

DECONSTRUCTING CREATIVE INDUSTRIES IN THE GLOCAL CONTEXT: THE CASE OF CREATIVE LABOUR IN BUENOS AIRES

Master Thesis Global Markets Local Creativities

Lía Barrese

DECONSTRUCTING CREATIVE INDUSTRIES IN THE GLOCAL CONTEXT: THE CASE OF CREATIVE LABOUR IN BUENOS AIRES

Master Thesis in Global Markets, Local Creativities (GLOCAL)

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Academic Year 2017-2019

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The process of writing thesis was an arduous work an troublesome journey which I could not have accomplished without the guidance, support and encouragement of my supervisor Prof. Montserrat Pareja Eastaway. I am deeply grateful to her, not only for her knowledge that help me 'land' in my thesis, but also because her faith in me was a constant motivation that impelled me in those moments I questioned my work. I simply hope that this thesis lives up to your expectations.

I would also like to thank the former director of the Observatory of Creative Industries of the City of Buenos Aires, and my first boss Fernando Arias for his contribution in the case study process and his predisposition to teach me for several years now. Also, I would also like to take the chance to thank Enrique Avogadro, current Culture Minister of Buenos Aires for his time and interest in the development of this work.

Finally, thanks to all the professors who have contributed to develop my 'glocal' look at things, my life has new lenses after this master.

And to my dear Buenos Aires, thank you for always being the source of my inspiration.

"Mi Buenos Aires, tierra florida
donde mi vida terminaré.
Bajo tu amparo no hay desengaño
vuelan los años, se olvida el dolor."
/Mi Buenos Aires Querido by Alfrdo Le Pera, 1934/

Lía Barrese
June 28 2019

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The urban contemporary economy, led by innovation growth, is grounded on a shift from a manufacturing based to knowledge-intensive and service-based industries. The now globalised process of production highlights the growing role of knowledgeable human capital as a primary driver of growth, where Creative Industries (CI) are often considered as avenues of development of this new economy. This CI discourse was developed as a political-economic project focusing on the economic contribution of the CI associated with the development of official statistics of added-value (creative GDP) and job creation. However, in recent years, some academics have started to question CI's benefits as only being one side of the coin. Problems such as gentrification, exacerbation of inequality, dislocation, labour precariousness, ownership and wealth concentration, are being more and more associated with CI's impacts; backlashes that oppose of that claims made during its original political conception.

Creative Labour (CL) studies -a subdiscipline of cultural studies- have grown as one of the most critical approaches to the CI. Precariousness, social inequality, gender and race discrimination, informality and individualisation are some of the 'troubles' that creative workers face according to these line of theories. Interestingly, both arguments have built their argumentations taking the same Western examples. On the one hand, the policy alleges that CI are sectors that contribute to social and economic development, and on the other hand, the critics from the academia led by CL studies that questioned this same capacity of development and the CL's undesirable social impacts, both argumentations have historically centred their assumptions in case studies notoriously produced in Euro- and North American creative-hubs. These two opposing positions have taken a universalist approach assuming the status of general truth, despite being generated from regionally limited empirical evidence.

Through a combination of a theoretical review, and a qualitative and a quantitative approach to the case study in Buenos Aires, this thesis hopes to contribute to the de-Westernisation of the CL studies, as well as to the deconstruction of the CI rhetoric by focusing on the creative labour in the city of Buenos Aires. This empirical study may suggest that the global theories may actually have different socio-economic impacts in different local contexts. CI are neither critical, nor can be disregarded, for social and economic change; and a call to a more nuanced perspective is much needed both in policy and academia to understand the specific contexts in the creative sectors.

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SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The urban contemporary economy, led by innovation growth, is based on a shift from manufacturing to knowledge-intensive and service-based industries.[1] Global networks and information technology are redefining social configurations, including labour relationships and occupational structures.[2] In fact, transformations in labour structures are the most direct evidence of transitions from agrarian systems to industrial and informational ones. In parallel, the now globalised process of production highlights the growing role of knowledgeable human capital as a primary driver of growth, where Creative Industries (CI) are often considered avenues of development of this new economy.[3] As promoters of urban regeneration, economic development and job creation, CI are claimed to be not only an economic source of growth but also enhancers of social, cultural and sustainable development.[4]

The term 'Creative Industries' started in Australia in 1994 but it was not until 1998 when it was embraced by the Labour Party in the United Kingdom (UK) that the term started to be used extensively. The CI discourse was developed as a political-economic project in the UK's Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS), focusing on the economic contribution of the CI associated with the development of official statistics of added-value (creative GDP) and job creation; showing how culture contributes to economic growth, signalling what Schlesinger named as the 'creative turn'.[5] Over the past 15 years, CI have received growing attention, been approached as new motors of economic growth worldwide and supported by supranational policy (such as the EU and international institutions like UNESCO and UNCTAD) as well as academia.[6] The adoption of policy initiatives to support CI gradually occurred throughout Europe, where today CI are seen as sectors contributing to dynamic European innovation, economic growth, and overall development.[7]

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[1] Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*, (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 6.

[2] Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 2nd ed., with A new pref. The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture, v. 1. (Chichester, West Sussex ; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).

[3] Gaëtan Trembley, "Industries Culturelles, Économie Créative et Société de l'information" (Vol. 1, 2008), 68; See the definition of Creative Industries in the following section.

[4] Kate Oakley, "Whose Creative Economy? Inequality and the Need for International Approaches." *Les Enjeux de l'Information et de La Communication 17*, no. 2, (2016): 163.

[5] Philip Schlesinger, "The Creative Economy: Invention of a Global Orthodoxy." *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 30,* no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 76; Andy Pratt, "Creative Industries and Development: Culture Development, or the Cultures Development?" In *The Oxford Handbook of Creative Industries*, Ed. Candace Jones, Mark Lorenzen, and Jonathan Sapsed., (Oxford University Press, 2014), 503.

[6] UNESCO is the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, while the UNCTAD reference to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Both institutions are part of the United Nations (UN); Terry Flew, and Stuart Cunningham. "Creative Industries after the First Decade of Debate." The Information Society 26, no. 2 (February 18, 2010): 113.

[7] Caroline Chapain, and Tadeusz Stryjakiewicz, eds. *Creative Industries in Europe: Drivers of New Sectoral and Spatial Dynamics.* (Cham, Schwitzerland: Springer, 2017).

The CI's policy discourse has been rapidly globalised, and as it has touched different geographical and political contexts some academics and researchers have begun questioning the overall role of CI in economy and society.[8] While some authors argue that CI are a generalised prescription that serve as a vehicle for the export of neoliberal policy prescriptions, others defend the ideal of a CI discourse with policy variance and attend to local contextual factors. [9] Further, some academics have started to notice in recent years that CI's benefits might just be one side of the coin. Problems such as gentrification, exacerbation of inequality, dislocation, social exclusion, labour precariousness, ownership and wealth concentration, and the general unsustainability of the CI's discourse, are being increasingly associated with CI's impacts; backlashes opposing the claims put forward in its original political conception.[10]

This thesis understands the impossibility of covering the entire spectrum of criticism, and thus has decided to narrow its analysis to Creative Labour (CL) studies.[11] Taking the critical approach of the CL's studies -a subdiscipline of cultural studies that focuses on the production of creative goods and services- that offers the benefit of concretely assessing the economic, political and social implications of the CI. Thus, the theoretical framework in which we stand comprises a combination of CL studies with a political-economy analysis that acknowledges the influence of the state and capital in the control of factors such us labour and ideology. Together with a wide range of academic and policy writing on the CI, this thesis builds a path to understand the profile of the people working in the CI and what the socio-economic implications are of that.[12]

If CI are leading the rest of the economy, as it is often argued, it seems imperative to understand the organisational characteristics of these industries, namely: the working conditions, the organisational forms and inequalities (if any) that characterise the work of CI.[13] The figure of the creative worker conjured by industry and governments as the iconic representatives of the 'brave new world of work' have become the face of the new economy.[14] In this context, if creative workers symbolise current labour transformations

[8] Oakley, "Whose Creative Economy? Inequality and the Need for International Approaches,"165.
[9] Flew and Cunningham "Creative Industries after the First Decade of Debate,"114.
[10] Allen J. Scott, "Creative Cities: Conceptual Issues and Policy Questions." *Journal of Urban Affairs* 28, no. 1 (January 2006): 13; Andy C. Pratt, "The Cultural Contradictions of the Creative City." *City, Culture and Society* 2, no. 3 (September 2011): 123–30; Nicholas Garnham, "From Cultural to Creative Industries: An Analysis of the Implications of the 'Creative Industries' Approach to Arts and Media Policy Making in the United Kingdom." *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 11, no. 1 (March 2005): 15–29; Kate Oakley and Dave O'Brien, "Learning to Labour Unequally: Understanding the Relationship between Cultural Production, Cultural Consumption and Inequality." *Social Identities* 22, no. 5 (September 2, 2016): 471–86; J. O'Connor, *The Cultural and Creative Industries a Review of the Literature*. (Newcastle upon Tyne: Creativity, culture and education, 2010).
[11] See the definition of Creative Labour in the next section.
[12] Miller, Toby, David Rowe, and Geoffrey Lawrence. "The New International Division of Cultural Labour and Sport," January 1, 2011, 98; David Hesmondhalgh, *The Cultural Industries*. 4th edition. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2018), 22-23; Ana Alacovska, and Rosalind Gill, "De-Westernizing Creative Labour Studies: The Informality of Creative Work from an Ex-Centric Perspective." *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 22, no. 2 (March 2019): 2.
[13] Alacovska and Gill, "De-Westernizing CL Studies," 2.
[14] Ross, Andrew. "The Mercurial Career of Creative Industries Policymaking in the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States." In Nice Work If You Can Get It: Life and Labor in Precarious Times, Andrew Ross., 15–52. NYU Series in Social and Cultural Analysis. (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 16.

more than other groups, it is worth investigating the kinds of labour these industries are helping build.

In fact, in studies on CL, some characteristics tend to resonate as commonalties. Precariousness, social inequality, gender and race discrimination, informality and individualisation are often mentioned as some of the 'troubles' that creative workers face.[15] In contrast, other lines of study highlight emancipatory possibilities for those working in creative fields.[16] However, despite an emphatic focus towards recording case studies to help address contradictions, CL studies are not empirically heterogenous.[17] Indeed, empirical CL studies are notoriously produced in Euro- and North American creative-hubs, producing certain claims that are universalised as representative of the 'global' creative worker.[18] That is why this thesis aims to contribute towards closing the gap highlighted by academia, to de-Westernise CL studies through empirical work that might help build a more comprehensive understanding of the conditions of creative jobs.[19]

All the above considered, this thesis presents the case of Buenos Aires, the capital of Argentina, as a response to the following factors. First, focusing more precisely on the period 2007 and 2015 the city government adopted CI's ideas which signalled the localisation of the global *creative turn.*[20] Then the city adopted, and almost replicated as will be shown, the model of the CI developed in the UK and spread by UNESCO and UNCTAD at the verbatim. Thus, it represents a clear case of the 'glocalisation' of the creative rhetoric.[21] Secondly, Buenos Aires is one of the most important cities in Latin America at an economic, cultural and political level.[22] Hence, as it is comparable with other cities of similar size and importance of the region, the case study of Buenos Aires could be representative of a Latin American capital and, in fact, stimulate the replication of the study of CL in other capitals in the region. Third, in Argentina the concentration of economic activities, and especially the CI, is notoriously located in Buenos Aires. Historically standing as the richest city of the country, and benefits from its port and centralism, the city's cultural and creative concentration has gained it the title of the cultural capital of Latin America.[23] Finally, due to the author's familiarity with the creative sector of the city and its people, as the former economist of the Creative Industries Observatory of the City (OIC), this thesis portends a critical perspective from a local scholar invested in challenging the 'Western' hegemonic perspectives of CI and CL.

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[15] Rosalind Gill, "Technobohemians or the New Cybertariat?: New Media Work in Amsterdam a Decade after the Web." (Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures, 2008): 15; Angela McRobbie, *Be Creative: Making a Living in the New Culture Industries*. (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2016).

[16] David Hesmondhalgh and Sarah Baker. *Creative Labour: Media Work in Three Cultural Industries*. (Routledge, 2010), 18.

[17] Alacovska and Gill, "De-Westernizing Creative Labour Studies,"5.

[18] Throughout this thesis, the terms West, Centre, and Global North, referring mainly to the European and North American regions, are understood as synonymous.

[19] Alacovska and Gill, "De-Westernizing Creative Labour Studies."

[20] Rubens Bayardo, "Políticas Culturales y Economía Simbólica de Las Ciudades: 'Buenos Aires, En Todo Estás Vos.'" *Latin American Research Review* 48, no. S (2013): 100–128.

[21] See the definition of *glocalisation* in the next section.

[22] UNCTAD, "Creative Economy Report. A Feasible Development Option." UN, (2010), 54.

[23] Bayardo, "Políticas Culturales y Economía Simbólica de Las Ciudades,"103.

On the one hand, CI are alleged as sectors that contribute to social and economic development, an assumption enhanced by policy rhetoric. While, on the other hand framed by the critical lines of academia, CL studies have questioned this same capacity of development; attributing undesirable social impacts for those working in the CI. However, these opposing positions have taken a universalist approach assuming the status of general truth, despite being generated from regionally limited empirical evidence. In this questioning is from where the construction of this thesis began, and first defines its basic concepts as follows.

1.1.1 Definitions

This section presents the definitions of the central concepts that form this thesis.

Creative Industries (CI):

The complexity of the definition of *creative industries* itself presents an extensive debate and varies among countries. A number of different models have been developed in recent years, with the intention of providing a systematic structure, each presenting clear underlying assumptions about the purpose of these industries.[24] However, the classification of the CI remains unprecise and controversial. What seems to be a general consensus is that CI broaden the scope of the *cultural industries* beyond the arts, marking a shift that includes more commercial activities in a change of terminology that seems more pragmatic, economistic and policy oriented.[25]

This thesis is guided by the two more widespread definitions of CI, as both help explain what is understood about these industries. The first is the definition offered by the first UK's DCMS Mapping Document in 2001 for which the CI are *"those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property."*[26] Now, expanding into the consideration of production and reproduction, the UNESCO defines CI as "*the sectors of activity whose main purpose is creativity, production or reproduction, promotion, dissemination and marketing of goods, services and activities of cultural, artistic or heritage content"*.[27] The conceptual intersection between these two definitions is what defines the adoption of the creative industries by the Buenos Aires City's policy, as while the methodology taken by the creative statistics of the city follows the UNESCO suggestions, the political conception of the CI responds to what the DCMS defined. This is the reason why both are considered and contribute in this analysis.

In practical terms, for the purpose of empirical analysis, what we consider to be contained within the creative industries concept include the following sectors: advertising,

[24] UNCTAD, "Creative Economy Report 2010,"6.
[25] Mark Banks, *Creative Justice: Cultural Industries, Work and Inequality*. (London ; NewYork: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017), 10.
[26] Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS). "Creative Industries Mapping Documents 2001 Demonstrating the Success of Our Creative Industries." (United Kingdom: UK Government, 2001), 5.
[27] José Pessoa and Lydia Deloumeaux. "The 2009 Unesco Framework for Cultural Statistics (FCS)." (UNESCO, 2009).

architecture, art and antiques markets, crafts, design, fashion, film and video, music, performing arts, publishing, software, television and radio, video and computer games.[28] In general terms, what this thesis understands by the concept of CI is that it is a political-economical construct born in the late 1990's in the UK, under the assumption that it would be a sector leader in the social and economic development of post-industrial capitalism.[29]

Creative Labour (CL):

Even though it could be argued that all labour is potentially creative, this thesis understands CL in the way it is defined by those working in the CI, including those performing cultural and non-cultural occupations.[30] However, this is not simply a universally agreed definition, as problems already described in the CI's definitions extend to its jobs and occupations. In this regard, this study takes a methodology suggested by the UNESCO, but with a different criterion. Basically, the distinction lies in two aspects: to work in the CI in a cultural or non-cultural occupation; or to work in the non-CI in a cultural occupation. Cultural occupations are a special kind of CL in that they are first and foremost centred on the activity of symbol-making.[31]

UNESCO defines the term cultural employment to include cultural occupations in CI and in non-CI, as well as the non-cultural occupations in CI. This thesis' understanding of CL is really an abbreviation of the term which refers to people working in CI. The main reason for this responds to an interest in understanding how CI behave, what kind of jobs they offer, and how sustainable their dynamics are for development. That is why we exclude occupations that, despite being cultural (and therefore creative), are performed outside the CI. Moreover, this is what attracts the general attention of academia when referring to CL within the field of cultural studies as well as in media and communication studies.[32] In the methodological sections of the third chapter of this study, a more developed explanation is provided of the different understandings adopted by creative statistical institutions, as well as the empirical support for what this study understands by CL.

Glocalisation/Glocal

Glocalisation is a considerably recent conceptualisation among globalisation theories that refers to the 'reality of internal globalisation'.[33] In other words, the concept is meant to transcend the binary opposition between the 'global' and the 'local' providing an interpretation of their blending.[34] This is precisely the interpretation that is considered for this thesis. The *glocal* context in this study combines the global policy assumptions of CI as

[28] DCMS, "Creative Industries Mapping Document 2001."
[29] *Ibidem*, 6.
[30] Alonso Guiomar and Melika Medici. "The UNESCO Culture for Development Indicators: Methodology Manual." (Paris: UNESCO, 2014,) 30.
[31] Jim McGuigan "Creative Labour, Cultural Work and Individualisation." *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 16, no. 3 (August 2010): 326.
[32] Hesmondhalgh and Baker, "Creative Labour,"9.
[33] Victor Roudometof, "Transnationalism, Cosmopolitanism and Glocalization." *Current Sociology* 53, no. 1 (January 2005): 118.
[34] *Ibidem,* 123.

drivers of development as it is understood and absorbed by the city of Buenos Aires and its local socio-economic framework.

Some interpretations of the concept tend to emphasise the global heterogeneity that results from social processes of *glocalisation*, and reject the idea that forces emanating from the West present a homogenising power.[35] Opposite to this, some other interpretations support the idea that in fact, the *glocalisation* allows imperialist ambitions by governments and organisations whose desire is to be imposed in different parts of the planet in economic, political, institutional and cultural spheres.[36] With the understanding of these two possibilities, and applying the political-economic theory framework, this thesis will try to shed light on these dynamics through the Buenos Aires case study.

Development

This study takes Amartya Sen's concept of 'development as freedom', which understands development in a holistic way arguing that human development is about the expansion of citizens' capabilities.[37] Here, development means access to opportunities, as opposed to the mainstream idea of development, suggesting development is possible only by economic growth. Sen's theory recognises that an increase of income does contribute to the expansion of freedom. However, this important contribution stresses the idea that economic development that translates to an increase in income alone without redistributive measures is not enough to guarantee that poor segments of the population benefit from growth. This definition of development is employed by this thesis and is perhaps the most critical approach to the conception of CI as development promoters have focused only on their economic aspects.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

As we have briefly introduced, the rise of the CI as both theory and policy discourse have intersected from the beginning. The global expansion of these theories has found different expressions in different parts of the world, while at the same time demonstrating the classic one-size-fits-all reproduction of policies coined for and in the economies of the Global North.[38] The expansion of universalist policy prescriptions is widely criticised in academia which also presents an extensive debate around definitions, methods and the overall impact of CI.[39] However, most of the academics that present doubts about policy

[35] George Ritzer, "Rethinking Globalization: Glocalization/Grobalization and Something/Nothing." *Sociological Theory* 21, no. 3 (September 2003):194.
[36] *Ibidem,*194.
[37] Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*. 1. ed., 6th print. (New York: Knopf, 2001). Amartya Sen is an indian economist who was awarded the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for his contributions to welfare economics and social choice theory and for his interest in the problems of society's poorest members.
[38] Paul Schlesinger, "Creativity: From Discourse to Doctrine?" *Screen* 48, no. 3 (September 1, 2007): 3.
[39] Some of the more renamed critical authors of the CI that come from different fields of studies and that we are going to cite in several occasions along this work are: Nicholas Garnham and Toby Miller from culture economics; Andy Pratt, Stuart Cunningham, Philip Schlesinger policy literature; Angie McRobbie, Rosalind Gill, Nicholas Ross from Creative Labour studies, to mention a few.

claims about the CI are also mapping examples from the Global North, with only a few exceptions of study cases of South-East Asia, Eastern-Europe and Africa.[40] That is why it is important to introduce the case of Latin America, with the example of the city of Buenos Aires, as representative of a region that acquired similar strategies in their policies with respect to the CI.[41] The creative turn adopted by the city should be embedded in global dynamics regarding creative theories and policies, whilst being situated in a broader theoretical framework of the evolution of the labour markets in recent history. Accordingly, this thesis aims to respond to the following questions:

Main Question**:** Which are the socio-economic characteristics of the CL in Buenos Aires and what are their implications for the development assumptions of the creative industries in the city?

General theoretical sub-questions

Guiding the literature review we intend to address:

- What have been the historical conceptions of CI and how has it evolved in the last 20 years? Why are they important for contemporary economy?
- What are the relations between CI and development/growth and the limits that academics have found in it?
- What are the characteristics of the CL, and how do they connect with a general tendency in the labour markets?

Resulting from the literature the following empirical sub-questions are formulated regarding the case study:

- Which are the socio-economical characteristics of the nation? and how do they condition the general labour market?
- How has Buenos Aires adopted CI conceptions?
- What are the characteristics of the creative sector in Buenos Aires and how has it evolved?
- How is the distribution of CL regarding informality, gender balance, multi-employment, self-employment, level of education and wages between the years 2007 and 2015?

[40] For example, web designers in New York (Ross, "No-Collar"), new media workers in Amsterdam (Gill, "Technobohemians or the New Cybertariat?"), classical musicians in London and Berlin (Scharff, "The Psychic Life of Neoliberalism")

[41] Guillermo Quiña, "Los Sentidos de La Precariedad: Reflexiones En Torno a Las Representaciones Del 'Trabajo Creativo.'" *Controversias y Concurrencias Latinoamericanas*, (Asociación Latinoamericana de Sociología, 8, 2016).

1.3 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

The construction of these research questions has helped to identify the following objectives of this work. First, to de-westernise the CL studies, contributing to the robustness of the theory through the extension of the characterisation of a creative worker outside the usual western contexts. Second, to deconstruct the CI rhetoric this study tries to contribute an empirical study that may suggest the actual socio-economic impact of the creative sector in Buenos Aires. Third, to illustrate the extent to which policies that consider development only from an economic point of view have biased the creative sectors to be repeatedly measured according to 'jobs and growth', neglecting social and cultural aspects in their practices.[42] Finally, we expect to shed some light on aspects barely studied in Latin America and bring attention to the debate around CL in the region.[43]

In order to accomplish these objectives, our methodology is defined by a mix of theoretical analysis, and qualitative and quantitative approaches to the case study. The theoretical review of the first two chapters establishes the political and academic framework discussion; the fundamental axis around which this work revolves. Consequentially, the examination and processing of the CL theories serve as the basis upon which the hypothesis is built and to be contrasted against in this empirical study. The characterisation of the CL in Buenos Aires is found through both a qualitative approach based on exploratory and in-depth interviews, and by a quantitative analysis using the primary source of the national official socio-economic survey of the country (named EPH).[44]

The interviews were semi-structured conversations established with some key actors with strategic positions in the public sector during the time framework. Due to the limited time period for field work, the four interviews were performed with people with the highest hierarchies in their positions. Hence, this study was fortunate enough to talk with the former Secretary of Creative Industries (current Minister of Culture of the city), and the heads of the two creative statistics institutions of the city. They helped to explore how the adoption of the concepts of the CI was undertaken by the government in Buenos Aires, the place of creative labour and creative workers in this context.

The main instrument of the analysis is, however, the quantitative study. The EPH is the most important database used by the official measurements to understand the socio-demographic and socio-economic characterisations of the populations. The National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC) has been responsible for the EPH since 1974. The Institute has provided the basis of the EPH from 2003 to the present on its website, as well as methodological manuals for its processing.[45] This study's analysis of the creative sector applied to this database was grounded in the UNESCO methodological manual and segmentation of the creative activities, as well as from the local CI Observatory (OIC) that has performed similar studies before. In sum, all these methods together helped produce proper and reflective conclusions, with the hope of encouraging similar studies.

[42] Oakley, "Whose Creative Economy?,"165.
[43] Quiña, "Los sentidos de la precariedad,"90.
[44] To see in detailed explanation of how the survey was processes, go to Section 4.
[45] To see the data base availability access https://www.indec.gob.ar/bases-de-datos.as

1.4 RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY

First, acknowledging the research gap pointed out by academia, this study provides an interesting opportunity to advance the understanding of the CL in different regions, other than the traditional Euro-North America pole.[46] Although there are a few studies in Latin America exploring some aspects of the creative workforce, they seem to be limited to some industries (like the fashion industry in Bolivia, or the independent music industry in Buenos Aires) or some aspects of labour (like informality in Rio's favelas), rather than performing an evaluation with the aim of analysing the characteristics of the CL force as a whole.[47]

Secondly, establishing the global-local link in the adoption of the concept of CI, connecting their political origins with the adoption in Buenos Aires and its implications, is another innovative aspect this research hopes to contribute. In the analysis of the glocalisation processes, some academics understand that this expansion of the CI model found its particularities in the different geographical areas it reached, while others criticise that in reality the policies impart a common strategy with the ability to penetrate equally in the north and south of the globe. Focusing on Buenos Aires will allow this study to make a conclusion regarding this. [48]

Finally, an evaluation of the characterisation of the CL through a quantitative approach based on the Official Households' Survey (EPH) is an innovative resource in the region and globally, as far as this study is concerned. This thesis, therefore, provides an exciting opportunity to open the analysis of CI and their social impacts, examined in this case through the working conditions of its workers, and by offering a new quantitative approximation other than the classic measurements of growth rate of jobs and creative GDP.

1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE WORK

The overall structure of the study takes the form of five sections, including this introductory chapter. In this section, the main issues, definitions, research questions and relevance of the study are introduced, serving as guidelines to further elaborate the topics. Section 2 begins by laying out the theoretical dimensions of the research. First, looking at the idea of new or informational economy and the importance of the CI in this context. Then, examining in depth the origins and evolution of the concept of the CI, their connections with growth and development and, finally, presenting the limitations of certain assumptions granted to the CI. Section 3 focuses on CL theories and begins by laying out the

[46] Alacovska and Gill, "De-Westernizing Creative Labour Studies."
[47] Cecilia Dinardi, "Creativity, Informality and Cultural Work in Rio de Janeiro's Favelas." *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 22, no. 2 (March 2019): 248–63; Kate Maclean, "Fashion in Bolivia's Cultural Economy." *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 22, no. 2 (March 2019): 213–28; Quiña, "Los sentidos de la precariedad."
[48] Stuart Cunningham, "Trojan Horse or Rorschach Blot? Creative Industries Discourse around the World." *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 15, no. 4 (November 2009):383; Bayardo, Rubens. "From Culture to Creativity. Some Reflections from Argentina." *Revista Uruguaya de Antropología y Etnografía* 1, no. 1 (2016): 46; Oakley, "Whose Creative Economy?,"166.

importance of CL, the approach taken by both academy and policy on the subject and how it appeared as the vehicle of labour reform conducted by the new economy. Next, we examine the characteristics of the CL in depth, condensing the literature review on the subject around five topics: affection, temporality, access, wages and individualisation.

