"A Soldier's Creed"

Means, Methods and Messages used in National Identity building amongst American soldiers in West Germany 1944 -1970

Thessa Boringa

Master's Thesis History of Science
Faculty of History, Culture and Communication
Erasmus University Rotterdam
thessa-boringa@hotmail.com
August 2018
459510

Supervisor: Dr. Robbert-Jan Adriaansen
Second Reader: Prof. Dr. Ben Wubs

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1. Introduction

"The Americans had arrived in Germany on the heels of the Nazi defeat and stayed for nearly five decades, first as conquerors and protectors against Soviet aggression, then as economic, military and political partners, and finally as awkward guests."[1] That is what historian John W. Lemza writes in his book *American Military Communities in West Germany.*. One can imagine that different roles throughout these years required different behavior, specific codes of conduct and attitudes of the American soldier.[2]

According to historian Maria H. Höhn, as much as fifteen million Americans lived in West Germany between 1945 and 1989. They were living in a vastly different culture than they were used to, and many men going overseas were draftees; young, adventurous and inexperienced.[3] It cannot have been easy to stimulate and guide these Americans to portray and feel a similar national identity. And to be effective as an army, and as ambassadors for the US, these millions of men with different backgrounds, had to feel connected and be as one united Armed Forces. According to political scientist Benedict Anderson, the military is a prime spot for nationalism to grow, because in the face of death or danger, we tend to bond with one another.[4] Furthermore, as historian Dan Reiter suggests, nationalism can at the same time make soldiers more willing to kill and die for their nation.[5] Both these factors contribute to a military's effectiveness for obvious reasons.

The guidelines and training policies necessary to bind these American soldiers to each other and to the US, naturally, had to be designed and initiated by someone, the actor. Since the task of troop information and education fell on several US Governmental organizations and branches throughout the Cold War years, these organizations often changing in name and in composition, and several Presidents and administrations that came and went, it would make it unnecessarily confusing to name every specific organization or initiator with every policy or source. It is important to mention here that the main focus of this thesis is not the actor. The

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[1] J.W. Lemza, *American Military Communities in West Germany: Life in the Cold War Badlands, 1945-1990* (Jefferson: McFarland & Company Inc., 2016), 1.

[2] Lemza, *American Military Communities in West Germany,* 1-16.

[3] M.H. Höhn, *GI's and Fräuleins: The German – American Encounter in 1950s West Germany* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002) 1-9.

[4] B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), 7.

[5] D. Reiter, "Nationalism and Military Effectiveness: Post-Meiji Japan," in *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness,* ed. R.A Brooks and E.A Stanley (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 27-29.

focus of my analysis lies on the intentions; on the means and methods used, and the message sent to the American soldiers in West Germany, not on who specifically directed the construction attempts. That said, all the primary sources that I use and the policies that I highlight in this thesis were either from, on demand of, in cooperation with, or supported by the United States Department of Defense. Therefore I have decided to use US Department of Defense (DoD), as a general term when talking about the top-down actor in this research.

The Cold War is often called an "ideological war," because allies and enemies focused mainly on winning the hearts and minds of their own, as well as each other's people, instead of on a more traditional physical battle.[6] In my opinion, this makes the Cold War period especially interesting and relevant when it comes to analyzing national identity and its construction.[7] This thesis attempts to contribute to the history of American Cold War politics, to a better understanding of national identity construction and to the knowledge of American soldiers' self-image during this period. As the title of this thesis suggests, I aim to investigate the creation of a Soldier's Creed. I find this title especially suitable since the term is used on several occasions in primary sources by the DoD themselves.[8] Moreover, creed stems from the Latin word 'credo,' which means "I believe."[9] This I found fitting to an investigation of American national identity in the midst of an ideological battle of ideas.

Before starting my own investigation, I will first have to go deeper into the current discourse that exists on American soldiers in the Cold War and national identity building in general.

1.1 Historiographical Review

When most people think of the Cold War period, they usually remember the conflicts such as the Vietnam War and the Korean War, and tend to forget the American soldiers who were stationed in West Germany. This tendency is especially visible in general (American) literature. For instance, when we look at historian and professor, John Lewis Gaddis' book *The Cold War* (2011), we can see that the most explained topics are the Korean War, the United States – Soviet Union superpower struggle, and the Middle East. Gaddis claims that

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[6] R.B. Woods, *Quest for Identity: America since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 32.
[7] D.C. Engerman, "Ideology and the Origin of the Cold War, 1917-1962," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol. 1,* ed. M.P. Leffler and O.A. Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 20-26.
[8] "Credo of the U.S. Army Soldier," *Army Information Digest* 17, no.1 (Jan 1962): 47; "The Soldier's Creed," *Army Information Digest* 21, no.1 (Jan 1966): 66.
[9] 'Translation of Credo,' https://www.dictionary.com/browse/credo (accessed 28-07-2018).

the purpose of his book is to give people who did not live during the Cold War years, a better understanding of what happened. Because of that goal, we should be able to assume that Gaddis choose the most important elements of the Cold War to put in this book. This means that since he does not elaborated on West Germany, Gaddis does not consider Germany to be one of the more important focal points of the Cold War. This book thereby keeps the status quo in place: Germany is not a priority when it comes to studying the Cold War in the US.[10]

Another influential title is *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War* (2013), edited by Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde. This book portrays a similar perspective on the Cold War. Even though contributions from a wide range of writers, and from different disciplines, were collected, the introduction explains that "this does not mean that the topic of the United States versus Soviet Union rivalry over power, loses its significance."[11] On the contrary, they suggest it should be held central in all perspectives on the Cold War history. In other words, a well-considered selection of prominent writers and historians, again focus on the conflicts and tensions with and in South East Asia and Russia. When one looks at their contents, both the wars in Asia are given more thought and space than West Europe in general, let alone Germany in particular. I understand, and agree, that the tension between the US and the Soviet Union, as well as the escalations of violence that occurred in Asia, are highly important events in Cold War history, but I do believe these general works neglect the social, human and soldier parts that played a role in the Cold War.[12]

If we then consider non-American books on the Cold War, such as *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War,* edited by Detlef Junker (2004), we often get a different status quo. In this book written by several (European) authors, for instance, we find that it does go into Germany as the main subject. Furthermore, it even investigates the relation between the US and Germany, and therefore touches upon the American soldier in West Germany. But it fails to discuss the state of mind of these American soldiers, their behavior, the politics designed for them to boost their morale or what unified them as brothers in arms. The book is divided into three thematic chapters, namely 'Politics,' 'Security' and 'Economics.' None of these chapters pay attention to the individual, social and more psychological history surrounding the American soldiers in West Germany during the Cold

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[10] J.L. Gaddis, *The Cold War* (London: Penguin Books, 2011), 1-12.

[11] P. Goedde and R. Immerman ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 7.

[12] Goedde and Immerman, *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War,* 1-10.

War. In conclusion, the same lack of depth and perspective can be found in European general works, as in the American ones.[13]

Although I only portray three volumes with general history here, the books represent the general perspective of Cold War handbooks.[14] This invites us to look deeper into the more individual history of American soldiers in West Germany. The next part will focus on the discourse on American national-, and military identity during the Cold War years.

1.1.1 American Soldiers and National Identity

An author who has paid close attention to (military) identity, and identity construction, is Volker Franke in *Preparing for Peace: Military identity, Value Orientations and Professional Military Education* (1999). In his book, he argues that the morale, identity and behavior of the American soldiers in West-Germany changed over the years. He places this change in attitude right after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. "After the fall of the Berlin wall, military identity was unstable because of the loss of a clear enemy to fight."[15] He argues that soldiers needed to change their vision of what it meant to be an American soldier to deal with the new situation. When the Communist threat fell away, that national identity which had become basic instinct, left the soldiers confused. This perspective suggests that national, or military, identity of the American soldiers in West Germany had not undergone significant changes until the fall of the Berlin Wall. Which I find hard to believe considering the shifting of enemies and allies during the late 1940s, this must have had some effect on how the American soldier portrayed and viewed themselves.[16]

A historian that shares the idea that there has been a change in national identity amongst American soldiers during the Cold War, is Jeanne P. Sharp. She wrote the chapter "Reel Geographies of the New World order: Patriotism, Masculinity and Geopolitics in post-Cold War American Movies," in *Rethinking Geopolitics* (1998). She opens with the argument: "That the Cold War was constructive of American self-identity rather than a threat to it, has now become quite clear in the clamor to find an alternative source of danger against

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[13] D. Junker ed., *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1990, vol. 1* (German Historical Institute: Washington D.C., 2004), vii-xii.

[14] J.L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3-24; S.E. Ambrose, ed., *The Cold War: A Military History* (New York: Random House Trade, 2005), 3-20.

[15] V. Franke, *Preparing for Peace: Military Identity, Value Orientations and Professional Military Education* (Westport: Praeger, 1999), 3.

[16] Franke, *Preparing for Peace,* 2-14.

which to define the boundaries of the USA."[17] Focused on gender, she argues that American soldiers felt they had to regain some masculinity after the Cold War ended. She furthermore, emphasizes the importance of popular culture, such as media, on such stereotyping and national identity construction. In her chapter she mentions that American propaganda did not only influence the foreign audience, it also had an effect on what American citizens thought and how they behaved.[18] Although Sharp's chapter is a bit too focused on gender identity and the aftermath of the Cold War, it does provide some interesting theories on propaganda and national identity construction that I can apply to earlier years of the Cold War.

Both these sources and additional literature, focus mainly on American national identity in the post-Vietnam or post-Berlin Wall years, in some cases even post-Cold War. But if we were to believe the quote by Lemza, then it should be clear to us that this is too narrow a perspective. If the American soldiers had different roles to play during the Cold War, then this must have also required different attitudes, behavior and therefore adjustments in national identity.[19]

1.1.2 Historiographical Gap

All these books and articles give us general information or interesting elements of the history of American soldiers in West-Germany during the Cold War. But, many of these works only cover a short period and are either too general or too specific in topic, which leads in the first place to a void in knowledge on US involvement in West Germany, and secondly results in the neglect of the human, social and behavioral side of the Cold War events.

The most unsatisfying feeling, however, is fueled by the fact that many studies on national identity and national identity building have been completed in the last decades, why then, have those theories not yet been applied to American soldiers in West Germany? In other words: why is there not yet a study on the attempts to guide and influence the self-image of these American soldiers through the Cold War years? Studies up until now have focused mainly on national identity theory in general. Those that do study soldiers stationed in West Germany, are written from the perspective of the soldiers, or on the actual national identity

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[17] J.P. Sharp, "Reel Geographies of the New World Order, Patriotism, Masculinity and Geopolitics in Post-Cold War American Movies," in *Rethinking Geopolitics,* ed. S. Dalby and G.O. Tuathail (London: Routledge, 1998), 152.

[18] Sharp, "Reel Geographies of the New World Order, Patriotism, Masculinity and Geopolitics in Post-Cold War American Movies," 152-156.

[19] Lemza, 1-16.

itself, instead of investigating how it was created, stimulated, guided, and for what purpose and through which methods. Which in my opinion is just as interesting and maybe more relevant than a history of just a national identity it itself.

Because of this gap in history writing, an important part of the Cold War military history is left untold. With this thesis I intend to contribute to the completion of the story of national identity building amongst American soldiers during their service in West Germany.

1.2 Research Questions

To accomplish that contribution, my research question will be the following: *How was national identity constructed and maintained amongst American soldiers stationed in West Germany? (1944-1970)*

To answer this main question, the thesis is divided into three chapters. Each has a different time frame and a different theme. The chapters will be chronological, but will have some overlap. The following questions will be answered in the subsequent chapters:

- How did the transition from being a conquering force to an occupying force affect the construction of national identity amongst the American soldiers stationed in West Germany in the immediate post-war years?

- How did the changing political dynamics in West Germany translate to national identity building attempts in material provided to the American soldiers stationed there? (1947-1961)

- In the 1960s, when global attitudes towards the United States shifted, in what ways did the US Department of Defense (still) try to influence national identity amongst their soldiers in West Germany?

In the first analytical chapter, I will focus on the aftermath of the Second World War, and the position of the American soldier in the occupation of West Germany. The unorthodox situation of occupation caused for many improvised policy - and guideline - changes which influenced the ways Americans soldiers were approach, as well as the messages they received. They had to adjust to the reality of a broken down nation, to the new roles they had to play and to what was expected of them regarding national identity.[20] The 1950s ushered in a new period with different tensions, and different expectations for American soldiers stationed in West-Germany. Furthermore, the changes in foes and friends forced the US to rethink its

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[20] E.F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (Washington D.C., Center of Military History United States Army, 2003), 425-427.

policies and attitude towards the West Germans, as well as towards the East Germans and Soviets. I will investigate how these changes influenced national identity constructing attempts in the second analytical chapter.[21] The period discussed in the last chapter will be the 1960s, because in this period the US was under a great amount of stress and criticism, which made the US portray itself differently from the decades before. The identity crisis the US faced during these years, impacted what was expected of the American soldiers, what it meant to be an American soldier, and how they should view and portray themselves.[22]

I furthermore picked each period the way I did because in all three timeframes, a significant shift or change took place which had consequences for the American soldiers stationed in West Germany. By investigating those changes and their impact on national identity building of the soldiers, I will hopefully be able to come to an overarching and comparative analysis at the final conclusion.

My research will focus on a large portion of the Cold War, it will roughly cover 1944 to 1970. I let my thesis begin during the final hours of the Second World War because in this period the American soldiers were being prepared for the occupation of West Germany. The mindset created during that preparation, influenced the mindset and self-image of American soldiers in the next decades, and it is therefore a good starting point for a comparative analysis. By the 1970s, American soldiers in West Germany became decreasingly important to the US for various reasons. This resulted in the fact that American soldiers were no longer a prime target for national identity, which provides me with a natural end to my research period. All chapters begin with a short context sketch, followed by source analyses.

1.3 Theoretical Concepts

In the following section I will elaborate on two theoretical concepts that I will be using throughout this thesis. Firstly, *National Identity*, and secondly, *Othering*. Both these concepts will be explained to ensure an understanding of their relevance to the research question. National identity is the main focus of this thesis, and therefore needs to be understood before proceeding into the thematic chapters. Othering is a technique which is often used to enhance national identity.

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[21] Ambrose, *The Cold War*, 3-20; J.L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment,* 23-40.
[22] Lemza, 1-16.

1.3.1 National Identity

Historian Richard Verdugo states that "Scholars tend to agree that national identity is a sense of 'belonging' to a nation or state," and "this sense of belonging is affected by many factors, including relational, normative, contextual, kinship and historical factors."[23] An important author in this discourse is Benedict Anderson who introduced his ideas in the book *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (first ed. 1983, revised 2006). His definition of a nation is: "It is an imagined political community – and imagined both inherently limited and sovereign."[24] The connectedness that citizens of the same country feel towards each other, is a strange phenomenon, since they can never all really know each other. A development which enhanced the ability to feel connected was "print capitalism."[25] As Anderson explains, because of the start of fast printing and distributing of books and other written material in a specific language close to the dialects spoken in the nation, masses of people could now read the same things. With only weeks apart, people in the South of a nation could be just as informed as people in the North. This development did not only make people better understand each other's spoken word, it also made them more aware of each other, because they now shared the same news. A shared knowledge of events and the world around has the ability to unite a people.[26]

Interesting will be to see if this connectedness is still felt by Americans throughout the Cold War, whilst living in a nation far from home. Americans do usually seem to feel a strong bond with other Americans. It does not seem to matter what background they have, and wherever in the world they may meet one another. Their constructions of a shared history and culture, make them identify with each other. According to author L.R. Samuel, they share a strong sense of duty and protectiveness of their nation and its citizens, and makes the military one of the pillars of their society. This, of course, is remarkable since an American soldier does not know, and will never know everybody he is fighting for. But he fights for the American flag, and what the US stands for. He fights for an American creed, a specific way of life.[27]

Critics, such as Tim Edensor, think Anderson focuses too much on the printing press

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[23] R.R. Verdugo, ed., *National Identity: Theory and Research* (Charlotte, D.C.: Information Age Publishing Inc., 2016), 2-5.

[24] Anderson, *Imagined Communities,* 6.

[25] Anderson*,* 45.

[26] Ibid, 46-49.

[27] L.R. Samuel, *The American Way of Life: A Cultural History* (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2017), vii-x.

as main catalyst of nationalism. Edensor argues that "National identity is grounded in the everyday, in the mundane details of social interaction, habits, routines and practical knowledge."[28] Edensor feels that especially those mundane details of life are neglected by Anderson. He further states that Anderson leaves out too many other factors that played a role in the origins and spread of national feelings of connectedness within civilizations. For instance, other forms of culture such as music, theater, architecture, fashion have grave attributed to the development of national identity. Although Edensor has a good point when one looks at influences on more modern forms of national identity, this does not disprove Andersons arguments, but is merely an addition.[29] Frank Bechhofer and David McCrone state in their book *Understanding National Identity* that Anderson does not address national identity itself thoroughly enough. They seem to agree with Edensor that national identity is based in the daily things in life. Unrelated but interestingly, they make the point that we do not think about our national identity or nationality unless something drastic happens, such as emigration to another nation, or a situation where (parts of) national identity is threatened.[30] Both these conditions were met in the case of the American soldiers stationed in West Germany during the Cold War.

Authors Michael Bamberg, Anne De Fina and Deborah Schiffrin wrote in their book, *Discourse and Identity* (2011), about the fact that although things such as identity, emotions, intentions and knowledge are usually perceived as personal and unique to one person, in reality it is "an inter-subjectively reached agreement that is historically and culturally negotiated."[31] They furthermore argue that these are not fixed concepts but are constantly renegotiated upon through history. It is socially constructed by the society, as well as by the events of the past and expectations of the future. In this process they state that we should not focus on what identity is, but we should "study identity as constructed in discourse, as negotiated amongst speaking subjects in social contacts, and as emerging in the form of subjectivity and a sense of self."[32] In this process they believe that language makes up for a big part of identity construction. They state for example that how a person expresses

[28] T. Edensor, *National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life* (London: Bloomsbury, 2002), 17.
[29] Edensor, *National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life*, 6-10.
[30] F. Bechhofer and D. McCrone, *Understanding National Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 10-15.
[31] M. Bamberg, A. De Fina, and D. Schiffrin, *Discourse and Identity* (New York: Springer, 2011), 177-199.
[32] Bamberg, De Fina and Schiffrin, *Discourse and Identity*, 177-199.

him/herself is a determining factor for his/her identity.[33]

Bechhofer and McCrone end their introduction with: "In our work, we have looked to see how people make use of cultural markers such as place of birth, ancestry, residence, skin colour, in assessing whether or not, and in what circumstances, to make claims to national identity, and to judge the claim of other."[34] Furthermore they claim that in defining a national identity, it is almost equally as important to know what you are not, as know what you are.[35] Which brings us to the other theoretical concept of this thesis: Othering.

