in my analysis includes mirroring of these informal institutions on a few Good Governance principles. This exercise was useful to theorise how urban local governance scenarios such as in Delhi, with the said demographic context, reflect on the conceptual understanding of Good Governance, in practice. Good Governance can be understood as a normative conceptualisation of how governance is realised and how a set of social actors engage towards it, in any given context. The lack of a standard definition is compensated by means of a set of characteristics or principles that strengthen good governance in any society. “Good governance has 8 major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law” (UNESCAP: 1 & Gisselquist, 2012).

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20 There are 8 Good Governance characteristics based on EU but the context of my research requires only 4 of the main parameters; EU Link
5.6 Good Governance Analysis

For the purpose of my study, I decided to map the broker scenario in MCD on some selected Good Governance characteristics namely:

5.6.1 Accountability

The citizen-broker-state arena operates independent of any legal binding and is an outcome of an informal understanding, trust and testimony (also endorsement by other citizens). The accountability of such a service delivery institutionalisation is expected to be quite low.

5.6.2 Transparency

Although the prima-facie broker operations, related to filling an application for or an affidavit usually happened on the spot in front of the service seeker, but other activities related to extended support (where broker interacted with the officials inside) were usually far from transparent. The brokers thus do not fare well in this feature of Good Governance.

5.6.3 Efficiency

This is one of the most important features of the Good Governance principles in relation to the MCD broker operations in Delhi. The primary reason for the service seekers to approach the brokers is to have smooth access to a particular public institution, in order to receive efficient delivery of service. The broker offers the same in exchange of a fee and also offer to facilitate extra-mile services at a premium, as establish in the previous sections. I can thus deduce that there is high efficiency attributed to the presence of these brokers in the context of municipal citizen service delivery in New Delhi.

5.6.4 Effectiveness

This particular feature related to Good Governance also fairs well when applied to broker led informal institutions. This is so as the brokers have expertise in completing all documentation for the applicants and seldom would you see a case where an application made by the broker gets rejected. This points out to a good effectiveness score in the Good Governance framework, related to broker practice.
The analysis section applied the findings on the Helmke and Levitsky framework from the perspective of key stakeholders in the particular arena and further understands how this broker led informal institutions fair on the good-governance framework, on a few select features.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

The state of Delhi became a ‘Union Territory’ in 1956 upon the recommendation of the State Reorganisation Commission and in 1992, the parliament passed the Government of NCT of Delhi (GNCTD) Act that forged a special status of the capital that is, as a union territory, it shall also possess state-like features including a government of elected representatives at the state, municipal and federal levels. This Act was followed by a series of misinterpretations related to the overlap of administrative jurisdiction of each level of government, for instance, storm water drainage is under the MCD but sewage management is under the GNCTD, which the common city dweller does not always know and has to run from pillar to post to get the work done (Sheikh et al, 2015).

The Municipality of Delhi (MCD), a locally elected body also operates within a defined, limited jurisdiction of administration of selected list of services posted in the 74th constitutional amendment related to decentralisation of administrative authority, but it has not been completely realised in practice, and most states in India tend to take on the delivery of most of these select services, mainly as municipal administration is still not well equipped to take on all the activities as per the 74th amendment. The complexity in the urban local governance due to administrative redundancy, lack of accountability, institutional capacity and budgetary delays further established an administrative conundrum in the capital in the past couple of decades (Sivaramakrishnan, 2013: 88).

As capital city, there is a huge influx of people every year for economic opportunities, and the administration is expected to cater to the burgeoning population by creating means for infrastructural and administration support. Due to a centrally managed municipality and the issues raised above, the citizens face problems in raining grievances and accessing basic services like registration, licencing, certification etc. The MCD, in an attempt to provide better

21 A union territory is a type of administrative division in the Republic of India. Unlike the states of India, which have their own governments, union territories are federal territories ruled directly by the union government, hence the name "union territory"
access to the citizens, trifurcated itself into three units namely, North, South & East Delhi Municipal Corporation in 2012. The scope of this study was structured around ‘access’ of these basic administrative citizen services at municipal level that are provided through the Citizen Service Bureau (CSB) at each of the 12 zonal offices across the three municipalities.