Section 4 is concerned with our case study, Buenos Aires, and its understanding of CI and its CL. We begin this part by setting the macroeconomic and labour market framework at a national level, later narrowing it down to the city level. Following this, the adoption of the CI's concepts taken by the city's policies and creative statistics institutions are examined. The first part of this section concludes by presenting a brief overview of the industrial organisation of CI and the first approximation to the characterisation of the CL in the city, using a qualitative approach based on interviews performed with key actors. The second part of this chapter concerns the quantitative analysis of this study. Beginning with a detail explanation of the sources, the Official Household Survey (or EPH in its Spanish acronym), the description of the design of the study will follow, as will a presentation of the hypothesis, and finally the presentation of the results and their analysis. Section 5 presents the final conclusions of our study, and discerns the main limitations as well as suggestions for further examination.

SECTION 2. CREATIVE INDUSTRIES IN THE GLOBAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 WHY ARE CREATIVE INDUSTRIES IMPORTANT IN THE CURRENT ERA OF GLOBALISATION?

The last quarter of the 20th century witnessed a restructuring to the configurations of social, economic and cultural organisations. Different attempts to explain these changes have drawn upon concepts like post-Fordism, post-industrialisation, and theories around the network society, information society and the new economy, all of them generally used with exchangeable meaning.[49] The landscape of human life has been transformed by the many forces that began to dominate since then. Some clear transformational forces of the current time include the technological revolution around information technologies, accelerated and increased economic global interconnectedness and interdependence, undebatable capitalist systems as an establishment, and the restructuring of firms and financial markets post-1970's crisis.[50]

This thesis begins by setting the framework of what, in the past decades, has been considered as the new era of globalisation, as creative industries insert themselves in this new paradigm.[51] However, the idea and development of a new or information economy presents several argumentations and differing ways of approaching its study. This paper will begin by describing its main characteristics using work by Manuel Castells, while emphasising the effects on labour markets. The second section unpacks the information economy and its connection with CI. Understanding global interrelations as a strategy of 'ground clearing' is necessary for this work to establish a robust foundation upon which the origins of CI can be explained, alongside the importance of the characteristics of CL, including their local impacts.

2.1.1 The new economy, the Information society, globalisation: you name the change

According to Castells, it was the information technology revolution that was the enabler of the new informational, global and networked economy. It is informational, as Castells states, because the capacity to generate knowledge-based information is what determines productivity of the agents of the economy. [52] It is global, as the production and production factors (capital, labour, raw materials, information, technology and markets) as well as consumption are all organised at a global scale. It is networked because global networks of interaction define social organisation and key practices. For Castells, the

[49] Rosalind Gill and Andy Pratt. "In the Social Factory?: Immaterial Labour, Precariousness and Cultural Work." *Theory, Culture & Society* 25, no. 7–8 (December 2008):2.
[50] Rodrik, Dani. "Premature Deindustrialization." Journal of Economic Growth 21, no. 1 (March 2016): 4; Castells, "The Rise of the Network Society," 18.
[51] Alfred E. Eckes, *The Contemporary Global Economy: A History since 1980*. History of the Contemporary World. (Chichester, West Sussex ; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).
[52] Castells, "The Rise of the Network Society,"160.

network society is simply a new form of capitalism adopted for the new features of globalisation in our times.[53]

The information society model, built upon classical theories as an heir of post-industrialism, can be described through its three main features.[54] First, as already mentioned, information as the source of productivity paves the way to innovation. Second, general economic activity shifts from production of goods to services. Third, a high-skilled labour force as a supplier of services, with high information and knowledge content, becomes the most solicited in the new structural organisation of production; indicating new standards of social stratification. The information society therefore, as a result of the post-industrial society, inaugurates a new model of economic production, social regulation and cultural life.[55] However, it would not be correct to assume a homogeneity in its adoption in each society. Each informational society, albeit capitalist, presents different cultural and institutional arrangements as well as differing levels of development, all of which should be addressed.[56]

Simultaneously, while the techno-economic restructuration and its globalised scale might have reached all societies, it also operates within particular segments of the economy, in certain countries and regions, and in proportions that vary according to the position that economy, country or region occupy in the global networks of goods, labour and capital.[57] Asymmetry between countries regarding integration, and their share of competitive advantages and benefits is another fundamental feature of the new economy. The global networks' assessment evaluates everything and everyone, simply determining their absorption or elimination according to their rules.[58]

Global networks and information technology have also redefined labour relationships and occupational structures. As post-industrialism highlights, automation and new technologies are changing work processes at the demise of manufacturing jobs.[59] Nonetheless, the globalising process of production simultaneously shows an increase in high skilled and educated workforce mainly in advanced economies, while low-skilled manufacturing jobs are more prevalent than ever in newly industrialised countries.[60] These two opposed types of workforces present very different bargain powers, demand around the globe, wages and working conditions.[61] Again, the global labour market is conditioned by this asymmetry as, on the one hand, the market for the professional elite presents them with high mobility and wages whilst, on the other hand, unskilled labour is highly immobile. This dichotomy illustrates the growth of a new economy that places more value on educated workers within

[53] Castells, "The Rise of the Network Society,"160; Tremblay,"Industries culturelles, économie créative et société de l'information,"120.
[54] Bell, "The Coming of Post-Industrial Society,"7.
[55] Tremblay,"Industries culturelles, économie créative et société de l'information,"120.
[56] Castells, "The Rise of the Network Society,"120.
[57] United Nations, ed. World Economic and Social Survey. Sustainable Development Challenges. 2013. (New York: United Nations, 2013).
[58] Eckes, "The Contemporary Global Economy"59.
[59] Wayne F.Cascio and Ramiro Montealegre. "How Technology Is Changing Work and Organizations." *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior* 3, no. 1 (March 21, 2016): 349–75.
[60] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). "Future of Work and Skills." Hamburg, 2017.
[61] Castells, "The Rise of the Network Society,"137.

a general framework of economies with a larger supply of low-skilled workers, thus reflecting the source of the growing inequality observed in and within most societies.[62]

Transformation in labour structure is the most direct evidence of system transition from agrarian, to industrial, and finally to the informational society. This is why understanding employment particularities is essential to capture the interrelations between technology, economy, and institutions in the new global system of networks. The occupational profile of the informational economy, although diverse in each society, presents flexibility and self-employment as its two most common characteristics.[63] A highly competitive market, and threat of automation, fosters flexibility and is easily observed in increasingly irregular working times, in the permanent re-location of practices, and through the lack of commitment of employers to offer stability and certain job conditions . It is this flexibility that enables the coexistence of a mainly rigid labour market with the high mobility of capital.[64] Different societies present different forms of flexibility according to their institutional and political factors. It is worth mentioning here how flexibility was also part of the workers' demands in the revolt against inhuman industrial working conditions. Alienating conditions commonly experienced in assembly lines and office cubicles were no longer acceptable in the new economy's demand for labour reform. Further, for the new economy to be inflexible might prove synonymous with limiting job creation. Thus, in the end, and despite social costs and unequal workers' benefits, such new forms of flexible work seem to have risen in parallel with insecurity, temporality and informality; all roots of labour precarity.[65]

Individualisation of labour forces seems to be another trend in the rise of current labour markets. Entrepreneurship, facilitated by new technologies and the 'democratisation' of the means of production, has become a source of innovation and a flagship of productivity. Increasingly, companies' practice of outsourcing highly competitive and well-educated labour, to low-cost locations that differ from the country of origin, has become a rapidly growing phenomenon across global business. The reproduction of global networks and technology has facilitated strategies of cost reduction, enhancing the rise a new class of 'entrepreneurial' and individualised workers.[66] This atomisation of labour forces clearly impacts the power of the worker to negotiate with the employer.[67]

Consequently, labour- as central as it is to the process of value-making - has never been more vulnerable thanks to the flexibilisation and individualisation of the workforce. As Stiglitz explains, while weak unionisation diminishes a worker's bargaining power, the main asymmetry of highly mobile capital and much less mobile work lies within the widening inequality gap.[68] Wages have risen far less than productivity, a fact highly inconsistent with neoliberal theories that project a scenario of free competition, whereby each worker earns

[62] Gill and Pratt, "In the social factory?,"14.
[63] World Economic Forum. "The Future of Jobs Report 2018." (Geneva, 2018).
[64] Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Inequality and Economic Growth." *The Political Quarterly* 86 (December 2015): 144.
[65] Castells, "The Rise of the Network Society,"166; Gill and Pratt, "In the social factory?,"4.
[66] Wendy L., Tate, Lisa M. Ellram, Lydia Bals, and Evi Hartmann. "Offshore Outsourcing of Services: An Evolutionary Perspective." *International Journal of Production Economics* 120, no. 2 (August 2009): 512.
[67] Gill and Pratt, "In the social factory?,"7.
[68] Stiglitz, "Inequality and economic growth,"144.

a remuneration equal to the marginal productivity they bring. However, industrial relations, political decisions, the level of unionisation, welfare and taxes all distort the direct relation of wage-productivity. What neoliberal explanations miss, and what Stiglitz well remarks, is that institutions do matter. They do affect markets, sometimes facilitating rent-seeking and exploitation but, more importantly, institutions and political decisions have the power to make structural changes to income distribution.[69]

2.1.2 CI and the information society

As almost every paper related to the CI begins, these industries are believed to be part of, connected with, and even based on, the new informational economy.[70] In order to understand the intersecting points between CI and the information society it is necessary to deconstruct the different lines of argumentation that have contributed to the development of the concept of CI. According to Granham, an avowed critic, it was through the *creative turn* that cultural industries became creative as a strategy to benefit from its linkage to the information society. [71] Borrowed from different segments of different informational standpoints, CI perspectives built themselves undoubtedly in connection with the new economy. Here, the reconstruction of a connection between CI and different post-industrial theories helps to understand the basis of the development of the concept of CI and its connection with development.

Post-industrialist theories, led by Daniel Bell, place the focus on human capital.[72] Capitalism's progress was no longer based in physical capital, but in scientific knowledge which could not be replaced by machines. Consequentially, creativity is considered essential not in connection with any cultural production but as the base of scientist's imagination. Some theorists argue about how the CI contribute to the society, understanding creativity in a broader sense; as part of human 'talent'.[73] As for Schumpeterian theories, capitalist development was in the hands of innovation, to which entrepreneurs were located at the heart of its evolution and considered to be the creative drivers of technological innovation. [74] From this theory, CI's supporters proposed a centrality of entrepreneurs' creative process and as leaders of capitalist growth, and applied it to the cultural production sector as equally transferable.[75] Entrepreneurialism and its centrality in the CI's narrative, and its effect in the conditions of CL, are leading aspects that shaped CI both in policy and in academia as shall be seen later on.

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[69] *Ibidem,* 140.
[70] Tremblay,"Industries culturelles, économie créative et société de l'information."; Garnham, "From cultural to creative industries."
[71] Garnham, "From cultural to creative industries,"20.
[72] Bell, "The Coming of Post-Industrial Society,"10.
[73] Jason Potts, and Stuart Cunningham. "Four Models of the Creative Industries." *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 14, no. 3 (August 2008): 233–47..
[74] Schumpeter theorized about how the capacity to transform innovations from theoretical inventions into practical goods is the key for economic growth. To see the whole theory development: Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process*. 1. ed., [reprint]. (Chevy Chase, Md.: Bartleby's Books [u.a.], 2005).
[75] Jason Potts, "Do Developing Economies Require Creative Industries? Some Old Theory about New China." *Chinese Journal of Communication* 2, no. 1 (March 2009): 102.

In parallel, the shift to a post-Fordist service-based economy meant consumption was no longer based solely on satisfaction of basic material needs, but instead made room for symbolic productions and services to supply immaterial needs. Explicitly, the growth of a cultural sector was considered able to fill the gaps that a declining manufacturing sector was making and was central in the policy agenda of the UK in the 1980's[76]. This is aligned with what Allen Scott names 'cognitive-cultural capitalism'; describing the current process of urbanisation, upon which the 'creative city' concept has been built extensively around.[77]

The arguments of a CI perspective and the information society evidently intersect. Some authors understand this intersection as natural, given that both fields share interests in the long-term shifts from manufacturing- to a service-based economy and its impacts on employment and growth as well as the growing role of knowledge capital as a primary driver of the new economy.[78] However, other scholars led by Garnham, understand this intersection as opportunistic from the CI side, questioning how the CI arguments have stolen from the 'prestige' information society theory as an attempt by the cultural sector to increase relations with the public sphere.[79] The following section focuses on this latter issue, and explains the gestation of the concept of CI and its intermingling between policy and theory.

2.2 ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF CI AND ITS EVOLUTION

The debate around the definition of CI is in constant evolution as Flew and Cunningham state.[80] From its origins the term has received increasing attention both from policy-makers and academics; two spheres in constant agreement as well as disagreement about the CI. However, it is generally agreed that the term CI is a political construct born in the late 1990's as a policy strategy coined for the first time in its plural expression 'Creative Industries.'[81]

The conceptual journey started with the term in its singular version, 'Cultural Industry' by the minds of the Frankfurt School, headed by Horkheimer and Adorno in 1947.[82] Here, Cultural Industry was a direct consequence of the new industries of mass reproduction and was a critical appreciation not of the commodification of culture, but of the new way that cultural commodity production was organised as it became integrated into the new capitalist system.[83] As the Fordist factory disappeared, art as an autonomous and independent form was displaced by a commodified art produced in the cultural factory. This first contribution of Adorno showed the connection between art, society and system of production, and was later taken by the political economy school of which the central

[76] Garnham, "From Cultural to Creative Industries,"23.
[77] Allen J. Scott, "Beyond the Creative City: Cognitive–Cultural Capitalism and the New Urbanism." *Regional Studies* 48, no. 4 (April 3, 2014): 566.
[78] Flew and Cunningham, "Creative Industries after the First Decade of Debate, "118.
[79] Garnham, "From Cultural to Creative Industries,"20.
[80] Flew and Cunningham, "Creative Industries after the First Decade of Debate, "112.
[81] Andy C. Pratt, "Cultural Industries and Public Policy: An Oxymoron?" *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 11, no. 1 (March 2005): 33.
[82] Ibidem.
[83] O'Connor, "The Cultural and Creative Industries a Review of the Literature,"18.

contention was indeed the emphasis that, under capitalism, culture was more and more becoming a commodity.[84]

Subsequently, the 1980's is when the importance of the change of the terminology from 'Cultural Industry' to 'Cultural Industries' took place, understanding the complex structure and variable dynamics of the production of different cultural products.[85] Meanwhile, the political economisation of culture led by the likes of Garnham in Britain and Miège in France became the intellectual basis upon which cultural industries' policies were constructed. Cultural industries were set already at the edge of the new economy; moving from the analysis of mass consumption to highlighting the need for policy-makers to respond to the pressure of de-industrialisation and, also in some cases (mostly in France), to combat cultural imperialism.[86] This interpretation was going to later be picked up by the Labour party as by other political regimes in the formulation and design of the 'Creative Industries' blueprint document: the UK's Department of Culture, Media and Sports (DCMS) first Creative Industries Mapping Document 2001.[87]

Initially introduced in Australia, the term Creative Industries attained its full expression when the Labour government under Tony Blair established the Creative Industries Task Force (CITF) as a central instrument of its new DCMS. This policy formulation defined the idea of culture as a market asset but, above all, it placed creativity in a privileged position within the chain of the production of culture.[88] In the DCMS' mapping document of 2001 that first defined CI as we have seen, lies the basis upon which both CI's concepts and utilisation were to be built in the following years.[89]

First, it contained clear political intentions; the new Labour administration established CI as a central part of the UK post-industrial economy, highlighting the added value and employment generated by these kinds of activities. Endowed by statistical backing, the mapping document of the DCMS of 2001, that basically groups together arts and cultural activities with those of software, showed that the CI sector was growing at twice the rate of the general economy.[90] Secondly, it outlined the economic importance of the culture sector as a wealth creator. Wherever possible, the thirteen industries selected had to be treated as any other industry would with a core business model. [91] Thirdly, the discourse quickly found eco into larger arenas such as those of trade policy, urban development and copyrights and

[84] *Ibidem*, 19.
[85] *Ibidem,* 22.
[86] Schlesinger, "The Creative Economy,"75.
[87] Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/creative-industries-mapping-documents-2001
[88] Jaron. Rowan, *Emprendizajes en cultura: discursos, instituciones y contradicciones de la empresarialidad cultural*. (Madrid: Traficantes de Sueños, 2010).
[89] Pratt, "Cultural Industries and Public Policy,"34; Go to definitions section in page 11.
[90] "The creative industries in the UK generate revenues of around £112.5 billion and employ some 1.3 million people. Exports contribute around £10.3 billion to the balance of trade, and the industries account for over 5% of GDP. In 1997-98, output grew by 16%, compared to under 6% for the economy as a whole." In DCMS, "Creative Industries Mapping Document 2001,"10.
[91] The thirteen industries were comprised by film, television and radio, publishing, music, performing arts, arts and antiques, crafts, video and computer games, architecture, design, fashion, software and computer services, and advertising. In DCMS, "Creative Industries Mapping Document 2001,"10; Ross, "The Mercurial Career of Creative Industries Policymaking in the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States,"25.

intellectual policy.[92]Finally, the term was not randomly constructed upon the awareness of heated global competition for human capital. CI were easy and intentionally linked with technological convergence, the information society and the 'new economy.'[93] Therefore, with manufacturing in decline , the political intention of underpinning the centrality of the knowledge economy and connecting it with CI was to use 'creativity' as the leading sector to maintain the UK's competitive advantages.[94]

The commodification of culture was presented as an attractive global proposition. The UK model was quickly taken up in other regions, starting in Europe and then travelled via Commonwealth countries such as Australia, and parts of East Asia and New Zealand.[95] Different countries defined different numbers and types of industries, at times distinguishing carefully the culture from the creative. But what remained a common strategy was to centre CI as the object of a policy to pursue economic and sometimes social outputs in a race to gain comparative advantage.[96] While the UK was leading the policy moves, the USA was a pioneer in academic interventions. The report 'Creative Industries', written by Richard Caves in 2000, set the economic commonalities of creative goods in terms of the high risks shared in their estimated success or failure, paying little attention to policy. In this regard, several reports that followed signalled what Schlesinger calls the *creative turn*.[97] In 2006, The Economy of Culture in Europe report commissioned by the European Commission set the scene for the continent. The Creative Economy Reports of 2008, 2010 and 2013- commissioned by the UNCTAD are arguably the most influential policy-oriented reports with global scope and frame the global *creative turn* regarding policy.[98] The sequence of reports introducing the CI from international organisations was received everywhere as a pitch to governments to redirect their policy-making to CI.[99] All these accounts had something in common: understanding culture as an economic resource consistently represented in GDP and evidenced by employment at regional and/or national levels.

The change in the terminology, from cultural to creative, was not accidental. The former UK Culture Secretary, Chris Smith, explained that the change was a pragmatic move to emphasise the connection with the new information economy, and to obtain economic visibility and support from the Treasury that the word culture, and its reminiscence with the arts, might have otherwise been jeopardised.[100] The focus was placed on creativity as a quality that individuals are able to exploit. The classic industrial sector appeared to come as

[92] "..Issues pertinent to most or all of the regions in the UK include: the need for creative industries strategies to integrate with other related strategies, including Regional Development Agencies, Regional Cultural Consortiums, Learning and Skills Councils and the Small Business Service," In DCMS, "Creative Industries Mapping Document,"17.
[93]Flew and Cunningham, "Creative Industries after the First Decade of Debate, "120.
[94] Pratt, "Cultural Industries and Public Policy,"33.
[95] Oakley, "Whose Creative Economy? Inequality and the Need for International Approaches,"165.
[96] Schlesinger, "The Creative Economy,"77.
[97] *Ibidem,* 76.
[98] Christiaan De Beukelaer, "Creative Industries in 'Developing' Countries: Questioning Country Classifications in the UNCTAD Creative Economy Reports." *Cultural Trends* 23, no. 4 (October 2, 2014): 235.
[99] Schlesinger, "The Creative Economy,"79.
[100] O'Connor, "The Cultural and Creative Industries a Review of the Literature,"42.

second behind the entrepreneurial creatives that generate value through property rights.[101] Some understood this turn as a direct apologia to neo-liberalism, celebrating entrepreneurship in an increasing incorporation of culture into the logics of the free market economy.[102] For others, like Tremblay, the notion of CI presents no added value to the already existent cultural industries, neither in the selection of the industries added under creatives, nor in their methodologic results which lack robustness and comparability across nations.[103]

Beyond the dichotomy 'culture-creativity' or 'cultural-creative', definitions vary from country to country angling more towards the culture or to the industry aspect. However, something has become clear: the arts and cultural field were no longer seen as a 'market failure' requesting the intervention of the state for its subsidy but, rather, have started to be seen as a 'market opportunity.'[104] This understanding of CI as a source of value, employment, urban regeneration and, ultimately, economic growth presents differing argumentations and applicability, as we shall see below.

2.2.1 CI, growth and development

The relationship between CI and development is embedded in a bigger debate centred around culture and development.[105] Culture and development, another set of hard to define concepts, relate in a way that presents many approaches and the overlap of many fields of study (Economy, Sociology, Anthropology, Political Science etc). In the last half of the 20th century, when development started to be considered beyond purely economic implications, culture became a necessary element for development.[106] As Amartya Sen argues, culture in itself is part of everyday life, thus if development is seen as a betterment of the living conditions boosting people's capacities and options, culture can hardly be ignored as part of development.[107] Cultural institutions are then, according to this vision, the base upon which economic and political institutions are built and are therefore vehicles for social and economic mobilisation.[108]

However, and despite the symbolic implications imprinted in creative products and services, CI have most commonly played the role of making visible the economic part of culture; its evolution has reinforced its economic aspect in direct line with economic growth. Strategies for development posited cultural goods and services as key for growing the creative

[101] *Ibidem*, 43.
[102] Schlesinger, "The Creative Economy,"77.
[103] Tremblay,"Industries culturelles, économie créative et société de l'information,"134.
[104] O'Connor, "The Cultural and Creative Industries a Review of the Literature,"14.
[105] Andy Pratt, "Creative Industries and Development: Culture Development, or the Cultures Development?" In The Oxford Handbook of Creative Industries, Candace Jones, Mark Lorenzen, and Jonathan Sapsed., 502–14. (Oxford University Press, 2014).
[106] Maraña, Maider. "Culture and Development Evolution and Prospects." Bilbao: (UNESCO, 2010).
[107] Although here the understanding of Culture refers to the combination of social practices of a certain society at a certain time, it serves in the construction of our argumentation to understand the different intentions that the idea of development might carry; Amartya Sen, "Culture and Development." Tokyo., 2000.
[108] Panagiotis E. Petrakis, *Culture, Growth and Economic Policy*. (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014), 51.

economy, reshaping what was known as cultural policy.[109] In general, the policy perspectives of national and international governments focused on numbers as tools for forecasting sources of wealth, while the academy generated models to explain the economic impact of this strategic sector.

Soon after the advent of the concept of CI and the development of official statistics, this group of industries quickly gained attention by showing how culture contributes to economic growth.[110] As aforementioned, the first organisation that identified the 'economic significance' of CI was the DCMS which placed them as the principal object of the economic development agenda.[111] The particularly pronounced GDP share of the UK's CI, as well as the share in employment and high volume of creative exports, were taken as signals of the fastest-growing segments of the economy and therefore the avenues of development that would lead to economic growth. [112] Based on this auspicious forecast, theories started to centre the CI as a growing sector capable of providing employment and stimulating local demand. Thanks to a multiplier effect, cities with CI may be attractive locations to other firms and educated populations, raising wages and economic growth.[113] The so-called neoclassical perspective understands CI as drivers of operational economic activity, and as creators of new jobs, firms and markets; also generating economic added value thanks to the increased aggregation of capital and capabilities producing goods and services with increased demands.[114]

The collection of data representing the international picture of CI became an essential addition to these theories and international organisations like UNCTAD, UNESCO and the IDB showed that CI growing rates were over the average of the economy, not only in the Global North but also in the South.[115] These empirical results (of added value, employment and export metrics) have led to the centring of CI as drivers of development, seeing these industries as *'workable means to poverty alleviation and environmental sustainability*'.[116] Considering CI not just as instruments for economic development but also that of social, cultural and environmental development, CI were presented as fundamental for the reorientation of economic models to foster structural changes.[117] Interestingly, employment was considered the main contribution of CI in the social aspect, regarding quantity, quality and capacity for social inclusion.[118]

Another set of theories highlight the contribution of CI to the productivity of other sectors of the economy, as being due to the 'spill over' effects that creative ideas may produce

[109] Matías Zarlenga, "New Frameworks of Cultural Creativity Vision Document." *Cultural Base*, March 31, (2016).
[110] Pratt, "Creative Industries and Development,"503.
[111] See footnote 89.
[112] Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS). "Creative Industries Economic Estimates: February 2010." (United Kingdom, 2010); Neil Lee, "The Creative Industries and Urban Economic Growth in the UK." Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 46, no. 2 (February 2014): 455–70.
[113] Peter Hall, "Creative Cities and Economic Development." Urban Studies 37, no. 4 (April 2000): 640.
[114] Potts, "Do Developing Economies Require Creative Industries?,"95.
[115] Pratt, "Creative Industries and Development,"503.
[116] UNCTAD, "Creative Economy Report,"33.
[117] UNCTAD, "Creative Economy Report,"37.
[118] UNCTAD, "Creative Economy Report,"24.

within industries that tend to agglomerate as CI.[119] Taking this idea further, Potts explains how CI may be seen as evolutionary drivers of growth of knowledge and structural change. This model is based on Schumpeter's understanding of economic growth through innovation, highlighting the significant role of CI as innovation systems, facilitating the flow of information and ideas and promoting economic systems that co-evolve with socio-cultural systems. Here, capacity for generating, adopting and retaining new ideas is key for economic growth and CI are facilitators and catalysts of this process resulting in spill-overs to the rest of the economy.[120] However, when going deeper in the role of CI in developing nations, Potts makes a valuable remark: '*CI can be a source of economic growth, when 'standard' economic mechanism of global trade, capital investment and institutions already become effective'*.[121]

Interestingly, despite the emphasis in explaining the link of CI and development there is still little empirical evidence on the subject with models often producing inconclusive results.[122] From neo-liberal to evolutionary approaches, scholars as well as policy makers have both exalted the benefit of CI for development in the merely economic sense. Development as an enhancement of living through granting freedom of opportunity seems to escape these models. Therefore, CI seem to stand in a delicate position as whilst they have the capacity to be instruments for economic, social and cultural development, they also present inconsistencies in their impact in each of these three spheres. Precisely, these inconsistencies or limits to CIs is what we shall be explored in the next section.

2.2.2 Limits of CI's assumptions

Inevitably, this inconclusiveness accommodated scepticism about CI as guarantors of growth and development. As Kate Oakley puts it, the narrow perspective of CI as purely creators of 'jobs and growth' has dominated both academic and policy rhetoric and demands urgent revision.[123] The conceptualisation of CI, Oakley suggests, presented in its beginnings a progressive view of development that failed to materialise. Without denying the sector's growth, she points out that the wider effect of development on society has been less beneficial.[124] In this regard, three critical approaches can be identified in the academic literature seeking to counter-balance the, perhaps simplistic, optimism in CI's contributions.

