COLLECTIVE CREATIVITY AND DIGITAL COPYRIGHT IN EUROPE
A critical analysis of the discussions around EUCD regulations

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ABSTRACT

The cultural production is discussed with the notion of creativity. Collective view of creativity suggests that culture is created with collective creativity, meaning it accumulates over time. Creation is based on reproduction and interpretation, and not the abilities of one individual genius. It is suggested that the agents use act of creation as connect, communicate and cope together. With the digitization, both the tools of creation and distribution got easier, hence, the cultural production is stopped being a privilege of a group of people and become a daily activity for regular individuals, like memes, which are based on replicable templates of content, which the users can manipulate within their context.

European Union Copyright Directive in Digital Single Marker, or EUCD for short, is created to stop the use of copyrighted content being replicated and redistributed. It suggests the stricter regulation in the digital platforms regarding the unauthorized use and uploads, goes as far as suggesting a stricter automated filter than the platforms already have. The regulation holds the said platforms directly responsible for any infringement, instead of the user. This is perceived as a threat for the digital creativity and the meme culture, as it is heavily based on the reproduction of snippets, hence is named "The Meme Ban". This regulation is highly criticized due to the lack of trust in the automated filters, the lack of unification of enforcement in member states, and hence a possible fear of it might hinder artistic production and user-generated content.

This research is conducted to critically analyze the ongoing discussions regarding EUCD's weaknesses and the prospected implications. 24 articles of 1000 words are collected from world-renowned online newspapers and magazines. They are analyzed by the recruitment of Grounded Theory Approach, which allows the researcher an analysis that holds both inductive and deductive properties, and essentially a well-rounded research. The articles are open coded into 576 open codes, 26 axial codes, and 4 tentative selective codes.

The analysis has helped identifying which stakeholders are supporting and which stakeholders are opposing the regulation. Lawmakers, traditional rights holders, and traditional platforms are found to be supporting, whereas digital rights holders, digital platforms and media produsers oppose. Organizations, creatives and experts tend to diversify in the stance, depending on which side they have closer relationships with. It had also shown that the regulation is going to have some unintended consequences, not only within the Europe but also for the rest of the world, but they will be not as severe as the opposing side argues to be. Digital creativity will be affected, indeed, not in terms of the number of creation but in terms of what is counted as authentic. The authenticity in the new regime will be defined as whatever can pass the automated copyright systems, despite the excessive definitions and exceptions the lawmakers made within the text, making the regulation harder to sustain and enforce as intended. These can only make the act of distribution of the creation longer, as the systems are vulnerable to misjudgment, and hence the creators need to go through formalities to amid false claims.

KEYWORDS: *Copyright, Collective Creativity, Cultural Production, EUCD*

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1. Introduction

In April 2019, the European Union had passed directive which is essentially an extension to the already-existing copyright regime, The European Union Copyright Directive, also known as the Information Society Directive of 2001. The new directive had perceived highly controversial by both the digital industry as well as the public. The most controversial parts of the new directive are two articles numbered 15 and 17, who are nicknamed as "Link Tax" and "Meme Ban" respectively. Although there are other articles, such as Article 12a, that are deliberated to some extent, the 15th and 17th are both taken as a threat towards the act of creativity. That is essentially fueled questions regarding the freedom of creativity and protection of intellectual property.

The full name of the new directive passed is the European Union Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, commonly known as EUCD (2016). The directive had initially been drafted in 2016 as a part of the European Union's project to merge the union into a single digital market. The directive was written by the European Commission and proposed to the Parliament for initial voting on September 12, 2018, by "438 in favor and 226 against" (Vincent, 2018, para. 3). With excessive campaigning both the Fair Use Agreement protection organization, Creative Commons and online video platform, YouTube had held resulted in the passing of the proposal with the demand for changes to it. After the negotiations and the re-drafting period, the directive had been voted again by Parliament in March 26, 2019, and voted for by the majority. The directive was approved by the European Council on April 15, 2019, by the majority vote as 19 of the 28 member states voted for, 6 against, and 3 abstained (Reynolds, 2019). It started being enforced on June 7, 2019.

The Link Tax, Article 15, commonly known by its name in the draft version: Article 11, regulates the "protection of press publications concerning digital uses" (EUCD, 2016, p. 28). It is created to ensure the publishing sector is getting royalties properly and the creators getting credits for the original work they had produced. The nick name comes from one of the article's demands; getting licenses for the use and share of the original content's hyperlinks.

The Meme Ban, Article 17, commonly known by its name in the draft version: Article 13, however, is mainly about the protection of the content created in terms of use, storage and access via service providers, i.e. social media platforms (EUCD, 2016). Where the name Meme Ban came from is unknown, however, it got spread further once Creative Commons and digital platforms had started employing it when discussing the regulation.

The name spread so much so that the nickname had got associated with the entirety of the directive. This article had become the most controversial aspect of the regulation, due to the cultural significance of memes, as well as the other forms of the remix culture.

Memes are a staple of cultural reproduction and they are perceived as a new form of communication. This is because they are contextual and also in a repeatable format. To be able to understand a meme, no background information or understanding of a language needed, as long as the use and the contextual meaning of the template are known. Memes are also perceived as significant because the researches show that the flow of content is the preliminary characteristic. Its remix and distribution occur naturally (Nooney & Portwood-Stacer, 2014) due to being easily accessible, understandable and repeatable (Diaz, 2013). Not only memes but also short cultural cues like catchphrases (Gervais & Hyndman, 2011) are also adapted and spread swiftly.

Memes, specifically crisis memes, are perceived as the portrayal of the freedom of speech (Rintel, 2011), therefore the directive is perceived by audiences as the restrictive regulations over the collective creativity. These restrictions are discussed to manifest themselves as a possible over-filtering issue due to platforms' desire to prevent any infringement prior to upload. However, unlike the audiences, both the copyright holders as well as the legal authorities perceive the new directive as the long-awaited justice for the illegal and/or intractable use of the content.

With the digitization of the cultural creation, the need to protect the uniqueness of content has become a bigger struggle since the technological developments had made the creations more vulnerable to unlawful download, reproduction, and redistribution. With the digitization of content creation, the problem of piracy has become a bigger concern. Therefore, stricter copyright regulations, as well as intellectual property laws with bigger implications, had been employed. These do not only aim to regulate the ownership and the protection of the content created but also the compensation of the traditional media industry over digital platforms.

Unlike its other counterparts, such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 of the United States of America and General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of 2018, EUCD is neither as much discussed nor well-known. This research also aims to start a conversation on a regulation which constitutes severe importance to the digital media sector in Europe. Europe is the 2nd biggest market in the digital industry right after North America. Average of %92 of the continent's population has access to and uses the internet (Hootsuite

& We Are Social, 2019). It is highly valuable as well, as the European Commission is expecting its value to reach €739 billion by 2020 (European Commission, 2019)

Although being quite Eurocentric, the new copyright directive had resurfaced the conversations on the protection of the digital content amongst the experts. However, it is more significant for the media studies aspect since the regulations on digital recreation is fairly new and the implications of them over the digital creativity as well as the cultural production are still vastly unknown. This research is conducted to critically analyze the ongoing discussions regarding the impacts of the European Union Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (EUCD) for assessing the possible implications of the directive over digital creativity and cultural freedom.

As the regulation had been drafted, negotiated, passed and enforced within a year period, by the time of this research, the impacts are still unclear. Therefore with this research, is aimed to perceive if EUCD regulation really mean the end of creativity, hence the internet as the media suggests. Therefore, the research question is formed as: *"In which ways could the copyright regulations, such as EUCD, impact digital creativity and cultural freedom?"*

The identification of stakeholders is essential for the critical analysis of the ongoing discussions about EUCD regulations, as they are the group that drives the discussions. To be able to understand the discussions clearly, two sub-research questions are formed regarding the stakeholders. These sub-questions are:

Sub-RQ$_1$: "Who are the primary stakeholders affected by this law and why?"
Sub-RQ$_2$: "What are the stance of stakeholders regarding the regulations?"

2. Theoretical Framework

Before starting with the analysis, one must become knowledgeable about cultural production, remix culture, and stakeholders' theory. It is important to understand how culture is produced, how societal cultural keys are formed, and who the agents in modern cultural production are.

Copyright regulations bring out so many different aspects together since it concerns interdisciplinary attention. Therefore, it is essential to approach discussions from an interdisciplinary perspective. Hence the upcoming section includes preceding theoretical discussion about cultural theories in media studies and business theories approaches, briefly touching upon the legal discussions to give context. These theoretical concepts will construct the basis of the expected results of coding as well as a guide to patterns to look for during the analysis.

2.1. Cultural Production

It is crucial to understand what culture is and how it is produced. The understanding of cultural production will build the foundation of the research. Culture is defined as "the store of meanings that we have available to make sense of our world..." (Gervais & Hyndman, 2011, p. 65), therefore cultural production is essential for the human experience. When culture and cultural products are discussed, it is often thought of arts and artifacts. It is argued that art is supposed to increase "length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged" (Shklovsky, 1917, p. 16). However, it should be kept in mind that when cultural production is discussed, at least within this context, it will be taken as the broadest sense of the term.

When the previous literature on the culture theory is analyzed, it is perceived that social structure and culture are in a looping relationship. Within those lines, Peterson (1976) argues that they simultaneously create and fuel each other. Social structure defines culture and vice versa. For instance, a person who is born and raised in a ghetto will have their values and taste developed based on the values they pick up growing up. They contribute to the overall ghetto culture since simply their identification and hence perception of the world is shaped by the ghetto.

Previous researches argue that societies have a "capacity for culture" (Haslam, Adarves-Yorno, Postmes & Jans, 2013, p. 384). This capacity, presumably, allows individuals their

individualities within a society that had been built on shared values. In other words, it is suggested that there are only so much originality a society can produce. The existence of such capacity will mean that every new creation is added on top of a preexisting one, once the threshold is passed. Everything that can be created is created, the rest could be iterations and interpretations of the past works. Hence it can be concluded that culture essentially is the accumulated values of a society that is "built upon on the past" (Cheliotis & Yew, 2009, p. 165).

One way the cultural production proceeds is by reproduction. Reproduction comes from the replication of the preexisting and builds upon the personal interpretation of the recreator, rearranging and remixing based on their understanding of the original. It is based on the concept of inspiration. As any original cultural form, which can be created by that hypothetical society, is created, agents will continue producing by getting inspired from the previous work.

Throughout the literature, the creatives are often referred to as the "authors". The name is given regardless of their product is a work of literature or not. In the English copyright law, an author is defined as a person "to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or literature" (Birdy, 2012, p. 5). Similarly, Jaszi (1992) defines an author as the ones who hold the rights to literary and artistic works. From this point forward, creators will be referred to as authors to eliminate the confusion.

Cultural production had been discussed by many different ideologies, although it has been observed to be changing back and forth between "purist" to "revolutionary" every so often (Peterson, 1976). These ideologies are merely based on the act of authorship and how individual it is. Purist ideologies believe that the productions are created purely for the sake of creation and follow through the means of creation. This type of production is also called "academic" (Peterson, 1976, p. 675) production. Whereas the revolutionary ideologies believe that those are the times where "paradigms themselves are altered" (Peterson, 1976, p. 677). In other words, those are the times when the rules are learned, implemented and changed during the procedure of creation. This type of production is also called "commercial" (Peterson, 1976, p. 675) production. The name criticizes the speed of cultural production and consumption, as the authors do not have concern for perfection. It can be adapted and reformed into different genres or forms. Take L. Frank Baum's the Wonderful Wizard of Oz. It is created as a book series that consists of 14 books, it is adapted to the movie the Wizard of Oz in 1939, which had become its own cultural staple after a while.

The original book itself is discussed to be inspired by Lewis Carroll's Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. Both the book and the movie had been adapted in several different forms either as a retelling of the story, inserting and/or exchanging the original characters with other characters to the story or simply basing an idea of trying to find a home. They had influenced Gregory Maguire to retell the story from a different perspective in a tetralogy of novels. The first book, Wicked, had been adapted to Broadway, becoming one of the longest-running, top grossing and most rewarded shows. The musical itself is announced to be getting adapted to both television and a movie and even tribute in several other shows.

The digitization of the cultural production aligns with the commercialization of cultural production. Cultural production, at the moment, is based on digital production. Digital production is criticized, as aforementioned, for the pace of production and consumption of the content created. It is viral and easily fading. The digital world allows agents to produce, edit, share and reproduce creations in real time. When discussing commodification, hence the commercialization of cultural production, the problem of ownership should be another aspect. If the copyright licenses are not protected, the content is open for exploitation. Hence, copyright laws and trademarks are introduced, to regulate reproduction and sampling. Therefore the creation and publication periods, which are the longest processes, happen more seamlessly.

Another point of debate for the digitization of cultural production is authenticity. It is also believed that the commercialized production harms the authenticity, as it takes away the "essence" that comes from an artist taking their time to produce something unique. Take brush lettering for instance. When it is created, the pressure put on the brush determines the thickness of the curves which makes a hand-lettered text unique as even the same artist recreating the very same art twice. However, digital tablets with stylus pens mixed with design softwares such as Adobe Illustrator or Procreate, brush lettering is digitized. The form had lost the importance of the force on the brush, as software knows down strokes mean thicker lines. This gives the benefits of consistency for those who make a living out of lettering, though it decreases the mistakes hence little quirks the hand-created version has.

2.1.i. Collective Creativity

As aforementioned, cultural production is believed to be built upon pre-existing artifacts. This accumulation is done by remixing based on imitation and inspiration. The idea is built on the image of culture snowballing instead of linearly progressing. The Internet had particularly created a platform that allows individuals to create a "shared cultural

experience" (Shifman, 2013, p. 367). This new medium takes the notion of creativity from a singular act of curation to a collective act of expression. This idea of creation highlights **collective creativity**.

O'Brien and Fizgerald (2006) define remixing as borrowing from the past for the curation of the future. This definition aligns with the concept of both cumulative and collaborative mean of cultural production. Remixing is believed to be a "social and creative innovation" (O'Brien & Fitzgerald, 2006, p. 17). However, it also inherits distinctive personal touches that are resulted from the individual expression of the re-creator. The purpose of art, in the first place, is to help agents "recover the sensation of life" (Shklovsky, 1917, p. 16).

The idea of collective creativity brushes the idea of gifted artists (Bruns, 2007) in academic production. Bruns goes a step further to suggest that creativity, just like knowledge, is distributed between the agents of society. Therefore, inherently, cultural production is never a completely individual act as suggested. Creativity is defined as the capacity to perform intellectual labor and work is creative if it includes adequate amounts of creativity (Birdy, 2012). Therefore, people who share a certain intellectual level are expected to group, share and inspire each other. As it is a collective experience, creativity also required tolerance and compassion towards others (Haslam et al., 2013). This exchange is expected to be the basis of production and reproduction of the culture.

Circling back to the previous Wizard of Oz and Wicked example. Both the original books, the very first movie, the adapted book and the musical are perceived as cultural cults. They are based on the same characters, the same storyline, and the same themes. However, they take the same story from different aspects and transform into different forms of culture and manage to become highly successful. Without Baum's book, either the Maguire's book or the musical would have not existed

In contemporary societies, the need to share "bring[s] things closer spatially and humanly" (Benjamin, 1936, p. 5). Similarly, it is argued that people are the culture and not the creations (Seneviratne & Monroy-Hernandez, 2014). Essentially what it means is the conversation between the agents in societies turns what's created into a cultural key. The conversation evolves into inspiration and interpretation, which fuels remixing and reproduction by adoption or mashing up different styles.

2.1.ii. Originality and Authenticity

The idea of collectivity in cultural production brings up a discussion about originality and authenticity. As mentioned before, it is believed that creation reflects the authors' personality and individuality. It is what makes a creation unique and valuable. However, if the production of the culture is an individual experience as suggested, then the creation has to be one of a kind and non-replicable. Collective creativity is criticized in this notion, as it suggests the act of creation as a collective experience. This collectivity causes plurality hence compromises the uniqueness (Benjamin, 1936). The discussion regarding authenticity is based on this idea, as it is believed to be the essence of cultural production that connects people with the creation. Campidoglio et al. (2009), however, argues that the creators long for a broader reach due to monetary interests hence might prefer wide distribution. Some artists are willing to do anything for creating and distributing their creations (Jocson, 2013). However, they do not necessarily need to compromise "the originality and creativity of their intellectual properties" (Campidoglio et al., 2009, p. 522).

When originality is discussed, it does not only mean something being created for the very first time, i.e unique. It also means a creation which does not have anything similar to it, i.e authentic. Supporters of academic production argue that no matter how well-done the reproduction is, it will lack "the presence in time and space" (Benjamin, 1936, p. 3), as well as the "language of genius and intellect" (Birdy, 2012, p. 6).

It is discussed that "original, inspired creative genius" (Jaszi, 1992, p. 298) is what is fueling the notion of authorship. In other words, inspiration is perceived as the prerequisite of creativity. Inspiration is believed to constitute the basis of non-replicable authenticity only a specific author can have in a specific period of time. Academic production perspective views that only a creative genius can deliver a certain extent of prolificacy (Jaszi, 1992). This brings the discussion to if cultural production and creativity are collective or individual experiences. The tricky thing with inspiration is that the same arguments can be used on behalf of both sides of the discussion. Inspiration can promote authenticity and originality. It promotes expression and muse, which can manifest in every individual remixer differently. At the same time, inspiration, which means creation based on the previously created, supports the idea of the collectiveness of the cultural production, as the new product cannot exist without a predecessor.

Rapid production became another point of discussion with the digitization of the production. This rapid production, or "mechanization" (Benjamin, 1936, p. 2) is criticized

for eliminating the "aura" (Benjamin, 1936, p. 4) of in the production. This aura is supposed to come from authenticity. The writers deemed "the individualization of authorship and the human element" (Birdy, 2012, p. 6) are deemed essential for an authentic work of art. However, with the technological developments, the creation produced by digital authorship is "indistinguishable from the works of human authorship" (Birdy, 2012, p. 3). This is not even only applicable to cultural production. Fast-consuming fashion thrives on the consistency of quality worldwide. However, the irreplaceability is what makes top-shelf high-end brands as well as the culture of couture on demand, the assuring of no one else in the world would have the exact same creation. These goods are Veblen Goods, their value comes from their exclusiveness and scarcity. Take Hermes Birkin bags. No two bags are exactly the same since it is handmade to the plating that has brands. It is argued that Hermes checks for small errors like skipped stitches or crooked letters, as it proves the bags being hand-made. The errors give a personality, a kind of authenticity to the bags, which makes it prestigious to own one.

