El Centinela Borinqueño: Working for the U.S. Army at Fort Buchanan in Puerto Rico

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Master’s Thesis, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
School of History, Culture, and Communication
Global Markets and Local Creativities Erasmus+ Programme
24 June 2019

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Word Count: 26,295
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Dedication and Thanks

I wish to thank my advisor, Dr. Dario Fazzi, for his inimitable enthusiasm, clear direction, constructive criticism, kindness and generosity during my thesis writing process. I certainly could not have managed this project without his guidance, and for that I am very grateful. I hope that we can continue our cheerful colleagueship in the years to come.

I also wish to thank my parents, Tim and Mary Ellen Trueblood, without whose love and support I would not be here today. Their enthusiasm and curiosity motivated me to do my very best work, even when I thought it was not possible.

And finally, no thesis is a work of only one person. The community of scholars, ‘personal correspondences,’ and friends that I have been surrounded by throughout my graduate degree that have made a world of difference and contributed greatly to my ideas, questions, and passions. Thank you especially to my fellow GLOCALs, who walked the road with me, and picked me up all along the way.

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My first dedication is for my grandfathers, Harley and Jack, whose military service and sacrifices I never fully appreciated while they were still alive.

However, I have come to learn through this writing that the presence of the 65th Regiment in Korea was partly the reason why my grandfather Harley survived the battle of the Chosin Reservoir. Therefore, my second dedication is for them. I hope that my work helps to ensure that their service is not forgotten, either.
Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology

That Puerto Rico is an anomaly in the United States’ empire is well understood.1 Whether one looks at the island nation through cultural, political, economic, or any other lens, there are both diversity and contradictions. Puerto Ricans, whose island population is greater than 20 other U.S. states, have unique identities and cultures, while also being U.S. citizens. Puerto Rico is an oppressed colony to some, a proud nation for many, and an *estado libre asociado* to others.2 Its economy, linked closely with that of the United States, is improving one moment and declining the next.3 Seemingly forever trapped in an undefined, liminal state, the island, its population and diaspora resist the static definitions and binary categorizations that academic and political analysts crave.

This thesis will not aim to sort out these multivariate aspects of life in Puerto Rico. Instead, the work will bring to light another aspect that complicates assumptions about Puerto Rican society – the local socioeconomic impacts that come from hosting and working for the U.S. military. Since becoming a possession of the United States, Puerto Rico has been an integral piece of U.S. security strategy in the Caribbean.4 From seizing the remains of a Spanish fort in 1898, to guarding the Panama Canal in the 20th century, to the numerous military installations, headquarters, and training facilities that ring the island today, the U.S. military has impacted the geography, economy, politics, and culture of Puerto Rico. Considering the economic and societal effects of this de facto occupancy, through a case study of an Army base in Puerto Rico, is the primary task of the thesis.

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1 Hopkins, A. G. 2018. *American Empire: A Global History*. America in the World Series. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 545: ‘In 1901, Luis Muñoz Rivera, Puerto Rico’s leading political figure, summarized the ambivalence that was to characterize the island’s standing throughout the century: “We are and we are not an integral part of the United States. We are and we are not a foreign country. We are and we are not citizens of the United States. The Constitution covers us and does not cover us.”’


Puerto Ricans have served in every U.S. military conflict since at least WWI. Yet, while their service has been at times celebrated, especially in the Korean War, the connection between Puerto Rican culture and the U.S. military has not been studied in detail. Furthermore, just exactly what the socioeconomic impacts of military service and military installments have had on Puerto Rican society has never been studied in depth. A complete analysis of the role of the military in Puerto Rican society is beyond the scope of this work; instead, the author focuses on the economic and cultural effects of a particular U.S. military base in Puerto Rico, Fort Buchanan. The case study presented in this thesis is another of its unique contributions, as no academic study has reported the history or economic impacts of this base. The aim of

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5 The work and advice of Prof. Harry Franqui-Rivera of Bloomfield College, NJ, has enlightened me to the remarkable history of Puerto Rican veterans, as well as the importance of respecting cultural diversity in Puerto Rico. For a military history of the island and socioeconomic analysis of Puerto Ricans’ service in the armed forces until the Korean War, see: Soldiers of the Nation: Military Service and Modern Puerto Rico, 1868-1952. Studies in War, Society and the Military. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. Prof. Franqui-Rivera is also featured in this video: Center for Puerto Rican Studies. 2017. ‘Puerto Rican Voices: Season 3 Episode 7 Borinqueneers.’ Video. Accessed 10-02-2019 via https://vimeo.com/192520866.
this thesis, therefore, is to expose the relationship between the U.S. military and Puerto Rican culture through an interdisciplinary analysis of the long-term workforce development impacts of the Fort Buchanan Army garrison near San Juan in the 20th and 21st centuries. By considering the history of the base, its impacts on soldiers’ and civilians’ employment, wages, and benefits, as well as what these effects can tell us about the complex history and relationship in which these effects occur, the thesis reveals an integral yet unstudied piece of Puerto Rican society – the socioeconomic impacts of Fort Buchanan and the U.S. military.
A. Methodological Approaches

This section explains the methodological approaches that are taken with the data – historic analyses of U.S. military and political history in Puerto Rico; the development of Fort Buchanan; a workforce development study of the base’s employment impacts; and qualitative interpretation of anecdotal data on experiences and values related to work and the U.S. military. This combination of approaches makes this thesis unique in both its goals and methods, but its novelty requires outlining some academic justifications here as well. The final chapter takes up this discussion again, where, in addition to reviewing the findings, this interdisciplinary approach is analyzed for its effectiveness and for its potential to be replicated in future analysis of other military bases.

While studies of the military usually focus on either its negative or positive effects, this study combines historic, qualitative, and quantitative methods in order to make the study more balanced, holistic, and culturally sensitive. To accomplish this task, the thesis first adopts a historical perspective on the development of the base and the role it has played thus far in the U.S. military strategy, as well as in Puerto Rican culture. Next, the thesis introduces the base, followed by a quantitative examination of the economic impacts of Fort Buchanan and the U.S. military’s presence in Puerto Rico. Finally, a qualitative discussion on the nature of the relationship is necessary for understanding both the transnational, long-standing colonial dynamics between the U.S. and Puerto Rico, and the diversity of local identities, cultures, and experiences that continually reinterpret this relationship. With this combination of approaches, this thesis begins the important work of not just exposing the economic impacts of Fort Buchanan, but also examining the complex internal individual negotiations that must happen when choosing military service as work in Puerto Rico. It can also contribute to the study of minority groups in the U.S. armed forces.

The first chapter presents the historical background on the United States military presence in Puerto Rico. A historical perspective on the U.S. military in Puerto Rico shows how American military strategy has already been integrated into the Puerto Rican economy and society. A summary of the 20th to 21st century social,

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political, and military history of Puerto Rico-United States relations highlights the
important foundations of the relationship between the U.S. and Puerto Rico, and helps
to understand the broader context in which contemporary military employment is
experienced. Pertaining to the military, the paper prioritizes those people, events, and
forces relevant to Puerto Rico, highlighting important military and political events
that have already defined the relationship between the U.S. and Puerto Rico.8 This
approach also frames the historical contexts into which the socioeconomic effects of
military service are later brought to light.9

To evaluate the historical data, this thesis adopts an imperial framework to
understand the United States’ political interactions with Puerto Rico in the 20th and
21st centuries.10 Most historic analyses of the Fort and the U.S. military in Puerto Rico
have been written by those in power, and could represent a biased perspective.11 This
thesis therefore analyzes historical data from a critical standpoint. However, even
with this approach, the historic perspective alone does not reveal the cultural
conditions under which this relationship between Puerto Rican culture and the U.S.
military has developed,12 nor the long-term socioeconomic effects of these changes.
In order to gain this cultural sensitivity, the thesis adopts an interdisciplinary
approach, combining the historical analysis with qualitative and quantitative methods.
To begin to further deepen and question the imperial narrative, therefore, the thesis
presents a case study on the socioeconomic effects of the Fort Buchanan garrison.

After describing the history of the U.S. military in Puerto Rico and the
contexts in which the relationship has operated, the thesis’ next chapter studies the
history and development of Fort Buchanan. Over the century of U.S. military
occupation of the island, much has been invested in Fort Buchanan’s buildings,
information, services, and training facilities. The fort’s purpose has also changed
over its 96-year existence, with these being primarily determined by changes in the

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8 Using the concept of ‘base diplomacy’ from Harkavy, Robert E. 1988. ‘Las bases como proyección de
fureza y seguridad nacional.’ Política Exterior 2, n. 6 (Spring): 227-56.
9 Ulin, Robert Charles. 1984. ‘Hermeneutics and Critical Anthropology: The Synthesis of Practical and
Critical Reason.’ In: Understanding Cultures: Perspectives in Anthropology and Social Theory.
Austin: University of Texas Press, Chapter 1.
10 My imperial framework is also modeled after Maier, Charles S. 2006. Among Empires: American
11 Kramer, Paul A. 2018. ‘How Not to Write the History of U.S. Empire.’ Diplomatic History 42, n. 5:
911-31.
12 Ulin, Robert Charles. 1984. Understanding Cultures: Perspectives in Anthropology and Social
Theory, 19-22, 127.
United States’ military priorities and important conflicts. The Fort, however, also has provided many local people with jobs, services, and benefits that they would not have otherwise received in difficult times.\(^{13}\) In spite of this, Fort Buchanan has never been analyzed as a potential economic contributor and driver of local development. Therefore, following the chapter on the history of Fort Buchanan, the thesis’ next step is to study the workforce development impacts of the base.

A workforce development perspective is the approach adopted to quantitatively evaluate the base’s economic effects on the local labor market. The typical aims of a workforce development approach are to understand how to best support economic growth, job creation, and the alleviation of poverty in a region or city.\(^{14}\) Rather than addressing other approaches to development, such as addressing the island’s lack of infrastructure\(^{15}\) or educational investments,\(^{16}\) this thesis examines the effects of Fort Buchanan, to understand whether the military’s presence can be considered as a local economic and labor force development option. The approach models other installation analyses, base studies, and economic impact assessments\(^{17}\) by authors like David Vine, Catherine Lutz, Louis Hicks and Curt Raney, and Kent Calder,\(^{18}\) and focuses on a few key occupational statistics. In this chapter, employment, wage, and benefit data are presented, to begin quantitatively explaining the workforce effects of the U.S. military in Puerto Rico and at Fort Buchanan.

\(^{13}\) Schultz, Jennifer. 2016. *Preparing for Duty: State Policy Options to Sustain Military Installations*. National Conference of State Legislatures, Military and Veterans Affairs Report. December, 1: DoD 'contributes billions of dollars each year to state economies through the operation of military installations.' This includes salaries, benefits, defense contracts, and tax revenues.


One way to assess the base as an opportunity for workforce development, and to strengthen its tie to the local labor force, is to compare its impacts to those of other local employment sectors. To accomplish this task, this chapter also charts the historic labor market impacts of Fort Buchanan relative to the annual local and national averages of other major employment sectors such as manufacturing and transport. Other factors such as average educational attainment, poverty rates, political and demographic changes are also considered in context. This comparison reveals some of the local, quantitative benefits of military service, such as steady wages, steady employment, and increased mobility.

A workforce development perspective also requires consideration of long term employment opportunities, so the types of benefits and skills that military employees gain will also be discussed. In comparison to other sectors, the U.S. military invests heavily in the skills and knowledge of its service members. One of the main goals of the U.S. military is preparedness, and investing in training is a strategic tactic used to achieve this. As a result, active duty recruits in the U.S. Army receive substantial training at a time when it is very difficult to get this kind of investment from private firms.

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20 Most of these are obtained from Census data, or from the Center for Puerto Rican Studies (CPRS). See, for example: Meléndez, Edwin, and Carlos Vargas-Ramos, eds. 2017. State of Puerto Ricans 2017. New York: Centro Press.
24 I was only able to find the operations of the major commands of the base, not specific units based at Fort Buchanan and their tasks. I also gathered information from personal correspondence, research in recent local media, and within the Army itself. Their recruiting websites have promotional videos about the skills that can be achieved during military training - healthcare and robotic, for example.
Active duty soldiers and veterans also have access to GI Bill benefits, which can be used to subsidize home purchases, alleviate healthcare costs, pursue further education, and for business investment loans. These extra supports, like other development incentives targeted to individuals, are meant to give active duty and veteran service members some workforce advantages. For example, in Puerto Rico, the U.S. Army and its reserve forces work with the local police, and service members often work for both entities. Understanding both the short and long-term employment and wage opportunities offered by the U.S. military relative to other sectors can help predict whether these variables might motivate an individual to choose military service over another employment sector. A case study of employment at Fort Buchanan demonstrates how this installation has not only provided jobs to Puerto Ricans, but also how it has made their values related to the U.S. military more complex. It also begins to document the long-term economic effects of military service for individual Puerto Ricans.

To better understand the socioeconomic effects of the base, the author also chose to employ semi-structured interviews and other means of qualitative research such as personal correspondence to collect accounts of individuals’ experiences at Fort Buchanan. Exchanges were treated methodologically as oral histories, which are most often used to uncover marginalized perspectives, and to document knowledge that is neither objective nor predictable. This method is an attempt to explicitly address the complex power dynamics between Puerto Ricans, who live in a territory controlled by the U.S., and the author, who is from the U.S. Instead of the author’s judgments as an outsider, the thesis relies on insiders’ experiences and perspectives to reveal and evaluate complex understandings of Puerto Rican culture. The concluding chapter discusses which aspects of Puerto Rican culture have been identified in this thesis, and which remain to be studied.

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28 Leavy, Patricia. 2011. Oral History: Understanding Qualitative Research, 4-5.


Because the military is ‘a labor market institution operating at a unique nexus of race, gender, and class,’ \(^{30}\) individuals’ understandings of and experiences within it are diverse and complex. Although a diverse group of respondents was sought, this thesis can do no more than to highlight only one or two subcultures of Puerto Rican society, the study of which should be expanded in future work. Demonstrating how perceptions and experiences can vary even within one culture and making sense of their diverse perceptions and values is an important lesson of this thesis, \(^{31}\) and another reason to employ a critical approach that resists static classifications and is sensitive to both complexity and culture. \(^{32}\) When considered alongside the history and economic impacts of the base, the qualitative data and theoretical frameworks complete the socioeconomic analysis of Fort Buchanan, and facilitate a concluding discussion around the larger effects of the U.S. military in Puerto Rico.

After demonstrating the socioeconomic impacts of the military and Fort Buchanan, the final chapter discusses the relevance of the approach with the evidence available. It is the author’s belief that the workforce development assessment data quantifiably demonstrates the economic effects of the base, but do not clearly illuminate the reality of Puerto Ricans’ lived experiences with the U.S. military. \(^{33}\) This concluding discussion is intended to challenge researchers – the author included – to create space for Puerto Ricans who work for the U.S. military to define their perceptions of the impacts of what a ‘military occupation’ is, to evaluate the quantitative data obtained, and to outline future research that can be done concerning Puerto Rican culture and the U.S. military.

The analysis of Puerto Rico’s relationship with the United States military indicates complicated identities, family histories, and political values that require

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\(^{31}\) Kleykamp, Meredith A. 2006. ‘College, Jobs, or the Military? Enlistment During a Time of War,’ 281-3.

Personal Correspondence. 2018. In-person meeting, 30-12-2018.


\(^{33}\) This belief was formed through my undergraduate (and ongoing) studies in economic and development anthropology, which some describe as the search for the ‘embeddedness’ of social concepts, and the ‘soft’ data that tells a more in-depth story of development projects. Edelman, Marc, and Angelique Haugerud, eds. 2005. *The Anthropology of Development and Globalization: From Classical Political Economy to Contemporary Neoliberalism.* Malden, Oxford, and Victoria: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 84 & 147-8.

Laguarta Ramírez, José A. 2018. ‘Riding the perennial gale: Working-class Puerto Ricans and the Involution of Colonial Capitalism.’ *Dialectical Anthropology* 42. The author seems to share my belief when he asks researchers to investigate the ‘strategic responses’ of Puerto Ricans to the ‘involution of colonial capitalism,’ 119.
further explication. Even though this thesis shows that the military presence affects many aspects of daily life in Puerto Rico, the individual perceptions, choices, and conflicts related to choosing military service for employment remain unknown. The thesis therefore present only a few cultural attributes of the military and work in one segment of Puerto Rican society - those with experiences at Fort Buchanan.

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35 Matos Rodríguez, Félix V. 1997. ‘New Currents in Puerto Rican History: Legacy, Continuity and Challenges of the “Nueva Historia.”’ *Latin American Research Review* 32 n.3: ‘the militarization to which Puerto Ricans have been subject has played a decisive and complex role in the life experiences of many islanders. The multiple connections between militarization in its broadest sense and the social and cultural life of Puerto Rico and its diaspora remain a virtually unexplored area of research,” 205, discussion through 207.

B. **Interlude - Explaining the Author’s Research Process**

Because this thesis employs qualitative methods, it is necessary for the author to explain both the justifications for her research and how her own learning and data gathering processes developed over the course of the last few months. Below, the author briefly recounts her research interest, perspective, motivation and process so that others may hold her accountable and improve upon her data gathering processes. Her part of the story will be told in first person, in an endeavor to be both transparent and concise.

Despite my extensive previous work in the humanities, I had never taken a class on world history until last fall, when I arrived in Rotterdam. Suddenly, the word ‘empire’ was everywhere, and everyone knew that the U.S. was one. I was used to the antipathy that I sometimes share for my home country, but suddenly I could see for myself how strongly this feeling affected individuals’ lives and values. I came to understand through a class on international relations that the United States still had colonies, and so I had to investigate. After writing a paper on military protests in Vieques, a small Puerto Rican island municipality east of the main island, my advisor encouraged me to overcome my initial hesitancy and study the impacts of the U.S. military in Puerto Rico.

For my thesis, I first intended to compare job creation policies. When I changed my approach, I had little firsthand knowledge of the military and much less about Puerto Rico, so I started reaching out to people with these experiences. Over the course of my research, I spoke with 6 individuals who had personal experiences at Fort Buchanan and Puerto Rico, some of whom I already knew and some I had not met before. My aims were not just to gain first-hand knowledge but also to prioritize their perspective in my research and work towards decolonizing research on Puerto Rico. I have tried bring their insights into this essay; ideas that I can credit to these exchanges are cited as ‘Personal Correspondence.’

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38 I disclose that I do not have any conflicts of interest in writing this thesis, and that all opinions, evaluations, and errors are my own. I do, however, want to clearly state my position on one issue. I am a pacifist, meaning that I do not believe in war as a means of settling disputes; but I also have many family members with military histories of their own. My evaluations of the military’s effects should not be interpreted as me condoning any aspect of the U.S. Department of Defense or its related apparatuses. I only hope to offer a fresh look at a colonial institution that might also be an asset.
Throughout my research, I have struggled to understand what it must be like to sign up to go to war, as I do not think I could ever do that; but I am not sure I could live in a colony of the United States, either. I find it completely understandable how some individuals in Puerto Rico could use the imperial relationship to try to make the most of a very difficult relationship. To unite the qualitative and quantitative sections and to describe my findings, Emily Rosenberg’s concept of ‘currents’ was the best metaphor I could find to describe the local processes of transformation that are inherent to the transnational relationship between the U.S. and Puerto Rico.
C. Considerations, Crises, Contexts, and Connections

When studying the role of the U.S. military as an option for work in Puerto Rico must first account for the detrimental effects that global capital has had on employment opportunities in Puerto Rico. Starting in the last decades of the 20th century, alongside neoliberal economic policies and climate change, the institution of free market ideology on a global scale has entailed increases in labor commodification and social inequalities. Under the guise of free choice, this ideology has also changed labor differentiation processes, which now tend to prioritize individual achievement and responsibility. This makes it more difficult for certain segments of society to participate in global capitalism, and in the US context, Latinos and Hispanics have suffered the most. Without the needed investments in workforce development efforts to help communities and individuals make up for the costs of recent socioeconomic shifts, there are fewer options for Puerto Ricans to pursue employment on the island. In the 21st century, this has resulted in consistent poverty rates of nearly 45 percent of the population, declining labor market participation rates, and official unemployment rates as high as 25 percent. As opportunities to advance one’s career through education have also dwindled in Puerto Rico, the military remains a pathway that can open doors to more education or better jobs in the future.

In Puerto Rico, neoliberal labor market changes have been accompanied by the withdrawal of U.S.-based transnational capital and tax incentives from the island, extreme growth of the national debt, and increased economic dependence on the U.S.

As a result, the island has struggled financially for well over a decade. Incoming foreign direct investment has remained flat in the 21st century, at around US$5 billion in both 2000 and 2010. Changing military priorities and the ending of tax breaks have also depressed external investments since the late 90s. Interestingly, in the mid-20th century, because of declining economic situation and the large size of federal military transfers to Puerto Rico, defense contracting was once considered a strategy for economic development. Whether this was a successful program is unknown, but some regard the military as integral to the economy’s transition from agricultural to industrial.

A few assumptions about work, employment, and workforce development in the 21st century are worth noting before beginning an examination of military service as work in Puerto Rico. Anecdotally, serving in the military is considered ‘a job,’ but recent scholarly work examining the socioeconomic effects of such employment in Puerto Rico is difficult to find. This may be due to the fact that in the all-

50 There were a few studies completed in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, however. These include: García Muñiz, Humberto. 1991. ‘U.S. Military Installations in Puerto Rico: An Essay on Their Role and Purpose.’ Caribbean Studies 24, n. 3: 79-97.  
volunteer era, the military follows the neoliberal model and negotiates its workforce-enlistment agreements through contracts with individuals,\textsuperscript{51} or because the military itself does not report its service members as part of the labor force.\textsuperscript{52} Margaret Somers describes the late-20\textsuperscript{th} century rise of ‘contractualization’ in the context of neoliberal restructuring as the shifting of value from belonging to a group to individual achievement, increased precarity in both work and life, and the changing role of the state as a protector of firms, not individual citizens.\textsuperscript{53} Since the Vietnam War, contracting has increasingly been used for tasks that federal employees will not or cannot do, and for the procurement of goods and services, often with a justification of cost savings.\textsuperscript{54} These kinds of changes are likely to affect Puerto Ricans’ judgments about occupations such as military service that are both open to them and that pay a stable wage, but the economic motivations and cultural values that affect their decisions about this today have been left mostly undocumented.\textsuperscript{55}

In order to examine the military as work in Puerto Rico, a few other assumptions and limitations of scope must also be made. First, some data sets are used to stand in for of the military sector’s annual employment at the base, since being in the Armed Forces is considered service, not work. One major assumption of this thesis, therefore, is that service in the armed forces is comparable to other forms of employment. This is not an analytical angle that has been taken in recent literature,\textsuperscript{56} but it is one that this thesis explores by analyzing the employment effects

\textsuperscript{52} Kleykamp, Meredith A. 2007. ‘Military Service as a Labor Market Outcome,’ 67-8: According to the US federal government, active duty service members are ‘not in the labor force.’
\textsuperscript{53} Somers, Margaret A. 2008. \textit{Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness and the Right to Have Rights.} Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The contractualization of citizenship in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century is her main topic of analysis.
\textsuperscript{54} Vine, David. 2015. ‘Chapter 12: We’re Profiteers.’ In: \textit{Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and The World}, 464-504 (eBook).
\textsuperscript{55} Dempsey, Jason K., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 2009. ‘The Army’s Hispanic Future.’ \textit{Armed Forces & Society} 35, n. 3 (April): 541. The authors found Hispanics motivations to be primarily serving the country, stability of work, and educational benefits. Puerto Ricans account for 40\% of their survey.
\textsuperscript{56} A thorough Cold War-era survey report of young peoples’ attitudes toward the military versus other forms of employment can be found in: Blair, John D. and Robert L. Phillips. 1983. ‘Job Satisfaction Among Youth in Military and Civilian Work Settings.’ \textit{Armed Forces and Society} 9, n. 4 (Summer): 555-568.
of Fort Buchanan. Annual active duty and reserve enrollment numbers at the base are assumed to be one component of its employment.\textsuperscript{57} The second aspect is civilian employment at the base, and the third is reservists, who are considered part time workers. These figures are found in sources from the Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, and from the base itself.\textsuperscript{58} Together they represent the direct and indirect employment of Fort Buchanan.

