The Power and Futility of Resistance

An Examination of the *Hauka* Movement in its Colonial Context

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Figure 1. (Cover page) Jean Rouch, dir., still from *Les maîtres fous*, accessed on 29-11-2018, https://www.zintv.org/Autour-de-Jean-Rouch-Les-Maitres-fous.

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Hauka Movement: An Introduction

"The West" versus "the Rest." "The North" versus "the South." "Occident" versus "Orient." "Us" versus "them." Research on colonialism tends to follow these binary models based on aspects of inclusion to and exclusion from society.[1] This particular model stresses the exertion of power of the dominant parties upon the subordinates. With this focus, often the perception of the subaltern or the "Other" is left on the sidelines. Some scholars question whether the subalterns even have a voice within the dominant colonial discourse.[2] Others argue that there is room for resistance against the dominant colonial discourse, for example in the form of mimicry.[3] It is in these ambivalent tropes of discourse that interesting and subtle power relations are at play.

One such example of colonial resistance is the *Hauka* movement, a cult of spirit possession which originated in the Filingue region of Niger and is practised by multiple ethnicities amongst which the Hausa and Songhay/Zarma. These ethnic groups know a long history of animist religions which are characterised by the belief in supernatural powers, the conviction that material objects such as plants, places and creatures possess a spiritual essence. Within this religion spirit possession also plays an important role in which the animists recognise different families of spirits whom they consult in times of need. The Hauka are one such family of spirits that emerged during the colonial era of French and British rule of West Africa. The Hauka spirits first appeared during a ritual of spirit possession in 1925 in the French-ruled Colony of Niger (presently know that the Republic of Niger). With the migration of Hauka mediums—followers of the cult who have the ability to be possessed by the Hauka spirits—the movement spread through West Africa, gaining particular popularity in the British-ruled Gold Coast (presently known as Ghana), between 1935, when the

[1] Robert J.C. Young, "Foucault on Race and Colonialism," (1995), accessed on 26-11-2018, http://www.robertjcyoung.com/Foucault.pdf, 5.
[2] Gayatri *Chakravorty* Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," in *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*, eds. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (New York: Colombia University Press, 1988), 66–111.
[3] Homi K. Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse," *October* 28 (1984).

regulations surrounding the performance of rituals became less strict, and the late 1950's.[4] When Ghana became independent in 1957, the government enforced stricter rules on migration, which meant that many of the migrants from Niger, including those that were also Hauka mediums, returned to their home country, where the spirits were incorporated into the more traditional religions.

What is particular about the Hauka spirits, is that they portray colonial European figures, through the use of colonial clothing, attributes, military behaviour and stylised language. Some examples of the Hauka spirits are Captain Malia, King Zuzi (king judge), Corporal, General, Bombara Mossi (foot soldier) and Lokotoro (doctor). The spirits live in Malia, the Red Sea, and during spirit possession, which are rituals characterised by dance and music, they possess the participating Hauka mediums. During these almost theatrical rituals, the spirits ask for sacrifices, give advice to local peoples, act as healers, reconcile conflicts and interact with their audience in a horrific and violent, but also comical manner, by for example making crude jokes.[5] The Hauka movement challenges the neat dichotomy and separation of African and European. By mimicking European colonisers, the Hauka appropriate European power, criticising colonial power relations through a form of colonial resistance.

The Hauka movement emerged within a colonial context and developed over time, also influenced by the progress of decolonisation. The Hauka cult received different reactions at different times from different actors, mainly the colonial administrators and French and British citizens in the metropoles. The practice of Hauka rituals went through periods of banning—due to its violent nature and due to its open resistance to the colonial administrations—as well as periods of tolerance by the French and British colonial administration. The outreach of the movement to a Western public was especially widened with the appearance of the documentary *Les maîtres fous* (1955), made by Jean Rouch, a renowned French visual anthropologist and ethnographer. The film portrays an

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[4] Jean Rouch, "Migrations au Ghana," *Journal de la Societé de Africanistes* 26, no. 1-2 (1956), 177; Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories: Spirit Possession, Power and the Hauka in West Africa* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 127.
[5] Paul Stoller, "Horrific Comedy: Cultural Resistance and the Hauka Movement in Niger," *Ethos* 12, no. 2 (1984): 167.

ethnographic account of a Hauka ritual during a yearly festival and was highly revered for its innovation in the field of visual anthropology, as well as highly criticised for its racist portrayal of the African Other.[6] This controversy sparked debate in the academic world whilst simultaneously introducing the Hauka movement to the general public in France and Britain, opening up room for challenging the dominant colonial discourse. The fact that the Hauka movement travelled through different colonies in West Africa, dealing with different colonial administrations and different types of pressures and styles of ruling makes this movement a particularly interesting subject for this research which deals with colonial resistance and the ways in which resistance is received and perceived by the dominant parties.

Figure 2. Jean Rouch, dir., still from Les maîtres fous. "Hauka mediums during a spirit possession trance," accessed on 3-5-2019, http://meluzifer.blogspot.com/2010/11/les-maitres-fous-jean-rouch-1956.html.

[6] James Ferguson, "Of Mimicry and Membership: Africans and the "New World Society,"" *Cultural Anthropology* 17, no. 4 (2002): 557.

1.2. Research Question

The research in this master's thesis will concern the development of the Hauka movement as a form of colonial resistance and its actual effect on the dominant colonial discourse. Discourse is important because it tells us something about the underlying presumptions, social cognition and power relations present in society. It effects many different actors on different levels, and when it is challenged by a resistance, the different actors from both the colonised and the colonisers' perspectives may experience this challenge in different ways. I initially intended to expand on these perspectives of more actors than the usual dichotomy of the colonisers and the colonial subjects, however I soon ran into the problem that I was confined to the scope of research available within a Western university. Considering research on the Hauka movement, an obscure, little-known form of colonial resistance, the scope seemed to be very limited indeed. I decided to give up my goal of focussing on a range of actors seeing as I did not have the necessary or enough primary sources to do so. Instead, this research focusses on the actors that were most susceptible by the dominant colonial discourse in day to day life, namely the European citizens, both in the metropoles and in the colonies.

Furthermore, although resistance may have clear intentions of changing the status quo, it may not always have this intended outcome. In order to find out how the Hauka movement developed and what its actual effects were for the European citizens I will use the following research question: "How did the Hauka movement, as a form of resistance to colonialism, effect the colonial discourse between 1925 and the 1980's in the Colony/Republic of Niger and the Gold Coast/Ghana and their respective metropoles?" In my research and analysis of the colonial discourse I hope to reveal the complex relations in colonial society and the role of discourse herein.

The periodisation of this research question is based on the timeframe in which the Hauka movement was most prominent. The movement emerged in 1925, making this the starting point of my research. Although the Hauka movement lost its momentum and, in a sense, even its meaning when

decolonisation began, it did not completely die out, as it still remained a way of both remembering and embodying the colonial past and its suppression. It still existed roughly until the 1980's when it became more incorporated into the more traditional animist religions. The end point of my periodisation therefore coincides with the diminishing of the influence of the movement. It is important to note that this timespan includes both the colonial era as well as the postcolonial era. The areas in question are the Colony of Niger and the Republic of Niger, after gaining independence from France in 1960, and the Gold Coast and Ghana, after gaining independence from Great Britain in 1957, and their respective metropoles, seeing as the Hauka movement was most active here.

In order to answer the main research question I have to answer several sub questions—concerning the Hauka movement itself and the reaction of the French and British actors—namely: "How did the French and British colonies in West Africa differ from each other?"; "What was the colonial discourse in general and was there any difference between the colonial discourse in the French and the British cases?"; "In what ways can the Hauka movement be perceived as a form of colonial resistance?"; and "How did the French and British citizens perceive or react to the Hauka movement?"

I intend to engage in a postcolonial discussion concerning the problems of depicting the colonial Other. It is highly important to gain an understanding of the wider cultural, social and political context when dealing with (post)colonialism. Without a proper contextualisation of topics concerning colonial resistance, one runs the risk of enforcing the conventional dominant colonial discourse. This resonates with a point made by Jenny Sharpe, a literary scientist with a focus on postcolonial studies: 'In the absence of a critical awareness of colonialism's ideological effects, readings of counter-discourses can all too easily serve an institutional function of securing the dominant narratives.'[7] Therefore, it is important to remain aware of the difficulties surrounding postcolonial studies and to maintain a critical approach when dealing with these difficulties. In this light, it is important to realise that even

[7] Jenny Sharpe, "Figures of Colonial Resistance," *Modern Fiction Studies* 35, no. 1 (1989): 139.

discourse that supposes to be anti-colonial, is still necessarily situated within the dominant colonial discourse, as this is the only available framework.

1.3. Theoretical Concepts

Some important concepts for my thesis are ((anti-)colonial) discourse, Othering, mimicry and performativity. All of these concepts are pertinent for research concerning power relations and will help me uncover the subtle ways in which power and knowledge is expresses through language.[8]

Discourse can be defined as groupings of utterances or sentences that have meaning and are determined by as well as contribute to the social context and institutions.[9] In terms that are slightly more palpable and comprehensible, the literary scientist Pramod K. Nayar uses the following definition of colonial discourse:

> "Discourse" is here simply the conversations, representations and ideas about any topic, people or race. It is the context of speech, representation, knowledge and understanding. It determines what can be said and studied and the processes of doing so. It is, in short, the *context in which meaning itself is produced.*[10]

Therefore, discourse concerns the dominant ways of speaking about aspects of society, which can also be seen as a reflection of society itself. In this sense, language and social practices do not only produce meaning that reinforces specific social contexts, but that meaning must also be understood as a result of these specific social contexts, such as the colonial context.

In Foucauldian terms, discourse is a system of meaning and knowledge production, that are present in texts, which determines and is determined by power relations.[11] It is not necessarily the actors that play a prominent and active role in configuring discourse but it is important to realise that discourse affects the actors' language and their conformation to the dominant discourse. Accordingly, Young argues: 'According to Foucault, discourse always involves a form of violence in the way it imposes its linguistic order on the world: knowledge has to conform to its paradigms in order to be recognised as

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[8] As initially proposed by Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (New York: Pantheon, 1980).
[9] Sara Mills, "Introduction", in: *Discourse*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 10-11.
[10] Pramod K. Nayar, *Colonial Voices: The Discourses of Empire* (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 2.
[11] Stuart Hall, "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power," in *Race and Racialization: Essential Readings, Second Edition*, eds. Tania Das Gupta, Carl E. James, Chris Andersen, Grace-Edward Galabuzi and Roger C. A. Maaka (Toronto and Vancouver: Canadian Scholars, 2018), 89.

legitimate.'[12] This does not necessarily mean that no anti-discourse or form of resistance can exist. Discourse consists of a series of discontinuous segments that do not necessarily have fixed functions.[13] The anti-discourse therefore exists within the discourse. In this particular research about colonial resistance, I will analyse the relation between the colonial discourse and the anti-colonial discourse as discontinuous segments in which I will reveal the complexity of the power relations at play.

One of the most important concepts inherent to colonial discourse is that of Othering. In Edward Said's work on orientalism, he criticises representations of the East or Orient, which are made by the West or Occident. He argues that the creation of orientalism was an ideological strategy of the West to account for the difference and sense of Otherness they encountered in the East.[14] The ideology is based on the dichotomy between West and East and Self and Other. The one is therefore dependent on the other. Within the colonial context in West Africa, the Other was the African who was characterised by the colonisers as savage, backwards and uncivilised; thus different from the European "Self," who was modern, progressive and civilised. The entire colonial enterprise was legitimised by this dichotomy and the idea that the European had to lead and support the African. If this dichotomy would be brought under question and resisted, the entire social framework supporting colonialism would fall apart.

A manner in which the dichotomy can bridged is through the act of mimicry. One of the most prominent academics concerned with the subject of mimicry is Homi K. Bhabha. He coined the term in his essay "Of Mimicry and Man" in 1984. Bhabha argues that mimicry is a strategy of colonial power and knowledge in which:

> Colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognisable Other, as *a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite.* Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an *ambivalence*; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference.[15]

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[12] Young, "Foucault on Race and Colonialism," 2.
[13] Ibidem, 4.
[14] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
[15] Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man," 126.

Mimicry is therefore a strategic act of imitating of the colonisers, performed by the colonised subjects as a means of gaining power and a higher status in colonial society. In this sense, when the colonised mimic the colonisers, showing that they have mastered the civilised manners of the Europeans, colonialism loses its superior legitimacy. Therefore, it is important for the colonisers that difference is still maintained within the act of mimicry, despite its production of similarities.

Bhabha bases much of his theory on cornerstone works by Said and Frantz Fanon. Fanon is renowned for his work on colonisation and decolonisation as well as his analysis on the psyche of oppressed black people. In his book *Black Skin, White Masks* he discusses the psychological workings of black people who originate from the colonies and live in the colonial metropole. He argues that they perform whiteness in order to navigate through a world in which black people are oppressed and white people have all the power.[16] This form of oppression is mainly done through the use of language. This argumentation forms the basis of Bhabha's concept of mimicry, in which the oppressed imitate behavioural and cultural traits, such as language, in order to gain a sense of power. Bhabha argues that mimicry differs from the process described by Fanon however, in that it doesn't conceal an essentialist identity of the subaltern behind its mask.[17]

This lack of essentialist identity resonates with a point made by Judith Butler. In her ground-breaking feminist work, Butler argues that gender is not something that is essential or natural to one's identity. Instead, gender is something that is performed through repetitive action.[18] Performativity is continually influenced by political, cultural and social contexts.[19] Similarly to discourse, the performances are influenced by as well as maintain the power structures at play through the 'reiterative power of discourse to produce the

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[16] Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2008 [1952])
[17] Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man," 129.
[18] Judith Butler, *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"* (London: Routledge, 1993); Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York and London: Routledge, 1999).
[19] Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 6.

phenomena that it regulates and constrains.'[20] Although Butler specifically uses the concept of performativity in her discussion on gender, this concept can also be applied to other notions of identity, particularly concerning notions of the Self and Other in the colonial context. The important point here is that gender and Othering are social constructions and not essentialist characteristics.

Imitation, or mimicry, in the colonial context can be seen as an embodiment of performativity. Instead of conforming to the typical dichotomic constraints and regulations of performances of coloniser and colonised, however, mimicry bridges this binary framework. It is important to note here that mimicry—used in this way as a strategic tool to obtain power—does *not* criticise the dichotomy of the colonial structure. When mimicking, one respects the subjects that are being mimicked and therefore conforms to normalised framework of power structures. When the colonised subjects mimic the powerful colonisers and bridge the dichotomy in order to obtain power, they recognise that they have less power than the colonisers and thus conform to this binary structure. Through the act of mimicry, as described by Bhabha, the colonised subjects manipulate the power structures to their advantage and thus resist their subordinate positions; yet do not in fact criticise these normalised power structures.

This binary framework and normalised power structures can, however, be challenged if the mimicry becomes a more layered form of mockery or parody, which is what we see in the case of the Hauka movement. Graham Huggan, an academic who specialises in postcolonial literature, argues that it is important to be aware of the difference between mimesis and mimicry, as some authors use these two terms interchangeably. Huggan defines mimicry as a form of mischievous imitation whereas mimesis is a form of symbolic representation.[21] Mockery lies somewhere in between these two forms and can serve as a means of challenging the dominance of the colonial discourse it finds itself in as well as the dichotomy itself. As stated by Butler: 'parodic proliferation deprives hegemonic culture and its critics of the claim to naturalised or

[20] Butler, *Bodies that Matter*, 2.
[21] Graham Huggan, "(Post)Colonialism, Anthropology, and the Magic of Mimesis," *Cultural Critique*, no. 38 (1997): 94.

essentialist gender identities.'[22] Although Butler discusses parody within the topic of gender, her statements can also be applied to the topic of colonial discourse. The parodic act urges for a recontextualization of the naturalised hegemonic status of the dominant parties.

In relation to my research on the Hauka movement, mimicry as well as mockery/parody are important tools for explaining how the movement serves as a form of resistance to colonialism. They also serve as important tools in outlying how the colonial discourse benefitted from Othering and how the power relations at play could be put off balance through mimicry. A deeper look at the colonial discourse and the anti-discourse will reveal the actual effect of the Hauka movement as well as shed light on how the discourse took shape for all of the actors involved. The concepts of discourse, Othering, mimicry and performativity therefore form the basis of the background to my research. Furthermore, they are highly intertwined and the relationship between them deserves much scrutiny, which this study can provide.

[22] Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 176.

1.4. Literature Overview

1.4.1. Introduction

The Hauka movement has attracted attention from a variety of different disciplines and has been a subject of debate in a broad scope of topics. The movement has mainly been discussed amongst anthropologists—ethnographers and visual anthropologists alike—and historians. Academic works concerning mimicry, spirit possession, colonial resistance and embodied memory are some of the topics that have drawn from research on the Hauka movement.

In this literature overview I will discuss these topics and put them into a broader historical framework concerning developments of trends of academic work concerning the Hauka movement. Before I delve deeper into these aspects, I would like to take a moment to discuss the more general background on the academic debate surrounding colonial rule in West Africa. This section will only deal with the academic debate whereas I will go into more detail about the colonial styles of the Third Republic and the British Empire specifically in Niger and the Gold Coast, as these are the specific colonies that are of importance in relation to my thesis on the Hauka movement, as well as discussions concerning modern imperialism and the "Scramble for Africa" in chapter 2. I will conclude this section with some remarks about the situation of my own work within this debate and formulate a hypothesis considering my own research.

1.4.2. Literature Overview: French and British Colonial Rule in Africa

The entire continent went through some dramatic changes at the end of the nineteenth century. During the Scramble for Africa, which started in 1881, African colonies were carved out. In the following decades European powers consolidated their power by establishing political administrative systems in their colonies. Each colonial power formed its own imperial policies and styles of ruling. Not only did the European empires differ from one another, so did the vast area of colonised African territory and the peoples and empires that were settled there. In this regard, many different approaches of colonisation and styles of colonial rule needed to be established.

In general terms, a distinction is usually made between indirect or informal rule, whereby the colonisers rule using traditional means and institutions, and direct or formal rule, whereby the colonisers impose their own policies and institutions. Considering the French and the British:

> The British espoused a philosophy of indirect rule, working through indigenous rulers and preserving traditional institutions. Conversely, the French adhered to a philosophy of direct rule, abolishing indigenous and imposing French beliefs and practices outright.[23]

This distinction in ruling styles is often used in the literature about the French and British colonial styles. However, this distinction has been used in different ways over the decades.

Kathryn Firmin-Sellers, a political scientist, identifies three different types of approaches considering colonialism, namely contrast, similarity and institutional. The contrast school of colonialism, which argues that the French and British types of colonialism were fundamentally different, emphasizes the differences mentioned above. Conversely, she states that most contemporary scholars are advocates of the similarities school of philosophy in colonial governing. These scholars disavow the inherent differences between French and British colonial rule, arguing that all colonial administrators had the same task of ruling the colonies on the authority of the metropoles and that they did this in the same manner, namely with the help of indigenous allies.[24] A third approach, which is advocated by Firmin-Sellers, is the new institutional theory. This theory criticises the contrast and similarities approach for being too Eurocentric and instead analyses how European and African institutions interacted with each other, acknowledging the differences in each context and considering the institutions available.[25]

Although I think that institutions do play an important role in revealing the differences between the two colonial powers, I disagree that most scholars argue that the two powers were in fact similar and contend for the contrast

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[23] Kathryn Firmin-Sellers, "Institutions, Context, and Outcomes: Explaining French and British Rule in West Africa," *Comparative Politics* 32, no. 3 (2000), 254.
[24] Ibidem, 254.
[25] Ibidem, 254, 268-269.

school instead. As the historian Michael Crowder argues, although both styles of ruling did make use of chiefs—or the indigenous allies mentioned by Firmin-Sellers—there were in fact fundamental differences between the two, based on different styles of political structures and colonial ruling.[26] I will discuss these differences in greater detail in chapter 2.