1.3.2 Othering

According to author P. Müller othering is a "mechanism of distinction," which can be used to categorize groups of people.[36] This distinction is often made in terms of "us versus them," or "in-group and out-group members."[37] In this distinction or categorization, Müller makes the same observation as Bechhofer and McCrone mentioned above: "A part of individual's identity work is to compare themselves with others."[38] Moreover, within this comparison to others there is usually an attribution of judgement and favor.[39] The categorizations usually depict the in-group as good and desired, and the outgroup as bad, different and unwanted.[40]

Professor of Literature Edward W. Said links this attribution of negative and positive elements in group categorizations to European colonialism. According to him "such a binary relation, in a hierarchy of weakness and strength derives from the European psychological need to create a difference of cultural inequality between West and East, which inequality is attributed to immutable cultural essences inherent to oriental people and things."[41] He believes that European colonials used that hierarchy of weakness and strength as justification for their colonialism. It at the same time also made it possible for the West, Europe that is, to

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[33] Bamberg, De Fina and Schiffrin, 178-179.

[34] Bechhofer and McCrone, *Understanding National Identity,* 18.

[35] Bechhofer and McCrone, 18-21.

[36] P. Müller, "National Identity Building as a Mediated Process: a two level Model of its Functions and Dysfunctions," in *Dynamics of National Identity: Media and Societal Factors of What We Are,* ed. J. Grimm, L. Huddy, P. Schmidt and J. Seethaler (London: Routledge, 2016), 321.

[37] Müller, "National Identity Building as a Mediated Process," 321-322.

[38] Müller, 320.

[39] Ibid.

[40] B.C. Tekin, *Representations and Othering in Discourse: The Construction of Turkey in the EU context* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2010), 153-158; N. Coupland, "'Other' Representation," in *Society and Language use,* ed. J. Jaspers, J.O. Östman and J. Verschueren (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2010), 242-246.

[41] E.W. Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 65.

form an image of themselves. As a contrast to what they found in Eastern lands, they could define who and what they were. It gave them a personality and identity.[42]

Sociologist Marilynn B. Brewer writes in "The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations," that stereotyping between the in and out groups is not an uncommon practice, it is normal behavior when we categorize the social world. An us versus them categorization also does not have to have hostile intent, but on the other hand "hostility toward out-groups helps strengthen our sense of belonging."[43] Furthermore, Brewer agrees with Said when she claims that "Outgroup prejudices both reflect and justify the existing structure of intergroup relations."[44] It is a justification for the treatment of others versus themselves, and a way to define oneself. One remark that especially links Brewer's research to mine, is that "in-group solidarity is increased in the face of a shared threat of common challenge."[45] The American soldiers in West Germany were faced with a common enemy, and the guidance of their solidarity, brotherly nationalism and their soldiers' creed is what this thesis is about.

1.4 Sources and Methods

A first set of primary sources which have proven valuable to my research, are propaganda films produced by the DoD. Many American communities in West Germany had movie nights in the weekends, and it provided a chance for the soldiers to recover and relax.[46] Although most soldiers went to the movies for entertainment, many of the motion pictures had additional purposes. Especially "Your Job in Germany"(1945) was useful for the first chapter, because it was produced to guide the American soldier on their new job in West Germany.[47] For the second chapter, I chose two propaganda movies: "The Big Lie"(1951) and "The Challenge of Ideas"(1961), which taught the American soldiers and their families in West Germany about the dangers of Communism and how to respond to it. For the last chapter I selected several *The Big Picture* motion pictures concerning the United States Army Europe headquarters and the daily duties of the American soldier in the 1960s. These motion pictures

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[42] Said, *Orientalism,* 1-2.

[43] M.B. Brewer, "The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations: Social Categorization, Ingroup Bias and Outgroup Prejudice," in *Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles,* ed. E.T. Higgins and A.W. Kruglanski (New York: The Guilford Press, 2007), 698.

[44] Brewer, "The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations," 695.

[45] Brewer, 695.

[46] "Movie Guide: Films Now Showing in the U.S. Zone," *European Stars and Stripes* 2, no. 203 (June 1948): 33.

[47] Information and Education Division - Army Service Forces, "Your Job in Germany," 1945. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7OUR5uvs9aw (accessed 16-02-2017).

provided me with information on what was expected of the American soldier, on what message was passed on in terms of mindset and general attitude, and what elements of national identity were thought of as important, and that for every consecutive period.[48]

Secondly, I used mandatory literature such as the *Pocket Guide to Germany* (1944). This book is filled with guidelines for desired behavior, and it acted as a code of conduct for American soldiers to follow. [49] I combined this book with articles, posters and secondary sources to get a clear picture of how the DoD used their influence and propaganda on their own soldiers.

A third primary source, which is used especially throughout the third chapter, is the *Weekly Information Bulletin*. This was a magazine produced between 1945 and 1953 by the Information Branch of the Office of Military Government US. It was a special magazine for American military personnel stationed in West Germany. It gave weekly updates on official objectives, it discussed future plans for Europe and guidelines for America's role in those plans. The magazine, therefore, gives us the chance to learn about the more official, and organizational guidelines provided to the American soldier in Germany.[50]

In addition to these primary sources which will be analyzed at length, throughout the thesis I used articles from the *European Stars and Stripes*, a military newspaper produced with authorization of the DoD.[51] Furthermore, I used several articles from another military magazine the *Army Information Digest,* the *The Soldier's Handbook* and official US directives and investigations to support my arguments.

I will use qualitative methods for my research; I will conduct a narrative analysis of the mentioned sources and pay special attention to the connection between narration and visual representations in the case of the selected motion pictures. I will furthermore make a comparative analysis. The main focus of this thesis lies on the why and how questions, it is

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[48] Warner Pathe News, "The Big Lie," 1951. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MaNTAUc-3tk (accessed 16 06-2017); Army Pictorial Center, "The Challenge of Ideas," *The Big Picture* series, 1961. https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=Qzu_J-7thQY (accessed 25-05-2017); The reason I chose these military-made propaganda films instead of Hollywood films, is because Hollywood films were not as clearly funded or guided by the DoD as the military ones were, and they therefore do not give as good a representation of what the DoD thought were desirable aspects in the American soldier. My main focus in the analysis will lie on aspects such as the narrative, the language used and message passed on.

[49] Army Information Branch - Army Service Forces, *Pocket Guide to Germany* (Washington: Department of Defense, 1944), 3-4.

[50] Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-5 Division, Information Branch, *Weekly Information Bulletin,* various issues. 1945-1953.

[51] General Information *European Stars and Stripes,* https://starsandstripes.newspaperarchive.com/history (accessed 15-07-2017); Lemza, 74.

about the message brought forth and methods used in the development and maintenance of a national self-image amongst American soldiers in West Germany roughly between 1944 and 1970. It will not focus on the effectiveness of national identity building attempts, on who designed policies, or on the responses of Germans or Soviets. Challenges lie in limiting the information I provide, without leaving important things out.

The innovative aspect of my research is that I try to fill a niche created in the academic literature: national identity construction by an own government has not yet been researched (enough), let alone the construction of this particular identity amongst the American soldiers in West Germany during the Cold War. No comparative or clear overview exists that covers this specific topic and development. This master's thesis means to contribute to the historiographical discussion. Secondly, knowledge about the tactic of 'othering' should be expanded and promoted. Although the concept of othering is not new, the study of its application on American soldiers stationed in West-Germany during the Cold War is. Furthermore, I think that research into national identity should be expanded. Identities that are constructed, the elements with which individuals identify themselves is decisive in how relationships work, between foreign countries, but also between citizens of a nation. The ways in which the US has tried to portray/modify their image after the Second World War, and how it has tried to construct an American national identity amongst its soldiers has been crucial for the relations with Germany, but also the world.

This thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of the events in the Cold War and especially of the relation between national identity amongst American soldiers in Germany, its construction and the methods used. A better understanding is favorable, so that nations might improve domestic and foreign relations in the future.

2. America's Occupation of West Germany and National Identity Construction in the Late 1940s

As the Second World War came to an end in 1945, a sigh of relief resounded across the Western world. Hitler and Germany were finally defeated and the Allied forces could occupy enemy territory. So called "occupation troops," were sent to West Germany to restore order.[52] Many of them were young and unsure of what to expect. German – American relations had been hostile for the past few years and many American soldiers had lost members of their family, friends or unit to German aggression. A feeling of resentment was common.[53] However, with the signing of the peace in 1945 a new era had begun. One in which Americans and Germans had to find new ways to interact. This had implications and consequences for how the American soldier was to behave, conduct and view himself.[54]

That is why in this chapter the central question is: *How did the transition from being a conquering force to an occupying force affect the construction of national identity amongst the American soldiers stationed in West Germany in the immediate post-war years?*

In this chapter we will start with the main objectives for United States' involvement in West Germany drawn up in 1944, and with a context sketch of the immediate post-war years. After that, I will go into several (primary) sources to illustrate what kind of means were provided to the soldiers and how these sources could have influenced a self-image of the soldiers. Finally I will briefly show that the portraying of, and attitude towards, the Germans changed towards the end of the occupation period in the late 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s.[55] This will provide us with an introduction to the shifting enemies and allies elaborated on in chapter three.

2.1 German Context and the Main Objective: Denazification

The main objective in 1944 for Germany was the 'denazification' of the country and its civilization; To rid the public and political domain of any sign of Nazi rule or support.[56] The aim of denazification was described at the Potsdam Four-Power Declaration in 1944 as:

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[52] Lemza, 5.

[53] F. Taylor, *Exorcising Hitler: The Occupation and Denazification of Germany* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 20-21; R. M. Weinstein, "Occupation G.I. Blues: Postwar Germany During and After Elvis Presley's Tour," *The Journal of Popular Culture* 39, no.1 (2006): 130.

[54] Ziemke, 425-427.

[55] When I speak of 'Germans' I refer to West Germans exclusively unless otherwise explained.

[56] "Abrogation of Nazi Law," *Weekly Information Bulletin,* no. 4. (July 1945): 3-6.

All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons, who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.[57]

This goal was set up, agreed upon and strived towards, by all four allies of the Second World War: France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the US. Members of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Administration had discussed at length what the right policy for occupied West Germany should be. In 1944 they chose a 'Hard Peace' approach.[58] The hard peace approach for West Germany entailed that the US acted strict and tough on the society, with little room for leniency or forgiveness. The most famous proposal for this approach was the one offered by Secretary of Treasury, Henry Morgenthau Jr. 'The Morgenthau Plan,' as it became known, consisted of the idea that Germany in its totality should be send back into an agrarian society.[59] Morgenthau wanted to strip every sign of industrialization from the German nation as a punishment for what they had done. Additionally he was, as were many others, afraid that if the US would let (West) Germany recover, it would grow its military and economic strength back, and be able to start another World War. Morgenthau did not feel any remorse for punishing the West German civilian population and was a great supporter of reminding them of the 'collective guilt' they ought to feel.[60]

Although the Morgenthau plan initially received quite some support, the American leaders and soldiers who were in West Germany, soon called for a softening of the plan and of the attitude towards West Germans. General Lucius D. Clay wrote to his superiors in 1945, that it was impossible for the American troops to build up any military organization, let alone safeguard American citizens stationed in West Germany, if there was no form of industry or recovery organization. According to Clay, in order for steel, food and oil shortages to be

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[57] Office of Military Government for Germany (US), *Denazification: Report of the Military Governor* (April 1947-April 1948), 1-5.

[58] E.J. Wilson, "Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, issue 1 (2008): 110-114.

[59] J. Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 1-5.

[60] Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany,* 1-4.

resolved, infrastructure had to be rebuild and industry had to be taken over instead of destroyed as the Morgenthau plan demanded.[61] General Clay's advice was heeded and a less devastating version of Morgenthau's plan was applied in 1945. Because of US' severe trust issues, this version did not yet focus much on (West) German recovery. Instead it focused on maintaining a minimum living standard for the American troops, and keeping them safe.[62]

2.1.1 "Soldiers wise don't Fraternize!"

On September the twelfth 1944, the DoD – in name of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and spurred by Supreme Commander General Dwight Eisenhower – put out a directive for all Americans in West Germany: the Directive on Non-Fraternization. This fraternization-ban entailed that no American was to associate him/her self with any German. Non-fraternization was defined as follows: "Nonfraternization is the avoidance of mingling with Germans upon terms of friendliness, familiarity, or intimacy, whether individually or in groups, in official or unofficial dealings."[63] It did not matter whether American soldiers encountered men, women, children or elderly, any contact should be avoided as much as possible.[64]

The directive was created for many reasons. It was drafted during the Second World War, in a time where a heavy resistance from the German population was expected in the final months. But to DoD's surprise, they were greeted with loaves of bread, flowers and bottles of schnapps. Eisenhower did not trust this warm welcome and wanted his soldiers to stay alert and keep their distance. According to him, embraces between Germans and Americans should be "nipped in the bud!"[65] That is why strong emphasis was laid on explaining non-fraternization to the soldiers. Slogans like "Soldiers wise don't Fraternize," were often used by the DoD to influence the American soldiers.[66]

According to sources on the fraternization ban in West Germany, there were additional reasons why fraternizing was undesirable. One of the main reasons named in an investigation dating from 1947, is World War I and its aftermath. In 1918 American soldiers had accepted the gifts and invitations of the Germans, and had generally viewed them as victims as well;

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[61] Gimbel, 3-11; "Abrogation of Nazi Law," 3-6.
[62] H. Holborn, *American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies* (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), 157-165.
[63] R.J. Starr, *Fraternization with the Germans in World War II: Occupation Forces in Europe series, 1945-1946* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Office of the Chief Historian European Command, 1947), 16.
[64] Starr, *Fraternization with the Germans in World War II,* 2-7.
[65] 'Quote by General D. Eisenhower,' in *Miss Your Lovin,* by A.E. Pfau (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 5.
[66] Starr, 2-19; Pfau, *Miss Your Lovin,* 2-14.

they had forgiven the Germans quite easily. According to the authors, World War II had been a direct result of this incautious behavior of the previous generation. Their good-heartedness would make them likely to make the same mistake their fathers had made, because they would give in to the pleads of the population and would take on a role of provider and protector as a good Christian would. If the soldiers were not allowed to come in close contact with the Germans this time, the role of conqueror and bringer of justice was hoped to come more natural to the American soldier.[67]

Another reason named is that the DoD was afraid that close interaction with Germans would lead to leakage of high class intelligence. They suspected German women of acting as spies for Nazis in hiding. Furthermore, the DoD was not only concerned with their soldiers being attacked physically by resentful Germans, they also feared that the population would try to mentally hurt the soldiers. As is said in the investigation report, they were afraid that Germans would try to influence American soldiers' minds.[68]

According to the DoD, a distant behavior and cold shoulder conduct would demand respect from the Germans. They figured that being aloof would "impress a people issued with militarism and a respect for uniforms."[69] It was thought that it would cause Germans to look up to the American soldiers if they would see the US as superior to them. This opinion was desired because it would help introduce some fundamental elements of the American way of life to the West German society. During the late 1940s elements such as democracy, equality and individual freedom were slowly imprinted on the German population. Since the fraternization was still frown upon, Germans were in this period mostly educated by example. American soldiers were to teach the Germans by setting a good example and by making them aware of their (past) mistakes. The DoD held that a teacher – student relation would be best suited for this situation, in which the teacher punishes the student for his wrong doings and strictly guides him on to a better path.[70]

A last main reason to emphasize this fraternization ban was the feared reactions at home. It was urged by President Harry S. Truman and the DoD that getting too friendly too soon with the enemy would cause for undesired reactions at the home. This had to be avoided at all costs to ensure (financial) support of stateside Americans. The occupation of West

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[67] Starr, 1-25; Information and Education Division, "Your Job in Germany*,"* 1945 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7OUR5uvs9aw (accessed 16-02-2017); Army Information Branch, *Pocket Guide to Germany*, 3.

[68] Starr, 5-23; Pfau, 18-25.

[69] Starr., 12.

[70] Ibid., 3-25.

Germany itself had already been an unpopular decision, because fathers, husbands and sons had been expected to come home soon after the Second World War ended in 1945, which did not happen. Therefore, it was very important to keep as much negative news about the troops or the occupation away from the public as possible.[71]

Although the US soldiers were expected to act as conquerors, even punishers, and were motivated to keep their distance from Germans and view them with distrust, the non-fraternization directive also states that soldiers were not to cause harm to them in any way. It says for instance: "Non fraternization does not demand rough undignified, or aggressive conduct, nor the insolent overbearance which has characterized Nazi leadership."[72] This quote is a perfect example of how American soldiers were influenced. It shows that although German citizens were generally viewed, and portrayed, as bad, untrustworthy people with Nazi backgrounds, the American soldiers should never let go of their own moral standards and stoop as low as the Nazis had done.[73]

2.2 Othering the Enemy and American National Identity

To inform the American soldiers in West Germany of the tasks ahead and to influence their perspectives and national identity, the DoD turned to media that reached many people relatively quickly, such as newspapers, magazines, books and motion pictures.[74] In this section I will highlight two sources made available to the American soldiers during the occupation period which will illustrate how their ideas of national identity were challenged.

