Political Participation among First- and Second-Generation Chinese Immigrants in the Netherlands

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Abstract

Chinese immigrants are a unique minority group in the Netherlands considering their living conditions and cultural background, whereas they are under-investigated due to the small population as well as relatively higher socioeconomic status compared with other ethnic minorities. This research aims to explore the political participation among first- and second-generation Chinese immigrants with emphasis on their level of education, the impact of cultural context which they are socialized into, as well as the perception of being “model minorities”. Based on ten respondents in total, the research findings demonstrate a low level of political participation among both first- and second-generation Chinese immigrants; whereas the explanations on non-participation of the two generations are of vast difference. While cultural influences and language barrier are the biggest reasons that stop the first generation being active in politics, socialization effects mainly account for the non-participation of the second generation.

Keywords: Chinese immigrants, political participation, the Netherlands, model minority
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Migration has been reshaping Europe in the last few decades. With immigrants coming to Europe from all parts of the world, it is essential to understand what impacts they bring to the local society and culture as well as what it may imply to the local residents. As minorities in the host country, it is essential for the immigrants to make their voice heard to better integrate into the local society; whereas political participation can be an effective way for the immigrants to express their need.

In previous research, many scholars have found out that political participation among migrants and ethnic minorities were relatively low (Cho, 1999); The same situation also takes place among migrant groups such as Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese in the Netherlands (van Heelsum, 2002). While these major ethnic groups attract scholarly attention mainly for their “consistent lower socioeconomic status in terms of educational level and income” (van Heelsum, 2002), people from Chinese descent stand out for their being perceived as “model minorities”. The concept of “model minority” was initially used to describe the Asian Americans that achieve higher socioeconomic status than the population average (model minority, n. d.). The group of Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands, especially the second generation, tend to be described as highly educated, successful and problem-free as well (Gijsberts, 2011).

The history of Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands dates back to the early twentieth century. With the industry of Chinese restaurants boomed, the number of Chinese immigrants also rapidly increased (Li, 1999). Since the 1980s, the Netherlands has also become a popular destination for Chinese overseas students to pursue their further education (Chinese people in the Netherlands, n. d.). However, this group as a whole still takes up a relatively small percentage in
the total Dutch population. Consequently, even though migration and immigrants in the
Netherlands have long been a heatedly discussed topic in the academic sphere, the research focus
on Chinese immigrants is still somewhat limited.

Some may question the meaning of the research itself as it seems that the Chinese immigrants have neither a large population nor outstanding obstacles integrating into Dutch society. However, besides the perceptions of Dutch society, the stories of the Chinese immigrants themselves regarding their living conditions and integration are yet to be investigated. Besides, it remains unclear whether they keep being “model minorities” when it comes to political participation, especially when taking the unique cultural context in China into account. Different from most liberal democracies in western society, the Chinese authoritarian political system results in less emphasize and opportunities for political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019).

Therefore, it might be possible to assume a difference in attitude and behavior regarding political participation among Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands. In order to study how such cultural differences may determine their level of political participation, a comparison will be drawn between the first and second generation.

In this research, I focus on institutional and non-institutional political participation (de Koster, 2018) since both are valid forms through which the immigrants can raise their voice in society. Therefore, this research mainly investigates to what extent the Chinese immigrants participate in politics in the Netherlands with emphases on 1) how being perceived as ‘model minorities’ may influence their political participation, and 2) how the uniqueness of Chinese culture may make a difference among the first and second generation.
Ideally, the research on Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands will firstly add to the current literature focusing on migration and immigrants in the Dutch context. Additionally, considering the increasing population and influence of the Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands, research focusing on the Chinese community in Dutch society and their political participation may have impacts on both themselves and the rest of society. It provides a chance for the native Dutch and people with other ethnic backgrounds to have a deeper understanding of the Chinese population in Dutch society. Meanwhile, it may also help the Chinese immigrants better integrate into the local society, not only in the domain of socioeconomic achievements; acculturation and social integration are equally important (Alba and Nee, as cited in Zhang, 2013).

**Theoretical Framework**

**Historical backdrop**

The history of migration in the Netherlands dates back to the middle ages. It attracts many Southern and Eastern European people for its tolerance and wealth between 1550 and 1880. The country then experienced a trend of emigration until the Second World War (Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies [IMIS], 2007). From the post-war period onwards, the Netherlands again became a popular destination country for immigrants. Turkish and Moroccan guest workers first moved to the Netherlands in the 1960s to help rebuild the country from the ruins; their family members followed in the 1970s thanks to the law of family unification (University College London, Department of Dutch, n. d.). Migrants from former Dutch colonies, Indonesia and Surinam, emigrated to the Netherlands after their home country gained independence in the 1940s and 1970s respectively. A large number of Antilleans also have been arriving in the Netherlands since the 1990s (IMIS, 2007).
Chinese immigrants, on the other hand, takes up only a small proportion of the total migrant population in the Netherlands. However, their impacts on the Dutch society is more significant than many other Asian ethnic minority groups; the popularity of China Town and Chinese restaurant in many Dutch cities can be a good example. The early Chinese immigrants that worked as peddlers in the first half of the 20th century experienced critical living conditions and struggled to their settlement (Li, 1999). After the Second World War, and especially during the 1960s and 1970s, Chinese people that already immigrated to the Netherlands started to become successful by developing Chinese catering business. As a result of the reform and opening up, an increasing population of Chinese emigrated to the Netherlands for better economic achievement. On the one hand, their hard work helps them overcome the lack of skills and knowledge on the Dutch culture (Li, 1999); on the other hand, it also contributes to the perception of their being “model minorities”.

**Model minority**

Many immigrant groups across the world tend to be negatively perceived due to their problems with integrating into the host society, considering their school attainment, language proficiency, as well as socioeconomic status. For example, immigrant children with Latino backgrounds in the United States still face risks against poverty, poor school performance, etc. (Toppelberg & Collins, 2012). However, Asian Americans, especially those from Japanese and Chinese descent, present a different story.

In 1966, the Japanese and Chinese immigrants in the United States appeared for the first time in the media as a favorable image. The evidence of their success includes higher educational achievements, “high-status occupations, rising incomes, and low rates of mental illness and crime” (Osajima, 2005). Previous literature on the theme of “model minority” mainly focuses on
three aspects: 1) educational and occupational attainments; 2) accounting for the academic performance with social-cultural factors; 3) the social and psychological impacts of being perceived as model minorities (Wong, Lai, Nagasawa, & Lin, 1998). In spite of the diversity within the Asian immigrant groups, the perception of “model minority” has been cultivated ever since.