1.4.3. Literature Overview: Spirit Possession

Spirit possession and witchcraft in Africa has been a much-researched topic, especially by anthropologists, throughout history. The debate surrounding spirit possession can be divided into two different focuses, with the shift taking place roughly in the 1980's.[27]

Earlier academic works usually focus on explanatory factors dealing with the cause and function of spirit possession.[28] Hereby, explanations of spirit possession are key, however these explanations tend to remain within their own sociological context, whilst ignoring wider contexts and their multicity in meaning concerning history, society and culture. Janet McIntosh argues that such explanations of function and cause of spirit possession tend to conform to 'master narratives' based on therapeutic resolution, psychotic disturbance or rectification of social injustices.[29]

In opposition to this type of approach concerning spirit possession, more recent scholarly works focus on meaning, symbolism and contextualisation of the rituals.[30] This shift in focus accounts for a better understanding of the complexity of spirit possession, acknowledging that the meaning and symbolism of spirit possession is different depending on its historical, social, cultural and political context. The focus here lies on the meaning and interpretation of spirit possession within a 'coherent symbolic system.'[31] Bearing this in mind, I now

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[26] Michael Crowder, "Indirect Rule: French and British Style," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 34, no. 3 (1964), 197.
[27] Janet McIntosh, "Reluctant Muslims: Embodied Hegemony and Moral Resistance in a Giriama Spirit Possession Complex," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 10, no. 1 (2004): 91.
[28] Michael Lambek, *Human Spirits: A Cultural Account of Trance in Mayotte* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981): 5; McIntosh, "Reluctant Muslims," 91.
[29] McIntosh, "Reluctant Muslims," 91.
[30] Lambek, *Human Spirits*, 4; McIntosh, "Reluctant Muslims," 91.
[31] Lambek, *Human Spirits*, 5.

turn my attention to the specific academic debate surrounding the Hauka movement.

1.4.4. Literature Overview: The Hauka Movement

Although research on the Hauka movement remains somewhat in a specific niche within spirit possession, the research that has been done has touched on a wide range of academic fields. Especially during the last four decades of the twentieth century, the Hauka movement was interpreted in a number of different ways and was situated in a wide variety of themes and debates. Although my research question concerns the period between 1925 and the 1980's, I will include academic debate of the Hauka movement until the turn of the millennium in order to give the reader a complete picture of the evolution of the literature surrounding the Hauka movement.

I have identified two moments in which the debate shifted, thereby forming three main periods of debate which are characterised by specific types of argumentation, namely histrionic, contextual and critical. In the 1950's and early 1960's the Hauka movement first became a topic of academic debate based on its histrionics, meaning theatrics or dramatical style, in its spirit possession rituals. The academic research situated within this debate was primarily descriptive and did not offer much explanatory value. From the mid-sixties and 1970's onwards, the debate shifted for a first time, and more attention was paid to the socio-political context surrounding the emergence of the movement, also contributing to the previously lacking perspectives on the functionalism and structuralism of the movement. The focus on the cultural context became an important addition to the debate about the Hauka movement from the 1980's through to the 1990's, although I still consider this to remain part of the second era of debate due to the focus on context. This shift in focus on context coincides with the shift in research on spirit possession mentioned above. It was in this period that scholars drew attention to symbolics of resistance, paid more thought to the meaning and cultural contextualisation of the movement as well as the colonial discourse it situated itself in. Finally, in the 2000's, the debate shifted a second time to a more critical debate considering the place of the Hauka

movement in postcolonial studies. I will now discuss all three of these periods of literary debate in more detail along with the most relevant academics.

Around 1960, scholarly debate about the Hauka movement began in which most attention was paid to the histrionics or theatrics of the rituals of spirit possession. This debate was prompted after the release of the film *Les maîtres fous* in 1955, which also made the Hauka movement known to a wider European audience. As mentioned before, this film was made by Jean Rouch, who was one of the first academics to show an interest in Hauka rituals. 'As early as the 1940s, Rouch was using filmmaking as a means to promote cross-cultural dialogue and to rethink the relationship between "the west" and "the rest."[32] In this sense, Rouch was also one of the first visual anthropologists who engaged in postcolonial critique by attempting to create a better understanding of subaltern practices in Africa.

As an extension of the film about the Hauka movement, Rouch also wrote much about the topic in several anthropological and historical studies.[33] In an ethnographic account of the Songhay and their religions and magic, including the the Hauka spirits, Rouch describes their rituals, practices and history.[34] These studies remain more descriptive however, and were criticised for their lack of analysis.[35] Although his book is not particularly theoretical, it does offer valuable insights into the practices and background of the Hauka movement. Furthermore, Rouch contributes a large array of accounts from informants which he translated into French.

This critique on the focus on description shifted the focus of the scholarly debate towards a more explanatory one with an emphasis on context. From the mid-sixties to the 1970's many French anthropologists and historians, specialised in West African studies, started to pay more attention to the Hauka movement. Finn

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[32] Jamie Berthe, "About maitres-fous.net an ongoing project…," Maitres-fous.net, last modified August 2009, http://www.maitres-fous.net/about.html.
[33] See Rouch, "Migrations au Ghana"; Jean Rouch, *La Religion et la Magie Songhay* (Paris: Presse Universitaires de France, 1960).
[34] Rouch, *La Religion et la Magie Songhay*.
[35] Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 120.

Fuglestad was one such historian. In 1975 he published an academic paper that analysed the socio-political context considering the emergence of the Hauka movement, which he considers to be a political and religious manifestation.[36] He offers a historical account of the genesis and evolution of the Hauka cult whilst at the same time comparing it to other (more modern) animist cults. He argues that the Hauka was invented in what was a stable society as a defence mechanism against the crisis that colonisation brought to that society.[37]

From the 1980's and 1990's onwards, this functionalist focus on contextualisation elaborated to include not only social and political aspects, but also cultural ones. This shift in debate coincided with the previously mentioned shift in the debate surrounding spirit possession, from an explanatory focus to a focus on meaning and symbolism, inherent to more cultural aspects of research.

Fuglestad expands on the thoughts in his previous essay in his book *A History of Niger: 1850-1960,* in which he discusses the Hauka phenomenon as a complex cultural event in relation to changes in the political and social spheres of colonial society.[38] One of the main strengths in this work is Fuglestad's use of a wide number of historical primary sources, adding to the legitimacy of his work. Although this work is highly valuable in its grasping of the political, social and cultural background in order to explain the emergence of the Hauka movement, scholars argued that it is still underdeveloped as it lacks a focus on the colonial discourse and the Hauka movement as a form of anti-colonial discourse or a discourse of resistance.[39] This is a particular gap in the scholarly literature that I intend to fill to a certain extent.

Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan was one of the main anthropological academics who discussed this debate on discourse in more depth. Also regarding the Hauka movement as a political and religious phenomenon, he argues that its emergence was brought on by *la rupture coloniale.*[40] This means that the colonial system disrupted African discourse, interfering with its systems of meanings

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[36] Finn Fuglestad, "Les *Hauka*: Une Interprétation Historique," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 15, no. 58 (1975).
[37] Ibidem, 216.
[38] Finn Fuglestad, *A History of Niger: 1850-1960* (Cambridge: Cambrigde University Press, 1983), 129-131.
[39] Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 120.
[40] Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, *Sociétés Sonay-Zarma* (Paris: Nubia, 1984), 276-277.

found in language and practices. This rupture, created by the dominant colonial discourse, shaped the perfect context for the emergence of the Hauka movement as a counter-hegemonic discourse.

These social, political, religious and cultural explanatory aspects, which added more depth to the academic debate about the Hauka movement throughout the 1980's, paved the way for the debate to take a different course in which more attention was paid to specific symbolism of resistance. Here, it is important to consider the emergence of the concept of mimicry and its influence on the debate about the Hauka movement.

Over the course of time mimicry has been interpreted and used in different ways. Many other authors have also used this theory and made it their own in some way or another. It is also important to keep in mind that there is a different type of use between the mimicry as described by Bhabha and the mimicry that is done by the Hauka. Bhabha's mimicry is a strategy that can be used by the colonised to incorporate themselves into and navigate through daily life whilst gaining a sense of control over knowledge and power. The followers of the Hauka cult use mimicry with a combination of mockery. They don't use it as a strategy for navigating daily life but as a strategy of resistance of the colonial powers. This use of the concept of mimicry has different connotations, an issue that calls for further research. In particular, Huggan is critical of the interchangeable use of the terms mimicry and mimesis. He argues that these terms have different cultural functions.

> In mimicry, the dominant function is that of mischievous *imitation*—the kind of imitation that pays an ironic homage to its object. Mimesis (although its function has always been disputed) usually refers to a wider process of *representation* that involves the mediation between different worlds and people—in essence, between different symbolic systems.[41]

Bearing this in mind, it would be important to take a critical look at the works on the Hauka movement and how they incorporate the concept of mimicry in each case.

In his book *Mimesis and Alterity,* Michael Taussig demonstrates how mimesis, the application of imitation, and alterity, the dual distinction between

[41] Huggan, "(Post)Colonialism, Anthropology, and the Magic of Mimesis," 94.

Self and Other, are intrinsically intertwined.[42] In this ethnographic account he researches the Cuna, a Native American tribe, and their practice of making figurines that represent colonial figures and have medicinal healing powers. Taussig opens a discussion about how mimetic faculty functions in society, rethinking the links between mimicry, savagery and civilisation. Although Taussig has been criticised for his repetitive, poetic and overly complicated style of writing,[43] his theoretical framework about mimesis is extremely valuable, especially in a colonial setting. This theoretical framework can also be applied to the case of the Hauka cult. Like the Cuna, the Hauka movement mimics colonial figures, drawing a sense of power from this mimesis.

These more theoretical works on mimicry and mimesis by Bhabha and Taussig influenced further debates on the Hauka movement. One of the scholars who draws on ideas from Taussig and applies it to the case of the Hauka specifically is Paul Stoller. Stoller is a French anthropologist who focuses on colonial memory in Africa and its embodiment. In earlier works, he focuses less on the Hauka rituals as a form of embodied memory but more on the rituals as a form of cultural resistance. In his essay "Horrific Comedy: Cultural Resistance and the Hauka Movement in Niger," Stoller argues that the Hauka mediums use their movement as a tool through which the colonial subjects culturally resist the influence of the powerful foreigners, the French colonisers.[44] In this sense, the Hauka followers use symbolism in order to protect their cultural identity by retaining a link to their ancestors[45].

In later works, Stoller focuses on another aspect of symbolism of resistance, namely the embodiment of colonial memory. He criticises Oliver de Sardan and other authors for neglecting the sensual aspect of *Hauka* rituals.[46] In his book, *Embodying Colonial Memories,* he describes his ethnographic study of the Hauka movement in West Africa.[47] His study uses methods of narrative description, historical analysis and social theories on embodiment and mimesis

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[42] Michael Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses* (London: Routledge, 1993).
[43] Huggan, "(Post)Colonialism, Anthropology, and the Magic of Mimesis," 94.
[44] Stoller, "Horrific Comedy," 168.
[45] Ibidem, 167.
[46] Paul Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories,* 123.
[47] Ibidem, 123.

in order to engage in a debate about politics of power and the embodiment of memories. He argues that in the Hauka cult, the followers perform and embody colonial memories through possession rituals and the use of mimicry and mockery as a means of appropriating their experience and reacquiring a form of political power. These anthropological works by Stoller focus on different aspects of the Hauka cult, offering a broad understanding of the movement and its historic background. However, Stoller fails to account for his own position as a white anthropologist in his studies. He describes many narrative accounts of ritual performances in which he is also spoken to the Hauka spirits and mediums. This interaction would obviously have a different meaning had the anthropologist never been there in the first place. Furthermore, unlike Fuglestad, Stoller uses few primary sources, basing his work mainly on other anthropological and historical accounts. His argument on the embodiment of colonial memory therefore lacks empirical sustenance.

The final shift in the debate concerning the topic of the Hauka movement was the shift in focus towards more critical train of thought based on postcolonial thinking. Postcolonialism, spurred on by academics such as Edward Said, Homi K. Bhabha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. These scholars advocated for a critical revision of colonial studies, focussing on its harmful side rather than its "mission in civilisation."

Considering the Hauka movement, this shift in critical debate took place around the year 2000. The scholars situated within this debate often criticise anthropological, ethnographic and historic studies and instead try to place the theory of mimesis and the Hauka in a broader social and (post)colonial context. Their criticism stems from the idea that these types of social studies merely reproduce the dominant discourse without challenging it. These scholars attempt to offer a wider picture to the scholarly debate.

Sharpe specifically deals with the place of resistance within colonial discourse theory. She argues that debates considering these forms of resistance are mainly situated within Western forms of knowledge, making it problematic

for them to provide any actual form of anti-colonial discourse.[48] In pointing out the issues with colonial discourse and its domination, scholars may therefore be simply adding to its hegemonic dominance.

The anthropologist James Ferguson argues that mimesis can happen in many ways and has many forms and effects, which lead to difficulties of misreading these types of practices. Instead he argues that mimesis could be better understood in the politics of membership in the "world society."[49] He argues that in a more globalised world whereby the whole world is becoming more interconnected and "moving forward", Africans became more aware of this "first-class world" as well as becoming aware of their position as a continent characterised by political violence and economic decline. As a result, they felt more and more disconnected from the rest of the world. Ferguson describes this sentiment with the term 'abjection.'[50] Considering the Hauka, and specifically the reception of the film *Les maîtres fous,* Ferguson argues that the film and the depiction of the cult obscures 'the continuing claims of Africans and others to full membership rights in a world society.'[51] It is for this reason that African students found the film to be extremely racist.

1.4.5. Situation of own Research Within the Debate

The debate concerning the Hauka movement is broad and complex. My own research will offer a holistic and multi-disciplinary, yet critical view, falling along the same lines as the most recent debate considering the postcolonial aspects of the Hauka movement. Although scholars such as Ferguson and Huggan do address the question of what impact these critical theories of the last period have in a wider context, this aspect deserves greater attention as well as a revision of how the impact of postcolonial critique changed over time. Herein my focus will lie on the analysis of texts dealing with the movement and their relations to the context. The importance of this type of analysis is highlighted by historian Karin Willemse: 'Analysing a text relative to the context is a way to

[48] Sharpe, "Figure of Colonial Resistance," 137.
[49] Ferguson, "Of Mimicry and Membership," 557-558.
[50] Ibidem, 559.
[51] Ibidem, 559.

understand the complex ways in which people deal with power relations and related subject positions in diverse social settings.'[52]

Considering my research, it is important to keep in mind that the Hauka movement developed in different colonial contexts, namely those of the British and the French. It will be particularly interesting to compare these two contexts and analyse whether the difference colonial contexts had any particular influence on the different texts and according discourses as well as how the Hauka movement may have influenced these in different ways. Hence, as well as using critical arguments from the third period of debate, the research in my thesis will also largely draw from literature from the second period of debate focussed on context in order to lay out the ground work for the colonial discourse.

1.4.6. Hypothesis

Returning to my main research question, being: "How did the Hauka movement, as a form of resistance to colonialism, effect the colonial discourse between 1925 and the 1980's in the Colony/Republic of Niger and the Gold Coast/Ghana and their respective metropoles?" I will now formulate a preliminary hypothesis based on the literature overview.

Colonial discourse was not static and did change overtime. However, in general terms it is possible to name a singular European colonial discourse that was widespread throughout the colonies and the metropoles. I believe that a closer look at the different colonies will reveal subtle differences in colonial discourse amongst them. These differences are the result of different styles of ruling, behind direct or indirect types of colonial rule, which are based on different ideas of power relations between actors, revealing different social cognitions in the French and British case.

Resting on the pretence that the colonial discourse differs somewhat between Niger and the Gold Coast, I expect that the Hauka movement, as a form of resistance to colonialism would stir up different reactions and incite different changes to the specific colonial discourse at hand.

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[52] Karin Willemse, *One Foot in Heaven: Narratives on Gender and Islam in Darfur, West-Sudan* (Leiden: Brill, 2007): 29.

1.5. Innovative Aspects

Although the Hauka movement as a topic of debate in academic research has died down since the 2000's, the subject still holds much relevance when it comes to discussions about (post)colonial discourse and power relations within the colonial system. The Hauka movement has been examined as a form of embodied colonial memory, of mimicry and of resistance in some literature. However, a holistic discussion on the movement is still lacking. In my thesis I will to add to this debate by offering an in-depth contextual and multi-disciplinary analysis. Furthermore, what is particularly innovative about the research in this thesis are the implications the Hauka movement had on the dominant discourse, and thus the link between the practical aspects and the analytic context.

Specifically, I believe a research of a critical discourse analysis—something that has never been done on literature concerning the Hauka movement—may offer valuable innovative insights, providing a deeper analysis of the colonial discourse than is presently available in academic work. Few academics have researched the actual effect of the Hauka movement as an anti-colonial discourse. This research therefore provides valuable additions to the debate in regard to the practical implications of resistance to colonialism on the colonial discourse. The difficulty lies in the fact that it is almost impossible to get an understanding of the native's point of view due to the lack of sources in this matter. It is for this reason that I will research how the dominant colonial discourse was affected through more contact with the anti-colonial discourse of the Hauka movement. I will do so by comparing the different perspectives of the French and British actors in this regard.

In relation to the contribution to postcolonial studies, Nayar describes colonial discourse studies as 'a scrutiny of the history of European ideas that pays attention to social forces, institutional mechanisms and power structures that influence thought, ideas and knowledge formation.'[53] With a focus on these aspects, research about the Hauka movement as a form of colonial resistance within the colonial discourse may offer some valuable insights to the debate

[53] Nayar, *Colonial Voices,* 4.

concerning agency of subalterns and whether they have a voice or not. By using a concrete example of colonial resistance and analysing the actual affect it had on the colonial discourse I will contribute to this specific debate.

The memory culture concerning colonialism has been a subject of critique which has brought a focus on history rewritten from the bottom up and from perspectives other than that of the colonisers. 'The remembrance of past colonial relations of power has emerged as fundamental to a range of postcolonial intellectual and political agendas that make the recording, rewriting and eliciting of colonial memories so pertinent and charged.'[54] However, according to Ann Laura Stoler and Karen Strassler, within this rewriting of colonial memory, the actual system of colonial memory culture is seldom brought under question. In order to bring this debate to a higher level, I will therefore engage in a critique on colonialism and colonial memory as a system.

Further research would also be beneficial to specific concepts I will use. As previously mentioned, the concept of mimicry as defined by Bhabha is mainly applicable to the colonised elite as a means of gaining power and a higher social status. Considering this concept, Bhabha is short sighted in his lack of attribution of the tool of mimicry to other strata of the colonial subjects. It is important to recognise the different actors and layers within the colonised peoples. The Hauka movement provides an example of how the rural indigenous population—a social class very different to that of the European-educated African elites—can also appropriate power by means of mimicry. A thorough examination of the concept of mimicry, based on academic research by Bhabha and Taussig, and its use in the Hauka movement could provide valuable insight.

To sum up, the use of discourse analysis has much to offer research on colonial discourse. An in-depth study focussed on the example of the Hauka as a form of colonial resistance will provide a beneficial addition to the debate on the Hauka movement, colonial discourse and the concept of mimicry.

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[54] Ann Laura Stoler and Karen Strassler, "Castings for the Colonial: Memory Work in 'New Order' Java," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42, no. 1 (2000), 4.