2.2.1 "Your Job in Germany," 1945

As Professor and Director of Film Studies John J. Michalczyk writes in his book *Filming the End of the Holocaust: Allied Documentaries, Nuremberg and the Liberation of the Concentration Camps,* motion pictures can be very useful to make an impact on an audience. He says for instance: "In our research we have seen how film has the power to move, shock, entertain and educate."[75] Footage of the concentration camp liberations were used as evidence

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[71] Ibid.; Pfau, 13; O. Bradley, *Special Orders for German – American Relations* (Washington: U.S. Army, 1945), 1-4.

[72] Starr, 7.

[73] Ibid., 5-12.

[74] "Your Job in Germany," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=821R0lGU 6A&=648s (accessed 16-02-2017); Army Information Branch, 2-3.

[75] J.J. Michalczyk, Filming the End of the Holocaust: Allied Documentaries, Nuremberg and the Liberation of the Concentration Camps (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 1.

in the Nuremberg trials, where high Nazi officers were prosecuted. Furthermore the footage was used to educate, and guide American soldiers in their attitude towards German citizens.

During the Second World War, propaganda for the American soldiers had been focused on painting the picture of peace after hardship. By promising opportunity, fortune and happiness for everyone after the war was won, in combination with giving justifications for America's role in the war, soldiers were offered reasons to fight the war. But when the victory came, the promises were not met and a different motivation had to be presented to the soldiers to keep them convinced of their purpose in Europe.[76]

With propaganda motion pictures it is important to look at the language and symbols used, the attitude and tone of the narrator, audio and visual images and the message that is send out. As we have already seen in the introduction, language is very important for communicating a certain message to an audience. Therefore it is good to keep in mind during an analysis of sources such as the ones below, that the language used, is almost always constructed. It is chosen by the producers to stir up feelings in the audience and trigger a direct or indirect reaction. These aspects of the film provide us with a better understanding of how the theory of othering, and other methods, were applied in this case of national identity building.[77]

The particular propaganda source we will begin with, is a motion picture called: "Your Job in Germany." It is a short film created in 1945 by the US War Department, Information and Education Division, for the US Army of Occupation. This particular clip was shown during the training of soldiers before going to, or already in, West Germany.[78]

The first thing the audience saw was an image of the US liberty bell ringing as a sign of American victory over the Nazis. The narrator says: "Victory leads to peace," he then pauses for a dramatic effect and then continues: "Sometimes NOT!"[79] With this sentence the American soldiers were immediately made aware that the American job was not yet done, and danger still lurked. The viewer is reminded of the horrible things the Germans had done, through images of dead, mutilated and starved bodies in concentration camps. By discussing

[76] J.E. Combs and S.T. Combs, *Film Propaganda and American Politics: An Analysis and Filmography* (New York: Garland Pub, 1994), 79-85; 'What are the tools of Propaganda,' https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/pamphlets/em-2-what-is-propaganda-(1944)/what-are-the-tools-of-propaganda (accessed 18-06-2018).

[77] M. Arribas-Ayllon and V. Walkerdine, "Foucauldian Discourse Analysis", in *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research in Psychology,* ed. W. Stainton-Rogers and C. Willig (London: Sage, 2008), 91-108; Coupland, "'Other' Representation," 242-246; 'Bamberg, De Fina and Schiffrin, 177-199.

[78] "Your Job in Germany," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=821R0lGUL6A&t=648s (accessed 16-02-2017).

[79] Ibid.

and showing dead bodies of innocent victims and concentration camps filled with starving people, a feeling of injustice was meant to be triggered in the audience. Its purpose was to make the American soldiers more convinced of the justification for the American presence in West Germany. They had to punish the Nazis and prevent a new World War from breaking out.[80]

A lot of responsibility was put on the American soldier's shoulders by presenting that the victory of the US over fascism was only complete if they would do their jobs right. It was stressed that they should take their jobs very seriously. Because, as is claimed in the clip, if the soldiers did not pay attention to their training, they could have another devastating war on their hands. Here again, as in Morgenthau's plan, the fear of giving (West) Germany another chance at prosperity, was clearly visible. The movie assumes that if West Germany would not be given extremely harsh punishments, it would pick up where it left off and endanger the free world once more. And that would mean that their fellow countrymen's deaths and losses in the effort to bring peace would be in vein.[81] American soldiers presumably did not want to be responsible for that.

The narrator continues to say: "The Nazi party may be gone, but Nazi thinking, Nazi training and Nazi trickery remain. The German lust for conquest is not dead, it's merely gone undercover."[82] The choice to repeatedly use the word 'Nazi' in combination with the three words, 'thinking,' 'training' and 'trickery,' makes the sentence catchy and easy to remember. Furthermore, usage of the word 'lust,' gives the sentence an deeply negative connotation, since lust is one of the seven deadly sins in the Christian religion. Because most of the American soldiers were Christians, this probably was meant to invoke a reaction of judgement.[83] By portraying Germans as a sinful people, the producers of this film tried to widen the gap between the American soldiers and the Germans. This distinction of us versus them is an intrinsic part of othering. Other words used to other the Germans were "Evil," "Warmongers" and "Nazi Gestappo."[84]

The German history is divided into four different chapters to suggest the continuation of German aggression. The first chapter introduces Otto von Bismarck as aggressor and bringer of war to Europe, the second chapter introduces Kaiser Wilhelm II as 'Führer' and

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[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid.

aggressor of the First World War, chapter three shows Adolf Hitler as antagonist and a final chapter is left blank with a question mark, to indicate the unknown future. With these examples it is presented that the theme of German history is aggression towards other nations, and that war is only broken up by periods of "phony peace."[85] That the producers thought war and destruction was inherently present in German people is highlighted through the sentence: "German people carried the torch of their culture," when reasoning why it was so easy for the Germans to start the Second World War.[86] This combined with the sentence: "Don't let them fool you, you are not up against tourist scenery, you're up against German history. It isn't good," confirms that the German history was only bad and that it did not indicate the likelihood of change.[87]

Although some of the images shown depict a lovely scenery with Germans dancing, laughing and playing music, the tone of the narrator is bitter and tells the audience not to buy into the friendliness because it is insincere. But the narrator is not only bitter and strict, he at the same time comforts the soldiers by letting them know that it is understandable to think that not all Germans are bad people, and that it is even admirable to always try to find the good in people. But in the case of the Germans, this would be a mistake, since they already had been given a second chance to show their goodwill after the First World War. According to the producers, the Germans intentionally chose for the Second World War to happen, because all of them had supported Hitler.[88]

The images and footage used by the makers of this propaganda film also has a message in themselves. Below, I have added a few of the images shown in the clip for a better illustration of how they were used. The first two pictures are footage of dancing, music-making people and picturesque countrysides, and they are shown as examples of the 'phony peace' the narrator discusses. The corresponding message is that German citizens may not look very dangerous, but they certainly are. In the scenes immediately following these peaceful portrayals of normal looking people, horrifying images of dead bodies and destruction are shown, linking the two together. Through the use of a spider web it is portrayed that every German was part of Hitler's network. The message given with these images is: No matter how innocent and "like you and me" these people look, no German can

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[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.

be trusted.[89] Which leads the narrator to stress the importance of the non-fraternization act. A frame is shown of two little German girls enjoying some berries, with the strong words that not even children should be associated with.[90]

Just as we have seen with the language, the imagery used was chosen to trigger a reaction from the audience. To show sickening images of rotting bodies immediately after singing and dancing Germans enforced the words used to describe the Germans as evil and

'Phony peace' scenery and joyful culture in Germany, in between wars. Source: "Your Job in Germany"

Victims of the Nazi regime. Source: "Your Job in Germany"

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[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid.

Innocent looking German Girls and the Nazi network. Source: "Your Job in Germany"

untrustworthy.[91]

Lastly I want to focus on the elements in this clip which are clear national identity indicators. The clip was not only meant to other Germans as the enemy, it was also meant to unite the American soldiers by reminding them of elements of their culture as part of their national identity. First of all, it is very clear that the narrator and soldiers were representing the US, the leader of the free world, and the ultimate fighter against Nazism and other fascisms. This for instance was emphasized by the listing of all the countries who had been victimized in Germany's conquest of world domination, and who needed defending in the future.[92] The US acted as ultimate destroyer of oppressive, totalitarian governments and was the bringer of freedom and democracy.[93] The differences between the German culture during the Nazi regime and what the Americans stood for becomes clear in the next bit about the 'Nazi Youth':

> They know no other system than the one that poisoned their minds. They're soaked in it. Trained to win by cheating, trained to pick on the weak. They have heard no free speech, read no free press, they were brought up on straight propaganda. They are products of the worst educational crime in the entire history of the world.[94]

[91] Ibid; Much of the footage of Nazis marching, holding speeches, making music, and crowds saluting Hitler was originally made as a proud collection of the Third Reich culture. This footage was seized from the Nazis by the DoD when the War ended. The producers of this clip used these images in exactly the opposite way of how they were intended by the Germans, namely to put the Nazi/German culture in a bad light; E. Cheshire, "Leni Riefenstahl: Documentary Film-Maker or Propagandist?" 2000, https://web.archive .org/web/20051217 014854 /http://www.kamera.co.uk/features/leniriefenstahl.html (accessed 20-07-2018).

[92] "Your Job in Germany," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=821R0lGUL6A&t=648s (accessed16-02-2017).

[93] Ibid; E. Foner, *Give Me Liberty!: An American History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2010), 46-60.

[94] "Your Job in Germany," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=821R0lGUL6A&t=648s (accessed16-02-2017).

The attention payed to their lack of free press and free speech as basic rights were meant to cause the American soldiers to, on the one hand, realize that they should not take their basic rights for granted, and on the other hand, realize what they were protecting: American values. These values meant things like individual freedom, freedom of opinion, freedom from oppression, and moral standards.[95]

With this source we can see how characterizing the Germans as different, other and bad, in combination with reminding the soldier of their own 'American' values, created an atmosphere in which the American soldier could be challenged to (re)think their national identity and what kind of soldier they wanted, or even needed, to be.

2.2.2 Pocket Guide to Germany, 1944

A second source of information that was provided to soldiers, were (training)books. In this section I will analyze the *Pocket Guide to Germany* (1944), which was given as mandatory literature to every soldier going to West Germany. It was produced by the Army Information Branch, for the US Armed Forces, in name of the DoD and for military personnel only. [96]

The book starts with the same (sub)title as the motion picture, "Your Job in Germany." The focus is put immediately on what the American soldier should not do, rather than what he ought to do. They were for instance expected to not disrespect German property, food, local regulations or religion.[97] There ought to be no violence used against the Germans and the skills of the German soldiers should not be belittled, as they had proven to be strong enemies during the Second World War. To link this back to national identity, the book states: "The point is, we don't like to kick people when they are down."[98] Just as in the motion picture it is mentioned that although the US had defeated the Germans and feelings of revenge towards them were understandable, it was not acceptable to let go of basic American morals and values, such as being respectful to other people's property and not hurt unarmed civilians.[99]

The next point highlighted in the book is, not surprisingly, the non-fraternization act. Just as in previously discussed sources, the book is very strict on this matter and clearly states

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[95] Ibid.
[96] Army Information Branch, 3-12.
[97] Ibid., 2-4.
[98] Ibid., 2.
[99] Ibid., 2-8.

the expectations: "There must be no fraternization. This is absolute!" and "At home you had minor transactions with many people. You were courteous to them, but never discussed intimate affairs, told them secrets, or gave them the benefit of your confidence. Let that behavior be your model now."[100] Americans were only there to stand guard so that Germany could not grow into a new totalitarian state and war machine. It ends this section of the book with: "Trust no one but your own kind."[101] Which could not be a better example of national identity building and othering combined. It excluded everybody outside their own cohort of fellow countrymen.[102]

Because no German could be trusted, the soldiers should never let their guard down, according to the authors of the book. To translate that into a situation the American soldier could easily relate to, the book uses sports. It states that war is not like a sport where a bell will tell you when the fight is over and you can relax. In war there is no bell and you can never let your guard down, because the Germans will stab you in the back if they get the chance; Germans do not have the morale of playing fair. This again depicts the Germans as fundamentally different, because the American does know how to play fair, as that is a basic element in American upbringing.[103]

The American soldier was warned about the reception they would face. Some of the suspicion towards Germans was of course well founded. Especially towards the age group that had been eight to eighteen during the Second World War and the former SS troopers who had gone underground. They could be expected to still be dangerous to the American forces in West Germany. The book states for example that the "Hitler Youth" in Germany had been brought up to hate everything the Allied Forces stood for.[104] Through propaganda and education these children had been brainwashed and formed a dangerous group in the post-war period since it would be more difficult to turn their way of thinking around. This image is compared with what the authors depict as a 'normal' American upbringing. It says:

> One of the things in which we take pride in America is the spirit of sportsmanship, decency and fair play instilled into our boys during their education. Most young Americans hate a bully, despise a snitch, and have nothing but contempt for a double-

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[100] Ibid., 6, 7.
[101] Ibid., 7.
[102] Ibid. 3-9.
[103] Ibid., 7-13.
[104] Ibid., 10.

crosser. When you played games you were taught to fight to the last whistle no matter how big the score against you: you learned not to cheat and that if you couldn't win fairly, then you took your licking like a man and shook hands with the man who beat you. You learned that these rules were good ones to take into life with you when school was over, that you belonged to a community of free men with all the rights and privileges inherent in a Democracy, that the loyalty you gave to your government was loyalty to a country governed by representatives of your own choosing. You know that to be born free and equal meant that you were no better and no worse than anyone else but that you would have a decent chance to prove your abilities in fair competition.[105]

That Americans raise their children the right way, was something these soldiers could feel proud off and which could unite them. Although it also created a distance between the German and American culture, this time, the authors focused more on what it meant to be an American and which values and norms he was raised with, rather than othering the Germans directly by attributing them with negative elements.[106]

This focus on the 'good' and 'right' characteristics of their own culture as distinction from others, seems to be a big part of national identity construction. It is an 'our-ing,' or a 'reversed othering,' that is taking place next to ordinary othering. By attributing elements to an in-group culture, it consequently attributes opposite, or at least not the same, elements to the out-group. Here, by proclaiming that Americans *were* raised democratically, it indirectly states that Germans were not. Democracy is used as one measure out of many to determine if a people/individual could be part of the in-group. In all these examples it is important to notice the use of the words 'us/we' and 'them/they' to describe the difference between the two parties. This is a classic example of (reversed) othering, since this division includes on the one hand Americans and excludes Germans/Nazis on the other.[107]

These sources give a good indication of what kind of innuendo's were hidden in the sources and which values were thought of as important for the soldiers to keep in mind whilst stationed in West Germany. By characterizing the Germans as untrustworthy cheaters and killers, with a bad, totalitarian society without the basic human rights, the Americans were

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[105] Ibid., 7-8.
[106] Ibid., 8-12.
[107] Ibid., 3-6.

triggered to think of their own situation and compare themselves with the Germans.[108] This thought process of what it meant to be an American, and what made Germans fundamentally different from Americans is a very important contribution to national identity building in this period.

2.2.3 Non-Fraternization versus Reality

Despite the many warnings, fraternization between West Germans and American soldiers occurred increasingly during the post-war years. Especially fraternization between young German women and American soldiers was difficult to contain. It became one of the most difficult issues for the DoD.[109]

  A tactic to stop the fraternizing behavior was a campaign warning the American soldiers for sexually transmitted diseases. Posters and pamphlets, as can be seen below, were spread through the American communities with pretty looking girls on them and slogans such as: "Loaded? Don't take chances with Pickups!"[110] Other posters suggested that German women pretended to be clean and innocent, but that they were just deceiving and seducing

American Non-Fraternization posters in the 1940s. Sources: http://www.dailymale.sk/media/k2/items/cache /ed912fdae7007d8d88234e83845eb476_L.jpg and favorwire.files.wordpress.com/ (accessed 24-07-2017)

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[108] Ibid., 13.
[109] Starr, 2.
[110] 'American Anti-Fraternization Posters,' http://www.dailymale.sk/media/k2/items/cache /ed912fdae7007d8d88234e83845eb476_L.jpg; favorwire.files.wordpress.com/ (accessed 24-07-2017).

men whilst intentionally infecting them with venereal diseases. These posters meant to scare away the American soldiers, but it failed miserably. The rates of soldiers asking for medical help against sexual transmitted diseases rose, even with these warnings. In June 1945 as much as 80 percent of enlisted men admitted to having violated the non-fraternization policy.[111] The word fraternization soon became a synonym for casual sex between the former enemies.[112]

According to the then chief editor of *Stars and Stripes* Major Arthur Goodfriend it was not the fault of the American soldiers. It was the combination of the "generous nature, sense of decency, desire for female companionship and seductive warmth and cleanliness of German homes" that pulled these men in.[113] Many were homesick to this warmth and companionship, as they had not been home in many months or even years. Ann Elizabeth Pfau points out that, already during the making of the policy, key military officials were uncertain about its outcome. "They predicted that the soldiers would be tempted to fraternize with young women, no matter what nationality."[114] Fraternization with the locals had been a common element of battle in many wars before the Second World War and it would not change for the wars that still had to come.[115] Goodfriend wrote: "Unless the basic human desires of the soldier are taken care of, there can be no solution of the problem."[116]

As they fully recognized the problem, the DoD recommended to hire American servicewomen and volunteers to be included in the occupation forces. They hoped that the American communities would balance themselves out and that the soldiers would not feel the need to go to the Germans for female companionship. Representative of the US Government Margaret Smith, wrote in 1946 to the Secretary of War that the best way to fight the issue was to allow wives, fiancées and children to join their husbands/fathers in Europe. Smith presented this policy as a solution to two different problems, firstly it would combat fraternization with the German girls and secondly it would ease the unrest of families at home. The DoD agreed and figured that a reunion with sweethearts and children could be a reminder for the American soldiers of the core values of family, which would be an extra reminder of their traditions, morals and American way of life. It was hoped that this reminder would bring the soldiers to choose a less scandalous lifestyle, which would be more compliant

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[111] Starr, 4-9.
[112] Pfau, 2.
[113] Quote by Major Arthur Goodfriend, in Pfau, 4.
[114] Pfau, 3.
[115] Höhn, *GI's and Fräuleins,* 6-12.
[116] Pfau, 4.

with the desired American standards.[117]

