New business initiatives in a corporate context

A process study of corporate entrepreneurship, identifying antecedents in scaling new business

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KEYWORDS

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Preface

On the cover of this thesis, a road is displayed, as well as a light bulb. The light bulb is possibly the most cliché visualization of ‘a great idea’, but is shown on purpose. This light represents a new business initiative within a corporate organization. As cliché as this light bulb may be, that is how relatively common it is for ideas to rise up in corporates. Most organizations do not have a lack of good ideas; the light bulb is presented clearly on the front of the image for this reason. However, making this idea work for the company as a successful new business initiative, ramping it up to scale, and knowing what helps the organization along the way is a process less well understood. Most companies fail trying. The road on the image is clear at first, but soon leads to a cloudy, unclear environment, where organizations tend to lose their way and end up in the rough dirt road, or ditch, as a metaphor for what the corporate environment sometimes can be. This thesis aims to identify the antecedents in scaling new business initiatives, as well as indicate where along the way these antecedents are most relevant, providing corporates the insights to make scaling new business work.

This thesis represents my final work in order to obtain the degree of Master of Science in Business Administration, specialization Strategic Management & Entrepreneurship, at Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University. In achieving this, the past two years I have worked with great people, have had the privilege to learn from some of the best scholars in the world and got the opportunity to combine all this with my fulltime job. For all of this, I am very grateful.

Special gratitude goes out to my coach, prof. dr. Justin Jansen, who has been able to give me the right amount of inspiration and stimulation, in a way only he is able to. For that reason, I am glad my request to have him as my coach was granted. Also, I would like to thank dr. Raymond van Wijk for his co-readership and the useful feedback sessions we have had.

My employer, who gave me this opportunity, deserves my gratitude as well. The initial opportunity to start was great at itself, but the flexibility I have had to combine work and my studies as I saw fit has been extremely helpful, and one of the most important success factors. Therefore special mentioning goes out to Fred Bosch, who encouraged me to ‘choose for my personal development’, despite the fact that, especially at that time, we faced great business challenges. Also, I would like to thank Ivo Pronk, who has been a shoulder to lean on in many ways. Last, and certainly not least, I will thank my friends and family, for supporting me during the process.

After 2 years, approximately 100 nights of college in Rotterdam, 30.000 kilometers of travelling, a great study trip to South Africa and between 20-30 hours spent a week, this is it.

It was all worth it. Big time.

Marc Splithof, 09-08-2019

Executive summary

Scaling new business initiatives, as a part of a Corporate Entrepreneurial effort, in order to thrive and survive, is difficult in practice. Exploring the literature domain of Corporate Entrepreneurship – the process whereby an individual or a group of individuals, in association with an existing organization, create a new organization or instigate renewal or innovation within that organization' (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999) – and the process a new business initiative goes through, several process models are found and – in this research - are converted to an integrative model with a three-step approach: Discovery, Incubation, Acceleration.

Prior research shows various antecedents known to influence CE as an outcome which can be structured in three main groups: structure, context and leadership. Each have several underlying determinants. Summarizing the structural antecedents, we have identified **organizational structure** (differentiation, contextual or dual purpose), an **entrepreneurial climate** (use of rewards, comprehensive metrics and friendly management processes) and emphasized the role of **support** (top management- and organizational support). The most important factors found within the contextual theme are **strategic management** (scanning, opportunity recognition, uncertainty absorption), **flexibility** (to change strategic planning) and **team orientation** (employee involvement). Lastly, the role of leadership, **transformational leadership** and **vision** is elaborated.

Although we know that these antecedents influence the process of scaling new business, based on prior research we do not know when in the process they are most relevant. Our empirical study among two cases in a corporate organization, active in a hostile market, shows that various structure, context and leadership antecedents have played a role in the process to scaling new business. Structural determinants that have been found are **structural differentiation, support** and **entrepreneurial climate**. Contextual determinants are respectively **market orientation, strategy & milestones** and **adaptability & responsibility.** Last, leadership related determinants found are **strategic vision, focus / risk-taking** and **change management & communication**.

We contributed to the field of Corporate Entrepreneurship by presenting a tentative model that shows the importance of these antecedents and underlying determinants linked to the separate phases in the process of scaling a new business initiative in a corporate context. Finally, we conclude that the end-to-end process requires a systemic view. This means that there is no single 'shortcut' or 'golden method' that is going to 'fast-forward' a companies' efforts, but an integrative approach, with a proper alignment of the management and organizational factors structure, context and leadership, with the right emphasis on these three components, at the right time in the process is the way to increase chances on making it work.

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1. Introduction

"It is not the strongest of the species that survive, nor the most intelligent, but the one that is most responsive to change." Charles Darwin

Change. It's a widely applied theme. For a long period of time change has been subject of research in many areas of expertise (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2016). Especially within the literature department of organizational studies, strategy and entrepreneurship the question how companies can survive in changing tides is broadly discussed. What kind of approach leads to the best chance of long-term thriving businesses? What types of business are most sensitive to change and what can we do about that? Just a few examples of questions researchers have been asking in many variations (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2008). An example of environmental change companies have to tackle, is the increasing pace of upcoming competitors, as a result of increased use of technology, knowledge sharing, more foreign competition and many other developments from recent years. In other words: companies are dealing with shifts in the economic environment, also known as environmental turbulence (Volberda, 1996). Markets change and companies need a way to adapt to stay in the game.

This is why these questions about survival in changing markets are so frequently asked by researchers and why it is important to create more understanding of this phenomenon. Studies show that the average life expectancy of a well-established firm is dropping significantly. Research shows that in 1935 a company could expect to be in Standard & Poors' 500 listing for 90 years. This expectation has fallen to 6-15 years on average (Agarwal & Gort, 1996). And it continues to fall (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2016). Underlining these findings is a statement by Amit & Zott (2012): "You are always one innovation away from getting wiped out."

We know that adapting to change proofs to be difficult, especially for corporates, as corporates are typically around for a longer period of time and have built a series of habits, structures, processes and not to say the least: a specific culture (all for the better part naturally focused on 'keeping status quo'). Staying relevant in the long run, requires companies to develop a way to successfully initiate and execute new business activities: corporate entrepreneurship (Zahra S. A., 1991). This study will focus on the antecedents required to manage the process of scaling new business, and will clarify when in the entrepreneurial process these antecedents are most relevant.

Corporate entrepreneurship is also known as internal venturing or intrapreneurship (Parker, 2011), all part of the general domain of entrepreneurship. Studies show that there are different definitions of corporate entrepreneurship (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999). For example, as described by Stopford and Baden-Fuller (1994): creation of new businesses within an existing organization (also called corporate venturing or intrapreneurship), activities associated with the transformation or renewal of existing organizations – both mainly defined in the same way by Guth and Ginsberg (1990) – or activities where organizations change the 'rules of competition' for its industry. As stated by Guth and Ginsberg: "entrepreneurship involves the identification of market opportunity and the creation of combinations of resources to pursue it. The 'de novo' development of new businesses within established firms reflects the process of corporate entrepreneurship." In this study we will be using the first definition.

Several management & organizational factors with a positive effect on corporate entrepreneurship are known. These can be divided in structural (Kuratko, Montagno, & Hornsby, 1990) (Zahra & Covin, 1995) (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2005), contextual (Zahra & Covin, 1995) (Covin & Slevin, 1991) (Ireland, Covin, & Kuratko, 2009) and leadership (Ling, Simsek, Lubatkin, & Veiga, 2008) (Chen, Tang, Jin, Xie, & Li, 2014) related antecedents.

Less well understood is the actual process of corporate entrepreneurship (Burgelman, 1983). Known process studies on this subject are from, for example, Burgelman (1983), Raisch & Tushman (2016), Garud & Van de Ven (1992) or Colarelli (2009). Relatively little research has been done on how to initiate and, possibly more important, how to scale corporate entrepreneurial activities (Raisch & Tushman, 2016). Generating ideas in most organizations is not the biggest issue (Ardichvili, Cardozo,

& Ray, 2003). Even initiating a corporate entrepreneurial project will be a step many organizations are able to take. However: transforming or scaling ideas into viable businesses and successful internal ventures is where most of them fail, as is underlined by Raisch and Tushman (2016) and Kuratko, Covin and Garret (2009). Managing the process to scale is a challenge. Colarelli (Colarelli O'Connor, Corbet, & Pierantozzi, 2009) distinguishes three phases in the process of accelerating new business (scaling): Discovery (creation, recognition), Incubation (evolvoing the opportunity into a viable business) and Acceleration (ramping up the business to stand on its own).

As entrepreneurship is important for growth / organizational performance (Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999), the economic (Chandler & Hanks, 1993) and social driving force (Parker, 2011) of those organizations, it is important to create more understanding about what can help companies successfully manage the process of scaling new business (Raisch & Tushman, 2016) initiative to a (self)sustaining business.

This study contributes to prior research on corporate entrepreneurship by transcending the static perspective of linking internal venturing to corporate entrepreneurship or by posing factors that positively influence corporate entrepreneurship. We will approach the corporate entrepreneurship phenomenon in a more dynamic way, by investigating the corporate entrepreneurial process to scale at one hand. In addition: we know that various management & organizational factors influence corporate entrepreneurship. Little do we know about what factors are important in what stage of a corporate entrepreneurial initiative. So, at second hand, this study will determine the most important antecedents, and link them to the entrepreneurial phase in which they have most influence. This enables us to identify what makes the challenge to scale new business more manageable, and gives insights in the areas worth investigating further.

This leads to the research question this thesis will be about:

Main RQ: *"How can corporate organizations successfully manage the process to scaling a new business initiative?"*

Sub RQ 1: *"What does the process of scaling a new business initiative look like?"*

Sub RQ 2: *"What management and organizational antecedents influence the process to scale (e.g. structure, context and leadership?)".*

Sub RQ 3: *"When in the process of scaling a new business initiative are the antecedents structure, context and leadership most relevant?"*

1.2 Methods in short

To answer the research questions, a qualitative, inductive approach is chosen. Two case studies will be conducted, in a large corporate firm in The Netherlands. This firm provided access to approximately 20 employees who have been closely concerned in (1) developing an e-commerce proposition and a (2) new convenience store-formula. These employees have all been participants in semi-structured interviews, which resulted in a large set of data. This set will be analyzed with the Gioia method (Gioia, 2013) and results in a set of propositions.

1.3 Thesis structure

This paper started with an introduction to corporate entrepreneurship, it's relevance to the field and the contribution of this research project. The research questions, and sub-questions are posed, after which a description of the research methods is provided.

From this point on, chapter 2 will contain an in-dept literature review of the most relevant research on corporate entrepreneurship and related subjects. Focus will be on (1) the process of corporate entrepreneurship and on (2) the antecedents that influence CE as an outcome.

In chapter 3 the methods are covered and a description of the corporate firm in which the case-research took place will be given, as well as an explanation of choosing this firm and cases. Chapter 4 covers the results of our case studies and will be presented by combining (1) the antecedents of Corporate Entrepreneurship with (2) the Entrepreneurial process, by presenting a set of propositions. After this a conclusion and answers to our research questions will be formulated, finalizing with chapter 5: the limitations and discussion of this research as well as a recommendation for further research.

2. Literature review

In this chapter the relevance of corporate entrepreneurship becomes clear and the most relevant academic literature concerning (corporate) entrepreneurship, internal venturing and related subjects, for example innovation and ambidexterity, will be described. Furthermore a review of various process studies and -models will be given, as well as a review of the antecedents of corporate entrepreneurship. The process review together with the antecedent review will form a fundament for this research, by presenting a theoretical framework. The chapter will conclude by making clear which elements of the literature are further used in this research.

In recent years, we've seen a lot of (technological) developments that have changed the way we all live day-by-day. Think about the way we pay for our groceries (with a phone, with our face, sometimes even without seeing a cashier). The unimaginably fast adoption of mobile technology / internet connected devices defines our work and private life nowadays. We simply cannot live without these things anymore. Many of these developments are a result of various innovative efforts of large firms.

Another example is not particularly technological, but we've all seen the dramatically decreased prices of travelling by air. This way of transportation has become reachable for almost everybody now, as a result of business model innovation (Johnson, Christensen, & Kagerman, 2008). Airliners have had a fight for the customer. In the early days, flying was a way of traveling for the happy few. Airliners focusses on comfort, luxury and service. At the time the attendance of 'budget airliners' was complete new. It eventually turned the airliners' business upside-down, resulting in a huge price competition, which made flying available for the masses. This way of innovating is called disruptive innovation, for example because firms like Ryanair and EasyJet focused on a 'low-end' market, where traditional players were 'overshooting' customer needs, opening doors for players to provide a 'good enough' product/service (Christensen, Raynor, & Mc Donald, 2015).

A lot of these examples are likely to appeal to the imagination, but the way it has influenced – and is still influencing – how businesses need to adapt to developments like this is a world at itself. Better said by Van Wyk & Adonisi (2012): "Continuous economic environmental changes force businesses to nurture their entrepreneurial environment in order to secure global competitiveness, growth and survival." Scholars have written about it a lot in the last 10 years, as adaptiveness and agility may one of the biggest challenges for companies. In a lot of industries the environments became more hostile, or turbulent.

Business growth strongly depends on corporate entrepreneurship (Antoncic & Antoncic, 2011). An important way of strengthening a company for threats in the environment is exploring for (future) opportunities the company can benefit from: developing new business initiatives. This would mean searching for adjacent businesses, relatively close to a companies present core, but can also mean developing completely new skillsets, to become ready to enter or create a new market, without a direct relation to the present core business.

A lot of companies – for this reason – are creating or exploratory units , but few of them reach scale (Raisch & Tushman, 2016). New business development within an existing company – corporate entrepreneurship – can be the answer to environmental threats, but comes with various challenges in terms of how to organize, and/or integrate and manage it. Because of the key economic and social importance corporate entrepreneurship has on survival of firms and flourishing of economies, this research will further look into this phenomenon. Maybe Christensen et.al. said it best: "one secret to maintaining a thriving business is recognizing when it needs a fundamental change (Johnson, Christensen, & Kagerman, 2008)".

2.1 Corporate Entrepreneurship

Corporate entrepreneurship is part of the general literature domain of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship is known to be of key economic and social importance (Parker, 2011). Organizations' performance and survival is largely depending on it (Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999) and it is embraced by executives today as the focus of an organizations' success (Kuratko, Covin, & Garret, 2009). Looking at academic literature about corporate entrepreneurship, many definitions are used in prior research and there is no universally accepted definition. However, most definitions show a lot of overlap / similarity. Differences can be found in the nuances. A couple of examples are provided below, to create some understanding of these differences and similarities.