1.6. Primary Sources

In order to research the discourse surrounding the Hauka movement from the perspectives of the colonisers, I look at primary sources written either by the colonial administration—government records (requoted from other academic literature)—or by citizens in the metropole—newspaper articles (from The Times, The Observer, The (Manchester) Guardian, Le Monde and Gallica).[55] In total I use sixteen primary sources, half from the French perspective and half from the British perspective, dating from 1925 till 1981. In this way I can examine the perspectives of the Hauka movement in both colonial perspective as well as how these change over time.

One of the main problems considering this research is the unavailability of sources concerning the Hauka movement specifically. Most governmental sources are held in France and Niger and cannot be retraced online. In order to bypass this problem, I will requote from primary sources available to me in academic literature. Although this does limit my scope to the primary sources that have been previously been used, I will expand on this by also focussing on other primary sources (newspaper articles) which will expand my scope of analysis on the discourse.

Another difficulty concerning research on the Hauka movement is that it is not a generally known movement, meaning that it is either hardly present in popular discourse and that there are no common forms of spelling of the movement. I have come across the following terms, which all refer to the Hauka movement/spirits: "*Hauka,*" "*Haouka*," "*Hawka*" and "*Baboule*" or "*Babule*" (sometimes the "*Holey*" spirits are also associated with the Hauka although this is in fact a different family of spirits). The use of these terms will help me broaden my search. In order to further expand my scope of primary sources, which would otherwise be very limited, I also include terms such as "spirit possession" and "animism." Even though the Hauka movement is not specifically mentioned here, the movement does fall under spirit possession and animist practices, meaning that the discourse surrounding these practices is also applicable for the discourse on the Hauka movement. The downside here is that

[55] See Appendix II. List of Primary Sources.

the specificity of resistance to colonialism which is characteristic of the Hauka movement is lacking in these sources.

Furthermore, because of its impact and popularity, I will include primary sources that are linked to the film, *Les maîtres fous* (1955), directed by Jean Rouch. Although this will not be the main focus of my research, I do believe primary sources dealing with the film may offer valuable insights as it offered the colonisers and citizens in the metropoles a visual image of the followers of the Hauka movement without them having to come into physical contact with one another.

A combination of these primary sources will be complementary in analysing the discourse and therefore also the power relations surrounding this movement. Because these primary sources are directed at a larger public of citizens, they will reveal something about the dominant colonial discourse and the actual effect of the colonial resistance of the Hauka movement and its reception.

1.7. Research Methods

The type of research I will be conducting will concern a close reading of primary sources. After an initial literature research, I will delve deeper into methods of discourse analysis, conducting an analysis on the colonial discourse surrounding the Hauka movement. According to Norman Fairclough, systematic discourse analysis is the combination of textual analysis (including linguistic analysis—how texts draw upon linguistic systems—and intertextual analysis—how texts draw upon discourse) and analyses of social context.[56] In this particular research the discourse analysis will not be extremely systematic due to the variety and low number of primary sources available. However, the definition of the quote above highlights that text and context are always intrinsically intertwined, and it is obsolete to study the one without the other. This focus on context within the colonial discourse will play an important factor throughout this research. Considering critical discourse analysis, Van Dijk approaches research and critique of social inequality through a focus on '*the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance*. Dominance here is defined as the exercise of social power by elites, institutions or groups, that results in social inequality, including political, cultural, class, ethnic, racial and gender inequality.'[57]

I am particularly interested to analyse how the Hauka movement affected colonial discourse, researching whether or not it played a part as an anti-colonial discourse, resisting the dominance of the colonial powers. Teun van Dijk argues that critical discourse analysis prefers a focus of top-down influence of dominance as opposed to resistance from bottom-up, although he does not deny the fruitfulness of an approach on resistance.[58] This particular thesis will approach the colonial discourse from the perspective of the colonisers, researching how the Hauka movement was received and perceived by the colonial government and the citizens in the metropole. By studying the colonial

[56] Norman Fairclough, "Discourse and Text: Linguistic and Intertextual Analysis Within Discourse Analysis," *Discourse and Society* 3, no. 2 (1992), 193-194.
[57] Teun A. Van Dijk, "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis," *Discourse & Society* 4, no. 2 (1993), 249-250.
[58] Van Dijk, "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis," 250.

discourse from their point of view I will be able to research in what ways the Hauka movement effected this dominant discourse by analysing different primary sources and identifying patterns in language and social practices.

My main concern whilst doing this type of research has to do with the postcolonial critique of unintentionally enforcing the dominant colonial discourse despite focussing on colonial resistance.[59] I am aware that through my own juxtaposition of the colonisers and the colonised, I am reinforcing the dichotomy between the West and the Rest, participating myself in a practice that I deem to be harmful to a complete understanding of the colonial context. A solution to this problem is to keep reminding myself—and the reader—throughout this thesis that this is a problem of colonial research. In doing such I hope to create an awareness of these difficulties, which will hopefully be part of a solution to the problem.

[59] Sharpe, "Figures of Colonial Resistance," 137-138.

1.8. Chapter Outline

Chapter 1 has laid the groundwork for this thesis through the introduction of the research and sub questions, theoretical concepts, literature overview, primary sources and research methods.

In chapter 2 I will discuss the background and socio-political context of French colonialism in Niger and British colonialism in the Gold Coast as well as the process of decolonisation. In this section I will answer the sub question: "How did the French and British colonies in West Africa differ from each other?" Furthermore, I will link the different styles of colonial rule to the colonial discourse, answering the second sub question: "What was the colonial discourse in general and was there any difference between the colonial discourse in the French and the British cases?"

Chapter 3 will be an in-depth analysis of the Hauka movement itself in which a link will be drawn to the colonial socio-political context. I will look into the aspects of resistance that are inherent to the movement and answer the third sub question: "In what ways can the Hauka movement be perceived as a form of colonial resistance?"

After laying the theoretical and contextual groundwork for the research in the previous chapters, chapter 4 will concern a critical discourse analysis of the primary sources in which I will discuss some aspects of the sources individually as well as form a comparison in the colonial discourse between the French and the British sources. The main topic of this chapter will deal with the sub question: "How did the French and British citizens perceive or react to the Hauka movement?" Here I will present my main findings before drawing some more general conclusions and answering my main research question in chapter 5.

CHAPTER 2.
SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT OF COLONIALISM

2.1. Introduction

The entire continent of Africa went through some dramatic changes at the end of the nineteenth century. During the Scramble for Africa, large territorial areas were annexed by the major European powers of that era.[60] The European metropoles colonised their newly claimed peripheries in Africa and developed new philosophies concerning the best way to govern the colonies, not only politically but also for economic benefits.

In West Africa, the main European powers involved in colonisation were France, Great Britain, Portugal and Germany. French-ruled West Africa consisted of a number of colonial territories covering a vast area, namely, Senegal, Mauritania, French Guinea, French Sudan (presently known as Mali), Ivory Coast, Upper Volta (presently know as Burkina Faso), Dahomey (presently known as Benin) and Niger. British-ruled West Africa consisted of Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and Nigeria (West, East and North). The Portuguese had control over Cape Verde and Portuguese Guinea. The Germans colonised Cameroun and Togoland, only to have the territories mandated to France and Great Britain respectively, after the First World War by the League of Nations. Liberia was the odd country out, as it remained independent from 1847 after having previously been colonised by the United States in 1822.[61]

The different philosophies and different colonial styles of governing of the empires meant that the colonies—most importantly Niger and the Gold Coast in respect to the Hauka movement—had different political and economic contexts. The Gold Coast offered more job opportunities and had less economically constricting policies considering tax collection. This sparked the major flow of migration of people from Niger to the Gold Coast, which, as I have already shown, had a major impact on the evolution of the Hauka movement. It is important to grasp the history of these specific socio-political and economic contexts in order to gain a better understanding of the background of the emergence of the Hauka movement and the reasons for its migration to the Gold Coast.

[60] Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa*. (London: Abacus, 1992).
[61] See Figure 2.



Figure 3. Margot Lombaert, Map of West Africa in 1922, *The British Library,* accessed on 24-01-2019, https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/map-of-west-africa-in-1922.

In order to gain an understanding of the background and motives for the Scramble for Africa, I will briefly go into its general history and the age of modern imperialism in section 2.2. For the purposes of this thesis in relation to the Hauka movement, I will focus on the French and British colonies in West Africa and their ruling styles. Specifically, I will focus on the colonial socio-political background in Niger and in the Gold Coast, in section 2.3 and 2.4 respectively, as these are the two main countries in which the Hauka movement was active. Because the Hauka movement persevered even after decolonisation, I will discuss the socio-political context of independence in the Gold Coast and Niger in section 2.5. Section 2.6 will deal with the colonial discourse and the subtle differences between French and British colonial discourse and I will conclude the chapter with section 2.7.

2.2. The Scramble for Africa

2.2.1. Modern Colonialism

Imperialism had been an important political structure for European powers over the centuries. It is mainly used as a tool for nations to extract wealth and resources from colonised nations for their own economic benefit. Before the nineteenth century, imperialism focussed more on conquest of frontiers and the expansion of empires and their ideologies, politics and religions. During the nineteenth century this changed, however. Power was concentrated to a small portion of states and the economic differences between the metropoles and colonies widened. Furthermore, the Europeans became more convinced of their own inherent superiority over dominated nations.[62]

Burbank and Cooper call this new type of imperialism in the nineteenth century 'modern colonialism.' They argue that '[m]odern colonialism … would entail the action of engineers and doctors rather than conquistadors; it would give rise to a domain of mutually beneficial progress, not of extraction.'[63] This type of colonialism was based on making claims to territories on the grounds that the people who lived there could not properly govern themselves, make the best use of their land or become modern without the "help" of the colonisers.[64] In this sense, it was the duty of the colonisers to civilise and modernise their colonies. These civilising missions served as a means to justify and legitimate the colonial enterprise. Again, here we see the notion of European superiority in the mentality of colonialism.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, this particular type of colonialism had a major influence on the entire African continent. European presence in Africa was nothing new. Before the "scramble," Europeans had established trading posts, mainly along the coastline and up several rivers. They had not ventured very far inland due to the presence of diseases and the lack of the technological means to do so. The interior of Africa was very much left to the

[62] Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2010), 287.
[63] Burbank and Frederick, *Empires in World History*, 287.
[64] Ibidem, 287-289.

Africans before the 1880's. Modern colonialism may have given the European elite the necessary new form of imperial ideology to spur on the Scramble for Africa, but this only answers part of the question of why the Scramble for Africa took place. In the next section I will deal with more advanced economic and political developments that played precursory roles in the invasion of Africa.

2.2.2. Reasons for the Scramble of Africa

The Scramble for Africa is often thought of as the epitome of modern colonialism. It embodied the essence of the mentality of superiority over the colonised subjects; and although the European colonisers did conquer African territories and peoples through military intervention, technological superiority and the 'action of engineers and doctors' as previously mentioned by Burbank and Cooper also played a significant role. This still does not explain which economic or political factors played in role in instigating the colonisation of Africa.

The classical economic explanation, based on works by Marx and expanded on by Hobson and Lenin, argues that changes in the European economy initiated the Scramble for Africa. As the European economy became more capitalist, it became more efficient, producing a surplus of capital for which there was no domestic demand. Therefore, investors imported this surplus capital to foreign areas where the return would be higher. Imperialism followed as a means of securing the empire's overseas investment from both the local population and European competition.[65] This argument has been criticised for several reasons. First of all, not much was actually invested in Africa by European countries and most of the surplus capital was invested in areas outside of the European empires.[66] Furthermore, there is no particular correlation between investing overseas and imperial expansion in that particular area.[67] Therefore, only focussing on an economic reason for the Scramble for Africa doesn't suffice. It is necessary to include more political and sociological explanations as well.

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[65] Antony Gerald Hopkins, "Economic Imperialism in West Africa: Lagos, 1980-92," *The Economic History Review* 21, no. 3 (1968), 580-581; Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 313.
[66] Hopkins, "Economic Imperialism in West Africa," 581; Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 313-314.
[67] Hopkins, "Economic Imperialism in West Africa," 581.

Following a more political line of reasoning, Robinson and Gallagher argue that Great Britain, whilst previously preferring a more informal manner of imperial rule, started employing a more formal means of imperial rule due to the political crisis in Egypt in 1882 in which the British intervened in order to retain their control over the area.[68] This area was particularly important because of its links to India and the rest of Asia through the Suez Canal. Before this crisis, France and Great Britain had a mutual understanding of informal rule in the area. The switch to a more formal style of ruling spurred on competition between the two empires, leading to the expansion of their strongholds in Africa.[69] In short, political competition between European empires spurred on the Scramble for Africa. Here too are some problems with this line of argumentation. By identifying the political crisis of 1882 in Egypt as the root cause of imperial expansion in Africa, Robinson and Gallagher ignore the earlier political developments in Africa which were already pointing to colonisation as well as the economic and commercial interests that influenced the Scramble for Africa. They also ignore the fact that France's imperial policies were mainly defensive and restrained until the mid-1880's and put too much blame on the imperial policies of France and Great Britain.[70]

I argue that it is important to take economic, social and political explanations into account in order to achieve a greater understanding of the history of the Scramble for Africa. In order to do so, I follow Burbank and Cooper's argumentation. They give four reasons for the Scramble of Africa. Firstly, they argue that commercial arrangements concerning free trade between Europeans and Africans were unpredictable in the eyes of the Europeans who were worried that conflict and competition would lead to instability in the trade and flow of raw materials.[71] Secondly, European civilisation had advanced technologically, with weapons, medicine and communication, giving it an edge in the colonisation of Africa.[72] Thirdly, changes in the public representations of Africa, showing it as a wild place with uncivilised people in need of benevolent

[68] Hopkins, "Economic Imperialism in West Africa," 582.
[69] Ibidem, 582.
[70] Ibidem, 583.
[71] Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 314.
[72] Ibidem, 315.

intervention, allowed for the sociological mind-set needed to encourage the imperialist policies on behalf of the public and policymakers.[73] Finally, Burbank and Cooper argue that 'colonisation acquired its own momentum.'[74] This argumentation can be subsumed under the heading "political arguments" made by Robinson and Gallagher in which competition between European powers created a climate for colonial expansion.

It is impossible to trace the colonial conquest of Africa back to one main reason as there were several factors that collided to create the perfect environment—socially, politically and economically—that facilitated the Scramble for Africa. Surprisingly, this conquest didn't lead to extreme military interactions between many European powers on African territories. Instead, the Europeans handled the competition between themselves in a much more "civilised" manner.

2.2.3. The Beginning of the Colonisation of West Africa

Before 1881, when the formal colonisation of Africa started, West Africa was a territory with an abundance of different peoples, tribes and empires. Historically, Africans have been conquered by foreign forces and have resisted their subjugation.[75] The African peoples were therefore familiar with the notion of force and conquering and the colonisation by Europeans could not have been seen as any different from the conquering of other powerful tribes or empires, such as the Tuareg in Niger. Furthermore, Europeans were not complete strangers to Africans as they share a longer history of trade. French, British and other European traders had settled along the coast of West Africa and often acted as middlemen between other Europeans and African tribes. Traders were also important because of their previously established links with the future colonies which legitimised the European countries' claims to these territories.[76]

Before the Scramble for Africa, European powers had different approaches and opinions about colonisation. Although Great Britain's economy

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[73] Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 315.
[74] Ibidem, 315
[75] Finn Fuglestad, *A History of Niger: 1850-1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 11.
[76] Michael Crowder, *West Africa under Colonial Rule* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1968), 54.

did have surplus capital that needed to be invested in foreign countries, the British government was unwilling to create any permanent settlements or administrations besides those in which British traders were already active. In fact, the government actively opposed any colonial ventures.[77] The reason for this was that the entire British administration thought that colonies in Africa simply did not have any economic value or importance.[78] Before the Scramble for Africa, therefore, the British Empire had shown no interest in extending its hegemonic sphere of influence to include the African continent.

France on the other hand, did show an interest in acquiring African territories, even though the government may have been reluctant to make it an official governmental policy. Interestingly enough, the actual lands the French annexed did not have much commercial value in fact, because it was mainly dessert around the area of Senegal. One reason behind their motive to acquire land despite its low commercial value is that France was trying to make up for its national humiliation of her defeat by the Prussians in 1870 during the Franco-Prussian War.[79] Another interesting point to mention here is that France's economic situation differed considerably from Great Britain's, in the sense that it did not actually need colonies in an economic sense. France only industrialised is economy in the 1840's, much later than Great Britain. Therefore, there was little surplus capital, manufactured goods or population that needed new overseas avenues. In short, France's economy was self-sufficient for the most part.[80] In this light, France's motives for colonisation were more political than economic.

During this period of initial colonisation before 1880, in which still most European powers (Great Britain, Germany and to a certain extent France) involved in the colonisation of West Africa remained hesitant except for Portugal, not many social, political or cultural changes occurred in the various African societies that were to be colonised. This changed drastically after the Berlin Conference—which was hosted in 1884-85 by Otto von Bismark, the German chancellor—which became a milestone for the Scramble for Africa.

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[77] Crowder, *West Africa under Colonial Rule*, 51.
[78] Ibidem, 55.
[79] Ibidem, 52.
[80] Ibidem, 52.

2.2.4. The Berlin Conference

Although the Scramble for Africa had already started in the early 1880's, the Berlin conference was important because it gave international recognition to the phenomenon.[81] There was no sudden change of heart considering the colonisation of Africa. This was a gradual shift. After the conference, however, the Europeans' political attitudes towards colonisation were aligned and the Scramble for Africa went ahead in full force.[82]

During this conference, negotiations took place about the question of which African territories would be annexed by which European powers. The goal was to set out a clear set of rules of the empire-building enterprises, in order to ensure that this happened in a systematic manner.[83] This was a means of constraining competition between European powers. A key principle was agreed upon that any European power '… had to demonstrate effective occupation of a territory it claimed.'[84] This implied that a European power could not merely claim a territory as its own colony on the basis of a treaty but that the empire also had to retain a physical presence, either in the form of civilian settlement or in the form of military occupation, in the land.

Colonisation was a process that sometimes took up to decades to stabilise. European powers dealt with this process in different ways and this also varied between colonies. There was no "one-size-fits-all" solution and some colonies benefitted more than others, although I would argue that the overall effect of colonisation was detrimental to the entire continent of Africa. Before going into the differences between these styles of ruling in further detail, I would like to remark that it is important to realise that the styles changed over time and that the indirect rule was not strictly used by the British and that direct rule was not strictly used by the French. British and French policies often alternated between these two styles depending on the political and social contexts.

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[81] Crowder, *West Africa under Colonial Rule*, 62.
[82] Ibidem, 17.
[83] Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 316.
[84] Ibidem, 315.

2.3. French Colonialism in Niger

The Colony of Niger was only formally established in 1922, although the French had been present in the region from the end of the nineteenth century.[85] Being so far inland, it was one of the later colonies that was conquered by the French. It is also one of the poorest of the colonies; because of its situation in a harsh desert environment it lacks agricultural opportunities.

2.3.1. Precolonial Nigerien Society

Whereas the era of colonisation mainly focussed on territory and the acquisition of territories, in precolonial West African society people were always more important than land and a person's identity was primarily based on their descent and not *where* they actually came from.[86] Although the following map is from 1969 and not of precolonial Niger, it should give the reader a good idea of the



Figure 4. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Niger Maps – Population 1969," *University of Texas Libraries*, accessed on 9-4-2019. https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/niger.html.