From 1947 on, families were shipped to West Germany to keep the servicemen company. With them came their furniture, music, fashion and even their enormous American cars. The American Army communities turned into little American villages in West Germany where the American culture and way of life thrived. These villages became known as 'Little Americas.'[118] The issues of *Stars and Stripes* were filled with sporting results, accounts of beauty competitions and stories detailing the victory of the American justice system. It even published fashion and cooking tips for the increasing number of female readers. All designed to make the American soldier, and his family, feel at home abroad.[119]

2.3 The Shift of America's Attitude towards Germans

Although fraternization did not end with the arrival of American families and the hiring of service women, its rates were lowered. Furthermore, the bringing in of more aspects of the American home life seemed to boost the morale of the soldiers, which in turn made them less vulnerable to West Germans.[120]

Still, as early as mid-1945 the harshness, suspicion and distance between American soldiers and German civilians had started to fade away, and overall unhappiness about the ban was uttered. US soldiers objected most fiercely against the policy when it came to young children. A young soldier, for instance, wrote about the conflict he felt within himself when he had to ignore the happy, welcoming smiles and waves of little German children. He felt that it conflicted with his friendly, open character, and his upbringing.[121] The acceptance of fraternization with children under eight years old was therefore the first modification of the non-fraternization act. But soon the whole policy of non-fraternization was criticized. Colonel Starnes said: "A non-fraternization policy anywhere with any people with whom we are not at war, will appear childish, senseless, and in a very short time all of us will be ashamed that we ever behaved in such a manner."[122] Although the policy was lifted in September 1945, the intimate fraternization between American soldiers and German women was still frowned upon

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[117] Ibid., 3-5.
[118] Lemza, 34-35.
[119] Ibid., 2-15; D. Alvah, *Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families overseas and the Cold War, 1945-1965* (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 4-18; Various issues, *European Stars and Stripes,* 1947.
[120] Starr, 35-39; Pfau, 28-42.
[121] Ziemke, 323-324.
[122] Quote by Colonel Starnes, in *The U.S. Army in Occupation of Germany,* by E.F. Ziemke, 321.

for decades, which explains the attempts to steer their soldiers away from German girls with poster campaigns and such even after 1945.[123]

From 1947 on, a definite change in attitude towards Germans was noticeable. The US slowly started to concern itself with the recovery of West Germany. In that, American women proved to be highly useful. The processes and practices of recovery and reeducation of the German civilian population demanded a more subtle and female touch.[124] Donna Alvah, who grew up on American military bases in the Cold War, writes that during the last years of the 1940s, Cold War military and foreign relations were no longer "just a display of masculine military might but also showed feminine demonstrations of American sensitivity toward and in cooperation with the residents."[125] American soldiers and their families were now more than ever representatives of the American culture and way of life. They were even expected to "exert friendly, cultural influence."[126] American children played with German children, German youth were wearing American jeans and the soldiers focused on bringing democracy, order and peace instead of justice and punishment. Americans were stimulated to get educated in the German language and costumes, so that the reeducation of the German society would go as smooth as possible. American soldiers and their families were encouraged to speak freely about their country and their way of life, in the hopes that it would infatuate the Germans.[127]

An important man in the general attitude-shift towards Germany was Secretary of State George C. Marshall. In April 1947 he stated that: "The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate. Push ahead to make Germany self-sufficient."[128] He motivated President Truman and his administration to stimulate economic recovery in West Germany, through 'The Marshall Plan' which had as goal to stabilize Western Europe economically and socially.[129] The Administration realized that it would not only be beneficial economically for the US if West Germany could recover, it would also be better morally. Military men, diplomats, reporters and others who first came to West German, were set back by the destruction. They saw the total war that the Allied forces had brought to Germany and felt that that should be enough punishment. Witnesses described seeing women and children searching

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[123] Pfau, 3-27.

[124] Alvah, *Unofficial Ambassadors,* 2-4.

[125] Alvah, 2.

[126] Bradley, *Special Order for German – American Relations,* 5.

[127] Bradley, 20-28.

[128] Office of Military Government for Germany U.S., *Denazification,* 23.

[129] Ibid., 23-29.

through the rubble for anything of value, with only the clothes on their backs. Being harsh and ruthless against these people seemed to be the furthest thing from American upbringing and Christian virtue. Although they had been sent to West Germany with the state of mind of a conqueror, they soon had, and wanted, to revise their attitude. As Lieutenant General Omar Bradley writes in *Special Orders for German-American Relations*: "We are now fighting on German soil and we are in contact not only with soldiers of our enemy but also civilians of Germany. As conquerors, we must now consider our relations with the people of Germany."[130]Although they were still conquerors of the enemy, they at the same time could start to fulfill the roles of guides and teachers of the German civilian population.[131]

2.4 Conclusion

In light of the above I will answer the sub-question posed in the beginning of this chapter: *How did the transition from being a conquering force to an occupying force affect the construction of national identity amongst the American soldiers stationed in West Germany in the immediate post-war years?*

As we have seen, the main objective of the DoD was the denazification of the German society. American soldiers had expected angry demonstrations from the Germans, but their welcome was friendly and open. Because of the contradiction between what they had expected and were told to think/do, and the reality, it was difficult for many soldiers to find their way. Motion pictures and books had prepared them for an inherently evil people that could not be trusted or associated with. Because of that general stereotype of the German people, a fraternization ban was erected to avoid interactions, but it caused confusion and unhappiness amongst the American soldiers. Many struggled with this measure, as it did not feel right to punish the mostly female population more than the total war that they had already brought on the German towns.

Fraternization turned out to be one of the biggest problems of the occupation period, because it was difficult to keep American soldiers in line when it came to German women. The soldiers simply needed some female company and comfort. This led to various attempts through the use of media tools such as posters, books and magazines to scare the American soldiers away from Germans and into the arms of their own sweethearts. The decision to bring the wives and children of the soldiers to West Germany was a very effective one. The

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[130] Bradley, 2-3.
[131] Ibid., 4-7; Starr, 2-8.

American soldier was reminded through the reunion of their families, cars, music and other cultural aspects of the American way of life, as well as kept away from bad German influences.

Throughout the first months, it was made very clear to the soldiers that they were the occupiers and the conquerors of the enemy. Soon, however, US policy makers and the soldiers themselves realized that they could not keep being the strict, firm conqueror. They also had to aid the recovery of West Germany if they wanted it Germany to become a stable democracy. The soldiers had to play the role of protector, caregiver, guide and teacher of the German people if they wanted to restore order, and perhaps more importantly, wanted to expand the American influence sphere in West Germany and Europe. This was only possible if the US would let go of the hard peace approach and let their soldiers be the 'good' Americans that they were. In this chapter we have learned that being a 'good' American meant the following things in late 1940s West Germany: a brave, morally strong man, a good Christian, a conqueror of the Nazi, bringer of democracy and freedom, a family man and brother in arms and peace.

Throughout this chapter, we have seen that the American soldiers were provided with many different sources. They had books, magazines, films and pamphlets to entertain, educate and guide them. Although these means of the DoD might have looked propaganda-free, many did contain a certain tone, attitude or motivation to think or behave in a particular way. With the use of language and symbols, such as describing the Germans as Nazis, and attributing characteristics as 'inherently evil,' a message could be given to the audience, subtly influencing their minds, with the soldiers likely often unaware that that was the exact purpose of the entertainment. This tactic of othering was used to influence national identity through tone, language and images.

The most remarkable and important identity influencing methods in these sources were othering, 'our-ing' or 'reversed othering' as I have called it, and unifying of cultural traits. With othering, the propagandists and authors in this period chose specific words such as 'Nazi supporter,' or 'warmonger' to describe German citizens. They pointed out all the evil, and bad characteristics that made the Germans such fundamentally different people than Americans. Furthermore the constant use of 'us' versus 'them' also made clear the distinction between in-group Americans and out-group Germans.

Instead of attributing negative characteristics to Germans, through reversed othering positive characteristics were attributed to Americans and the American culture. By stating, for

instance, that Americans *do* know how to play fair, and *do* have democracy, and *do* have equality, in contradiction to Germans, they indirectly, yet implicitly say that German society does not have those things. Therefore again, the message is: Germans are different from us; as well as: do not fraternize with them or their culture, because they are not a decent, democratic people. Both 'otherings' provided the soldiers with right and wrong characteristics to keep in mind.

Lastly I want to focus on the unification of the soldiers through reminders of what it meant to be an American, and of American culture. American society is a combination of people of many cultures and backgrounds. To make these people feel connected and unified as one Armed Forces, one American Armed Forces, reminders of home and the American way of life were added to the sources. By reminding soldiers of their typically Christian values, their common history, their love for sports, their democratic values and individual liberty, these soldiers could feel as connected. These reminders contributed greatly to their sense of self, their self-image as an individual, but also as a member of the American Armed Forces.

Through this analysis I have tried to provide characteristic examples of national identity building. With the in-depth analysis of sources we not only have illustrated the methods, means and message, used in the occupation period, but we also created a platform with which we can compare later periods and circumstances. Doubly so, since this period was, in many ways, the launchpad for the ideological war to come, with policies and objectives shifting to accommodate a large force of American young men abroad and continually tie them to the US. At first, to play the role of occupier and enforcer of justice. Yet, the reality of the situation forced them into a more friendly, aiding, protecting, maybe more traditionally Christian, and typically American role towards the Germans, whilst refocusing on a new enemy: the Soviet Union.

3. "Keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down"

In this chapter we will see that countries who had been allies during the Second World War, now had become enemies and vice versa. The Soviet Union grew in its power and influence over Europe, and the US found itself face to face with this new challenger. Furthermore, Germany would become an ally in the battle for the hearts and minds of Europe.[132] To cope with the new developments in Europe, the US and its soldiers had to adjust their views on the Soviet Union, the German population and themselves in respect to their national identity. That is why in this chapter the following question is posed: *How did the changing political dynamics in West Germany translate to national identity building attempts in material provided to the American soldiers stationed there? (1947-1961).*

The title of this chapter is a quote by the first Secretary General of the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO), Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay. With it, he described the aim of the organization, but this might as well have been a summary of the American policy towards, for, and in, West Germany in the 1950s. As we will see, the US tried to halt the Soviets, make friends with the Germans and justify American presence in West Germany.[133]

I will focus on the main objectives set by the DoD as a reaction to the growing tension towards, and influence of, the Soviet Union. Additionally, I will provide some context of the particular period, and explain some developments that occurred in (West) Germany which are relevant to this research. This will lead us to the analysis of a variety of primary sources, which will provide us with answers to what elements belonging to American national identity were provided to the soldiers, in terms of guidelines, message, and desired behavior. Methods such as othering, reversed othering and unifying cultural reminders will be tested throughout the chapter.

3.1 Changing Dynamics in West Germany in the 1950s and the US Containment Policy

During the 1945 Potsdam meeting between the four Allied Forces of the Second World War, the US, France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the future of Germany was discussed. All four nations had claimed to desire a democratic unified society in Germany, and a stable

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[132] Ziemke, 425-427.

[133] Quote by H.L. Ismay in *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's only Superpower Can't go it alone,* by J.S. Nye jr. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 33; B. Steil, *The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War,* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018), xi.

nation which would bring back the balance in Europe.[134]

After a few years of occupation and a lot of time and effort put into ridding the German society of Nazism, the Allies met again in 1948 for unification talks. Especially the Soviet Union and the US could not agree on the best way forward. Both accused the other of having hidden agendas.[135] The Conference, therefore, was ineffective and the Soviet Union continued to govern East Germany as it saw fit, whereas the three Western nations under the leadership of the US, governed West Germany. The US was adamant about providing the Germans with a stable, democratic and developed society as counterweight to the Soviet Union's influence.[136] As author B. Steil writes "Economic castration no longer seemed such a bright idea."[137] Instead the DoD wanted to rebuild Western Europe, and bring back balance, wealth and stability.[138]

The shift in enemies did not only require a different attitude towards West Germany as a nation, but also towards the German people. The DoD felt that they had to accommodate the Germans, in order for them to support the US and not the Soviet Union in this growing divide. To this end, German and American interactions were officially stimulated.[139] To convince the American soldiers, who previously had been taught to hate and distrust the Germans, the DoD changed its perspective in popular media. Where in the 1940s the German people had been depicted as warmongers, Hitler supporters and inherently evil, Germany was now described as "a nation suffering from all the agonies of bad government, mistaken leadership and a misled people."[140] In short, it was not their fault, they had simply fallen victim to Hitler and his unstoppable hunger for expansion.

Messages coming from experts on the Soviet Union such as US Ambassador in Moscow, George Kennan, created unrest in the President Truman's Administration. Kennan had written a telegram about the fundamental differences between the Soviet society and the American one. Kennan predicted that this would cause problems for their international relation in the future. In the telegram, Kennan describes Soviet leadership as "negative and

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[134] Ziemke, 425-428.

[135] "London Conference: Statement by Secretary Marshal," *Information Bulletin,* no. 127 (Jan. 1948): 6-11; Steil, *The Marshall Plan,* xii.

[136] "The Western Powers," *European Stars & Stripes* 2, no. 81 (Feb. 1948): 3.

[137] Steil, 6.

[138] Ibid., 5-7, xii; G. Maitra, *Tracing the Eagle's Orbit: Illuminating Insights into Major US Foreign Policies since Independence* (Bloomington: Trafford Publishing, 2008), 100-108.

[139] "German – American Discussion Groups." *Weekly Information Bulletin,* no. 128 (Feb. 1948): 14-16; "Search for Truth," *Information Bulletin,* (Mar. 1951): 11.

[140] "Surveying the Occupation," *Information Bulletin,* (Feb. 1951): 25.

destructive," with a "lack of frankness," and a society where "flexibility and deception are [seen as] valuable qualities."[141] These characterizations in combination with the attitude of the Soviet Union towards the US during the conference, sparked a more decisive opinion within the DoD that the Soviet Union could no longer be perceived as an ally. It was the beginning of the so called 'Policy of Containment,' the strategy of containing the Soviet Union and stopping its influence and ideology known as Communism from spreading across the world.[142]

3.1.1 Marshall Aid Program

By the late 1940s, the US struggled with the question of how best to handle the recovery of West Germany. One way for West Germany to rebuild was through the 'European Recovery Plan,' or as it became better known over the years: 'The Marshall Plan.'[143] It was developed in 1947 to bind the European countries and Allies together and to make sure that Europe could recover and become stable again.[144]

During the conference in 1948, the Soviet representatives had, according to George Marshall, purposefully withheld information on the situation in the Eastern part of Germany and had openly sabotaged every attempt of the US to come to an agreement on the unification policy for Germany.[145] The American soldiers was informed of Marshall's futile efforts to guide the conversation towards progress and that it had become clear that the Russians had only come to the conference to "utilize this meeting as an opportunity for propaganda declarations which would be pleasant to German ears."[146] With this statement Marshall explained that the Soviets were only out to make the Americans look bad in the eyes of the Germans, and to make them more sympathetic to the Soviets and their ideology. The general message given in the article "London Conference," is that Marshall had tried to be the better man, but that the Soviets had made cooperation impossible.[147]

A big part of the article is about the introduction of the Marshall Plan. Although the

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[141] G.F. Kennan, *The Long Telegram,* 1946. 15; http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm (accessed 15-04-2017).
[142] G.F. Kennan and J. Lukacs, *George F. Kennan and the Origins of Containment, 1944-1946: The Kennan-Lukacs Correspondence* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997), 4-9.
[143] Maitra, *Tracing the Eagle's Orbit,* 106.
[144] Steil, xii.
[145] "London Conference," *Information Bulletin,* 3-7.
[146] Ibid., 6.
[147] Ibid., 3-8.

plan was originally designed to give protection to the war-torn nations that needed stability, it soon became a tool in the battle against Communism, because the US could tie many West European countries to itself in exchange for the aid.[148] Sentences such as "Cussing won't cure European chaos or stop Soviet aggression, only a successful Marshall Plan of American aid for self-helping democracies and close security cooperation will do the job!" were meant to get the Europeans and American soldiers to support the plan.[149] For the European audience it played on the fact that their national safety was at stake, and for the American soldiers it played on their sense of moral duty. Despite their potential as strong allies in the future, the European countries, West Germany in particular, were for the moment presented as weak, innocent victims without any means to defend themselves against the big Communist bully.

Allen W. Dulles writes in "Alternatives for Germany," that there was no other nation than the US who could take the lead in that time. Dulles simply states that it is the right thing to do when you are the leader of the free world. He tried to convince the American reader that they had to see it as an: "investment in our own future welfare and security."[150] A strong, democratic Europe would be beneficial to the US itself in terms of international trade and allies in future conflicts.[151] This became reality as The Marshall Plan allowed the US "to create a network of American corporate control over the globe, and, in the process, to project its political influence over the countries aided."[152] The nations in which the US could influence politics, culture and economy, grew into strong and stable allies in the battle with the Soviet Union.[153]

Especially the importance of Germany, as a whole, is stated in this recovery plan. It was presented that this was not only the case because of the size and potential of Germany as an economic force and stabilizer in (Western) Europe, but also because it was in Germany that West and East were divided. Germany as a divided country and Berlin as a divided city became the symbolic treasures which both the Soviet Union and the US wanted to claim. Therefore it was in Germany where the strongest support for the American cause and ideology was needed from the German civilians and American soldiers alike.[154]

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[148] Steil, xi-xii.
[149] "London Conference," 5-6.
[150] A.W. Dulles, "Alternatives for Germany," *Foreign Affairs* 25, issue 3 (April 1947): 421.
[151] "London Conference," 6-15; Dulles, "Alternatives for Germany," 421-426.
[152] Maitra, 107-108; Steil, 50-56.
[153] Ibid.
[154] J.V. Forrestal, *U.S. Objectives with respect to Russia* (Washington: Modern Military Record Branch, 1948), 3.

