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SIZING UP:
THE NETHERLANDS' VIEWS ON
NATO ENLARGEMENT DURING
THE COLD WAR, 1949-1982

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NATO. *The Flag of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)*. October 14, 1953. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_NATO.svg.

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1. Introduction & historiography

The worsening of relations between the West and Russia in recent years has reignited a debate regarding NATO enlargement. The enlargements that occurred after 1990 have been pointed to as one of the main reasons for the increased tensions. Within this debate, it is easily discounted that NATO had been enlarged several times before 1990. Although it is acknowledged that these enlargements occurred, the ‘communist threat’ during the Cold War is often pointed to as the motivation for these enlargements. Although the overriding theme of the Cold War offers a clear and simple explanatory framework for the relation between the West and the Soviet Union in the period after the Second World War, the position of ‘the West’ tends to be reduced to the position of the United States. What motivated the separate states that make up the alliance to support or oppose NATO enlargement is easily overlooked. Small states tend to have different security requirements and capabilities when compared to larger states.¹ They have smaller economies, militaries, populations and territories compared to larger powers. The small NATO members therefore may have had different motivations for supporting or opposing enlargement than their larger alliance partners. This thesis will focus on the view of one of the smaller powers, the Netherlands, on the enlargements that occurred during the Cold War. These enlargements occurred between 1949 and 1982, therefore the main research question of this thesis is: How did the small power status of the Netherlands affect its position on NATO enlargement from 1949 to 1982?

This initial chapter will examine the currently available body of research on this topic. It will also introduce the sources that will be used. The second chapter will examine ‘small powers’. It will define the concept and explore the foreign policy needs and strategies of small powers. It will also investigate whether the Netherlands considered itself a small power. The third chapter will explain how NATO enlargement works. These chapters are followed by four chapters, each dealing with a separate round of enlargement. In each chapter, the main research question is examined for a specific round of enlargement. However, this cannot be achieved without first asking: what was the Dutch position on this specific enlargement? By analysing the reasoning of government officials in primary sources such as internal memos and parliamentary records, the motivations for the Dutch governments’ decisions on enlargement can be found. This will be supplemented by secondary literature whenever possible. After outlining the Dutch position on the enlargement round at hand, each chapter is concluded with a short summary and an analysis of how the Netherlands’ small power status may have affected this decision. By combining and comparing the analyses of each of these chapters, the main research question will be answered in the concluding chapter.

¹ Baldur Thorhallsson and Sverrir Steinsson, *Small State Foreign Policy*, vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2017), <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.484>.

There are three distinct historical debates to which this subject is related. Each of them is related to the subject in a different way. Firstly, the majority of the enlargements took place between 1949 and 1955. The first section of the historiography will cover the debate about the causes of the Cold War and the causes for the creation of NATO, as well as the early history of NATO. Secondly, this historiography will summarize the available literature on NATO enlargement, both during and after the Cold War. This is followed by a review of the literature on Dutch security policy pertaining to the period of this study.

NATO: origins and early years

Not only was Europe severely weakened by the Second World War, it had also become starkly divided between a communist East and a democratic capitalist West, the most dramatic manifestation of which was found in Germany and Austria, which had been divided in different occupation zones. After the war, the US had demobilized most of its forces in Europe. Meanwhile, on Europe's other extreme, the Soviet Union and its satellite states had amassed a large standing army. The US started providing economic aid in the form of the Marshall Plan to get the Western European countries back on their feet.

Why the United States stayed involved in European affairs after the Second World War is subject to debate. Traditionalist historians focus on expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union. They argue that after the Second World War, the Soviets were finally in a position to pursue what they had wanted since the Bolshevik Revolution: spread communism. Before the war the Soviet Union's relative weakness and isolation made this impossible. Their relative post-war strength made it possible for them to expand communism into Eastern Europe and created a drive to spread it further west.

Traditionalist historians also state that the US clearly showed their goodwill to the Soviets by quickly demobilizing their forces, to no effect. Traditionalist historians interpret the deterioration of Soviet-Western relations into the Cold War as a result of resistance by the Western powers, in particular that of the United States, to stop the spread of communism.² Revisionist historians argue that the Soviet foreign policy was misinterpreted. According to them the Soviet communist system was not bent on expansion for the spread of communism. They argue that the Soviets simply wanted to prevent a future repeat of the Second World War and needed a buffer zone. They argue that the Soviets even accepted some governments that were not communist on their borders, as long as they were friendly to Soviet interests, such as Finland.³ Revisionist scholars argue that the US also had economic and other self-serving motives for their international involvement. Revisionists found that a large reason for the deterioration of American-Soviet relations was because Soviet policy in Eastern Europe 'blocked opportunities for American exports to these countries and the import of inexpensive raw materials

² Peter G. Boyle, "America's Hesitant Road to NATO, 1945-1949," in *The Origins of NATO*, ed. Joseph Smith, Exeter Studies in History, 0260-8626 ; No. 28 (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1990), 65–68.

³ Boyle, 70.

from this region'.⁴ Besides traditionalist and revisionist scholars exists a third class of historians known as post-revisionists. These scholars tend to incorporate elements from both schools.⁵ An example of post-revisionist work is the early work of John Lewis Gaddis.⁶ Another example of post-revisionist work is that of Melvyn Leffler, who argued that the Americans had learned that 'potential adversaries must never again be allowed to gain control of the resources of Europe and Asia through economic practices, political subversion or military aggression. The acquisition of such resources allowed potential foes to augment their fighting capabilities, encouraged them to spread their influence to the Western hemisphere, tempted them to wage war against the US, and enabled them to fight a protracted struggle. Truman's task therefore, as World War Two came to a close, was to use American power to forge an international environment conducive to the American way of life'.⁷ Another influential article on the subject is Geir Lundestad's 'Empire by invitation?' This article argues that the US stayed involved in European affairs because the Western Europeans wanted them to. Western European leaders actively campaigned for the US to remain involved in European affairs, since the US was the only major source of economic and military assistance available to them.⁸ Then there is historian Timothy Ireland's account of the background of NATO. According to Ireland, the US involvement in Europe after the war represented a strong break with its previous foreign policy, contradicting both the 'Washington's Farewell Address dictum against entanglement in permanent alliances and James Monroe's doctrine of the mutual exclusiveness of European and western hemispheric political affairs'.⁹ He argues that the US was trying to create a new balance of power in Europe which had been destroyed by the Second World War. By creating a new balance of power the US could again limit its foreign commitments. The main problem it encountered was what role Germany was to play. Germany could not be left out of a new European balance of power against the Soviet Union, yet the other European states, especially France, wanted protection against a possible resurgence of German aggression. According to Ireland, 'the only way the United States could provide adequate safeguards against the fear of German *revanchism* was progressively to involve itself in European affairs'.¹⁰ The US thus remained involved in order to create a new balance of power against the Soviet Union, but had to be a part of this balance of power in order for it to work.

⁴ Boyle, 72.

⁵ Boyle, 72–73.

⁶ John Lewis. Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*, Contemporary American History Series (New York ; Columbia University Press, 1972); Boyle, "America's Hesitant Road to NATO, 1945-1949," 72.

⁷ Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945 - 1952," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 68.

⁸ Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952," n.d., 15.

⁹ Timothy P. Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (Greenwood Press, 1981), 3.

¹⁰ Ireland, 5, 221–28.

Whatever the motivations for continued US involvement in Europe may have been, one condition for their aid was for Western European countries to cooperate. Western European cooperation after the Second World War was not limited to the economic sphere. The United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Treaty in 1948, establishing what would become known as the Western Union (also known as the Brussels Treaty Organization, and after West German membership in 1955 as the Western European Union, or 'WEU'). The Western Union was a military alliance meant to deter a Soviet advance, but it was also created to prevent a renewed domination of the continent in case of a German resurgence.¹¹ Author Lawrence Kaplan argues that the Western Union served mainly as a means for the Western European states to show that Europe could organize itself. This was done to draw in American support, which the Europeans mainly wanted to serve their own national goals.¹² Kaplan argues that the Western Union wanted US membership of the organization, as the Western Union was deemed militarily too weak to repel a future Soviet invasion. After the Berlin blockade in 1948, as well as a communist takeover of Czechoslovakia and North Korea, the need to create a larger more powerful alliance arose.¹³ The United States, Canada and Britain had already been engaged in talks about a collective security organization since the UN had become 'paralyzed' by the Cold War.¹⁴ The result of these talks was the Pentagon Paper of 1948, which outlined the rough contours of the defence arrangement. Initially, the idea was for this defence pact to be a guarantee by the US of the Brussels Treaty. It was supposed to be a formal arrangement between the US and the Brussels Treaty states. Initially there were no plans for the US to accede to the Brussels Treaty, nor to create a new security treaty.¹⁵ The Pentagon Paper made several recommendations about membership, which once again makes clear that it was initially supposed to work in conjunction with the Brussels Treaty. The paper advised that Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and Italy should be invited to join the Brussels Treaty. The proposed defence arrangement would then consist of the Brussels Treaty states, the US, Canada, as well as Ireland and Portugal. The initial Pentagon Paper had been formed by the British, Canadians and Americans. Later on, the Brussels Treaty states were invited to join the talks.¹⁶ These talks resulted in the creation of a new treaty, which would later become known as the North Atlantic Treaty. This alliance combined the forces of the existing Brussels Treaty states with the United States and Canada. During the negotiation of the treaty, one of the major issues was who else to invite.

¹¹ Peter Duignan, *NATO : Its Past, Present and Future*, 1 edition (Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), 1–2.

¹² Lawrence Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*, Edition Unstated edition (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999), 9–14.

¹³ Duignan, *NATO*, 2.

¹⁴ "NATO | Founders, Members, & History | Britannica.Com," accessed February 11, 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/North-Atlantic-Treaty-Organization>.

¹⁵ Mark Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance* (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2000), 18–22.

¹⁶ Smith, 18–22.

Lawrence Kaplan argues that initially, the Brussels Treaty states wished to limit its membership to its founding states, plus the US and Canada. They feared that adding other members would affect their position by diluting the aid they received from the US.¹⁷ Kaplan states that it was the US that had preferred a wider ‘Atlantic’ alliance, instead of joining the existing Brussels Treaty. For the Americans, the Brussels Treaty had two issues. Firstly, it was too specific in its membership, as the US wanted other states that might be threatened by communism to be part of the treaty too. In addition, American isolationists found the treaty too ‘European’. Secondly, the obligations in the Brussels Treaty were too broad to accept for American isolationists.¹⁸ The Western Union was initially not willing to accept the American wish to include the so-called ‘stepping stone’ countries of Norway, Iceland, Denmark and Portugal in a new alliance. Instead they proposed an idea of a different form of membership. Kaplan mentions Dutch former minister of foreign affairs Eelco van Kleffens’ analogy in which he compared the proposed alliance to a peach: ‘the Brussels Pact would be the hard kernel in the centre and a North Atlantic Pact the somewhat less hard mass around it’.¹⁹ Eventually American pressure made the Western Union states give up their opposition to the membership of the ‘stepping stone’ states. Kaplan argues that the Atlantic character of the treaty, reflected in its name, was a consequence of two considerations. Firstly, the membership of the ‘stepping stone’ states was required in order to be able to militarily link the North American and European continents. Secondly, American proponents of a mutual defence treaty with Europe had to obfuscate the predominantly European nature and goals of the treaty in order to please American isolationists. By labelling it an Atlantic alliance, proponents could argue that it also served security interests outside the European continent.²⁰

Eventually, after a decision was made on the membership issue, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Norway and Iceland also acceded to the treaty. In 1952, Turkey and Greece joined the alliance, followed by West-Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982. Kaplan’s work shows that, at least initially, there was significant disagreement over which states should be members of the North Atlantic Treaty amongst the Brussels Treaty states on one side and the United States on the other. This research will examine the point of view of one of the Brussels Treaty signatories, the Netherlands, which may give more insight into this debate.

The North Atlantic Treaty was initially just a paper guarantee of mutual defence. The most well-known article is Article 5: ‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or

¹⁷ Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement*, 19.

¹⁸ Kaplan, 14–16.

¹⁹ Kaplan, 31.

²⁰ Kaplan, 32–33.

Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.²¹ This was nothing more than a declaration of intent. Exactly what the response to an attack would entail was not a part of the treaty. Initially, the alliance relied on the nuclear deterrence provided by the United States, however this deterrent was weakened by the creation of Soviet nuclear weapons.²² In the years after its creation, the North Atlantic Treaty alliance started to gradually take on the structure of an integrated military organization. Author Robert Osgood explores this initial phase of the alliance's history and found several reasons for this development. Firstly, the military aid from the US to the European states came with the condition that it was to be used for the collective good of the treaty partners and not solely to serve individual national interests. This meant that joint strategic plans were to be created by the North Atlantic Treaty's Defence Committee.²³ This in turn would lead to specialization, with each nation specializing in a certain branch of armed services, diminishing the role of individual national armed forces and increasing the importance of collaboration with other states. Secondly, the Western European nations had to balance their military and economic priorities. They were still rebuilding their economies after the Second World War. The military capacity of all these countries could be maximized through an integrated structure, with each country having a specialized force. This way, the required military spending would be minimized.²⁴ Finally, the Korean War was the impetus for integrating the militaries of the North Atlantic Treaty members. It led to the creation of the position of SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), who was at the head of SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe). From 1951 onwards SHAPE would control the military forces committed to NATO in Europe by its member states, which transformed the alliance from a paper promise to an integrated military organization.²⁵

NATO enlargement during the Cold War

The only previous work that thoroughly studied the phenomenon of NATO enlargement during the Cold War is by author Mark Smith. Smith divides his analysis of NATO enlargement after the Cold War into three categories. For each enlargement he studies the impact of external factors, the nature of the intra-alliance debate and the 'taxonomy of membership', in which he analyses the role of everchanging criteria of becoming a NATO member. Smith finds that although there were no objective rules to NATO accession, each of the enlargements was due to a varying mix of geographical, political and strategic properties of both the candidate countries and the alliance as a whole.²⁶ The fact that each accession was due to a different composition of strategic, political and geographical ingredients can be

²¹ NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty," NATO, accessed February 20, 2019, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

²² Robert Endicott Osgood, *NATO, the Entangling Alliance* (University of Chicago Press, 1962), 39.

²³ Osgood, 45–46.

²⁴ Osgood, 66.

²⁵ Osgood, 73.

²⁶ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 171–73.

explained by the continuously changing needs of NATO and the new candidate countries during this period. Smith's work provides a comprehensive overview of the debate within the alliance and of the external factors that affected this debate. What it lacks however is detailed accounts of the respective positions of each of the member states. This is natural as it is out of scope of Smith's research, since the focus is on the international debate. This provides ample opportunity for further investigation into this topic. Smith does occasionally delve into the reasoning behind the decisions of single members, but this is mainly done for the US, Britain and, at times, France. Smith identifies a hierarchy within the alliance, with the US, Britain and France at the top. He states that these states tended to intensively discuss any enlargement proposal before discussing it with the rest of the alliance, and that 'agreement between them was of decisive importance in the positions of the other allies'.²⁷ The Netherlands and the other smaller member states' positions are mentioned at times, but mainly when they contradict the position of the larger members. An investigation into the position of the successive Dutch governments on NATO enlargement will show whether or not this country's relative size affected its stance on enlargement. In addition, research of this kind, with an additional focus on the national debate within government and parliament of individual member states has previously only been done for the larger allies, and not for the Netherlands. This research is therefore an attempt to add to the history of NATO enlargement, but it is also an attempt to add to the history of the Netherlands' foreign and military policy.

NATO enlargement after the Cold War

In the early 1990s, NATO was enlarged to include new member states in Central and Eastern Europe. This proved to be one of the most controversial decisions in the organization's history. Although it occurred much later than the enlargements that form the topic of this investigation, it is still an important related subject for two reasons. Firstly, most research on NATO enlargement has focused on these expansions in 1990 (East Germany through reunification), 1999 (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) and especially in 2004. In 2004 the alliance expanded to Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, but most controversially to the Baltic States, right on Russia's border. Since the deterioration of Russia's relations with the West, NATO enlargement has been featured in explanations of this deterioration.²⁸ In other words, this debate is very current. Secondly, some of the rationales behind NATO enlargement after 1990 may show similarities to those found in the earlier enlargements. The debate on NATO enlargement after 1990 can be subdivided in two: a debate about the causes of NATO enlargement in general, and a second debate focussing on the specific motivations of the United States.