The first critical approach has focused on questions of representation in production or, in other words, access to jobs. Labour in cultural sectors is highly socially skewed .[125] The

[119] Lee, "The Creative Industries and Urban Economic Growth in the UK,"461.
[120] Potts, "Do Developing Economies Require Creative Industries?,"99.
[121] Ibidem, 100.
[122] Lee, "The Creative Industries and Urban Economic Growth in the UK,"462.
[123] Oakley, "Whose Creative Economy?,"165.
[124] Ibidem.
[125] Joan Acker, "Inequality Regimes: Gender, Class, and Race in Organizations." *Gender & Society* 20, no. 4 (August 2006): 441–64.

representation of ethnic minorities as well as women in the CI is declining.[126] The access to creative occupations generally involves unpaid internships (not accessible to people from working class backgrounds), as well as connections to certain circles or social networks.[127] Further, other questions have arisen due to problems of gentrification in the urban centres where CI thrive and which eventually leads to the displacement of the very cultural workers on whom they depend, as well as a lot more vulnerable lower income citizens. In this context, the contradictions of the CI model appear clear as some authors emphasise how it was carried out in a framework of deregulation, privatisation while at the same time reframed in progressive policy goals such as diversity, inclusion, quality of life and sustainability.[128]

The second critical perspective focuses on CL conditions. The present given model of production of the CI is based on small and temporary projects that require only temporary commitment of resources.[129] Consequently, the workforce necessary for accommodating this model tends to be flexibilised, adaptive to short-term contracts and turning over self-employment. The results in the labour market are related to problems of instability, informality and multi-employment; worsening the social security of the people working for these industries.[130] Interestingly, as Eikhof and Warhust highlight, policies that aim to attract CI and CL tend to overlook these characteristics of the model of production which they further argue '*contains in it systemic social inequalities*.'[131]

Finally, another critical pathway questions the CI's model of production through an industrial organisation perspective, arguing some concerning patterns usually shared by the CI. These patterns refer to capital concentration in some specific parts of the value chain; the incapacity of small firms (which are the majority) to grow, and their vulnerability to face economic crises; and the frequent connection between CI and the figure of the entrepreneur, where the promotion of the individualist interest leads to a the-best-take-all strategy producing more losers than winners. [132] Accordingly, concerns regarding regulation and monopolies arise as peculiarities and specificities of this model of organisation, according to Pratt, are embedded in the global asymmetries of legislation and inequalities of these industries.[133]

As shown in the next chapter, Mark Banks explores the unequal access, inequitable pay, instability, woeful diversity and inclusion balances that are also typical characteristics of the

[126] Bridget Conor, Rosalind Gill, and Stephanie Taylor. "Gender and Creative Labour." *The Sociological Review* 63, no. 1_suppl (May 2015): 1–22; Herman Gray, *Watching Race: Television and the Struggle for Blackness.* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004).
[127] Andreas Wittel, "Toward a Network Sociality." Theory, Culture & Society 18, no. 6 (December 2001): 53.
[128] Oakley,"Whose Creative Economy?"; Pratt, "The Cultural Contradictions of the Creative City."
[129] Ruth D. Eikhof, and Chris Warhurst. "The Promised Land? Why Social Inequalities Are Systemic in the Creative Industries." Employee Relations 35, no. 5 (August 9, 2013): 495–508.
[130] Alan McKinlay, and Chris Smith, eds. *Creative Labour: Working in the Creative Industries. Critical Perspectives on Work and Employment*. (Basingstoke [England] ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Gill and Pratt, "In the Social Factory?."
[131]Eikhof and Warhurst, "The Promised Land?,"495.
[132] Jaron Rowan, "La Cultura Como Problema: Ni Arnold Ni Florida. Reflexiones Acerca Del Devenir de Las Políticas Culturales Tras La Crisis." *Revista Observatorio Cultural.* (2014).
[133] Pratt, "Creative Industries and Development,"511.

creative sector, and are also rather difficult to capture in any statistics.[134] Perhaps it might be argued that these are intrinsic characteristics of the informational society itself. However, the fact that CI are not excluded from these characterisations should at least rise some concern. Hence, the social limitations in the growth agenda seems to be the usual policy overlook. In the short term, more flexible production conditions, with exploitation and self-exploitation of human capital, might produce higher growth rates. However, in the long run, an increase in inequality and the worsening of economic performance and growth could also be perceived.[135] In sum, the social limitations in the short term might become economic limitations in the long term.

However, the economic paradigm under which the dominant discourse of CI has expanded and been legitimised seems to present other limitations than the social. Discussions have explored the limits of a purely economic interpretation of culture as reducing it to a merely economic resource.[136] Polices have often coupled creativity as an essential input for innovation and development. For instance, *'creativity, a natural resource in abundance all over the world within reach of rich and poor*' is a seductive statement that has been commonly used in official reports.[137] This idea of culture as a reservoir of good ideas ready to be used by entrepreneurial and high-skilled professionals, motivated by the pursuit of art but still able to create a profitable business, has dominated the cultural imaginary of governments.[138] Again, the limit here is the reduction of people with 'talent' or 'creativity' as the source of growth and understood as an individual race, not as a collective process.[139]

Overall, a gap seems to exist between what policies promoting CI are supposed to accomplish and what they actually do. If creativity is a universal asset, power relations and its consequent asymmetrical distribution forces are the trade-off. The materialisation of the notion of creativity and the CI policy discourse somehow become a normative distinction that focus on growth, not paying attention to its redistributive outcomes.[140] When applying strategies of theoretically perfect societies in a realistically unequal society, results might not correct but rather enlarge inequality. Thus, the concern about CI polices in less developed places is reasonable to appear. So, if polices are to favour creative growth and the expansion of CL, it is timely to question what kind of society these strategies are contributing to build. Embedded in the information society, it has been argued how CI are leading the rest of the economy and here lies the importance of understanding the organisational characteristics of these industries. The nature of creative work provides some practical ground to analyse the perhaps simplistic optimism of policy makers that often overlook how patterns of regressive social and economic structures are reproduced.[141] For that, the academic debate on the nature of CL is laid out in the next chapter, on which the grounds of the empirical case study of CL in Buenos Aires are built.

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[134] Mark Banks, "Creative Economies of Tomorrow? Limits to Growth and the Uncertain Future." *Cultural Trends* 27, no. 5 (October 20, 2018): 367–80.
[135] Stiglitz, "Inequality and Economic Growth,"153.
[136] Zarlenga, "New Frameworks of Cultural Creativity Vision Document,"52.
[137] UNCTAD, "Creative Economy Report,"26.
[138] Banks, "Creative Economies of Tomorrow?,"370; Schlesinger, "The Creative Economy,"75; Zarlenga, "New Frameworks of Cultural Creativity Vision Document,"36.
[139] Zarlenga, "New Frameworks of Cultural Creativity Vision Document,"37.
[140] Pratt, "The Cultural Contradictions of the Creative City,"124.
[141] Ibidem, 128.

SECTION 3. CREATIVE LABOUR THEORIES

3.1 WHY DOES CREATIVE LABOUR MATTER IN THE NEW ECONOMY?

As stressed at the beginning of this work, the political economy approach that is taken considers production as a site of value generation and a space of power disputes. The previous chapter introduced the concept of the 'new economy' and elaborated ideas of change produced by technological advancements, global integration and liberalisation of markets, and the asymmetry in the production relations and in labour markets. The mass workers of the Fordist era were replaced by dispersed, fragmented and individualised workers, now part of a decentred and transnational regime of production.[142] With the overall decrease in the conditions of standard employment, ideas concerning labour precariousness emerged from both theorist and activist movements explained as '*all forms of insecure, contingent, flexible work – from illegalised, casualised and temporary employment, to homeworking, piecework and freelancing*.'[143] In another words, precarity understood as existence without security.[144]

In this context, the centre of the analysis tackled in this chapter (and in the overall research) is the importance of the creative worker representing, more than other groups, current labour transformations. The figure of the creative worker as an example of 'model entrepreneurs'- said by industry and governments- is conjured as representative of the 'brave new world of work' willing to solely carry risks and responsibilities and has become for some the new face of neoliberal entrepreneurship.[145] Voices amongst policy makers have shared the belief that creative workers have the potential to deliver a new meritocratic world, tribalising approaches from which the rest of the economy and society could benefit.[146]

Therefore, given this central place of CL, this research is naturally concerned with the characteristics of the practice. First, the object of this type of labour are cultural products; goods that contain not only material but also symbolic meaning, with the potential to shape how we understand ourselves and our society. So, too, cultural products have become an instrument of power as they do not escape the logic of production (the market) and are a part of a circuit where the distribution of work is subsumed to those with authority over the conditions and possibilities set by capital.[147] Therefore, as a combination of their economic and meaningful essence, it is profoundly relevant to understand who and under which

[142] Gill and Pratt, "In the Social Factory?"
[143] Ibidem.
[144] Catherine Murray and Mirjam Gollmitzer. "Escaping the Precarity Trap: A Call for Creative Labour Policy." *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 18, no. 4 (September 2012): 419.
[145] Ross, "The Mercurial Career of Creative Industries Policymaking in the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States,"16.
[146] Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS). "Staying Ahead: The Economic Performance of the UK's Creative Industries." (United Kingdom, 2007).
[147] Miller, "The New International Division of Cultural Labour,"99.

conditions these cultural goods are produced.[148] Secondly, CL studies offer a concrete terrain for questioning the economic and social values of the creative economy. Given the importance granted to CI in socio-economic policy world-wide, there is a pressing need for a better understanding of these industries, demanding some assumptions to be displayed with evidence. Beyond the seductive narrative of the rapid and expansive growth of jobs and income in the CI, critical research from social science, public policy, and the third sector has offered a more nuanced perspective of the creative model of production. Such research has revealed a more complex and troubled picture of the CI, stating that the best kind of education and good positions in the CI remain elusive for the majority, and only available for a privileged few.[149]

However, despite the critics of CL generating empirical evidence of issues of discrimination, exploitation and thus raising awareness of the sector's challenges, further empirical work is necessary in this field.[150] The case study model is often skewed towards certain industries and places, meaning that future analysis should move beyond particularities. This includes trying to answer what kind of values and working lives underpin creative work; the question of how to find better jobs for more people in these industries.[151] Finally, if the CI model of production is proclaimed as the archetype of future of work, and creatives are the 'ideal workers' of the future, it is essential to better understand what the implications are of this assumption. If creativity and CI continue to be imagined as an instrument of job creation, located at the epicentre of labour reform, this could imply the continuation of limited opportunities for the participation and advancement of the majority.[152]

In sum, the present chapter intends to explore these ideas by first focusing on the academic and political debate with reference to creative employment, following the dialectic placed as the structural axis of this study's analysis. Later, and to conclude this introductory section, there will be an examination of the deployment of labour reform and its intersection with flexibilisation and the *creative turn*. The following provides a brief review of the historical perspectives on labour markets to understand the role of meritocracy and talent in CI's conception. In addition, the most relevant characteristics of creative employment and the arguments for them are explained more deeply. To conclude, there will be a reflexive segment about the movements towards sustainable practices in the CL field.

[148] Kate Oakley and Dave O'Brien. "Learning to Labour Unequally: Understanding the Relationship between Cultural Production, Cultural Consumption and Inequality." Social Identities 22, no. 5 (September 2, 2016): 473.
[149] Banks, "Creative Justice."
[150] Oakley and O'Brien, "Learning to Labour Unequally,"482; Alacovska and Gill, "De-Westernizing CL Studies,"14; Pratt, "The Cultural Contradictions of the Creative City,"129.
[151] Hesmondhalgh and Baker, "Creative Labour,"10; Banks, "Creative Justice."
[152] Eikhof and Warhurst, "The Promised Land?."

3.1.1 The academic delay and the policy blind-spot

On the one hand, considering the historical perspective from the time of the Frankfurt School of Adorno and Horkheimer until recently, cultural studies have largely ignored cultural production and the individualised parts of it.[153] It is certainly a recent phenomenon that terms like 'precariat' (describing a type of worker that brings together precarious conditions while becoming the new proletarian armies of a now expanded 'social factory'), and 'cognitariat' (labelling the highly educated professionals undertaking casual and uncertain work), have recently been coined to describe creative workers.[154] CL has much in common with the demands of modern capitalism; extreme flexibility, autonomy and tolerance to inequality have all led to creative workers becoming a poster child of the demands of an information society. Actually, some have argued that the new labour conditions of the general economy have been 'contaminated' with the complexity, instability and precarity that rule in creative domains, more specifically the non-commercial arts, and for a longer time.[155] Hence, it is plausible to question the extent to which the dialectic between the economisation of culture and the culturalisation of the economy is a battle with a clear winner, at least with regards to labour markets. Regardless, the redefinition of the production of norms resulting from this integration is far from being empirically proven.

Nevertheless, there are reasons that lead us to understand that creative work presents greater precarious conditions than the rest of the labour force: swathes of qualitative data (mainly through interviews, social surveys, observations) and ethnographic studies have identified such chronic characteristics in different creative sectors.[156] From Sociology, Cultural and Media studies, Political Economy and Feminism, a diverse group of scholars including Andrew Ross, Angela McRobbie, David Hesmondhalgh, Kate Oakley, Rosalind Gill, Andy Pratt, Jaron Rowan and Dave O'Brien, among others have been especially eloquent in highlighting how some stable features of this work under the domains of flexibility, autonomy, and informality, are systemic causes of social inequality in the CI.[157] As introduced in the previous chapter in our analysis of the Limits of the CI's assumptions, access and conditions of CL are two areas under which critics reside. Unsurprisingly, however, most of these reflexions are based in case studies from the UK, the USA and some from Australia, with marginal to zero representations from other parts of the globe.

Consequentially, the recent work of Ana Alacovska is pressing not only for the ongoing de-Westernising of CL studies, but also to contest ideas of informality.[158] She questions how, in general, Western studies have a normative approach of informality, associating it with insecurity and precarity whilst assuming a universal dynamic everywhere.[159] Opposed to this rather uniform concern for insecurity, which actually Alacovska labels as a fatalistic

[153] Banks, "The Politics of Cultural Work,"27.
[154] Gill and Pratt, "In the Social Factory?,"3,12; Miller et al., "The New International Division of Cultural Labour and Sport,"111.
[155] Tremblay,"Industries culturelles, économie créative et société de l'information,"120.
[156] Gill and Pratt, "In the Social Factory?."
[157] These authors' material is being permanently cited in our work. For more information, go to references.
[158] Alacovska and Gill, "De-Westernizing CL Studies."
[159] Ibidem, 7.

understanding of creative work, she advocates 'theories of hope'. Essentially this theory suggests that in contexts where 'radical precarity' exist (mainly, inexistent welfare protection, rampant unemployment and a fragile private sector) and are the new normal, hope arises as the most effective instrument for workers who, in the short run, might choose to put up with precarity as they accumulate more worthwhile social and symbolic capital in the longer term.[160] This is a provocative theory to consider, especially in the context of the case study of Buenos Aires examined in this study where informal labour structures are a characteristic of the whole economy, as we shall see.

Regardless of the sceptical analysis surrounding the work lives of creatives since the early 2000's, the policy arena has been slow to catch up. Concomitant with the *creative turn* in the overall global economy, the material conditions of CL proved to be a blind spot in policy considerations.[161] Ostensibly, during the first decade of the 2000's when CI were being launched as the new model, there was little or no mention of the worker perspective, nor any discussion of the possible negative effects of short-term jobs or of the striking features of self-organised or self-employed new labour.[162] Instead, the focus and political narrative - repeated so frequently it became like a mantra- was that creativity was the new place for job creation and growth.[163] Governments, local and national, were quick to provide policy support to entrepreneurial activities, particularly attractive to young middle-classes seeking the challenge of becoming creative entrepreneurs.

Unsurprisingly, and associated with this perspective, the statistics have paid little attention (and we arguably still do) to the development of variables able to measure the quality of working life in these industries.[164] Excited about the promotion of creativity as a latent resource in ordinary people, as a synonym of innovation and endogenous economic growth, and as a central axis for urban renewal, the policy sphere overlooked social security in its agenda for creative employees.[165] This omission is all the more remarkable considering the high status that governments have historically given to CI as enhancers of high-quality of life.[166] In a study mapping over 20 countries worldwide, the main three lines of policy intervention regarding cultural workers are to be grouped under: education and training, awards and grants and business support, and entrepreneurial activities. Again, among these policies, which are relatively cheap to implement and demand small investments in infrastructure, there are no observable initiatives aimed at balancing problems of short-termism in contracts, stationary unemployment, lack of medical coverage or parental leave, or any of those sort of types of backlashes that come with the flexibilisation of the labour market.[167]

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[160] Ana Alacovska, "'Keep Hoping, Keep Going': Towards a Hopeful Sociology of Creative Work." *The Sociological Review*,(June 15, 2018): 1-19.
[161] Murray and Gollmitzer, "Escaping the Precarity Trap,"420.
[162] McRobbie, "Be Creative,"149.
[163] Ibidem, 150.
[164] Ross, "The Mercurial Career of Creative Industries Policymaking in the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States,"18.
[165] Murray and Gollmitzer, "Escaping the Precarity Trap,"420.
[166] Ross, "The Mercurial Career of Creative Industries Policymaking in the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States,"27.
[167] Murray and Gollmitzer, "Escaping the Precarity Trap,"425-427.

3.1.2 The labour reform: flexibility and the creative turn intersect

Around the middle of the 1980's, a call for humanising labour with mentally stimulating tasks raised when a collective revolt against the assembly line and the cubicle farms signalled the imminent labour reform. These were the post-industrial voices claiming for the arrival of a new economy; one that, unlike the previous model, had the possibility of offering a better quality of working life.[168] In this context, creativity appeared as the missing ingredient in the working routine; an answer to a prayer for a change in the unmeaningful and inhuman working factories and offices that were wasting the talents of their employees. Nevertheless, the offer of a more flexible workplace and the liberation of drudgery was simultaneously accompanied by the introduction of risk, uncertainty, disorganised labour, and non-standard working arrangements. It is fair to say then, that the flexibilisation of the working life gave with one hand and took with the other. [169]

In this context, the *creative turn* provided the perfect argument, appearing as the vehicle for labour reform, redefining a passionate work life under the flag of a talent-led-economy. As we have explored in the first chapter, in the post-industrial society the restructuring process that sustained an increasing fragmentation of the productive processes - with a reduction of jobs offering security, the creative entrepreneur, more tolerant to risk- could now be understood in retrospect as a necessity disguised as choice.[170] The creative sphere provided the modern individualised workforce with the perfect space to explore its potential, just as de-regulation also provided companies and the state with the release of their role as guarantors of labour protections.

The convenient intersection offered by both sides of liberalisation accelerated the cultural realm impact. CI 'speed up' while the state pulled back and the young less-adverse-to-risk entrepreneurs who wanted to make it in the creative sector had to find their new pattern of work in the cultural economy; a pattern usually normalised as holding several projects at the same time whilst expecting no social protection.[171] However, as Angela McRobbie states, this was a middle-class labour reform. More specifically, a young middle-class revolt, probably flagged by the sons and daughters of factory workers and office employees who sacrificed everything in their lives for a company. Low-wage workers seem to belong to a different limbo. In these spheres, where casualisation, temporary work, stagnant wage levels, and an overall informal economy were the norm, the even further flexibilisation and deregulation of the labour market did nothing but increase the vulnerability of their workers.[172]

Indeed, CI deploy a fragmentation of the workforce where intermingling differences of classes, activities and regions are observable. Between the portion that performs artistic or

[168] Ross, "The Mercurial Career of Creative Industries Policymaking in the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States,"44.
[169] *Ibidem*, 45-46.
[170] Quiña, "Culturepreneurship y Condiciones Del Trabajo En Las Industrias Creativas,"200.
[171] McRobbie, "Be Creative,"59.
[172] McRobbie, "Be Creative,"59; Ross, "The Mercurial Career of Creative Industries Policymaking in the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States,"46.

creative activities or complex intellectual work, and another fraction that is responsible for technical or craft work, CI are articulated through the dualisation process reflected in the conformation of international labour force markets.[173] While in some countries the productive subjectivity (so-called immaterial, cognitive, complex informational work, etc.) expands, in others it degrades to offer a work force subjected to strenuous workdays and misery wages.[174] Again, this is part of the advancement of outsourcing processes in different activities and to which CI have also contributed to on a global scale. Now, how all these dynamics took place and develop differently in different places is another question and one that will be explored in this work.

3.2 CHARACTERISATION OF CREATIVE LABOUR

Building on the previous sections, we now explore in depth some of the characteristics said to define the field of CL. Different lines of theorisation have approached this subject from the Political-Economy, Sociology or Cultural Studies perspective. The strongest line of critique, departing from cultural studies and post-structuralist theories, define certain specificities in the labour field as mechanisms that serve to subordinate creative workers and deteriorate their working conditions.[175] On the contrary, other studies highlight the emancipatory possibilities for those working in creative fields. [176] Hence, in order to provide an organised approach, this thesis coalesces topics of affection, temporality, access, wages and individualisation. These topics are discussed following a brief overview of the historical account of events that characterised creative employment to explain certain dynamics of the present.

3.2.1 Tracking inequalities: the history of the exclusion of the inclusion

As we have mentioned before, to understand who gets to work and under which conditions in the creative field is an issue of major concern. This is not just because of the material opportunities or recognition, but also (and perhaps more importantly) because the creative field is a site of social and political making. In present times, there has been an increase in public concern regarding the unequal distribution of access and retributions that appear as general features in every CI. However, this issue is trackable in time. Mark Banks makes a consistent case, returning to the point when it all began, when CI started to be recognised as a desirable path to follow to provide (supposedly) new opportunities for all; showing how historical dynamics affected the perceptions we have today about CI.[177]

After the Second World War, Western societies advanced based on welfare state systems covering basic needs and increasing public education. The Fordist regime was stabilising and elevating wages, altogether stimulating the demand side and, in particular, the demand of cultural goods. This phenomenon together with the introduction of technological

[173] Miller et al., "The New International Division of Cultural Labour and Sport."
[174] Quiña, "Culturepreneurship y Condiciones Del Trabajo En Las Industrias Creativas."
[175] Hesmondhalgh and Baker, "Creative Labour,"52.
[176] *Ibidem*, 55.
[177] Banks, "Creative Justice,"97-98.

innovations helped to build an unprecedent phase of expansion of popular culture.[178] Simultaneously, as Adorno and Horkheimer present, there were concerns about the massification of culture as employment was increasing in the radio, television, journalism, advertisement, music industries etc. During the 'golden age' of capitalism and its new set of workplaces and occupations, CI expanded in the provision of goods, employment and trade.[179]

In relation to this dynamic, the sub-narrative of meritocracy and social inclusion were initially linked with the creative sector and the white-collar class. CI were presented as the sector where talent and hard work were the only determinants to success, regardless of social background. The young and ambitious, many from low-middle classes, were finding jobs as actors, musicians, journalists, designers and other talent-based positions, offering everyone the opportunity for social elevation and meaningful work. Or, at least, this was the popular impression. However, since then, little attention has been given to the dynamics of this popularisation. The history suggests that even though there was a working-class entry into creative work, it is inconclusive in showing that the new entrees were occupying anything else than bottom end, low-paid and unglamorous jobs. As Banks states, in the UK as well as in the USA most companies' executives and senior positions in CI remained under the domain of the elite or well established upper-middle class. Thus, a safe assumption could be that while there was an overall expansion in working-class cultural employment, there is less evidence of equivalent redistributions of opportunities in the same sector. [180]

Besides, women were less likely to access or even obtain a 'top job'.[181] Clearly, and without forgetting the culture of labour at the time, this is not something that only involves cultural industries. Nevertheless, it is remarkable how only a few women found their way in a sector theoretically open to everyone. Ethnic minorities seem to have had even less room made for them. Despite a few cases that were championed as examples of the good work of meritocracy, throughout the long boom of CI in the post-war period through to the 1970's, classism, sexism and racism pervaded CI working environments, influencing who entered and who got elevated to the best positions. Thus, the economic expansion and the social democratic approach made space for ordinary people to participate in cultural production, therefore highlighting both patterns of inclusion and exclusion in the golden age of capitalism. However, the general popular perception contributed to the portrayal of CI as the new equal space for opportunities when, in fact, it overlooked many forms of inequalities that were part of their history from the beginning.[182] These inequalities are, in part, what guides this empirical case study, with special attention paid to gender and social class.

[178] *Ibidem,* 89-91.
[179] Banks, "Creative Justice,"90.
[180] *Ibidem,* 91-96
[181] *Ibidem,* 98.
[182] *Ibidem,* 103.

3.2.2 Topics on CL

The following section is based on a literature review comprised largely of research studies that utilise a qualitative methodology, interviewing workers on a wide range of industries within CI. There are many difficulties when it comes to developing labour patterns that characterise a sector that ranges from multinational media conglomerates to local art and crafts workers. Moreover, the problematic also includes the analysis and comparison from artistic to humdrum jobs, as well as amateurs and professionals. However, and despite all these difficulties and the debatable robustness of global generalisations of specific cases (most of them being in the UK, USA or other Western-European countries), the commonalities and consistency of the findings remain significant for such a diverse group. These commonalities are grouped under the topics of affection, temporality, access, wages and individualisation.

Affection

One of the more distinctive characteristics of CL is the degree of enthusiasm and even love that workers seemingly have for their jobs. Consistently, research findings of CL describe workers' experiences as profoundly satisfying and pleasurable.[183] 'Love what you do' finds a fertile field in the creative production, which helps people to put up with casualisation, insecurity and exploitation.[184] Angela McRobbie even describes this passionate connection that people have with their work as a '*space of romantic idealisation perhaps more rewarding than personal relationships*.'[185]

The romantic reward of working in your 'dream job' or at least in the field around it, often comes with the cost of having to tolerate poor pay, long working hours and difficult conditions, and even self-exploitation.[186] Further, the attraction of having 'passionate work' instead of 'mundane work', with the subjugating idea of work as a source of happiness and not punishment, is characteristic of modern societies. This attracts more (especially young) people as reservoirs of creative workers, probably willing to work for less money, or even for free.[187] Yet, it might all just be for the 'myth of the starving artist', a romantic place of sacrifice where the artist put him or herself naturally, in order to obtain recognition.[188]

Clearly, workers in the creative field see their jobs as more than just ways to earn a living. According to Hesmondhalgh and Baker, creative workers care about the quality that their products reflect. The concern lies not only in aesthetic value but also in the ethical value implicated in the making of cultural products and their associated social, political and cultural significance. Therefore, self-realisation found in these fields is a combination of

[183] Kate Oakley, "Good Work? Rethinking Cultural Entrepreneurship." In Handbook of Management and Creativity, Bilton, Chris, and Stephen Cummings., 145–59. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014), 151; Hesmondhalgh and Baker, "Creative Labour,"159; McRobbie, "Be Creative,"86.
[184] Quiña, "Culturepreneurship y Condiciones Del Trabajo En Las Industrias Creativas,"219.
[185] Angela McRobbie, "The Los Angelisation of London: Three Short-Waves of Young People's Micro-Economies of Culture and Creativity in the UK," 2007.
[186] McRobbie, "Be Creative,"93
[187] Hesmondhalgh and Baker, "Creative Labour,"19.
[188] *Ibidem*, 227.

personal and social meaning that workers seem to acknowledge and are willing to explore as creative impulses continue to provide inspiring resources to maintain the vitality of cultural productions.[189]

In sum, when trying to explain the most symbolic and immaterial aspect that describes creative work, forces of passion versus precariousness are constantly in counter-position. The sense of autonomy and the potential for a pleasurable and exciting job all seem bound insecure positions. Thus, it is fair to wonder if the expansion of precariousness and the expansion of cultural production are to always be connected.

