

Imaginaries and state-market relationships: The securitisation and
commercialisation of migration in the European Union

Master's thesis
Governance of Migration & Diversity
Erasmus University Rotterdam
16-06-2019

Anandi Vinken, 480460
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Willem Schinkel
Second reader: Dr. Rogier van Reekum
Word count: 10925

Abstract

As a concept rooted in Science and Technology Studies, imaginaries are seen to be capable of mobilising technologies and facets of the imagination that result in the creation of collectively held political or social visions. The sociotechnical imaginary framework aims to clarify the “continually rearticulated awareness of order in social life” and the processes committed to upholding this order made visible through practices (Jasanoff, 2015, p.38, 324). This thesis lays bare the imaginaries that configure the relationship between the securitisation of international migration and the EU’s security and defence market by investigating their connection in Horizon 2020 research and technology (R&T) projects. As a creative force, imaginaries work to legitimise relations between security and defence businesses and policymaking that shape material outcomes such as bordering practices and security R&T. These imaginaries relate to security and defence innovation as being able to achieve global competitiveness, while claiming to fix complex political and societal issues. The combination with imaginaries that associate migration and migrants with threat and criminality make deterring and combatting migration become self-evident answers for dealing with the issue. This sustains the demand for security and defence products and sees an increasing militarisation of civil society. The research also shows how a mode of governance that favours private participation in order to achieve political goals is used by the EU as a form of governmentality to assert political agency and reinforce its integration process.

Key words: commercialisation, European Union, imaginaries, migration, securitisation.

Introduction

International migration has come to be associated with disorder, crime, and terrorism. This has led to migration-related issues being regarded as a security concern closely linked to a political community’s sense of sovereignty (Bigo, 2002). The practice of securitisation has the aim and consequence of treating the issue it refers to with urgency and exceptional political measures, which can curtail rights and liberties (Bigo, Carrera, Guild & Walker, 2007, p.2). Ascribing migration as a security issue focuses on “combating” migration and sees migrants arriving at borders as threats and “illegals”. The main responses to address migration are therefore related to stricter border controls, pre-travel risk assessing populations and the invention of new technologies that manage people’s identities (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p.134).

Within the European Union (EU) and the administration of the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA), migration and asylum came to be institutionally linked to illegal activities and terrorism because of the European integration process. By abolishing the EU’s internal borders, it was thought that in order to remain in control of who and what enters the area of free movement, external borders need to be secured. Consolidated with the creation of the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the development of the internal market and the Schengen Agreement were fundamental factors that contributed to the securitisation of migration (Huysmans, 2006).

According to the JHA, migration and asylum require the same response of policing and border patrol as the measures needed in the fight against organised crime and terrorism (European Council, 2019). However, security assemblages now operate less along a rationale of responding to emergencies but rather to provide a justification for the growth and reinforcement of the security measures already in place (Jeandesboz, 2016, p.295). This plays into the hands of the industry that manufactures and sells border security technologies, referred to as borderscapes (Lemberg-Pedersen,

2013). Operating according to a capitalist logic, private and public-private security companies benefit from the demand on their products for securing borders. Private security companies (PSCs) have also been able to shape the definition of security through processes of meaning-making by providing knowledge and expertise to politicians, with the aim to perpetuate their business model (Bigo & Jeandesboz, 2010, p.2; Leander, 2005; Lemberg-Pedersen, 2013).

The many processes at play within migration's political economy and securitisation that rely on technological innovation come together in sociotechnical imaginaries that have the capacity to form these processes and practices into a coherent whole (Jasanoff, 2015; Walters, 2010, p.219). Part of this imaginary revolves around creating and sustaining a market for the security industry, which has been informed by market rationales governing public and political decision-making. This does not imply that governments have lost control to private companies. Rather, in line with contemporary capitalism, governments aim to increase control by allowing private firms a greater role and providing a conducive environment in which to establish (Fligstein, 2001; Menz, 2013).

The specific governance practice of open method of coordination (OMC), first referred to during the Lisbon European Council in 2000, actively seeks to achieve its goals by relying on the private sector and public-private partnerships. Within the EU, the OMC creates a system based on participation from societal actors so as to ensure innovation and cooperation in the areas it seeks to develop (European council 2000; Walters & Haahr, 2005, p. 90, 99). One such area is the EU's security and defence industry. The growth of this industry not only aims to guarantee the security and freedom of European citizens but also enlarging the global market position of European PSCs (EC, 2012, p.9). The creation of a European security and defence budget for R&T is meant to contribute to achieving this goal. Moreover, the European Commission (EC) undertakes a synergy of civilian and military research and development initiatives. This aims to tap into private companies' research in order to support the defence industry as well as making military technology available for civil use. Blurring the distinction between security and military are according to the EC necessary to satisfy Europe's capability needs (EC, 2016, p.5,9,11).

The EU Horizon 2020 programme is one of the means to make procurers "agents of change" by "bridging the gap from research to market". Innovations made by private companies are supported by public users that buy new technology through pre-commercial procurement schemes (EC, 2012, p.9). This specific state-market relationship, the securitisation of migration and technological innovations are based on imaginaries that make these modes of regulation possible and accepted. These imaginaries inform what political actions are deemed appropriate and how the wider public is to view migration. The aim of this thesis is to render visible the imaginaries that legitimise the relationship between PSCs and policymaking. In that way, this thesis hopes to contribute with a deeper understanding of migration's securitisation process, exposing naturalised forms of violence, surveillance, and militarisation that answer to an internal dynamic of profit-making. The question of this research is:

What imaginaries configure the relationship between the securitisation of international migration and the EU's security and defence market in R&T programs?

Theoretical Framework and Previous Research

Science and Technology Studies (STS) investigate what place science and technology occupy within society. Such investigations go further than establishing how knowledge or machines are made, and

examine how science and technology as authoritative features relate to other powerful institutions and are integrated within society (Jasanoff, 2015, p.340). A concept rooted in STS, imaginaries are seen capable of mobilising material technologies and facets of the imagination that result in the creation of collectively held political or social visions (Jasanoff, 2015, p.324). As defined by Sheila Jasanoff (2015), the term “sociotechnical” imaginary captures more completely the notion of science and technology as being both products and instruments of imaginaries present in society, and their performative function in the realms of politics and policy (p.28). The sociotechnical imaginary framework aims to clarify the “continually rearticulated awareness of order in social life”, and the processes committed to upholding this order in which science and technology are central institutions (Jasanoff, 2015, p.38). This awareness is made visible through practices, such as the R&T projects that stimulate innovation for border security technology, which instruct and respond to a desired social order. Material infrastructures like roads, sewage systems or surveillance and security complexes clearly show what historically has been achieved and what has been deemed important. In turn, it is through the development and (re)constitution of these technopolitical systems that collective desires for the future are materialised. What direction science and technology take within a society, therefore, reveals its normative conception of itself and what is considered right and wrong (Jasanoff, 2015, p.28, 32).

The concept of imaginaries is intimately related to the notion of co-production, which highlights the relation between the ‘social’ (such as practices, identities, norms, and institutions) and the material underpinnings of social formations. Awareness of co-production will make visible how natural and social orders are produced together, which describes specific historical periods and its particular political and cultural formation (Jasanoff, 2004). The co-productionist notion points directly at how the making of science and technology, or knowledge more broadly, is integrated into practices of state-making and governance (Jasanoff, 2004, p.13). In this view, particular knowledge such as the meanings of ‘security’ or the practice of securitisation are constitutive of specific modes of governance, but also of meanings pertaining to national identity or social belonging. Securitisation practices such as border control technology have a demonstrative effect which enacts the community ‘Europe’ that is to be secured against threatening outsiders. Through this, a specific version of ‘Europe’ itself comes into being, which formulates who is to be governed and in what manner (Van Reekum, 2018, p.2).