The economic impacts of the base come from a variety of sources and therefore also require a few caveats. Fort Buchanan primarily serves the U.S. Army, but other branches are also present at the base – the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marines all train their reservists at Fort Buchanan. As this is not the primary function of the base, and in an attempt to make conservative estimates, therefore, statistical data on reserve employment or enrollment in this thesis uses only Army data.

The author acknowledges that the overall assessment is necessarily incomplete by function of limited time and resources, and by the author’s inability to visit Puerto Rico to gather first hand data, which would have provided a more thorough analysis of the context and relationship in question. Even if that had been possible, there is no way for this thesis to determine all the individual, direct, causal, economic linkages to the base in a complex, imperial, metropolitan environment. With this in consideration, and given the limited, fragmented availability of data specifically about the base itself, the thesis aims for clarity and brevity when selecting data to present, not completeness. The most specific geography is used for each data set, but without the opportunity to personally visit Puerto Rico, the author attempted to use reliable sources – primarily the U.S Census and the Government of Puerto Rico. At times, national data are used to paint a high-level picture of people’s experiences with the military and the labor market. Using the Army’s data as a baseline, the garrison’s employment numbers are compared to other sectors in the San Juan region of Puerto

\textsuperscript{57} One justification of this metric is that while on active duty, soldiers are not allowed to work elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{58} Many Army reports can be found here:

Defense Manpower Data Center. 2019. ‘DoD Personnel, Workforce Reports & Publications.’ Government Website. Accessed 14-02-2019 via https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp. But the Base Structure Reports, in which most of the employment data for this thesis is found, are not collected in one repository. A few can be found on GlobalSecurity.org, for example:

Rico that offer employment opportunities for high school graduates and low-skilled workers – manufacturing and transport. The trends of the base’s socioeconomic effects compared to these other sectors indicate that military employment offers specific benefits that could be used to develop skills and improve quality of life in the local labor force, which reinforces the idea that both parties can use the relationship for improving or maintaining one’s socioeconomic position.59

59 My main theoretical framework for analyzing the relationship between the U.S. and Puerto Rico is adapted from: Rosenberg, Emily S. 2011. Transnational Currents in a Shrinking World, 1870-1945. Cambridge MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. She characterizes early 20th century transnational relationships with asymmetrical balance of power by their dynamism. The processes that define these relationships change over time and space, create opportunities for inclusion or reproach, effuse values of modernity, and perpetuate complimentary socioeconomic tensions. In this work I attempt to use this framework to better understand the effects of military work in Puerto Rican society, and how these effects characterize the larger relationship between the U.S. and its ‘free associated state.’
D. Conclusion

Thus far, academic works on this topic have focused on Puerto Ricans’ resistance to the U.S. military, which give the impression that this nation is in a perpetual struggle against the U.S. presence there. A socioeconomic analysis of the Fort Buchanan garrison offers a unique challenge to this assumption, as the base’s primary activities include not just mission preparedness but also providing needed services such as healthcare, affordable foodstuffs at the commissary, and hurricane relief to current and former members of the armed forces, their families, and local communities. Instead of identifying military supporters or detractors, this thesis aims to investigate how ‘perpetrators of war are themselves conflicted actors embattled in practices whose causes are far from evident.’ By taking an intentionally interdisciplinary approach, this thesis aims to demonstrate complexity – that forms of resistance and adherence exist in the dynamic between the U.S. and Puerto Rico. This thesis shows that the relationship between the U.S and Puerto Rico is characterized by dynamic flows, persistent tensions and negotiations, and variability in interaction across time, space, and politics, where both parties are affected, and both can challenge and gain advantages from the other. To that end, this thesis aims to present a thorough understanding of the complex and diverse relationships between Puerto Rican society and the U.S. military through individuals’ experiences at Fort Buchanan. Presenting the 20th to 21st century history of the United States in Puerto Rico is the necessary first step.

64 Rosenberg, Emily S. 2011. Transnational Currents.
65 Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. ‘The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics.’ International Organization 32, n. 4: 881–912. Because I have taken a number of International Economic Relations courses while at Erasmus University, some inspiration is taken here from Gourevitch’s idea that domestic politics and international structures affect each other.
Chapter 2: Puerto Rico and The U.S. Military

Now that the theoretical and methodological positions of the thesis are clear, the paper begins this chapter by examining the U.S. military presence in Puerto Rico in historical perspective. This chapter charts the 20th to 21st century history of the military in Puerto Rico, covering historical, political, and cultural aspects. In addition to a clearer understanding of its beginnings, this history facilitates a discussion about the colonial, racial and class dynamics that have affected the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States, ever since the former was acquired by the latter in 1898.

The historical analysis is divided into four periods, corresponding with both major U.S. conflicts and significant periods of Puerto Rican history. The first period covers the time from U.S. invasion of Puerto Rico until just before the Second World War. The second period accounts for World War II (WWII), the Korean War, and almost all of the Vietnam War. The third period covers the post-Vietnam era through the end of the Cold War and the last part of the 20th century. The final timeframe considers what has happened in the 21st century. The analysis of each period considers the historical, political, and social contexts in which the U.S. military was operating, in order to better understand how Puerto Rico’s strategic military roles and functions have changed across these periods.

By tracing the larger story of the United States’ history in Puerto Rico, this chapter also sets the stage for the history and workforce development analysis of Fort Buchanan in the following chapters. The periods used in this chapter will be repeated in the later chapters for clarity. From its beginnings until today, the effects of the U.S. economy and its military priorities are evident on the structure, role, and activities of the base, and as will be shown later, on its employees’ employment and wages as well.
A. **Puerto Rico at the Turn of the 20th Century**

Before the island was controlled by the United States, Puerto Rico had already been a colony of Spain for four centuries. After negotiations with the Spanish Crown, the local Puerto Rican government had received the Autonomous Charter in 1897, allowing them to elect a legislature, engage in international trade, and establish tariffs.\(^1\) By the time it had held its first legislative assembly, though, the United States and Spain were at war. U.S. troops landed in Puerto Rico on 25 July 1898 and quickly took control of the island away from Spain. A military government was instituted, although new imperial leadership was mostly a welcomed change.\(^2\) The autonomy that Puerto Ricans thought they had achieved was not to last. Their charter and provincial autonomy with Spain were soon replaced by a number of U.S. court rulings and Congressional acts that defined their island's place in the U.S. empire.\(^3\)

The United States established an explicitly colonial relationship with Puerto Rico from the outset: restructuring the economy, reconstituting its external governance, and the imposition of U.S. citizenship were not requests of the Puerto Rican people. Furthermore, the congressional legislators in this first era were clear that constitutional protection was never going to be part of the relationship.\(^4\) Why, then, were the impositions of the new leaders initially accepted? According to Sotomayor, this was because the island’s elites saw U.S. rule as a way to develop Puerto Rico.\(^5\) The Spanish empire had been in decline for some time, and lacked the ability (or will) to invest in the island’s development. In 1898, Puerto Rican elites believed the same racist logic that their colonizers did\(^6\) – that in this newer, richer empire could help the island progress by improving healthcare, communications, infrastructure, and education.\(^7\)

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4. Torruella, Juan R. 2017. ‘To Be or Not to Be: Puerto Ricans and Their Illusory U.S. Citizenship.’ *Centro Journal* 29, n. 1 (Spring), 112: ‘General Miles was met with open arms by most Puerto Ricans, to the point that he had to cable the War Department to send more U.S. flags.’
Congress’ first legislative action toward Puerto Rico was the Foraker Act of 1900. This established United States legislative and gubernatorial oversight of the island. The laws of Spain could remain in effect, but only with a hybrid US-Puerto Rican government. The act gave U.S. control over tariffs, immigration, and currency. It also enforced a coastwise shipping mandate that would require U.S. ships to move goods between the mainland and Puerto Rico. These mandates reflected the racial stigma that U.S. lawmakers had about Puerto Ricans, based on their belief that the climate and improper tutelage of the Spanish had made the native population incapable of self-governance.

In 1901, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in *Downes V. Bidwell* that Puerto Rico was an unincorporated territory, “belonging to but not being part of” the U.S. – or, more simply, a colony. Because the Puerto Rican people were not granted citizenship with the Foraker Act, their legal status (and those of other territories) had to be defined by judicial rulings. These ‘Insular Cases’ determined Puerto Ricans to be nationals, not citizens. The citizenship issue was not sufficiently resolved, however, and Congress continued to debate the status of territories and their residents into the second decade of the 20th century.

Although Presidents T. Roosevelt and Taft had supported the granting of citizenship to Puerto Ricans, it would not be until President Wilson that this task was accomplished. Roosevelt and Taft, as well as the governors of Puerto Rico that they appointed, were supportive of extending citizenship in order to recognize the island’s political development, and to influence the U.S. image in Latin America. They, like Wilson, also believed that citizenship would also politically and economically tie the island to the United States in perpetuity, and discourage any further independence movements against the United States. Neither President, however, could pressure

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Congress to act. With the growing threat of war and his New Diplomacy project, President Wilson finally had the necessary incentives. He considered both defense of the newly completed Panama Canal and Puerto Ricans’ continued loyalty to the United States to be important military roles for the island.\(^\text{14}\) Just as necessary, however, was the liberal international order, characterized by self-determination, freedom and diplomacy, which Wilson hoped to create.\(^\text{15}\) It was not enough to promote these values in the world – the United States had to demonstrate its credibility and commitment to the cause, in order to make others follow. Wilson publicly advocated for the granting of Puerto Rican citizenship in his first annual address to Congress in December 1913:

‘No doubt we shall successfully enough bind Porto Rico and the Hawaiian Islands to ourselves by ties of justice and interest and affection… We can satisfy the obligations of generous justice toward the people of Porto Rico by giving them the ample and familiar rights and privileges accorded our own citizens… by perfecting the provisions for self-government already granted them…’\(^\text{16}\)

Three months after his speech, the Puerto Rican House of Delegates asserted to Congress that their people did not want U.S. citizenship – they wanted, at minimum, increased autonomy, ideally expressed as the granting of statehood.\(^\text{17}\) Their swelling ranks being driven by disillusionment, the Union Party led one of the first independence movements in the early 1910s.\(^\text{18}\) Luis Muñoz Rivera, the Puerto Rican Resident Commissioner to Congress from 1911-16, however, changed the political direction of the insular government. From his experiences working with the U.S. Congress, Muñoz and other Unionist party officials had realized by the end of 1915 that pushing for independence was not going to afford them any additional rights from

\(^{14}\) Fors, Bonnie D. 1975. The Jones Act for Puerto Rico, 98 & 256.
\(^{17}\) Fors, Bonnie D. 1975. The Jones Act for Puerto Rico, 92.
\(^{18}\) Fors, Bonnie D. 1975, 84.
the U.S. Congress. The party therefore put independence as a longer-term objective, and instead focused on increased cooperation with the United States as a path to greater self-governance. Subsequently, with the support of President Wilson and the insular governor, Congress enacted the Jones-Shafroth Act in March of 1917.

The Jones Act officially established Puerto Rico as a territory, and conferred U.S. citizenship on its people. The Jones Act also gave Puerto Ricans the opportunity to elect a legislature and a Congressional representative. The Congress’ motivations for granting citizenship were not to empower Puerto Ricans or to get more soldiers for the First World War. Puerto Ricans were granted citizenship to further perpetuate the dependence of their island on the United States, and to quell, as much as possible, any local ideas about independence. Some Puerto Ricans tried to reject this citizenship in protest of its colonial nature; others rejected it to avoid being drafted into the U.S. military. But for the most part, U.S. citizenship was accepted, at least until the 1930s, when a much bigger Puerto Rican nationalist movement challenged U.S. rule.

The imperial idea that Puerto Ricans were not fit to govern themselves had larger effects than just excluding them from citizenship. This also meant that most Puerto Ricans were excluded from making important decisions about their society and economy. Presidentially appointed governors made decisions in the interests of the United States, not those of the local people. By the 1920s, the island began to show the effects of U.S. control. Land and property ownership became much more concentrated, with sugar production taking 1/3 of the island’s arable land. Wages for

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the local, precarious labor force that worked in production were suppressed to ensure high profits to U.S. firms. Tariff manipulation subsidized the rapid expansion of sugar production, with exports reaching 72 percent of the total by 1920. Already under financial strain from international markets and land pressures, the coffee industry, formerly a top export product, was obliterated by a hurricane in 1928. Shipping and import controls on top of the ongoing economic restructuring meant that Puerto Rico relied more every year on food imports from the U.S. With little local room to maneuver, the Great Depression underway, and Congressional priorities elsewhere, Puerto Ricans found themselves in poverty and imperial disregard once again.

Not all Puerto Ricans accepted this situation. A Puerto Rican independence group, the Nacionalistas, led by Pedro Albizu Campos, began a campaign of violent protests against U.S. rule in the 1930s. On top of existing economic strife, the Nacionalistas increased social instability by bombing buildings, shooting weapons, organizing strikes and militias, and protesting, in hopes of creating a groundswell movement against the Americans. Their tactics divided Puerto Rican society in a new way, however, attracting some but alienating many, including an up-and-coming politician, Luiz Muñoz Rivera. Opposed to violence, a believer in the power of development, and understanding of the necessity of a strong relationship with the United States, Muñoz Rivera’s social ideas proved more attractive to the majority of Puerto Ricans than did a revolt against the United States. Instead of joining the

31 New York Times. 1932. ‘$5,000,000 Bonds of Puerto Rican “Republic” Launched by Junta Here; Capital Not Alarmed.’ Late City Edition, 29 June, 1 & 4. In contrast to the Liberal party, “the more militant independentistas, under the leadership of Señor Camos, have adopted a policy of having nothing to do with the United States and have been carrying on a vigorous anti-American propaganda campaign.” Interestingly, the paper also states that neither the State nor War Departments were concerned over the Nacionalistas issuing of $5M worth of “republic” bonds, to be due 5 years following the achievement of Puerto Rican independence.

I am skipping over a lot of important history, as the Nacionalistas are not the main focus of this thesis. For a more thorough telling of the story, see: Franqui-Rivera, Harry. 2018. ‘Chapter 4, War against the Yankees!’ In: Soldiers of the Nation, 109-133.

33 Hopkins, A. G. 2018. American Empire, 554-8: Muñoz Rivera understood, along with apparently the majority of the Puerto Rican population at the time, that the island was too economically weak to be able to survive the immediate withdrawal of U.S. tariff and financial supports. Therefore, independence was an option that could only lead to their continued impoverishment. This was also the case after WWII, when another independence campaign challenged the Commonwealth initiative, 658.
separatists, in 1938 he formed the *Partido Popular Democrático*, or Popular Democratic Party.\(^{34}\) In the future, he would attempt to use this platform to lead the island closer to decolonization. For the time being, however, his party and subsequent campaign in the 1940 elections promised that an *estado libre asociado* – literally, ‘free associated state’ but practically, the idea of a Puerto Rican Commonwealth – would bring the island some much-needed social stability.

Although the independence movement had been crippled by their first failed campaign, the divisive effects on society were long-lasting. In spite of the violence inflicted on the *Nacionalistas* by the police, however, most Puerto Ricans still agreed on the value of military service. Already an established pathway for socioeconomic improvement, the prestige of the U.S. military ‘remained unblemished by this period’s violence.’\(^{35}\) Even Albizu Campos believed in the empowering potential that military service could have for Puerto Ricans.\(^{36}\) In the years that followed, many more Puerto Rican individuals would volunteer for the insular police and National Guard than had done so before. In order to move towards understanding their experiences there, the next section outlines how U.S. military priorities and the strategic value of Puerto Rico changed during this period.

\(^{34}\) Franqui-Rivera. 2018. *Soldiers of the Nation*, 126.
\(^{35}\) Idem. 2018, 130.
I. A Stronghold for the U.S. Military in the Caribbean

The priorities and strategies of the United States military from 1898-1939 were diverse and varied. At the beginning of the period, the United States was recovering from its own divisive conflict, the Civil War, but it was also laying the foundations of its hegemonic ascendency. The war with worn-out Spain was an opportunity to demonstrate the reformed unity and strength of its troops. During the war, a major offensive move was led by Theodore Roosevelt and his “Rough Riders” to take a strategic site in San Juan. Their success, and the speed with which the Spanish were defeated, were claimed to be evidence of American exceptionalism, power, and manliness; evidence that the federal government needed to achieve its goal of becoming a continental power. The ‘white’ Rough Riders also embodied the racial logic inherent in the military of the time. The procurement of colonies such as Puerto Rico was also a hegemonic strategy. The first President Roosevelt ascribed to the belief, following Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, that colonial possessions were crucial to becoming a great power: U.S. colonies were necessary to house naval bases that would become the basis for opening markets to U.S. products, therefore expanding domestic production and economic prosperity on the mainland. Puerto Rico was key to this naval strategy of defending U.S. economic interests, guarding the Panama Canal, and hosting bases.

The colonizers, along with the local elites, believed that the creation of domestic military units would help the island’s people develop and improve their quality of life, discipline, and character. Hence, their first actions were to implement military government and education systems, and to allow Puerto Rican men to volunteer for a local, segregated militia. Elite Puerto Ricans immediately began

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asking for Puerto Ricans to support U.S. conflicts, but the belief that Puerto Ricans were racially inferior and unfit for service prevented the islanders from being fully incorporated into the U.S. military until much later.\textsuperscript{44}  

The United States entered into World War One in April 1917, about a month after the passing of the Jones Act, yet Puerto Ricans could not join until President Wilson extended the draft to Puerto Rico some months later. Their service in World War One was stymied by the same racial logic that was evident at the turn of the 19th century. Even though over 18,000 Puerto Ricans were drafted,\textsuperscript{45} and many more attempted to join, none made it to the European continent.\textsuperscript{46} Another 12,000 were recruited to the U.S. mainland, especially in the South, to work service jobs in Army and Navy camps.\textsuperscript{47} The occupation of Puerto Rico had always been strategic in the eyes of the U.S. military, but not for more combat troops or officers. From 1898-1934, the island’s military role was considered purely defensive.\textsuperscript{48}

A fundamental shift in Puerto Rico’s strategic military role, from being a defensive outpost to an offensive one, began in the mid-1930s. In 1934, under Franklin Roosevelt, the federal management of Puerto Rico was moved from the War Department to the Department of the Interior.\textsuperscript{49} A year later, the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration (PRRA) was formed under the New Deal, whose budget exceeded that of the insular government until the height of WWII. In partnership with the WPA, these federal programs not only developed the island’s infrastructure and military facilities, but also employed many Puerto Ricans.\textsuperscript{50} In 1939, Roosevelt’s former chief of naval operations, William Leahy, was appointed governor to oversee an even greater phase of military construction during World War II.\textsuperscript{51} He would lead Puerto Rico into the Second World War, and to a time when the U.S. Navy became the most dominant military presence on the island.

\textsuperscript{47} McGreevey, Robert C. 2018. \textit{Borderline Citizens}, 123.
\textsuperscript{49} Negroni. 1992, 417.
\textsuperscript{50} Rodríguez Beruff, Jorge, and José L. Bolívar-Fresneda, eds. 2015. \textit{Island at War: Puerto Rico in the Crucible of the Second World War}. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 145.
B. **Mid-20th Century Political Relations between Puerto Rico and the U.S.**

In 1939, the United States was preparing for war. PRRA and WPA reconstruction projects had brought important changes in Puerto Rico’s infrastructure in the years leading up to this period. President Roosevelt’s former chief of naval operations, William Leahy, was appointed Puerto Rico’s governor in 1939. Under his and later Governor Tugwell’s leadership, investment in infrastructure and military construction was expanded even further. The major buildup began in 1939, with infrastructure improvements and the construction of bridges and airports. Although military motivations were not made explicit, apparently the people of Puerto Rico understood this, and took notice.\(^{52}\)

World War II changed almost everything about Puerto Rico. In addition to infrastructure upgrades, the war would bring more U.S. troops to the island, and many new opportunities for Puerto Ricans to interact with the Americans. One of the WPA projects in early 1939 worked on eradicating malaria from the island, as it was feared to affect the troops who would be stationed there.\(^{53}\) In public schools, children were taught to celebrate Veterans’ Day and to support the National Guard.\(^{54}\) The island’s economy was still dependent on sugarcane, with unemployment and economic strife both increasing in 1940.\(^{55}\) WPA and PRRA jobs provided employment to around 40,000 Puerto Ricans throughout the war period, but those accepting these positions were also monitored for their possible inclination to crime or sabotage.\(^{56}\)

The political dynamic between Puerto Rico and Washington D.C. was also much scaled up during this period, not just for the war effort. The Nationality Act of 1940 gave Puerto Ricans a new definition of citizenship: those born on the island after 1940 were birthright U.S. citizens,\(^{57}\) replacing the Jones Act precedent for Puerto Rican citizenship. However, this legislation, much like the previous citizenship precedent, was driven by security concerns, not increased autonomy for Puerto Rico.\(^{58}\)

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\(^{52}\) Rodríguez Beruff, Jorge, and José L. Bolívar-Fresneda, eds. 2015. *Island at War: Puerto Rico in the Crucible of the Second World War*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 137.

\(^{53}\) Rodríguez Beruff, Jorge, and Bolívar-Fresneda, eds. 2015. *Island at War*, 138.