This paper is set around the citizen-state interface at the CSBs of the MCD and problematizes the emergence and sustenance of the middlemen or agents or brokers or facilitators or touts, service seeking behaviour of the citizens through these brokers and also establishes the key institutional responses to informal mediation. These brokers facilitate transactions of the service seekers with the MCD for services offered at the level of the CSBs that is, birth/death registration, licencing, property tax etc. in exchange of a nominal fee as their private profit. The paper further articulates the conceptual understanding of these broker led transactions as ‘informal institutions’, following a set of socially shared rules of trust and cooperation leading to the delivery of these services, access to which usually gets blocked due to incomplete paperwork, citizen confidence & education and the paucity of time.

I operationalised a mixed-method technique to explore the answers to the research questions by conducting 15 qualitative interviews with a wide spectrum of actors (Brokers, NGOs, Experts, RWA, municipal politicians, bureaucrats, Representatives from GNCTD etc.) and by surveying 30 service seekers to understand how they access services through brokers. I also interviewed a few service seekers to understand the deeper nuances of access and ‘shadowed’ two brokers as well at the South & North Delhi MCDs by being in their close vicinity for 3-4 days each.

The first sub-question around the emergence and sustenance of brokers was answered by saying that these brokers primarily emerged and evolved due to systemic deficiencies of the public institutions in the city like the lack of institutional capacity to serve huge volumes and also the design complexities of the process that was rather difficult to comprehend at the demand side of operations. The brokers I met were in their occupation since up to 15 years and

22 Low enough or affordable for the average citizen
mainly encountered this job, either by gaining familiarity with the process after multiple visits for their own personal work, or due to unemployment (when they got introduced to this work by an acquaintance within the system). The brokers gradually gained acceptance and legitimacy with the service seekers and became an integral part of service delivery, claiming they had a complementary role in the system. There were only a few brokers outside every office mainly responsible for completing paperwork for which they charged a market-oriented fee that is, an amount the user is willing to pay (INR 30 or EUR 0.4) and not high enough to lose a customer to another broker.

To answer research sub-question 2 on service seeking behaviour it so emerged that service seekers were usually low on confidence and not aware of availability of these services online and a majority came from a low-economic position (based on survey). They were sensitive to costs related to multiple visits to MCD (time and money) and so usually were in need of support to accomplish the objective in just one visit. The usual tasks included filling up of forms, affidavit undertakings, calculation of property tax or payment to name a few and while all of these are available online, and almost 70% of the seekers were unaware of the same. Those who knew found it complicated or were not technology savvy at all. Service seeker behaviour was thus mainly dependent on the guidance of the brokers who guided them and in some cases even went the extra mile to get the work done, at a payment of a premium fee. The general public, based on interviews claimed that although they trusted the brokers, they would any day prefer a better administrative readiness at the supply side so that there is no suffrage related to these chores.

Responding to sub-question 3 on institutional responses, they were largely classified around three types of that of the bureaucrats, sitting inside the office and a couple of administrative reforms in the form of e-governance and the introduction of the new doorstep delivery of administrative service at the GNCTD, where too the service delivery suffered from the same modus operandi. The first key takeaway from this analysis was that the public officials inside the premises were indifferent to the broker operation as long as there was no apparent corrupt practice happening, leading to customer distress. The experts and the GNCTD officials disagreed though, claiming that the general public suffer in multiple ways including cost of multiple visits to office premis-
es and the inadvertent loss of pay that one may suffer from by not showing up to work because of administrative chores.

E-governance, as another type of institutional response in the form of administrative reform, was triggered by the IT sector boom and the availability of the internet as a household service. While most of these services are available online, there are multiple problems associated with lack of user awareness, IT illiteracy of the poor and uneducated masses, complicated design of software (due to shoddy terms of reference to the IT company responsible for creation and maintenance of software), cheap server hardware etc. Also due to poor management and procurement terms, the MCD further suffered with severe outage due to delayed payments to the IT Company employed for these tasks.

The last institutional response was that while GNCTD initiated the home delivery of public services, most of which were too available online but still offered in this manner due to the reasons mentioned above regarding IT reluctance of the users. There was a lot of political backlash around this scheme and it also suffered with teething technical glitches in the first few weeks. While there is no official report on its current status and feedback, a few media reports seem to appreciating this effort by the GNCTD as already mentioned in the previous chapters.