Working in the reverse direction, a society’s particular mode of governance has an influence on what knowledge or meanings are being made (Jasanoff, 2004, p.13). Institutional structures such as the JHA and the EU’s governance practice of OMC will, therefore, have had an influence on what knowledge is deemed important to gain, and what technologies are deemed necessary to develop or invent in order to satisfy ‘security’ needs. Co-production can focus attention on how generally presupposed and accepted knowledge and expertise, with the technologies resulting from these, are involved with modes of governance and power constructs (Jasanoff, 2004, p.14). In relation to this, imaginaries instruct the content and also the direction of co-productions that are to order society. For the EU to reach its goals it now relies, apart from the governments of the member states, on the private sector. According to the EU, the involvement of civil society is a way to answer to complaints of its democratic deficit. However, the OMC as a mode of governance aims to create subjectivities that possess certain qualities so to optimise performance. This renders citizens, companies and member states alike calculable, competitive and required to be self-sufficient (Walters & Haahr, 2005, p.99) This process is an example of Foucauldian governmentality that seeks to exert power by developing Europe’s interior spaces through mechanisms of knowledge production. By depicting concepts such as markets, borders, and citizens knowable in a particular way, as well the creation of governance

structures such as the OMC, governmentality is a form of control that permeates into society rather than ruling from a central locus of government (Walters & Haahr, 2005, p.102).

The co-productionist notion and the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries can be combined with a sociological approach to the creation of market institutions. Such an approach takes into account that firms such as PSCs need a wide set of social relations to create an environment in which to make a profit. For markets to form and to continue to exist, political and social will are needed to set up stable markets in which cultural understandings and cognitive frames have the function of sense-making. These frames stipulate 'the rules of the game' about who is an actor, how to organise resources, and provide the conditions for the private accumulation of wealth (Fligstein, 2000, p.16-17, 20,22). Market creation does not operate along the logic of a cost-benefit model only but includes the set-up of social and political relations that allow for the acceptance and infrastructure of a particular market. As such, studying the political economy of a certain sector highlights the connections between "economic interests, political processes and social structures" (Flynn, 2016, p.1). The commercialisation of security technologies is part of a restructuring of public-private and global-local relations, which require acceptance of norms and meanings relating to risk, security and technology. Within such a political economy it is hard to determine where the border lies between the public and the private (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009, p.3, 6). Sociotechnical imaginaries play an important role in creating the acceptance of such a political economy and social order. Knowledge production that shapes the public imagination through stories of progress, such as the belief in technological innovation as a solution for societal issues, relies on the configuration of imaginaries (Jasanoff, 2015). The effect is that imaginaries condition the people living in a certain social order, in the EU/EC's case it also aims to condition the people living outside of it.

In addition, knowledge construction, as the power to define desirable ways forward, does not originate solely from state institutions. A particular vision of the future can come from powerful individuals or groups in society and is consolidated through policy, legislation, the media, and other social institutions (Jasanoff, 2015, p.5, 6). Furthermore, non-state actors such as multinational companies are also capable of (co-)constructing dominant imaginaries. In relation to immigration policy and its effect on border control, Martin Lemberg-Pedersen's (2013) use of the concept of borderscapes exemplifies how sociotechnical imaginaries can be shaped by a diverse set of actors and processes. Referring to the industry of border security technology, through the process of borderscaping, political and material aspects of borders are given new meaning and are reconstructed in such a way they securitise the governance of Europe's borders. This happens through creating a demand for border control technologies, in which PSCs play an active role, and from which they profit. In order to secure market shares, PSCs have become lobbyists, security advisers, and public-opinion shapers (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2013, p.161). This means that the issue of migration has not become a matter of security in response to rising levels of insecurity or crime, but on the contrary, migration's securitisation is the result of its construction by professionals concerned with "the management of unease". These professionals are politicians, police, and PSCs, but also organisations and companies dealing with intelligence and the military that needed a new purpose after the end of the Cold War (Bigo, 2002, p.64).

The securitisation of migration goes further than creating profitability for border security technology and enlarging Europe's market position alone. From an International Political Sociology perspective, Didier Bigo (2002) has defined securitisation as a form of Foucauldian governmentality that serves to give content to political and economic processes. The extreme politicisation of migration, as well as seeing the immigrant as a threat, fits into the creation of a sovereignty myth and

a 'truth' about the culture of a nation-state as a homogenous container that needs protection from outsiders (p.68). Therefore, securitisation of migration does not only create threats but makes identities as well. The narrative of the opposition between the migrant, who threatens the core values of a country, and the image of the good citizen, creates a hierarchy among people and mobilises a huge array of policing, monitoring, controls, and participation from businesses and citizens. In effect, the securitisation of migration gives politicians the appearance of being in control over deciding who comes into the country. Moreover, taking a stance on migration is a way for politicians to distinguish themselves from other politicians in the political game where 'immigration' is utilised to address uncertainties about topics ranging from the economic to the social (Bigo, 2002, p.71-2, 79).

According to Bigo (2002), securitisation does not aim to take an issue outside of the political sphere and into a security framework, which requires exceptional measures. Instead, securitisation works through everyday technologies that capture the struggle of power positions (politicians, bureaucracies, business, military) in determining the legitimate truth and course of action in the "management of unease". These technologies can take the form of exceptional and illiberal practices in a particular move of (in)securitisation and when accepted by different publics. The practice of (in)securitisation renders some actors to be secure and others insecure, which makes this relationship interdependent (p.73-4; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p.69-70). For example, there is a dominant vision within Europe that regards countries outside of Europe to be insecure as opposed to a safe and secure Europe (Collyer, 2006, p.256). The 'immigrant' provides politicians with a focal point as an internal threat. For the police, military, and secret services this 'enemy' provides the external threat from which society needs protection. In addition, the professionals and experts such as PSCs have managed to create a shared sense of 'security', which they claim they are able to provide. In this view, securitisation of migration is a process of normalising international migration as a security issue. It provides a much-needed enemy, keeping daily politics as well as the security and surveillance complex in motion (Bigo, 2002, p.77; Jeandesboz, 2016, p.293).

Analysing the governmentality of securitisation as a form of co-production can tease out imaginaries that underlie and function to legitimise the securitisation of migration and its industry. In addition, as proposed by STS and the concepts of sociotechnical imaginaries and co-production, this thesis will examine the importance of material inventiveness and its role in generating and embedding social order. This will provide a deeper understanding of the particular formation and normative forces present in society and at work within migration's securitisation (Jasanoff, 2004; 2015, p.338). The term "sociotechnical" specifically highlights the connection between technology and society. Regarding border security, policies and technological solutions have become an amalgamation of entities that are "not strictly technical nor exclusively human" (Jeandesboz, 2016, p.292). Instead, material outcomes reflect how technology is fused with attempts to exercise social control, in which imaginaries will have the function of providing direction, acceptance, and legitimacy (Jasanoff, 2015, p.10).

Lastly, it would be a mistake to think there is only one particular set of sociotechnical imaginaries present in society. As there exist multiple conceptions of the common good within a society, there exist multiple imaginaries that accompany these. Dominant sociotechnical imaginaries can become contested when the interaction between science and technology, and an individual's or group's idea of how society should function, clash. The existence of competing desired futures reveals the powerplay between imaginaries that have become dominant and their alternatives. This reflects the Foucauldian approach to power as relational and subject to practices of resistance (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p.73). Contestation allows for a space to open up in which imaginaries can be questioned and also has the potential for changing dominant understandings of the right way

forward (Jasanoff, 2015, p.31-33). Clearly, it is important for certain associations of actors that an issue does not become a subject of public debate. De-publicizing an issue, as in preventing it from becoming public, or in this case, normalising its meaning through processes of securitisation, will make controversies disappear or seem nonexistent (Marres, 2007, p.773). However, composing the public involved in the securitisation of international migration are activist groups and academics that question this practice. NGOs and advocacy groups aim to expose the practices that sustain the business model of the defence and security industry by providing the wider public with information. Critical academic research provides interpretations and analyses that can de-normalise current migration governance. Looking into how these actors do this will not only clarify the contestation between the different actors involved, but also the imaginaries present in the securitisation and commercialisation of international migration.