\(^{54}\) Rodríguez Beruff and Bolívar-Fresneda. 2015, 265.

\(^{55}\) Idem. 2015, 138 & 264.

\(^{56}\) Idem. 2015, 140 & 138.


Another powerful political figure started making waves in this period – Luis Muñoz Marín. The son of Luis Muñoz Rivera, he was elected President of the Senate in 1940, which was the highest locally-elected office at the time. When Rexford Tugwell was appointed by President Roosevelt to the Puerto Rican governor’s position in 1941, he found ‘an ideological ally in Muñoz Marín … and together they promoted land reform and social justice while maintaining US economic and military interests on the island.’ The socialist political views of Muñoz Marín aligned well with those of Tugwell, who was a New Deal supporter. Their shared goals and strategies helped Puerto Rico weather the effects of World War II, and their complementary ideologies facilitated the creation of a new strategy for economic development and employment in later years.

WPA and PRRA employment, along with federal transfers, kept the island afloat financially during WWII. Puerto Ricans who worked on military bases were paid salaries 40 percent higher than those in sugarcane and manufacturing. Some have argued that actions like these create a ‘military economy,’ by which the United States extracts the needed resources to wage war, but these programs were also intended to ideologically and politically mobilize the people in favor of the war. However, military development and the PRRA also forced a decline in the sugarcane industry by limiting their access to inputs as well as their production levels. Across the main island and especially in the Vieques municipality, the U.S.-led military construction took over where the original U.S. colonial occupation had left off, quickly expanded over the remaining agricultural land, and threatening many traditionally low-skill jobs. This was already creating problems for the nearly 230,000 Puerto Ricans - more than a third of the total workforce - who worked in this sector. Unemployment and poverty were still remarkably high after the war period, and the


Bolivar-Fresneda 2007. ‘La Economía de Puerto Rico durante La Segunda Guerra Mundial,’ 205-60.


Rodríguez Beruff, Jorge, and Bolívar-Fresneda, eds. 2015. Island at War, 136.


Rodríguez Beruff, Jorge, and Bolivar-Fresneda, eds. 2015. Island at War, 139: 229,901 people worked in this industry out of a total labor force of 607,700.
U.S. economic subsidies tied to agriculture and the military were also too important to be removed without a strategy. Something had to be done.

The answer devised by President Truman and Muñoz Marín was a project called Operation Bootstrap, or *Manos a la Obra* in Spanish. The project was based on a belief that Puerto Rico could not develop because it had too many people, a lack of resources, and too low of income. Operation Bootstrap was designed to transform the island’s economy to one primarily focused on exports. The first step was creating a series of tax breaks in the U.S. tax code for firms that were believed to provide both export products and jobs. These tax breaks were complimented locally by low wages, free movement of inputs and goods between Puerto Rico and the U.S., domestic infrastructure investment, and forgiveness for environmental mismanagement. U.S. legislators also supported the project by creating incentives for U.S. firms to open factories on the island. Mainland employment had already begun to draw many Puerto Ricans to agriculture, service, and manufacturing sectors there as well, so reducing airfares to the U.S. was another tactic used to further incentivize emigration. The final piece was to extend a select number of federal health, education, and infrastructure benefits to Puerto Ricans, without the burden of federal taxes to pay for these. Puerto Rico was therefore the first test and ‘showcase’ of a new export-led development model, which would be remade across Latin America throughout the rest of the 20th century.

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During and after World War II, Truman and his secretary of interior promoted
Puerto Rico’s right to self-governance, but the conservative Congress did not. Post-
warp decolonization pressures, the need to control military facilities and colonial
nationalism on the island, and the new politically moderate leadership of Muñoz
Marín were equally important factors that began to change their minds. In 1946, the
political shifts were great enough that President Truman appointed the island’s first
Puerto Rican governor, Jesús Piñero. A congressional bill was passed in 1947 to
finally allow Puerto Ricans to elect their own territorial governor, but without any
other significant changes to Puerto Rico’s autonomy. However, in the post-WWII
era, Truman wanted to show the world that the U.S. was not an empire of the colonial
sort. Its ideology instead was that Puerto Rico would benefit from cultural
modernization and economic development provided by the United States. He and
others also knew that, at the time, the risks of allowing the island more self-
determination were low: the WWII-era investments that the U.S. had made in military
modernization, and the American acculturation of the locals as a result, had made
independence a very unlikely path. In 1950, Truman’s political support allowed the
Puerto Rican Resident Commissioner and the U.S. Senate to approve a bill that
permitted Puerto Ricans to determine their own constitution and government. Before
they could fully realize their new autonomy, the people of Puerto Rico first had to
assemble a constitutional congress and then vote on the resulting document. The new
constitution and Commonwealth status were finally approved by the people on 3 July,
and both were made effective on 25 July 1952. Puerto Rico was subsequently

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74 History, Art & Archives. N.D. ‘Puerto Rican Migration and Political Participation.’ U.S. House of
Publications/HAIIC/Historical-Essays/Separate-Interests/Puerto-Rico/.
76 History, Art & Archives. N.D. ‘Puerto Rican Migration and Political Participation.’
Transforming Anthropology 26, n. 2: 103-6. This is another example of a dynamic flow of ideas,
In: The Anthropology of Development and Globalization: From Classical Political Economy to
also coined the phrase ‘underdevelopment,’ which was used as justification for creating the 20th
century U.S.-led development apparatus that later fuelled liberalism and populism in Latin America.
removed from the UN’s list of non-self-governing territories in 1953,\textsuperscript{81} but in practice, little more sovereignty than local governance was actually devolved to the island.

\textbf{Figure 2.1: President Truman (center) is greeted by Jesus Piñero (right) and Luis Muñoz Marín (left) upon his arrival in Puerto Rico, 1948.}


Rather than mollify political tensions, Operation Bootstrap and the new political status of Puerto Rico within the United States both fueled the debate about its proper place.\textsuperscript{82} An exploratory Puerto Rican legislative commission formed in 1965 determined that, because there were so many political disagreements, the best way forward would have to be determined by the Puerto Rican people. The first plebiscite on Puerto Rico’s status was held on the island in July 1967. With only 2/3 of the electorate voting, 60 percent went in favor of the Free Associated State, or Commonwealth status, with 39 percent in favor of statehood, and less than 1 percent around 4,200 votes, for independence. While no Congressional action was taken, the

\textsuperscript{81} Cabán, Pedro. 2018. ‘PROMESA, Puerto Rico and the American Empire,’ 168: ‘The UN resolution affirmed the US petition (November 23, 1953) that “the People of Puerto Rico have effectively exercised their right of self determination” and the young international organization recognized Puerto Rico as “an autonomous political entity.”’

plebiscite did help spur the creation of a new political party, the *Partido Nuevo Progresista*, or New Progressive Party, which would later win the governorship in the 1968 elections.\(^{83}\) This pro-statehood party would continue to compete with Muñoz Marín’s *Popular Democrático* party throughout the remainder of the 20\(^{th}\) century, and beyond.

Initially, Operation Bootstrap was very successful, but it was not to last. Average annual economic growth in the period from 1947-1973 was around 6 percent.\(^{84}\) The first and second sets of tax breaks ‘succeeded in attracting external investments,’ and in transforming the economy by bringing factories to the island.\(^{85}\) Puerto Ricans migrated to the United States in huge numbers compared to previous periods.\(^{86}\) By the 1970s, however, the program was starting to show its weaknesses. Unemployment had declined to around 11 percent, mostly as a result of migration,\(^{87}\) but climbed back up over 20 percent by 1979.\(^{88}\) The ‘possessions corporations’ that enjoyed the tax breaks employed far fewer workers than had been hoped,\(^{89}\) repatriated their profits instead of investing them, and created few linkages to sectors of the local economy.\(^{90}\) Starting in the 1950s, Puerto Rican governments, regardless of political party, had financed additional extensions on business incentives, tax-exempt bonds, and infrastructure and development projects by borrowing money from creditors in the U.S., which resulted unconstitutional debt levels by 1973.\(^{91}\) The oil crisis also beginning in 1973 signaled the end of positive returns to the development project, while decreasing trade barriers and greater international competition for FDI made investment by invitation in Puerto Rico increasingly less enticing to U.S. firms,\(^{92}\) and the economic ‘miracle’ was defunct within 30 years of its start. Unfortunately for

\(^{85}\) Cabán, Pedro. 2018. ‘PROMESA, Puerto Rico and the American Empire,’ 166.
\(^{86}\) Grosfoguel, Ramón. 1997. ‘Migration and Geopolitics in the Greater Antilles,’ 123.
\(^{89}\) Pantojas-García, Emilio. 2007. “‘Federal Funds’ and the Puerto Rican Economy: Myths and Realities.” *Centro Journal* 19, n. 2: 206-23.
Puerto Rico, the outlook would not improve in the following years. As investment slowed, the federal government felt pressure to maintain Puerto Rico’s ‘successful’ development project and therefore continued to increase its local payments. Federal transfers to individuals, designed to maintain artificially high consumption and employment, increased to 20 percent of income in 1970 and 30 percent by 1980.\textsuperscript{93} In the end, the overall effect of Operation Bootstrap would not be long-term economic development, but increased dependency on the U.S.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{93} Dietz, James. 1982, 502.
I. The U.S. Military in Puerto Rico between WWII and the Vietnam Era

At its height in 1940, the U.S. military controlled around 13 percent of Puerto Rico’s land, including the entirety of the island of Culebra and seventy-six percent of Vieques.95 Puerto Ricans understood that the WPA build-up in 1934-38 was for military purposes, even if this was not explicitly stated.96 Their government was still led by presidential appointees, and Puerto Rico was still a U.S. possession without autonomy. Governor-Admiral Leahy and his successor Rexford G. Tugwell held similar positions on the management of Puerto Rico – maintain social stability, and support military expansion.97 This build-up was deemed necessary because Puerto Rico had a key geostrategic role during World War II, at the entrance of the Caribbean basin, protecting the Panama Canal and Gulf of Mexico from German U-boats. From 1939-46, federal expenditures in Puerto Rico were greatest within the War and Armed Forces Departments ($376.2 million), for loans ($123.2 million), and for unemployment ($89.2 million).98 While the Army, Navy, and Air Force all increased their footprints during this period, the biggest military investments were made in naval infrastructure. Isla Grande Naval Station in San Juan, and Roosevelt Roads in Ceiba were to transform Puerto Rico into the ‘Pearl Harbor of the Caribbean.’99 Roosevelt Roads was built big enough to host the British Royal Navy in case their country was invaded.100

Although the British never arrived, plenty of allied troops did. For the U.S. military, World War II and the Korean War had the largest mobilizations of troops – about 12 million and 3.6 million, respectively.101 Around 47,000 troops were

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96 Rodríguez Beruff, Jorge, and Bolívar-Fresneda, eds. 2015. Island at War, 136.
97 Rodríguez Beruff, Jorge, and Bolívar-Fresneda, eds. 2015, 136.
stationed in Puerto Rico in 1942. Although not many local troops deployed from Puerto Rico during WWII, around 65,000 enlisted and prepared to go to war. This was claimed locally as a demonstration of Puerto Ricans’ commitment to the American cause, and of the level of political and economic development they have achieved. However, the racist logic of the previous era was still very much present during WWII. In 1942, the Navy would not accept Puerto Ricans in any position, and the Army was just starting to accept them for positions at garrisons. Although the 65th Regiment was activated to guard the Panama Canal in January of 1943, Puerto Ricans continued to be excluded from combat service – which meant they had no way to advance up the Army’s career ladder.

In the late summer of 1950, the 65th Regiment of the Infantry was activated for the new conflict in Korea. This was the first Puerto Rican unit to be deployed in combat, but the military rationale behind sending them was not a change of heart – it was due to a manpower shortage following WWII. Once this opportunity was open to them, Puerto Ricans volunteered in huge numbers. Their participation in the conflict was celebrated across the spectrum of Puerto Rican society. In total, 61,000 Puerto Ricans, mostly in the 65th Regiment, would serve during the Korean War.

While there, they not only fought military battles but attempted to demonstrate that they had learned democratic values and had gained the strength and ability to fight in combat roles. Political leaders as with diverse views supported military service as a way to decolonize Puerto Rico. When the soldiers returned home, they were an integral part of the island’s development. Their skills gained in the military,

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102 Rodríguez Beruff, Jorge, and Bolivar-Fresneda, eds. 2015. Island at War, 117.
106 Franqui-Rivera, Harry. 2018, 149.
109 Franqui-Rivera. 2018, 175.
110 Ibid. 2018, 181.
and their federal benefits, were necessary for modernizing Puerto Rico and its economy. For the United States, their continued ideological commitment to development and economic prosperity were as geopolitically strategic to the post-WWII and Cold War eras as was their military participation in these campaigns. As the Korean War ended and the Cold War era began, Puerto Rico was intended to be used in U.S. propaganda against the Soviet Union and Cuba as a successful example of ‘democratic economic development.’

After the Korean War, the U.S. military interests changed. In 1945, Truman kept most of the U.S.’s WWII bases in place by arguing that they defended their interests in peace and protection. This was the beginning of the military’s forward positioning strategy. In 1946 Puerto Rico fell under the newly created Caribbean Command. Eisenhower brought nuclear weapons to the island, and launched many Latin American operations from there as well. After Korea, the Vietnam War soon took hold, sending another 48,000 Puerto Ricans overseas. In response to new kinds of war, the U.S. military reorganized its troops, making combat units smaller and increasing the technical specialization of many other positions throughout the 1950s and 60s. With the military’s attention shifting towards Asia and the east-west axis of powers, the strategic importance of Puerto Rico began to diminish in the 1970s.

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118 Torres Rivera, Alejandro. 2018. ‘La creación del Comando Geográfico del Caribe.’
C. Puerto Rico during the Late Cold War period, 1971-1999

The late 20th century was characterized by political and economic turmoil and major international challenges. Early on in this period, the Cold War was beginning to take hold and U.S. legislators were engaged in fighting for leadership of the emerging world order and for national security. More crises and conflicts continued throughout this initial Cold War period. After the withdrawal from Vietnam, the 1973 world oil price recession, and the Watergate scandal, U.S. politics focused on a new east-west axis of power much more than the Caribbean Basin.

In the 1970s and 80s race for global supremacy, the United States did not put much importance on Latin America unless they were fighting communism or the war on drugs. By 1970, it had become clear that the economic success from Operation Bootstrap was over, as manufacturing employment began a precipitous decline alongside the agricultural decline that had begun decades earlier. Recessions and economic declines created more risk than companies could sustain while based in Puerto Rico. Instead, capital-intensive firms in electronics, oil refining, chemical and pharmaceutical industries were able to profit from the island’s tax haven status, but generated very little additional employment. When Congress extended tax breaks to these firms in the late 1970s, they already knew that the development model was not working, but they went ahead anyway. Federal transfers were also increased, primarily to maintain the image of development and consumerism. The

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121 Fusté, José I. 2017. ‘Repeating Islands of Debt: Historicizing the Transcolonial Relationality of Puerto Rico’s Economic Crisis,’ 105
122 Herring, George C. 2008. From Colony to Superpower, 786.
only major legislation that Congress passed in regards to Puerto Rico during this time was the gradual extension of food stamp benefits to the island from 1971-4.\textsuperscript{128}

At the time, the Puerto Rican economy was already beginning to falter under mounting debt and slowing growth. During the Cold War period, however, no other country in the Caribbean or state of the union received as much military funding as Puerto Rico.\textsuperscript{129} Federal military expenditures accounted for 65 percent of transfers on the island in 1970, and 46.7 percent in 1985.\textsuperscript{130} One could therefore expect the relative qualitative impact of defense spending to be much higher in this context.\textsuperscript{131} As had been the case in previous periods, this exchange also increased the island’s dependency on the United States for its economic well-being.\textsuperscript{132}

The fall of the Soviet Union changed the political climate of Puerto Rico, as well as the geopolitical interests of the U.S.\textsuperscript{133} In the 1990s, as the United States’ focus began to shift to the Middle East, the island’s military infrastructure was repurposed for large security operations targeting drug crime.\textsuperscript{134} Some began to speak out about their dissatisfaction with their relationship to the United States. Three plebiscite votes were held in the 90s to ascertain the possibility of changing Puerto Rico’s status, but none were definitive.\textsuperscript{135} Protests against a military radar project in 1995 spilled over into a larger general strike against the governor’s plan to privatize the phone company in 1998.\textsuperscript{136} In 1999 when a Navy exercise accidently killed a Viequense civilian worker, it sparked a major transnational movement that would

\textsuperscript{130} Pantoja-García, Emilio. 2007. ‘“Federal Funds” and the Puerto Rico Economy: Myths and Realities.’ Centro Journal 19, n. 2 (Fall): 215.
\textsuperscript{131} Grusky, Sara. 1987. ‘The Changing Role of the US Military in Puerto Rico,’ 65: ‘The stagnation in the Puerto Rican economy means that the military role in Puerto Rico has a more significant qualitative impact on the Puerto Rican economy than the analogous activity does in Rhode Island.’
\textsuperscript{132} Rivera-Batiz, Francisco L. 1998, ‘Chapter 1, Island Paradox: Puerto Rico in the 1990s,’ 16.
\textsuperscript{136} McCaffrey, Katherine. 2006. ‘Social Struggle Against the US Navy in Vieques, Puerto Rico,’ 93-4.
eventually force the United States to make major changes in its 21st century relationship with Puerto Rico.\textsuperscript{137}

As a result of its central role in coordinating the global monetary system, U.S. purchasing power was beginning to match its military supremacy at the end of the 20th century. At its center were the IMF and WTO, and the policies of free trade, privatization, and financial liberalization. However, the speed and instability of international financial flows started causing more frequent economic crises as well,\textsuperscript{138} which were painfully felt in Puerto Rico. After decades of inactivity, the U.S. Congress began to legislate for Puerto Rico again – this time, for the worse. Concerns over tax evasion in 1996 motivated their decision to let the tax breaks expire that had been created for the possessions corporations’ factories in Puerto Rico.\textsuperscript{139} The process was meant to be gradual, but this coupled with slow growth over the following decade, and the deadline for complete expiration of tax benefits coming in the 21st century, an economic crisis was on the horizon for Puerto Rico.\textsuperscript{140}

The Puerto Rican government arguably did the best they could in an impossible situation. Because of its territorial status, the insular government had to borrow money whenever federal funds ran out. The government also borrowed for public works projects and business incentives, even when it could not afford to.\textsuperscript{141} As a result, its people suffered. The Tobin Report of 1975 described a deplorable situation of poverty and unemployment, and the island’s increasing dependence on the United States. The report professed that a rushed implementation of neoliberal policies would be the solution to the problem.\textsuperscript{142} Regardless of this, public debt remained over 60 percent of GNP between 1977-2000.\textsuperscript{143} Federal transfers, especially social security and food stamps,\textsuperscript{144} allowed some to get by. Migration to the United States was another option that 1.4 million people chose.\textsuperscript{145} Throughout this period,

\textsuperscript{139} Fusté, José I. 2017. ‘Repeating Islands of Debt.’
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid. 2017, 105.
\textsuperscript{141} Quiñones-Perez and Seda-Irizarry. 2016, 139-40.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid. 2016, 139-40.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid. 2016. 139.
\textsuperscript{144} Pantoja-Garcia, Emilio. 2007. ““Federal Funds” and the Puerto Rico Economy,’ 213-15.
and even during the Vietnam conflict, the military was also an ‘escape valve’ for Puerto Ricans seeking opportunities elsewhere.¹⁴⁶

Puerto Ricans did not remain quiet during this period. After a long campaign, the people of the Culebra succeeded in removing the U.S. Navy presence from their island municipality in 1974.¹⁴⁷ The people of another island, Vieques, protested the same from 1978 to 1983. The protests began as a way to challenge the Navy’s detrimental impacts on fishermen’s livelihoods, but were soon co-opted by political groups including the Independentistas. After their protests became violent, a concession treaty was signed to delegitimize the movement.¹⁴⁸ The Viequenses would return to protests in 1999, forcing the Americans to pay attention once again.