As is stated by Zahra & Covin (1995) product innovation, proactiveness and risk taking capture the essence of corporate entrepreneurship. A company's ability to create new products (or improve existing ones) is not enough, according to this definition. Proactiveness is needed to beat competitors in introducing these products (or services, or technologies) to the market. Finally, companies have to be willing to engage in strategies of business ventures with a high amount of uncertainty about the outcome.

When investigating previous research on corporate entrepreneurship, a pattern can be noticed in terms used as synonyms. For example corporate entrepreneurship is also known as intrapreneurship or internal venturing (Parker, 2011), or internal corporate entrepreneurship and internal corporate venturing (Zahra S. A., 1991). As furthermore indicated by Zahra 'Regardless of the label, corporate entrepreneurship refers to the process of creating new business within established firms to improve organizational profitability and enhance a company's competitive position or the strategic renewal of existing business.' Another view: 'Corporate entrepreneurship is a set of firmwide activities that centers on the discovery and pursuit of new opportunities through innovation, new business creation, or the introduction of new business models'. So initiatives in order to improve, as well as (total) renewal (strategic renewal) and new business model creation are covered in this phenomenon.

As can be concluded from the above description of various definitions, it is hard to create a clear image of the phenomenon this research will further look into. To thoroughly understand the difference between (1) phenomena and discussion about (2) definitions for these phenomena, this research will build on the foundation that is presented by Sharma & Chrisman (1999). Because of the striking number of definitions and the indistinctness it creates between phenomena, they sought to create a definitional framework, as a result of combining the most relevant elements of the most relevant work within the field. This research on corporate entrepreneurship will use their foundation. A brief description is given below, to ensure that the basis this research will build on is thoroughly clarified.

First, Corporate entrepreneurship being part of the general domain of entrepreneurship '… encompasses acts of organizational creation, renewal, or innovation that occur within or outside an existing organization (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999)'. Under the umbrella of entrepreneurship independent entrepreneurship ('…the process whereby an individual or group of individuals, acting independently of any association with an existing organization, create a new organization.") and corporate entrepreneurship can be distinguished ('…the process whereby an individual or a group of individuals, in association with an existing organization, create a new organization or instigate renewal or innovation within that organization').

Then Sharma & Chrisman acknowledge that corporate entrepreneurship can be differentiated in two interrelated dimensions: strategic renewal and corporate venturing. The difference: strategic renewal focusses on entrepreneurial efforts that result in transformations of current organization's business or corporate level structure and strategy, whereas corporate venturing refers to the entrepreneurial efforts that lead to creation of new business within the corporate organization (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999). Both may have impact on strategy and/or structure and may involve innovation: "introduction of something new to the marketplace with potential to transform the competitive environment and organization, usually occurring in concert with corporate venturing or strategic renewal (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999)".

2.2 Corporate Venturing

Corporate venturing, as a part of Corporate Entrepreneurship, also knows ambiguity concerning the best fitting definition (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999). Addressing this issue, Kuratko et al. (2009) stated that Corporate Venturing involves the firm creating an entirely new business. As there was no consensus on what constitutes a 'new business' within an existing company, Kuratko et al. determined just that. He stated that a corporate venture was defined as "an entrepreneurial initiative that originated within an within the corporate structure (or within an existing business of the corporation) and was intended from its inception as a new business for the corporation". What could be understood as 'a new business' is represented in figure 1.



Figure 1: defining 'new business' (Kuratko, Covin, & Garret, 2009).

Close to the definition by Kuratko is the work from Covin & Miles (2007), who also state that CV involves entrepreneurial efforts in which established business organizations invest in and / or create new business. In sum, it is safe to say that corporate venturing is mainly about creation and development of new business(es) in an existing organization.

Covin & Miles differentiate by introducing Internal & External Corporate Venturing (ICV and ECV). When the new business is created within the parent company's organizational domain, Internal Corporate Venturing is the label attached to the phenomenon. External Corporate Venturing involves investments that facilitate the founding and/or growth of external businesses – that is, those outside the parent company's organizational domain.

To have an overview of the hierarchy in phenomena, figure 2 presents the framework of Sharma & Chrisman (1999).



Figure 2: hierarchy in terminology in corporate entrepreneurship (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999).

2.3 Corporate Entrepreneurship and Ambidexterity

Successful corporate entrepreneurship involves simultaneous attention to both innovation and exploitation (Hayton & Kelley, 2006). A lot about this simultaneous attention to innovation and exploitation (or exploration and exploitation) is known and generally called: ambidexterity. To stay relevant, as opposed to traditional ways of strengthening businesses for a sustainable future, for example by choosing a generic strategy (Porter, 1980) through focusing, differentiating, or cost leadership (Dess & Davis, 1984), there are relatively new insights on increasing your chances on long-term success by ambidexterity. For decades companies received advice from – for example - consultancy firms, based on Porters work (1980) on how to make the right choice for a company's strategy. Differentiating could not be combined with cost leadership. It had to be either one. Ambidexterity however is about managing evolutionary and revolutionary change simultaneously (Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996), about managing your daily business (core business) while on the other hand exploring for new business opportunities. And those opportunities may well be activities that won't fit sticking with a single/generic strategy. Organizational ambidexterity is defined as "…an organization's ability to be aligned and efficient in its management of today's business demands while simultaneously being adaptive to changes in the environment" (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008)."

Companies around the globe are struggling with managing these totally different tasks. Today's business, exploitation, asks for (completely) different knowledge and skills than exploring what keeps your business running on the long term. This is often seen as a paradox (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). To become ambidextrous, managers need to destroy the very 'alignment' that made their organization successful. They must be prepared to cannibalize their own business at times of industry transitions. This proofs to be very difficult in practice (Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996).

Prior research on ambidexterity is mainly arguing that ambidexterity can either be organized in a 'structural' or 'contextual' way (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004), which ignores the fact that different stages or phases in the corporate innovation process (idea generation, conversion, diffusion (Hansen & Birkinshaw, 2007) may require different approaches.

Corporate Entrepreneurship or Corporate Venturing can be seen as an explorative effort of an organization. Depending on the specific future business, this effort can for example be developed separately from the core business from a company (structural ambidexterity) of an initiative which has risen from an existing ambidextrously organized business-unit (contextual).

In practice organizations struggle with the question how to structurally organize (new) business units. Sometimes new businesses start off as a small 'idea', and over time evolve to a fully grown business about which the organizational question arises. But, for example, when new business starts with a thought out business plan, companies should examine the best way to organize it. More conventional knowledge of organizing new business units in corporations tends to organizing the new unit as separate as possible from the core business. More recently the concept of dual-purpose design is presented by Govindarajan & Trimble (2005). Dual-purpose design means that the new unit ('NewCo') is carefully linked to the established organization ('CoreCo'), but they remain distinct units with their own management. Govindarajan & Trimble acknowledge that the established and new units have such different DNA that it is not realistic to expect that a single person can take on both sides simultaneously. The fact that the two units are separate does not mean they are isolated. On the contrary, there are operational links between CoreCo and NewCo. The latter must forget much of what made the established organization thrive and at the same time borrow their resources. This 'borrowing and forgetting challenge' points out various dilemmas companies face in building new business in a corporate context.

Another link with ambidexterity can be found in the fact that organizations, when creating new business (e.g. ventures, NB projects), transition from an exploration phase to an exploitation phase as they scale up (Jansen, Simsek, & Zao, 2012) (Simsek, Heavey, Veiga, & Soude, 2009). This shift from exploration to exploitation at itself can also been seen as a process. A process view will be discussed in the following paragraph.

2.4 Process view

The first key element of this research is to explore the process a new business initiative goes through, by diving into literature about process studies within the Corporate Entrepreneurship domain. This is important to be able to create a more dynamic view, by linking the most influential antecedents to the phases in the process of scaling new business later on in this research. Therefore firstly an overview of previous process studies is presented in this paragraph, ending with a synthesis. This will be expressed in a process framework, which forms the process-basis for our research from that point on. The most relevant process studies found are presented together in table 1.

#	Reference	Model	Level of differentiation	Phases	Locus of CE	Main purpose
1	Burgelman, 1983	Proces model of Corporate Entrepreneurship	1. Corporate, NVD management, Group leader/venture manager 2. Core processes (definition and impetus) and overlaying processes (strategic context and structural context)	Definition, Impetus	Corporate Venturing	Determine proces of CV, with all of the specific **'corporate challenges' on different levels** simultaniously.
2	Hanssen & Birkinshaw, 2007	Innovation Value Chain	X	Idea generation, conversion, diffusion	Innovation	Determine the **right tools & approaches** in each phase
3	Colarelli et el., 2009	DIA	X	Discovery, Incubation, Acceleration	Corporate Entre-preneurship	**Allocate the right human capital** in each phase
4	Raisch & Tushman, 2016	Proces framework of the transistion to scale	Venture level, Parent Organization	Exploration, Transition, Exploitation	Corporate Entrepreneur-ship	Focus on '**graduating**' to scale
5	Nagji & Tuff, 2012	Innovation ambition matrix	X	Core, Adjacent, Trans-formational	Innovation	**Balance the organizations' ambition in a portfolio** (capacity, financial, strategic, HR)

Table 1: CE process model comparison.

When we analyze the models these scholars have presented, there are various findings. Looking at the aspect *level of differentiation* – referring to the extent to which scholars have distinguished processes at different levels of the organization (e.g. top level, middle management, organization members or even organizational level) – we can conclude that only Burgelman (1983) and Raisch & Tushman (2016) have made this differentiation. Moreover all of the models present, naturally, a set of phases an innovation, or new business initiative goes through. All scholars have applied their own 'label' to these phases, but it is noticeable all can be placed or 'layered over each other', because of the similarities within them. They can all be brought back to a three-step-phase. Next, we have analyzed the locus of entrepreneurship, referring to the area of entrepreneurship – as described in table 1 – the model is primarily focused on. We have identified the use of Corporate Entrepreneurship in general, Corporate Venturing and Innovation. Last, all models have their own main purpose, differing from determining the corporate process (Burgelman, 1983) of new venture development, to allocating the right human capital (Colarelli O'Connor, Corbet, & Pierantozzi, 2009) in each phase, or balancing new business efforts in an integral (firmwide) portfolio (Nagji & Tuff, 2012).

One of the most widely cited process studies is from Burgelman (1983); (1983); (1984). First, Burgelman describes a 5 phase model, proposed by Jay Galbraith (proof of principle, prototype, model shop, start-up volume production, natural growth), but immediately acknowledges that this model does not really address the problems of growing a new business in a corporate context. Because he states that the related strategic activities take place at multiple levels of corporate management, Galbraiths model would not be sufficient. Therefore he developed a model that distinguishes different layers of activity: corporate management, new venture development management and group leader / venture manager level. He then states that there are two core processes. First there is the definition phase. In this phase the definition of a new business project is developed. Once this definition is clear, we move up to NVD management level for the second core process: the impetus process. Here, market building for the new business initiative is the core activity. Lastly, Burgelman defined overlaying processes, which depend on the strategic context and structural context a company is in. The Burgelman process is visualized in figure 1 (appendix A).

2.4.1 Using the right tools & approaches

Another interesting approach is from Hansen & Birkinshaw (2007) who presented an innovation process model (figure 2, appendix A) they argue to be a value chain, consisting of 3 main phases (A-C), with 6 subphases. Idea generation, conversion and diffusion form the three main phases. At the (A) Idea generation phase they found 3 sub phases, namely: 1. in-house, 2. cross-pollination, 3. external. (B) Conversion, the second main phase, knows 4. selection and 5. development as subphases, and (C) Diffusion has 6. spread as final subphase.

Hansen & Birkinshaw state that managers should adopt and end-to-end approach on innovation and state that not all organizations face the same challenges in the innovation process. By adopting the value chain, managers should be able to identify the company's weakness and be more selective about which innovation tools and approaches to implement. It also can help managers realize that focusing on the wrong activities can weaken the weakest parts in the value chain even more, and the company's innovation capabilities (Hansen & Birkinshaw, 2007). This model is relevant in the context of corporate entrepreneurship, because it shows that managing an idea to a well diffused/spread initiative in an organizations requires different tools and approaches. Choosing them consciously may help successfully scaling new business.

2.4.2 Incorporating the right personality

Knowing which corporate process is underlying the 'journey' of a new business initiative in a corporate organization, or selecting the right tools, may at itself not provide the best chance on success. A perspective from Colarelli et al (2009) is focusing on skills and personality needed in the process, as they have presented the model of Discovery, Incubation and Acceleration. They show that large organizations are much better at incremental innovation than they are at radical innovation. In their long-term study, they found that despite large amounts of efforts companies put into innovation, most fail to provide the necessary measures, as there are: an autonomous organization, processes tailored for highly uncertain work and well-designed metrics. They also found that companies fundamentally mismanage their innovation talent, which prevents the companies from actually succeeding in (as they call it: breakthrough) innovation. High-potentials in the innovation leadership role are often rotated in and out of this role a lot. This broadens the concerning leaders' experience, but deprives the company of real innovation expertise at a senior level. With that in mind, they presented a model that consists of three phases innovation has to go through. In the discovery phase it is all about creating or identifying high impact market opportunities. During incubation, the company is experimenting with technology and business concepts to design a viable model for a new business. Finally, in the acceleration phase, a business is being developed until it can stand on its own (Colarelli O'Connor, Corbet, & Pierantozzi, 2009).

Colarelli et al. also connect different types of 'careers' or, personalities, to each of the three phases. You need a different skillset per phase, as a they notice that an individual with that breadth of skill sets (the sum of all skills needed in the separate phases) would be extremely rare, and therefore they proposed a set of entry-level, midlevel- and senior level skills for these separate phases (figure 4, appendix A). This enables companies to strategically place its human capital in innovation roles where individuals excel the most. An additional fact is that the three phases of innovation as presented above, can be combined with the innovation portfolio model from Nagji and Tuff (2012) who developed a way of managing your ambition.