These responses to the research questions, when analysed against the conceptual framework by Helmke & Levitsky, through the lens of a few select groups of stakeholders, reflect the plurality of interests that are applicable in the sustenance of an administrative institution of informal brokers engaged within the formal set-up of citizen services. The existence of these brokers seems necessary till the time the formal institutions become robust and effective. While it is relatively easy to analyse the effectiveness and impact of formal institutions due to the availability of rules that are written down and officially sanctioned, it becomes quite cumbersome when we study informal institutions that operate differently in different contexts. The matrix by Helmke and Levitsky was able to shed light on how governance outcomes may get affected through the course of interaction between formal and informal institutions. The model further stated that formal institutions may often constrain actors’
expectation (& behaviour) and how it often becomes a trigger for informal rules to emerge (Helmke et al: 733).

In my opinion, the findings and analysis of this study reflect the extent to which a society is self-sufficient in terms of getting access to basic municipal public services in a developing country context like India. While there are a multitude of reasons why access to citizen services become problematic, through the formal institutions, it is therefore important we look at comprehensive administrative reform that targets both formal institution strengthening along with demand side readiness. For example, while robust e-governance platforms may seem promising, it is important to acknowledge availability of technical infrastructure, capacity of bureaucratic personnel, and most importantly an estimate of how many beneficiaries will use the new systems in place. This analysis is an important pre-condition to gain self-sufficiency in obtaining seamless citizen services.

6.1 Policy Recommendations

Formal institutional strengthening may either take place by means of building better process, design and effectiveness. Client readiness is important and may require intense efforts in informing and educating the citizens about the available service and how these can be accessed easily. For example, in the Netherlands, there are periodic awareness drives for the aged residents at municipal levels to help them stay abreast with the new technologies that replace old systems (Based on my informal interaction with an official in Schiedam municipality) The Indian scenario may make use of its young demographics coupled with a booming IT sector and low cost of internet services to simplify access.

The GNCTD doorstep delivery initiative lags efficacy due to technical deficiency and its readiness to face volumes. The government of Delhi must rather spend its resources on better administrative reforms that build processes to seek service better, educate people on technology and services and checks lower level corruption. There can also be ways to include these brokers within the system, which currently was impossible based on the responses by bureaucrats.
The e-governance initiatives in Estonia for instance are generating enough attention all across the world. Unlike the UIDAI (Aadhar) in India, every one of the 1.3 million citizens of Estonia has a digital identity, digital signature & comprehensive personal record, secured by block-chain technology, also used in cryptocurrency. The e-governance programme in Estonia enables 95% of its citizens to pay tax, vote online and register for any citizen service digitally based on a unique ID, like Aadhar. These services are possible in India but due to the massive heterogeneity in languages, economic inequality and volatile political climate, policies such as these face criticism like privacy, cyber-security and differentiated political priorities (Zeynep et al, 2018).

The National e-Governance Plan (NeGP) in India is deliberating towards making all government services “accessible to the common man in his locality, through common service delivery outlets, and ensure efficiency, transparency, and reliability of such services at affordable costs to realise the basic needs of the common man” (Chauhan, 2009). It is important to acknowledge citizen centrality as an important feature of governance, and how states design processes to be close to citizens and at the same time remain robust & centrally controlled. A rather concrete policy recommendation around e-governance in the MCD is to begin with a comprehensive evaluation of the current state of play, to be in a better position to plan. The initiative must be decentralised as a state run activity, by employing retired IT technocrats as consultants in the GNCTD in a dedicated Department of e-Governance. The e-governance reform must take into account not just software design, but how the staff can be trained to use it on a daily basis with a dedicated troubleshooting division. The e-governance ‘reform’ policy must take a phased mission mode approach in implementing the policy after a careful articulation of need.

6.2 Scope for further research

6.2.1 Administrative Reforms in Delhi

As a by-product of this research, it is inevitable that I have encountered many other questions around diverse socio-political scenarios that impede the numerous administrative reform initiatives. While the experts from the respective fields or even the government lay out impressive policies, they usually get ta-
abled, but discontinued at the pilot or implementation stage due to one or the other delivery issues as more actors are introduced. Policies should thus be more democratic by taking into account interests and influence of all stakeholders for chances of foreseeable success. The administrative reforms department in the GNCTD must have a user-friendly web-page informing the citizen on a dashboard of administrative reforms list along with status and intended deadlines.