I. The U.S. Military and the End of the Cold War Era

The size of the U.S. armed forces increased during the Vietnam War to around 3.5 million soldiers, but opposition to the war also grew during this time.\footnote{Moskos, Jr., Charles C. 1973. ‘The Emergent Military: Civil, Traditional, or Plural?’ \textit{The Pacific Sociological Review} \textbf{16}, n. 2 (April): 259.} The war caused Americans to question the value of military service, and significantly weakened soldier morale.\footnote{Moskos, Jr. Charles C. 1973. ‘The Emergent Military,’ 259-60.} There were protests against the ROTC on college campuses, as well as war protests. The draft was also eliminated during this period, significantly changing the relationship between the U.S. forces and its soldiers, especially those who were minorities.\footnote{Segal, David R., and Mady Wechsler Segal. 2004. ‘America’s Military Population.’} During this period the military’s impact on soldiers’ lives expanded, from an occupation\footnote{Blair, John D. and Robert L. Phillips. 1983. ‘Job Satisfaction Among Youth in Military and Civilian Work Settings.’ \textit{Armed Forces & Society} \textbf{9}, n. 4 (Summer): 555.} to a ‘total institution,’ taking over personal aspects as well as professional.\footnote{Moskos Jr. 1973. ‘The Emergent Military,’ 274.} The military’s established values of service and patriotism were transformed into a new mission - individual achievement.\footnote{Vine, David. 2015. ‘Chapter 8, Everyone Serves.’ In: \textit{Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and The World}. New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, 342-5 (eBook).} While the forces were increasingly being integrated racially, the military was increasingly segmented by the trend of technical specialization throughout the 70s.\footnote{Shyles, Leonard, and John E. Hocking. ‘The Army’s ‘Be All You Can Be’ Campaign.’ \textit{Armed Forces & Society} \textbf{16}, n. 3 (April 1990): 369–83. ‘Be all you can be,” was the Army’s marketing campaign during this era.}

In the late Cold War decades, the total number of U.S. troops was reduced to 2.5 million.\footnote{Ibid. 1973, 257.} In the early 1970s, the military activities on Puerto Rico also diminished,\footnote{Negroni, Héctor Andrés. 1992. \textit{Historia Militar de Puerto Rico}, 417-23.} but under Carter, Reagan, and Bush, the bases in Puerto Rico started to become central to the U.S. defense strategies again. This was primarily because of a renewed focus on eradicating communism from Latin America, but also because the U.S. would be forced to close Howard Air Force Base in Panama by 1999.\footnote{Col. Ballard, Eli. 2002. ‘The Role of Puerto Rico in United States National Security Strategy.’} The reductions in force size, implementation of the all-volunteer force, and missions to
address the ‘growing insurgency’ and ‘human rights violations’ in the region made Puerto Rico’s existing infrastructure even more valuable to the military network.\footnote{Grusky, Sara. 1987. ‘The Changing Role of the U.S. Military in Puerto Rico.’}

The regional mission of the Armed Forces also changed during the Cold War. In 1966, Caribbean Command was deactivated, and Puerto Rico was subsequently placed under US Southern Command.\footnote{Negroni, Héctor Andrés. 1992. Historia Militar de Puerto Rico, 417-8.} Their primary objectives were to manage socioeconomic changes and ensure they did not become threats to U.S. hegemony in the region. Their missions prioritized ensuring safe passage for US ships and resources, as well as the prevention of ‘destabilizing’ forces. Their development initiatives focused on collaborative security agreements with shared political, economic and military objectives, with the aim of strengthening these partnerships in the interest of long term security.\footnote{Grusky, Sara. 1987. ‘The Changing Role of the U.S. Military in Puerto Rico,’ 65-71.}

The biggest military presence on the island during this period was still the Navy, both in terms of property holdings and personnel. The presence of Roosevelt Roads and other major installations put Puerto Rico at ‘the center of U.S. military presence in the Caribbean.’\footnote{García Muñiz, Humberto. 1991. ‘U.S. Military Installations in Puerto Rico: An Essay on Their Role and Purpose.’ Caribbean Studies 24, n. ¾: 85 & 97.} It hosted half of the military personnel in the Caribbean at the time, as well as many national guardsmen and reservists.\footnote{García Muñiz, Humberto. 1991. ‘U.S. Military Installations in Puerto Rico,’ 80.} During the 1960s, the Navy controlled all installations in Puerto Rico under Southern Command, Atlantic.\footnote{U.S. Army. N.D. ‘History - U.S. Army Fort Buchanan Puerto Rico.’ Website. Accessed 03-02-2019 via https://home.army.mil/buchanan/index.php/about/history.} When Army command was reactivated in 1971, it was under the Third U.S. Army Forces Command. In 1989, the Army’s Command was found to be superfluous and deactivated;\footnote{García Muñiz, Humberto. 1991. ‘U.S. Military Installations in Puerto Rico,’ 84.} in 1999, the control transferred to back to Southern Command.\footnote{Col. Ballard, Eli. 2002. ‘The Role of Puerto Rico in United States National Security Strategy.’}

By the end of the 20th century, though, Puerto Rico’s value to the U.S. military was rapidly decreasing. Its economy was deteriorating, and the growing social unrest was often targeted at the military presence on the island. Crime increased as more young men became unemployed, which prompted the governor to activate the National Guard in support of security measures during the 1990s.\footnote{Lebrón, Marisol. 2018. ‘Puerto Rico’s War on Its Poor.’ Boston Review, 12 December. Accessed 20-06-2019 via https://bostonreview.net/class-inequality/marisol-lebron-puerto-rico-war-poor. This} Some residents
opposed this measure, but many others tolerated or accepted it. Improvements in weapons technologies and air travel had made it less necessary to keep large numbers of active duty troops in Puerto Rico, although meanwhile, the populations of veterans and reservists on the island remained high. By 1997, its only significant role in the U.S. government strategy was its location, necessary for launching collaborative military operations; and a bilingual force. US control over the island’s security and economy, however, only deepened Puerto Rico’s dependency on the mainland during this period.

Controversial program, named *Mano Duro Contra el Crimen*, was marketed as part of the war on drugs, with the same underlying classist and racist logics.


Harkavy, Robert E. 1988. ‘Las bases como proyección de furor y seguridad nacional.’ *Política Exterior* 2, n. 6 (Spring), 237: ‘la presencia externa no es bien recibida casi en parte alguna, excepto donde se puede interpretar como una contribución directa y visible a la protección.’

Grosfoguel, Ramón. 1997. ‘Migration and Geopolitics in the Greater Antilles: From the Cold War to the Post-Cold War.’


D. **Puerto Rico in the 21st Century**

In 1999, the accidental killing of a civilian worker in Vieques during a naval training exercise resulted in years of protests against the military’s presence in Puerto Rico. Drawing activists from the church, all Puerto Rican political parties, and the Puerto Rican diaspora, the struggle against the naval base Roosevelt Roads in Ceiba challenged the relationship between the island and the U.S. mainland.\(^{171}\) While some saw the military as security, others saw it as an example of colonialism.\(^{172}\) The injustices suffered by the people of Vieques at the hands of the U.S. Navy were exposed in the Western media, in order to put pressure on the President and Congress to act. Their reasoning and justifications for live bombing an inhabited island exposed to the public an outdated Cold War strategy, and could not be upheld under international scrutiny.\(^{173}\) Finally, President Bush agreed to cease operations at the base and to close it officially in 2003. Although initially hailed as a success of the people, the base’s closure also had negative effects on the community, including languishing development and growing health insecurity.\(^{174}\)

In fact, Vieques was only the beginning of one of the more difficult chapters in Puerto Rico’s history. A few years later, in 2006, the last of the Operation Bootstrap-era tax credits expired, right before the onset of the global financial crisis. This sent Puerto Rico’s economy into an even more precipitous decline, and nearly half a million of its people to the United States.\(^{175}\) The status plebiscite held in 2012 was indecisive, while the one held in 2017 was marred by a boycott.\(^{176}\) In 2016, the Puerto Rican government was unable to pay its debts; yet, because of its territorial status, it was unable to officially declare bankruptcy. The solution of Congress was to

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establish a financial oversight board with the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). The explicit purpose was not to rebuild Puerto Rico’s economy, but to ensure that the island would repay its debtors.\(^{177}\) What would become clearer after Hurricane Maria was that Puerto Rico, ready or not, was going to have to stand on its own.\(^{178}\)

21st century migration, economic restructuring, and ‘big events’ have drastically altered Puerto Rico.\(^{179}\) The general pattern has been that young people, the prime age labor force, are leaving for better economic opportunities elsewhere.\(^{180}\) The vast majority of them travel to the United States, where they have higher chances of finding a job and improving their lives, but also higher chances of experiencing discrimination and poverty.\(^{181}\) Many move again once they reach the United States, and circular, periodic migration to and from the island is also common.\(^{182}\) Return migrants and those who remain, however, are disproportionately older generations, retirees, and veterans.\(^{183}\) The age disparity between the diaspora and Puerto Rico has shrunk the local tax base, which was already small, and forced the closure of hundreds of schools.\(^{184}\) The island’s official unemployment rate in 2017 was 11.8 percent, on top of a labor force participation rate of only 44 percent.\(^{185}\) Then, Hurricane María hit.

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\(^{177}\) Cabán, Pedro. 2018. ‘PROMESA, Puerto Rico and the American Empire,’ 161-84.
\(^{178}\) Laguarta Ramírez, José A. 2018. ‘Riding the Perennial Gale: Working-Class Puerto Ricans and the Involution of Colonial Capitalism,’ 118. The hashtag used after Hurricane Maria, \#PuertoRicoSeLevanta, means that Puerto Rico will rise, or Puerto Rico is standing again. Personal Correspondence. 2019. Email exchange, 24-06-2019.
\(^{179}\) Laguarta Ramírez, José A. 2018. ‘Riding the Perennial Gale.’
The ongoing effects of climate change on Puerto Rico cannot be overstated.\textsuperscript{186} By 2014, even the Department of Defense had identified climate change as a security risk.\textsuperscript{187} On 20 September 2017, Hurricane María made landfall on Puerto Rico as a Category 4 storm, one of the biggest ever recorded. Around 3,000 people died, and the island’s antiquated power grid was destroyed. Power stayed off in most places for months. In all, the local government estimated that the storm caused around $94 billion in damages.\textsuperscript{188} People described the event as if a bomb had gone off.\textsuperscript{189} Recovery efforts were made, but days and sometimes weeks later. Often, it was the military that cleared roads and repaired infrastructure.\textsuperscript{190} The military also provided emergency healthcare, delivered aid, and distributed water, albeit very imperfectly.\textsuperscript{191} An increasingly insecure environment will certainly continue to change the military’s relationship with Puerto Rico.

\textsuperscript{186} Laguarta Ramirez, José A. 2018. ‘Riding the Perennial Gale.’ 126.


I. The U.S. Military in the 21st Century

The U.S. military’s goals and strategies for the nation and the Caribbean have changed in the 21st century. After September 11th, homeland security became top priority.\(^{192}\) The military has also changed the way its soldiers fight war, making operations more technical,\(^{193}\) increasing the use of contractors, and differentiating its workforce.\(^{194}\) The aim is to have a force that is ‘agile, rapidly deployable, automated, precise, and long-range.’\(^{195}\) In 2010, the military also began claiming that it ‘does not simply protect the country but also saves lives the world over.’\(^{196}\) The military’s main imperatives are to combat terrorism, to be prepared for any attack, to counter drug crime, foster economic collaboration, ensure energy security, enforce democratic and human rights principles, and to provide humanitarian aid.\(^{197}\)

Puerto Rico was situated under the jurisdiction of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) until 2008. Its mission included promoting cooperation with troops from other nations in the region, and protecting U.S. oil and gas access. Drug crime, political turmoil, and natural disasters in SOUTHCOM’s military theatre created a nearly ‘constant demand for outreach and humanitarian intervention by the United States military.’\(^{198}\) To aid in those efforts, a fleet of vehicles was added to aid its operations in Latin America,\(^{199}\) and two regional programs, the ‘Third Border Initiative,’ and ‘Operation Enduring Friendship,’ were initiated during the Bush administration.\(^{200}\) These international operations, and the increased deployment of troops from Puerto Rico during Iraq and Afghanistan, increased the intensity with which the military facilities there were used.\(^{201}\) In 2008, the military command of


\(^{201}\) Torres Rivera, Alejandro. 2018. ‘La creación del Comando Geográfico del Caribe.’
Puerto Rico was transferred to U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). While their missions are similar to those of SOUTHCOM, this command has fewer assigned forces with which to accomplish them – instead, they assign troops when needed, which provides flexibility and rapid response.

Although no longer in command of it, Puerto Rico’s military architecture still speaks of the Navy. Its last major base in Puerto Rico, Roosevelt Roads, was closed in 2003. This has resulted in a significant decrease in military operations around the island, leading some to believe that Puerto Rico’s military value has decreased as well. However, the island’s collaborative security network is its key strength the U.S. military today. The island also still hosts half of all the U.S. troops in the Caribbean, and in 2018, the Army was increasing its local recruiting. Around 10,000 National Guardsmen, 4,500 Army Reservists, and smaller offices of the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, the FBI, DEA, Secret Service, CIA, the Air Force, and even a few from the Navy are still in Puerto Rico. Many of these military organizations are housed at or work through Fort Buchanan, the only remaining federal base on the island.

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204 Although this closure was made official in May of 2004, manpower data challenge the idea that this base was actually ‘closed.’ Like Fort Buchanan, it appears that the function of this installation was transferred to the Army Reserves. As late as 2011 the Department of Defense reported around 600 active duty members at this installation, but did not report any reservists, however. Department of Defense. 2011. Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2012 Baseline. Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense. Accessed 27-04-2019 via https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/BSI/Base%20Structure%20Report%20FY12.pdf, 69.
209 Pantojas-García, Emilio. 2007. ‘“Federal Funds” and the Puerto Rican Economy,’ 216.
210 Torres Rivera, Alejandro. 2018. ‘La creación del Comando Geográfico del Caribe.’
Chapter 3: The History, Structures, and Functions of Fort Buchanan

In spite of its century-long existence, an extensive history of the U.S. Army Reserve garrison Fort Buchanan has never been written. One of this thesis’ aims is therefore to bring together Army and academic sources for a thorough history of the garrison’s structures and functions since it was first used by the 65th Regiment in 1923. The history of the installation shows how its roles in the U.S. military network changed to accommodate imperial conflicts and desires. This adaptability has allowed the base to remain relevant in the military network, ensuring that its employees and the military community maintain access to the additional benefits that result from the garrison’s transnational exchanges with the U.S.¹

A. **Fort Buchanan from 1898-1939: Leadership, Training, and Services**

Twenty-two years after becoming part of the United States, Puerto Ricans were finally allowed to join its military. The first unit was called the ‘Porto Rico Regiment,’ a local militia that was formed in 1899. After the unit was used to guard the Panama Canal during World War One, it was finally designated as a unit in the U.S. Army. The militia officially became the 65th Regiment on 14 September 1920. Two years later, an artillery battalion was added, and the unit needed a training site. In 1923, the battalion was assigned an allotment of around 300 acres on the south shore of San Juan Bay. This piece of land was originally called Fort Miles, after Nelson A. Miles, a commander of the U.S. invasion in 1898. Once given to the Borinqueñas, as they now called themselves, the base changed names and became known as Camp Buchanan. It was named after Brigadier General James Anderson Buchanan, who had served in Puerto Rico from 1898 to 1903, where he commanded the first Porto Rico Regiment of U.S. Volunteers.

The base’s main function during this period was to provide space for target and maneuver practice for the 65th. Once it was formed, the National Guard also trained there as well. Later, a command depot was added, then a personnel center, and finally a services center. Until the United States joined World War II in 1939, these remained the base’s main functions. The next section explains how preparing for a new conflict spurred a new phase of construction that significantly expanded the size of the base, altered its core functions, and once again, changed its name.
B. Fort Buchanan from 1939 until 1971: Initial Expansion, Contraction, and Changing Leadership

The Works Progress Administration (WPA) and Puerto Rico Recovery Administration (PRRA) infrastructure build-up campaign from 1934-38 was just the first phase of military construction in Puerto Rico. The United States’ entrance into World War Two prompted another round of even greater investments in existing and new military installations. Roosevelt used funds from the Lend-Lease program in 1940 to build up of a network of Air Force, Navy, and Army bases in Puerto Rico, including what was then called Camp Buchanan. The camp was transformed into a permanent installation of the US Army, and was thereafter called Fort Buchanan.13

Admiral W. Leahy, who was at the time governor, oversaw the installation’s expansion in 1939, which required an exchange of land with the 65th Regiment.14 When the first rounds of developments were complete in 1940, Fort Buchanan’s territory had been expanded to around 4,500 acres. Its facilities then included an industrial complex of port facilities, ammunition storage and railways, as well as an Army supply depot, reception, and induction centers for local troops.15 It was also connected via a new $5M road to the Borinquen Air Field in Aguadilla, facilitating the processing and deployment of troops.16 By 1942, there were new housing units available for Army families17 and the base began offering financial services,18 reflecting post-WWII trends at bases across the military as a whole.19 The new Antilles-Caribbean Command was formed for the US’s entrance into World War II and headquartered at the base.20 In terms of overall military construction, Fort Buchanan might not have garnered the most funds, but it was certainly central to the military’s operations in Puerto Rico.

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16 Rodriguez Beruff, Jorge, and José L. Bolivar Fresneda, eds. 2015. Island at War, 139.
17 Rodriguez Beruff and Bolivar-Fresneda 2015. Island at War, 139: 450 housing units were slated to be built for both the army and the navy; determining for which service they were built is not possible.
19 Matos Rodriguez, Félix V. 1997. ‘New Currents in Puerto Rican History: Legacy, Continuity and Challenges of the “Nueva Historia.”’ Latin American Research Review 32, n. 3: 193-208. Fort Buchanan was the first place on the island to welcome mobile banking services in the 1950s.
Once it was clear in 1943 that the U.S. would be successful in its WWII endeavors, most military construction stopped.\textsuperscript{21} Over the following years, Fort Buchanan was gradually reduced in size to about 800 acres. Its key functions continued to be housing personnel and training them, but its relative importance in the network of bases was diminished. The base became increasingly used to provide administrative support to the Antilles command, as well as for the army’s water transportation, personnel, and training. It maintained a port after the war that processed army and air force commodities, but began decreasing its acreage.\textsuperscript{22} In 1966, the Antilles Command it housed was deactivated, and the base was transferred to Navy control in December of that year.\textsuperscript{23} While under Navy command until 1971, Fort Buchanan was known as the US Naval Station Annex.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{figure}
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{map.png}
\caption{Map of Puerto Rico’s Military Infrastructure, 1948. Fort Buchanan is in light grey, center.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{21} Rodríguez Beruff and Bolivar-Fresneda 2015. \textit{Island at War}, 145.
\textsuperscript{23} U.S. Army. 2019. ‘History of Fort Buchanan.’
C. Fort Buchanan at the End of the 20th Century: Static Defense, Operational Services, and Reserve Support

Fort Buchanan was returned to the Army in 1971 after five years of being under Navy control. The military had initially planned to close Fort Buchanan; however, the protests of Puerto Rican veterans and the military community of around 100,000 people on the island influenced their ultimate decision not to close the base.\footnote{Johnson, Richard. 2011. ‘Graphic: Mapping a Superpower-sized Military.’ National Post. 28 October. Accessed 18-02-2019 via https://nationalpost.com/news/graphics/graphic-mapping-a-superpower-sized-military.}

For the local and federal governments, it was seen as a valuable deterrent to nationalistic political insurrections throughout this period.\footnote{Ibid. 1991, 89.} A realignment of communications activities around the island prevented the closure from happening, and many activities were consolidated at the base,\footnote{Rodríguez Beruff, Jorge. 1985. ‘Puerto Rico and the Militarization of the Caribbean, 1979-1984.’ Contemporary Marxism 10 (Summer): 68-91.} including communications, intelligence, logistics, and ground troop preparation.\footnote{Harkavy, Robert E. 1988. ‘Las bases como proyección de fuerza y seguridad nacional,’ 242-3.} When the question was raised again in 1989 Congressional hearings of whether Puerto Rico would continue to host military installations in the case of independence, people from the Puerto Rican military community, and from both the statehood and commonwealth parties spoke out in favor of retaining Fort Buchanan.\footnote{García Muñiz. 1991, 89.} The base changed command within the Army a few more times during this period, first to Forces Command and then to U.S. Southern Command in 1977, where it remained until 2008.

Since returning to the Army, the primary missions of Fort Buchanan were property management and base operational support. The base was primarily used to provide services to soldiers and their families, and for coordination of logistics and training.\footnote{García Muñiz. 1991, 85 & 91.} Its territory covered 828 acres, and by that time it was very close to the metropolitan area of San Juan.\footnote{García Muñiz. 1991, 89.} Many services were moved to the base as the result of further condensation of the military’s effort to reduce its overall footprint.\footnote{Harkavy, Robert E. 2005. ‘Thinking About Basing,’ Naval War College Review 58 n. 3 (Article 2): 16-26.} In the 1980s, Fort Buchanan hosted only 350-500 active duty troops, but about half of the
island’s 18,500 reservists and members of the National Guard trained on its grounds.\textsuperscript{33} Otherwise, the role of the base was:

\begin{quote}
‘purely internal: providing administrative, logistical and training support and supervision to the U.S. National Guard in Puerto Rico, the Reserve and ROTC; conducting Army intelligence activities; providing commissary and exchange benefits to retired personnel and their dependents as well as to veterans; and coordinating the recruitment program of the U.S. armed forces in Puerto Rico.’\textsuperscript{34}
\end{quote}

The base was increasingly securitized throughout the 1990s as a result of the First Gulf War, damage from Hurricane Georges, and later, the arrival of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).\textsuperscript{35} Housing units were improved to house more active duty troops, as well as the command and intelligence operations of SOUTHCOM. Their aim was to create an exemplary Army base, one that demonstrated commitment to modernization and security.\textsuperscript{36}

The base also functioned as a site where different actors could negotiate the benefits, costs, and priorities of the U.S. military in Puerto Rico. The quote above begins to show how local communities were engaged with the U.S. military at this base – through recruitment activities, the provision of veterans and commissary benefits, supporting of dependents, and surveillance. Unlike at other bases, however, the presence of the U.S. military at Fort Buchanan seems to provide the community with more tangible benefits than it does costs. Things like receiving one’s retirement benefits and affordable food from the commissary can be absolutely essential for survival, and a positive association with the entity that provides such needed resources would not be surprising; and indeed, that seems to be the case with Fort Buchanan. The next section explores what happened to the base – and its relationship to the community – in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.


\textsuperscript{34} García Muñiz, Humberto. 1991, 89.

\textsuperscript{35} Personal Correspondence. 2019. Skype interview, 19-06-2019.

D. The 21st Century Role of Fort Buchanan: Support and Service, Reserve Training, and Power Projection

At the beginning of the 21st century, Fort Buchanan hosted a subordinate outpost of SOUTHCOM, the United States Army South Command (USARSO), whose operations covered Latin America, the Caribbean nations and territories, and the Gulf of Mexico. This command was made up of around 5,300 soldiers, and primarily was engaged in counter drug, administrative, and logistical missions, as well as in executing collaborative security agreements with regional forces. Fort Buchanan also continued to host the 65th Regiment. When activated, they provided ‘materiel and service support for military operations’ in the Caribbean region. The missions of other military units headquartered in Fort Buchanan included equipment maintenance, medical services, engineering, and emergency training, reflecting in part the military’s pivot to ‘humanitarian relief’ efforts. Fort Buchanan was designated an Installation Management Reserve base in 2003. The purpose of the base was still primarily to provide soldiers with services, but the base functioned as an important training ground for Reservists and National Guardsmen as well. A 2004 survey of 140 Puerto Rican soldiers, among others, found that most of them still were not placed in combat positions, but instead, in support roles.

USARSO command was relocated from the garrison to Texas in 2002, which ended plans for further upgrades to on-base housing units and shrunk the total personnel on the base. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure round recommended concentrating Reserve components in Fort Buchanan to save costs, improve readiness and training of reserve troops, and improve collaborations. Once realigned as such, the fort became a garrison in 2006, and two years later, was placed

38 Torres Rivera, Alejandro. 2018. ‘La creación del Comando Geográfico del Caribe’
41 ArmyBases.org. N.D. ‘Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico.’
42 Dempsey, Jason K., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 2009. ‘The Army’s Hispanic Future.’ Armed Forces & Society 35, n. 3 (April), 543: 60 percent of Hispanics, which include Mexicans, Cubans, and others from Latin America, do not serve in combat positions.
Improvements to Fort Buchanan in 2010 and 2011 included renovations to soldiers’ barracks and base headquarters, more facilities for families, a visitor’s guesthouse, and a new school.