3.1.2 The Berlin Airlift

The tensions between the Soviets and the Americans in Germany heated up when in 1948 the Soviet Union cut off the access roads to the Western part of Berlin. The Soviet Union had not assaulted any Americans or set foot on US territory in the process, therefore there was no official offence, which meant that the DoD could not do much in return without risking Soviet aggression or being perceived as the aggressors by the Germans. The only way to get to West Berlin and deliver food, coal, oil and other necessary products, was through the air.[155]

It was the idea of General Lucius Clay, to use aircrafts flying into Berlin as a way to dodge Soviet blockades. The main goal of the Soviets had been to force the Western allies out of Berlin, but Clay and the DoD had no intentions of complying. Not only did Clay want to show his own personnel that Americans would not be bullied out of Berlin, he also claimed that it was important to show that Americans would stick to their commitment to protect and rebuild Germany. This had a positive effect on the American – German relation. As an American soldier stated: "The perception was that the US army was there to meet a potential attack of the Soviet bloc nations. We were deployed to meet that threat. We trained everyday with that thought in mind. We had no doubt that we needed to be there and that the local population was happy to have us there."[156]

The growing tension in Germany and the fact that increasing number of American families lived in close proximity to the enemy made that the American soldiers were trained extensively to be in a "constant state of readiness."[157] These factors combined contributed to the sense of a real danger, one that could strike at any time. This was felt by the German civilians, but especially by the American soldiers and their families, as they felt they would be Soviets' primary targets.[158]

3.1.3 'Little Americas'

It was important to the DoD to keep the morale of the soldiers high, especially since soldiers were growing restless and frustrated with the uncertainty of the future. A actual battle had not yet taken place, and might not happen at all, but the soldiers were pushed to stay prepared at all times. To deal with that uncertainty, and to "reinforce identification with and involvement

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[155] Maitra, 108-109.
[156] 'Quote by anonymous soldier' in Lemza, 82.
[157] J.P. Hawkins, *Army of Hope, Army of Alienation: Culture and Contradiction in the American Communities in Cold War Germany* (Westport: Praeger, 2001), 69-75.
[158] Hawkins, *Army of Hope,* 71-74.

in the American community for military personnel and their family members," the DoD strived to make sure the traditional family could live in West Germany as if they were living in the US.[159] They created areas with typical American housing, shopping centers, schools, hospitals, chapels, gymnasiums and recreation opportunities such as swimming pools. Many sports were stimulated, since "it suited the goals and culture of the military."[160] These military communities were shaped so much like actual American towns, that they soon became known as 'Little Americas.'[161]

This attempt to create a home away from home for these soldiers can be used to analyze what kind of elements were thought of as important and typically American. They, for instance, built the housing with "special American electric standards, larger rooms, more space for auto's, and more lawn surrounding the building than usual German developments."[162] Families were stimulated to buy their favorite American products at the various American stores. Magazines and newspapers such as the Stars & Stripes contained special adds for the newest, trendiest and all-American, kitchen supplies and furniture for the spouses.[163] The soldiers themselves could buy an American car, and drink American beer in the American bar down the street, and on Sunday go to an American church.[164]

These elements of their familiar culture enabled the rekindlement of national traditions and values, and most importantly to my research, painted a picture of what it meant to be a typical American. Apparently, it meant that you bought imported American (made) products, whether it was food, clothing or kitchen applies. It meant that you bought big; a big American car for on your big lawn, and a big American refrigerator for in the kitchen. It above all meant being an active participant in the new growing American consumerism. They were motivated to spend their wealth on the newest products and keep up with the latest trends. Americans in the 1950s became known as "a people of plenty."[165]

The construction of these communities and the created illusion of home, is a clear

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[159] A.P. Baker, *American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military Presence* (Westport: Praeger, 2004), 56; D. Junker and T.W. Maulucci jr. ed., *GIs in Germany: The Social, Economic, Cultural and Political History of American Military Presence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 16-18.
[160] Baker, *American Soldiers Overseas,* 56.
[161] Ibid., 47-48; Junker and Maulucci, *GIs in Germany,* 16; 'Little Americas Photo Exhibit,' Allied Museum Berlin, 2018. http://www.alliiertenmuseum.de/en/exhibitions/temporary-exhibition.html (accessed 27-07-2018).
[162] Baker*,* 54.
[163] 'Various Stars and Stripes,' 1950s, https://starsandstripes.newspaperarchive.com/ (accessed 27-07-2018).
[164] Baker, 48-60.
[165] Samuel, *The American Way of Life,* 49.

example of how cultural elements, traditions and values were used to remind the soldiers living in West Germany of the American way of life. It reminded them of what they were protecting at home, but most of all, it could make them feel 'normal' again. In these Little Americas, the soldiers did not have to adjust to the German culture, or deal with the fact that they lived an ocean away from home, here they could stay themselves. The soldiers, above anything else, could feel and stay typical Americans.[166]

3.2 Shift of 'the Other' in US Propaganda

In an attempt to keep the American soldiers and their families motivated for the potentially upcoming war, Nazi fascism was linked to "Red Fascism."[167] DoD "casually and deliberately articulated distorted similarities between Nazi and Communist ideologies, German and Soviet foreign policies, authoritarian controls, and trade practices, and between Hitler and Stalin."[168] Words such as "totalitarianism," which were used in anti-Nazi propaganda before, were now used to describe the Soviet Union.[169] To cope with the new mission and to deal with their frustrations of being stuck far from home, and with international tension growing, it was easier for soldiers to translate the hatred that they had felt for the Nazis to the Soviets. They reassured themselves, and others, that they had already defeated the Nazis and their ideology; they could surely also defeat this Soviet totalitarianism. At the same time, similarities instead of differences between Germans and Americans were emphasized to justify their new partnership.[170]

3.2.1 Portrayal of Soviets in the Weekly Information Bulletin

In the following section I will analyze various articles published in the *Weekly Information Bulletin*. The magazine focused on "new policies, regulations and directives, its progress, difficulties and achievements."[171] Because of that purpose, it provides us with insights into what kind of subjects, lessons and guidelines the soldiers were confronted with. This in turn

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[166] Ibid., 58; Hawkins, 98-99

[167] L.K. Adler and T.G. Paterson, "Red Fascism: The merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American image of Totalitarianism, 1930s-1950s," *The American Historical Review* 75, no. 4 (1970): 1046.

[168] Adler and Paterson, "Red Fascism," 1046-1047.

[169] Adler and Paterson, 1046-1051.

[170] Ibid., 1046-1050; H.J. Stimson, "The Challenge to Americans," *Foreign Affairs* 26, issue 3 (1947): 5-8; Jones, C.M., C.W. Kegley jr. and E.R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Progress* (Wadsworth: Thomson Learning Inc., 2008), 40-44.

[171] Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, "A Note on a New Publication," 3.

can teach us about what choices were made to portray a certain 'American' vision, and spark a certain self-image amongst the American soldiers.

The articles come from a series with the title: "Freedom vs Totalitarianism." In it, the differences between a democratic society and a totalitarian society were explained and highlighted. The purpose of this series is described as: "to explain the American conception of democracy as opposed to such political ideology as Communism."[172]Although the articles were written by different authors, all worked for a branch of the DoD.[173]

The first article of the series is written by Dr. Edward Litchfield, director of the Civil Administration Division. The first thing he does, is remind the reader of what the mission objectives were when the Americans first arrived in West Germany. He explains that the US as a nation had promised to free the German people of fascism and to make sure that the German people had "freedom from want, freedom from fear" and that Americans would "guarantee derivative rights of freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of press and freedom of movement."[174] This reminder is put in this introduction because Litchfield then proceeds to say: "Now after two and a half years after the collapse of Nazism, we find that these fundamental human rights are again disputed. This time by Communism."[175] Immediately we see that the same negative characteristics and the same kind of threat were attributed to the Soviet regime, as had been done to Nazi regime.

The most fundamental difference between the American society and a totalitarian society, according to Litchfield, was its purpose. He states that in a democratic society such as the US: "the government, the institutions, and the multitude of informal ways of community living are all directed towards the satisfaction of the needs, desires, and aspirations of individual men and women."[176] Whereas in a totalitarian society: "those needs, desires and aspirations are of little consequence. For the government, social institutions, and every aspect of community life are designed to serve the goals of an abstract state."[177] Therefore, as Litchfield states, the biggest problem the US has with the Soviet dictatorship is that it does not serve its people. It is not a government for the people and by the people, as is the case with the traditional American way of governing.

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[172] "Freedom vs Totalitarianism," *Weekly Information Bulletin,* no. 120 (Nov. 1947): 12.
[173] "Weekly Information Bulletin: A Review," *Weekly Information Bulletin,* no. 125 (Dec. 1947): 3.
[174] E. Litchfield, "Freedom vs Totalitarianism," *Weekly Information Bulletin,* no. 120 (Nov. 1947): 12.
[175] Litchfield, "Freedom vs Totalitarianism," 12.
[176] Ibid.
[177] Ibid.

Then the article discusses two different kinds of rights that are present in a democratic society and not in a dictatorship. The first, not surprisingly, is freedom of speech. Secondly, freedom of press, or the lack of it, is named with an example of how it works in the Communist state. "In a Communist system the view of the individual man and woman is both theoretically and practically limited by the views of the government."[178] Because of the absence of both these freedoms, Litchfield argues that in the Communist regime only one opinion mattered: Stalin's. Anyone who opposed would be "directly eliminated."[179] Whereas the US, on the other hand, prided itself on having all different kinds of voices that together brought about discussion and a democratic society where everybody was equal.

It is noteworthy here that in most of the sources provided to the American soldiers, in which they classify elements of a society as good or bad, freedom of speech is one of the first mentioned, as is freedom of press.[180] This could suggest that these were considered the two most important freedoms a person could have, or it could suggest that those were the kinds of freedoms that were taken for granted the most by American soldiers, and would therefore trigger the biggest reaction when confronted with the fact that some societies do not live with those kinds of freedom.

Another important observation to make is the clever and convenient use of history. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the initial objective of the US occupational forces was denazification through a hard peace, with influential voices going as far as to wish the German society regressing into an agricultural state. Dr. Litchfield, however, portrays the invasion as a liberation of the people, in defense of their rights. Presumably, because this translates better to the current mission and the attention-shift towards the Soviet Union. On the premise that this was the mission all along, it is easily justified to oppose a new threat to the said mission. Also note Litchfield's use of sentences like "freedom from want, freedom from fear," a reference to the Four Freedoms Speech given by president Franklin D. Roosevelt, before American forces were even engaged in the Second World War.[181] By using it now, he creates the illusion that the relatively recently deceased President had the current situation in mind. It also was meant to connect a feeling of patriotism to the mission of the soldiers now. This practice of conveniently twisting, highlighting and connecting history to

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[178] Ibid.
[179] Ibid.
[180] Ibid.
[181] F.D Roosevelt, "The Four Freedoms," 1941. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrNDwyj4u1w (accessed 27-07-2018).

further a desired goal is something we will see more often in this thesis.

In the second article the right environment for the creation of certain fundamental rights are brought forward. It is said, for instance, that in a democracy "we believe men cannot be free in their minds unless they think, and we know they cannot think unless they are provided in our schools and by our press with the materials of thought in the form of objective fact."[182] The author Ralph E. McGill, who was editor at *Atlanta Constitution*, uses in his article the tactic of reversed othering. Different from Litchfield, McGill does not directly make claims about the Soviet regime, but instead makes statements about the US and its way of life. McGill states that in the US it is considered normal, and right, that one is free in his way of thinking, and furthermore that he is supported in that by media and education through objective information. By proclaiming this message so strongly as a key element in a democratic society, McGill therefore indirectly claims that this is not the case for the Soviet Union, making Soviets the 'others.' This premise seems to be backed up by the previous article, where Litchfield described the Soviet Union as a strict 'one-opinion government,' that did not motivate or celebrate a free spirited, objective mind.[183]

The final article of the series focuses on political parties and which differences between the democracy and the totalitarian state are important to know. Author, and Chief of the Elections and Political parties branch Richard M. Scammon starts with saying that, "Opposition in a democracy is not a crime, an evil sin to be hunted down [for] by a political police and punished in secret courts and dread concentration camps."[184] With these words, Scammon implies through reversed othering that such things do happen in the Soviet Union. He goes on to confirm this by explaining that in the Soviet Union there is a special "thought police" which would hunt people down for their beliefs, and that "truck-loads of Communist party thugs" crashed peaceful meetings of democratic thinkers.[185] The use of words such as 'thugs' to describe members of the Communist party visualizes and dramatizes the evil character of the Soviet Union.

With the use of othering as well as reversed othering, all three articles educated the reader on their new enemy. In previous years critique towards the Soviet army was

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[182] R.E. McGill, "Freedom vs Totalitarianism: part 2 – The Press in America," *Weekly Information Bulletin,* no. 121 (Dec. 1947): 11.

[183] McGill, "Freedom vs Totalitarianism," 11; Litchfield, 12.

[184] R.M. Scammon, "Freedom versus Totalitarianism: Political Parties," *Weekly Information Bulletin,* no. 125 (Dec. 1947): 14.

[185] Scammon, "Freedom versus Totalitarianism," 15.

downplayed and American soldiers were stimulated to see the Soviets as their trustworthy allies.[186] In these articles and in other primary sources provided to the American soldiers in this period, a very different image was portrayed: the US is good and democratic, the Soviet Union is evil and totalitarian.

3.2.2 Anti-Communism Film "The Big Lie," 1951

Produced by the US Army services, "The Big Lie" was an anti-Communism propaganda film shown to American soldiers in Germany. Its purpose was to educate Americans on Communism. In it, the audience is given an overview of the similarities between Nazi ideology and practices, and those of the Communists. It claims that Hitler told the 'Big Lie' of peace and redemption to his followers, and that now the same type of 'Big Lie' was told by Stalin. Both men created platforms for themselves, from where they spread their ideology across the globe. During these statements, footage of marching German and Soviet soldiers was shown to indicate the use of violence, and the aggressive nature of both ideologies. It was meant to trigger the feeling of danger and threat amongst the audience, and to provide an justification by making them link Nazis with Soviets.[187]

As the narrator continues, especially the peace movements and initiatives from the Soviet Union should not be believed. The narrator sums up some of the 'satellite' states and on the screen we see a white dove, the symbol of peace. But then footage is shown of people suffering under physical labor and exploitation, people who are fleeing their war-torn homes. The Soviets claim that they bring peace, but their deeds show their real intentions. Therefore the narrator repeats the slogan for every satellite nation: "Beware the Big Lie, beware the dove that goes BOOM!"[188] The image below is how the film end. The white dove turns into a tank with the Communist symbol on it. This to emphasize that the common symbolization of peace, in Soviet's case, stands for military aggression and oppression.[189]

This supposed manipulative and lying behavior correlates with the original characteristics that George Kennan attributed to the Communists in his telegram, and which George Marshall used to describe the Russians during the Council of Foreign Ministers.

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[186] "The Western Powers," *European Stars & Stripes*, 2-3; "A Free Press and the Future," *Weekly Information Bulletin*, no. 15 (November 1945): 19-20; C.S. DeRose, *Political Indoctrination in the U.S. Army: From World War II to the Vietnam War* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 65-74.

[187] Warner Pathe, "The Big Lie," 1951. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MaNTAUc-3tk (accessed 16-06-2017).

[188] "The Big Lie," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MaNTAUc-3tk (found 16-06-2017).

[189] Ibid.

Soviets withheld information, fooled nations into believing that the Soviet Union would bring them peace, while they were actually expanding the influence sphere for their deadly ideology.[190]

Peace dove turning into a Soviet tank. Source: "The Big Lie"

By focusing so much on the fact that the Soviet leaders lied to their own people, and by fiercely condemning them for it, the American soldier was indirectly reassured that the US would not lie to their soldiers and could be trusted. This othering of the Soviet Union as untrustworthy and aggressive in nature likely influenced the views of the American soldiers on the Soviets and on their own position in the new dynamics in Europe.[191]

3.2.3 Anti-Communism Film "The Challenge of Ideas," 1961
This next film is part of a TV series *The Big Picture,* which aired in West Germany during the 1950s until the 1970s. This series was popular with the soldiers, but also with their families.[192]

This film starts off with reminding the audience of what it means to be an American, and what the American culture entails. The narrator gives examples such as the element of

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[190] Ibid.

[191] Ibid.

[192] Army Pictorial Center, "The Challenge of Ideas," 1961 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qzu_J-7thQY (found 25-05-2017); Engelhardt, *The End of Victory Culture,* 75-76; *The Big Picture* distribution, http://www.armypictorialcenter.com/Catalog_of_the_Big_Picture.htm (accessed 15-08-2017).

free speech and equality of opinion which, according to him, is normal for every US citizen. To illustrate these claims, the audience is shown footage of a young woman who raises her hand in class, and who gets the opportunity to speak freely.[193]

Furthermore, Americans are described as noisy, industrious, sentimental, proud, and with the belief that a man is an unique and individual being. Moreover, the narrator says "We relax as hard as we work," and "Beauty is of national concern to us."[194] From the imagery it becomes clear that with 'relaxing hard,' the narrator means first and foremost, the common love for sports, as something which unites Americans all over the world. It shows the sportsmanship and the characteristic of fair play, which are big parts of the American culture. Whereas women watching this film could take the statement about beauty as a reminder of their 'duty' as a woman to look presentable, the men were reminded of the beautiful American girls back home who were romanticized, and sexualized (pin-up girls) for their entertainment. The audience was also motivated to feel connected to the American history by hearing about Abraham Lincoln and his battle for the individual freedom of US citizens in the 1860s. The connection is made that the American soldiers nowadays were fighting the same kind of battle Lincoln had done in the past. They were also fighting for the unalienable right of individual freedom.[195]

With these examples of typical elements of the American culture, a nostalgic feeling was triggered in the audience. All these aspects named in the first part of the film were meant to unify the American soldiers, to make them feel patriotic towards the US and willing to protect their nation and its unique way of life. Specific footage, language and subjects were chosen to bring across the message of the good life American soldiers had waiting for them at home, the wonderful US culture and beliefs that they were protecting by standing their ground in West Germany, as well as to boost morale by creating common grounds for the soldiers to bond over.[196]

The second part of the film focuses on the Soviet Union, and presents the audience with characteristics of the Communist ideology. The patriotic and nostalgic sentiments are brought into sharp contrast with the presented reality and threat of the Soviet Union. This contrast is enforced by the change in tone of the imagery; it turn dark and sober. The footage

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[193] "The Challenge of Ideas," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qzu_J-7thQY (found 25-05-2017).
[194] Ibid.
[195] Ibid.
[196] Ibid.

in the beginning had shown lovely scenery in the park, with children dancing and playing, and families laughing. Now, however, the audience saw footage of rows upon rows of Soviet soldiers marching in front of Stalin, saluting him with a gesture that looks eerily similar to the one Nazi's had used for Hitler. It is combined with threatening music, images of big tanks and rockets moving through the screen and the narrator explaining that all the Soviet Union wants is "total world conquest."[197] This argument is emphasized through the use of the map depicted below. On it we see the spread of Communism, symbolized in black, and the (still) free world in white.[198]

The biggest and most fundamentally different aspect of the Soviet society presented here, was the lack of individual liberty amongst their people. As is presented in the first part of the film, in the US the freedom of every citizen is guaranteed and people are stimulated to

Map of the Ideologies in the world. Source: "The Challenge of Ideas"

be different and free spirited. The Soviet Union is depicted as exactly the opposite; it is described as a society in which the people live under the rule of the state. Their political, economic and cultural life is decided for them by the state. Notable here, is that the directors of the film show the Soviet population as victims of their own government. They were unable to escape from the totalitarianism of their rulers. The fundamental differences between the

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197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.