[85] Fuglestad, *A History of Niger*, 6; Crowder, *West Africa under Colonial Rule*, 15.
[86] Fuglestad, *A History of Niger*, 19.

population density and different ethnicities present in the territory, as this was the most important characteristic that defined one's identity. The main ethnicities in Niger are the Hausa (Mawri and Sudie are the two main Hausaphone groups), Zarma/Songhay (Djerma in Figure 3.), Fulani (the majority of the Fulani arrived during the colonial period from Northern Nigeria, after having been driven out of the area in the nineteenth century) and the Tuareg.[87] The north of the country is mainly desert and scarcely populated, with the Fulani and the Tuareg being mainly nomadic. The south is much more densely populated along the Niger River and amongst the Hausa population which crosses over to the Nigerian border.

The nineteenth century was marked by a long period of war and domination of peoples in the area of what today is known as Niger. Without going into too much detail of the course of actions throughout the entire century, the Fulani ruled the southeast of Niger until they were overthrown by Zarma rebels in 1866 and the Tuareg ruled over (mainly) Songhay tribes in the northwest parts of the country.[88] The domination of the Fulani and Tuareg prompted the spread of Islam to a section of the subjugated Zarma populations, some of which whom fled further towards the West.[89] Amongst other ethnicities, a fraction of Zarma (those from Zermaganda) and the Mawri and Sudie remained animists.[90]

Generally, chiefdom was the main political institution of Western African society. 'Chiefs led armies, adjudicated disputes, made political decisions and performed sacred rituals.'[91] Other political institutions were also kingdoms and centralised states, which changed frequently considering territory and leadership. Economically, society was mainly based on bartering and local sustenance production.[92] Another important aspect of Nigerien society, especially amongst the Songhay, was domestic slavery. Noblemen of the

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[87] Fuglestad, *A History of Niger*, 1, 4. According to Fuglestad, the Hausa accounts for between 45 and 48 per cent of the population, the Zerma/Songhay account for about 20 per cent, the Fulani make up 11 to 13 percent and the Tuareg account for between 10 and 12 per cent of the population. These numbers may have varied widely throughout history.
[88] Fuglestad, *A History of Niger*, 39-40.
[89] Ibidem, 40-41.
[90] Ibidem, 41.
[91] Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 66.
[92] Ibidem, 66.

Songhay, a hierarchical and aristocratic society, gained prestige from the number of slaves, cattle and other dependents they had control over.[93] These slaves, which formed a large and important proportion of the population, were attached to families and often had certain rights along their domestic obligations.[94] Besides Islam (and Christianity after the arrival of the Europeans), the main proportion of the people in West Africa had animist beliefs, in which spirit possession plays an important role.[95] During spirit possession rituals, humans may ask for things or consult the spirits to solve certain affairs, often in return for animal sacrifices. Animism knows a great number of different families and is also recognised for its flexibility and ability to incorporate many new elements, even from other religions.[96] Hence, the Hauka spirits were so easily incorporated into religious society.

2.3.2. The French Conquest of Niger

The Scramble for Africa initially began along the coast of West Africa where traders had already settled and formed links and connections with the territory and its people. It developed further through military conquest of territories further inland and the formation of treaties between European powers and African chiefs. After the military conquest of the coastal kingdom of Dahomey in 1894, France could resume their conquest further north towards Niger.[97] Great Britain had claimed most of the south of Niger on paper, however had failed to establish any form of rule. As such, France pushed through the region and claimed it for themselves. A treaty was signed between the two empires in 1898, in which the border between Benin and Nigeria was settled upon.[98] In order to make claims on the land further north—in Niger—French troops had to colonise the Central Sudanese area towards the north. This territory was of importance, not only because the French thought it was of economic value, rich in natural

[93] Fuglestad, A History of Niger, 35; Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 64.
[94] Ibidem, 62.
[95] There are no certain numbers for the percentage of animists in the population. In "Migrations au Ghana," 165, 177, Rouch estimates that about 80% of the population in the Gold Coast are animists. He further estimates that about 10% of the population in Niger have the ability to be possessed by spirits.
[96] Fuglestad, "Les Hauka," 210; Fuglestad, *A History of Niger*, 116-117.
[97] Crowder, *West Africa under Colonial Rule*, 103-104.
[98] Ibidem, 105.

resources, but also because of its strategical geopolitical value, connecting the French colonies of Northern Africa to their colonies in West Africa.[99]

The conquest of the territory that formed the colony of Niger did not happen easily or peacefully. The French troops met much resistance in the area, especially from the Fulani and the Tuareg. However, they subdued the military resistance relatively easily due to their military and technological advancement. The Zarma were often harassed by the Fulani and the Tuareg had often called upon the French for protection. With these actions, the Zarma created a closer relationship with the French than most other ethnic groups. Because they were closer to French society in approximation the Songhay and Zarma also suffered the most from the harshness of French rule.[100] This led to revolts on behalf of this ethnic group which took place in 1906. The Hausa generally resisted the French rule in a more passive manner; by simply not reacting to their rule or by migrating to more remote regions or to Northern Nigeria.[101]

The territory of what would become the colony of Niger was conquered for the most part by 1908. During the early days of colonial rule the French had a hard time establishing any form of direct rule because they simply did not have the means to do so, especially after the First World War.[102] There were not enough colonial administrators and Niger's economy, being devastated by drought and famine, was not strong enough to support a system of direct rule. Niger remained under military rule until 1922 when it was established as the Colony of Niger and governed by civilians. It was during this time that France truly established its colonial rule in Niger.

2.3.3. The Effects of Colonialism on Nigerien Society

The changes in the societal structure in Niger that were brought on by colonialism that I discuss in this section are not necessarily specific to Niger but can be said about the broader rule of the French colonials in West Africa. The political history of France knows different eras of republics. At the time of the colonisation of Africa, France's political system was defined by the constitution

[99] Fuglestad, *A History of Niger*, 51.
[100] Ibidem, 109.
[101] Ibidem, 108.
[102] Ibidem, 84.

of the Third Republic, which dated from 1870 till 1946. A major component of the constitution had to do with the laws and conceptions of the *indigénat*, which placed natives from France's colonies in an inferior position legally. This greatly influenced the process of colonialism and the situation in the colonies: 'French subjects, in Algeria and colonies acquired later in the nineteenth century, came under the *indigénat*, decrees that enabled the local administrator—acting as a prosecutor and judge—to condemn subjects for a wide range of offences.'[103] The concepts of the *indigénat* influenced colonial society greatly in fostering an unequal relation between coloniser and colonised.

Besides the policies of the *indigénat*, French colonialism in Niger, and more generally in West Africa, brought about four major changes to society, borrowing arguments from Stoller.[104] The first major influence of colonialism to Nigerien society was the abolition of indigenous slavery, which disrupted the social stratification order of Nigerien society and undermined the sovereignty of the noblemen. The newly freed slaves were now able to move as they pleased, which caused a massive migration to other parts of (West) Africa. However, a large proportion of the slaves also found themselves under French rule, which in a way simply replaced the previous system of economic exploitation, bringing me to my second point.

The second change in society was the introduction of forced labour and taxation. The colonies were expected to be economically independent from their metropole, France. Therefore, the colonial administrators had to devise policies which would provide them with manual labour and an income. Forced labour was the system used to provide the French with manual labour for building an infrastructure and other public projects. In a sense, forced labour simply replaced domestic slavery. Furthermore, as a means of acquiring an income, the French introduced a head tax, which all colonial subjects were deemed to pay.

These policies changed the economy of Niger drastically. The economy based on local sustenance and trade in produce shifted to an economy '… based on foreign money exchange and the production of export surpluses.'[105] Although

[103] Cooper, *Citizenship, Inequality and Difference*, chapter 2.
[104] Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 62-72.
[105] Ibidem, 66.

this can be said of most of French-ruled West Africa, Niger was hit particularly hard due to its economic hardship. With arid lands, mostly being desert, agriculture was particularly fragile to droughts. Great famines were not uncommon during the colonial period and when they occurred the local population received little help from the colonial administration. Often in these cases, the head taxes or demands for production of export surplus were not alleviated.

The third social and cultural change brought on by colonialism was the decimation of the traditional authority of the African chiefs. The French governed on the basis of direct rule, which placed the chiefs directly under colonial officers, using them as agents of the government in the metropole.[106] The colonial governors gave the chiefs new and specific orders, tasks and duties, such as tax collection, essentially undermining their traditional roles as chiefs and transforming them into resented actors of the colonial scheme.[107] Not only did French colonialism change the nature of the chiefs' role in society, they also divided the territory in districts or *cercles* and *cantons* that necessarily fall in line with previous "borders" between tribes and kingdoms, deliberately separating certain areas whilst consolidating others.

The fourth and final major change which mainly affected African culture and their conceptions of self and other was education. The French believed that it was their duty to educate the Africans and they did so by strictly enforcing the French culture and language in order to educate the "uncivilised African" and bringing about a sort of "cultural renaissance."[108] This also meant that the French were in a sense trying to re-educate, re-culture and eventually assimilate the African subjects into European civilised culture, although it is debatable whether this was in fact desirable for the French.

Although only a very small proportion of Western Africans from the French colonies went to school compared to those from the British colonies, the French did produce an elite class of Africans through the use of education: *les évolués*. This group of French-educated African elites could often obtain higher

[106] Crowder, "Indirect Rule," 198.
[107] Crowder, "Indirect Rule," 204; Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 66.
[108] Crowder, "Indirect Rule," 204; Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 68-69.

positions and functions in society, sometimes even becoming actual French citizens. Most of the *évolués* came from the ethnic group in Niger that were most in contact with the French, namely the Zarma/Songhay.[109] The *évolués* fell somewhere in between African and French, they did not quite belong to the one group or the other. They were educated and therefore culturally French, however, they still remained ethnically African. These "black Frenchmen" were therefore assimilated into French civilisation, yet racial differences and racism prevented them from ever becoming fully accepted by the French as one of their own.

Education not only had a profound impact on the small group of *évolués*, but also on African culture in general. Once colonialism was fully accepted in Niger in 1922, the notion of French superiority affected all layers of African culture, leading the population to question their own values, morals, society, political institutions and even their civilisation and history.[110] According to Stoller, education became the first and foremost means for achieving 'European cultural embodiment.'[111]

[109] Fuglestad, *A History of Niger*, 109.
[110] Ibidem, 113.
[111] Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 72.

2.4. British Colonialism in the Gold Coast

The Gold Coast, along the Gulf of Guinea, had ties with the British Empire from as early as the 1850's. At that time, Great Britain had control over a number of forts in the area. Slowly Great Britain expanded and in 1874 the British annexed a number of surrounding the coast, forming the first major British colony in West Africa.[112]

2.4.1. Precolonial Society in the Gold Coast

Before the colonisation of the Gold Coast, the territory was relatively sparse in population. There were a few larger kingdoms towards the South of the region, namely the Ashanti in the centre region and the Fanti of the coastal region. Towards the northwest, there were fewer larger empires. 'They [the population] lived in more or less scattered groups of farmsteads and subsisted primarily on agriculture (shifting cultivation) and hunting.'[113] Identification with specific tribes or ethnic groups was more fluid and the borders were less fixed, if even existent at all.

The precolonial economy of the Gold Coast was agrarian, in which land was distributed equally and the families had fair rights to the land they used.[114]. The system of land tenure was furthermore designed to equally spread out the rights to the land.[115] The society was democratic and egalitarian and so were the relationships between the chiefs and their people.[116] The pre-colonial context in the Gold Coast was thus very different to the hierarchical pre-colonial society in Niger.

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[112] Crowder, *West Africa Under Colonial Rule*, 45.
[113] Carola Lentz, "Colonial Constructions and African Initiatives: The History of Ethnicity in Northwestern Ghana," *Ethnos* 65, no. 1 (2000), 109.
[114] Stephen H. Hymer, "Economic Forms in Pre-Colonial Ghana." *The Journal of Economic History* 30, no. 1 (1970), 34.
[115] Ibidem, 35.
[116] Roger S. Gocking, "Indirect Rule in the Gold Coast: Competition for Office and the Invention of Tradition," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 28, no. 3 (1994), 422.

2.4.2. The British Conquest of the Gold Coast



Figure 5. Evolution of the Gold Coast Colony, *Exploring Africa*, accessed on 12-4-2019, http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/module-twenty-four-activity-two/

Whereas the French government was headfast in conquering all lands they could get their hands on, no matter how desolate, the British took on a different approach. The British imperialist mission tended to keep clear of land that had little promise of becoming economically valuable. Their imperial conquest of Africa remained largely commercial in nature and the state and the British flag followed private companies and traders to sites where the commercial value had already been established.[117] In the Gold Coast, it was a slightly different case as this colony was one of the few British colonies that was established before the Scramble for Africa. British colonialism came much more gradually than with many other African colonies because of the longstanding ties with the land from as early as the 1850's.[118] As you can see in Figure 3, the southern area of the colony was established in 1874. Only after the turn of the century did the British extend their colonial reach towards the north, as the result of the several Ashanti Wars.

One of the main reasons for Great Britain's early interest in the region was because of its location near the hub of slave trade along the coastline, from which they could thus make attempts at stopping slavery in other empires. Whereas France somewhat reluctantly formally abolished slavery in the mid-nineteenth century after receiving pressure from other European empires, Great Britain had been advocates of the global anti-slavery movement for almost half a century prior. From 1807 onwards, Great Britain went through great measures to halt the global trade in slaves. This was done not only by naval attempts,

[117] Denis Cogneau and Alexander Moradi, "Borders That Divide: Education and Religion in Ghana and Togo Since Colonial Times," *The Journal of Economic History* 74, no. 3 (2014), 694.
[118] Gocking, "Indirect Rule in the Gold Coast," 424.

carried out from the Gold Coast Forts, to stop slave traders at the different ports and during transportation of slaves, but also by establishing commercial relations in Africa with the hope of supplying Africans with enough ulterior means of income besides the trade in slaves.[119]

British colonialism resembled the French colonialism in many ways although there were several differences. The main difference was between the direct rule of the French and the indirect rule of the British, in which the British '… believed that it was their task to conserve what was good in indigenous institutions and assist them to develop their own lines.'[120] The British generally gave their colonial governors much leeway considering the structures of their administration and political relationships, which were considered to be unique and specific per territory.[121] Furthermore, the political relationships between colonial governors and native authorities were generally of a more advisory nature.[122] The general sentiment and philosophy of the British was that the Africans' 'own traditional methods of government were the most suitable.'[123]

2.4.3. The Effects of Colonialism on Society in the Gold Coast

The British colonisation of the West Africa brought about certain changes to the society. Great Britain's strict adherence to the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade was well under way by the time the Scramble for Africa started. Their anti-slavery sentiments had little influence on domestic slavery in West Africa, however. Interestingly, in the Gold Coast and in other colonies, the abolition of slavery did not become a central policy of colonialism.[124] This was because the colonial administration was afraid of what drastic changes the abolition would bring to society. Instead, the colonial policies claimed to encourage abolition whilst in practice were rarely, or lightly, enforced.[125]

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[119] Crowder, *West Africa under Colonial Rule*, 26-27.
[120] Crowder, "Indirect Rule," 198.
[121] Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship, Inequality and Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), chapter 3, Kobo.
[122] Crowder, "Indirect Rule," 198
[123] Ibidem, 204.
[124] Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 63.
[125] Ibidem, 64.

Like the French, the British resorted to forced labour and taxation as a means of economic revenue in their West African colonies, although they were less harmful to the society than in the French colonies. This was because the British also relied on other methods of wealth extraction.[126] In the Gold Coast, direct taxes were not enforced until 1936 as initial attempts of taxation provoked the outburst of revolts.[127] Simply put, the Gold Coast was wealthier then Niger and had many more economic opportunities and sources of revenue, which softened the need for harsh policies of taxation and forced labour (although they were still administered to a certain extent in the colony).

As previously mentioned, Great Britain formed a policy of indirect rule in their colonies. In general, this meant that the chiefs retained their traditional roles along with the traditional political structures. The British colonial administrators acted in a sense as political advisors to the chiefs. In the Gold Coast however, which was a more democratic society, indirect rule altered the relationship between chiefs and their peoples by giving the chiefs more autocratic powers.[128]

Education in British West Africa differed greatly from that in French West Africa. As opposed to the supplementation of European culture in the colonies as the French did, the British believed that the Africans were inherently different and conformed policies to conserve their culture and traditions. On the political level, this was achieved through the promotion of indirect rule and on the cultural level, education was used as a means to conserve tradition. In British-ruled West Africa, English was taught as a subject and most other subjects were taught in the local vernacular. In British West Africa, there were more opportunities for education, which produced a large group of European-educated elites. This educated elite, however, was kept at a distance from higher political functions and were generally discouraged and disinherited as a whole.

[126] Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 65.
[127] Ibidem, 65-66.
[128] Gocking, "Indirect Rule in the Gold Coast," 422.

2.5. Move to Independence

After the Second World War, the colonial empire became less feasible for most colonial powers. Europe was in ruins and had to rebuild and its citizens found themselves in an atmosphere of despair. Besides this, concepts of citizenship were questioned more and more by a growing European-educated elite. Many African colonial subjects had helped their European empires in fighting their war. As such, they felt that they had earned their rights and claims to citizenship. These changing concepts of citizenship as well as questions on the significance of empires within changing political structures also began to influence the colonies and their political spheres. As such, movements towards independence began to make headway.

2.5.1. Republic of Niger

The French empire lost a great deal of power and influence after its defeat to Germany in 1940 during the Second World War. After the war, the constitution of the Fourth Republic was instated in 1946. The laws of the *indigénat* were no longer applicable and the constitutions of the Fourth Republic held that citizens theoretically had the same rights as citizens in the metropole; however, in reality a degree of inequality was still very much present.[129] Because people from the colonies were no longer subjects, they could represent themselves in the French Parliament, and thus new African political parties were formed, mainly led by the class of *évolués*.

France's Forth Republic made way to a new political regime in 1958, the Fifth Republic, as a reaction to the crisis and revolts in its colony of Algeria. Following this development, France gave all of its colonies a chance to become a part of the French Community and referenda were held in each colony in Africa that same year. Niger joined the French Community, as did most of the other colonies, however the community never properly gained ground or followers which lead Niger to independence in 1960 with Hamani Diori as its first President.

[129] Cooper, *Citizenship, Inequality and Difference*, chapter 3.

2.5.2. Ghana

Great Britain came out of World War II in a rather different position than France. They had played a crucial and supportive role to their allies and came out as one of the most prominent global powers and hegemonies besides the United States of America. Here too however, changes in conceptions of citizenship were occurring. Following the 1948 Nationality Act, which allowed previous subjects from the colonies to reside in Great Britain, a great migration of people occurred in people from the colonies and the dominions to the metropole in the 1950's.[130] This happened rather unexpectedly, and the government had to review its position on the act.

Discussions concerning citizenship influenced discussion on the place of the colonies in West Africa within the British empire. After the Second World War, the Gold Coast had issued the right for self-government in 1947. Kwame Nkrumah became the head of the government led by African parties. He argued for the Gold Coast's plight to become fully independent in 1956 and following discussions with Great Britain, they settled on becoming independent the next year. In 1957, the new state of Ghana became the first nation to become independent within the context of modern imperialism in West Africa. Nkrumah subsequently became the country's first Prime Minister.

[130] Cooper, *Citizenship, Inequality and Difference*, chapter 3.

2.6. Colonial Discourse

2.6.1. Colonial Discourse

With the rise of modern colonialism, a shift in the discourse occurred dealing with the focus of politics of inclusion and exclusion, of difference and similarity. These modern empires needed new ways of justifying their superiority and empire-building policies in Africa. In order to do so, new ways of classifying people became more important than in previous forms of imperialism, namely classifications based on nation and race.[131] This type of mentality of superiority formed the main component of colonial discourse.