2.4.3 Managing your ambition

In addition to Burgelman (1982), Hansen & Birkinshaw (2007) and Colarelli (2009), from an innovation perspective, Nagji & Tuff (2012) have focused on a way to keep organizations' new business efforts clear and manageable. Innovation can vary from something incremental as a new packaging material of a juice-pack, to the concept of a solar powered rocket ship. So, what does that mean for a company's innovation ambition? How can a companies be clear about what innovation means for them? As an answer to that question, Nagji & Tuff (2012) developed a matrix, with on the x-axis the degree of novelty of a company's offerings, and on the y-axis the novelty of its customer markets. Then there is an overlay of 3 levels of distance from the company's current reality (bottom left). In the core layer efforts are made to make incremental changes to existing products in existing markets. In the middle layer activities in pursuit of adjacent opportunities are displayed, and in the third layer, the transformational territory, opportunities are sought that are 'breakthrough' and don't have a market yet. With these three layers, a company can develop a so called portfolio of innovation projects, opportunities or activities, which gives a clear image of the ambition a company has in terms of its innovation strategy.

From a financial perspective, Nagji & Tuff found in their research two – as they call it – striking findings. First: companies that outperform their peers tend to allocate their investments in a ratio of 70% safe bets in the core, 20% to less safe sure activities in adjacent spaces, and 10% to high risk transformational initiatives. The total return on innovation, as the 70-20-10 ratio happens, will be inverse. A balanced portfolio over all three layers should be the goal here. This is emphasized by Hickman & Raia (2002), as they propose similar model, ('S-path to growth), saying 'companies must leverage the full spectrum of innovation, from the incremental to the revolutionary (Hickman & Raia, 2002)'.

2.4.4 The process to scale

Successfully scaling a new business initiative is a difficult task (Raisch & Tushman, 2016). When investigating the success rate of new businesses, the results are not encouraging. A broad study from Kuratko et. al. (2009) shows that among 145 internal corporate ventures (in 72 firms in the United States), 36.62% was rated successful, 18,17% marginal, 16.13% unsuccessful and 29.43 was impossible to evaluate. Burgelman (2001) conducted research on 15 exploratory initiatives at Intel. Just one grew into a full-scale business (Burgelman, 2001). Other researchers underline the high mortality rate among new ventures (most of them within the first five years), which is bad for the company itself, but also for the critical driving force companies have in economic development (Chandler & Hanks, 1993). Growing new business may be one of the toughest challenges that large companies face (Raisch & Tushman, 2016).

Raisch & Tushman (2016) have developed a process framework (figure 5, appendix A) with a specific focus on the transition to scaling new business venture, or as they call it: growing new corporate business. New businesses follow a process from exploration to exploitation. Because this research focusses on the scaling challenge, this model is described rather detailed.

The unique part of this framework is the fact that it focusses on the transitioning process of a new business initiative, as they argue that literature mainly describes how companies create exploratory business (from an ambidexterity standpoint), but says little about how they scale these businesses. Raish & Tushman propose that a new business initiative undergoes a 'graduation' process when a company tries to scale. Because this research focusses on the transitioning process from initiation to scale, this model is described more in detail.

In the horizontal relationship they describe the evolving relationship between an exploratory unit and an exploitative peer unit in the exploration, transition and exploitation phase. Here an exploratory unit is structurally separated from the exploitative unit, but 'loosely' working together to create a distinct skillset and local identity. Structural separation is important, so the exploitative units' 'inertial' forces cannot hold the exploratory unit back from developing this skillset and identity.

Then, in the peer graduation phase, the exploratory unit strives to eventually exploit their newly developed capabilities in the market. But, before the unit is able to do so, it has to 'graduate' first. This phase means that the exploitative unit first has to assess the potential value of combining resources with the exploratory unit, before it is willing to do so. The exploitative unit will assess potential value against the potential cost of cannibalization and / or internal competition. If they conclude that value exceeds the costs, the exploratory unit will be supported. Furthermore, this support depends on if the two units are able to clarify territories (no or minimal cannibalization from new unit) and to identify strategic complementarities ('quid pro quo').

In the final phase, peer integration, the units start sharing resources in the form of operational assets to realize economies of scale. The fact that the two units are working together this way, develops a collective identity. Acceptance of this way of working under the same 'parent organization' allows the units to start working on more complex ways of resource sharing. For example: joint product developments.

In the vertical relations, the parent graduation process takes place, starting with parent differentiation. Here units start taking initiative. They are generating new ideas, assess market opportunities and create public awareness. Another important activity in this phase is coalition building, which is aimed at creating a durable relation with the parent company and ensure continued support and resource flows. Taking initiative and coalition building reinforce each other, increasing the chance of moving to the next phase: parent graduation.

Graduation takes place by showing and convincing the parent company that the exploratory unit has strategic value and the investment in this unit exceeds the costs. To do so, units have to build their own profile, which showcases this strategic value. Showing how the unit complements the already existing units within the parent company increases chances on success. This however is a delicate process, since the profile of the exploratory unit can't be too similar, nor be to distinct to effectively complement the capabilities of the parent company. Second, in this phase it is important to defend unit autonomy, meaning that the unit has to be able to remain autonomous, and 'clarify boundaries', to ensure a stable relationship with the exploitative units and, ensure the identified strategic complementarities.

Lastly, parent integration takes place. In this phase, the unit aims to control strategic resources. They rely on a strong coalition and resources sharing with their exploitative partners (i.e. product development, production), but they also create their own strategic resources in other domains (i.e. marketing & sales). This makes the unit less dependent on the central services of the parent company. Control over the strategic resources strengthens the position of the unit. This increases strength in the final activity in relation to the parent company: negotiating decision making authority.

This framework shows important challenges established organizations face in making the transition between exploration and exploitation. It also shows the interrelated activities between the parent company and the exploratory unit.

2.4.5 Conclusion – Processes

Apart from the fact that all of the five described models have similarities in their way of determining steps, or phases that form a process, there are very different focus points each of the scholars have worked on, which in our view all complement each other, as we made clear in the brief descriptions about these models. Solely focusing on the phases, bottom line, all models can be brought back to a three-step process in which an initiative goes 'from A, through B, to C', as is shown in table 2.

#	Reference	Model	A (from)	B (through)	C (to)
1	Burgelman, 1983	Proces model of Corporate Entrepreneurship	Definition	Overlaying process	Impetus
2	Hanssen & Birkinshaw, 2007	Innovation Value Chain	Idea generation	Conversion	Diffusion
3	Colarelli et el., 2009	DIA	Discovery	Incubation	Accelleration
4	Raisch & Tushman, 2016	Proces framework of the transistion to scale	Exploration	Transition	Exploitation
5	Nagji & Tuff, 2012	Innovation ambition matrix	Core	Adjacent	Transformational

Table 2: Overview of processes.

As a conclusion we state that an integrative model can be established. When looking at the three phases from Colarelli et al. (2009) as a basis, these can be placed over the model of the Innovation Matrix from Nagji & Tuff (2012) (figure 3), as Discovery takes place in the transformational layer, Incubation is the process where an initiative, project or opportunity transfers from the transformational layer to the adjacent layer, and Acceleration is the process from the adjacent layer to the core business, as given in figure 4. Finally, this also corresponds with the notion from Hansen & Birkinshaw (2007) (Idea generation, Conversion, Diffusion) and Raisch & Tushman (2016), as previously described, where they proposed that new business follows a process from exploration (layer 3, 'transformational', respectively 'discovery') to exploitation (layer 1 'core', respectively 'exploitation'.



Figure 3: innovation matrix (Nagji & Tuff, 2012).



Figure 4: innovation matrix with phases from Colarelli and exploration to exploitation (Raisch & Tushman).

In our integrated model, the contribution from Burgelman (1983) and Hansen & Birkinshaw (2007) does not seamlessly fit in the way Colarelli (2009), Nagji & Tuff (2012) and Raisch and Tushman (2016) do, but can be put to use within the model as well, only in a slightly different manner. In our view initiatives, starting from the core, or starting in the discovery / transformational layer, can benefit from the knowledge Burgelman added to te field in terms of the 'corporate process' (different layers of activity) that imminently exists in corporate business, but has not been taken in to account in the models of the other four scholars. The end-to-end innovation approach from Hansen & Birkinshaw (2007) can be applied in all of the three layers (separately).

“Travelling through” the layers from transformational / discovery to core / acceleration – one can draw an imaginary timeline over the three horizons - can also be reversed, as initiatives do not always start in the transformational area. On the contrary, ‘leveraging’ your core competencies (things you do best) (Prahalad & Hamel, 2003) is a proven method to grow business. For example, in the context of a supermarket chain, if the organization is highly competent in IT-infrastructure (transitions), which may have arisen out of the need to constantly improve, due to the competitive environment, the company can choose to leverage this competency and start to exploit this is the market. Next to exploiting supermarkets, ‘IT-services’ then becomes the company’s business too. This is one of many possible examples of new business that can grow from a company’s core, into adjacent or even transformational areas.

In this research we will use the label ‘Discovery, Incubation and Acceleration’ when we are referring to the process of scaling a new business initiative. This model from Colarelli seamlessly corresponds with the model of Nagji and Tuff (figure 5) and thereby also with the more recent statement from Raisch and Tushman (2016): new business follows a process from exploration to exploitation.

2.5 Defining success

Studying successfully scaling new business initiatives, a clear definition of success is needed. Studies show lots of different ways to measure success. For example the combination of satisfying market needs or demands, developing a competitive advantage over other firms, or establishing a set of throughput processes that ensure that the market needs and processes are met (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001).

On the contrary, some researchers worry about the question if corporate entrepreneurial success is (to a good enough extent) measurable / how it can be operationalized (McGrath, 1995). According to McGrath ‘the most widely used measures of success are unavailable at the outset, when these key decisions must be made’ (referring to a go / no-go milestone for internal corporate ventures). A similar statement is done by Chandler and Hanks (1993). In most cases a company does not have at its disposal the traditional measures at the moment impactfull decisions as ‘go-no/go’ have to be made.

Concluding, as hard as it is to define success of CE-efforts, due to various definitions and assumptions, and the fact that it is an underexposed issue in the literature (Stopford & Baden-Fuller, 1994) it is worth emphasizing the words of Kuratko et al., as he stated that “it is impossible to evaluate the success or failure of corporate venturing initiatives unless it is clear what management’s goals were in the first place.” Therefore they plea for creation of venture evaluation and control systems that assess venture performance on the criteria that were set from the foundation of the firm. This can be made as big or small a firm feels it needs to be, but that fact is that it is still an effort that has to be made and not be underestimated, in favor of the rest of the process.

2.6 Antecedents of Corporate Entrepreneurship

The second key element of this research focuses on the antecedents of Corporate Entrepreneurship as an outcome. Previous research mainly used a rather static approach, by leaving the process of CE out of scope and (thus) solely focus on the antecedents and effects on CE as an outcome. When we study previous literature, we can conclude that many scholars have conducted research of antecedents on corporate entrepreneurial (related) subjects. To create a clearer view on previous research (1) an overview of the antecedents found in prior research will be presented in a comprehensive framework, table 2. The purpose of this comprehensive framework is to create (2) better understanding of differences and similarities of antecedents posed by previous researchers, by:

1. Distinguishing factors at organizational, senior management or individual level
2. Converging different terms used to indicate antecedents by various scholars to a set of three general antecedents that will form our framework for further research (‘Translation Splithof’)

Looking at the antecedents, these can be described in 3 main themes: Structure, Context and Leadership. These factors are also used by Raisch & Birkinshaw (2008) in ambidexterity literature, which makes sense because of the close relationship CE has with ambidexterity.

Howard (1992) linked the antecedents of CE to the components of an organizations' architecture - hardware, people and software - and argues a proper alignment of the components is essential. We use an umbrella to describe the main antecedents of CE, inspired by Howards organizational components model and determine under which of the three main antecedents of Structure, Context and Leadership, they fit best, based on the converging scheme in table 3.

Structure	Context	Leadership
Organization structure	Skills (Top) Managers Need	(Top) Management Leadership & support
Business Planning Systems	Personality	Individual level Leadership (mid and front-line level)
Control Mechanisms	Character	
Measurement systems	Informal Networks and Practices	
Reporting Relationships	Value System	
Reward Systems	Culture	
	Environment (external)	
	Strategy	

Table 3: Main antecedents of Corporate Entrepreneurship and their underlying components (inspired by Howard, 1992).