Soviet Union and the US only applied to the Soviet government and their minions.[199]

Another aspect that characterized the Soviet Union regime, was that it was atheist. The narrator argues that, "as a creature of God, man is a being of dignity, and conscience, with the ability to determine right from wrong, and the obligation to act on that right."[200] With this, he is suggesting that the Soviets could not possible know right from wrong. They were not morally guided the way Americans were. And if the Soviet rulers did not know the difference between right and wrong, it was impossible to trust on them to do right by their citizens and the rest of the world. It justified the US' containment policy, and it provided another legitimate reason for the American soldiers to be in West Germany.

The last part of the film focuses on explaining to the audience why it is so important for the American soldier to stay, or get, involved in the American cause. The narrator presents the American soldier as the ultimate and sole defender of the free world. He literally states that "only you can help stop the spread of Communist conquest."[201] This provides the DoD with another justification for being in West Germany, one that had been used since US' involvement in the Second World War.

In this motion picture it is clear that the writers played on the national identity of the American soldier and tried to make the soldier feel patriotic, warm and nostalgic, and proud to fight for all the good things that were the US. In contrast they showed imagery of military aggression, discipline and Soviet's overwhelming hunger for expansion, all to trigger the exact opposite feeling, namely uneasiness, unrest and disconnectedness. The common 'us versus them' tactic in the othering process shows a clear in-group and out-group. The methods and messages in this film together were meant to unify the audience behind an American national identity, and against a common Soviet enemy.[202]

3.3 Conclusion

Instead of going home after the denazification of West Germany, the US were confronted with new reasons to stay and fight. The Soviet Union was a totalitarian regime that held back unification attempts at the conference of 1948, which created a conflict of interests between the US and the Soviet Union which resulted in mutual distrust. The following shift of the US'

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[199] Ibid.
[200] Ibid.
[201] Ibid.
[202] Ibid.

focal point from Germany towards the Soviet Union as a (perceived) threat, demanded a change in the state of mind for the soldiers stationed in West Germany since Germany became the theater for this unusual standoff. Therefore the question was raised: *How did the changing political dynamic in West Germany translate to national identity building attempts in material provided to the American soldiers stationed there? (1947-1961).*

The sources analyzed in this chapter have shown us that the Germans no longer were viewed as the enemy by the DoD. The relaxation of the Morgenthau's Plan and the general focus to rebuild Germany and help it recover to a prosperous democracy are clear examples of that shift. Furthermore, a new plan was designed: The Marshall Plan. It was initially created to help West Germany, as well as many other European countries become economically stable. Although the plan was not originally meant to act as a safeguard against the spread of Communism, it eventually became exactly that. US supported countries financially, materially and military who were in need of protection against the Soviet Union's expansion thirst.

Mutual distrust between the two new superpowers led to sabotage and propaganda campaigns on both sites, such as the Berlin blockade by the Soviet Union and the resulting US airlift in 1948-1949. Although no actual fighting had taken place, it meant an intensifying of the standoff, as well as an increased dedication toward Germany and its people. Whereas Soviets had been portrayed as allies during the first postwar years, they were more and more depicted as untrustworthy and manipulative people and discarded to the 'out-group.' Already in 1946, distrust was advised by George Kennan, when he wrote about the bad characteristics of the Soviet regime. By the late 1940s, Germany and the Soviet Union had traded places in who belonged to the 'in-group' of the US. West Germany now was part of the free and democratic West, opposite to the totalitarian and Communist East.

The othering of the Soviets resembled the way the DoD had also othered the Germans right after the Second World War. The hunger for expansion and the use of oppression on innocent nations was highlighted as well as their totalitarian and state orientated regimes. In the articles analyzed from the *Weekly Information Bulletin* series "Freedom versus Totalitarianism," we could recognize the classic use of othering where the author focused on several negative characteristics of Soviets and of the Soviet regime in general. The authors accused the Soviet regime of having special 'thought police,' and claimed that in the Soviet Union any opinion other than that of Stalin's was eliminated immediately. This was of course a stark contrast with the believe in freedom of speech and thought that was praised in the US.

But not only the traditional othering method was used, the reversed othering was

increasingly used in this particular series, as was the method of highlighting unifying, and typically American, values and important cultural aspects. More and more, the authors described what American democracy stood for, and what American society and American way of life looked like, in opposite to the totalitarian society of the Soviet Union. Equality, spiritual freedom and individual liberty were the most important aspects that defined the American democracy, and in which it differed tremendously from the Soviet Union, according to the articles.

These particular elements were also named in the analyzed motion pictures. "The Big Lie," was a more traditional portrayal of the enemy. The film is filled with links between the Nazis and the Soviets and especially footage of their aggressive nature and militarism is shown to the audience to trigger a sense of danger. Especially the fact that the Soviet Union lied to their own people was highlighted with great effort. By claiming to be so offended by that aspect, the audience was stimulated in their belief that the US would never do that to them. Indirectly, presumably, making them more trusting towards the training material and other messages coming from the DoD.

The second motion picture, "The Challenge of Ideas," starts with painting a picture of what the American way of life looks like, and of what it meant to be an American. The soldiers were reminded of the rights, beliefs and values important to their nation's culture. They were reminded of the things they could feel proud of protecting. And the need for protection became clear by cleverly contrasting these lovely scenery with scenes of oppression, soberness and aggression. The Soviet Union is again portrayed as the power lusting warmonger threatening to destroy the free, democratic world, and infect weak nations with their ideology. The biggest difference between the US and the Soviet Union presented in this film, was the lack of individual freedom in Soviet society as well as the fact that the state ruled country was atheistic in nature. Something that was fundamentally different in the US.

Another means that proved particularly useful to the DoD were the 'Little Americas.' With the constant threat of the Soviets hanging over the soldiers, the DoD tried to lift the morale and motivate connectedness amongst the soldiers. The communities were built to resemble ordinary villages at home. For the sake of this research, these communities are very interesting because they show us what the US thought was typically American and what was ought to be represented in these villages. We can deduce that it apparently was important to be able to buy all American products, shop according to the latest American trends, buy and live big and be part of the consumerism that was Americanism in the 1950s. Furthermore

sport seemed to be the biggest recreational activity that was provided and stimulated, which seems to be a recurrent element in the more sources describing the American way of life.

As we will see in the next chapter, these and following decades were a very confusing and at times frustrating time for the soldiers stationed in West Germany. Even with nothing resembling an actual war between the Soviet Union and the US, a war was always perceived as imminent. The DoD's struggle to provide justifications for the soldiers, I feel, can already be seen in the last film; The American soldier was motivated to embrace their normal traditional family life, but at the same time always stay vigilant for the Soviet threat, which needed justifying.

Not only was the Soviet Union the new enemy, the 'bad guy' was no longer the average man. Where the othering of the Germans had largely meant that not one soul was to be trusted, including women and children, now the message was that Germans had been victims of their government. The new threat, therefore, also came from a government and not the average man. The Soviet Union, if left unchecked, would continue to take the individual rights of its own citizens, the Germans and any other free nation it could expand to.

To justify the shift in enemy and message, past events were conveniently shaped to fit the current goals. The DoD made it seem like the objective had always been to protect the Germans' basic rights, therefore it was only logical to also protect them from the new threat. This convenient usage of history to justify opinions, action or missions is also visible in "The Big Lie" where the Nazis are linked to the Soviets and in "The Challenge of Ideas" where the struggles of Abraham Lincoln for freedom are linked to the heroic soldiers watching the film.

Methods that made justifications easier became more important in an increasingly complicated and ideological war, especially when Western criticism towards US policy, soldiers and war became more frequent and common, as we will see in the next chapter. Reminding the soldier of his roots, heritage and typically American traits to reaffirm his national identity proved more and more common and necessary to ensure his resolve, pride and unit cohesion.

4. American Self-Image during the 1960s

"I am the American soldier. For the American people, my family, my fellows, my sons to come – I carry on."[203] This is a quote from the article "Credo of the U.S. Army Soldier," published in the official military magazine *Army Information Digest* in 1962. It goes on to say that, "I am the ring of steel around Democracy," and "Whatever the need - for the spirit of liberty, for the future we're making – I, the American soldier, am the ultimate weapon."[204] These statements do not differ much from the general conception brought forth by the US during the 1950s that the US was the prime fighter for freedom, the ultimate defender of Western freedom, the only superpower capable of stopping the Soviet Union. Note how the message is extremely heroic and individualistic. The first person in the creed is not an American soldier, he is "THE American soldier".

In 1966, the same magazine published a new article "The Soldier's Creed." In it, it now says: " I am an American Soldier. I am a man of the United States Army – a protector of the greatest nation on earth."[205] Furthermore, it states that "I am doing my share to perpetuate the principles of freedom for which my country stands."[206] The use of words is quite different from the previous description of what the American soldier was. In 1966, the American soldier became an American soldier, part of a team. "The Soldier's Creed" was originally written as part of *The Soldier's Handbook*, to be given to army trainees from 1964 onward. This guide starts with the significance of the recruit's vows and reminds him of his place in the army: "As you look around you will not find a 'typical American soldier'(...) but (...) you are all serving the United States of America and believe in the principles that make it a free country."[207] It goes on to say that "the responsibility of all Americans is outstanding in the world today," emphasizing that the soldiers are part of a team, a country and an international community.[208]

This apparent change in attitude had many reasons and many implications for the American soldier in West Germany, in respects to his self-image, desired behavior and his position in a transforming world. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the US shifted

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[203] "Credo of the U.S. Army Soldier," 47.
[204] Ibid.
[205] "The Soldier's Creed," 66.
[206] Ibid.
[207] Secretary of the Army, *The Soldier's Handbook* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1964), 2.
[208] Secretary of the Army, *The Soldier's Handbook,* 2.

most of their attention from Germany to the Soviet Union. The Armed Forces had relatively little trouble winning the hearts and minds of the Europeans after they had offered them aid, and helped them recover through The Marshall Plan. The US was perceived as a benevolent leader of the free world. The threat of the Soviet Union and its Communism was effectively highlighted in many sources. Therefore, hardly anyone doubted the justification of the US for being in West Germany.[209] As we will see in this chapter, for various reasons, this confidence and faith in the US's presence in West Germany faded during the 1960s. This had an effect on how the American soldiers viewed the US, the Armed Forces, themselves and their future in West Germany.

Therefore the main question in this chapter is: *In the 1960s, when global attitudes towards the United States shifted, in what ways did the Department of Defense (still) try to influence national identity amongst their soldiers in West Germany?* To come to an answer I will first provide some context information. The second part of the chapter will consist of thematic analyses of several primary sources.

4.1 A World in Transformation

The 1960s were tumultuous years, in which US' involvement in the conflict in Vietnam increased, and a new generation of Americans came of age, with different views and opinions than their parents. Although in this research I will not go into detail about these events, I will have to touch upon the subjects since they were of significance to the so called 'zeitgeist' of the period, and to the general image of the US. All the factors that will be highlighted below influenced the ways the DoD reached out to its soldiers in West Germany, as well as their message.

4.1.1 Vietnam, the New Reach of Media and their Significance to the Department of Defense
From 1954 on, Vietnam had been an area of conflict. Initially it was a conflict between Vietnam and the French colonizers settled in Vietnam, but soon the US got involved because the Soviet Union and Communist China supported North Vietnamese freedom fighters.[210] From 1960-1961 on, the US started to send military advisors, and from 1964 on combat units

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[209] H. Notaker, G. Scott-Smith and D.J. Snyder ed. *Reasserting America in the 1970s: U.S. Public Diplomacy and the Rebuilding of America's Image Abroad* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 3-17; "The Challenge of Ideas," www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qzu_J-7thQY&t=13s (accessed 25-05-2017).

[210] K.C. Statler, *Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam* (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 1-14.

into South Vietnam. The Communist North had infiltrated the 'free' South and threatened to make the entire country a Communist state. In light of their policy to contain Soviet Union power from spreading across the world, the US stated that Americans had to step in and defend the South Vietnamese, as they had promised to protect any free people against Communist oppression.[211]

This decision in itself did not have much to do with the American soldier in West Germany, or with their training material. The War became relevant to Americans everywhere because of the role media played in it. Photography and film had already been used during the Second World War, but during the Vietnam War media tools and techniques had improved to a level that made it possible to provide the world with the latest news quickly through newspapers, motion pictures, radio and even television. News became more instant and widespread, which meant that not only stateside Americans could learn about world affairs but also soldiers on base in Germany.[212]

Because of the boost in media possibilities, journalists from all over the world could quite easily record and distribute news. This progress resulted in that it was becoming more difficult for the DoD to guide the news provided to their soldiers. Although official, military media such as magazines were still popular, American soldiers now also received news through independent and international channels. News about America's involvement in the Vietnam War reached the soldiers in Germany on a daily basis, often with graphic pictures that were hard to ignore, or justify. It was becoming increasingly difficult for the US to keep their credibility as leaders of the free world, or their image of the 'good guys.'[213] This, of course, had consequences for the way American soldiers in West Germany saw themselves, the DoD and their purpose. As media had changed and especially television had become increasingly important in the spreading of news across the globe, the DoD had to join in, if they wanted their soldiers to still be interested in their material.[214]

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[211] W. Mausbach, "America's Vietnam in Germany – Germany in America's Vietnam: On the Relocation of Spaces and the Appropriation of History," *Changing the World, Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Collective Identities in West Germany and the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s,* ed. B. Davis, W. Mausbach, M. Klimke and C. MacDougall (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 46.

[212] C. Page, *U.S. Official Propaganda during the Vietnam War, 1965-1973: The Rights and Wrongs* (London: Bloomsbury Academy, 1996), 132-140.

[213] M. Lind, *Vietnam: The Necessary War. A Reinterpretation of America's most disastrous Military Conflict* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), ix-xi.

[214] Army Pictorial Center, "The Story of American Forces Network (AFN)," *The Big Picture* series, 1962. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4EUx1UJyaeY (accessed 06-08-2017); Armed Forces Network, Frankfurt, 1960-1969. https://archive.org/details/1960-1969RadioNews (accessed 06-08-2017).

Another way the Vietnam War was significant for American soldiers in West Germany was because it caused intense protests and general degrading of US's image amongst Americans as well as Europeans.[215]

4.1.2 US as 'the Other' and German – American Relations

Many Americans had a hard time trying to understand why the US had gotten involved in this war, which in their opinion had nothing to do with the US. Especially young Americans, who had been born after the Second World War, were protesting against America's actions in Vietnam and were resisting their draft.[216]

This unrest and unhappiness was not exclusive to the US. West German students held their own protest marches on Universities in Bonn and Berlin in 1968. They demonstrated against the Vietnam War and the American involvement in it.[217] The German students especially emphasized the resemblance between the Nazi atrocities during the Second World War and the actions of Americans now.[218] Words such as "American genocide" were used, and a direct comparison to Auschwitz was made to define US' actions.[219] This time, Americans were othered by Europeans, instead of the other way around. They claimed that the US was only interested in world domination through imperialism and barbarism.[220] The image, integrity and credibility of the American soldier received a tremendous blow. Not only Armed Forces units in Vietnam had image issues, the soldiers in West Germany were also confronted with protesting Germans outside their bases, which forced them to think about the Armed Forces' involvement all over the world, and the justification for their part in foreign affairs.[221]

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[215] S.C. Tucker, ed. *Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social and Military History, 2nd edition* (Santa Barbara: ABC – CLIO, 2011), 55-56.

[216] B.T. Harrison, "Roots of the Anti-Vietnam War Movement," in *The Vietnam Antiwar Movement,* ed. W.L. Hixson (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 2000), 23-35.

[217] A. Markovits and L. Rensmann, "Anti-Americanism in Germany," in *Anti-Americanism: History, Causes, Themes, Vol. 3 – Comparative Perspectives,* ed. B. O'Connor (Oxford: Greenwood World Publishing, 2007), 171.

[218] Mausbach, "America's Vietnam in Germany – Germany in America's Vietnam," 45.

[219] Mausbach, "Auschwitz and Vietnam: West German Protest against America's War during the 1960s," in *America, the Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and International Perspectives,* ed. A.W. Daum, L.C. Gardner and W. Mausbach (Washington D.C.: German Historical Institute, 2003), 291.

[220] Mausbach, "Auschwitz and Vietnam, 296; T.S. Brown, "'1968' East and West: Divided Germany as a Case Study in Transnational History," *American Historical Review* 114, issue 1 (Feb 2009): 69-75.

[221] B. Greiner, *"Saigon, Nuremberg, and the West," Americanization and Anti-Americanization: The German Encounter with the American Culture after 1945,* ed. A. Stephan (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 53.