6.2.2 Evaluation for GNCTD Doorstep Service

Another area of further research opens up around the evaluation of the recent GNCTD doorstep initiative that is being celebrated as a unique project, not done anywhere in the world. It would be interesting to conduct a retrospective baseline assessment of the state of play before this project and have periodic evaluations to understand the efficacy of this initiative as it is estimated to cost around INR 12 Crores (EUR 1.5 Million) per year (Administrative Reform Report GNCTD, 2017).
6.3 Concluding Statement

Residents of the megacity of Delhi are mainly migrants with close to 25% without formal housing and basic utilities (Sheikh et al, 2014: 1). Citizen services provided by municipalities provide the much coveted legitimacy to a dweller that further reinforces confidence of being a lawful resident. A huge portion of this service delivery gets taken over by private players or brokers. This Research Paper studied the inter-play of the citizen-state relationship mediated by brokers who operate for a profit. While the brokers mainly emerged due to joblessness and accidental familiarity with the municipal service delivery system, they are now an integral part of the system with acceptance by the service seekers (a majority of whom are not aware that most of these services are also available online).

The three-fold institutional response indicates the denial of public officials on the adverse effects of brokers and focuses on reforms like e-governance and doorstep delivery of services (both of which can be accessed from home). The findings were analysed through the conceptual framework by Helmke & Levitsky and selected Good Governance principles to understand how these broker driven services operate from different perspective and if they contribute towards improving municipal service delivery in the capital of India.
Annexure 1: Interview Guide(s)

Experts

- Introductory Questions
  - How would you like to comment on the effective delivery of Municipal Services in Delhi? Have they improved, worsened or status quo over the past decade or so?
  - How would you describe the presence of intermediaries/agents within public service delivery? Can we try and categorise them (Political, Bureaucratic, Private etc.)? If not, how else?
  - What are the key services where they can be seen the most and why these services?
  - What are the most important services in demand at the CSBs

- Emergence of Intermediaries
  - What are the key underlying conditions based on which these intermediaries are able to operate in municipal public services (originally operated purely by state machinery)? (Lead with: Complex bureaucratic system, vulnerability of seeker, capacity of public institution, ICT, Any other?)
  - Can you describe the profile of these intermediaries (All types)?
  - If we specifically focus on the private rent seeker, how would you describe him/her? How is he able to be in the system?

- Operation & Maintenance of Intermediaries
  - What are the various ways in which intermediaries operate in the public services space in Delhi? Can you give an example of his operation for any particular service? <To be verified by the seeker interaction/shadowing>
  - How can you describe the normative rules of the game regarding nature of tasks, commercials (rate and payment terms)
  - What do you have to say about the trust factors here and legitimacy amongst seekers? How do the intermediaries promote their ‘businesses’? <Explain legitimacy>
  - How do these intermediaries maintain themselves? Is there any form of ‘permission to operate’ that reinforces the existence of these informal institutions?

- Impact on GG
  - How do these informal means affect the functioning of the municipality, considering the magnitude of size and operations?
  - Are these parallel institutions accommodating/complementing or competing/substitutive with public institutions?
  - Are these services accountable, transparent, effective and efficient?
Key Informant Interviews

Councillors (Municipal politicians)

- **Operations**
  - How often do the citizens approach you?
  - What are the main issues the citizens face on frequent basis?
  - What is the most common profile of people who approach you?
  - How do you route these issues to the respective municipal officer?
  - What is the process for follow up for the citizen?
  - Are you able to fix

- **Incentives**
  - Do you charge any fee or get any gifts from the service seekers?
  - What is your motivation to work for the people?
  - Do you see any political gains in this?

RWA Representatives

- Since when is your RWA in place and what are the key functions
- Do you assist the citizens on municipal administrative tasks
- Do you charge an annual fee to maintain office
- How and why do you think an RWA is necessary for the citizens
- Do you think the municipal officers entertain your RWA for official work? How often do you meet MCD officials?

MCD Officials

- About work profile
  - What is your main job profile at the MCD?
  - Since when have you been working here?
  - What are the main tasks completed in your department here?
  - Do you think all the tasks get completed in a smooth manner?

- Extra support to service seekers
  - Do all service seekers need the same kind of support?
  - Are you able to provide the seekers with extra support to the ones who need?

- On brokers
  - Do you acknowledge the presence of brokers outside this office?
  - What do you think about the brokers who fulfil these tasks? Are they helping service delivery?
What do you think service seekers think about them? Are they exploited to pay rents?

On e-governance
- How far has e-governance been able to respond to this and for seekers?
- Do you think service seekers can use online services?
- Do you think these brokers are important for service delivery?