Before I discuss what the colonial discourse entailed exactly, I will briefly mention some developments that occurred which enabled the Europeans to form a unified mentality towards the people and lands they colonised. The European colonisers were never one unified group, neither as a whole of Europe or per individual country. There were many different actors from different backgrounds and with different interests involved in the colonisation process. Furthermore, as the colonisers settled in the colonies, a new culture emerged, one distinct from their European culture in the metropoles.[132] In her article "Rethinking Colonial Categories," Ann Laura Stoler argues: '… that colonisers live in what elsewhere has been called "imagined communities"—ones that are consciously created and fashioned to overcome the economic and social disparities that would in other contexts separate and often set their members in conflict.'[133] It was in the colonisers' best interest to create a sense of a unified group in order to further their conquest in the most efficient manner. Through policy making and agreements between empires, European powers were able create a sense of an "imagined community" and overcome the differences between them, subsequently forming a "single unified colonial discourse."

[131] Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 289.
[132] Ann Laura Stoler, "Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31, no. 1 (1989), 136.
[133] Ibidem, 137.

According to Burbank and Cooper, the Berlin conference of 1884-85 and the Brussels Anti-Slavery Conference of 1889-90 helped create an idea of an imagined community of colonisers:

> These two conferences helped define "Europe," for their premise was that one set of states set the rules for acting somewhere else. Europe announced itself as the repository of rational regulation and international law, demarcated from the uncivilised populations in Africa.[134]

In this sense, Europe was defined by its regulation and prohibition of traffic in arms, liquor and slaves. The abolition of the slave trade by several European empires, the British Empire being amongst these, was a major development that affected the colonial discourse and its new focus on race as a means of discrimination. Slavery was given up as a source of labour in the early nineteenth century as the slave trade was no longer deemed economically viable by the British capitalists. Society could no longer be based on the classification between slave and free man—meaning civilian and British—and people had to adjust to this shift in classification. These ex-slaves could have been considered a threat to the societal order. In order to maintain the difference between the two groups and prevent the ex-slaves from becoming equals, a certain hostile attitude towards the group was upheld. 'They were to be the subjects of a racialised system of rule and labour discipline.'[135] It was in this sense that race became such an important means of social classification in the nineteenth century.

This type of mentality influenced the reasoning behind and justification of the Scramble for Africa. This can be recognised in humanitarian arguments which argue that the colonisation of Africa was beneficial for the African populations. As argued by Crowder: 'Theories of the racial superiority of the white man coupled with the explorers' and missionaries' tales of the backward condition of Africa, increased support for the occupation of Africa and its subjection to the "benefit" of European rule.'[136] These types of argumentations affected the colonial discourse in the sense that the Europeans saw the Africans

[134] Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 315.
[135] Ibidem, 292.
[136] Crowder, West Africa and Colonial Rule, 59.

as inable to exploit their own lands to the fullest potential. They needed the guidance of European powers to achieve this.

The colonial discourse based on racism was further reinforced by the scientific discourse of that era. The general scientific discourse followed the argumentation that the human races were naturally distinct and unequal to one another. It was in this sense that race was linked to culture and that different races were seen as reflecting various "stages" of civilisation.[137] This scientific discourse reflected the societal views about race. Colonial discourse configured as well as continually reinforced its own dominance.

Logically, through the creation of an imagined community of colonisers—the "us" as it were—you would have to demarcate the group from everything that is not "us"—the "them," the colonised, the Africans. In colonial discourse, from a European perspective, the "us" were the disciplined, civilised, superior, rational European colonisers. The "them," on the other hand, were the uncivilised, immoral, inferior, irrational, fearful African colonised subjects. Racism served as a means of naturalising these differences.[138] The colonial discourse formed and reinforced this dichotomy, because of its focus on the inherent differences between the colonisers and the colonised, which were emphasized with the process of Othering.

It is also important to note here that this racist colonial discourse was not separated entirely from the African cultural sphere. Through the means of education and embodiment of European practices, not only did the Europeans convince themselves of their superiority, but they also managed to convince the African colonial subjects of their "inferiority." Fuglestad calls this questioning of one own's culture the inherent side-effect of colonial rule:

> This is the quintessence of colonial rule, and its most subtle, damaging and long-lasting aspect: the cultural, historical and even psychological alienation of the Africans; the fact that the French had been able to persuade not only themselves, not only their fellow-Europeans, but even the Africans, that the latter had no history, no civilisation, and that they

[137] Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 325.
[138] Stoler, "Rethinking Colonial Categories," 137.

> were barbarians predestined to be ruled by the white man. There was a complete disregard for African values, culture and history.[139]

Colonial discourse was therefore not limited to the European cultural sphere but also influential in the entire sphere of colonial influence, including the colonies.

2.6.2. Colonial Discourse in the French and British Contexts

Although I argue that we can speak of one colonial discourse in general terms, there are subtle nuances within colonial discourse that must be taken into account. Different policies and colonial styles of ruling would mean that the colonial discourse would differ somewhat in every colonial context, although still sharing the main characteristic of colonial ideology based on racial difference.

Therefore, the colonial discourses would differ slightly between Niger and the Gold Coast, based on the differences in policy and tactics. To summarise, the main differences between French and British colonialism in West Africa had to do with the political institutions and the mentality behind these institutions. The French maintained a form of direct rule whereas the British upheld more traditional political structures. These different styles of ruling had to do with the different mentalities of the colonial administrators. Whereas the French colonial administrator believed that his role was to bring "enlightenment" through the French culture, language and civilisation, the British colonial administrator believed that the Africans were fundamentally different from European culture and therefore that their own traditional methods of government were more suitable in the colonies.[140]

It followed then that under French rule, the European-educated African elite could climb up the European social ladder to a certain extent if they were "re-culturised" properly. The following quote by Cooper reveals the ideology of the French particularly in the first years of colonisation: 'Africans were imagined to be confined by "custom" to a way of life unassimilable to French notions, perhaps one day to be educated and elevated but for the foreseeable future to be obedient subjects whose contribution to the empire would be labour and

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[139] Fuglestad, *A History of Niger*, 113.
[140] Crowder, "Indirect Rule," 204.

exportable commodities.'[141] Although the initial belief was that Africans could not assimilate to the same level of civilisation, this did not negate the possibility in the future, once the African would be better educated. The European-educated elite of the British colonies on the other hand were discouraged in forming a class and were not offered many job opportunities in the British metropole, as they belonged to a different social sphere in the eyes of the British. The difference between French and British ideologies can be summarised by the following quote:

> Whereas the idea of biological difference, enforced by various legal means, predominated in the British and American contexts, the French imperial framework privileged concepts of cultural uniqueness over corporeal markers of separateness and made citizenship conditional upon attainment of certain attributes of "French civilisation.[142]

How would these differences in styles of ruling translate into differences in discourse? Based on the theory described above, I argue that the French engage in methods of social stratification whereby both subjects and citizens are subject to a single sphere of civilisation in cultural, political, social, religious and economic terms. There is one social ladder which all can climb, although the colonial subject is per definition degraded to a lower social standing than the European. The term I use to describe the discourse relating to these types of ideas is *discourse based on assimilation*. In order for colonial subjects to become civilised they have to assimilate to or re-socialise themselves by French standards of assimilation. The British also distinguish between higher and lower levels of social standing, however in this case there are two different spheres of civilisation. Colonial subjects belong to a different sphere of civilisation than the Europeans and are therefore also subject to different standards. I use the term *discourse based on difference* to describe the type of discourse that relates to this type of colonial rule. Keep in mind that racial superiority still plays an important role in both types of discourse, as is shown in graph 1 on the following page.

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[141] Cooper, *Citizenship, Inequality and Difference*, chapter 2.
[142] James Eskridge Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence, Cultural Authenticity, and the Limitations of Mimicry in French-Ruled West Africa, 1914-1956* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2004), 147.

In practice the discourse based on assimilation would entail a strict subjugation over the cultural practices of colonial subjects, because these practices would be seen as a threat to and not belonging to the civilisation sphere of French civilisation—which was enforced as the main type to aspire to. The French achieved this by means of enforcing their political and educational

Graph 1. Spheres of Civilisation in French and British Colonial Rule



institutions upon their colonial subjects. Although in theory it was possible to assimilate into French society, the practice of assimilation threatened the status quo, which is why the French stressed the differences between European and their colonial subjects, maintaining inequality in order to ensure their superior position.

The discourse based on difference on the other hand showed more tolerance for traditional cultural practices, because the British perceived them as not belonging to the British sphere of civilisation. Because they were seen as

separate spheres, therefore traditional practices did not form a threat to British civilisation. Furthermore, this ideological strategy meant that it would be highly improbable that a colonial subject could cross the spheres of civilisation and be judged by the same standards as the British. Indirect rule, whereby chiefs maintained their traditional roles and the use of the vernacular langue, encouraged the separation of the sphere of civilisation. In chapter 4 I will go into more detail of how these differences translated into the discourse in practice.

2.6.3. Colonial Discourse after Decolonisation

It is important to keep in mind here that although there is obviously a correlation between colonialism and the colonial discourse, the two are not dependent on one another. In this sense, colonial discourse can exist outside of the context of colonialism. Colonial discourse was most distinct and prominent from the beginning of the colonial conquest until the beginning of World War II. With new concepts of civilisation and the decolonisation of Africa in the late 1950's and 1960's, the colonial discourse became less prominent although it still lingered on in certain aspects of society even after decolonisation. Racial inequality is still a problem, even in the present day. On the other hand, independence effected the colonial discourse, but the colonial discourse must also have been diminishing beforehand in order for independence to come about. Without a change in ideology in society, bringing about social and structural change is almost impossible. In this sense, actions are defined by ideologies.

2.7. Conclusion

Chapter 2 has examined the different styles of colonial rule and has answered the sub question: "How did the French and British colonies in West Africa differ from each other?" I have also answered the second sub question in the discussion of colonial discourse and the clarification of how the differences between the French and British colonies influenced the colonial discourse.

Now that I have outlined the socio-political contexts of colonialism and the discourse that comes with it in Niger and the Gold Coast, I will go into more detail about the Hauka movement and how it fit into these colonial contexts.

CHAPTER 3.
THE HAUKA MOVEMENT

3.1. Introduction

The Hauka movement emerged as a religious cult within an animist context. *Bori* is the animist religion practiced by the Hausa ethnic group, traditionally mainly by women. It is also in this religious context that the Hauka spirits were able to appear.[143] The Hauka movement began in a Hausa society, however it is important to note that it was above all a multi-ethnic religious cult. It quickly spread throughout the south of Niger and became popular not only amongst the Hausa but also amongst the Zarma and Songhay where it seemingly became incorporated into the *holey* spirit pantheon. It therefore consisted of a mosaic of different ethnicities and unified these different people and ethnic groups (against the French colonisers).[144]

During ritual dances, led by a *zima*, or priest, accompanied by the music of a monochord violin, and surrounded by a circle of spectators, Hauka mediums would dance for up to many hours before becoming possessed by their spirits. The mediums were mainly young men, although women were not at all excluded from the rituals. To give the reader an idea of the type of spirits that could appear I will name a few here, namely Istambula (leader of the Hauka spirits), Zeneral Malia (general of the Red Sea), Lokotoro (doctor) and Bambara-Mossi (foot/private soldier). A more elaborated chart of the different Hauka sprits, which I have borrowed from an article by Henley,[145] can be found on the previous page. Jean Rouch mentions that more than fifty and possibly even up to one hundred Hauka spirits were recognised in the later years of the movement's development.[146]

The spirits had European characteristics or used certain attributes, linking them to the colonisers. They often spoke pidgin French (and pidgin

[143] Nicole Echard, "Cultes de Possession et Changement Social: L'Exemple du Bori Hausa de L'Ader et du Kurfey (Niger)," *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 79 (1992), 96.
[144] Olivier de Sardan, *Sociétés Sonay-Zarma*, 284.
[145] Paul Henley, "Spirit Possession, Power, and the Absent Presence of Islam: Re-viewing 'Les maîtres fous,'" *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 12, no. 4 (2006), 747.
[146] Rouch, *La Religion et la Magie Songhay*, 75; Jean Rouch, "Jean Rouch Talks About his Films to John Marshall and John W. Adams: (September 14th and 15th, 1977)," *American Anthropologist* 80, no. 4 (1978), 1007.

English in the Gold Coast), marched in a colonial, authoritative and militarised manner and used colonial attributes such as colonial clothing, wooden batons

Hauka in Rouch 1943	*Hauka* in *Imf* (1955)	*Hauka* in Rouch 1960/89
Istanboula		Istanbula – chief of all the *hauka*
		Dogo Malia – Very Tall Muslim
King Zouzi Malia – King Judge/George(?)		King Zuzi
		Prazidan di la Republik – Président
Goumna	Governor	Gomno
		Minis, Minis de Ger – Ministre de Guerre
		Askandya – a judge
	Secretary General	Sekter
Zeneder Malia		
Zeneral Malia – General Malia	General	Zeneral Malia, Colonel
Commandant Mougou	Major Mougou – the 'Wicked' Major	Kommandan Mugu or Korsasi
Captan Malia	Captain Malia	Capitaine
Lieutenant Malia	Lieutenant Malia	Lieutenant
Lassidan Malia – Adjutant Malia		Adjutant chef, Adjutant
Serzan Malia – Sergeant Malia		Sergent-chef
Capral Gardi – Corporal of the Guard	Corporal of the Guard – General's adjutant	Kapral Gardi
		Kafrankot – corporal of the coast
		Bambara Mossi – private soldier
	Private Tiemoko – General's orderly	Tyemoko – child of Kapral Gardi
Doctor Malia	Mme Lokotoro – Doctor's wife	Lokotoro – doctor
	Train Driver	Hanga Beri – 'big ears' who drives trains
Maymota Malia – 'the chauffeur'	Truck Driver	Maymota Malia
		Maykuano – mechanic
		Maylanba – surveyor
		Basiru – telephone linesman
		Babule – blacksmith, 'spirit' in Hausa
Mayaki		Mayaki – 'warrior' in Hausa
		Wasiri – executioner
		Kafuyi – marabout killer
		Maykarga – who spends all day sitting down
Fatimata – 'wife of Zenender'	Madame Salma – Colonial wife	Fatimata Malia – wife of Zeneral Malia
		Maryama, Musukura – female spirits
		Ramatala, Andro – child spirits

Table 1. List of Hauka Spirits from various works by Jean Rouch, Henley, "Spirit Possession, Power and the Absence of Islam," 747.

and whips. Furthermore, they would call themselves European and act according to the character of their colonial spirit (being a general, truck driver or doctor). Other typical characteristics of the spirits during the rituals were frothing at the mouth, using crass, rude and often sexual language, violent outbursts and dropping themselves on the ground. As a means of proving that they were possessed and showing their power, the Hauka spirits would burn themselves with fire and put their arms in boiling water without showing that they were getting hurt. They would also break taboos by eating animals which were deemed unclean by the majority of the society in which they appeared (often pig in Niger, being primarily Islamic, and dog in the Gold Coast).

The Hauka movement evolved from and was incorporated into different contexts, both colonial (French and British) and traditional (*Bori* religion of the Hausa and the *holey* spirit pantheon of the Songhay/Zarma). This chapter will deal with the Hauka movement in these different contexts. Section 3.2 will go into further detail about the evolution of the movement itself, including how the colonial administration reacted to the movement. Section 3.3 will deal with the film *Les maîtres fous*, and what reactions it inspired. In section 3.4 I will discuss with the more theoretical aspects of the Hauka cult concerning mimicry, mockery and resistance, linking these with the concepts discussed in the theoretical section 1.3. Lastly, section 3.5 will conclude and review the main arguments made in this chapter.

3.2. The Evolution of the Hauka Movement

3.2.1. Socio-political Context

The Hauka movement emerged in the rural district of Filingue in Niger in 1925. The French colonial forces had already been established in the area for roughly two decades and, as elaborated in chapter 2, had implemented a number of policies. Of all of the effects of the French colonisation of Niger, the policies of tax-collection and forced labour had the most impact on the daily life of the population in rural areas. These rural people were particularly condemned to a situation of poverty and powerlessness[147] as there were less economic and educational opportunities in these areas. This created a strong feeling of resentment towards the French amongst the rural population.[148]

After 1922, when the French formally established civilian (as opposed to military) colonial rule in Niger, more effort was put into the structural implementation of the aforementioned policies. Fuglestad argues that Niger, compared to other French colonies, had an especially pragmatic and down-to-earth attitude in the implementation of administrative matters because of its constant lack of (senior) personnel.[149] This pragmatic attitude could also translate to a harsher implantation of the colonial rules and policies as a means of keeping the population under control despite the colonisers' lack in numbers.

Furthermore, the decade of the 1920's was particularly harsh for the Nigerien population. The colonial authorities increased taxes per capita and on products and they deployed new forced labour forces in order to provide infrastructure of the new capital. Furthermore, the decade went through severe periods of drought and famine.[150] Therefore, the Nigerien population was under exceptional strain, which was once again felt most amongst the people in the rural areas, creating the perfect context for the emergence of a new form of resistance to French colonialism.

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[147] Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 104.
[148] Ibidem, 103.
[149] Fuglestad, *A History of Niger*, 119.
[150] Ibidem, 127-133.

3.2.2. The Beginning of the Hauka Movement

The beginning of the Hauka movement can be traced back to Chibo, a Sudie (group within the Hausa) priestess who was possessed by a European female spirit in the village of Toudou Anza in northern Arewa.[151] From there the movement gained momentum and spread to the regions around Filingue, causing distress first of all amongst the local population and the chiefs. As noted by Rouch in an interview:

> When the cult first appeared in Niger in 1925, the priests of the traditional religion were violently against it because, for example, when the priests were asking Dongo, the thunder god, to speak of rain, all the Hauka were coming and shouting and speaking of something other than the requests of the chiefs of the village. So, the chiefs complained to the French administrators.[152]

The French administration also became worried about the movement. In a political report, written in 1925, a French colonial official wrote about the Hauka movement for the first time:

> It is good to point out a kind of crazy wind that originated in the east that blew over the Kourfey [also known as Filingue] and Tondigandia cantons last July. In most of the villages young people in the guise of "bori" (spirit possession genies, in Haoussa) had formed groups that parodied our military institutions. They played majors, captains, lieutenants all the way down to the bottom of the hierarchical ladder. Everyone amused themselves by drilling with well fashioned minuscule wood rifles. A woman, the sister of Dangalamdia of Chikal, had been the instigator of the movement, explicitly directed against us(!). Elsewhere, certain natives spread the gossip that one had to cut the throats of all chickens to please Allah and that mosques had to be taken into the bush, and that sexual promiscuity had to exist. The origin of this movement and these rumours is unknown. After the commander of the circle learned of these facts, several

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[151] Fuglestad, *A History of Niger*, 128; Echard, "Cultes de Possession et Changement Social," 97; Adeline Masquelier, *Prayer has Spoiled Everything: Possession, Power, and Identity in an Islamic Town of Niger* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2001): 164.
[152] Rouch, "Jean Rouch Talks About his Films to John Marshall and John W. Adams," 1007.

> punishments were announced and several palabres sufficed to bring complete calm to the situation.[153]

Here we see that the officials were aware of the parodic elements directed at the colonial institutions. They also downplay the seriousness of the movement by accrediting it to a 'crazy wind,' 'rumours,' and viewing it as a form of 'amusement.' Yet, at the same time, they felt the need to quiet the movement quickly by punishing the subordinates and outlawing the practice, as the French officials normally would in the face of any type of resistance.