2.2. Remix Culture

As discussed prior, reproduction plays an important role in cultural growth and development. The literature had defined this process as "(...) to appropriate, borrow and blend texts to create new(er) texts" (Jocson, 2013, p. 70). Benjamin (1934) argues that every creation is vulnerable to reproduction. This reproduction culture is associated with remixing. It is the "activity of reusing [this] open content to create derivative works" (Cheliotis & Yew, 2009, p. 165). It is stripping an artwork to its bare bones and making rearrangements structurally to create a new one.

A parody is defined as the "essence is a ridiculing dialogue with an existing, mostly famous work or well-known trademark" (Voorhoof, 2002, p. 636). For instance, the Simpsons' Treehouse of Horror Halloween episodes, which are based on cult horror movies, are a parody. Pastiche is defined similarly, though adaption of the work in high(er) culture mediums. For instance, Wicked the Musical is counted as pastiche, as the musical theater is not considered as mainstream, and perceived as a higher class of cultural form. High culture is defined as a culture that is not accessible to every agent in a society, whereas a sub-culture (or a popular culture) is belittled for being accessible. Sub-culture is defined as "expressive forms and rituals of [the] subordinate groups" (Hebdige, 1979, p. 1259).

The concept of remixing had entered the literature by music production. It is defined as the rearrangement of beats and lyrics, creating a new experience from the same song. When it got translated to visual media, it adopted the name of mash-up (O'Brien & Fitzgerald, 2006). The term used across the genres, however, is sampling. As the borders between the genres are blurring, the means of consumption of the media are also converging. Sampling and rearranging, and hence remixing, are becoming the dominant way of cultural development. This convergence is caused by the digitization and adoption of technological improvements (Fagerjord, 2009).

Reproduction, however, is not only about rearranging but also re-conceptualizing (Jocson, 2013). In other words, it is another way of interpretation. Maguire reimagining the story of the Wizard of Oz from the Wicked Witch of the West's perspective can be understood as a reconceptualization. As previously mentioned, Gervais and Hyndman (2011) suggest that culture is the recording of individuals' interpretations. Similarly, Cheliotis and Yew (2009) argue that remixes are a tool for "vehicles of personal expression" (p. 166). For instance, young people use cultural recreation to manifest internal and external criticize, as well as reflect on personal experiences and identity (Jocson, 2013). This opinion makes cultural production inherently an individualist concept. Creations get their authenticity through their creators' reflections over their experiences, whereas audience perceives and interprets according to theirs.

Remixing allows social agents to "exchange, discuss, and evaluate their work in online message boards" (Shiga, 2007, p. 94). The interaction between users, consumers, and adapters of the media are collectively brainstorming that channels an extraordinary cultural production. This act of reproduction is an act of expression, collective creativity, and not an "illegal art" (Shiga, 2007, p. 107) as copyright owners villainize it. It is argued that traditional forms tend to "become both boring and overly conventional" (Shklovsky, 1917, p. 15), and new forms of creation allow the cultural and art studies to evolve and enrich. Similarly, it is argued that "Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object" (Shklovsky, 1917, p. 16)   Remixing is simply a platform for "artistic expression" (Voorhoof, 2002, p. 638), an opportunity of experimenting and finding a niche for creators (Shiga, 2007).

However, remix culture prospers with social commitment and prospers from it. Social commitment forms a shared social critique by creating a medium of manifestation for the agents (Jocson, 2013). Hence, it needs users to be producers simultaneously. Therefore,

understanding what user-generated content is and why it is important for cultural production becomes crucial.

2.2.i. User-Generated Content

New media does not only consist of original work but also "user-created derivatives" (Shifman, 2013, p. 362) of the original. As the use of the internet is broadening up, people started sharing more of (somewhat) amateur recreations and mash-ups. Web 2.0 had created "amateur creators – creators who are no longer willing to be merely passive receptors of content" (O'Brien & Fitzgerald, 2006, p. 17). User participation had increased with anonymity. Hence, the internet became predominantly becoming the first stop for immediate reaction and feedback (Liu, Safavi-Naini & Sheppard, 2003). As the speed and significance of electronic Word of Mouth (eWOM) had been noticed, the main goal had shifted from promoting commodity to promoting participation. With audience participation becoming more important as a branding strategy, collecting user-generated content had become the priority.

Digital remix culture needs the active participation of the audience; especially for the production, reproduction, and distribution. Based on this idea, Bruns (2007) states the consumer is more than a passive audience. Hence he suggests a hybrid, "produser" (Bruns, 2007, p. 255), an interactive agent who both creates and consumes the content. These agents are "…leaders, participants, and users" (Bruns, 2007, p. 255). They get inspired and adopt what they see. They become the re-creators of the new and remixed content. As every consumer also becomes a producer, or a produser, the concern for the rapid production grew deeper. This theory aligns with collective creativity in terms of the idea of collective creation of culture (Bruns, 2007). Theory suggests that cultural production is "collaborative and continuous (…) and extending of existing content" (Bruns, 2007, p. 255). However, "serial collaborations" (Jaszi, 1992, p. 304) is discussed with produsers. This idea takes away the romanticized notion of the art of creation (Jaszi, 1992), therefore fuels the concerns about the commodification of culture.

In this day of age, people are deploying the means of remixing as self-expression as well as a shared social critique. Therefore, it becomes essential to sustain user-generated content not only because it fuels a collective discussion, but also it is the most immediate form of reflection, and in some cases, feedback of the targeted audience. This becomes an important point for the "participatory culture" (Shifman, 2013, p. 372). For instance, Shiga (2007) argues that agents of subcultures use remixing to challenge the leading culture, the

high(er) culture. This is done to make the culture their own or just to create a space for themselves within. This vie introduces a personal element to the rapid production, rather than labeling it as the commodification of culture.

2.2.ii. Importance of Memes
Internet memes become one of the rising stars of how one unit of content becomes a cultural phenomenon over the course of years. They also constitute an example of the importance of collective creativity, as everyone understands and participates to the meme culture. What differs a meme from a regular parody or pastiche? The biggest difference memes have than pastiche and parody is that memes can be parodied but not every meme is a parody (Shifman, 2013). Memes can be a reaction that is used in a context like "Confused Nick Young" that can be shared without any editing. Memes can be a video or a picture modified according to the context like "Pennywise Dancing" or "Is This a Pigeon?" whose meaning is universal despite the context. The initial memes are a parody of the stills from It of 2017 and "Season 1, Episode 3 of The Brave Fighter of Sun Fighbird of 1991" ("Is This a Pigeon?", knowyourmeme.com, 2015), respectively. Memes can also be challenges such as "Cinnamon Challenge" that starts and spreads through internet.

Memes are one of the most discussed contemporary works of remix culture. One problem the genre has is the problem of identifying what a meme is. Derived from the biological meaning, memes are the smallest unit of information that can recode and duplicate itself (Nooney & Portwood- Stacer, 2014). Shifman (2013) describes memes as procreation and diffusion of the content within the realms of the internet. Similarly, Jameson (1985) highlights that concepts of procreation contain mimicking, imitation, and adaption. All three of which are very observable in popular culture with internet memes.

Memes are particularly important for the contemporary remix culture as they offer a new currency of communication. They often do not only reflect their own singular meanings but also can contain intertextuality as they grow like rapid fire (Rintel, 2013). When the replication is discussed, there are three key aspects to be kept in mind: how easy (fidelity) and quickly (fecundity) the original can be copied and how long it can last (longevity) (Rintel, 2013). He also suggests that memes' success comes from how easy it is to replicate, search and consume them, without even being an active produser (Rintel, 2018). They allow mimicking by their templated nature, as they follow through a template: "phrases positioned as setting *[sic]* up at the top and punch line at the bottom" (Rintel, 2013, p. 258). Therefore, they spread fairly easily amongst the produsers. Similarly, Diaz (2013) supports the

widespread distribution of memes with their easily accessible themes to facilitate recreation. This rapid production allows art, and the act of creativity, to deviate from the idea of perfection. The language used derives from the proper as it includes "typing errors and grammatical mistakes, misspellings, and jumbled pagination were left uncorrected in the final proof" (Hebdige, 1979, p. 1262) which makes memes and internet lingo entertaining in the first place. As most of the time "creators have more ideas than capabilities" (Nooney & Portwood- Stacer, 2014, p. 251), the idea of perfection often manifests in hindering the cultural production.

Rintel (2013) suggests that although the civility in the production of memes is questionable, their power of uniting people from similar backgrounds is undeniable. The cultural production ability may allow people to "form and reform" societies (Haslam et al.., 2013, p. 385) bringing order and harmony. Individuals are found to be bonding over the "online content they consume and create" and "the tensions between anonymity and fame on and off the internet" (Nooney & Portwood- Stacer, 2014, p. 251). It is not top-down but mostly created by an inspired user. Shifman (2013) suggests that this key aspect is based on peer reproduction and distribution. The factor of shareability allows one individual to connect with others instantly by just clicking one button (Jocson, 2013). This shows how fast memes are to spread between the masses, how much it calls people to participate in the conversation.

However, in some cases, individuality has brought up by cultural distance. Cultural distance is "measured by (the absence of) a shared language and religion," (Martens, 2013, p. 4). It makes it harder for individuals to stay on common grounds and build solidarity. Yet it is observed that memes create a bonding experience unlike any other. Culture can be created and consumed without needing any literature, though it constitutes a part of it. Memes are a significant element of the bonding and/or coping mechanism for individuals across and cross-cultural societies that they are named as "cultural keys" (Nooney & Portwood-Stacer, 2014). They are representational and reflexive of humane experience, especially during the times of crises. During the Gezi Movement in 2013 in Turkey, Twitter was a key player for connection as traditional media is mostly under the control of Erdoğan's regime. The digital platform had not only allowed communication and immediate information, but also the share of crisis memes "created a culture of public joy, lightness, and hilarity in the midst of fear, distress, and anger" (Dağtaş, 2016, p. 12). Therefore they constitute an important genre for postmodern revolution and feels the need to be regulated.

2.3. Stakeholders' Theory

As digital content creation became more widespread, newer forms of copyright infringements surfaced. Therefore a need for new regulations had born. Digital media products are mostly commercial goods despite drastic peculiarities media has rather than other economic goods. Fagerjord (2009) suggests that it is not only the genres and the means of culture that are converging. The lines between media industries with others are blurring. It is essential to understand, who stakeholders are before anything else. This is necessary to identify the agendas of the economic agents when constructing strategies and/or constituting regulations.

The ability of rapid production had changed the characteristics of culture as a commodity thoroughly. The new means of cultural production and the inclusion of users had eliminated some stakeholders out while introducing some new. Hence, it is essential to understand the stakeholders' theory to be able to determine who the stakeholders are in the case of digital copyright regulations and management. Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, and Palmar (2010) established the stakeholders' theory to explain the phenomenon of firm responsibility. The basic stakeholder approach is developed to understand the ethics system of companies. By understanding this, it is aimed to eliminate the competitive injustice within the open market. The "stakeholders" indicate that the people who are directly or indirectly affected by the actions of the company. Even the name "stakeholder" originates from the group of people who have too much on the stake if and when something undesirable happens. The term "stakeholder" can be used as an umbrella term for "employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, competitors, governments, and communities" (Stern, 2008, p. 52).

Unlike the market-driven counterpart "stockholders", stakeholders also include the people and entities that the management mostly tends to ignore (Freeman et al., 2018). The basic stakeholder theory includes primary and secondary stakeholders (Freeman et al., 2018). Primary stakeholders are essential for creating a company value, whereas secondary stakeholders are to influence decision-making (Freeman et al., 2018). Determining specific stakeholders, however, is shown to be a tricky task. Freeman et al. (2018) suggest that every stakeholder has a "customer-like power" (p. 19).

Stakeholders also have their own different engagement incentives. New stakeholders might enter, and the important ones might become irrelevant. Some can even have several roles (Freeman et al., 2018). They are also "interconnected" (Freeman et al., 2018, p. 20).

They are linked to each other's stakeholders. Therefore, a piece of new information or a fragment of a discussion might swiftly spread between the stakeholders, independent from the decision-makers.

Within the context of this research, stakeholders are going to be used to refer to any parties that will be affected thoroughly by the regulations and its possible implications. The new EUCD regulations are going to change the operation of the media industry. Copyrighted material could be used in a completely different context than its original (Rintel, 2011). Therefore, it is elementary that the stakeholders to become more acquainted with the internet culture.

2.3.i. Ownership Problem

When the acts of creation are considered to be collaborative and collective, rather than individual, it raises the problem of ownership. Especially when the stakeholders' theory is discussed, the main question should be the ownership problem of the cultural keys. Ownership is crucial to digital rights management as well as copyright regulations in general since it decides who can make claims and how legitimized those claims are (Liu et al, 2003). Owner is the person who holds the rights of use and distribution, as well as the royalties, who is usually the author or the broadcaster (Jaszi, 1992).

As mentioned, an author is someone "to whom anything owes its origin; originator" (Birdy, 2012, p. 5). Therefore, authors are expected to hold ownership. However, it is more intricate than that. Authors, for most of the time, have a team of people to get the creation ready for public consumption. As aforementioned, cultural borders are blurring industries as well as technological improvements. These improvements allow aspiring creators to create, publish and promote. This can be done within minutes, all alone from a personal computer from the comfort of their homes.

This technological convergence due to technological improvements is also causing the line between a remix and a close copy to blur as well. This often results in the system open to being exploited by one's power and resources. There are times when the distributors are copyright owners or perceived as "author-in-law" (Jaszi, 1992, p. 298). This situation makes it harder for recreational media to thrive as much as desired. This is due to the distributors' incentive of deeming what is copyright infringement and what is not. Literature supports this as "Copyright and trademark protection are the monopoly islands in the ocean of freedom" (Voorhoof, 2002, p. 369). Some academics, however, argue that when the blurred lines are clarified and settled, the system would get more foolproof (Hemphill & Suk, 2009). A more

fool-proof system would allow recreational media to thrive without compromising the rights of the authors (Voorhoof, 2002; O'Brien & Fitzgerald, 2006).

As mentioned prior, to a certain extent, reproduction is innovation. Similarly, collectivity is essential when it is concluded that cultural growth is built up. For many years, the main concern of the copyright holders was the problem of piracy. They perceived it as the "unauthorized copying on the Internet with theft" (Shiga, 2007, p. 93). In the current copyright system, owners either use licensing to promote, or to regulate the reproduction and redistribution (Liu et al., 2003). Watermarks (Liu et al., 2003) are used to eliminate unauthorized and unlicensed activities or simply to discourage pirates.

As of now, recreational production; i.e. parody and pastiche, are exempted from copyright infringement, as long as they are not mistaken for the original work (Voorhoof, 2002, p. 645). This compromise had not only been made to encourage recreational production but also disperse the opposition. The opposers are using the Fair Use Treaty, which outlines the extent of remixed content can spread to, as an argument. Contrary to the common belief, copyright holders do not want to eliminate user-generated interpretation. However, they want to regulate the misuse of copyrighted content and unauthorized redistribution. This miscommunication between the stakeholders, as well as the vagueness of the ownership doctrines, however, cause regulatory problems which will be discussed in the next section.

2.3.ii. Regulation Problem

The boundaries of reproduction, as well as the ownership, had started to be blurred out as technological developments had changed the accessibility of the information in daily life. One technology that had been game-changing in this aspect is the Cloud. The Cloud is an infrastructure that allows access to "data located outside of the user's personal computer or other digital devices" (Gervais & Hydnman, 2011, p. 56) Before Cloud, the data and the information were stored in personal computers (Gervais & Hyndman, 2011).

The Cloud is a system that the users cannot possess, regulate or locate (Gervais & Hydnman, 2011). Therefore, it makes it particularly challenging for regulators to regulate it in a way that could have benefited both the public and the commercial interest. This is partly because the infrastructure of the technology and partly because both the internet and the Cloud itself is constantly moving and evolving (Gervais & Hydnman, 2011; Rintel, 2013). Gervais and Hyndman (2011) suggest that the Cloud is structurally meant for sharing, it is created to allow easy access to information and the data remotely from wherever and by

whomever. It allows anyone with internet access and a functioning device to join in cultural production (Gervais & Hyndman, 2011).

In today's conditions, it seems challenging to sustain a fair and feasible copyright system due to the "amount and quality of the free material" (Baker, 2003, p. 7) roaming in the Cloud. The illegitimate use of the copyrighted content will result in a significant revenue loss for the owners since it would be "more difficult to sell information a profitable price" (Campidoglio et al., 2009, p. 522). The reproduction of the pirated goods has zero marginal cost (Baker, 2003), meaning that it does not cost any money to produce one additional unit. Hence, it puts extra pressure on traditional industries to protect the copyrighted content since it causes serious loss in revenue for industries involved (Liu et al, 2003). This will cause any strict copyright regime to eventually collapse since no one would like to pay for the licenses for the remixing (Baker, 2003). The reproduction is excerpted from copyright infringements by law, since they are considered original work of art (Smith, 1992). However, it is still a point of discussion as since the borders of originality are blurred and it is only allowed as long is it does not have any monetary returns.

Copyright is the current choice of method for regulating the ownership and the reproduction of the cultural keys. However, it is not exempted from flaws that favor the monetarily powerful, i.e. intermediaries. These flaws do not favor producers or the user. Despite the expectations, the market does not seem to solve the conflicts within on its own when the regulation is left to the copyright holders. It allows the rights holders domination "over the reproduction, public performance and display, and distribution of a work, as well as a monopoly on the creation of derivative works." (Campidoglio et al., 2009, p. 524). Rights holders argue that the copyright regulations are mainly for "dissemination of information and protection of personal privacy" (Campidoglio et al., 2009, p. 522). On the contrary, the literature argues that any regulation over intellectual property results in gatekeeping rather than "the statutory limitations of subject matter, owner's rights, and duration of copyright" (Smith, 1992, p. 1239). In other words, they are used to determine who can access a cultural property, when, and how.

The internet, as well as the Cloud, allows a new kind of elasticity since it makes it both easier and faster to create and share (Rintel, 2013). In other words, they create a platform of "cultural access beyond borders" (Gervais & Hyndman, 2011, p. 64). Similarly, the remix culture is mainly perceived as the "free exchange of ideas and discourse"

(Campidoglio et al., 2009, p. 524). Therefore, setting limitations in access is argued to hinge the freedom of access to information as well as creative reproduction.

3. Methodology

As stated in the Introduction, the main research question is *"In which ways could the copyright regulations, such as EUCD, impact digital creativity and cultural freedom?"*

The research is conducted by Grounded Theory Analysis since the topic is quite timely. Because most of the discussions are ongoing by the time of the research, the analysis was to seek recurring themes. Since the regulations are started implementing in early July 2019, the timeliness of the topic played a crucial role in data collection. Given that it was not possible to observe the implications they will have over the digital industries right away, the discussion had an evolving nature with every new development. Since the research was a critical analysis of the discussions over the regulations, it was vital to see the recurring themes from the outset. This was expected to show the common concerns of the stakeholders as well as the differences within perspectives.

