

Burgomaster Rückert: Shimmering between Good and Evil

A research regarding the position of Burgomaster J.J.G.E Rückert of Enschede between 1940-1945, based on the analytical model of Dutch Historian Peter Romijn

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Chapter I: Introduction

During the Second World War, the Dutch government went into exile. The government in exile had asked the civil servants and other governmental institutions that were left behind to make decisions that had the most benefits for the Dutch people and not so much for the Nazis. This last request could be broadly interpreted by the many servants and institutions whilst dealing with the Nazis. In the first year of the occupation life continued seemingly without too much influence of the Nazis. However, in October 1940, all civil servants had to sign a document which was called the Ariërverklaring. In short, this was a declaration set up by the Nazis in which a civil servant had to confirm if they were Jewish or not. If they were, they would lose their job. During the occupation there were a number of civil servants and burgomasters in local government that refused to follow orders set up by the Nazis and resigned. Others were replaced by the Nazis if they were not deemed suitable for the task at hand. Their replacements were members of the Dutch National Socialist Party (Nationaal Socialistische Beweging, NSB) or other collaborators that would obey the Nazis without a second thought. But there was a particularity in which a burgomaster could navigate between obeying, cooperating or objecting Nazi policies without getting replaced or fired. The particularity in question was the burgomaster of Enschede, Johannes Jacobus Gerardus Everwijn Rückert. He was able to maintain his position as the burgomaster of Enschede during the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands.

The Nazis hoped that the implementation of their rules and regulations would be executed without any hinderance from within the Dutch governmental system. There were a few major players that played a role for the implementation and execution of Nazi regulations on a local level. These players were the burgomaster and the Aldermen. The City Council was at first an important factor in local government, but after 1941 the Council ceased to exist as it was abolished by the Nazis. The Nazis tried to dictate and influence the policy of the burgomasters and the local civil servants by using an ‘top down’ approach. This approach meant that the top positions in the Dutch governmental system solely exist of high-ranking Nazi bureaucrats. The rest of the system would remain Dutch, as it was before the war. The reason for this decision was because the Nazis did not had enough people at their disposal to fully replace the Dutch governmental system. As a result, the burgomasters and civil servants were placed into a position in which they had to obey the requests, regulations and demands made by the Nazis. This decision made by the Nazis did not come without any consequences,

since rejecting or posing any form of resistance from the Dutch civil servants could lead to different punishments. Examples were being replaced or fired, which would bring unemployment.

The end of the Second World War and the liberation of the Netherlands resulted in a “retribution”, or witch hunt, against burgomasters who openly cooperated with the Nazis. These collaborators were fired or put into prison, whilst others fled to Germany. The focus in this Master Thesis will be on the position of burgomaster Rückert during the Second World War. Research regarding this burgomaster of Enschede is limited, but the research that is available showed that Rückert did in fact cooperated with the Nazis during the occupation. There are even sources that mention the involvement of Rückert in the persecution of Dutch Jews in the city of Enschede, be it direct or indirect involvement.¹ But what makes the case of Rückert so interesting is that during the war he did not resign from his position, never got replaced by the Nazis and even received an honorary discharge from his service as a burgomaster, which was granted by the reinstated Dutch government after the war.²

¹ Marjolein J. Schenkel, *De Twentse Paradox. De lotgevallen van de Joodse bevolking van Hengelo en Enschede tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog*. (Nederland: Walburg Press, 2003) 77-79.

² See Appendix I, Image 1.4. Article originates from a Dutch newspaper called *De Nieuwe Nederlander*. Published on 19-12-1945.

1.1: Research Question

The research question will be focused on the burgomaster of Enschede, Rückert. The research itself is based on a theoretical model to analyse the behaviour and position of the burgomaster during the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands. This model was made by Peter Romijn in his book *Burgemeester in oorlogstijd. Besturen onder Duitse bezetting* published in 2006.³ Romijn's work covers an extensive time period wherein Romijn portrays a general image of the position of the burgomasters in the Netherlands and tries to find an explanation as to why this position became under siege by the Nazis. Furthermore, Romijn showcases that there were many different factors that had an impact on the decisions made by burgomasters, therefore resulting in different cases.⁴ Romijn tries to elaborate the process regarding the burgomasters during the occupation in a chronological method, starting with the Nazi invasion of the Netherlands. By using Romijn's model, the research question within this Thesis is the following:

How did burgomaster Rückert behaved during the occupation and how does that fit in the theoretic model of the historian Peter Romijn?

What this model means and how does this model work will be explained in paragraph 1.2. The research question will be supported by three additional sub-questions that will focus on three events and three behavioural types. These three behavioural types will be cooperation, negotiation and objection by the burgomaster in regard to Nazi regulations. The three sub questions are based on three themes from Romijn's analytical model. Those three themes are the following: What was *'the function of the burgomaster and local government'* in these years? What were *'the dynamics in the history of the occupation seen through the eyes of government'* and lastly, was there a *'clash between the state and society as a result of the imported revolution due to national socialism'*?⁵ How these three themes of Romijn's model shape the sub-questions and what the sub-questions are will also be explained in paragraph 1.2

³ Peter Romijn, *Burgemeesters in oorlogstijd. Besturen onder Duitse bezetting* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans, 2006) 15-16.

⁴ Ibid.: 15-16.

⁵ Ibid.: 15-16.

1.2: Theoretical Model

This research focuses on the position of Burgomaster Rückert between 1940 until 1945, a period of five years. There are theories that focus on burgomasters in general or another specific burgomaster, but the problem with the latter is that not every burgomaster operated in the same way and each one had different factors that influenced their behaviour. To find and use a model that specialises on a single burgomaster is difficult. A theoretical model, or concept, that understands the many individual cases regarding the position of the burgomaster and tends to explain a more general concept of the position of burgomasters during the Second World War, can be found in the work of Peter Romijn.

The first theme in Romijn's work focuses on the burgomaster and local government. Romijn argues that the position of the burgomaster must first be explained thoroughly before continuing.⁶ This ensures that there is an understanding as to what the function meant and to give a description of the position before and during the war. According to Romijn, the position of the burgomaster was not the most important one in local government *before* the war. However, the burgomaster was one of the major players that made up local government.⁷ The other major players in Dutch local government was the city council, with their members being elected by the people, and the College of Burgomasters and Aldermen.⁸ (*College van Burgemeesters en Wethouders, B&W*) The Aldermen in turn, were chosen by the members of the city council. The Aldermen themselves were not part of the council. When the occupier took control and implemented new regulations that changed the dynamics of local government, the position of the burgomaster changed with it. At first, the burgomaster would be one of the first persons in local government to be addressed or notified in case of a tragedy or good news. He would be informed by civil servants or news came from the people over whom they governed.⁹ Being the "face" of local government added a certain value to the position of the burgomaster, but this changed when the Nazis stepped in and changed the system.¹⁰ In 1941 the Nazis implemented the *Führerprinzip* system. This system meant that all political responsibility, legislative and executive power was placed solemnly in the hands of

⁶ Ibid.: 16.

⁷ Ibid.: 16.

⁸ Ibid.: 16.

⁹ Ibid.: 16.

¹⁰ Ibid.: 17.

the burgomaster. From that moment on, there was no other force that could negate or object the decisions made by the burgomaster within local government.¹¹ The city council was abolished and ceased to exist. Other influential bodies that could challenge the position of the burgomaster lost their political powers as well.¹² This did not mean that civil servants and the Aldermen would be powerless. They could influence policy making by giving advice to the burgomaster, but in the end the decision making was left solely to the Burgomaster. However, the services provided by the civil servants and the Aldermen were still needed to keep local government running.

However, the difficulty that Romijn faced during his own research was that there exist a variation between the burgomasters.¹³ Each burgomaster acted differently and accordingly to many factors, such as time, location and personality.¹⁴ To create a method to measure all these varieties of burgomasters, Romijn looked at events that were recorded and therefore measurable. These events are acts of war, damage by war, the location of the municipality within the Netherlands, orders regarding the evacuation of citizens, Jewish citizens within the municipality, the towns, cities and social cohesion.¹⁵ These varieties are also present in this research, but the focus will be on three events and three behavioural types in order to analyse and determine the position of burgomaster Rückert.

Another factor that Romijn tends to keep in mind whilst looking at the position of the burgomaster are the social, political and religious backgrounds.¹⁶ For example, burgomaster Rückert was not affiliated with any political party. As such, this might have been an important factor as to why he could maintain his position for so long. Furthermore, it is important to take in account the personal capacity of each burgomaster. How strong willed or motivational was the burgomaster to hold on to his position?¹⁷ The last aspect that Romijn highlights in the first theme, is the cooperation between the burgomaster and the rest of the servants active in local government.¹⁸ Good relations between operating servants was necessary to maintain or

¹¹ Ibid.: 17.

¹² Ibid.: 17.

¹³ Ibid.: 18.

¹⁴ Ibid.: 18.

¹⁵ Ibid.: 19.

¹⁶ Ibid.: 19.

¹⁷ Ibid.: 19.

¹⁸ Ibid.: 19.

introduce a new policy. A secretary and the institutions that followed could make or break a burgomaster.¹⁹

The second concept within Romijn's model focuses on the government set up by the Nazis. Romijn describes this government as *"The totality of civil servants and institutions that during the German occupation of the Netherlands held governing task, both German as Dutch, both before the war and in the new national socialistic order, both military and civil"*.²⁰ According to Romijn, the Nazis believed in a principle called *Aufsichverwaltung*, meaning that a small, selected group of German high ranking officials would be assisting and guarding the Dutch governmental system to make sure that this system would comply with national socialistic ideas and regulations.²¹ In fact, the Nazis had no alternative to this system, simply because the Nazis did not have enough manpower to fully replace the Dutch governmental system. Because the Nazi officials in this system existed of a relative small force, the Dutch civil servants believed that they could maintain their autonomy within the Dutch governmental system.²² As a result of this small force, this meant in practice that the Nazi officials would try to spread their influence in every single aspect and task, no matter how big or small.²³ Romijn gives an example where Nazi officials tried to influence policy regarding hiring and firing janitors of elementary schools in Den Haag.²⁴ Furthermore, civil servants that did not obeyed the Nazi officials, or were simply not to their liking, were fired and replaced by those who shared the political ideology of the Nazis or someone who would obey, such as Dutch National Socialists.

Another problem that threatened the autonomy of the Dutch civil servants was the creation of Dutch national socialist institutions. These institutions had the purpose of slowly transforming Dutch society into a national-socialist one and eventually became part of the Nazification policy in the Netherlands.²⁵ Romijn argues that the introduction of these Dutch National Socialist institutions had a negative influence on Dutch civil servants.²⁶ Whereas most

¹⁹ Ibid.: 19.

²⁰ Ibid.: 20.

²¹ Ibid.: 20.

²² Ibid.:20.

²³ Ibid.: 20.

²⁴ Ibid.: 20.

²⁵ Ibid.: 20.

²⁶ Ibid.: 20.

servants reluctantly cooperated or resigned their positions when the occupier took over, but with the instalment of these institutions, the civil servant effectively became part of a national socialist system resulting in a split of loyalty. This split was between the exiled government and the occupier that created these “Dutch” institutions. This also had a consequence for the burgomaster, since it became increasingly difficult to dictate which road to follow.²⁷ Romijn tries to illustrate this point by arguing that a decision made by a burgomaster in 1941, which was in accordance with Nazi policy, could be seen as collaboration by the Dutch populace at in 1944 or after the war.²⁸ The decisions of the burgomasters during the occupation would be partly influenced by factors from outside the legislation of the burgomaster.²⁹ This is something that Romijn also focuses on. A few of these factors were K.J Frederiks, the Dutch Secretary-General of Internal Affairs, the Nazi staff of the occupational government, the Dutch national-socialists, the resistance and the Dutch government in exile.³⁰ Some of these factors will be discussed within this research, since they were important factors for not just on a national level, but also on a local level and thus for burgomaster Rückert.

The last theoretical concept in Romijn’s model is what he called the “imported revolution”.³¹ This “imported” revolution came to be because the Nazis implemented not a military occupation in the Netherlands, but a bureaucratic one, based on civil servants. The purpose of the bureaucratic occupation was transforming Dutch society in a society based on a National Socialist model. According to Romijn, this policy started when the Dutch were defeated by the Nazis. The Nazi elites wanted to show the Dutch that their defeat was due to the shortcomings of their own society, including their norms and values.³² Nazi officials wanted that the transformation of the Netherlands into a national-socialist one would become irreversible.³³ This partly explains why the occupier reacted immediately, or harshly, when there was any form of resistance by both civil servants and civilians.³⁴ Resistance would not be tolerated. For Romijn, this approach by the Nazis is an explanation why Dutch society

²⁷ Ibid.: 20-21.

²⁸ Ibid.: 21.

²⁹ Ibid.: 22.

³⁰ Ibid.: 22.

³¹ Ibid.: 22.

³² Ibid.: 23.

³³ Ibid.: 23.

³⁴ Ibid.: 23.

eventually clashed with the Nazi State.³⁵

This clash had consequences, since the loyalty of burgomasters, judges, servants and other employees of the state was split between the exiled government and the Nazis. First and foremost, all of them had pledged loyalty towards the Dutch Queen and the official government in exile. But with the implementation of the new Dutch national-socialist institutions and the influence of the Nazis, these civil servants became part of already existing institutions, but now these were carrying out Nazi policies instead. It could be argued that this had the result that after the war, civil servants and burgomasters were judged based on their willingness to cooperate with the Nazis. Those who were able to protect its citizens against the measurements of the Nazis would be heralded as “good” after the war. Those who failed to do so were seen as a powerless ruler and would be persecuted for their collaboration after the war.³⁶ This image of morally good versus morally bad in terms of burgomasters and civil servants would be reinforced in the earliest researches and documentations of the Second World War in the Netherlands. This image of a split in morality would change after the Eichmann trial in the 1960s. It was after 1960 that questions rose regarding the role that not only governmental officials had played, but also the people, regarding the occupation and the persecution of Jews. In the end, the system that was implemented by the Nazis for local Dutch government was a system to transform the burgomaster into an instrument for Nazi policy on a local level.³⁷

Now that Romijn’s analytical model and the three themes are explained, the next question is *how* his analytical model can be translated into the single case of burgomaster Rückert. There are questions that needs clarification before the research can begin. Some of these are for example: Why is Romijn’s model used in this research in the first place? Why focus on the city of Enschede? Is the choice of any specific city, in this case Enschede, of any influence on Romijn’s model? Can the choice for a geographical aspect be included in the model? Lastly, how are the three themes of Romijn’s model translated into the case for burgomaster Rückert? As previously mentioned, the reason why the choice fell on the model of Romijn is because his theoretical model portrays a general image of burgomasters in the Netherlands

³⁵ Ibid.: 23.

³⁶ Ibid.: 24.

³⁷ Ibid.: 24.


and a description of the system of Dutch local government. Furthermore, Romijn's model explains the difficult position of the burgomaster during the occupation and highlights elements and key factors, such as the Nazis, their allies, The Commissars of the Provinces etc.³⁸ Romijn's model provides a basis which makes it possible to adjust the model in such a manner that it becomes possible to analyse a single case instead of an general image of Burgomasters during the occupation.

The option for burgomaster Rückert, and therefore the choice of including the city of Enschede within the research, has to do with the fact that the interest from this research came from the archive of Enschede themselves. There was a suggestion of researching burgomaster Rückert further, perhaps an indication that even till this day, there remains an interest in the past of Enschede and in the Second World War in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the fact that the archive is interested in the past of one of their burgomasters, showcases that there is a need for further research on Rückert.

As for a geographical aspect as an addition to Romijn's model, this could be a discussion at length. It can be argued that a geographical factor might be included, but it remains to be seen if this had any direct or indirect effect on the position and policy of Burgomaster Rückert. One such event that might lean more into the matter of a geographical factor is that Enschede, being a city close to the German border, had an influx of Jewish refugees from Poland and Germany around 1933. Burgomaster Rückert and his administration did act upon this development by providing assistance and regulations. However, the flow of refugees became an economic burden on a city which already faced economic stagnation. The mood was that the city rather saw the refugees go than stay. But if this event, and the later occupation, had an influence on the policy of Rückert has yet to be found.

Now that the previous questions have been given more clarification, the focus will now be on Peter Romijn's model and the three sub-questions within this research. How is the model of Romijn implemented in this research and how are the three themes of Romijn's model translated into the three sub-questions? In order to get an better understanding as to how Romijn's model is translated into this research, an image is included which visualises the application.

³⁸ Ibid.: 15-16.



The first theme in Romijn's model, which is "The Function of the Burgomaster and Local Government", is an important factor to include in this research. However, it will not be an independent chapter. The reason why is because focussing solemnly on the activity of burgomaster Rückert, how his administration consists of and works, can be a whole Thesis on its own. As such, information regarding the function of the burgomaster and local government in the context of Enschede is included in this research, but as additional context and vital background information, instead of a dedicated chapter.

The second theme in Romijn's model, which is the "Dynamics in the History of the Occupation seen through the eyes of Government", the focus is on the dynamics of the occupation. There are many events during the occupation that could be seen as part of, forces

or properties which stimulate chance within a system of process.³⁹ The system of process in the case of Rückert was the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands and Enschede. The process within this system is the persecution of Jews. Chapter two will look at Burgomaster Rückert and how he dealt with the persecution of Jews in his city, his stance and policy, if there even was one to begin with. The sub-question for this chapter is: ***What was Rückert's behaviour and position as burgomaster during the persecution of Jews in Enschede?***

The last theme of Romijn's model, "The Clash between State and Society as a result of the Imported Revolution due to National Socialism" will be divided into two parts. The result from this division is that there will be two chapters regarding this last theme. The first chapter regarding this theme will look at the first part of the theme, which is "The Clash between State and Society". The example that will be used in the chapter that highlights this clash will be the April-May strike of 1943. The chapter will look at the effect this strike had on both burgomaster Rückert and Enschede. The sub-question for this chapter is the following: ***What was Rückert's behaviour and position as burgomaster during the April-May Strike?***

The second part of Romijn's last theme is the "Imported Revolution due to National Socialism". That chapter will look at the influence of the NSB and the Nazis and how they attempted to transform the existing Dutch governmental institutions in National Socialists institutions. For this research, that development will be placed in the context as to how burgomaster Rückert dealt with the advances of the NSB and the Nazis towards local government in Enschede. The sub-question for this chapter is the following: ***What was Rückert's behaviour and position as burgomaster towards the Dutch National Socialists?***

By using Romijn's model in this narrowed down version, it serves this research two possible functions. Firstly, there is the possibility in taking Romijn's broad definitions and concepts regarding his research for burgomasters in general, and refine them into narrowed down aspects. By narrowing them down, the themes in Romijn's model can be used to analyse a burgomaster as a single case. This instead of the original intention of the model, which was a grand description of all. For Rückert's case it is necessary to narrow down the model of Romijn in order not to rely on outliners of the model. Outliners of the model are present in Romijn's extensive research, but these might not be as frequently present in the case of burgomaster

³⁹ *Cambridge Dictionary*. Accessed June 20, 2019, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/dynamics>.