Translation Splithof		General factors from literature	Organizational level	Top-level management	Individual level (organizational members)	Reference
Context (Int.)	1	Structural / organizational	Strategic context			Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999
Context (Int.)			Strategic management practices			Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999
Structure	2	Contextual	Internal organizational structure			Zahra & Covin, 1995
Context			Internal: culture			Zahra & Covin, 1995
Structure			Internal: systems			Zahra & Covin, 1995
Context		Environment	External: industry globalization			Zahra & Covin, 1995
Context			External: product/market life cycle stage a			Zahra & Covin, 1995
Context			External: governmental regulations			Zahra & Covin, 1995
Context (Ext)	3	Corporate entrepreneurship strategy antecedent	External environmental conditions (comp. Intesity, technological change, prod./market fragementation & emergence)			Ireland, Covin & Kuratko, 2009
Context (Ext)	4	Corporate entrepreneurship strategy element			Individual entrepreneurial cognitions (entrepr. Beliefs, at	Ireland, Covin & Kuratko, 2009
Context (Ext)				Entrepreneurial strategic vision		Ireland, Covin & Kuratko, 2009
Context (Ext)			Pro entrepreneurship organizational architecture (structure, culture, resources, reward systems)			Ireland, Covin & Kuratko, 2009
Context	5	Corporate entrepreneurship strategy element			Entrepreneurial processes & behaviour (opportunity reco	Ireland, Covin & Kuratko, 2009
Structure	6	Internal environment			Appropriate use of rewards	Hornsby et.al, 2002
Structure					Gaining top management support	Hornsby et.al, 2002
Structure					Resource availability	Hornsby et.al, 2002
Structure					Supporting organizational structure	Hornsby et.al, 2002
Structure					Risk taking & failure tolerance	Hornsby et.al, 2002
Context	7	Strategic management	Scanning intensity			Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999
Context			Planning flexibility			Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999
Context			Locus of planning			Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999
Context			Control attributes			Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999
Structure	8	Context	Communication climate			Rutherford & Holt, 2007
Structure			Perceived organizational support			Rutherford & Holt, 2007
Structure			Perceptions of co-workers			Rutherford & Holt, 2007
Leadership (tmt)	9	Process	Leadership support & reward alignment			Rutherford & Holt, 2007
Leadership (individual)	10	Individual characteristics			Dispositions (affect)	Rutherford & Holt, 2007
Leadership (individual)					Confidence (efficacy)	Rutherford & Holt, 2007
Leadership (TMT)	11	Market Orientation	Intelligence generation			Van Wijk & Adonisi, 2012
Leadership (TMT)			Inertia			Van Wijk & Adonisi, 2012
Leadership (TMT)			Responsiveness			Van Wijk & Adonisi, 2012
Structure	12	Flexibility	Formality			Van Wijk & Adonisi, 2012
Structure			Authoritarianism			Van Wijk & Adonisi, 2012
Structure	13	Job Satisfaction			Extrinsic	Van Wijk & Adonisi, 2012
Structure					Intrinsic	Van Wijk & Adonisi, 2012
Leadership (TMT)	14	Top Management support				Garret & Neubaum, 2013
Structure	15	Innovation Requirements			Taught to think like innovators	Hamel & Tennant, 2015
Structure			Sharp definition of innovation			Hamel & Tennant, 2015
Structure			Comprehensive innovation metrics			Hamel & Tennant, 2015
Structure				Accountable innovatnion leaders		Hamel & Tennant, 2015
Structure			Friendly processes			Hamel & Tennant, 2015
Leadership	16	Structure for intrapreneurship/CE		Management support		Kuratko, Montagno & Hornsby, 1990
Structure	18	Organizational structure	Organizational structure			Kuratko, Montagno & Hornsby, 1990
Structure					Reward and research availability	Kuratko, Montagno & Hornsby, 1990
Leadership	17	Leadership		Mangement style		Van Wijk & Adonisi, 2012
Leadership				Proactive action		Van Wijk & Adonisi, 2012
Leadership				Engaging in innovative behaviour		Van Wijk & Adonisi, 2012
Context	19	Common atributes	Proactiveness			Stopford & Baden-Fuller, 1994
Context				Team orientation		Stopford & Baden-Fuller, 1994
Context			Aspirations beyond current capability			Stopford & Baden-Fuller, 1994
Context			Capability to resolve dilemmas			Stopford & Baden-Fuller, 1994
Context			Learning capability			Stopford & Baden-Fuller, 1994
Leadership	20	CEO transformational leadership		Behavioral Integration		Ling et al., 2008
Leadership				Decentralization of Responsibilities		Ling et al., 2008
Leadership				Risk-Taking propensity		Ling et al., 2008
Leadership				Long-Term Compensation		Ling et al., 2008
Structure	21	Organizing New Business Ventures	Structural			Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004
Structure			Contextual			Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004
Structure	22	DNA for Strategic Innovation	Dual purpose design			Govindarajan & Trimble, 2005
Context	23	Environment	Dynamism			Covin & Slevin, 1991
Context			Heterogenity			Covin & Slevin, 1991
Context			Hostility			Covin & Slevin, 1991

Table 4: Integral framework of Corporate Entrepreneurial Antecedents

2.6.1 Structure

Structure can be defined in (a) the 'hard' aspects of how units are organized, organizational structure, and (b) 'soft' aspects of structure, as in reward systems, measurement- and control systems and reporting relationships. Main findings of recent studies on structure in relation to corporate entrepreneurship state that there are 3 important ways of approach when it comes to CE and its place in the **organizational structure** (Kuratko, Montagno, & Hornsby, 1990; Zahra & Covin, 1995). New business can be (1) organized completely separate from the parent company (*structural differentiation*). Scholars have argued that the best way of organizing CE units is to place ventures in an autonomous unit, as far away from mainstream business as possible (Burgelman, 1983). More recent knowledge increasingly presents a (2) *contextual approach* (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004), or (3) (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2005). An explanation of the increasing interest in the contextual approach, is the fact that structural differentiation may at first hand seem to allow units to most effectively do their work, but comes with a set of coordination problems, as knowledge sharing/transfer between units may not occur, or risks of the separate unit not acting in the organization's best interest may play parts (Burgers & Covin, 2016). Finally, the view of Ireland et al. (2009) sheds another light at the theme of structure, by presenting the linkages between structural organicity and the tendency of organizations to exhibit entrepreneurial behaviors. Greater organicity should imply a proclivity towards decentralized decision making, low formality, wide spans of control and expertise (vs. position)-based power, process flexibility, free-flowing information networks and loose adherence to rules and policies. Greater mechanization should imply to opposite.

In connection to Ireland's statement concerning organicity, the next element within the theme of structure we have found is the fact that organizations should have a proper **entrepreneurial climate**. When looking at the work of Hamel & Tennant (2015), who investigated the elements that determine a truly innovative company, and Hornsby et al.(2002), who write about the elements that influence entrepreneurial behavior, there are a lot of similarities that can be covered by the *use of rewards* (Hornsby, Kuratko, & Zahra, 2002; Ireland, Covin, & Kuratko, 2009) which has to spur entrepreneurial activity, goals, feedback en has to be result based. In other words, Hamel & Tennant (2015) notice that *comprehensive metrics* are an important success factor, which means using the right metrics to measure success of innovations, by tracking inputs, throughputs and outputs. This can actually be seen as a boundary condition, as it is needed to properly being able to use a fitting reward system. Rewards are also recurring in the Intrapreneurial assessment Instrument (IAI) (Kuratko, Montagno, & Hornsby, 1990).

Diving deeper into literature concerning structure related elements, we can see more evidence of the need of an entrepreneurial climate, called *friendly management processes* by Hamel & Tennant (2015), as they state that organizations' management processes need to be tuned for innovation: '…any process that significantly impacts investment, incentives, or mindsets needs to be re-engineered for innovation. Moreover, Van Wijk & Adonisi (2012) add that formal structures of management practices that support flexible reactions (to market needs) foster corporate entrepreneurial actions. On the other hand, rigid structures of inflexible authoritarianism inhibit corporate entrepreneurial behavior (Wyk & Adonisi, 2012).

Essential in building new business is **support**. Support in relation to building new business can be divided in two ways: *top management support*, and *organizational support*. The first element reflects the dedication and determination of C-level management to the concerning initiative, project, unit, or business transformation (Garret & Neubaum, 2013). This may sound evident, but is not something that speaks for itself. "The entire top-team has to be on board (Hamel & Tennant, 2015)" and because building the right climate to be a truly innovative company takes years and a strong C-level leader, chances are companies will not make it. This can be due to various reasons, such as leadership shifts, dividedness in the top-team, or external influences from for example a supervisory board. The mentioned 'strong leader' is called *"the innovation architect"* and should be the one taking care of all the pieces coming together in one coherent system (Hamel & Tennant, 2015). Top management support, or leadership support is believed to be a process component enabling entrepreneurial behavior (Rutherford & Holt, 2007). It represents the willingness to support an individual's innovative behavior and as is found by Hornsby et al. (2002) accounts for a large percentage of the variance in the creation of an entrepreneurial corporate environment (as mentioned previously).

The second support-element is *organizational support* and reflects two phenomena. First it covers the fact that the (corporate) organization in which changes are being made through new business development, has to be willing to 'receive' these changes, in order to support them and (depending on how things are structurally organized (e.g. dual purpose design (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2005))) actively cooperate with it. This asks for, what is called a 'graduation process' (Raisch & Tushman, 2016), as the established organization has to be convinced of the new units', or initiatives' added value. The second form of organizational support can be found in *Perceived Organizational Support (POS)* (Rutherford & Holt, 2007) which represents the amount of support that is perceived by members of the organization; they have to believe the organization values and supports each individual member of the organization. This is reflected by *problem solving assistance* and *safe working conditions (psychological safety)*. When employees feel positive about the organization and its supportive nature, it influences receptivity towards the entrepreneurial efforts or the organization. Related to the latter element, *risk taking and tolerance for failure* are vital to encourage entrepreneurial behavior. Encouraging this behavior means that *availability of resources* must be perceived (Hornsby, Kuratko, & Zahra, 2002). This seems a logical thing to do, but acquiring or providing resources is a decision to be made by top management. Ireland et al. (2009) link the likelihood of making this decision to strategic vision: "Executive decisions and actions will reflect their visions for their organization. Therefore, executives subscribing to an entrepreneurial strategic vision will likely encourage acquiring resources that collectively promote an entrepreneurial capability" (when a combination of resources enables an organization to accomplish a task) (Ireland, Covin, & Kuratko, 2009). Vision is an element that recurs as a leadership antecedent in this research.

2.6.2 Context

Covin & Slevin (1991) mention that the environmental influence is of importance for CE: "Companies innovate and venture in participation of, or response to, their external environment. An environment poses challenges and offers new opportunities to which firms must respond creatively with corporate entrepreneurship. An environment also serves as a rich source of ideas for new product developments". Covin & Slevin propose three important factors: dynamism, hostility and heterogeneity. Zahra & Covin emphasize the role of environmental hostility, as they state that CE initiatives are particularly effective in organizations active in hostile environments. It influences entrepreneurial behavior and competitive proactiveness (Zahra & Covin, 1995).

Second, the contextual influence of **strategic management** and strategic management practices an important predictor of CE (Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999). In relation to the environment, scanning the environment and learning about events and trends in the organization's environment is an important strategic practice, as it facilitates opportunity recognition and also functions as uncertainty absorption (Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999), as it makes companies more aware of events and trends in the environment and enables organizations to take proactive (Stopford & Baden-Fuller, 1994) action. It is a company's 'bridge to remaining competitive, so the company must be continually innovative to remain competitive, which requires extensive scanning to recognize and exploit environmental change. Additional elements, related to the above, that are important strategic management practices, are the **flexibility** to change strategic planning to environmental change. Keeping up with the environmental change not only asks for the ability to recognize events en trends by scanning extensively, but also requires the ability to adjust strategic plans quickly to pursue opportunities and keep up with the (pace of) change. Hence, is askes for flexible planning systems in the organization. Planning often tends to create inflexibility, especially with more detailed and widespread plans. Newman (1951) argued that "once an executive prepares a plan there is a tendency to try to 'make it work' which engenders a resistance to change as a result of an established mindset and a fear of loss of face" Lastly, Barringer and Bluedorn opt for a relatively short planning horizon, referring to the length of the future time period that decision makers consider in planning. This 'short' horizon means less than five years, as this may be optimal for entrepreneurial firms. The locus of planning, referring to the depth of employee involvement in a firm's strategic planning activities (Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999) is another important element and should be deep. This means that a high level of employee involvement in the planning process, which is team oriented, enhances the level of CE intensity as it brings people closest to the customer in the process and more diversity of viewpoints are considered. **Team orientation** is also mentioned by Stopford & Baden-Fuller (1994). They underline the importance of this attribute and state that ‘vertical teams’ (team that consists of people from more than one (top) hierarchical level) can help improve both decision making and implementation’. They also underline the importance of building coalitions to support innovative ideas and creative individuals (Stopford & Baden-Fuller, 1994).

2.6.3 Leadership

In the literature domain of innovation and entrepreneurship two styles of leadership are extensively referred to: transactional leadership and **transformational leadership**. The latter is argued to be positively related to corporate entrepreneurship by various scholars (Jansen, Vera, & Crossan, 2009) (Vaccaro, Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2012) (Ling, Simsek, Lubatkin, & Veiga, 2008) (Chen, Tang, Jin, Xie, & Li, 2014). Transactional leadership refers to the bulk of leadership models, which focus on the exchanges that occur between leaders and their followers (Northouse, 2016). The exchange dimension characterizes this type of leadership. “Transactional leaders engage in a transaction in order to satisfy their respective wants Burns (1978).” Examples are a teacher who gives a student a grade for work completed, or a manager who offers a promotions to employees who surpass their goals. In contrast, transformational leadership focusses on engaging with others and creating a connection that raises the level of motivation and morality in both the leader and the follower. It is a process that changes and transforms people and is concerned with emotions, values, ethics, standards and long-term goals (Northouse, 2016). Vaccaro et al. distinguish four types of transformational leadership, as there are (1) *idealized influence* (the degree to which leaders are admired, respected and trusted), (2) *inspirational motivation* (provides meaning and challenge to followers, fostering team spirit, encouraging to envision attractive future states), (3) *intellectual stimulation* (prompts followers to question assumptions and be creative and (4) *individual consideration* (the extent to which followers’ potential is developed by attending to their individual needs, as well as learning opportunities and supportive environment for growth.
Success of CE has a correlation with *transformational leadership*, also in the CEO-Top-Management relation, as it plays a role in promoting corporate entrepreneurship (Ling, Simsek, Lubatkin, & Veiga, 2008). Evidence points out that a CEO’s transformational proclivity impacts his or her firm’s engagement in corporate entrepreneurship by shaping characteristics of the TMT. The members of the TMT are more likely to encourage managers to be more responsive to new opportunities and associated risks and more committed to initiating and supporting entrepreneurial initiatives (Ling, Simsek, Lubatkin, & Veiga, 2008). (Chen, Tang, Jin, Xie, & Li, 2014).

A recent study, focused on leadership behavior as a key antecedent for management innovation - “i.e. new managerial processes, practices or structures that change the nature of managerial work”- states that management innovation can be an important source of competitive advantage (Vaccaro, Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2012). This is an interesting approach in relation to our research, as building new business in a corporate context, requires different ways of management practices. For example inherent to choosing a dual purpose design (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2005) or enhancing the entrepreneurial climate. Furthermore the study from Vaccaro et al. shows that larger organizations tend to benefit more from transactional leadership than smaller organizations. Since corporate organizations are inherently larger companies, this underlines their beneficial potency of transformational leadership.

The role of transformational leadership in relation to exploration and exploitation subsequently shows relevant insights to our research. Jansen, Vera and Crossan (2009) have pointed out that transformational leadership behaviors contribute significantly to adopting generative thinking and pursuing exploratory innovation. On the other hand, they show that transactional leadership behaviors will facilitate improving and extending existing knowledge and therefore are associated with transactional leadership. As companies ultimately need both exploration and exploitation, this poses a challenge for companies in managing this. Referring to the statement of Hayton & Kelly (2006), successful corporate entrepreneurship requires both exploration and exploitation.

The second leadership antecedent found is **vision**. We know that executive decisions and actions will reflect their visions for their organization. Executives subscribing to an entrepreneurial strategic vision will likely encourage acquiring resources that collectively promote an entrepreneurial capability (Ireland, Covin, & Kuratko, 2009). Vision may even have a direct effect on entrepreneurial processes and behavior. A longitudinal study from Baum & Locke (1998) shows (the first) evidence of a positive effect of vision and vision communication to organizational level performance. Communicating a vision clearly can affect follower outcomes and can inspire workers, and theorists point to the importance of this for new venture teams as well (Baum & Locke, 1998).