The existing theory over the copyright regulations affects over creativity are mostly economic and/or law bases, or simply not applicable to the cultural aspect. To be able to conduct the research throughout, two sub-questions were formed:

Sub-RQ$_1$: "Who are the primary stakeholders affected by this law and why?"

Sub-RQ$_2$: "What are the stance of stakeholders regarding the regulations?"

3.1. Research Design

3.1.i. Grounded Theory Approach

Grounded Theory Approach is selected as the primary research method because it allows research around recent topics to be conceptualized easier (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). Grounded Discourse Theory, just like Thematic Content Analysis, was also used to converge different themes into a theory (Mathison, 1988). However, the premise of the research is not suitable for the Thematic Content Analysis as the discussions are highly recent and however the theory is still somewhat lacking. The regulations were still in the voting period, so there was not enough time to observe real-life implications. However, it differs from the latter in terms of the systematic rules in conducting the research.

This choice of method is widely used for descriptive studies (Vaismoradi, Turunen & Bondas, 2013). Both theories recruit a mix method of "open-ended questions used in a semi-structured data collection" (Brewster, Velez, Mennicke & Tebbe, 2014, p. 163). However, Grounded Theory Approach creates "a hybrid approach of qualitative methods of thematic analysis, and it incorporated both the data-driven inductive approach (...) and the deductive a priori template of codes approach" (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006, p. 82-83). It is quite

precise in the steps the researchers should take while conducting the analysis, but flexible enough to allow the researcher to adapt the process according to the findings. The method withholds best of both of the worlds as it allows conducting a descriptive analysis throughout while double checking the findings in different aspects. It "has some elements of both inductive and deductive modes" (Stern, 1980, p. 20), which allows researchers to form a new theory based on the already existing as well as the data analysis.

Grounded Theory Approach also allows researchers to specifically design the research that ensures the credibility (Elliot & Timulak, 2005) as it allows the researcher to design an analysis that allows a verification step to ensure the replicability of the initial analysis. Good research that is designed according to the Grounded Theory Approach, designs the analysis in such a systematic way that even the people who are unfamiliar with the method could understand the process (Elliot, Fischer & Rennie, 1999, p. 222., 1999).

On the other hand, the method is not fool-proof. As the research is, first and foremost, based on the theory that is researchedinitially, it makes both the research and the researcher vulnerable to biases and expectations (Elliot & Timulak, 2005). As the analysis is based on the interpretation of the researcher, they are expected to be highly open-minded and careful throughout the conduct of the analysis to ensure both openness and theoretical sensitivity of the research (Elliot & Timulak, 2005).

However, unlike other research methods, Grounded Theory Approach does not only focus on the collection and analysis of the data. It also gives a guide on how the research should be written. It also requires the researcher to ground the findings in "examples of data" (Elliot et al.), hence the name "grounded". This way, the researcher can both show "the fit between data and [their] understanding of them; they also allow readers to conceptualize possible alternative meanings and understandings" (Elliot et al., 1999, p. 222). This allows the researcher to build an analysis that is both well-rounded and easier to grasp.

This method had seemed the most suitable for the nature of this research, as it allows for up-and-date and highly relevant topics that do not have much research about. This research, in particular, is based on certain media studies theories, i.e. collective creativity and reproduction of media, however, the regulation itself does not have many types of research conducted, especially since it had started being regulated on June 7, 2019.

3.1.ii. Atlas.ti

Atlas.ti was chosen for the manual coding since it is a fairly easy software to learn. It is also quite efficient in terms of counting the repeating codes, as well as the fact that it constructs coding tree as the coding steps are taken. The software allows the researchers to

visualize the analysis as well as automatically stores the numeric data such as frequencies of codes (Konopasek, 2007). This system allows codes to be developed as the texts are further analyzed. This is expected to also help the researcher to get rid of the contextual bias, as this type of coding system suggests verbatim coding, hence ensuring confirmability and hence the trustworthiness.

It is preferred to use software for the conduct of the analysis, as the sample chosen as the sample of the articles for coding is highly long. Although the analysis can even be conducted via Microsoft Excel, using content analysis softwares such as Atlas.ti helps researches with a lot of data to work easier. In other words, Atlas.ti had chosen purely for convenience purposes. The software allows researchers to upload data collected and analyze it by just highlighting the sections that are going to be coded.

In analyses such as Grounded Theory Approach, in which researchers can choose to code word-by-word or in word groups, Atlas.ti offers an "In Vivo Coding" option that automatically reads and adds the highlighted part as a code. The software includes a running list of all the codes introduced, counts how many times a certain code is used. It also allows access to the quotes under the codes, if and when the researcher needs to go back to the original sample. The software also allows color-coding of the codes, allowing the researchers to organize the codes in a highly visual system.

The software also allows the introduction of the second-degree codes, known as Code groups. Code groups consist of the regular codes, which allows the access to codes included within. It also forms a coding forest as the codes are grouped.

The software allows researchers to run sample analyses on the data that was mined such as Network Analysis, Co-Occurrence Analysis etc. It also offers basic visualizations such as word clouds, tables and coding forests for the researchers who have access to Atlas.ti only. The software is quite user-friendly, easy to adapt to and can be used for a variety of qualitative research methods, making the software highly suitable for researchers who are new to digital analyses or do not have much time to learn a new platform.

Atlas.ti also allows researchers to continue working on other devices such as smartphones, tablets and other computers with different operating systems. Although it allows accessibility, however, it is slightly more work as it requires constant overwrite and uploads of the project file into said mediums. However, for the researchers who travel often and for long hours, it is an advantage of the software.

3.1.iii. Measures

By selecting this type of analysis, it is aimed to observe the recurring themes and the differences of narratives of the different social science approaches. Complementary or critical aspects are categorized, and the most repeated are included in the discussion part. The coding process will be held beyond the verbal meanings; hence the deployment of tentative selective codes was quite vital for interpretation and the construction of the discussion.

Once all of the data is collected and analyzed, the argument for the discussion was built on the pre-existing theories and the results. The aim was to analyze the stance of stakeholders on the cultural production and freedom of creativity, with as many bases of the discussions covered in an equal representation of ideas. Therefore, the frequency of the stakeholders mentioned was one of the key measures for the analysis. The rest of the selective codes are determined by the topic list created based on the literature review (Please refer Appendix B for the Topic List). These topics were settled on based on combination of the theory and the pre-coded BBC news report (2018).

3.2. Sample

The number of samples was determined by two factors: the requirement in the methodological guide and the equal representation of the perspectives. Therefore, the sample was chosen so that it would show as many different aspects as it could, from as many aspects as possible. Since the analysis and the reporting will mainly consist of the ongoing discussion, the equal representation of both for and against sides is crucial. This was done to achieve reliability in research design. This was also to eliminate the oversaturation of the sample by one group and biased analysis that is leaning towards one specific view. However, the data collection stopped when a saturation point was hit by dates, as the repetitions became imminent.

Since most of the business articles around the 1000-word margin, it was planned to code 24 online articles in total. Although the methodological guide requested more, the length of the articles chosen were more or less three times the limit. Considering the complexity of the research method, as it requires careful coding of the content in smaller portions, the number of samples had cut shorter. It was planned to add further until the research had reached the saturation point, however, the articles had even started repetition of not only themes but phrases. The sample was collected from a year-long window, clustered in three main dates: the date of the first voting of EUCD (September 12, 2018), the date of second voting procedure (March 26, 2019), and the date of approval (April 15, 2019). This

was done to see to monitor different stakeholders' immediate reactions towards the developments. It was also done to see how the discussions are formed and transformed into with every substantial change.

The set of the coded articles on the Appendix A was selected from well-accredited news and business magazine websites. The articles were selected from prestigious and well-renowned online journals, which usually guarantee access with a subscription. This is done to increase the credibility of the research and the data collected. The articles were mostly analyses and essays regarding the EUCD regulation. However, one news report is selected (BBC, 2018) to hold the initial coding for the credibility of the analyses, which is a specific requirement the research method has.

3.3. Operationalization

24 articles are collected from several news outlets, focusing on three previously mentioned dates, as well as the 5-month gap between September and March votings. In the end there were 5 articles for September 2018 voting, 9 articles for March 2019, 6 articles for April 2019 collected. The remaining 4 articles were selected from the 5-month hibernation period. (Please refer to Appendix A for the further information about the coded articles.)

The audiences', or produsers', the perspective was mostly eliminated, since it had been recorded that there is not much awareness on the topic. There were several hashtags, for and especially against the regulations, such as #SaveYourInternet. However, they were not as actively used as their counterparts across the pond, as the Twitter data had shown.

The Ensuring Intellectual Property Rights in a Digital Age conference, held in Brussels, Belgium on 24 January 2019, was participated to get a preliminary idea on the ongoing discussions. The conference hosted keynote speakers selected had a diverse background as well as different stances on the possible implications on the matter. The group of experts included a wide variety from intellectual property lawyers, to scholars, media industry professionals, content creators and members of organizations and collectives.

As stated prior, Grounded Theory Approach was employed for the data collection process. Before the start of coding, the articles collected are briefly analyzed in the light of the theoretical framework for pre-determination of the arguments as well as phrases that are assumed to be used. A theoretical sampling had been created, per the method's requirement. After the collection of the sample, the textual data was transferred to Atlas.ti, for data analysis. The transferred documents were manually coded into open codes.

Once all of the open codes were collected, they were grouped in axial codes. This allowed being able to see the recurring themes and discussions more clearly, identify the stakeholders, concerns, and topics, as well as converge the different points of view into well-rounded groups. As the axial codes are started forming, the theoretical sampling had been updated simultaneously based on the emerging findings.

After the analysis of the axial codes derived, they were regrouped in tentative selective codes with the reintroduction of the context within the keywords. The aim was to be able to show which code suffices an answer to one of the sub-research questions. When sub-research questions were constructed, they were based on the theory. The main points that were necessary to explain the main research question were drawn out and represented as sub-questions.

Tentative Selective Codes are created by the commonality of the axial codes, as well as these sub-questions kept in mind. At this stage of the research, the context of the open codes is reintroduced. This means that the final grouping is based on the meanings of the code than literal verbal correspondence. Tentative selective codes are regrouped based on the constantly-updated theoretical sampling as well as the emerging themes from the analysis. The findings have been constructed based on this final grouping. (Please refer to Appendix C for the coding tree.)

4. Findings and Analysis

The main discussion regarding the EUCD regulations fall under five main themes: (1) general information regarding the regulation, (2) identification of the stakeholders, (3) the power battle between the said stakeholders, (4) the expectations regarding the implications of the regulation, and finally (5) suggestions to eliminate controversies revolving around the directive. Findings are distributed to these recurring themes that are observed during the analysis of the data collected.

Essentially it is found that a severe miscommunication festered between the supporting and the opposing stakeholders. The identified stakeholders have different agendas but similar motives, hence a healthy communication between the two sides of the discussion is highly suggested.

The regulation, however, has its biggest problem in the forms of trust. The subjects of the regulation lack trust about two main things: the sustainability of the regulation and the automated content filters. The main concerns regarding the freedom of expression and the creativity being held back are both based on the fear of the possibility of mislabeling of the original content as an infringement. The opposing side is aware of this. Despite the numerous compromises the lawmakers make on what counts as an infringement and what does not, the automated systems will always lack to catch up on the complexity of nuanced meanings.

4.1. Essential Information about the European Union Copyright Directive (EUCD)

European Union Copyright Directive in the Digital Single Market is the full name of the somewhat-recent copyright regulation by the European Parliament. It aims to minimize unauthorized use of copyrighted content within the European Union, as well as to regulate the digital platforms' treatment of content within the region. However, there are two types of countries mentioned within the articles: European Union Member states and Non-European but highly influential states. Member states are members of the European Union, who are directly under the influence of the regulation. Non-European states, however, are the states that will be affected indirectly by the regulations, as Europe is one of the biggest markets both online and offline.

The new regulation had sparked a lot of controversy. These controversies were mainly around Articles 15 and 17, previously known as 11 and 13, respectively. The analysis revolves mostly around these two regulations. Article 17 (Article 13) is the center of the

controversy because of this specific article's importance for the future of social media platforms, such as YouTube. It is followed by Article 15 (Article 11) and then Article 12a, which was neither as necessary nor controversial for the analysis. These two articles are constructed for more specific cases, hence not as impactful as Article 17. Despite the opposing stances and ongoing discussions, the regulation had passed with the majority of the votes from the member states (Reynolds, 2019).

4.1.i. Aims of the Regulation

The articles present one of the main aims of the EUCD regulations as leveling the playing field for stakeholders. Regulators and traditional rights holders have many concerns regarding how powerful and influential the big technology companies are becoming. They had even repeatedly mentioned their concerns about how untouchable they are getting. Just like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), European lawmakers want bigger firms to be held liable and be essentially less powerful.

Even when the oppositions regarding the regulation are taken into consideration, regulators worry that big tech companies are manipulating the creators and the audience into opposing it. It is perceived that these platforms are scaremongering audiences (Kleinman, 2019; Saez, 2019; Vincent, 2018) by nicknames like "link tax" and "meme ban", manipulating them into opposing something that is different than what it actually is. They are using an "alarmist and hyperbolic" (Braun, 2019, para. 18) language towards their users, calling them to act against the articles to their representatives, just to manipulate their users and creators into getting what they want out of the regulations (Saez, 2019). When audiences' and creators' ignorance regarding the regulation mixed with their trust regarding the platforms, platforms seem to hold the upper hand even about the influence over these agents.

EUCD is an extension to the already existing copyright regulation, which one of the main goals is to stop unauthorized use and uploads. With the rise of digitization, the control over piracy had gotten trickier. Therefore, EUCD consists of updated measures to stop piracy while authorizing all the content and licensing the copyrighted. It is essential to have a "control over distribution" (Reynolds, 2019, para. 32) of the content by stakeholders. This way it is aimed to stop the sharing of the content without explicit permission from the rights holders (Shaw, 2019; Tahir, 2018).

Speaking of the rights holders, regulators also would like to regulate the compensation of the rights holders, as they think the current royalty rates are nowhere as far as they would like it to be. However, to be able to achieve this, the identification of the

content plays an important role. For identification, regulation strongly advises platforms to adopt automated copyright filter just like YouTube's ContentID (Reynolds, 2019). This way, it is wished to make it easier to track (Browne, 2019; Ferguson, 2019) and regulate content (Ball, 2018; Ferguson, 2019; Tahir, 2018). It is hoped to identify and stop the infringement immediately (Southern, 2018), hence perceived as a necessity for copyright management.

4.1.ii. Why is It Criticized?

One of the main concerns about EUCD regulations is how uncertain it is regarding the most important points. The regulation is often criticized for being well-intended but rushed. Experts who work in intellectual property law and management agree that Europe trying to "pass too much too fast" (J. Holden, personal communication, January 24, 2019), regardless of their stance regarding the regulation. Unless these uncertainties are cleared, EUCD regulation will be "open to abuse" (Browne, 2019, para. 11) and hence prone to mistakes (Reynolds, 2019; Schaub, 2019). The regulation text still includes numerous loopholes despite the continuous changes made into the original proposal, making it still perceived as somewhat "questionable" (Riegert, 2019, para.7) and "badly written" (Griffin, 2019, para. 12), therefore, possibly in need of more revisions and further negotiations.

For instance, one of the main criticisms comes from the vagueness regarding which genres will be included in the regulation and which will be excerpted. The backlash created by the platforms and the users caused lawmakers to take a step back, compromise and specifically indicate that these were exempted from the regulation to avoid any abuse and misinterpretation of the regulations (Alexander, 2019). Possibility of memes being counted as infringement, for instance, was the main reason why the regulation received major public attention in the first place. Similarly, music labels are and have been claiming copyrights on the animatic videos made for their music. Therefore it is asked to protect animations as they are modifications as long as they do not replace the original content according to the Fair Use Agreement. The backlash and campaigning against the regulation drew the Parliament to explicitly exclude the genre in the next voting period (Kleinman, 2019).

Another uncertainty comes from the suggested automated filtering systems. There is no current consensus on what will happen once copyright infringement has been identified; if that content be blocked before or after upload. For example, images are included as copyrighted content, whether they are of sporting events, works of art or in the general context since they are prone to rapid and unauthorized replication. Although the article 12a had been created to manage this very situation, similar events like concerts, conferences and festivals are still not regulated. However, if "posting photos on social media" (Schaub, 2019,

para. 4) of the same events around similar times and yet taken and uploaded by different people (Swain, 2018) considered as infringement is still unknown. It is left to the incentive of the filtering algorithm (Ball, 2018; Schaub, 2019). If it decides it is the work is copyrighted, then the post will be marked as infringement, it even is personally taken.

Another unclear point is how the regulation is going to be implemented. European Parliament had assigned two calendar years to the regulators of the member states to adopt the passed directive into their national copyright regimes. Therefore, a question in how the international jurisdiction of the regulation will be held (Griffin, 2019; Rigiert, 2019) arises. Since the regulation is interfering with other laws and not completely aligned with Fair Use, hence if it "will bring different regulations in line" (Griffin, 2019, para. 10). For instance, the CEO of peg.co, Nic Yeeles said "no one knows exactly how strictly enforced these regulations will be, or how severe the punishments will look for mishaps" (Ferguson, 2019). All these uncertainties resulted in a collective skepticism regarding the regulation, especially by digital platforms and creatives since it makes it harder to predict the outcomes.

4.2. Identifying the Stakeholders

It is essential for the research to identify the stakeholders who will be affected once the EUCD regulations are implemented. These stakeholders are the people who drive the discussion as well as the future of the regulation, as their opinions shape the improvements implemented during the drafting period of the regulation.

Stakeholders mainly place themselves either as supporting or as opposing side of the discussions regarding the regulation. Knowing which stakeholder stands on which side allows researchers to clearly identify the motivations, as well as their actions. There are, however, some particular cases in which the group of stakeholders does not have a particular stance collectively. These stakeholders also hold similar discussions within themselves, representing the bigger concerns in industry-specific aspects.

When it comes to the discussions regarding the possible manipulation of the users, it is clear that the information given by the digital platforms are more saturated. Whether it is conscious or not, many digital natives use social platforms and microblogs as their main source of immediate knowledge. When platforms link and/or share a perspective on their homepage, repeatedly, it is expected for that link to be highly engaged with. Because the content comes directly from the digital platform itself, the users will feel the need to click as they already trust the said platform. This curiosity increases engagement further. As the discussed personalization of the content aspect enters the equation, the algorithms benefit the platforms in only showing the content most perceived. If a post is highly popular, it will get

requested to more users, increasing its spreading rate and range. Users are directed away from the counterarguments unless they choose to dig deeper from other sources. Digital platforms, especially their rights holders should be fairer in the exposure of information and allow users to decide where they will stand on their own.