The same also goes for Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands. They remain as a silent and invisible group (Pang 2002, as cited in Wu & Wang, 2007) which keeps away from the public and scholarly attention because of their less risky lifestyles, as well as conflict-avoiding expectancy (Friedman, Chi, & Liu, 2006). According to Gijsberts (2011), the second-generation Chinese immigrants are well integrated, and sometimes perform even better than the native Dutch when it comes to the level of education and labor market competitiveness. In contrast, the second generation Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands, for example, shows a higher percentage of students going to the lowest track of education as well as a higher dropout rate. (Crul & Doomernic, 2003). Their level of political participation is lower than the overall population as well (Michon, Tillie, & van Heelsum, 2007).

The comparison raises the question of what being “model minorities” implies to the Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands regarding their political participation. On the one hand, it is reasonable to expect that Chinese immigrants, as “model minorities”, could participate more actively in politics thanks to their better integration into the Dutch society. On the other hand, since they tend to keep silent and stay away from public attention, being “model minorities” may not contribute to mobilizing their political participation either.

Driven by the racial politics in the Civil Right Movement in America, the media, as well as public perception of Chinese and Japanese being “model minority”, has particular
implications to the other ethnic minorities such as Blacks on social welfare and social movements where they fight for equality and opportunities (Osajima, 2005). Despite the historical context where the concept of “model minority” is rooted, it has been developing over time as the target group extends to other Asian minorities (Osajima, 2005).

Meanwhile, critiques were also on the rise as the concept of the “model minority” was stereotypically overgeneralized. They tend to underreport their mental health problems due to cultural reasons (Chao, Chiu, & Lee, 2010). Besides, regardless of the diversity within the Asian immigrant groups, it is always unclear which groups are referred to in particular (Nakayama, 1988). Considering the distinction between first- and second-generation Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands, to what extent can “model minority” be generalized is of particular importance. What is more, the self-perception of “model minority” among the Chinese immigrants is yet to be investigated either.

**Forms of political participation**

Political participation “refers to the various ways in which individuals take part in the management of the collective affairs of a given political community” (Martiniello, 2005). Institutional political participation, in this article, stands for ‘all acts directly related to the institutional process’ (Hooghe & Marien, as cited in de Koster, 2018), such as voting, contacting a politician, being a member of a political party and campaigning for a political party; and non-institutional political participation is ‘forms of civic engagement that take place outside of the institutionalized sphere of politics’ (Stolle & Hooghe, as cited in de Koster, 2018), such as demonstrating, boycotting and signing a petition.

In the literature, various terms have been used for the same concept, such as conventional and non-conventional participation, as well as state and non-state participation (Zapata-Barrero,
Gabrielli, Sanchez-Montijano, & Jaulin, 2013). For simplicity’s sake, I will use the term institutional and non-institutional political participation in this research.

Considering the higher educational attainment, as well as their experiences in the Dutch educational system, where they are exposed to Dutch political knowledge, I expect that the second-generation Chinese immigrants will be more active in institutional participation (Armingeon & Schadel, 2015). Meanwhile, due to the relatively more challenging living conditions of the first-generation immigrants than their children’s generation, it is possible that the first generation may have more shared discontent (de Koster, 2018) that leads to non-institutional participation.

**First- and second-generation Chinese immigrants**

If focusing specifically on Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands, the differences between the first and the second generation are hard to be omitted. The first generation mostly lives in closed communities; they either do not speak Dutch at all or only speak the language poorly; they are also relatively lower educated and work for longer hours (Gijsberts, 2011). On the one hand, the lack of local contacts, low Dutch proficiency and lower socioeconomic status may lead to their low level of political participation since it restricts their opportunity to access critical information, or they just do not have the time and money to participate (Verba, Schiozman, & Brady, as cited in de Koster, 2018). On the other hand, their strong sense of community may also mobilize their participation in which way they expect to improve their status in society (Sandovici & Listhaug, 2010).

The second generation, however, performs almost the opposite. The majority are well educated and successful in the labor market, thanks to the emphasis on education in Chinese culture. They have weekly contacts with Dutch friends, and one-fifth of them even do not speak their mother tongue (Gijsberts, 2011). Therefore, it is worth exploring what impacts of
socialization in either Chinese or Dutch culture may make a difference in their willingness to participate in political activities.

Education can be a good indicator when measuring the impacts of socialization in a different cultural context. As is mentioned above, a higher level of education generally leads to more political participation. However, it might be the socialization process provided through education rather than the higher education per se that influences their political participation (Cho, 1999). In this case, in which cultural context that the immigrants were socialized matters as well; in other words, the political socialization that the first-generation Chinese immigrants acquired previously in China would not help much in understanding the Dutch political system. Consequently, their educational experience may not contribute much to their level of political participation in the Netherlands either. Meanwhile, being educated in the Netherlands may make the distinction between the level of political participation among the first- and second-generation Chinese immigrants more significant. Besides, it is essential to take parent-child socialization (Dinas, 2013) into account, which means that apart from school education that the second-generation immigrant receives in the Netherlands, their parents’ points of view towards politics may also shape their attitudes on political participation in their early life.

When it comes to the cultural differences between China and the Netherlands, the emphasis on political participation becomes salient. In China, there are only limited forms of political participation. The most well-known one in the western world is the community/village participation, which is also known as community/village democracy or self-government (jumin/cunmin zizhi) (Zhong & Chen, 2002). Technically, it does not belong to the government body, whereas, in reality, citizens do show their preferences to the government by voting in elections, especially in villages. However, such opportunities only exist on the grassroots level.
Officially, citizens over the age of 18 do have the rights to vote for the representatives of the National People’s Congress (renda daibiao) in China. The problem is that the level of political efficacy is low among the voters. Internally, the Chinese government heavily restricts the information on politically related issues; externally, the candidates of all government levels in China are nominated by the Communist Party rather than the general public (Hu, 2016). Therefore, additional to the lower participation rate that may be caused by external facts such as language barriers, the first-generation Chinese immigrants may participate less also due to the lack of knowledge and experience prior to migration. On the other hand, it is also possible that they participate more because of the increasing opportunities to raise their voice in the Netherlands.

**Data and method**

**Sampling**

To ensure the rights to vote in the national elections in the Netherlands, all the respondents in this research are Dutch passport holders; the second-generation respondents are all born in the Netherlands and above the age of 18. Considering the small sampling size, the second generation immigrants who moved to the Netherlands with their parents before school age are not included.