Conclusion – Antecedents

We have showed the way we have structured or converted the most relevant antecedents found in prior research to a set of structurally, contextually and leadership related elements. Summarizing the structural antecedents, we have identified **organizational structure** *(differentiation, contextual or dual purpose)*, an **entrepreneurial climate** (use of rewards, comprehensive metrics and friendly management processes) and emphasized the role of **support** *(top management- and organizational support)*. The most important factors found within the contextual theme are **strategic management** *(scanning, opportunity recognition, uncertainty absorption)*, **flexibility** *(to change strategic planning)* and **team orientation** *(employee involvement)*. Lastly, the role of **leadership** *(transformational leadership)* and **vision** is elaborated.

2.7 Conclusion (process + antecedents)

We've shown the relevance of (corporate) entrepreneurship, internal venturing, described various process studies that have been integrated to one model, consisting of respectively the Discovery, Incubation and Acceleration phases. We have noticed the difficulty of scaling initiatives to sustaining business. Many organizations initiate new businesses, but few of them reach scale.

Studying literature in the corporate entrepreneurial domain, we have identified that there are three main antecedents that influence this phenomenon: structure, context and leadership. This is made clear in figure 5, with the straight arrows to the process to scale new business. Little do we know about when in the process these factors are most important, as it is an underexposed domain in the literature. This is visualised by using the dotted arrows to the separate phases. The results of our empirical study will answer this question.



Figure 5: the relation of structure, context and leadership antecedents to the process of scaling new business.

3. Methodology

This chapter will include a detailed description and explanation of the research design and used methods in this thesis. Also, the company that provided insights for the purpose of this research will be further elaborated, as well as cases that are used.

3.1 Research design

The aim of this research is to get a better picture of the underlying factors within the process of successfully managing the process to scale of new business initiatives. To get this picture, a qualitative approach is used, by conducting comparative case studies. By answering the research question, the objective of this research project is to build theory: a set of propositions will provide insights to the (academic) field of corporate entrepreneurship / internal venturing, as well as practical insights for the corporates themselves.

First, we will determine the **specific corporate entrepreneurial processes or phases**, based on the corporate organization that provides our cases. The concerning corporate is: a major (Dutch) national supermarket chain, Coop Supermarkten, that provided two cases that fit our research goals.
The cases are:

a. The creation and launch of an E-commerce proposition (webshop (web+app) for groceries)
b. The creation and launch of a completely new store-formula (convenience stores)

A supermarket chain fits our research for various reasons, that can be divided in practioners arguments and arguments for academia. For practioners from the supermarket industry, it is of high value to evaluate and understand more about the end-to-end process of corporate entrepreneurial activities, because supermarkets are active in a very hostile market with extremely low margins.
The highly competitive characteristics make it imminent to constantly search for ways of improving business (hostile environments already afford fewer opportunities for achieving growth and profitability (Zahra & Covin, 1995) and ways of expanding business into areas that are not known to the company today. However, possibly even more so than in other industries, there are very low margins of error, due to the low margins supermarkets have to work with. An overview of key characteristics is given in paragraph 3.4. For academia it is of interest to understand more about the way organizations in highly competitive environments cope with the process of scaling new business initiatives, as it is essential for companies survival and thriving of economies (Wyk & Adonisi, 2012) (Parker, 2011) (Chandler & Hanks, 1993; Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999).

Second, in the organization two internal venturing projects will be analyzed; one successful project and one less successful project. Within the determined process, Discovery, Incubation and Acceleration, the analysis will have a specific focus on the antecedents Structure, Context and Leadership.

Lastly, when we know what steps the concerning corporates took in the process of scaling internal venturing projects, why they choose to do so and what effect it has had, we will analyze what antecedents have played a significant role and where in the process it was most impactful or relevant. Ultimately, we will be able to determine what made the successful case as successful as it is, and we will be able to explain the less fortunate internal venturing examples. The cross-case analysis should point out if a lack of the determined success enhancing factors in the positive cases also explains the lower degree of success in the ‘negative' cases. Steps one, two and three will result in a set of propositions.

The validity of this research project can be described as follows: due to the fact that research takes place in a large corporate firm (approximately 13.500 employees), in a hostile environment (Zahra & Covin, 1995) the propositions as a result of our case studies can assumed to be true in this specific domain and appurtenant circumstances (internal validity). Internal validity is boosted by choosing for two cases in one company, and comparing a successful and less successful example of an internal venturing project. This method is chosen, because by taking both a good and a bad, or less good, example in the same corporate organization, results of these interviews are very well comparable because of the fact that the organizational variables should be mainly consistent (organizational structure, context and leadership). External validity is limited, because conclusions of this research project cannot by definition be generalized to other contexts.

3.2 Data collection

Primarily data will be collected from the semi-structured interviews, which will be recorded and saved. Recording takes place for multiple reasons. First, because when, for some reason data is requested for further clearance of data analysis, we are sure it is available. Second, if needed, in analyzing the interviews the recording can be used to transcribe them. Next to data from semi-structured interviews, several secondary sources can be used. In order to determine the degree of success of our internal venturing cases, we will collect as much historical data from the project archives as is available. Examples of project specific data or documents are: project initiation documents / plans, business cases (for example revenue, turnover, investment prognoses, targets and realization figures) and information about time to market. Since we are focusing on structure, context and leadership, all documents, recordings or files that can help to create the full image can be used. In order to get the answers to interview questions / topics, but without limiting our interview too much, a semi structured approach is used. To give the interview enough flexibility, the preparation of the interview is arranged in topics. A framework of the interview setup is attached in the appendix. In total approximately 21 interviews will be conducted. Figure 8 shows a schedule of participants. This schedule does not include more informal conversations with various project members.

In total 2 cases will be analyzed by conducting interviews with the (project)manager or director responsible, as the level of analysis is the concerning new business initiative. The cases in this thesis are not built on the search for full representation. The usage of cases is to offer theoretical insights, not to validate theory (Eisenhardt, 2007).

Table of participants interviews *Participants and role*	**Case Coop Vandaag** *# of interviews*	**Case E-commerce** *# of interviews*
Chief Executive Officer	1	1
Chief Financial Officer	1	1
Chief Operational Officer	1	1
Chief Commercial Officer	1	1
Manager Coop Vandaag (convenience store formula)	1	
Head of Formula Management (all Coop store formula’s)	1	1
Manager Projects and Program’s (portfolio management)	3	3
Manager E-commerce		2
Interim Manager E-commerce		2
Total amount of interviews	**9**	**12**

Table 5: Participants interviews per case.

3.3 Data analysis

Data from the interviews is used as building blocks for the case studies (Gioia, 2013). As a first step the content of the interviews is coded on a low level, resulting in first order concepts. These concepts are combined and transferred to second order themes. Lastly, these will be aggregated to main concepts. In the first step, all of our notes, and quotes from the interviews are analyzed. In a chronological way, all of the categories, definitions and terms used, quotes from determinative events are identified, without seeking for similarities, or converging to aggregate dimensions. Second, these first order concepts are further investigated, in order to aggregate the different concepts found into second order themes, by looking for patterns and ..”asking whether the emerging themes suggest concepts that might help us describe and explain the phenomena we are observing (Gioia, 2013)”. The last step of this Gioia-method consists of combining second order themes into the actual concepts of this research: antecedents that influence the process to scaling new business. The result of this method is a graphic representation of how we progressed from raw data to terms and themes in conducting the analysis, as it is a key component of demonstrating rigor in qualitative research (Gioia, 2013). As our research also aims to link the antecedents to the point in the process to scale where they are most relevant, we use our (recorded) interviews (and date) to reconstruct the point in the process where they have been most influential, or the point in the process they should have been most influential. For this ‘reconstruction’ the actual quotes from interviews are used (At this point we certainly benefited from…’), but also the context (indirect indications) is taken into consideration. This enables us to develop a set of propositions.

3.4 Setting – the organization

The corporate organization that provided the two cases that have been studied is Coop Supermarkten (Coop). Coop is a full service supermarket chain that is active in the Netherlands and has a market share of approximately 4 percent, which represents approximately 1,5 billion euro’s turnover. This is achieved with +/- 320 stores, from which +/- half is managed by franchise entrepreneurs. Coop possesses two distributions centers, one dedicated location for all fresh products, one dedicated center for all preservable goods. Coop also has its own meat production facility, from which not only the Coop supermarkets are delivered, but a number of competitors receives their meat from too (Coop as a supplier). Recently Coop decided to participate (50%) in a business-to-business E-commerce organization, called TeleSuper. This organization was started by two franchisees a has grown to a turnover of +/- 25 million euro’s. It focusses on delivering groceries to day-care and care-home institutions, as well as small to medium enterprises/offices.

In total Coop has +/- 7.000 employees on payroll, 13.000 are connected to Coop when including the franchise employees. Coop is pursuing a solid position in the market by looking for innovative approaches to compete with competitors. In the past ten years Coop has grown four-fold. The extremely competitive environment Coop is active in results in extremely low margins and bottom-line results (between 0,3 – 0,9 percent) in the past ten years.

Characteristics	Coop
Founding year	1891
Current # stores	325
Current revenue in €	1.500.000.000
# Employees	13.500 (6500 franchise)
Net profit (range over last 5 years)	-0,1 - 0,8%
Average EBITDA (% of net revenue)	2.2% - 4.4%
Market	Food-retail
Environmental turbulence	Very competitive / dynamic

Table 6: characteristics of Coop organization.

3.5 Setting – organizational context

To understand the environment Coop Supermarkten is operating in, a description of the (competitive) environment is presented in this paragraph. Facts and figures of the industry, as well as milestone events in recent years will be covered and as a whole will clarify the need of effectively making use of corporate entrepreneurial initiatives and, with that, form a justification of Coop Supermarkten as an organization for our research.

Trade magazines often publish articles about **'disruptive developments'** in food-retail. However disruption in the sense of Christensen (2015) is not always applicable here, however it does say something about the scale and pace of innovation in this industry. To understand more about the dynamism of the market and its hostility, we will describe the most influential events in the industry from the past decade. That said, we will focus on the development of the food-retail industry in The Netherlands.

The food-retail market in the Netherlands represented 38,7 billion euro's in 2018 (Loon, 2019). The two largest players, Albert Heijn and Jumbo, together are good for more than half of the total market share (34,7+19,1 percent). The other (14) supermarket organizations have market shares that vary from 0,2 to 6,4 percent. This indicates the inequality in the market and says something about the power market leaders have on the more modestly sized players (e.g. prices, new business initiatives as food-boxes, delivery, etc.). Coop Supermarkten can be seen as one of the biggest chains within this group of smaller ones (compared to the market leaders), with a market share of 3.4 percent (which will be approx. 4 percent after integration of the -in co-operation with JUMBO Supermarkten – recently acquired supermarket chain EMTÉ).

Food-retail market has evolved from small traditional grocers to large full service supermarket chains that dominate the streets. In recent years supermarket chains are in a battle for acquisitions. Because margins have turned out to be so small, adding volume to the supply chain became (for a lot of organizations) the number one opportunity/priority to create significant operating result and/or net profit. More volume would mean more net profit and a more solid position in the market.

Meanwhile (traditional) supermarkets are fighting a deep discount battle (price is a vital factor in the (homogenic) food-retail market) and try to optimize their supply chain as much as possible. Efficiency is key to fund low pricing and for investing in attractive unique selling points at the commercial forefront of the organization. In the search for efficiency, adding volume (turnover) is (once more) essential. As autonomous growth options (expanding results from the same store; without acquisitions) for most supermarkets are limited, many players in the field are actively searching for possible acquisitions and or mergers. In the past 2 decades over more dan 20 supermarket organizations have disappeared from the playing field, due to a merger or takeover. **Consolidation** is almost 'every day's business'.

As a reaction to the consolidation battle, more organizations tend to broaden their view on growing business: they start to experiment with adjacent businesses with corporate entrepreneurial initiatives: **new business**. As an example, Jumbo – number two in the market – has started a separate business unit that is fully dedicated working on further development of innovations within their online business model. It is called the 'Tech Campus' and is a significant investment (the unit houses 200 dedicated employees) to increase the speed of online development. Jumbo states in a press release that another import reason for starting Tech Campus is to develop in-house knowledge regarding online business, whereas that knowledge now is brought in by external advisory parties.

Another trend companies are addressing is called 'blurring' and means that the borders of (traditional) industries increasingly fade. In practice this means that for example the petrol industry, formerly exploiting 'just' petrol stations, now start incorporating a small but entire supermarket assortment in their shops. An example is international food-retailer Spar, who started a collaboration with petrol company Esso. At their turn supermarkets also are increasingly broadening their product and services range, for example by creating a coffee bar (Albert Heijn), of a small restaurant in their stores (Jumbo, Albert Heijn, Coop).

Online retailing has become a commodity in various industries. *Online food-retailing* knows a relatively slow adoption rate in food-retail, compared to other industries. In contrary to, for example clothing, books and office supplies and consumer electronics market (respectively good for 64, 59 and 50% online purchases / total), in food 'just' 2 percent of the total spent comes from e-commerce purchases (Tellingen, 2018). Traditional players in food were startled when an online-only supermarket was being launched in 2015. Serial entrepreneur Michiel Muller (Tango pertrol stations and Route Mobiel) founded Picnic: an online supermarket (app only), with short delivery times, low prices and all facilitated via a sophisticated app, with a lot of technological intelligence behind it, and excellent fulfillment (small delivery window, high customer satisfaction). Traditional players are struggling with the integration of online processes in their organizations, who are mostly designed around brick-store-processes.

Never in the history of modern supermarkets has a **new entrant** penetrated the market this way. Picnics online market share of 17 percent (2018) shows that there is a growing demand from customers to obtain their groceries in another way than they used to know. Investors are lining up, although the first profitable year is still to be expected. This indicates the changing way investors look at business models and value creation in food nowadays. Another new entrant that has grown very fast is the foodbox concept from Hello Fresh: ingredients and recipes for fresh meals delivered right at your doorstep. Fresh foods, no artificial flavoring, no additives, all addressing the *'healthy food an convenient solutions'* trend.