Method and Data

Collective imagining is a political action as it enacts the futures that are envisioned in which science and technology take a central position. Not only the material productions of science and technology reveal acts of imagining, but ideas and practices surrounding 'technology' are also formative of society and political life (Jasanoff, 2015, p.338). In line with the notion of the co-production of science and social order, the following analysis examines how the practice of securitising migration informs and is informed by modes of governance that require certain imaginaries so to come into existence. These imaginaries include a specific vision of society and social order. They also reserve a special role for technological innovation (Jasanoff, 2004; 2015, p.35-6). What follows is an elaboration of this thesis' methodological process and a presentation of the data used.

Within the framework of imaginaries, the concepts *embedding*, *extension* and *resistance* are some of the tools used to analyse the imaginaries present in a society. Each concept represents different phases in the construction of sociotechnical imaginaries and serve as this thesis' operational guide (Jasanoff, 2015, p.323, 338). In order to become sociotechnical imaginaries, ideas need to be embedded into the social fabric and be able to materialise. In this process, these ideas are often connected to the generation of economic and social value. Embedding is a process of co-production that organises labour and capital, which secures sociotechnical assemblages into society's infrastructure and institutions (Jasanoff, 2015, p. 326-7). Through the validation of knowledge, behaviour, and technology, institutions contain processes of meaning-making that answer to the imagined ways the world should take shape. Analysing the process of how ideas are embedded into institutions and materialities reveals how the imagined is translated into specific identities and routines (Jasanoff, 2004; 2015, p.323). The concept of *embedding* has been used to examine the specific institutional formation in the EU concerning security research and markets.

The connection of several social, political, and policy objectives points towards how embedded imaginaries in one area extend into new contexts. *Extension* is re-embedding imaginaries into other already existing and powerful sociotechnical imaginaries. The believed ability of markets, technology, and innovation in achieving the social order that is envisioned in European policymaking is extended to ideas about the management of migration. Here too, institutions of governance are effective in the practice of extension because of their jurisdiction and authority. Extension of sociotechnical imaginaries function therefore also as state-building, which makes for specific political cultures (Jasanoff, 2015, p.333, 335). The concept of extension has been used to analyse how specific modes of governance and ideas about profitability and technological solutions extend to migration-related policy.

Policy documents are products of sociotechnical arrangements; as official discourses of the state, they reveal an imagined future with their programmatic statements as well as expose technological expectations (Jasanoff, 2015, p.37-39). However, security and defence-related R&T policy not only makes clear what 'security' issues technological innovation is supposed to address and achieve. The processes and practices needed to bring this technology about also reveal imaginaries concerning modes of governance and political-economic structures. Therefore, security policy documents and the making of policy can be regarded as sites of securitisation practice and meaning-making in their own right. This not only expresses itself through discourse but affects the composition of the actors in security politics deemed relevant and the solutions deemed appropriate (Jeandesboz, 2016, p.293-4). In order to lay bare the "continually re-articulated awareness of order" imaginaries convey, I have conducted a qualitative content analysis on policy documents and websites relating to Horizon 2020's security and defence R&T and 'migration management' (Jasanoff, 2015, p.38). Applying the criteria of *authenticity*, *credibility*, *representativeness* and *meaning* (as in comprehensiveness), I then explored what the policy documents meant to express and why they were created, as documents have been designed with a specific goal in mind (Bryman, 2016, p.546, 560-1). Analysing what these documents set out to accomplish led me to other documents they refer or respond to. This interconnectedness formed a context from which I could distil themes corresponding to different sets of imaginaries. As such, I did not start the analysis with predefined categories or themes but aimed to uncover the imaginaries legitimising the relationship between PSCs and policymaking by connecting the theory with the data. All of the data used in this research are available online, which answers the research criterium of replicability. As document analysis is non-reactive the validity of the data is strengthened (Bryman, 2016, p.546, 563).

The analysis was conducted on the policy documents and online content that address EU's R&T funding and pre-commercial procurement schemes regarding border technology within Horizon 2020 projects. Horizon 2020 is an EU Research and Innovation programme with nearly € 80 billion of funding available over 2014 to 2020. The programme has a section addressing "societal challenges", of which "Secure societies – Protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens" related to migration and border technology is the focus of this analysis (Horizon 2020, 2019b). R&T and procurement projects respond to what the client, the EU, envisions they will need in the future. A focus on technological innovation in connection with the *European Agenda on Migration* (2015) and other migration-related EU policy (from both Commission and Council), presented the opportunity to find out on what imagined futures and ways of ordering society these projects are based. The specific focus on the Horizon 2020 programme allowed me to explore whether and how military rationales are employed by civilian infrastructures. Security and defence R&T also has budgets available through FRONTEX, European Defence Agency and European Defence Fund (Akkerman, 2016, p.30, 33). The practice of institutionalising defence-related R&T in Horizon 2020 (a non-military institutional structure) is therefore of interest.

Security-related tenders are often informed by other security and defence market-related policy, for that reason the *EC Security Industrial Policy* (2012), *A New Deal for European Defence* (2014), and the *European Defence Action Plan* (2016) are included in my analysis. The concept of borderscapes and the close cooperation between the EU and businesses led me to examine the documentation of the Group of Personalities (GoP). The group, which is composed by the EC, advises the EU on security and defence market matters and has initiated the creation of the European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB) and *Security Research Agenda* (2006). The GoP consists mainly of people in, or connected to, the security and defence industry (GoP, 2004; ESRP, 2006). This

documentation addresses the connection between the EU/EC and market forces and functions to analyse part of the internal logic of professionals active in the field of the “management of unease”.

However, the *embedding* and *extension* of sociotechnical imaginaries do not have to happen uncontested. Just as the co-production of society can take the lead from both state and capital, different publics can offer resistance or enact a new sociotechnical imaginary (Jasanoff, 2015, p.332). NGOs and advocacy groups aim to offer resistance against profit-making with the securitisation of migration. Also, academic research of a critical nature aims to question or explicate certain practices. The methodological tool of *resistance* can lay bare the processes and points which cause contestation so that the relationship between migration’s securitisation and the EU’s security and defence market in R&T programs becomes more explicit. In order to get a full picture of the imaginaries related to migration’s securitisation and the commercialisation of security technology and innovation, activist and advocacy groups’ communications by primarily Statewatch, as well as academic research, provide insight into aspects left out by the EU/EC and PSCs. This documentation and research address the *resistance* phase of sociotechnical imaginaries but is used to uncover the sociotechnical imaginaries pertaining to *embedding* and *extending* the relationship between the securitisation of migration and market forces.

Analysis

The analysis starts with presenting the governance structure of Horizon 2020 as part of the EU/EC’s Innovation Union. As the OMC suggests, this structure favours close cooperation between the public and private sectors. The analysis then explores how ‘security-related’ innovation has become embedded in a framework where security research is strongly associated with technological capabilities and economic competitiveness. This has made a ‘hybridisation’ of security and defence technology possible in order to expand the market. Then, the analysis discusses the imaginaries that see technological innovation as the solution to political and societal challenges such as migration. Lastly, the analysis connects how imaginaries pertaining to technological innovation relate to the securitisation of migration and views about migrants.

“Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth” ¹

Horizon 2020 is the EU’s financial policy instrument that is set to implement the Innovation Union based on a “knowledge-driven economy”. This union is to secure “Europe’s global competitiveness”, believed to lead to economic growth and job creation (European Council, 2010; Horizon 2020, 2019). Described as an investment in the future and capable of tackling societal challenges, academic and industrial (private) R&T are combined as to lead to scientific breakthroughs. Procurement and pre-commercial procurement, which is the procurement of R&D where the intellectual property rights do not exclusively belong to the contracting authority, facilitate public-private constructions (EC, 2012, p.9). This will provide a producer with a guaranteed return on investment for the R&D stage. The projects are to create procurement markets across Europe that will make delivering products and services easier. The end goal of the Innovation Union is, however, to create a single European market for knowledge, research and innovation that can compete with other foreign markets (Horizon 2020, 2019; Innovation Union, 2010). The Innovation Union and its policy instrument Horizon 2020 are an example of creating favourable market conditions for companies and research institutes by making available budgets. Starting with 10 billion to increase to 50 billion annually, on par with innovation

¹ Innovation Union, 2010

budgets in the United States (Innovation Union, 2010). Moreover, the Innovation Union and Horizon 2020 create institutional frameworks that put into place the ways research should be conducted, such as the obligatory composition of companies and research institutes from several member states when bidding for a tender and a 3% R&D target of the EU GDP of which 2% should come from private investment (Innovation Union, 2010; CORDIS, 2014).