Rückert. This however, should pose no difficulties if Romijn's model would be narrowed down.

Secondly, not only can the model of Romijn be used to analyse a specific case, the model can also be used in this research in order to test it. The outcome of this research might bring new information to light for further research. The outcome may show that the model might be flawless, or perhaps has limitations in some areas or even may have certain problems. Furthermore, this model serves the initial goal of the research, which is to analyse the case of a single burgomaster. The case for burgomaster Rückert might provide a different point of view regarding burgomasters during the Nazi occupation. Most importantly, it might bring new information to the academic debate of the Second World War in the Netherlands.

1.3: Innovative Aspect

This research and its result might add additional information regarding government, policy and the history of the burgomaster of Enschede to the ongoing academic debate of the Second World War in the Netherlands. However, there might be some questions if there might be more innovative aspects that this research could contribute at. For instance, there is other research regarding the position of the burgomaster during the Second World War. A few examples of these can be found in the works of historians as Peter Romijn, Loe de Jong and G.A. Kooy. There are some differences in content of each author, think of the political background of the burgomasters that they have researched. Some of them were staunch believers in, or part of, the Dutch national-socialists, whilst others might have supported the resistance. Some of these burgomasters might have held a more pragmatic approach to Nazi regulations whilst others did not. This raises the question as to where Rückert of Enschede could be placed in this line of research.

One argument that might place Rückert in the ongoing debate, is that contemporary research about Rückert hardly exists. What makes the case of Rückert interesting, and perhaps the reason why his case differentiates from that of other burgomasters, is that Rückert could run his full office. Despite the pressure from both the Nazis and other factors that influenced the behaviour and policy of the burgomaster. Despite all of this, burgomaster Rückert was able to sustain his position for five years before he resigned. After the war, Rückert could resign without any repercussions for his deeds and actions during the occupation. How and why this was possible for Rückert to resign, without repercussions or investigation by the Dutch government after the war, is until this day not analysed in greater depth or fully explained. This research will therefore place itself in the context of the wider academic debate regarding the position of the burgomaster during the Second World War in the Netherlands. Furthermore, this research is an attempt to give an explanation or at least shed some light on the particularity of burgomaster Rückert of Enschede.

What more can this paper add to, say perhaps, innovation for the methodology within this research? The study of primary source materials out of the archives in Enschede is a central part in this research and the method that shall be used to analyse the primary source material is considered a classic method of conducting research in the field of history. This research will be done through the use of hermeneutics, since information regarding the burgomaster, the contacts he had and the correspondence between local government, the

occupier and the national government are all documented in written and paper sources. The result is that all this information needs to be read and filtered in accordance of relevance by hand.

1.4: Sources

The research will rely heavily on two types of sources. The first type will be primary source material, which consists mainly of written letters, notes and publications by the burgomaster of Enschede, local civil servants, the Aldermen and those that tried to influence the policy of the burgomaster. A problem that might arise with the primary source material is language. Not all letters and notes that are in the archive are written in Dutch. Some of them were addressed to the occupier, meaning that these sources are in German. The difficulty is that translating German into Dutch or from Dutch into English without losing important information in the translation might be a challenge.

The second type of sources are secondary sources and/or literature. However, the use of these kind of sources does not come without hinderances. It is important to understand the context of the written works and articles, to know the intention of the author and to underline the need of objectivity within the use of these sources. One could assume that the information in these works are correct. That there is no doubt that these works are correct because the authors had conducted many years of research. However, to blindly accept what is in these works without reflection to the information that is available in the archives of Enschede and other sources may be a rash conclusion.

The content of the primary sources are not the only challenges, another barrier might also be the accessibility of the sources. In a play of grand fortune, the complete inventory of notes, letters and other forms of communication regarding the city council, Aldermen and the burgomaster of Enschede between 1933 and 1945 is kept intact within the archive of the city. However, there are many other sources they may be relevant for the research that might not be complete as the archive in Enschede. There are various reasons as to why such inventories are incomplete, such as that they have been deliberately destroyed, damaged by fire or simply lost through time. The archive in Enschede contains a treasure of information, but this treasure is also a burden. Since the methodology will be mainly through the use of hermeneutics, the problem that arises is time. The information in the source material that is deemed relevant need to be read, piece by piece, in order to uncover an answer.

Another possible problem that comes with this method is the selection of information that is relevant. Some perspectives or information regarding the policy of the burgomaster, the council or the Aldermen in Enschede will not be covered in this research, simply because

other sources were *more* relevant in the eye of the researcher. This might have the consequence that there can not be a fully objective judgement or culminate in an over extensive and complete overview of certain institutions or policies by burgomaster Rückert.

1.5: Literature regarding WWII & Local Government

This research will use the model of Peter Romijn. How this model worked and the three themes that are used for this research have been explained. This paragraph will look at a general overview of Romijn's work and serves as an exploration of the general content and information in the remainder of the chapters of *Burgemeesters in oorlogstijd. Besturen onder Duitse bezetting*, published in 2006.⁴⁰ The main argument in Romijn's work is that Dutch burgomasters found themselves in a difficult position after the defeat of the Dutch army against the Nazis. One such result of the defeat was that the Dutch queen and government went into exile. They did so in order to remain close to Dutch territory. Since there were many different burgomasters, and therefore many case studies, Romijn decided to showcase the position of the burgomaster on a general scale and explain his model by providing an overview of the general image regarding Burgomasters during the occupation.

The first part of Romijn's research describes the policy set up by the Dutch local government and how this policy was introduced to slightly modernise the current system in a period of over forty years.⁴¹ It also describes how the burgomaster had to operate within his own responsibilities and his connection to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This was the office on a national scale.⁴² Romijn spends a great amount of detail to the Dutch defeat at the hands of the Nazis and how the occupation changed the position of the burgomaster. One such important factor was the *Aufsichtsverwaltung*.⁴³ Since the Nazis held on to the policy of transforming Dutch local government into a national-socialist model, as was the case in Nazi Germany, it was decided that not only did Dutch society had to change. The position of the burgomaster also had to change in order to suit the needs of the Nazis.

Local government over a municipality was always based on a balance of power. The policy of the burgomaster before the war was always in accordance and agreement with different commissions, the college of Burgomasters and Aldermen and the city council. But when the Nazis took over, they decided to lift the power of these commissions and councils and place sole responsibility of government on the burgomaster alone. This was based on the idea of the *Fuehrerprinzip*, which was based on a hierarchical model which was frequently

⁴⁰ Peter Romijn, *Burgemeesters in oorlogstijd. Besturen onder Duitse bezetting*. (Nederland: Uitgeverij Balans, 2006)

⁴¹ Ibid.: 28-44.

⁴² Ibid.: 28-44.

⁴³ Ibid.: 130-138.

found in Germany. The civil servants, the members of the city council and the Aldermen became "employees" of the burgomaster, rendering their former positions powerless, but not obsolete. It does need to be mentioned that the city council was abolished. As a result of these implementations, the burgomaster became solely responsible for important decisions and regulations.

Not only did the burgomaster receive absolute power and sole responsibility within Dutch local government, his position became the centre of attention from both (political) sides during the war. On the one hand there were the Nazis and their allies that demanded loyalty and expected that executing new regulations would occur without hesitation. On the other hand, there were concerned citizens that looked up to the burgomaster for assistance and perhaps even shelter and protection against the Nazis. Combined with the latter was also the rise of the Dutch Resistance. The Dutch Resistance actively took shape in a more organised form, but only from 1943. It was only from there that they became more apparent. This difficult position had the result that the burgomaster had to manoeuvre between two opposites. Leaning too heavily to one of the sides could result in incredible danger and perhaps even death. Governing and maintaining order and balance, with such consequences lurking around the corner after every decision or event, is no easy feat for a burgomaster. They carried a lot of weight and burdens upon their shoulders. It is almost to be expected that not all burgomasters could keep their spine straight under the weight of such difficulties. Romijn argues that the intention of his work was to show the factual functioning of the local policy, placed in the context of the policy that was set up by the Nazis.⁴⁴ Because of Romijn's intention and how he wanted to focus on the actual functioning of the local policy, it enabled him to form an analysis of choices, attitudes and actual policy.⁴⁵ This in turn, could be placed within the concept Romijn wanted to use. This was the analysis of choices, instead of looking to the question as to *why* a certain burgomaster could hold his position during the occupation.

Rather than making a summary of academic works that focus on the position of the burgomaster or local government during the Second World War in the Netherlands and leave it as such, there will be an addition to this historiography to prevent it from becoming just a summary. The following works that will be discussed will also be placed within the context of

⁴⁴ Ibid.: 664.

⁴⁵ Ibid.: 664.

Romijn, if possible. In what way does the works of these authors fit or go alongside the argument in Romijn's work? How do the authors look at *Burgemeesters in Oorlogstijd*? Which works provide additional information or perhaps an argument against Romijn?

One of the first and foremost works regarding the Second World War in the Netherlands is the *Magnum Opus* by Loe de Jong. His dedication to his work is often regarded as the "standard" work or representation of the history of the Second World War in the Netherlands. The reason why, is because the entire history of the war in the Netherlands was documented on paper by the effort of De Jong. His work, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog* is documented in 12 books, spread out over 26 volumes. De Jong himself thought he would spend at least 15 years of his life documenting the entire course of the war in the Netherlands.⁴⁶ However, he dedicated almost 25 years to this project.⁴⁷ 26 volumes and 12 books regarding the entire war contains too much information for this research. Why De Jong's research is included in here, is because his work was influential in the shaping of other researches regarding the Second World War. Besides, no other research regarding the Second World War in the Netherlands had spent more than fifteen years to this day.

The goal of De Jong's work was to give a description of every aspect of life during the occupation. Its content could be seen as a confrontation for the generation that endured the war, especially since De Jong's audience was the generation that survived the war. The image and symbolism that De Jong uses in his work is distinctively "black and white", of right and wrong. The population of the Netherlands knew exactly what was meant when someone was "wrong" or "good" during the war. A judgement was placed upon the choices one made during the war, and especially in the case for the burgomasters, since they were the representatives of the people or the occupier during the Second World War. Therefore, the assumption is made that "everyone" of the Dutch population knew what was going on. Secondly, there is the assumption in De Jong's work that the stance people took during the war was based on the notion of being "good" or "wrong", of good and evil. Those who worked with the occupier were inherently bad or seen as evil. However, this image and attitude regarding those who worked alongside the Nazis would be shattered by the results of research

⁴⁶ Loe de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (Nederland, Uitgever, Jaar) Deel 1: *Voorspel*, 5.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*: 5.

regarding the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands and the persecution of Jews in the following years.

A sharp contrast to the image of “Good” versus “Evil” in De Jong’s work, is the oration of Dutch historian Hans Blom, *In de ban van goed en fout? Wetenschappelijke geschiedschrijving over de bezettingstijd in Nederland*, published on the 12th of December 1983.⁴⁸ According to Blom, previous research regarding the occupation of the Netherlands had been written from one perspective. In his oration, Blom argues the importance of using different perspectives in order to analyse the occupation. In order to do so, Blom argues that there must be an analysis and description of the situation, mentality and the world of experience for ordinary citizens.⁴⁹ Secondly, more emphasis must be placed on an international research regarding the persecution of Jews.⁵⁰ Lastly, there must be more research regarding the question as to what place the Second World War gets in Dutch history.⁵¹ What Blom means by this, is that the Second World War should not be seen and treated as an isolated part of Dutch history. Instead, the Second World War and the persecution of Jews in the Netherlands are part of Dutch history.⁵²

Another research that takes a closer look at the “good” and “evil” perspective, is Christiaan van der Heijden’s *Grijs verleden. Nederland en de Tweede Wereldoorlog*, which was published in 2001. Van der Heijden no longer wants the perspective that is argued by De Jong, as that perspective long dominated research regarding the Second World War in the Netherlands. Van der Heijden wants to look at a perspective of adaption and compromise, a *grey* image, instead of the “traditional” “black and white”.⁵³ Van der Heijden uses the theory of “accommodation” in his work to illustrate his point. This theory was originally used by Dutch historian E.H. Kossmann.⁵⁴ Kossmann’s theory argues that the politics of accommodation was used by the Netherlands during the occupation and that these politics were a “business-like”

⁴⁸ Hans Blom, *In de ban van goed en fout? Wetenschappelijke geschiedschrijving over de bezettingstijd in Nederland* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 1983) 7-8.

⁴⁹ Ibid.: 7-8, 15-16, 18-20, 21-23.

⁵⁰ Ibid.: 7-8, 15-16, 18-20, 21-23.

⁵¹ Ibid.: 7-8, 15-16, 18-20, 21-23.

⁵² Ibid.: 7-8, 15-16, 18-20, 21-23.

⁵³ Christiaan van der Heijden, *Grijs verleden. Nederland en de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (Nederland: Uitgeverij Atlas Contact, 2009) 15-17, 133-135, 186-190.

⁵⁴ Ibid.: 15-17, 133-135, 186-190.

and neutral approach towards the Nazis.⁵⁵ Kossmann argues that the majority of the Dutch population and civil servants held on to this approach since they hoped that their lives would not change under Nazi occupation if they remained neutral.⁵⁶ By remaining neutral, it was believed that their lives could continue on as it was before the war broke out.⁵⁷ However, Van der Heijden's work gives the assumption that Kossmann's "theory of accommodation" equals collaboration. However, this is not the ideological neutrality that Kossmann proposes in his research. Nevertheless, the image regarding the occupation of the Netherlands had to change according to Van der Heijden. The publication of van der Heijden's work was an attempt to achieve this change.

Twenty years after the liberation of the Netherlands, burgomaster J.J.G Boot of Hilversum published a book with notes he made regarding the occupation and his time as burgomaster of Wisch and Terborg.⁵⁸ His book, *Burgemeesters in bezettingstijd* showed that burgomasters had to judge the situation that was presented to them under constantly changing dynamics and also had to manage to keep their own position.⁵⁹ Another aspect that was added to the already problematic position, was that the burgomaster also needed to cope with the needs and interests of individual citizens, the community and the national socialists.⁶⁰ On top of that, burgomasters had to deal with their own beliefs and morals.⁶¹ One interesting thing to address with the research by Boot, was that it was the inspiration for Romijn to continue the topic and research that was initiated by Boot. Nonetheless, one thing that should be taken into consideration when looking at the work made by Boot, is that he states that his work was created through the process of his own memory and that additional information has been added a few years after the war.⁶² Furthermore, Boot's work is a publication of his diary, providing commentary and reflection of his run as burgomaster starting from January 1939 until December 1945.⁶³ Therefore, it gives a good insight in how Boot managed the

⁵⁵ Ibid.:15-17, 133-135, 186-190.

⁵⁶ E.H Kossmann, *De Lage Landen 1780-1980: Twee Eeuwen Nederland en België, deel II* (Amsterdam: Agon, 1986) 179-180, 182-183.

⁵⁷ Ibid.: 179-180, 182-183.

⁵⁸ J.J.G Boot, *Burgemeesters in Bezettingstijd* (Apeldoorn: Uitgeverij Semper Aagendo, 1964) 8; Peter Romijn, *Burgemeesters in Oorlogstijd. Besturen onder Duitse bezetting*. (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans, 2006) 13-15.

⁵⁹ Boot, *Burgemeesters in Bezettingstijd*, 8; Romijn, *Burgemeesters in Oorlogstijd*, 13-15.

⁶⁰ Ibid.: 8;13-15.

⁶¹ Ibid.: 8; -13-15.

⁶² Boot, *Burgemeesters in Bezettingstijd*, 8.

⁶³ Ibid.: 344.

occupation, but he is only an example of one of many burgomasters, all of them acted different during the occupation.

Around the same time as Boot, another work was published regarding the position of the burgomaster during the war. In 1964, Dutch sociologist G.A Kooy published *Het echec van een "volkse" beweging*. In this work he focuses on the Dutch National Socialist Party in Winterswijk. What is particular in this work, is that it highlights not only the negative aspects of rule by a collaborator, but also the positive effects and the political charisma the NSB burgomaster of Winterswijk had, which was W.P.C Bos.⁶⁴ The goal of Kooy was not to antagonise civil servants who went beyond their jurisdiction to aid the Nazis during the Second World War, but to provide means as to understand *why*.⁶⁵ Kooy's conclusion is particular, stating that he had failed to portray an un-biased opinion regarding Dutch Nazis. He argues that this was the case since, during the time period (1964), general consensus regarding former Dutch National Socialist was one of hatred.⁶⁶ However, Kooy concludes that those who collaborated with the Nazis or worked within the system could be kind-hearted and were not evil, even though the ideology of Nazism was seen as an evil ideology.⁶⁷

A recent work regarding the position of the burgomaster during the occupation in the Netherlands is written by Dutch journalist Arend Hulshof. In his work, *Rijpstra's Ondergang*, he describes in great detail the role of his great grandfather, Johannes Rijpstra, who was at the time burgomaster of Zelhem.⁶⁸ What makes Rijpstra's case interesting, is that his policy as burgomaster got him ended up in concentration camp *Neuengamme*, where he died in December 1944.⁶⁹ What is notice worthy on the work of Hulshof is that it shows that the burgomaster and many of his colleagues were not "inherently bad" or "evil" when they collaborated. This label was placed upon them after the judgement that they received when the war was over.⁷⁰ Hulshof's example regarding burgomaster Rijpstra is another argument

⁶⁴ G.A Kooy, *Het echec van een "volkse" beweging* (Utrecht: HES Publishers,1964) 1-347.

⁶⁵ Ibid.: 4.

⁶⁶ Ibid.: 349-350.

⁶⁷ Ibid.: 350.

⁶⁸ *Burgemeesters in oorlogstijd*, accessed on December 4,2018, <https://www.bestuurskunde.nl/2016/12/12/burgemeester-in-oorlogstijd/>.

⁶⁹ Ibid.: accessed on December 4,2018.