Ten people have participated in this research in total. The respondents are equally divided into two groups, with half being the first generation and the other half being the second generation. I first posted a basic requirement for potential respondents together with a short description of this research project using my personal account on WeChat, which is the most popular and widely used Chinese social networking mobile app. Because of this message, I got one person joining my research. Meanwhile, I was invited into a WeChat group chat with
Chinese immigrants residing in a city near Rotterdam. By posting the same message in the group chat, three other persons contacted me voluntarily. The majority of the respondents I found with the help of WeChat are the first generation. I was introduced to the 5th first-generation respondent through an association, in which the majority of the members are highly educated Chinese immigrants working in the Netherlands.

Four of the second generation respondents are members of a Chinese student association in the Netherlands, while the last one was a recent graduate from Erasmus University. When being asked whether they agree to be interviewed for my thesis project themselves, they were all willing to help. However, even though the Dutch Chinese all over the country are more or less involved in a small and relatively closed network where everyone can somehow relate to each other, they prefer not to help to look for more respondents because, according to them, their Dutch Chinese friends are unlikely to be interested in politics. Also, among the Dutch Chinese population, many of them were born in China and moved to the Netherlands with their parents at a young age. This group is excluded from the research.

The first generation respondents are more diverse than the second generation ones. The least educated first generation respondent only completed middle school; whereas the highest educated received his PhD in a Dutch university. Apart from their level of education, there is also a significant difference regarding their age, with the youngest being 33 years old and the oldest being 70. All of them have lived in the Netherlands for at least ten years.

The second generation, on the other hand, is quite similar in many ways. They are all between 20 and 25 years, and current are at least enrolled in a university of applied sciences in the Netherlands. They all consider Dutch as their native language. They all lived in small towns
in childhood and was the only Asians in their community. All of their parents are working or worked in restaurants and without experiences going to university.

Table 1: List of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Education Attainment</th>
<th>Generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chunmei</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Vocational school</td>
<td>First generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jianming</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Middle School</td>
<td>First generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lan</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Bachelor’s Degree</td>
<td>First generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaojun</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>First generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhifang</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Bachelor’s Degree</td>
<td>First generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Pre-Master student</td>
<td>Second generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwin</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Master’s Degree</td>
<td>Second generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gina</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Master student</td>
<td>Second generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irene</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Bachelor student</td>
<td>Second generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesse</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Bachelor student</td>
<td>Second generation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Qualitative interviews**

All the respondents are invited to a face-to-face in-depth interview to talk about their life and experience in the Netherlands, as well as their attitudes and behavior regarding political participation. An interview guide was designed with three parts, their general information including age, provinces of origin in China, level of education, language proficiency; model minority and political participation.

The interview lasted between 30 minutes and 90 minutes. Due to unexpected circumstances, the 30-minute interview did not cover all the questions as planned; the respondent answered the rest of the questions with texts through WeChat shortly after the interview was conducted. All the interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. The interviews with first generation respondents were conducted in Chinese. Those with the second generation
respondents were in English. All the interviews in Chinese were translated into English based on the transcripts. The transcripts were analyzed with open coding and axial coding based on the principle of the grounded theory approach. In preparation to generate theory out of data (Bryman, 2012), the following dimensions emerge along with the process of analysis: “a closed community?”; “model minority”; “identity: Dutch or Dutch Chinese?”; and “political participation”.

**Ethnic & privacy**

A consent form stating the research aim as well as the rights of the respondents is provided and carefully explained before the start of each interview. All interviews were conducted and recorded with the consent of the respondents. All documents containing data and information of the respondents are password protected and securely stored. To ensure privacy, all information that might relate to the identity of the respondents is anonymized both in the transcripts and the final thesis. Transcripts were sent back to the respondents to double check whether I have entirely excluded information they prefer not to reveal to the public. The transcripts and the quotes are, therefore, adjusted according to their comments.

**Result**

**First generation**

**A closed community?**

The first-generation Chinese immigrants are indeed very diverse. Among all the respondents in this research, every person shows different characteristics in almost all aspects, such as age, level of education, occupation, and language proficiency. Thus, it is rather difficult to distinguish the common features among this group of people regarding their shared
characteristics. Despite the differences, I put them into two groups, the higher and lower educated.

Without opportunities to work on family businesses, there are not popular provinces of origin among the higher educated immigrants. Therefore, considering the limited overall population of Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands, the number of people from each province in China is hard to be sufficient for them to form associations based on their provinces of origin.

On the contrary, the lower educated Chinese immigrants who work or worked in restaurants, are mostly from Zhejiang, Guangzhou, as well as Hong Kong. Even though they do not live close with each other geographically, they indeed have secure connections within closed communities. According to a second generation respondent Edwin, he described the Chinese community his parents belong to as follows:

It’s a close community though. So everyone knows each other pretty well. … And that's the way how we live, and the most important thing is this, you know, to stay connected with each other and just to figure out how to live here.

Being involved in this kind of communities strengthened their ties with other Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands. They also more easily recognize and accept newcomers if they come from the same region or the same province. They contact each other every week.

So it's like every month, I would say, so my parents are just going to meet some other friends, you know, just for some dinner and, you know, going to the city, maybe that's all. So basically they communicate with each other like, I would say, like on a weekly basis, just sending out WeChat messages or just call each other.

Meanwhile, the lower educated Chinese immigrants barely have contacts with native Dutch or other immigrants due to language barriers. The only occasion where they might talk with them is
when their kids decide to meet up. “I’ll just ask like when, what is their home address, and when to pick them up.” (Chunmei, 33) Some of the Cantonese speakers here in the Netherlands even do not speak Mandarin, either.

The higher and lower educated group do not interact much with each other. It is especially true for those with older age, and it has a more considerable impact on the highly educated Chinese immigrants from northern provinces, who do not speak or understand Cantonese. Therefore, despite their higher level of education, the weaker tie with other Chinese immigrants may also motivate them to integrate into local society.

So like the older generation of Chinese immigrants, a lot of them were from Hong Kong. They were a group. Because I don’t speak Cantonese, I can’t be a part of their group. Then this is also, it forced me to integrate into the Dutch group. (Zhifang, 56)

As for the first generation immigrants with younger age, forming online communities becomes more manageable thanks to the Internet. For example, in the WeChat group where I was invited into when looking for respondents, the group contain members with entirely distinct backgrounds. Even though the inter-group contact is still relatively rare between the higher and lower educated, they met and got to know each other through group activities. For example, when they need to pick up their purchases at a particular location at the same time, thanks to “group buying”:

We sometimes may buy groceries together, or buy other things through “group buying”. Then people would meet somewhere, and gradually, after meeting for a few times, everybody started to know each other. For example, the lady you interviewed just now, I didn’t know her before, because before I didn’t live here, also my personal network does not include someone who works in the restaurant. (Lan, 33)
Model minority

When it comes to Chinese being “model minorities” as immigrants in the host country, there is a big gap between their self-perception and how they behave in society, especially among the highly educated first-generation immigrants.