In line with the OMC, the Horizon 2020 projects can also be seen as the next phase in establishing favourable market conditions by implementing a governance system that seeks to control and activate the participation of civil society and social partners. Suitable with advanced liberalism/neoliberalism in which, in the name of freedom, citizens and communities are to solve social problems that traditionally were the subject of state control. The OMC goes a step further by setting targets and controlling the processes it instantiates through contracts (Walters & Haahr, 2005, p.89). Regarding the Innovation Union, the EC has set up an innovation scoreboard in order to track the progress of regions and sectors. The EC also seeks to standardise processes across the EU so to avoid duplicate research and innovation, and market fragmentation. In this way, the EC wants to “revolutionise the way public and private sectors work together” (Innovation Union, 2010).

The OMC as a mode of governance enables the EU to create a decentralised network based on an approach of competition and efficiency (Walters & Haahr, 2005, p.100). By institutionalising the specific ways research and innovation is to take place in the EU it also embeds a particular sociotechnical imaginary surrounding innovation. Based on the idea that technological innovation will lead to economic growth, competitiveness, and job creation, the political objective of coping with globalisation’s adverse effects is thought to be met by building a political economy around innovation and the establishment of a European Research Area (Innovation Union, 2010). Here, an imaginary of productiveness and a belief in the ability of markets to achieve political goals comes to the fore. This imaginary perceives economic competitiveness as an end and innovation in R&T as the means. It also shows a belief in technological progress able to tackle societal challenges.

As a “technology of power”, the EU/EC through the OMC, does not enforce control over member states directly by telling them what to do. Rather, by setting standards and inventing best practices the OMC aims to secure commitment and maximise performance (Walters & Haahr, 2005, p.105). According to Walters and Haahr (2005), the EU/EC uses the OMC also to achieve uniformity of goals and problems to solve among its member states. By invoking the agency of member states and civil society, the EU does not become a super state but coordinates existing systems (p.79, 98). In the area of migration, notorious for causing disagreement between member states, the OMC might present a way to achieve a more coherent European migration policy. As with the sociotechnical imaginary concept, the creation of norms, knowledge, and meanings are imperative for achieving social order and consistency in the EU. The Horizon 2020 projects span across several areas in society such as health, climate change, ICT, space and security (Horizon 2020, 2019b). The EU/EC disseminates knowledge about what constitutes as desirable by presenting the conditions to which producers and researchers should comply. This knowledge does not only refer to specific wants and needs presented in the tenders but also to the way R&D is to take place in cooperation with multiple stakeholders in the EU. In that sense, the Horizon 2020 programme constitutes a specific way of providing order in society which is embedded in institutional funding programmes. Contrary to the EU/EC claims, however, does the Horizon 2020 framework not present a more democratic mode of governance since the tenders presented are taken for granted as a necessity, without having been subject of debate in for example the European Parliament. The matter of accountability for the invented technology is also not subject of democratic control (Hayes, 2009, p.18, 79).


Security Innovation

In the area of security and defence innovation, the Horizon 2020 programme packages the work that has been done by the EC and industry in this field. Behind the policies set out in Horizon 2020, it was the Group of Personalities (GoP) that strongly recommended security-related tenders to be taken into the precursor of Horizon 2020, Framework Programme 7 (FP7) (GoP, 2004). The first GoP (a second one was established in 2016 regarding defence research) structured policymaking surrounding security technology research. In their report *Research for a secure Europe* (2004), the group set forth the dangers the EU faces in a world where

“[p]olitical, social and technological developments have created a fluid security environment where risks and vulnerabilities are more diverse and less visible” (p.6).

Although created for security-related research, the report identified the need for synergies between civilian and defence R&T as “spill-over effects” go both ways. This allows each industry to benefit from each other’s research through technology transfer. The report highlights the fragmented state of the market because of a lack of cooperation between member states and a lack of coordination between national and European security research. Moreover, the report emphasised the need to be part in pre-commercial procurement schemes such as those of Horizon 2020 to ensure access to funding (GoP, 2004). While acknowledging that “new threats, risks and vulnerabilities” cannot be fought with technology alone, the report states that “technology is a key ‘force enabler’ for a more secure Europe.” (GoP, 2004, p.12). The report gives the impression of a Europe that fails in providing for its internal security by comparing Europe’s spending on R&T for security and defence with the then newly set-up U.S. Department of Homeland Security after the 9/11 attacks. Highlighted is also the risk of a Europe falling behind in the market for security and defence products and losing out on reaching a competitive market position if Europe does not invest in technological research. Political action was called upon (Gop, 2004, p.21).

In terms of the relationship between the securitisation of migration and the EU’s security and defence market in R&T programs, the establishment of the GoP and its identified needs can be seen as instantiating this sociotechnical imaginary. The report is an example of knowledge construction and meaning-making relating to ‘security’ and the provision of ‘protection’. At the time the fights against terrorism, organised crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were mentioned to be the focus areas for developing border security technology. As stated by the GoP, technology should meet Europe’s security needs and take political objectives into account. “Illegal migration” came to be defined as a threat to be fought with technological capabilities at a later stage. However, the identification of threats and “mission areas” put into place a structural link between the need for the creation of technological capabilities along Europe’s borders that benefit the security and defence businesses. Technology for *detection, protection, surveillance & monitoring* and *interoperability* were the stated capabilities needed for border control. One technology with the right capability that was deemed necessary in order to meet protection needs as well as employable in multiple non-military uses, were Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) (GoP, 2004, p.17-20; Hayes, 2009, p.55). SafeShore, a current Horizon 2020 project, is an example of the development of these stated needs in conjunction with political objectives. Defined by its coordinator as providing safety and managing “the migrant problem”, the drone is designed to detect other drones and small vessels such as those used by migrants in the Mediterranean (SafeShore, 2018).



“Detection, Assessment, Tracking & Response” (SafeShore, 2016).

Embedding ‘security needs’

In order to come up with a directed plan of action, as proposed in the GoP report, a European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB) was established in 2005. This board consisted out of 50 members but in total 300 experts worked across nine identified “missions” bringing together the end-users of security research with the suppliers and security researchers (ESRAB, 2006, p.5, 14). Together they focused on the double objective of


“meeting society’s needs through the definition of clearly defined customer (end-user) needs” and “raising the global competitiveness of the European technology supply chain” (ESRAB, 2006, p.6).

In order to create the “ambitious, coordinated and holistic approach” to security that is needed to address challenges, the board also came up with a definition of security research as

“... research activities that aim at identifying, preventing, deterring, preparing and protecting against unlawful or intentional malicious acts harming European societies...” (ESRAB, 2006, p.14,18).

Border security is one of the defined mission areas and the report describes in detail how the enormous scale and scope of border management requires an integrated approach of technologies, systems, and information sources. Emphasising the importance of protecting Europe’s external borders if it is to maintain freedom of movement within (ESRAB, 2006, p.26-28). As such the report can be regarded as constructing not only meanings pertaining to security and security research it also put even more firmly into place the need for technological products and solutions. This is problematic as many of the members of the board are executives of big and small security and defence companies (ESRAB, 2006, p.2). In effect, the report provided industry with the opportunity to create its own demand. Moreover, the report served as the blueprint for the Horizon 2020 projects relating to security, which confirms the political power of the industry. Below is an illustration of the defined mission area of Border Security with its stated needs of *functions*, *capabilities* and *technologies*. The

sheer amount of proposed needs and the technologies, which PSCs are able to provide, is striking. As an imaginary, it taps into feelings of inadequateness if the proposed functions remain unaddressed. Moreover, it premises technologies and innovation as solutions for political issues.