²⁷ Smith, 168.

²⁸ John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault | Foreign Affairs," 2014, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault+&cd=3&hl=nl&ct=clnk&gl=nl>.

The simplest motive to expand NATO was ‘preclusion’ of a new Russian threat. Russia was weak at the time and this provided an opportunity for NATO to expand that would disappear if Russia regained its strength. The availability of this option that had never been there before made expansion attractive to NATO members. This possibility was even more important to Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries who had borne the brunt of an aggressive Soviet foreign policy, and therefore wanted to escape the Russian sphere of influence.²⁹ This argument has been criticized as it failed to explain why the enlargement occurred in Central Europe instead of Eastern Europe first. It also does not explain why the first enlargement was limited to three states.³⁰ The second rationale for NATO expansion was the urge of the institution to stay relevant. NATO had become a large organization of officials and bureaucrats who had a degree of autonomy. The people who worked for NATO had an interest in keeping the organization alive, since their livelihood depended on it.³¹ Critics of this argument stated that NATO officials’ autonomy was very much constrained as NATO only lives by the virtue of its members. Without key members’ support, NATO officials’ could not pursue a policy of expansion to eastern Europe.³² A third reason for expansion is of a constructivist nature. In constructivism, NATO is seen as an ‘organization of an international community of values and norms’.³³ For NATO, these are liberal Western values, the most important of which is democracy. The group had to defend the community against competing values and spread its principles to expand the community.³⁴ The constructivist argument posits that post-communist states and countries that were already in NATO both had different reasons for expanding NATO. Central and Eastern European nations chose to join NATO because they identified with Western values. Furthermore, it allowed these states to take on a new identity after they had lost their communist ideology.³⁵ But why did NATO states support the expansion to the east? As mentioned before, these countries are all members of a community of countries with similar values and ideas about how international relations should be conducted (multilateralism). In order to expand this community, NATO membership served as an incentive. When countries successfully adapted the community’s values, they would be accepted. For NATO members, it was the belief that the spread of their own values would improve the region’s security the most that motivated them to support expansion.

The reasons why the dominant country within NATO, the United States, supported NATO expansion has also been the subject of debate. The positive stance of the alliance’s biggest and most powerful

²⁹ Frank Schimmelfennig, “Nato Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation,” *Security Studies* 8, no. 2–3 (December 1, 1998): 203–9, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419808429378>; Robert W. Rauchhaus, “Explaining NATO Enlargement,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 21, no. 2 (August 1, 2000): 176–77, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260008404261>.

³⁰ Rauchhaus, “Explaining NATO Enlargement,” 176–79.

³¹ Rauchhaus, 177.

³² Rauchhaus, 178–79.

³³ Schimmelfennig, “Nato Enlargement,” 213–16.

³⁴ Schimmelfennig, 209–13.

³⁵ Schimmelfennig, 216–20.

state on NATO expansion is a significant factor in explaining why NATO expanded. Society-centred approaches focus on two interest groups: the arms industry and groups that represented Eastern European immigrants and their descendants. Both of these groups lobbied the president and congress.³⁶ Eventually the US adopted a pro-enlargement stance. Besides society-centred arguments, other explanations of the US stance focus more on the political landscape. One such explanation mentions an existing ideology of internationalism that found its origins in more than half a century of Cold War. Another explanation is that American policymakers had learned from the failures surrounding similar situations before both World Wars. They realized that not getting involved in Europe could also have consequences for the US.³⁷ According to Robert Rauchhaus, there was a small group of policy-makers within the Clinton administration that were eventually able to push through their will and they were responsible for the US government's positive stance on enlargement. One final factor in explaining the US position on NATO expansion was the failure of the opposition to materialize. Many academics and policymakers were opposed to the policy, yet public debate about the policy was limited. Either most Americans simply agreed with the policy, or they were too apathic to oppose it, as the economy was doing well and the costs of expanding the alliance did not interest them.³⁸ On the other hand, voting against expansion would anger some of the Eastern European voters and other interest groups, and it would yield no short-term reward.³⁹

The collapse of the Soviet Union is often viewed as the end of the Cold War. But how did this collapse affect the Western defence organization that was so heavily involved in this conflict? Did the dissolution of the Soviet Union cause a significant break in the policies and strategies set forth by NATO during the Cold War, or did NATO simply continue on a path it had already chosen? Since NATO enlargement after the Cold War has received much more attention than those enlargements before 1990, the period between 1949 and 1982 merits more attention. Further research into this period would enable more comprehensive comparisons between enlargements before and after the 'breakpoint' that the dissolution of the USSR is often portrayed as in Russian-Western relations. In addition, the research into the position of individual states has mainly focused on the US, similar to the studies of enlargements during the Cold War. This study, by focusing on the Dutch position during the Cold War, can partly serve as a base for further research on more recent enlargements from a Dutch perspective.

Dutch security policy after the Second World War

Cees Wiebes states that experiences of the Second World War caused a break in the Dutch tradition of neutrality. As Wiebes puts it: 'The legacy of the negative experiences in 1940, the postwar planning

³⁶ Rauchhaus, "Explaining NATO Enlargement," 181–82.

³⁷ Rauchhaus, 183–85.

³⁸ Rauchhaus, 187–90.

³⁹ Rauchhaus, 189–90.

about the Atlantic and other regional security systems, the desire for direct American involvement in European and Asian affairs completely ruled out a return to neutrality.⁴⁰ The Dutch government initially rejected the idea of a Western European defence organization. This was mainly in order to prevent a negative Soviet response, as the Soviets would have a large share in determining the future of Germany. Since Germany was the Netherlands' biggest economic partner, it was best to maintain friendly relations if the Netherlands wanted any say in this as well.⁴¹ The Netherlands subsequently did join the Brussels Treaty for four different reasons, as Wiebes explains. Firstly, it had become clear that Germany would not be a single state anymore. It was divided into a western and eastern zone and thus maintaining good relations with the Soviets had become less important than it was when there were talks of a single, neutral, German state. Secondly, the Truman doctrine showed the US' willingness to remain involved in Europe. Thirdly, the Marshall Plan had 'laid a basis for cooperation and full American support'. Fourth and finally, the UN had failed to work as a collective security organization.⁴² The Netherlands later also joined the North Atlantic Treaty, but not without trying to use the negotiations to its advantage. Dirk Stikker, the minister of foreign affairs, tried to use the North Atlantic Treaty talks in order to stifle American resistance to Dutch actions in Indonesia. He threatened that the Dutch government would not sign the treaty as long as the US stayed with its negative attitude. When Dean Acheson, the US secretary of state, said that the other countries would simply move on and sign without the Netherlands, Stikker changed course and signed anyway.⁴³ These events leading up to the Netherlands' NATO membership show that the Dutch government, or at least Stikker, was willing to try to use a potential Dutch NATO contribution as a bargaining chip to achieve national goals. Whether or not this set a precedent for the Netherlands' later comportment within NATO regarding the subject of enlargement remains to be seen in the later chapters.

Alfred van Staden notes that the Netherlands during the Cold War was one of the staunchest supporters of the United States involvement in Europe and the Atlantic alliance, and explains this position by showing that the Dutch were taking on a role of balancer. The Hague tried to play this role not at the highest level between the major powers of the Soviet Union and the US, but at a regional level between the Western European powers. William Mallinson states that the Dutch initially feared French domination on the continent, causing them to strive for increased ties with the United Kingdom and the United States.⁴⁴ Later this balancing was done to prevent a combined French and West German domination of European affairs.⁴⁵ In order to prevent domination by either Germany, France or a

⁴⁰ Cees Wiebes, "The National Security Policy of the Netherlands," in *The Origins of NATO*, ed. Joseph Smith, Exeter Studies in History, 0260-8626 ; No. 28 (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1990), 130.

⁴¹ Wiebes, 132.

⁴² Wiebes, 133.

⁴³ Wiebes, 135–37.

⁴⁴ William Mallinson, *From Neutrality to Commitment: Dutch Foreign Policy, NATO and European Integration* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2010), 226–27.

⁴⁵ Alfred van Staden, "Small State Strategies in Alliances: The Case of the Netherlands," *Cooperation and Conflict* 30, no. 1 (March 1, 1995): 39–43, <https://doi.org/10.1177/001083679503001002>.

combination of the two, the Netherlands would always support US leadership, hoping that they would gain US support in opposing any German or French military or political ambition that they deemed unfavourable. Van Staden quotes Dutch political scientist and former minister of defence Joris Voorhoeve: "By not objecting to US dominance and actually promoting it, the Netherlands helped to keep all but the major ally in a secondary position, which enhanced the Dutch status and influence. If a select group of important allies had been established formally, the Netherlands would have been relegated to a third class with very little influence".⁴⁶

The rivalry between the world's two superpowers during the Cold War and the Netherlands' loss of its most important colonial possessions after the Second World War led to a strong break in its foreign policy tradition. The Netherlands had become a smaller power than it was before and it let go of its tradition of neutrality. This investigation will add to the historical knowledge on Dutch foreign policy in a period when it was going through major changes.

Sources & methodology

This research is fully based on qualitative analysis of three types of sources. First and foremost is archival data from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Dutch embassy in the candidate country was often in contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding public opinion, the political situation and most importantly, the Dutch position on the proposed enlargement. Therefore the archives of these embassies, and those of the ministry itself, are great primary sources. The second type of sources are newspaper articles. Dutch newspapers of the time range that this investigation deals with are freely available on www.delpher.nl. Delpher is an online search engine created by the *Koninklijke Bibliotheek* (Royal Library) that uses optical character recognition to digitally archive old newspapers. These can easily be searched with the integrated search engine that allows all the regular search functions and operators, such as wildcards. The third and final source type are parliamentary reports. These consist of committee meeting summaries and responses by the government (*memorie van antwoord*), as well as verbatim parliamentary records of the debates about accession.

These sources all have their benefits and problems. The archival data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassies for example is often incomplete. On the other hand, it contains the same documents that the people that took the decisions used to form their positions and statements about these enlargements. In this sense, it is a very good primary source. However, because it is impossible to know whether or not an archive contains all of the documents that pertain to a certain subject, it can also be deceptive. For example, certain sensitive documents may have been destroyed right away. In addition, the archival data of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may only show the internal debate at the ministry itself, instead of the wider national debate. Therefore these documents should, as far as possible, be backed up by other sources such as newspaper articles and records of parliamentary

⁴⁶ van Staden, 39–43.

meetings. For newspaper articles, objectivity is always an issue. Newspaper articles can be invaluable sources of information as they were created at the time of the decision, giving an impression of the circumstances and atmosphere in which decisions were taken. Newspapers often have an ideological influence as well, which should always be considered carefully. For example, the enlargements that are the subject of this investigation took place during the Cold War, and communist newspapers often wrote about it in very different terms than most other newspapers. Newspapers are valuable sources of different interpretations of events, and can serve to confirm or invalidate information from other sources. Parliamentary records are useful in that they show what the position and thought process of different political parties was. Although the verbatim reports are useful, it must always be kept in mind that these statements were made in public and therefore have different limitations. Politicians might be unwilling to state certain things in public, which could harm their position. For example, an anonymous policy analyst at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might more easily point out certain negative aspects as there is no public exposure of their work, whereas a politician always has to carefully pick his or her words. Another problem of parliamentary reports is that no names are mentioned in certain reports. This is notably the case for the reports of the so-called '*afdelingsonderzoeken*', which were a way of preparing a subject for a plenary debate, that was later replaced by committee meetings. These reports contain useful information about the overall stance of parliament, although no names are mentioned.

In spite of the limitations of the source material, this topic is certainly worth investigating since it has not received much prior attention. An account that recognizes the weaknesses of the available source material is after all preferable to no account.

2. Small powers & alliances

What are small powers? This question has generated a varied range of definitions, either focussing on absolute numbers or relative size. Authors Baldur Thorhallsson and Sverrir Steinsson mention the following in their work on small state foreign policy: ‘Small state size has been defined in various ways. Central to most definitions of smallness is a shortage of the resources and capabilities that determine power and influence. The foremost variables concern the size of population, territory, economy and military. Of these, the most common factor for defining state size is population size. States with up to 30 million inhabitants are sometimes considered small, although most academic definitions regard those with less than 10 or 15 million inhabitants as small’.⁴⁷ Measuring population, territory, economy and military may give a skewed view of a state’s power due to the modern international system being ‘unprecedentedly peaceful, institutionalized and economically open’.⁴⁸ This has given rise to several definitions of small states that use a more varied set of criteria, besides population, military, economy and territory. There is however a simpler, relative definition of small states. Small states are simply those that are ‘far inferior to great powers or modestly inferior to middle powers in terms of influence at any given time and struggle to influence the international system’.⁴⁹ Besides these absolute and relative definitions, others simply chose to follow a list based on ‘scholarly consensus’ of powers that are considered ‘Great Powers’, the rest being small powers.⁵⁰ Which countries are considered Great Powers differs from author to author.

It is very difficult to give an unambiguous definition of ‘small power status’, because of the myriad of different measures available. In the context of this research, the Netherlands’ ‘small power status’ refers to its relatively small population, economy, territory, military and resulting political status, compared to the larger founding states of the North Atlantic Treaty: the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

Was the Netherlands really a small power?

In order to study whether or not the Dutch small power status affected its position on NATO enlargement, another question must be answered first. Did the Netherlands consider itself a small power during the twentieth century? What was the foreign policy tradition of this country leading up to the Cold War? This matters because the way the Netherlands traditionally saw its role in the international system may have affected its stance on enlargement. Samuel Kruizinga writes that in the early twentieth century there were two conceptions of Dutch foreign policy. The first being that the

⁴⁷ Thorhallsson and Steinsson, *Small State Foreign Policy*, 1:3.

⁴⁸ Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 1:3.

⁴⁹ Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 1:3.

⁵⁰ Volker Krause and J. David Singer, “Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns,” in *Small States and Alliances*, ed. Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner (Physica-Verlag HD, 2001), 15–16.

Netherlands was small, and therefore should keep to itself as much as possible and simply said just ‘stay out of trouble’.⁵¹ The second conception saw a more active role for the Netherlands in maintaining peace in Europe. Its proponents saw the Netherlands and importantly, the Netherlands East Indies, as territories with large strategic value. Since the Netherlands occupied a geographical middle position between the Great European Powers of Germany, Britain and France, Dutch commentators and politicians deemed it pivotal in maintaining the balance of power in Europe. Supporters of this view found that the Netherlands should not be aligned with any of these states, since this would change the balance of power too much, leading to war. The Netherlands should instead promote peace by supporting the development of international law.⁵² As Kruizinga states, this is a natural response for a small state, since it ‘removes military and economic power from the equation as much as possible’.⁵³ During the early twentieth century, the Netherlands thus saw itself as a small yet crucial balancer in Europe, even though it also had clear domestic motivations for neutrality. It would maintain national sovereignty, and the economic markets of all sides would remain open to the Netherlands in case of war.⁵⁴ It should be noted that there was also a minority that saw the Netherlands as a Great Power, because of its large colonial possessions. The First World War was a big blow to the view of the Netherlands as the crucial balancer, since the war occurred despite Dutch neutrality.⁵⁵ The Second World War and its consequences completely changed the international stage. The Great Powers were no longer predominantly located in Western Europe, diminishing the strategic importance of the Netherlands. Indonesia gained its independence causing any previously existing (minority) ideas of the Netherlands as a Great Power to disappear. Whether it was or was not before no longer mattered: the Netherlands now clearly was a small power.

Small state alliance policies and strategies

Small states tend to have different security needs than larger states. In this section, the reasons why states form alliances and the risks and benefits of alliances for small states will be analysed. This is followed by a review of the strategies small states employ within alliances.