The first-generation immigrants, in most of the cases, do not identify themselves as “model minorities”. The only respondent who agrees on the concept, Zhifang, says that "most Chinese people must be very hardworking" and they will not ask the government for help saying that "I don't want to work. I am lazy." The rest either think that Chinese immigrants are more “vulnerable” (Lan, 33) or "not worse" (Shaojun, 52) than other ethnic minorities.

For instance, Lan thinks that Chinese immigrants are more vulnerable than the major ethnic groups because

Firstly, the population is not so large as theirs … Besides, the first-generation Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands probably started in the 1970s, so it is much later than others, …

When the second generation immigrants can speak Dutch as their mother tongue, those immigrants [from other ethnicities], their second generation is already one generation earlier than us. (Lan, 33)

According to her, many people from major ethnic groups already have high-end jobs. “As a Turk, you can be a lawyer; you can be a dentist or a teacher”; the Chinese immigrants, on the other hands, haven’t got as many chances as them.

However, their behavior features a different picture. Generally speaking, the higher educated first-generation Chinese immigrants are far from being problematic. Zhifang, the only first-generation respondent who uses Dutch as her working language, tried the hardest to force
herself integrate into Dutch society. She got her Dutch citizenship before the language test was mandatory, but she kept taking Dutch language courses for years.

I was without a job so I take the course five days a week. … I was in the 5-day intensive course. … It was three years later [that I can communicate with others in Dutch fluently].

To practice speaking Dutch with local people, she volunteered in many places.

After I started to learn Dutch, I wanted to improve my Dutch by volunteering at the language school … I volunteered all the time, then I went to the nursing home to help the elderly for coffee and tea every Wednesday…

Through all these experiences, she also made Dutch friends and have frequent contact with them.

We set up a coffee group with the Dutch parents [in the language school], the friendly ones, it was like we went to your home today, and my home tomorrow. Even though I left there more than ten years ago, we are still in touch. They came over just a while ago.

Chinese culture is of vital importance on her self-expectations to perform well in the new environment, especially when she just came to the Netherlands.

When I just came here I even don’t want myself to make mistakes, that is to say, I have to be perfect. I was afraid that people would say that you don’t do well on this, you don’t do well on that… I have to do everything well, 100 percent well, it’s a habit formed while I was still in China…

Shaojun shares a similar point of view as well:

No matter what I do, no matter what environment I am in, I hope I can do the best on everything to prove myself to be excellent.

The less educated first-generation immigrants with younger age, on the other hands, feel a high level of discrimination against them. They feel discriminated in many occasions, such as
in the supermarket, “I, together with my three kids, went to buy milk formula. They said I couldn’t buy it. They said I would go to sell it” (Chunmei, 34).

As the 2008 milk scandal in China raised public concern on the safety of milk formula, especially the infant formula in China, many people prefer to choose foreign brands instead. Admittedly, this incident has vastly increased the purchase of milk formula by Chinese in the Netherlands (Pieters, 2017). However, the panic towards the freelance retail consultant (Mercer, 2016), also known as daigou, in this case, is apparently overgeneralized to racism against Asian shoppers. According to Chunmei, the cashier still refused to sell her the milk formula after she explained that her kids are all Dutch citizens and provided him with their insurance card. Besides, they have also been followed by the security guard in grocery stores and falsely accused as thieves.

However, another less educated respondent, who first came to the Netherlands as an asylum seeker, holds an entirely different point of view. Comparing his previous experience before coming to the Netherlands with the social welfare he currently is entitled to, he is grateful for what he has gained over the years. As far as he is concerned, the living conditions in the Netherlands is better than China as well as the United States.

**Political participation**

Despite their diverse backgrounds, the first-generation Chinese immigrants are generally not motivated to participate in politics. “I have to tell you that I’m not interested in politics. Otherwise, I’m afraid that I wouldn’t know the answer to your questions later.” Said by Lan repeatedly before the interview started. Even though the others may prefer not to say it as explicitly as she does, it represents the opinion of many of them.
Among the first-generation Chinese immigrants, it seems common that they rarely go to vote. “There is a chance to vote every year, but none of us did. We haven’t voted.” (Chunmei, 34). For her and the people she knows around that area, the main reason for non-voting is still the language barrier according to themselves. “I take photos to translate it, so I know what it is mainly about, but I still never voted. None of us did.”

Besides language proficiency, there are also other factors that contribute to their non-participation. For both the higher and lower educated respondents, their lack of motivation to participate in politics is vastly influenced by their Chinese cultural background. Grown up in China, they developed a low level of political efficacy due to the limited possibility to influence politics through any forms of participation, as well as the restricted access to political information. Consequently, lack of political interests seems to be common as well. Therefore, their knowledge about politics in general, as well as Dutch politics to be specific, is very limited. “Basically I don’t care about it…. That is to say. I completely, I know nothing about politics at all.” (Chunmei, 34)

The higher educated respondents all have voted before, but none of them voted this year because they were too busy so they missed it. It’s more likely for them to vote when their own rights or interests are at stake.

Voting, well, I participate as well. It was last year, last year many people were afraid that the extreme right-wing parties would be elected, like the rightist parties who are against immigrants. It was not okay. Then I said when it was my turn to vote I had to do it. (Shaojun, 52).

Apart from lack of interests, it is also possible that they do not prioritize political participation since they know others would work on it. “I think to make a big influence is not
what one person can do, there should be, for example, the Inspraakorgaan Chinezen (IOC), they will represent the Chinese immigrants to participate [in politics]” (Zhifang, 56). As for her, she does have a relatively higher level of political interests.

I watch Dutch news every day. Even though we don’t have the right to establish policies, you can learn about the political opinions in this country … Political participation is important because you have the right to speak up.

Knowing the importance of political participation gives her the motive to get herself involved. However, the extent to which she did participate is scant.

I didn’t participate myself. I used to get involved in the IOC to promote Chinese language education, … I participated only a part of it. …

The chances of them being involved in non-institutional political participation are very low. “because I cannot speak the language. If I go there, I can only stand there without talking with anyone.” Even if the language is not a problem, they still prefer not to go.