The situation was not completely subdued however, and in 1927 further agitations arose in Filingue. The Hauka "sect," still led by Chibo, had grown stronger in numbers by that time. Besides resisting the French administration by embodying their power and parodying their military institutions, the Hauka mediums promoted open dissidence by refusing to pay taxes, disobeying the chiefs or refusing to carry out forced labour.[154] As a reaction, the commander of the district, Croccichia, rounded up and imprisoned about sixty Hauka mediums, including Chibo. The story goes that Croccichia left the Hauka followers without food or water in their cells for three days. When he brought them out, they danced and became possessed by their spirits. When they were asked where the Hauka were, Chibo replied that there were no Hauka, and soon the entire group were saying: "There are no Hauka."[155] After this incident, the Hauka mediums were punished, and several of the main instigators of the movement were expelled to the Ivory Coast.

Following these events of 1927, many of the Hauka mediums migrated to the Gold Coast along with a large part of the population who were migrating towards the south in search of better livelihoods. The Hauka movement lost its momentum in Niger after 1927, however, new altercations arose in 1937 in Tondigandia with migrant Hauka mediums who had returned from the Gold

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[153] Anonymous, "Affair des Baboule," Rapport Politique Annuel de Cercle de Niamey, (1925). Dossier 5, pieces 5, Vincennes: Archives de Services Historique d'Armee. Quoted in and translated by Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 117.
[154] Fuglestad, *A History of Niger*, 129.
[155] According to Alhadji Mohammadou, Rouch's informant, quoted in Rouch, *La Religion et la Magie Songhay*, 73-74.

Coast and were once again subdued with disciplinary measures.[156] Nicole Echard argues that the Hauka sprits were absorbed into the traditional religious sphere for the most part by 1940.[157] In a different colonial context, the Gold Coast, the Hauka movement gained a cult status.[158]

3.2.3. Migration to the Gold Coast

In order to escape the harsh colonial situation in Niger, many locals migrated to the Gold Coast as seasonal labourers, where there were better job opportunities and less strict colonial policies by the British. Rouch traces the first appearance of the Hauka movement in the Gold Coast back to 1929,[159] which started in Asuom and quickly spread to Kumasi and Accra (the country's capital).[160] It was predominantly migrants of the Zarma/Songhay ethnic group that travelled to the Gold Coast. Those migrants who were Hauka mediums brought their spirits with them.

The movement quickly became rather popular in the Gold Coast. This surge in popularity is also attributed to the influence and popularity of Ousmane Fodé, a high priest of the Hauka cult, who died in 1943. After his death the Hauka cult did not completely disappear, although it did lose popularity.[161]

Until 1935, the Hauka had performed their rituals without any incidents or problems with the British colonial administration. This changed after a dispute between a Hausa woman and a Hauka medium, which resulted in the outlawing of Hauka rituals by the British authorities.[162] According to Tyirni Gao, an informant of Rouch, the banishment of the performance of Hauka ceremonies lasted for forty days, after which Ousmane Fodé called a meeting which became a possession dance:

> The celebration began about seven o'clock in the morning, but at noon the police arrested everyone. That evening, a guitar player played in the prison. The Hauka possessed their dancers. They broke down the prison door and

[156] Olivier de Sardan, *Sociétés Sonay-Zarma*, 284.
[157] Echard, "Cultes de Possession et Changement Social," 98.
[158] Rouch, "Migrations au Ghana," 177-178, Fuglestad, *A History of Niger*, 130.
[159] Rouch, "Migrations au Ghana," 176.
[160] Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 126.
[161] Ibidem, 132.
[162] Ibidem, 127.

> escaped. Then, that same night, two fires broke out. In Koforidua the church burned, half the village of Kibi burned, and eight Hauka dancers were killed; the governor of the Gold Coast became alarmed—Is it because we arrested the Hauka that in only one night there have been so many accidents? Who are these Hauka?—The governor ordered Ousmane Fodé and Amani to explain what the Hauka were. The governor authorised them to have a place in Nsawam, Accra, and Akwatia. In this way the Hauka remained in the Gold Coast.[163]

Furthermore, Hauka ceremonies were designated to specific days, namely Saturdays and Sundays. As the Hauka cult was no longer banned, it was therefore tolerated in the British colonial society, although with certain restrictions on when and where the rituals could be performed.

The fact that the Hauka movement was allowed by the British government did not necessarily mean however that the rituals were positively viewed by all strata of society. As Stoller states: 'The autochthonous populations of the southern Gold Coast found Hauka ceremonies bestial, a similar reaction to that of the established religious orders in Niger.'[164] An explanation for this may be that the indigenous population of the Gold Coast carried a fear of foreign religions, which were seen as illegitimate and disruptive to traditional tribal authority. This was rooted in the historical conflict with the Aberewa, an anti-witchcraft movement, in the early twentieth century.[165] Another explanation could be that the Hauka put people off because of its violent and crude characteristics which were associated with inappropriate sexual behaviour. Despite these disapprovals on the part of the local population, the movement remained in the Gold Coast until the late 1950's, when all changed because of changes in the political sphere brought on by decolonisation.

3.2.4. The End of the Hauka

There has been quite some debate amongst the academics considering the size and impact of the Hauka movement as well as when it ended. Most agree that the

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[163] Rouch, "Migrations au Ghana," 176. Quoted in and translated by Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 127.
[164] Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 128-129.
[165] John Parker, "Witchcraft, Anti-Witchcraft and Trans-Regional Ritual Innovation in Early Colonial Ghana: Sakrabundi and Aberewa, 1889-1910," *Journal of African History* 45 (2004), 417.

heyday of the movement was between the 1930's and 1950's, particularly in the Gold Coast. Rouch suggests that there were at least 30 000 practicing Hauka mediums in Accra alone at the time the movie *Les maîtres fous* was made in 1954.[166] During that time the number of Hauka practitioners in Niger seems to have practically disappeared according to the literature, only to return after the Gold Coast became independent. The exact numbers are impossible to know, however, I have made a rough estimate of the size and popularity of the movement over the years in graph 2 below.

When the Gold Coast became independent in 1957, migration became more regulated and many migrants from Niger returned to their home country. Amongst them were also the Hauka mediums. Stoller argues that these mediums carried on their traditions and spirit possession back home and that here the movement retained its relevance, even after decolonisation. According to him, the leaders of Niger took over the roles of the colonisers in their behaviour, which is why the Hauka ceremonies still remained meaningful for the locals even



Graph 2. The size/popularity of the Hauka cult between 1920 and 1980, rough estimates based on academic literature. The Hauka movement first arose in Niger in 1925, after which it went through periods of repression, caused by its banning by the French authorities, as well as periods of increase. After 1927 there is little mention of the Hauka movement in primary and academic sources with the exception of small uprisings in 1937 and 1941. The migration of Hauka mediums started the evolution of the movement in the Gold Coast in 1929. It continually gained popularity before briefly becoming banned by the British authorities in 1935. The following period was the height of the movement, which lasted until 1943. After this period, it slowly diminished in popularity in the Gold Coast before its drastic decline beginning in 1957. As migrants who were Hauka mediums returned to Niger, the movement once again gained more ground there, before slowly becoming incorporated into traditional religions.

[166] Rouch, "Jean Rouch Talks About his Films to John Marshall and John W. Adams," 1007.

after the 1980's and will probably not lose their importance.[167] However, at present we can see that this is not the case as the Hauka spirits have ceased to exist as a family of spirits in its own right.

According to Rouch, although the Hauka movement didn't disappear, it lost its value and meaning once colonialism ended.[168] In this sense it was strictly a colonial phenomenon and slowly disappeared in the background of a new world order without colonialism. The spirits themselves were assimilated into traditional spheres of spirit possession. This brings us back to the introduction of this chapter in which I briefly mention the *bori* religion and the *holey* spirits, which would be the traditional spheres of spirit possession the Hauka would have assimilated into. Although these two animist practices seemingly belong to different societies and different religions, the Hauka spirits assimilated into both of them in surprisingly similar ways and with surprisingly similar functions. Considering the *bori*, Echard states 'From the 1940's, the *babule* spirits (another term for Hauka) became institutionalised spirits of the *bori*, specialized in the fight against human witchcraft.'[169] Comparing this to when we regard the Hauka cult as an addition to the *holey* cult, we find large similarities. The different holey spirits families have certain specialities in specific fields regarding the resolution of problems. The speciality of the Hauka spirits are matters dealing with witchcraft.[170]

[167] Stoller, "Horrific Comedy," 185.
[168] Rouch, "Jean Rouch Talks About his Films to John Marshall and John W. Adams," 1008.
[169] Echard, "Cultes de Possession et Changement Social," 98, own translation. Original quote: 'A partir de années 1940, les genies babule sont devenues des genies du *bori* institutionnel, spécialisés dans la lutte contre la sorcellerie humaine.'
[170] Henley, "Spirit Possession, Power, and the Absent Presence of Islam," 753.

3.3. *Les maîtres fous*

3.3.1. *Les maîtres fous*

Members of the Hauka cult asked Rouch to film their annual ceremony—in order to have recording to use in future rituals—after viewing his movies and lecture at the British Council in Accra.[171] The film *Les maîtres fous*, which was filmed in 1954, depicts a Hauka festival and ceremony, held in the capital of the Gold Coast, Accra. The movie opens with shots from daily life in the capital city of the Gold Coast, Accra. Rouch films and describes migrants from Niger, with many different types of professions. He then goes on to shoot the Hauka festival. The migrants gather at the compound of a priest of the Hauka cult, Mounkaiba, about an hour drive and an hour walk away from the city. The ritual contains quite horrific and provocative elements, such as mediums frothing at the mouth, moving erratically, violently beating, sacrificing animals—including a goat, a chicken and a dog—eating of dog meat and drinking of its blood. The Hauka festival lasts for a day or two, after which the Hauka mediums return to their "normal" lives.

Rouch hints at the connotation between the Hauka rituals and British colonialism in the Gold Coast, but he does not go into much depth on this subject. There is one scene where Rouch cuts from the trance of the Hauka spirits to a

Figure 6. (Left) Jean Rouch, dir., still from *Les maîtres fous*. "The cracking of an egg over the governor's statue," Henley, "Spirit Possession, Power, and the Absent Presence of Islam," 741.

Figure 7. (Right) Jean Rouch, dir., still from *Les maîtres fous*. "The British governor arriving at an event in Accra," Henley, "Spirit Possession, Power, and the Absent Presence of Islam," 741.

[171] Nick Eaton, ed. *Anthropology-Reality-Cinema: The Films of Jean Rouch* (London: British Film Institute, 1979), 6.

scene of the British governor arriving at an event in Accra, in which he compares the cracking of an egg over a statue of the governor during the trance with the plumage of the real governor's cap.

In his closing remarks, returning to the setting of the bustling city life in Accra, Rouch states: 'When comparing these smiles with the contortions of yesterday, one really wonders whether these men of Africa have found a panacea against mental disorders. One wonders whether they may have found a way to absorb our inimical society.'[172] In this statement, Rouch criticises Western society, also suggesting that there may be other alternatives to Western scientific medicine. He suggests that the Hauka ceremonies have a therapeutic value for the mediums—they are able to live normal lives under the pressure of colonialism due to their outlet in performing the rituals.

Figure 8. "Jean Rouch filming *Les maîtres fous,*" accessed on 3-5-2019, https://www.rexbern.ch/filme/les-maitres-fous/.

3.3.2. Reactions to *Les maîtres fous*

The film *Les maîtres fous* was intended for private use and educational purposes by the Hauka mediums. However, Rouch claims that when he showed the film to them, the mediums, seeing themselves being possessed by spirits, 'went into

[172] Jean Rouch, dir., *Les maîtres fous,* internet archive, (Paris: Les Films de la Pléiade; United States: McGraw-Hill Films/Contemporary Films, 1956), https://archive.org/details/lesmaitresfous.

trance [and] did so in an uncontrollable and almost dangerous way.'[173] He therefore could not screen the movie in the British colonies, although several years after he was able to screen the movie in rural villages in Ghana and in Niger, receiving positive feedback.

Besides being shown in an African context, the film *Les maîtres fous* also brought the topic of Hauka spirit possession closer to a Western audience. In doing so, it caused quite a controversy amongst European civilians and African students in the metropoles when it was first screened in 1955 at the Musée de l'Homme in Paris. Rouch's critique of Western society and openness to other cultures was not always understood in his films. Marcel Griaule, a pioneer in the field of ethnographic studies and Rouch's mentor, was highly disturbed by the film, he called it 'a "travesty" and urged Rouch to destroy it.'[174]

The film was banned in Great Britain '… because of British censorship which equated the picture of the governor with an insult to the queen and to her authority.'[175] African students found the film to be harmful to their own dignity because of reinforced stereotypes of savagery and primitivism.[176] Specifically, Ferguson argues that the film obscured African students' attempts to become full members of a (modern) world society.[177] Here follow some other examples of racialised statements that were made by members of a Western audience after viewing the film. In an interview with Rouch for a piece called "Role de Techniciens du Cinéma," written for the monthly bulletin *Informations Sociales*, he states that a member of the audience in a viewing of the film in the United States complimented him for capturing the inherent barbarism of the black savages very well.[178] In another interview, Rouch states that the Senegalese director Blaise Senghor told him that after the screening of *Les maîtres fous* in

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[173] Rouch, "Jean Rouch Talks About his Films to John Marshall and John W. Adams," 1009.
[174] Kien Ket Lim, "Of Mimicry and White Man: A Psychoanalysis of Jean Rouch's *Les maîtres fous*," *Cultural Critique* 51, no. 1 (2002), 40.
[175] Rouch, "Jean Rouch Talks About his Films to John Marshall and John W. Adams," 1009.
[176] Rouch, "Jean Rouch Talks About his Films to John Marshall and John W. Adams," 1009; Eaton, ed, *Anthropology-Reality-Cinema*, 6; Eric Gable, "An Anthropologist's (New?) Dress Code: Some Brief Comments on a Comparative Cosmopolitanism," *Cultural Anthropology* 17, no. 4 (2002), 574.
[177] Ferguson, "Of Mimicry and Membership," 557, 559.
[178] Marcel Reguilhem, "Role de Techniciens du Cinéma," In *Informations Sociales: Bulletin Mensuel à l'Usage des Services Sociaux* (Paris: Union Nationale des Caisses d'Allocations Familiales, 1960), 66.

Paris, other members of the audience looked at him and commented: "Here's another one who is going to eat a dog!"[179] Therefore, many actors criticised Rouch because they did not comprehend the meaning of the film or his intentions behind it. Muller argues that the film should be seen as a complement to ethnographic work on the Hauka movement by Rouch. The film by itself lacks sociological, political, religious and cultural context necessary to properly understand the Hauka rituals.[180]

Generally, we see that despite the intentions of the filmmaker, Rouch works within a specific discourse that is not entirely free yet from colonial connotations, which therefore also has an effect on how the film was viewed and how it was received. The colonial discourse, based on racial differences, dictates the context in which the film can be perceived. Thus, even though Rouch attempts to criticise this racial inequality, the viewers can often only see the film within this racialised context, which therefore heightens the racial inequalities.

[179] Dan Yakir and Jean Rouch, "*Ciné-Transe*: The Vision of Jean Rouch: An Interview." *Film Quarterly* 31, no. 3 (1978), 3.
[180] Muller, "Review of *Les maîtres fous*," 1472-1473.

3.4. Mimicry, Mockery and Resistance

3.4.1. Mimicry and the Hauka Spirits

As previously mentioned, the Hauka spirits resemble, portray and therefore mimic European colonial figures. They copy the Europeans through the use of certain attributes, clothing, language and behaviour. By copying the Europeans, the Hauka spirits are able to understand, or grasp, a sense of their identity. In this understanding, the spirits have the capacity to Other, which is what Taussig means by the mimetic faculty:[181] 'Here is what is crucial in the resurgence of the mimetic faculty, namely the two-layered notion of mimesis that is involved—a copying or imitation, and a palpable, sensuous connection between the very body of the perceiver and the perceived.'[182] The power of mimicry therefore lies not only in the achievement of the act of copying but also through the connection between the one who is mimicked and the mimicker.

Through the connection achieved in mimicry, the Hauka spirits are able to appropriate the European power and use it within their own local context. 'Mimesis operates strategically in colonial contexts, as a means both of relating the self to others and of usurping others' power.'[183] The mimicry in the case of the Hauka spirits does not only serve as a strategic tool to appropriate the colonisers' power. It is important to note that the way in which the Hauka spirits imitate the Europeans is not done in a respectful manner in which the African Other tries to become as "pass" as a European coloniser. In the eyes of the European, the Hauka medium was never taken seriously as a civilised "European" counterpart, despite their European performance. This is where the aspect of mimicry, namely mockery, plays an important role.

3.4.2. Mockery/Parody

The Hauka spirits did not simply mimic the European colonisers; they also parodied the colonial institutions through their absurd imitations. As mentioned in section 1.3, parody deprives the dominant party of its hegemonic status by

[181] Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 40.
[182] Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity*, 21.
[183] Huggan, "(Post)Colonialism, Anthropology, and the Magic of Mimesis," 93.

questioning its essentialist characteristic of dominance.[184] The Hauka mediums therefore criticised the normalised power relations and colonial binary of coloniser and colonised through the parodic elements in their rituals.

One must question whether it was the Hauka mediums' intentions to mock. Henley argues that the Hauka mediums claim that it was never their intent to actually mock the Europeans.[185] We can never know for certain, but the purpose of the Hauka movement may not have been to mock colonial institutions. However, this does not diminish the meaning of how the Hauka movement was interpreted by a Western audience, which often concerned the element of mockery.[186]

3.4.3. Colonial Resistance

Colonialism can be seen as an attack to the cultural identity of Africans in general. The system uprooted traditional spheres of power and supplanted them with those of the colonisers. In this sense the Hauka movement can be seen as a means of combining the two spheres and appropriating power in a traditional manner. Therefore, it is a 'symbolic means to protect the vital links to their ancestors, the essence of their cultural identity.'[187] In order to make sense of the situation of colonisation and their new position within the society, the Hauka mediums expressed their unhappiness within a religious framework, as the political framework was in a large sense unavailable.[188]

Sharpe defines colonial resistance as: 'an effect of the contradictory representation of colonial authority, a native appropriation of its ambivalent strategies of power.'[189] The Hauka movement resisted the colonial authorities in several different ways. Firstly, this happened in an overt sense when the movement first emerged in 1925 and during the subsequent years in Niger. At this time the Hauka mediums formed their own villages and refused to pay tax or

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[184] Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 176.
[185] Henley, "Spirit Possession, Power and the Absent Presence of Islam," 753. Henley bases his argument on the following interview with Jean Rouch: Dan Georgakas, Udayan Gupta, Judy Janda and Jean Rouch, "The Politics of Visual Anthropology: An Interview with Jean Rouch," *Cinéaste* 8, no. 4 (1978): 16-24.
[186] See for example Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*; Stoller, "Horrific Comedy."
[187] Stoller, "Horrific Comedy," 167.
[188] Muller, "Review of *Les maîtres fous*," 1473; Olivier de Sardan, *Sociétés Sonay-Zarma*, 283.
[189] Sharpe, "Figures of Colonial Resistance," 145.

do forced labour. The French found in the Hauka '… the presence of an open dissidence, a society, the members of which openly defied the social, political and religious order. It is here that we discover the most original aspect of the Hauka movement: their total refusal of the system put into place by the French.'[190] This form of colonial resistance did not last long however as its was quickly repressed by the French forces.

The Hauka movement is also seen as a form of colonial resistance in a more subtle way—through parody and appropriation: 'By mocking Europeans, Hauka members denaturalised and contested their authority; by seizing on white cultural forms and ritually stealing their powers, they appropriated colonial power within the terms of their own cultural system.'[191] The movement addresses power relations between the colonisers and the colonised, forcing the viewers to rethink the relations between the two. Referring back to the definition of resistance by Sharpe described above, we see that the Hauka movement represent the colonial authority in their own terms, and in a manner which is different to the way the colonisers want to be represented. In their appropriation of colonial power they resist the colonial order, rethink strategies of power and show a sense of agency.

[190] Fuglestad, "Les Hauka," 205. Quoted in and translated by Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 119.
[191] Ferguson, "Of Mimicry and Membership," 554.

3.5. Conclusion

The main point in this chapter is that the Hauka movement pertain their agency through its mimetic faculty. Now that I have linked the colonial context to the Hauka movement and answered the sub question of how the movement can be seen as a form of cultural resistance, I will move on to the discourse analysis of the primary sources.

In the following chapter I will focus on the perception and reception of the Hauka movement in order to analyse how the movement effected the colonial discourse and what its effects were as a form of resistance to colonialism. Furthermore, I will analyse whether the differences between French and British colonial discourse can be identified in the primary sources.

CHAPTER 4.
ANALYSIS

4.1. Introduction

In order to test whether the Hauka movement as a form of resistance had any effect on the colonial discourse between 1925 and the 1980's I will conduct a critical discourse analysis. For this purpose, I have chosen sixteen primary sources concerning the Hauka movement or animist religions, which portray the mainstream discourse from the perception of the colonial authorities or the citizens in the metropoles. In my analysis I research how the movement is portrayed, whether it is successful in resisting and thereby changing the dominant colonial discourse and whether this happened differently in the French colonial discourse and the British colonial discourse.

Based on my findings in chapter 2 regarding colonial discourse, I have formed a preliminary model which will guide my discourse analysis. The lingual markers ascribed to colonial discourse are described thoroughly in table 2. The markers of colonial discourse will be present in both types of discourse, the French one based on assimilation and the British one based on difference.

Colonial Discourse	Discourse based on Assimilation	Discourse based on Difference
Primitive Backwards Lack of intelligence Barbaric Savage Stress on inequality between Europeans and Africans – Europeans are described positively and Africans are described negatively	No distinction between different spheres of civilisation (European and African) No tolerance for traditional practices Traditional practices are given no context	Emphasis on different spheres of civilisation (European versus African) Tolerance for traditional practices More context available

Table 2. Linguistic markers in colonial discourse

Furthermore, I believe that the colonial discourse, conveying negative messages about the colonial Other will be most predominant in the articles until roughly 1945, which is when the discourse began to lose its dominant standing as I have argued in chapter 2.

As discussed in chapter 1, the research method that is used here is critical discourse analysis. By using the markers described in table 2 I am able to analyse each primary source and determine the extent of colonial discourse present, how this has changed over time and whether there was a difference between the French and British cases.

Due to a lack of primary sources dealing specifically with the Hauka movement, I expanded the search of my scope to include newspaper articles that simply mention animism in more general terms and from other areas in West Africa. As the Hauka movement is a form of animist belief, the inclusion of these primary sources is enough to make conclusions about what the discourse surrounding the movement would entail and the specific place of the Hauka movement in that context.

4.2. Analysis

4.2.1. Reactions to the Hauka Movement: Colonial Administration

When the Hauka movement first came to attention to the French colonial administrators in Niger, they realised its potential for colonial resistance.[192] As is portrayed by the fragments from primary sources 1, 2, 3 and 6 (see table 3), the French administrators recognised the potential the Hauka movement had as a form of resistance. Especially in Niger, the movement promoted open dissidence by forming separate communities that refused to pay taxes, honour agreements of forced labour or obey the chiefs. Besides this type of resistance, which was overtly political, the administrators also realised that the Hauka promoted a more covert form of symbolic resistance through their spirit possession rituals in which they parodied and mimicked their military institutions.

Primary Source	Descriptions of Hauka movement	Reaction to the Hauka movement
1. Anonymous, "Affair des Baboule," in Rapport Politique Annuel de Cercle de Niamey, (1925).	'crazy wind' 'parodied our military institutions' 'explicitly directed against us' 'sexual promiscuity'	'several punishments were announced and several palabres sufficed to bring complete calm to the situation'
2. Anonymous, Rapport Politique Annuel de Cercle du Niamey, (1926).	'spirit of individualism and insubordination' 'opposition' 'agitation is aggravated'	
3. Scheurer, Rapport de Tournée dans le Canton de Kourfey, (1927).	'serious trouble' 'a sect that copies our administration and wants to supplant our authority' 'Chibo goes into trance, preaches insubordination, invites non-payment of taxes and work refusals' 'Census: no one [cooperates]'	'The energetic guards and the cavalry of Mayaki (the Kourfey canton chief) corrected the Sudies.' 'Several of the ring leaders were exiled for 10 years in the Ivory Coast.'
6. Brachet, Historique de Filingue: Carnet Monographique de Filingue, (1937).	'a fetishist agitation that troubled the inhabitants' 'they refused to budge' 'open opposition'	'punished … with disciplinary sentences.' 'given a disciplinary sentence and the affair ended there.'

Table 3. Discourse analysis: summary of discourse in primary sources 1, 2, 3 and 6 (colonial administration)

[192] Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 119.

Following a mainly negative description of this insubordination and agitation, the administrators stated how they quickly calmed the situation by handing out punishments, jailing and exiling the main perpetrators in primary source 1, 3 and 6. By outlawing the Hauka movement, the administrators claimed to put a stop to the unrest. However, the movement returned each year and amplified in 1927, after which the French once again punished the mediums severely. Seemingly the Hauka movement lost its force in Niger after these efforts, as there is little mention of it in primary sources from then until 1937 (primary source 6). In 1937, the movement once again gained more followers in Niger following the return of a Hauka medium from the Gold Coast and was once again quickly terminated by French authorities. There was therefore no tolerance for the Hauka movement in the colony of Niger.

I would argue that the Hauka movement was in its essence successful as an anti-colonial movement due to the fact that the French administrators saw it as a threat and quickly attempted to diminish the numbers of followers every time the movement arose. Even though the French claimed every time that they settled the situation, it kept coming back. I would therefore question the reliability of these sources as they would more likely highlight the successes of the colonial authorities and not their failings. However, it is impossible to say to what extent the movement remained in Niger I could not find any sources from the colonial subjects' point of view relating to this subject. These would offer a more complete picture on the events that took place in the late 1920's in Niger.

Unfortunately, I could not find any sources from the British colonials' point of view relating to the emergence of the Hauka movement in the Gold Coast and therefore cannot form a comparison between the reactions of the French and British colonial administrations. As discussed in section 3.2.3 dealing with the migration of the Hauka movement to the Gold Coast, according to an informant of Jean Rouch, Tyirni Gao, the British colonial administration also jailed and outlawed the Hauka movement in 1935. This only happened about six years after the Hauka mediums had been practising in the region and after a specific incident between a Hauka medium and another inhabitant. After this incident the British colonial government initially acted in a similar manner to the French colonial government by outlawing and punishing the Hauka mediums by

jailing them. This changed however, after the mediums broke out of prison during at spirit possession trance and supposedly caused two fires, illustrating their power. As a reaction to this show of force, the British governor in Accra allowed the Hauka mediums to practice their rituals in specific areas and on specific days of the week. The British colonial administration therefore showed more tolerance towards the traditional practices of the Hauka and it appeared that they hardly gave these practices any second thoughts. In this sense the Hauka performed less of an overt resistance towards the British administration as it was not recognised as a dangerous practice directed at the colonial administration per se.

4.2.2. Reactions to the Hauka Movement: Citizens in Metropole

The reason I argue that the British colonial administration or British citizens were not bothered by the movement is due to the fact that the movement is hardly mentioned in any British newspaper and when it is, this is only done so in relation to the film *Les maîtres fous*.[193] French newspapers do mention the movement by name more often, however this also often happens in relation to the film by Jean Rouch. Therefore, this section will predominantly analyse the reactions the *Les maîtres fous* as discussed in detail in section 3.3.2.

When members of the audience in the film say that Rouch has captured the barbaric nature and savagery of the Africans very well and call Blaise Senghor, "another one who will eat a dog," simply because he is black, we acknowledge that the colonial discourse is enforced by the viewing of the film. In this light, I would argue that the Hauka movement (and Jean Rouch) does not succeed in resisting the colonial discourse. If anything, it does the opposite. The movie confirms present racial stereotypes in the colonial discourse, by forming grounds on which the spectators can base their racist comments.

The critique of *Les maîtres fous* by the African students follows this logic. They felt that the film was reinforcing racial stereotypes on primitivism as

[193] As is the case in primary source 11. Colin Legum, "Negro Culture in Revolt: Black Orpheus," *The Observer*, August 30, 1959. Note that this is the only British source out of seven that actually mentions the Hauka movement specifically.

opposed to challenging them.[194] Here we see once again that the Hauka movement was not challenging the colonial discourse in the way it was received and perceived by its Western audience in practice. As a form of colonial resistance, it would follow that it was not fulfilling its desired effect of forcing the colonisers to rethink the relationship with their colonial subjects through mimicking members of the colonial administration.

When citizens in the metropole describe the Hauka movement as 'brutal,' 'disgusting,' 'violent,' 'horrific' and 'savage,' they did not seem to realise, or maybe forgot that the Hauka spirits did not represent Africans but were in fact mimicking the colonisers. As such, it would follow that the citizens were calling their own colonial system and members 'brutal,' 'disgusting,' 'violent,' 'horrific' and 'savage.' However, this mimicking aspect of the Hauka movement seems to be forgotten in practice.

Most primary sources seem to ignore the characteristics of mimicry and mockery, and when it is mentioned it is quickly brushed aside as something that is not relevant. An example of this can be found in the newspaper article by André Blanchet called ""*Les maîtres fous*" de Jean Rouch" (primary source 8). Although Blanchet praises the film for winning the first prize at the Venice Film Festival, he also characterises the scenes and rituals in the film as having 'an impressively brutal character,' being 'extraordinarily violent' and 'disgusting.'[195] Furthermore he comments:

> The strange thing is that [they were not possessed] by any of the old divinities of the African bush, but by the characters of colonial mythology: the governor, the general, the captain and even the sergeant... He [the possessed medium] even takes it upon himself to decide whether the dog will be eaten raw or boiled, a decision to be made at the "Table Conference," inspired by the most modern British tradition.[196]

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[194] Rouch, "Jean Rouch Talks About his Films to John Marshall and John W. Adams," 1009; Eaton, ed, *Anthropology-Reality-Cinema*, 6; Eric Gable, "An Anthropologist's (New?) Dress Code," 574.
[195] André Blanchet, ""Les maîtres fous" de Jean Rouch," *Le Monde*, October 31, 1957, own translation. Original quotes: 'un caractère de brutalité impressionnant;' 'les rites extraordinairement violents;' 'dégoûtant.'
[196] Ibidem, own translation. Original quote: 'L'étrange, c'est que ce ne soit par aucune des vieilles divinités de la brousse africaine, mais par les personnages de la mythologie coloniale: le gouverneur, le général, le capitaine, et jusqu'au sergent… Il se tient même, pour décider si le

Even though Blanchet recognises the Hauka spirits and rituals as mimicking elements of European colonialism, he uses several linguistic techniques in this passage in order to downplay the importance and meaning of the mimicry. For one, he calls it strange that the Hauka movement mimics colonisers instead of 'old divinities from the African bush.' In doing so he stresses the unusualness of this phenomenon, essentially undermining the link between spirit possession and colonial figures whilst at the same time marking it as less important. Secondly, by referring to colonialism as a mythology, he undercuts colonialism's historic relevance and validity as a phenomenon that suppressed a large part of Africa. Finally, there is a general tone of surprise and disbelief in this section of the newspaper article. After briefly mentioning the acts of mimicry Blanchet seems to quickly continue his discussion without giving the mimicking aspect too much thought.

The concept and power of mimicry and its link to the Hauka movement seems to remain in the realm of academic discourse and are not made known amongst the public. In the dominant discourse of the citizens in general, racial ideologies belonging to the colonial discourse remain most prominent. Authors of the newspapers conform the discussion on the Hauka movement to fit the stereotype of the African Other. The performativity and the colonial discourse influenced how the colonisers received and perceived the movement. Furthermore, by denying the Hauka movement the recognition of its mimetic faculty, from which it obtains its power, the citizens in the metropole also remove its power and its effect on the colonial discourse at the same time.

4.2.3. Presence of Colonial Discourse

A critical discourse analysis of the primary sources on the tone of discourse concerning the Hauka movement and animist beliefs more in general reveals information about the how present the colonial discourse was and whether this changed over time. The manner in which I conducted the analysis was by examining each primary source and evaluating how prominent markers of colonial discourse were in each one. Negative markers were also weighed

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chien sera mangé cru ou bouilli, une "conférence de la Table rende" inspire de la tradition britannique la plus moderne.'

Primary Source No.	Negative	Somewhat Negative	Neutral	Somewhat Positive	Positive	Not Applicable
1.	0					
2.		0				
3.	0					
4.	0					
5.		0				
6.	0					
7.						0
8.	0					
9.	0					
10.					0	
11.			0			
12.		0				
13.				0		
14.			0			
15.				0		
16.		0				

Table 4. Discourse analysis: tone of discourse concerning the Hauka movement/animist beliefs in general

against positive linguistic markers, creating an overall evaluation which can be found in table 4. A negative assessment alludes to stronger presence of colonial discourse whereas a positive assessment would mean that the colonial discourse is weaker in these cases. This means that fewer of the markers of colonial discourse mentioned in table 2 would be present in the texts.

A general trend towards negativity can be recognised in the first nine primary sources with a major shift taking place starting in source ten which dates to the year 1958. Primary source number 10, "Notes to Editor," is in fact a direct response to primary source number 9, a British newspaper article which remarks that animists were primitive: 'Like India, Nigeria's people are divided by language (there are scores of different tongues) and religion (about half Muslim, a fifth Christian and the remainder primitive animists.'[197] Primary source number 10 responds to this judgement and Kennedy states: 'I am dismayed to

[197] "Independence for a Giant," *The Observer*, November 2, 1958.



Religion in Nigeria

Sir,—Your valuable feature "The Week" (November 2) says that those Nigerians who are not Christians or Muslims are "primitive animists."

As one who much appreciates your great paper, I am dismayed to see such a glib phrase in use to-day, when the fallacy of animism has long been recognised by those who have given their unbiased attention to the peoples of Nigeria. (See the work of Amoury Talbot, writing more than a generation ago, to mention only one reliable authority.)

Many of the Pagan religions or cults of Nigeria (and elsewhere in West Africa and the Congo) are backed by a deep and advanced philosophy, while in a few cases—as with the great Yoruba people of western Nigeria—they have existed in similar form for centuries, and their origin can be traced directly back to the religions and civilisation of Ancient Egypt.

ROBERT A. KENNEDY.

Brighton.

∴ We certainly meant no disrespect by describing those Nigerians who hold polytheistic and magical beliefs as "animists": the word—no doubt for want of a better—is in fact the official classification employed by the Colonial Office (see, for instance, the recently published Report of the Minorities Commission). Nor did we mean any disrespect by describing these beliefs as "primitive." Some cults have, of course, changed with the times, but, as Mr. Kennedy points out, many of them have remained unchanged in essence since remote antiquity. This surely justifies the use of the neutral-tinted word "primitive."

Figure 9. Primary source 10, newspaper clipping, Robert A. Kennedy, "Notes to Editor: Religion in Nigeria," *The Observer*, November 16, 1958.

see such a glib phrase in use today, when the fallacy of animism has long been recognised by those who have given their unbiased attention to the peoples of Nigeria.'[198] Judging by this primary source, which is more or less an attack of the colonial discourse, through the use of the words "glib phrase," "fallacy" and "unbiased attention," I would argue that the colonial discourse had already started becoming less dominant. This shift took place around the same time as the decolonisation process started. This took off in 1957 in the Gold Coast and quickly spread throughout the rest of West Africa in the next couple years.

4.2.4. Discourse Based on Assimilation or Difference

In addition to the recognition of the dominance and prevalence of the colonial discourse I analysed whether I could recognise a difference in the types of colonial discourse in the French and British cases. In order to do so I analysed the discourse by studying the linguistic markers of discourse based on assimilation and discourse based on difference as noted in table 2 on the following page.

In order to analyse the difference between the French and British primary sources I have separated the sources in the following two tables and marked which type of discourse was most prominent. In general, the different sources

[198] Robert A. Kennedy, "Notes to Editor: Religion in Nigeria," *The Observer*, November 16, 1958.

significantly convey different types of discourse based on the exact places where they were originally from.

The discourse based on assimilation is somewhat obscure to recognise as it is generally found in the lack of a focus on separate spheres of civilisation, being European and African. It was very rarely explicitly stated in texts that African society can and should strive to assimilate into European civilisation. Although this was the underlying ideology of civilisation, it was not necessarily the desired outcome as this outcome would have caused the justification for colonisation to be lost. An example of a primary source that typically marked colonial discourse based on assimilation is source eight, a newspaper article written in 1957 by André Blanchet. Blanchet states in this article: 'The Parisian public will know not to judge Africa in relation to the Sunday disturbances of a

Primary Source No.	Assimilation	Difference	Both	Neither
1.	0			
2.	0			
3.	0			
6.	0			
8.	0			
11.		0		
13.			0	
16.				0

Table 5. Discourse analysis: discourse based on assimilation or discourse based on difference in French primary sources

Primary Source No.	Assimilation	Difference	Both	Neither
4.			0	
5.		0		
7.				0
9.			0	
10.		0		
12.		0		
14.		0		
15.		0		

Table 6. Discourse analysis: discourse based on assimilation or discourse based on difference in British primary sources

restricted sect which would have no basis to represent the religion of the French according to the followers of the "Christ" of Montfavet.'[199] In this statement Blanchet claims that there is no longer any basis for representing the Christian religion of the French due to the actions and traditions of the Hauka mediums. Although the Hauka cult is described as a religion not belonging to the French sphere of civilisation, there is the underlying idea that there was a basis for Africans to represent the French religion in the first place. This would suggest that African society is judged by the same standards as French society and therefore belong to the same sphere of civilisation.

An example of a primary source which demarcates typical colonial discourse based on difference is primary source five. On the topic of education, Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore states in 1928: 'Education must be adapted to the genius and requirements of peoples in their own environment. It must not consist in forcing upon the youth of a country an alien tongue and an alien civilisation.'[200] In this newspaper article, Ormsby-Gore quite clearly argues that African society is something separate and different from European society. Therefore, education should be adapted to the different contexts. There is no single sphere of civilisation and African society should not strive to adapt to this type of civilisation nor should this "alien" civilisation be enforced upon African society. Difference is stressed within the colonial discourse in this manner, which is typical for the British primary sources.

[199] André Blanchet. ""Les maîtres fous" de Jean Rouch," *Le Monde*, October 31, 1957, own translation. Original quote: 'Le public parisien saura ne pas juger l'Afrique d'après les dérèglements dominicaux d'une secte restreinte qu'il n'y aurait de fondement à se représenter la religion des Français d'après les adeptes du "Christ" de Montfavet.'
[200] Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, "Education in West Africa: Insistent Demand: Adaptation to Native Environment," *The Times*, October 30, 1928.

4.3. Results

I have discerned four main findings from this analysis of the Hauka movement and its relation to the colonial discourse.