4.1.3 American Soldiers' Aimlessness

This criticism, directed at American soldiers in West Germany, added to the dip in morale and confidence they were already feeling. Many American soldiers had felt lost because of the lasting military inactivity in Germany during the late 1950s and beginning of the 1960s. No one knew if, and when, the threat of Eastern Europe would solidify into a battle. As a result, American soldiers in West Germany were caught in an awkward mix of perpetual readiness and doing nothing for months. Furthermore, whereas they had been portrayed as heroes of war by the DoD and were welcomed with open arms by the German citizens after the Second World War, they now were uncertain about their purpose and felt unappreciated.[222] They had lived in luxurious houses, with all-American products and facilities available to them, but even those familiarities were diminishing. This was not only because the military focal point of the Cold War had been relocated towards South-East Asia, but also because the DoD simply received considerably less funding from US citizens. This combination caused the DoD to be unwilling and/or unable to create and maintain the comforts of the Little Americas communities.[223]

Consequently the American soldiers stationed in West Germany were becoming a problem. They, for instance, increasingly started to use numbing substances to deal with their aimlessness. According to historian Petra Goedde and others, the situation was so severe that by the 1970s 34.000 American men and women in West Germany were unsuitable for active duty because of drug and alcohol abuse.[224] American soldiers felt neglected by their superiors and were less open to directions and guidance by the DoD than during the first decades of the Cold War.[225]

Nevertheless, attempts were made to provide a frame for national identity for their soldiers during this period, and give them satisfying justifications.

4.2 The Everlasting Soviet Threat

"I will never do anything for pleasure, profit or personal safety which will disgrace my uniform, my unit or my country."[226] Another part of the Soldier's Creed that endeavored to

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[222] Notaker, Scott-Smith and Snyder, *Reasserting America in the 1970s,* 3-17.

[223] Hawkins, 36; Lemza, 224.

[224] P. Goedde, "Military Romance: American Soldiers and Foreign War Brides in the Twentieth Century," *Diplomatic History* 36, issue 1 (Jan. 2012) : 209-212; Lemza, 142.

[225] Hawkins, 29.

[226] Secretary of the Army, 12.

keep the American soldiers in West Germany loyal and motivated to wear their uniforms with pride. It was important to the DoD to convince them of their necessity in West Germany. To investigate how the DoD approached the soldiers, what its message was and what kind of national identity elements were stimulated throughout these difficult 1960s, I will now analyze an AFN source made available to the soldiers.

4.2.1 AFN Broadcast – Berlin Wall Report, 1962

The broadcasting that we will analyze, is one dating from mid-1962 and it covers a documentary by reporter Daniel Schorr, who is visiting the Berlin Wall and East Germany. Schorr starts by telling the audience that AFN had tried for many weeks to convince the East German and Communist leaders to let them into the Eastern part of Germany to document this broadcast. Although Schorr was eventually allowed in, this detail already creates a feeling of hostility and secrecy around East Germany. Furthermore, the Berlin Wall is called the "Wall of Shame" throughout the broadcast by Schorr, and he calls the move of many East Germans to West Germany, before the Wall was erected, "escapes."[227] Both terms give a negative connotation to the Wall and adds to the alienation of East Germany and the Soviet Union.

Schorr, under Soviet supervision, first arrives at an East German school, where he can talk to students as well as the teacher. In the background, you can hear children singing in German. Schorr translates the message: "I carry a flag, and the color of the flag is red."[228] The red flag symbolizes the Socialist party and these children are taught to feel pride in being part of a Socialist state. The East German teacher himself explains that songs like these "implant the desired image" of Socialism.[229] Schorr sees this statement as proof that children are indeed indoctrinated in the East, as he already suspected.[230]

The teacher continues by saying to the children that they should go home to teach their parents what they have learned in school, for they are better educated than their parents; these children have learned the Socialist way of thinking. Schorr others the East Germans by explaining to the audience that they, for instance, are not allowed to listen to Western Radio. This, of course, is the exact opposite of the free West, where everybody can listen to whatever

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[227] D. Schorr, "Berlin Wall Report," *Armed Forces Network*, 1962. https://archive.org/details/1960-1969RadioNews/1962-xx-xx-CBS-Reports-Berlin-Wall-Daniel-Schorr.mp3 (accessed 06-08-2017).

[228] Schorr, "Berlin Wall Report," https://archive.org/details/1960-1969RadioNews/1962-xx-xx-CBS-Reports-Berlin-Wall-Daniel-Schorr.mp3, (accessed 06-08-2017).

[229] Ibid.

[230] Ibid.

they want without judgement. The teacher claims that East Germans have all the freedom they need, as long as their main perspective is the same as, and in service of, the Socialist state.

Schorr emphasizes the topic of discipline when the teacher admits that their society is easier to keep disciplined, because it depicts such a different attitude than what free Americans, and Western Europeans, are used to. The teacher says that especially students could be tricky before the Wall was erected. Now, the Wall keeps out all the bad and wrong Western influences, and East Germans can focus on helping each other and the community.[231] Although taking care of one another and helping your community are also characteristics of the American way of life, the purpose of these aspects in respective societies is very different.[232] By highlighting this negative element, and others, in Soviet society, Schorr pushes them further away from the 'normal' way of life in the US. It is meant to strengthen the unity between Americans, and widen the gap with the Communists at the same time. A typical us versus them tactic.

Schorr then turns to the children in the class and asks them about the future. All children claim full heartedly that the only way for Germany to ever be reunited peacefully, is through Socialism. They are convinced that the Americans will eventually give up their efforts to bring and defend democracy, and that Communism will prevail in the end. The proof of indoctrination provided throughout the documentary is used as othering material. By stressing and judging the intense indoctrination and manipulation of these innocent children, Schorr attributes to the US that such practices are not accepted. [233]

Schorr claims that the Soviet only forbids Western radio because it would inform the public too much about the practices in East Germany, such as nuclear weapon installations.[234] He accuses the Soviet Union of withholding information, the truth from their own people. Something that strikes him as unusual for a nation that claims to have its citizens' best interests at heart. Schorr enforces the claim presented in many sources in this period, that the US can be trusted. To me this emphasis on being trustworthy over and over in many sources, proves that the US was worried about their credibility.

By showing the audience how the Communists think and talk about the West, and how

[231] Ibid.

[232] "10 Core American Values," https://www.andrews.edu/~tidwell/bsad560/USValues.html (accessed 18-08-2017).

[233] Schorr, "Berlin Wall Report," https://archive.org/details/1960-1969RadioNews/1962-xx-xx-CBS-Reports-Berlin-Wall-Daniel-Schorr.mp3, (accessed 06-08-2017).

[234] Ibid.

they for instance propagandized against the US in combination with the mentioned lack of basic human rights, such as freedom of expression, and the fact that Schorr emphasizes on the 'imprisonment' of Eastern people behind the Wall of Shame, paints a very clear picture to the (Western) audience of what is right and wrong. It shows the differences between West and East without actually comparing them. By focusing on the things that are wrong in the Socialist state and its society, it indirectly assumes the opposite to be good, meaning the US.[235]

4.3 The USAREUR

The next part of this chapter will be dedicated to the United States Army Europe command which was, and still is, stationed in Germany. In Heidelberg, this on-the-ground command was in charge of overseeing and directing operations in Europe during the 1960s in the DoD's name. It is highly likely that the USAREUR had come up with reasons for the Armed Forces units to stay active in Europe. Not only did they have to convince the public at home in order to get the right finances and support, but they also had to keep morale high amongst the soldiers stationed in Europe. During the 1960s they recorded and broadcasted three *The Big Picture* films that were designed to give the audience a glimpse into the lives of American soldiers in West Germany.[236] Interesting for my research is to see how the DoD through these films responded to the changing environment mentioned before. How they tried to justify the soldiers' presence and how they reassured their soldiers.

4.3.1 The Big Picture – "The USAREUR Story Part 1" 1961

An American soldier is shown standing guard, in the dark, close to a barbed wire barrier: the border between free Germany and suppressed satellite states. The narrator explains that "This man, and others like him, are working for you too. And for themselves, since what they are guarding belongs equally to us all."[237] Freedom is what the soldiers are protecting in West Germany. The narrator recognizes that the situation in West Germany might not seem as threatening anymore as it had done in the 1950s, but he assures the audience that is just an

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[235] Ibid.

[236] D.A. Carter, *Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951-1962* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 2015), 180-182; 'General Information USAREUR,' https://www.usarmy germany.com/Sont.htm?https&&&www.usarmygermany.com/Units/HqUSAREUR/USAREUR _HqUSAREUR.htm (accessed 20-07-2018).

[237] Army Pictorial Center, "The USAREUR Story – part 1," *The Big Picture* series, 1961. https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=cDnoQoF0q0M (accessed 15-07-2018).

illusion. Because "behind barbed wired barriers is a captive country, a Soviet satellite;" it is nothing more than " a vast concentration camp."[238] The film claims that these fences were built to keep anyone from seeking a better life. With these remarks, the audience is reminded of the fact that the Soviet regime is not only a threat for the Free Western World, it already oppresses many innocent people. At the same time, the Western world is conveniently presented as the place where you can make a better life for yourself. The narrator calls the border between West Germany and Soviet lands, a border "where one way of life leaves off, and another begins."[239] Emphasizing the vastly different character of the two societies.

The enormous pressure of always being ready for action is highlighted in the next part of the film. Large groups of men are getting ready for training, doing border patrols and participating in mock battles. This state of readiness is very important for the American soldier in West Germany, according to the narrator, because the Soviets can strike at any time. If at any moment the Soviet Union suspects the US to be relaxing, they will overrun West Germany, and the Free World. The US held border in Germany is presented here as the last stand for the rest of Western society. These statements had two purposes, firstly to make sure the audience still feared the Soviet threat, but secondly, to reassure the American soldiers as well as the people back home, that the DoD was doing everything possible to be prepared. The narrator continues with saying that the US has the "fastest moving force of the twentieth century," and over 15000 men, tanks and helicopters are shown to the audience whilst triumphant music plays. The US Armed Forces have the best equipment, the newest weapons and the most modern training. The superior might of the US is clearly a phenomenon in which the producers and the DoD take pride.[240]

This need of the DoD to have the best and most high-tech weapons, did mean for the soldiers that different education and skill was needed than before. As is shown in the film, a certain intelligence and education became part of the requirements a soldier had to meet. That the US was modern and high-tech is also highlighted by the contrast that is made with Germany. Germany is presented as a picturesque, ancient and traditional nation, with a small-village feel, whereas the US is presented as bigger, better, modern, with state of the art weaponry, technologically advanced and industrious. Through these characterizations it is presented as obvious that the US should take the lead and take on the role of defender, as they

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[238] "The USAREUR Story – part 1," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cDnoQoF0q0M (accessed 15-07-2018).
[239] Ibid.
[240] Ibid.

are the most advanced and capable nation. This vision enforces the already existing divide of West Germany as being the defended and the US as the ultimate defender.[241]

According to General Burke, leader of the USAREUR, the American soldier was "proud that he is part of the greatest peacetime fighting forces ever assembled by our country, in number and fire power and weapons and equipment. And in might."[242] This is the general message of the film. US' might is the most advanced, it is one soldiers can be proud of, but at the same time: "A might that we hope we never have to use. Because, we of the United States are a lawful nation, a peace-loving nation."[243] General Burke ends his speech with a message for the Soviet enemy: "But let the enemy make no mistake, we are ready."[244]

4.3.2 The Big Picture - "The USAREUR Story part 2" 1961

"Man, the defender. On guard near the Iron Curtain, here to stand as a forceful symbol of Western determination."[245] This is how the second part of the USAREUR story begins. The American soldier is still depicted as the defender of the free world, but a slight change seems to have occurred. The narrator does not present the American soldier as the symbol of American determination, but of Western determination. Implying that the US no longer is the sole defender and safe keeper of Europe, but that there is a Western front of nations making a stand against Communist aggression.[246]

This is confirmed when the narrator tells of how the forces of several allied nations work and train together. He even speaks of the "Free World Team, defenders in Europe."[247] The American soldier is motivated by the narrator to have an open mind, to cooperate and to be a team player. He is urged to "speak their language," for better relations between the different nations.[248] For there should be a "climate of learning," which is quite a difference from the superior position the US portrayed in the past. The US, as is clear in this film, no longer wants to be a single player. It seems as though the US took a more humble position in

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[241] Ibid.

[242] Ibid.

[243] Ibid.

[244] Ibid.

[245] Army Pictorial Center, "The USAREUR Story – part 2," *The Big Picture* series, 1961. https://www.youtube .com/watch?v=rw7ntHytFgY (accessed 21-07-2018).

[246] "The USAREUR Story – part 2," https://www.youtube .com/watch?v=rw7ntHytFgY, (accessed 21-07-2018).

[247] Ibid.

[248] Ibid.

a team of saviors.[249] There was a need for "A spirit of Allied trust and cooperation: An Allied Unity."[250]

That the American soldier had to improvise whilst dealing with various cultures and on various terrains, was no problem whatsoever according to the narrator. The "American fighting men have traditionally matched courage with ingenuity, to win what seemed unwinnable battles."[251] With an open mind, they could teach allied guerilla troops how to fight barehanded, how to fire an enemy weapon and make a bomb out of ordinary household gear. But the producers still wanted the American soldiers to remember that they represented the US and its army. "The stature of an Army, is increased by the example of its leaders and its men. By its professionalism."[252] The same standards still stood, such as keeping their uniform and weapon clean as much as they could, and discipline in training, in order for the soldiers to act out their duty with pride.

Different than in the first part of this series, this part addresses the more psychological side of this war. The Cold War is called a "War of Binoculars," by the narrator because it never evolved into a physical battle, and many soldiers spend their time overseas looking through binoculars to see if they saw anything out of the ordinary at the border with the Soviet Union states.[253] Furthermore, the narrator recognizes that "this is also a contest for the minds of men, who are directly involved in a clash of ideologies."[254] He speaks of the psychological warfare specialists that were involved in training and the making of battle plans. The narrator even goes as far as to say that "in the hands of a psywar specialist, loudspeakers and microphones become virtual launching pads for one of the most effective missiles in use today: words."[255] Furthermore he states that "words and images, [are] men's artistic weapons in the delicate war of ideals and political structures."[256] Not only the DoD and strategy planners were thinking and training in psychological warfare, also the individual American soldier dealt with how to best influence friend and foe through psychology.

These psychological warfare skills were another type of skill that had become important for the American soldier and which had to be taught in school. Education therefore,

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[249] Ibid.
[250] Ibid.
[251] Ibid.
[252] Ibid.
[253] Ibid.
[254] Ibid.
[255] Ibid.
[256] Ibid.

was highly motivated. A good education was already praised in the American society of the 1960s, but now education also became important during the soldiers service. Knowledge was key according to the narrator of the film, and soldiers with the right education would learn better "discipline for performance of mission," and would really "earn the title: leaders of men in war and in peace."[257] With these statements the DoD made clear to their soldiers that they needed brains as much as muscle in their army.

Finally, in case the audience did not remember the active state of readiness they were in, and why they were in it, footage of the Berlin Wall is shown. The narrator says "This is the Wall. A barbed wire and concrete exclamation point, reminding us of just how precious freedom really is, and why it must be defended."[258] The Soviet threat was still there, the US army was still necessary in West Germany. Freedom was still in danger, only this time the US teamed up with other Western nations to be the defender of that freedom.

4.3.3 The Big Picture – "This is US EUCOM" 1967

In 1967 the Army Pictorial Center dedicated an episode of *The Big Picture* on the US Europe Command, which had similar tasks in Germany as the USAREUR in 1961.[259] It therefore, can provide us with a leap into the future, and it makes us able to see what had changed in six years.

The film starts with the narrator explaining about the need for American soldiers in Europe as part of the NATO formation. "Because the security of the Free Western World and the United States was plainly indivisible."[260] And although the NATO formation took place in 1949, its purpose was still as valid in 1967. The Soviet Union still formed a threat to the Western, capitalist nations. Therefore, the narrator claims, the allies have to come together to "build a shield against aggression, forging a sword of retaliation."[261] Right from the start, this particular film suggests that the main reason for the American soldiers to still be in West Germany is because they are part of the defense team of Europe. Just as the second part of the USAREUR story, being an ally to other nations with the goal of defending Western freedom

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[257] Ibid.

[258] Ibid.

[259] Army Pictorial Center, "This is US EUCOM," *The Big Picture* series, 1967. https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v=qEyeU_Utrqs (accessed 21-07-2018).

[260] "This is US EUCOM," https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v=qEyeU_Utrqs (accessed 21-07-2018).

[261] Ibid.

seems to be the justification for American soldiers to be in Europe.[262]

Furthermore, the audience saw a prosperous and rebuilt West Germany, still containing hints of the picturesque olden days architecture, but industrious and modern at other places. We see an overview of what West Germany looked like after years of US support and guidance. On the one hand praising the US and its efforts, on the other to contrast this modern, wealthy nation, with Soviet territory behind the Wall. The same sober, threatening music is played while the audience is shown rows upon rows of Soviet soldiers and their tanks as in earlier sources. Just as seen in the previous chapter, the contrast between dark and oppressive Soviet Union is made with a light, wealthy and prosperous Western country. Only in this example, the Western country is West Germany instead of the US, which suggests that West Germany had officially become the in-group.[263]

The narrator goes on to state that "US service men and their families are members of the European Community, making lasting friendships. They join in Holiday celebrations, and participate in community projects, enjoying every minute of it."[264] These statements again indicate a close relation between the US and its allies, and West Germany in particular. The US soldiers are as much of a part of the West German society as any German is. Attributes such as community member, family man and a good neighbor are again highlighted when it comes to what is important to an American soldier, just as it had been in the 1950s.[265]

But West Germany still needs major vigilance. Footage is shown from inside a watch center with radars and other high-tech equipment, where American soldiers study the skies above the satellite states. The narrator comments: "The fate of free Europe could be decided in a view seconds. Supersonic aircrafts could be across Europe in a matter of minutes."[266] This statement indicates the rapidness in which things could change for the whole world. If the American soldiers, and their allies, neglect their preparations, or are not standing on high alert, an actual war could break out within minutes. The narrator adds that "World peace could be shattered at any moment. Today or tomorrow, hopefully never. But should military aggression be launched against Western Europe, a poised power of a free Europe would respond."[267] This final statement sums up the message of the film: The defense of Western

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[262] Ibid.
[263] Ibid.
[264] Ibid.
[265] Ibid.
[266] Ibid.
[267] Ibid.

civilization and Western freedom is still highly necessary. We have to be there as defenders. The Soviet threat is still there, but together with our allies, through training and cooperation, a free Western World will be prepared to respond.