An example at much bigger scale is the recent takeover of Wholefoods Market, by Amazon. With an acquisition sum of 14 billion dollars, this is Amazons largest take-over so far. The technological giant entered the food-market for the first time, promising a disruption (e.g. lower prices of healthy food immediately). Not only do they exploit supermarkets now (high end), they also combine their massive amount of technological possibilities with respect to (among others) online shopping, machine learning, business intelligence and (with that) vastly efficient ways of delivery.

What will happen if a company, with hundreds of billions of cash and unimaginable amounts of technological knowledge enters your market? How do you respond, and keep or create a sturdy position in this playing field, or should you be looking for a different one? The hostility in the market has always been a fact, but nowadays supermarket business has to cope with additional trends that make thriving business even more challenging. Coop is in the middle of all this an therefore a perfect example of a company in search for 'the solution for the future', experimenting with initiatives executed with 'best-effort, but in need of ways (skills and knowledge) to scale new business successfully, faster.

3.6 Setting – the cases

Within the Coop organization two new business cases have been selected: ‘E-commerce’ and ‘Coop Vandaag’. These cases have been the most significant new business initiatives Coop has invested in, since the last decade. Coop mostly invested in ‘traditional acquisitions’, as is shown in figure 3.



Figure 6: ‘Traditional acquisitions’ and participations in a timeline.

From 50 stores in 2001 to 325 stores in 2019	
De Wit	11 stores
Edah	9 stores
Super de Boer	24 stores
C1000	54 stores
Heveck	25% participation
EMTÉ	51 stores
Telesuper.nl	50% participation

In the aim for the organization to build a competitive online proposition, soon became clear that Coop started off in a way Coop was used to. People working at the organization describe their colleagues as ambitious people with a practical, pragmatic mentality. This has brought Coop to the point of today and people are proud of that accomplishment. Typical traits in the organization are ‘let’s do it, instead of talk about it’. It’s relatively important to ‘look busy’, because when you’re not behind your desk, with rolled-up sleeves, you might not be so productive. It is a ‘hands-on’ mentality Coop has inherited from its long history (1891). After all, grocers back in the day also were ‘hard workers’.
The E-commerce and Vandaag case have been approached in similar ways. As an introduction both cases will be described, to clarify objectives, the way projects have been approached and executed.

3.6.1 E-Commerce

When the E-commerce challenge started in 2011, Coop did not know what it was getting into. Triggered by the fact that a group of (brick store) franchisers started an E-commerce initiative, the central organization was ‘obligated’ to ‘wake-up’ too. Two years later, Coop took over the initiative from the franchisers, which then had rolled out several other franchisers. What Coop had bought precisely was another question. It was the result of ‘franchise pioneering, and – as it turned out another two years of hard work later – did not fit the requirements for a complete roll-out to all other Coop stores (as was the ambition). For this reason in 2015 Coop made the decision to start over and buy a completely new platform, appointed a manager, a small team and new implementation partner (front and back-end development). As a result, in 2016 the new Coop.nl website and website were launched. Making full use of it meant that the strategic goals to increase turnover (no retention or basket size) were significant. 75 million euro's in 2020 was the goal (downgraded from the initially set goal of 100 million). At the time of this writing, reaching a third of that goal would be an accomplishment for this year (2019).

Particularly since the launch of Coop.nl (fresh start) Coop has had a lot of moments worth celebrating (relative increase in turnover is enormous) but also had to cope with a lot of challenges. Coop chose to structurally organize the new business unit within the established organization. First resorting under the Commercial manager (who reported to the CCO). After approximately 1,5 years of poor progress later, the CEO decided to take the lead and made the E-commerce manager report directly to himself. In addition he appointed an interim-manager to help set things straight ('breaking through walls' & setting up a roadmap). The established organization had trouble seeing the unit as a viable proposition, and the more ambitious the E-commerce team became, the more they turned out to be needing the established organization (due to delivery via brick-stores, assortment management and marketing and promotion were al resources needed from the established company).
Despite the fact that the E-commerce initiative is mostly viewed (in retrospect) as a successful new business case, it is one that presents a lot of elements to learn from.

3.6.2 Vandaag

Back in 2013 the market showed a new trend, and a trend that seemed to sustain: convenience stores. This type of store does not aim for customers to buy a full cart of groceries for the whole week, but is aimed at 'the moment', meaning a quick breakfast in the morning, a healthy lunch in the afternoon, or a convenient meal (ready to (h)eat) in the evening. Additionally people can buy their 'forgotten' groceries (basics). After some of Coop's competitors already took initiative to develop and roll out a new convenience store concept, Coop decided to also develop one: 'Coop Vandaag'. Almost one and a half years' time did it take to develop a concept – with a little group of internal people and some external advisers – that has been piloted in Rotterdam for about one year, with 3 stores.

After this pilot had been finished, the results (store exploitation figures) were encouraging enough for the supervisory board to give their green light for a further roll-out. Coop however did not manage to stick to the assumptions that formed the policy whether store locations were matching the Vandaag concept or not. In the rush for a quick roll-out, acquisitions of store-locations became a 'rush-job', resulting in deviated store appearances at the newly opened post-pilot stores. Exploitation figures deviated negatively too. From that point on discussions about the leading assumptions – and whether or not to revise them – were taking place, costing a lot of valuable time. Eventually, Coop seized the chance to acquire the EMTÉ supermarket chain, together with Jumbo. This directly meant an acquisition freeze, regarding the new business concept Vandaag. At the time of this writing, Coop is looking for ways to improve exploitation figures in the current Vandaag stores, such that the concept will be steady enough to roll-out further.

3.7 Cases fitting research goals

These cases make a good fit with our research goals, because they perfectly fit within the context and research's questions. The cases are a good examples of new business (Kuratko, Covin, & Garret, 2009) initiatives in a corporate context (Zahra & Covin, 1995), and give access to all the people and information needed to answer our research questions. Next, the urgency for the Coop organization to strengthen the competitive position is significant, as can be concluded from the organizational context description (3.5), which is highly competitive.

We have access to almost all al people involved in the process, from start to the current appearance of both cases. Also, a lot of data is available throughout the process. Both cases have been strategic choices, as E-commerce is an increasingly upcoming turnover-risk to our 'brick' stores, and convenience stores increasingly become an extra form of 'brick' competition as well.

4. Results / findings

This chapter will cover the findings of this research. The results of the data processing method from Gioia will be presented. It will then become clear that 3 main antecedents are relevant in scaling new business: Structure, Context and Leadership. Each antecedent contains three underlying determinants. As this research also aims to clarify the most relevant antecedents in the separate phases of the process to scale, results will be given per phase (Discovery, Incubation, Acceleration). Concluding, we present a framework of the antecedents, linked to the specific entrepreneurial phases and corresponding propositions as the end result of this research.

The empirical study that has been conducted leads to 9 determinants influencing the process to scaling a new business initiative and can be dived in 3 main antecedents, using the scheme as presented in appendix C. The *structural* determinants are *structural differentiation, entrepreneurial climate* and *support*. The *contextual* determinants are market *orientation, strategy & milestones and responsibility & adaptability*. The *leadership* determinants are respectively *strategic vision, focus & risk-taking and change management & communication*. The data construct in appendix C shows on which basis these determinants are created.

As the results will be elaborated per phase, each phase will entail the results of both cases. Most noteworthy events, differences or similarities between the cases will be described. When, in the described findings, cases are not especially mentioned, the results are applicable on both cases. A concise overview of the most important events per case is given in figure 10 and 11, appendix B.

4.1 Coordinating a thorough discovery phase: developing a market oriented, strategic vision with continuous management support

Looking at the way both initiatives have originated several observations around the concept of **market orientation** can be made. We know that being strongly market oriented facilitates *opportunity recognition* and also functions as *uncertainty absorption* (Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999), as it makes companies more aware of events and trends in the environment and enables organizations to take proactive (Stopford & Baden-Fuller, 1994) action. Analyzing both Coop cases, we can speak of a reactive approach in general (low *scanning intensity*). The E-commerce initiative has been a response to franchisers who started it and Coop Vandaag was a reaction to competitors in the market, as a C-level manager told us:

"We were aware of the fact that our competitors were already searching for online propositions and we felt that our current way of delivering groceries (via fax or telephone orders) did not match our brand values anymore. Therefore we decided to develop our own online proposition."

When it comes to the development of Coop Vandaag, a similar trigger has led to the start of this initiative. Coop noticed that some of the most important and influential competitors began to exploit a city/convenience concept and did not want to leave behind (to prevent turnover leakage).That said, this (following competitors) is not a value judgement and can even be a chosen strategy. This however does not appear from the interviews. What does appear is the fact that both initiatives today (already) lag behind in the market when it comes to latest tech and concepts (payment options, online proposition, extensive options in meal preparation). This tends to be an inadequate responsiveness (*or flexibility*) to market developments, as the concepts could very well at least have been 'on par' when they originated. Unfortunately, with a lead time / development period of several years, intermediate adjustments are necessary, underlined by – among others – the E-business manager:

"The world is way further then we are with our current proposition. We are not responding to trends to a good enough extent. For example the changing consumption patterns and thus we're not meeting the needs of our customers. We don't 'think innovation'. As a result of this, our basis is to weak."

Market orientation can also be explained as the way an organization scans the market for fitting talent, young potentials, or at least look for a continuous flow of new and needed skills and knowledge in the market. In other words: attractiveness to talent in the job market and also the ability to keep being attractive for people who already work at the organization (job satisfaction). The E-business manager continuous:

"We are underinvesting in people / HRM. Partly because of that people have left our team."

Investing in people doesn't just mean investing in the people of the e-commerce or Vandaag teams. It also means that what is called the 'umfeld' had to be managed. New units are usually not accepted without a struggle, as is explained by Raisch & Tushman (2016) with the graduation process. Expectations of the established organization has to be managed, as is the alignment of KPI's and responsibilities. These have to be 'tuned for innovation' (Hamel & Tennant, 2015) This exact situation was applicable to the Vandaag case

In the complete process, when looking back, people state that a clear **strategic vision**, a point a the horizon, would have been very helpful. A roadmap came in to late, which made making choices before that point very hard. Apart from that, they point at great examples of Steve Jobs and Pieter Zwart, who create enthusiasm with their visionary leadership. It makes people exited to work on a common goal. Several interviewees told us they think this this sense of direction would have helped te process. Literature suggests the likeliness of this assumption, as Ireland, Covin and Kuratko (2009) presented that the most important job of an organizational leader is not to find new opportunities, or to identify the critical competitive insights. The most important task is to create an organization that does these things for you as a matter of course. "…when an organization's top-level managers develop and clearly communicate an entrepreneurial strategic vision, organizational members will have encouragement, guidance, and a philosophical justification for entrepreneurial actions. Under such conditions an entrepreneurial opportunity is more likely to be recognized and persued. (Ireland, Covin, & Kuratko, 2009)"

Starting with two relatively controversial initiatives (online is until this day not profitable and Vandaag is still producing red figures), does not lead to instant buy-in from all employees, as is already clarified in various examples before. What has not been explicitly discussed is the **support** role of the Top Management Team (TMT) in this perspective. We know from literature that the role of Top Management Support is vital: "The entire Top-team has to be on board (Hamel & Tennant, 2015)". Interviews indicate that there has been a case of dividedness within the TMT. Some TMT members were actively pro-ecommerce and Vandaag, some were almost actively against. *Top Management Support* was insufficient, and although the E-commerce manager reported to the CCO, actual support rested mainly on the shoulders of the CEO. The CEO had to choose his battles wisely, to not come across as a directive or authoritarian leader or even a dominant manager. The CCO told us:

"Since 1994 I've known that E-commerce is not a right fit for food-retail. This belief was widely shared within the organization, but our franchisers pushed us to develop an online proposition anyway. As a board of directors, we've decided to go along, despite my concerns."

This 'example' of dividedness in the TMT seeped through to lower levels, resulting in lack of broad organizational support. Several employees indicated that 'giving a good example' is very important to create a supportive environment, which is very much needed to succeed. They stated that even the TMT was not in solidarity, so what did they expect from the rest of the organization? A very distinct and determinative event was the point where the CEO took the lead, made the Manager E-commerce report to himself, and decided to go all in. This has been a great success factor in boosting online sales and in further integrating the processes in the established organization. The COO mentioned:

"Our online proposition (and the unit that was responsible) got a lot of distrust and people did not see viability in this concept. It almost became a sort of 'pariah'. Therefore it was essential that the CEO took the lead an made the E-commerce manager report directly to himself. This was a crucial event to create a breakthrough".

4.2 Incubating: creating an entrepreneurial climate in which calculated risk taking is not shunned, with simultaneous attention for strategy and organization.

Working on the E-commerce and Vandaag case, it became clear that these cases did not particularly fit the way of working that is (still) dominant in the organization, as there is not an **entrepreneurial climate** with fitting *control mechanisms* (KPI's) (Hamel & Tennant, 2015) and reward systems. The importance of both is described by (Hornsby, Kuratko, & Zahra (2002) and Ireland, Covin, & Kuratko (2009), as they state that proper control mechanisms and reward systems spur entrepreneurial activity, goals and feedback. The CCO worded:

"To start with Ecommerce and Vandaag has been a decision of the board, however for a couple of people our current KPI's are in the way of supporting these initiatives."

The competitive environment and fast pace of every company in it asks for a new *way of working*, as also is indicated by the interviewees. While there is a high amount of trail & error noticeable and people are *encouraged* to 'act entrepreneurial', there is no supporting end-to-end implemented way-of-working, such as for example the (lean) start-up methodology, which favors experimenting over elaborate planning (Blank, 2013). Prototyping and validation of assumptions can speed up the learning process in the organization, where Coop is mostly learning slow, or not learning at all (as there is lack of proper evaluation, learnings are not shared on structural basis and issues are not always resolved on structural basis). This is costing time and money, which are both very scarce. Lastly, the referred to ways-of-working (startup methodology) are very customer centric, which tends to be ignored sometimes in the Coop organization. Within the organization people too often tend to act like they already know the customer(needs). For example: delivery is most likely in the future being organized centrally, instead of from the stores (locally), because "order-picking employees in our stores are 'in the way' of customers during opening hours", as an interviewee told us. But, what is the problem here? And what is the desired (online) customer need? The Coop way-of-working, which is a home-grown 'this is how we've always worked' type of approach, is applicable in both the E-commerce as the Vandaag case. The head of formula management represented notions from various others by saying:

"Coop Vandaag is a typical example of the way we like to work here at Coop: we just do it, we'll just start and see. In the beginning, and for a long time afterwards, we were just doing it as a side-job, without additional resources (people)."