Temporality

Another of the major characteristics (and concerns) regarding the conditions of CL refers to time as a problematic and difficult terrain for finding balance. Again, much of the research from the cultural studies field points to the extraordinarily long working hours of creative workers.[190] Long days of 10 to 12 working hours, including weekends, bear heavy costs on social life outside work including relationships, friends and children - the latter being unevenly gendered in effects and seem to be the norm and not the exception.[191] Further, surveys have found that not taking holiday time is common among creative workers and even more for freelancers in these industries. Therefore, to participate in the creative production workers need to be flexible and available.[192]

Similarly, temporality is centred in the debate of the model of production of creative industries, based mainly in projects. 'Projectification' is in fact a widespread phenomenon in Western economies pertaining to all economic sectors, and is an issue because it requires a temporary commitment of resources.[193] However, this seems to be the dominant model for CI, whereby the workers' uncertainty of both length and frequency of projects tends to be one of the major causes of the endemic instability of the sector as a whole.[194] The unstable nature of temporary employment usually demands the employee to bear the costs and the risk of its own social security, sick pay, maternity leave, etc.[195] Similarly, instability also translates into a lack of a regular income. Hence, creative workers often tend to spread the risk by working across multiple sites, usually taking part-time jobs in other industries, most often teaching.[196]

The blurred border between work and non-work time is another contested terrain in CL studies. The notion of work-life balance finds no clear separation in these industries whereby passionate engagement might lead to a pleasurable absorption of time, and

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[189] *Ibidem,* 21, 75.
[190] Hesmondhalgh and Baker, "Creative Labour,"114; Murray and Gollmitzer, "Escaping the Precarity Trap,"425.
[191] Eikhof and Warhurst, "The Promised Land?,"499.
[192] Mark Banks, *The Politics of Cultural Work*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2007), 55.
[193] Yvonne-Gabriele Schoper, Andreas Wald, Helgi Thor Ingason, and Thordur Vikingur Fridgeirsson. "Projectification in Western Economies: A Comparative Study of Germany, Norway and Iceland." *International Journal of Project Management* 36, no. 1 (January 2018):72.
[194] Eikhof and Warhurst, "The Promised Land?."
[195] *Ibidem,* 498.
[196] Hesmondhalgh and Baker, "Creative Labour,"118.

compulsory social networking might end up covering all of a person's social life. And yet the problem is that there is no clear boundary between self-realisation and self-exploitation in order to reach a certain level of recognition, in which case self-realisation links precariously to the work-life balance, especially for people who have established their own business. [197] Research findings have established precisely that much of the personal identity of creative workers is derived from their work. [198] All and all, it seems hard even for creative workers to define themselves by their pleasurable work, as experiences of CL can be highly ambivalent.

Access

It is claimed that CI provide spaces wherein effective meritocracy succeeds. The talent-led economy places talent not just as the root of creativity but as the means of production.[199] Furthermore, individuals with natural talent and the right attitude are believed to freely obtain the rewards and social recognition they deserve irrespective of social, ethnic and gender origin. *'Talent is the life blood of creative industries (…) Everyone has the chance to discover their aptitude'* as the DCMS states.[200] However, the patterns observable of the enhancers of social inequality appear to be disregarded, redolent of a Darwinian struggle where the most talented are the ones who make it to the top by superseding the weakest. The thing is that natural talent theory stops short of explaining the distribution of recognised talent as it is mainly white middle-class males who appear to be endowed with innate talent. Hence, talent seems far from being a process of natural ordering and closer to a social-institutional construction.[201]

In the field of CI, despite the 'open to everyone' narrative, there appears to be some systemic blockages and inequalities in access that prevent the equitable distribution of opportunities. The conventional pathway for accessing CL tends to rely on higher education training to obtain talented credentials.[202] Nevertheless, applicants with working class backgrounds or belonging to ethnic minorities are less likely to obtain positions in higher education institutions, as admission processes tend to have criteria that only a limited sector of the population can fulfil.[203] Admission processes have been widely explored, both in genal and in the arts and cultural field. Issues pertaining to a lack of knowledge of application processes, the attribution from private or public middle-education institutions, the ability to cultivate social skills, and even family connections, seem to be determining factors that are unequally distributed .[204] Consequently, as the capacity for employability in CI tends to reflect those with an advantaged education and extra-curricular activities like volunteering and global travel, poor people (and ethnic minorities) who simply cannot enter

[197] Hesmondhalgh and Baker, "Creative Labour,"157, 226; Gill and Pratt, "In the Social Factory?,"17.
[198] Hesmondhalgh and Baker, "Creative Labour,"148.
[199] Banks, "Creative Justice,"67.
[200] DCMS 2008 in Banks, "Creative Justice,"70.
[201] Banks, "Creative Justice,"72.
[202] 'In 2015, the 78% of the UK media industries workforce hold an undergraduate degree.' In Oakley and O'Brien, "Learning to Labour Unequally," 476.
[203] Oakley and O'Brien, "Learning to Labour Unequally,"476.
[204] 'According to the public agency charged with monitoring 'fair access,' 'the most advantaged 20% of young people were 2.5 times more likely to go to higher education (. . .) than the most disadvantaged 40%', In Oakley and O'Brien, "Learning to Labour Unequally," 476.

the best arts schools or obtain brand new media degrees are structurally denied opportunities in high-quality education and therefore the best kind of creative jobs.[205]

Further, apprenticeships and student workplaces which are generally unpaid, and often exploit the idea of working in a dream job, are a common entrance into the professional creative world.[206] Here, too, it is possible to observe how only people from middle-class backgrounds, with the possibility of family support, are the ones most likely to undertake unpaid work. Unpaid labour, as well as the insecure 'bulimic' dynamic of the project-based model of production, and the high demands of a flexible working life that benefits the young and those without caring responsibilities, are marked characteristics of the economic exclusion and social stratification to which these industries are prone to reinforce.[207] Moreover, social networks and contacts matter too. Beyond access, to do well in these industries, personal ties and informal recruitment methods are common dynamics.[208]

Finally, as the working class seems to lack the appropriate social capital for accessing and advancing in CI fields, women and ethnic minorities continue to fail to gain equal access as well. The patterns of work (with long working hours, weekends, and demand for flexibility) suggest a high degree of incompatibility with maternity which disincentivises access or sometimes implies putting that aspect of personal life on hold.[209] Women are under-represented in CI overall, and particularly in the upper levels of almost every cultural sector. With regards to ethnic minorities, historical patterns of underrepresentation are clear and disadvantaged in 'backstage' technical positions and absent in managerial roles.[210]

Overall, it seems that the talent-led 'open to everyone' creative economy fails to account for the fact that people do not experience access as equals, and thus operates as an unfair game. Although it is arguable that these inequalities are not exclusive of CI, it is striking that mainstream approaches continue to profess meritocracy as one of the sector's main equalising instruments, neglecting the access mechanisms which tend to exacerbate inequalities.

Wages

According to Mark Banks' data compilation of mainly Anglophone countries (UK, Australia and the US), and despite difficulties in comparing different categories of definitions of creatives in the national censuses, the wage pattern still remains consistent, showing incomes with a mean and a median lower for (professional) creative workers than the overall professional occupations.[211][212] From a cultural economic perspective, one of the

[205] Oakley and O'Brien, "Learning to Labour Unequally," 477.
[206] Eikhof and Warhurst, "The Promised Land?,"498.
[207] Gill and Pratt, "In the Social Factory?,"14.
[208] '48% of the media industries workforce have done unpaid work at some point in their career, up from 43% in 2010 and over half (56%) found out about their current or most recent role through informal recruitment methods, personal and social networks' In Oakley and O'Brien, "Learning to Labour Unequally," 480.
[209] Eikhof and Warhurst, "The Promised Land?,"499; Oakley and O'Brien, "Cultural Value and Inequality: A Critical Literature Review,"12, 14-16.
[210] Banks, "Creative Justice,"101.
[211] *Ibidem*, 122.
[212] The media It is the most frequently used position measurement. To calculate the arithmetic mean or

underlying reasons for this scenario is that artists' wages depend on what people are prepared to pay for art, which tends to be lower than that of other 'basic needs' providing professions.[213]

Another reason that explains the low pay is that creative workers accept it as being so. The vulnerable position in which creative workers stand is a consequence of the 'huge' reservoir of young and willing to work for free in order to succeed in their aspiring creative field- an argument that can only simply explain low wages as an over-supply in market terms. The fact that there is 'an army' of young, just graduated creatives to-be-workers who are willing to do anything to get into creative fields generates the feeling of being dispensable and replaceable which directly translates in decreased wages.[214] Also, the pleasure that the professionals dedicate to their dreamed creative field, together with prestige and recognition, can be interpreted as positive externalities that compensate for low incomes.[215]

In this context, another interesting aspect is how unequally distributed income patterns are within the creative sector. Creative workers' wages tend to skew towards small groups at the top of the pyramid partly due to a winner-takes-all dynamic , i.e. the 'superstar effect.'[216] Here, the income difference between superstars and an 'ordinary' artist could be quite astonishing, perhaps more surprising than in other professional fields.[217]

While this imbalance is not new, more recent dynamics show a rise in the well-remunerated minority of superstars at the expense of the expansion of a majority working in more precarious (and even unpaid) conditions, widening the systemic inequalities in CL. The difference between workers with the possibility to be affiliated with trade unions (mainly in the oldest industries of film, TV, magazines) and those who are individualised freelancers, is also a factor that increases the imbalance in remunerations in the creative sector. In wage negotiations, freelancers are powerless individuals in comparison to the collective actions of other creative groups.[218] In sum, most people working in the creative field will probably never secure regular work or a liveable income, showing how unsustainable the continuation of these practices are.[219]

Individualisation

Throughout this work, we have mentioned several times the centrality that the figure of the entrepreneur has taken in the creative industries approach. Framed by a general restructuration of labour markets, where the classic hiring form is conceived as

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average of a set of observations all the values are summed and divided by the total number of observations. While the median is the data that occupies the central position in the ordered sample of less than higher. In general the median is a more robust measure, and it explains what the 'typical' workers earn: half of the workers have earnings less than the median, while the other half have earnings higher than the median.

[213] Banks, "Creative Justice,"127.

[214] Hesmondhalgh and Baker, "Creative Labour," 114.

[215] Richard E. Caves, *Creative Industries: Contracts between Art and Commerce*, (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard University Press, 2000), 78; Hesmondhalgh and Baker, "Creative Labour," 19.

[216] Banks, "Creative Justice,"130.

[217] Caves, "Creative Industries,"82.

[218] Banks, "Creative Justice,"138.

[219] Ibidem, 141.

obsolete and suffocating, self-organising creative entrepreneurs are increasingly seen as the Schumpeterian heroes of economic development.[220] Now, a fair question would be to examine the extent to which this entrepreneurism is actually desirable. In the context of rapidly changing industries, where speed is of the essence in the process of vertical disintegration and fragmentation, the individualised figure of the entrepreneur emerges as a sort of last option that artists, technicians, and other workers in the cultural and creative industries are forced to assume in order to sustain their own activity.[221] McGuigan states that when individualisation is normalised, it stops being a choice and becomes an obligation; similar to what Oakley conceived as 'forced entrepreneurship'; an adaptive mechanism to describe the sort of entrepreneurialism characterising CI.[222]

Nevertheless, an exploration of creative entrepreneurs' is full of conflicts, starting from the premise that entrepreneurship in these sectors is driven by a different set of motivations involving not only commercial but also personal purposes. Many workers embrace the shift to an individualised form of employment as an instrument to gain autonomy and have the freedom to express their ethical, political and social concerns. Sometimes, even aware of the exploitative and insecure conditions that this shift might involve, workers 'voluntarily' adopt material scarcity as they choose to perceive benefits in non-monetary forms. It is necessary then to pay attention to the precedence of social status and the type of creative entrepreneurialism this paper aims to discuss. Since, on the one hand, this 'voluntary' adoption of 'poverty' often serves 'neo-bohemians' rather than genuinely working-class people and, on the other hand, manifold forms of contingent work fall under the 'creative entrepreneur': autonomous, contingent and precarious workers, 'all of them capturing the reality of self-employment in the industry but each of them having their own baggage and limitations'.[223]

Despite these contradictions labelled rightly as the 'paradox of independence' by McGuigan, some connections can still be drawn from such diverse experiences. One clear connection is that individualisation has become a collectively shared experience and therefore the individual worker is the one who has to face off capital.[224] In the disintegration process the risk is passed from employer to worker- the latter becoming the only one responsible for their chosen actions.[225] The decline of trade unions is another highly relevant commonality which directly increases worker vulnerability and insecurity, removing the opportunity for collective bargaining. The debilitation of unions in the creative sectors, even in those once highly unionised, is a remarkable feature of the last decades, where the increase in freelancers is inversely proportional to unionisation.[226] Instead, networks rise as spaces of frantic participation and are a central mechanism for both career advancement and risk

[220] Gill and Pratt, "In the Social Factory?,"14.
[221] Oakley, "Good Work? Rethinking Cultural Entrepreneurship,"148.
[222] Jim McGuigan, "Creative Labour, Cultural Work and Individualisation." International Journal of Cultural Policy 16, no. 3 (August 2010):332.
[223]Oakley, "Good Work? Rethinking Cultural Entrepreneurship,"153.
[224] McGuigan, "Creative Labour, Cultural Work and Individualisation,"329, 333.
[225] Quiña, "Culturepreneurship y Condiciones Del Trabajo En Las Industrias Creativas,"213.
[226] Gill and Pratt, "In the Social Factory?,"13, 19; McGuigan, "Creative Labour, Cultural Work and Individualisation,"333.

reduction. Sometimes exclusionary, networks also seem to provide assistance and support and, even in some cases, develop a collective identity.[227]

In sum, while the notion of cultural entrepreneur was functional to a liberal rhetoric, supported even by the creative sector itself with an old-fashioned idea of artistic individualisation, the independent worker is the one most likely paying the cost of a work life with no social support, in precarious conditions, and in charge of their own training and social reproduction, whether through choice or not.[228]

3.3 TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE CREATIVE LABOUR…

Considering all the above, even if it seems reasonable to question CI as being enhancers of sustainable working paths, the components of that debate demand careful considerations. An analysis of the problematics of CL needs to be situated in a broader perspective of the problematic of human labour in general. Simply because questions of CL are embedded in questions about labour in general and the latter address issues of general well-being. The common meaning of welfare, which traditionally involved security, equality, redistribution and inclusion is today also about autonomy, capacity-building, and the expansion of individual options.[229] Likewise, the concept of social security must adjust to the increasingly mobile and self-employed masses, allowing a fair and optional distribution of flexibility. Indeed, flexibility cannot just be associated with neoliberalism as that diminishes the hunger for free agency to a purely ideology matter. Instead, the consequences of labour flexibilisation should consider the different impacts in high-end and low-income occupational sectors.[230] Ultimately, if we are to imagine a world of sustainable prosperity, what matters might not be so much an agreement on the conditions that make a 'good-life', but the aspects we should tackle to avoid a bad one.

Moreover, individual choices are a matter of social justice and social justice is a consequence of political choices that shape the social, economic and political institutions.[231] Here too, as we have seen, general tendencies show how most governments have withdrawn welfare protection while doing little about, or even supporting, the weakening of labour regulation. Meanwhile, the increased tendency of corporations subcontracting and outsourcing offshore has contributed to the growing precariousness of the workforce.[232] However, in contrast to the extreme deregulation of the neoliberal anglophone countries, some social democracies in Europe have developed a 'new form of welfare' options with the goal of protecting workers in a more flexible landscape.[233] This political decision has

[227] Hesmondhalgh and Baker, "Creative Labour,"21, 54.
[228] Pratt, "The Cultural Contradictions of the Creative City,"128.
[229] Murray and Gollmitzer, "Escaping the Precarity Trap,"427.
[230] Murray and Gollmitzer, "Escaping the Precarity Trap,"431; Ross, "The Mercurial Career of Creative Industries Policymaking in the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States,"48.
[231] Hesmondhalgh and Baker, "Creative Labour,"228.
[232] Ross, "The Mercurial Career of Creative Industries Policymaking in the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States,"48.
[233] A good example is the 'flexicurity' policy, pioneered by the end of the 1990's by Denmark and the Netherlands, developed to preserve worker's core labour rights, regardless of their contractual status

reinforced state's obligation to social security, while simultaneously enabling them to adapt to the restructuring of markets. [234]

Finally, as hopefully exposed in this chapter, CL has a great role in the overall scene of political-economic and social change. The above described characteristics of the creative workforce make clear how CL markets are perhaps the most notable public examples of the dynamics of modern societies.[235] Labour flexibility offers contradictions and the same happens with creative employment. Two confronting elements can be identified when exploring the qualities of creative work: on the one hand, CI are far from allocating opportunities fairly, evidencing patterns of discrimination, misrecognition and inequality. On the other hand however, they can also provide positive fulfilment and self-realisation through meaningful and expressive activities, providing rewards and compensations both personally and socially.[236] The winner-takes-all culture of creativity also demands regulation in the creative field, a kind of regulation that offers equal possibilities, opening the means of cultural production to a broadened group of people, and making the good aspects of CL available to other sectors of population.[237] In the end, creative workers are not merely workers of certain types of industries, they are part of a certain form of social practices with the power to challenge accepted orthodoxies and the creative resources to provide alternative worlds. Working in the CI is not only related to 'making a living', but rather about making a life.[238]

Acknowledging the advantages of flexibility, the policy on the one hand makes it easier to hire and fire, and on the other increases the pay and social protection of flex-workers providing for those temporarily unemployed.

[234] Gill and Pratt, "In the Social Factory?,"13.

[235] Hesmondhalgh and Baker, "Creative Labour,"222.

[236] Banks, "Creative Justice."

[237] Ross, "Nice Work If You Can Get It,"47-48.

[238] Banks, "Creative Economies of Tomorrow?,"377.

SECTION 4. THE CASE OF BUENOS AIRES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Throughout the previous chapters it has been shown that concurrent with the expansion of developmentalist ideas about CI, critics from CL studies also grew in number. While universalistic claims have expanded the notion of CI as powerful instruments of economic, social and urban development, CL studies have warned about the increasingly white, middle-class, male and urban representatives of the 'global' creative workforce.[239] Notoriously, both constructions were born and are inclined towards Euro-North American empirical studies. Now, following suggestions from academia on de-Westernising CL studies, we aim to contribute to the closing of the gap by re-localising CL studies in the city of Buenos Aires.

Hopefully by this point the reader is aware of the significance that this thesis places on the global dynamics as a means of understanding local impacts. Conversely, studying creative work in 'ex-centric countries' should contribute to the theory-building of CL studies. Re-contextualisations are important because place matters to understand what a 'good life' is and what 'good creative work' might constitute.[240] Hence, we begin with the macroeconomic framework of Argentina, a country where political, social and economic uncertainties are more the rule than the exception. Understanding economic cycles as well as the impacts they have in general labour markets are essential to the dynamics of Buenos Aires. Here, we first explore the conceptual adoption the city made of global CI concepts, and the policies carried out, especially in the period 2007-2015 when the PRO party ascended to the government and the *cultural* industries became *creative*.[241] After revisiting how the government subscribed to, and almost replicated, the ideas originated in the UK, and adopted the methodology suggested by the UNCTAD and UNESCO, we frame the first segment approaching the local creative workforce with a qualitative perspective. The following section employs the empirical study carried out based on official information from the National Institute of Statics (INDEC) on the Official Household's Survey (EPH). Finally, a preliminary analysis is carried out that seeks to answer this thesis' main question: which are the socio-economic characteristics of CL in Buenos Aires? After which final conclusions will be made.

[239] Alacovska and Gill, "De-Westernizing Creative Labour Studies."
[240] *Ibidem,* 5.
[241] PRO are the initials of the political party led by Mauricio Macri, which corresponds in Spanish to the acronym of 'Propuesta Republicanal'

4.2 ANALYSIS OF THE MACROECONOMIC AND LABOUR CONTEXT OF ARGENTINA

In the early 1990's, within the framework of local hyperinflation and rising external debt, Carlos Menem's government (1989-1999) set in motion a plan for structural adjustment and economic deregulation which deepened the process of economic opening that began in the 70's.[242] In a framework of deindustrialisation which worked to the detriment of the industrial sector and in favour of the financial and services economy, competitiveness was declining whilst and vulnerability to external shocks became more prominent, negatively affecting demand for work whilst raising labour underemployment.[243] Further, worsening the situation of the labour market, the government of Menem advanced with regulatory modifications of labour flexibilisation, such as limiting the right to strike, the promotion of temporary contracts and reduction of severance payments.[244]

Additionally, the fixed monetary policy that was introduced in 1991- named *Convertibilidad* - pegged Argentina's peso to the dollar in an effort to curve hyperinflation. However, this led to a decade of uncompetitive domestic industry, a growing balance of payments problem, and personal indebtedness that resulted in one of the country's biggest economic crisis in 2001.[245] The negative evolution in the labour market reached its worst level in 2001-2002 when open unemployment reached 25% of the population and only 44% of workers were registered in social security.[246] The crisis was mere evidence of the aftermath of the flexibilisation process, in an increasingly atomised labour market in which informality and outsourcing were problems that had been brewing for some decades. The practice of outsourcing in both the private and public sector (the Argentinian State being one of the largest subcontractors of its work force) unloaded onto workers the risks of being separated from the company with minimum cost and legal obstacles all thanks to Menem's reforms. These workers, labelled as entrepreneurs or freelance businessmen, were in fact dependent on rules imposed by flexible labour markets. Informality, individualisation, uncertainty, and job insecurity all affected society but differed in effects according to social stratification. [247]

Indeed, Argentina's middle class was one of the most affected sectors. The illusory consumption boom brought by the *Converitibilidad* in the 90's -sustained mainly by privatisations and external credit influxes- resulted in the a crisis that forced massive portions of the middle class into the category of the 'new poor'.[248] In this context, new forms of organisation rose within the society and the labour market. On the one hand, social

[242] Roberto Picozzi, "El Mercado De Trabajo En La Argentina Post-2003: Estado De La Cuestion, Aportes Y Tendencias Recientes." (Georgetown University, 2014), 5.
[243] Luis Beccaria and Roxana Maurizio. "Mercado de Trabajo y Desigualdad En La Argentina Un Balance de Las Últimas Tres Décadas." Sociedad 37 (2017).
[244] Picozzi, "El Mercado De Trabajo En La Argentina Post-2003: Estado De La Cuestion, Aportes Y Tendencias Reciente,"5.
[245] Cara Levey, Daniel Ozarow, and Chris Wylde, eds. *Argentina since the 2001 Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming the Future*. Studies of the Americas.(New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 25 .
[246] Picozzi, "El Mercado De Trabajo En La Argentina Post-2003: Estado De La Cuestion, Aportes Y Tendencias Reciente,"6.
[247] Lago Martínez, Silvia. "Trabajo y empleo en las industrias culturales y creativas en Argentina. La figura del emprendedor." Quórum Académico 14, no. 2 (2017): 20.
[248] Gastón Beltrán and Paula Miguel. "Doing Culture, Doing Business: A New Entrepreneurial Spirit in the Argentine Creative Industries." *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 17, no. 1 (January 2014): 44.

and popular organisations assumed the struggle for the transformation of the socio-economic conditions, proposing self-managed assemblies and *club del trueque* (barter clubs) based on non-commercial and cooperative values.[249] In contrast, given the extreme uncertainty and the unfeasibility of finding traditional jobs, the middle class were forced to create alternatives themselves, generating individual self-paths of professional realisation. Public and financial institutions promoted the entrepreneurial capacity of these new vulnerable and yet highly qualified agents, financing micro-enterprises and encouraging individuals to assume the individual responsibility of their own vulnerable situation.[250] It was precisely the struggle during periods of crisis and the economic recessions which taught these mostly middle class entrepreneurs from urban areas to be flexible and adaptive to changes. [251]

Informality also escalated with the crisis, affecting mainly people with low qualifications and households already located in the lower rungs of income distribution.[252] Towards the end of 2002, economic fluctuations which proved favourable for production dynamics as result of betterment in the macroeconomic performance led to informality rates to a decrease.[253] However, unregistered labour remains a structural aspect of the economy and labour market of the country. Despite decreasing since 2003, informal employment made up around 43% of the nation's total number of employees in 2010. [254] The main issue, as indicated in mobility theory, was the proximity between unemployment and informality whereby the latter is considered the gate for unskilled youth to enter the labour market.[255] However, the informal labour segment is not homogeneous. Unregistered self-employment seems to be associated more with the idea of voluntary informality (escape), preferred to informal salaried employment associated with involuntary informality (exclusion). Again, class stratification and education seem to shape whether a worker might fall in any of the above categories. Despite this heterogeneity, informality is not in general a desirable occupational segment.[256]

Similarly, the sector of the population with the lowest qualifications fared the least well in the distribution of salaries towards the end of the *Convertibilidad* up until 2003. In fact, the relation between the remuneration of people and their different qualifications/education levels appears as one factor that contributed the most to the concentration of labour income.[257] Since 2004, however, an inequality reduction is observable in the distribution of household income up until 2011. During the first years of the Kirchnerismo (2003-2015), a

[249] Cecilia Dinardi, "Cities for Sale: Contesting City Branding and Cultural Policies in Buenos Aires." *Urban Studies* 54, no. 1 (January 2017): 88.
[250] María C. Rodríguez, and Vanesa Ciolli. "Tensiones Entre El Emprendedorismo y La Autogestión: El Papel de Las Políticas Públicas En Este Recorrido." ORG & DEMO 12, no. 1 (2011): 28.
[251] Beltrán and Miguel, "Doing Culture, Doing Business."
[252] Beccaria and Maurizio, "Mercado de Trabajo y Desigualdad En La Argentina Un Balance de Las Últimas Tres Décadas,"32.
[253] Leopoldo Tornarolli, and Adriana Conconi, "Informalidad y Movilidad Laboral: Un Análisis Empírico Para Argentina." Documentos de Trabajo Del CEDLAS 59 (2007): 6.
[254] Picozzi, "El Mercado De Trabajo En La Argentina Post-2003: Estado De La Cuestion, Aportes Y Tendencias Reciente,"43.
[255] Tornarolli and Conconi, "Informalidad y Movilidad Laboral: Un Análisis Empírico Para Argentina,"8.
[256] *Ibidem,* 22.
[257] Picozzi, "El Mercado De Trabajo En La Argentina Post-2003: Estado De La Cuestion, Aportes Y Tendencias Reciente,"17.

populist left-wing movement, Argentina experienced economic recovery of its annual GDP at 8-9%, as well as a decline in unemployment thanks to a high real exchange rate together with improvements in fiscal and external accounts.[258] As a result of income policy, grants of lump sum subsidies, and reconfiguration of the minimum wage, (plus the intensification of collective bargaining heavily debilitated during the 90's) income gaps reduced between workers with different skills and educational levels. Moreover, the marked growth rate of aggregate employment and corresponding declines in unemployment and informality may have also contributed to the closure of gaps.[259]

The system's dependency on foreign exchange and revenue from commodity exports also transpired to be external restrictions of the new model. As growth decelerated, the prosperous process of inequality reduction stopped in 2012 when the wage gap started to grow again. Likewise, employment growth contracted sharply and in relative terms mostly affected those with lower levels of education, affecting less favourably their relative income. Nevertheless, the overall degree of income concentration recorded in 2014 was lower than in the beginning of the 1990's.[260] In early 2014, the local currency suffered a devaluation and Argentina was again facing another recession. The economic contraction and the social discontent of the regime's final years led to a new backlash towards neoliberal policies, when the 2015 presidential elections saw an embrace of Mauricio Macri, former mayor of Buenos Aires, as the new President of the Republic. With no signs of potential change following that, economic activity remained in contraction while this new government was clearly showing the same characteristics of the 1990's political and economic manoeuvres.[261]

Altogether, the national's socio-economic historical patterns, with the economic cycles, crisis, and growth periods have had an undoubtedly marked influence in the labour conditions, for both those working and not working in the CI. Together with the global tendency of a labour market flexibilisation that came to stay in Argentina since the 90's, and the structural problems of informality and unequal income distribution, the context around which we are describing creative workers clearly differs from Western studies.