⁷⁰ Ibid.: accessed on December 4,2018.

for the “grey” perspective regarding burgomasters during the Second World War, This in favour of the “good” versus “evil” perspective that was present in De Jong’s work, but also in that of others until the 1980s. Collaboration was more a necessity to keep the peace in the communities after the defeat of the Netherlands at the hands of the Nazis It was a necessity because the burgomasters themselves did not wanted to fall prey to the Nazis themselves in the form of replacements or worse. Perhaps it was the fear of replacement or worse that persuade burgomasters to implement rules and regulation from the Nazis step by step, with some (might) not have realised where it would eventually or could potentially lead to.⁷¹

One work that is in line with morality and the role that burgomasters and civil servants played, during and after the war, is *De Papieren Oorlog: gemeentearchieven geven geheim prijs. De kwalijke rol van de Gemeente Groningen en politie in 1940-1945: "foute" Groningers in de Duitse pas: opsporingslijsten van vermeende collaborateurs*, by Johan van Gelder.⁷² What is interesting is that Van Gelder’s argument is a harsh judgement on the burgomaster, the city council and the Aldermen in the province of Gelderland and the role that they had played during the occupation. Van Gelder has made use of many documents and other primary source material that survived the war. Most of those documents originates from the local archives in Gelderland. To summarize the conclusion of his research: the police department of Groningen, the Dutch National Socialist party and individual citizens who collaborated were quite successful in taking over positions in the local government of Gelderland and could successfully oppress and persecute Dutch Jews and rebellious citizens.⁷³

A work that focuses on the context of the burgomasters during the occupation is *Oorlogsburgemeesters 40/44*, by Nico Wouters.⁷⁴ The difference in the research done by Wouters in comparison with others, is that he focuses on collaboration and local government in Belgium. Wouters focuses on the role of burgomasters and how they navigate and balanced living and governing under the weight of the Nazis. Why Wouter’s research is included here,

⁷¹ Ibid.: accessed on December 4,2018.

⁷² Johan van Gelder, *De Papieren Oorlog: gemeentearchieven geven geheim prijs. De kwalijke rol van de kwalijke rol van de Gemeente Groningen en politie in 1940-1945: "foute" Groningers in de Duitse pas: opsporingslijsten van vermeende collaborateurs* (Groningen: Gelders Boek, 1997) 1-57.

⁷³ Ibid.: 1,7,13,53-57.

⁷⁴ Nico Wouters, *Oorlogsburgemeesters 40/44. Lokaal bestuur en collaboratie in België* (Tielt: Uitgeverij Lannoo, 2004) 1-745.

is because his research is in line with the work of Romijn. Wouters also argues that burgomasters had to provide good government, mediate between the Nazis and their citizens, maintain personal legitimacy and build local consensus towards the burgomasters. But this had also to be done towards the Nazis in order to appease them as well. As was the case in both the Netherlands and Belgium, the local authorities were slowly transformed into a copy of National Socialism in Germany and becoming an instrument for control and repression. This transformation only suited the Nazis.

1.6: Literature regarding Enschede & Twente

The different kind of research that have been discussed previously in paragraph 1.5 all tend to focus on the work made by Peter Romijn and general literature regarding government during the Second World War in the Netherlands. They also tend to focus on other cases. The following works that will be discussed in paragraph 1.6 will focus on the city of Enschede, the province of Overijssel and the region of Twente during the Second World War.

Marjolein J. Schenkel wrote in 2003 a major work that focuses on the Second World War in Enschede and partially involves burgomaster Rückert. This work is *De Twentse Paradox. De lotgevallen van de Joodse bevolking van Hengelo en Enschede tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog*. Schenkel has made extensive use of the archives in Enschede and determines that local authorities, resistance, collaborators and the Jewish council all had influence on the persecution of Jews in Enschede. Her conclusion is that of a "paradox". The more resistance there was regarding the persecution of Jews, the more Jews were actually deported from the city. The Nazis did not allow any form of critique regarding the persecution. However, the organisation of the deportation was handled by the Dutch police in Enschede in cooperation with the Germans and the burgomaster.

Schenkel's work is relevant for this research since she addresses a few regulations and developments that were important for the policy of burgomaster Rückert. According to Schenkel, the local government in Enschede was divided into two parts, one being the College of Burgomasters and Aldermen (*B&W*) and the other being the city council.⁷⁵ However, the power of these institutions were limited due Nazi order 152/41, which meant that some institutions were absolved of their power and the city council itself was abolished after 1941.⁷⁶ Order 152/41 was effectively put into power on the 12th of august 1941 and removed power from the Aldermen and abolished the council.⁷⁷ Another measurement that Schenkel mentions regarding the position of the burgomaster is the cooperation between Rückert and the Dutch National Socialist Party. The burgomaster of Enschede had to manoeuvre his policy alongside the National Socialists.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Ibid.: 77.

⁷⁶ Ibid.: 77.

⁷⁷ Ibid.: 77.

⁷⁸ Ibid.: 77-80.

Schenkel main argument is about the persecution of Jews, but there are other works that look at the events in Enschede during the occupation. The historian L.F. van Zuylen published a work in 1973 regarding the persecution of Jews in Enschede, *De Joodse Gemeenschap te Enschede 1930-1945*.⁷⁹ However, van Zuylen tends to focus more on the solidarity between the Jewish community and other parts of the Dutch community in Enschede. For example, Van Zuylen looked in what manner the non-Jewish Dutch did assisted and aided the Jewish community before, during and after the war. Van Zuylen's work can be used to provide information regarding records that were not made or missing by the official council in Enschede. There is a small downside with this source. His work is a revamped edition of his own thesis, excluding some of the footnotes. However, the original including the footnotes can still be consulted if there are any doubts regarding the content.⁸⁰ Another problem is that the focus of Van Zuylen's work is mostly on the persecution of Jews rather than highlighting the position of the burgomaster regarding the persecution.

The same problem is known for another work that looks on the history of Enschede, namely that of the former archivist of Enschede, Ties Wiegman.⁸¹ His work, *Enschede 1940-1945*, also has a lack of footnotes. However, whereas Van Zuylen focuses on the history of the Jewish community in Enschede, Wiegman tends to focus on the general history of Enschede during the Second World war.⁸² This work can be addressed for additional background information, but it does not contribute enough in order to include it in the model of Romijn.

A work that looks at a larger frame of the Second World War, one in which Enschede could be placed, is made by G.J.L Kokhuis. Kokhuis gives a broad description of the situation in the whole province of Overijssel and the region of Twente during the war.⁸³ His description starts with the mobilisation of Dutch forces and the eventual defeat of them and how they were returned to their homes.⁸⁴ However, what makes Kokhuis's work interesting and relevant for

⁷⁹ L.F van Zuylen, *De Joodse Gemeenschap te Enschede 1930-1945* (Nederland: Twents-Gelderse Uitgeverij Witkam, 1973)

⁸⁰ Ibid.:

⁸¹ Ties Wiegman, *Enschede 1940-1945* (Enschede: Uitgeverij Elmar BV, 2014)

⁸² Schenkel, *Twentse Paradox*, 24.

⁸³ G.J.L Kokhuis, *Twente 1940-1945* (Enschede: Twents-Gelderse Uitgeverij, 1975)

⁸⁴ Ibid.: 15.

the topic is his description of the rise of the National Socialist Movement in the province and region and how their influence gradually spread.⁸⁵ However, there is one point of critique to the work of Kokhuis. The narrative of his work is biased to a certain degree. Kokhuis highlights the influence and role of the Dutch resistance, giving the impression that the resistance was a force to be reckoned with.⁸⁶ Later research had shown that the importance of the resistance was less than what was believed. Kokhuis' work reinforces the perspective provided in De Jong's work, namely that there were two sides during the occupation, "good" and evil".

A recent work regarding the history of Enschede is *Geschiedenis van Enschede. Stad uit stoom en strijd* by Wim H. Nijhof.⁸⁷ Nijhof's work is a collection of fifty themes spread over 450 pages in which he describes the history of Enschede. Most of the chapters in Nijhof's work are not relevant for this research. However, the chapter that looks at the Second World War is relevant. That chapter looks at the burgomaster of Enschede during the Second World War and highlights the background of Rückert, his policy during the occupation and his encounters with the NSB. The chapter also highlights certain key figures where Rückert had to deal with. One such figure was J.H.H. Wevers, who was an important figure for the National Socialists in Enschede. Furthermore, the chapter also includes another important event for Enschede, Rückert and this research, which is the April-May Strike. Lastly, Nijhof's work includes footnotes and further references that are present within the archive of Enschede that benefits this research.

⁸⁵ Ibid.: 26.

⁸⁶ Ibid.: 41.

⁸⁷ Wim H. Nijhof, *Geschiedenis van Enschede. Stad uit stoom en tijd*. (Enschede: Uitgever Historie, 2014) 325-334.

Chapter 2: Burgomaster Rückert and the Persecution of Jews in Enschede

This chapter will look at the sub question regarding Rückert's behaviour and position as the burgomaster of Enschede regarding the persecution of Jews in Enschede. The chapter looks at the theme of Romijn's model regarding the dynamics in the history of the occupation through the eyes of local government. The dynamics in this case are mainly the measurements and implementations of the persecution of Jewish citizens in the Netherlands and how Burgomaster Rückert was dragged along in these dynamics set in motion by the Nazis. This chapter is divided in three paragraphs, where each paragraph will look at three aspects, or behavioural types. These types are then used to determine the position of burgomaster Rückert regarding the measurements and persecution of the Jewish population of Enschede. These types are the following: a moral stand or view against the measurements, cooperation (albeit it unwillingly) and lastly, negotiation between the Burgomaster and the Nazis regarding measurements and implementations.

However, looking at these three types is not enough to determine Rückert's position on the persecution of Jews in Enschede. For instance, what has burgomaster Rückert done or undertaken against these measurements or did he supported them instead? What was his intention with the measurements of the Nazis? What was his policy and what was Rückert's connection with the Jewish council of Enschede? The Jewish council was mostly responsible for the negotiations between their own persecuted people and the Nazis, but more on that will be explained further on in this chapter. Lastly, the sources that are being used in this chapter are primary sources from the city archive of Enschede that are supported by the use of secondary literature about measurements and legislation against Dutch Jews in the Netherlands.

2.1: The Jewish Council of Enschede.

The reason why a paragraph is dedicated to the Jewish council of Enschede is because it is an important factor in the persecution of the Jews of Enschede. Not only was this the governing body for the Jewish people in the city of Enschede, it was also the negotiator with the Nazis regarding Anti-Jew policies and the conductors of the measurements against their own kin. To explain the Jewish council of Enschede and what the difference was between the one in Amsterdam and the one in Enschede is part of the context, in which the persecution of the Jews in Enschede can be placed. However, there is little indication that Rückert held frequent contact with the members of the Jewish council or if the council had any influence on Rückert. This because the information that is present in the archives does not yield complete or personal correspondence between the Jewish council of Enschede and Burgomaster Rückert.

The predecessor of the Jewish council was the Jewish Coordination Commission. This was given the authority by the Nazis to be an representative organisation of Dutch Jewish citizens that cooperated with the Nazis.⁸⁸ However, this commission was absolved in December 1940 and in February 1941 did another institution appear, which was the Jewish council.⁸⁹ This council was stationed in the Dutch capital of Amsterdam, but its influence and legislative power was soon extended to cover all of the Netherlands on the 25th of October 1941.⁹⁰ Not every municipality had its own Jewish council, but Enschede did nonetheless. According to historian Schenkel, the board of the Jewish council of Enschede existed of three members: Sigmund Menko the chairman, Isidor van Dam, the treasurer, and Gerard Sanders, the secretary.⁹¹ Menko was a member of a rich Jewish family in Enschede which owned a large textile factory within the municipality of Enschede.⁹² Van Dam and Sanders were also prominent members of both the Jewish community and the community in Enschede. Furthermore, Sanders and Van Dam were also important players within the textile industry of Enschede. Sanders being a procurator for a textile factory of the Van Gelderen family, while Van Dam worked at the factory of Van Dam en Zonen (Van Dam and Sons).⁹³ The leading

⁸⁸ Schenkel, *Twentse Paradox*, 90.

⁸⁹ Ibid.: 90.

⁹⁰ Ibid.: 90.

⁹¹ Ibid.: 90; Van Zuylén, *De Joodse Gemeenschap*, 57-58.

⁹² Ibid.: 90.

⁹³ Ibid.: 90.

figures of the Jewish council were all prominent and influential personas within the community of Enschede. The Jewish council of Amsterdam was the official legislative body that represented the Jewish community in the Netherlands. However, to spread their authority, it had smaller councils in different municipalities that represented the Amsterdam council. These small councils would therefore represent the Jewish community in municipalities other than Amsterdam. The Jewish council had the task of announcing and implementing laws that were discriminatory against Jews and eventually had to assist in the persecution of Jews.

The council in Amsterdam was of the opinion that cooperation with the Nazis was the better option than resistance. It was believed that cooperation could prevent worse. Laws and regulations against Jews were executed on both a national and local level and were executed by civil servants or the local police force. However, the execution was overseen by the Jewish council. An example that confirms this originates from the 16th of October 1942.⁹⁴ A local police officer was accompanied by two members of the Enschede Jewish council to an empty house, which belonged to a Jewish family. The task that the officer and the council members had was to make an inventory of the furniture that was left behind. Afterwards, they had to remove the items and store them somewhere else.⁹⁵ More of these reports exists and copies were sent to the Council in Amsterdam. The Council in Amsterdam both cooperated with the local Dutch police and the Nazis, something that the council in Enschede reluctantly did. However, resistance was an option that they could not afford, as that would result in Razzia's, a method that was ever-looming for Dutch Jews.

The Jewish council in Amsterdam (located on the Prinsesstraat 16) and the one in Enschede had a different approach when it came to cooperation with the Nazis. Amsterdam wanted to cooperate to prevent worse for the Jewish people. The council in Enschede decided to also work together with the Nazis but, in secret, made sure their people could hide from the Nazis. This different approach was not only noticeable after the war, since more Jews survived in Enschede than in Amsterdam, but also in the correspondence between the two councils. The Amsterdam council had sent a message to their branch in Enschede on the 8th of December 1941 and the message was regarding the disappearance of Jewish citizens of Enschede.

⁹⁴ City archive of Enschede. Archive of the Local Police Department 1884-1959. Inventory number 153: 189.

⁹⁵ Ibid.: Inventory number 153: 189.

Important message. The members of the Jewish council for Amsterdam, notably Prof. Dr. D Cohen and A. Asscher, would like to share the following. The representatives of the Jewish council and their associates would like to announce that those who have temporarily left their homes can return without any commotion. A few persons whose names had been addressed in the police magazine have been revoked, since it was assured to us that those who would willingly return would face no consequences and their safe return is in fact possible. However, we have been told that there is a certain time limit for this arrangement that will be due to Monday the 15th of December. If one would return after this date, the consequences might be dire. The members Asscher and Cohen would recommend to immediately take this opportunity and would like to request to spread this message as fast as possible, since the current agreement will be accepted by all of those who have been mentioned.⁹⁶

The council of Amsterdam caught word that there were Jews in Enschede hiding. Instead of letting the council of Enschede the local police deal with it, they had intervened instead. the council in Amsterdam was able to convince both the Nazi authorities and the local government of Enschede that the Jewish citizens who disappeared could turn themselves in without any dire consequences. The only catch for this agreement, was that the missing Jews had to reply within a certain timeframe. If one would not apply before the date and would be found afterwards, they would be punished. Not every missing Jew in Enschede responded to the message from the Amsterdam Council. Another source provided some insight that not all of the disappeared Jewish citizens took this opportunity, believing their chances of survival were better if they kept hidden. This document was sent by a Jewish survivor, B. Woudstra, to the city archive of Enschede. Woudstra had sent an original copy of the announcement of the Jewish council alongside his own comments regarding the announcement. Woudstra had sent the original message of the Jewish council alongside his own comments on the 28th of February, 2000:

Dear mr. Gunnik. In this message you will receive the promised copy by the Jewish council, D.D. 8.12.1941. This message was sent to those who were in hiding, come back, all is safe. My

⁹⁶ Collection War Documentation 1913-1945. Inventory Number 86: 28. Cabinet 7424.

*mother, brother and I were lucky enough to not respond to this message. Kind regards, B. Woudstra.*⁹⁷

Not all Jews in the Netherlands obeyed the Amsterdam Jewish council, even though according to the Nazis, this institution represented all Jewish citizens in the Netherlands. The decision made by certain Jews to not directly follow the orders of the council of Amsterdam has likely to do with the fact that the Jewish council in Enschede decided to hide their kin whilst “pretending” to have peaceful cooperation with the occupier.

One of the most drastic and known measurements against Jews was the implementation of the Star of David on the 3rd of May, 1942.⁹⁸ This piece of fabric in the shape of the Star of David had to be sewn on the clothes of every Jew. The Amsterdam Jewish council was ordered to inform, produce and distribute these yellow stars to their kin.⁹⁹ This order came from the commander of the German security forces and the Nazi Secret Service, Wilhelm Harster.¹⁰⁰ He had sent a report to Dr. Friedrich Wimmer, who was the commissar-general for Administration and Justice. (*für Justiz und Verwaltung*) It was *SS-Hauptsturmführer* Ferdinand Aus der Fünften who brought the news regarding the Star of David to the Jewish council on the 29th of April 1942.¹⁰¹ The council had only three days to distribute the Star of David, a task that was left completely to the council, without any help.¹⁰² Perhaps the most cynical part about this task, is that the production of the Stars of David were created in a Jewish textile factory in Enschede. This task was overlooked by a non-Jewish surveyor placed by the Germans, called a *Verwalter*, and worked together with the Jewish council of Enschede.¹⁰³ An estimation of around 569355 stars were produced for the Jewish council in Amsterdam.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁷ Collection War Documentation 1913-1945. Inventory Number 86: 28. Telefax 31 053 4354398

⁹⁸ L. Ph. Polak, *Documenten van de Jodenvervolgung in Nederland 1940-1945* (Amsterdam: Joods Historisch Museum Amsterdam, 1965) 45-47, 53-54.

⁹⁹ Ibid.: 56-57.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.: 56-57.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.: 56-57.

¹⁰² Ibid.: 56-57.

¹⁰³ Ibid.: 56-57.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.: 56-57.