I think it is, for me the behavior is both marginal and dangerous, and especially for someone like me, we have kids, I don’t want to do this kind of stuff. Like in Chinese we say: the shot hits the bird that pokes its head out. Because when you are against the government, you will never, you will be punished by the government for sure. I will never do this, ever. Even if I don’t have kids. (Lan, 34)

Similarly, Chinese cultural influence appears to be the major explanation of not actively participating in non-institutional forms of political events. However, instead of low political efficacy, it is the intention to avoid conflicts as well as not sticking out from the majority in society that leads to non-participation in, for example, protest.
Generally, Chinese people would prefer not to deal with this kind of situations if possible. Chinese people don’t like to cause trouble, which is influenced by the philosophy of Confucius. They don’t want to be different; … it’s in our blood. …When Chinese people do have problems, they still prefer to deal with it silently. (Lan, 33)

That is to say, they may sit together and complain about the discrimination or unfairness, instead of reporting the problems publicly. This is common for both the lower and higher educated people in general.

Instead of being active in politics-related activities, Chinese immigrants are likely to stay connected with Chinese communities or associations. However, these communities and associations, which may provide opportunities to get together and become stronger than individuals, often stay away from politics as well.

Lan, the creator of the WeChat group chat, says she personally would not invest her time on politics-related issues in the group chat.

It depends on the person, after all, I’m more interested in family activities, so I always share information about family activities in the group chat. … Because I can speak Dutch, I also use the Apps that Dutch people usually use, which other people probably don’t know. So I will share it with others.

Shaojun used to be the president of an association for a group of Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands. He particularly emphasized that the association should be “independent and non-political” due to the high-tech industries which most of its members are working in.

In the Charter of registration in the Dutch Ministry of Commerce, the association emphasizes independence, non-political, and non-profit. If not so, you’ll be labeled by the Dutch or western society, political groups or the media. They would target us as a group that serves the
Chinese government. In the case of some sensitive political topics involving China, the voice of the association will not be regarded or objectively viewed by the Dutch or the Western media, and the association will be seen through colored glasses.

Surprisingly, the former asylum seeker is the only one who voted this year, and the only one who is strongly motivated to participate in politics as well. “Whenever there is a chance to vote, I will participate.” (Jianming, 70) Explained by himself, “We went to school before the Cultural Revolution, the education we received was different from the later generations.” Deeply influenced by his previous experiences in China, the way he describes Dutch political parties reflected the political culture in China decades ago after he has been living in the Netherlands for almost 30 years. He has strong opinions towards many things, including Dutch, Chinese and world politics. Besides, he is the only respondent, both the first and second generation, who went to court when he got a ticket for parking in the wrong area without being informed.

Constantly comparing the environment and social welfare in the Netherlands with that in China, he is “undoubtedly” and “absolutely” grateful for what the Dutch government and society offered to him, such as housing, health care, as well as free education for children. The gratitude, to some extent, motivates him to take an active part in politics, as he tries the best to enjoy the rights and benefits of his Dutch citizenship.

**Second generation**

**Identity: Dutch or Dutch Chinese?**

Compared to the first generation, the second generation shares more commonalities than diversities. They all grew up in a similar environment back in childhood. However, their attitudes towards identity and politics, in general, are still slightly different. The five respondents can roughly be divided into two groups: one group consider themselves as Dutch Chinese, and the
other as Dutch. In this case, parent-child socialization, which is values they have learned and internalized from their parents, is the primary factor contributing to their self-identification. That is to say, their recognition of Chinese culture largely depends on the importance their parents attach to it.

Three of them identify themselves as Dutch Chinese. They do realize the differences between them and the native Dutch as well as native Chinese. Meanwhile, they are aware that Dutch people distinguish them from both native Dutch and native Chinese as well. When being asked whether they consider themselves more as Dutch or Chinese, they say:

None of them actually. Not really Dutch but also not really Chinese, like when you ask Dutch people do you think I'm Dutch, they say no you're a bit different, and when you ask Chinese people they also say no you are a bit different. I think we really are our own sort of mix. (Jesse, 20)

For this group of respondents, they do care much about the influence of Chinese culture on them.

I have strong Asian influences because I know many Dutch Chinese that is heavily influenced by the Dutch, so they consider themselves as like, because they don't really care or know about Chinese culture anymore. I still care. I still know. (Albert, 23)

Meanwhile, what they have learned from their Chinese cultural background and their Dutch environment are still different. “I think Chinese people makes you a bit closed and then the Dutch society makes you a bit more open.” (Jesse, 20) More explicitly speaking, the influence of their parents played a more critical role in their childhood, and the Dutch environment shaped them more as they grow up. The influence of their parents is mainly about the fundamental values in life, and it has a lot to do with the traditional Chinese culture indeed.
From my parents, it was just like, you know, how to act as a person, like you think about other people, you know, don't be selfish, sharing is caring. Those basic values actually, just respect other people they then will respect you, for example, just those like basic things in life, yeah, so that's actually what my parents told me. (Irene, 21)

For this group of respondents who do emphasize the influence of Chinese culture on them, they tend to develop a closer relationship with their Dutch Chinese friends because they “just somehow search for own kind of people with similar mindsets”. (Jesse, 20)

If you talk, I have the idea that I can talk deeper and having deeper conversations with the Dutch Chinese because I kind of trust them more, you share the same views and perspectives about certain things. (Irene, 20)

Their parents indeed have high expectations for their educational achievements. They also stress the importance of getting high grades, especially before they go to university. Compared with the somewhat stereotypical expectations of Chinese people doing better at Math or getting higher scores in school, the respondents usually only care about the expectations of their parents. To some extent, it does result in their higher academic achievements.

The other group, in contrast, consider themselves as the Dutch identity. They do not perceive a difference between them and the native Dutch from their perspective.

I know that I was born and raised here. So I'm completely Dutch, to be honest. But I know that I look different and I grew up in a different household that I have a different culture. So, of course I am a little bit different, but I don't feel that way unless people pointed out. So unless they tell me that I look Chinese, otherwise I feel completely like home here. (Gina, 23)

Different from the parents in the former group, Gina’s parents gave her more freedom while she grew up. “They just let me explore, just let me do what I want”. Therefore, it has
created more opportunities for her to experience the Dutch culture and ways of living; meanwhile, it puts less pressure on adjusting themselves to the cultural background of their Chinese households. “They will not really push me into the Chinese culture”. Besides, they are not so strict with her school performance either.

The reasoning becomes more complicated in Edwin’s case. The ways Edwin was brought up by his parents was, to a large extent, similar to the parents in the former group. They also stress the importance of education. He is primarily impacted by the Chinese culture as well. The only noticeable difference between him and the former group of respondents is that rather than inherit particular cultural norms, the Chinese culture impacted him more philosophically.

So in my sense a little bit philosophical, a little bit deep as well… So for instance, some people just view some, key issues, like in a certain way, like, let's say, from a western perspective, … And I was trying, you know, to keep an overview like what really matters at the moment. So look at both sides, like their views and their opinions, their arguments.