Today, Fort Buchanan’s motto is ‘The Sentinel of the Caribbean.’ Its main function today is still reserve training, mostly for specialty occupations beyond soldiers’ first boot camp. The garrison has seven directorates, seven support offices and three management and control offices. It houses the Caribbean Geographic Command, which supports and trains multiple reserve components, and coordinates a number of local exercises efforts from the garrison. Recently, Caribbean Command organized the Army Reserve and National Guard to provide emergency fuel, subsistence, transportation, infrastructure, and health service delivery to Puerto Rican communities following Hurricane María. Normally, the garrison provides services to approximately 130,000 veterans, civilians, service members and their families in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and throughout Latin America. In addition to hosting multiple events for the military community, the base’s facilities include a soldier processing center, a commissary, veterinary clinic, bowling alley, family center, and contracting offices. There are approximately 438 buildings and 119 housing units on its 746 acres. Rodriguez Army Health Clinic, on the grounds of Fort Buchanan, provides healthcare services to 15,000 active duty and reserve soldiers, and more than 95,000 veterans. The clinic has an annual operating budget

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51 U.S. Army. 2019. ‘History of Fort Buchanan.’ This seems to be reported as an annual number.
54 ArmyBases.org. N.D. ‘Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico.’
55 Cabán, Pedro. 2018. ‘PROMESA, Puerto Rico and the American Empire.’ Latino Studies 16, iss. 3 (July), 165: The author cites a different number – 450 acres.
of $5 million, and there are plans to increase its capacity in the near future.\textsuperscript{55} The garrison’s schools enroll approximately 1,900 students. Annual operating budget of the base is $42 million, with an additional $9.6 million allocated for mobilization expenses.\textsuperscript{56} Its estimated real estate value is $1.2 billion, but this is likely to increase in the near future as a number of construction projects have been underway at the base recently. A child development and youth center, the first of its kind on a U.S. military base, was begun in 2017 at a cost of $14 million. Another $39.1 million was spent on construction at the base during fiscal year 2017-18.\textsuperscript{57} Repairs from Hurricane Maria cost another $16 million. The U.S. Army allocated $52 million in 2018 to upgrade training and office facilities at the base,\textsuperscript{58} and Congress approved another $26 million in late 2018 for 26 new family housing units.\textsuperscript{59} A ‘super clinic’ that can serve over 200,000 people and a new access point are also planned for the future.\textsuperscript{60}

These investments demonstrate how Fort Buchanan is an important part of the military’s network for many reasons. The base’s strategic location, significant Reserve function, and the skills of its soldiers help the military achieve its goals in the Caribbean region.\textsuperscript{61} But Fort Buchanan has an important symbolic function for the military as well – as a platform for U.S. power projection.\textsuperscript{62} In a region that it perceives as unstable, the military needs sites where it can prove its strength to potential adversaries, as well as persuade ‘local hearts and minds’ to at least not interfere with its operations.\textsuperscript{63} Multimillion-dollar investments in infrastructure and the thousands of full- and part-time troops who train on its grounds are therefore


\textsuperscript{56} Office of the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico. 2018. ‘Jennifer Gonzalez inspects work in Fort Buchanan, Product of a $81.6 Million Investment.’


\textsuperscript{59} Army Times. 2018. ‘US Army to invest $62M in Puerto Rico in upcoming years.’

\textsuperscript{60} U.S. Army. 2019. ‘History of Fort Buchanan.’

\textsuperscript{61} Harkavy, Robert E. 1988. ‘Las bases como proyección de furerez y seguridad nacional.’ ArmyBases.org. N.D.

\textsuperscript{62} This is, of course, an old idea, demonstrating the persistent realist ideologies of the military. Maier, Charles S. 2006. \textit{Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors}. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press,169.
important ways that Fort Buchanan aids the U.S. military in demonstrating its power. However, it is important to point out that the adaptability of the base and its employees to the needs of the U.S. military is part of the reason for its continued existence. By remaining flexible, the garrison remains an asset to the military network, as well as to the local community. The next chapter looks more specifically at this mutually beneficial relationship by examining what the troops and civilian employees of the base might get in exchange for their services.

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Chapter 4: Analyzing the Workforce Development Impacts of Fort Buchanan

A. Introduction

The survey of the U.S. military history in Puerto Rico and the development trajectory of Fort Buchanan in the previous two chapters were needed to demonstrate the long-standing military relationship between the two nations, but unfortunately, they do not show clearly enough the local socioeconomic impacts of this connection. Therefore, this chapter examines the labor market effects in the San Juan metropolitan area of the U.S. military at Fort Buchanan. The chapter takes a workforce development approach to the data, by investigating the employment opportunities for individuals with low skill levels and low educational attainment. In its most effective implementation, workforce development continuously strives to match the supply and skills of the labor force to the demands of local businesses over time, and to respond quickly to changes in socioeconomic conditions.\(^1\) In this respect, the approach dovetails with the historical perspective used earlier, which has already outlined some of the relevant contextual changes that this approach considers below.

The workforce development approach also confirms that the U.S. military is a key employment sector in the Puerto Rican economy. It is worth mentioning at the outset that members of the U.S. Armed Forces are not technically considered ‘employed’ or part of the labor force.\(^2\) However, since transitioning to an all-volunteer force, the military has acquired increasingly more characteristics of an ‘occupation.’\(^3\) It has become the largest employer of young adults and the largest vocational training institution in the U.S.\(^4\) Service members sign contracts for their services in exchange for monthly wages and benefits. The average Army recruit receives two months of basic training at the beginning of service,\(^5\) has regular training requirements to maintain their abilities, and has access to a number of other

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opportunities to upgrade their skills both during and after their term of service, such as healthcare and metalworking. Moreover, veteran status can (though does not always) provide employment advantages in the civilian market upon completion of service. As will be demonstrated below, the number of employment opportunities and quality of wages in this sector relative to other local sectors make it imperative to consider the U.S. military as an employment institution in Puerto Rico.

Additional service benefits are another important reason to study the workforce effects of U.S. military service in Puerto Rico. Jobs are a positive result of development not just for their income effects, but also for their productive and perceptual contributions to society. Education, for example, is the most cost effective way to invest in and improve the local labor force. In the 20th and 21st centuries, education benefits for military service have been provided by the GI Bills of 1944, 1984, and 2008. The GI Bill traditionally provides scholarships for post-secondary education and job training to active duty and military veterans. For minorities like Hispanics in the military, these benefits are used at a higher rate than in other racial groups. Active duty members and their families are also eligible to receive housing, healthcare, subsistence, educational, and childcare support during service, often via their closest military base. Additional benefits after military service include a federal pension, subsidized healthcare, subsidized home loans, and preferential status for business loans. Although these benefits have declined over time, they are still seen by recruits as an important reason to join the military, and for good reason. These

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16 Bennett, Pamela P. and Katrina Bell McDonald. 2015. ‘Chapter 6: Military Service as a Pathway to Early Socioeconomic Achievement for Disadvantaged Groups,’ 133.
benefits can have the most long-lasting qualitative effects on service members and veterans, not only by increasing employment opportunities through training, but also by helping individuals surmount existing barriers and increase their socioeconomic mobility.\textsuperscript{15}

In Puerto Rico, those barriers are immense. The national poverty rate is one indicator of the situation – although it has declined from a height of 65.2 percent of the population in 1970,\textsuperscript{16} the percentage of Puerto Ricans living in poverty has remained above 40 percent in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.\textsuperscript{17} Labor force participation has declined since the 1970s,\textsuperscript{18} indicating not only an aging population but also declining local employment opportunities, especially in the private sector.\textsuperscript{19} Although they do not account for the informal sector and discouraged workers, official Puerto Rican unemployment rates remained between 8-13 percent in the last quarter of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century and have risen again since the millennium.\textsuperscript{20} As was mentioned in the first chapter, foreign direct investment, a traditional method of creating jobs, has not increased in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.\textsuperscript{21} Educational attainment, an avenue for socioeconomic advancement, has been increasing since the end of WWII, but with increasing costs to the insular government and decreasing returns to workers for their investments.\textsuperscript{22} In 2010, high school graduates accounted for around 70 percent of the population over

\textsuperscript{15} Bennett and Bell McDonald. 2015. ‘Chapter 6: Military Service as a Pathway to Early Socioeconomic Achievement for Disadvantaged Groups,’ 120 & 133.
\textsuperscript{16} HathiTrust Digital Library. 2019. ‘Puerto Rico 1970 Census of the Population, V2.’ Website. Accessed 10-05-2019 via https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=txu.059173024001170;page=root;seq=13;view=image;size=100;orient=0. Although reliable statistics for Puerto Rico are not easily found from before this time period, a number of anti-poverty programs had already been in place for some time before 1970.
25 years of age, while 4-year college graduates accounted for only 22 percent. For individuals searching for work in this environment, the Army represents an economic opportunity. It is in this context that the thesis examines the workforce effects of the U.S. military in Puerto Rico and at Fort Buchanan. With the economic situation of the island in mind, joining the armed forces of an entity otherwise considered to be a colonial power can be seen more clearly as strategy to increase one’s access to specific socioeconomic benefits. This exchange exemplifies the dynamic connections between the two nations, Puerto Rico and the United States, that prevent this relationship from being classified as static or unilateral. The imperial control of the U.S. over Puerto Rico has certainly caused many of its ills and struggles, but this connection has also conferred some benefits, such as free migration to the U.S., and large federal transfers that increase both individual and the insular government’s income. Puerto Ricans have challenged the political peace and complicity desired by the U.S., but also reaped the socioeconomic benefits that come from helping the imperial military to further its missions. Because this exchange is dynamic, it is possible to be changed and exploited by both parties. The work in this thesis aims to highlight the fact that a different and more complex understanding of this relationship could also create space for the military to be used to a greater extent as a tool for economic and workforce development in Puerto Rico.


In the sections that follow, different aspects of military employment in Puerto Rico and at Fort Buchanan are analyzed for their overall workforce development effects since the 1980s. The first section deals with overall numbers of active duty soldiers, reservists, and civilian employees at Fort Buchanan, and compares these numbers to other sectors in the local labor market that provide jobs for low-skilled individuals. The next section compares the annual wages of the garrison’s employees over time to the annual median incomes in the San Juan metro area. A third section looks at military benefits, including training and opportunities after service. The final comparison looks at the changes in Fort Buchanan’s property value relative to other federal and domestic investments in the San Juan area. The concluding section looks into the existing workforce development programs on the island and discusses the results of the previous sections relative to these efforts.
B. Active Duty, Reserve, and Civilian Employment

There are four main categories of military occupations: active duty troops, administrative supporters, logistics management, and reservists, who are considered flexible and temporary.\(^2^9\) However, reports on the economic impacts of domestic bases only consider civilian and active duty members as employees.\(^3^0\) Therefore, this section considers active duty service members to be full-time employees if they are listed on its annual report as being based at Fort Buchanan.\(^3^1\) Administrative support and logistics management employees are also considered full-time employees if they are listed in these annual reports, although additional contractors are often used for these functions. Because both contractors and reservists are considered temporary employees, their numbers are not as readily available for the given time period, even though reserve training is one of the explicitly stated functions of the garrison. Their numbers are reported whenever available to demonstrate the total number of personnel that might be present on the base during a given period.

Although the closest town to the garrison is Guaynabo, the thesis looks at the greater San Juan metropolitan area employment figures for a number of reasons.\(^3^2\) First, Guaynabo is integrated into the San Juan metro area as a suburb of the capital city.\(^3^3\) Second, data for the San Juan area are more readily available than those for Guaynabo. Third, service members from ‘Hispanic’ backgrounds are more likely to


\(^{3^1}\) Active duty and civilian numbers come from a series of Base Structure Reports released by the Department of Defense. While their structures are fairly consistent, the series of reports itself is not readily available in one location; hence, multiple sources will be used in this chapter. For an example of a recent Base Structure Report, see Appendix 3.


come from large urban areas, and San Juan is by far the largest metro region on the island. Finally, the size and functions of the base will draw employees from the surrounding area, not just the immediate neighborhoods, so the individuals living in the metro area around the base should be considered among its potential employees.

As a basis for understanding the relative employment strength of the base, labor force statistics and employment figures for the manufacturing and transportation sectors in the San Juan metro area are compared to the figures from the base in each period. These sectors were selected because they have traditionally been employment options of low-skilled workers. Understanding that interest in the military varies by a number of conditions and characteristics, all efforts are made to clarify which worker characteristics are most represented by the results in this chapter. Because data is not available for every year, the time period is analyzed every five years, beginning in 1980.

Beginning in 1980, 2,094 active duty troops and 748 civilian employees were based at Fort Buchanan, while the total number of reservists was found to be 147. At 2,989 employees, the base housed around 50 percent of the total armed forces present on the island, but represented around 2 percent of the San Juan labor force. This is

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35 Most employment figures are taken from decennial U.S. censuses, a collection of which may be found here: Instituto de Estadísticas de Puerto Rico. 2019. ‘Censo decenal de Población y vivienda.’ Gobierno de Puerto Rico. Accessed 25-04-2019 via https://censo.estadisticas.pr/censo-decenal/Puerto-Rico/1980. For manufacturing employment figures, I used data from the category ‘Industrial Manufacturing’ and for transportation figures, I used ‘Transportation and Material Moving Occupations.’ If the the citywide average is available, I use that figure; if the figure is disaggregated, the male figure is reported instead, as this number has been more consistently measured over time. Please see Chapter 5 for a discussion on how military experiences differ by gender.


39 This range in percentages comes from conflicting numbers from the 1980 US Census (4137) and from Grusky 1987 (5877). Grusky used DoD data, however.

40 Own Calculations 1, see Appendix 2.
a much smaller workforce than the number of individuals employed by manufacturing (13,331), about 9 percent of the workforce, but is comparable to the transport sector (3,685), representing about 2 percent of the local workforce, during the same period.\textsuperscript{41} In 1985, active duty numbers decreased to 468 soldiers, while civilian employment increased to 1,065.\textsuperscript{42} The number of reservists stationed at the base increased to over 900,\textsuperscript{43} which was intended to make up for reductions in the active duty force during the same period.\textsuperscript{44}

By 1990 and the end of the Cold War period, employment numbers had leveled out close to those in the previous period: 331 active duty troops and 564 civilian employees, while reserve numbers had decreased to 1,097.\textsuperscript{45} In the same time period, San Juan’s manufacturing employment had decreased by almost 37 percent, to 8,403 individuals, and the transportation sector grew by around 31 percent to 4,844 workers.\textsuperscript{46} These now represented 5 and 3 percent of the San Juan metro area workforce, respectively.\textsuperscript{47} In 1995, the base’s employment remained steady at 297

\textsuperscript{41} Own Calculations 2, see Appendix 2.
\textsuperscript{42} García Muñiz, Humberto. 1991. ‘U.S. Military Installations in Puerto Rico: An Essay on Their Role and Purpose.’ Caribbean Studies 24, n. 3/4: 85. Although the author also uses base structure reports, these conflict with an earlier report also using BSRs:
Grusky, Sara. 1987. ‘The Changing Role of the US Military in Puerto Rico.’ Social and Economic Studies 36, n. 3 (September): 59-61. While Grusky’s figures are lower than those in García Muñiz, I assume that the more recently reported numbers are the most accurate.
Also, an important note on the variations of personnel within the Army, from:
DoD. 1979. Base Structure Annex to Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1980, 20: ‘Some installation requirements are relatively fixed because they support more stable missions such as service schools, research and development activities, material testing, and specialized depot activities… the Army has other missions which are subject to larger variations and which, at one time, may generate additional requirements; and, at another time, reduce requirements for active installations. Examples are training centers for initial entry training, aviation training facilities, production facilities, administrative space to support specialized activities, and troop unit installations.’
\textsuperscript{47} Own Calculations 3, see Appendix 2.
active duty and 645 civilians. Without reliable data on numbers of reservists for this period, the thesis cannot present a clearer picture on the magnitude of their impacts; the author can only report that the base’s direct employment represented around 0.5 percent of the San Juan labor force during the 1990s.

The year 2000 brought many changes to the Fort Buchanan workforce. Changing of command and more regional missions quickly increased the number of active duty troops stationed there to 2,362 soldiers. The concentration of power at Fort Buchanan was relatively increased during this period, even as the overall number of active duty troops on the island was beginning to decrease. Civilian numbers also ramped up to accommodate for the increase, to 936 employees. Reservists represented 1,171 individuals in the year 2000. The total increase in personnel also raised the garrison’s relative percentage of the local labor force to more than two percent with just civilians and active duty service members, and three percent when including reservists. Manufacturing employment continued to decrease, now with 6,500 employees representing only 4 percent of the San Juan workforce; however, with a slight increase in total employment numbers to 5,235 individuals, transportation now represented around 3.4 percent of the local workforce.

The Army maintained relatively high numbers of active duty troops at Fort Buchanan in the early 2000s. Existing housing units had been improved at the turn of the century to house more families of active duty USARSO soldiers, but the departure of this command in 2002 resulted in a decline in the base’s overall numbers. In 2005, active duty numbers decreased to 1,591 soldiers, while reservists were increased to 1,421. Civilian numbers decreased by nearly 45 percent, however, to 518

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49 Own Calculations 4, see Appendix 2.
52 Own Calculations 6, see Appendix 2.
53 Own Calculations 6, see Appendix 2.
employees. The overall representation of Fort Buchanan’s employment to the local labor force stayed about the same between 2005 and 2010, between 1-2 percent. In 2005, manufacturing employment dipped below 6,000, and by 2010 the figure was 5,456 workers, representing 3 percent of the workforce. Transportation jobs in San Juan increased to 8,575 in 2005; even with a decrease in employment in 2010, the sector still represented almost 4 percent of local jobs.

The most recent DoD personnel data paint a more confusing picture, and could be in error due to underreporting. The 2015 Base Structure Report only listed 31 active duty troops at Fort Buchanan, and 422 civilian employees. However, the number of reservists increased by 86 percent to 2,580 individuals. While this represents the garrison’s function as a reserve training center, it is unclear how 31 individuals could train more than 2,500 new recruits. With this significant increase in numbers, the garrison’s reservists now must be counted in order to show any meaningful labor force impact. When including all personnel, Fort Buchanan employment represented around 2 percent of the San Juan labor force in 2015. Because the practical differences between an active duty soldier and an activated

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58 Own Calculations 7, see Appendix 2.
62 Own Calculations 8, see Appendix 2.
63 Starting in 2001, DTRH started publishing an annual report on their cities’ industries. Labor market calculations using both data sets from DTRH therefore should improve their reliability – even if the numbers are ‘incorrect,’ the magnitudes of impact should still be clear.
65 Own Calculations 9, see Appendix 2.
reservist are few, and the high chance that contract employment makes up the gap in personnel, the findings can only be taken for a high-level abstraction of the garrison’s current employment impacts. Due to a significant decrease in the size of the overall labor force and loss of 20 percent of jobs in Puerto Rico since 2007, the relative labor force impact of both sectors had decreased slightly by 2015.

The most recent data anomalies notwithstanding, employment numbers at Fort Buchanan show a few patterns in their fluctuation. Active duty troops averaged around 797 individuals from 1980-1995, then remained relatively higher, between 1500-2000 soldiers a year, from 2000 through 2010. Again, the data on active duty troops from 2015 are likely to be incorrect or misleading, but the recent increase in reservists may also indicate that the structure and composition of the military force has changed. Indeed, the garrison’s new command, NORTHCOM, no longer keeps high numbers of permanent troops at any one time, preferring flexibility in their response. A relative increase in reserve troops that are only activated when needed and a decrease in active duty soldiers would follow this line of reasoning. It is likely that, as neoliberal and capitalist values become more important to the modern U.S. military, this shift also decreases overall fixed costs for the garrison while placing the burden of precarious employment upon the reservist; one would question what this could mean for civilian employees as well. While the numbers of civilian employees at the base have not fluctuated as much as those in the active duty and reserve components, there has been a sustained decrease in their overall numbers since 2000. Along the same line of reasoning about what may be affecting the relative balance of soldiers, it is possible that some functions of civilian employees have been transferred to contractors as well. Without reliable data on contract amounts or awardees, it is unfortunately not possible for this thesis to determine whether that is the case. Historical figures on civilian and active duty wages, however, are available through the Department of Defense, and the next section turns to this data to determine the income effects of working at Fort Buchanan.

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67 Own Calculations 10, see Appendix 2.
69 Heinecken, Lindy. 2009. ‘Discontent Within the Ranks?,’ 489: In the 21st century, military work seems to be increasingly precarious.
C. Active Duty and Civilian Wages

In addition to employment figures, wages are an important indicator of the competitiveness of military occupations relative to other local job opportunities. This is because most job seekers compare potential earnings among different positions before choosing an occupation.\(^\text{70}\) Although they may have only incomplete information, individuals make calculated employment choices based on things like their available skill sets, perceived opportunities in the job market, time availability, and potential earnings. If, in Puerto Rico, the military offers more reliable or higher earnings than other job opportunities, then this should increase its attractiveness for some job seekers. To investigate this aspect of military employment, this section presents historic wage data of both civilian employees and active duty soldiers, and compares these figures to wage income in the same industries that were analyzed above, the manufacturing and transportation sectors. Because reservists are only considered employees when activated, calculating their annual wages and benefits in a way that is comparable to full-time employees is not possible in this study. Median annual income figures for the San Juan metro area are shown in an effort to understand how military wages compare to the local average. Because none of the data are adjusted for inflation, the median annual income also serves as a comparative baseline for each period. Because wage figures are not readily available for the end of the 20\(^{th}\) century, figures from decennial censuses are presented every ten years from 1970 through 1990, and then every five years for the period 1995 through 2015. Civilian wage data are only available since 1995, and thus begin in this period as well.

Average active duty pay tends to be higher than average non-military pay in Puerto Rico.\(^\text{71}\) Active duty wages are increased annually according to federal law, and with approval from the U.S. Congress.\(^\text{72}\) Service members also receive a number of allotments that are not common in other occupations. These include special allowances for dependents, active duty service, subsistence, incentives, and housing. The analysis of this chapter does not include the allotments that are contingent upon

whether the individual is deployed, but instead focuses only on base pay and allowances for housing with dependents. Pay scales increase by cumulative years of service and rank, so to ensure consistency, this section analyzes only the wages of the E-5 rank, or sergeant, with more than two cumulative years of service and with dependents in their household. The author chose this as the most appropriate analytical category since the rank can be achieved within the average service timeframe of three years, as it is the first supervisory position a soldier receives after college or ROTC; because the sergeant rank is one of the most populous in the army, and because it surfaced from a few key informants. Instead of showing a range of earnings, the thesis aims to show what the typical experience of a one-tour soldier with dependents might be.

Active duty annual wages started at $5,335 in 1970. This is higher than the median annual income in San Juan, which at the time was $4,461. Although Operation Bootstrap was still in effect and manufacturing employment represented nearly forty percent of the local labor force, wages in manufacturing jobs were still lower than the median annual income at only $2,900. Wages for transportation workers are unfortunately unavailable, but a representative calculation produces an annual income of $3,000, only slightly above the area median.

For all historic pay scales in this section, see: 
- Own Calculations 11, see Appendix 2.