Why do states form alliances? Stephen Walt argues that states respond to external threats, and have two ways of doing so. They can either balance against the source of the threat by seeking alliance with other states, or they can form an alliance with the state that they deem the biggest threat, which is called bandwagoning. Walt argues that whether a state chooses to balance or bandwagon against a threat is determined by several factors, some of which are particularly important to small powers. Walt

⁵¹ Samuël Kruizinga, “A Small State? The Size of the Netherlands as a Focal Point in Foreign Policy Debates, 1900–1940,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 27, no. 3 (July 2, 2016): 424–27, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2016.1196062>.

⁵² Kruizinga, 424–27.

⁵³ Kruizinga, 422.

⁵⁴ Maartje Abbenhuis, *The Art of Staying Neutral : The Netherlands in the First World War, 1914-1918* (Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 23–36, <https://doi.org/10.5117/9789053568187>.

⁵⁵ Kruizinga, “A Small State?,” 432–33.

argues that the stronger the state, the greater its tendency is to balance. ‘Weak states will balance against other weak states but may bandwagon when threatened by great powers’. Secondly, ‘the greater the probability of allied support, the greater the tendency to balance’. Finally, Walt argues that ‘the more unalterably aggressive a state is perceived to be, the greater the tendency for others to balance against it’.⁵⁶

The above is an explanation for why states seek alliances, but how exactly does an alliance serve a state? An alliance provides two main collective goods for its members. Firstly, alliances provide collective defence. Collective defence refers to the defence against hostile parties outside of the alliance. By joining forces, alliance members are able to create a defence that would not be possible if they acted alone. Secondly, an alliance provides defence against the other members of the alliance. A good example which will be touched upon in a later chapter is West Germany’s NATO membership. NATO served as a collective defence mechanism against the Soviets, and as a security mechanism against but also for the Germans. NATO would protect the other members against a possible unwanted German military resurgence, while protecting Germany against an outside Soviet threat as well as against military aggression by any of the other NATO members.⁵⁷ Enlarging an alliance can thus increase security for all members by increasing total military power and decreasing risk of conflict among member states.

Besides these two basic functions that benefit all states within the alliance, some of the alliance’s functions benefit small states more than other states. For example, the alliance can guarantee a small state’s survival as an independent country.⁵⁸ While the alliance guarantees the existence of all its members, this function is particularly important to small less powerful countries since these present easier targets than big countries. Secondly, by joining an alliance a small state can receive more international influence and status than it would if it was not part of an alliance. The alliance will give them access to the decision-making process of larger powers. Thirdly, small powers may receive relatively large amounts of military and economic aid in return for joining an alliance. Finally, joining an alliance can also have a purely domestic reason, since the military capabilities of other members of the alliance can help keep a particular government in power.⁵⁹

Small states also have to pay a price for joining an alliance. Most importantly is the security-autonomy trade-off. Joining an alliance will provide more security, but since the alliance acts as a unit, the members’ autonomy decreases. This leads to less diplomatic flexibility. Small states outside of an alliance may be able to find some sort of compromise with an adversary and avoid a war, while this

⁵⁶ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Cornell University Press, 1987), 17–33, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt32b5fc>.

⁵⁷ Krause and Singer, “Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict.”

⁵⁸ van Staden, “Small State Strategies in Alliances,” 33–35.

⁵⁹ van Staden, 33–35.

flexibility is not always available within an alliance.⁶⁰ Entrapment is another risk that applies to all members. This term refers to the risk of having to become involved in a conflict caused by another state, that the member itself has no interest in.⁶¹

The power of small states within alliances is not always proportional to their military and economic weight. Because a state cannot always use any instrument in its arsenal in any situation, a conflict between two different-sized powers can be a lot less clear-cut than it might seem from the numbers. Another reason is that, depending on what is at stake in a given situation, one state might be more motivated than the other, also swaying the outcome.⁶² Small states can also employ certain strategies that might amplify their influence within an alliance. For example, they can try to influence the decision-making process of a bigger ally. They can deliberately entrap bigger allies into a conflict by creating a position in which the bigger ally will have to act. Perhaps most importantly, they can ‘exploit a position of indispensability’.⁶³ Some decisions within an alliance, NATO enlargement being one of them, require unanimous support of all members. Therefore, the enlargement process, at least on paper, gives each member the same amount of influence on the decision regardless of size. What the consequences of this theoretical equality are for the behaviour of the smaller powers within the alliance is one of the main points of interest of this research.

⁶⁰ Krause and Singer, “Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict.”

⁶¹ Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (1984): 467, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010183>.

⁶² van Staden, “Small State Strategies in Alliances,” 36–39.

⁶³ van Staden, 36–39.

3. NATO accession rules

Accession rules differ from organization to organization. There are two general types of voting systems used for enlargement: majority and unanimous votes. NATO uses the latter system, which means that every single existing member has to give its permission in order for a new country to join. If a state wants to join NATO it can deposit its 'instrument of accession' with the United States Government, notably not at the NATO headquarters in Brussels. The current members subsequently have to ratify the Accession Protocols according to their national law. Only once these have been ratified by all members is a new state formally a member of the alliance.⁶⁴ The treaty itself mentions very few accession requirements, and none can really be determined objectively. The main article that deals with enlargement, Article 10, states that NATO can 'invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty'. Eunika Frydrych identifies two major points of possible disagreement with regards to this article. Firstly, the geographical boundaries of Europe are not clearly defined, so which states should be classified as European states and which states should not? Secondly, whether or not a state is 'in a position to further the principles of the treaty' is also not something that can be measured objectively, and is therefore subject to very different interpretations. Each member can interpret this statement differently, for various reasons such as national interests, historical experience or domestic politics.⁶⁵ Articles 1, 2 and 3 also state several broad goals that the alliance members need to strive towards, such as respecting the principles of the UN charter and using peaceful means to resolve international conflicts, promoting stability and well-being and 'maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack'.⁶⁶ The preamble to the treaty also mentions that the members are 'determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law'.⁶⁷ Whether or not non-democratic countries should be allowed to join led to significant controversy at times. The criteria for joining NATO are not set in stone, and have been interpreted differently in different cases, as the following chapters show.

⁶⁴ Eunika Katarzyna Frydrych, "The Debate on NATO Expansion," *Connections* 7, no. 4 (2008): 8–10.

⁶⁵ Frydrych, 8–10.

⁶⁶ Frydrych, 8–10; NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty," accessed April 23, 2019, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

⁶⁷ NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty."

4. Initial membership composition

It is possible to begin the history of NATO enlargement at the creation of the alliance in 1948. Mark Smith argues that the first round of enlargements happened right after the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty. The treaty was created by the US, Canada and the Brussels Treaty states, however several states were immediately invited to join, and are thus considered original signatories. The creators of the treaty were the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Benelux countries and France. Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and Italy were then invited to join. Although these states joined right away, their accession constituted an enlargement in the sense that they formally acceded to the treaty once it had already been formed.⁶⁸ An important aspect to bear in mind is that although the accessions of Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Iceland can be seen as enlargement of NATO, it is not an enlargement of a similar nature as the later expansions to Greece, Turkey, West Germany and Spain. Although Portugal, Italy and the Scandinavian countries did not take part in the creation of the treaty but were invited to join right after, their membership was determined before the treaty was signed. Joining the treaty and accepting the membership of these states was therefore a package deal. The countries that created the treaty did not have a possibility of vetoing another state's membership, without directly compromising its own membership. If any country strongly opposed the membership of another state, it only had two options. It could either refrain from joining the treaty, or it would simply have to accept the other state's membership. In other words, the unanimity rule did not yet determine accession to the treaty as it would later on.

Italy

During the treaty negotiations, one of the thorny issues was whether to invite Italy or not. The Netherlands was initially against inviting Italy to join.⁶⁹ The main issue for the opponents was that Italy was clearly not a North Atlantic state, even though it was also considered to be very closely connected to Western Europe. In the debate within NATO there were several arguments in favour of Italian accession. Firstly, the location of Italy was strategically important to the other member states, since it covered the southern flank in the Mediterranean. Secondly, Italy had a strong communist party. Failure to invite Italy to join the treaty might increase communist influence, as it could be perceived as a denial of Italy's Western status. Even if it would not lead to a strengthening of the communist party, it might still encourage Italy to take a more neutral stance, which would decrease Italy's Western orientation.⁷⁰ On the other hand, Italy was clearly not an Atlantic state and purists, such as US State Department official George Kennan, wanted to contain the alliance to the Atlantic states (i.e. the most obviously 'Western' states). This way, the alliance could only be seen as a purely

⁶⁸ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 11.

⁶⁹ Smith, 34.

⁷⁰ Smith, 28–39.

defensive pact and it would be less likely to agitate the Soviet Union. Also, it would prevent any grey areas membership-wise. A purely geographically defined Atlantic alliance would avoid disagreements about membership of states like Italy, Greece or Turkey.⁷¹ In addition, although Italy was important to Western European security it was not necessarily important to the entire Atlantic area. Other arrangements were proposed, like inviting Italy to become a member of the Brussels Treaty, or the creation of an entirely new Mediterranean arrangement.⁷²

Although the Dutch government did not formally oppose Italian membership of the Brussels Treaty, the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs Pim van Boetzelaer expressed fears that it would move the centre of the pact too far to the South.⁷³ This can be interpreted purely geographically, but also culturally and politically. Similar concerns were apparently voiced regarding Italian NATO membership. A report regarding the later accession of Turkey and Greece, mentioned that the pact ‘would serve as an instrument for the collective self-defence of spiritually, socially and economically closely related states. For that reason, the inclusion of Italy already encountered some reservations’.⁷⁴

In the debate between the founding members of the treaty, two additional arguments against Italian membership existed. There were fears that there was insufficient military capacity at the time to provide Italy with a security guarantee. If Italy were to be attacked and the other states could not adequately defend it, this would make the treaty lose all of its credibility. The final argument opposed to the inclusion of Italy was not related to Italy itself. Italian accession would make it harder to exclude the other Mediterranean states like Turkey and Greece.⁷⁵

Italy was eventually invited to join, and it is interesting to outline the process that led to its accession, because it clearly illustrates the importance of timing and contingency in the accession process.

During the treaty talks in 1948, the general consensus was opposed to the inclusion of Italy in the treaty. This suddenly changed due to a communist coup in Czechoslovakia. This led to calls for the inclusion of Italy in order to prevent a similar fate befalling this country. However, Italian elections in the same year led to a victory for the Christian Democrats, which meant that fears of a communist Italy subsided again, decreasing support for Italian membership. Whereas this abated fear of a communist-ruled Italy, it also started calls by Italy to be included in the Western security system, eventually leading to a direct request by the Italian government to be included in the treaty. In the meantime, France, which had been opposed to Italian accession, started to support Italian membership in December of 1948. France had been lobbying for the inclusion of Algeria in the area covered by the treaty, since it considered the Algerian departments an integral part of France. Other parties had been

⁷¹ Smith, 23.

⁷² Smith, 28–39.

⁷³ “Internal Memo Indicating Earlier Talks about Expanding the WEU,” 1948.

⁷⁴ “Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report Outlining the Rationales for Opposing Accession,” July 7, 1951, 2.05.96 - 182, NA - Gezantschap in Turkije (Ankara).

⁷⁵ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 28–39.

reluctant to include Algeria in the treaty, and France realized that its lobbying efforts were not working. By voting for inclusion of Italy, the treaty would be engaged in the Mediterranean and it would be more likely to also include Algeria.

This French volte-face was followed by the Netherlands in January of 1949. The rationale behind this sudden change can be found in the international position regarding the Indonesian War of Independence. International resistance to Dutch actions in Indonesia intensified after the second ‘police actions’.⁷⁶ The United States was one of the staunchest opponents of the war in Indonesia, while at the same time the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations were taking place. The Dutch minister of foreign affairs at the time, Dirk Stikker, tried to relieve some of the international pressure on the Netherlands by using the North Atlantic Treaty talks as leverage. One of the mechanisms he envisioned was a *quid pro quo* with France.⁷⁷ On January 2, 1949, the French ambassador to the Netherlands, M. Jean Riviere, had sent a request to Stikker for support regarding the Algerian inclusion.⁷⁸ The international opposition to Dutch actions in Indonesia was mainly channelled through the United Nations Security Council, in which the Dutch initially could only count on Belgian support. After Belgium had been replaced by Norway on the Council, this support disappeared and the Netherlands was in an even less favourable position than before. Therefore, the French request was welcomed with open arms as it provided an opportunity for a mutually beneficial trade. France, in a strong position as a permanent member of the Security Council, would support the Netherlands in this council by refraining from voting on any resolution regarding the actions in the Netherlands East Indies. In case of UN sanctions, Stikker even counted on the French to use their veto.⁷⁹ In return, the Netherlands would support the French goal of inclusion of Algeria and Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty. Additionally, the Netherlands made sure that the Belgians would also support the inclusion of Italy and Algeria.⁸⁰ The Netherlands thus revised its position on the inclusion of Italy in order to garner support, or at least suppress condemnation of its actions in the Dutch East Indies within the United Nations Security Council. This interpretation is further corroborated by a letter from Stikker to the Dutch ambassador in Paris. The French had insisted on inviting Italy to join in an ambassadors’ meeting regarding the North Atlantic Treaty, after the Norwegian representative had also been invited to join. Although the other participating countries were opposed to inviting Italy, the French insisted on Italian participation. The US State Department requested Stikker to urge the French to change their position. Stikker stated that although Italy and Norway were not to be treated identically, as one was a

⁷⁶ C. Wiebes and B. Zeeman, “Stikker, Indonesië en het Noordatlantisch verdrag. Of: hoe Nederland in de pompe ging,” *BMGN - Low Countries Historical Review* 100, no. 2 (January 1, 1985): 225–31, <https://doi.org/10.18352/bmgn-lchr.2579>.

⁷⁷ Wiebes and Zeeman, 233–34.

⁷⁸ Wiebes and Zeeman, “Stikker, Indonesië en het Noordatlantisch verdrag. Of”; “De Franse Ambassadeurs in Nederland,” *Frankrijk in Nederland/ La France aux Pays-Bas*, accessed June 7, 2019, <https://nl.ambafrance.org/De-Franse-Ambassadeurs-in>.

⁷⁹ Wiebes and Zeeman, “Stikker, Indonesië en het Noordatlantisch verdrag. Of,” 234.

⁸⁰ Wiebes and Zeeman, “Stikker, Indonesië en het Noordatlantisch verdrag. Of.”

former enemy and the other a former ally, the French would keep pushing for Italian inclusion. ‘For the Netherlands, which continuously receives French support on the Indonesian matter, it would be quite inopportune to make a move in Paris regarding Italy that would be unpleasant to the French’.⁸¹ This letter indicates that the change in the Dutch attitude towards Italian inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty was not based on a changed perception of Italy itself, but was indeed due to French support regarding Indonesia.

With the French, Dutch and Belgians now in favour, the other members either somewhat opposed or neutral, the decision was to be made by US president Truman, who eventually voted in favour. This decision was thanks to three factors. Firstly, there was no viable alternative military arrangement that allowed Italy to become a part of the Western defence system. Secondly, there were severe costs associated with not including Italy, as it would risk allowing Italy to drift to neutrality, or worse, communism. Thirdly, the direct request by the new Italian government, which certainly considered itself a part of the Western world, to be included in the Western security arrangement meant that a yes or no decision had to be made in a short timeframe. These factors combined led Truman to vote in favour of Italian inclusion.⁸² Eventually Italy was invited to join by the United States government, also in the name of the other governments participating in the treaty talks.⁸³

Scandinavia

In a reversal of the Italian case, for the Scandinavian countries of Iceland, Denmark and Norway, the question was not whether to allow them to join or not, but whether these states would be willing to join the treaty. In the ‘tiered membership’ that was initially floated during the talks about a new collective security organization, these countries were all marked as ‘stepping stones’. This emphasizes their status as strategically vital yet politically somewhat distant from the ‘core’, Brussels Treaty, states. Norway and Denmark of course have large Atlantic coasts, and Iceland is located in the North Atlantic itself. As such, these countries were considered important in connecting the North American and European allies.