(Edwin, 25)

Therefore, the influence of Chinese culture, in this case, does not deviate him from the western cultural norms. Besides, when he socializes with other people, he prefers not to distinguish them from ethnicities, which may help him better integrate into Dutch society as well.

**Model Minority**

“Model minority” appears to be new to all of the respondents. However, after being introduced to what “model minority” stands for, they mostly agree with the description. “So you see a clear difference between cultures. Usually, the Chinese culture it’s like, usually rated the highest compared to other foreign cultures.” (Albert, 23) At the same time, they also noticed that
the media and the Dutch society are likely to perceive people from Chinese descent more positively than the other ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands, even though they personally do not associate much with people from other ethnicities. While the Dutch-identity respondents are more like only to agree with the concept, the Dutch Chinese respondents tend to file themselves into this concept as well.

I understand where it comes from, and I'm actually quite proud to hear that, like yeah, we are doing quite well, ah, but I think that's all I can say. (Irene, 21)

Different from the first generation, they recognize themselves as “model minorities” mainly because their behavior is consistent with the description. However, without the deeply rooted philosophical thoughts in Chinese culture, they behave as such thanks to the process of parent-child socialization. In other words, without questioning how they end up acting like “model minorities”, this is how their parents teach them.

**Political participation**

Surprisingly, being highly educated in the Dutch educational system and being socialized in a Dutch environment failed to help the second generation Chinese immigrants cultivate a higher level of interests in politics. There are some differences between the two group of respondents who consider themselves more as Dutch or Dutch Chinese since it determines the environment they are socialized into as they grow up. Socialization effects, again, play a critical role in impacting their likelihood of active political participation.

The respondents who identify themselves as Dutch Chinese generally show fewer interests in politics compared with those who identify themselves as Dutch since the Dutch Chinese population tend to show fewer interests in politics than their Dutch peers. The chances for them to talk about politics-related topics both with their parents and their close friends are
minimal. Meanwhile, when mainly socialized with the native Dutch, the latter group of respondents have more chances to talk about politics with their Dutch friends. However, the overall likelihood of political participation among the second generation Chinese immigrants is still relatively low. Only one out of five respondents voted in the latest elections in March 2019:

I thought, okay, I mean, I have the right to vote, so why shouldn't I just do it? Because it might help a little bit, because I think a lot of people think, oh my vote wouldn't help. It's just one vote. But if you have that thought for like thousands of people, then it does matter. So I thought, why not? It doesn't really take a lot of time and effort. I just have to know what I want to vote for and that's it. (Gina, 24)

Considering the lower voter turnout rate in the elections on provincial and EU level, it might be possible that the respondents are more likely to have voted in the national elections. However, when talking about previous voting experiences, most of them did not mention national elections in particular. The only respondent who talked about national voting explicitly said that he usually would not vote either:

When it comes to like national voting, usually I want to skip that as well. … because some of them are using the arguments that are not my cup of tea, I would say, but some of them, they really have good points. But then again, their party background is not the one that I am really looking for. (Edwin, 25)

Even though non-voting seems to be shared among the second-generation Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands, their reasoning of not going to vote still differs on the individual level. Most of them also claim that they have voted before. However, compared to the things that are more relevant to their daily life, they do not care about Dutch politics that much, therefore, voting might not be among their priorities.
Maybe because of also my parents they don't care about Dutch politics, so I don't also, I'll be honest, I don't really follow the Dutch political news either, because I don't really care. I still will vote occasionally, but this year not, because I don't know why, I have things to do, or like I said because I'm busy or something. I'll just, I won't prioritize voting, you know. (Albert, 23)

A more frequent answer to non-voting is lack of knowledge and awareness. They do not think they have acquired enough knowledge and information to be able to vote responsibly. Different from the first generation respondents, they do understand more about Dutch politics in general. It becomes quite apparent when they talk about how they decide which party or candidate they have voted for in previous elections. However, the basic understanding they are equipped with thanks to their educational experience does not contribute much to help them achieve a higher voter turnout rate. According to the respondents themselves, they lack the party-specific knowledge to understand how they should make their decisions when it comes to voting.

Because I don't really read about those things, I don't know what those parties stand for ... Of course, in general, I know what parties want but not specific, and I think when you are uninformed about that you shouldn't vote. (Jesse, 20)

In the cases where they do vote in the previous year, they are likely to vote for right-wing parties. Grown up in the household of business owners, they generally support the idea of low taxation, being independent, as well as being responsible for one’s own development and success in the economic sense. As is seen, their political preferences also have much to do with their household environment.

In general, I am more like on the right side. I have more the idea of being independent and because I do think it's good that the Dutch government is covering a lot like studies, like money, subsidies for people can't work anymore, but also I think for the people who are
working hard shouldn't pay that much tax for example, … so that why I will choose more like on the right side instead of left… (Irene, 21)

Other issues they usually care in voting also closely relate to themselves. For example, as university students, they may pay more attention to student-related elements in the party statements, “I'll focus on the party that more focus on the students. so it's more like, how environment or the retirements, … I don't really care that much, because I'm not having that right now”. (Albert, 23)

Instead of voting for issues that have much influence on their current status, the only second-generation respondent who has voted in the March 2019 election stated that she would consider the implementation of policies and, thus, focus on issues that would benefit people in the long run.

I mainly um, more looking at the bigger picture, I think because of course, I'm a student, so I would like to have my student rights, but I don't think that really works because if the rule is implemented and probably I'm not a student anymore. … So I would look at what I think is important for the future. And now I think I know that the environment part is very very important. That's what I also really am interested in. (Gina, 24)

Additionally, they are also not likely to commit to a specific political party when they make voting decisions. In other words, when they vote, they mostly focus on the party statements that are in line with their preferences, rather than a political party with a certain background or culture.

I mean it's still like every political party has their own culture as well. So because I voted for the conservative-liberal party, it doesn't mean that I really fit in with the type of people who were going to those political events. (Edwin, 25)
Similar to the first-generation respondents, the second-generation Chinese immigrants also state that generally speaking, voting is the only way of political participation they take into consideration. When it comes to non-institutional political participation, they either had no willingness to participate at all at this moment or at least will not participate positively.

Take protesting for instance; none of the respondents has ever been to protests. Generally speaking, the second generation respondents are pretty comfortable with their current living conditions. Even though it does not mean that they are satisfied with everything, they do not quickly attend protests.