Transportation workers generally do not receive a salary but instead are paid hourly. I therefore calculate their annual income based on minimum wage rates in Puerto Rico, found here:
In 1980, active duty annual pay was increased to $11,012. This increase sustained the relative earnings advantage over the San Juan area median income of $9,519 for that year. A minimum wage worker in 1980 would earn around $4,687 annually, although the minimum wage was raised slightly the following year. Manufacturing income increased that year to $5,264 for male employees, although this figure is still well below the local average. Transportation incomes also increased to $5,485 for male employees. In all cases, the income received from armed forces employment was greater than could be received in the other sectors, as well as the average wages in the local labor market.

Active full-time soldiers received an average wage of $16,877 in 1990. This increase was in part due to economic expansion in the U.S., which pushed up wages slightly and allowed unemployment to decrease. Minimum wages were still set at $3.10 locally, but would receive another small boost from legislation in 1991. Median incomes of the San Juan area had risen to $10,325 per year, and manufacturing incomes had reached $13,731. Annual earnings in transport are not available from 1990; according to the same minimum wage calculation that was used for transport workers in 1970, a truck driver would have earned an estimated $6,281 annually, still well below the median San Juan and military averages.

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84 Own Calculations 13, see Appendix 2.
85 Santiago, Charles E. 1992. Labor in the Puerto Rican Economy, 130: The author cites local rates in 1981 at $3.35/hr., while the St. Louis FRED reports the state minimum wage at only $3.10/hr for that year.
90 Own Calculations 14, see Appendix 2.
Wages continued to rise through the end of the 20th century. Starting in 1995, the military began reporting civilian pay scales in each state and Puerto Rico through the Defense Manpower Data Center.\(^91\) Civilian employees of Fort Buchanan were paid annual wages of $35,752 that year,\(^92\) while active duty troops received only $26,832.\(^93\) Manufacturing workers in San Juan received their highest wages yet, more than 17 thousand dollars,\(^94\) an amount finally above the median area income.\(^95\) Now

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earning a minimum wage of $4.25 per hour, the same truck driver who earned $6,281 in 1990 could have earned nearly $8,000 in 1995 for the same work.\textsuperscript{96}

However, things would soon change on the island, and these trends toward growth would reverse. In 1996, Congress began to expire the possessions corporations’ tax breaks. The labor force effects of this decision were felt soon after, with overall employment rates reduced 30 percent by 2000. Once buoyed by U.S. private interests and incentives from the Puerto Rican government, manufacturing wages began to fall. By 2002, a factory worker in San Juan only received $12,531 per year,\textsuperscript{97} once again below the local area average of $17,367.\textsuperscript{98} Wages for transport work also declined to $6,381,\textsuperscript{99} as factories began to close and business demand declined. At the turn of the century, soldiers were paid an average salary of $32,000 and civilian employees earned $27,909.\textsuperscript{100} The absolute wage advantages of the U.S. military in this context are quite clear.

The state minimum wage was held at $5.15 per hour from 1998 through 2008, meaning an hourly employee would earn around $9,656 per year over this decade.\textsuperscript{101} This was relatively more important factor for the growing services sector, which accounted for 20 percent of the Puerto Rican economy (GDP) by 1980 and 38 percent by 2001.\textsuperscript{102} Transportation workers also saw a boost in their earnings in the early 21st century to $8,582 per year.\textsuperscript{103} Both of these sectors were absorbing workers from the declining manufacturing sector, whose transnational tax benefits would fully expire in 2006. Their workers’ annual wages shrunk to $6,528 per year by 2005,\textsuperscript{104} the lowest level since the 1980s. Although military wages remained relatively higher during this

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{96} Own Calculations 15, see Appendix 2.
\item \textsuperscript{99} Instituto de Estadísticas de Puerto Rico. 2019. ‘Composición Industrial por Municipios.’
\item \textsuperscript{101} Own Calculations 16, see Appendix 2.
\end{itemize}
period, an expensive war meant further cuts to personnel in later years, with a 6 percent decrease in pay for active duty and a 44 percent cut for civilian wages.\textsuperscript{105}

Since 2010, military pay has resumed its upward trend. Active duty troops were paid more than $36,000 in 2010, and nearly $39,000 in 2015.\textsuperscript{106} Civilian pay scales were stabilized in 2010 and then nearly doubled in 2015 to an average income of $31,383.\textsuperscript{107} Overall the island’s labor force participation rate has declined, due to both aging workers and migration. U.S. legislation (which is enforced in Puerto Rico) increased the minimum wage to $7.25 per hour in 2010.\textsuperscript{108} Both of these changes have had slight upward effects on the wages of the remaining labor force. In 2010, median annual income increased to around $18,000\textsuperscript{109} and manufacturing wages increased 18 percent from 2005 levels to $7,698.\textsuperscript{110} Transportation wages rose significantly to $11,338 per year, but then fell slightly in 2015.\textsuperscript{111} Neither these workers, nor those in manufacturing with annual wages of $8,024, earned half of the 2015 annual median income in San Juan, which was $21,677.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{106} Military.com. 2018. ‘Historical Military Pay Rates.’
\textsuperscript{108} This was preceded by a brief decrease in the minimum wage in 2009 to $4.10/hr.
\textsuperscript{111} Their data is for the entire island and from 2008.
\textsuperscript{110} Instituto de Estadísticas de Puerto Rico. 2019. ‘Composición Industrial por Municipios.’
\textsuperscript{111} Instituto de Estadísticas de Puerto Rico. 2019.
Although brief and imperfect, the data on the San Juan labor market presented above speak to the overall economic situation of Puerto Rico from the end of the 20th century through the first two decades of the 21st century. Both U.S. legislation and U.S.-led conflicts affected military pay, and local wages in manufacturing were affected by changes in both the legislative and economic contexts. Earnings in the transportation sector increased in tandem with changes in the minimum wage legislation, but suffered in periods of slow growth. Transportation and services have become the island’s major employment sectors in the 21st century as industrial jobs and wages have continued to disappear.\textsuperscript{113}

The differences between local and military wages have been clear in every period examined. Since 1970s, active duty wages have been higher than those in the manufacturing and transportation sectors, as well as the annual median income and minimum wage rates. Civilian employees’ wages have also been higher, except for a brief period following the Global Financial Crisis. These higher wages, of course,

\textsuperscript{113} Santiago, Charles E. 1992. {
\textit{Labor in the Puerto Rican Economy}}, 123.
improve individuals’ quality of life relative to their neighbors, but they also benefit the United States by keeping employees from needing federal aid, and perpetuating a sense of good will towards the base. Employees’ other qualitative benefits contribute to the social impacts of Fort Buchanan as well, and are a primary reason why individuals – especially minorities – choose to enlist. The next section outlines how military training and incentives benefit soldiers during and after their service, building skills and providing opportunities.

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D. Training and Benefits

Skill training during military employment is one way of improving workforce readiness and overall social mobility.¹¹⁶ The military’s transition in 1973 to an all-volunteer force protected its public image, but also began a transition that allowed military branches to become more specific about the skills asked of their employees. In the 1970s, there was an increase in the specialization of military jobs,¹¹⁷ which meant that training and missions also became more complex as well. Work flexibilization and the overall reduction in force strength that has taken place since the end of the Cold War have increased the need for soldiers to be trained in both general and specific tasks. As has been discussed above, in Puerto Rico, the Army usually maintains a small group of specialized forces and a larger pool of reservists with more general skills (who are frequently trained to maintain their relevance). The actual division between the two groups is blurred when reservists are activated, however. In the 2¹ˢᵗ century, it is common for soldiers to receive training in cyber security as well as disaster response, vehicle maintenance as well as physical fitness. The diversity of skills and interpersonal tools acquired through service make military employees and veterans attractive to some businesses.¹¹⁸

Work experiences also help solidify skillsets. Common occupations for Hispanic civilian employees include human resources, administration, contracting, management, engineering, information technology, and transportation, which are all useful skill sets for the local labor market as well.¹¹⁹ Missions and training exercises deployed from Fort Buchanan teach soldiers and reservists skills like medical readiness, engineering, and construction, which are also valuable in the local labor market. Puerto Rican units are also praised for their bilingualism, logistical skills, transportation and aid delivery, power generation and hurricane relief,¹²⁰ on top of

¹¹⁸ Bennett, Pamela P. and Katrina Bell McDonald. 2015. ‘Chapter 6: Military Service as a Pathway to Early Socioeconomic Achievement for Disadvantaged Groups,’ 119-43.
their security knowledge. These skills are transferrable and valuable not just for an officer position in the armed forces, but also for work in the private sector. Especially important for this transfer could be the cluster of security organizations at the base – such as the FBI, CIA, DEA, and Puerto Rico Police Force – with whom the armed forces already collaborate on many of their missions.\textsuperscript{121} If partnerships were fostered and career pathways were developed, these connections and shared workforce experiences could prove valuable to soldiers’ transition to civilian careers after the military.\textsuperscript{122}

The military in fact already has an employment readiness program, an office of which can be found at Fort Buchanan.\textsuperscript{123} They provide employment coaching, classes, and information that aid service members, veterans, and their family members in finding work. However, military service offers more opportunities to improve one’s employability than just these programs. One of the primary benefits is the opportunity to receive support for continuing post-secondary education. The financial aid provided to service members, especially minorities, makes it more likely that these individuals will go to college, albeit only for a two-year degree. It was mentioned above but bears repeating here, that education is one of the best and most cost effective ways of improving one’s job opportunities. Many individuals recognize that the military offers this chance to improve their educational attainment, and hence take advantage of this opportunity. The military also offers additional, long-term benefits like healthcare and retirement plans that other entry-level occupations for high school graduates do not receive in other jobs. Accessing these benefits may be more challenging than many recruits realize,\textsuperscript{124} but they are still an important reason why many Hispanic and Latino individuals enlist.\textsuperscript{125}

Another aspect of military employment that is especially important to Puerto Ricans is the migration factor. Although Fort Buchanan and another reserve


\textsuperscript{122} Schrock, Greg. 2013. ‘Reworking Workforce Development: Chicago's Sectoral Workforce Centers.’ \textit{Economic Development Quarterly} 27, n. 3: 163-178. This is not his recommendation; my argument is an extension of his focus on sector strategies.


installation in the west of Puerto Rico both have training grounds, all Puerto Rican troops are sent to the U.S. mainland for training.\textsuperscript{126} This cultural experience and facilitated movement to the U.S. are important qualitative features of military employment for Puerto Rican individuals, but their migration has a positive impact of increasing the job opportunities for those who remain as well.\textsuperscript{127} Starting during the Vietnam era, the majority of Puerto Rican veterans stopped returning to the island after their service and instead chose to stay in the U.S., often near the base where they were first stationed.\textsuperscript{128} Migration during military service to the U.S. mainland and the employment opportunities they find there are both ways that Puerto Ricans can increase their social mobility.\textsuperscript{129}

Bases often have community-building functions that benefit soldiers, their families, and veterans, as well as the immediate neighborhood and the installation’s connection to it. Military and federal employees receive services from Fort Buchanan including healthcare, primary education, a commissary and exchange center, financial and legal advice, and religious council.\textsuperscript{130} The garrison also has police, fire, and public works services. Their Family and Morale, Wellness, and Recreation programs offer activities for military families such as outdoor sports, fitness, bowling, golf, community meetings, and a library.\textsuperscript{131} Their quarterly newsletter promotes important commemorative events and veterans’ affairs, as well as community events such as tournaments and races, volunteer opportunities, festivals, and regular visits from local Boy Scouts troops.\textsuperscript{132} Of course, the community must interact with the garrison in negative ways as well, but data on these are not as readily available. The base, however, clearly has a social convening role for some community members.\textsuperscript{133} The

\textsuperscript{128} Franqui-Rivera, Harry. 2017. ‘Chapter 3, Migration and Military Service: a Pathway to the Middle Class,’ 33-42.
\textsuperscript{129} Bennett, Pamela P. and Katrina Bell McDonald. 2015. ‘Chapter 6: Military Service as a Pathway to Early Socioeconomic Achievement for Disadvantaged Groups,’ 119-43.
\textsuperscript{130} U.S. Army. N.D. ‘For Newcomers: Welcome to Fort Buchanan – Puerto Rico.’
\textsuperscript{132} For all newsletters of Ft Buchanan since 2014, see: https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/651/el-morro/page/6.
\textsuperscript{133} Personal Correspondence. 2019. Skype interview, 24-02-2019.
services and events that the garrison coordinates facilitate individuals’ behaviors that enact specific identities and values, which both forge community connections and recreate these linkages to Fort Buchanan and to the military. Fostering these relationships also benefits the garrison, helping to improve the garrison’s public relations and communications with local residents. Evidence of this connection in play can be found in the local community’s continued support for keeping Fort Buchanan open\textsuperscript{134} even though changes in military command and the base network routinely cause its relevance to be questioned.\textsuperscript{135} Many in this military community then and now are Puerto Rican veterans, who are featured in many of the base’s newsletters and functions, and are recipients of many of the garrison’s services.\textsuperscript{136}

The veteran experience is an important consideration for potential military enlistees, as it shows what opportunities and challenges they may face after service. U.S. veterans are entitled to subsidized healthcare and home loans, a federal pension, disability and life insurances, and benefits transferrable to their dependents.\textsuperscript{137} In Puerto Rico, today’s veterans are not only better educated, but also have lower unemployment and poverty rates than the island’s non-veterans.\textsuperscript{138} However, Puerto Rican service members are joining younger than in previous generations,\textsuperscript{139} and the socioeconomic context into which they emerge after service will be different than it was in the past. For 21\textsuperscript{st} century veterans, ‘the effects of military service on civilian labor and educational outcomes are unknown,’\textsuperscript{140} especially the outcomes resulting from use of military benefits.\textsuperscript{141} Recent studies have produced conflicting results

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\textsuperscript{136} Personal Correspondence. 2019. Skype interview, 24-02-2019.


\textsuperscript{138} Franqui-Rivera, Harry. 2014. ‘Puerto Rican Veterans and Service Members’ Wellbeing and Place within the Diaspora,’ 199-201.

\textsuperscript{139} Franqui-Rivera, Harry. 2014, 196-7.

\textsuperscript{140} Routon, P. Wesley. 2014. ‘The Effect of 21st Century Military Service on Civilian Labor and Educational Outcomes,’ 16.

\textsuperscript{141} Franqui-Rivera. 2014, 199.
about when and whether the benefits of military service come into effect,\textsuperscript{142} and what the long-term effects on veterans’ financial health might be.\textsuperscript{143} In addition to the perennial healthcare and homelessness challenges that plague the entire veterans’ community, the reduction of military benefits and increasing mainland populations of Puerto Rican veterans in the U.S. will likely make it more difficult for enlisting soldiers to predict what their post-service lives may entail in the future.

\textsuperscript{142} Routon, P. Wesley. 2014. ‘The Effect of 21\textsuperscript{st} Century Military Service on Labor and Educational Outcomes,’ 32: The author argues that effects of military service are not clear until at least 2 years after service, and that the short term effects are even more unclear.

\textsuperscript{143} Blair, John D. and Robert L. Phillips. 1983. ‘Job Satisfaction Among Youth in Military and Civilian Work Settings.’ \textit{Armed Forces & Society} \textbf{9}, n. 4 (Summer), 555-568: However, these authors explained how the aggregate benefits of military service, while greater for minorities than for whites, affect their current situation but not their future opportunities.

E. **Local Investments**

This chapter’s final workforce development analysis examines federal defense spending as local investment dollars in the 21st century. In Puerto Rico, overall investment has declined since 1970, effectively enforcing systematic limitations on employment growth. Investment is an important aspect of workforce development in that it can improve the accessibility and productivity of jobs, as well as profitability and growth of firms. Furthermore, when workforce and economic development strategies are in sync, both worker opportunity and business profitability can grow. This section, therefore, aims to understand whether Defense spending supports these goals as well. One aspect of this analysis covers the changes in property values of the Fort Buchanan garrison during the 21st century, relative to changes in local property values. These changes, when positive, are considered to be capital investments in that they should improve the functionality of the installation. Another factor considered is the overall size of federal transfers to Puerto Rico over time and the proportion of these that are from the Defense department. These funds affect existing personnel levels but also the military’s overall demand on the local economy, so an increase or decrease would signal a change in the relative impacts of this spending on the local labor market. Although the direct returns to each of these investments are not calculated, this could be useful to pursue in further research to discover how the use of military and federal funds in Puerto Rico compare to other forms of workforce development.

Changes in Fort Buchanan’s property values can be found in annual base structure reports released by the Department of Defense (DoD). Unfortunately, the military only began reporting their property values in the 21st century, so the analytical period does not align as well with the previous sections. However, the historical analysis in the previous chapter already mentioned some anecdotes about earlier periods of investment - especially the World War II infrastructure build-up under Roosevelt, the shift to providing services during the Cold War period, and refurbishments made in 1998 when SOUTHCOM headquarters were located at Fort Buchanan. It should be noted that these previous investments incentivize the military to hold onto their properties even when they no longer fulfill their original purposes.

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if only for the sake of power projection. Because base structure reports do not explain why or how property values changed, it remains important to keep the historic contexts in mind for this period of analysis as well. Therefore the analysis proceeds first with the presentation of data, and subsequently discusses the contexts and implications.

Figure 4.3: Puerto Rico, Annual Percent Change in Gross Fixed Domestic Investment versus Annual Percent Change in Plant Replacement Value, 2001-2018.

The chart above compares the annual percent changes in overall domestic investment to annual percent changes in the plant replacement values (PRV) of Fort Buchanan’s facilities, from 2001 through 2018. This allows a nominal comparison of the similarities, differences, and patterns in investment exhibited by the insular economy and the military. Gross fixed domestic investment measures changes in fixed capital, such as infrastructure improvements, construction investments, and fixed assets, minus any disposal of property. The Army’s metric of investment, the plant replacement value, considers number and factor costs of facilities; design, management, and engineering costs; and contingencies that would be required to

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replace a property. Changes in this rate from year to year reflect the net changes in construction, real estate, and property investments – or, more simply, their rate of investment in fixed capital.

From this vantage point – comparing the national and the garrison’s rates of fixed capital investment – a number of observations can be made. First, the garrison’s rates of investment clearly trend closely to changes in the overall macroeconomic environment. This is not surprising because federal investments generally fluctuate in accordance with macroeconomic factors, such as GDP, monetary and military policy, and the political environment. From 2001-2005, the investment patterns are slightly opposite – when the domestic investment environment declined from 2001-3, Ft. Buchanan’s PRV increased; and when the domestic environment improved, the garrison’s PRV stagnated. Contextual factors that would have affected these rates include the attacks of September 11, 2001; the US entrance into the Second Gulf War in March 2003; and the closing of Roosevelt Roads naval station in 2004, which returned some potentially productive large land to the private and public real estate markets. The effects of the tax break expiration and increasing tax burdens on corporations are also clear from 2006 onwards: ten of the twelve years since then have seen negative rates of domestic investment. The military’s rate of investment in Fort Buchanan has followed more directly the growth and decline of the Puerto Rican economy since 2007, but with wider variance. The one exception was a huge spike in property value, when an additional 900 acres were added to the garrison’s property between 2016 and 2017. These results indicate the close adherence between military spending, the Puerto Rican economy, and the military and strategic priorities of the United States, but do not illuminate the effects on labor. To examine this aspect, the thesis next considers the Defense spending portions of federal transfers to Puerto Rico and the opportunity costs of these priorities in transnational budgets.

The relative size of federal transfers to Puerto Rico has grown between the 1970s and today, while the percentage of these transfers that can be attributed to

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defense spending has declined. A key starting point for studying the history of federal transfers to Puerto Rico is 1973, when the production levels of the Puerto Rican industrialized economy began to slow. In the same year, the U.S. military transitioned to an all-volunteer force, ending the draft. In 1975, Department of Defense spending accounted for 40.6 percent of the Puerto Rican economy. As an anti-poverty measure, nutritional assistance programs were extended to Puerto Rico in 1976, significantly increasing the overall size of transfers. In 1980, the Defense department’s portion of federal spending had declined to 27 percent. Starting from that year, an increasing share of transfers were made for social security and Medicare payments. As more young veterans and service members stayed in the U.S. for work, the population who remained on the island got older and began filing for retirement and veterans’ benefits, increasing their relative portion of the federal government’s insular budget.

The Defense department’s insular budgetary share increased in 1985 to 46.7 percent of transfers, to support the Reagan administration’s Central and South American operations, accommodate the War on Drugs, and facilitate the growing number of regional and internal security collaborations with the Department of Justice, CIA, DEA, and the insular/state police that were originating in Puerto Rico. Throughout the 80s, the federal government also had a vested interest in maintaining the international image of Puerto Rico as a flourishing capitalist democracy, in contrast to communist Cuba. A ten-percent average annual increase in federal spending on the island could be justified by handsome profits for tax-exempt U.S. corporations and continued political stability. Throughout the end of the 20th century, however, tax incentives and public assistance also both served to increase Puerto Rican dependence on the U.S. federal government.

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153 Pantojas-García, Emilio. 2007. 216.
155 Ibid. 2007, 216.
158 Grosfoguel, Ramón. 1997. 'Migration and Geopolitics in the Greater Antilles: From the Cold War to the Post-Cold War.' Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 20, n. 1 (Winter): 122.
159 Sotomayor, Orlando J. 1996. 'Poverty and Income Inequality in Puerto Rico,' 49-61.
The end of the Cold War meant a change in the federal government’s strategic use for Puerto Rico. The military began to decrease its total force size,\(^{160}\) and focused their missions more on counter-drug and customs operations, as well as humanitarian relief. The Defense department’s share of insular expenditures decreased to 31 percent by 1990, 28 percent in 1995, and 25 percent by 2000.\(^{161}\) However, the Departments of Justice and Treasury both increased their insular shares of federal expenses rapidly over the last decade of the 20\(^{th}\) century, in line with the military’s new missions.\(^{162}\) Under first SOUTHCOM and now NORTHCOM, flexibility, rapid response, and cost savings have been the military’s priorities; the increased number of reservists and collaborative security programs at Fort Buchanan gives evidence of this. Federal expenditures averaged $771.8 million from 2000-5, with defense expenditures accounting for about $475 million of that per year.\(^{163}\) From 2006-10, defense spending accounted for an average of $640 million per year, of $1,245 million in total federal expenditures. Notwithstanding the higher defense spending from the onset of the second Gulf War in 2003, the increase in funding in the latter period is even more remarkable given that the largest installation on the island – Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in Ceiba, on the eastern coast of Puerto Rico – was gradually deactivated from 2004-5. As their local facility management costs decreased, the military’s expenditures on operations and services at the garrison must have simultaneously increased, highlighting its central role within the military organizational structure.

An important change began in 2002, when veterans’ benefits began to account for the majority of defense expenditures to the island. According to the Veterans’ Administration, these benefits are intended to improve veterans’ quality of life, primarily through healthcare.\(^{164}\) The VA operates one large hospital in San Juan, serving the 150,000 veterans of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. They also


\(^{161}\) Pantojas-García, Emilio. 2007, 216.