The exception to the rule when it comes to the entrepreneurial climate, is the E-commerce unit itself. The people working in this unit are working in a different way than the 'traditional part' of the organization does. At E-commerce they have adopted the Scrum-method. They work with daily stand-ups, and have adopted validation and prototyping processes in their way-of-working. This leads to transparency, job satisfaction, and attracts people who expect no different. The gap between this group of people and the established organization is growing, making integration processes difficult because people are increasingly speaking 'another language'.

Another recurring position has been the extent to which people have felt safe to come up with (new) ideas, improvements or other points of view throughout the process. Results show that they have not always felt free to say what is on their minds, and even, at some points, tried to prevent information from getting to top-level management, in fear for being overruled. Even within the TMT a sense of fear and in transparency can noticed. Literature shows that psychological safety or work discretion/autonomy (Ireland, Covin, & Kuratko, 2009) is of importance to a healthy entrepreneurial climate. Both cases show a lot of similarities when it comes to the entrepreneurial climate. Coop Vandaag benefited from a relatively long period of discovery, enabling the organization to properly conceptualize the opportunity. Unfortunately later on, the traditional way of working gave room for letting the tested assumptions regarding the store concept go. This had led to delay in the acceleration process, because (unconsciously) letting tested assumptions from pilot stores go (mainly regarding the store acreage (m^2) and kitchen approach) resulted in doubtful results from following store-openings. This forced the team to go back to the drawing-board when this may well have been prevented.

The process of both cases knows a lot of ‘ups and downs’. When it comes to strategic **focus** and the willingness to **take risks** by making sharp choices, there is a kind of schizophrenia noticeable. As Zahra & Covin (1995) described, risk-taking is part of the essence of corporate entrepreneurship. As an example for the E-commerce case first a ‘hard choice’, documented in the organizations ‘2020 Strategy’, was made to follow an omni-channel path (integrating online and offline over all customer channels). Therefore extra effort was being made to make it succeed, by building up a complete E-commerce team. However, in financially less fortunate times (due to a traditional acquisition), the E-commerce unit suffered from budget cuts. Although every unit in the organization ‘felt the pain’ of budget cuts, the relative amount of money that was being cut from E-commerce budget was out of proportion, which tends to show the relative importance of ‘new business’ when push comes to shove. This is, by all means, how the E-commerce unit and some other colleagues described their experience of it. Apart from strategic focus (priority) and willingness to take risks, literature indicates that that encouraging risk-taking behavior in the organization means that availability of resources must be perceived (Hornsby, Kuratko, & Zahra, 2002). The Vandaag case has shown comparable events. Despite a significant ambition (opening 32 stores in 4 years) the ambition was lowered when an opportunity for a traditional acquisition (traditional brick stores) presented itself.

In terms of *capacity* or resources (personnel) Coop has not shown to be willing to take risks. Although there are dedicated teams for both cases at the moment of this writing, both cases started with zero additional capacity and were vested at people in the established company as ‘a side job’. In retrospect, almost all people involved would appoint dedicated teams from the start. Among others, the CCO said:

“Both E-commerce and Vandaag have been started up led by the head of formula management (at that time Operational Commercial Manager, reporting to me). We started out with no additional resources and worked with a very small team. When I should do it all over, I’ll create a more integrative team and I’m going to deliver dedicated resources from initiation on.”

Related to the ‘rolled-up-sleeves’ mentality, Coop shows a relatively low amount of *fact-based decision making* and instigates action to a large extent from ‘the lower belly’. This is partly the reason of the low adoption of *validation* processes, because it ‘prevents’ decision making without a proper knowledge base – *fact based* – (or tested assumptions) and this goes against the dominant approach people at Coop seem comfortable with. Discussions of ‘when it is good enough’ could have been avoided, by defining a *definition of success* at the start of the process. It could be of help to cut large challenges up to smaller, manageable pieces and create a feeling of making progress step by step, keeping a positive sentiment and having reasons to celebrate. Even at the moment the interviews were held, the lack of a definition of success became very clear in both cases, hence there is strong ambiguity of employees’ determination of ‘were we stand’. They all use their own perspective, thus standpoints differ very much, as will become clear from the following statements:

“We are never done, because there is always room for improvement ” (CEO), to “We should be making money with this concept, but I’m obliged to say that from my current role” (CFO), or “Looking at the long-term potency, it may be a good thing for Coop, but I don’t know if the timings for our roll-out have been right’ (COO).

Another recurring subject from the interviews was the fact that people involved in both initiatives indicate that they have experienced a lack of clear *milestones*, as a result of a *business strategy*. They felt the need for a clearer and unambiguous strategy, one which all people involved should be aware of, to prevent discussion over next steps (‘what should we do next?’) and give a sense of purpose (‘what am I doing it for?’). The E-commerce manager mentioned:

“In the beginning, nobody had a sense of what we should be doing. Nobody had a clear overview. At that time, even the steering group seemed to have no idea. Later on in the process, after the CEO took the lead and the interim E-business manager had been appointed, things slowly became more clear. (However) To this day we still don’t have a common image of when our E-commerce unit is successful, apart from some general annual KPI’s, such as turnover goals.”

Interviewees clearly show that they are not aiming for elaborate planning sessions, in order to create a perfect long-term business plan. They know that nobody can look into the future, but do seek more grip on short term, or medium term steps. Various interviewees express that they wish to be working in a more experimental way, such as the lean start-up method. This is an interesting fact, because this method is known for ‘short cycles’ and less planning. Working this way at Coop more in the future is promising, as the CEO told us:

“I would like to work with more trial and error, small sprints, continuous improvement. Then it is impossible to think of everything up front, but that is not the goal here. I am in favor of as many autonomy for project teams to ‘play around’ as possible, within some boundaries of course. Nobody has unlimited funds. We neither.”

We refer to the fact-based decision making / validation, the definition of success and milestones with the label **‘strategy & milestones’**.

Almost throughout both cases Coop had to do with integration issues. The choice to organize both initiatives within the established organization (no structural differentiation) is seen by various employees as something they would not do again if they had to do it all over. It seems that an underestimation of both cases had led to the choice to organizing things ‘in-house’. The CFO explained:

“At first, we thought that setting up an E-commerce proposition would be ‘the same game’ we were playing for years already: selling groceries, only now via a web shop instead of a brick store. Now we know that that was not the case at all! It is another game in all its aspects, which resulted in Coop having a very hard time integrating all of the online processes in the organization that is built for offline purposes. It’s not easy at all, as we are being confronted with various processes and accompanying systems that have to be adjusted to properly fit the online needs. And for this adjustments we do not by definition have the right skills and knowledge available (inhouse). At some points we should have been honest to ourselves and have asked if we were well enough equipped to pull this online proposition off, or if we should have outsourced it, or leave this game to our competitors.”

Underestimation of the challenge that was ahead, has led to no discussion about structural organization questions at the beginning of this initiative. After all it seemed to be something the organization could ‘absorb’, so there seemed to be no need for it. Later on in the process, it was not a decision that could be turned back without great consequences. As the explanation of the CFO shows, both cases were having fairly severe challenges integrating ‘the new’ into ‘the status quo’, but integration processes, despite all difficulties, were put in motion to a great extent. Managing product data, delivering weekly special offerings for the advertisement brochure, integrating to financial/administrative systems (integrating with core SAP architecture) and dashboarding solutions had all been put in motion. At this point, the *borrowing and forgetting* interaction (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2005) should be in play, but things had been ‘going their way’ (nobody actually managed the borrowing and forgetting processes), so this interaction went far from smooth. People in the established company were supposed to deliver resources and knowledge (e.g. assortment management, marketing & communication, operational management) but resistance was more common than cooperation (**borrowing**). Mostly noticed as an explanation is lack of trust in the viability of the initiatives. At first Vandaag received a fair amount of support, but that decreased over time, as people did not see great results (exploitation).

“Vandaag should be easier than Ecommerce”, responded one of the interviewees. He stated that this was still a brick store concept, and that is what we should be able to pull off (as it is – in a less traditional way – our core business). Other interviewees related to the fact that we were not responsive or flexible enough to adjust store-elements to market needs and stated that working in a more experimental way was lacking. This was needed to learn and ‘tweak’ the concept enough until is was successful. This way of working was not the case and success was measured by comparing the results of the convenience store to the results of the traditional ones. “We kept on comparing the concept to our traditional business model". People at Coop were not **forgetting** how things worked in the established business.

Deciding to take a different course, referring to the structural organization, would mean significant time loss and above all a great divestment. On the other hand, deciding to organize the complete operation, or the E-commerce unit as a whole, externally would not mean all 'peaches and cream' either. The COO said about this:

"This topic of how to organize a new business unit (in this case E-commerce) has been on the agenda a lot, with many discussions as a result."

Very similar challenges have been experienced in the Vandaag case. Also in this case processes and systems needed to be integrated in the established organization, but the difference was that the thought was that this would be easier, as it was a brick store after all. That should be the game Coop is used to play. In practice this expectation – as did the one from E-commerce – proved false in practice. Because the convenience concept of Vandaag was also aimed at selling products for direct consumption, such as sandwiches and salads, the current Coop systems did not meet the needs of Vandaag. This is just one example, but these has arisen in many forms, many times. And, similar with E-commerce – although not as large in size – the established company was expected to deliver and cooperate to fix all these issues, but was not well enough aligned. The result was likewise.

4.3 Acceleration: towards a more change receptive, adaptable organization

During the DIA process the E-commerce and Vandaag teams were very busy with day-to-day business. Although hard work can been be seen as a good thing, interviews indicate that during this process there has been little to no attention to managing the established company's people's expectations. **Change Management and communication** about the why, how and what, concerning E-commerce as well as Vandaag was not top of mind. The CFO:

"Managing expectations from scratch is something that has been underestimated. Change management, communication and explanations about the things we were doing in the new unit have been important. Creating goodwill and understanding is what I've tried to do, but how do you hand the people who have to make it a success the things they need to be able to that?"

Even at the starting point of both cases, a relatively small group of people was involved, resulting in poor understanding of 'what they were doing' in the established organization. The lack of broad support grew over time, and when the initiatives were beyond discovery, and things needed to get done, the established organization was not well enough aligned with the new unit to expect instant cooperation. This is where attention to 'the people side of change' had been essential (HRM). Mento, Jones and Dirndorfer (2002) presented a framework for implementing changes in an organization and describe the importance of carefully going through a series of phases, each lasting a considerable amount of time. Critical mistakes in any of the phases can have a devastating impact on the momentum of the change process. Communication in the sense of keeping people on board, creating goodwill in the established organization has shown to be of importance to succeed. In a similar way communication of a vision, as previously described, may affect followers outcomes, communication seems to play a role in the new business process.

A 'harder' aspect of change management was the fact that the established organization did not have all of the knowledge and skills that were needed. Specialist knowledge of integrating a full-size E-commerce organization in an established was needed. No one from the Coop organization had ever done it before. Organizational processes needed to be adjusted or reviewed. People all of a sudden got extra responsibilities (because E-commerce 'suddenly came in'), but not a lot was arranged to formalize it. Coop dealt with these challenges, but acknowledged that hiring *specialist knowledge* earlier in the process is essential to fill the knowledge gaps the organization could not fill by itself (at that time).

New responsibilities that arose, during the process, meant that the new E-commerce and Vandaag Unit had to manage the absorption of those responsibilities in departments of the established organization. A lot of discussion about who should be doing what was the result. The *RACI* (Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed) theory has been discussed various times. Progress of building new business stagnated because of this and a lot of time and, eventually, force, was deployed to make it 'work'. To continue building on both cases mainly the CEO has been decisive in dividing tasks and responsibilities. The effect was far from ideal, because actually people did not support all of those ideas, which reflected in the quality and consistency of work. Most people focused on their own set of *KPI's*; who were not aligned with the new E-commerce and Vandaag concepts, with conflicting interests as a result.

4.4 Conclusion: the process to scaling new business initiatives and its antecedents

Next to determining the antecedents of CE, this study also resulted in a proposition regarding the antecedents in relation to the process of scaling new business: Discovery, Incubation and Acceleration. By analyzing the 9 antecedents found in the interviews, based on the evidence found in interviewees response, we have placed each one in the phase where it is most relevant. That said, various antecedents seem to play a role of importance at more than one point in the process (and not solely in only one phase), but the emphasis per phase differs. This shows that not only the question where in te process antecedents play a role is relevant, but just as well *how* they play a role. This dynamic character of the antecedents is visualized in the dotted lines, as the concerning antecedent may 'move within the phase' – or across phases -, as indicated with the dotted area.

The end result of this research is presented in figure 6, which we consider an answer to our main research question (How can corporate organizations successfully manage the process to scaling a new business initiative?) and with that, inherently, the sub research questions.

As a conclusion, we describe the process to scale sequentially, including the corresponding propositions regarding the role of the antecedents, and distinguish direct relations (black arrows) and moderating relations (green arrows) in our model. Starting point of this model is the situation we have found in the Coop cases, at which new business has not been vested at a singular point in the organization, nor has new business been vested separately from the established organization.



Figure 7: framework with antecedents and their role in the process to scaling new business.

Proposition 1: Organizations with a market oriented strategic vision, who are willing to take calculated risks and set out a business strategy in a change-receptive organization are likely to successfully scale new business initiatives.

A **market oriented** organization, which extensively scans the market to be able to be responsive to market developments, is likely to identify opportunities and create a strategic vision – based on the perceived developments in the market, more than companies who are not or less market oriented. This is an important aspect in the discovery phase, as building a proposition all starts with identifying opportunities and creating a vision to make opportunities reality. Having this vision, enables the company to apply focus in making resources available and streamline efforts. It makes risk-taking more manageable, as risks are only taken if some of the appurtenant uncertainty can be 'absorbed' (Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999).

It shows that people have a strong urge to work on new business, knowing that there is **strategic focus**, meaning that the organization is taking calculated risks, and is making available the corresponding resources. This basis seems to enhance making a clear business strategy and setting out decent milestones. Without strategic focus, based on the preliminary determined vision on where to go, it is almost impossible to create a business strategy. With enough and the right resources, the knowledge and skills to create a roadmap of some sort, fact-based prognoses, working with supporting processes to validate assumptions and creating a definition of success, the organization should be able to make it work.