2.2: Rückert and Anti-Jew measurements in Local Government

After the Netherlands was under Nazi control in 1940, it only took a few months until the Nazi elites started to implement some measurements that targeted national and local government. One of these measurements had an influence on civil servants that were part of the national and local administrations. This specific measurement was the *Arierverklaring*. A declaration with on it a statement by the civil servant that confirmed or rejected the notion if one had Jewish (grand)parents or not. The reason why this measurement was taken by the Nazis was because they wanted to have an inventory of civil servants. With that inventory, they could see which servant was Jewish with the result that they were fired from their position. There were some forms of formal protests made by civil servants, but the implementation was carried out regardless success. The reason why this was possible without too much protest was because the fired Jewish personnel were compensated for their loss of income and their salaries would be kept intact.¹⁰⁵

This does not mean that there were no attempts to lighten the burden for the Jews. There were instances wherein a handful of burgomasters, commissions and councils tried to keep their fellow Jewish colleagues employed through the use of "honorary positions".¹⁰⁶ But these practices came to an end when the Secretary-General of the Department of Justice, J.C. Tenkink, heard of these honorary positions and in his declaration on the 10th of December 1940, it was decided that even these positions were prohibited for Jews civil servant.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, Tenkink had sent a message to all burgomasters that they had to fire any remaining Jewish civil servants who held an honorary position. Alongside this message was another rule, stating that the empty positions of the fired Jewish civil servants would not be open to new applications.¹⁰⁸ This announcement was aimed at every burgomaster in the Netherlands.

The consequence of the message by Tenkink was that burgomaster Rückert had to start an investigation on his own to find out which one of his civil servants were of Jewish descent.

¹⁰⁵ Archive of the City Council of Enschede 1921-1944. Inventory number: 2:582. Corr. Number U615/544. Afd. 1.60. Written on the 10th of December 1940. No. 34054. Afd. B. BURG.ST en Adm. Recht. Discussed in the college of Burgomasters and Aldermen on 16th of December 1940. No.15.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.: 2: 582.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.: 2:582.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.: 2:582.

Rückert's first message regarding this matter was sent on the 10th of December 1940, targeting the Aldermen first.¹⁰⁹ It is not known why Rückert decided to target the Aldermen first, but it may very well be a method for Rückert to find out if there were any Jews that were close to his legislative circle and deal with that internally without the interference of the Nazis should one of the members be a Jew. At the time the college of Aldermen existed of a considerate amount of people.¹¹⁰ The most important figures within the college were W.R Soetekouw, H.C Nijkamp, Jan Haantjes and A. Sein.¹¹¹ One particular member, A. Sein, had not responded as quickly as the other Aldermen, and as a result, Rückert had send him a more personal message:

To the member of the Aldermen of Enschede. In line with the last remark made by the Secretary-General for Government and Justice it was ordered that every Jew, not only for positions within the National Government, the provinces etc. but also regarding honorary positions, had to be released from their function. It was also stated that this also counts for Jews who are members of a representative public body. Jew in this message is characterised as: a. One, who has at least three pure-blooded Jewish grandparents. b. One, who at least has two pure-blooded Jewish grandparents. 1. One, who belonged to a Jewish community before or on the 9th of May, 1940. 2. One, who was married to a Jew or was about to get married to a Jew before or on the 9th of May, 1940. A grandparent would be indicated as a full-blooded Jew when it belonged to the Jewish community. I would like to hear your reply as soon as possible and would like to know, based on the following criteria, if you would still be able to carry out your duty. If not, you are hereby to be ordered not to participate in any application or meeting of the council.¹¹²

It can be argued if Rückert had send this message to Sein with the intention of perhaps "finding" a Jewish colleague within the Aldermen, or perhaps he was concerned of the measurements the Nazis would implement should Rückert inform them that there were Jewish civil servants working in Enschede. To further put pressure on Sein, Rückert decided to send another message to him on the 22th of January 1941:

¹⁰⁹ Archive of the city council of Enschede 1921-1944. Inventory Number 2:582. 1e afdeling. No. U610/545.

¹¹⁰ See Appendix I: Image 1.6.

¹¹¹ Archive of the Secretary of the Municipality of Enschede 1945-1967. Inventory Number 81:5778.

¹¹² Archive of the city council of Enschede 1921-1944. Inventory Number 2:582. 1e afdeling. No. U610/545.

*With this message I would like to remind you of my writing on the 20th of December, 1940, 1st rubric, No. U 610/545 regarding the topic. I would like to request that you answer before Friday the 24th of January.*¹¹³

Sein eventually responded. According to the criteria in the previous message of Rückert, Sein could continue and keep his position as Aldermen within the administration of Enschede.¹¹⁴ The result of Rückert's investigation was that none of the Aldermen were of Jewish descent. This might be an important reason as why Rückert wanted to keep the Aldermen close to him, as their backgrounds could no longer be used by the Nazis as a way to get them replaced by other Nazis or National Socialists.

What is interesting to see in the development of measurements taken against Jews in both national and local government, is that Burgomaster Rückert complied with the *Arierverklaring* and the request made by Tenkink regarding the "honorary" positions. The *Arierverklaring* was a measurement meant to be executed on both levels, but the situation regarding the "honorary positions" was created because of local burgomasters. It is not known if Rückert also participated with these "honorary positions" in his administration, but it is known that Rückert did comply with the request by the Tenkink to halt such practices. Furthermore, the investigation to find out if there were any Jewish personnel in the administration of Enschede was initiated by Rückert as a reaction to the message by Tenkink. Rückert did not actually have to start an investigation. However, it is not clear what Rückert's intention was to conduct the investigation. Perhaps it was a way for Rückert to get his own inventory of his personnel and to deal with it on his own method. However, it does highlight that there was little to no negotiation on his part towards the initial announcement made by the Secretary-General nor was an objection.

¹¹³ Archive of the City Council of Enschede 1921-1944. Inventory number 2:582. No. U611/545.

¹¹⁴ Archive of the City Council of Enschede 1921-1944. Inventory number 2:582. 23/12 U. Corr. Number U-610. Afdeling 1.

2.3: Rückert and Anti-Jew measurements in Enschede

The regulations and measurements against the Dutch Jews are quite numerous and extensive. To try and cover even the most important ones alone can be a Thesis on its own. For this reason, this chapter will only look at measurements that had an influence on the policy of burgomaster Rückert and how that displays negotiation, cooperation or objection coming from Rückert regarding the persecution of Dutch Jews.

As mentioned before, there were already a number of measurements and regulations that targeted the Jews. However, the following measurement was implemented to reduce the mobility of the Jews and to concentrate them in an area that could be easily overseen and controlled by the Nazis. This measurement was the prohibition of Jews from entering cinemas, theatres and comedy clubs.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, they were also forbidden to perform in these facilities or visit them as guests, even if they were invited. This measurement had the result that the Jews slowly disappeared from everyday life. For Enschede, this measurement was implemented on the 23th of September 1941. The order to implement this in Enschede came from the Procureur-General of the Court of Justice in Arnhem and was sent to burgomaster Rückert. There was no trace of any opposition or negotiation from Rückert's part, since the regulation was implemented as intended. The same Procureur-General had send an additional message to both Rückert as well to the head of Police of Enschede on the 8th of November 1941.¹¹⁶ The content of this message was that Jews were no longer allowed to work on cattle markets, work as butchers, as well as being an assistant for traders in foodstuffs.¹¹⁷ Like the previous regulation, Rückert did not negotiated or opposed this decision in the slightest, nor did the head of police brought in any objection. They just did what was ordered. Another example of this cooperation without negotiation or opposition was a question sent to Rückert by the Secretary-General of Internal Affairs on the 12th of November 1941.¹¹⁸ The question was about Jewish photographers in Enschede and if Rückert could send him their names if

¹¹⁵ City Archive of Enschede. Archive of the Local Police Department 1884-1959. 153:189. Published in Vereeniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten. 1941. VI.60 No. 4009.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.: 153:189. Parket van de Procureur-Generaal. 8 november 1941, La. A. 1336. Betreffende: Verbodsbepalingen voor Joden.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.: 153:189. Parket van de Procureur-Generaal. 8 november 1941, La. A. 1336. Betreffende: Verbodsbepalingen voor Joden.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.: 153:189. Departement van Binnenlandsche Zaken. No. 40/26. Nr. 3790. Afd. Kabinet. 12 november 1941.

there were any.¹¹⁹ From the reply that had been sent by Rückert, it had been confirmed that there was indeed a Jewish city photographer in Enschede.¹²⁰

Burgomaster Rückert was not only the head of the local government, but also of the local police in Enschede. However, his position and the role that the local police department would take on during the occupation would change, especially when it came to the persecution of Jews in Enschede. The first one of these changes happened on the 14th of November, 1941, when a letter from the department of Internal Affairs arrived for burgomaster Rückert with the following message:

*When large numbers of Jewish citizens are being detained, the German police shall no longer call upon the cooperation of the Dutch police authorities.*¹²¹

This message might have been a foreshadowing wherein the local Dutch police forces would be ignored or be pressed to the side-lines when the persecution or deportation of Dutch Jews would occur. The problem with this message to determine the position of Burgomaster Rückert is that the reply by both Rückert and the captain of the local police force is missing.

Burgomaster Rückert received on the 12th of September 1942 a letter from the Head Inspector of the Population Register, J.L. Lentz, that Dutch Jews were ordered to registrate themselves if they lived in a mixed marriage, where only one of the two was Jewish.¹²² The couples had to comply with this regulation between fifteen and twenty September 1942 and had to sign the *Verklaring voor de vaststelling van een gemengd huwelijk*, which was a declaration that confirmed if certain persons lived in a mixed marriage.¹²³ Furthermore, these declarations had to be signed in the presence of the Burgomaster to ensure the declarations were "official". There is no further documentation regarding the initial response of Rückert with this

¹¹⁹ Ibid.: 153:189. Departement van Binnenlandsche Zaken. No. 40/26. Nr. 3790. Afd. Kabinet. 12 November 1941.

¹²⁰ Ibid.: 153:189. 7^{de} afdeling. No. 20. 40/27. 18 November 1941.

¹²¹ City Archive of Enschede. Archive of the Local Police Force 1884-1959. Inventory number 153:189. Departement van Binnenlandsche zaken. No. 40/28. Nr.4000 Afd. Kabinet. Betreffende: medewerking nederlandsche politie bij arrestatie van Joden.

¹²² City archive of Enschede. Archive of the county of Enschede 1921-1944, 2:1430. D. IV. No. 5. Onderwerp: Verklaring voor de vaststelling van een gemengd huwelijk. Corr. No. 8473/145. Afd. 7. 15 September 1942.

¹²³ Ibid.: 2:1430.

declaration, only that it was received and executed afterwards and the result were sent back to the Head Inspector.¹²⁴ This regulation ordered by the Head Inspector of the Population Register was executed by Rückert without negotiations or objections. Unfortunately, the sources regarding this matter which were available in the archive does not give a clear distinction nor an explanation what Rückert's reaction to this message were and his stance regarding Anti-Jews measurements. It gives not the impression that Rückert was an Anti-Semite, but also that he hesitated to execute such measurements. So far earliest implementations regarding the persecution and discrimination of Dutch Jews were executed without hesitation or negotiation from Burgomaster Rückert. This has most likely to do with the fact that in the first two years of the occupation of the Netherlands, ordinary Dutch life did not seem to change much under Nazi control. However, this does not mean that Rückert had no intention to negotiate or object certain regulations set up by the Nazis whatsoever.

Actually, there are instances wherein Rückert did negotiate with a certain degree of success. A specific regulation that was aimed to concentrate Dutch Jews in certain areas were prohibition signs that excluded Jews from the public sphere from 1942 and onwards. These were simple signs which read *Forbidden for Jews* on them. The first signs needed to be hung at the entrances of parks, restaurants and hotels. The first message regarding these signs came from the Commissar-General of Public Safety on the 19th of June 1941.¹²⁵ However, after a period of time, more regulations and even updates of the rules regarding these prohibition signs changed. The Commissar of the Province of Overijssel, Wilhelmus van Rijke, initially published a publication dictating the rules and regulation as to which municipalities had to place these signs and which did not. The Commissar of the Province was the highest representative of the government in the province. However, in some cases there were updates of the rules with the result that the updated rules overplayed the old. This resulted that Rückert's response to the new measurements against the Jews, which was in the message by Van Rijke, was initially one of confusion.

"...Of this publication I have had some uncertainties, since it differs greatly with previous publications regarding the same topic. This was the case in the publication of the

¹²⁴ Ibid.: 2:1430. 7de afdeling. No. E 473/367.

¹²⁵ Archive of the Local Police Department 1884-1959. Inventory Number 153: 189. Kabinet. Afdeling: ? No. 984. Onderwerp: Verbodsbepalingen voor Joden. 11 juli 1941.

Commissar-General of Public Safety on the 19th of June [1941]. That publication dictated that the signs would only be hung in the municipalities that are near the beach, sea or have public bath places. It stated that this also accounts for municipalities that were in contact with the flow of refugees and offered them a place to stay. For this last aspect, I can say that this is not the case for my municipality. I would like to know if the previous publication, which is the one by the Commissar-General, is the one that needs to be followed. Perhaps it may be possible that the publication by the Commissar-General or the one by the Commissar of the Province might rest on a misunderstanding?”¹²⁶

Rückert's message could be seen as an attempt to get a confirmation that the initial publication by the Commissar-General was the correct one, as that publication had a more "light" approach towards the prohibition signs against the Jews. The latest publication made by the Commissar of the Province of Overijssel had the consequence that more municipalities had to include these signs. At first this regulation was only for municipalities that were close to large open bodies of water. This gives the impression that at first, Rückert held a pragmatic approach to the new regulations. Eventually these regulations would remove Jewish citizens from the public spheres. Rückert even went so far to call Van Rijke for an explanation regarding this matter and if there were other solutions or exceptions, should the initial publication rests on a misunderstanding.¹²⁷ The result of the meeting between Rückert and Van Rijke resulted that the measurements set up in the second publication, the one of the Procureur-General, was also accounted for the situation in Enschede. The result was that the prohibition signs for Dutch Jews in Enschede had to be hung up nonetheless.

Rückert's initial response to the prohibition signs would not be the only thing that could be seen as some objection to these regulations. As it turned out, these signs were also hung up at public swimming pools. What is interesting is that on 3 June 1942, there was an exception to the rule wherein Burgomaster Rückert, the commissar of the local police force, the Jewish council, Textile Factory Van Heek & Co and the Nazis could come to an agreement to keep one

¹²⁶ Archive of the Local Police Department 1884-1959. Inventory Number 153: 189. Kabinet. Afdeling: ? No. 984. Onderwerp: Verbodsbepalingen voor Joden. 11 juli 1941.

¹²⁷ Ibid.: 153:189. Kabinet 985. Afdeling 1. 11 juli 1941.

swimming pool open for the Jews of Enschede.¹²⁸ Initially, the idea originates from the textile factory Van Heek & Co which held ownership over a swimming pool in Enschede, *Zuiderhagen*.¹²⁹ Van Heek & Co had an argument with the head of the local police department of Enschede, De Rijke, if they were allowed to open up *Zuiderhagen* for the Jews. This was eventually proposed to Rückert and B&W. There were no objections.¹³⁰ By then the Nazis were informed of this proposition and the *Sicherheidsdienst* was not pleased with this at first. Their reaction was a message to Rückert with their complain, which arrived on the 13th of July 1942. What is quite peculiar is that, despite the concerns of the *Sicherheidsdienst* and the Nazis, it was decided on the 5th of August 1942 that the proposition of Van Heek & Co was to be accepted by all political factors. Starting from that day, *Zuiderhagen* was to be open to Jews between 14:00 and 16:00 on each Tuesday. Furthermore, a sign had to be placed in front of the door which stated *Only for Jews*.¹³¹

What truly is striking to this example, is that most of the negotiation was done through a verbal agreement. The archives and documents that mention this agreement all state that the agreement made between Van Heek & Co, Rückert, the Jewish council and the Nazis was done through a verbal agreement. The reason as to why this was done, could be that it prevents other high-ranking members of the Nazis or the Dutch Socialists to protest this in a formal way. If there were no official Nazi documents regarding this decision, it would not be a violation of previous publications wherein exceptions would not be tolerated. Instead, it could be seen as some form of "Gentlemen's Agreement". This particularity could also be a way for the Nazis to use this agreement as a gesture towards the government of Enschede and the Jewish citizens to endure the regulations set up against them. After all, the gesture by the Nazis could be interpreted that they can be reasoned with. In return, the Nazis could gain obedience from the Jews and the government of Enschede. Simply because the non-formal agreement could be interpreted as a sign of good will from the Nazis' side.

¹²⁸ City Archive of Enschede. Archive of the Local Police Force 1884-1959. Inventory Number 153:189. 1ste Afdeling. No. G460/269. Onderwerp: Openstelling badinrichtingen a.d. Zuiderhagen voor Joden.

¹²⁹ Ibid.: 153:189. Afdeling. No. G460/269.

¹³⁰ Ibid.: 153:189. Afdeling. No. G460/269.

¹³¹ Ibid.: 153:189. Afdeling. No. G460/269.

2.4: Conclusion

Rückert and his administration just watched at the persecution of Jews in Enschede and did nothing. However, it does look like Rückert himself does not reveal himself to be an anti-Semite. Rather, it gives the interpretation that Rückert did not took a stance of rejection or disobedience with this matter due to the numerous risks that he or others might face should one act against the wishes of the Nazis regarding this matter. As a matter of fact, Rückert and the Jewish council already had a “taste of what was to come” with the first Razzia of Dutch Jews in Enschede in 1941 where a group of Dutch Jews were arrested and sent east and none of them came back. This might have been a contributing factor to the “indifference” that Burgomaster Rückert displayed when faced with the measurements and persecution of the Dutch Jews in Enschede. Earlier attempts to halt the persecution of Jews and the result of that has been demonstrated in Schenkel’s work.

Furthermore, it has to be noted that the image of Burgomaster Rückert, the image of him doing nothing in regards to the persecution of Jews in Enschede, is quite a grim image. To shed some positivity to this conclusion, it has to be noted that although Rückert did less to halt or objected the regulations and measurements set out by the Nazis, there was a successful attempt by Rückert to make the best of the dire situation. The example that is being hinted at was regarding the swimming pool. That example shows that Rückert, on the one hand, implemented the wishes of the occupier by placing the prohibition signs that targeted the Jews of Enschede. On the other hand, he made it possible to open up one swimming pool for the Jewish citizens, even when they were forbidden to enter them in the first place. The fact that the Nazis eventually accepted this decision by Rückert does raises the questions as to what was promised in return. This is unknown and left open to interpretation or speculation at best.

In the eyes of the Nazis, their “acceptance” of Rückert’s decision regarding the swimming pool could be used by the Nazis to show that negotiation with them was possible. Another advantage to this gesture was that the Jews of Enschede would still remain concentrated in one area, which would be the swimming pool, and therefore easily for the Nazis to keep them in check. In the eyes of the population of Enschede, Rückert had provided a swimming pool in a sea of limitations for the persecuted Jews of Enschede. It may very well be possible that due to this, his position would not under siege from the people’s side. Above all else, Rückert could negotiate with the Nazis and sealed a deal that was favourable for all

parties; himself, the Nazis and the Jews of Enschede. Above all else, it kept the peace between all parties for the time being.