\(^{162}\) Pantojas-García. 2007, 215-16.


maintain six to eight clinics around metropolitan areas.\textsuperscript{165} The Rodriguez Health clinic on the campus of Fort Buchanan provides a range of primary, pharmaceutical, laboratory, and mobilization services to veterans, soldiers, reservists, and their families.\textsuperscript{166} These benefits provide necessary services that would be inaccessible to many Puerto Ricans if these locations were closed. They are considered the national society’s repayment for military service, but their allocation has been fraught with challenges at the local and federal levels.\textsuperscript{167} Local veterans’ apparent lack of knowledge about their eligibility on top of irregularity in services indicate that these investments in service members’ well-being are not being used efficiently.\textsuperscript{168} If healthcare helps more veterans participate in the local labor market as well – which it should – then these services could be improved as part of an integrated, systematic workforce development project.

The concluding section below compares the military’s labor force programs to Puerto Rico’s existing workforce and economic development plans.

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\textsuperscript{165} U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs. 2015. ‘About the VA Caribbean Healthcare System.’ https://www.caribbean.va.gov/about/index.asp. \\
\textsuperscript{166} Lonzano, Eli. 2019. ‘Work Experience: Commanding Officer at Rodriguez Army Health Clinic.’ Website, LinkedIn Profile. \\
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F. Concluding Comparison: Puerto Rico’s Existing and Military Workforce Development Systems

This final section of the analysis considers the components of workforce development system on the island and compares the goals of these programs and institutions to those within the Army. Much like how the previous chapter aided in explaining the historic contexts in which Fort Buchanan’s employment effects were examined, the previous sections demonstrate that the U.S. military in Puerto Rico does have some specific workforce effects that make it relevant to consider as a workforce development option alongside other opportunities. This section therefore compares the sectors, strategies, and target populations of Puerto Rico’s workforce development system to those in the Army. From this brief analysis, the military programs seem to be somewhat better organized than the alternatives, but they only target labor market sectors to the extent that they are relevant to the strategies and conflicts of the U.S. armed forces.

Puerto Rican workforce development is coordinated at the state level by the Department of Labor and Human Resources (Departamento del Trabajo y Recursos Humanos, or DTRH). This department aims to improve the productivity and competitiveness of Puerto Rico’s human capital in all sectors.\footnote{Departamento del Trabajo y Recursos Humanos. 2019. ‘DTRH – Nosotros.’ Government Website, Gobierno de Puerto Rico. Accessed 01-06-2019 via https://www.trabajo.pr.gov/nosotros.asp.} Under federal jurisdiction, Puerto Rico must produce a workforce development plan every 5 years in order to be eligible for grant funding for this purpose, as do all U.S. states. The latest plan published by DTRH covered fiscal years 2012-2016, and focused on connecting workforce development to the educational system, providing services to employers and job seekers, and reaching out to specific populations in need of services.\footnote{The first, explanatory section of the plan can be found here: DTRH. 2012. ‘Puerto Rico State Integrated Workforce Plan.’ Government Website. Accessed 30-05-2019 via https://www.trabajo.pr.gov/puerto_rico_state_integrated_workforce_plan/prdol_state_plan_2012_2016_section_I_II.pdf.} Citing the declining employment impacts of manufacturing as compared to the increase in service sector employment rates, the report emphasizes the need to increase the efficiency of and private sector participation in workforce development programs.\footnote{DTRH. 2012. ‘Puerto Rico State Integrated Workforce Plan,’ 15-21.} Government; trade, transport and utilities; and the healthcare and education sectors are listed as the top employers, but these also have the most variability in local job...
losses. The plan aimed specifically to develop sectors focused on innovation and entrepreneurship, due to the island’s many small businesses; while also fostering those focused on export services and commerce, especially the tourism sector.

The military has interesting parallels to the state’s workforce approach, in addition to the similar translation of federal requirements at the local level. Obviously, the primary objective of the Army is not to train workers for the civilian labor market, but for national defense. The military clearly recognizes, however, that some of its positions are well-suited for civilian careers. Transition services, in particular, are intended to help soldiers make career choices that line up with their military experience. Fort Buchanan’s military operations are closely tied to certain sectors, such as energy, logistics, security, healthcare and construction. While the quality of the garrison’s employment services cannot be evaluated by this thesis, it is clear at least according to Puerto Rico’s labor force projections that the combination of military training and experience in these fields could be valuable to soldiers’ future careers.

Puerto Rico is subject to federal legislation, therefore most of its workforce strategies originate in federal requirements – these include private sector and economic development representatives on its workforce investment board; linking local employers to job seekers through career centers; a unified system for data reporting and analysis; and tracking changes in wages to determine whether initiatives are successful. Puerto Rico is also required by the federal government to have a number of employment centers, called “One Stops,” often run by local non-profits.

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174 I might also call this ‘national offense.’
These organizations sign agreements with the workforce board to administer training, counsel customers, and share information on ancillary benefits.\(^{180}\) The 2012 report counts 15 workforce centers active at the time.\(^{181}\)

The workforce strategies of the Puerto Rican government are primarily related to improving economic growth and education on the island,\(^{182}\) as opposed to focusing on the workers’ skills and opportunities for employment that they hope to develop. While economic and workforce development can support similar goals, they only do so with intentional, interdepartmental collaboration.\(^{183}\) The Puerto Rican workforce plan gives little evidence of this. Furthermore, its tax incentives lack the necessary local linkages to the private sector that would leverage additional opportunities and investment.\(^{184}\) The plan of the Department of Economic Development and Commerce (DDEC), however, puts workforce development clearly at the center of its strategy.\(^{185}\) Its plan lists both the DTRH labor force initiatives as well as youth programs as strategic efforts, but does not clarify how these are linked to other strategies. In its own plan, there is one mention of the DTRH’s efforts to leverage economic development with workforce development: since 2010, the Employment Service has increased its outreach to employers in an effort to improve services to both businesses and potential employees. The insular government maintains online databases of job opportunities,\(^{186}\) labor market trends,\(^{187}\) and economic statistics.\(^{188}\) A small apprenticeship program for high-demand sectors was also launched in 2018 as a
collaborative effort between DTRH, DDEC, and the U.S. Department of Labor. These initiatives are important, but are seriously fragmented, underfunded, and lack the united strength that is needed to break the cycle of poverty, especially for those who already face barriers to employment.

In the U.S., military service has the most positive effects for women and minorities, primarily due to increased access to education through benefits and improved social mobility. Although many Puerto Ricans identify as white, they are labeled Hispanic by the military and grouped with other Latinos. Hispanic representation in the military is expected to increase as their share of educated 18-year-old males rises in the general population. Much of the recruiting in Puerto Rico is done at high schools, targeted at piquing students’ interests by senior year. While many Puerto Ricans have high school degrees or the equivalent, not many go to college. The military is often a short-term career choice that affords students the opportunity to receive educational benefits that are guaranteed by local universities, where they also have ongoing military training.

The military does not sacrifice a skilled labor force by recruiting young individuals – for certain aptitudes such as math, Hispanics with higher test scores are more likely to enlist. Military entrance exams have in fact become more exclusive in the 21st century, making the increase in Hispanic enlistments an important counter point to the racial logic of the previous decades. Interestingly, by focusing on

194 Dempsey, Jason K., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 2009. ‘The Army’s Hispanic Future,’ 536: Most soldiers identify as both Hispanic and white, but the Army classifies them only as the former.
195 Franqui-Rivera, Harry. 2014. ‘Puerto Rican Veterans and Service Members’ Wellbeing and Place within the Diaspora,’’ 196.
198 Personal Correspondence. 2019. Email exchange, 01-03-2019.
recruiting young people almost exclusively, the military has found a market of potentially skilled employees without education that can still be valuable to their enterprise. Unlike other employers, it has resources and time to invest in training its workers, offers benefits, and creates opportunities for community service.

The garrison employs a number of strategies to provide employment services to soldiers. Through the Army's Advanced Individual Training program, soldiers have access to career pathways in maintenance, nursing, firefighting, engineering, and transportation.\textsuperscript{197} The Directorate for Human Resources is responsible for providing soldiers with services to support their ongoing military work as well as their transition to civilian employment. A hierarchy of divisions under the directorate provides these services at different times during a soldier's military career—these include Personnel, Continuing Education, Retirement, and Transition assistance.\textsuperscript{198} Soldiers are required to track their training and career development milestones through post-military separation via a program aptly named 'Soldier for Life.'\textsuperscript{199} After their service ends, veterans are often given preference for civilian positions at bases; something that mainland Puerto Rican veterans seem to have realized.\textsuperscript{200} And finally, veterans' federal benefits are a crucial component of the U.S. military presence in Puerto Rico. These are intended to make up the difference between a living wage and what a veteran could or should have earned without a service-related handicap, and are a large portion of federal transfers. Incidentally, the San Juan Regional Office of the Veterans Benefits Administration is located on Fort Buchanan's grounds.\textsuperscript{201}

The state workforce plan outlined extensive services for veterans as well. Among their strategies, they committed to spurring job creation in the tourism industry, and increasing local awareness about requirements to hire veterans.\textsuperscript{202} Veteran outreach programs were to be coordinated throughout the island's workforce centers in a partnership with Fort Buchanan.\textsuperscript{203} Their focus remained primarily on

\textsuperscript{199} U.S. Army. 2018. ‘Soldier for Life – Transition Assistance Program (SFL-TAP).’
\textsuperscript{200} Franqui-Rivera, Harry. 2017. ‘Migration and Military Service: a Pathway to the Middle Class.’
\textsuperscript{202} DTRH. 2012. ‘Puerto Rico State Integrated Workforce Plan,’ 97-106.
\textsuperscript{203} DTRH. 2012, 100.
serving dislocated workers and ex-offenders, as well as youth, individuals with disabilities, and agriculture workers. Small businesses, services, and manufacturing were meant to be key economic drivers, but very little in the report was discussed about how to actually develop these sectors. The DDEC also targets small businesses and start-ups, but focuses on innovation industries such as the medical, hemp, and technology sectors. Interestingly, this plan does not cover the San Juan or Guaynabo areas; and unfortunately, whether, how, and to what extent these plans were executed is not known. Today it appears that the DDEC participates in many local conversations on economic development in these sectors, particularly for tourism and trade; but understanding their relative political strength, and ability to affect the lived experiences of Puerto Ricans, would require gathering additional evidence. This thesis has tried to show that military employment provides important workforce development functions in the local economy. The final chapter concludes by reviewing these and other findings.

Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion

This final chapter reviews first the findings of the previous sections, and then discusses the relevance of the findings and approach. The histories of the U.S. military in Puerto Rico and of Fort Buchanan reveal how the United States’ imperial behaviors and priorities shifted over time, and the local consequences of these changes. The analysis of Fort Buchanan’s labor market and workforce development effects, as an inquiry into the base’s socioeconomic impacts, shows how some workers are able to gain access to benefits provided by the garrison, which they could use to improve their socioeconomic situations. These findings, as well as other cultural complexities found in the research, demonstrate a dynamic transnational relationship between the U.S. military and Puerto Rico. In conclusion, the author argues that this exchange is one that deserves further study.
A. Results

I. Historical Analysis

Fort Buchanan has experienced a number of changes in its structures and functions over the last century, but it has also retained a few. It was first designated as a training ground for local militiamen in 1923, and it still serves this purpose today. During the build-up to WWII, Fort Buchanan realigned along with the rest of Puerto Rico’s military installations to an offensive stance, and increased in size so that it could send American troops to war. Following a relative decline in importance after the Korean War, the garrison was temporarily detached from the Army from 1966-71, but since then it has maintained a role as service and training provider for the Army Reserve. Frequent command changes at the end of the 20th century changed the infrastructure of Fort Buchanan as well as its tenants. Although few families reside on the base now, Fort Buchanan still has schools, a health clinic, commissary and exchange, community facilities, military offices, and other security organizations operating on its grounds. In historical perspective, the changes in the garrison’s structures and functions have tended to follow the patterns of the U.S. military’s conflicts and strategies.

These changes have been immense in their size, often unilateral, and prioritize the goals of the metropolitan center over those in the periphery.\(^1\) The nature of these effects allows the United States’ behavior with respect to the island nation to be characterized as imperial and colonial.\(^2\) The island’s strategic role for the U.S. military is consistent across time periods, even though the island’s purpose has been remade several times in Washington.\(^3\) The military’s strategy of using Puerto Rico to

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project power and development ideology in the Latin American and Caribbean region, and Fort Buchanan’s revived role as a platform for security collaborations, are two modern examples of this.  

At the same time, many Puerto Ricans have consistently provided support to U.S. military operations in exchange for the variety of reasons and benefits of service that they receive in return. Public officials of all sorts have recognized the potential that military service represents for the development of Puerto Rican society, demonstrated by its involvement in imperial projects that range from providing skilled labor for Operation Bootstrap, to funding scholarships at the University of Puerto Rico, and helping with hurricane recovery efforts. Serving such diverse projects requires the Army Reserves to have a high level of adaptability, which clearly should be considered an asset of both Puerto Ricans and Fort Buchanan. In a socioeconomic context that is unstable, frequently changing and in decline, adaptability has been key to remaining relevant. Overall, the historical relationship between the U.S. and Puerto Rico demonstrates variability in each party’s strategy and relative benefits over time, as well as the ability of both nations to affect change in the other’s society.

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II. Workforce Development Analysis

Employment with the U.S. military has offered Puerto Ricans some specific benefits that are especially important to consider in light of the current state of the island’s labor market. The impact of military work on service members’ wages has been significant. In nearly every year examined, military wages have been higher than the local averages, and more consistent than in other employment sectors. Educational benefits were found to be one of the most common incentives that drew some people to serve in the military, and also one of the most effective ways to improve skills, long-term job stability, and labor market attachment of an area’s workforce.

The analysis demonstrated, however, that the socioeconomic effects of military service are not limited to the individual but extend into the community. Considering the garrison’s workforce effects within the wider San Juan community allows the thesis to again highlight the mutual benefits provided by the military’s presence in Puerto Rico. Because of this interconnectedness at many levels, the employment effects of Fort Buchanan are much more revealing when considered alongside those of other sectors in the local labor market. For example, military service relieves unemployment pressure by removing some individuals from the local labor market and freeing up jobs there. Meanwhile, those soldiers have the opportunity to improve their socioeconomic opportunities through education, training, and migration.8

The training and additional benefits that soldiers receive have potentially the most qualitative and long-term positive impacts on soldiers’ social mobility. The workforce development role of the military could be explored and potentially expanded through concerted, strategic efforts with other local partners. The current governor seems to believe that fostering this sector could have a positive effect on the Puerto Rican economy.9 However, it is important to remember that, first of all, the benefits of military service also come with drawbacks – namely, the risk of injury and death in combat. To benefit from the relationship between the United States and

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Puerto Rico seems to require accepting higher risk for potentially greater reward, as well as tolerating vacillations in the center’s imperial behavior toward the island and its population. Fluctuations of investment in the base demonstrate the conditionality and risks of inclusion that are required when engaging with an empire. The results of the workforce development analysis also reveal consistently present, yet diverse ideological components of the United States’ imperial practices in Puerto Rico, which complicate Puerto Rico’s role in the U.S. military, and indicates that there is room for further study about the qualitative dynamics of this relationship.

The first place to start should be with Puerto Ricans themselves. To better understand the complex negotiations that Puerto Ricans have to manage in order to serve in the U.S. military, more research should investigate the worker’s position—or, in this case, the warrior’s position. Young men in Puerto Rico have been at a labor market disadvantage since the 1980s, a situation recently made more difficult by hurricane damages and the global financial crisis. Overall, the Puerto Rican workforce experience has worsened, however. In the 21st century, employment opportunities have declined, federal minimum wage statutes and transfers have repressed employment growth, and poverty rates have remained over 40 percent. How have the island’s workers reacted to this change, and what role has the military played in their decisions? Puerto Rican workers often rotate between formal positions, informal work, and being out of the labor market, and their military

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11 Clarke, Kamari M. 2010. ‘Toward a Critically Engaged Ethnographic Practice.’ Current Anthropology 51, s. 2 (October): S301-312. The author calls for more complex analysis of ‘warriors,’ and a more complex understanding of ethical research, during a time when the U.S. Army was hiring anthropologists as cultural informants.
contracts usually only last one to two tours. Research might therefore investigate what role military employment plays in individuals’ overall career strategies, and whether this relationship could be put to more productive use to achieve local workforce development goals.

The research for this thesis has revealed a number of complimentary tensions in Puerto Rican society that are often more than binary. Maintaining this undefined or extra space allows the relationship to remain mutually beneficial, albeit in an imbalanced asymmetry, and creates opportunities for socioeconomic transformation. If Puerto Rico’s relationship with the United States military can be used to improve life on the island, then perhaps new purposes could be considered for the base. The workforce development analysis demonstrated how the skills that Puerto Rican service members gain through military training and experiences could, at minimum, be strategically invested in building a skilled local labor force. The public sector is already a countercyclical program for the island, recognizing the military and the base as potential workforce development partners could provide Congress, the Defense Department, and the Puerto Rican government with creative new solutions for its intractable socioeconomic woes.

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One interesting case that demonstrates this complexity is that of Vietnam veterans protesting against the Navy’s bombing exercises in Vieques:
22 Franqui-Rivera, Harry. 2014. ‘Puerto Rican Veterans and Service Members’ Wellbeing and Place within the Diaspora,’ 203: ‘Historically, economic hardships have provided an incentive for racial, ethnic, cultural and religious minorities to join the military. But one cannot ignore that such service has also been used as a tool for improving the social and political standing (of) these communities.’
III. Overall Socioeconomic Effects

In addition to its investigation of the employment effects of the Fort Buchanan garrison, this thesis has documented extensive impacts of U.S. military presence on Puerto Rico’s socioeconomic conditions. In this section, the broader impacts are reviewed in societal, cultural, and political categories. They demonstrate the breadth of the military’s impact on Puerto Rico in the 20th and 21st centuries, and again suggest the opportunity for expanded scholarship in this regard.

The most common societal effect that the author documented was a racial ideology that separated Puerto Ricans from other U.S. Americans. Since the U.S. invasion in 1898, they have been classified as unfit to govern themselves, requiring constant management by the United States. Persistent stereotypes of Puerto Ricans in American media have characterized them as violent, mentally inferior, hypersexual, and lazy. For many years, Puerto Ricans were excluded from military service for both their race and class. Their overspecialization in support roles today is not unusual for minorities in the U.S. military, as combat roles in the past have been traditionally reserved for white soldiers to advance in leadership. Throughout their history with the United States, Puerto Ricans have attempted to resist, redefine, and negotiate their position in its racial hierarchy, but little has changed overall.

One reason why so many Puerto Ricans have served is that individuals from communities with greater local military presence have tended to sign up at higher

24 Harkavy, Robert E. 1988. ‘Las bases como proyección de fuerza y seguridad nacional.’ Política Exterior 2, n. 6 (Spring): 254: Puerto Rico is an example of an entire island nation that has been remade over and over by US military interests.
25 Fusté, José I. 2017. ‘Repeating Islands of Debt: Historicizing the Transcolonial Relationality of Puerto Rico’s Economic Crisis.’ Radical History Review, iss. 128 (May): 95. This sounds a lot like a ‘civilizing mission’ to me.
rates than others. The thesis has already shown how the military not only has a significant presence, but also has had significant effects on Puerto Rico’s infrastructure, society and economy as a result of its strategic functions, dynamic relationship, and spending. Because the societal effects are potentially so widespread, the thesis’ critical and gendered review of the employment data brought further clarity to why individuals choose military service as employment. Young and male workers especially have been disadvantaged by recent changes in the local labor market, and for some, the military represents an alternative to migration and informal markets as a means of finding good work and stable income.

The cultural impacts of U.S. military presence in Puerto Rico also highlighted its interconnectedness within the society. This thesis has focused on aspects of military service that help individuals sustain themselves and their quality of life, such as incomes. Further research on how the military affects aspects of social networks, family histories, and national characteristics in Puerto Rico is needed, therefore, to better understand this connection.

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31 Kleykamp, Meredith A. 2006. ‘College, Jobs, or the Military? Enlistment During a Time of War.’ Social Science Quarterly 87, n. 2 (June): 283.


Rose, Peter I. 2019. ‘YANK as a “Four-Letter Word.”’ Keynote Address, American Islands: Outposts of Security, Prosperity, and Culture. 22 May, Roosevelt Institute for American Studies. Rose found in the 1960s that Puerto Rican women had benefitted more from late 20th c. manufacturing than had men.


Franqui-Rivera, Harry. 2014. ‘Puerto Rican Veterans and Service Members’ Wellbeing and Place within the Diaspora,’ 202.


36 Dressler, William W., Camila D. Borges, Mauro C. Balieiro, and José Ernesto dos Santos. 2005. ‘Measuring Cultural Consonance: Examples with Special Reference to Measurement Theory in Anthropology.’ Field Methods 17, n. 4 (November), 331-8: The authors identify the ‘lifestyle’ cultural domain as characterized by the material and behavioral actions such as employment that are needed to achieve good quality of life.


Franqui-Rivera, Harry. 2014. ‘Puerto Rican Veterans and Service Members’ Wellbeing and Place within the Diaspora,’ 182.


military have not been discussed in this paper, but could also prove significant.\textsuperscript{38} This paper has already demonstrated how the military impacts educational outcomes,\textsuperscript{39} access to services,\textsuperscript{40} and social mobility\textsuperscript{41} in Puerto Rico. Further ethnographic work is needed on how individual choices to join the military are negotiated,\textsuperscript{42} how individuals choose specific occupations such as the military,\textsuperscript{43} and how working class Puerto Ricans navigate the volatility of a colonial capitalist system.\textsuperscript{44} The desire to feel a sense of purpose also adds value to military service\textsuperscript{45} and should not be ignored in this context either.\textsuperscript{46} In addition to expanding cultural scholarship on the military’s effects, exploring this sense of belonging could be used to build community, increase local leadership, and empower more transnational negotiations.