4. 3 BUENOS AIRES, LA REINA DEL PLATA[262]

Considering Argentina's economic cycles of the past 30 years, and the conceptions of CI in international development, the necessary background for exploring the process of the adoption of the creative turn in Buenos Aires is now laid out. Globalised promotional rhetoric found a fertile terrain of localisation in Buenos Aires, where optimistic expectations

[258] Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (INDEC). "Revisión Del Producto Interno Bruto, Base 2004 y Series de Oferta y Demanda Globales," 2016.
[259] Beccaria and Maurizio, "Mercado de Trabajo y Desigualdad En La Argentina Un Balance de Las Últimas Tres Décadas,"35.
[260] *Ibidem,*36.
[261] Levey, Ozarow, and Wylde, "Argentina since the 2001 Crisis."
[262] 'La Reina del Plata' or in English 'The Queen of Silver' is a popular nickname given to the city of Buenos Aires, especially in popular prose, for its location at the mouth of the Silver River.

about the creative economy were evident in the actions of public policy from the beginning.[263]

The position of Buenos Aires has always been complex, with decades of separatist history until its federalisation, always standing as the richest city that benefits from its centralism and political-economic concentration.[264] The imaginaries of its peculiarity were renewed when the city gained autonomy in 1996, identifying itself as *La Reina del Plata*, the *Petit Paris* and the cultural capital of Latin America. The invocations to 'the city that never sleeps' allude to the abundance of theatres, cinemas and dance halls, bookstores and record stores, restaurants, bars and cool underground culture. References are often directed to the literacy of the population, to an abundant reading public and to the early development of cultural industries.[265]

As we have seen, at a national level, the 1990's were marked by neoliberal policies. Capital concentration in every part of the productive process was not unfamiliar to the creative sectors which experienced, as many other economic sectors, the consolidation of economic conglomerates to the detriment of the local SMEs which could not compete with the avalanche of imports.[266] However, the country's openness did have some positive impacts as they helped to upgrade local means of technology that, indeed, enhanced software and videogame sectors.[267] Certainly, the 2001 crisis affected the creative sectors as much as the rest of the economy suffering a deep contraction of productive and commercial capacity. However, the aftermath of the crisis saw the proliferation of diverse cultural projects associated with social movements of protest, which eventually led to the organisation of artistic collectives, independent cultural production SMEs, and creative entrepreneurs- most of them concentrated in Buenos Aires.[268]

By 2003, the general economic recovery enabled through devaluation, and the consequential rebuilding of the domestic market, evidenced a general recuperation including in the creative sectors.[269] This scenario stimulated a surge in several creative SMEs as self-managed enterprises, as well as the surge in a new type of agent: the creative entrepreneur characterised by its symbolic value placed in their products.[270] In this favourable context of post-crisis, the Government of the City of Buenos Aires (GCBA) guided spontaneous initiatives, promoting Buenos Aires as a cool, artistic and vital city, rich in cultural patrimony, entrepreneurial initiatives, all whilst enhancing the incubation of companies and the existence of fashion, music and books international fairs.[271] In fact,

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[263] Bayardo, "Políticas Culturales y Economía Simbólica de Las Ciudades,"102.
[264] Bayardo, "Políticas Culturales y Economía Simbólica de Las Ciudades,"102.
[265] *Ibidem,* 103.
[266] José Ignacio Diez and Nadia Giannasi. "Las Industrias Culturales En Argentina: Trayectoria y Políticas Públicas." *Realidad Económica* 292 (n.d.): 32.
[267] *Ibidem,* 33.
[268] Ivana Mihal and Guillermo Quiña. "Notas Sobre La Relación Entre Independencia y Cultura. Los Casos Discográfíco y Editorial En La Ciudad de Buenos Aires En Clave Comparativa." *Iberoamericana* 58 (2015): 139–58.
[269] *Ibidem,* 140.
[270] Beltrán and Miguel, "Doing Culture, Doing Business,"40.
[271]The most significant was the creation of the Metropolitan Design Centre (CMD) which, together with the Microenterprise Support Center (CAM), opened the possibility of accessing loans at a 0% rate along with the

under the government of the Mayor Anibal Ibarra (2000-2005), the Strategic Culture Plan that revolved around the creation of a registered brand of Buenos Aires was created with the aim of transforming the city into a cultural object to be consumed, and to present it as the cultural capital of Latin America.[272]

However, until then, the cultural and symbolic strategies that indeed helped to promote the city and attract tourism where not yet influenced by the aforementioned *creative turn*. It is not until the arrival of the PRO administration of Mauricio Macri, in 2007 that the economic approach to culture interrupted the policies of the city.[273] At the government level, the sub-Secretary of Cultural Industries -which was until then a part of the Ministry of Culture- became the Direction of Creative Industries in 2008; a division of the Economic Development Ministry. This brought a logic of enterprise to culture and signalled a change that endured the two terms that Macri ruled from 2007 to 2015.[274] It is for this reason that this thesis focuses on this period, the intention being to decipher the construction of the logic of CI in the local context, influenced by the global development of the term. The following subsections are therefore geared towards an analysis of the political adoption of the ideas of CI and how it is connected to the ideas of development and dynamics of CL during this time.

4.3.1 Buenos Aires' CI: global concepts, global policies

Creative Industries, as first defined by the Economic Development Ministry of the PRO administration as '*content industries, which use creativity and intellectual capital as the main inputs*', were quite similar to, and even included the same, industries listed by the DCMS of the UK.[275] Similarly, the alignment with the creative economy ideas as well as creative districts or clusters policies in consonant practice with the Anglo-Saxon example, reinforced similar understandings.[276] In fact, by incorporating the concept of CI the city government intended to '*get rid of the rigidity of the Cultural Industry concept, in order to maintain support for the Cultural Industries but incorporating new sectors that seem relevant to us'* as stated by the former Director of Creative Industries Enrique Avogadro.[277]

incubated project of IncuBa. In 2005 the Observatory of Cultural Industries of the City of Buenos Aires was created; Bayardo, "Políticas Culturales y Economía Simbólica de Las Ciudades,"107.

[272] From the Strategic Plan of Culture, great cultural events were created such as the Independent Film Festival of Buenos Aires (BAFICI) which this year is having its 20th edition, the Buenos Aires International Festival (FIBA) – an ongoing annual theatre international event, and, the Buenos Aires Tango Festival; Zarlenga and Marcús, "La Cultura Como Estrategia de Transformacion Urbana. Un Análisis Crítico de Las Ciudades de Barcelona y Buenos Aires."

[273] Bayardo, "Políticas Culturales y Economía Simbólica de Las Ciudades,"109.

[274] Dinardi, "Cities for Sale," 88.

[275] Observatorio de Industrias Creativas (OIC), "Anuario de Industrias Creativas." Buenos Aires: Dirección de Industrias Creativas GCBA, 2007.

[276] Rubens Bayardo, "Creatividad y Políticas Culturales Públicas En La Ciudad de Buenos Aires a Comienzos Del Siglo XXI." *Etnografías Contemporáneas*, 2, no. 3 (2016): 162.

[277] Enrique Avogadro, "Buenos Aires Ciudad Creativa: Políticas Públicas Para El Desarrollo de La Creatividad." In Economía Creativa : Ponencias, Casos, Debates, Octavio Getino, Bruno Maccari, Héctor Schargorodsky. (Observatorio Cultural, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 2014), 127.

Indeed, opposite to the populist non-market-friendly national polices in the PRO's neoliberal agenda, the *creative turn* from the Global North fitted quite well.[278] The primacy of the market logic under the creative management can be spotted behind the many initiatives that saw in culture a strategy to attract tourism and investors. These included urban regeneration plans, whereby the Creative Districts were aimed at regenerating some former industrial urban areas in the south of the city by granting tax incentives to some creative industries.[279] This district policy applied under the concept of 'it works in the most important cities of the world', was believed to guarantee economic success and affluence of FDI (foreign direct investments), as well as being a prerequisite for the development of employment, exports and international recognition brought by CI.[280] Likewise, the guide *Invest in Buenos Aires*, elaborated in cooperation with the British Council, was the institutional pamphlet that promoted the cultural advantages of the city as a remedy to its convoluted politics and unstable economy.

In contrast, the elimination of many existing cultural programs, the closure of many non-profit self-managed cultural centres, and the wage cuts of employees of public cultural institutions signalled the stance that GCBA took in the middle of the culture-creative battle.[281] Certainly, the little attention conceded to the cultural industries, especially to the non-commercial self-managed initiatives, was a clear replacement of cultural policies for economic ones.[282] Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the state was not completely absent in the cultural sector. The role played by the public sector was mainly in financial aid and participation in international festivals to help some sectors of entrepreneurs or some independent initiatives with 'clear programs', as they were considered tools with economic development potential. '*We also work together with the Ministry of Culture, and we do it very actively, although we know that our main mission is to support entrepreneurs, as companies that can generate employment and added value in the area of the City of Buenos Aires'*, Avogadro states.[283] According to this administration, being part of CI meant being part of the international circuit of events. This emphasis on international recognition highlights the originality and exceptionalism of local talent, and seems to have left little room for the aims of social inclusion also stated as part of CI's goals.[284] In sum, the cultural, the social, and the symbolic appeared at best as collateral effects in relation to the enterprise logic that in fact searched for competitiveness and commercial success in creative international markets. The local absorption of the idea of CI was the exactly the one that was meant to be globalised, no more no less.[285]

[278] Dinardi, "Cities for Sale,"89.
[279] Zarlenga and Marcús, "La Cultura Como Estrategia de Transformacion Urbana. Un Análisis Crítico de Las Ciudades de Barcelona y Buenos Aires,"43.
[280] Bayardo, "Políticas Culturales y Economía Simbólica de Las Ciudades,"119.
[281] Dinardi, "Cities for Sale,"94.
[282] Bayardo, "Políticas Culturales y Economía Simbólica de Las Ciudades,"121.
[283] Avogadro, "Buenos Aires Ciudad Creativa: Políticas Públicas Para El Desarrollo de La Creatividad,"127.
[284] *Ibidem,* 131.
[285] Bayardo, "Creatividad y Políticas Culturales Públicas En La Ciudad de Buenos Aires a Comienzos Del Siglo XXI,"169.

4.3.2 The creative idea of development

The adoption of the idea of CI as an avenue for economic development was rapidly adopted by the city government during the 2000's. The economic and symbolic double aspect of CI was introduced by the academic and political tradition in dialogue with UNESCO's perspectives. The country and the city, in fact, formalised the recommendations of UNESCO through international agreements and strategies of promotion and financing that condition the orientation of cultural policy.[286] More specifically, the UNCTAD understanding of the role of the CI described in the Creative Economy Reports of 2008 and 2010, worked as the supra-national model for the local agents, as it was not only the government but also professionals, consultants, and academics, who subscribed to it. The rhetoric of the UNCTAD helped globalise the CI notions that surged in the UK and its locally unquestioned absorption by Buenos Aires' government. Moreover, the UNCTAD presented itself as the international spokesperson for the developing countries of the Global South.[287]

Culture begins to be presented by these institutions as a central input for economic development and poverty alleviation utilising, as we have seen, variables such as creative added value and job growth as proof. Basically, the assumption behind the presentation of these variables considers CI as drivers of development stating their above average growth rates of employment and GDP; mainly highlighting the quantitative potential impact of the CI.[288] In Buenos Aires, the Observatory of Creative Industries (OIC) is the organism in charge of obtaining such parameters of the CI's performance in the city. Always following UNESCO's methodological recommendations, OIC's statistics present the added value of CI in the city as being stable through the period 2004-2014, reaching 9.5% of the gross geographic product of the city in 2014.[289] Moreover, in 2014 CI were explained 10% of the jobs in the city.[290]

In turn, following the recovery of information from the databases of the OIC's last website, it is interesting to see not the static annual rates but the variable dynamic of added value and employment over time in comparison with the rest of the city's economic activities.[291]

[286] Liliana Raggio, "Las Relaciones Entre El Campo Cultural y El Campo Del Poder. Las Políticas Culturales En La Ciudad de Buenos Aires 2000-2010." (University of Buenos Aires, 2013), 38.
[287] Bayardo, "Políticas Culturales y Economía Simbólica de Las Ciudades,"115.

[288] Raggio, "Las Relaciones Entre El Campo Cultural y El Campo Del Poder,"98.
[289] The 52% of that creative added value was explained by the wide category of 'creative services' (that included software, architecture, engineering, publicity, news agencies and photography); Lago Martínez, "Trabajo y empleo en las industrias culturales y creativas en Argentina. La figura del emprendedor,"28.
[290] Lago Martínez, "Trabajo y empleo en las industrias culturales y creativas en Argentina. La figura del emprendedor,"28.
[291] The OIC was practically dismantled and stopped providing information in 2015.

Figure 1. Interannual variations of the GDP and the added value of Creative Industries. Buenos Aires. Years 2005 to 2015. At constant prices, in percentages.

Source. By author based on information obtained from OIC.

As *Figure 1* illustrates, the added value of the CI seems to, in general, accompany the general tendency of activities of the city. Except for 2008 and 2009, when the activity of the city contracted because of the global financial crisis, the CI presented a softened behaviour, signalling a positive reaction from CI in the face of the general crisis. However, the recession that started in 2012 decelerated the economy of the city and the CI contracted even more severely. This behaviour seems to explain how attached CI are to the local market and, more specifically, to the income elasticity of the domestic demand.[292] By the end of the analysed period, the recovery of the overall economy after 2013 is magnified within the CI segment.

[292] It is interesting to amplify the analysis inside the CI, disaggregating in all the sectors that composed them as is illustrated by the OIC until 2011. Unfortunately, the limited information did not allow this kind of construction for the studied period. However, the evidence presented in this segment shows how different the behaviour of each industry is inside the CI, and questions the representativeness of grouping these differently behaved industries under the single category of CI.

Figure 2. Interannual variations in registered employment in the private sector for the Creative Industries and for the total of economic activities. Buenos Aires. Years 2006-2016. In percentages.



Source. By author based on information obtained from OIC and INDEC

Likewise, registered employment variations in CI seem to portray quite a similar trend to the city's general dynamic (Figure 2). However, the magnifying trend here is even more clear, as exemplified by the period 2006-2008, when the number of jobs in CI surpassed that of the city's total, after which in 2009 the general fall appears more substantial in the creative segments. Further, according to the estimations based on the EPH -explained in its full the next section- we are able to include the unregistered segments of the creative employment. This is different to the estimations of the OIC which are only based on official information of registered employment. As shown by the grey line in *Figure 2*, the un-registered segment of the creative labour explains with even more emphasis how the creative sectors' employment dynamic continues the general trend of the labour market of the city, amplifying the turbulent effects.

In sum, in Buenos Aires the responsiveness of CI 'variables of development' seem quite aligned with the general economy, exemplifying the dynamism of a sector more subsumed with the variation of demand than enhancing growth. For understanding the quantitative impact of CI these variables are a rich source of information. However, as has been argued above, the dynamic of these rates is far from explaining a development strategy. To do that, many other aspects should be considered such as the socio-economic characteristics of the workforce, an aspect that shall be explored in the following segments.

4.3.3 From the industrial organisation to the qualitative description of the creative workforce in Buenos Aires

Portraying a description of the creative worker in Buenos Aires is a task to be carefully executed. The complexity lies fundamentally in two issues. The first is that the dynamic within CI in Buenos Aires (as in many other places) involves different sub-sectors with heterogeneous dynamics.[293] As illustrated by *Figure 3*, extracted from a publication of the OIC, the variation of employment (in this case the registered employment) has very heterogeneous patterns according to the type of industry analysed.[294] Secondly, in each industry there are heterogeneous organisational levels that make it difficult to speak of a single type of worker. Mainly, because these industries are articulated on the axes of four features (namely, creation, production, distribution and consumption), the organisational level of each of these links is ultimately what determines the form that labour characteristics acquire in each sector.[295]

According to the OIC's analysis of industry dynamics (Figure 3), the phonographic and publishing sectors are clearly the least dynamic.[296] Although these sectors are perhaps one of the most impacted by technological changes, the different stages of acceleration and deceleration in the economy have also had significant impact, especially in the creation of independent or small-scale enterprises.[297] That is, unlike the audio-visual sector in which the presence of medium-sized companies with historical traditions, the publishing and phonographic sectors present a marked polarisation between large conglomerates (mainly of capital concentrated during the 90's), and small businesses. For its part, the service sector is the one presenting more atomised organisational features, with a high presence of freelancers and unipersonal small and medium enterprises.[298]

The understanding the industrial organisation structure of the sector is relevant to approach the CL market, and to set the basis upon which the characteristics of the creative workforce of the city are built. First, it was decided to approach this characterisation from a series of interviews with actors considered key for providing an accurate representation, whilst simultaneously illustrating a general vision of CI and the condition of the creative workers in Buenos Aires. Based on these interviews, the 'soft-characterisation' and profile of the creative worker 'porteño' was built.[299]

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[293] Ieva Rozentale, "Creative Industries during Economic Recession: The Case of Riga." Regional Studies, Regional Science 1, no. 1 (January 2014): 334; Caroline Chapain, and Roberta Comunian. "Dynamics and Differences across Creative Industries in the UK: Exploring the Case of Birmingham." REDIGE 2, no. 2 (2011).
[294] Observatorio de Industrias Creativas (OIC). "Empleo Generado Por Las Industrias Creativas En La Ciudad de Buenos Aires." (Government of the City of Buenos Aires, 2013).
[295] *Ibidem.*
[296] Mihal and Quiña, "Notas Sobre La Relación Entre Independencia y Cultura,"142
[297] Observatorio de Industrias Creativas (OIC). "Dinamica Empresarial de Las Industrias Creativas Porteñas." (Government of the City of Buenos Aires, 2016).
[298] *Ibidem.*
[299] 'Soft-characterisation' refers to the less quantifiable characteristics that have more to do with the topics of affection, discussed in the previous chapter. From these interviews we will understand that the creative 'porteños' - this being the gerund for those who live in Buenos Aires- are people involved with symbolic productions and who deeply value their contact networks.

Figure 3. Interannual variations in registered employment in the private sector in the Creative Industries. Buenos Aires. Years 1996-2012. In percentages.



Source. Special report on Employment generated by the Creative Industries in the City of Buenos Aires. OIC. 2013.

4.3.4 CL in Buenos Aires though the lens of the locals

To begin with, the creative worker in Buenos Aires seems to belong to a group of people with high 'entrepreneurial spirit' with an ability to see opportunity in a context of uncertainty and crisis.[300] Similar to what happened cross the city in general in and in the country, many studies agree that the 2001 crisis was a moment whereby creative initiatives proliferated when, due to the precarity of the socio-economic situation and mainly as a survival strategy, workers produced creative ideas to cope with the crisis.[301] This is reflected by Paula Rivera, the current vice-president of the INAMU (the National Institute of Music Promotion), who reflects on the minds of many independent record label owners:

> *'For the passion they have, for the love to music, and for the necessity of being creative or disappear' (Interviewed 1, Paula Rivera, INAMU)*

These are also the kind of entrepreneurs artistically invested, and who grew to appreciate the freedom that independent forms of work allow in aesthetical decisions, with importance placed on symbolic value rather than that of the commercial. These kinds of entrepreneurs present a type of polyvalent work, whereby the same person might be in charge of the artistic, as well as administrative and managerial tasks.[302] The thing is, as Paula continues, creative workers love what they do:

> *'I love working with musicians, because they love profoundly what they do, and you can tell that just by seeing how much they sacrifice just to be on a stage.' (Interviewed 1, Paula Rivera, INAMU)*

[300] Beltrán and Miguel, "Doing Culture, Doing Business."
[301] Lago Martínez, "Trabajo y empleo en las industrias culturales y creativas en Argentina. La figura del emprendedor."
[302] Mihal and Quiña, "Notas Sobre La Relación Entre Independencia y Cultura,"148.

However, there are fundamental differences between the working conditions of those engaged with activities that allow them to pay their bills while being able to spend time on their own creative work and develop their own business; and those who do not. The latter lack other sources of income and must submit to the rules imposed by labour flexibilisation, experiencing greater insecurity and lack of protection. In this last segment, the figure of the freelancer overlaps that of the entrepreneur, although there is a substantial difference that in practical terms divide these two categories: entrepreneurs have time and capital while freelancers do not.[303] This points to differences in access that are, as in other segments of the economy, highly influenced by educational backgrounds. All and all, and despite the different conditions (broadly including businessmen and freelancers), creative entrepreneurs have middle-class backgrounds, are highly educated, and possess impressive adaptive strategies for facing uncertain situations.[304] In this regard, Enrique Avogadro, former Sub-Secretary of Creative Industries and current Minister of Culture of the City, makes an interesting point that this is not only a characteristic of CI but of any industry at the vanguard of development:

> *'CI are vanguard sectors, talent based industries. Of course depending the location of the social pyramid one is, you might have access or not, but this happens in many industries…there are not so many nuclear physics from low-class backgrounds, but that is a sad outcome of living in an unequal society where not everyone has access to education.'(Interviewed 2, Enrique Avogadro, Secretary of CI)*

Moreover, the associative character of the creative worker is considered fundamental. Interpersonal bonds are fundamental for the workers of the culture, especially in the independent and informal areas where many times the payment is 'symbolic'. As Paula Rivera states:

> '*It is essential to have acquaintances [...] guys with whom you have played, shared things, [...] that opens you more and more doors, because one recommends you, later someone else recommends you too, and so on...' (Interviewed 1, Paula Rivera, INAMU)*

Likewise, in the more professional sectors, the highly appreciated university degree is valued largely for it is considered a process not only for professional training, but also for making contacts. According to Fernando Arias, former director of the OIC:

> *'Creative workers enter to the Universities as perhaps artist dreamers, and leave the institution with one or two associates.' (Interviewed 3, Fernando Arias, OIC)*

Interestingly, the collaborative emphasis and the associative actions are more engaged with conceiving culture beyond its commercial function.[305] Different social movements and

[303] Lago Martínez, "Trabajo y empleo en las industrias culturales y creativas en Argentina,"22.
[304] Beltrán and Miguel, "Doing Culture, Doing Business,"45.

[305] Dinardi, "Cities for Sale,"92.

assemblages of neighbourhoods understand culture as a resource for the production and distribution of political and social statements.[306] The theatre group Catalinas Sur, the Cultural Circuit of Barracas, and the Cooperation Cultural Centre, are good examples of this. [307] It is worth mentioning too that the proliferation of women's associations in the creative sectors are part of a general movement of feminist protest that has hit the country very strongly over recent years.[308] In Avogadro's words:

> *'The gender debate, for instance, is led by creative sectors. CI are in fact motorising the participation of women, especially compared with more traditional industries.' (Interviewed 2, Enrique Avogadro, Secretary of CI)*

There are also some associations that intend to promote professional activities like the movement of the cultural venue Meca, the institute for music promotion INAMU, the alliance of independent publishers EDINAR, and others, but there are not so many representative unions in charge of defending creative workers' rights.[309] Despite the historical traditions of unionisation in the country, there are only a few unions among these industries with the capacity to fight for workers' rights, mainly in the audio-visual sector where workers are not so atomised within independent labour relationships.[310]

In connection, the reliance of personal networks as tools to secure recommendations also work as instruments to cope with temporality. According to Fernando Arias, this is one of most concerning issues that creative workers have to face, not just in Buenos Aires but in general:

> *'The instability of being occupied transitorily, not specifically in Buenos Aires, although here is more visible specially in the audio-visual sector'(Interviewed 3, Fernando Arias, OIC)*

However, for Avogadro, instability it is not something exclusive to CI but for the general globalisation of the economy enabled by technological change:

> *'what is not changing is that the change is happening…the technology enables a search for the designer around the globe. This is product of the technological change, not product of the CI (...) CI, instead, are in any case, evolving to not became obsolete.' (Interviewed 2, Enrique Avogadro, Secretary of CI)*

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[306] Mihal and Quiña, "Notas Sobre La Relación Entre Independencia y Cultura,"140.
[307] Dinardi, "Cities for Sale"92-94.
[308] Some examples of the women initiatives in creative sectors is the ligts-off event produced by the collective 'Nosotras Podemos', see https://www.clarin.com/cultura/apagon-feminista-paseo-museo-artistas_0_HJiEG5ndM.html; the INAMU's gender agenda https://inamu.musica.ar/index.php?sec=articulo&id=397; the collective 'Mujeres a la Obra' a series of plays starred by women directors https://www.anred.org/?p=106716; the platform 'Mujeres Audiovisuales' that gathers women working in the audiovisual sector https://www.plataformamua.com.ar/; to mention a few.
[309] Meca, 'Movement of Cultural and artistic Spaces' Access to http://www.movimientomeca.com.ar/
[310] Quiña, "Los Sentidos de La Precariedad: Reflexiones En Torno a Las Representaciones Del 'Trabajo Creativo,"95.

Hector Shargorodosky, the director of the Observatory of Creative Industries of the Economy Faculty of the Buenos Aires University, also supports this idea by highlighting the importance of technology in enabling change, careful not to reject the fragility of the CI for its flexibility:

> *'The new generations are not willing to work in the same company, in a job for life. The conditions have also changed. Being connected in a global network allows us to be working from anywhere in the world. Anyway, I see that all these characteristics are more exacerbated in some branches of the cultural sector. There are some activities that were always more fragile than others in terms of flexibility and precariousness, and many of them are from the creative sectors'(Interviewed 4, Hector Shargorodosky, Economy Faculty UBA)*

For its part, the GCBA has been deploying policies in relation to CI that tend to ignore the character of workers as cultural producers and artists, encouraging instead the consolidation of 'projects' and 'entrepreneurs' without intervening in the workers' labour conditions. In this regard, Avogadro's statement shows how this is in fact a general problem for the economy:

> *'We have a really hypocritical country, because half of the workers are registered and half that are not. The problem is that the registered part is not competitive. Do you have to take out of them their won rights? Of course, not. But they are also becoming obsolete sectors.' (Interviewed 2, Enrique Avogadro, Secretary of CI)*

He goes further, highlighting the position of the CI as enhancers of the change:

> *'CI are vanguard sectors of post capitalism, and in that position they take the good and the bad of post-capitalism; specially labour flexibilisation and lack of rules; as first, especially here regulations have always come late and also because the interests are transnational and therefore it is not easy to align objectives with.' (Interviewed 2, Enrique Avogadro, Secretary of CI)*

Today, there is no visible policy in the creative agenda. The former Creative Industries Direction was relocated several times and is now part of the Ministry of Education, renamed under the label of Knowledge Industries. Enrique Avogadro critically highlights the importance for a city to build on CI, while it builds on issues of inclusion that these industries have:

> *'There is something inevitable about this, it is the way towards which the world is going, and until the society does not question the super-structure, a city with the potential of Buenos Aires should understand how to be creative, while of course trying to include as many people as possible, and perhaps there lies the challenge.' (Interviewed 2, Enrique Avogadro, Secretary of CI)*

To sum up, this exploration was insightful to understand more about the 'soft' characteristics of the creative workforce of the city, contributing with aspects not captured by this study's quantitative analysis. These descriptions help us to understand that the people working in CI in Buenos Aires have a deep appreciation for the symbolic, and a rooted love for what they do without always having a commercial goal in mind. Networks and collaborative associations seem to be supportive characteristics of the creative sector to which the workers respond to. Finally, the workers who are in the CI generally have another job that supports them and belong to a middle class that gives them the privilege of education and access to the contacts of the networks in which they are immersed.