Kaplan mentioned that the Brussels Treaty states had initially been opposed to full membership for the ‘stepping stone’ countries of Scandinavia. This is somewhat contradicted, at least regarding the Netherlands, by two statements in early 1948 from then Dutch minister of foreign affairs, Pim van Boetzelaer. Van Boetzelaer, in a message to the Dutch embassy in Stockholm, states that ‘the Netherlands has always considered the accession of the Scandinavian countries to the Western Union to be desirable, even more so now, as in the coming weeks an increasing insistence for the accession

⁸¹ Dirk Stikker, “Letter from Dirk Stikker to Dutch Ambassador in Paris,” February 26, 1949, 2.05.43 - 1272, NA - Gezantschap België (en Luxemburg).

⁸² Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 28–39.

⁸³ “Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1948-1949 Kamerstuknummer 1237 Ondernummer 3, MEMORIE VAN TOELICHTING” (n.d.), <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/0000082382>.

of Italy is to be expected'.⁸⁴ In another message, Van Boetzelaer argued that it would be beneficial to seek cooperation with the Scandinavian states. This would prevent the centre of gravity of the organization from drifting too far south.⁸⁵ What is meant by drifting south is subject to interpretation. On the one hand it could point simply to strategic military considerations. However it is also a possibility that this 'south' was meant differently, signifying not geographical but cultural and political properties. Although the messages from Van Boetzelaer concern Western Union membership and not NATO membership, the two are very closely related, since after the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty this largely incorporated and replaced the Western Union. What can be determined from the available sources is thus that the Netherlands was in favour of Scandinavian membership of a Western defence pact. What exactly motivated this support remains ambiguous.

In the case of the Scandinavian states, the biggest obstacle to accession were not external but internal factors.⁸⁶ The Scandinavian countries had historically pursued a largely neutral policy, but both Denmark and Norway had been invaded by Germany in the Second World War, and logically in its aftermath they were considering whether neutrality was appropriate, and more importantly, if it would be possible at all in any future wars. Sweden had had a completely different experience during the war, as it remained neutral and was not invaded. At the time of the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, then also known as the Washington Treaty, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland were engaged in negotiations of their own to create a Scandinavian Defence Union (SDU). These negotiations eventually failed because of disagreements about alignment. Sweden was in favour of strict neutrality, whereas Norway wanted a future SDU to be aligned with the West. Denmark occupied a middle road, and mainly tried to keep the countries together. It was in favour of neutrality, but if this would not be possible it wanted a defence union that was aligned with the West. Since the SDU negotiations failed because of the different views on alignment, both Norway and Denmark decided to join NATO. Sweden chose to remain neutral. The Norwegian decision was also influenced by Soviet pressure to commit to a non-aggression pact similar to the one it signed with Finland. This Soviet pressure on Norway was also one of the reasons the North Atlantic Treaty was created in the first place.⁸⁷ Iceland also joined the treaty, although it was highly divided on the issue. Proponents of Icelandic neutrality as

⁸⁴ "Telegram from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Stockholm Embassy Stating That the Netherlands Wishes Scandinavian Countries to Join WEU," 1948, 2.05.117 - 22686, NA - Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief 1945-1954.

⁸⁵ "Telegram from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Stockholm Embassy Stating That the Netherlands Wishes Scandinavian Countries to Join WEU"; "Telegram from Embassy in Washington Regarding Conversation with Danish Ambassador," April 15, 1948, 2.05.117 - 22686, NA - Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief 1945-1954; "Internal Memo Indicating Earlier Talks about Expanding the WEU."

⁸⁶ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 39-47.

⁸⁷ Smith, 41.

well as the extreme left were opposed to joining the North Atlantic Treaty. The final government decision to accede to the treaty was even met by a large riot at the Icelandic Parliament House.⁸⁸

Portugal

Portugal controlled the Atlantic islands of the Azores, which were the site of strategically important airfields that would be essential if the US was to provide military assistance in case of war in Europe. Although this was the only argument for inviting Portugal to join the North Atlantic Treaty, it was certainly a strong one. At the time Portugal was ruled by António de Oliveira Salazar, who was at the head of a thoroughly authoritarian regime. Salazar was in favour of Portugal joining NATO because of his views on international politics of the time. Smith states that according to Salazar, the Second World War had given rise to a new structure of world power, with the three key hegemonies being the UK, the US and the Soviet Union. This had made the Iberian peninsula a strategically important location, as these areas were vital for connecting North America to Western Europe. This meant that in a future war, it was very unlikely that Portugal could remain neutral as it had been during the Second World War. This drove Salazar to strive towards the inclusion of Portugal in an Atlantic system. Secondly, joining the North Atlantic Treaty would allow Portugal to remain outside of the Brussels Treaty, which was also an ideological project of Western European democracy in addition to being a military alliance.⁸⁹

Portuguese membership was not a big point of contention in Dutch parliament. Some questions were raised before the plenary debate through the so-called *afdelingsonderzoek*, a now no longer used method of preparing discussion of a bill in the Dutch House of Representatives.⁹⁰ The joint reports from these preparatory bodies unfortunately do not contain names and parties of the members that asked questions.⁹¹ These questions focussed on the preamble of the treaty. According to the preamble, the North Atlantic Treaty was created to protect the principles of democracy, personal freedom and the rule of law; additionally Article 2 mentions the freedom for institutions, and Article 10 states that any European state, which can further the realization of these principles can be invited to join. Members asked whether this meant that the Dutch government would prevent this treaty from ever covering fascist or totalitarian regimes, and how the government viewed the situation in Portugal in relation to this.⁹² Minister Stikker's answer mainly focused on the definition of 'free institutions': 'An expression such as 'free institutions' must be interpreted here in a general sense. The creators of the treaty did not

⁸⁸ Einar Benediktsson, "At Crossroads: Iceland's Defense and Security Relations, 1940-2011," accessed June 8, 2019, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/articles/Icelands-Defense-and-Security-Relations-1940-2011/2011/8/18>.

⁸⁹ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 47–50.

⁹⁰ "Tweede Kamercommissie," accessed June 8, 2019, https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrogvuz/tweede_kamercommissie.

⁹¹ "Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1948-1949 Kamerstuknummer 1237 Ondernummer 5, VOORLOPIG VERSLAG" (1949), statengeneraaldigitaal.nl.

⁹² Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1948-1949 kamerstuknummer 1237 ondernummer 5, VOORLOPIG VERSLAG.

have specific institutions in mind; the intention using the chosen terminology, was to give an indication of the general democratic principles and institutes of law, which form the common characteristics and heritage of the allies. . . . Indeed the treaty does express a certain similarity of views among the participating countries, but this does not signify that it strives towards equality or equalization ('*gelijkvormigheid*' or '*gelijkschakeling*' in the original text). It is from this point of view that the participation of a country like Portugal must be seen. Along with many members, I agree that the prevailing conditions in Portugal in many ways differ from the situation in the Netherlands. In the opinion of the government, this does not take away, that the differences in the form of government between Portugal and other Western powers is not such that Portugal cannot be included in the broad description of the principles underlying the treaty'.⁹³ Additionally the minister mentioned that one of the most important elements of the common heritage of the Western powers consisted of the tradition of Christianity, as such 'there seems to be no reason to exclude Portugal based solely on the fact that several aspects of its administration are different from those in other countries'.⁹⁴

In a discussion about the possibility of Spanish membership, some members of parliament asked why Portugal was allowed to join while Spain was not, despite both states not being democratic.⁹⁵ The minister answered that the situation in Spain differed from that in Portugal. 'In response to the objection by a number of members, that the applied distinction between Spain and Portugal is not very convincing, I would like to point out that the situation in Spain, contrary to that in Portugal, has led to an intervention by the United Nations, which makes it difficult to put this country on par with other Western powers which are united in the treaty'.⁹⁶ The intervention of the United Nations that Stikker pointed to is UN General Assembly Resolution 39, which denies Spanish membership of the UN on the basis that the Franco regime did not represent the Spanish people due to the way it came to power. The resolution also included a recommendation to withdraw ambassadors to Spain.⁹⁷ Charles Welter of the KNP (Catholic National Party) stated multiple times that Stikker's argument was weak and that Spain should be allowed to join as well. In the final decision, no-one explicitly opposed Portuguese membership of the North Atlantic Treaty.⁹⁸

Although the Netherlands was in favour of Portuguese accession to the North Atlantic Treaty, severe opposition existed at an international level, especially from Canada. The Canadians saw the pact as an alliance of liberal democratic states against Soviet threats. Portugal was very clearly not a democratic

⁹³ "Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1948-1949 Kamerstuknummer 1237 Ondernummer 6, MEMORIE VAN ANTWOORD" (1949), statengeneraaldigitaal.nl.

⁹⁴ Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1948-1949 kamerstuknummer 1237 ondernummer 6, MEMORIE VAN ANTWOORD.

⁹⁵ Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1948-1949 kamerstuknummer 1237 ondernummer 5, VOORLOPIG VERSLAG.

⁹⁶ Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1948-1949 kamerstuknummer 1237 ondernummer 6, MEMORIE VAN ANTWOORD.

⁹⁷ "Relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain," Pub. L. No. A/RES/39(I) (1946), <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/032/90/img/NR003290.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁹⁸ "Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1948-1949 15 Juli 1949" (1949), statengeneraaldigitaal.nl.

state at the time: ‘The argument was that the Treaty could be dangerously weakened by the inclusion of a state whose political values clashed with those the Treaty was supposed to uphold’.⁹⁹ The matter of Portuguese accession to the treaty boiled down to ‘ideological homogeneity or strategic advantages’, and in the end strategic factors won out, as Portugal was invited to accede to the treaty.¹⁰⁰

Conclusion

In summary, the Netherlands was in favour of Italian, Scandinavian and Portuguese membership. The initial resistance against Italian membership was overridden by the need to garner French support in the UN Security Council regarding the Indonesian War of Independence. Scandinavian membership of a Western defence organization was supported by the Netherlands from the start. However exactly what motivated this position remains unclear. It could either be due to strategic considerations or cultural and political aspects. Portuguese membership was supported due to the clear strategic necessity of the Azores, even though reservations regarding the political situation in Portugal existed in the Dutch House of Representatives.

The small power status of the Netherlands seems to have been of little importance in the formation of the Dutch position on the membership of the aforementioned countries. Only the Dutch requirement of support in the UN Security Council could arguably be connected, since the Netherlands as a small power did not have a veto. Although not all countries that can be considered Great Powers have veto rights in the UN, those that do are universally Great Powers.

⁹⁹ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 48.

¹⁰⁰ Smith, 48.

5. Turkey and Greece

In 1952 both Turkey and Greece acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty. This is also where similarities between the two countries largely end. Both had had vastly different experiences of both the First and more importantly the Second World War. Turkey had managed to maintain its neutrality during the war and had a strong sense of national unity and followed Ataturk's policy of modernization.

Modernity was largely equated to Europe and the West. Whereas Turkey and its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, had always had difficult relations with the Russian Empire, the threat of the Soviet Union was considered to be even bigger. This was because the Soviet threat also contained an ideological component, which had not been a big factor before. Secondly, neutrality seemed increasingly impossible in a world that was more and more divided into two spheres.¹⁰¹ An important characteristic of Turkey's accession that Smith mentions is that joining the North Atlantic Treaty was not only seen as a security guarantee, but it was seen as acceding to the Western community.¹⁰² Turkey was also involved in a conflict over control of the sea straits between the Black and Mediterranean seas with the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union claimed territory in eastern Turkey.¹⁰³ Greece on the other hand had different reasons for wanting to join a Western alliance. After the Second World War, during which it was occupied by Axis forces, a civil war broke out that divided the country in two diametrically opposed camps: communists and conservatives. When the conservatives gained the upper hand, they were set on embedding Greece in a Western security apparatus to consolidate their victory and prevent encroachment from its communist neighbours.¹⁰⁴

Both Greece and Turkey wished to join a western security organization. However, why did the other members invite these countries to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty? Both countries are neither Atlantic nor West-European, and in addition, Greece suffered from severe political instability. Both countries were however seen as important to European security, because of their position in the Eastern Mediterranean. These countries were located in strategically important locations between the West and Middle Eastern oil supplies. Turkey and Greece were important because they formed a buffer between these oil supplies and the Soviet Union, while simultaneously being in a location from where the Soviet oil fields and industry could be attacked.¹⁰⁵ This meant that communist influence over this area was to be avoided.

¹⁰¹ Smith, 64–65.

¹⁰² Smith, 64–65.

¹⁰³ Mustafa Aydin, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 108–12, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263200008701300>.

¹⁰⁴ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 65–67; John Fricas, "Greece and the Truman Doctrine." (Naval Postgraduate School, 1980), 40–42.

¹⁰⁵ D. J. K., "Greece, Turkey, and N.A.T.O.," *The World Today* 8, no. 4 (1952): 163.

Although both Greece and Turkey lobbied for their accession to the North Atlantic Treaty from the start, their requests were initially declined. From the available literature, it can be concluded that the majority of the Netherlands was initially hesitant, if not against Turkish and Greek membership in 1948 and 1949.¹⁰⁶ This hesitance in the formative years of the alliance, was mainly based on perceived cultural differences between the existing North Atlantic Treaty members and these two countries.¹⁰⁷ Several unnamed members of parliament had expressed in 1949 that ‘with regards to Turkey, one has to wonder whether there is any common heritage and whether or not this country shares the other spiritual values mentioned in the preamble with Western Europe and North America’.¹⁰⁸ In a response to parliament Stikker revealed a different point of view, mentioning that he ‘endorses the view of several members that there are commonalities in the heritage of Turkey and Western Europe, which does not only consist of Christian values but also of inherited elements of Greek culture and Roman principles of law.’ Stikker further pointed out that Turkey had sought and attained a connection to the West.¹⁰⁹ Thus, in 1949 at least, by looking at the parliamentary reports the Netherlands seemed to be divided on this issue.

However, a year later, in the Turkish press, the Netherlands was presumed to be among the staunchest opponents to accession. A local press update from the Dutch embassy in Ankara from August 1950 stated that ‘resistance was only to be expected from the Benelux countries and Scandinavia, as these had also impeded Turkey’s accession to the Council of Europe.’¹¹⁰ The Netherlands’ government sent out telegrams to the embassies in Brussels, Rome, Oslo, Ottawa, Copenhagen and Lisbon inquiring about the stance of these countries’ governments on Turkish and Greek accession. The only response that was found during this research was that from the embassy in Norway, which stated that it was highly likely that Norway would oppose accession.¹¹¹ Roughly a month later the Turkish envoy to the Netherlands, Abdullah Zeki Polar, requested minister Stikker to support a Turkish accession proposal.¹¹² He argued that the addition of the Turkish military to the pact would be an asset, not a burden. He also strongly emphasized the difference between the position of Turkey and Iran, indicating that there might have been plans for Iran to be included in some sort of Western defence pact as well. In addition, the Turkish envoy argued that the regional geographical limit of the treaty implied by the ‘North Atlantic’ in the name was no longer valid, since Italy could join. Finally, he

¹⁰⁶ Mallinson, *From Neutrality to Commitment*, 81; Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 77-79,83.

¹⁰⁷ Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1948-1949 kamerstuknummer 1237 ondernummer 5, VOORLOPIG VERSLAG, 15.

¹⁰⁸ Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1948-1949 kamerstuknummer 1237 ondernummer 5, VOORLOPIG VERSLAG.

¹⁰⁹ “Kamerstuk Eerste Kamer 1948-1949 Kamerstuknummer 1237 Ondernummer 1237, EINDVERSLAG DER COMMISSIE VAN RAPPORTEURS, MEMORIE VAN ANTWOORD” (1949), 5, statengeneraaldigitaal.nl.

¹¹⁰ “Local Press Update from Ankara Embassy to Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” August 1950, 2.05.96 - 182, NA - Gezantschap in Turkije (Ankara).

¹¹¹ “Telegram Regarding Expected Norwegian Resistance against Accession,” August 30, 1950, 2.05.227 - 368, NA - Nederlandse Gezantschap in Noorwegen (Oslo).