ESRAB, 2006, p. 26

The work of embedding imaginaries concerning believed security needs and solutions in connection with capitalist market rationales continued within the EU/EC. After the GoP and ESRAB succeeded in securing research funding through the FP7, in 2007 the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF) was created in order to provide a “roadmap” for public-private dialogue in security research for the next 20 years (Hayes, 2009, p.22). In response, the EC presented *The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe* (2010). This put forward a plan to answer to threats in an agenda with the aim of bringing together all member states, the European Parliament, Commission, Council, civil society, and local authorities. While acknowledging the relative safety Europeans can enjoy, the plan points out the increasing scale and sophistication of threats the EC believes endanger European society. The agenda stressed the need for a common approach within the EU and the importance that “[t]his agenda should be supported by a solid EU security industry” so to develop a “European social market economy”. According to the agenda, this called for manufactures and service providers to work together with end-users (p.2-3). The recommendations of the GoP, ESRAB and ESRIF were not only followed and implemented but its ideas about ‘security’, technological innovation and the provision of industry-led solutions were also adopted. Furthermore, ‘security’ became a business with which the EU/EC wants to develop Europe and compete globally.

In 2012 the EC developed a *Security Industrial Policy*. This policy communicated the security industry’s significant potential for market growth, making it one of the components to obtain

competitiveness and sustainability (p.2). As stated, the overarching aim of the policy is to increase growth and employment in the EU's security industry. In order to support European businesses in providing not only Europe's security needs, but newly emerging markets in third countries as well, the EC created an internal market for security technologies, favourable market conditions and economies of scale (EC, 2012, p.3). Fear of losing market share to the U.S. and Asian countries that are closing the technological gap between Europe, the EC proposed the making of a 'European brand' in security technology. Like the assumed reputation for American security equipment, an EU security label should according to the EC contribute to global competitiveness (EC, 2012, p.7). However, the EC points out that the lack of harmonisation stands in the way of market integration and standardising European security technology. Often caused by member states' lack of willingness to give up national control. Horizon 2020 pre-commercial procurement schemes are therefore to align programmes and secure market access for security research. A 1% increase in R&D spending was estimated to lead to € 2 billion in extra security sales. The Commission even considers buying prototypes in order to test and validate new technology in case EU capacity is needed (EC, 2012, p.9-10).


Another area in which the EC, in accordance with the GoP, identifies fragmentation is the differentiation between the (civilian) security and the (military) defence market. The *Security Industrial Policy* already points out how 'hybrid standards' applying to both security and defence technologies could lead to an increase in sales by improving compatibility making it possible to sell the same technology on both markets (EC, 2012, p.8). This dual-use potential is further emphasised in the EC's communications *A New Deal for European Defence* (2014) and the *European Defence Action Plan* (2016) where Horizon 2020 projects are to be synergised with research at the European Defence Agency (EDA). A GoP surrounding defence research constructed a plan for making Europe's security and defence market able to compete globally. As an attempt to create favourable market conditions, the EC promised to make sure the internal market, as well as externally the industry would face the least amount of restrictions possible (EC, 2014, p.9-13).

Again, the EC reports that member states spend less and less on research and manufacturing. This "untapped potential" creates a gap the EC wants to take unto itself to close in order to establish a "genuine and innovation-enhancing Single Market" and "Defence Union" (EC, 2016, p.13-14). While the EC cannot force national governments to cooperate, it can stimulate businesses and research institutes to provide the technological innovation and the economic profit the EC is looking for. Access to funding for defence-related projects is also available through Horizon 2020 (EDA, 2019). The OMC as a mode of governance presents the EC with the opportunity to satisfy its goals of competitiveness through engaging civil society directly. Even without having an EU army to supply, the EU can "become an important security provider in its own right" (EC, 2016, p.19). In doing so it instantiates a form of governmentality by a 'Europeanisation' that sets and controls standards ensuring interoperability. However, while member states might be reluctant to bring together their defence efforts with other countries, national governments have made sure their corporate and defence research interests are represented in the ESRAB and ESRIF (Hayes, 2009, p.28-9).

Also stated as important, both military and civilian authorities should benefit from new technologies.

"Such solutions developed by the defence industry could be effective in addressing security-related fields, such as maritime surveillance..." (EC, 2016, p.18).

The EC communications do not, however, only present what it wants to accomplish. As part of a sociotechnical imaginary it relates to the envisioned society in which finding new ways for economic profit-making is paramount without contemplating the consequences of, for example, militarising borders might have. It is implied that more border security technology will lead to safer societies. Appropriating the language and practices of *detection, protection and surveillance & monitoring*, a militarisation of civil society is taking place. This has established an elaborate system of surveillance, with the result of regarding people as enemies and situations as threats before their nature is known (Graham, 2011, p. xi-xii; GoP, 2004, p.17). Moreover, the adoption of militarist practices as a normal way to deal with civilian issues has led to the inability to see alternatives and disregards the power inequality it creates (Hayes, 2009, p. 80-81). An example of the EU responding to the “migration crisis” with military effort is the EUNAFAVOR MED Operation Sophia. Naval vessels from several member states, in some cases assisted by NATO, have been deployed to dismantle “criminal networks” by “aiming to break the business model of smuggles and human traffickers in the Mediterranean”. Operation Sophia’s mandate keeps on being extended, most recently until 30 September 2019, which also includes the training of Libyan coastguard and navy (European Council, 2019c). This sociotechnical imaginary also established ideas about security and defence provision as part of a market. So far and as the image below illustrates, the “managers of unease” have created a structural link between investment in security and defence research and the EU’s market position in this field as needed to satisfy growth and job-creation. While at the same time, as we shall see next, claiming to be able to fix complex global societal and political problems.



“The case for an EU-funded defence R&T programme” (GoP, 2016, p.1).

Cure-all Innovation

In order to keep market demand sustained, political issues such as migration governance are made believed to be sufficiently dealt with through technological innovations that are supplied by private

firms. The horizon 2020 program for “secure societies” has a budget of roughly € 1.7 billion (CORDIS, 2014). As stated in CORDIS, the EU research results webpage


“[i]n order to protect freedom and security, the Union requires effective responses using a comprehensive and innovative suite of security instruments.” (CORDIS, 2014).

These instruments are to be able to anticipate, prevent and manage threats as well as

“... understand the causes, develop and apply innovative technologies, solutions, foresight tools and knowledge, stimulate cooperation between providers and users, find civil security solutions, improve the competitiveness of the European security industry and services... while ensuring European citizens’ individual rights and freedom.” (CORDIS, 2014).

This illustrates how much innovation is believed to accomplish. Using a similar language as the ESRAB report, border management is also defined as a mission area. In the Horizon 2020 programme the protection of European borders “requires the development of systems, equipment, tools, processes, and methods for rapid identification” (Horizon 2020, 2019b). An example of a border security project that expresses imaginaries relating to technological capabilities is ROBORDER worth € 8 million of EU contribution and bringing together 24 different European companies and research organisations (CORDIS, 2017). In order to provide complete situational awareness to border patrol,

“ROBORDER is to develop a fully-functional autonomous border surveillance system with unmanned mobile robots including aerial, water surface, underwater and ground vehicles (UAV1, USV, UUV and UGV), capable of functioning both as standalone and in swarms, and incorporate multimodal sensors as part of an interoperable network.” (ROBORDER, 2019).



‘Heterogenous robots’ (ROBORDER, 2019).

Described as providing “accurate decision support services” by “detecting and recognizing illegal border activities” a range of political implications remain, however, unaddressed (ROBORDER, 2019). As a study by Dijstelbloem, Van Reekum and Schinkel (2017) has shown, the surveillance

technology of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System of which ROBORDER will be part, implies that objects ('irregular' migrants) are not only seen, the seeing also requires a response (p. 228). Both border patrol guards and migrants have agency in relation to these detecting technologies. It is up to individual border guards whether to decide to 'push back' boats to where they came from or help people in distress. Migrants can perform their agency by actively trying to get detected and in this way, instantiate their right to non-refoulement (Dijstelbloem et al. 2017, p.233). Therefore, instalment of surveillance equipment with the ultimate aim of controlling movement at sea in real-time does not present the clear-cut management of migration European officials and PSCs suggest. Yet PSCs directly relate the capabilities of their products to more safety (Dijstelbloem, et al., 2017, p.230; ROBORDER, 2019b). In addition, there arise political questions when being able to 'see' more is not accompanied by acting more, or when Europe decides action should be taken by countries such as Libya and Turkey. Moreover, ROBORDER's expected results are "improved automatic threat recognition", meaning that what constitutes as a threat is inscribed in its algorithm (ROBORDER, 2019b). Why migrants should constitute as a threat is here, similarly as in the SafeShore project above, not questioned but taken as a fact. These projects illustrate how current political objectives are asserted in material outcomes. As such, they reflect how technology is fused with attempts to exercise social order and control (Jasanoff, 2015, p.10). It also exemplifies the way in which these innovations are a blend of both human and technological arrangements (Jeandesboz, 2016, p.292). Perceiving migrants as threats who require special treatment is part of the securitisation of migration and migrants, which will be discussed next.

Extending Sociotechnical Imaginaries: "The Migration-Security Nexus"²

Although at the time of the first GoP and ESRAB reports, 2004 and 2006 respectively, international migration was not high on the political agenda, both reports mention already securing borders as a form of migration management. With the creation of the Schengen Agreement and the 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice', migration institutionally became part of security-related issues (Huysmans, 2006). "Illegal immigration" automatically became one of the objectives from which society was to be protected with enhanced technology. It is not self-evident that migration policies should be institutionally linked to fighting crime. Such connections send out ambiguous signals to different publics that some will readily exploit (Faist, 2002, p.6). The result of migration being socially and politically constructed as a threat expresses itself in regarding 'the immigrant', 'the refugee', 'the human smuggler' as the embodiment of danger and fear (Walters, 2010, p.218).

The practices of surveillance and deterring migrants aiming to arrive in Europe correspond to how immigrants inside European cities also are regarded as a threat by rightist politicians, media and citizens (Graham, 2011, p. xix). Immigrants are seen to disrupt ideas of society as a homogeneous whole. This creates opposition and hierarchy relating to 'insider-outsider' among a country's inhabitants. Immigrants become subjects from which the nation-state is to be protected, or at the least are met with suspicion (Bigo, 2002). Stephen Graham (2011) explains how today's postcolonial cities have taken the shape of colonised zones, which builds a new "inner city Orientalism" (p. xix). The segregation and policing of immigrants in cities resemble the colonial techniques of pacification, militarisation and control subjected to colonised countries in the past. Having now spread to Western cities these deemed necessary techniques provide incentives for the expansion of military style

² As analysed by William Walters (2010) the words migration and security seem to belong together. This naturalised coupling is reflected in policymaking and academic research (p.218).

equipment that profit the security and defence business. Moreover, conflating migration with criminality and terror causes migration to be regarded as acts of warfare (Graham, 2011, p. xvi, xx). With heightened importance of security and defence policies, more technology and more militarisation of the border makes any migrant crossing the Mediterranean seen as a target and unquestionably suspect. As such the sociotechnical imaginaries concerning the ability of markets within the field of security and defence R&T have extended to other already powerful imaginaries about migration and believed correct 'management'. Together they form coherent political and cultural practices with which to approach society.

In the EU's *Internal Security Strategy in Action* (2010) border security and migration management are highlighted as a common European affair, which needs to make use of new technology. It states,

“[i]n relation to the movement of persons, the EU can treat migration management and the fight against crime as twin objectives of the integrated border management strategy” (p.11).

This called for the implementation of the second generation of the Schengen Information System (SIS II), the Visa Information System (VIS), the entry/exit system and the registered traveller programme. These “Smart Border” technologies are deployed in very busy border crossings such as airports (EC, 2015, p.11). EUROSUR is to strengthen the “EU Maritime Domain”. All these new technologies and capabilities are to be coordinated through FRONTEX. The EUROSUR was established in 2013 making use of the new technologies developed through EU research projects, such as FP7 and Horizon 2020, with the aim of civilian and military authorities to develop near real-time “situational pictures” (EC, 2010, p. 11; EC, 2015, p.11).

Enhanced “situational awareness” is also one of the main solutions the *European Agenda on Migration* (2015) proposed to target criminal smuggling networks, which were identified as causing the sudden influx of migrants. At this point in time migration had become a major political issue. Saving lives, in response to the lives lost of migrants trying to reach Europe was to be performed by FRONTEX joint-operations. However, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations, such as Operation Sophia, were to “systematically identify, capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers” (EC, 2015, p.3). This illustrates that there is no discussion about whether migration management should take place at the border as all migrants that arrive via the Mediterranean are seen to make use of illegitimate transportation. This supposedly provides enough reasons to as a “powerful demonstration of the EU’s determination to act” stop the vessels from entering Europe. The proposed method for migration management is to target “criminal networks that exploit vulnerable migrants” (EC, 2015, p.3,7).

This a contradictory rhetoric, on the one hand, migrants found in the Mediterranean are portrayed as victims, which ‘Europe’ should save. However, not by allowing these migrants access to the EU and process their claims but by preventing them from arriving by destroying their means of transport. On the other hand, this rhetoric constructs Europe as the saviour of not only migrant victims but as the provider of the safety of Europeans as well. As a consequence, ‘securing’ the border has resulted in not only enacting immigration control at the border but also in countries of transit or before migrants have left a country of departure. This displaces or externalises the European border to “pre-frontier” areas in order to prevent having to give migrants access to the procedures they are entitled to by international law (Little & Vaughan-Williams, 2017, p.538-539, 547). According to Little and Vaughan-Williams (2017), employing the humanitarian discourse of saving migrants’ lives from

smugglers presents the EU with an opportunity to assert political control. A form of governmentality is created by generating knowledge about migrants as 'irregular' populations in need of saving. This 'fixes' subjects into the recognisable binary of regular-irregular. The fixation of this category renders a disparate and 'problematic' group of people easier to control. This neglects any political agency migrants have or their reasons for migrating while making them dependent on European rescue. Furthermore, adopting a humanitarian logic in which smugglers get all the blame has provided the excuse for employing military responses (p.550).

About the 'Central Mediterranean route', the European Council states that because migrants transit through Libya they make use of smugglers. Therefore, according to the Council, all migrants using this route are irregular and their asylum claims unfounded (European Council, 2019b). However, because of the lack of legal migration opportunities, migrants and refugees are in effect forced to use 'irregular' means such as migration facilitators (Crawley et al. 2018). Moreover, 'secure' borders that keep migrants out of Europe have caused the creation of new and more dangerous routes, which has seen the number of migrants' deaths rise. Of course, this process will keep the security market growing as the breaching of borders provides the demand for more of PSCs' services and products (Andersson, 2016, p.1067).

Causing confusion about migrants as being both victims and irregular thus criminal is part of an (in)securitisation move, which decontextualizes migration. Migration becomes a problem seen as generated outside of the EU and sees migrants as destabilising the security of Europe (Bigo in Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p.69-70; Glick-Schiller & Faist, 2010, p.6). Although migrants are to a certain degree regarded as having fallen victim to the hands of smugglers, the supposed destabilisation they bring makes migrants arriving on European soil an 'insecurity'. Hereby, Europe is portrayed as needing defence against migrants, regardless of the state of their asylum claims. Therefore, the issue of migration is to be dealt with as a 'security and defence' matter, which calls for the use of detecting technologies that prevent migrants from arriving in Europe such as ROBORDER and SafeShore.

Under the heading of the Horizon 2020 programme and the "Secure societies: Protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens" section it reads

"[t]his Challenge is about undertaking the research and innovation activities needed to protect our citizens, society and economy as well as our infrastructures and services, our prosperity, political stability and wellbeing." (Horizon 2020, 2019b).

In Horizon 2020's work programme for 2018-2020, this translates in calling for a tender that makes technology for

"[m]odeling, predicting, and dealing with migration flows to avoid tensions and violence" (Horizon 2020, 2019c, p.7).

This research should not only analyse data generated abroad but "map public sentiment" of migration inside Europe as well. The data sources mentioned are governmental or public and the technology should develop "...socio-economic indicators of integration strategies" in order to

"better deal with such flows and to reduce risks of tensions and violence among migrants and European citizens." (Horizon 2020, 2019c, p.37).

The possibility of responding to the so-called migratory pressures and migration flows with expanding technological capacities in, not only Europe but third countries as well, points towards the increasing normalisation of seeing migration as a danger. The securitisation of migration as part of an imaginary which conflates migration, criminality and disorder sustains the legitimisation of practices that lead to the anonymisation and marginalisation of migrants as well as the increasing surveillance of society.

Referring to border management, a 2018 European Council press release states that “combating illegal migration” calls for flexible instruments. Careful to prevent creating “pull factors”, disembarkation platforms are to ensure migrants cannot reach European soil. Only those that are saved and brought to the EU will in control centres be distinguished between ‘irregular’ migrant or those that need protection (European Council, 2018). Here again, a contradictory logic is applied to the people that try to reach Europe via the Mediterranean. If migrants are detected and captured before they reach Europe, they are all regarded as ‘irregular’ with unfounded asylum claims. However, the migrants that are saved are processed, which might reveal their asylum claims as legitimate. Denying migrants from having their claims processed by preventing them from reaching Europe constitutes an arbitrary and unjust system of migration management (Hayes, 2009, p.81).

Only when migrants and migration are imagined and constructed as European security and defence issues, these practices become a normal course of action. For the companies supplying the equipment for border control, the securitisation of migration has guaranteed their continued profit and power. As the concept of borderscapes highlights, the securitisation of migration is aided by allowing private companies and a market logic to influence how to govern European borders (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2013, p.152-3). Security and defence companies, as well as the EU, have big interests in upholding this business model. This is done with the help of creating an imaginary of Europe under threat where it needs this type of security and technological solutions.

Conclusion

This research has laid bare imaginaries that configure the relationship between the securitisation of international migration and the EU’s security and defence market by investigating their connection in Horizon 2020 R&T projects. Two broad sets of imaginaries were identified. The first relating to *embedding* via market construction, competition and technological abilities, the second *extending* to migration and its ‘management’. Both sets of imaginaries are, however, connected with the ‘making’ of Europe and are indispensable for co-producing its society and political system. This thesis is also a broader analysis of how material reproduction depends on social interactions that are based on capitalist social processes. These processes order society and have generated modern states and markets. When firms aim to stabilise exchange and the making of profit, they turn to governments to provide a suitable social organisation. Policymaking and building the bureaucracy and infrastructure firms need in such a way that benefits the government, provides the opportunity to ‘make’ the state (Fligstein, 2001. p.4-8, 12). Thus, technological innovation and competition can only take root when a social organisation and imaginary exists for making that possible.

Starting with analysing the institutional structure of the Horizon 2020 programme, imaginaries pertaining to the importance of Europe’s global competitiveness and technological innovation as the means to achieve it came to the fore. In connection with these stated goals, a Europe-wide infrastructure of funding and production was instantiated. Private businesses and research institutes work together with the EU/EC to address societal and political challenges while ensuring marketability and generating profit. Within this infrastructure, other imaginaries pertaining to the mode of governance of the OMC came to light. As a form of governmentality, the Horizon 2020 programme not

only set up standards and benchmarks for participants to follow but in doing so created a distinctive 'European' mode of conducting R&T. Thereby, the single market for knowledge, research and innovation as a European project does not only force adherence to a neoliberal mentality, it also, more literally 'makes' Europe by constructing a specific infrastructure in which to conduct research and procurement.

By unifying profitmaking and R&T it was not a far stretch for the EU/EC and businesses to see the market potential in security and defence products. Utilising the fears surrounding first the 'war on terror' and later the 'migration crisis', a demand and supply for 'securing' Europe's borders was created. This also saw the hybridisation of civilian and military products in order to be able to cater to more markets.

Borders and the technology deemed necessary for their construction are of course another very material instantiation of any social or political community. The Smart Borders system and EUROSUR project force all current and future member states to cooperate, coordinate and integrate their bordering practices (EC, 2008, p.5-6; Walters, 2017, p.801). In addition, as a technopolitical system containing sociotechnical imaginaries, the practices it instantiates aim to provide 'situational awareness' of Europe's borders and pre-frontier areas. By inscribing technology a particular (believed) function, it shapes the nature of the enacted response. The analysed tenders of this thesis associate migration and migrants with intruders, criminal networks, illegal entry and imply a Europe under threat. Apart from perpetuating a business model for security and defence products it also makes deterring and combating become self-evident answers for dealing with migration. The securitisation of migration expresses itself thus by naturalising military style response. This has led to 'making' Europe in yet another way, for example; saviour, protector or violator of human rights.

For the EC provides migration management in the form of deterrence an opportunity to reinforce the integration of the EU. As expressed by the commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship Dimitris Avramopoulos "[t]oday we offer more Europe where more Europe is needed by maximising EU support on border and migration management". An expansion of FRONTEX' amount of staff, equipment, mandate and budget is believed to ensure European solidarity (EC, 2018, September 12). Investigating what sociotechnical imaginaries configure this expansion of FRONTEX and the future EU Agency for Asylum can be subjects for further research. Apart from examining political-economic relations, such an analysis could benefit from a post-colonial perspective. This would investigate how colonial and post-colonial power relations and identities have shaped how security is imagined, as well as come to expression in practices of (EU) state-making (Walters, 2010, p.225).

As analysed by Stephen Graham (2011), security origins do not come from a single source. The initiation and normalisation of ideas about the militarisation of civil society involve multiple businesses and research institutes, experts and politicians (p. xxii). By applying the sociotechnical imaginary framework this thesis has shown how these multiple sources come together in imaginaries, which shape collectively held political and social visions. As a creative force these imaginaries work to legitimise intimate connections between PSCs and policymaking, as well as shape material and social outcomes that can render the governance of migration and the militarisation of civil society uncontested. Examining the political-economic structure of the securitisation of migration has highlighted how processes of meaning-making and imagining a desired future serve to increase spending on security and defence technology with the construction of migration as a threat.

References

- Abrahamsen, R., & Williams, M. (2009). Security Beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics. *International Political Sociology*, vol. 3, 1-17.
- Akkerman, M. (2016). *Border Wars: The arms dealers profiting from Europe's refugee tragedy*. The Transnational Institute and Stop Wapenhandel. Retrieved 3-3-2019 from <https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/border-wars-report-web1207.pdf>
- Andersson, R. (2016). Europe's failed 'fight' against irregular migration: ethnographic notes on a counterproductive industry. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 42(7), 1055-1075. DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2016.1139446
- Bigo, D. (2002). Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease. *Alternatives*, vol 27, 63-92.
- Bigo, D., Carrera, S., Guild, E., & Walker, R.B.J. (2007). *The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security: Mid-Term Report on the Results of the CHALLENGE project*. Research Paper no. 4, ISBN 978-92-9079-697-8. Retrieved 15-3-2019 from <http://www.ceps.be>
- Bigo, D., & Jeandesboz, J. (2010). The EU and the European Security Industry: Questioning the 'Public-Private Dialogue'. *INEX Policy Brief no. 5*. Retrieved 10-4-2019 from <https://www.ceps.eu/publications/eu-and-european-security-industry-questioning-%E2%80%98public-private-dialogue%E2%80%99>
- Bryman, A. (2016). *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: University Press
- Collyer, M. (2006). Migrants, Migration and the Security Paradigm: Constraints and Opportunities. *Mediterranean Politics*, 11(2), 255-270. DOI: 10.1080/13629390600682974
- CORDIS (2014). *H2020-EU.3.7.-Secure societies- Protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens*. Last accessed 7-6-2019 from <https://cordis.europa.eu/programme/rcn/664463/en>
- CORDIS (2017) *ROBORDER*. Last accessed 6-6-2019 from <https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/209949/factsheet/en>
- Crawley, H., Duvell, F., Jones, K., McMahon, S., & Sigona, N. (2018). Navigating borders and dangers: the use of smugglers. In *Unraveling Europe's "Migration Crisis". Journeys over land and sea*, pp 73-94. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Dijstelbloem, H., Van Reekum, R., & Schinkel, W. (2017). Surveillance at sea: The transactional politics of Border control in the Aegean. *Security Dialogue*, 48(3), 224-240. DOI: 10.1177/0967010617695714

European Commission [EC] COM (2008) 68 final. *Examining the creation of a European Border and Surveillance System (EUROSUR)*. Retrieved 7-6-2019 from <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2008/EN/1-2008-68-EN-F1-1.Pdf>

European Commission [EC] COM (2010) 673 final. *The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe*. Retrieved 9-6-2019 from <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2010/EN/1-2010-673-EN-F1-1.Pdf>

European Commission [EC] COM (2014) 387 final. *A New Deal for European Defence*. Retrieved 7-3-2019 from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0387&from=EN>

European Commission [EC] COM (2015) 240 final. *A European Agenda on Migration*. Retrieved 1-4-2019 from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf

European Commission [EC] COM (2016) 950 final. *European Defence Action Plan*. Retrieved 8-4-2019 from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2016:0950:FIN>

European Commission [EC] COM (2012) 417 final. *Security Industrial Policy: Action Plan for an innovative and competitive Security Industry*. Retrieved 8-4-2019 from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0417:FIN:EN:PDF>

European Commission [EC] (2017). *Support to Integrated border and migration management in Libya – First phase*. Last accessed 5-6-2019 from <https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/494>

European Commission [EC] (2018, September 12). *State of the Union press release 2018*. Last accessed 6-6-2019 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-5712_en.htm

European Council (2000). *Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon* European Council 23 and 24 March 2000. Retrieved 10-4-2019 from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21038/lisbon-european-council-presidency-conclusions.pdf>

European Council (2018). *European Council conclusions, 28 June 2018*. Last accessed 5-6-2019 from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/29/20180628-euco-conclusions-final/>

European Council (2019a). *EU migration policy*. Last accessed 5-6-2019 from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/>

European Council (2019b). *Central Mediterranean route*. Last accessed 5-6—2019 from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/central-mediterranean-route/>

European Council (2019c). *Saving lives at sea and targeting criminal networks*. Last accessed 5-6-2019 from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/sea-criminal-networks/>

European Defence Agency [EDA] (2019). *Access to EU funding*. Last accessed 1-6-2019 from <https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/access-to-eu-funding>

European Security Research Advisory Board [ESRAB] (2006). *Meeting the challenge: the European Security Research Agenda*. Retrieved 28-3-2019 from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/security/pdf/esrab_report_en.pdf

Faist, T. (2002). "Extension du domaine de la lutte": International Migration and Security before and after September 11, 2001. *International Migration Review*, 36(1), 7-14. DOI: 0198-9183/02/3601.0137

Fligstein, N. (2001). *The architecture of markets: An economic sociology of twenty-first-century capitalist societies*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press

Flynn, M. (2016). Capitalism and Immigration Control: What Political Economy Reveals about the Growth of Detention Systems. *Global Detention Project*, Working Paper No. 16. Retrieved 7-3-2019 from <https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/category/sidebar-publications/publications/working-papers>

Glick Schiller, N., & Faist, T. (2010). Introduction: Migration, Development and Transnationalization. In N. Glick Schiller & T. Faist (Eds) *Migration, Development and Transnationalization: A Critical Stance*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Group of Personalities [GoP] (2004). *Research for a Secure Europe*. Last accessed 7-6-2019 from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/security/pdf/gop_en.pdf

Group of Personalities [GoP] (2016). *European Defence Research: The case for an EU-funded defence R&T programme*. Last accessed 7-6-2019 from https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/GoP_report.pdf

Graham, S. (2011). *Cities under siege: The new military urbanism*. London: Verso

Hayes, B. (2009). *NeoConOpticon: The EU Security-Industrial Complex*. Statewatch and the Transnational Institute. Last accessed 8-6-2019 from <http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/neoconopticon-report.pdf>

Horizon 2020 (2019). *What is Horizon 2020?* Last accessed 5-6-2019 from <https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/what-horizon-2020>

Horizon 2020 (2019b). *Secure societies – Protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens*. Last accessed 7-6-2019 from <https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/secure-societies-%E2%80%93-protecting-freedom-and-security-europe-and-its-citizens>

Horizon 2020 (2019c). *Work Programme 2018-2020: 14. Secure societies – Protecting Europe and its citizens*. Last accessed 8-6-2019 from http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2018-2020/main/h2020-wp1820-security_en.pdf

Huysmans, J. (2006). *The politics of insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU*. Oxon: Routledge

Innovation Union (2010). *Turning Europe into a true Innovation Union, Press release*. Last accessed 9-6-2019 from [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO-10-473_en.htm?locale=en](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-473_en.htm?locale=en)

Jeandesboz, J. (2016). Smartening border security in the European Union: An associational inquiry. *Security Dialogue*, 47(4), 292-309. DOI: 10.1177/0967010616650226

Jasanoff, S. (2015). Future Imperfect: Science, Technology, and the Imaginations of Modernity. In S. Jasanoff & S-H. Kim (Eds.) *Dreamscapes of Modernity. Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power*, pp. 1-43. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

Jasanoff, S. (2004). *States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order*. London: Routledge

Leander, A. (2005). The power to construct international security: On the significance of private military companies. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 33(3), 803-826. DOI: 10.1177/03058298050330030601

Lemberg-Pedersen, M. (2013). Private security companies and the European borderscapes. In T. Gammeltoft-Hansen and N. Nyberg Sorensen (Eds.) *The Migration Industry and the Commercialisation of International Migration*, 152-172. Oxon: Routledge

Little, A., & Vaughan-Williams, N. (2017). Stopping boats, saving lives, securing subjects: Humanitarian borders in Europe and Australia. *European Journal of International Relations*, 23(3), 533-556. DOI: 10.1177/1354066116661227

Marres, N. S. (2007). The Issue Deserves More Credit: Pragmatist Contributions to the Study of Public Involvement in Controversy. *Social Studies of Science* 37(5) 759-780. DOI:10.1177/0306312706077367

Menz, G. (2013). The neoliberal state and the growth of the migration industry. In T. Gammeltoft-Hansen and N. Nyberg Sorensen (Eds.) *The Migration Industry and the Commercialisation of International Migration*, 108-127. Oxon: Routledge

Peoples, C., & Vaughan-Williams, N. (2010). *Critical Security Studies; An introduction*. Oxon: Routledge

ROBORDER. (2019). *Aims and objectives*. Last accessed 5-6-2019 from <https://roborder.eu/the-project/aims-objectives/>

ROBORDER. (2019b). *Expected results*. Last accessed 5-6-2019 from <https://roborder.eu/the-project/expected-results/>

SafeShore (2016). *Presentations*. Last accessed 7-6-2019 from <http://safeshore.eu/presentations/>

SafeShore (2018). *Succes Stories*. Last accessed 13-6-2019 from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3gQwhHrsYLk>

Van Reekum, R. (2018). Patrols, records and pictures: Demonstrations of Europe in the midst of migration's crisis. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 0(0), 1-19. DOI: 10.11/0263775818792269

Walters, W. (2010). Migration and Security. In J. P. Burgess (ed.) *The Handbook of New Security Studies*, 217-228. London: Routledge

Walters, W. (2017). Live governance, borders, and the time-space of the situation: EUROSUR and the genealogy of bordering in Europe. *Comparative European Politics*, vol 15, 794-817. DOI: 10.1057/s41295-016-0083-5

Walters, W., & Haahr, J. H. (2005). *Governing Europe: Governmentality and European Integration*. Oxon: Routledge