4.4 CL IN BUENOS AIRES, THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

4.4.1 Introduction: the EPH and the methodological definitions of cultural employment and CL

The main household survey in Argentina is the Permanent Household Survey (in Spanish: *Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, EPH*) which will from now on be referred to as the EPH. Since 1974, it has been carried out by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC) and allows a convergence of both sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the population.[311] The main purpose of the research that sustains the EPH is to characterise the population in terms of its socioeconomic nature, placing significant weight on its social and labour aspects.[312] It should be noted that based on this survey, official rates of employment, unemployment, underemployment and poverty are regularly provided, among other results.[313]

Initially, the EPH took samples only from Greater Buenos Aires, extending later to all the urban agglomerations of more than 100 thousand inhabitants. The EPH currently covers the 31 largest urban areas in the country, in which around 70% of the urban population of Argentina lives. Given the low proportion of rural population in the country (approximately 10%), it is likely that the real national statistics do not differ substantially from those obtained within urban data.[314] The EPH is based on a probabilistic sample, stratified, in two stages of selection. The mentioned sample is distributed throughout the period for which

[311] Leonardo Gasparini, Martii Cicowiez, and Walter Sosa Escudero. "Pobreza y Desigualdad En America Latina: Conceptos, Herramientas y Aplicaciones." (La Plata: Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales (CEDLAS), 2014), Appendix II, 7.

[312] Surveys are, in fact, the main source of empirical evidence on social issues. In particular, the distributive analysis fed by household surveys, that is, questionnaires destined to a representative sample of the population, interviewed in their homes, in which information is gathered about all the members of the household, including income data and / or consumption. In Latin American, every countries has an official statistical institute that periodically implement household surveys, from which microdata are extracted for the study of poverty, inequality and other social issues. Gasparini, et al. "Pobreza y Desigualdad En America Latina: Conceptos, Herramientas y Aplicaciones," Appendix II, 7.

[313] The Intrnational Labour Organisations obtains Argentina's employment data from the EPH. Access to http://www.ilo.org/surveydata/index.php/catalog/1094/study-description

[314] Gasparini, et al. "Pobreza y Desigualdad En America Latina: Conceptos, Herramientas y Aplicaciones," Chapter 3, 54.

information is provided (by quarter) and the survey is developed annually.[315] In this way, the rotation scheme in the sample design of this survey enabled successive sample panels to be built. Thus, taking the results from the first quarter of each year for the period 2007-2015 from the EPH, we estimate the socioeconomic characteristics of the creative workforce.

For the analysis, this work took the study performed by the Observatory of Creative Industries of Buenos Aires (OIC) as a model, with important methodological contributions for the development of a precise measurement of the CL using the EPH as a resource.[316] Similarly, the national statistics institution of cultural information, SinCA (Sistema de Information Cultural Argentina), has also used the data provided by the EPH to explore the characteristics of cultural employment using this source.[317] Both institutions have used the methodology suggested by UNESCO for measuring the cultural employment.[318]

It is important at this point to explain the intersection between what is suggested by the UNESCO as under the category of cultural employment, and what the national and local statistics institutions apply, with what concerns this work. First, the definition offered by UNESCO considers that the term cultural employment is built, on the one hand, by people who perform a cultural occupation including those who work in establishments dedicated or not to cultural activities and, on the other hand, by people involved in a variety of cultural activities including those who perform cultural and non-cultural occupations. Therefore, for this definition, cultural employment involves the segments A+B+C portrayed in the following *Table 1.*[319]

Table 1. Cultural employment definition by UNESCO

Activities / Occupations	Creative Industries	Non- Creative Industries
Cultural Occupations	A	B
Non-Cultural Occupations	C	

Source: Indicadores UNESCO de Cultura para el Desarrollo: Manual Metodológico puede descargarse en: www.unesco.org/creativity/cdis

Secondly, the national statistics institution of culture SinCa applied this methodology in the estimation of cultural employment measuring (A+B+C), noting the difficulty in correspondence of international codes with national ones given that the latter does not allow identification of all branches of the family of international codes. They also emphasise the difficulty in the analysis of occupations, and how this institute adapted its methodology as best as possible to that suggested by UNESCO (A+B+C).[320] For its part, the local institution

[315] Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (INDEC). "Mercado de Trabajo. Indicadores Socioeconómicos (EPH)." Trabajo e Ingresos. (INDEC, 2017).
[316] Observatorio de Industrias Creativas (OIC). "Ocupaciones Culturales." Government of the City of Buenos Aires, (2016).
[317] Sistema de Información Cultural de la Argentina (SinCA). "Mujeres En La Cultura: Notas Para El Análisis Del Acceso y La Participación Cultural En El Consumo y El Mercado de Trabajo," (2018).
[318] Guiomar and Medici, "The UNESCO Culture for Development Indicators: Methodology Manual."
[319] *Ibidem,* 19.
[320] Sistema de Información Cultural de la Argentina (SinCA), MERCOSUR. "Empleo Cultural Urbano," 2018.

of the city of Buenos Aires OIC, has also applied the methodology, but maintains the separation in the analysis between the activities and occupation, even making comparisons between them (A+C) vs (A+B) and not submitting to the concept of cultural employment like the other institution does. For the OIC, presenting a more critical approach, the definition of cultural occupations suggested by the UNESCO is too broad, including sectors not properly cultural.[321]

Finally, considering all these methodological factors and the theoretical development of this thesis, as stated in the introduction, our interest lies in understanding how CI behave and what kind of jobs they offer. That is why the analysis centres on CL is understood by its definition given by the people working in the CI themselves including those performing cultural and non-cultural occupations (A+C). This criteria was not taken lightly. Previously, already considering the information of Buenos Aires between 2007 and 2015, our analysis included the cross-examination of data to understand the differences in the representation of the creative activities on the one hand (A + C), and the cultural occupations (A + B) on the other, all the while understanding that the difference was negligible. In other words, the segment A is the one that presents greater weight in both groups and is most representative of our criteria. Moreover, researching about the cultural occupations in the city, SinCA statistics revealed that the majority of cultural occupations (81%) were in the education sector, a domain not included in the 6 domains for cultural statistics provided by UNESCO itself but is a supra-level to which each of the six domains contributed.[322] Finally, as SinCa states, the correspondence between CIUO (international occupations codes) and CNO (national occupations codes) was the most complex to perform. The impossibility of opening the last code beyond two digits and the dispersion of professions that each family includes led to the exclusion of many codes. This means that estimated levels of cultural occupations are not entirely robust.

Last but not least, this study adds one more variable not included (at least not to our knowledge) in any other analysis using the EPH to describe CL, that is to include a time period in the study. Therefore, the dynamic approach used in this work allows an intertemporal study of the variation of each socioeconomic characteristic, identifying its evolution and allowing for conclusions to be made about them - or lack of them. In the following sections there is a complete description of the design and methodology used, which aims to justify the importance of statistical analysis.

[321] Observatorio de Industrias Creativas (OIC), "Ocupaciones Culturales."
[322] This domain includes: Cultural and natural heritage, Artistic presentations and celebrations, Visual arts and crafts, Books and press, Audiovisual and interactive media, Design and creative services. In Pessoa and Deloumeaux, "The 2009 Unesco Framework for Cultural Statistics (FCS)."

4.4.2 Objectives and Hypothesis

As briefly mentioned before, the objective is to try to generate empirical evidence to deconstruct the CI rhetoric that might suggest some socio-economic impacts within this sector. For this analysis we set the following objectives to guide the statistic exercise:

- Analyse the previous evidence provided by the local (city-wise) and national institutions of cultural statistics. Understand the methodology they applied and critically revise its relevance to this thesis.
- Develop a robust statistical examination of statistics as a reliable source of information providing new variables beyond numbers of jobs generated by the creative industries. Instead, numbers will be shown as not only useful to measure quantity but also to provide information about the quality of the work.
- Choose the categories to examine and the type of tests and statistical analysis to be performed.
- Establish the hypothesis of the tests based on the theoretical revision covered in previous chapters.
- Perform the statistical examination carefully and present the results.

4.4.3 Working Hypothesis

It is always a matter of high concern in statistical analysis to establish a testable hypothesis that can be rejected or be failed to reject . That is why, considering the theoretical exposition of previous chapters, especially that of the second chapter which focuses specifically on the CL market, we established the following hypothesis:

- The participation of women in CL is less than in non-creative employment

$$CL_{W} < NCL_{W}$$

- The percentage of workers with high education completed is higher in the CL group that in the non-creative.

$$CL_{HE} > NLE_{HE}$$

- The percentage of people with more than one job is higher in the creative field than in the non-creative.

$$CL_{ME} > NCL_{ME}$$

- The percentage of entrepreneurs/self-employed people is higher in the creative work field than in the non-creative

$$CL_{SE} > NCL_{SE}$$

- Informality is superior in the creative field than in the non-creative

$$CL_I > NCL_I$$

- Wages in creative employment are lower than in non-creative fields

$$CL_{Wa} < NCL_{Wa}$$

Now, in order to make clear how this examination was carried out, the following section expands in the concepts taken to approach the hypothesis, and the variables chosen from the basis of the EPH. A brief explanation of the contribution of the statistical instruments for the analysis is then presented.

4.4.4 Empirical Study Methodology

The methodological design responds to this work's main question which, on the one hand, concerns the characteristics of those people belonging to the already defined creative workforce and, on the other hand, concerns the discrepancies in the characteristics of people working in the creative fields and those who do not. In order to explain in detail how we performed this analysis, first it is worth highlighting the methodology involved in inferential statistics as a portion of people (a sample) have been taken, and conclusions are then made over the entire population. Consequentially, the complete design of the empirical study is presented including definitions of occupational categories as well as activities chosen to represent the CI's workers of the city. The presentation and analysis of the results follow below.

Origin: Populations and Samples

Statistical analysis is complicated because the researcher cannot observe full reality, but imperfect samples of it. Therefore, a survey is thus used as a representative sample of the population. Based on partial information, an analyst must infer generalisable results to the entire population. For that, first, the sample must be representative of the population meaning that any individual of the population under study must have had the same probability of being chosen. This is exactly the type of sampling applied by the EPH (and many others official surveys); *simple random sampling*, in which each element of the population has the same probability of appearing in the evaluation. Chance determines who is surveyed in the population and who is not, with everyone having the same probability of being selected. [323]

This consideration requires inferential analysis and tools to estimate the statistical significance of the results. Specifically, each observation *i* in the survey is then associated

[323] Gasparini, et al. "Pobreza y Desigualdad En America Latina: Conceptos, Herramientas y Aplicaciones," Chapter 3, 44.

with a weighted or expansion factor ρ_I that indicates the number of elements in the population that the observation represents. [324] In our case, the EPH contains a variable named *pondera* that stores the expansion factor. This variable *pondera* was the expansion factor applied to each observation included in the selected variables analysed in our study.[325] Put simply:

$$(i) \qquad n_i * \rho_i = N_i$$

Where:

(n_i) is the sample observation

(ρ_I) is the expansion factor for that observation

(N_i) is the fragment of the population that *i* observation represents

Therefore, in the estimation for each variable the typical procedure was to apply the following equation:

$$(ii) \qquad \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathrm{CL}wi * \rho i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathrm{CL}i * \rho i} = \mathrm{CL}w$$

Where:

$\sum_{i=1}^{n}$ is the addition from the first observation *i=1* to the last observation *n* of each sub-sample

(CL_i) is the observation of the subsample restricted to the creative workforce

(ρ_i) is the expansion factor for each observation

$\mathrm{CL}wi$ is each woman from *i=1* to *n* from the subsample of the creative workforce

$\mathrm{CL}w$ is the total estimation of the proportion of women in the creative employment

The practical recommendation is to use the expansion factors whenever possible, thus obtaining weighted statistics that constitute a better approximation to the reality of the total population.[326] In this way, the EPH uses simple random sampling and offers the expansion factor for each observation, allowing conclusions to be drawn for the entire population. To better understand this, the next section introduces each variable analysed and the procedure applied to them.

[324] Ibidem.

[325] Comari, Claudio, and Augusto Hoszowski. "Ponderación de La Muestra y Tratamiento de Valores Faltantes En Las Variables de Ingreso En La Encuesta Permanente de Hogares." Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC), 2007.

[326] Gasparini, et al. "Pobreza y Desigualdad En America Latina: Conceptos, Herramientas y Aplicaciones," Chapter 2, 50.

Design of the analysis: definitions of concepts, operational variables and activities' codes

Despite the multiple purposes of this type of official survey, the labour aspects are of central relevance. For their analysis, there are concepts that allow for the relationship of the population with the labour market to be considered, such as the condition of activity, occupational category, underemployment, informality, and others. Hence it is important to clarify what is understood by each of these concepts according to the definition provided by the national statistics institution, INDEC, that commands the EPH.[327] They define:

- **Economically Active Population (EAP) or Labour Force**: for the measurement of this concept in the EPH, it includes within the EAP all people of 10 years old or more who have work in a short reference period (employed); and those who without having a job are actively seek for one (unemployed).
- **Non-Economically Active Population (NEAP):** includes all persons, regardless of age, who are not considered 'economically active' according to the above definition. Children under 10 years old are included in this group.
- **The occupational category:** is an important dimension for the characterisation of the relations of production. In the EPH four positions are distinguished: employer, self-employed person, employee and household worker without remuneration.
    - **Employers** are those who work without a labour dependent relationship. They are the sole owners or active partners of a company, establishing the conditions and organisational forms of the production process and employing at least one person.
    - **Employee** any person who works in a labour dependent relationship, where the forms and organisational conditions of the production are given to him/her, and also the instruments, facilities or machinery, contributing solely with their personal work.
    - **Self-employed** workers are those who carry out their activity using only their own personal work, that is, they do not employ salaried personnel and use their own machinery, facilities or instruments.
    - **Household worker without remuneration** are those who are employed in an economic establishment run by a person in their family, who may or may not live in the same household and are unpaid workers.

- **Informality:** this category includes all salaried workers (in firms of any size or self-employed) who do not have access to any social benefits.

- **Multi-employment:** situation characterized by the act of having various positions, jobs, occupations by the same person.

All these are important concepts to bear in mind at the time of choosing the operational variables, or in other words, to select the EPH variables that would provide the necessary information for each category. In order to do this, first, the total number of observations

[327] Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (INDEC). "Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Conceptos de Condición de Actividad, Subocupación Horaria y Categoría Ocupacional." INDEC, 2011.

provided by the survey was divided to narrow it down to the city of Buenos Aires.[328] Second, from the observations of Buenos Aires we breakdown the occupational categories according to the EAP (the employed and unemployed), in order to clean our sample from any of inactive population.[329] Third, the PEA was divided between the creative workforce and non-creative workforce; the two groups which this study aims to compare. Therefore, the sample can be described graphically as Figure 4 shows:

Figure 4. Group segmentation between Creatives and Non-Creatives. Methodology illustration.

Source. By author

The breakdown of the EAP between creatives and non-creatives was done following the activities codes provided by the study of the EPH carried out by the OIC. As mentioned before, the OIC used the methodology suggested by UNESCO and applied it to the international CIIU Rev.4 and the national activities classifier in Argentina used by the EPH named CAES MERCOSUR. This crossover was not without its difficulties; the nomenclature CAES MERCOSUR presents a minor level of disaggregation and thus some categories suggested by UNESCO could not be included. In the end, our creative sample was determined by the following variables (Table 2):

[328] It is also important to mention that an analysis of each region or, each *aglomerado* as is catalogued in the EPH, to ascertain a different labour market was performed. The reason being is that the great metropolitan area of Buenos Aires (AMBA) was not included in our study as it is considered by the EPH formulation to be a different market for labour.

[329] Occupational categories is the terminology used by the EPH to define the above described relations of productions. The reader should not make the mistake of associating this occupational categories with the cultural occupations described previously.

Table 2. Activities code conversion from CIIU Rev 4 to CAES Mercosur

CIIU REV 4	Description of the economic activity	CAES
5811-5813	Publishing of books, newspapers and other publications, including integrated printing	**5800**
5911-5912-5913-5914	Cinematographic activities; production of videos and television programmes; sound recording and music editing	**5900**
6010-6020	Radio and television programming and broadcasting activities	**6000**
6391	Information service activities	**6300**
7110	Architecture and engineering services; technical tests and analyses	**7100**
7210-7220	Research and Development	**7200**
7310	Advertising activities	**7301**
8542	Higher education and other types of education and support services for education (Cultural Education)	**8501-8509**
9000	Artistic and entertainment activities	**9000**
9101-9102-9103	Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities	**9100**

The next step concerned the definition of the operational variables to be taken to analyse in each subgroup of the creative and non-CL Following both the conceptual definitions described above, and taking some of the variables chosen by the OIC in their study as a model and adjusting them according to this study's hypothesis, the operational variables were defined as follows:

Table 3. Definition operational variables. EPH codes and chosen answer.

	Concept	EPH Variable	Question and chosen answer[330]
Socio-demographic profile	Gender	CH04	2=Women
	Education	NIVEL_ED	6=Completed High Education
Employment situation	Individual workers (Entrepreneurs/Self-employed)	CAT_OCUP	1=Employer 2=Self-employed
Occupation Characteristics	Multi-employment	PP03_C	2 = last week had more than one job / occupation / activity
	Informality	PP07H	2=no retirement discount
	Temporality	PP07c	1=temporary occupation
	Wages	P47T	Total amount of individual income perceived in the reference month (sum of principal labour occupation and other occupations)

4.4.5 Presentation of the results

The results obtained from the analysis of the EPH in Buenos Aires was carried out with the intention of having a more definitive description of the socioeconomic characteristics of the creative workforce in comparison to that of non-creative. Proceeding in this way, the most empirical sub-question of this thesis was answered. The information obtained from the EPH was analysed through STATA, a statics software designed to process samples with large responses. Each calculation was carried out through a careful procedure that 'cleaned the sample' from missing answers in order to avoid disproportionate alterations in the results. After that, the sample subdivisions were made according to *Figure 4*, and the procedures of the estimation of each EPH variable applied. As explained before, each variable was estimated according to the expansion factor (*Equation ii*). The results are presented here as percentages and graphs in order to make it easy for the reader to make comparisons.[331] The significance of the sample is given, first by its randomness and, second, tested by the coefficients of variation deployed in *Table 5*.[332] Next, the results of the socio-demographic profile (gender and education); the employment situation (mainly evaluating levels of entrepreneurialism and self-employment), and working conditions (multi-employment, informality, temporality and wages) are deployed.

Sociodemographic profile

Figure 5. Women's presence in the labour market in the Non-Creative and in the Creative sectors. Buenos Aires. Years 2007-2015. In percentages.



Source. By author based on EPH

[331] To see the complete statistics result go to Appendix 1 and 2.

[332] The coefficient of variation provides an idea of the precision of the estimate, that is, the relationship between the standard deviation and the value to be estimated. The smaller the coefficient of variation, the more accurate the estimate. Although it is up to the user to determine if data with a certain coefficient of variation is useful or not for its purpose, according to the degree of precision require, it is noted that figures with a coefficient of variation greater than 20% should be treated with caution. In our study, coefficients of variation show a rate under 20% confirming it adequacy.

Regarding gender, the composition of the CL presents a similar distribution to that of the non-creative with respect to the presence of women in the workforce, especially in the first 5 years of the analysis (Figure 5). From 2007 to 2011 women represented an average of 45% of the non-CL market and a 46% of the creative one. From 2012, the proportion of women markedly increased in the creative sector with an average of 63%, while the non-creative sector remained with a rate of 44% of women representation. This information also aligns with studies carried out by the already mentioned national and local institution of cultural statics (SInCa and OIC), supporting the period with similar distribution between the creative and non-creative sectors. The second segment (from 2012 to 2015) clearly marks a change in tendencies, with a greater presence of women in the creative labour market.

However, the wage distribution is far from being equal and does not present a change in tendencies. Throughout the period studied, the results clearly show that not only do men earn more than women in both the creative and non-creative sectors, but also that men in creative sectors are the ones who get the highest wages even compared with men that work in the non-creative sector. Also, as shown in *Figure 6*, the salary gap between men and women for the non-creative sector seems to be reducing with a difference of 39% higher wages for men in 2007 and a gap of 12% in 2015. Contrastingly for CL, the wage gap between men and women seems to be enlarging, presenting a 21% rate of higher wages for men in 2007, rising to a difference of 44%, again in favour of men, in 2015.

Figure 6. Wage distribution per gender and per sector Non-Creative and Creative. Buenos Aires. Years 2007 to 2015. In averages (mean).



Source. By author based on EPH

Overall, the results suggest that while women's representation in the creative sector are not only similar to those in the non-creative fields but, also, it seems that women are in fact

gaining more terrain in the creative sectors, or penetrating barriers of access more easily. Perhaps, the fact that women in the creative sector earn significantly less than men in the same sector is one of the reasons why they are gaining more employability in these creative fields.

Figure 7. Education. Presence of high education graduates per sector Non-Creative and Creative. Buenos Aires. Years 2007 to 2015. In percentages.



Source. By author based on EPH

With regards to the level of education the evidence is clear; a creative workforce presents higher levels of education throughout the period analysed (Figure 7). The creative workforce has a higher percentage of workers with completed university study, ranging between 54% and 64% at the beginning and at the end of the period respectively with an average of 50%. Meanwhile, the non-creative workforce has a proportion of 35% of its employees with full university studies, averaging at 33%. Even at its lowest point in 2011, with only 45% of its workforce with full university studies, the creative sector's percentage still surpassed the non-creative sector by almost 10 percentage points. Moreover, the highest proportion of creative graduates presents a stable trend with a slight rise toward the end of the period. In sum, while half of the CL has a high education degree, only a third can confirm the same in other sectors of the economy.

Employment situation

Regarding entrepreneurialism and self-employment, results are less evident or conclusive (Figure 8). On the one hand, the non-creative sector presents a stable trend in the period analysed, with an average of around 20% of its employees being entrepreneurs (employers) or self-employed (altogether labelled as individual workers). On the other hand, the creative sector shows a rather irregular trend. At the beginning of the period, the proportion of independent workers surpassed that of the non-creative sector, peaking in 2012 with more than a third (36%) of creative employees without any employment relationship. However,

after this year, the rate of independent creative workers fell by a half, to 14%, continuing to threaten those values, followed by a reduction. Curiously, the period's average of independent creative employees coincides with that of non-creative employees (around 20%) although with greater intertemporal variations. Thus, the presence of entrepreneurs does not seem to be a characteristic aspect of the CL in Buenos Aires.

Figure 8. Entrepreneurialism. Presence of entrepreneurs/self-employed per sector Non-Creative and Creative. Buenos Aires. Years 2007 to 2015. In percentages.



Source. By author based on EPH

Occupation characteristics

The results of the multi-employment evaluation also present clear and conclusive results (Figure 9). Among the creative sectors there are more workers with more than one job, with an average of 12% for the entire period. Meanwhile, among non-creative workers, only an average of 7% have more than one job. This tendency also indicates a rise in multi-employment practices among the creative workforce, with special accentuation in the last four years of the period analysed. For its part, the non-CL shows quite a stable tendency; never exceeding more than 8 percentage points. Here, a complementary finding might prove helpful to understand the distributed practice of multi-employment in the creative workforce. As *Table 4* illustrates, creative workers work less hours per week than non-creative ones.[333] This might force creative workers to search for more than one job to reach a stable finance level. Also, informality and temporality might be factors influencing creative workers to seek more than one source of income.

[333] This is based on averaged work hours per week, with does not represent the project-based dynamic of the creative sector, with periods of high working hours and periods of unemployment. However, it helps to explain some part of the characterisation of the multiemployment as this segment illustrates.

Figure 9. Multi-employment. Workers with more than one job per sector Non-Creative and Creative. Buenos Aires. Years 2007 to 2015. In percentages.



Source. By author based on EPH

Table 4. Working hours per group Creative and Non-Creative. Buenos Aires. Years 2007-2015. In averages.

	Creative	Non- Creative
2007	38.2	42.3
2008	36.3	40
2009	37.8	47.8
2010	44.6	44
2011	52.3	42.8
2012	38.3	50.9
2013	25.8	42.1
2014	43.3	41.8
2015	31.1	45.1

Source. By author based on EPH

Informality is a segment that yields few clear results (Figure 10). Overall, the percentage of informality in the non-creative sector surpasses that of the creative sector by a small amount throughout the period of 2007-2015. However, it is noted that the trend of creative employment accompanies the general fluctuation of informality of the workforce, and always closely follows the non-creative tendency at only one or two percentage points below. It is unsurprising then that both sectors averaged about 16% and 15% of informality for non-creative and creative workers, respectively. Again, informality does not seem to be a specific aspect of the CL in the city.

Figure 10. Informality. Workers with no social security per sector Non-Creative and Creative. Buenos Aires. Years 2007 to 2015. In percentages.



Source. By author based on EPH

Now, despite informality presenting quite similar patterns in both of our analysed groups, the results do not seem to fall in line with the critics that find CL to have bigger informal conditions. However, the other variable analysed, temporality, seems to present more conclusive data (Figure 11). Within the period analysed, an average of 8% of creative workforce is in temporary contracts, while only 4% of the non-creative workforce comes under this temporary form of employment. [334] According to this sample, temporality is a distinctive feature of the type of jobs present in the creative sector as it exceeds the same segment of the non-creative in every year studied.

Figure 11. Temporality. Presence of workers with a temporary job per sector Non-Creative and Creative. Buenos Aires. Years 2007 to 2015. In percentages.



Source. By author based on EPH

[334] This is not including self-employees who actually sell they labour temporarily in a continuous manner.

Wages

In order to understand the discrepancies in income levels it is necessary to explain the type of distributions the creative and the non-creative segments exhibit. One way of presenting a distribution is through summary measures. Within these measures, those of central tendency are used the most widely in economics, with the average or mean being the best known indicator. As *Figure 13* shows, the mean represents the average monthly income per worker and seems to be higher for the creative group. Except for two years between 2012 and 2013, the overall tendency of the period analysed indicates that creative workers in Buenos Aires earn more than those in non-creative sectors. However, to ensure a correct analysis, another measurement to describe income should be considered. The median, for example is another central tendency measurement that, when the values from lowest to the highest are ordered, the median is the value that shows below (and above) half of the observations. Although the mean is a more popular measure than the median, the latter has an interesting property: it is considerably more robust in the presence of outliers. Therefore, following what *Table 5* suggests, the result is more conclusive as throughout the whole period between 2007 and 2015 the median of the creative group was higher or equal to that of the non-creative. This means that the lower half of the creative workers with the lower incomes earned more than the lower income half of the non-creative workers.

Figure 12. Income distribution per worker per month. Non-Creative and Creative Sectors. Buenos Aires. Years 2007-2015. At current prices, in averages (mean).



Source. By author based on EPH

Although this information already infers much about the intergroup comparison, the behaviour of the income distribution within each sector is not yet clear. Here, there are different measurements that could be taken to understand how dispersed or not the sample is. In general, real income distributions are not symmetric, meaning that the income of the rich is well above the average. All distributions of the world's income are asymmetric to the right, which in statistical terms means that the distance from the rich to the mean overly compensates for the small negative values of the distance from the poor to the mean. It is thus a generalised rule that for distributions with positive asymmetry, the median is below the mean, as reported and confirm by our samples in *Table 5*.[335] Now, a question arises as to how asymmetric or dispersed a distribution is and according to what the concept of inequality is associated with. The more similar the income between people is, the less dispersion and inequality a distribution presents. In practice, as the existence of inequality is discounted, the interest lies in measuring the degree of inequality of the distributions with the purpose of making comparative evaluations.

Table 5. Statistical variables of the income distribution. Creative and Non-Creative Groups. Buenos Aires. Years 2007-2015. Central distribution and weight measures.