¹¹² “Nieuwe Turkse Gezant,” *De Tijd : Godsdienstig-Staatkundig Dagblad*, April 1, 1949, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:011199591>.

stated that if Turkey was not to be admitted this would be a severe shock to the confidence of the Turkish population and for its ability to resist in case of a Russian attack. In response, the Secretary-General of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, H.N. Boon, stated that the Netherlands could not yet share its position on Turkish accession.¹¹³

As mentioned before, early Turkish and Greek requests for membership fell on deaf ears. This was, until wider circumstances started to change, which had a significant effect on the position of the US which is seen as the main sponsor for Greek and Turkish accession.¹¹⁴ The most important change was the evolution of America's 'containment' policy, which strived to contain Soviet power. Initially, since the United States' resources were limited, it had to focus on the areas it deemed vital. What areas were considered vital was determined by their military-industrial potential. One of the areas that was deemed vital in this respect was Western Europe. If this area was to fall into Soviet hands, it could constitute a threat to the United States. Therefore, the US focussed its resources on this area, as well as several other centres of industry. This approach is described by John Lewis Gaddis as the 'strongpoint defence'. Greece and Turkey were considered important, however mainly because they were on the flank of Western Europe.¹¹⁵ Between 1949 and 1951, with China becoming communist, the development of a Soviet nuclear bomb and the Korean War, the US increasingly started to see anywhere a Soviet threat existed as a vital US interest. Whereas previously the strategy had focussed on actual military and industrial potential, by now, any Soviet threat, be it military, economic or psychological was deemed a threat to the US, and thus a vital interest. This shifted the US policy from strongpoint defence to 'perimeter defence', since the US now had to defend all areas equally against Soviet influence. The Korean War also significantly increased the willingness of the United States to spend resources to fight the Cold War. Where it had to limit its scope before to fit its goals to its resources, it now expanded its resources to fit its goals, as the US started taking on more commitments.¹¹⁶ The new hardened view was outlined in NSC68, a National Security Council policy paper, which mentioned that 'a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere'.¹¹⁷ Whereas before the US had been largely deaf to Greek and Turkish calls for North Atlantic Treaty membership, its revised security policy started to steer it in another direction. At the same time as the US was hardening its anti-communist containment policy, the North Atlantic Treaty had spawned an

¹¹³ "Letter from Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ankara Embassy about Turkish Request for Support," September 8, 1950, 2.05.96 - 182, NA - Gezantschap in Turkije (Ankara); "Dr. Boon Secretaris-Generaal van Buitenlandse Zaken," *Het Parool*, May 21, 1949, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCD:010828921>; "Dr H. N. Boon Gezant in Italië," *Het Vrije Volk : Democratisch-Socialistisch Dagblad*, July 12, 1952, Dag edition, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010951288>.

¹¹⁴ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 67–72.

¹¹⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, Revised ed. edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 40, 53–59.

¹¹⁶ Gaddis, 87–124.

¹¹⁷ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 67–72; Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity*, Reprint edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press, 2012), 108–14.

organization. Up until this point, there was really no such thing as NATO, there was just a treaty which formed the North Atlantic Council, however this was only a political body. Because of the Korean War, the North Atlantic Council had to start somehow implementing the contents of the North Atlantic Treaty in practice, thus spawning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.¹¹⁸ Now that the treaty was being put into practice, an actual military strategy was required, and the organization started focussing on ‘forward defence’. This meant that a possible invasion from the east would be countered as far east as possible. The implementation of this strategy necessitated adherence to the West by Greece and Turkey.¹¹⁹ During the initial treaty negotiation Greece and Turkey were not seen as potential candidates. However, with the inclusion of Italy and Algeria the alliance had already spread into the Mediterranean. This cut any argument against membership based on geographical criteria off at the knees, just as the Turkish envoy to the Netherlands had mentioned previously.¹²⁰ The combination of the hardening containment policy by the US, the adoption of the forward defence strategy by NATO and the inclusion of other Mediterranean territories was compounded by two more factors: the lack of a viable alternative and increasing Turkish public pressure. The US was militarily involved in Turkey and the US congress demanded that these relations would somehow be formalized before any strategic cooperation. The big question was: how should these relations be formalized? Would it be best to include Turkey and Greece in NATO, or would it be better to create a new Mediterranean or perhaps Middle Eastern alliance? Both these other options would also be problematic because it would have to include states that were regularly engaged in conflicts amongst each other. Also, a Mediterranean arrangement would probably involve several NATO members like France and Italy. If these NATO countries would be drawn into an external conflict due to the Mediterranean alliance, would NATO have to act?¹²¹ In 1951 Turkey’s president also increasingly put pressure on the US by bluntly saying that Turkey would have to reconsider its foreign policy if a US security guarantee would not be given soon. If a public request would be made to join NATO and it was rejected, this could be seen as a denial of Turkey’s importance to the US, which could lead to a more neutral orientation.¹²² This finally led the US to voice strong support for the accession of Greece and NATO.

The view that it was the US that was responsible for renewed talks of Turkish and Greek membership seems to be confirmed by the Dutch sources. In May 1951, a message was sent to the embassy in Ankara stating that the Netherlands had informed the US government that it saw no reason to deviate from the decision taken in July the year before to not allow Turkey and Greece to join. This objection was said to be mainly for practical reasons, since enlargement would increase difficulties with regards

¹¹⁸ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 72–74; “NATO | Founders, Members, & History | Britannica.Com.”

¹¹⁹ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 72–74.

¹²⁰ Smith, 72–74.

¹²¹ Smith, 75–87.

¹²² Smith, 75–87.

to decision-making within NATO. It also cites bad previous experiences with the Greek and Turkish governments: ‘The Greeks and Turks have a tendency to form a bloc within other international organizations that consist of mainly European countries, such as the Council of Europe and the OECD. Also, Turkey has abused the unanimity rule within the OECD.’¹²³ In a circular telegram sent out to embassies a few days later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeated this view and asked its representatives to find out the views of the governments of their host-countries and to try and see whether a joint position could be formed on this issue.¹²⁴ A month later, in a visit to the Secretary-General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, F.Z. Akdur, by the Dutch envoy, D. van Eysinge, the latter was told that if the Netherlands would keep with its negative attitude towards Turkish accession that this would be considered an unfriendly act.¹²⁵

In July, a comprehensive policy report on this issue was created by the European Directorate of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, further outlining the rationales for the Dutch opposition to Turkish and Greek membership. Firstly, enlargement would decrease the ‘Atlantic character’ of the pact. ‘It was originally meant to be a collective defence instrument for spiritually, socially and economically very similar countries on a regional basis. Even Italian accession had already caused concern over this aspect.’ By the proposed enlargement, the pact would lose its regional character and it would be ‘more similar to a purely military alliance of free nations that fear the Soviet-Russian imperialism’.¹²⁶ With this accession, it would become impossible to define a geographical limit to the treaty. Secondly, the report stated that aside from the military purpose of the treaty, the original signatories wanted to possibly extend the treaty towards more encompassing integration in other fields, which would lead to an ‘Atlantic community’. ‘With the accession of Turkey and Greece, countries of a different nature from the current treaty partners which cannot be considered to be a part of the Atlantic area, it is feared that these intentions may be impossible to attain’.¹²⁷ Thirdly, the report argued that the enlargement would be seen as a provocation by the Russians, which could lead to problems. It draws a parallel with Norwegian accession, during which the Russians had apparently made ‘threatening statements’ towards Norway. These had caused the Norwegians to state explicitly that they would not allow its Atlantic allies to use its military bases in peacetime, nor allow foreign armed forces on Norwegian soil. If Greece and Turkey were to be forced into a similar situation, the value of their accession would diminish significantly. The fourth argument is of a different nature, as it is unrelated to the characteristics of the candidate members. It instead focuses on the internal dynamics within

¹²³ “Memo about Opposition to Turkish and Greek Membership,” May 16, 1951, 2.05.96 - 182, NA - Gezantschap in Turkije (Ankara).

¹²⁴ “Circulaire Regarding Dutch Opposition to Accession and Possibility of Collaborating with Other Countries,” May 19, 1951, 2.05.227 - 368, NA - Nederlandse Gezantschap in Noorwegen (Oslo).

¹²⁵ D. van Eysinge, “Letter from Dutch Representative in Ankara Regarding Turkish Lobbying amongst NATO Members Opposed to Accession,” June 14, 1951, 2.05.96 - 182, NA - Gezantschap in Turkije (Ankara).

¹²⁶ “Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report Outlining the Rationales for Opposing Accession.”

¹²⁷ “Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report Outlining the Rationales for Opposing Accession.”

NATO. The report stated that the Americans and the British had a tendency to settle important affairs together before plenary meetings of the North Atlantic Council. If NATO was to expand, this tendency would be encouraged: ‘In the political bodies of NATO (North Atlantic Council and Council of Deputies) there is already a tendency for the English and Americans to settle controversial matters of high importance between themselves, outside the plenary meetings. This tendency, which through the continuous activity of the other deputies with or without cooperation with the French can currently be largely quelled, would increase through enlargement of the aforementioned political bodies. The Great Powers would fear more that their important projects, when treated in a plenary meeting, would not remain secret enough. Additionally they would fear that when they do not reach agreement amongst each other, the unity required for decision-making could not be reached in the plenary meetings. It can be considered a certainty that the decision-making will become more difficult after the accession of Greece and Turkey, when the not very pleasant experiences of trying to reach consensus with these countries in the OECD are taken into account’.¹²⁸ A fifth argument given in the report is that by enlarging the organization, certain articles of the treaty needed to be changed which had to be ratified in the national parliaments. This could lead to discussions in parliament and in the press which ‘should not be considered conducive to the good relations which the NATO members wish to have with Greece and Turkey’.¹²⁹ This can be considered as fear of public opposition against the enlargement. In addition, the report dismisses the argument that Greece and Turkey should be allowed to join based on their strategic position. If these countries were to accede, this would in turn create a need to expand to other areas as these other areas would be in a strategic position in relation to Turkey or Greece.¹³⁰ In other words, a domino-effect was feared. Also, the internal political situation in Greece was considered to be problematic. The last argument given in the report is that accession of Turkey and Greece would force smaller powers within the alliance to take on new responsibilities in a region where they barely had any interests. ‘This is different for the larger powers, as they are already formally or at least morally bound to support both countries. For a small power, like the Netherlands, there are no reasons to take on further commitments’.¹³¹ The report contained another remark which may also have affected the Dutch decision to oppose accession: ‘Now that the Norwegians and Danes have already opposed accession, this offers a good opportunity for the Netherlands to join in voicing their concern, without the Netherlands having to take on the less pleasant role of being the first and sole country to oppose accession’.¹³² The report ended by stating that the Netherlands was not in favour of NATO accession for Greece and Turkey, but instead wanted a separate regional treaty for the Mediterranean to be established.

¹²⁸ “Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report Outlining the Rationales for Opposing Accession.”

¹²⁹ “Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report Outlining the Rationales for Opposing Accession.”

¹³⁰ “Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report Outlining the Rationales for Opposing Accession.”

¹³¹ “Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report Outlining the Rationales for Opposing Accession.”

¹³² “Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report Outlining the Rationales for Opposing Accession.”

Several days after the report was created, the permanent representative in the Council of Deputies, T. van Starkenborgh, was instructed to put forward the Dutch opposition to full NATO membership for Greece and Turkey.¹³³ Not much later, the Dutch permanent representative to the United Nations sent a message to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding a conversation he had with the Turkish representative in which the latter tried to convince him of the necessity of Turkish and Greek membership. The arguments he used were largely the same as those mentioned earlier by the Turkish envoy in the Netherlands, but it included one additional argument. The Turkish representative mentioned that ‘he wondered if a Western European defence line on the Rhine (or even the Elbe) would be tenable if flanking a Russian attack from Turkey or Greece would be impossible’.¹³⁴ This was an argument that was more specifically tailored to the smaller European allies such as Denmark and the Netherlands, indicating that perhaps, Turkey was also expecting most resistance to come from these countries.

The culmination of the enlargement issue occurred at the Ottawa meeting on 18 September 1951, where a decision would be made. In the leadup to this event, several newspaper articles were published stating that the Netherlands would vote against the accession.¹³⁵ However, in a meeting with the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Fuat Köprülü, Dutch envoy W. Huender ‘got the impression that the minister had information that gave him reason to think that accession was a *fait accompli*, and perhaps also that the Netherlands basically agreed’. He went on stating that ‘days before the final decision, in the press, Holland disappeared from the list of opposing countries, which can be considered an advantage since probably only Norway and especially Denmark will be remembered as opponents’.¹³⁶ During the Ottawa conference, in a surprising turn of events, the Netherlands indeed did move away from its earlier position, and allowed Turkey and Greece to join, albeit reluctantly. At the Ottawa conference, the Dutch representative gave a speech which started thusly: ‘My government felt and still feels that it would have been possible to establish this cooperation in a satisfactory manner by other means than the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO; to this admission the Netherlands Government had grave objections. My government recognizes however, the factual significance of the situation which has arisen between some of our Pact-partners and Greece and Turkey with respect to the inclusion of these two powers in NATO. In the circumstances, the Netherlands government is now ready to revise its attitude, prompted by a desire not to bar the road to the unanimity which is

¹³³ “Instruction from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to NATO Council Representative to Oppose Turkish and Greek Accession,” July 12, 1951, 2.05.96 - 182, NA - Gezantschap in Turkije (Ankara); “Tjarda Van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, jhr. Alidius Warmoldus Lambertus (1888-1978),” November 12, 2013, <http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/bwn1880-2000/lemmata/bwn1/tjarda>.

¹³⁴ “Letter from Dutch Permanent Representative at UN Regarding Turkish Lobbying for Membership,” July 20, 1951, 2.05.96 - 182, NA - Gezantschap in Turkije (Ankara).

¹³⁵ “Nederlands Standpunt: Griekenland En Turkije Niet in Pact,” *Het Vrije Volk : Democratisch-Socialistisch Dagblad*, August 22, 1951, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010949164>.

¹³⁶ W. Huender, “Update from Ankara Embassy to Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding Earlier Dutch Resistance to Membership,” September 24, 1951, 2.05.96 - 182, NA - Gezantschap in Turkije (Ankara).

indispensable for NATO decisions'. The speech then continued by stating that several practical issues still needed to be worked out.¹³⁷ Firstly, the Dutch government had perceived that there were still plans to create a separate Middle Eastern alliance. Turkey was perceived to be a possible member of this alliance, which led to concern about the division of the Turkish military power among the two alliances. Since the majority of its military might fall under the Middle Eastern alliance's command, a possibility of imbalance in the alliance existed. Turkey would have a full vote in NATO's affairs and be fully covered by the treaty, whereas it would divide its military assets between two alliances, thus possibly diluting its contribution to the Atlantic alliance. The Dutch government wanted to make sure that there were 'equal rights and equal contributions' among all NATO states, and it received assurances from the Turkish government that this would be the case.¹³⁸ Secondly, there were worries that enlarging the alliance would dilute American support for Western Europe. However, it was pointed out that well before any plans to enlarge NATO emerged, Turkey and Greece were already receiving, and continued to receive large amounts of American support.¹³⁹ In the end, the countries that opposed Turkish and Greek membership were not willing to use their veto, and thus, Turkey and Greece were formally invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty.

The reversal of the Dutch position was interpreted in several ways by different newspapers in the Netherlands. Some indeed focused on the statement that the fear of a privileged position for Turkey was attenuated by certain promises.¹⁴⁰ Others however put more emphasis on the internal dynamics argument previously outlined in the internal report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Dutch resistance or stubbornness was interpreted as a reminder to the Great Powers to include the smaller powers in decisions.¹⁴¹ Others pointed to the Korean War as the cause. If the West would defend others against communist aggression in Korea, then it would surely defend a strategic location like Greece and Turkey regardless of their membership of any pact.¹⁴² In any case, the Dutch government had agreed to accession, and it was now up to parliament to approve or reject the decision.

Although there was little opposition within the Dutch House of Representatives, there was quite a large range of motivations given by parliamentary representatives. Labour party (PvdA) member Goedhart mentioned any Soviet military move into Greece or Turkey, with or without NATO membership would drag the Netherlands into the conflict. At least, as NATO members, a coordinated response could be organized. Goedhart, as well as several other members of parliament, did consider

¹³⁷ "Speech in Ottawa by the Dutch Representative about Turkish and Greek Membership," 1951.