That does raise the question as to how Romijn and his model fit in this chapter. It fits in this chapter because Romijn looks at the position of the Burgomaster in relation to the persecution of Jews. For the case of Rückert, this meant that the initial legislation was targeted to segregate the Jews in Enschede, but eventually the switch was made in persecuting and deporting the Jews. What makes Romijn relevant, is that according to his argumentation, the persecutors decided to use the burgomaster as head of local police to oversee the arrests and deportation of Jews.¹³² Furthermore, what Rückert's position as head of police meant in practice is not clear. Romijn argues that the reorganisation of the Dutch police on the 1st of March 1943 meant that the burgomaster was, in theory, responsible for the local police forces. In practice it was to be revealed that Rückert did not have that much room to negotiate or object the Nazi police forces.¹³³ It became rapidly apparent for Rückert that if he wanted to remain the burgomaster of Enschede, he had to overcome his moral objection toward the persecution.¹³⁴ The Nazis furthered the pressure on Rückert by using different methods, such as misdirection, overwhelming tactics and intimidation. These methods were also used against the Jews and other members of local government.¹³⁵ Romijn argues that this brought pressure on local government, since the measurements against the Jews were not done before, let alone on such a scale. Nevertheless, the execution of the measurements and legislation against the Jews of Enschede resulted in a moral wound, both in local government as in society.

¹³² Romijn, *Burgemeesters in Oorlogstijd*, 442.

¹³³ *Ibid.*: 460.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*: 442.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*: 442.

Chapter 3: Burgomaster Rückert and the April-May Strike of 1943

This chapter will look at the position of Burgomaster Rückert during and after the April-May strike of 1943. The first paragraph will give a brief explanation of the April-May strike in order to provide context for the position that Rückert took during and after the initial Strike. The second paragraph will delve deeper into the position that Rückert took, the measurements and restrictions implemented as a repercussion to the strike. It also begs the question as to what the policy of the local government of Enschede was in opposition of organised strikes. How does the policy “fit” in line with Burgomaster Rückert or was it all in line with the Nazis? This chapter is divided into two sections, where each section will attempt to look at three aspects, or behavioural types. These aspects are the following: a moral stand or view against the measurements, cooperation (albeit it unwillingly) and lastly, negotiation between the Burgomaster and the Nazis regarding measurements and implementations. Furthermore, the sources that are being used in this chapter are primary sources from the city archive of Enschede that are supported by the use of secondary literature regarding the April-May strike and how Burgomaster Rückert dealt with this.

3.1: Strike at Stork! Spread the Word!

On the 29th of April, 1943, *General der Flieger* Fr. Christiansen, commander of the German military forces in the Netherlands, sent a message to the Dutch telex services and newspapers.¹³⁶ The message by Christiansen started off with the assumption that the former members of the Dutch military forces repeatedly showed a hostile and violent attitude and abused the freedom that has been granted to them by the Nazis.¹³⁷ As a result, the German occupier decided the following measurement for the former Dutch military personnel:

*By order of the Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber in den Niederlanden, all former Dutch military personnel are once again prisoners of war and to be taken prisoner. The names of the personnel will be published in the Dutch newspapers with a heed to answer to the call. Those who do not heed the call by the Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber or by any other means will not cooperate, can count on the most severe of punishment. All who are now ordered to be returned to being a prisoner of war, have none other to thank but their peers whose behaviour made this measurement necessary.*¹³⁸

The Dutch military personnel were to be taken to Germany, where they had to work in the industry. This has come as no surprise, since at the time the Germans were defeated in Stalingrad and the Soviets were pushing them back. Nazi Germany was facing dwindling resources and manpower due to the losses on the Eastern Front. To fill up this gap, the Nazis needed more workers to produce supplies for their soldiers and the war. At first there was a hesitation by the Nazi high command in the Netherlands for using forced labour, since retaking the Dutch military personnel into prisoners of war could only be validated if it was a *military* motive for the Nazis.¹³⁹ According to the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (OKW), there was a military motive for this decision.¹⁴⁰ It was known by them that within the personal circles of the former Dutch military, there was an increase for the support of the Dutch resistance.¹⁴¹

The Nazis assumed that in the case of an invasion, the former Dutch military personal

¹³⁶ P.J. Bouman, *De April-Mei-Stakingen van 1943* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhof, 1950) 18-19.

¹³⁷ Ibid.: 18.

¹³⁸ Ibid.: 18.

¹³⁹ Ibid.: 17.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.: 17.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.: 17.

would surely aid the allies.¹⁴² On the 24th of April it was decided by Herr Ritter of the Office of External Affairs, after the declaration was approved in Berlin, to bring the former Dutch military personnel back into being prisoners of war.¹⁴³

The result of the publication was a massive strike that raged across most of the Netherlands. It started on the day of the publication, 29th of April and lasted until the 3th of May 1943. The strike started at *Machinefabriek Gebr. Stork & Co* in Hengelo, close to Enschede.¹⁴⁴ The strike obtained a catchy phrase of "*Strike at Stork, Spread the Word!* (Staking by Stork, zegt het voort!) to further increase the size and create some form of unity amongst the strikers.¹⁴⁵ According to the post-war publication by B.A Sijes, the workers who left N.V. Stork caused a small traffic jam in Hengelo and nearby companies and their workers heard of the strike. In the following days, the strike and its message spread across the country, where workers in towns and cities joined in with the strike.

However, there are two remarks to be made about the April-May strike. Firstly, not all cities participated in the strike, namely Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Den Haag. This was due to the fact that there already were strikes in the earlier years of the occupation, such as the notoriously uprising in February 1941 in Amsterdam.¹⁴⁶ The result of that strike and the aftermath had the consequences that Amsterdam but also other large cities though twice before participating in yet another strike.¹⁴⁷ Secondly, the Railways did not participated in the strike. This had the consequences that Dutch police forces, the Dutch National Socialists and the Nazis could arrive faster at the places where the strikers were and could stop the strike, be it through arrests or by gunfire. The Nazis had a good reason to fear the strike, since they would believe that if this strike would not be stopped as soon as possible, that it might blow over to a strike on a national level, which might inspire the workers in France, Belgium and Denmark to rise up in solidarity with their fellow workers.¹⁴⁸ The Nazis even feared that the

¹⁴² Ibid.: 16-17.

¹⁴³ Ibid.: 17.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.: 17, 22-23.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.: 22-23.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.: 22-23.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.: 23.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.: 23.

strike might spread over to one of the German provinces of Westfalen, where under bishop Von Munster's authority, illegal practices gained terrain in that time period.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁹ Bouman, *De April-Mei-Stakingen*, 23.

3.2: Rückert and the Repercussions of the April-May Strike.

On the 30th of April 1943, the commander of the SS and police in the Netherlands, Hanns Albrin Rauter, implemented the *politiestandrecht*. This could best be described as a special set of laws for the Nazi and Dutch police forces to use force and other means of intimidation to break up the strike as soon as possible.¹⁵⁰ This had as a consequence that there were wild shots on the streets on unarmed civilians, arrests of factory owners and civil servants of Enschede and lastly, there were executions.¹⁵¹ When the strike came presumably at an end on the 3rd of May 1943, burgomaster Rückert had to deal with the repercussions by the Nazis. One such repercussion was that during the strike, a number of people were arrested and imprisoned. Amongst these were key figures of the local government of Enschede such as W.R. Soetekouw, H.C. Nijkamp, B. Ter Beek and J.W.A. van Hattum.¹⁵² Soetekouw and Nijkamp were both Aldermen. Ter Beek and Van Hattum were of equally importance to Rückert, since Ter Beek was the head of the 6th department of the local government in Enschede and was the only one capable of running that department.¹⁵³ Van Hattum was the head of secretary of Enschede.¹⁵⁴ Rückert pleaded for the release of at least Ter Beek and Van Hattum, since they could not be easily replaced as there were no others who had the same expertise as they did. Rückert had send his request to the newly appointed commissar of the province of Overijssel, which was Van Rijke.¹⁵⁵ Most commissars originate from the nobility or from other important social circles. When the royal family and the Dutch government went into exile, the position of the commissar remained the same, but instead of being a representative of the central government, they became representatives of the provinces instead. The commissar also owe responsibility for their actions to the Nazis instead of the Dutch government in exile. Van Rijke was a member of the Dutch National Socialist Party and was installed as commissar of the province of Overijssel in 1943. He took that position from the previous commissar, Von Bonningshausen. The latter volunteered for the Eastern Front in 1943 and died from his wounds near the Ukraine.¹⁵⁶ To further increases his chances of getting Ter Beek and Van Hattum released from custody, Rückert had also sent his request to *Herrn Hauptman der*

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.: 23.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.: 28-29.

¹⁵² Archive of the Municipality of Enschede, 1921-1944. Inventory Number 2:111. Afdeling *onbekend*. No. 1257

¹⁵³ Ibid.: 2:111. No. 1257.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.: 2:111. No. 1257.

¹⁵⁵ Schenkel, *Twentse Paradox*, 78.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.: 78.

Schutzpolizei, Rauter, who was at the time in nearby Hengelo.¹⁵⁷

However, there is a problem with Rückert's attempt to get the Aldermen released from custody. It is not clear what Rückert had promised to his superiors in the first place, nor is it to be found within the archives. In the archives there is no correspondence between Rückert and either Rauter or Van Rijke to be found. The messages that does mention Rückert's plea were copies. These copies were sent to Rauter and Van Rijke. These messages do not have any responds stating a definitive confirmation by Rauter or Van Rijke that the four individuals would be released from captivity. It can be assumed however, that Rückert promised *something* to the Nazis. This promise has most likely to do with the obedience of himself and the local government of Enschede in order to get his Aldermen free. The result of Rückert message is probably related to the execution of Nazi legislation regarding maintaining order in Enschede after the strike. Another explanation of this is the willingness of Rückert to assist the Nazis in their search for those who participated in the strike in Enschede.

On the 4th of May 1943, one day after the strike, did Burgomaster Rückert receive a message from the Police President of the District of Overijssel, Cornelis Christiaan Walraven.¹⁵⁸

*By order of the Commissar-General for Public Safety, all official announcements regarding the strike of early May which have been attached to houses, walls, signs etc. must be removed as soon as possible. Any costs involved with that are to be presented to the municipality. Request to take measurements that ensures the removal of the pamphlets are with great haste.*¹⁵⁹

The message by Walraven indicates that any traces that mentions the strike needed to be taken down. After all, the strike had been broken up by violence and threats. To keep reminding the people of what happened may incite fear and resentment towards the Nazis instead of further cooperation. The message from Walraven would not be the only one that Rückert would receive regarding the April-May strike. The following message that Rückert had received on the same day indicates that further measurements were taken after the strike.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.: 78.

¹⁵⁸ Archive of the Municipality of Enschede 1921-1944. Inventory number 2:2429. 29 ES Arnhem 9001 63/62 W INH 20/7 0855 REGERINGS.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.: Inventory number 2:2429. 29 ES Arnhem 9001 63/62 W INH 20/7 0855 REGERINGS.

These had consequences not only for Rückert, but for all Burgomasters that had to deal, direct or indirect, with the aftermath of the strike. Burgomaster Rückert received the following message from Walraven on the 4th of May 1943.

*It is hereby requested that all burgomasters have to report every instance regarding a company that participated in, or organised a strike, to me before 10 o' clock. Negative messages are not accepted. Furthermore, security services and personnel that are used to counter sabotage are hereby viewed as assistants of the police. Men that had applied for these services before the 29th of April are hereby excluded for the call of working in Germany.*¹⁶⁰

What is interesting to see in this message is that the burgomasters were, in a way, forced to take a stance against the strike. What makes this stance difficult, is that it is a stance favoured by the Nazis, but not by Dutch society. The report that Walraven requested from the Burgomasters would mean punishment for the companies and workers that participated or assisted the April-May strike. It was also a way to discourage any future strikes. The second notion in Walraven's message however, is perhaps an indication from the Nazis that those who would or had cooperated with the Nazis, prior to the strike, would be excluded from working in Germany. This could have enticed cooperation from one portion of the Dutch populace. But if this convinced people to support the Nazis was not likely. This has to do with the fact that the Nazi punishments and their violent response to the April-May strike had the consequence that there was fear, rather than willingly cooperation from both the common people and the civil servants in local government.

The request by Walraven would be extended through another message. This message was from the Commissar of the Province of Overijssel, Van Rijke, sent on the 10th of May 1943.¹⁶¹ Van Rijke stressed that Rückert needed to remind the companies and department of the local government of Enschede that if a company and its employers indeed participated with the April-May Strike, the punishment would *only* be that employers were forbidden to pay salaries to their employees, albeit for a limited time.¹⁶² It is not known why Rückert accepted Van

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.: Inventory number 2:2429: 29 ES Arnhem 9001 63/62 W INH 20/7 0855 REGERINGS.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.: Inventory number 2:2429: 6de Afdeling. No. V375/1 Onderwerp: Korting op lonen en salarissen.

¹⁶² Ibid.: Inventory number 2:2429: 6de Afdeling. No. V375/1 Onderwerp: Korting op lonen en salarissen.

Rijke's order, but as previously mentioned, this could have been part of the promise that Rückert made in order to get his Aldermen free. Rejecting the request might have had negative consequences for Rückert, as he was in no position to make objections or demands. Cooperating would be in Rückert's best interest. The result of Walraven's message, combined with that from Van Rijke's, was that Rückert had sent out an official publication on the 7th of May 1943 and was targeted to civil servants and to the heads of the different public departments in Enschede:

I would like to let you know that the Hohere SS- and Polizeiführer of the Reichscommissar for the occupied territory of the Netherlands, have taken a new measurement on the grounds of article 64 of order 1943. It has been decided that it is now forbidden to pay wages or salaries to workers who laid down their work to participate in the strike, be it partly or fully. Coincide with that, civil servants and workers who fully or partially laid down their work of the strike between Thursday 29th of April and/or until Friday 30th April, an amount of money equally to their wages or salaries that they would have earned that day, will be retracted from their salaries of the month May, specifically the wages of week of the 8th and the 14th of May 1943. Please note that the retracted amount of money does not count for the build-up pensions. I hereby request that civil servants and workers, including all contract staff, who partly or fully laid down their work on or during the mentioned days, will report their activities to the heads of their departments before Wednesday the 12th of May. Those who fail to send their forms before the date, it will then be assumed that they have participated fully or partially with the strike.¹⁶³

Most of the departments and associated branches responded, although some did later than the requested date. In the end however, Rückert received the information that he needed to present to Van Rijke.¹⁶⁴ What is interesting is exactly his presentation to Van Rijke. It highlights the negotiation on Rückert's part. When Burgomaster Rückert requested information from his subjects who participated in the April-May strike, he received from most departments and public works a clear answer. However, there was one exception, namely that

¹⁶³ Archive of the Municipality of Enschede 1921-1944. Inventory Number 2:2429. n.o. 834/646 Kabinet.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.: 2:2429; An overview of the companies that had responded positively or negatively is included in Appendix I, Further Reading.

of Director Buijs of the City Works of Enschede (*Gemeentewerken Enschede*).¹⁶⁵ In the message of Buijs, he is unable to give an answer to Rückert. The employees of Buijs do not work in an office, but outside in the fields.¹⁶⁶ To find out whether all of them were actually working when the April-May strike occurred, would be a time-consuming task.¹⁶⁷ Furthermore, Buijs argues that if he was forced to do his own research on this topic, it would be an ungrateful task.¹⁶⁸ Buijs would not receive any assistance from his employees for his research.¹⁶⁹ Buijs argues therefore, that this made it impossible to give an precise overview.¹⁷⁰ However, it is mentioned that the workers who were *actually* home and can confirm, were the former Dutch military soldiers who went home. They left their work since they were instructed to prepare themselves for the coming journey to Germany and work in the German industry. After all, they did what was instructed to them in the initial publication.¹⁷¹ The argument made by Buijs, regarding an in-depth research to find out whether the workers participated in the strike or not, is also used by Rückert in his letter to Van Rijke on the 19th of May, 1943.¹⁷²

*...It is not possible to fully trace which civil servants did not worked or those who wanted to work. They found themselves incapable to do so since their colleagues participated in the strike. Finally, it has to be noted that a number of our civil servants work in the fields instead of in an office. This makes it quite difficult to determine if they participated in the strike or stayed at work. To attempt to create a clear overview of the situation of that day (The day the strike broke out) would be a very time-consuming effort which will yield no sympathy, nor cooperation from the heads of the respective departments. Furthermore, if this would be continued nonetheless, it does raise the question if it would still yield any reliable results. Unless one would want to rely on the testimonies of the workers themselves, something that would not be a great measurement.*¹⁷³

¹⁶⁵ Archive of the Municipality of Enschede 1921-1944. Inventory Number 2:2429. No. 0005.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.: No. 0005.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.: No. 0005.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.: No. 0005.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.: No. 0005.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.: No. 0005.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.: No. 0005.

¹⁷² Ibid.: Inventory Number 2:2429. No 2.08.89, Kabinet. 6de Afdeling No. 1263. Onderwerp: Opgave gemeente-personeel.

¹⁷³ Ibid.: No 2.08.89, Kabinet. 6de Afdeling No. 1263. Onderwerp: Opgave gemeente-personeel.

By using the argument previously used by Buijs, Rückert hoped that the same argument could be used to halt further interference by his superiors and the Nazis in his local government. Furthermore, Rückert gives the impression to his superiors that continuing on this path would yield them no result. Rückert also tries to play off his responsibility on this matter, as he blames the inability for further research on the complexity and scale. This meant that Rückert essentially tried to give this situation out of his hands to his superiors instead of him. It would come as no surprise that there was no further research on this matter after Van Rijke and Van Walraven received the report and message by Rückert.

One would believe that after time went by, the strict control on workers and their salaries might be over. Or perhaps that further repercussions regarding the April-May would no longer come, but this was not the case. On the 30th of September, 1944, Rückert had a last announcement regarding this matter:

*I have decided that every civil servant or worker, who had not come to their work for longer than one day without permission, will not receive any payment or salary. Furthermore, each head of the departments for the municipality are ordered to place a stamp on each and every loan - and payslips that indicates that my decision is being upheld. Each stamp needs to have the following message on it: "The one who have signed this loan/payslip confirms that the person who this loan/payslip belongs to has not left his work for longer than one day without permission and that the person has remained on his position. Furthermore, on the day the workers shall receive their payment, they shall continue to work." Even though I am convinced that the following will be done without question, I do want to be notified by you that you have not paid any salary to absent staff."*¹⁷⁴

It is here that Rückert decided to take matters in his own hands after the initial punishments set up by his superiors. It could be argued that Rückert 's measurement was a way to further discourage workers from attempting another strike. If they would go on strike, the repercussion would automatically be that they won't get their salaries. The measurement

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.: Dossier V630. 6^{de} Afdeling. No. V 600/15. Onderwerp: Niet-Uitbetaling afwezig personeel.

by Rückert had the result that the amount of their salaries became dependent on the number of days that they have worked. The stamp and the statement on it were now necessary on every payslip to validate Rückert's decision. The statement by the heads of the departments became a "check" for Rückert. All of these steps and measurements could be interpreted as a way for Rückert to deal with problems relating to labour himself, instead of letting it escalate and have the Nazis deal with it, resulting in more Nazi regulation. The measurement taken by Rückert could be seen as a way to keep the reigns tight in his local government.