		Mean	Median	Variation Coefficient	Income Coefficient	Share
2007	Non-Creat	1999.078	1500	1.05	18.91	26.28%
	Creative	2252.171	1660	0.75	13.57	23.57%
2008	Non-Creat	2412.369	1800	0.97	19.09	26.27%
	Creative	2641.463	2000	0.64	9.97	24.23%
2009	Non-Creat	2958.113	2500	0.85	22.45	25.74%
	Creative	3474.944	3000	0.72	11.93	19.25%
2010	Non-Creat	3567.875	2900	0.87	15.01	28.16%
	Creative	3727.188	3500	0.69	14.58	23.70%
2011	Non-Creat	4379.209	3500	0.71	12.35	23.96%
	Creative	4637.052	3700	1.11 (0,64)	19.84	26.75%
2012	Non-Creat	5694.504	4500	0.79	11.74	23.57%
	Creative	5414.288	5000	0.62	10.72	22.72%
2013	Non-Creat	7389.64	6000	0.76	16.39	18.59%
	Creative	6991.949	6300	0.62	10.62	25.08%
2014	Non-Creat	8261.942	7000	0.72	14.30	24.24%
	Creative	9882.548	7000	1.39 (0,61)	14.87	21.61%
2015	Non-Creat	10736.74	9000	0.73	13.01	21.92%
	Creative	12409.52	10000	0.86 (0,53)	9.14	25.54%

Notes: Estimations by author based on EPH. The Creative represents the people working in the CI, while Non-Creat represents the people not working in the CI.

[335] Intuition is derived from the analysis of the previous paragraph: relatively few of the very high values have a strong effect on the average and relatively weak have an effect on the median, since the latter is more resistant to extreme values. In practice, the fact that the average income is higher than the median is taken as a natural symptom of asymmetry.

For this purpose, there are some possible measurements to be taken, as the coefficient of variation. This coefficient builds on the standard deviation division by the mean, and it is considered a desirable indicator of inequality.[336] Basically, the bigger the coefficient, the more dispersed the distribution and therefore the more prominent the inequality. In our study, *Table 5* shows the intertemporal coefficients of variation for our two groups, showing how overall the non-creative group present a higher coefficient and therefore a bigger dispersion and inequality in their distribution. There are, however, three outstanding coefficients in the creative group from years 2011, 2014 and 2015 (shaded in the Table 5). Looking more closely, the graphic portrait of the income distribution (known as a histogram) for the creative groups of these years (Figures 13, 14, 15) shows the presence of salient outliers (circled in red) that might be pushing the dispersion coefficient up. As the graphics show, the presence of those outliers cannot be overlooked, as they clearly have a big impact especially in the creative group. Moreover, after eliminating the outliers and recalculating the coefficients of variation for those three years -the new ones in brackets- we can conclude that the non-creative group presents a bigger dispersion in the income distribution than the creative group. However, the latter presents a clearer case of outliers that also represent a disparity in distribution with outstanding cases of some workers earning far more than others.

Figure 13. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Creative Sector Buenos Aires. Year 2011. At current prices.



Source. By author based on EPH

[336] Explicar varianza y desvio estandas

Figure 14. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Creative Sector Buenos Aires. Year 2014. At current prices.



Source. By author based on EPH

Figure 15. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Creative Sector Buenos Aires. Year 2015. At current prices.



Source. By author based on EPH

Finally, there are other estimations to calculate that can help understand the distributive characteristics of these two groups. The share is another distributive characteristic that represents the participation of an individual or group (in general the highest percentile of the distribution) within the total income of the population. Again, the higher the indicator or share, the more unequal the distribution. In our samples, the share indicator shows how in general for both groups all along the period the decile of workers with the higher income (the 1% who earn the most) represented on average 23% of the total income generate by each group. This means that those who earn the most in both groups earn a similar share (close to a quarter) to those who earn less in their respective groups.

4.4.6 Analysis of the results

Although the empirical information still requires a contribution from sociological understanding, the data provided describing the case of the socio-economic characteristics of CL in the city of Buenos Aires might help to repair the gap in the theory of CL, especially in non-Western based empirical cases. After the design and methodological description and presentation of graphics as numeric evidence, this section reviews the hypothesis outlined earlier, leaving the general conclusion of the empirical framework for the final chapter.

Based on the critical theory approach of CL presented in Section 3, the above outlined hypotheses were designed to test the empirical evidence. The first hypothesis suggested a minor presence of women in the CL, compared to that of the non-creative, as part of the problem of access for women in the creative industries. The evidence does not seem to support that idea. Even though the results do not show a clear picture, the tendency towards the last years seems to outline a CL market with more women than before. In this regard, an explanation could be that the wave of activist feminist movements is strong in Argentina, especially in Buenos Aires, with more emphasis in the creative sectors as seen in the previous section. In addition, the wage difference might be another possible explanation of the bigger women presence in the creative segments. The salary gap between men and women, clear in these two subgroups (as in many others), show that the creative sector wage gap is increasing, while the non-creative subsample is reducing the gender salary difference. However, despite the evidence being seemingly inconclusive regarding quantity and access, there are some clear indications that the retributions women receive are smaller than those for men which says a lot about the quality work.

The second hypothesis failed to be rejected as, in fact, there are more highly educated graduated workers among the creative workforce in proportion to the non-creative sectors. The stable tendency seems to show this characteristic as a pattern. Could people with no high education be employed in the creative sectors? Probably, but the evidence suggests that employment in the creative fields is more likely with high education preparation. As described before, higher education in Buenos Aires is also represented by a greater presence of middle-class people, which strongly influences the market labour. Therefore, if having a degree is, as far as can be seen here, a characteristic and potentially a condition in the CL market, many working class people who have no access to education might be marginalised.

The third hypothesis which considers a greater presence of individualised workers (that we built adding the categories of entrepreneurs and self-employed) in the creative sector, cannot be rejected, nor failed to be rejected. The first five years of the period analysed shows more individual workers in the creative field, with rates falling sharply in the last four years. So, we can intuitively suggest that the entrepreneur/self-employed in the creative sector are occupational categories often taken more by necessity than by choice. If this were not so, the trend of labour individualisation in the creative sphere would present a growing trend and not a decreasing one as our sample does. Moreover, the presence of entrepreneurs in the local (city and national) context is remarkably high. Due to the cyclical nature of economics, the 'entrepreneurial spirit' has surged in Argentina out of a necessity to overcome the recurrent crisis and recessions. If, for traditional entrepreneurs, uncertainty arises as a product of the ignorance of the markets that are being discovered, in Argentina uncertainty derives from the dramatic uncertainty of the context and entrepreneurism is mainly a synonym of finding alternatives to self-development.

The fourth hypothesis is again quite conclusive. In the creative sector, multi-employment predominates as a work practice. As suggested above (empirically and by the theory), working hours per week, or more job rotation might explain this result. However, we cannot disregard other less observable factors, such as those described in the previous chapter which fall under the topic of affection that creative workers feel for their jobs. Creative workers who love what they do might want to do more of what brings them pleasure while searching for a recommendation which is an important strategy of networking as has been presented in this study. Our qualitative analyses shaded some light precisely in these aspects, confirming both the personal involvement of creative workers in their jobs and the high regard they place on networking practices.

The fifth hypothesis is clearly rejected. Not only does CL present similar informality rates as those in the non-creative segment, but it also always follows behind the general informality trend by one or two points. This evidence was rather surprising as this issue is the most contested affect argued by the critics of CL studies. According to the OIC report, the higher levels of informality in cultural employment is to be found in cultural occupations (B from Table 1), a segment excluded from this thesis' analysis for aforementioned reasons. In line with the high levels of general entrepreneurialism, it is again found that the basal levels of informality of the economy contribute to a more nuanced impact on the levels of informality in CI.

Finally, income distribution seems to favour workers employed in the creative fields, opposite to what the theory suggests and to what the hypothesis posed. In general, creative workers are better paid than non-creative workers (with a gender imbalance always favouring men), and this is an important finding. Quite likely to be in line with the already discussed dynamic found in the general economy, the more qualified workers, as creatives seem to be, are better remunerated. However, the other measures considered also shed light on the distributive characteristics on both groups. Non-creative sectors appear to be more dispersed and therefore less homogeneously distributed, leading to a great social inequality. However, although the creative sector shows a lower degree of dispersion, it also shows the presence of more weighty outliers, with the ability to move the dispersion coefficient sufficiently to change the understanding of the distribution of the sample. This

seems to correspond with the theory of the 'superstar effect' in income distribution that is quite characteristic of creative fields. Ultimately, across both groups the 1% that earns the most takes the same proportion of the total income that each groups generates.

Noteworthy is to mention, that the hypothesis was built upon the already existent toolkit of political studies based mainly in Western-centred countries. However, one of the first general observations to be made is that the landscape is by no means black and white. The complexities of CL across the globe presented themselves clearly throughout this study. A second observation is that, in general, this hypothesis (or critical fronts) are made on stable political and institutional examples (as we have mentioned, mainly in Euro-Anglophone countries). In such contexts, the degrees of informality, multi-employment, individualisation, etc., of the general labour market are far from similar to those in non-Western contexts, as is the case of Buenos Aires. The structural conditions of the general labour markets in each specific case should be acknowledged to be able to make serious and substantial conclusions. The following and final section will present a review of all the evidence presented in this chapter concerning the local context of CL in Buenos Aires in the light of the global theories of CL and current general labour trends.

SECTION 5. CONCLUSIONS

As stated in the introduction of this work, the aim of this thesis was to contribute to both the de-centralisation of labour studies, as well as to the de-construction of CI rhetoric; trying to understand the local socio-economic impacts of global theories. In the pursuit of this aim, research questions were developed alongside a subset of questions to guide analysis, from which conclusions will now be presented.

5.1 Answering questions and summarising findings

First, the objective of understanding the importance of CI in the contemporary economy was successfully accomplished. As we have seen, the nature of CI's has a lot in common with the long-term general shift from the manufacturing to the service economy, and the growing importance of knowledge capital as primary drivers of growth. Moreover, as Enrique Avogadro states, CI might be considered the *'vanguard sector of the new economy, evolving faster than others not to become obsolete*.'[337] However, despite being one of the sectors leading the shift in economic dynamics, it is still debatable to assume that CI are drivers of development, as the term's political origins suggest. The policies surrounding CI coined a relationship with development and reduced the latter to simple measures of economic growth. This study questions the understanding of development that places the focus exclusively on economic aspects, but even with such a view the results are far from clear. This research in Buenos Aires shows that the adoption of such economically centred development rhetoric, as most policy makers have, coupling CI with development presents inconclusive concrete results. The classic added value metrics, as well as job growths, showed how CI behaviour accompanies general tendencies of the city's activities, exemplifying the dynamic nature of a sector more subsumed with the variation of demand than becoming an enhancer of growth.

Second, this study's objective to understand the characteristics of CL, as well as their connection with general labour market reforms, was also accomplished. As we have seen, CI's ideas were instrumental not only for policy, but also for the general labour markets that have followed a process of flexibilisation since the mid-80's. A synchronisation took place whereby the modern individualised workforce, searching for a passionate work-life and more autonomy identified in the creative sectors the perfect space to explore its potential. Meanwhile the political process of de-regulation also provided companies and the state with the release of their role as guarantors of labour protections. The CI 'sped up' both in policy expectations and in social understanding the creation of a space for new opportunities. In this context, CL theories have identified some common problems in creative work, far from allocating opportunities fairly. Problems of access, according to gender or social class, and problems in labour conditions where casualisation, temporary work, stagnant wage levels, and an overall informal economy do nothing but increase worker's vulnerability. In fact, according to CL theories on which this study has built its hypotheses, the representation of a creative worker is a middle-class, highly educated,

[337] Interviewed 2, Enrique Avogadro, Secretary of CI. See Appendix

multi-employed, with entrepreneurial spirit, probably not registered in social security, and a low-income earning white man.

Third, the socio-economic study of the national framework was an essential part of this research and successfully helped to contextualise the characterisation of the creative workforce in Buenos Aires. Economic cycles of growth and recession, the general tendency of a labour market flexibilisation and the structural problems of informality and unequal income distribution, are anything but understated in this analysis. Indeed, it is understood that the local socio-economic conditions explain a great part of the discrepancy between the hypotheses of CL theory and the results of this study case. In Buenos Aires, labour force is highly entrepreneurial (mostly out of necessity), and informality in the labour market is basally high. Income distribution is correlated with education levels, with the latter being a direct reflection of social class. Certainly, socio-economic conditions influence labour markets for both those working in CI and those who do not, and it thus seems noteworthy to suggest the concept of 'path dependency' in CL studies as an explanation.

Fourth, to understand the adoption of the city's conceptions of CI, Buenos Aires provides a clear case of *glocalisation* in the form of a spread of universalistic claims. Specifically, marked by the 2007 political shift, the *creative turn* reached Buenos Aires and found fertile terrain. Culture and creativity were utilised as commercial strategies although, as this study shows, this was more in rhetoric than in practice. International institutions like UNESCO and UNCTAD, as well as countries like the UK and its British Council, were highly influential in the local adoption of the binomial CI-development as it is globally understood. Nevertheless, despite the CI presenting different dynamics and structures among each other, creative workers share some commonalities. From the qualitative side, we saw that creative workers in Buenos Aires have middle-class backgrounds; they often value the symbolic more than the commercial; they love what they do and believe in networks and collaborative associations.

Fifth, and thanks to the answers to the sub-questions developed above, this study can now answer its main question: the creative worker in Buenos Aires seems to present different characteristics to the ones claimed in theory. Our quantitative analysis suggests that the 'porteño' creative worker is a highly educated, middle class, multi-employed woman, with the same 'high' entrepreneurial spirit and facing similar problems regarding informality as the rest of the society. However, even if working conditions are shared with the rest of the economy, the social access problem seems to remain the most pressing issue in the creative sector, just as the theory suggests. Basically, in understanding the local socio-economic conditions, high levels of education are a privilege of the middle class. Consequently, qualified workers- as creatives seem to be- are not only the ones with access to jobs in CI, but also have the benefit of being top of the income distribution next to the rest of the highly educated middle-upper class workers of the city.

5.2 Some reflections on the research

Based on this study, it was considered it appropriate to draw some general reflections. CI's assumptions as drivers of development cannot be universalised, but neither can the critics signalling the precarity of CL. Taking the example of Buenos Aires, it is not lineally probable that CI contribute to development. In purely economic terms, the used indicators show that CI tend to follow general economic dynamics. When examining social development, CI do not seem to contribute to low-income segments of the population, as catalysts of poverty alleviation (as the policies claim), nor providing genuine opportunities to everyone. In contrast, and following the characterisation of its workforce, Buenos Aires' CI are middle class industries, with the same unstable and precarious conditions that the rest of the sectors have. Based on all this evidence, the economic impact of the CI seems questionable, while the social impacts seem to be free as a collateral effect, whether they are beneficial or not.

This is a clear example of the gap that exists between what the policies ideas of CI set out to accomplish and what they actually do. The normative policy notion of creativity as a latent resource in ordinary people, a synonym of innovation mainly focused on 'jobs and growth', has neglected other aspects namely social and symbolic impacts. If it is true that CI are leading the rest of the economy, it is fair to question where they are leading us. With the understanding that the quality of work-life matters because it impacts directly on individual well-being and therefore in the social prosperity, this is why we focused on the labour terrain to approach the concrete reach of the impacts of CI. However, thanks to this study, it is now understood that while CI cannot be portrayed as saviours of the new economy, academia still remains lacking in an empirical basis to understand these industries' social impacts, at least on labour issues. It is precisely here that this study becomes highly relevant as it presents a de-centralised empirical case that might contribute to the robustness of CL theory.

It seems clear that these sectors' dynamics present different effects in different socio-economic contexts. Buenos Aires' case proves that the circumstances are, without a doubt, local but the model follows global conceptions, whereby international organisations and policy rhetoric has a lot of normative influence. However,CI seem to be situated activities, not a set of universal applicable strategies. Similarly, the creative sectors are not critical nor insignificant for achieving social and economic change. This thesis seeks to show the need for a more nuanced perspective of the relationship between CI and development, as well to demonstrate that contexts matters. Policy-making should respond to evidence, not rhetoric or expectations. In the end, CI are simultaneously a group labelled together for their economic results, and a symbolic construction that congregates social practices capable of altering cultural institutions upon which political and economic constructs are built. Perhaps it is time to question the social and cultural values that CI are proposing. Perhaps it is time to return to the symbolic importance of the cultural, rather than the economic benefit of the creative.

5.3 Limitations of the study and suggestions for further research

The most pertinent limitations of this study relate to methodological aspects of the quantitative analysis. Firstly, individual responses to the household survey contain flaws. Respondents often forgot to report an item, do not accurately recall quantities of money or expenses, or deliberately omit or falsify information. Of course, these errors must be considered to ensure a careful understanding of the results. Secondly, through the use of inferential statistics this study generated general results for the population based on partial information provided by the sample. In this case, the sample's randomness is essential to the nature of the variables analysed and should thus be understood as a way of modelling ex ante ignorance on the part of the analyst. In this regard, a larger sample always increases the statistical significance of a study and in this specific case, a larger sample might have allowed for a more in depth study into the dynamics of the different CI. Unfortunately, this was not possible within the context of this study. Finally, our qualitative approach, although significant because of the political and institutional positions occupied by the interviewees, would have also required an extension of the sample which we suggest should be made in future to a larger group of workers in certain CI. Hopefully this thesis has helped to illustrate the importance of placing studies on creative work in new contexts, and to address the urgent need to find new ways to empirically measure the socio-economic effects of CI, perhaps stimulating other similar heterodox initiatives.

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APPENDIXES

Appendix 1: Tables of statistics results on the EPH

Appendix 2: Figures of statistics results on the EPH. Income distribution analysis per year. Non-Creative and Creative Sectors. Buenos Aires.

Appendix 3: Interviews.

Interviewed Number	Name	Represented Institution	Date	Page
1	Paula Rivera	INAMU	5th May 2019	102
2	Enrique Avogadro	Secretary of CI (2012-2015)	27th April 2019	105
3	Fernando Arias	OIC	22th April 2019	108
4	Hector Schargorodsky.	Observatorio Cultural Economic Faculty (UBA)	15th April 2019	109

Appendix 1: Tables of statistics results on the EPH

Appendix 1.1 Characterization of the Non-Creative Workforce. Numbers of workers weighted per segment and participation of the weighted total. Buenos Aires. Years 2007-2015. In thousands and percentages.

	Women	High Education Graduates	Multi-employment	Entrepreneurs	Informality	Temporality	Weighted total (population inference)	Sample Observations
2007	583,085	454,451	113,407	302,987	311,230	74,857	1,274,053	974
	45.77%	35.67%	8.90%	23.78%	24.43%	5.88%		
2008	591,255	490,430	97,621	274,400	258,892	47,182	1,235,847	883
	47.84%	39.68%	7.90%	22.20%	20.95%	3.82%		
2009	614,797	604,417	115,576	304,476	243,019	49,836	1,318,027	876
	46.65%	45.86%	8.77%	23.10%	18.44%	3.78%		
2010	635,910	477,799	136,172	362,277	282,635	51,722	1,610,397	828
	39.49%	29.67%	8.46%	22.50%	17.55%	3.21%		
2011	615,795	493,967	106,407	268,026	223,323	56,668	1,350,799	888
	45.59%	36.57%	7.88%	19.84%	16.53%	4.20%		
2012	584,105	481,217	88,181	304,358	244,253	61,685	1,301,653	835
	44.87%	36.97%	6.77%	23.38%	18.76%	4.74%		
2013	534,213	494,764	91,483	283,826	190,665	56,432	1,265,869	694
	42.20%	39.08%	7.23%	22.42%	15.06%	4.46%		
2014	554,112	451,850	108,409	299,506	232,364	47,441	1,260,021	888
	43.98%	35.86%	8.60%	23.77%	18.44%	3.77%		
2015	567,915	446,684	105,064	301,865	233,634	66,033	1,248,179	917
	45.50%	35.79%	8.42%	24.18%	18.72%	5,29%	5.29%	

Appendix 1.2 Characterization of the Creative Workforce. Numbers of workers weighted per segment and participation of the weighted total. Buenos Aires. Years 2007-2015. In thousands and percentages.

	Women	High Education Graduates	Multi-employment	Entrepreneurs	Informality	Temporality	Weighted total (population inference)	Sample Observations
2007	92,365	104,638	29,044	63,798	42,056	18,115	192,256	149
	48.04%	54.43%	15.11%	33.18%	21.88%	9.42%		
2008	118,324	130,193	29,907	57,715	44,161	20,689	250,378	179
	47.26%	52.00%	11.94%	23.05%	17.64%	8.26%		
2009	85,668	114,116	22,401	53,066	31,449	14,951	201,874	142
	42.44%	56.53%	11.10%	26.29%	15.58%	7.41%		
2010	87,247	93,865	20,596	42,652	39,616	20,285	176,857	116
	49.33%	53.07%	11.65%	24.12%	22.40%	11.47%		
2011	80,656	84,178	18,356	66,380	29,263	15,872	184,061	125
	43.82%	45.73%	9.97%	36.06%	15.90%	8.62%		
2012	111,552	105,895	22,750	25,791	23,646	16,254	176,644	114
	63.15%	59.95%	12.88%	14.60%	13.39%	9.20%		
2013	128,155	114,175	27,994	31,503	21,092	11,532	194,044	108
	66.04%	58.84%	14.43%	16.23%	10.87%	5.94%		
2014	118,499	121,115	33,736	28,559	32,643	18,012	190,043	136
	62.35%	63.73%	17.75%	15.03%	17.18%	9.48%		
2015	122,229	123,100	36,256	16,289	30,632	10,117	190,808	146
	64.06%	64.52%	19.00%	8.54%	16.05%	5.30%		

Appendix 2: Figures of statistics results on the EPH. Income distribution analysis per year. Non-Creative and Creative Sectors. Buenos Aires.

Appendix 2.1 Dispersion of total income per individual per month. Non- creative sector. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Buenos Aires. Year 2007. At current prices.

	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	130	9		
5%	300	20		
10%	500	40	Obs	944
25%	800	70	Sum of Wgt.	1,232,184
50%	1500		Mean	1999.078
		Largest	Std. Dev.	2091.887
75%	2560	11320		
90%	4000	13000	Variance	4375991
95%	5100	30000	Skewness	6.396249
99%	8200	30000	Kurtosis	77.621



Appendix 2.2 Dispersion of total income per individual per month. Creative sector. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Buenos Aires. Year 2007. At current prices.

	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	150	120		
5%	400	150		
10%	700	250	Obs	147
25%	1000	300	Sum of Wgt.	189,678
50%	1660		Mean	2252.171
		Largest	Std. Dev.	1678.746
75%	3000	6000		
90%	4800	6480	Variance	2818187
95%	5980	7700	Skewness	1.299761
99%	8000	8000	Kurtosis	4.424182



Appendix 2.3 Dispersion of total income per individual per month. Non- creative sector. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Buenos Aires. Year 2008. At current prices.

	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	150	40		
5%	400	42		
10%	600	50	Obs	870
25%	1100	100	Sum of Wgt.	1,218,939
50%	1800		Mean	2412.369
		Largest	Std. Dev.	2351.143
75%	3000	13600		
90%	4950	17000	Variance	5527873
95%	6300	22500	Skewness	3.731816
99%	12000	27508	Kurtosis	26.52025



Appendix 2.4 Dispersion of total income per individual per month. Creative sector. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Buenos Aires. Year 2008. At current prices.

	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	350	50		
5%	650	200		
10%	900	350	Obs	174
25%	1400	400	Sum of Wgt.	240,205
50%	2000		Mean	2641.463
		Largest	Std. Dev.	1702.659
75%	3500	6700		
90%	5000	6720	Variance	2899048
95%	6500	7000	Skewness	.9214374
99%	7000	7500	Kurtosis	3.038808



Appendix 2.5 Dispersion of total income per individual per month. Non- creative sector. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Buenos Aires. Year 2009. At current prices.

	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	160	50		
5%	400	100		
10%	650	100	Obs	1,023
25%	1350	100	Sum of Wgt.	1,491,388
50%	2500		Mean	2958.113
		Largest	Std. Dev.	2499.917
75%	3900	15000		
90%	5400	17000	Variance	6249583
95%	7600	20000	Skewness	2.766846
99%	13700	23500	Kurtosis	15.89136



Appendix 2.5 Dispersion of total income per individual per month. Creative sector. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Buenos Aires. Year 2009. At current prices.

	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	450	250		
5%	800	450		
10%	1000	600	Obs	135
25%	1800	600	Sum of Wgt.	193,273
50%	3000		Mean	3474.944
		Largest	Std. Dev.	2488.164
75%	4400	8150		
90%	7000	9000	Variance	6190960
95%	8000	15000	Skewness	1.908483
99%	15000	15000	Kurtosis	8.508725



Appendix 2.6 Dispersion of total income per individual per month. Non- creative sector. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Buenos Aires. Year 2010. At current prices.

	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	400	100		
5%	700	120		
10%	1000	120	Obs	810
25%	1800	200	Sum of Wgt.	1,283,696
50%	2900		Mean	3567.875
		Largest	Std. Dev.	3101.522
75%	4400	21000		
90%	6900	23000	Variance	9619437
95%	9000	25500	Skewness	3.783909
99%	14000	35000	Kurtosis	29.14171



Appendix 2.7 Dispersion of total income per individual per month. Creative sector. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Buenos Aires. Year 2010. At current prices.

	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	400	20		
5%	600	400		
10%	960	400	Obs	113
25%	1800	490	Sum of Wgt.	171,791
50%	3500		Mean	3727.188
		Largest	Std. Dev.	2564.258
75%	5000	8700		
90%	6700	9500	Variance	6575418
95%	7350	12000	Skewness	1.88408
99%	12000	17980	Kurtosis	10.36076



Appendix 2.8 Dispersion of total income per individual per month. Non- creative sector. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Buenos Aires. Year 2011. At current prices

	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	400	20		
5%	1000	50		
10%	1400	110	Obs	868
25%	2400	200	Sum of Wgt.	1,321,893
50%	3500		Mean	4379.209
		Largest	Std. Dev.	3094.586
75%	6000	20000		
90%	8000	21000	Variance	9576460
95%	10000	23000	Skewness	1.912921
99%	15000	25000	Kurtosis	9.099251



Appendix 2.9 Dispersion of total income per individual per month. Creative sector. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Buenos Aires. Year 2011. At current prices.