Broker Interviews
- Emergence
  - Since when have you been operating here?
  - How did you end up working here?
  - Did you have do an ‘informal setting’ with any official inside?
  - Are you registered as a company? Do you pay income tax?
- Operation
  - What are the various services that you offer here?
  - How much do you charge for the various services?
  - Do you help if people need to make false document?
  - If someone does not want to go inside, do you know the officials inside and can you provide extended support?
- Relationship with service seeker
  - Why do these seekers come to you?
  - Why do they not use online services?
  - Do you think you charge a reasonable fee?
- Importance to Good Governance
  - Do you make sure you will complete the work? What is the promise?
  - Do you tell what all work you are doing?
  - Do you ensure work is completed on time?
  - How important do you think you are for service delivery?

Service Seeker Interviews
- Survey questions
  - Age, education, income, reason for coming to MCD, Reason for coming to broker, knowledge of online services
  - What is the nature of work that brought you to MCD
  - Why did you prefer to come to the broker
  - Do you think the fee charged is viable?
  - Are you aware these services are also available online?
  - If yes, why do you not use it online?
  - Do you ever get exploited by the broker?
  - Do you think a broker is necessary for service delivery in MCD?
## Annexure 2: Quantitative list

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Income (INR)</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Reason to visit MCD</th>
<th>Reason for approachingtout</th>
<th>Official Fee (INR)</th>
<th>Tout Fee (INR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Pension Scheme</td>
<td>To make an affidavit</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>&lt;50,000</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Pension Scheme</td>
<td>NOC Application</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>100,000-250,000</td>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>Birth Certificate (name addition)</td>
<td>Affidavit for Correction in wife’s name</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>500,000+</td>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>Payment of Penalty (Trade)</td>
<td>Affidavit</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>100,000-250,000</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Death Certificate</td>
<td>Application typing and form filling</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>500,000+</td>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>Property Tax</td>
<td>Calculation of new tax after construction; time constraints</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>100,000-250,000</td>
<td>XII</td>
<td>Birth Certificate</td>
<td>Application form filling</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Pension Scheme</td>
<td>NOC Application</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.No</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Income (INR)</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Reason to visit</td>
<td>Reason for approaching tout</td>
<td>Official Fee (INR)</td>
<td>Tout Fee (INR)</td>
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<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>250,000-500,000</td>
<td>XII</td>
<td>Community Hall Booking</td>
<td>Demand Draft for hall booking</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>100,000-250,000</td>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Hackney Carriage</td>
<td>Complicated application procedure</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>500,000+</td>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>Property tax</td>
<td>Calculation of new tax after construction</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>100,000-250,000</td>
<td>XII</td>
<td>Trade Licence (health)</td>
<td>Help for making file</td>
<td>1100 (plus annual fee)</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>Pension Scheme</td>
<td>NOC Application + Affidavit</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Hackney Carriage</td>
<td>Multiple licences</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>100,000-250,000</td>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>Penalty</td>
<td>Affidavit</td>
<td>15000</td>
<td>1000</td>
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</table>

NDMC
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Problem Description</th>
<th>Time Constraints</th>
<th>Fee</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>Property Tax</td>
<td>Calculation of new tax after construction; time constraints</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>Name change in house ownership</td>
<td>Complicated process and lack of time with kids to run around</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Death Certificate</td>
<td>Needed copies after MCD office had closed; no time to make a trip again next day</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>Cancellation of booking of community park for wedding</td>
<td>Delay in refund for security deposit due to errors in application; Needed help for correct format of application and an affidavit to correct an incorrect undertaking made at the time of application by mistake</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>1000 (depending upon refund amount)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>XII</td>
<td>Birth Certificate</td>
<td>Application for addition of name of child</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>Death Certificate</td>
<td>Application typing and form filling</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Birth Certificate</td>
<td>Change of name on birth certificate</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>XII</td>
<td>Property Tax</td>
<td>Affidavit for payment of penalty of unpaid property tax and help for recalculation</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>2500</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Health Trade Licence (Small restaurant- Dhaba)</td>
<td>Preparation of file of documents</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>3500</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Fee</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>Birth Certificate</td>
<td>Application form filling and copies; after closure of office</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>500,000+</td>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>Property tax</td>
<td>Calculation of new tax after construction</td>
<td>Nil</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>500,000+</td>
<td>XII</td>
<td>Property tax</td>
<td>Mutation: Change of name of owner after sale of property</td>
<td>250,00 (stamp duty)</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>100,000-250,000</td>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>Penalty</td>
<td>Affidavit to claim confiscated stuff</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<td>VIII</td>
<td>Birth Certificate</td>
<td>Application form filling and copies</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Hackney Carriage</td>
<td>Multiple licences</td>
<td>700</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


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