The main stakeholders of these regulations, that are identified from the articles analyzed are; European Regulatory Institutions, Traditional Rights Holders, Traditional Platforms, Digital Platforms, Digital Rights Holders, Media Produsers, Creative Agents, Organizations, and Experts. Knowing who the stakeholders are would not only help to answer the second sub-research question: "*Who are the primary stakeholders affected by this law and why?"* It would also help diversify the points in the discussion and clearly see who stands where to answer the second sub-question: *"What are the stance of stakeholders regarding the regulations?"* for clearly making sense out of the further analysis.

4.2.i. Supporting Stakeholders

European Regulatory Institutions, or Policymakers, include the decision-making body of the European Union. European Union has four main legislative bodies, two of which are frequently mentioned within the articles analyzed: the European Parliament and the European Commission. European Commission proposes and creates a draft of the regulation, whereas the European Parliament discusses the proposal and decides if it will be regulated or not ("How EU Decisions are Made?", europa.eu, 2019).

Although there are opposing members of the European Parliament, the voting results show that the member states and their representatives in the European Union give their blessing to the regulation. However, the written pieces analyzed show that it took the European Parliament to convince representatives a while. Excessive changes had to be done to the original proposals and the text had to be voted many times since the time after it was proposed in 2016.

Traditional Rights Holders mentioned the most within the articles diverse from big entertainment and broadcasting companies to their executives, agencies, distributors and partners. Some of the bigger and more impactful traditional rights holders are mentioned by name such as Disney, Marvel Studios, Warner Music Group, NBC Universal, etc. However, despite of the roll call, articles usually mentioned these rights holders as their function such as: producers, publishers, music labels, and even in such instances as traditional rights holders. These people had "seen social platforms grow, in part, from unauthorized uploads of their content" (Ferguson, 2019, para. 3) and demand -mostly monetary- rights from the digital platforms that allowed the unpermitted use.

Analyzed pieces portray these rights holders as the managerial body who complain about the widespread digitization caused them to lose their control over the reproduction and distribution over their work. One of the constantly-repeated points made by these agents is that their feelings of mistreatment by digital platforms, possibly because they start to observe a substantial decrease in revenue they earn from the licenses. The pieces also highlight their demand for protection of their work as well as better compensation, despite many are earning royalties from the third-party use of their content (Braun, 2019). Hence it can be concluded that they see the new regulations as an opportunity to get what they want out of the digital platforms.

It is observed that this group of stakeholders are more than the artists defined in the most traditional sense, but it also includes big production and distribution companies that are compensated by the artists' work. As mentioned in the previous sections, they are also shareholders of a project, since they get shares from royalties (Cirisiano, 2019). Therefore, either partially, or fully owners of the copyright (Wojcicki, 2018). One of the most mentioned traditional rights holders are definitely the music labels. In the mainstream music industry, artists are not the only one who earns money out of royalties (Kleinman, 2019). Therefore, the fair compensation of artists affects more than just the artist. Hence, articles show that the rights holders in the music industry are more vocal than any other.

Producers within the coded articles refer to music and visual content producers. Articles show that similar to the music labels, they are managerial body, the source of assets to make a project reality, marketing, and legal assistance. Along similar lines, articles show that when a movie's or a television show's rights are sold, they are the shareholders that earn income out of the fees. Therefore, protection of the work they had invested in, especially if it is a blockbuster, becomes extremely crucial for the return of investment. Hence, they are forming lobbies to support with EUCD regulations (Ferguson, 2019; Swain, 2019). Bigger traditional rights holders, such as producers, labels, publishers, etc. tend to pressure the lawmakers into their necessary needs in informal meetings (Freedman, 2006, p. 911). As traditional companies have mutual benefits with the regulatory bodies, in this case monitoring big data companies to some extent, they turn to each other to create a regulation that can benefit both. Traditional rights holders are more local, they are also easier to moderate as they are registered. They have direct impacts on the local economy, and hence be beneficial for the regulators. Similarly, lawmakers can promise their content and rights' protection.

Analyzed pieces mostly mention publishers as news publishers. The news industry is one of those who took one of the biggest hits by digitization. As print media ceased to decease (Ball, 2018), the newspapers and magazines had resorted into sharing their content online to be able to stay in the game. The articles show that the pass of the EUCD all together had made the publishers somewhat satisfied, as they "uncorked their metaphorical champagne magnums" (Volpicelli, 2019, para. 3). They are observed to be more welcoming towards the Article 15 (Riegert, 2019) as it directly addresses them and their problems with the news hosting websites. They are initially demanding their share out of the revenue from the content that is originally based on their platforms (BBC, 2018, para. 15), hence they are willing the push for regulations harder (Shaw, 2019). It is also observed that the digital copyright regulations, specifically in publishing industry drives out the electronic and self-publishing opportunities, therefore creating a market dominance of traditional companies over print media (Tang, 1998).

Smaller Right Holders are discussed to show the importance of the resources in the effects of the regulation within the pieces. With bigger rights holders, it already had been discussed that they have enough power and connections, hence leverage against the platforms. But smaller right holders do not have that fall back and support system to protect neither their work nor their rights under any type of abuse (Cirisiano, 2019). Writers expect them to get the biggest hit by the EUCD regulations, as they will be caught in the crossfire between the push of the bigger rights holders and platforms (Reynolds, 2019).

Traditional Platforms are mainly owned by the traditional rights holders; hence they are placed in the supporting side by default by the pieces analyzed. These platforms such as television channels, print media, radios, and art were given no choice but to comply and adapt to the accessibility of the Web 2.0 offers, otherwise they would not be able to compete with the digital counterparts. These platforms had been introduced as one of the intentions of traditional rights holders' to revive the traffic to and from them. They are the agents mentioned in Traditional Rights Holders which are working and trying to protect their stance and competitive position regarding the digital platforms that are supported by big tech giants.

4.2.ii. Opposing Stakeholders

Digital Platforms are mostly big platforms that host digital content in various ways. These platforms vary from social media platforms to news sharing ones and many more, some are even identified by name. Some of the biggest, most known and most frequently mentioned ones are also referred to as big tech companies or its variations. This jargon is

widely used by the policymakers when referring to the biggest technological firms, as the name suggests. Highly popular and impactful, world-renowned social media platforms, however, are mentioned by name individually. A variety of platforms are mentioned from Twitch to Snapchat, from Netflix to Reddit. The most mentioned, however, are Google and its subsidiaries YouTube and Google News. Both Google News and YouTube are the most vocal against Articles 15 and 17, respectively, since they are the direct addressee of their corresponding regulations.

The pieces define them as social, collaborative and (mostly) user-generated platforms (Cirisiano; 2019; Kleinman, 2019; Orlina, 2018; Reynolds, 2019; Shaw, 2019). They are argued to be preferred over their traditional counterparts, due to accessibility benefits. One of these benefits is that the users have accounts which are linked to the Cloud, from which they can access their profiles from everywhere with an internet connection. Some writers are concern that this allows these platforms a competitive advantage over the traditional ones, although it is not the only one. Another one is the personalized experience aspect. As they mash technological advances with media services, they are able to collect more specific data faster, and hence personalize the content per user.

Digital Rights Holders, that are mentioned, are the chairmen and/or founders of the digital platforms, as well as media professionals. They are the highest circle of the digital realm, the rule makers and the rule breakers. They are vocal in their stance and criticized for manipulating their users against the regulation without presenting them all of the aspects. This group of stakeholders includes mostly the shareholders of the platforms that are mentioned in the Digital Platforms code prior, chief officers, founders, and even media professionals. The ones that are mentioned by name specifically are the YouTube's CEO Susan Wojcicki, Wikipedia's co-founder Jimmy Wales, and World Wide Web (WWW)'s founder Tim Berners. These people play a key role not only because of their opposing stance towards the regulation but also their significance in the digital world. So much so that, due to Wales' campaigning, the regulation text went through another rewrite to exclude Wikipedia and other wiki pages specifically (Reynolds, 2019). Wojcicki herself had taken the liberty of leading the #SaveYourInternet movement as the head of the second-biggest social platform: YouTube (Hootsuite, 2019). YouTube, as mentioned prior, had been highly significant during the conversations. As Article 15 is expected to have the biggest impact on YouTube and its creators, as the platform has held the biggest competitive advantage in video upload and streaming services. Therefore Wojcicki was not the only one mentioned within the pieces but also other managerial bodies.

Media Produsers are the users of the user-generated digital platforms, who both consume and create content (Bruns, 2007). They are not the most sentient, however regarding the Directive, as they are not as informed about it as the GDPR. As it was defined in the Theoretical Framework, Produsers are the consumers who also produce. Media Produsers, per se, refers to audiences who also create content. These people are the audiences, the ordinary people, everyone that uploads content, readers, and users of the discussed digital platforms. The pieces analyze expect them to be one of the biggest -and unintended- causalities of the Directive (Griffin, 2019) as they lack resources and lobbies that can represent their voices (Alexander, 2019)

4.2.iii. Stakeholders that Represent Both Views

This section includes the stakeholders who represent both perspectives. In other words, the groups in this subsection do not have one dominating stance.

Creative agents, or creatives, are commonly referred to as "authors" during the Theoretical Framework section. These people are the people who create the art and/or content that is usually subjected to copyright regulations (Jaszi, 1992). The creatives depend on the platform where they present their content in. The analysis shows that creatives who share their work through traditional platforms tend to take a stand with the regulations, such as artists, journalists, authors, and musicians, for example, Sir Paul McCartney and Blondie's Debbie Harry (Kleinman, 2019; Schaub, 2019). On the other hand, the creatives who use the digital platforms, oppose the regulations with a strong voice, such as content creators and influencers, for instance, YouTubers Philip DeFranco and Grandayy (Alexander, 2019). Content creators are highly significant as they are often mentioned and highly influential, despite in most of the cases they are overlooked. Content creators are not only the people who literally create the content platforms host, they are also the agents that get most of the exposure, hence who drive the traffic to the platforms (Schaub, 2019). They differ from produsers, however, as they are the ones who share content as an actual job and/or to earn money from it.

Organizations are another stakeholder that falls into this category. There are a variety of organizations are mentioned who support numerous aspects. Organizations mostly represent the agents such as creatives', produsers', and rights holders' stances. They rather act as a bridge between the smaller stakeholders with the bigger, and moderating the conversation. For example, the organization European Digital Rights, or EDRi, is one of the most mentioned organizations as they are one of the most vocal advocates against the EUCD regulations. They collaborate with controversial platforms like YouTube and Wikipedia to

inform the public. Organizations are not directly impacted by the EUCD. However, they lobby with agents as well as lawmakers to make the voices of their representees to be heard loud and clear.

Experts are usually the media professionals who are featured within the pieces to provide insight into the regulation and its implications. Unlike other stakeholders, they are perceived to be on the more objective side, though their stances can be assumed by their arguments. When their choice of words are examined, it is perceived that they are trying to observe more from an objective perspective to analyze the regulations and strategize. The diverse opinions are usually based on the expertise and the personal stance is based on observations and predictions.

4.3. Power Battle of the Stakeholders

As previously mentioned, the regulators and the traditional stakeholders were initially not happy with how powerful the big tech companies are getting (Ball, 2018; Ferguson, 2019). Hence, both GDPR and EUCD are proposed and voted upon to regulate the actions these companies are taking, especially in terms of the use of data and resources. It is observed that the platforms and the organizations that are opposing the regulation had introduced nicknames to the most controversial articles: Article 15 and 17. Not many people, including the officials, refer to the articles in their official names: Article 15 and 17. Since the name changes, the preliminary names of Article 11 and 13 are still in use, since people are more familiar to them. There are also given nicknames for both of the articles: "link tax" and "meme ban" respectively. It is not known when and by whom the nicknames were initially introduced but they sure did catch on swiftly, spreading like wildfire once Creative Commons and YouTube had started using them.

These platforms had also introduced the hashtag # SaveYourInternet (Braun, 2019; Reynolds, 2019) and its variations such as #SaveTheInternet (Orlina, 2018; Tahir, 2018). These hashtags had been used to inform the smaller creators and the users regarding the regulation, specifically regarding Article 17, and convince them to take action opposing the article. Similarly, the European Parliament and the European Commission, as well as the supporters of the regulation had started sharing the hashtag #Yes2Copyright as a response with the very same aim to inform the audience (Braun, 2019).

4.3.i. Conflict in Parliament: Voss v. Reda

Political Figures refer to the European Parliament Members (MEPs) who are named individually within the articles. This axial code includes French MEP Marc Joulaud, British MEP Mary Honeyball, and German MEPs Axel Voss and Julia Reda. Voss and Reda are the

key figures and also the most mentioned in the discussions regarding the EUCD regulations, especially Article 17. They are not only representing the same country but in completely polar opposite sides of the discussion.

Pieces have shown that the representatives' arguments align with the other stakeholders they share their stances with. Voss' points regarding why this extension is needed align with the concerns the traditional platforms and stakeholders voiced. Whereas, Reda openly campaigned alongside with YouTube and Creative Commons before the votings, so much so that asking the citizens to raise their voices against the regulation.

Reda was mostly vocal about the impracticality of the automated filters for either of the sides but the big tech (Liko, 2019; Southern, 2018). She was one of the very first ones who pointed out the global implications (Liko, 2019). She even went as far as calling the day the regulation passed "dark day for internet freedom" (Volpicelli, 2019, para. 3) and the outcome as "catastrophic" (Vincent, 2018, para. 9).

Whereas, Voss was one of the most vocal advocates of the regulation since the beginning. He held several press releases advocating for the regulation. Unlike Reda, he congratulated and thanked his colleagues "for the job they had done together" (Vincent, 2018, para. 9). He had believed that the regulation is created "to protect people's livelihoods" (Kleinman, 2019, para. 26), whom, according to him, were not paid enough for their work. However, he made a statement questioning the Directive's motive, to "correct [sic] a situation which has allowed a few companies to earn huge sums of money" (Kleinman, 2019, para. 28) which aligns with Reda's concerns. She criticized the supporting lawmakers for not being objective and being blinded by the desire to stop "big media companies, with their waning control over distribution channels" (Reynolds, 2019, para. 30), and the law for "over-reach and create new problems that didn't exist before" (Liko, 2019, para. 13).

4.3.ii. Link Tax: Google v. Newspapers

Article 15, previously known as Article 11, is the regulation that aims to regulate the redistribution of online news shared by news platforms such as Google News. The analysis shows that hyperlinks, news, texts, online stories, and publications are discussed along similar lines. It is given the name "Link Tax" as it regulates the share of hyperlinks to compensate the journalists and the traditional news outlets fairer when their work is featured in the digital platforms (Tahir, 2018; Vincent, 2018). The regulation suggests the licensing of the hyperlinks mentioned or referenced like a copyrighted item, that the hosting platforms pay a commission out of the clicks as well as the right to use the news article (Ball, 2018;

BBC, 2018; Browne, 2019; Griffin, 2019; Kleinman, 2019; Reynolds, 2019; Schaub, 2019; Vincent, 2018. Hyperlinks are counted as citing, as long as the news, texts, online stories and/or publications are shared with a hyperlink and a couple of the sharer's own words (Browne, 2019; Reynolds, 2019; Riegert, 2019; Tahir, 2018; Vincent, 2018). The authors of the articles coded argue that the rights holders should not be putting too much trust on this exception as the regulations are not specific enough and the filters are not trustworthy (BBC, 2018; Schaub, 2019). The analysis shows that, however, in the case of news and online stories, the links are protected by Article 15, mostly to protect their directed income from traffic back to the author from the hosting platforms such as Google News (Kleinman, 2019; Newton, 2019; Reynolds, 2019; Vincent, 2018). Similarly, excerpts shared from these content in any social platform without a hyperlink still falls under Article 17, holds the platform liable for its redistribution and will need explicit permission from the rights holders for its share (Liko, 2019; Tahir, 2018).

It had sparked controversy as it is creating a worry regarding the spread of fake news. It is expected for more reliable and popular platforms to have higher rates for the hyperlink licenses, making it harder to use their content for the smaller creators. (I. Genna, personal communication, January 24, 2019). However, fake news already has a shareable property as it sparks interest. If their rates would be lower, they can be shared and spread faster than a piece of trustworthy news.

4.3.iii. Meme Ban: YouTube v. Music Industry

Article 17, previously known as Article 13, is aiming for the fairer compensation of the artists, similar to the Link Tax, if and when their works are used by another produser in any hosting platform. However, the Article 17 requires the internet content uploaded, especially the video uploads, "must have a copyright license so that royalties can be paid" (Braun, 2019, para. 4). Internet content and video uploads can include snippets, clips and/or excerpts from third-party contents as these forms can be a meme and/or go viral. Simultaneously, the hosting platforms will be held directly responsible for their users' choice of unauthorized use (Alexander, 2019; Wojcicki, 2018). The nickname Meme Ban had been created to refer to recreational cultural production. The Article 17 was highly vague when it comes to any genre of creation, which are currently protected under Fair Use Agreement. These genres are usually the ones that are created by reproduction and remix of the original content (Jocson, 2013), such as memes, parodies, and pastiche.

YouTube plays a key role both in the prospects of the new regulation as well as the discussions revolving around this very Article. The platform is very vocal about their stance

regarding the regulation, even taking it as far as collaborating with organizations that have similar agendas to inform the community about their perception of what the Article is and calling them to act against it.

The aforementioned hashtag #SaveYourInternet (also known as #SavetheInternet) is the viral hashtag for the movement started against the EUCD regulations. It is believed to be started by Creative Commons and YouTube, although it is not precisely known. The hashtag grew exponentially once YouTube's CEO Wojcicki asked the readers of her quarterly letter to speak up using the hashtag on October 22, 2018 (Reynolds, 2019). As the hashtag had gotten more engagement, the platform started directing its users to a landing page (Reynolds, 2019). Wojcicki had asked the creators who are world-renowned and already have a very trusting subscriber base (Reynolds, 2019) to dedicate videos to EUCD regulations to inform the community. Many YouTubers such as Matthew Patrick of The Film Theorists, Phillip DeFranco of DeFranco Show, Fine Brothers, and many more had published numerous videos to raise awareness to the Meme Ban and convince European audience to get in touch with their representatives and ask them to vote against.

Similar to YouTube, Twitter is known for the creation and redistribution of memes. Twitter also has a vast artist community, as much as YouTube has the musicians (Braun, 2019). It had been mentioned 18 times, usually for voicing their concerns regarding the future of the global digital economy. Since it is constituted as a microblog, Twitter allows its users to share everything they enjoy or within a moment's notice with a somewhat short limit of 240 characters. The platform also plays a highly crucial role, just like YouTube, in the distribution of the wildfire that is #SaveYourInternet (Orlina, 2018). It is also where the image memes thrive since the retweet and like features allow immediate reaction and repost. These functions allow hashtags and memes to get very popular very fast and die down as fast as they got popular in the first place.

#Yes2Copyright, on the other hand, is a hashtag created by traditional rights holders as a counter-movement to the #SaveYourInternet campaigning. It supports the copyright regulation to the fullest (Braun, 2019) and criticizes the platforms for scaremongering the users and smaller creators into opposing what is a very necessary regulation (Griffin, 2019). The music industry is one of the biggest supporters of the article and the regulation in general. Since music is either use as background music (Cirisiano, 2019), covers (Tahir, 2018), or just for the sake of sharing; it constitutes one of the biggest aspects of the discussion. The genre is quite prone to piracy and not as much regulated as the traditional rights holders would have liked to. Not only the musical snippets and the full songs are

protected by the article but also the music videos (Orlina, 2018), creating well-rounded protection for the musical content. This shareable property of the content causes their official rights holders to be one of the loudest groups supporting the EUCD regulations (Griffin, 2019). Hence, making the industry was one of the industries that lobbied the hardest to support EUCD regulations (Swain, 2019).

Traditional rights holders in the music industry often give Spotify as an example of how they want the licensing should be transformed into when discussing the better compensation of the rights holders for the music content hosted on YouTube. In previous years, Taylor Swift and Spotify had a disagreement on how much the artists should be compensated, which had resulted in artist to pull all of her songs out of the platform (Braun, 2019). The conflict had been solved in 2017 when Spotify compromised and increased the rates of loyalties. Chairman of IMPALA Kitcatt suggests that despite its reach, YouTube is paying fewer royalties than Spotify and independent musicians on the digital platform should get a better share for their work (Braun, 2019, para. 6). However, in 2018, "YouTube paid content owners across the EU €800m (…) the global music industry more than €1.5bn from advert-generated revenue alone," (Wojcicki, 2018, para. 3). In YouTube's case, ad-generated revenue is how the platform pays for the music content it hosts on the website.

4.4. What to Expect

Despite all the vagueness regarding several aspects of the regulation, the stakeholders had formed some expectations and predictions. These are regarding the overall impacts on stakeholders, European audience's access to the global content, audiences, and platforms, and overall global implications. It is necessary to see what the agents are expecting to happen from which they ground their arguments and criticisms. The analyzed pieces are found to be approaching the implications from more of a pessimistic side. Even the pieces who seem to support the Article, or at last debunk the most-hyped criticisms, tend to expect some certain negative impacts. This had shown that the discussions between the authors differentiate more on what the expectations will be in detail, but who and how will be impacted seems more alike.

4.4.i. Impacts on Stakeholders

The regulation had sparked conversation about the freedom of the internet. Platforms, specifically YouTube and its CEO Susan Wojcicki, criticize the regulation for being a preliminary step for online censorship (BBC, 2018; Braun, 2019; Browne, 2019; Riegert, 2019; Schaub, 2019; Vincent, 2018). They are worried that it could eventually slow down user-generated content (Kleinman, 2019; Swain, 2019). User experience is a priority

for these platforms, as well as digital rights holders and organizations that are against, therefore it is mentioned quite often when discussing the regulation. It is believed that the user experience will take a hit once the users are not able to access certain content (Tahir, 2018). It is also expected to see a deterioration in "users' ability to upload content" (Ferguson, 2019, para. 3) which is also expected to directly affect the user experience. Platforms are concerned that these restrictions might cause more closed societies (Browne, 2019; Kleinman, 2019; Orlina, 2018, Reynolds, 2019) than the more open and transparent like lawmakers had promised since it limits the user's abilities as well as creativity.

  YouTube specifically is very vocal regarding the regulation's possible impact on user experience. The platform repeatedly presents itself as if they really would not like to strengthen the copyright policies. However, they also underline they would have no option to adopt it the regulators are persistent and uncollaborative. Although there is no legal imposition for platforms' adoption to the regulation, platforms like YouTube resort in making their copyright policies stricter to accommodate for the European market. As regulation strongly suggests the creation of a software that automatically detects unauthorized use, such as YouTube's already existing ContentID, platforms are pushed to follow a more authoritarian path that is "against [their] user base" (Newton, 2019, para. 11). This very obligation to adapt is what worries the opposers about hindering creativity as making the creators more cautious and pickier with what they are uploading. Despite all the criticism, it is expected for the regulation to shift the power balances and industries. It may not only harm the smaller platforms despite all the intentions and protections, but it can also cause corporate battles (Reynolds, 2019), that could only end in unfair competitive advantage, which is the very same thing supporters claim that they do not want. This could also make platforms to make it harder to upload content as well, causing both produsers and content creators to "lose a vital showcase for their work" (Braun, 2019, para. 5). Similarly, articles argue that news search engines like Google News are one of the biggest help of the traditional news platforms in terms of exposure. However, a limitation as such can hinder this opportunity (Reynolds, 2019). The traditional platforms would not be able to "compete with [their] peers because [they] need to be findable" (T. Hoppner, personal communication, January 24, 2019).

  One way or another, digital platforms are aware that the implementation of the regulation will be the end of the internet known now (Ferguson, 2019; Riegert, 2019). The impacts are thought unpredictable and drastic, spreading through every aspect of the digital world. Creator economy is expected to be under severe threat by the Article 17 (Wojcicki,

2018, para. 3). Wojcicki (2018) expects this hit to come from platforms getting more primal to survive. This could be translated into the over-cautiousness of both the platform and its creators (Schaub, 2019) hence slow down the pace of both the production and the exposure. In YouTube's case, creators mainly earn money through watch time and advertisements through the Ad-sense tool. In other words, ad-generated revenue is perceived as the main source of money flow. Although it is not known precisely how Ad-sense works, it is known that the amount earned is related to the number of visits and advertisements shown. Though the rates are not too high and irregular, bigger creators create multiple streams by collaborating with brands or selling merchandise. Wojcicki had repeatedly said that they are planning to "add more detail to its community guidelines and advertiser-friendly policies, so there's more predictability around monetization" (Cirisiano, 2019, para. 6). However, the stricter regulations are expected to not only shorten the content uploaded but also the quality to depreciate and harder to get collaborations. As YouTube is based on the consistency of uploads, any obstacle for monetization would decrease the revenue made from videos, hence discourage creators to put more effort into their content.

It had been often times observed that both the pieces analyzed, and the stakeholders are arguing about how the regulation will be implemented with the already-existing other regulations. Some stakeholders even treat the EUCD regulations as if it is ground-breaking and highly disruptive. For instance, YouTube takes a stance almost like it will destroy the whole platform and creativity, completely derail the industry and hinder the cultural production whole together. The reality is, there are already copyright regimes and some sort of digital content regulation regimes exist worldwide. Similarly, the traditional rights holders treat the regulation if it is the savior for all of the problems they have ever since the dawn of digital platforms, where in reality it will probably not change as much except a slight increase in royalties.

4.4.ii. European Audiences' Right to Access

Copyrights and intellectual property licenses can have multiple owners; therefore, it is not always the easiest to identify who the subjected rights holder is (Volpicelli, 2019). This inconvenience can even create disagreements in ownership at certain times, confusing both the platforms and the creators (Reynolds, 2019; Southern, 2018; Wojcicki, 2018). Although automated content filters are found very convenient and strongly advised by the regulation, it can assess false copyright infringement claims which could result in taking down a content uploaded unfairly. A non-European creator can get a copyright strike, just because his content includes a clip that cannot pass through European filters. In that case, the

creator can choose to block their content for the European audience, which could only deepen the split of the internet. For instance, DeFranco, a news YouTuber with over 6 million subscribers under his name, explicitly said "If it created a situation where my videos might get taken down because of some law in the EU, I'm just going to block my content from the EU (...)" (Alexander, 2019, para. 7) to protect both himself and his content from suspension out of the platform, even though it translates into a drastic drop in his analytics.

Netflix is often mentioned in the articles as an example of how differentiating content based on the users' location can work successfully by the supporters of the regulation. The platform's content diversifies vastly from country to country (Newton, 2019). However, intellectual property warns other platforms who think of adapting that system, as Netflix has peculiar properties than other hosting platforms. Unlike platforms like YouTube, Netflix users are simply audiences who consume content created by the platform's own creators. They are not produsers, but only consumers. However, other subjected platforms like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and even to some extend Spotify, are built on the activities of users who produce, or produsers. Any change in produsers access to content from a different side of the globe means that the other side may not be able to access theirs, hence causing a drastic drop in analytics for either side, whereas this is never the case for Netflix.

4.4.iii. Global Implications

The new copyright reform will not only impact the European continent but also the non-European countries. The regulation is, by default, quite Eurocentric. However, assuming Europe is one of the largest digital markets when it is considered as a single one, any digital patrolling becomes globally impactful and a matter of concern for the allies, especially the ones across the pond. 2 out of 24 pieces coded were from Northern American journals, specifically chosen for their perspective on the new regulations different than the Eurocentric point of view the others had taken. North American countries, especially the United States and Canada, both have their highly controversial Net Neutrality discussions. These discussions had been started when the governments had given more power to the Internet Providing Services (IPSs), which had been taken as a threat against the neutrality of the web. The United States of America (USA) has seen highly significant within the pieces. As the country has the leading stance in the digital industry, it hosts both most of the digital platforms as well as the content created and shared. Therefore, it is expected to be the most impacted non-European country as content export is a significant source of income.

"American internet" (Newton, 2019, para. 4) is often one of the most overlooked which will be affected by the regulation. This is usually because those effects will be indirect. United States have regulations over the internet until some extent (Newton, 2019, para. 16), such as the Communications Act of 1934 and regulations over recreational content, such as Copyright Directives and Fair Use, which are not taken to an extent as far as EUCD.

Newton (2019) argues that there is no longer going to be a unified internet. Unified internet refers to an internet experience in which every user can access everything around the globe without any limitations. It is discussed thoroughly in terms of the steps the American platforms will be taking once the European national governments implement the regulation and start regulating (Newton, 2019). It is expected that the platforms will try to unify the experience as creating different platforms and/or filtering systems based on the location. This means non-European audience to be affected by the regulation as well. Although this would keep the "unified internet" experience intact, it will be harder to sustain as national priorities differ not only across Europe but also the world.

It is said to have that much control over something that vast, fast-moving and global, "it's very hard to use regulation to achieve specific outcomes, and the devil will always be in the details" (Newton, 2019, para. 16). However, with the end of the unified internet, Article 17 is expected to shake the digital industry to the core worldwide. (Ferguson, 2019).

4.4.iv. Re-questioning the Novelty of the EUCD

Coded articles show that both the policymakers and the supporters try to convince the skeptics about EUCD regulations' priorities align with the already-existing copyright regulations. These agents use previous regulations as an example to show critics how well those work and their concerns are irrelevant. The mention of the different examples of working digital copyright regimes could be set a preliminary source of insight on the consequences and the applicability. For instance, one article highlights that "In Germany and Spain, such a rule already exists, but now, logically, it will be implemented across the entire EU" (Riegert, 2019, para. 10). Similarly, the United Kingdom already has a porn block, which had started regulating within the Digital Economy Act (Volpicelli, 2019).

Copyright regulations exist ever since cultural creation had started. However, the spread of the internet had observed to deepen the conversations regarding the content uploaded on the servers. Articles argue that similar discussions keep resurfacing with every disruptive technological change introduced. This is mainly due to the monetary concerns of the rights holders which had been one of the main concerns ever since the monetization of

art (Nooney & Portwood-Stacer, 2014). Therefore, it is inevitable for economic agents to resort to asking for a regulation to protect the works. The main difference, however, is the change of medium to be regulated.

Another highly mentioned regulation within the articles is the highly-discussed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The main point of concern for opposers is how the continent will be affected once EUCD regulations' implementation combined with GDPR. As mentioned before, one of the main uncertainties regarding the regulation is the strictness of the enforcement, therefore it is very challenging for the stakeholders to foresee and strategize as Yeeles mentions (Ferguson, 2019). Despite most of the platforms, especially the bigger ones, complied with the GDPR regulations, they probably will do so with the EUCD. However, the articles discuss the worries regarding the possible hinge an extra level of regulation will bring onto smaller platforms' accessibility to the European audience. This is a worry since Europe is a big market which is highly profitable, that no platform of any scale would not like to lose.

4.4.v. Sustainability of the Regulation

The discussions question the incentives and the possible implications of the regulation but not the sustainability. The regulation, itself, has already so many exceptions for both the forms and platforms that creates several concerns regarding the future of the regulation. Digital platforms have lifespans, they are born, raised, and eventually died down. It is essentially what happened with MySpace. Sometimes, if the managerial bodies are smart enough, they transform into different platforms as Musically did to TikTok and Foursquare did to Swarm. The developments in technology introduce new ways and forms of production. As mentioned above, copyright systems are neither new nor revolutionary, but micromanaging what will be enforced and how it will be enforced is, especially when it consists of numerous exemptions.

As mentioned before, the member states are given two years to implement the regulation within their national laws and start the enforcement (Alexander, 2019; Cirisiano, 2019; Newton, 2019; Reynolds, 2019). European Commission is delegating member states to solve the problems (Kretschmer, personal communication, January 24, 2019). This autonomy the member states have over the implementation of the regulation is highly criticized. The directive does not have a centralized regulation or consequences when broken, which will be implemented across the union. This situation is hindering the non-European rights holders from predicting and strategizing their moves across the continent

(Newton, 2019). At this very moment, it is not possible to see how the countries will adopt and enforce the regulation. These differences can be caused by the different interpretation of the accepted text, which will cause an inconsistency within the continent. This situation is one of the highly discussed criticisms within the articles coded, as it is not possible to foresee the individual countries' implementation, 2 years prior. For instance, Germany and Spain (Riegert, 2019) are expected to adapt their already-existing regulation, whereas others might have to rewrite theirs. This vagueness of the directive is one of the most controversial aspects of the directive.

Another point in the sustainability of the regulation is what will happen to the United Kingdom if and when they go through with leaving the European Union (Brexit). Due to the uncertainties regarding the United Kingdom and its highly controversial, still quite unsolved, attempts to leave the EU. As of June 2019, the United Kingdom is still a part of the European Union. This means that, as of the time EUCD had passed, the UK and the creators there are also subject to the new regulations. The UK is one of the most powerful and impactful countries in the union. Therefore, leaving the EU means unprecedented complications for every party involved (Griffin, 2019).

The main issue regarding the sustainability of the regulation, however, comes from the uncertainty regarding the included and excluded contents, especially when used together with the augmented infringement detection systems. There are essentially two types of explicit exemptions: the genre of content and subject platforms. The exceptions regarding the genres show technicalities of the suggested AI systems, whereas exceptions regarding platforms show inconsistencies within the stance of the lawmakers through the compromises made. Regulation, for instance, explicitly excludes platforms who are "available for less than three years; it has a yearly turnover below €10 million; and it has fewer than five million unique monthly visitors' (Volpicelli, 2019, para. 13), otherwise they are required to either pay to accommodate proper licenses or develop a content filter to automatically block the unauthorized use of copyrighted content. However, having so many exceptions to the regulation can cause other up and coming platforms and/or forms to ask for exemptions, hence eventually making the regulation redundant, as the lawmakers will not be able to control the agents and the content they would like to.

There are also platforms that are exempted by name within the regulation specifically. The biggest example of this is the case of Wikipedia. Wikipedia is a completely different story since it is a particular case. Just like the educational content on YouTube,

Wikipedia falls under the prospectus of the use of educational content, the redistribution of the information. However, it still holds user-generated articles that contain images, audio and video clips, quotations, and hyperlinks. Wikipedia's co-founder Jimmy Wales is known to be almost as big of a critique of the regulation as Wojcicki. As he persisted on campaigning against, Wikipedia explicitly excluded from the liability clause in the expansion during the latest draft (Reynolds, 2019).

Despite not being mentioned too often, Shopee plays a particularly significant role since it is used as an example for the online marketplaces (Orlina, 2018). However, this by no means good news for others such as eBay and Amazon, who are still the target of the regulation (Reynolds, 2019). This difference between the websites come from their classification; Shopee is an online marketplace (Orlina, 2018) whereas Amazon and eBay are e-commerce websites (Browne, 2019), hence need to be regulated. Amazon is the biggest company in the world and it is more than just an e-commerce website. It collects data regarding the habits and preferences regarding the users, streams original shows, offers several services as well as products under the brand. Whereas, online marketplaces such as Etsy or Shopee are intermediaries between smaller shops and customers.

The examples given above brings the discussion of the sustainability of the regulation. Previous attempts of digital copyright regimes had revoked due to "customer resistance and the inconvenience of copy protection mechanisms" (Tang, 1998, p. 28). A similar destiny for EUCD is undesirable for many if not all of the parties involved. Hence it becomes clearer, that the lawmakers had to compromise quite often to make as many stakeholders as possible. Bigger stakeholders should be more aware of the struggles of the smaller agents and their struggles. It is what the coded articles had meant by "humanizing [sic] the discussion" (Southern, 2018, para. 10). Scholz (2016) argue that the workers, in this case, the creators and produsers, need someone in their corner "who really cares for their long-term welfare" (Scholz, 2016, p. 12). Lawmakers are very well aware of the importance of the bigger platforms over the European market, as they are the main source of income (J. Holden, personal communication, January 24, 2019), therefore would like to smoothen some of the controversial edges. Scholz (2016) also takes the liberty of suggesting "produser-owned platforms" (p. 16), which could be an option to both the lawmakers' and the creators' problems, though eliminating intermediaries such as traditional rights holders and platforms as well as the hosting platforms. Michelle Phan's HelloThematic, for instance, was born from that idea, to create a free platform by creators for creators, which is based on a trade of

the rights to use music with payment for the said rights directly between the creators.

4.4.vi. Impact on Digital and Collective Creativity

The analysis had shown that the main concern regarding the regulations is economic for both the supportive and the opposing stakeholders. Digital media products are economic goods, despite having certain different properties. For instance, "reproduction and redistribution of digital content have zero marginal cost" (I. Genna, personal communication, January 24, 2019). In other words, reproducing or redistributing one extra unit of digital good are at no cost. Digitization had also allowed faster distribution of the content, whether it is legal or not. This very idea aligns with the commercial production Peterson suggests (1976). Similarly, the controversy regarding the EUCD regulations, especially regarding Article 17, is based on the commercialization of art that comes with the digitization.

Article 17's alternative name "meme ban" and the discussions around it gives the biggest insight on the copyright regulations' impacts on collective creativity. Automated content filters, that are suggested to stop this, are just algorithms and they are failure-prone (Schaub, 2019) since they cannot always identify the context of a third-party excerpt used (Liko, 2019; Reynolds, 2019; Swain, 2019). Therefore it will continue blocking recreational media despite the exclusion of the recreational genres. This is a handicap for the digital creators, as they need to go through formalities to prove their contents' authenticity to be able to republish it in the hosting platform.

As it is named as meme ban, memes were the most controversial, hence the most mentioned genre within the articles and stakeholders. It is excluded by the European Parliament explicitly with similar genres such as GIFs, mashup, remix after the backlash by defining them as a form of parody and pastiche (Braun, 2019; Ferguson, 2019; Kleinman, 2019). MEP Honeyball had even taken it a step further when she said that "This directive was never intended to stop memes and mashups" (Kleinman, 2019, para. 18). Although the content in this genre might still be taken down although it is not perceived as an infringement by the law. This is expected since "filters won't be able to distinguish between memes and other copyrighted material" (Reynolds, 2019, para. 19).

Recreational formats, as discussed in the theory, are for users' to make sense out of the world as much is at is to carry the cultural creativity further. Memes, in that aspect, play a key role, a role satire and caricature had beheld before it, to help people cope with humor in times of crises (Dağtaş, 2016; Rintel, 2013). Braga & Logan (2017) argue that humans bestow a sense of self that artificial intelligence (AI) seems to be lacking at the moment. One

of the key elements to the sense of self is the sense of humor as it is the "key ingredient of human intelligence" (Braga & Logan, 2017, p. 7). Both the articles coded and the literature show that technological improvements, especially the Artificial Intelligence, are nowhere near able to identify and analyze linguistic nuances as such. Therefore it is expected for the automated filters, which recruit AI for determining and blocking the uploaded content in case of an infringement, have a while to go to be somewhat trustworthy.

Although being the most controversial, memes are not the only genre that could have this problem. Genres, which are based on recreational media, for instance, reviews, gameplays, film analyses, etc. are also excluded by the regulation. For instance, movies are, just like music and images, are protected under copyright regulations. Although the copyright of the movies themselves are recognized, trailers as copyrighted content (Ferguson, 2019) is often overlooked. Though trailers are uploaded and distributed to the hosting platforms by the studios due to the exposure, the use of said trailers by other users within the very same platforms still considered as an infringement by the regulation (Ferguson, 2019). However, the use of any clips of the movies for review or analysis is excluded by the regulation.

Reviews such as gameplays and gaming streams, however, constitute a more complicated case. Articles coded highlight that video games are copyrighted (Swain, 2019). With gameplays, however, the performance is copyrighted to the streamer and it is copyrighted in a different sense (Dubey, 2019; Schaub, 2019). They considered to "bring the truth about the game into public knowledge, so no one wastes their hard-earned money over it" (Dubey, 2019, para. 16). In other words, they help with the potential buyers to decide if that game is right for them or not, while developers controlling the access to free trial themselves. For instance, developers of highly sensational No Man's Sky had followed through this strategy, which had helped to create a hype around the released preview of the game (Dubey, 2019). This had actually seen as a positive impact on game sales unless the full game was leaked (Dubey, 2019, para. 16). However, as they will include recordings from the games played, it is still possible for them to get stuck in the automated filters, though gamers are protected by the game developers, unlike the case of movie broadcasters or music producers.

This is not only inconsistency the stakeholders hold. Even the stakeholders within the gaming industry are contradicting themselves at certain times. Although it might spoil key points of highly-anticipated games, gameplays are often encouraged as they allow people who do not have access to the game to get the essence of it (Postel, 2017). Sometimes the

original rights holders' conflict themselves such as sharing screen captions from user-generated content, which fall under the copyright protection, to create promotional content. Though it is mostly overlooked as it is interpreted as the recognition and exposure by the owner, though it is technically an infringement.

Similarly, lawmakers' and traditional rights holders' stance regarding the regulations aligns more with the academic production of culture (Peterson, 1976). Traditional creatives are more concerned about protecting their work whereas other traditional rights holders - such as broadcasters, publishers, etc.- have more monetary concerns. Similar to music, movies are another highly mentioned and one of the most influential in the passing of the regulation (Liko, 2019) because it is one of the industries that have the most problems with piracy. It is arguably easier for film industries to protect their content, as they have more than enough resources to fight for their rights. They have both the money and the people to ensure their work is not used within any digital recreational content. However, for smaller creators, it does not seem like the case. Smaller creators will be left in the middle of a battlefield between the digital platforms and traditional rights holders (Vincent, 2018). For instance, both Twitter and Instagram have a wide artist society, who cannot be as cutthroat as the traditional rights holders. They do not have much to do against an infringement but to report it to the platform, as they lack the impact any big company has. Therefore, it might either dishearten them to create or share what they had created, by the time the hosting platforms go through with their copyright claim (Ferguson, 2019).

Any other critical genres other than review and analysis, such as caricature, satire, and tutorials are also excluded (Braun, 2019) as they are used to cope with and reflect on the current situations collectively (Rintel, 2013). These genres aligned with the originality requirements of the Fair Use as they include personal commentary of the re-creator. This form of creation is explained in terms of freedom of expression by the authors of the articles coded, where the creators can express their individualities by sharing their opinions on the original content, that people with similar points of view can find and form a community (Benjamin, 1936). However, these genres would not have the problems the others facing as they tend to change the formatting altogether. For instance, a satire video might parody a trailer, but as they would feature completely new actors and a somewhat different script, the automated copyright system could pass it as original content. Therefore it can be expected to these genres to thrive while others have to manage the technicalities and hence become the preferred medium.

One thing that should not be overlooked is the stance of the regulations regarding recreational media. Unlike the digital platforms claim, none of the past and present copyright regulations in the continent had ever included caricature, parody or pastiche. These genres had been excluded explicitly in the Legal Protection of Databases Directive of 1996, Information Society Directive of 2001, or any iterations of the EUCD. Once the history of the copyright directives in the European Union is researched, it can be seen that platforms are indeed scaremongering their communities to some extent as the analyzed articles suggest (Kleinman, 2019; Saez, 2019; Vincent, 2018). The produsers were not as aware of what EUCD regulations are or how they will be affected by it. YouTube and its creators are criticized for realizing the unawareness of the produsers, and promoting campaigning against the regulations by the supporters of the regulations. One of the reasons that the hashtags are not being analyzed as much is that these users' unawareness (Vincent, 2018). Simply put, EUCD regulations did not create as much deliberation as GDPR regulations, which had concerned users deeply as it was promoted as the regulation of the use of their personal data directly. However, the main problem the digital creator should have been worried about was the definition of caricature, parody or pastiche, which had never been structurally defined in any of the past regulations until the backlashes started.

However, one problem that still stands within the regulation is regarding authenticity. The problem of authenticity, however, is barely discussed. Although in suggestions, it is suggested to produsers to make sure their content is original (Ferguson, 2019), it was never explicitly defined what is counted as an original content by the articles coded. Although theory defines it as a creation that is unique and does not have anything alike already been created. To answer the main research question: "*In which ways could the copyright regulations, such as EUCD, impact digital creativity and cultural freedom?",* the main implication of the article regarding creativity will not be the change in the rate of creation as expected, but the definition of originality. When discussing originality, the entirety of the content is considered, however, the remix and mashup culture thrive on the snippets of the copyrighted content. Due to the technological limitations of the automated systems, any content that can pass automated content filters such as ContentID is going to be perceived as original content.

4.5. How to Make EUCD Better
Despite having different priorities and agendas, stakeholders also hold some common goals, whether they are aware or not. This motivation similarities are often observed by the

use of language when discussing their aims and prospects within the articles analyzed. These common grounds, both the platforms' and the lawmakers' address, are the repeated goals and/or concerns. These grounds are mainly regarding the current system of the copyright legislation and the monetary compensation of the creators and the future of online creation. For instance, both of the sides mentioned protecting people's livelihoods as one of their main goals (Browne, 2019; Kleinman, 2019; Wojcicki, 2018), although whose livelihoods should be protected is a point of disagreement. For example, YouTube shows concern regarding their creators' livelihoods taking a hit (Dubey, 2019; Wojcicki, 2018), whereas traditional rights holders try to get better compensation for their artists (Ball, 2018; Braun, 2019; Browne, 2019; Kleinman, 2019; Newton, 2019; Swain, 2019). Similarly, both sides want to protect the act of creation, though traditional rights holders want to protect licenses (Ferguson, 2019; Liko, 2019; Orlina, 2018; Southern, 2018; Riegert, 2019) whereas platforms like YouTube wants to protect user-generated content (Orlina, 2018; Tahir, 2018). Monetization of creations is another common ground for the sides. Traditional rights holders want to make sure about the monetization by licenses happen somewhat fairly, whereas platforms want to ensure consistent ad-generated revenue (Crisiano, 2019; Reynolds, 2019; Schaub, 2019; Wojcicki, 2018).

When the articles are analyzed, it can be perceived that none of the stakeholders reject the need of collaboration between four biggest and most mentioned stakeholders: lawmakers, platforms, traditional rights holders, and produsers (creators and users). The articles show that either of the sides are willing to come together, to collaborate and compromise, to be able to "humanize the discussion" (Southern, 2018, para. 11). Both sides mention they desire to create legislation that will eventually benefit both the agents (Alexander, 2019; Kleinman, 2019) and Europe's creative industry (Vincent, 2018).

However, what needs to be compromised on and who needs to compromise are still observed as the points of conflict, depending on the stance of the commenter. Authors of these articles, as well as featured professionals, suggested and encouraged a compromise between every party involved. Same authors encourage every stakeholder to hold meetings and discuss the "best solution" (Wojcicki, 2018, para. 8) for the regulation that takes everyone's concerns into consideration as well as the ones who cannot represent themselves as well (Ball, 2018). There are also some suggestions given by the authors, which are grouped under the aforementioned four stakeholders to build a compromise.

4.5.i. What Regulators Can Do?

Regulators are one of the most mentioned stakeholders, therefore the articles hold numerous suggestions regarding them. For instance, most of the articles mentioned necessary changes to be done to the legislation to make it clearer and more understandable (Orlina, 2018). As mentioned before, one of the main concerns regarding the regulations is how unclear it is found (Ferguson, 2019; Kleinman, 2019), therefore authors of the articles suggest some improvements and clarifications to be implemented within the text.

When it comes to exceptions of the regulation, EUCD already explicitly states which genres and a few platforms to be excluded. However, the articles underline their expectations regarding the automated filter systems' inability to distinguish context (Liko, 2019; Reynolds, 2019; Swain, 2019). This makes both the automated systems and the regulation prone to error (Schaub, 2019). Therefore it is often suggested for lawmakers to work with other stakeholders such as creators (Southern, 2018) and platforms (Wojcicki, 2018) for the creation of a safer method.

Authors criticize the independence that was given the individual countries' enforcement of the regulation. Hence they suggest that some type of unification, either in the legislation, regulation or the enforcement. Just like aforementioned Netflix example, some authors expect that Google and its subsidiaries would refrain from "further [dividing] the internet into zones" (Newton, 2019, para. 8) as creating different regulations and systems for all 28 member states plus the others all around the globe would be challenging. O'Hara and Hall (2018) takes Newton (2019)'s "three internets" theory a step further by introducing a fourth "commercial internet" (p. 9) next to open, European and authoritarian internets. They also foresee a possible further division of the internet, even possibly depending on the socio-political stances, which would make it exponentially harder to strategize towards and even enter the competition in other internets, since the internets might even start competing with each other (O'Hara & Hall, 2018). Therefore, they are expected to implement one of two possible strategies for the entirety of the platforms: either limit European audiences from accessing certain content (Ball, 2018; Newton, 2019) or make the filtering stricter all together to bring everyone the same scale of content. A unification of the enforcement is hoped to increase the practicality of the application for every party involved (Liko, 2019), making it easier to strategize for the other stakeholders.

Few of the articles even go further to suggest the elimination of the controversial articles all together (Newton, 2019), although it is highly unrealistic. Despite the

controversy, it can be observed that both the Article 15 and 17 have some powerful allies on their end, who will be in demand of them (or any sorts of regulation) to some extent.

4.5.ii. What Platforms Can Do?

Articles include the most suggestions to the platforms, as they are the stakeholders campaigning the most against the EUCD regulation, even after what they had initially asked for is approved by the regulators. Articles highlight the necessity of holding "agreements with multiple entities" (Wojcicki, 2018, para. 7) as YouTube already does (to some extent) and collaborate closely with traditional rights holders (Alexander, 2019; Newton, 2019; Reynolds, 2019; Schaub, 2019; Vincent, 2018; Wojcicki, 2018). Authors repeatedly drive attention to how essential collaboration of stakeholders is to create a peaceful environment between the very same agents. Newton (2019) even mentions that Google was asked to be more cooperative and he takes it one step further by suggesting other platforms to "follow the suite across Europe" (Newton, 2019, para. 8). In other words, it is suggested that the platforms to "align [their] own rules with that of member states" (Browne, 2019, para. 16), as Facebook suggested, to work towards the benefits of the creators.

The regulation of the digital plane is very much needed (M. Kretschmer, Personal communication, January 24, 2019). However, it should not be based on traditional media stakeholders. The digital plane needs its own rules to be written and implemented. Updating already-existing regulations do not seem like they would suffice, or at least bring the results the regulators and traditional rights holders expect them to bring. When the power-battle is analyzed under this light, it can be predicted that both opinions are very much valid. Personally, it is expected for digital platforms to take a big hit when the EUCD regulations are first implemented. This will be due to the adaptation process, the growing pains of the regulation for every stakeholder involved. However, as the experts discuss in the Unintended Consequences, once the big technology companies and their platforms adapt to the regulations and try their extents with implications, they will gain back the power in the country (Ball, 2018; Braun, 2019; Ferguson, 2019; Griffin, 2019; Kleinman, 2019; Schaub, 2019; Swain, 2019). As their resources are nowhere comparable to the traditional rights holders' (Swain, 2019), they have the opportunity to canalize some of it to bend the rules to their needs and desires.

One of the concerns that are mentioned quite often within the articles is the use of collected user data. It is known to be the reasoning for the GDPR regulation, but articles discuss that the European Parliament to not be as convinced. It is suggested by the articles that the platforms should be more transparent about what they are doing with the data (BBC,

2018; Newton, 2019) they are collecting and use this data to modify and extend automated filters (Liko, 2019), such as ContentID, to be able to spot the infringements faster and more accurately. This way, articles argue that it would be possible to catch any unauthorized use before upload (Ball, 2019; Browne, 2019; Kleinman, 2019; Shaw, 2019; Schaub, 2019) , so the platforms do not have to worry about being held more responsible by their users' choices. Schaub (2019) argues that developing such a technology could be either too costly or not affordable for the mid to smaller size platforms. Therefore, it is suggested by articles that YouTube should sell the licenses to ContentID, although it might constitute a competitive advantage towards the one platform they are very much trying to stop in the beginning. Although both the regulators and the traditional rights holders want to take some of the power of the big tech companies, these regulations can completely backfire by giving them more power in the end (Ball, 2018; Braun, 2019; Ferguson, 2019; Griffin, 2019; Kleinman, 2019; Schaub, 2019; Swain, 2019).

Platforms would wish to eliminate the legal risk that is born from the distribution of the unauthorized material as the EUCD regulation will hold them directly responsible in such a case (Ferguson, 2019; Swain, 2019). Articles foresee that platforms can take a more over-filtering regime to be on the safer side, which can end up in blocking any content that includes any sort of third-party snippets to be blocked (Newton, 2019; Southern, 2018; Vincent, 2018; Volpicelli, 2019). Automated copyright systems are criticized for not being completely accurate by the articles, therefore many suggest the adoption of a system of both automated and manual checks. Some of the articles, however, suggest a temporary blocking system (Ferguson, 2019; Tahir, 2018), which will have no pension for the mistakes of the automated system permanently blocks (Ball, 2018).

Just as mentioned in the previous section, the accessibility problem of European produsers is another point of concern for the platforms. In the case of regulation not being unified, there are two suggestions within the articles: either the creation of a regional iteration of a platform that is accessible from the subjected states (Ferguson, 2019) or full compliance with the lawmakers. Either way, the platforms are suggested to prioritize to ensure through giving the European audience close to full access, if not completely unified through the globe.

Articles are also giving suggestions regarding the compensation of the traditional rights holders. Numerous platforms who are subjected to the regulation already have monetization benefit to their creators. However, articles coded asks the question of what would happen if a pirate earns money by posting unauthorized content. It is suggested by

articles that the platforms as big as YouTube should not only compensate the original artists more as the traditional rights holders ask for, but also pay for the licenses as the Article 17 requires (Braun, 2019; Browne, 2019; Southern, 2018; Swain, 2019; Vincent, 2018; Volpicelli, 2019). Little it is known, the highly controversial platform YouTube already holds licenses and licensing agreements with several rights holders. It is suggested for YouTube to take the agreements to further extend (Ferguson, 2019; Wojcicki, 2018), whereas other platforms to start licensing "all content from the rights holders in the same way that a broadcaster would" (Ferguson, 2019, para 5).

4.5.iii. What Rights Holders Can Do?

Suggestions for the rights holders align more or less with the platforms. Traditional rights holders are advised to negotiate with both the lawmakers and the platforms. Articles suggest that these negotiations with big tech firms should be held for the artists and their work, mainly regarding the ownership of the content and license management (Braun, 2019; Griffin, 2019; Southern, 2018; Swain, 2019; Vincent, 2018). License management means how the excerpt of the copyrighted material is distributed. Authors suggest negotiations to also focus on the extent of the licenses, how much of the authorized content can be used and how can it be shared (Braun, 2019; Browne, 2019; Ferguson, 2019; Griffin, 2019).

It can be perceived that when "leveling the playing field" discussed, it is often mentioned within the context of market power. It is essential for all parties to keep in mind that the digital platforms mentioned are global powers, whereas traditional rights holders are mostly local. However, they are not in the same position economic-wise either. Instead of trying to take away the power from the big tech, traditional stakeholders can strive to work in collaboration with them. This way, they can also take a slice out of the pie that is the reach and the resources of the big tech, while protecting both themselves and their works.

The borders between the industries are blurring, however, the industries themselves are splitting into digital and traditional. This had been seen a couple of times within the results; i.e. Rights Holders and Platforms. This rifting cliff is merely based on the characteristic differences of the mediums they are trying to survive. Essentially, digital and traditional stakeholders are not rivals with each other, as the differences of the mediums desire different specialties and strategies (T. Hoppner, personal communication, January 24, 2019). The problem of "leveling the playing field" comes from this much-overlooked difference. It is almost impossible for regulators to level the playing field as they are different planes.

4.5.vi. What Produsers Can Do?

Articles coded focuses two main suggestions towards produsers based on two main activities: access and create. For undivided access, Liko (2019) suggests produsers to sign in by using Virtual Private Network (VPN) systems. If either the platforms, member states, or the non-European users block the European produsers from accessing the content, it is suggested for them to log in platforms over non-European countries. Using VPN for this purpose allow not only these produsers to get access to a wider library of content, but also broaden the reach of their own content.

For content creation, articles simply suggest produsers to make sure they do not use any third-party content (Liko, 2019; Orlina, 2018; Riert, 2019). This way, they could minimize the possibility of getting blocked by ContentID or any similar content tracking system. These articles argue that when a produser is more confident in their content not including any snippets from any other content, it should be almost sure to pass through the online filters, and create something almost completely original.

As content creators and produsers do not have a union or a lobby like the traditional authors and rights holders, Quigley-Jones suggests that platforms should "creator ambassadors and bring them to Brussels or tell their individual stories and humanize the discussion" (Southern, 2018, para. 10). As mentioned in the previous section, articles emphasize how essential it is for stakeholders to communicate and communicate well. Articles coded argue that lawmakers and traditional stakeholders are unable to understand the importance these platforms have over the produsers, therefore digital rights holder like Wojcicki (2018) run their opposing campaign based on the success stories of the creators in the platform. No direct opinion of the smaller rights holders and produsers had been featured within the articles. The articles feature media professionals' and representatives' opinions on possible implications of the EUCD regulations than featuring what the hashtags of either side features. It might be because both the smaller rights holders and produsers are not as powerful as the influencers and the content creators, do not have the resources as the rights holders (whether traditional or digital), no lobbyist (Alexander, 2019). Hence, their concerns about their voice, engagement, and impact are not as observed.

5. Conclusion

Creation, especially the cultural creation, is a medium for agents in society to express their individuality as well as react and reflect on events happening around them collectively. This type of cultural production highlights recreational media as it is based on the personal interpretation simultaneously fueling the cultural shareability.

As digitization improves and spreads, the old ones transform and adapt to fit in the digital realm. This transformation creates new media recreational genres, new forms of parody and pastiche, such as memes, GIFs, and video reviews such as gameplays. It makes easier to access, create and share so seamless that even the act of production is no longer exclusive to the specific group of people such as creators and their producers and distributors. Digitization allows an everyday agent to create and share within the second over the specific platform for their type of content. What is shared gets instantly available to millions, gets recommended, watched and spread.

Digitization also allows information to spread faster. Educational content becomes accessible with minimal cost in forms of text, audio or visual. This speed is also observed in spreadability of the news updates as one article can spread like wildfire within minutes via the power of the internet. This makes, however, the demand for information exposed to the fake news and false information, as the rate of spread barely allows fact-checking.

Copyright regulations had become a topic of discussion as digitalization. Technological developments had eased up the act of reproduction and redistribution, which had increased the illegal multiplication of the copyrighted content. With the rise of the internet and up and rising Web 2.0 platforms, sharing has become a daily activity. Redistribution had moved into these platforms, hiding piracy and pirates in plain sight.

European Union had several copyright regimes accepted and regulated as the digitization of media grew further. The Legal Protection of Databases had introduced in 1996, Information Society Directive had introduced in 2001 and Copyright in Digital Single Market (EUCD) was proposed in 2016. All three of the regulations included necessary updates on the already-existing copyright regimes, which had mostly regulated under the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty matched with the member states' regulations.

Out of the three, however, EUCD regulations had stirred the most discussion as it had concerned certain platforms and organizations regarding the limitations it is bringing to the systems. The regulation requested more payment for the use of copyrighted content to the rights holders, stricter regulations and consequences for the unauthorized uploads, and

offered the content hosting platforms to be held liable in terms of copyright infringement. The commission had stated they had worked with the traditional rights holders that had diverged from the media companies to creatives.

The analysis had been conducted to observe the ongoing discussions regarding the EUCD regulations to be able to clearly define the aspects of discussions. This is done to understand the stakeholders, their concerns and predictions regarding the regulations. Articles chosen are selected around four dates that are significant for the regulation: the date of first voting (September 12, 2018), the date of second voting (March 26, 2019), the date of final voting on which the regulation had passed (April 14, 2019). The fourth group was the somewhat uneventful 5-month period between the first and second voting, which was left for reevaluation and redrafting of the directive, as the first version was rejected by the European Parliament per public request. This 5-month period was considered because it represents the times the regulation was not discussed as much, and the discussions had started to die down. As both the main and the sub-research questions are more on the descriptive side, they are used to clearly identify the ongoing discussions regarding the regulation.

When the articles are analyzed, the stakeholders who are expected to be affected by the regulations are identified. These stakeholders are grouped into three main categories based on their stances regarding the regulation: Supporters, Opposers and Other. The stakeholders who support the regulation are found to be the regulators, traditional rights holders (like broadcasters, producers, publishers), and traditional platforms (like television, radio, newspapers, magazines). The stakeholders who are opposing the regulations are found to be the digital platforms (like YouTube, Google, Facebook, etc.), digital rights holders who are mainly the managerial body of the said platforms, and media produsers who both create and consume the content in these platforms. The third group holds creatives, organizations, and experts in which some support and some oppose the regulation based on their proximity towards the digital or traditional platforms. Regulators, traditional rights holders, digital platforms and produsers were found to be the most discussed and vocal stakeholders of the regulation.

The articles have shown that the concerns of the rights holders and platforms are more monetary-related as most are big companies with revenue-concerns. Traditional rights holders are concerned about getting the fair payment for their content as well as pirates profiting from their work. Digital platforms have similar concerns although there are slightly more complicated. They are mainly worried about the limitations on their power over one of the biggest markets in the world, which would not only affect the rate of both the uploads

and exposure but also get more costly as it needs specific alterations to comply with the regulators. Regulators perceive the regulation both as an opportunity to limit the big tech companies who they worry about becoming unstoppable, as well as getting one step closer to the goal of transforming European Union into a digital single market which they had initiated when they eliminated the roaming charges. Produsers, however, concerned more about themselves and their content, as the articles show that they perceive the regulation as a limitation for their creative outlets and hence freedom of expression. As mainstream digital creation is argued to be mainly based on a recreation of the already-existing creations, such as memes, GIFs, reviews, fan art, etc., they are worried to auto-censor themselves to not to get punished for uploading content that includes one small snippet. Despite the lawmakers making changes to the regulation and excluding the formats that create concerns, the produsers seem to be not convinced as they do not trust the automated copyright systems the regulators insist on platforms for adopting.

Within some of the articles, the traditional rights holders' concerns regarding the produsers being manipulated by the digital platforms are mentioned. Essentially, some supporters believe that the digital platforms, especially YouTube, are taking advantage of their users' indifference regarding the regulation and manipulating them into opposing it. The platforms are supposedly doing this by scaring the produsers with censorship. They use memes as an example, a format that is loved by many people as they are easy to understand, share and replicate. Article 17 gets its nickname "meme ban" from this, which had become one of the biggest reasons the campaigns against the regulation (#SaveYourInternet) got big in the first place. Platforms had gone as far as specifically asking their European produsers to contact their representatives to vote against the regulation, which had resulted in the rejection of the very first voting in September 2018. The backlash grew so big, that the lawmakers had to explicitly exclude certain forms of creation as well as some of the platforms. As mentioned in the discussion, memes were never included in the regulation in the first place, as it is protected under parody, and parody is excluded in both EUCD and previous regulations. When this is considered, it can be said that the platforms had benefited from the produsers' lack of information regarding the copyright regulations. However, it cannot be denied that the EUCD had defined what is considered as a parody within European copyright regulations for the first time, bringing more clarity to its articles, for which it was highly criticized for.

The exclusion of the recreational genres by name is done to reassure produsers that their creativity will not be limited as long as they respect the already-existing rules.

However, the articles argue that despite its best efforts, EUCD will hinder creativity, as the suggested automated copyright systems are still vulnerable to errors. Despite being excluded, the content that includes snippets might be filtered and blocked by said systems, as they cannot identify the context of a snippet being used. This is expected to cause false claims that could hinder the speed and rate of uploads, as the creator would need to go through formalities to get their content back up. The creators, therefore, might choose to auto-censor, or refrain from using snippets, which is a hit for collective creativity rather than the digital creativity itself. However, the formats which are based on the complete modification of the snippets are still safe, hence the impact will be smaller than the platforms claim to be.

The research's relevance was not only its biggest strength was also its biggest limitation. The topic is highly up to date and still very much debated. Most of the developments were simultaneous to data collection, therefore the time restrictions were highly present during the research period. As the final coding was in mid-April, the data collection had to keep on hold until the final coding had ended. The prospect of the research had to be constantly updated since the lawmakers had changed certain aspects, even the names of the articles, several times.

Another limitation of the analysis was the length of the articles coded. There were 24 articles coded within the analysis. Although the Master's Thesis Guide requests the articles selected should have 300 or higher word count, most of the articles that are not news reports regarding the regulation are around 800-1000 words. Therefore 24 articles are selected carefully, as the articles are 3 times as much the limit. There was only one news report within the sample, which is coded to show how the developments are reported as it has no known writers mentioned and highly objective. The lengthiness of the sample, however, made the analysis a lot longer and time-consuming than expected, as the collection of data collection had started in mid-April. This had required a systematic work ethic and time management to manage the analysis on time. The lengthiness also caused 576 words and word groups to be coded, making the list of open codes highly length and complicated to arrange. Similarly, the construction of the coding tree needed pure attention.

However, this lengthiness of the articles benefited the research context-wise, as they mostly had covered the discussions thoroughly. They were well-constructed, included multiple sides of the discussions and excerpts of the interviews of stakeholders. Although the titles seem like they are over-saturated with similar context, which might seem like a problem in representativity. This is not the case. The pieces' coded names, even seem

similar, and mostly consist of Article 13. However, most of the articles coded include "Article 13" (Article 17) as a clickbait of some sorts. As Article 17 is the most controversial part of the regulation, it might have been thought to bring more exposure to the articles shared. The articles are quite diverse in points of views, regardless, discussing the regulations from different industries', stakeholders', and even locations' aspect.

The research is conducted with the grounded theory approach, which introduces quantitative properties in qualitative research. As the open coding was conducted mostly word-by-word or in small word groups, it increases the analysis' replicability. However, the discussions align more or less under similar themes, which sustains the consistency of the research. This method introduces the context of the texts in further steps of research, hence makes it easier for the researcher to get similar results within every trial. This research can even be conducted in content analysis software such as the University of Illinois' ConText to double check the results' reliability and research's validity.

Word-by-word coding was quite hard and labor intensive. It was initially chosen to be able to compare and contrast data with ConText, as the first methodology consisted of a triangulation with the Topic Modelling and Network Analysis conducted in ConText. If this research were to be conducted again, either the triangulation method would have been kept or the open coding would have been the basis of fragments or sentences. This could make to be able to stop the themes faster and more accurately, which was one of the limitations for this research due to the time constraint.

Consistency also applies within the application of the methodology, as the approach demands a quantitative approach to the initial analysis. All 24 of the articles are coded the same way, by recruiting open-coding. As grounded theory approach requires After a certain number of articles are coded, both the words and the word groups are started being observed. This also shows how the sampling had reached to a saturation, as after a certain point, the repetitions had started in general. The BBC article, the shortest and the only news article, had been used for the credibility check, however the future researchers are highly advised to use triangulation with expert interviews, as it might allow more clarification to the statements made.

Coherence was the hardest to ensure, however, as the data collection was lengthy and there were too many aspects to consider. However, both the complexity and the beauty of the grounded theory approach comes from the multidimensionality in analysis. The research had not only included aspects from different disciplines such as media studies, media economics and business law; it had also presented different agents and industries.

The further research would eventually be highly necessary, especially after the two-year period given to member states ends and the EUCD regulations start being actively enforced. This could allow researchers to observe the real-life implications of the regulations, and hence give better predictions about its effects on digital creativity in a better grounded and more accurate manner.

The research could be modified into an interdisciplinary one as economic theories based on digital single market and legal theories regarding copyright regimes could be employed to design the research in a better-rounded way. Discussions regarding the European digital market transforming into a single market will have on the creativity should be analyzed further, as its sustainability since European member states have different agendas as mentioned before.

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Appendix A. The List of Articles Coded

Alexander, J. (2019, March 27). YouTube creators are still trying to fight back against European copyright vote. Retrieved from https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/27/18283800/youtube-copyright-directive-article-13-memes-grandayy-philip-defranco-european-union

This article was written by Julia Alexander for The Verge on March 27, 2019. Alexander introduces YouTubers', specifically American YouTubers', perspective on the very-Eurocentric copyright regulation. It also discusses the accessibility problems once the regulation is implemented, through the creators' eyes.

Ball, J. (2018, September 13). In punishing tech giants, the EU has made the internet worse for everyone | James Ball. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/13/tech-giants-eu-internet-searches-copyright-law

This article was written by James Ball for the Guardian on September 13, 2018. The article discusses the freedom of the internet. It argues about the regulations' effects on the genres of creative production. It also introduces Wikipedia's stance on the controversy.

BBC. (2018, September 12). Controversial EU copyright change faces key vote. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45485484

This article was a story written for BBC on September 12, 2018. The article not only reports on the regulations right after the first voting period but also gives insight on traditional creatives as well as the stakeholders.

Braun, S. (2019, March 27). Article 13: Will it hinder or promote artistic expression? | DW |
27.03.2019. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/article-13-will-it-hinder-or-promote-
artistic-expression/a-48081724

*The article was written by Stuart Braun for Deutsche Welle on March 27, 2019. This article
is one of the few ones within the sample who discusses the regulation from the perspective of
creative production. Doing this, it represents both sides of the discussion as they feature
opinions from several rights holders. The article discusses the regulation in the lights of
already-existing similar ones from different countries, especially European states like
Germany and Spain. It also discusses the backlash regarding Article 13 and memes,
analyzing it from both perspectives.*

Browne, R. (2019, March 29). What Europe's copyright overhaul means for YouTube, Facebook
and the way you use the internet. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/28/article-
13-what-eu-copyright-directive-means-for-the-internet.html

*The article was written by Ryan Browne for CNBC on March 29, 2019. It discusses what the
consequences could be for the biggest user-generated content platforms; i.e YouTube and
Facebook. It particularly takes a stance because it discusses how the users (or producers)
will be affected by the regulation. It takes the discussion directly from the users perspective
and evaluates how it could impact the daily use of social media by recruiting opposing
organizations' insights.*

Cirisano, T. (2019, April 30). YouTube CEO Susan Wojcicki Ramps Up Article 17 Opposition,
Promises Copyright Claim Changes. Retrieved from
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8509462/youtube-ceo-susan-wojcicki-
opposition-article-13-copyright-claims

This article was written by Tatiana Cirisiano for Billboard on April 30, 2019. The article reports on YouTube's CEO Susan Wojcicki's speech in Cannes. Cleaned from reflections on other things in Wojcicki's speech, the article presents both Wojcicki's and the platform's updated stance on the final version of the regulation.

Dubey, Y. (2019, March 28). EU Article 13 Explained: From A Noob's Perspective. Retrieved from https://fossbytes.com/eu-article-13-explained-noob/

This article was written by Yetnesh Dubey for Fossbyte on February 28, 2019. The article discusses the regulation not only from the "meme ban" aspect but also its possible implications in the gaming industry. It also introduces conflicts in a new genre of content, game streams.

Ferguson, L. (2019, April 24). Article 13: The End Of The Internet As We Know It? Retrieved from https://www.bandt.com.au/opinion/article-13-end-internet-know

The article was written by the social video strategy consultancy The Flaxen's CEO Liz Ferguson. It was featured in B&T Magazine on April 23rd, 2019. The article discusses how the EUCD regulations are perceived by traditional rights holders and content creator and influencers. It gives solid ideas on both of the opposing sides of the discussion. The article also touches upon the global impact of the regulation and how it is not as Eurocentric it is deemed as.

Griffin, A. (2019, March 26). The EU just passed some of its most controversial rules ever. Here's what they actually mean. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/article-13-vote-eu-meme-ban-copyright-law-rule-explained-a8841016.html

This article was written by Andrew Griffin for Independent on March 26, 2019. Similar to the Orlina (2018) article, it discusses the regulation and the discussion surrounding it in a very objective and informative way. However, Griffin's article was featured after the second round of voting, so it shows the differences made to the regulation clearly from its earlier counterpart.

Kleinman, Z. (2019, March 26). Article 13: Memes exempt as EU backs controversial copyright law. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-47708144

The article was written by Zoe Kleinman for BBC News on March 26, 2019. This article discusses Article 13 with the perspective of the nickname "meme ban". It reports on where the nickname came from, why it constructed such a backlash and what the European Parliament did to calm the opposition.

Liko, C. (2019, April 15). Copyright in a digital world: The implications of Article 13 in North America. Retrieved from https://obj.ca/article/copyright-digital-world-implications-article-13-north-america

This article was written by Chris Liko for Ottawa Business Journal on April 15, 2019. It discusses what the regulation will mean for the North American stakeholders, especially the ones from the United States and Canada.

Newton, C. (2019, March 27). Europe is splitting the internet into three. Retrieved from https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/27/18283541/european-union-copyright-directive-internet-article-13

This article was written by Casey Newton for the Verge on March 27, 2019. The article discusses the possible harm of the regulations on unified internet. The main discussion is

about the accessibility problem of the European audience. It also discusses the extents of the measurements the big tech can take.

Orlina, G. (2018, September 24). All filters: Article 13 of the EUCD explained. Retrieved from https://www.gadgetmatch.com/eucd-article-13-explainer/

This article was written by Gab Orlina for GadgetMatch on September 24, 2018. The author reports on what the regulation is and why it is highly controversial. It clearly states every aspect of the regulation and the discussion surrounding it in a very objective and informative way.

Reynolds, M. (2019, May 24). What is Article 13? The EU's divisive new copyright plan explained. Retrieved from https://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-is-article-13-article-11-european-directive-on-copyright-explained-meme-ban

This article was written by Matt Reynolds for Wired on April 15, 2019. The article discusses the concept of meme ban and the stances taken towards it. It focuses on YouTube's strategy as well as introducing the music market's problems with the platform.

Riegert, B. (2019, February 14). Opinion: EU online copyright reform won't break the internet | DW | 14.02.2019. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-eu-online-copyright-reform-wont-break-the-internet/a-47524988

This article was written by Bernd Riegert for Deutsche Welle on February 14, 2019. It is one of the few articles that are from the hibernation period of voting. The article takes the regulation and flips it upside down, becoming one of the earliest discussion of the over the hyperbole regarding the "end of the internet". Riegert argues why regulation is necessary and why it will not be the internet as known.

Saez, C. (2018, December 05). Google, YouTube Accused Of Disinformation, Scaremongering By European Authors. Retrieved from https://www.ip-watch.org/2018/12/05/google-youtube-accused-disinformation-scaremongering-european-authors/

This article was written by Catherine Saez for the IP- Watch on May 12, 2019. It is the most recent article within the sample. It is also the final article that discusses the misinformation and scaremongering strategy YouTube supposedly has. It debunks why the truth is far away from what YouTube says it is.

Schaub, S. (2019, April 12). Article 13: Has the EU killed the open internet? Retrieved from https://www.techradar.com/news/article-13-has-the-eu-killed-the-open-internet

This article was written by Sebastian Schaub for TechRadar on April 12, 2019. The article discusses the freedom of the internet as well as simple predictions for what could happen after the implementation of the regulation.

Shaw, A. (2019, April 25). EU copyright crackdown is intended to protect artists, but might it damage their market instead? Retrieved from https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/will-eu-copyright-crackdown-protect-artists-or-damage-their-market

This article was written by Anny Shaw for the Art Magazine on April 25, 2019. The article discusses the new regulations through artists' eyes, presenting opinions from both digital artists and traditional art rights holders.

Southern, L. (2018, December 14). The death of memes and other myths of the EU's controversial new copyright laws. Retrieved from https://digiday.com/uk/copyright-laws-eu-myths/

This article was written by Lucinda Southern for Digiday on December 12, 2018. The article reflects on three speculations surrounding the regulation and why it is not the case as they are presented. Similar to Volpicelli, it discusses how the misinformation is circulating to create pressure on the regulators. However, in this article, it is the effects on producers that are discussed and not the platform.

Swain, F. (2019, March 27). Article 13: A guide to the new EU copyright rules and the ban on memes. Retrieved from https://www.newscientist.com/article/2197907-article-13-a-guide-to-the-new-eu-copyright-rules-and-the-ban-on-memes/

This article was written by Frank Swain for NewScientist on March 27, 2019. Similar to the previous two, it discusses what the regulation is and why it is controversial. However, it introduces the industrial exemptions to the regulations rather than the content. It also introduced the piracy aspect to the discussion, linking it back to GDPR.

Tahir, N. (2018, November 15). EU's Article 13, and how it affects "you" as a creator. Retrieved from https://medium.com/datadriveninvestor/eus-article-13-and-how-it-affects-you-as-a-creator-2cea49bd2c6b

This article was written by Nabeel Tahir for the Medium on November 15, 2018. It breaks down what the regulations are in bite-size information to inform produsers about what to expect once it starts being implemented.

Vincent, J. (2018, September 12). EU approves controversial Copyright Directive, including internet 'link tax' and 'upload filter'. Retrieved from https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/12/17849868/eu-internet-copyright-reform-article-11-13-approved

This article was written by James Vincent for the Verge on September 12, 2018. The article shows the initial implementation plan of the European Parliament and discusses the regulations' effects on the global scene.

Volpicelli, G. (2019, March 28). Don't believe the hype: Article 13 is great news for YouTube. Retrieved from https://www.wired.co.uk/article/article-13-youtube-what-next

This article was written by Gian Volpicelli for Wired on March 28, 2019. The article discusses how big tech platforms, especially YouTube can benefit from the up and coming regulations. It is also one of the only articles that discuss YouTube's perception management towards its creators and users. It discusses ContentID thoroughly, under the light of similar software in very different websites across the continent.

Wojcicki, S. (2018, November 12). YouTube chief says EU copyright plan could lead to blocked access. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/266e6c2a-e42e-11e8-a8a0-99b2e340ffeb

YouTube's CEO Susan Wojcicki released this article from both Financial Times and YouTube Creator Blog in November 12, 2018. The article includes YouTube's stance on the new regulation and reasons for it. It also includes how they are preparing for it. It is taking the platform's narrative back into their hands and assessing what's in store for them. The article also gives information about the automated copyright filter, ContentID, which the platform already uses.

Appendix B. The Topic List

   The initial coding of BBC (2018) article had shown some idea on how the articles to code should be selected. The insight on what to expect from the topics of the articles that are looked for before the open coding had started are as given below:

Topic 1: Understanding EUCD

Topic 2: The identification of the stakeholders and their relations to the regulation

Topic 3: The stances of the stakeholders regarding the regulation and their arguments

Topic 4: The stance of the author of the article regarding the regulation

Topic 5: The expected media economic implications

Topic 6: The expected digital creativity implications

Topic 7: The further developments for the regulation

Topic	Objectives
Understanding EUCD	-What is EUCD? -What does it aim for? -Why it is criticized?
The identification of the stakeholders and their relations to the regulation	-Who are the stakeholders? -What is their relation to copyright regimes? -What are their relations to each other?
The stances of the stakeholders regarding the regulation and their arguments	-Are they for or against the regulation? -Why are their expectations from the regulation? -What is their argument?
The stance of the author of the article regarding the regulation	-Do they have an opinion? -What is their stance regarding the regulation? -What are their arguments?

	-What are their expectations?
The expected media economic implications	-What is the definition of "original content"? -What is the definition of "authenticity"? -What will the impacts of the regulation be on creativity? -What will the impacts of the regulation be on cultural production?
Impact on Media Economy	-What are the impacts on industries? -What are the impacts on stakeholders? -Is the regulation feasible? -What are the global implications?
Further Developments	-How can the EUCD could be moved better? -What can the stakeholders do?

Appendix C. The Coding Tree

Table 1

[Table Title]

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
Background Information	Countries Mentioned	EU member states	22
		North America	8
		UK	6
		Germany	5
		United States	5
		Canada	4
		Other countries	4
		France	3
		China	2
		Russia	2
		Spain	2
		Estonia	1
		Finland	1
		Italy	1
		Sweden	1
		Luxembourg	1
		Slovenia	1
		Poland	1
		the Netherlands	1
		Belgium	1
		North Korea	1
		Iran	1

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		United Arab Emirates	1
		different regions	1
		other parts of the world	1
	Institutions	European Parliament	64
		European Policymakers	4
		European Organizations	1
		Influencing institutions of EU	1
	Procedure	Time frame*	49
		Voted in	42
		EU countries implement changes	36
		Approval of EU countries	4
		Request Changes	3
	Regulation	Article 13*	195
		EUCD	157
		Article 11	24
		Discussions of EUCD	13
		Article 12a	1
		EU Rules	1
	Other Copyright Regulations	Fair Use	5
		GDPR	5
		Similar Regulation	3
		Digital Economy	1

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		Act	
		UK's Porn Block	1
Conversations about EUCD	Aims of Lawmakers	liability.	51
		stop copyright infringement	40
		copyright legislation	32
		fair payment	27
		stop unauthorized uploads	23
		ContentID	19
		stop platforms from spreading misinformation	18
		remove power of big tech giants	15
		stop unauthorized use	13
		protecting original works	13
		compensation of right holders	9
		copyright management	8
		protecting licensees	7
		identification of content	7
		authorized content	7
		monitor	7

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		protecting partners	6
		necessary	6
		easier to regulate	5
		create copyright legislation	5
		build a more open world	4
		track content	4
		control over distribution	4
		intentions of lawmakers	4
		legal obligation	3
		stop share without explicit permission	3
		license all content	3
		benefits of artists	3
		worried	3
		warnings	3
		leveling the playing field	2
		fair rules	2
		avoid borrowed content	2
		easier to comply	2
		extension of copyright law	2
		age verification	2

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		checks	
		create digital single market	2
		legitimate	2
		fund quality journalism	1
		easy access	1
		protecting children	1
		future-proofing	1
		legal right	1
		stop fraud	1
		correcting a situation	1
		bring EU countries together	1
		broader control	1
		stoo direct violation	1
		excuse of copyright	1
		more money journalism	1
		pull the news platform	1
		workaround	1
		widespread introduction	1
		trouble	1
		supporting	1

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		member states	
		protecting children	1
		future-proofing	1
		legal right	1
		stop fraud	1
		correcting a situation	1
	Call-to- Actions	meme ban	9
		#SaveYourInternet	8
		Link tax	8
		backlash	4
		#Yes2copyright	1
		landing page	1
		online petition	1
	Common Goals	monetize content	20
		user-generated content.	16
		freedom of expression	13
		protect people's livelihoods	8
		Freedom of art	7
		community	6
		protect artists	5
		benefit everyone	4
		protect creators	3

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		not the end	3
		compassion	2
		humanize the discussion	1
		cultural and journalistic diversity	1
		benefit Europe's creative industries	1
		ally	1
	Concerns of Platforms	internet freedom	26
		end of internet	14
		users have the ability to upload content	13
		online censorship	12
		harm Europe's creative industries	10
		harm creators	6
		user experience	6
		caution	5
		harm Europe's digital industries	5
		Brexit	4
		creation of a more closed society	4
		hinder creation	4
		lose access	4

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		promote	4
		threat	3
		blocked by state	2
		destroy user-generated content	2
		free market	2
		strengthen incumbents	2
		not making posting harder	2
		open web	2
		not harm	2
		vast content	2
		against its user base.	1
		authoritarian internet	1
		avoid auto filter	1
		avoid penalties	1
		Conservative government	1
		deleted channels	1
		harm musicians	1
		IP enforcement	1
		lose a vital showcase for their work	1
		lost revenue	1
		protect big tech	1

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		users challenged by rightsholders	1
		web neutrality	1
		demonetises	1
		allowing content immediately	1
		more content	1
		Share Worthy content	1
		shut down	1
		sift through material	1
		severity of punishments	1
	Critiques	campaigned against	63
		filter	46
		controversial	43
		unclearity	30
		dramatically impact	28
		block content before upload	19
		open to abuse	18
		block content after upload	16
		forcing	6
		Fair Use	5
		complicated	5
		harm smaller	4

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		platforms	
		impossible	4
		industrial change	4
		inefficient	4
		harder to put content	3
		catastrophic	3
		limitations	3
		will need passport	3
		unability to decide	3
		against conventional wisdom	2
		change the power balance	2
		difficult to implement	2
		difficulty in international juristication	2
		platfors manipulating users	2
		indifferent	2
		no choice	2
		badly written	1
		conflict of interest	1
		corporate battle	1

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		counterproductive	1
		creators caught in the crossfire	1
		difficult to manage	1
		draconian possible national laws	1
		harder to navigate	1
		harder to regulate	1
		impractical	1
		Interfere with other laws	1
		not liable	1
		not useful	1
		questionable	1
		time-consuming	1
		very little guidance	1
		antitrust	1
		better methods	1
		challenging	1
		disaster	1
		fear	1
		hesitation	1
		inconsistency	1
		pricing	1

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		paradox	1
		overreach	1
		more money live	1
		redundant	1
		refusal to mistakes	1
		regret	1
		set of ideals	1
		wrongheaded	1
		unlikely to be affected	1
		unpopular system	1
		unrealistic	1
		untested	1
		upheld and strengthened	1
	Exempted Content	memes	51
		parody	13
		GIFs	10
		game streaming	8
		non-commercial use	7
		remix	6
		snippets	6
		gameplay performance	4
		permitted content	4

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		caricature	3
		Citing	3
		educational content	3
		mashups	3
		quotation	3
		cloud storage	2
		license free music	2
		pastiche	2
		satire	2
		reaction	2
		small samples	2
		comment videos	1
		emojis	1
		film analysis	1
		musical covers	1
		preview	1
		annual turnover below €10 million	1
		available for fewer than three years	1
		dating service	1
		fewer than five million unique monthly visitors	1
		retweet	1
	Included Content	copyrighted	28

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		content	
		video uploads	20
		hyperlinks	12
		news	12
		imagery	11
		music	10
		text	7
		internet content	6
		film	4
		images of sporting events	4
		online stories	4
		clips	3
		Press publications	3
		sport	3
		apps	2
		images of works of art	2
		mainstream songs	2
		music uploads	2
		sound recording	2
		trailers	2
		background music	2
		visual example	2
		flag	2

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		science	2
		Avengers	1
		family video	1
		Nipples, pornographic content	1
		No Man's Sky	1
		publications	1
		software	1
		Slipped content	1
	Impacted by the EUCD	content	7
		global digital content industry	6
		advert-generated revenue	5
		creator economy	4
		e-commerce	4
		creation of knowledge	3
		competitors	3
		creativity	3
		digital advances	3
		information	3
		US companies	3
		American internet	2
		create new content	2
		database	2

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		European internet	2
		impact on everyone	2
		inspire	2
		creator experience	1
		activities	1
		business models	1
		collection	1
		country you log on from.	1
		dark web	1
		location	1
		offline world	1
		money	1
		public space	1
		purchasing decision	1
		gaming industry	1
		Global music industry	1
	Unintended Consequences	block all content	33
		failure-prone	22
		uninteded consequences	13
		big tech giants gain power	9
		over-filter	6
		can't identify	5

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		context	
		disagreement on ownership	5
		global issue	5
		splitting the internet into three	5
		creators block users in EU	4
		multiple copyrights	3
		delay to the publish date	2
		preferred platform	2
		reproduction	2
		can't keep up with digital	1
		capitalise on the internet's sudden need	1
		Europe's powerlessness	1
		fake claims.	1
		false statement	1
		harder to create rivals	1
		lack of respect to EU	1
		library of content varies	1
		platform-policing	1

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		use copyright law aggressively	1
		user-block content	1
		ardent claims	1
		preferred creators	1
		reputation	1
		safety ranking	1
		uneffective	1
		take advantage	1
Stakeholders	Creative Agents	CONTENT CREATORS	59
		artists	26
		YouTuber	15
		musicians	12
		European creators	11
		Dr. Grandayy	9
		influencers	8
		Philip DeFranco	5
		Debbie Harry	4
		Sir Paul McCartney	3
		streamers	3
		authors	2
		journalists	2
		pianist Rhodes	2
		Wyclef Jean	2

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		actors	1
		creatives	1
		Ed Sheeran	1
		Elton John	1
		Entertainer	1
		Sir Tim Berners Lee	1
		smaller pornographers.	1
		YouTuber Craig Thompson	1
		contributors	1
		berlin-based musician	1
		Dua Lipa	1
		Kurzgesagt	1
		Matt Koval	1
		MindGeek	1
	Digital Platforms	YouTube	148
		social platforms	54
		big tech giants	48
		Google	38
		hosting platform	33
		Facebook	30
		Twitter	18
		online platforms	15
		news platforms	14
		Wikipedia	9

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		Instagram	6
		service providers	6
		Google News	5
		Spotify	4
		Twitch	4
		Amazon	3
		big platforms	3
		Github	3
		Soundcloud	3
		search engines	3
		Alphabet	2
		forums	2
		Netflix	2
		Reddit	2
		start-ups	2
		4Chan	1
		Apple	1
		Apple Music	1
		DeviantArt	1
		eBay	1
		IGTV	1
		PornHub	1
		RedTube	1
		Shopee	1
		Snapchat	1
		streaming service	1

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		Tinder	1
		niche social networks	1
		aggregator sites	1
		vast majority of the sites	1
	Experts	Critics	19
		senior lawyer at linklaters	2
		copyright specialists	1
		media professionals	1
		lawyers	1
	Digital Rights holders	Wojcicki	17
		YouTube executives	5
		media firms	5
		Wikipedia cofounder	4
		internet stakeholders	2
		WWW inventor	1
		platform owners	1
	Media Produsers	european audience	21
		users	19
		Youtuber	15
		everyone that	8

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		uploads content	
		ordinary people	7
		Reader	1
		customers	1
		individuals	1
		less trusted uploaders	1
		online mobs	1
		young people	1
		Reader	1
	Organizations	lobbyists	17
		representatives	7
		freedom of speech campaigners	6
		EDRİ	5
		activists	5
		organisations	4
		DR group EFF	3
		Edima	2
		non-profit service providers	2
		EU organisations	1
		European Authors' Society	1
		experts	1
		IFPI	1
	Policymakers	EU member states	12

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		regulators	8
		MEP Reda	7
		Axel Voss	5
		European policymakers	4
		MEP Honeyball	2
		decision makers	1
		EU organisations	1
		French MEP	1
		influencing instutions of EU	1
		MEP for London	1
		Max Andersson	1
	Traditional Platforms	TV	2
		radio	1
		German television station	1
		Magazines	1
	Traditional Rights Holders	supporters	33
		company	26
		traditional rights holders	24
		publishers	21
		music labels	20
		smaller right holders	11
		Game developers	5
		IMPALA chairman	4

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		chairman of BASCA	3
		entertainment channels	3
		producers	3
		Silicon Valley	3
		SVP of NBCUniversal	3
		big studios	2
		CEO	2
		CEO of peg.co	2
		head of art law	2
		IMPALA	2
		IP owners	2
		media conglomerates	2
		head of sharper group	2
		AFP news agency	1
		big brands	1
		CEO of Flaxen	1
		CEO of open knowledge	1
		Disney	1
		editor of Netopia	1
		German commissioner for culture	1
		German television station	1

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		head of broadcast partnership	1
		High-profile figures	1
		Hollywood	1
		Marvel Studios	1
		music distributor	1
		official organiser of a sports match	1
		PRS for music	1
		record label BPI	1
		Sony Music Entertainment	1
		Universal Music Group	1
		Waner Music Group	1
		Axel Springer	1
Suggestions to Stakeholders	To Platforms	online copyright system	13
		collaboration with right holders	10
		royalties	6
		automated filters	3
		trust rank	3
		permanent block	2
		special platform for Europe	2
		temporary block	2

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		transparency	2
		diversification of trending	2
		align its own rules	1
		creator ambassadors	1
		follow suite	1
		manage data differently	1
		manage data differently	1
		no pension for mistakes	1
		relocation	1
		sift through material	1
		distribution deals	1
		global platform	1
		manual copyright claims	1
		own solutions	1
	To Produsers	ensure that an uploaded video	4
		VPN	1
		Cut ties	1
	To Regulatos	exemption	30
		changes to legislation	9
		compromise	8
		improvements	6

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		enforcement strength	4
		explicity	4
		reduce legal risk	3
		agreements with multiple entities	2
		GDPR compliance	2
		no union	2
		removal of articles	2
		sufficient to comply	2
		creators working with policy makers	1
		practical application	1
		deleting	1
		detailed guideline	1
		fixing	1
		keep as is	1
		no change	1
		reversal	1
		scaling back	1
		softening the language	1
	To Rights Holders	license	18
		negotiate with big tech	6

Selective Codes	Axial Codes		

Selective Codes	Axial Codes	Open Codes	Number of Codes
		license	18
		negotiate with big tech	6
		own and distribute content	6
		right to access	2
		no lobbyists	1
		extract fines	1
		settlement	1

Notes:

1. *Article 13 refers to Article 17 and Article 11 refers to Article 15. It is coded that way as that is how it is used in the written pieces.*
2. *Timeframe also includes the timeline of the regulation as well, for convenience.*