	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	400	200		
5%	700	400		
10%	1000	400	Obs	120
25%	2200	500	Sum of Wgt.	175,381
50%	3700		Mean	4637.052
		Largest	Std. Dev.	5153.001
75%	5000	11200		
90%	8000	13000	Variance	2.66e+07
95%	9400	24000	Skewness	5.401017
99%	45000	45000	Kurtosis	40.84973



Appendix 2.10 Dispersion of total income per individual per month. Non- creative sector. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Buenos Aires. Year 2012. At current prices

	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	500	150		
5%	1020	300		
10%	2000	400	Obs	817
25%	3000	400	Sum of Wgt.	1,272,429
50%	4500		Mean	5694.504
		Largest	Std. Dev.	4482.241
75%	7400	23000		
90%	11000	24000	Variance	2.01e+07
95%	14000	43500	Skewness	3.135897
99%	22500	53000	Kurtosis	24.02247



Appendix 2.11 Dispersion of total income per individual per month. Creative sector. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Buenos Aires. Year 2012. At current prices

	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	200	200		
5%	1000	200		
10%	2000	300	Obs	110
25%	3200	400	Sum of Wgt.	171,594
50%	5000		Mean	5414.288
		Largest	Std. Dev.	3378.697
75%	7000	13000		
90%	9200	13000	Variance	1.14e+07
95%	10750	15000	Skewness	1.350859
99%	19300	19300	Kurtosis	6.122143



Appendix 2.12 Dispersion of total income per individual per month. Non- creative sector. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Buenos Aires. Year 2013. At current prices

	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	540	160		
5%	1500	200		
10%	2100	300	Obs	682
25%	4000	300	Sum of Wgt.	1,243,552
50%	6000		Mean	7389.64
		Largest	Std. Dev.	5606.19
75%	9250	35000		
90%	15000	37000	Variance	3.14e+07
95%	18000	38000	Skewness	2.137202
99%	30000	40500	Kurtosis	9.665929



Appendix 2.13 Dispersion of total income per individual per month. Creative sector. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Buenos Aires. Year 2013. At current prices

	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	1000	800		
5%	1200	1000		
10%	2700	1000	Obs	105
25%	4058	1000	Sum of Wgt.	188,802
50%	6300		Mean	6991.949
		Largest	Std. Dev.	4316.283
75%	8000	17000		
90%	13500	18600	Variance	1.86e+07
95%	16500	20000	Skewness	1.342732
99%	22500	22500	Kurtosis	4.889005



Appendix 2.14 Dispersion of total income per individual per month. Non- creative sector. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Buenos Aires. Year 2014. At current prices

	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	500	200		
5%	1730	250		
10%	2500	300	Obs	905
25%	4500	300	Sum of Wgt.	1,279,967
50%	7000		Mean	8261.942
		Largest	Std. Dev.	5956.895
75%	10000	33000		
90%	15000	36000	Variance	3.55e+07
95%	20000	40000	Skewness	1.960345
99%	30200	40000	Kurtosis	8.447605



Appendix 2.15 Dispersion of total income per individual per month. Creative sector. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Buenos Aires. Year 2014. At current prices

	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	1000	200		
5%	2500	1000		
10%	3500	1400	Obs	136
25%	5000	2200	Sum of Wgt.	190,043
50%	7000		Mean	9882.548
		Largest	Std. Dev.	13766
75%	10500	21750		
90%	18000	22500	Variance	1.90e+08
95%	21000	22500	Skewness	6.823934
99%	120000	120000	Kurtosis	54.73888



Appendix 2.16 Dispersion of total income per individual per month. Non- creative sector. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Buenos Aires. Year 2015. At current prices

	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	800	110		
5%	2000	300		
10%	3500	300	Obs	950
25%	5900	400	Sum of Wgt.	1,286,300
50%	9000		Mean	10736.74
		Largest	Std. Dev.	7860.388
75%	13800	48000		
90%	20000	51000	Variance	6.18e+07
95%	24000	60000	Skewness	2.502632
99%	40000	80000	Kurtosis	14.57905



Appendix 2.17 Dispersion of total income per individual per month. Creative sector. Histogram of the distribution of income per worker per month. Buenos Aires. Year 2015. At current prices

	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	2000	2000		
5%	4000	2000		
10%	4000	2000	Obs	140
25%	7300	2300	Sum of Wgt.	183,320
50%	10000		Mean	12409.52
		Largest	Std. Dev.	10658.36
75%	15000	28800		
90%	21000	30000	Variance	1.14e+08
95%	25900	45200	Skewness	6.12008
99%	45200	116000	Kurtosis	57.61641



Appendix 3: Interviews.

Interview Number 1 – Paula Rivera – INAMU

LB-How did the conditions of people working in culture evolve in these years, both locally and globally? Are they recognized as workers?

PR-My base was always here, but I had more professional development outside. Due to gender condition I have had more development in Europe, in terms of the possibilities and how the working conditions were facilitated, and later because I think I have been lucky also for the artists I have worked with or for the platforms where I was able to land also by the hand of artists, professionals or colleagues with whom I was related.

LB-A continuous round trip ...

PR-Yes. Therefore, I know well that great difference and also that contrast with which one has to live together; I consider myself as a manager but mainly a producer of culture and behind the production there is always a business; then in those moments and in that development I had ten strong years where I went from working from one agency to another and each time the artists with whom I was linked were better, with more developed careers. In Argentina we come with a very strong brake on development, we must improve the conditions of cultural work. The economic repeated crises had responses and that I think that also gave birth to independents, those who set up their own personal kiosks and started to say: if I do not work as an artist, it can work with a booking. It is clear that here artist rise for the passion they have, for the love to music, and for the necessity of being creative or disappear.
Argentina is not the best place to be a cultural and productive manager in the whole music industry. It seems to me that there are countries that have already paved the way much more, like Chile.

LB-And that you think has to do with greater support from the public sector or this kind of independent network that are being put together, or a bit of the two?

PR- I think it is a bit of everything but above all we have been going through a very strong crisis for many years.

LB-Economically?

PR- Economically, that makes you have to go to these multitasks and to be open every possible opportunity. Many times a cultural manager ends up being the musician or some sort of manager, of booker ... and many times it is not by choice but because it is needed, because you can not band to coast and have a manager and a booker and then you are manager of your own band.

LB-Well, and talking about all this, about the independent, and the many musicians who work for free, or who actually pay to play. How do you think this type of arrangement is sustained?

PR- Yes, of course, the industry continues to make the musician believe that he needs it to work, the musician is willing to do everything, the artist goes out to pay for everything.. they pay to the record label what they do not have ... it's terrible, it's awful. The thing is that I love working with musicians, because they love profoundly what they do, and you can tell that just by seeing how much they sacrifice just to be on a stage. Few are chosen, they are maintained and some are destroyed because the industry destroys artists.
In reality, the big producers bet on the one that gives them the most revenue. However, most independent musicians base they work in the networks the build. For them it is essential to have acquaintances not only in the big companies, but other musicians collegues; guys with whom you have played, shared things. In general is that what opens you more and more doors, because one recommends you, later someone else recommends you too, and so on, not the big producers.

Then you start producing your own project, you may even get Sony to hit the door but you will know how to do it. And I'm not saying never sign with a company; On the contrary, I am saying that you can do it from another place of knowledge and in that way also reorder this industry so unpleasant that at some point it will have to implode. Until recently the multinationals, the big companies, were destroyed…They were saved by technology, everything digital saved them.

That's why the industry is at the most powerful moment in the history of multinationals. Last year they took 77% of everything generated, now they take 80% of what is generated. However, the conditions do not improve, because if the conditions of the musician do not improve much less they will improve those of the manager or the producer of the independent music.

LB- What role do the trade associations, the sector or the cultural sectors of the musician in Sadem or equivalent play? Do you think that the presence of a union has weight?

PR-There is a reality, in Argentina the Sadem Musicians Union has no national jurisdiction. To start is a union that is limited to the City of Buenos Aires and part of the province of Buenos Aires; and some other provincial jurisdictions.
It is very limited, at the time it was a very active and useful union that responded to the reality of the artists.

LB- How was the INAMU created?

The law of music was born precisely from the creation of all these associations that legitimized the musician, the music, within something that contained them and pushed the bill to the Congress. The INAMU was born from this law, what was promoted was the draft law of music. It was very associative and is a pioneer because it was born from an impulse of the same independent organized sector. It was not proposed by a government, it was not proposed by an official. Obviously afterwards a lot of work was done so that each senator and each deputy supported and could be debated.

Did not enter the hand of a political project or a management, it was the same activity organized independently that boosted the INAMU, were the musicians and music nothing

more. At that time, neither the producers nor the managers nor the union nor the society of authors were present. They were themselves who ended up putting a stage at the door of Congress to put pressure. It was Flaco Spinetta sending a video to the Senate, it was Cerati, it was Santolalla. I do not know, all the national music greats bank to INAMU. It was incredible.

LB- I wanted to touch a bit on the gender issue, on the access that women have or not to the industry from the top of the stage; below, the gender agenda is very valid and present in the INAMU, right?

PR- The feminist boiling that has taken place in the last year in the country, but more specially in the city of Buenos Aires, where the workers of the audiovisual industry and also those of the music were getting together to discuss gender issues in their respective sectors. That was the perfect framework for women music begin to gestate, which was the need for a law of quotas on the stage from the lack of visibility of women in live music.
What did your arrival at the Institute entail?

With my arrival there was a generational change based on the idea that we have to take care of women musicians. To begin the registration of INAMU did not reach 14% of registered women, today we are at 18.5 - 19%. We are talking that in April of this year over 47,200 registered, 9,001 were women. Since last year I started an action by gender agenda and I started going to all the provinces. Only with an email and nothing more than an email I knew that it would be the perfect feedback to understand where I had to go. So it was. The groups appeared, the associations, all began to call, we made twelve meetings. In those meetings I made the perfect radiography of needs by region. What happens in Patagonia is not the same as what happens in the Northwest. Culturally, Argentina is very complex and diverse.

It was a working X-ray…

Yes. From the radiography is born the need to make a survey that was also worked with women. We were generating women nodes, which were left as representatives, as antennas in the city, province and region and we formed a survey with ten very broad questions: from if they were registered in the INAMU to if they had ever suffered some type of discrimination or abuse in the music sector. Of this last query, which is a fact that everyone is interested in, 70% said yes. Then there was a lot of hard work to do. For ninety days we were open to almost 5,000 women who polled, not only music but all those who do all the roles of the sector. And this year with a budget already on the table we managed to put together a petit committee with sociologists, anthropologists and musicologists working conclusions and in August we will present a clear report of real data, where women are standing in music, in terms of the labor, its formation, the activity and the obviously subject of discrimination by region or by city.

LB-Finally, broadening a bit the scoop to the CI an the attention payed to them as enhancers of development, do you think that applies here in Buenos Aires and more specifically in the music industry?

PR- Creative Industries and development does not apply in this country, I can assure you. But I think it has to do with the simple fact that culture is really the first thing that is cuts off from the public budget because, according to some, it's not a priority.

However, the government management of culture in the City of Buenos Aires has bet many points to that [CI]. What happens is that you can not push alone or just the 'culture car' in a context of other problems. It's a giant world that makes these industries continue or not, but there is a part that I admire a lot of how it is trying to drive and I always look at it from the music side that is what concerns me. In the last years I like how the scenarios were rethought in the streets where not everything is political propaganda or the name of the ministry or the secretariat. It seems to me that the image that is being carried out is very good. Hopefully it may have some continuity.

Interview Number 2 – Enrique Avogadro– Former Secretary of Creative Industries

LB- According to your perspective, what is the importance of the creative industries in our current global system?

EA- For me they are very relevant because they are post-industrial productive sectors; They are also a response to the problem of changing the productive matrix of cities. The cities historically had a presence of very labor-intensive sectors that, with a change in the productive matrix together with changes in the global market, meant that in many cases the countries in their evolutionary curve ended up going to the services, while in the poorest or least developed countries ended up in the most intensive sectors. That change in the productive matrix led to question who could generate employment if these sectors that previously generated it are not doing it anymore. And there the CIs appear along with other sectors such as tourism, as the new places for employment generation. However, many things that we have been proclaimed about the CI did not match the results. Even so, I argue that CIs are important because they continue to maintain their potential for generating employment. The British are the ones who popularized the CI and who spoke of intellectual property and exploitation of that property. Thus, although the rules of the game are given in the global markets, I prefer to be in a country or a region that has or has given itself a strategy on ICs than those that do not. In our case a city like Buenos Aires has a very powerful audiovisual industry, it has a music industry. They are phenomena where one can operate if you see mini work niches that arise.

LB- What kind of development or local strategy do you need to apply to accompany the CI?

EA- What happens is that even so, I am critical in terms of the fact that we still do not deploy a coherent, aggressive, industry or economy strategy, say, and constant over time, neither as a country nor as a city. We have to operate on the creative value chain in the field of visual arts, theater, film, and so on. I am convinced of the importance of a coherent and sustained strategy over time with a level of governance, with commitment from all political parties to follow a plan in our country, saving the institutional problems that are in both the public sector and the public sector. It is very difficult to create medium-term plans that have a level of commitment throughout society. In the United Kingdom a passage from an

industrial to a post-industrial economy was made; the same is true of the French in a completely different style because it is understood that culture is much more than culture, it is clearly the construction of power of the nation and, at the same time, it is a possibility of generating income with ramifications to all areas.

LB- What do you think about the Employment - I.C. relationship?

EA-The relationship for me is very direct, I believe that there is creation of employment without any doubt. In social terms, to the extent that it is understood that the spill over effect comes in addition. Not a spill for the neoliberal idea; the market has flaws and the State has to fit in in order to make sure that these failures are not put at all. The problem gentrification, for example is a market problem, you can decide if you are going to intervene or not, but what will happen if you see much development in some value chain of the CI with positive impact: 1) There will be a few or there will be several beneficiaries; 2) what story you are going to tell, pasteurized for the consumption of an average tourist or something more sophisticated, more complex where society is your own identity; 3) how everything happens in a given territory How will you operate on that change? Does it give you the same or does it not?

Barcelona is a city that today has serious problems with tourism and, at the same time, lives from it; then it is a tug-of-war where society has to decide. If you get the tourism to Barcelona in 10 years are impoverished, then you have to think what tension, what point of balance exists between a lot of local tourism and abroad. In that there are a lot of cities that are tourist cities but at the same time the most populist version is "outside all foreigners". That is not viable either.

LB- It is not viable…

EA- It is not viable Who gives food? You have a lifestyle of the first world, medium or high. These are problems that we wish we had and I hope before we have that problem we have discussed it. I wish the problem today was a lot of tourism in Buenos Aires. We are far from that problem. It is part of the challenge that one has, it is not that an CI is bad, it is bad if you do not work to develop it.

LB- What role do you think that played or was assigned to cultural policies or to the figure of the entrepreneur?

EA- For me they are concepts that were very close to hand. It is sometimes difficult to analyse concepts because semantics change over time. At the time an entrepreneur was used in its positive version, because it used to be a bad word and then it appeared as a positive figure. And I think that the concept of an entrepreneur was a bi abused. Second, because in fact it was not verified that you were going to have 25 thousands Mercado Libre let's say; and thirdly because for me it has something of selfish the concept of an entrepreneur, has something related to de idea of ‘save yourself’. However, entrepreneurs do not exist in a vacuum, they exists in societies, and there lies the collective responsibility of the state. The toolbox that comes behind what it means to be an entrepreneur is what it is highly positive and should be massified.

LB- Creative Labour studies highlight aspects of the labour conditions of the CI that have negative social effects. The exacerbation of informality, the long working hours, more flexibilisation, much less inclusive for women or people of other ethnic groups, and so on. What is your position about that?

EA- Many things are mixed. For instance, the technological district of the City was always much faster in its development than the rest because it is a more organized, formalized sector. The audiovisual, on the other hand, is full of hustlers. In addition, a production company can be opened and closed in a second. However, I do not believe that it is a characteristic of the CI in itself, but it is the current stage of capitalism that leads that direction, Clearly it is a loss of rights of the workers, because it is the technology development rather than creativity what transfers the power to another, I do not know if for better or for worse, but it does involve a change of power.

LB- And transfer the risk too ...

EA- Yes. Now I think we are still living a moment of Far West, clearly there is no regulation ... However, they are employees who in practice are not exactly 8 hours employees, those who mark the card, but what some countries are exploring are regimes intermediate labor…Labor flexibilization is not something exclusive to the I.C.

LB- Definitely and we can blame for it from the newswork society to neoliberalism, but what is somehow understood is that these industries tend a little more to exacerbate flexibilization.

EA- The technology that allows is to go out and look for the designer in the whole world and if you want to make a logo ... there is a Rabbit in the whole world. If they offer you something cheaper, you go there. What is not changing is that the change is happening. The technology enables to search for the designer around the globe. But that's where I say I do not know, my vision is that it is a product of technological development and not of the CI. In the end, this process of globalization is unstoppable because it is the technology that is generating it, it is the technology and the consumers that are generating it, so the CI are rather the ones evolving so as not to become obsolete.

LB- It is true, thinking it not as bad "per se" but what I question about the narrative and the rhetoric with which it was generated, sold, expanded globally, not that CI have in themselves a component element of inequality but perhaps in the way in which the concept was expanded.

EA- But it is not something that is a product of this specific sector, I think, but because CI are vanguard sectors, and therefore intensive in talent. Of course depending on your location in the social pyramid you might have access or not, but this happens in many industries. There are not so many nuclear physics from low-class backgrounds, but that is a sad outcome of living in an unequal society where not everyone has access to education. In fact, the issue of gender and racial diversity: in Argentina this debate is less visible; Gender is debated but not diversity because it is a more European issue if you want. I would also question it in the sense that if you focus on Netflix the contents are very diverse. Many of

those who lead the gender discussion are the creative sectors themselves. Me Too emerges from the global gender debate. One could argue that the participation of women is not only part of the CI, but it is the one that is motorizing because it emerges effectively from the cinema or other sectors. It is likely that there is more debate about the participation of women in the CI than in more traditional industries, like the metallurgical industry.

LB- As final reflextion, what can you tell about the good and the bad effects of the CI?

EA- CI are vanguard sectors of post-capitalism, and in that position they take the good and the bad of post-capitalism, specially labour flexibilisation and lack of rules; as at first, especially here regulations have always come late and also because the interests are transnational and therefore it is not easy to align objectives with. But within the context in which we are, I want to be a creative country, I want to be part of a creative city. There is something inevitable about this, it is the way towards which the world is going, and until the society does not question the super-structure, a city with the potential of Buenos Aires should understand how to be creative, while of course trying to include as many people as possible, and perhaps there lies the challenge.

LB-I agree, that is the biggest challenge…

EA- Indeed. We also have to do something for those who are losing the game, and in countries like ours with high labour costs, a country that is very hypocritical, with half of the workers are registered and half that are not. The problem is that the registered part is not competitive. Do you have to take out of them their won rights? Of course, not. But they are also becoming obsolete sectors. The areas that have economic development is that at the same time they have to regulate the new ones without making mistakes because they are going to another country and deregulate the previous one without that being the cuckoo of the 90s. It's ovum, it's a very thin line between stifling flexibility and deregulating everything. For me it is not a dilemma of creative industries exclusively, but it is rather a problem of any cutting-edge industry.

Interview Number 2 – Fernando Arias– OIC

LB- Starting by analysing the debate about the economisation of culture or the culturalisation of the economy, what are your thoughts about that?

FA – I believe it is a big question that still remains open and from my general point of view, the economic dimension of the cultural industries seems to be part of their DNA, but also the symbolic value they generate is the very basic of their character. That double dimension, if then a concept comes together more well there is also debated. In the cultural industries the diversity of that concept more clearly fixes a position regarding the distinction of the sector in the cultural but this is diluted when encountering the creative. In the creative industries there are sectors that clearly do not have a cultural component such as software, such as architecture.

LB– Well in fact, Chris Smith, the head of the DCMS took the 'creative turn' to make that double dimension even more clear. The rename of the culture to the creative was a strategy to get away from everything that has to do with culture and have more connection with the economic dimension.

FA - Yes, but at the same time at least from the most political level the strategy was also to return to the generation of the Rolling Stones and the Beatles highlighting the relevance of the British culture. Tony Blair played with it, with the addition of this cultural sector in the agenda something that had been quite confronted at the time of Margaret Teacher, mainly in budgetary terms. Blair's policy caught the popular support better, that's for sure.

LB – Yes, let's say it was a political movement. According to you, how important are the CI in our contemporary economy?

FA – Well, first at the national level I would say that, with no doubt, CI are increasingly important. Keynes anticipated this when he stated that in a future economy, once the basic needs are covered, leisure time that was going to be key in the society of the future. Clearly cultural consumption would enter into this idea, right? This was also anticipated by the French sociologist Bordieu. For him, the distinction between social classes, talking about the 80s, was achieved through cultural differentiations. Well, the line of Keynes clearly believe that this is how it is, there is more and more space for recreation, there is a lot of leisure time to do cultural activities among others

LB - is it the same for the north as for the south?

FA - for me there are two differences clearly, that of undeveloped or moderately developed societies such as our region, this is much less widespread, so the population does not have access to the possibilities of leisure enjoyment that may have societies in the North.

LB - what do you think were the biggest impacts of the CI in Argentina? or the biggest ideas adopted about the subject in our country?

FA – It was a process. There are two moments differentiated by the orientations in the national and local government, that is Bs. As. The first policies were developed to focus on cultural industries with a strong focus on protecting, accompanying, promoting local cultural SMEs. Today with the change of political management that started in 2007 in the city, the idea or the concept of the CI was adopted, taking in the same model of the UK. What I would say in that process, the first question is that there was not a debate around this. It can have some disadvantages in terms of profit in relation to what I mentioned in relation to technology. To think today of the cultural sector independently of advances, technological changes would be a problem. In fact, perhaps the CI help you think about that articulation. When this change was produced, the Observatory of Cultural Industries, then it was all the sudden, the Creative Industries' period. Finally, we specialized in the British model because we had developed that line that follows the DCMS documents at that time the more explicative of how to explain the inclusion of certain activities such as the ones that constituted the creative.

LB – Do you think that over the years the CI concept has evolved from how it was coined at the begging?

FA - No, I do not see it, frankly. To the worker even if this is measurable through the management itself, clearly in the City of Buenos Aires the policy of the Creative Industries is totally stagnant or even decelerating. Cultural Industries entered the Ministry of Culture, then they moved to the Ministry of Production even being Cultural Industries. With the change of political management the CI are integrated to what was successor the Ministry of Production, it becomes the Ministry of Economic Development and the recent novelty is the area is now in the Ministry of Education and what I know are really in a vegetative state throughout the area, and also in that course was going down different steps in level of importance. At the time CI was aa Secretary, and today it is a Direction that has even fall into the vague name of Knowledge Industries.

LB – Usually, the use of the same variables (VA, employment) is apply to diagnose and at the same time measure the impact of CI policies. In short, how much does the VA tell us and the rate of creative employment on the true economic and social impacts of IC?

F- They were useful at the beginning to valuate economically and to make visible the political value, to make these industries to enter in the political agenda, and it was a valid strategy in my opinion. But well, with the time there should be an evolution to new parameters to measure impact. The social impact is measure by the employment and that is questionable. It does not look at a social impact accurate indicator. Actually, perhaps each particular program should have its own kind of indicator.

LB-Regarding the so called exacerbation of flexibility as a main characteristic of the creative labour, how much do you think it is something exclusive of the CI and how much something of the general labour reform?

FA-I think the creative labour market is specially characterised for these circumstances of mayor flexibilization, multi-employment, informality. Many cultural jobs have these characteristics and there are already some studies addressing that.

L-And what do you thin it differentiates the most creative employment in Buenos Aires?

FA- Well, there are many things. First of all, the city is quite rich in culture. There are some industries with long tradition as the audio-visual and the music sectors. However, due to the characteristics of these productions the instability of being occupied transitorily, here is more visible specially in the audio-visual sector'. Also the professionals in these industries are from a particular kind. They are composed by mainly entrepreneurs, highly educated: Creative workers enter to the Universities as perhaps artist dreamers, and leave the institution with one or two associates, its incredible. People working in the CI are really hard workers, that can coup with a lot of uncertainty basically for the passion of what they do.

Interview Number 2 – Hector Schargorodsky - Observatorio Cultural Economic Faculty (UBA)

LB- According to your perspective, what is the importance of IC in our current global system? Is it the same for the north as for the global south?

HS-Well, that depends on what the real objective is, let's say for the ICs are being implemented. If you see them only from the point of economic view, the difference is very large between the countries that really generate value with the CI and those that do not. Then, from the social and cultural point of view, it already changes. They are industries with great symbolic content that carry ideas and messages and connect us in some way with the world. There is, of course, a great difference in the north and south. Here we do not have the amount of patents or technology. You can hopefully be a supplier of certain things, but it is very difficult to sell design content. I admire why these guys like 4 Qabezas, or Suar with his company ... what's his name? Polka! These entrepreneurs who knew how to put content out against the flow, let's say. Chapeaux Equally it is not that entrepreneurship is what is going to have real impact. Let's say that they are two examples of thousands who failed or did not even try to cope with a global chain of role distribution.

LB-What do you think were the biggest impacts of the concepts since the origin of the CI in the UK in LA and more specifically in Buenos Aires?

HS- I think that what most impacted was the idea of professionalization. It took somehow the arts and cultural activities out of the hobby spectrum. From a more theoretical point of view, let's say that he introduced them to the market, taking them from behind the shadow of the economy to now be part of it. Understanding that in order to get involved, you had to stop fulling around and play the guitar all day to sit down and see how it really is done to record a record.

LB-Do you think that it evolved over the years or does the same perception about the impact of ICs continue?

HS- No, it is evident that the attention has greatly increased. You can see it clearly with the university degrees that have grown relation to CI. Now in each major city you have a master's degree in IC or cultural management. The number of arts professionalization courses, the number of events and mentions to the CIs. It evolved a lot in these 20 years. Before we did not have data, we did not have anything and now we have local, national and regional statistics; journals, thousands of academic articles. It evolved a lot and the term is still very valid.

LB- How do you understand the relationship between CI and development? From what point of view (econ, soc, cult), with what consequences…

HS- CIs are a contribution to development. If there is economic development, it is because there is cultural development, otherwise it would not work. They are not everything, it is not that they guarantee 100% of the development, but they collaborate, they contribute

their part. The most advanced economies, the most developed ones have a great cultural development of base, I say very characteristic cultures with a lot of history ... and of course for that reason also great development of the CI. They come from the hand, let's say.

LB- In the same document, diagnostic variables are numbered and the importance of the data is discussed in order to elaborate policies. My doubt that derives both from this and from other reports lies in the use of the same variables (VA, employment) to diagnose and at the same time measure the impact of CI policies. In short, how much does the VA tell us and the rate of creative employment on the true economic and social impacts of IC?

HS- Well the variables are being developed. It is all very new in the study of CIs and is also very new to make impact measurements, besides being generally more expensive studies. The VA, employment, serve clear to measure the evolution over time. And all those data began to be generated 20 years ago, before there was nothing like that. Of course it is difficult to measure impact, especially the social one.

LB-It is argued in creative labour studies that employment in the sector has distinctive characteristics of greater self-employment, informality, partial days, flexibility / precariousness of being project-based industries. How much are these characteristics of the CI and how much are part of the general trend of labour markets in the new information age?

HS- Well, this is a very important discussion, just talk about this recently with my son. It is true that we are in an era in which labor flexibilization is part of everyone's outlook. The new generations are not working in the same company, in a job for life. The conditions have also changed. Being connected in a network allows us to be working from anywhere in the world. Either way, I see that all these characteristics are more exacerbated in some branches of the cultural sector. There are some activities that we say were always more fragile than others in terms of flexibility and precariousness, and many of the cultural sector are part of this group more impacted by this.

LB- In the document are suggested strategies for the development of HR in the design of CI policies, do you think that in practice these labor characteristics of the sector have been taken into account?

HS- Well to answer that we must take into account the different legal levels since the policies emerged. At the local level, the particularities of employment have been taken into account, but also because local governments have the greatest possibility of doing so. At the national level, policies can not and have not taken into account labor practices because they are much more generic policies to promote the sector, which point to something else besides. At the provincial level there has been some initiative, but it is always the most local government that can have some impact in this regard. The City of Buenos Aires has been able to address these issues.

LB- What opinion do you have about the relationship between the study of working conditions and development?

HS- Which are KEY. One of the most important factors to consider has to do with that, as they directly affect the social sphere. There is no development if there is not a labor force that finds its correct position in the economy.

LB- Do you have any opinion on the policy strategy for CI implemented by the city of BsAs between 2007 and 2015. How are they framed in the global context and in the local context?

HS- Well, nothing very different from many policies in general in our country. At a discursive level they say that many things will be done and in practice they do not end up happening. Many policies were also ambitious, and many other difficulties were found along the way. But in any case it is something to notice the difference between what is said and what it does. And in the end we have to keep the facts.

LB-What problems do employees face in the city? Was this made visible at some point in the policies aimed at the sector?

The biggest problem in the sector (and the country as a whole) is the lack of access to financing. Of an economic infrastructure to which the sector can appeal. There is a lack of strategies to facilitate access to financing and in general, the sources of financing for our country are few, because here there is no money and those outside do not trust to come and invest here due to the contrasting lack of political and economic stability. If that infrastructure does not stabilize, the creative sector will not develop either.