Well, it's like if people are protesting I would never, I don't think, maybe I shouldn't say never but I won't easily go protest as well; and I don't have, right now I don't have anything that I want to change that much or I would go for it, yeah, attend the protest. (Irene, 21)

Another reason for their non-participation is that they also have a higher level of tolerance. Grown up in families with immigration backgrounds, their exposure to both Chinese and Dutch culture also helps them understand and tolerant different choices and preferences regarding a different group of people. For this reason, they tend to stay neutral when it comes to strong arguments or intention to achieve something only certain groups of people want.

I think for personality I'm quite, tolerating quite a lot of things. so it's not that I have like a very strong opinion about something because I respect kind of everyone I feel, … I can also understand other people as well, … I wouldn't participate because I don't have that driven that I should go to that side or that side. I'm like in between. (Irene, 21)

Due to their higher level of tolerance, they also prefer not to react to minor discontent in society. When asked about the situations where they have taken actions in the past, they state that they will only participate when it becomes really personal.
I know that in the past there were some problems with the Netherlands not allowing Chinese chef cook, … and I think my Dutch uncle, … he did go petition for that. And actually also my uncles, like native Chinese, they also went to protest actually. … but that's was like the one time only because it was really personal. They are chef cooks themselves. They really work in restaurants, and then they suddenly said like it is not allowed anymore to get Chinese people to work in the Netherlands in your restaurant, so they just protest for that. (Jesse, 20)

When talking about protest merely as a form of political participation, rather than their willingness to take part in it, some also think that protest can be a bit extreme.

And when people try to break things or try to hurt people during the protests, and if they're trying to make the government or the police people trying to make them like, to bother them specifically because you just want to be a rebel. I don't think that's good. They can do it in a more civil way, and what you're doing that, of course, you come in the news, but I don't think you will achieve a lot through that. … And people are just marching around and maybe shouting some stuff. That's okay. If you don't cause trouble, then it's fine. (Gina, 24)

Some of the respondents may also sign for petitions. In these cases, their likelihood of signing still has much to do with the awareness of the issue. "Most of the times I already know about it. It mostly is something that just has been recently in the news, and they'll start a petition about it." said by Jesse, "well, just I think, oh I agree with this, then I would sign of course."

Besides, it also depends on how many people are joining, as it directly influences to what extent the petition may bring to the actual change of the eventual outcome. Even though the willingness to sign for a petition already shows their concern of the issue, Jesse will not initiate such activities like petitions to express his preferences themselves. "Like sometimes they ask for
signatures for petition then I’ll think about it and then oh I’ll just put my signature, but I don't really actively participate in that”.

**Conclusion and Discussion**

Based on the ten respondents, including the first- and second-generation Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands, I explored and systematically analyzed their attitudes and behavior regarding political participation, as well as the explanations behind it.

In contrast to the literature, which explains the relationship between the level of education and political participation (Armingeon et al., 2015), the overall likelihood of active political participation among the Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands is relatively low, despite their level of education among the first and second generation. In other words, the research findings show no remarkable generational differences regarding political participation among the Chinese immigrant at first sight. However, the explanations of non-participation between generations drive into different directions.

The language barrier and Chinese cultural influence seem to be the primary explanation of non-participation among the first-generation Chinese immigrants. While the inability to understand Dutch political knowledge and information, as well as the difficulties in communicating with native people more or less equally discourage them from both institutional and non-institutional forms of political activities. The Chinese culture, on the other hand, influence their voting behavior and motivation to protest in different respects. When it comes to institutional participation such as voting, low external political efficacy (Craig & Maggiotto, 1982) mainly accounts for their non-participation, which is, the low possibility of the public to influence political outcomes, which they have experienced before migrating to the Netherlands.
Meanwhile, it is the ancient Chinese philosophy of avoiding conflicts and not sticking out from the majority that prevents them from participating in protests.

As for the second generation, parent-child socialization (Dinas, 2013) appears to be the fundamental factor that influences their attitudes and behavior towards political participation. The extent to which parents emphasize Chinese culture to children determines their self-identification in the first place. Therefore, it also influences peer socialization later in life. In other words, the second-generation Chinese immigrants who have stronger recognition of Chinese culture lack the environment where they can talk about politics-related issues either with their parents or Dutch Chinese friends. When it comes to the Dutch-identity second-generation immigrants, the peer environment mobilizes their political interests and political participation to some extent. Without the cultural root to avoid deviating from the majority, their non-participation in protest mainly accounts for, firstly, their satisfactory living conditions; secondly, the value and principles internalized from their parents. Moreover, considering the young age of all second generation participants, it is also understandable that they present a low level of political interests.

The concept of “model minority” has different implications to first- and second-generation Chinese immigrants. Despite the low self-perception of being “model minorities” among the first generation, Chinese cultural influences again play a critical role in their behavior to act in such ways. In contrast, the second generation acts like “model minorities” mainly because of the parent-child socialization since they follow the expectations of their parents. Above all, being “model minorities” failed to mobilize political participation in both generations.

Instead of mobilizing political participation (Sandovici et al., 2010), intimately connecting with people from the same ethnicity restrict their opportunity to acquire information
about politics. Although some of the members within the community have higher language skills, they do not often provide information to the rest due to the lack of political interest, as well as the political environment.

The most obvious limitation of this research is about sampling. The most well-known Chinese immigrants in Dutch society are those who work in the restaurant. None of the respondents in this research works or worked in the catering industries as a family owned business. Fortunately, their stories can be partly represented with the help of their children’s generation. Besides, a total number of ten respondents makes it harder to find bright patterns within this diverse group of the population, especially when I divided them into two groups to make the comparison between first and second generation. Besides, further studies may include the second generation immigrants who were born in their original country but moved to the Netherlands before school age as well.
References


Appendix

CHECKLIST ETHICAL AND PRIVACY ASPECTS OF RESEARCH

INSTRUCTION

This checklist should be completed for every research study that is conducted at the Department of Public Administration and Sociology (DPAS). This checklist should be completed before commencing with data collection or approaching participants. Students can complete this checklist with help of their supervisor.

This checklist is a mandatory part of the empirical master's thesis and has to be uploaded along with the research proposal.

The guideline for ethical aspects of research of the Dutch Sociological Association (NSV) can be found on their website (http://www.nsv-sociologie.nl/?page_id=17). If you have doubts about ethical or privacy aspects of your research study, discuss and resolve the matter with your EUR supervisor. If needed and if advised to do so by your supervisor, you can also consult Dr. Jennifer A. Holland, coordinator of the Sociology Master's Thesis program.