¹³⁸ "Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1951-1952 Kamerstuknummer 2401 Ondernummer 3, MEMORIE VAN TOELICHTING" (1952), statengeneraaldigitaal.nl.

¹³⁹ "Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1951-1952 29 Januari 1952" (1952), statengeneraaldigitaal.nl.

¹⁴⁰ "Atlantische Conferentie Minister Stikker Geeft Verzet Op," *Nieuwsblad van Het Noorden*, September 19, 1951, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010679240>.

¹⁴¹ "Nieuwe Vrienden," *De Volkskrant*, September 20, 1951, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCDDD:010843072>.

¹⁴² "Stikker En Ottawa," *Het Vrije Volk : Democratisch-Socialistisch Dagblad*, September 20, 1951, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010949187>.

the supposed cultural ties between the West, Turkey and Greece as a reason for expansion.¹⁴³ Also, he claimed that the Soviet Union, starting in 1947, launched a propaganda campaign claiming the Turkish city of Trabzon as Soviet territory, showing the Soviet threat to Turkey. However, he also outlines the clear military strategic reasons for expansion. Turkey and Greece both had capable armies. It would allow NATO to control the Turkish straits, which in case of a Soviet attack would allow the alliance to attack the Soviet main oil fields in the Caucasus. Turkey as a NATO member would be a big obstacle for a Soviet attack on the West's main oil supplies in the Middle East. Greece and Turkey would also be of major importance in controlling the eastern Mediterranean and protecting shipping through the Suez Canal. Goedhart also mentioned Greece in particular, because the Soviets had a submarine base in Albania. Having Greece in NATO would isolate this base, and in case of war it would isolate Albania which was an important ally to the Soviet Union. An additional argument of military nature, was the contribution by Turkey to the Korean War. Goedhart mentioned that the large contribution made to the war effort showed that Turkey was a worthy ally. Goedhart also gave several reasons that are not necessarily related to Turkey or Greece, but to enlargement in general. Turkey and Greece acceding to the treaty showed that they had faith in the organization, he said. 'As we grow stronger, others will also have more faith in us, and will want to seek cooperation and friendship'.¹⁴⁴ He thus hoped that this enlargement would lead to a bandwagon effect. Other members, especially Mr. Korthals of the liberal party, focused on the cultural bonds between NATO members. He stated that NATO had been created under negative circumstances: the perceived military threat from the east. However, he said that these negative circumstances had forced the Western states to come together, and that NATO was increasingly becoming an important instrument for social-economic integration of its member states. Korthals said that 'surely, Turkey's request (to join) was not only caused by strategic considerations. Its wish to maintain close cultural ties to the West must have played a role in this as well.'¹⁴⁵ The government, by word of minister Stikker, agreed with Groenhart and Korthals.¹⁴⁶

The main opposition to the enlargement came from the communist party. The communists provided a number of domestic reasons for not supporting the enlargement, although some arguments were mainly anti-NATO, not necessarily anti-expansion. Firstly, they stated that the large costs associated with the North Atlantic Treaty because of defense spending was causing a housing shortage in the Netherlands, since funds were being spent on the military that should have been spent on housing. Secondly, they stated that the treaty caused the Netherlands to lose its independence. Another argument stated that the enlargement would unnecessarily endanger the Netherlands, as the alliance moved further towards the Middle East which was a conflict zone. Communist party member Mr. Haken stated that the timing, with increasing instability in Egypt and French North-Africa made it

¹⁴³ Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1951-1952 29 januari 1952.

¹⁴⁴ Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1951-1952 29 januari 1952.

¹⁴⁵ Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1951-1952 29 januari 1952.

¹⁴⁶ Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1951-1952 29 januari 1952.

clear that Britain and France were ‘trying to get others to do their dirty work’.¹⁴⁷ Haken also objected to the Turkish and Greek accessions, because these countries were not democracies, he said. The inclusion of these states would only create a precedent for the accession of Spain and Germany.¹⁴⁸ The communists and the other parties also, predictably, disagreed on the Soviet threat. The communists stated that a socialist state could by its very nature not be aggressive and imperialist. Other parties had mentioned the large army build-up on the other side of the Iron Curtain in response to this statement, however the communists stated that these parties were ‘tampering with the numbers’. The vote on enlargement ended with fifty-nine votes in favour and seven against. All votes against the enlargement were cast by members of the Communist Party.¹⁴⁹

To summarize, the Dutch government’s position on Turkish and Greek accession was initially largely negative. It would dilute the ‘Atlantic character’ of the pact, impede the possibility of forming an ‘Atlantic community’, provoke the Russians, increase difficulty in decision-making, lead to public opposition, create a domino-effect leading to further enlargements and, last but not least it would create additional commitments for the smaller states in an area where they barely had any interests. Nonetheless, at the Ottawa conference the Netherlands voted in favour of the proposal. There are several reasons for this sudden change. Firstly, the combined resistance by the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark beforehand had not been enough to make any of the bigger powers change their stance. Secondly, the Netherlands was unwilling to exploit the unanimity rule. This would be considered hypocritical, since Turkey’s abuse of the same rule in the OECD was one of the reasons the Netherlands opposed accession. Also, exploiting the unanimity rule would negatively affect ties with both the candidate members, as well as the bigger powers that were in favour of enlargement. This would not be wise in a time when the Netherlands was so dependent on mainly US aid. Another interpretation of events is that the Dutch government exaggerated its opposition to the proposal, in order to send a message to the larger powers to consult their smaller allies more thoroughly on major decisions. Also, although the Netherlands preferred a separate Mediterranean alliance this turned out to be impossible. The lack of a feasible alternative that would keep Greece and Turkey aligned with the West may have increased the willingness to grant them full NATO membership. This may also help explain why the parliamentary debate was a lot more positive towards the accession than the earlier internal documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Another reason for the difference between the parliamentary debate and the ministry’s earlier position is that the debate occurred only after the Netherlands had already approved the enlargement in the North Atlantic Council. This made opposition more costly, as approval was already expected by all other partners.

¹⁴⁷ Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1951-1952 29 januari 1952.

¹⁴⁸ Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1951-1952 29 januari 1952.

¹⁴⁹ Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1951-1952 29 januari 1952.

Out of all the aforementioned arguments against accession, only one can be seen to be influenced by the Netherlands status as a small power. The Netherlands' role as a small power affected its view on the Greek and Turkish membership because enlargement was feared to force new responsibilities on the smaller powers. The Netherlands did not have as much direct strategic interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East as the Great Powers. It therefore did not want to take on additional commitments in this area.

6. West Germany

Out of all the enlargements, the enlargement to West Germany has the largest available body of literature. Dutch-German relations have been extensively researched. The Second World War, during which the Netherlands had been occupied by the German military, left the biggest mark on Dutch-German relations during the time of the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty. This is why the Dutch stance on the inclusion of its former enemy in the North Atlantic pact has received more attention than the other enlargements. Therefore this chapter will mainly use secondary literature, since the Dutch position on NATO enlargement has already been covered as a side-product of the research into post-Second World War Dutch-German relations and European integration.

The German Federal Republic acceded to the treaty in 1955. The road to German accession was filled with many obstacles. From the birth of the treaty, West Germany had been considered as a possible member. Germany was too big and powerful to be left out of the alliance, even though many alliance members feared what could happen if Germany would be allowed to rearm itself. A unified Germany had shown that it could not simply be controlled by other powers on the continent, which led to a debate about Germany's place in Europe after the Second World War. The first Secretary-General of NATO, Briton Lord Ismay, once said that NATO existed to 'keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down'.¹⁵⁰ As Smith says: 'The paradox was that Germany was vital to European prosperity, but was also capable of overturning stability within Europe'.¹⁵¹ Surprisingly, the Cold War division contributed to solving the German dilemma, or it at the very least made it a less acute problem. The Cold War locked the European state system in place, meaning that alliances were less likely to change as they had been before. In addition, the continuing involvement of the US in Europe meant that there was a far stronger barrier to renewed conflict between Germany and the other European states, since German power could be constrained by superior US power. These restrictions on Germany were also very clear to its post-war leadership, especially to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer who saw that the only option for Germany to find a solution to the problems of its past was to align itself firmly with the West. He was in favour of West Germany joining NATO since it would both protect the country's territory, as well as provide a way to overcome the historic security tensions with its neighbours.¹⁵² However, since Adenauer recognized that NATO needed Germany as much if not more as Germany needed NATO, he wanted German sovereignty in return for its rearmament and alignment with the West.

¹⁵⁰ William Burr, "NATO's Original Purpose: Double Containment of the Soviet Union and 'Resurgent' Germany | National Security Archive," accessed March 10, 2019, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2018-12-11/natos-original-purpose-double-containment-soviet-union-resurgent-germany>.

¹⁵¹ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 96–99.

¹⁵² Smith, 99–102.

The adoption of the forward defence strategy as NATO's principal military strategy meant that Germany became indispensable. It would also require a significant German contribution since the forward defence predicted that the front line of any invasion would be in Germany, as its main principle was to hold an invasion as far east as possible.¹⁵³ This required German rearmament, and Germany would somehow have to be integrated into NATO, whether this was by full membership or through some other mechanism. One such possible mechanism was proposed by the US in 1950, which was to form a European Defence Force within NATO that would combine forces from all allies under one command. German armed forces would contribute to and be subject to this command. This allowed a German contribution without allowing a new German national army.¹⁵⁴ This was to be combined with increased contributions by the US as well as NATO's other members. The other NATO members were divided on the proposal. On the one hand, a German contribution and the possibility of forward defence combined with an increased US contribution would strengthen the alliance. On the other hand, just five years after the war, German rearmament was not a prospect many were happy with. Also, the other members were expected to increase their contribution too, leading to higher costs.¹⁵⁵

The Netherlands' government was highly in favour of the principle of German rearmament. In September 1950, at the fifth session of the North Atlantic Council, Dirk Stikker revealed one of the main determining factors for the Dutch stance on Germany: the Rhine-IJssel line. In case of an invasion from the east, he said, 'it will be necessary for instance in the Netherlands to evacuate the northern provinces of the Netherlands. That means to say, about 2.5 million people. On top of that, there should be evacuated the people who are living on the west bank of the Rhine-IJssel line. That would imply only for my country probably another million people. On top of that it is to be expected that there will be evacuation from Germany, and when the military people deem it possible that they could make a defense on the Rhine-IJssel in the Netherlands, when in this very restricted territory there are about eight million people that are now living there, then I must say that this sort of defense in my opinion – I hope you don't mind the words – is just plain lunacy'.¹⁵⁶ The Dutch government believed that defences had to be placed in Germany, as far east as possible. Without defences in Germany, a Soviet army would be able to cut through Germany right up to the Netherlands. The threat of a communist invasion of Western Europe was taken very seriously at the time, since the Korean War had started several months before this meeting. The North Korean invasion increased the

¹⁵³ Marc Trachtenberg and Christopher Gertz, "America, Europe, and German Rearmament, August-September 1950: A Critique of a Myth," n.d., 11, [http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/trachtenberg-gertz\(final\).doc](http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/trachtenberg-gertz(final).doc).

¹⁵⁴ Trachtenberg and Gertz, 11–14.

¹⁵⁵ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 102–7.

¹⁵⁶ "North Atlantic Council - Verbatim Record of the First Meeting Held in New York on 15th September 1950," September 15, 1950, C/5-VR/1, NATO archives, http://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/1/9/19437/C_5-VR_1_BIL.pdf.

willingness of Western European countries for German integration and even German rearmament.¹⁵⁷ However even before the Korean War, Dutch politicians had been in favour of cooperation with the Germans. According to Martijn Lak, ‘to Dutch politicians, from 1948-1949 there was little doubt that it was vital that the newly founded German Federal Republic became a western ally in the rapidly developing Cold War. By the end of the 1940s, the Dutch German trauma had been overshadowed by a fear of communism’.¹⁵⁸ Military rationales were not the only factors affecting the Dutch stance on relations with Germany. Germany had once again become the largest trading partner of the Dutch. The Netherlands is a small open economy. Small open economies tend to rely more on trade than larger economies. This is because smaller countries generally have less diversified economies and need to import more goods than diversified large economies. Secondly, they only have small domestic markets which means that they are more dependent on the export of products as well.¹⁵⁹ The Netherlands therefore had a large economic interest in Germany, which would benefit from the additional stability the economic and military integration of Germany within the Western framework would bring.¹⁶⁰ Another financial incentive in favour of German military integration was the increasing pressure from the US to increase the Dutch defence budget. The Netherlands had succumbed to the pressure and agreed to increase its defence budget in 1951 after significant debate. A German contribution to the European defence costs provided an opportunity to be able to lower the budget again and save costs.¹⁶¹

Although the majority of the existing NATO members agreed with the American proposal for a European Defence Force, there was significant opposition from France, which eventually vetoed this plan. France did not want to invite Germany in the European Defence Force from the start. It wanted to have an integrated European military structure in place, and then make a decision about whether or not to invite Germany. The French position can be explained by domestic and international factors. On the domestic level, it was considered hard to convince the public of the need for German rearmament. However, if a strong European defence system with the necessary safeguards was already in place, this would diminish the perceived risk and probably lead to more support.¹⁶² On the international level, the French foreign minister was worried about provoking the Soviets at a time when the military power balance was considered to be in favour of the Soviet Union. Rearming West Germany could provoke a Soviet military response. It was thought to be a better option to first strengthen the Western

¹⁵⁷ Martijn Lak, “Because We Need Them: German-Dutch Relations after the Occupation: Economic Inevitability and Political Acceptance, 1945-1957” (2011), 203–5, https://www.eur.nl/sites/corporate/files/Thesis_Lak.pdf.

¹⁵⁸ Lak, 217–21.

¹⁵⁹ P. Földvári, “The Economic Impact of the European Integration on the Netherlands. A Quantitative Analysis of Foreign Trade and Foreign Direct Investments” (Dissertation, 2006), 35–36, <http://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/8528>.

¹⁶⁰ Lak, “Because We Need Them: German-Dutch Relations after the Occupation: Economic Inevitability and Political Acceptance, 1945-1957,” 217–21.

¹⁶¹ Lak, 217–21.

¹⁶² Trachtenberg and Gertz, “America, Europe, and German Rearmament, August-September 1950: A Critique of a Myth,” 2–3.

alliance in other ways, and allowing German rearmament and accession from a position of strength, which would diminish the risk of a Soviet attack.¹⁶³ The French position was not acceptable to the US, who wanted a European promise that Germany would participate before committing any resources and troops to the programme. Since France had vetoed the agreement, it was considered to be up to them to form an alternative option, which became known as the Pleven Plan. The Pleven Plan consisted of setting up a so-called European Defence Community (EDC). This would consist of a single European army controlled by a European Defence Minister. Therefore, this plan went further than the NATO option in the sense that entire armies would be combined into one army in a supranational organization, whereas in NATO the distinct national armed forces would collaborate very intensively. Initially there was little support for the Pleven Plan amongst the other members. This was mainly due to the fact that the EDC showed little to no benefit over the NATO option, and it was even seen by many to be a French attempt at gaining the upper hand on the continent.¹⁶⁴ There were two key issues with both options. Firstly, Germany and other Western European countries had different views of what the goal of German rearmament and military cooperation would be. The Germans saw it as a way of rehabilitating in Europe, and to become a country again that was to be treated equally. The other countries mainly used the military integration options as security measures to keep Germany from reverting to militarism. Secondly, whereas the Europeans saw German rearmament as a reason for the US to stay involved on the continent, the US saw it as an opportunity to dial back its military presence.¹⁶⁵ Although for a large part these options encountered the same issues, support for the Pleven Plan soon arose, especially due to domestic circumstances in the US. In late 1950 and early 1951 there was a big debate about whether or not the US should remain involved in Europe. The resulting view was that the US would remain invested in Europe, however they had to make sure that NATO allies were also taking care of their collective defence. Since the EDC would be a purely European alliance without too much US involvement, this option became increasingly attractive to the US. Also, it was recognized that France was not likely to accept any other option.¹⁶⁶ Despite this, many of the smaller member states had their reservations about the EDC. They were worried that the EDC would eventually become dominated by Germany and France and that they would lose their voice. The EDC could be treated as a unit within NATO, which would overrepresent Germany and France and underrepresent the other countries. They wanted the relationship between the EDC and NATO to be set up so that they would not lose their say in the organization. In addition, Adenauer did not agree with the Pleven Plan, which he felt did not treat Germany on a basis of equality. However, giving in to the German demands would make the plan unacceptable to other countries.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ Trachtenberg and Gertz, 2–3.

¹⁶⁴ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 107–11.

¹⁶⁵ Smith, 107–11.

¹⁶⁶ Smith, 107–11.

¹⁶⁷ Smith, 107–11.

The Netherlands was one of the countries that had reservations about the EDC. It felt that the creation of a European Defence Community would delay German rearmament. The debate about the exact form and process of German rearmament took place at a time when a possible Soviet invasion was on everyone's mind and the Dutch strived towards moving the defence line as far east as possible, as fast as possible. The Dutch government thought that NATO, since it already existed, would provide the easiest way of quickly integrating West Germany militarily with the West.¹⁶⁸ The Netherlands also preferred the Atlantic treaty over any European alternative, since strong leadership by a single remote superpower was preferable to having fragmented leadership divided among France and Germany within the EDC.¹⁶⁹ If the EDC was to gain traction, the Netherlands would be relegated to a lower class. As Smith puts it: 'the Dutch expressed fears that, once it was set up the EDC might take a line independent of NATO and that EDC would be represented in NATO with only one voice . . . The Dutch were afraid that they would not only have little say in EDC but they would also end up with little voice in NATO'.¹⁷⁰ In an explanatory statement to parliament, the government also points to the added benefit of including the United Kingdom in the NATO solution.¹⁷¹ The UK would not become a member of the EDC because of its supranational nature. This means that the EDC would have been under Franco-German leadership, whereas the inclusion of the UK in the NATO option might balance out this tendency.¹⁷²

Although initially not alone in its opposition to the EDC, the change in position and diplomatic pressure from the United States in 1951 made the Netherlands change its stance, at least superficially.¹⁷³ According to Jan van der Harst, the majority of the Dutch cabinet still favoured German NATO membership over the creation of a European Defence Community. Despite this, the Dutch government was the first to ratify the EDC treaty in January 1954. One possible explanation is that the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan-Willem Beyen, was more pro-European, and he hoped that the EDC would lead to further European cooperation in other fields.¹⁷⁴ Although a plausible explanation, according to Van der Harst the quick ratification of the EDC treaty was due to more opportunistic reasons. Firstly, by 1953 the government in France had changed. The previous French government had been the main architect of the EDC idea, however the new government was opposed to the EDC and was trying to get rid of the treaty. By quickly ratifying the treaty, knowing that it was

¹⁶⁸ Jan van der Harst, "The European Defence Community and NATO, A Classic Case of Franco-Dutch Controversy," in *NATO's Retirement? Essays in Honour of Peter Volten*, ed. Margriet Ellen Drent, Peter M. E. Volten, and Adriaan van den Assem, Greenwood Papers 26 (Groningen: Centre of European Security Studies (CESS), 2011), 84.

¹⁶⁹ van der Harst, 90–91.

¹⁷⁰ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 110.

¹⁷¹ "Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1954-1955 Kamerstuknummer 3805 Ondernummer 3" (1954), statengeneraaldigitaal.nl.

¹⁷² Mallinson, *From Neutrality to Commitment*, 229.

¹⁷³ van der Harst, "The European Defence Community and NATO, A Classic Case of Franco-Dutch Controversy," 85–86.

¹⁷⁴ van der Harst, 89–90.

likely to fail in France, the Dutch could portray themselves as reliable partners.¹⁷⁵ This was mainly important to Dutch-American relations, since the Americans were in favour of the EDC. In Van der Harst's words: 'Acheson's (Secretary of State) successor John Foster Dulles had made clear that he would reward a cooperative stance by the European partners, and punish non-compliance. The continued need of US support - in the form of army equipment and offshore orders - for the country's defence build-up and economic reconstruction provided the Dutch government with an extra motive to welcome a positive decision on the EDC by the national parliament'.¹⁷⁶ In other words, the Dutch pretended to be in favour of the EDC after they knew it was likely to fail, in order to gain American goodwill.

In the end the EDC treaty was not ratified by the French parliament. This left NATO membership for Germany as the only viable alternative to facilitate German rearmament, exactly as the Netherlands wished. During the debate about possible EDC or NATO membership for West Germany, NATO had undergone an important change. By 1954, the organization had developed its own integrated military structure through the creation of SHAPE, which is mentioned in the historiography. NATO had adapted a new strategy (forward defence) and had grown much stronger than it was in 1950. This removed two important barriers to German membership that had given rise to the earlier French objections. Firstly, the integrated military command structure meant that NATO could more easily absorb German military contributions. Secondly, because of NATO's increased military power it could now take in German forces without fear of being dominated by Germany.¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, there were still some obstacles to overcome, as different NATO members had different priorities.

Eventually it was decided to let West Germany accede to the treaty, albeit with certain safeguards. Firstly, Germany would also sign the Brussels Treaty. The Brussels Treaty states, by now known as the Western European Union (WEU), would set the limit on German rearmament. This appeased Germany's continental neighbours, but it also helped Germany. The UK was also a member of the Brussels Treaty, and was largely opposed to far-reaching integration. This was a safeguard for Germany against further integration.¹⁷⁸ Whereas the WEU set the limit on German rearmament, NATO would oversee German rearmament. Also, both Britain and the United States agreed to maintain their forces in Europe.¹⁷⁹ NATO accession was a part of the Paris agreements of 1954, in which the occupation of West Germany officially came to an end. The Federal Republic of Germany formally acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty the next year.

In Dutch parliament, all parties, with the exception of the communists, agreed to German accession to NATO. Beforehand the parties had been divided about the best way of including Germany in the

¹⁷⁵ van der Harst, 89–90.

¹⁷⁶ van der Harst, 90.

¹⁷⁷ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 111–20.

¹⁷⁸ Smith, 111–20.

¹⁷⁹ Smith, 111–20.

defence of Western Europe. This disagreement was mainly over the degree to which supranational control of the military and further European integration was desirable. The failure of the EDC in French parliament eliminated one of the two options which meant that NATO and WEU membership was the only viable alternative. The accession of Germany was approved with seventy-one votes in favour and six votes against.¹⁸⁰

In conclusion, the Dutch government was in favour of rearming Germany since this would shift any front line to the east out of the country, it would be beneficial to trade and it would cut the defence costs for the Netherlands. It preferred to channel the German rearmament through a NATO framework instead of a European framework since the latter would decrease its relative influence.

Its size affected the Netherlands' position in two ways. Firstly, as mentioned before, small economies usually rely on imports and exports more than larger economies. This means that the argument of increased German trade carried significant weight, whereas it might not have if the Netherlands had been bigger. Secondly, the Netherlands preferred the NATO/WEU option over the EDC option for German integration partially because of its small power status. Within the EDC it was afraid of being dominated by either Germany or France or a combination of the two, especially since the UK would not be a part of the organisation. Also, the EDC might be seen as one bloc within NATO. Since the voice of the EDC would essentially be that of France and Germany, the NATO/WEU option was much more attractive. It would guarantee a safe route to German rearmament, yet the Netherlands would not lose its say in NATO.

¹⁸⁰ "Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1954-1955 29 Maart 1955" (1955), statengeneraaldigitaal.nl; "Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1954-1955 Kamerstuknummer 3805 Ondernummer 4, VOORLOPIG VERSLAG" (1955), statengeneraaldigitaal.nl.

7. Spain

Spain under the rule of Francisco Franco had a unique relationship with NATO and the West. Spain was certainly a Western European and Atlantic state, and was therefore considered as a candidate to join the treaty from the outset. The main problem with Spain was the Franco regime. The countries that comprised NATO, at least in its initial stage, were mainly part of the Allies during the Second World War. Although Franco's Spain was officially neutral during this war, his accession to Spanish leadership during the Spanish Civil War was in part due to German aid provided by Adolf Hitler. During the war, Spain was not considered to be fully neutral and was ideologically on the side of the Axis powers.¹⁸¹ After the war this meant that Spain was considered a pariah, the last state in Europe that still had a regime that was considered fascist by many. This international isolation becomes apparent from the fact that Spain was not invited to join the newly established United Nations, as was mentioned in a previous chapter discussing the membership of Portugal.¹⁸² Despite of its regime, Spain was considered to be in a strategically important location. In this way, it is not much different from Portugal. According to Smith, the reasons for Portugal's inclusion and Spain's exclusion was firstly wartime policy. Whereas Franco was seen as openly supporting Axis powers, Salazar's regime was seen to have a less fascistic origin. Also, during the war Salazar had facilitated Allied forces in the Azores. In addition, Portugal had a historically strong relationship with Britain, which was lacking in Spain.¹⁸³ Despite it being run by the Franco regime, Spain was still important to the NATO members. One important factor that differentiates the Spanish case from earlier enlargements, was the lack of the option of neutrality. Franco's right-wing political orientation and historical opposition to the Soviet Union meant that Spain was not likely to choose a neutral route between East and West. In earlier accessions by Greece and Turkey, the threat of neutrality had been an important factor for NATO to invite these states to join.¹⁸⁴

The international opposition to Spain joining NATO was largely based on two reasons, the first and most important of which is the nature of the regime in power. Franco's right-wing orientation and policy of persecuting Protestantism in Spain can be seen as two factors (out of many) that determined what countries were opposed to Spain's accession. Firstly these were countries with a strong Protestant culture, and secondly these were countries where the political left wing had a big influence. The main opposition came from Norway, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands.¹⁸⁵ The second argument against Spanish accession in the international debate was strategic. The central idea of

¹⁸¹ Angel Viñas, "Spain and NATO: Internal Debate and External Challenges," in *NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges*, ed. John Chipman, An Atlantic Institute for International Affairs Research Volume (London ; New York: Routledge, 1988), 146.

¹⁸² Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 127–29.

¹⁸³ Smith, 130.

¹⁸⁴ Smith, 129–36.

¹⁸⁵ Smith, 133.

NATO's forward defence strategy was that territory was to be defended, not liberated. In a massive invasion from the East, Spain could become a refuge, allowing forces to be withdrawn behind the Pyrenees. This would undermine the forward defence strategy, since without a fall-back option, the need to immediately fend off an attack when it happens (the central idea of forward defence) would be stronger.¹⁸⁶

As was mentioned above, the Netherlands was opposed to Spanish NATO membership. A report from the initial preparation for the debate in the Dutch House of Representatives on the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, shows that the Dutch parliament was not unanimous in its opposition to Spanish membership. Although the report does not mention names or parties, several members argued that 'leaving Spain out of the alliance would cause a void in the political and strategic design' of the alliance. On the other hand many members argued that 'Spain was one of the non-democratic states, whose accession is ruled out by the preamble of the treaty'.¹⁸⁷ Minister of foreign affairs Stikker stated that 'at the current stage, the government shares the view of several speakers that the arguments against accession must prevail'.¹⁸⁸

Although there was severe international opposition to Francoist Spain joining the alliance, in the early Cold War when tensions were running high over the Korean conflict, Spain's adherence to the West was still necessary. Thus, a different mechanism was required and was found in the form of the Madrid Pact. This pact was signed in 1953 between the US and Spain, without formal NATO involvement. The Madrid Pact allowed US forces to operate bases on Spanish territory in exchange for economic aid.¹⁸⁹ This way Spain had become a strategic ally to the West in the Cold War. Franco also benefited from the pact, as he used it to legitimize a regime in crisis. An alternative government in exile had been declared in Mexico and Spain suffered from severe economic issues. Since the pact was signed between the US and Francoist Spain and not with the alternative government in Mexico, it somewhat politically stabilized the regime. The economic aid that Spain would receive as a part of the pact relieved some of its economic issues.¹⁹⁰

In the following decades, the issue of Spanish accession to NATO came up from time to time. This was often due to either developments in other countries or due to statements made in the media. The first time the debate re-emerged was in 1955, when in the US senate a draft resolution was created by senator Wiley in favour of Spanish accession to NATO. The Dutch envoy, S.G.M. van Voorst to Voorst, wrote that an employee of the embassy subsequently made clear to the Western European directorate of the State Department that there were still reservations about this in the Netherlands due

¹⁸⁶ Smith, 134.

¹⁸⁷ Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1948-1949 kamerstuknummer 1237 ondernummer 5, VOORLOPIG VERSLAG.

¹⁸⁸ "Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1948-1949 19 Juli 1949" (1949), statengeneraaldigitaal.nl.

¹⁸⁹ Viñas, "Spain and NATO: Internal Debate and External Challenges," 147; Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 129-36.

¹⁹⁰ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 129-36.

to the state of human rights in Spain.¹⁹¹ The Dutch position was also polled by the British Foreign Office, to which the Dutch representative in London responded that there were still severe objections against Spanish membership, mainly in Protestant circles and the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA).¹⁹² Two years later in 1957, the European Directorate of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs created an advisory report on possible Spanish membership. It stated that due to memories of the Spanish Civil War and the Spanish stance in the Second World War, the Spanish regime was still widely despised. It mentioned that the Spanish system was still authoritarian and based on fascism. It also mentioned that ‘the regime is discriminating against Protestants, which is a continuing source of irritation in the Netherlands’. Although it also states that there were clear military advantages to Spanish membership, at the time it was ‘not opportune’ to allow Spain into NATO. Its conclusion was as follows: ‘It can be assumed that right now the US would not resist against Spanish membership. On the other hand they will probably not take the initiative for Spanish membership, as long as there is no consensus with at least France and the UK on the matter. Also, the explicit opposition of a country like Norway would have to be overcome. Beforehand, the Netherlands can suffice by taking a waiting stance. Only when the admission of Spain is concretely discussed it is possible to form a political position on whether, and if so, under what conditions, Spain could be allowed to join NATO’.¹⁹³

Two years after this report, the Dutch ambassador to Spain, W. Cnoop Koopmans, wrote several letters to the minister of foreign affairs arguing in favour of Spanish accession. He stated that although the Franco regime was still authoritarian, this had also created stability in the country which had become the basis of Franco’s rule. Secondly, some important countries were thought to be in favour at the time. The ambassador mentioned Germany, France and the US as being in favour of Spanish membership. He added that Portugal had been an original member, while this country had a regime that he considered even more dictatorial than the Spanish regime. In addition, including the larger part of the Iberian peninsula made it easier to resist a possible communist attack. Finally he states that Franco will one day disappear, and it was in the best interest of the West to already have strong political and economic ties with Spain when it happens, in order to steer the country in the right direction.¹⁹⁴ No response to these messages was found in this research, and the next mention of Spanish membership in the Dutch archives is dated more than five years later.

There had been rumours caused by a New York Times article, related to the possibility of France leaving the integrated command structure of NATO. In this case, Spain was envisaged by some to take

¹⁹¹ S.G.M. van Voorst tot Voorst, ‘Letter Regarding Dutch Point of View Regarding Accession after Wiley Resolution,’ July 22, 1955, 2.05.249 - 409, NA - Nederlandse Ambassade en Consulaten in Spanje.

¹⁹² ‘Letter Regarding Dutch Point of View Spanish NATO Membership from Dutch Temporary Representative in London,’ August 3, 1955, 2.05.249 - 409, NA - Nederlandse Ambassade en Consulaten in Spanje.

¹⁹³ ‘Report Regarding Desirability of Spanish NATO Membership by European Directorate, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs,’ May 23, 1957, 2.05.249 - 409, NA - Nederlandse Ambassade en Consulaten in Spanje.

¹⁹⁴ W. Cnoop Koopmans, ‘Letter from Ambassador in Madrid to Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs,’ April 25, 1959, 2.05.249 - 409, NA - Nederlandse Ambassade en Consulaten in Spanje.

up France's role. When the Spanish ambassador asked the Dutch director-general for Political Affairs about the Dutch opinion on the matter, the latter responded that 'in the Netherlands, there are reservations against Spanish accession in important political circles. Therefore it would be better to maintain ties with Spain through the existing Spanish-American relationships'.¹⁹⁵

A few years later, in 1968, the Dutch prime minister was asked in a television program about membership of several NATO countries due to political developments in Portugal and Greece which were seen as negative. The prime minister stated that although Spain had 'worse papers' than the other members at the time of creation, there were positive developments to be noted.¹⁹⁶ What these positive developments entailed exactly remains unclear. In the same year, minister of foreign affairs Joseph Luns was explicitly asked by member of parliament Max van der Stoel (PvdA) whether or not the Netherlands would oppose Spanish membership as long as it was being ruled in a dictatorial manner. The minister confirmed this and also stated that Spanish membership was not currently being considered.¹⁹⁷ In 1971, the Spanish sent an aide-memoire to the NATO member states desiring to formalise relations between Spain and the alliance. It cited an increased Soviet presence in the Mediterranean, and the pre-existing connection of NATO and Spain through the special Spanish-American treaty, i.e. the Madrid Pact. In response, the Dutch permanent representative at NATO, D.P. Spierenburgh, was informed by the minister of foreign affairs that partly because of views within parliament, the Dutch government position on NATO membership or any other special connection between NATO and Spain was negative.¹⁹⁸ The timing of the request coincided with a crisis in the Mediterranean regarding NATO forces on Malta. Dom Mintoff of the Maltese Labour party had become president of the country and it was not sure whether NATO forces would continue to be stationed on Malta.¹⁹⁹ In parliament, the minister was asked whether the need for a closer relation between Spain and NATO had increased due to the changed situation in Malta and the strategic location of Spain in the Mediterranean. He responded that there could be no relation between Spain and NATO other than full membership, which 'is not now nor has it been in the past' being discussed.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁵ J.A. de Ranitz, "Internal Message by Director-General for Political Affairs Regarding Rumours of Spanish Possible Membership," December 20, 1965, dav / 1965-1974 / 00954, ABZ - Directie Atlantische Samenwerking en Veiligheidszaken.

¹⁹⁶ J. Luns, "Letter from Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs to Madrid Ambassador Regarding Statement Made by Prime Minister on Spanish Membership," February 28, 1968, dav / 1965-1974 / 00954, ABZ - Directie Atlantische Samenwerking en Veiligheidszaken.

¹⁹⁷ "Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1968-1969 20 November 1968" (1968), statengeneraaldigitaal.nl.

¹⁹⁸ "Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Permanent Representative at NATO," March 15, 1971, dav / 1965-1974 / 00955, ABZ - Directie Atlantische Samenwerking en Veiligheidszaken.

¹⁹⁹ Simon C. Smith, "Dependence and Independence : Malta and the End of Empire," *Journal of Maltese History* 1, no. 1 (2008), <https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar//handle/123456789/17929>.

²⁰⁰ "Memo about Questions Asked in Parliament," July 2, 1971, dav / 1965-1974 / 00956, ABZ - Directie Atlantische Samenwerking en Veiligheidszaken.

Despite Spain not being a member of the alliance on paper, in practice it had almost become a member through the Madrid Pact. The bases in Spain became part of NATO strategic planning. The Spanish navy and air force increasingly cooperated with NATO forces in Europe, adapting NATO standards and procedures.²⁰¹ The importance of Spain to NATO increased after political instability in Southern member states like Portugal and Greece in 1974, which led to governments with big left wing influences in these countries. The southern flank had always been considered the most unreliable part of the alliance, as several of these countries had been admitted mainly out of fear of them taking a neutral stance. Adding Spain could strengthen the alliance in two ways. Firstly, Spain itself would provide an additional territory on the southern flank that could serve as a back-up if one of the other members decided to leave. Secondly, Spain joining the alliance could have an influence on the policy of other southern members.²⁰²

Although Franco was disliked amongst many NATO members, under his leadership Spain was stable and strategically allied to NATO. When he died in 1975, the question of a newly democratic Spain's alignment rose to the surface. Spain now had three options. It could renew the Madrid Pacts, which, due to how they came into existence, carried negative connotations in Spain.²⁰³ The second option was to join NATO, and the third option was to choose neutrality in a form similar to Sweden or Ireland.²⁰⁴ To NATO, Spain's accession would be more than welcome. At the time, the organization was suffering from internal division and a newly democratic state choosing to join proved that it was still considered an important institution and therefore would give a necessary boost to its image as an alliance of democratic states.²⁰⁵ In order to explain Spain's willingness to accede to the treaty, military strategic reasons are not enough. The main security concern for Spain was the protection of its enclaves in Africa, which would not be covered by NATO. One of the big rationales behind Spain's accession was its wish to join the European Economic Community. Although these were officially treated as different issues, Smith sees them as thoroughly connected. NATO was the military arm of the Western European political-economic system and the EEC was the economic branch of the same system that NATO was meant to protect. Spain wanted early access to the common market, and could use NATO membership as leverage, since the EEC and NATO shared many members.²⁰⁶ Another factor that favoured NATO accession was the imbalance of the Madrid Pact, which required Spain to let the US use facilities in Spain but it did not receive protection under Article 5 in return.²⁰⁷ Most importantly, NATO accession would help transform the Spanish army. During Franco, the army was mainly directed inwards, since it was used to maintain domestic stability and protect the regime. It

²⁰¹ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 129–36.

²⁰² Smith, 136–39.

²⁰³ Viñas, “Spain and NATO: Internal Debate and External Challenges,” 148.

²⁰⁴ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 139–45.

²⁰⁵ Smith, 139–45.

²⁰⁶ Smith, 145–47.

²⁰⁷ Smith, 145–47.

became clear that the army was a big anti-democratic element in Spain during an attempted military coup in 1981. Joining NATO would serve to transform the Spanish army using the template of the other members, hopefully resulting in a military that was less directly involved in domestic politics. NATO would protect Spain against the Soviet threat but more importantly it would protect it against its own army.²⁰⁸ Another factor that caused Spain to join when it did was an idea held by many within the ruling UCD (centre-right) party at the time. They thought that if Spain did not accede to NATO during their rule, a next government that could be run by or supported by socialists was unlikely to join.²⁰⁹

The next mention in the Dutch archives of Spanish membership is in 1981, one year before the final accession. A Dutch parliamentary delegation to the North Atlantic Council was informed by the, by now Secretary General of NATO Joseph Luns, regarding the current affairs in the ‘restricted session’ surrounding Spanish accession. Parliamentarian Henk Waltmans of the PPR party informed the minister of foreign affairs that he had requested an interpellation debate on Spanish accession.²¹⁰ The announcement of the delay this debate would cause led to some stern reactions by the other countries’ permanent representatives.²¹¹ In the introduction of the debate, Waltmans stated that in early 1981 the CDA and VVD government had silently agreed to Spanish membership if there would be a majority in favour in Spanish parliament. However, this occurred during the elections in the Netherlands. The new government consisted of CDA, D66 and PvdA.²¹² Waltmans stated that the new cabinet had decided that the line set forth by the former VVD minister of foreign affairs had to be followed, because NATO wanted this and the US wanted this.²¹³ The reliability of this account is of course debatable, as Waltmans was an opposition member. New minister of foreign affairs Max van der Stoel responded that during the NATO ministerial meeting in May, none of the countries had opposed Spanish membership, however this did not mean that the decision was final. During the interpellation debate, the parties in favour argued that allowing Spain into NATO would get the country out of its isolated position and promote democracy. This was countered by the opposition parties by stating that NATO membership would not promote democracy, as undemocratic states like Turkey and Portugal had already been members for a long time. The proponents argued that Spain was already connected to the Western European security system through its bilateral treaty with the US. Also, not allowing Spain into NATO would increase the risk of a nationalist kickback. Opponents of accession put forward three additional arguments. Firstly, Spain had not promised to refrain from developing nuclear

²⁰⁸ Smith, 147–51; Viñas, “Spain and NATO: Internal Debate and External Challenges,” 153–54.

²⁰⁹ Viñas, “Spain and NATO: Internal Debate and External Challenges,” 161.

²¹⁰ J.G.N. de Hoop Scheffer, “Letter from Dutch Permanent Representative to Minister of Foreign Affairs Regarding Statements Made by SG Luns,” November 26, 1981, 2.21.420 - 233, NA - Max van der Stoel.

²¹¹ J.G.N. de Hoop Scheffer, “Letter from Dutch Permanent Representative to Minister of Foreign Affairs Regarding Delay Due to Parliament,” November 26, 1981, 2.21.420 - 233, NA - Max van der Stoel.

²¹² Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, “Kabinetten sinds 1945 - Regering - Rijksoverheid.nl,” webpagina, December 16, 2009, <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering/over-de-regering/kabinetten-sinds-1945>.

²¹³ “Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1981-1982 03 December 1981” (1981), statengeneraaldigitaal.nl.

weapons. Secondly, Spain was internally divided on the issue. The accession was not broadly supported by all political parties and there was a serious risk that a new government might reject NATO membership. Finally, enlarging NATO would worsen relations with the Soviet Union, which might be tempted to enlarge the Warsaw Pact to include Afghanistan or Yugoslavia. During the debate, two motions were put forward to either delay or vote against Spanish accession, both of which were rejected by parliament. The only parties that were in favour of voting against Spanish accession were the Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP), Political Party of Radicals (PPR) and the Dutch Communist Party (CPN). The Labour Party (PvdA) voted in favour of delaying accession until it was clear what the next Spanish government's view on the matter would be, but it was not in favour of immediately voting against it like the other parties.²¹⁴ During the final ratification debate, the arguments of the previous debate were largely repeated. However, during this debate the PvdA declared its solidarity with the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), which was opposed to NATO accession. The accession of Spain to NATO was finally accepted, with PSP, PPR, CPN and PvdA as its opponents, the rest of parliament being in favour.²¹⁵

Spain joined NATO in 1982, and the negotiations on how to integrate Spain into the military structure soon began. These negotiations were soon stopped after the PSOE indeed won the elections in the same year. Within the party there were many members that did not want to join NATO at all. This led to a situation where Spain had become a member but did not take part in the integrated military structure. A referendum in 1986 showed that 52% of the voters was in favour of the Socialist Workers' Party's policy. According to Smith, because of the vague wording of the referendum the 'no' votes could either be people that wanted further military integration into NATO or people that wanted to leave NATO altogether.²¹⁶ The party decided to follow a middle route between maintaining the Madrid Pact and further integration into NATO. It was decided to modify the Madrid Pact. This modified Madrid Pact essentially maintained the status quo, the only big change was that Spain was now formally a member of NATO and the facilities that were part of the bilateral agreement with the US would now be part its contribution to NATO.²¹⁷

From the outline given above, it can be concluded that the Netherlands adopted a negative position on Spanish accession from the beginning and stuck with it for thirty years. The opposition was largely based on Franco's actions during the Spanish civil war and his stance in the Second World War, but also on his regime since. The Franco regime was widely disliked, in both Protestant Christian circles as well as in left-wing political circles. Only after Franco died and with Spain turning towards democracy did this resistance diminish. Major left-wing political parties were still against Spanish

²¹⁴ "Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1981-1982 08 December 1981" (1981), statengeneraaldigitaal.nl.

²¹⁵ "Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1981-1982 28 April 1982" (1982), statengeneraaldigitaal.nl; "Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1981-1982 29 April 1982" (1982), statengeneraaldigitaal.nl.

²¹⁶ Smith, *Nato Enlargement During the Cold War*, 151–56.

²¹⁷ Smith, 151–56.

accession, either because it would negatively affect relations with the Eastern bloc or out of solidarity with their Spanish colleagues. It is important to note that the successive Dutch governments rarely explicitly stated their stance on Spanish accession (as far as this research has shown). It was simply not necessary to do so. By either pointing to opposition existing in other countries, or to difficulties that could arise in parliament, they never had to state their own position on the matter, which could only harm either the relationship with Spain or the government's domestic position.

The local Dutch factors that seem to have influenced its position are its political makeup and its religious composition. The Netherlands' position as a small power did not play a role in forming its views on this accession.

8. Conclusion

The Netherlands' small power status affected its government's position on NATO enlargement several times and in different ways between 1949 and 1982. During the initial membership debate, the Netherlands was still heavily involved in a colonial conflict in Indonesia. In order to curb international pressure exerted through the United Nations Security Council, the Netherlands completely changed its position on the inclusion of Italy, which it had opposed before. This was due to a French request for support on this matter. The Netherlands' government made a deal with the French government. The Dutch would support the inclusion of Italy and French North Africa in NATO in return for French support for Dutch colonial policy in the Security Council. This was necessary because the Netherlands had no veto of its own.

The small power status of the Netherlands affected its stance towards the accession of Turkey and Greece in two ways. It was thought that the enlargement would impose new responsibilities on the smaller powers, that these states were simply not willing to take on. The smaller powers did not have as much strategic interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East as the larger powers and therefore did not feel obliged to defend this area. The lack of far-reaching global objectives has also been defined as a typical characteristic of a small state.²¹⁸ The reason why the Dutch government finally did agree with Greek and Turkish membership may also have been affected by its size. Although still opposed to accession, it was not willing to use its veto power to stop accession. A larger, more influential power, could better afford to maintain opposition than a small power. It could argue that it contributed more to the alliance than other members. Organizations also have unwritten rules and it might be considered 'bad etiquette' for a smaller, less influential power to use its veto in cases like this, although this would be very difficult to assess since informal rules are not documented.

In the case of German accession, the Netherlands' size affected its position in two ways. Since small states rely on imports and exports more than larger states which have larger domestic markets, the inclusion of Germany in a stable Europe, both economically and militarily was of vital importance to an open, small economy like the Netherlands. Secondly, the Netherlands chose to support German rearmament through a NATO framework instead of a purely European option like the EDC because this would maximize its influence. The Netherlands realized it was smaller and less influential than France, West Germany and the UK in Europe and therefore decided that maximizing US influence would safeguard its own influence as well.

²¹⁸ Krause and Singer, "Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict."

In the case of Spanish accession the Netherlands' size does not seem to have affected its position. Although severe opposition to Spanish membership existed in the Netherlands this was largely due to the religious and political composition of the country.

The small power status of the Netherlands affected its position on NATO enlargement several times, but it did not always play a role. This answers the main research question. In answering this question and exploring the Dutch positions on each accession, another pattern did show which is worth mentioning. There is a thread linking all the Dutch positions on NATO enlargement: the desire for homogeneous membership. In each accession, perceived cultural or political differences and similarities seem to play a role. In the case of Italy, there had been doubts about Italy's similarity to the other member states. This doubt was later overridden by the need for French support on the Indonesian matter. Although the accession of Portugal was not opposed, questions were raised in the Dutch House of Representatives regarding Portugal's political nature. In this case, these concerns were overridden by the strategic necessity of Portuguese membership. The motivations found for the Dutch support of Scandinavian NATO membership remain ambiguous, and cultural and political similarities may or may not have played a role.

In the case of Greek and Turkish NATO accession, resistance in the Netherlands against their membership was present from the start, again based on perceived cultural and political differences. Although in the case of West Germany, national strategic and economic interest seem to have been the most important reasons for Dutch support, the Dutch also wanted a German neighbour that was incorporated in the same Western structures as the Netherlands. Finally, in the case of Spanish membership, the political differences were the main causes for the Dutch opposition. However, it was also the idea that NATO membership would have a positive impact on the political situation in Spain which created support for Spanish membership after Franco died.

There is a striking contrast with the enlargements after the Cold War. During the Cold War, it were those states that focused on the identity of the North Atlantic Treaty members, such as the Netherlands, that opposed enlargement. The shared identity of the members was a reason not to expand. In the constructivist literature regarding enlargements after 1990, the shared identity and the desire to spread it is the main argument given for the occurrence of the enlargements. During most of the Cold War there was a fear that new members might negatively affect the alliance. In the case of Spanish accession and the enlargements after the Cold War, there was a hope that the alliance might positively affect the new members. The accession of Spain seems to have been a watershed moment in this regard.

As more sources become available concerning the enlargements after 1990, it will be interesting to see how its small power status affected the Dutch position on these accessions, but also whether the Dutch governments' focus on homogeneous membership remained.

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