First of all, although the lack of primary sources specifically mentioning the Hauka movement itself—and when it is mentioned, often only in the context of the film *Les maîtres fous*—diminishes the strength of my research to some extent, it is in itself also a major finding. The lack of available primary sources about the Hauka movement from a Western context means that the scope of the movement was not widespread. It could also mean that the colonial administration went through considerable lengths to curb the reach and exposure of the Hauka movement as it would form a risk to the colonial enterprise through its resistance, although I could find no hard evidence to substantiate this claim. The movement was only mentioned by the French colonial administration when it first emerged and in all these instances the authorities claim to have brought the movement to an immediate halt. Before 1957, the movement was not a topic of discussion in French or British newspapers, meaning that the citizens in the metropole had little knowledge about this form of resistance to colonialism whatsoever. This was especially the case in British sources although accounts of the Hauka rituals were also scant in French primary sources. Rouch's film was the main aspect in popular culture that introduced the Hauka spirits to a wider European audience. Based on these findings I argue that the Hauka movement was not an important topic of discussion amongst the French or British citizens in the metropole.

Secondly, when the Hauka movement and animist beliefs more generally did become topics of discussion, in relation to *Les maîtres fous* or otherwise, they are mainly described in more negative terms. Examples of terms used to describe the movement are "disgusting," "mentally disturbed," "sickening," "primitive," "agitating" and "fetishist." Other aspects that dealt more with the qualities of resistance of the Hauka cult were also lacking. The movement was almost never described in relation to its mimetic power or acknowledged for the fact that the spirits were copying colonial figures. Even when it was described in

this way, it was subsequently labelled as "strange" or "in search of identification with modern colonial society," thereby undermining the movement's aspects of resistance to colonial discourse. This shows how writing about the movement was modified to fit in the conventional dominant colonial discourse.

Besides the analysis of the discourse surrounding the Hauka movement and animism specifically, I have also analysed the presence of colonial discourse in more general terms considering the colonisers and the colonised in both the French and British cases. Colonial discourse entails that the unequal dichotomy between coloniser and colonised is stressed through linguistic markers in texts. Markers of colonial discourse could be found throughout the primary sources that have been analysed. African people, culture, religion politics and even geography are often described using negative terms such as "uncivilised," "savage," "primitive," and "unintelligent." Even when these aspects are described in more positive terms this is often followed by a more negative remark, not quite fully praising the African Other. Furthermore, whilst the African Other is mainly described in negative terms, the colonial European, the "us," is often described in positive terms: 'European adventurers,' 'modern' and 'civilised;' consequently reinforcing the dichotomy of inequality. This shows that the colonial discourse and the notion of Othering were present in the primary sources as the Hauka movement and Africans more generally were presented in a negative view, highlighting the backwardness and primitiveness of the colonial Other.

The presence of the colonial discourse in the primary sources can be explained by two factors. The first factor deals with the dominant characteristic of the colonial discourse itself as this had a great influence in framing the ways in which African traditions were perceived and described and which furthermore reinforced the colonial discourse itself. This discourse—which painted a picture of Africans or animist beliefs as being primitive, savage and uncivilised—also influenced the perceptions of the Western audience to a large extent. When this audience would be confronted with a film or newspaper articles that supposedly portrayed the Hauka mediums or spirits—the African Other—as being just such—primitive, savage and uncivilised—their colonial ideologies would only be confirmed and therefore also reinforced. The concept of performativity plays a

role here. Certain roles and performances are constrained by social constructions and contexts, in turn influencing the availability of performances on can conform to. Therefore, even if *Les maîtres fous* did not intend to portray the Hauka cult in this way, as Rouch has claimed, it was watched within the framework of the colonial discourse, as we could conclude from the remarks of the audience concerning Blaise Senghor as well as the portrayal of the savagery and barbarism of the African in a more general sense.[201] If anything, the discourse surrounding the movement enforced racist attitudes by confirming the idea of a savage, violent and primitive African with pictures of the Hauka cult eating dogs, thrashing about, wide-eyed, salivating and beating themselves. This is because the dominant discourse, in this case the colonial discourse, shapes the coloniser's perceptions and ideas of the world around them.

This configuration of the ideology concerning the Hauka movement can also be explained by a second factor. As has been elaborately argued in chapter 3, the Hauka movement gains its power through its characteristics of mimicry and the appropriation of European power in the spirit possession rituals. This is what Taussig labels the "first contact." Taussig argues that the mimetic faculty as portrayed by the Hauka spirits is re-appropriated by the magic of mimesis through machinery of the camera in the filming of the Hauka ritual.[202]

> But this machinery arguably also serves to *restore* the Songhay to "exotic" status; Rouch's film (and Taussig is well aware that the irony also applies to him) effectively reinstates alterity through a secondary mimesis. *Hauka*, in the process, is divested of its anticolonial impetus through the film's colonialist gesture of recapturing the power of the colonised.[203]

The first contact, the initial colonial encounter which gives the colonised subjects power through its appropriation by mimesis is therefore subsumed by the "second contact," or the reversal of contact through mimetic machines.[204] The power of resistance of the Hauka is therefore reversed and rendered useless in its appropriation by the Europeans through the film *Les maîtres fous*. Hence, the

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[201] See section 3.3.2 and 4.2.2.
[202] Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity, 251.
[203] Huggan, "(Post)Colonialism, Anthropology, and the Magic of Mimesis," 98.
[204] Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity*, 251.

citizens in the metropoles have a negative reaction towards the Hauka movement, which is seen in the literature as well as the primary sources. This negative reaction towards the Hauka movement, indicating the presence of colonial discourse, can therefore be explained by the fact that movement lost its power through the re-appropriation and reversal caused by the second contact through mimetic machines.

The third finding relates to the pattern of diminishing of the presence of colonial discourse over time. Although the colonial discourse could be identified in most of the primary sources, there was a clear shift in the discourse, after which the colonial discourse and its emphasis on inequality and Othering became less prevalent. The shift in discourse took place around the time of independence in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Negative colonial discourse was most prominent in most of the primary sources until the late 1950's, demonstrating the dominance of the colonial discourse. After this time, the authors of the sources presented African culture in more neutral and positive terms and gave it more context, indicating that the dominance of the colonial discourse was subsiding. This proves that, as would be expected, once the process of decolonisation started, the colonial discourse became less valid and therefore less prominent. This shift in the dominance of the colonial discourse was not sudden. As I argued in chapter 2, the colonial discourse started becoming less relevant due to political and social changes that took place between empires and their colonies after World War II. On the other hand, the colonial discourse did not become completely non-existent after decolonisation; it lingered on, by forming and enhancing racist ideologies that are still present in modern day society.

The fourth and final finding of this research deals with the difference in colonial discourse in the French and British cases. Unfortunately, I was unable to determine whether the Hauka movement affected the French and British colonial discourse in different ways because of the lack of primary sources that dealt with the movement specifically. However, I was able to draw some more general conclusions about the differences in colonial discourse between the two colonies. In section 2.6, I argue that there are subtle differences within the colonial discourse. The French colonial discourse is based on assimilation and the British

colonial discourse is based on difference because of the different styles in ruling. In my analysis concerning the different types of discourse I find that in general the French sources do follow the trend of colonial discourse based on assimilation in which they highlight a single sphere of civilisation. Furthermore, the British sources do follow the pattern of colonial discourse based on difference in which they highlight separate spheres of civilisation.

Based on this finding, I would imagine that if the primary sources dealing specifically with the Hauka movement were available, they would also convey similar outcomes, following the trends in discourse based on either assimilation or difference depending on whether they are French or English. This would confirm my hypothesis, which was that the Hauka movement would incite different reactions in the French and British colonial contexts, although I could not confirm this indefinitely due to the lack of primary sources dealing with the Hauka movement specifically. Furthermore, the initial reactions and policies by the colonial administrations in dealing with the Hauka movement in Niger and the Gold Coast offer some substantiation for the claim of differences within the colonial discourse. Both the French and British colonial discourses are characterised by aspects of inequality and difference, however, as I have argued in chapter 2, there is a nuanced difference between the colonial discourse and its effects in the two cases. In the French case, the colonial administration did not tolerate or accept the Hauka movement, indicating that a colonial discourse based on assimilation was present. In the British case, the colonial administration did tolerate the Hauka cult because it was seen as part of a different sphere of civilisation and therefore not linked to European civilisation. This would indicate that the colonial discourse based on difference was prominent in this case. This fourth and final finding demonstrates the importance of researching the more nuanced aspects of colonial discourse, as the subtle differences in the way a dominant discourse works has a large effect on social cognition and how colonisers comprehend and react to resistance.

CHAPTER 5.
CONCLUSION

5.1. Conclusion

Colonial discourse sustained a dichotomy between colonial subjects, who are uncivilised, primitive, backwards and barbaric, and colonisers, who are civilised, modern, intelligently advanced and cultured. The colonial mission was legitimated on the basis that the colonies needed the help and guidance of the metropoles in order to become modern international actors. Hence, it was in the interest of the metropole that the colonies never achieved this feat, as once this goal was reached, colonisation would no longer be necessary. How this translated in the discourse was through the maintenance of a dichotomy between the colonisers and the colonised based on the concept of Othering. This division of power and superiority, inherent to the colonial discourse, did not go uncontested, however. Colonial opposition, either overtly through military intervention or more subtly through cultural resistance in the form of rituals, art or behaviour, was not uncommon throughout the era of colonialism in Africa. One such form of colonial opposition was the Hauka movement, which was active in the French and the British colonies of Niger and the Gold Coast.

The focus of this research was the examination and analysis of the practical effect of the Hauka movement on the colonial discourse from the perspective of the colonisers—the colonial administration on the spot as well as the citizens in the metropole. The goal of this thesis was to analyse whether the Hauka movement, as a form of resistance to colonialism, had an effect on the colonial discourse in any way in either the French or the British cases and whether these differed from each other.

The mimicry and mockery inherent to the Hauka movement gave the movement its power and established its basis as a form of resistance to the colonial discourse. Due to the lack of primary sources available from the metropoles of the Colony/Republic of Niger and the Gold Coast/Ghana in which the Hauka movement is mentioned specifically, I argue that the movement did not have a widespread influence as a form of resistance, and thus was not very effective.

In the selection of primary sources that did in some way mention the Hauka movement or animist religions in more general terms, I found that the discourse surrounding aspects of African culture and tradition were mainly

negative in nature. This leads me to confirm that the colonial discourse was present in the texts I analysed, especially when this discourse was most dominant. The colonial discourse diminishes in dominance when the process of decolonisation starts in the late 1950's, at which point a shift towards less colonial discourse occurs in the texts. This change in discourse is also corroborated by the analysis of the primary sources. The findings show the presence of the colonial discourse to be stronger in the primary sources until the end of the 1950's. After this time the sources become more positive in nature in their discussion of African society in general, suggesting that the colonial discourse is less prominent from this point on. On the basis of these findings, I conclude that the colonial discourse did have a large influence on the manner in which the African Other was perceived and described.

Considering the more nuanced examination of the colonial discourse in this thesis, I argue that the colonial discourse in the French and British colonies was based on different principles, respectively assimilation and difference, which stemmed from the different styles of colonial rule. The findings in the critical discourse analysis of the primary sources substantiate this argument. In the French primary sources, the colonial discourse based on assimilation is most present in the earlier primary sources and the correlation becomes less significant towards the late 1950's, when the colonial discourse in general terms was also becoming less prominent. Furthermore, in most of the British primary sources, the colonial discourse based on difference was most prominent. These findings lead me to conclude that there are in fact nuanced differences within the colonial discourse which stem from different socio-political contexts.

Following the previous summary of the answers to the sub questions and the main findings, stems the answer to my main research question. Based on my analysis of the Hauka movement between 1925 and the 1980's in the Colony/Republic of Niger and the Gold Coast/Ghana and their respective metropoles I argue that the movement itself in fact had very little effect as a form of colonial resistance on the colonial discourse. However, it is important to note that the colonial discourse, especially in its era of dominance, influenced how the Hauka movement was received and perceived by a Western audience. There was also a subtle difference in the type of colonial discourse in the cases of French

and British colonialism. The Hauka movement was limited in the ways the movement could be regarded as a form of resistance to colonialism as the mimetic faculty was never fully acknowledged. However, this did not render the Hauka movement futile. Within the context of the colonised the movement did offer the Hauka mediums (and their indigenous audiences) a certain extent of agency and a way of making sense of the changing world around them. Whether their voice was heard or not is in fact irrelevant for their own life experiences. Within the context of the colonisers the Hauka movement was futile as it did not have much influence as a form of colonial resistance. However, within the context of the colonised, the Hauka movement was a powerful means of dealing with colonialism. Colonial resistance must be therefore understood within different contexts in order to be fully understood as a whole, as colonialism itself is based on the dichotomy between coloniser and colonised. As such, resistance can be powerful and futile simultaneously.

The contribution of this thesis to academia is an in-depth research on an example of colonial resistance and an examination of the structures of colonial discourse as well as the practical effects of the resistance. In this light, my research offers a much deeper, more nuanced analysis of colonial discourse and resistance to colonialism and the ways in which they work in everyday life than what is present in the current academic debate. One of the stronger aspects of this analysis is that it offers a multidisciplinary account of the Hauka as an anthropological subject situated in a historical setting of colonial and postcolonial studies. Through my unique analysis on the effect of types of rule on colonial discourse, I advocate a more nuanced and layered discussion of colonial discourse, uncovering more subtle differences within the colonial discourse itself in the French and British cases. The focus on the delicate differences within discourses in a more general sense could prevail a fruitful theme within future research in order to gain a better understanding of notions of discourse.

The relevance of this research deals with the previous point in relation to discourse. Discourse has an effect on one's social cognition which is influenced by certain preconceptions and power relations. It is therefore important to be aware of conceptions of discourse as they have a major effect on daily life, not

only in a colonial setting but also in present day life. By becoming aware of these dominant discourses, including their more nuanced aspects, one can shed light on certain stereotypes, prejudices and notions of power in society, gaining a greater understanding of linguistic discursive markers that effect day-to-day life. The discourse is expressed through performative acts which not only reflect reality but are also shown in actions. Hence, discourse and performativity are highly intertwined.

This research was limited by the availability and access to primary sources that specifically mentioned the Hauka movement. The lack of primary sources may on the one hand divulge information about the extent in which the Hauka movement was successful as a form of resistance and on the other hand reveal a trend in colonial and postcolonial literature. This trend refers to a conscious decision by colonial and postcolonial policy makers to curb the extent to which instances of resistance to colonialism became a common knowledge in the metropoles. If the resistance was discussed more widely, it would have brought the system of colonialism under attack, which could be a reason for the general lack of primary sources which mention the Hauka movement. Whilst this is seen as a prominent finding in itself, if more sources were available through the access to different archives and databases, for example in the Republic of Niger, Ghana, France and maybe even Great Britain, the findings may have been very different. Furthermore, because of the limit of sources, I was forced to focus on the perspectives of the colonisers. In this sense, the research does not offer a voice to the colonised or stress the multiple perspectives of actors of colonialism. This would be a valuable addition to further research dealing with the Hauka movement.

Furthermore, this research is particularly insightful for the concept of mimicry. Whereas most academic literature review mimicry as a sign of respect to those who are being mimicked, the research shows that mimicry can also be used in another manner, namely with a tone of mockery. This finding, which illustrates the gap in the academic literature, adds a new layer to the concept of mimicry as a whole by drawing on academic research concerning performativity and its elements of parody. Furthermore, this aspect highlights the importance of multi-disciplinary research and all it has to offer.

An important aspect of mimicry is expressed through the potential of subalterns to demonstrate agency. The act of mimicking challenges the dichotomy between "us" and "them," "Self" and "Other," which is inherent to colonial discourse. Structural power relations are hereby brought under discussion. These notions have been thoroughly demonstrated throughout this research of the Hauka movement and can moreover be applied to other forms of resistance. Although the Hauka movement may not have had a widespread impact as a form of resistance to colonialism, it displays agency within its own colonial context. When confronted with the image of the Hauka mediums, eyes rolled back and frothing at the mouth, leaving all control over their body at the mercy of the European colonial spirits, one can only imagine that this ritual was never felt as something futile by the Hauka mediums, but as something extremely powerful.

CHAPTER 6.
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND APPENDIXES

6.1. Bibliography

6.1.1. Archival Sources

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6.2. Appendix I: Figures, Tables and Graphs

6.2.1. Figures

6.2.2. Graphs

6.2.3. Tables

6.3. Appendix II: List of Primary Sources

No.	Pers-pective	Date	Title	Author	Source	Perspective actor	Type
1.	French	1925	"Affair des Baboule," in Rapport Politique Annuel de Cercle de Niamey		Dossier 5, pieces 5, Vincennes: Archive de Service Historique d'Armee. Quoted in and translated by Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 117.	Colonial administration	Quote, political report
2.	French	1926	Rapport Politique Annuel de Cercle de Niamey		Niamey: Archives Nationales de Niger. Quoted in Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 117; Olivier de Sardan, *Sociétés Sonay-Zarma*, 282.	Colonial administration	Quote, political report
3.	French	1927	Rapport de Tournée dans le Canton de Kourfey	Scheurer	Niamey: Archives Nationales de Niger. Quoted in Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 117; Olivier de Sardan, *Sociétés Sonay-Zarma*, 282.	Colonial administration	Quote, political report
4.	British	30-10-1928	The Churches in West Africa: Devotion of the Missionaries: Powerful Influence of Christianity	Rev. E.W. Thompson	The Times	Citizens in metropole	Newspaper
5.	British	30-10-1928	Education in West Africa: Insistent Demand: Adaptation to Native Environment	Hon. W. Ormsby Gore	The Times	Citizens in metropole	Newspaper
6.	French	1937	Historique de Filingue: Carnet Monographique de Filingue	Brachet	Dossier 8, sous-dossier 6-c (1903-44), Vincennes: Archives de Service Historique d'Armee. Quoted in and translated by Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories*, 129.	Colonial administration	Quote, historical report
7.	British	20-02-1951	African Experiment		The (Manchester) Guardian	Citizens in metropole	Newspaper
8.	French	31-10-1957	"Les maîtres fous" de Jean Rouch	André Blanchet	Le Monde	Citizens in metropole	Newspaper
9.	British	02-11-1958	Independence for a Giant		The Observer	Citizens in metropole	Newspaper
10.	British	16-11-1958	Notes to Editor: Religion in Nigeria	Robert A. Kennedy	The Observer	Citizens in metropole	Newspaper
11.	French	1959	L'Art du Masque, Inséparable de la Danse Rituelle	Aéromaritime de Transports	U.A.T. Relations	Citizens in metropole	Magazine
12.	British	30-08-1959	Negro Culture in Revolt: Black Orpheus	Colin Legum	The Observer	Citizens in metropole	Newspaper
13.	French	31-12-1960	Les Religions Africaines en Afrique et en Amérique	Jean Pépin	Le Monde	Citizens in metropole	Newspaper
14.	British	01-08-1962	Togo Pays her Way to Survival	Arnold Breene	The Times	Citizens in metropole	Newspaper
15.	British	01-10-1971	A Remarkable Recovery		The Times	Citizens in metropole	Newspaper
16.	French	09-04-1981	La Volonté de Savoir	Hervé Guibert	Le Monde	Citizens in metropole	Newspaper

6.4. Appendix III: Tables of Analysis

Tone of colonial discourse in primary sources

Primary Source No.	Negative	Somewhat Negative	Neutral	Somewhat Positive	Positive	Not Applicable
1.	0					
2.		0				
3.	0					
4.	0					
5.		0				
6.	0					
7.						0
8.	0					
9.	0					
10.					0	
11.			0			
12.		0				
13.				0		
14.			0			
15.				0		
16.		0				

Colonial discourse based on assimilation or difference in primary sources

Primary Source No.	Assimilation	Difference	Both	Neither
1.	0			
2.	0			
3.	0			
4.			0	
5.		0		
6.	0			
7.				0
8.	0			
9.			0	
10.		0		
11.		0		
12.		0		
13.			0	
14.		0		
15.		0		
16.				0