4.4 Conclusion

The image that the United States had obtained and presented to the world in the decades leading up to the 1960s, was one of a benevolent do-gooder and protector of the free world. However, mainly because of America's controversial (military) involvement in the Vietnam conflict, and the general unhappiness and disconnectedness felt amongst the generation born after the Second World War, this image was challenged. To relate that changing image to national identity building of American soldiers in West Germany, I posed the following question: *In the 1960s, when global attitudes towards the United States shifted, in what ways did the Department of Defense (still) try to influence national identity amongst their soldiers in West Germany?*

We learned that (especially) young people were questioning the sincerity of US's efforts and intentions in the world. Demonstrations were held in the US, as well as in Germany and other European nations. Germans came to US bases in West Germany and protest, which made these soldiers uneasy about their own purpose and validation. The most damaging criticisms uttered by Germans was a comparison between US practices in Vietnam and Nazi atrocities during the Second World War. During the 1960s, Americans faced othered by the Germans and Soviets, instead of the other way around.

The critique towards the DoD and its Armed Forces was widely covered in the news, and spread internationally. This did not only affect civilian populations, but also American soldiers stationed overseas. War journalism had become very popular and the techniques allowed news to be spread far, fast and easy. The DoD was losing their monopoly on news broadcasting to its soldiers in Germany. It is therefore, highly likely that the ideas and confidence of American soldiers in Germany was altered by the increasing outings of anti-Americanism. Especially since they already increasingly felt neglected and unsupported by the DoD. In addition, the increasing unhappiness on the home front with war efforts, led to a decrease in funding and therefore an increase of pauperization of American living conditions in West Germany. The most important factor that influenced the American soldiers' state of mind during the 1960s, however, was the lack of direction and an unclear future. The tension with the Soviet Union was never high enough to cause the Cold War to become a 'hot' one,

which made soldiers uncertain of their purpose in Germany.

Although newspapers and magazines issued by the DoD were still popular in the military, they had to adapt to the new media age and compete with graphic footage and photographs. By focusing on *Armed Forces Network (AFN)* and *The Big Picture* broadcastings, the US tried to reach their target audience through a less obvious top-down way. It was still propaganda and the DoD still guided the contents and the presentation of that contents carefully. Through a close source analyses we can come to several conclusions to how, in response to the criticism and with the purpose of convincing their soldiers of their justified presence in West Germany, the DoD still tried to construct a 'good' national identity and guide towards a desired image amongst their soldiers.

The first thing that stands out is the use of reversed othering. Whereas the DoD in the past had usually depicted the enemy in a bad light, and had focused on the bad characteristics of the Nazis and Soviets, they now increasingly focused on their own qualities. Because of all the criticism outed towards the US in general, it was not effective anymore to bash on the enemy to suggest good elements in their own society. Instead of an offensive use of othering, the US moved increasingly towards a defensive use of othering. Especially visible in the last *The Big Picture* episodes on the United States Europe Command and United States Army Europe, the DoD is pointing out and defending their good deeds and characteristics. More than in the previous decades, the DoD felt it had to convince their own people, and their neighbors in the free world, that their involvement in the world was justified, and that the US was still the most adequate leader of the free world.

Through these types of media, the US was able to hide their propaganda and many soldiers probably never realized that they were (still) being guided and influenced. The distinction between news and propaganda was less clear than before. News and entertainment was made more available to everybody who had access to a radio or TV, but it at the same time made it more difficult for the soldiers to recognize propaganda.

By focusing on their (righteous) role of leader of the free world and to emphasize the good heartedness of American people, the US tried to unite their citizens. But this decade also brought a new aspect which became important for the American soldier: Cooperation. The US started to motivate its soldiers to cooperate with Allied Forces. To teach them the American way of fighting, and learning their language and training in return. More importantly, that is how it was depicted to the outside world. No longer did the US pretend to be the sole defender of the Western World, it now was part of an Allied team of defenders.

This was one part of the justification for American soldiers' presence in West Germany. The other part was that the Soviet Union still embodied a grave danger for the liberty and other values the US stood for. The threat was real, American soldiers were still a necessity, because the Soviet Union would strike the moment the US would weaken its stance. Through the use of othering as well as reversed othering and unifying cultural traits, the DoD still made the divide between the Soviet Union on one side, and now the Western Allied defense team on the other.

The American soldier in the 1960s had to be educated, modern, courageous, a community man, a defender of freedom, and a team player with vigilance and skill. No longer did the American soldier have to be the ultimate weapon against evil, he could now be part of a team that protected the American values of freedom and democracy.

5. Conclusion

We started this master's thesis with a quote by John Lemza, claiming that the American soldier had to perform different roles in West Germany throughout the Cold War years. According to him, the American soldier went from conqueror to protector, and from partner to awkward guest. This quote inspired me to investigate how the American soldiers were shaped to be able to play those roles. Men from all walks of life and with different backgrounds, came together in an American Armed Forces during the Cold War. They had to train together, bond together and think alike in order for them to become the all-American soldiers the United States, and the world, needed them to be. Throughout my thesis I aimed to research how these American soldiers' national identity was influenced. I was especially interested in the messages, methods and means used in that process. Therefore, the central question posed in the thesis was: *How was national identity constructed and maintained amongst American soldiers stationed in West Germany? (1944-1970)*

To come to an answer I divided the thesis into three analytical chapters. In each I have researched how a significant geopolitical change had an impact on the way American soldiers' national identity were influenced.

In the first chapter (2. in Contents), I set out to see how the changing atmosphere in West Germany, from a hostile warzone to an occupation of a broken nation, impacted the way the American soldiers were approached, and what different behavior, attitude and self-image was required and desired from the American soldier. Not only did this chapter function as an analysis of a specific, and important, piece of American history, it also functioned as a framework with which I can compare the later periods. Furthermore, methods, means and messages were discovered here which proved to be recurring elements throughout the rest of my thesis.

We found that the American soldiers were confronted with a US Department of Defense (DoD) that expected heavy resistance and resentment from the Germans at Second World War's end. This expectation resulted in the strict fraternization ban, the Morgenthau Plan and general warnings to stay away the German public. In reality, however, the Americans were confronted with a mainly female population, more resembling victims of devastation than anything else. The American soldiers struggled with their roles as distant occupiers and conquerors. They grew restless, and in order for them to feel connected to each other, their homeland and the American way of life, they saw their families arrive and the

creation of Little Americas.

Popular means used by the DoD to reach and influence its soldiers in this period were books, magazines and motion pictures. The booklet *Pocket Guide to Germany* and the motion picture "Your Job in Germany" were part of the mandatory material provided to the soldier stationed in West-Germany. These were quite direct and obvious means to guide, train and influence the soldiers' behavior, attitudes and general ideas about their position and mission in West Germany. A bit more subtle were magazines such as *Weekly Information Bulletin,* which, although they also often contained official guidelines, came across more as leisure and entertainment material than training material.

In the material provided to the soldier and to achieve the generally desired attitude, the soldiers were confronted with methods such as othering, reversed othering and reminders of unifying cultural traits. Through othering the DoD tried to establish a distance between the Germans and the American soldiers by enhancing differences between them, and via the use of an 'us versus them' divide. Another method, which I did not expect to find next to classical othering, was reversed othering. The DoD highlighted and attributed positive characteristic of the American way of life and the American society, which implied negative characteristics in the German society and nature. This method still functioned as a divide, but instead of focusing on the outgroup, it emphasizes the characteristics of the in-group. A third method which was often used to make the American soldier feel extra American and provide the soldier with a solid link to the American way of life, was reminding the soldier of his American values, culture and history.

The general message throughout this period was to distrust Germans. To stay away from every German, especially women, because they could be Nazi spies, give you STDs or stab you in the back. The DoD portrayed the Germans as warmongers, Nazi supporters, inherently evil and fundamentally different from Americans. The American soldier was stimulated to feel superior to the Germans and strengthened by the idea that he *was* raised in a good society with democracy, freedom of press, freedom of speech and fair play. The soldier was to act as the conqueror and occupier of a defeated enemy, as well as stand guard to prevent anything from threatening a long lasting peace. When the DoD realized that Hard Peace was not feasible, American and German interaction became more accepted, and the message slightly changed. The American soldier was to become an ambassador of the American way of life and teach Germans about the benefits of a society such as the American one. The imagery and language used in this period, was usually a contrast between happy,

victorious and friendly scenery and tone to indicate the Americans or German trickery, and sober, dark, aggressive footage with an ominous tone and music to imply the German reality.

In the second chapter, the goal was to see how the shift in allies and enemies in the 1950s impacted the means, methods and message used to influence American soldiers' national identity. Because of the big change in who to trust and who not to trust as friend and foe, this period is especially interesting for a comparative analysis with the other two chapters.

The 1950s brought a lot of new tension to the American soldier in West Germany. The Soviet Union, which had been an ally in their fight against the Nazis, had become a threat to US plans and wishes for an democratic and unified Germany. The American soldier saw a change in attitude, with official policies such as the Marshall Plan for the Germans and experienced tensions running high when Soviets blocked the access roads to the US zone of Berlin. German and American relations grew stronger as West Germany proved to be a valuable ally against the Soviet Union. The DoD tried to ease the tensions caused by ever-perceived impending war, by motivating the soldier to enjoy all the typically American perks of the Little Americas and to indulge in the American consumerism thriving in these communities.

The main means of reaching the American soldiers in this period did not differ much from the previous chapter. Although in this period there was no clear mandatory guide book provided to the American soldier, the *Weekly Information Bulletin* was used to inform the soldiers on the US' position and mission in West Germany. Furthermore, motion pictures were increasingly used as means to propagate the DoD's view to the American soldiers. In this period the films "The Big Lie," and "The Challenge of Ideas" were used. Additionally, in this time of uncertainty, the Little Americas on its own proved to be a means of influencing and stimulating the American soldiers' ideas about himself and the US' mission in West Germany.

As methods we have seen that the use of othering was still popular in the material provided to the American soldiers. Throughout the 1950s reversed othering as a divider between the Soviet regime and the US became more frequently used, as was reminding the soldiers of their unifying cultural traits. To aid in a natural shift to a new enemy and mission, in this period a clever use of American history was utilized to justify US' attitude towards the Soviets, and to make American soldiers feel patriotically connected with each other and their homeland.

The message changed radically. The Soviet regime was now othered instead of, but in similar fashion to, the Germans in the previous decade. The Soviets were called totalitarian, warmongers, manipulators and oppressors of innocent people. And fundamentally different from Americans. The Germans, on the other hand, were to be seen and trained as allies to the American soldier and the American cause. Also, where the othering of the Germans had been directed at the population as a whole, now in hindsight the populace was portrayed as victims of their government. In the othering of the Soviets this was maintained, making the Communist Party the enemy of the West, as well as of its own citizens. The American soldier was to play the role of protector of the innocent and sole defender of the free democratic world. He was stimulated to be a family man, consumer and active community member. But most of all ready for when the evil, untrustworthy Soviet leaders would try to conquer the Western world. A similar use of imagery and language was used in this period, as was used for the Germans in the 1940s. Especially the aggressive nature of the Soviets was highlighted by showing the audiences rows upon rows of Soviet soldiers marching.

In the third and final analytical chapter I aimed to investigate how the changing image others had of the US, and of the US military, impacted the way the American soldiers were reached and how they were influenced. This chapter is especially interesting because in the previous periods, DoD's effectiveness was for a large part based on winning the hearts and minds of not only their own people, but also the locals. In the 1960s however, this became increasingly difficult, which makes for a good final comparative analysis of national identity building amongst the American soldiers in West Germany.

During the late 1950s and the 1960s, the American soldier found himself waiting and gearing up for a physical war that never came to West Germany. This awkward limbo between a state of readiness for the ever imminent war and not actually getting to that point, made many a soldier unsure of the future and uneasy with his purpose in West Germany. In combination with the increasingly dire US involvement in Vietnam, the more accessible media, American soldiers being othered by Germans and confronted with anti-American protests in the US and West Germany, it forced the DoD to justify the American soldiers' presence in West Germany.

Next to military magazines such as the *Army Information Digest,* broadcasts from the *Armed Forces Network* and books such as *The Soldier's Handbook,* the DoD increasingly used film and television as means to reach its soldiers in West Germany. The motion pictures belonging to the *The Big Picture* series were especially popular amongst the soldiers and their

dependents which made them effective means to bring across DoD's opinions. In this period the American soldier was provided with three different episodes of *The Big Picture* dedicated to the United States Army Europe, and their duties in West Germany.

As methods, the DoD still occasionally used othering in their material, but leaned much more heavily on the use of reversed othering as well as unifying cultural traits. Presumably because these paired up more easily with justification, which increasingly became a method on its own during this tumultuous period.

The message in the 1960s was to take the still imminent threat of the Soviet Union serious. The Soviet regime was still the focal point of the us versus them divide, considered to be untrustworthy, and out to destroy everything Americans stood for. Furthermore the soldier was stimulated to be an ally to Germans and other Western people, to interact, to learn, teach and be a team player. The soldier was motivated to feel equal to all his brothers in arms, and to view himself as one out of many to help stop the Soviet Union, instead of as the ultimate weapon. The imagery and language used in the sources discussed in this chapter were much more positive and happy than in previous chapters, which can be related to the fact that the DoD especially used reversed othering and unifying cultural traits and therefore mainly focused on the US and its society.

Now that we know what resulted from every chapter's investigation, we can make some cross - chapter conclusions. First of all I would like to comment on what stayed the same throughout the periods. Many of the same means proved useful to the DoD until the 1960s, when motion pictures and television dominated the way American soldiers were receiving their news. And although new instruction videos and books came and went, they, as a means, fulfilled roughly the same purpose. The three methods, othering, reversed othering and unifying cultural traits remained in use, although towards the 1960s, othering became less common in the material provided to the soldiers whereas the other two were used more. Striking remainders and similarities in message can also be found throughout the researched period. The characteristics of freedom and fair play loving, democratic protectors remained in use. In the 1960s the soldiers were still told that an American was true to his word, pointing out the same fairness and integrity that characterized him in the 1940s. More surprisingly, also many elements in the message of othering stayed the same, even though the other changed over the years. The other was consistently described as totalitarian, militarily aggressive, untrustworthy and constantly on the lookout for opportunities of foul play. The STD riddled German women would betray you in a moment of weakness, as was also said

about the Soviets two decades later.

Besides the many similarities, many things changed. Some overtly or even proudly, like new missions or the latest in high tech advances, some covertly like opinions on the German population. When it was no longer useful to see all Germans as evil it was more convenient to make it seem like you always knew they were just victims of their government. The greatest change in means was surely seen in the 1960s, when televisions became more of a household item, war reporters were common and the DoD lost its monopoly on information dispensing to its soldiers. Where in the 1940s it was a means to aid in the non-fraternization act, the 1950s saw a height in the Little Americas' importance as a means to affirm what it meant to be an American and in American national identity building. This development also meant a broadening of the audience, in the form of the dependents. Entertainment and community related news were added to the instructional papers of the earlier years. Also in methods this was a development; over the years it became harder to distinguish entertainment from instruction and othering from history. Combinations were used where the Soviets were not directly compared to Americans, but to the Nazis, for instance. Othering and affirming of cultural traits were increasingly paired up with justifications or reports with entertainment value. Also in the 1960s, the Americans were confronted with being othered by the Germans, instead of being the ones to other. In message we already touched on several changes, like the government's focus of later period othering and the use of history and justification to deal with the newly risen challenges. In addition to these, the American soldier was motivated to become more of a team player with his brothers in arms, as well as his allies from other countries. Furthermore, knowledge, words, psychological warfare and education had become part of the soldier's skill set.

What stood out in this research was the seemingly effortless transition from the other in othering. The same method, and even the same negative attributions were used to other the Soviets, without much question about why. It seems that although in - and outgroups are presented as vastly different and clear divined, it actually is fairly easy to interchange who is us and who is them. Another conclusion that we can make, is that Bamberg, De Fina and Schiffrin, were indeed right about that identity, and also national identity, is not a fixed concept. What was important in American soldiers' lives and behavior, and which elements were part of the desired American way of life changed over time. It adjusted to the changes in the world and the requirements of the DoD. A third and final observation that struck me in this research, was that justification in itself became a method for the DoD to influence

soldiers' state of mind and ideas about what the US stood for. For instance, the justification that the American soldier was needed in West Germany as part of the Allied Forces made that the soldier identified himself as a team player. The justification that the American soldier was needed as a defender of American values, became part of the general perception that the Americans were the leaders and guardians of the Free World.

It has become clear throughout this thesis that national identity building was an intrinsic part of the Cold War period. The DoD overtly set out to guide and shape the American soldier in West Germany. They influenced their mindset, their conduct, their self-image, motivations and justifications as Americans. National identity elements were highlighted throughout the different periods to suit what was needed from the soldier. This construction and maintaining of national identity not only affected the soldiers in West Germany, it arguably also affected the way American society holds its soldiers in high regard as veterans of war. Furthermore you could say that especially the justifications for American military presence in West Germany has shaped the American identity of today. The later justifications the DoD used for the soldiers' presence in Germany, namely that the US was the leader of the free people and protector of democratic values, are now often the elements of national identity that are most remembered and most praised.

This leaves me with stating my suggestions for further research. In this thesis I have tried to provide as complete a picture of national identity building amongst these American soldiers, but there is still much to explore and investigate, such as a study to see which national identity elements are still visible in the American society of today. It would also be exceedingly interesting to research the Russian side of the conflict and the national identity building of their soldiers, since we in the Western World often only learn history through a Western perspective. Another aligned research could investigate whether the methods and means found in this thesis are still used in national identity construction. Moreover a similar approach to mine, could be applied to a different nation or time. I hope, with this thesis, that I have provided a platform which will prove useful to other researchers in the future.

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