The accumulative effect of having a clear **vision**, based on opportunities identified in the market, approached with strategic focus, translated into a validated strategy seems to lead to stronger adaptability of people in the organization. Is results in them understanding the viability of the initiatives that are taken and therefore makes them more receptive to step up and take their role in the bigger picture. In other words, it lowers chances on employees acting with resistance. The mentioned 'accumulating effect' forms the first proposition and is supported by five 'moderating antecedents'.

Proposition 2: Top Management and Organizational support are positively related to the creating and maintaining an entrepreneurial climate and is likely to support the transition from discovery to incubation.

Creation of an Entrepreneurial climate is merely impossible without Top Management Support (Garret & Neubaum, 2013) (Rutherford & Holt, 2007). To create a fitting way-of-working, ultimately a company specific process, with accompanying tools and techniques (Hamel & Tennant, 2015), can theoretically be set up by middle-management and 'frontline' employees, but without support of top management it can never be put to full use. Ways-of-working within the entrepreneurial, or innovative domain are commonly interfering with the way a company is used to work, as was the case at Coop. Investing in the adoption of more innovation oriented approaches proofs to be difficult, as a large part of the Coop organization is still working 'traditionally'. One of the employees worded:

"It is funny, we say we want to be more innovative, but we tend to reject efforts that create the accompanying way of working. Sometimes even before it has gotten a chance. Maybe it is because our KPI's are not aligned with another way of working. I don't particularly feel encouraged to do things differently, or come up with new ideas. I know they will be rejected."

Proposition 3: The entrepreneurial climate has a positive relation with the ability to create a (business)strategy and set out milestones and enables moving forward in the incubation phase.

To properly create a business strategy, people show a need of proper mechanisms, a way-of-working, with corresponding tools & techniques and have to be encouraged to work this way. Without the ingredients to create a strategy and clear milestones to guide the organization and its stakeholders along the process, it becomes much harder to do so successfully.

Proposition 4: Top Management and Organizational support in the Discovery phase are positively related to the adaptability and willingness to take responsibility in the acceleration phase.
As employees feel supported in their task, working on new business, the receptiveness to claiming a role in the process tends to grow. Furthermore, when the Top-Management team is, not ‘all-in’ (Hamel & Tennant, 2015), the effects seem to shatter. Giving the right example (TMT) by showing cohesiveness, supporting explorative work, seems to enhance middle management to engage in the process more. This also leads to a more broad form of support from the rest of the organization: organizational support.

Proposition 5: structurally organizing new business early on in the process is positively related to adaptability and willingness to take responsibility, and facilitates the transition from incubation to acceleration.
Depending on the situation, decision making about how to structurally organize new business is a question that is answered ideally as early as possible in the process. For companies that have chosen to separate all new business activities from the established organization, by organizing it as a separate unit things are clear to a greater extent from the beginning. Based on the cases at Coop, we’ve seen that both initiatives has arisen in the established organization (in ‘Top-Management chambers’), and the question how to organize it – when eventually the initiatives were perceived viable enough to continue with – had to be answered later on in the process. With this approach as a starting point, we state that choosing a definitive way of organizational structuring should be made at least at the end, but ideally earlier, of the Incubation process, where eventually experimenting results in a business proposition. Before commercializing or scaling the business, it has been found advisable to know where business should be vested, to prevent ending up in a situation in which people are ‘dancing around the issue’ of who should be executing what tasks. This ultimately leads to a low degree of motivation at the level of people carrying out the work, including their managers.

Proposition 6: Using change-management & communication techniques enhances the support process of TMT to create adaptability in the organization, as well as people – as a result – taking responsibility; it facilitates the process from incubation to acceleration.
The effort of TMT to create an organization that is receptive for new business, evidence shows that lacking to effectively make use of change management techniques and proper communications to create broad support in the organization, tends to make the support process instable or ineffective. Making use of the HR-department in ‘realizing change’ should enhance people’s receptiveness to contribute in the (change)process.

Finally, we conclude that the end-to-end process of scaling a new business initiative requires a systemic view. This means that there is no single ‘shortcut’ or ‘golden method’ that is going to ‘fast-forward’ a companies’ efforts, but an integrative approach, with a proper alignment of the management and organizational factors structure, context and leadership, with the right emphasis on these three components, at the right time in the process is the way to increase chances on making it work.

5. Discussion and limitations

This study assessed the process of scaling new business initiatives, identified the antecedents and determined the point in the process where they are most relevant. In this final section the results of our research will be discussed as will be clarified to what extent we have been able reach our research goals. Second, the limitations of the study will be presented, after which we finalize with suggestions for future research.

5.1 A process framework for scaling new business

This research has added various insights to the field of Corporate Entrepreneurship, and specifically to the knowledge of scaling new business. Prior research mainly focuses on the process and the antecedents as an outcome, but lacks extensive research on the link of the addressed antecedents and the process studies that have been carried out. Separately there are relatively many scholars who studied the phenomena. A lot is known about Corporate Entrepreneurial antecedents as an outcome in terms of structure, context and entrepreneurship. The process of scaling new business is also studied by several scholars ((Burgelman, 1983) (Hansen & Birkinshaw, 2007) (Colarelli O'Connor, Corbet, & Pierantozzi, 2009) (Raisch & Tushman, 2016) (Nagji & Tuff, 2012)). Widely cited studies from Burgelman are relatively old and should be re-examined by diving further into the process of corporate venturing and how it is evolved. Little to no research is found on linking antecedents of scaling new business to the process of it. Hence, we do not know when which antecedents are most relevant, or influential in te process.

The first contribution of our study to the field of Corporate Entrepreneurship is by proposing a tentative framework of antecedents, linked to the known phases of the process to scale. As many organizations fail in scaling new business, it is of importance to as well theorists, as practitioners to create more understanding of this phenomenon. The empirical study that has been conducted, led to the identification of 9 antecedents, which are respectively entrepreneurial climate, structural differentiation, market orientation, strategy and milestones, change management & communication, responsibility / adaptability, focus & risk taking, strategic vision and support. For a significant part the antecedents found in our research correspond or show similarities with the antecedents found in prior research. This indicates that there is a relatively reliable basis regarding antecedent for scaling new business in the literature. The antecedents from our empirical research that do stand out relative to the antecedents from the literature are responsibility / adaptability and change management / communication.

The fact that our aim was to create more understanding of de link between the process of scaling new business and the antecedents, has inherently led to a integrated overview of antecedents know from prior research, as well as an overview of the most relevant process studies from prior research, which we have formed to an integrative model, which, as a whole, is our second contribution.
As a third contribution, within our framework we distinguish direct relations between antecedents (black arrows) within the process to scale and indirect or mediating-like antecedents (green arrows). Based on our cases organizations with a market oriented strategic vision, who are willing to take calculated risks and set out a business strategy in a change-receptive organization are likely to successfully scale new business initiatives. The green arrows, from the entrepreneurial climate, support and structural differentiation, tend to play a mediating role. These insights are new to the field, and – because of the importance of corporate entrepreneurial activity on firm-level, as well as economically (Chandler & Hanks, 1993) and socially (Parker, 2011) – are relevant for theorists and practitioners.

5.2 Alternative explanations and boundary conditions

This research has been conducted in one organization, based on two cases, aiming to build theory by proposing a set of propositions. The results that are presented contain limitations. As in all research alternative theoretical explanations may exist. The framework with nine antecedents presents at which point in the process to scaling new business they are most relevant. However, developing this framework, a couple of assumptions have been made. The framework is based on the data we have collected from the case studies at the Coop organization. In this organization, there is no dedicated new business responsibility vested at a particular place in the organization. This means that all initiatives can theoretically arise form all areas/unit of the company. This implicates the extent to which our framework represents other organisations; organisations who for example have a dedicated new business unit, and a determined process for idea management, selection and organizing a new project, or even organizations who outsource these activities. For example, our framework entails a structural differentiation antecedent in the incubation phase. Based on our case study, at this point in the process we have seen that Coop needed to make a decision about where the E-commerce unit of Vandaag unit had to be vested. This has been a great source of discussion. Even prior to this discussion, there were signs of dividedness in the TMT. This however is not applicable for all companies. When we are looking through the glasses of a new business manager, working in a dedicated new business development unit, support may for example not be a topic to be discussed at all.

Results cannot be generalized to other contexts (e.g. industries, environmental turbulence, geographical / cultural differences) and or organisations (e.g. organizational size), because not all organizations function in the same way (e.g. organization culture), not all managers and organizational members are acting universally either. Findings are linked to the context of analysis (Yin, 2009), as is inherently the case with the chosen methodological approach. Our research has a strong case when it comes to the variables within the organization itself. By conducting case studies in the same organization, with almost the same people involved in both cases, the organizational variables regarding structure, context and leadership are fairly consistent.

Our framework aggregated the antecedents found in the case studies according to the framework inspired by Howard (1992). This basis enabled us to create a clear set of antecedents, categorized by either structure, context or leadership. Using a different basis could lead to placing the antecedents found under ‘another umbrella’ or ‘label’.

When looking at the work of Burgelman (1983), one of the unique contributions is the fact that Burgelman differentiated in the level of the organization that is at play (level of organisational activity) at critical parts of the venturing process. Our framework does not make such a differentiation, but this could be useful for further research.

Personal biases can also have played a part in conducting research (Voss, Tsikriktsis, & Frohlich, 2002). In interpreting interview results, as well as in determining the point in the process where antecedents are most relevant, personal biases could have played a role, as researchers carry the risk of subjective interpretations.

Strong interest in the field of entrepreneurship may have caused a pro-entrepreneurship bias. Analysing and processing interview data with the Gioia method may have been influenced by this. To counter this possible effect, first the interviewer has recognized the possible bias. Second, the interviews have all been recorded and elaborated, which has decreased the chance on biased notions, by checking statements afterwards on the recording and reducing the chance on taking things out of perspective.

5.3 Towards an integrative process framework for scaling new business

This study advances knowledge in the field of Corporate Entrepreneurship, by providing a framework of antecedents linked to the entrepreneurial process. Referring to our propositions, we suggest that the direct and indirect propositions are tested, as other researchers may.

Results are obtained from two cases, provided by the same company. Because our setting is too limited to generalize results to other contexts, we suggest that research is extended in other organizations, in order to be representative for its context. This research can also be of value to other contexts or (less hostile) industries as well. Furthermore, to indicate the significance of the determined antecedents in the separate entrepreneurial phases, quantitative research could be carried out validate our propositions. The fact that our framework will be extended by other researchers may also mitigate the chance on biased perspectives from the researcher(s) (Yin, 1994).

Making a differentiation between the corporate organizational levels (with Burgelman (1983) as an example) may enrich the framework and possibly even increases the usability in corporate organizations. Another interesting question could be what this framework would look like for small or medium enterprises. In other words, what would it mean to leave out the corporate context?

Concluding, this research is an important extension of the current knowledge within the field of Corporate Entrepreneurship. Explorative by nature, we created a tentative framework to study scaling new business initiatives in a corporate context further.

Appendix A: Tables and figures



Figure 1: . Key and peripheral activities in a process model of ICV (Burgelman, 1983).



Figure 2: The Innovation Value Chain: An Integrated Flow.

Figure 3: Discovery, Incubation and Acceleration as presented by Colarelli et. al. (2009).



Figure 4: Activities and skills by Colarelli et.al. (2009).



Figure 5: Process framework of the transition to scale (Raisch & Tushman, 2016)

Appendix B: Timeline cases



Figure 6: Timeline Coop Vandaag.



Figure 7: Timeline E-commerce.

Appendix C: Data construct (Gioia)




“We’re not working enough with metrics/KPI’s: when is good enough?”
“We just wanted to start this, not knowing when is was good enough (and we still don’t).”
Control mechanism
“High rate of trial & error”
“Next time, I would incorporate even more trial and error”
Way-of-working
“We were granted time and autonomy; they trusted us”
Encourage-ment
Entrepreneurial climate
We’ve chosen for an omnichannel strategy
“Store formula is to weak/antique and acutally does not contain Ecommerce”
“The budgetcut didn’t help.“
“As a result of a traditional acquisition, our new business upgrade goed on hold.“
Strategic focus
“We’ve started with no additional resources. It was a side-job. “Now we have a couple of people working for us dedicated, but it is to little to late”
Capacity / Resources
“Resources to grow are being limited at this moment. That stagnates our progress”
“We say that new business is important, now we have to act like it.”
“Next time I’ll choose for the Picnic-model; taking enough time for development and than starting roll-out small, but steadily”
Risk-taking
Focus / Risk taking
“You couldn’t get a hold of it”
“Nowbody had an idea of where to start or what to do”
“We did not have the right knowledgde to determine it”
Defining a definition of succes
“Without a businesscase we were going to do it anyway”
“Why do you enter a market like this an what do you want do achieve (What problem are you solving?). ”
Our approach has been opportunistic”
Validation of initiatives
“Later on we realized that it was a totally different game than we were used to, and underestimated at first.”
Fact-based/data driven
Strategy & Milestones
“We are spreading impact and effort across the complete organization; I would have liked to keep that smaller and more manageable”
“Structural organization has been a long discussion”
“This concept should have been operationally seperated from the core business”
“It would have been fine to seperatate the unit from the established organization”
Integration challenges
”Sometimes you have to ask yourself: are we able to play this game? And sometimes you have to awknoledge that you can’t. It is very hard to organize this within the established company.”
Borrowing
“We keep comparing this new business with the business model we used to know from oure core. That doesn’t work!”
Forgetting
Structural differentiation


• "People don't understand why it happens"
• "It leads to seeming cooperation (what in fact was counteraction or resistance"
• "We've invested to little in the HR-aspects of the projects"
• "How do you add new processes in a corporate cooperative environment that is tuned for 'brick-store' processes; integration is a big challenge"
• "It is no sinecure organize a process like this; knowledge and skills are lacking"
• "The YES-WE-CAN mentality was essential; it has given a boost to the team"
• "Opening 3 stores at the same day gave people a proud feeling."
• "People did not stand up and claim a role. They were not even assessed on those KPI's , so actually you couldn't blame them."
• "After an intervention, it felt like everybody showed 'temporary' ownership. I'm having the same conversations all over again at the moment."
• "Shared ownership is no ownership. Make someone responsible and accountable."
• "Managing expectations and creating goodwill is something we have not done enough. We underestimated the importance of alignment with the established company."
HRM
Specialistic knowledge
Can-do mentality
Adaptiveness
RACI
Alignment / goodwill
Change management / communication
Adaptiveness/ Responsibility

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