3.3: Conclusion

Referring back to how Burgomaster Rückert dealt with the April-May strike of 1943 and the position that he took, *how* does Rückert maintain his position and *what* was his position? The policy, even if there was one, that Rückert maintained during and after the strike was one that suited the Nazis, and not Rückert's administration. Rückert's own administration was turned upside down and was disrupted during the strike with the arrest of important and valuable Aldermen. To spend resources and his attention to both the strike and to get his Aldermen free from Nazi custody, had the consequence that direct action from Rückert regarding the strike is missing. This can be seen in both his own correspondence and within the archives of Enschede. It can only be assumed that, since Rückert 's was occupied with dealing with the arrest of his Aldermen, the task of dealing with the strike was mostly given to the Nazi forces and the local Dutch police. The result of that decision to place responsibility of dealing with the strike with them, due to his own inability at the time, culminated in violent results and plentiful arrests.

Regarding to the position of Rückert during the strike it can be argued that there was less negotiation between Rückert and the Nazis and more cooperation. Negotiation can be found his plea to get his Aldermen released from custody, as Rückert had sent multiple letters to influential figures that were his superiors. The position of Rückert after the strike was one of cooperation. It is not known why Rückert held this approach, but it can be assumed that he had promised his superiors and the Nazis *something* as a way to get the captured Aldermen free. The trade-off between the Rückert and the Nazis could have been his obedience. Furthermore, the arrest of high-ranking members of Rückert's administration might have had an impact on Rückert, given him the impression that nobody would be safe if one would disobey the Nazis, no matter the status one had.

It might have been this impact on Rückert which might be an explanation as to why Rückert accepted the requests from Walraven and Van Rijke without hesitation or objection. This does not mean that Rückert no longer dared to oppose Nazi regulations. One example of this is that Rückert used a less-confronting method instead, which could be traced back to the message by Director Buijs. By using the argumentation that was also presented by Buijs, there would be no further investigation or suspicion by the Nazis. This is important since Rückert 's administration would also believe these arguments, reinforcing the validity of Rückert's

report. To further elaborate on that: at that time, the college of Burgomasters and Aldermen had Dutch National Socialists among their ranks. The argumentation in Buijs's message would have made "sense" in their eyes, since a full-blown investigation where there is reluctant cooperation would even convince National Socialists as a reason why the research would yield not the intended results. Furthermore, this also would have removed further suspicion from the National Socialist to Rückert's report, which argues to blow off further research.

Lastly, the extra measurements made by Rückert about wages, salaries and labour could be seen as precautionary measures. If Rückert could have an overview of the civil servants that all obeyed the rules, Rückert could present this to his superiors with the idea that everything is under his control. This could be used as a way to convince his superiors and the Nazis to leave Rückert alone for the time being. This meant that they would also leave Enschede alone. But did Rückert implemented these measurements to protect the people of Enschede from further Nazi influence or was it to protect his position?

Where does Romijn fit in this chapter? The reason why Romijn is relevant for this chapter is because his research also includes the development of the April-May Strike. The reason why this is included in his work is because the strike posed a governmental problem. This problem was noticeable on both the national and local levels of government, as burgomasters, the commissars of the provinces and the Nazis were confronted with the strike. Romijn argues that during and after the strike, many burgomasters were incapable of making strategic decisions.¹⁷⁵ The reason why they were incapable was because of the demand made by the Nazis during and after the strike. This demand was to stop the strike and to hand in reports about who participated with the strike.¹⁷⁶ This meant for the burgomasters that they had to take partial responsibility for specific measurements that were placed to quell the strike.¹⁷⁷ What Romijn describes is exactly what we see in the case of Rückert and the requests made by Walraven and Van Rijke. Since Rückert cooperated with the demand it provides a different point of view. Not of a burgomaster who heroically defied the demands by the Nazis by reporting themselves in, as what was mentioned in De Jong's work about the April-May Strike.¹⁷⁸ But as a burgomaster who was not a supporter of the Nazis, but cooperated

¹⁷⁵ Romijn, *Burgemeesters in oorlogstijd*, 479.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.: 479.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.: 479.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.: 479

nevertheless due to other contributing factors. For Rückert these factors might have been the arrests of his Aldermen and what was agreed upon between him and the Nazis in order to get them released.

One thing that is interesting to add to the case of Rückert was the role that the Commissars of the Province had after the strike. Romijn mentions that an investigation was started by the Head of the Commissars to obtain an overview from the commissars about the capabilities of the burgomasters during and after the strike.¹⁷⁹ The report from Overijssel contained some inconsistencies and difficulties. This was likely due the fact that the commissar of the province of Overijssel, which was Von Bonningshausen, left his position in 1943 before it was eventually filled by Van Rijke.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.:479.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.: 480.

Chapter IV: Burgomaster Rückert and the Dutch National Socialists

This chapter will look at Burgomaster Rückert and his involvement with the Dutch National Socialist Movement (*Nationaal Socialistische Beweging, NSB*) in Enschede. The first part of this chapter will give a brief explanation on the Dutch National Socialist Movement. Who were the key figures in this movement and how did they rose to power? That chapter will be brief, since explaining the entire history of this movement is not relevant here. This chapter is divided in three sections, where each section will look at three aspects, or behavioural types. These types are then used to determine the position of Burgomaster Rückert regarding the Dutch National Socialists. The three behavioural types are the following: a moral stand or view against the measurements, cooperation (albeit it unwillingly) and lastly, negotiation between the Burgomaster and the Nazis regarding measurements and implementations. Furthermore, the sources that are being used in this chapter are primary sources from the city archive of Enschede that are supported by the use of secondary literature regarding attempts by the National Socialists to gain political power and influence in the city of Enschede and how Burgomaster Rückert dealt with this.

4.1: The Dutch National Socialist Movement

Based on the developments of fascism in Italy and National-Socialism in Germany, the former head engineer of the Dutch Provincial Water Supplies, Anton Mussert, was inspired to set out and create his own anti-democratic movement in 1931.¹⁸¹ Together with clerk officer Cornelis van Geelkerken, they started to design a party program for a National Socialist Movement.¹⁸² Their first meeting on the 14th of December resulted in only 12 attendants, but due to a small interview with Mussert in a liberal newspaper, the numbers rose to over 600 on their second meeting of 7 January 1933.¹⁸³ The popularity of the NSB increased and the party seemed a large success when it obtained over 8% of votes with the Dutch regional (provincial) elections of 1935.¹⁸⁴ However, with the hostile takeover of the national-socialist in Germany and the increasing messages regarding the persecution of Jews in Nazi-Germany, support for the NSB declined. Another result of this was that Catholicism in the Netherlands and Dutch bishops in forbade the Dutch people to vote on a party which had anti-Christian believes. In 1937 the results of the vote made clear that the NSB (would lose) lost over half of their votes, going from 8% in 1935 to 4% in 1937.¹⁸⁵ The State election of 1939, one year before the start of the war, showed that the NSB obtained even less seats, going to a total of not even 4% of votes.¹⁸⁶

On the 13th of May, 1940, the Second World War started for the Netherlands. After 5 days of fighting, the country came under Nazi occupation. Mussert made contact with the Nazis in order to explain his idea of how they should govern the Netherlands alongside the NSB, but on the 19th of May, 1940, Mussert was informed through an announcement that the Austrian Nazi dr. Arthur Seys-Inquart would become the designated leader of the Netherlands.¹⁸⁷ To further the goals of his party and secure the future of the Netherlands as part of a German controlled Europe, collaboration was the next natural step for Mussert and the members of his party.¹⁸⁸ As such, Mussert swore loyalty to Adolf Hitler on the 12th of

¹⁸¹ Dr. G. A. Kooy, *Het Eche van een Volkse beweging. Nazificatie en Denazifactie in Nederland 1931-1945* (Utrecht: HES Publisher, 1982) 2.

¹⁸² Ibid.: 2.

¹⁸³ Ibid.: 2.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.: 4.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.: 4.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.: 5.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.: 7.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.: 8.

December 1941 in Berlin, making him and his party subordinates to the Nazis.¹⁸⁹ This in turn, had as a consequence that the Dutch, even more than before, came to see the NSB as traitors and collaborators with the enemy. Mussert also failed to convince Hitler of his plan to create a “Great-Netherlands”, consisting of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. However, he was rewarded the title “Leader of the Dutch people”, but this came with no responsibilities or power. Nonetheless, the Nazis deemed the NSB a useful party and decided that this was the only party that was allowed. As a result, many members of the Dutch National Socialist Party obtained positions within Dutch local government, albeit never in very high positions.

In Enschede the NSB developed slightly different. In the Dutch provincial elections of 1935, the NSB in Enschede got over 11,3% of the total votes.¹⁹⁰ This vast local development is explained by historian S.H. Quee, who argues that this was due the radicalisation of textile workers. They believed that social-democracy have failed when the economic depression hit the Netherlands before the war and believed that they would find their solace in national socialism.¹⁹¹ The general elections in April 1939 and elections within the municipalities of June 1939 showed that the NSB had lost votes when compared to previous years. This decrease of votes could be explained due to the fact that the NSB became more extreme in their manners and the development of fascists movements in Europe became increasingly violent and hostile, shunning away potential voters. On average, the NSB obtained 3.9% of votes in 1939 in the Netherlands. In the province of Overijssel that percentage was also 3.9%, but in Twente it was higher than the average, namely 4.4%.¹⁹² This was most likely due the degree of how much influence the NSB had in local government, sympathy of the populace towards the NSB, public image of the NSB and the influence of religious leaders who spoke against the anti-Christian values of the NSB.

In Enschede the NSB obtained a percentage of 6.3% during the provincial elections of

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.: 9.

¹⁹⁰ Marjolein J. Schenkel, *De Twentse Paradox. De lotgevallen van de Joodse bevolking van Hengelo en Enschede tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (Nederland: Waalburg Press, 2003) 56-58; S.H. Quee, “De NSB in Twente”, in *In de schaduw van de depressie. De NSB en de verkiezingen in de jaren dertig*, H.W. von der Dunk. (Alphen aan den Rijn: uitgeverij Luitingh-Sijthoff BV, 1982) 142-143.

¹⁹¹ Quee, *NSB in Twente*, 142-143.

¹⁹² Ibid.: 57-58.

1939, which was higher than the estimated average.¹⁹³ However, in the municipal elections of June 1939, the NSB only received a percentage of 4.6% of total votes.¹⁹⁴ The influence of the NSB in Overijssel and Twente, and in the city of Enschede, is not easily explained according to Schenkel.¹⁹⁵ However, she does mention that Quee argues that there are two possible factors that might have contributed to the strength of the NSB in Overijssel, Twente and Enschede when compared to the rest of the Netherlands.¹⁹⁶ The first factor is an economic one, since the textile industry in Enschede and the region of Twente declined in 1939 which might explain why voters turned towards National Socialism.¹⁹⁷ Even though the textile industry in Enschede and in Twente declined, it did not mean that this development could explain the increase of votes for the NSB in other areas. For example, the agricultural sector also suffered, but there was no increase of votes for the NSB in areas where this sector was dominant.¹⁹⁸ This was most likely due to the influence of social democratic and Christian parties whose ideologies were more relatable to the farmers than the ideology of the NSB.

The second explanation of Quee is that Twente and Enschede were more conservative and that some of these ideals were in line with National Socialism.¹⁹⁹ However, following this argument by Quee, Schenkel elaborates further on this by adding the influx of Jewish refugees to the Netherlands since the 1930's.²⁰⁰ These refugees arrived in Twente and the Dutch people and government rather wanted to see these refugees go than welcoming them. Not because the Dutch government and people were anti-Semitic, but because the country was in an unfortunate economic crisis.²⁰¹ Together with that argument, both Schenkel and Quee argue that because of that development, there was no correlation between anti-Semitism that was spurred because of the Jewish refugees, and the accumulation of votes for the NSB in the coming elections.²⁰²

¹⁹³ Ibid.: 57-58.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.: 57-58.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.: 57-58.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.: 57-58; Quee, *NSB in Twente*, 142-143.

¹⁹⁷ Schenkel, *Twentse Paradox*, 57-58.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.: 57-58.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.: 57-58.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.: 57-58.

²⁰¹ Ibid.: 57-58.

²⁰² Ibid.: 58.

4.2: Burgomaster Rückert, the NSB and Local Government in Enschede.

The first contact of Burgomaster Rückert with the NSB was on the 28th of May 1940, when the district leader of the NSB of the province of Overijssel, J. Velner, sent a message with the notification that contact with the NSB and further correspondence with them needed to be done through “comrade” J.H.H. Wevers.²⁰³ Wevers, who lived in Enschede, was a good choice for the NSB, since he could remain close to the Burgomaster. Before the war, Wevers was already a member of the NSB, but it was during the war that his role within the party began to grow. On the 14th of October 1941, Wevers was given charge by the NSB over the “Winter Relief” for the Netherlands.²⁰⁴ This was a charity-based organisation that assisted less fortunate Dutch families with food, drinks and clothing to help them through the harsh winter(s). This organisation was inspired by the *Winterhilfswerk des Deutschen Volkes* (WHW) in Nazi Germany, which was part of the National Socialist People’s Welfare. Wevers also was appointed by the NSB to look over the “Dutch Public Servants” charity.²⁰⁵ Since these institutions were initially set up as charities, they had to rely on donations and funds from the Dutch people. At first, they received funds and donations, even from wealthy Jewish textile industrialists in Enschede. One of these, the Menko family, even donated over 2000 Dutch guilders to these organisations.²⁰⁶ But as time progressed, these charities received less and less. This was due to the fact that the Dutch people came to distrust anything that was related with National Socialism. At one point this began to bother Wevers eventually and he sent a message to Burgomaster Rückert on the 6th of October 1942 with the question whether Rückert, his Aldermen and civil servants could donate more to the charities.²⁰⁷ When Burgomaster Rückert received a message from Velner regarding the appointment of Wevers as the representative of the NSB and Wevers would become the first man that Rückert needed to approach to contact them, that was the moment when Rückert’s position as Burgomaster would be tested by the National Socialists.

²⁰³ Wim H. Nijhof, *Geschiedenis van Enschede. Stad uit stoom en tijd*. (Enschede, Uitgever Historie, 2014) 325-334; Archive of the Municipality of Enschede 1889-1944. Inventory Number 2:111. Corr. No. C100/616 Afdeling 10.

²⁰⁴ S.H. Quee, *De politieke verhoudingen in Twente in de jaren 30*. (Twente, Jaarboek Twente, 1979) 135-142.

²⁰⁵ Nijhof, *Geschiedenis van Enschede*, 325-344.

²⁰⁶ Nijhof, *Geschiedenis van Enschede*, 325-334.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*: 325-334.

The first attempt by the National Socialist to gain more political power and influence in local government in Enschede was in December 1940. At that time, the still existing city council, the Aldermen and B&W, alongside burgomaster Rückert, were discussing the possibilities of a food shortage due to the demands of the Nazis regarding foodstuff. The Bureau for food supply during wartime (*Rijksbureau voor Voedselvoorziening in Oorlogstijd, RVVO*), was initially tasked to look at the distribution of foodstuff. This Bureau had to negotiate the different alignments of the interests of the Nazis, the Dutch government, the population in rural areas and the average consumer, whereby the interests of the consumer received less attention in the negotiations. This distribution also had to occur in Enschede for items such as fuel, food and textile. They needed a new institution and someone who would be in charge of it.²⁰⁸ None of the selectants were members of the NSB.²⁰⁹ As a consequence the NSB responded with the question to Rückert why there was not even a single member of the NSB appointed.²¹⁰ It was here that there was some form of objection or rejection to the advantages of the Dutch National Socialists and the Nazis. According to the answer provided by Rückert and his council, the reason as why they did not appointed a single member of the Dutch National Socialists was that the selection process did not looked at religious or political beliefs, but simply to the capabilities of the applicants.²¹¹ What is interesting to see is that this answer of Rückert can be interpreted as a suggestion made by Rückert meaning that those of the NSB who did applied, had inferior skills or capabilities than others. This particularity was supposedly played off as pure coincidence. Of course, it can be argued if this was truly the case, but for Wevers it was fruitless to argue against the answer provided by Rückert. There was no clear statement that the members of the NSB were rejected because of their political beliefs. Rückert and his council could hide behind “standard protocols”, in order to hire civil servants, as they had used the same protocol for every job-application process. In other words, “technically”, they did nothing wrong, but for Wevers and the NSB, their attempt to get into the local government of Enschede was halted. It comes as no surprise that Wevers sent a personal letter, or perhaps a threat, to burgomaster Rückert when he received his answer.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.: 325-334.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.: 325-334.

²¹⁰ Ibid.: 325-334.

²¹¹ Ibid.: 325-334.

*Are your achievements so impressive that you need a salary of 10.000 guilders? And that you also need a pension between 4000 and 5000 guilders each year? And yet, are you not a member of the Freemasons or the Rotary Club? It does not matter. National Socialism has come, now it is here and it shall remain, no matter what your opinion is. If you do not wish to cooperate with us, then I suggest you fully commit to that stance. If not, disappear from the stage and look on from the side-lines.*²¹²

The disdain from Wevers to be disregarded to the side-line is something that is highlighted within the lines of his message. The regard by Wevers to attack Rückert's income might be an indication or suggestion from Wevers that he is convinced that Rückert is only maintaining his position as Burgomaster because of the money. Not though his conviction towards the people of Enschede. According to Wevers, Rückert lacked the "of the people and by the people" image that the NSB did had. Wevers himself suggested that Rückert should disappear from the stage, step down as Burgomaster and pass the torch to someone more appropriate, such as a member of the NSB member, preferably Wevers himself. It is this hunt on the position of Rückert by Wevers and the Dutch National Socialists that would continue on for quite some time. Rückert's relationship with Wevers would deteriorate from this point on. For Rückert's point of view, it could be argued that Wevers was a man that Rückert never could fully trust as his loyalties would be with the Dutch National Socialists and the Nazis and less to the civil servants of Rückert's administration and the people of Enschede. Furthermore, the message by Wevers could have been an indication that Rückert was convinced that he *had* to stay as burgomaster and could not step down even if he wanted. The reasoning behind that was that *if* Rückert would step down, Wevers would get the possibility of becoming the new burgomaster of Enschede. That alone might be something that Rückert probably did not want to happen to the people of Enschede as Wevers would not serve the interest of the people of Enschede, but the Nazis instead.

In September 1941 there appeared another chance for the Dutch National Socialist to gain a position in the local government. The Nazis published a measurement for all Dutch municipalities wherein they decided that all city councils and their representatives would be

²¹² Ibid.: 328; Wiegman, *April-Mei-Stakingen*, 47.

abolished and the Aldermen would become subordinates to their respective Burgomasters.²¹³ This meant that the burgomaster no longer had to take into account the wishes of the council or regard them as a counterweight to his decisions. From now on, the burgomaster would have full responsibility for the government of the municipality. However, the burgomaster could not manage an entire local governmental administration on his own, so the College of Burgomasters and Aldermen would remain active. The college had more of an advising role and an executive character after September 1941. The Aldermen could no longer operate without permission from the burgomaster, as they still owe responsibilities to Rückert due the new system implemented. What is interesting at the remaining Aldermen within of the College is that a sudden removal or eviction of their positions would be difficult to pull off by the Nazis and their allies. One reason is that if an Aldermen would be evicted, Rückert would have had tasks at his hands that could no longer be distributed under the Aldermen. The result might have been governing Enschede became a more difficult task. The College of Burgomasters and Aldermen consisted of Burgomaster Rückert and four Aldermen, H.C Nijkamp, A. Sein, W.R. Soetekouw and J. Haantjes.²¹⁴ The relationship between the Aldermen and Rückert is an important one, as it is an explanation as to why the Nazis and the Dutch National Socialists had such difficulties to gain a foothold in the government of Enschede. The stronger the relationship between the five was, the more difficult it was for the Nazis and the NSB to drive a wedge between them and gain influence.

Furthermore, it is interesting that none of the Aldermen were members of the NSB. This was for the Dutch National Socialists a thorn in their sides that they could not remove yet.²¹⁵ This was also noticed by NSB member Egon von Bonningshausen, who was the commissar of the province of Overijssel until 1943.²¹⁶ Von Bonningshausen was of the opinion that it was not acceptable that none of the Aldermen were NSB-ers, since that party became the only legal political party.²¹⁷ He argued that civil servants who were affiliated with other political parties that were outlawed, should not hold their positions and pass them over to members of the NSB.²¹⁸ However, to suddenly evict the Aldermen from their positions

²¹³ Archive of the Municipality of Enschede 1889-1944. Inventory Number 2:582. 1e Afdeling. No. U520/7. 27 of august 1941.

²¹⁴ Nijhof, 328.

²¹⁵ Nijhof, 328.

²¹⁶ Ibid.: 328.

²¹⁷ Ibid.: 328.

²¹⁸ Ibid.: 328.

because of their political background was supported by the Nazis, as their resources for the occupation of the Netherlands was thin at best. Instead, it was centred around the *Fuehrerprinzip* with the Nazis having the highest bureaucratic authority within the system. The bulk of this system, however, remained occupied by mostly Dutch civil servants. Evicting civil servants would also mean that their salaries and pension would be endangered, and give a reason to the Dutch people to rise up against the Nazis. The NSB would receive little to no support from the Nazis to violently expel civil servants who were not to the liking of the NSB, but there remained other methods that could be used for the NSB to get into the administration of Burgomaster Rückert.

The NSB in Enschede decided to bring forth one of their own, Dr. G.A Lasonder, as a replacement for one of the Aldermen who would assist Burgomaster Rückert in the government of Enschede when the time would arrive to elect new Aldermen.²¹⁹ Lasonder was previously between 1913 and 1919 a member of the city council of Enschede for the A.R.P (Anti-Revolutionary Party) and therefore had the knowledge of local government of Enschede and also had the experience.²²⁰ Rückert expressed his disdain with the suggestion, because he was of the opinion that by appointing a member of the National Socialist Movement, they would lose the support of the people of Enschede, making governing them an more difficult tasks.²²¹ By then the general image of the NSB has been damaged beyond repair, as they were seen as collaborators with the Nazis. The attempt by the National Socialists have yet again been rejected by Rückert and his council without seemingly repercussions by the Nazis or the Dutch National Socialists. As the Nazis did not wanted too much turmoil from the Dutch people, it is interesting to see that the Nazis contemplated with the decision by Rückert to reject their proposition, and it seems that they would accept their rejection at first. There is no solid explanation as to why the Nazis and the NSB left Rückert's argument and decision unchallenged, but this would change in 1942.

On the 13th of July 1942, a group of Enschede civil servants were taken hostage by the Nazis.²²² This was a repercussion for a series of sabotages that occurred in the province for a

²¹⁹ Nijhof, 328; Schenkel, 78; Wiegman, 326.

²²⁰ Nijhof, 328; Schenkel, 78; Wiegman, 326.

²²¹ Nijhof, *Geschiedenis van Enschede*, 328.

²²² Ibid.: 328.

couple of weeks. Amongst the hostages was a member of the Aldermen, Jan Haantjes. An ultimatum was announced by the Nazis that if the sabotage would not cease, the hostages would pay with their lives. Rückert made numerous attempts to have him released, sending letters to the commissar of the province as well as to the Secretary-General of Internal Affairs in The Hague.²²³ Even if the plea by Rückert would have been successful, it came too late for Jan Haantjes. He was executed alongside other hostages when the attempts and sabotage did not cease in the province.²²⁴

The result of Haantjes' execution was that his position as an Aldermen was open due to the "unforeseen" circumstance that befell Haantjes. Seys-Inquart took this opportunity to promote and appoint J.H.H. Wevers as the new Aldermen in Enschede. Wevers would become the representative for the Dutch National Socialists in the municipality and in the province.²²⁵ What is interesting to see is that Rückert did not object to this appointment. The reason for this is that the execution of Haantjes was a shocking revelation and intimidation towards Rückert and the other Aldermen. If a high-ranking member of the local government of Enschede was executed, then that could mean that others who held high positions would not be safe from the Nazis. Rückert might have believed or realised that even he himself, as the burgomaster who has the highest authority within the system, might not be invulnerable against the Nazis because of his position. Another reason why Rückert might not have objected the decision, was that the appointment of Wevers was from Seys-Inquart himself. Going against the wishes of the highest Nazi official in the Netherlands might bring dire consequences for Rückert. Nonetheless, this event gave the National Socialists entry into the government of Enschede and forced Burgomaster Rückert concessions regarding measurements from the Nazis. No longer could Rückert object regulations of the Nazis or use bureaucracy as a way to stall the interference of the Nazis and their allies, since Rückert had to deal with National Socialists in his administration. The result of this development was that negotiation and cooperation became the better option for Rückert in order to maintain his position as burgomaster.

²²³ Ibid.: 328.

²²⁴ Ibid.: 328.

²²⁵ Ibid.: 328.

4.3: Conclusion

In the first two years of the occupation, Burgomaster Rückert could successfully restrain or object the advantages of the National Socialists and the Nazis. This was due to the fact that in the beginning of the occupation, the Nazis did not want to disturb or upheave Dutch society too much, as that would result that their “Germanic Brothers”, as how the Germans viewed the Dutch people, would rise up against the Nazis. Furthermore, it was of great importance that the system of local government would continue working underneath the occupation and the influence of National Socialism, as the Nazis did not have enough manpower to fully take over the system. What is not entirely clear regarding Rückert was his personal view or stance with the Dutch National Socialists. From his communication with district leaders and the commissar of the province who were mostly members of the NSB there are zero to no hostilities to be traced. Due to a lack of personal data or a shadow archive within the archive of Enschede, it cannot be concluded if Rückert had a disdain for the NSB or if he simply cooperated with them due to formalities and the scale of the situation. The NSB, as mentioned by Wevers, were here and they were here to stay. What can be interpreted based on the communication with Wevers and Rückert, was that the latter did not trust Wevers with legislative power or a position of power in the government of Enschede, this due to the fact that there could be a compromise of loyalty and duties between Rückert and his task as a burgomaster of Enschede and Wevers being a member of the Dutch National Socialists. As long as the Nazis did not fully insert their authority within local government and kept their distance by means of check-ups and status reports, then Rückert would have space to switch between negotiation or objection to certain measurements or suggestions made by the Nazis. Rückert could hide behind bureaucratic and administrative barriers to legitimise his decision of objection or to strengthen his position during cooperation or negotiation.

However, that was only the case until 1942, after that the influence of the Dutch National Socialists grew more intense and violent, alongside the ever-increasing watchful eyes of the Nazis. There is not a definitive explanation as to why this approach suddenly changed, but there are numerous factors that might have contributed to this, such as the war expanding towards the East, dwindling resources and manpower on the Axis’ side and the United States joining the war. Nonetheless, these factors and the growing influence of the Dutch National Socialists had the result that Rückert could no longer “hide” behind governmental protocols and his reasoning to object Dutch National Socialists in order to maintain stability and the

support of the people of Enschede was rendered absolute. Furthermore, the previous method used by Rückert to use the bureaucracy of his government against the Nazis was also hindered since the Dutch National Socialists had a foothold in the government of Enschede. With this, the Dutch National Socialists could then verify claims made by the Burgomaster, which in turn had the consequence that Rückert needed to voice his opinion carefully as well as his policies. Lastly, the execution of one of the high-ranking members of the local government was another key moment wherein Rückert came to be in a position wherein he no longer could object or pose some form of defiance against the Nazis. The execution of Aldermen Haantjes made clear that nobody would be safe for the Nazis should one disobey, regardless of status or political position. Cooperation with the Nazis or negotiation would be a better, and perhaps a safer, option for Rückert to maintain his own position. There was a possibility that if Rückert should fail to maintain his position and got replaced by a member of the National Socialists, the Nazi regulations and their control over Enschede would increase for the worse of the people of Enschede.

Why is Romijn relevant for this chapter? Firstly, Romijn dedicates a large part of his research describing the concept of national-socialists government in the Netherlands and how this eventually led to the disintegration of Internal Affairs.²²⁶ He explains that this disintegration was due the problems that arose between Frederiks and the national socialists. Frederiks wanted to keep "his" band of burgomasters, who were part of the "old order", together. The "new order" was the one that consisted of the national socialists who wanted to replace most burgomasters with their own. Romijn place a considerable amount of emphasis this "tug of war" between Frederiks and the national socialists. What is more important is how this eventually spilled over to local government.

Secondly, the reason as to why Romijn is relevant in this chapter is because he also describes the differences in success of the national socialists to gain a position in local government. As mentioned before, there were many reasons and methods that the NSB used to gain more influence, be it through intimidation, propaganda or using the Nazis. Furthermore, there was a difference in success between large and small municipalities. Romijn explains this difference because in the larger municipalities, the NSB had more influence in

²²⁶ Romijn, *Burgemeesters in Oorlogstijd*, 321-416.

local government by having more NSB Aldermen. This was not the case in smaller municipalities. This is true for Rückert's case.²²⁷ It did have the result that there was a considerable amount of NSB burgomasters. According to Romijn, the NSB calculated in December 1942 that there were a total of 161 NSB burgomasters that governed over 3.147.213 people, or 34.5% of total Dutch population.²²⁸ The municipalities that had a NSB burgomaster also wanted to have NSB Aldermen, but this was difficult due *Veroderning 152/1941*, which meant that current Aldermen were ordered to maintain their position.²²⁹ The only way for an Aldermen to step down was through a permission that could only be granted by the *Abteilung Niederlandische Personalangelegenheiten*.²³⁰ This organisation was also responsible for appointing new members. In Rückert's case this organisation did not had any role as the four Aldermen in Rückert's administration remained on their posts. Furthermore, there were no complaints or incentives that could result in the removal of one Alderman and be replaced with the NSB. But the execution of Haantjes highlights the uniqueness of Rückert's case. It was possible to get an Aldermen replaced and even so more without the *Abteilung*, since the new Aldermen was installed by Seys-Inquart himself.

²²⁷ Appendix I: Images. Image 1.6.

²²⁸ Ibid.: 411.

²²⁹ Ibid.: 411.

²³⁰ Ibid.: 411.

Chapter V: Conclusion

This conclusion is divided into two parts. The first part will look at burgomaster Rückert, the three themes in this research and the three behavioural types. Furthermore, the first part of this chapter will give an explanation as to which type was the most dominant one and why this was the case in each separate theme.

The second part of the conclusion is focused on Peter Romijn's analytical model. That part will look at how Romijn's model was used in this research, why the model was relevant and if his model gave an answer to the main research question and the sub questions.

5.1: Burgomaster Rückert

Johannes Jacobus Gerardus Everwijn Rückert was no hero. The execution of Aldermen Haantjes and the constant threat of Wevers, who was preying on his position, had a negative effect on Rückert. His approach to Nazi regulations and the advances of the National Socialists had the result that Rückert would maintain a careful approach to their demands, measurements and legislation. The result of that approach was that negotiation and cooperation became the dominant behavioural types for Rückert during the occupation. However, in Rückert's defence, it was a better option for him to stay and endure the measurements that the Nazis wanted to implement in local government, in order to prevent Wevers from becoming the new burgomaster. Wevers threat to Rückert was a clear indication that he wanted his position, resulting in a careful approach and mistrust by Rückert to the NSB. The decision of Rückert to maintain his position had another consequence, namely that the people of Enschede would not lose their faith in the local government of Enschede as long Rückert would remain. After all, Rückert was not antagonised by the people and there was no distrust towards him. Even if Rückert did cooperate with anti-Jewish legislation and enforced the punishment for those who participated with the April-May Strike. Nevertheless, the support that Rückert had from the people made his task more bearable, since he could count on their cooperation.

Cooperation was primarily dominant in the persecution of Jews. Rückert did nothing to halt that development. The only example of Rückert's negotiation regarding the persecution of Jews was the example of the swimming pool *Zuiderhagen*. However, that example only showcase the willingness of Rückert to ease the suffering of the persecuted Jews in his municipality. However, messages and publications that targeted the Jews in Enschede and robbed them of their rights and mobility were not hindered by Rückert. Requests made by Walraven and Van Rijke regarding the Jews in Enschede were obeyed and carried out by Rückert.

The April-May strike shows the same behavioural types where cooperation was dominant. This has likely to do with the fact that during the strike, members of his administration were arrested by the Nazis. The result was that Rückert's attention shifted to this problem, instead of dealing with the strike. The reason why Rückert was focused on getting the civil servants free has likely to do with the fact that if Rückert could not get them free, they would be replaced by the NSB instead. This would have made Rückert's position

more challenging to maintain if there were more members of the NSB within his administration. Why Rückert cooperated with the measurements that quelled the strike and the investigations afterwards could be explained because of the agreement made between Rückert and his superiors regarding the release of his Aldermen. If it is believed that Rückert did all of this to prevent the NSB for getting more influence in local government and to keep the Nazis of his back for the time being, this could mean a strong case for Rückert's negotiation. However, since there are no sources that can confirm as to what Rückert agreed to or promised, this remain open for interpretation.

Negotiation and objection were more dominant than cooperation when it came to Rückert and the National Socialists. Since the NSB did not had a strong foothold in Rückert's administration, Rückert could use protocols and the support of his Aldermen to keep the advances of the NSB at bay. The example of the distribution of foodstuff, oil and textiles demonstrates that. Before 1942, Rückert was able to halt most advantages of the Dutch National Socialists due to numerous factors. One being that his administration did not consists of members of the Dutch National Socialists, his circles remained loyal to him and the government in exile and the ties between the different administrations of local government remained close. Another factor was that the Nazis did not fully committed to the Nazification process of local government of Enschede in the first two years of the occupation. This because the Nazis did not want to disturb Dutch civil life. For the Nazis this was a method to win the Dutch people over to National Socialism, without forcing them. But this was not possible even if the Nazis did want to force the Dutch people, since they lacked the manpower and sources to do so completely. However, it does need to be mentioned that the Nazis did supported their allies, the Dutch National Socialists, to obtain positions in Dutch local government. Rückert could halt such opportunities since job applications that were filled in by national-socialists were mostly declined because Rückert's administration consisted mostly of non-national socialist civil servants.

Rückert's approach towards the NSB changed after 1942 when the Nazis forced their hand and wanted to placed National Socialists in the local administration. After the execution of Haantjes and the interference by Seys-Inquart himself, Rückert was no longer in a position to formally oppose the NSB and the Nazis. Formal objection would mean that Rückert would lose his position to Wevers. Non formal objection would be the better option for him, as the example of Director Buijs demonstrates.

In the end, Rückert was a burgomaster who hold on to his position, seemingly with the idea of "no matter the cost." As long he could keep his circle of civil servants and Aldermen close by, the Nazis and the NSB could not easily take over everything. The mindset of "no matter the cost" might be extreme, but keep in mind that there were many reasons as to why Rückert wanted, or perhaps needed, to remain. The threat of Wevers and the NSB, his own status, fear for a worse burgomaster or even the loss of income are such examples. The question of which reason was more important for Rückert, remains open for discussion. Fact was that Rückert did not had the intention to step down nor did he wanted to give the NSB and the Nazis a reason to get him replaced. However, what Rückert truly thought about the developments during the occupation, the persecution of Jews and the Nazis are lost to us. There are no personal notes or a diary kept by Rückert. All that was left of Rückert's thoughts and his persona, were his messages during the occupation.

5.2: Peter Romijn's Model

Romijn's model was crucial for this research and the analysis of burgomaster Rückert. Romijn had spent many years for his research about the position of the burgomasters during the occupation. The result yielded a solid analytical structure. This structure was beneficial for this research, as it provided the basis in which burgomaster Rückert could be analysed. In order to make the model of Romijn suitable for a single case, it had to be narrowed down. This was done without too much difficulty or problems by looking at three behavioural types and three key events that fit in Romijn's three themes. All of these measurements served the goal of analysing the behaviour of burgomaster Rückert, his position in the three sub-questions and how that would eventually fit in Romijn's model.

Romijn's first theme, the function of the burgomaster and local government, was not used as an individual chapter in this research. As stated before, it had been used as additional background information and context. This proved to be important for this research, since Romijn had an extensive description of the situation in local government before and during the war. Important changes and Nazi orders that had an influence on the structure of local government were present in the primary sources. But by implementing Romijn, they were explained further in depth.

The second theme of Romijn, which was the dynamics of the occupation seen through the eyes of local government, was more suitable to be used in the analysis of Rückert than the first theme. Although it was mentioned in paragraph 1.2 that there were many dynamics during the occupation, the reason why the persecution of Jews was chosen, had to do with the fact that this development had a large impact on the position of the burgomaster. Furthermore, the persecution shocked both society and local government, as something like that was never done before in Dutch society. This shock and how that changed the burgomaster was something that Romijn argued in his work and demonstrates that in his research with numerous examples. In that sense, Rückert would fit in with the examples that cooperated, as the examples of Rückert in this research cannot be classified as opposing the persecution of Jews. Rather, there was cooperation and attempts to ease the burden on the shoulders of the Jews of Enschede.

The third theme of Romijn holds a different position in this research. The theme was split into two parts, namely the clash between state and society and the imported revolution due to national socialism. The reason as to why this was done, had to do with the fact that the

single theme focused on different aspects of the burgomaster. The first part of Romijn's third theme, the clash, looked at the confrontation between the society and the Nazis and how the burgomaster was placed in between. The result of that difficult positions was that the burgomaster had to immediately react, or improvise, to solve the problem. If the burgomaster was unable to do so, he had to rely on advice from his superiors or the Nazis to deal with it. This approach highlighted an interesting dynamic between the local and national government and with the Nazis. Rückert's case showed that he had frequent contact with the Commissar of the Province, the Police President and also with the bureau of Internal Affairs. However, the contact between Rückert and his superiors was mostly a "top-down" approach, as Rückert had executed most request by his superiors without any objection. However, the example of the arrested Aldermen during the strike is an exception to this rule.

The second part of Romijn's third theme, the imported revolution, highlighted the position of the burgomaster and the NSB. In this research, that was demonstrated with the so called "tug of war" between Rückert and his Aldermen versus the NSB and the Nazis. Romijn shows in his model that this development of the NSB and their ambition to gain positions in local government was one of the factors that most burgomasters had to deal with throughout the occupation. However, the examples in Romijn' model shows many examples and outliers, such as burgomasters who were replaced and those who defied the NSB. What this meant for the case of Rückert was that he falls in between. He did "defied" them in a bureaucratic and formal way, but only until 1942. Afterwards, his approach changed and was more careful.

Does this mean that Romijn's model could be implemented in this research without any flaws? As mentioned before, the model of Romijn focuses on the description of all burgomasters during the occupation. To get an overview and an average image of the burgomaster during the occupation, Romijn made use of outliers. These extremes had the result that Romijn could construct an average description. However, by taking a look at Romijn's method of using outliers to construct an average, it seemed that this was not suitable to analyse Rückert. There were no extreme outliers. No cases in which Rückert's position or behaviour could be classified as "extreme", or to put differently, seen as heavily objecting the Nazis or of eager cooperation.

Secondly, it was necessary to narrow the three themes of Romijn down into the three sub-questions. If not, then this research would have taken years before it could give insight

regarding the position of burgomaster Rückert. Simply because there would be more time spend explaining many factors and other institutions before the actual research about Rückert could begin. Furthermore, the three central themes in Romijn's model could be broadly interpreted, meaning that many other events and dynamics during the occupation "fit" in the model. That aspect alone had the consequence of including even more cases and events, besides the ones in this research.

Lastly, there is the problem of a lack of personal data of burgomasters themselves. Romijn's work covers many burgomasters, with each their own motives, hopes and dreams. Because of that, Romijn had access to many diaries, personal notes and shadow archives of different burgomasters. This in turn, enabled Romijn to get into the mindset of the burgomasters and explain their motivations or reasons. It served as an additional explanation as to why there were cases of cooperation, negotiation and objection. In the case of Rückert, there was no personal diary nor a shadow archive. Romijn's model does not explain what one should do if there are no personal data available. However, it does need to be mentioned that Romijn's model does not need to include it in order to explain that. It is simply a factor that has been encountered along this research. If one wants to "truly" understand the motives, heart and mind of a burgomaster regarding the three themes in Romijn's model, then there is a need to create an in depth-overview of every single factor that contributed to the policy of the burgomaster in local government. This would take sheer dedication and several years of research in order to get close to the "truth" behind the policy of a burgomaster. Nevertheless, for Rückert's case, his personal motivation and opinions regarding the persecution of Jews or the NSB was missing. One method to find out more about this, is through further research. Perhaps it might be necessary to investigate what happened to him after the war and if there are still descendants of him to this day. But that would yield another possible setback, namely if the descendants or relatives of Rückert want to cooperate or not in the first place.

Epilogue

What is the image of Rückert as the burgomaster of Enschede between 1940-1945? Is it fair to place a judgement of character or a morally judgement? The conclusion in this research was based on three events that are part of a grand narrative that consist of many events during the Second World War in the Netherlands. Having the position of the burgomaster in local government or any governmental position during the Second World War was no easy task. It placed enormous moral weight and other burdens on their shoulders. How much space was there for the burgomasters or other civil servants when it was about objection, cooperation and negation? If one would please the Nazis too much might have been a death sentence for them, as retaliating citizens or the resistance might target them. This does not mean than the burgomaster or civil servants would be murdered, but removal from their position would most likely be the result. However, defying the Nazis could pose the same result. That raises the question if there was any other way to shimmer between cooperation, negotiation and objection. Was there a way to balance things out and appease both sides? What was legally possible for the burgomaster and what were his options? At first the order left behind by the Dutch government in exile was open to interpretation. That order was somewhat along the lines of "to serve the interest of the Dutch people and not cause them any harm." How this was put into practice differs between each burgomaster.

The image of the burgomaster after the war was dominated by the idea of "good" versus "evil". They were judged based on their cooperation with the Nazis. The image of spineless and cowardice burgomasters and civil servants only saw some change after there was more critique about the whole "good" versus "evil" perception of the war. This started after the 1960's, as more research revealed the difficulties and situation where a burgomaster had to operate in. What does this mean for Rückert? Where does Rückert "fit" in the discussion about burgomasters during the Second World War? After all, an answer to that question seems to be all but black and white.

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Archive of the Municipality of Enschede.1921-1944, Inventory Number 2:1430.

Archive of the Local Police Department of Enschede 1884-1959. Inventory Number 153:190.

Archive of the Municipality of Enschede 1921-1944. Inventory Number 2:1 - 2:5. *A collection of the inventory of "special items", archive of the civil servants, commissions for the city council and other archives.*

Archive of the Local Police Department of Enschede 1884-1959. Inventory Number 187: 153.
Documents regarding Anti-Jews measurements focused on the prohibition of Dutch Jews from entering public swimming pools and other public places.

Archive of the Local Police Department of Enschede 1884-1959. Inventory Number 188: 153. *Documents regarding the search for and arresting Dutch Jews in Enschede. Includes declaration of being Aryan, captured radios from Jews, measurements against Jews and a report about vandalism at the synagogue in the prinsesstraat in Enschede.*

Archive of the Municipality of Enschede 1921-1944 Inventory Number 2: 2.1. *Documents regarding the administration of the city council seen through the point of view of the Burgomaster and his civil servants toward the council between 1921-1933.*

Archive of the Municipality of Enschede 1921-1944. Document Number 002866. *Installation Burgomaster J.J.G.E Rückert of Enschede.* Period between 1930 and 1932. Author and Location unknown.

Archive of the Municipality of Enschede 1921-1944. Inventory Number 1300:2. *Archive regarding the coalition of the City Council, yearly reports and overviews of exploitation between 1927 and 1944.*

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Appendix I: Further Reading & Images

Further Reading: Companies that had responded to Rückert's request after the April-May Strike. Messages regarding staff and companies that participated in the strike. Archive of the Municipality of Enschede. Inventory Number 2:2429. No. 2.08.89. Kabinet. 6e Afdeling. No. 1263:

- Director H. Zwart of the Local Accountant Services reported on the 3rd of May that his staff could not work on Thursday since their offices and the buildings of the local gas factory and water pipelines were closed since the staff of *those* instances went home. The civil servant who was responsible for the Local Butchery went home before 17:00 PM, the female employee (Berends) was sick at home. Furthermore, on the 5th of May, Director Zwart added another name to the list that he provided for Rückert, which was J.J. Kuitert.
- Director J. Verkoren of the Local Gas Factory and Water Pipelines reported that the strike did not "found ground" within the factories and that they operated with no disruptions. (What is interesting to see is that either Zwart or Verkoren's story contain inconsistencies or lies)
- The director of the Local Department for the Unemployed, B.H. Scholten, reports that there were some employees who went home on the 29th of April due to sickness, the strike or were allowed to leave. His report contains names of those who participated in the strike.
- The director of the Local Department for healthcare, Dr. A.A. Koopal, reported that none of his staff participated in the strike.
- The Director of the Local Department of Municipal Reciprocity, (*Gemeenteontvangesten*) presumably Sir Ruilink, reported that a number of his staff participated in the strike and including in his report is a list with the names on it.
- **Burgomaster Rückert** also had send a list of civil servants of his department that participated with the strike and Rückert himself had send a list of names to the commissar of the province of Overijssel. However, those who were sick were not included in this list, which was sent on the 6th of May 1943.
- The 6th Department of the Local Gas Factory and Waterpipes responded on the 7th of May 1943, but none participated in the strike.

- The Inspection Service of Goods (*De Keuringsdienst van Waarden*) reported on the 7th of May 1943 that none of the staff participated in the strike.
- The Bureau for the provision of food in central kitchens (*Rijksbureau voor de voedselvoorziening centrale keukens*) reports on the 12th of May 1943 that a few members of their staff participated in the strike. A list of names was included.
- The Chief of the Local Police Force of Enschede, Anton Berends, reports that nobody of his staff participated in the strike.
- The Public Butchery of Enschede (*Openbaar Slachthuis Enschede*) reports on the 13th of May 1943 that nobody participated in the strike.
- The Harbour of Enschede (*Havenbedrijf Enschede*) reports on the 13th of May 1943 that nobody of the staff participated in the strike.
- Director Buijs of the Public Works of Enschede (*Gemeentewerken van Enschede*) reports that he is not able to give a clear overview of those who were actually working or those who remained home for the strike. All of his employees work in the field and it would be an ungrateful and time-consuming effort to delve further into this matter. The staff that actually were at home were former Dutch military personnel that went home as was instructed by the publication.
- The Public Swimming Pools and Lifeguards of Enschede reported that the work outside of the pools had been ended before actual closure, since there was not enough water to fill most of the swimming pools.
- The Director of the Local Department of the Provision of Electricity of Enschede (*Gemeentelijk Electriciteitsbedrijf Enschede*), Sir Kop, reports on the 13th of May 1943 that they all had participated with the strike and that Kop himself *also* participated with the strike.
- The Director of the Central Accountancy for the Local Departments, (*Centrale Boekhouding voor de Gemeentebedrijven*) Sir Buursink, reports on the 3th of May 1943 that some of his staff did participated with the strike and stopped working and added a list of names in his report.
- The Director of the Local cleaning, garbage disposal, patient transport and disinfection services, (*Gemeentelijke Reining, Vuilberging, Ziekenvervoer en Ontsmettingsdienst*) Sir J. Dompeling, reports that some of his staff participated with the strike and has added a list of names in his report on the 14th of May 1943.

- The Local Fire Department of Enschede reports on the 14th of May 1943 that nobody participated in the strike.
- The Distribution Circle Enschede, which assists in the distribution of scarce goods, reports on the 14th of May 1943 that some workers had laid down their work during the strike and their names were included in the report.
- The Director of the Local Department of City Greenery and Cemeteries (*Stadsplantsoenen en Begraafplaatsen*) reports on the 12th of May 1943 that some workers laid down their work and their names were included in the report.
- The Director of the Local People's Credit Bank reports on the 15th of May 1943 that nobody of his staff laid down their work or participated in the strike.

Images

Image 1.1:



009045

Beschrijving Ontvangst deelnemers 67e vergadering A.V.M.O. (= Algemene Vergadering Leraren Middelbaar Onderwijs) door burgemeester Rückert in de burgerzaal van het stadhuis

Plaats Enschede

Straat Langestraat 24

Collectie Fotoarchief Stadsarchief Enschede

Periode 31/12/1934

vanaf

Periode tot 1/1/1936

Trefwoord Middelbaar onderwijs, Burgemeesters, Verenigingen, Overheid

Translation: *This is a picture of the 67th General Assembly of teachers in secondary education led by burgomaster Rückert. (highlighted with the red square and the chain around his chest) This has been made somewhere between 1934 and 1936*

Source: Photo Archive city archive of Enschede.

Document number: 009045

Image 1.2




Documentnummer	080146
Beschrijving	Groepsfoto t.g.v. jubileum harmonie Kunst naar Kracht Glanerbrug, het bestuur met erecomité, met o.a. burgemeester Rückert
Plaats	Glanerbrug
Straat	Onbekend
Auteur	Onbekend
Trefwoord	Jubilea, Burgemeesters, Verenigingen, Muziek, Groepsportretten

Translation: *Group picture of the anniversary of "Kunst naar Kracht" (art exhibit) with the honorary committee. burgomaster Rückert is in the middle, highlighted with the red square. (assumption that this is taken between 1936-1939)*

Source: Photo archive Enschede. Document number: 080146

Image 1.3



Documentnummer	080148
Beschrijving	Portret van burgemeester Rückert
Plaats	Onbekend
Straat	Onbekend
Auteur	Onbekend
Trefwoord	Burgemeesters, Portretten

Translation: *Portret of burgomaster Rückert.*

Source: Photo Archive of Enschede. Document Number 080148.

Image 1.4



Source: Dutch Newspaper *De nieuwe Nederlander*. From 19-12-1945.

Translation: *J.J.G.E Rückert, on his request, has been honourable discharged from his position as burgomaster of Enschede.*

This is a very interesting message, seemingly that most collaborators after the war fled, were imprisoned or executed after the Second World War. Why was this not the case with

Image 1.5



Documentnummer	008409
Beschrijving	Deel getroffen huisnummers 39 t/m 43. In deze panden waren de SD en de Ortskommandatur gevestigd.
Plaats	Enschede
Straat	M.H. Tromplaan
Collectie	Fotoarchief Stadsarchief Enschede
Auteur	Kesler, J.
Periode vanaf	22/2/1944
Periode tot	22/2/1944
Trefwoord	Oorlogen

Source: https://enschedepubliek.hosting.deventit.net/detail.php?nav_id=10-1&id=13018&index=15, retrieved on 08-01-2019.

Image 1.6


Raadsleden (zitting 1939/1943).			BEHOORT IN DOSSIER
1. W.R. Soetekouw	Zuiderspoorstraat 15	wethouder	
2. H.C. Nijkamp	Menadestraat 12	"	
3. J. Haantjes	Minkmastraat 255	"	
4. A. Sein	Elferinkweg 19	"	
5. J. Bevers	Noorderhagen 68	S.D.A.P.	
6. A.D. Gunning	Jac. v. Heekkerkstr. 44 Glanerbrug	"	
7. N. Hagen	Wicher Nijkampstr. 22	"	
8. C. Hansen	Ribbaltweg 17	"	
9. F. Heinrich	Boekeloeschebleekweg 102, Boekelo	"	
10. W.H. Lebbink	Schouwinkstraat 50	"	
11. H. van Munster	Marcinistraat 32	"	
12. J.A. Prins	Leemkuilstraat 3	"	
13. J.W. Verduin	Weth. Nijhuisstr. 54	"	
14. A.H.J. Coppes	Bisschopstraat 53	R.K.	
15. J. van den Graven	Hegeboerweg 11	"	
16. G.J. Kleisman	Witbroukweg 99	"	
17. G. Kroese	Boeroestraat 11	"	
18. A.J. Beune	Pathmossingel 29	"	
19. J.H.H. Meijerink	Meijerinkweg 45 Lonneker (dorp)	"	
20. W.G. Hartmann	Hooge Bothofstraat 122	"	
21. G.H. Kaalvcrink	Kerkstr. 32 Glanerbrug	"	
22. A. Buijse	Hengeloeschestr. 147	A.R.	
23. J. Heres	B.W. ter Kuiles'r. 80	"	
24. A. van der Horst	Zwiksplein 4	V.D.	
25. Dr. H.A. Zwijnenberg	Lasondersingel 135	"	
26. A. Overduin	Haksbergerstr. 140	"	
27. J. Aldenkamp	Papaverstraat 77	O.P.	
28. J. Geessing	Hofstedeweg 139	"	
29. van Veen	Helenastraat 39	"	
30. M. ter Heide	Slankweg 125	G.H.	
AHL.			
31. K. van Heuven	Wagelerdwardsstraat 32	O.N.	
32. J. Riemersma	Haksbergerstr. 542	O.D.D.	
33. H.H. Kok	Bruggertsteeg 17	"	
34. A.J. Blijdenstein	Blijdensteinsbleekweg 20 Lonneker (dorp)	Mb.	
35. G. Kromhof	Schukkinkweg 15	"	
36. J.E. Rosink	Geerdinkszijdeweg 209	N.S.B.	
37. J.H.H. Wevers	Steenweg 134	"	

Documentnummer 81:5778
Beschrijving Lijst van de Raadsleden in de zitting van 1939 tot 1943
Plaats Enschede
Collectie Archief van de Gemeentesecretarie Enschede 1945-1967

Inventory of the College of Burgomaster and Aldermen. Notice that the familiar names of Soetekouw, Haantjes, Nijkamp and Sein are on the top. What is interesting is that the members of the Dutch National Socialists, J.E. Rosink and J.H.H. Wevers, are placed at the very bottom of the second page. If this was intentional or not is left open to speculation.

Furthermore, out of the 37 Aldermen and civil servants that made up the college, it is interesting to see


Image 1.7



Beschrijving Bericht van Directeur Buijs aan Ruckert over stakend personeel.
Plaats Enschede
Collectie Archief van de Gemeente Enschede 1889-1944. 2:2429

The message of Director Buijs of the *Gemeentewerken* Enschede wherein the argument is presented that an objective research regarding the question if his staff actually worked during the strike or went home is an impossible task to achieve. It is this kind of reasoning that gives Rückert an outcome and argumentation that he himself could use against his superiors and the Nazis.

Image 1.8



Beschrijving	Verslag van Rückert aan Van Rijke over stakend personeel tussen April-Mei 1943.
Plaats	Enschede
Collectie	Archief van de Gemeente Enschede 1889-1944. 2:2429

The message from Director Buijs and the argument included is also strongly present in the report of Rückert to his superior, Van Rijke. The similarities between the two messages clearly indicate that Rückert tries to play off the argument by Buijs to his superior in the hopes, or the assumption, that the argument of time and inefficiency of the research may persuade his superiors and the Nazis from further investigating on this matter.