The Puerto Rican desire to serve in the U.S. military has frequently been connected to political goals, such as increasing the island’s autonomy and strengthening negotiations with the mainland.\textsuperscript{47} Studying military work has therefore required examining the dynamics of power between the U.S. and Puerto Rico,\textsuperscript{48} how this situation has come to be, where power is located and limited, and how the actions

\textsuperscript{38} Personal Correspondence. 2019. Skype interview, 19-06-2019.
\textsuperscript{43} Silver, Patricia. 2014. ‘New Puerto Rican Diasporas in the Southern United States,’ 92-4
\textsuperscript{44} Laguarta Ramírez, José A. 2018. ‘Riding the perennial gale.’
‘To know you are serving your country and defending your people is very satisfying.’ ‘it was greatly satisfying to work for the well being of others and receiving that gratitude in return.’
\textsuperscript{47} Mariscal, Jorge. 2005. ‘Homeland Security, Militarism, and the Future of Latinos and Latinas in the United States.’ \textit{Radical History Review} 93 (Fall): 39-52. This is true for many other Latinos in the U.S.
of individuals sustain, contradict, and modify the existing relationship.\textsuperscript{49} It has already been made clear that the behavior of the United States toward Puerto Rico is best characterized as imperial, but in many ways the relationship hinges mainly on colonial exchanges.\textsuperscript{50} In addition to accommodating military infrastructure,\textsuperscript{51} Puerto Ricans residing on the island still cannot vote in U.S. federal elections; do not have the authority to manage their own financial, trade, education, or investment policies; and are subject to frequent changes in U.S. political will and ideology.\textsuperscript{52} Despite widespread desire for change on both sides of the Caribbean,\textsuperscript{53} the U.S. Congress traditionally resists transferring or ceding any kind of sovereignty away from the popular government at the center, especially to an unincorporated territory like Puerto Rico.\textsuperscript{54} It seems unlikely, then, that the United States will increase the island’s political autonomy through legislative means in the near future.

As a result of her research for this thesis, however, this author now agrees with those who have concluded that the island’s political status must be addressed in order to improve its socioeconomic conditions.\textsuperscript{55} This thesis has demonstrated how, throughout its history of being part of the United States, the island’s political situation has perpetuated structural dependencies that have been detrimental to Puerto Rico’s

\textsuperscript{50} Vine, David. 2015. ‘Chapter 4: The Colonial Present.’ In: Base Nation, 175-204 (eBook).
\textsuperscript{52} Cabán, Pedro. 2018. PROMESA, Puerto Rico and the American Empire.
economy, \(^{56}\) labor market, \(^{57}\) and national finances. \(^{58}\) However, this does not mean that the relationship must continue to be characterized by repression and exploitation. As was mentioned before, the island’s ‘special relationship’ with the U.S. creates opportunities for experimentation and negotiation. \(^{59}\) While there are important drawbacks to this connection, \(^{60}\) it is still possible for some Puerto Ricans to use the opportunities offered by the U.S. to improve their quality of life. \(^{61}\) The skills, wages, stability, and benefits that Puerto Ricans receive in exchange for their service are just a few examples of this. \(^{62}\) Whether or not Puerto Rico’s political status is changed, though, the dynamic exchanges inherent to this relationship are only likely to increase in the 21\(^{st}\) century. \(^{63}\)

In sum, the relationship between the U.S. military and Puerto Rico has shown all the characteristics of a dynamic, transnational current: it spans geographical boundaries; its relationships of power are variable over time; its effects are felt unevenly across space; and it facilitates the exchange of specific, yet unequal benefits. \(^{64}\) This thesis’ research on the workforce and socioeconomic impacts of the U.S. military in Puerto Rico has revealed some of the drawbacks and benefits of this relationship. The parties involved have become more flexible and more aware of the trade-offs associated with the inevitable transformations that characterize their relationship. This adaptability is particularly an asset for the Puerto Rican individuals


\(^{59}\) Rivera-Batiz, Francisco L. 1998. ‘Chapter 1, Island Paradox: Puerto Rico in the 1990s,’ 9: Puerto Rico has no control over the funding allocations for hurricane relief, so their congressional recovery allocations are perpetually underfunded and delayed.


\(^{62}\) Harkavy, Robert E. 2005. ‘Thinking About Basing.’ Naval War College Review 58 n. 3 (Article 2), 40: Ft Buchanan as a place for base diplomacy: in exchange for economic and security assistance, the US military achieves ‘sustainability’ of the base and its local operations.

\(^{63}\) Bennett, Pamela P. and Katrina Bell McDonald. 2015. ‘Chapter 6: Military Service as a Pathway to Early Socioeconomic Achievement for Disadvantaged Groups,’ 120.

\(^{64}\) Avilés-Santiago, Manuel G. 2014. Puerto Rican Soldiers and Second-Class Citizenship, 327: ‘I have found that Puerto Rican service men and women express their pride in doing the job, because they understand their service as a job - a job that entails duties, but also rewards.’


and entities who must constantly negotiate a number of conflicting values, identities, and goals in an undefined space. Indeed, while the nature of their connection to the United States is certainly characterized by flexibility, Puerto Ricans’ resiliency and strength are arguably more remarkable than the nature of their relationship with the United States.
B. **Relevance of the approach**

This final section analyzes the academic and social relevance of the thesis’ approach. This thesis combined qualitative and quantitative methods in order to examine the dynamic relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico. The combination of historical, workforce, and cultural approaches was meant not only to highlight the challenging contexts in which individuals make employment decisions, but also to acknowledge the diversity of their culture and identities. In addition to creating room for complexity, the decision to use mixed methods was made in an attempt to look beyond statistical variables and address the larger question of what the dynamics of this relationship might mean for people in Puerto Rico, especially those with low skill levels and few socioeconomic resources. While its data challenges were significant, the approach ultimately revealed a number of socioeconomic connections between the U.S. military and Puerto Rico that had not been documented before. These links helped shape both the characterization of the transnational relationship and the opportunities for studying it in the future.

The approach employed by the thesis was unique, not only for its original combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, but also because it allowed for a wider array of socioeconomic issues to be considered. A historical perspective was necessary to understand how the imperial relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States developed, and the impacts that the U.S. military presence had on that process. A broad focus on socioeconomic issues throughout the thesis ensured that the effects of class, gender, politics, and race were considered as well. The case study on Fort Buchanan was effectively used to demonstrate where and how the connection between the U.S. and Puerto Rico creates local effects. A workforce development analysis of the garrison allowed for its employment and socioeconomic effects to be seen alongside its colonial and military functions. This methodology also allowed for some of the complex negotiations involved in choosing military work to be considered. Together, the results of the interdisciplinary approach allowed the author to better understand the nature of the relationship between the U.S. and Puerto Rico.

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65 Laguarta Ramírez, José A. 2018. ‘Riding the perennial gale,’ 119.
66 Kramer, Paul A. 2011. ‘Review Essay, Power and Connection,’ 1377: He calls for methodological pluralism in order to more fully examine the dynamics of power in light of new sociological forces.
However, the author also encountered a number of challenges that made implementing this approach difficult. The main problems stemmed from the wide array of sources that were used in the analyses and the resulting inconsistencies that may be present in the data.\(^{68}\) Unable to visit Puerto Rico herself, the author relied on innumerable primary and secondary sources of various types to write about the garrison’s history and employment. While many of these sources were consistent with each other, the diversity of their findings and methodologies required the author to constantly and critically evaluate the relevance of her approach. Even with so many sources, however, some knowledge gaps were never able to be filled, such as demographic data that would help determine which of the garrison’s soldiers were from Puerto Rico and which are not;\(^{69}\) the money Fort Buchanan spent on defense contracts and their local employment effects;\(^{70}\) and the different experiences of the fort’s active duty and reserve troops. During the writing of this thesis, the author regularly contacted the garrison for this information, but was largely unsuccessful in receiving it.\(^{71}\) Other scholars who study the military have experienced similar difficulties, and suspect intentional underreporting by the military.\(^{72}\) If this were true, then the workforce effects that were considered in the previous chapter would have been greater.

As was mentioned in the introduction, the factors affecting the Puerto Rican labor market experience are so diverse that this thesis could not possibly identify them all. While the interdisciplinary approach revealed many of the benefits of military work, it did not explain well enough how employment in the military is

\(^{68}\) To give one example, the U.S. Census Bureau reports median annual incomes, while the Puerto Rican Governor’s Office reports annual wages paid, one of which represents the aggregate of all economic activities (income) while the other does not (wages).

\(^{69}\) Personal Correspondence. 2019. Email exchanges, 24-06-2019 & 26-06-2019. Both of these individuals thought that Fort Buchanan’s employees come primarily from the surrounding community.


\(^{71}\) I filed a few Freedom of Information Act requests in this regard, but was told that this information would be too burdensome for their employees to retrieve.

interconnected with other aspects of life in Puerto Rico. A few topics that have surfaced regularly in this research could be studied more in-depth to improve the descriptions of working for the U.S. military in Puerto Rico, such as the informal labor market, and climate change. Clearly, the workforce effects of Puerto Rican immigration should also be accounted for in future analyses. How the military interacts with the other federal and insular agencies operating on the island could also offer insights into its local effects.

However, it is primarily the cultural realm that this analysis has missed. Many aspects of Puerto Rican culture and history have clearly been affected by the military’s presence, but the approach used in this thesis could not explain these impacts. During the research, the author frequently returned to the questions of why Puerto Ricans would enlist, and what cultural negotiations this decision entails. To reveal the emotional, personal, and normative aspects of working for the U.S. military in Puerto Rico, more research will need to be done on this topic using anthropological methods. The author hopes that researchers continue qualitative methods of investigation with Puerto Rican military employees to discover more about the identities, values, and strategies they use to navigate the contexts and conflicts they encounter, such as experiences of discrimination based on race and class. This thesis has revealed only some of the most obvious complexities of military work in Puerto Rico. Understanding why different individuals decide to support, confront, or work for the U.S. military in Puerto Rico is a necessary next step in explaining the power dynamics of the overall relationship.

73 Franqui-Rivera, Harry. 2014. ‘Puerto Rican Veterans and Service Members’ Wellbeing and Place within the Diaspora,’ and 2017. ‘Migration and Military Service: a Pathway to the Middle Class.’
75 Fisher, Kelly and Kate Hutchings. 2013. ‘Making Sense of cultural distance for military expatriates operating in an extreme context.’ Journal of Organizational Behavior 34 (July), 796: Further research needs to do determine the ways that military experiences are translated into individuals’ identities.
Instead of her study of governance, I advocate for an analysis of the normalization of US presence more from the bottom-up, local perspective.
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Kleykamp, Meredith A. 2007. ‘Military Service as a Labor Market Outcome.’ *Race, Gender & Class* 14 n. 3-4: 65-76.


Primary Sources – Personal Accounts of Experiences at Fort Buchanan:
   Personal Correspondence. 2018. In-person meeting, 30-12-2018.
   Personal Correspondence. 2019. Email exchange, 01-03-2019.
   Personal Correspondence. 2019. Skype interview, 08-03-2019.


Appendix 1 Map of San Juan metro area from Census

Appendix 2: Author’s Own Calculations for Chapter 4

1. **Fort Buchanan Employment as a Percentage of the San Juan Labor Force, 1980:**
   - San Juan Labor Force 1980:
     - From Santiago, Charles E. 1992, 107: PR’s total labor force grew at a rate of 1.77% from 1970-80. $138,781 \times 1.0177 = 141237$
   - Total Base Employment:
     - From DOD 1979, BSR: $2094+748+147 = 2989$
   - **Fort Buchanan Employment as a Percentage of the San Juan Labor Force, 1980:**
     - $2989/141237 = 2.1\%$

2. **Sector Employment as a Percentage of the San Juan Labor Force, 1980:**
   - San Juan Labor Force 1980:
     - See Calculation 1 above: 141237
   - San Juan Manufacturing Workforce:
     - From U.S. Census Bureau, 1984: 13331 (as % of labor force: 9.4)
   - San Juan Transportation Workforce:
     - From U.S. Census Bureau, 1984: 3685 (as % of labor force: 2.6)

3. **Sector Employment as a Percentage of the San Juan Labor Force, 1990:**
   - San Juan Labor Force 1990:
   - San Juan Manufacturing Workforce:
     - From U.S. Census Bureau, 1993: 8403 (as % of labor force: 5.3)
   - San Juan Transportation Workforce:
     - From U.S. Census Bureau, 1993: 4844 (as % of labor force: 3.1)

4. **Fort Buchanan Employment as a Percentage of the San Juan Labor Force, 1990 & 1995:**
   - San Juan Labor Force 1990:
     - From DTRH. 2018. ‘Tablas Estadísticas’: 157173
   - Total Base Employment 1990:
     - From DOD 1989, BSR: $331+564 (+ possibly 1097 reservists) = 895$
   - Fort Buchanan Employment as a Percentage of the San Juan Labor Force, 1990:
     - $895/157173 = 0.5\%$
   - San Juan Labor Force 1995:
     - From DRTH. 2018. ‘Tablas Estadísticas’: 157000
   - Total Base Employment 1995:
   - Fort Buchanan Employment as a Percentage of the San Juan Labor Force, 1995: $942/157000 = 0.6\%$
5. **Fort Buchanan Employment as a Percentage of the San Juan Labor Force, 2000:**
   San Juan Labor Force 2000:
   From DRTH. 2018. ‘Tablas Estadísticas’: 150380
   Total Base Employment 2000:
   From DOD 2000, BSR: 2362+936+1171 = 4469
   Fort Buchanan Employment as a Percentage of the San Juan Labor Force, 2000:
   Only Direct: 3298/150380 = 2.2%
   Including Reservists: 4469/150380 = 3.0%

6. **Sector Employment as a Percentage of the San Juan Labor Force, 2000:** (Note 25)
   San Juan Labor Force 2000:
   From DRTH. 2018. ‘Tablas Estadísticas’: 150380
   San Juan Manufacturing Workforce 2000:
   From Instituto de Estadísticas de Puerto Rico. 2019: 6500 (2002) (as % of labor force: 4.3)
   San Juan Transportation Workforce 2000:
   From Instituto de Estadísticas de Puerto Rico. 2019: 5235 (2002) (as % of labor force: 3.4)

7. **Fort Buchanan Employment as a Percentage of the San Juan Labor Force, 2005 & 2010:**
   San Juan Labor Force 2005:
   From DRTH. 2018. ‘Tablas Estadísticas’: 173200
   Total Base Employment 2005:
   From DOD 2004, BSR: 1591+518+1421 = 3530
   Fort Buchanan Employment as a Percentage of the San Juan Labor Force, 2005:
   Only Direct: 2109/173200 = 1.2%
   Including Reservists: 3530/173200 = 2.0%
   San Juan Labor Force 2010:
   From U.S. Census Bureau. N.D. ‘Selected Economic Characteristics, San Juan Municipio, 2010: 175538
   Total Base Employment 2010:
   From DOD 2009, BSR: 2203+557+1385 = 4145
   Fort Buchanan Employment as a Percentage of the San Juan Labor Force, 2010:
   Only Direct: 2760/175538 = 1.6%
   Including Reservists: 4145/175538 = 2.4%

8. **Sector Employment as a Percentage of the San Juan Labor Force, 2005 & 2010:**
   San Juan Labor Force 2005:
   From DRTH. 2018. ‘Tablas Estadísticas’: 173200
   San Juan Manufacturing Workforce 2005:
   From Instituto de Estadísticas de Puerto Rico. 2019: 5983
   (as % of labor force: 3.5)
San Juan Transportation Workforce 2005:  
   From Instituto de Estadísticas de Puerto Rico. 2019: 8575 (as % of labor force: 5.0)
San Juan Labor Force 2010:  
   From U.S. Census Bureau. N.D. ‘Selected Economic Characteristics, San Juan Municipio, 2010: 175538
San Juan Manufacturing Workforce 2010:  
   From Instituto de Estadísticas de Puerto Rico. 2019: 5456 (as % of labor force: 3.1)
San Juan Transportation Workforce 2010:  
   From Instituto de Estadísticas de Puerto Rico. 2019: 6897 (as % of labor force: 3.9)

9. **Fort Buchanan Employment as a Percentage of the San Juan Labor Force, 2015:**
   San Juan Labor Force 2015:  
   From U.S. Census Bureau. N.D. ‘Selected Economic Characteristics, San Juan Municipio, 2015: 158109
   Total Base Employment 2015:  
   From DOD 2014, BSR: 31+422+2580 = 3033
   Fort Buchanan Employment as a Pctg. of the San Juan Labor Force, 2015:  
   Only Direct: 435/158109 = 0.2%
   Including Reservists: 3033/158109 = 1.9%

10. **Sector Employment as a Percentage of the San Juan Labor Force, 2015:**
    San Juan Labor Force 2015:  
    From U.S. Census Bureau. N.D. ‘Selected Economic Characteristics, San Juan Municipio, 2015: 158109
    San Juan Manufacturing Workforce 2015:  
    From Instituto de Estadísticas de Puerto Rico. 2019: 4637 (as % of labor force: 2.9)
    San Juan Transportation Workforce 2015:  
    From Instituto de Estadísticas de Puerto Rico. 2019: 5750 (as % of labor force: 3.6)

11. **Manufacturing Employment as a Percentage of the San Juan Labor Force, 1970:**
    San Juan Labor Force 1970:  
    From U.S. Census Bureau, 1972: 138781.
    San Juan Manufacturing Workforce 1970:  
    From Junta de Planificación de PR, 1989: 54330 (as % of labor force: 39)

12. **Minimum Wage Income, 1970:** (for transportation sector)
    Puerto Rico Minimum Wage 1970:  
    From St. Louis FRED. 2019: $1.60 per hour
    Considering low overall employment levels, average working hours are assumed to be less than full time at 37.5 hours per week, for 50 weeks per year.
    Annual Minimum Wage Income 1970: 1.6*37.5*50 = $3000
13. Minimum Wage Income, 1980:
   Puerto Rico Minimum Wage 1980:
   From St. Louis FRED. 2019: $2.50 per hour
   Annual Minimum Wage Income 1980: 2.5*37.5*50 = $4687.5

   Puerto Rico Minimum Wage 1990:
   From St. Louis FRED. 2019: $3.35 per hour
   Annual Minimum Wage Income 1990: 3.35*37.5*50 = $6281.25

15. Minimum Wage Income, 1995: (for transportation sector)
   Puerto Rico Minimum Wage 1995:
   From St. Louis FRED. 2019: $4.25 per hour
   Annual Minimum Wage Income 1995: 4.25*37.5*50 = $7968.75

16. Minimum Wage Income, 1998-2008:
   Puerto Rico Minimum Wage 1995:
   From St. Louis FRED. 2019: $5.15 per hour
   Annual Minimum Wage Income 1995: 5.15*37.5*50 = $9656.25
Appendix 3: Example of Data Sources
### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - Army

Base Structure Report - As Of 30 Sept 04

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITE</th>
<th>NAME NEAREST CITY</th>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>PHONE</th>
<th>ZIP CODE</th>
<th>BLDGS OWNED</th>
<th>BLDGS OWNED SQFT</th>
<th>BLDGS LEASED</th>
<th>BLDGS LEASED SQFT</th>
<th>TOTAL ACRES</th>
<th>ACRES OWNED</th>
<th>PRIV (SM)</th>
<th>MIL</th>
<th>CIV</th>
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### PROPOSED BASIC PAY—EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 2005

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**Notes:**
1. While serving as JCS/ViscJCS, CJCS, CNO, or CMC, Army/Air Force C5, commander of a unified or specified combatant command, basic pay is $15,146.40 (See note 2).
2. For basic pay for O-7 to O-10 is limited by Level III of the Executive Schedule which is $12,433.20. Basic pay for O-6 and below is limited by Level V of the Executive Schedule which is $10,600.00.
3. Applicable to O-1 to O-3 with at least 4 years & 1 day of active duty or more than 1440 points as a warrant and/or enlisted member. See DoD/FR for more detailed explanation on who is eligible for this special basic pay rate.
4. For the WCOF of the Navy, CNO/CG of the AF, SAG/CNO of the Army or MFRS Corps, basic pay is $6,304.20. Combat Zone Tax Exclusion for O-1 and above is based on this basic pay rate plus HPP/DTP is $272.00.
### ALLOWANCES

#### Basic Allowance for Housing Type II, Differential and Partial

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#### Basic Allowance for Subsistence

**All Grades:** $250

#### Cash Clothing Replacement Allowances (Enlisted Members Only)

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#### Civilian Clothing Allowance

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For other pays or specific requirements for the pay cited in this table, go to the web at: [http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/fmr/07a/index.html](http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/fmr/07a/index.html)
Appendix 4: Sample Interview/Personal Correspondence Questions

In order to ensure full transparency, here I present a sample of my formalized qualitative data gathering process. After an initial discussion with my informants, I would follow up with these questions. If they agreed to go forward, then I and the other person would either talk in person, or they would write their answers and send them to me via email. Following our discussion, I recorded and reviewed my notes, following up with the other person when I needed to ask any clarifying questions.

I would again like to extend my sincere gratitude to all who were so generous with their time and insights. This thesis would not have been possible without their help.

Hello! My name is Molly. I am from Indiana but am doing my master’s degree in The Netherlands. I am gathering data for my thesis about the effects of Fort Buchanan on the surrounding community. Below I have written some questions that I would like to ask you about your schooling at Fort Buchanan. I’m really interested in your experiences at the garrison, and I think that you could help me to improve my analysis. Since I cannot yet visit Fort Buchanan myself, I am gathering firsthand accounts from people who have worked at and/or visited the garrison, and I would love to hear yours! I look forward to speaking to you about these questions via Skype, telephone, or some other way; however, if you just want to write your responses here, that would be great, too.

If you are willing to answer my questions, it will help me to understand better the services that Fort Buchanan provides, as well as how the community experiences the garrison and the activities that happen there. You would not have to answer all of the questions, just the ones you feel comfortable with. Your responses would be kept confidential and you would have the chance to review them before I finish my thesis. My thesis probably will not be published, but if you are willing, I would be interested to use a quote or idea from our discussion in my paper. This would be anonymous, unless you indicate to me that you want to be identified.

I look forward to hearing what you think about my questions. Thanks for your consideration! Sincerely, Molly
Appendix 4:

Questions:

Please tell me a bit about yourself:

- Where are you from?
- How long have you lived/did you live in Puerto Rico?
- Where else have you lived?

Basic Questions for You about Fort Buchanan:

- Please confirm if you have visited Fort Buchanan? For what purposes have you visited the fort?
- In your own words, what is the purpose of Fort Buchanan?
- What does “everyone” in the local community know about Fort Buchanan?
- What are the 3 most important aspects of Fort Buchanan’s services for or impacts on the community that should be included in my report?

Questions about your Schooling at Fort Buchanan:

- Can you explain how you ended up attending schools at Fort Buchanan?
- As a child, did you live far from the base? What was it like to arrive there?
- Which schools did you attend and when? What do you remember most about the buildings? About the teachers and staff?
- What do you remember most about your fellow classmates?
- Did you feel that the school had a connection to the military in some way? If so, how was this manifested – in curriculum, values, activities, particular students, etc.?
- Did you ever interact with other base employees besides the teachers?
- Do you remember if there were any significant changes to your schools or other buildings on the base during the time you were a student there?
- Did you feel like the school or the base had a connection to the community in some way – perhaps you played sports against other schools, attended events on the grounds of Ft. Buchanan, or had community service projects?

Please feel free to share anything else that you think is important for me to include in my thesis. Thank you again!