PART I: GENERAL INFORMATION

Project title: Political Participation Among First- and Second-generation Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands

Name, email of student: Peiyao Zhang, 492735pz@student.eur.nl

Name, email of supervisor: Julian Schaap, Schaap@essb.eur.nl

Start date and duration: 01.04.2019 - 04.08.2019

Is the research study conducted within DPAS ☑️ NO

If 'NO': at or for what institute or organization will the study be conducted? (e.g. internship organization)

PART II: TYPE OF RESEARCH STUDY

Please indicate the type of research study by circling the appropriate answer:
1. Research involving human participants.  
   YES - NO

   If 'YES': does the study involve medical or physical research?  
   YES - NO

   Research that falls under the Medical Research Involving Human Subjects Act (WMO) must first be submitted to an accredited medical research ethics committee or the Central Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects (CCMO).

2. Field observations without manipulations that will not involve identification of participants.  
   YES - NO

3. Research involving completely anonymous data files (secondary data that has been anonymized by someone else).  
   YES - NO

PART III: PARTICIPANTS  
(Complete this section only if your study involves human participants)

Where will you collect your data?  
I will collect my data mainly in Rotterdam and possibly also in other cities in the Netherlands depending on the preferences of the participants.

Note: indicate for separate data sources.

What is the (anticipated) size of your sample?  
10-16 participation in total, with half being the first generation and the other half the second generation.

Note: indicate for separate data sources.

What is the size of the population from which you will sample?  
The Chinese ethnic group (74 234 people in 2018) in the Netherlands takes up 0.43% of the total population

Note: indicate for separate data sources.

1. Will information about the nature of the study and about what participants can expect during the study be withheld from them?  
   YES - NO

2. Will any of the participants not be asked for verbal or written 'informed consent,' whereby they agree to participate in the study?  
   YES - NO

3. Will information about the possibility to discontinue the participation at any time be withheld from participants?  
   YES - NO

4. Will the study involve actively deceiving the participants?  
   YES - NO

Note: almost all research studies involve some kind of deception of participants. Try to think about what types of deception are ethical or non-ethical (e.g. purpose of the study is not told, coercion is exerted on participants, giving participants the feeling that they harm other people by making certain decisions, etc.).
5. Does the study involve the risk of causing psychological stress or negative emotions beyond those normally encountered by participants? **YES - NO**

6. Will information be collected about special categories of data, as defined by the GDPR (e.g., racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a person, data concerning mental or physical health, data concerning a person's sex life or sexual orientation)? **YES - NO**

7. Will the study involve the participation of minors (<18 years old) or other groups that cannot give consent? **YES - NO**

8. Is the health and/or safety of participants at risk during the study? **YES - NO**

9. Can participants be identified by the study results or can the confidentiality of the participants’ identity not be ensured? **YES - NO**

10. Are there any other possible ethical issues with regard to this study? **YES - NO**

If you have answered 'YES' to any of the previous questions, please indicate below why this issue is unavoidable in this study.

This project aims to study the political participation among the Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands, therefore, both ethnic origin and political opinion of the participants will be involved in the qualitative interviews. Both categories are essential for the result of the study, and without either of it the research questions will not be valid any more.

What safeguards are taken to relieve possible adverse consequences of these issues (e.g., informing participants about the study afterwards, extra safety regulations, etc.). Apart from general information provided in the Consent Form, I'll emphasize their rights not to answer certain questions during the interview and ensure their access to the transcripts and final research findings before any further step is taken.

Are there any unintended circumstances in the study that can cause harm or have negative (emotional) consequences to the participants? Indicate what possible circumstances this could be.

No.

*Please attach your informed consent form in Appendix I, if applicable.*
Part IV: Data storage and backup

Where and when will you store your data in the short term, after acquisition?
There won’t be paper-and-pencil test data in this study. All digital data files including
recordings and transcripts will be stored in my password-protected phone and password-
protected laptop.

Note: Indicate for separate data sources, for instance for paper-and pencil test data, and for digital data files.

Who is responsible for the immediate day-to-day management, storage and backup of
the data arising from your research?
I will be responsible for the data management, storage and backup myself.

How (frequently) will you back-up your research data for short-term data security?
I will back-up my research data every time a new transcript is finished.

In case of collecting personal data how will you anonymize the data?
I will assign the participants pseudonyms that would be approved by themselves, and
use only the pseudonyms in the transcripts and database, and keep the original
information in a separate, password-protected file, which will not be publicized. No
information is used which may lead to the identification of participants.

Note: It is advisable to keep directly identifying personal details separated from the rest of the data. Personal
details are then replaced by a key/ code. Only the code is part of the database with data and the list of
respondents/research subjects is kept separate.

PART VI: SIGNATURE

Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the ethical guidelines in the conduct of
your study. This includes providing information to participants about the study and
ensuring confidentiality in storage and use of personal data. Treat participants
respectfully, be on time at appointments, call participants when they have signed up for
your study and fulfill promises made to participants.

Furthermore, it is your responsibility that data are authentic, of high quality and properly
stored. The principle is always that the supervisor (or strictly speaking the Erasmus
University Rotterdam) remains owner of the data, and that the student should therefore
hand over all data to the supervisor.

Hereby I declare that the study will be conducted in accordance with the ethical
guidelines of the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus
University Rotterdam. I have answered the questions truthfully.

Name student: 张伟健
Date: 02.04.2019

Name (EUR) supervisor: Julian Schaap
Date: 02.04.2019
APPENDIX I: Informed Consent Form (if applicable)

Consent for participants:

Dear Participants,

I am Peiyao Zhang (E-mail: 492735pz@student.eur.nl) from the Erasmus School of Social and Behavioural Sciences at Erasmus University. As a student of a Master program in Sociology, I will research on political participation among Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands as my Master thesis project. Please read carefully all the information below and sign this Consent Form if you agree to be a participant of this research project.

1. The study mainly focuses on political participation among Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands. By conducting this research, I hope to understand whether and to what extent Chinese immigrants are active in politics-related activities in the Netherlands and possible explanations behind it. I also hope to draw more attention to the Chinese group and help us raise our voice in the Dutch society.

2. All the data collected during the interview is strictly confidential and will be used only for academic purposes. No personal information regarding your identity will be released to others without your permission. The interview will be recorded and transcribed for further analysis. Apart from myself, the English, anonymized transcripts (translations) will be made accessible to my supervisor and second-reader for the evaluation of my research project. You have the right to read and check the transcript before any further analysis. The data will be stored until the end of the research project (no later than September 2019). You can contact the EUR data protection officer (E-mail: privacy@eur.nl) for more details regarding privacy and data protection.

3. It is possible for you to discontinue or withdraw from the research project at any time. You also have the right to lodge a complaint with my supervisor or my faculty.

4. You consent to me asking about and processing your data related to your ethnic origin and political opinions.

Your signature:

Date: