Taking public opinion to Brussels

The influence of policy issue characteristics on policy responsiveness in the Council of Ministers

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Abstract

When policy makers respond to public opinion within the policy making process, this is called *policy responsiveness*, or *responsiveness of the government*. On the national level, evidence for policy responsiveness is often found. More recently scholars are researching whether policy responsiveness also occurs when the policy making process is one level higher, in the European Union. This thesis researches policy responsiveness for one specific body of the European Union, the Council of Ministers.

In theory, there are two main arguments why there should or should not be policy responsiveness in the Council. Some researchers argue there should be, because the ministers represented in the Council want to be re-elected in their own country. This leads to incentives to respond to public opinion. Other scholars argue that the distance to Brussels is too big, citizens know little about European Union policies and also do not care as much enough to look up information themselves. This leads to less enticement for policy makers to respond to public opinion. Results on earlier research mostly show evidence in favour of policy responsiveness in the Council.

This thesis builds upon the article by Wratil (2018), as this thesis uses his dataset and variables. Therefore, the issues based on which policy responsiveness is investigated are separated into two scales: left-right issues and issues on integration (pro-anti integration issues). Wratil (2018) argues that for the former scale a long term strategic plan is developed by the ministers in the Council to respond to public opinion. For the latter scale, integration issues, Wratil argues there is no long term strategic plan. Ministers only respond when they think their constituency regards the issue as important.

The additional value of this thesis is to investigate the influence of three issue characteristics on policy responsiveness; (1) the type of issue; (2) the decision making procedure and (3) salience. The findings support Wratil's (2018) theory for the left-right scale, as policy responsiveness is found consistently and there is no interaction effect of the different issue characteristics. For the pro-anti integration scale, two factors were found that cause the ministers in the Council to respond to public opinion: the type of issue and the decision making procedure. For both scales, there was no evidence for an influence of the salience of an issue on policy responsiveness.

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Abbreviations

CoM	Council of Ministers
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMP	Comparative Manifesto Project
DEU	Decision Making in the European Union
ESCC	European Economic and Social Committee
EU	European Union
EP	European Parliament
IR	International relations
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
MEP	Member of European Parliament
MS	Member State
PR	Proportional Representative
SMD	Single Member District

"There is a power in public opinion in this country – and I thank God for it: for it is the most honest and best of all powers – which will not tolerate an incompetent or unworthy man to hold in his weak or wicked hands the lives and fortunes of his fellow-citizens"

Martin Van Buren, 8th president of the United States (Brainyquote, 2019)

1. Introduction

"We should tell the public the truth, not follow public opinion"

"Opinion polls are always wrong (…) we should not put trust in them. (…) nor do I think that we should follow the ups and downs of public opinion which is what is happening in Europe currently"

These are the words of Jean-Claude Juncker, the current President of the European Commission in his keynote speech at the 60th anniversary of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) in 2018. At that time, the Eurobarometer survey showed the highest levels of public support for the European Union (EU) since the early 1980s (Banks, 2018). Juncker was asked what his thoughts were on the numbers and the quotes were a part of his response. These quotes are especially peculiar when you look at the European institution that Juncker is the president of, the European Commission. The European Commission is the institution of the European Union that polls public opinion in the European Member States (Haverland, de Ruiter & Van de Walle, 2016). A question that therefore rises from these quotes is: what drives Juncker to make these statements as the head of an institution that places such value on public opinion? For this thesis, another question that can be derived from this case is more important: what actually is the value of public opinion to European Union policy makers?

The role of public opinion in politics has been discussed throughout modern history, Martin van Buren already stressed the importance of public opinion and that it is the duty of politicians to respond to it (Brainyquote, 2019). In scientific literature, the definition of responding to public opinion by politicians is called *policy responsiveness* or *responsiveness of the government* (Page & Shapiro, 1983). The first research on this concept was done at the country level, mostly in the United States. Page and Shapiro (1983) were one of the first to find evidence of response of government officials on public opinion. They found that topics that citizens find important have a higher chance of appearing on the political agenda. However, this only holds when an issue is salient and there is an opportunity for governments to pick up the change in public opinion.

Thirty-six years later, evidence for policy responsiveness at the country level has been found repeatedly (Williams, 2016). Public opinion can therefore be regarded as important within countries. However, what happens if you move one political level up, to the European Union level? The felt distance from the constituents to the policy makers is regarded bigger on the European level. This is caused by the lack of a direct link between the constituents and the European Union. National politicians are directly elected, this is not the case for all European Union institutions. Does this influence the extent to which policy makers respond to public opinion? In recent years, more and more scholars are analysing this question.

The first European Union institution for which policy responsiveness was researched was the European Parliament, because it has the largest democratic base with its members directly elected (Wiliams, 2016). Its characteristics are therefore similar to politics on the national level. It should come as no surprise then that policy responsiveness was found in the European Parliament. According to Alexandrova, Rasmussen and Toshkov (2015), the underlying theory for policy responsiveness in the European Parliament is that the members want to be re-elected. However, they also argue that policy responsiveness in the European Union as a whole is not a given fact. European Union citizens have little information and are less willing to be involved in European politics, which could lead to less incentives for other policy makers to respond to public opinion too.

This leads to a debate about policy responsiveness in the other institutions where policy makers are indirectly elected, such as the Council of Ministers. This is the council where the ministers of the Member States seat. More information on this Council will be presented later in this chapter. For this legislative body, policy responsiveness has been investigated less. Moreover, the results that are available are not conclusive (Hagemann, Hobolt & Wratil, 2017; Wratil, 2018). The extent to which there is policy responsiveness in the Council of Ministers is debated, especially on issues about European integration. The research that is available focuses mostly on the explaining factors of policy responsiveness, the influence of elections being the most important one. This factor is based on the first theory by Alexandrova, Rasmussen and Toshkov (2015).

However, not just the question to what extent there is policy responsiveness is important to research. What causes and explains it is just as important. It can be expected that next to elections, there could be more factors that influence policy responsiveness in the Council of Ministers. For example, does policy responsiveness appear equally on all issues, or does it diverge between different types of issues? This thesis will focus on characteristics of policy issues to investigate how they influence of policy responsiveness. This has to my knowledge not yet been researched. Researching policy issue characteristics can give insight on which types of issues ministers are more susceptible to public opinion. This has both societal and theoretical relevance and implications, which will be discussed in this chapter. Hence, this thesis tries to answer the following research question:

"*What is the effect of policy issue characteristics on policy responsiveness in the Council of Ministers?*"

To answer this question, this thesis investigates three types of issue characteristics: (1) content of the issue (left-right issues and integration issues); (2) the decision making procedure of the issue; (3) the salience of the issue. The next paragraph discusses why this question is relevant to answer, both scientifically and societally.

Scientific relevance

This thesis is scientifically relevant for three reasons. Firstly, because on the main concept of policy responsiveness, scientific information is still limited (Williams, 2016). Especially regarding the unit of study for this thesis, the Council of Ministers of the European Union. For the European Parliament, more information is available. This is logical, as it is the most 'democratic' institution of the European Union and therefore is more inviting to research about the influence of public opinion on policy making (Williams, 2016). This thesis therefore tries to add to the limited existing knowledge on policy responsiveness in the Council of Ministers.

Secondly, it is still (theoretically) debated whether there is policy responsiveness in the Council of Ministers at all (Alexandrova, Rasmussen & Toshkov, 2015). One theoretical explanation is that ministers seek re-election in their own country. Hence, they are influenced by public opinion, to keep their electorate satisfied. However, there is also a conflicting reasoning which entails that European citizens have little information on the European Union and European Union policy. Ministers, when discussing policy at the European level, are therefore not incentivised to incorporate public opinion because European citizens will not know about their efforts. This thesis tries to contribute to this conflicting debate.

Thirdly, the main focus of this study, the characteristics of policy issues, has to my knowledge not yet been investigated before as an influence on policy responsiveness in the Council of Ministers. The most important factor for policy responsiveness that has been researched until now is the prospect of elections and to what extent that influences policy responsiveness (Hagemann, Hobolt & Wratil, 2017; Wratil, 2018). This thesis will therefore add to the existing body of research on explanatory factors of policy responsiveness in the Council of Ministers. It will do this by building on the article by Wratil (2018). This thesis will use his dataset and explore what the influence of issue characteristics is based on his article.

This is important to investigate, as this thesis can give new insights into the boundaries of policy responsiveness. Firstly, by researching whether responsiveness differs for different types of issues. This gains knowledge in which policy fields ministers are more susceptible to public opinion than others. With this information, theory on policy responsiveness in the Council of Ministers can be more specified and nuanced, as previous research focuses mostly on the general appearance of policy responsiveness. Secondly, the type of decision making procedure influences the extent to which ministers respond in the Council. This knowledge specifies theory on policy responsiveness in the Council even further, as it explores another explanatory factor next to elections. The same argument can be made for the third policy issue characteristic, the salience of an issue. This concept has been explored before on the national level (Page & Shapiro, 1983), but does that also hold for the Council of Ministers? This thesis can expand the available knowledge on the influence of salience on policy responsiveness.

Societal relevance

This thesis can be considered relevant for both the institutions of the European Union and European Union citizens. According to Haverland, de Ruiter and Van de Walle (2016) the European Commission increasingly seeks public opinion on many different policy issues. This thesis can therefore shed light on to what extent the information on public opinion they increasingly gather is actually used by policy makers in the European Union.

Moreover, the results of this thesis can be used as input for justification of policies by the European Union, and the Council of Ministers in particular. The democratic base can be strengthened when evidence for policy responsiveness is found. Evidence can also decrease the democratic deficit, a concept that will be further elaborated upon in the literature review. For citizens it answers the question whether the ministers think their opinion is still important when they 'move up' one level of policy making, from their own country to the European level. More specifically, this thesis can give insight for citizens on which type of issues their opinion 'matters more' to the ministers, so on which issues citizens have a say in European Union politics. For the types of issues that show less responsiveness, this thesis can be input for citizens to be able to put more pressure on their domestic policy makers to listen to their opinion on those issues. Moreover, this thesis can also give insights for the citizens if it makes a difference whether an issue is salient.

Other actors where these differences in responsiveness on types of issues and the influence of salience of issues are also relevant for are interest (lobby) groups. When they know on which types of issues ministers make more use of public opinion, those groups can use that information strategically to pursue their interests. Moreover, this also holds for what happens when an issue is salient. For them, it answers the question whether making an issue salient in society could be a valuable strategy to meet their ends.

This research is also relevant as it can be used as input for the debate on trust in the European Union. Trust numbers in the European Union have always been lower than trust in national governments. The results of this thesis could increase trust in the European Union if evidence for policy responsiveness is found. Moreover, according to Alexandrova, Rasmussen and Toshkov (2015) it remains unclear to the public what the European Union does and why. This thesis can add to the general knowledge of citizens towards the European Union as it gives more information on how EU policy making works in practice and what influences it.

The Council of Ministers of the European Union

Before I will go into theory on policy responsiveness, I will explain what the unit of study, the Council of Ministers, is and what it does in practice. The Council of Ministers, or Council of the European Union, consists of the government ministers of each Member State. It was established in 1958 as the Council of the European Economic Community and seats in Brussels (Council of the European Union, 2019b). The Council of Ministers "*meets to discuss, amend and adopt laws, and coordinate policies*" (Europa.eu,

2019). In simpler terms; the main task of the Council of Ministers is to determine (together with the European Parliament) which legislative proposals by the European Commission become adopted, and which do not (McCormick, 2015).

More concretely, the Council has six major tasks (McCormick, 2015): (1) it shares responsibility with the European Parliament for discussing and passing laws; (2) it shares responsibilities with the European Parliament for approving and adopting the EU budget; (3) it coordinates the economic policies of the member states; (4) it coordinates justice and home affairs (JHA) policies in the member states; (5) has the responsibility for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); (6) and it makes international agreements on behalf of the entire EU. These tasks make the Council both a *legislative* and *executive* body because it not only adopts EU legislation, but also concludes international agreements (Hix & Høyland, 2011).

Moreover, the ministers also have the authority to commit their governments to the actions agreed in the meetings. The Council is therefore the main decision making body of the European Union (McCormick, 2015). It is important that the Council of Ministers is not confused with the European Council, which is the Council of the European heads of government (presidents and prime ministers) and the Council of Europe, which is a human rights organisation.

The name, Council of Ministers, implies that it is one council. This is not the case. It is a single legal entity but meets in ten different configurations depending on the policy field that is discussed (Council of the European Union, 2019b). The ten configurations are shown in table 1. The first four meet on a monthly basis, the others meet two to four times a year (McCormick, 2015). The presidency of the Council is rotated over Member States every six months.

1. Agriculture and fisheries	*2. Competitiveness*
3. Economic and financial affairs	*4. Environment*
5. Employment, social policy, health and consumer affairs	*6. Education, youth, culture and sport*
7. Foreign affairs	*8. General affairs*
9. Justice and Home affairs (JHA)	*10. Transport, telecommunications and energy*

Table 1: Configurations of the Council. Source: Council of the European Union. (2019a).

The detailed work for the Council is done by permanent representatives of the Member States based in Brussels. They meet in the Committee of Permanent Representatives, or *Coreper*, to discuss proposals for new laws before they are sent to the Council of Ministers. (McCormick, 2015). Consequently, the process of EU legislation and the role of the Council of Ministers is as follows (Hix & Høyland, 2011; McCormick, 2015): legislative proposals are sent by the European Commission to the Council. Complicated proposals get reviewed by working parties or committees of the Council,

others directly move to the Coreper. The Coreper mostly tries to make the proposal as concrete as possible for the Council, by reviewing political implications and clarifying problems. When this stage is completed, the legislative proposal goes to the appropriate Council configuration, after which a back and forth starts with the European Parliament. This eventually leads to a final decision on the policy. Voting on legislative issues in the Council of Ministers is mostly done by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). For executive issues, unanimity is almost always required (Hix & Høyland, 2011).

Outline

This thesis kicks off with the literature review (chapter 2), in which literature on the most important concepts of this thesis will be discussed. This starts with policy responsiveness, both at the country and EU level. In this subchapter the democratic deficit within the EU will also be elaborated. Thereafter, the literature review will discuss issue sensitivity and salience, two important concepts that can influence policy responsiveness. The last part of the literature review will give an overview of other possible influencing mechanisms of policy responsiveness. After the literature review, the theoretical framework (chapter 3) will specify theories towards the research question. Based on these theories the hypotheses of this thesis will be set out. The fourth chapter, methodology, will elaborate on the different methods of research and conclude which method is the most suitable for the analysis. The concepts will also be operationalised there. The fifth chapter, results, will discuss the assumptions of linear regression, after which the results of the analyses will be discussed. In the sixth chapter, the discussion, this thesis will return to the research question and attempt to answer it based on the results of the regression analyses and theories mentioned in the literature review and theoretical framework. This thesis will close off with the conclusion (chapter 7), where potential limitations, implications and suggestions for future research are discussed.

2. Literature Review

In this chapter the existing literature on the three core concepts of this thesis, *policy responsiveness*, *issue sensitivity* and *issue salience* will be discussed. These three core concepts are derived from the research question: "*What is the effect of policy issue characteristics on policy responsiveness in the Council of Ministers?"* First, I will discuss the concept policy responsiveness in chapter 2.1. Thereafter, policy responsiveness within states and in the EU will be explained. In this paragraph I also go into theories on democratic deficit in the EU and how this changes the relationship between the public and the EU. Second, this thesis will explain literature on the first issue characteristic, *issue sensitivity*, in chapter 2.2. This characteristic starts with international relations (IR) theory on realism, *high* and *low politics.* Thereafter, the focus will be shifted towards the two major theories in EU policy making, intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. Third, this thesis explores the second issue characteristic, issue salience. The concept will be defined and shown how it works in practice, by using the most important actors that play a role in making an issue salient: citizens, governments, interest groups and media.

2.1 Policy Responsiveness

One of the core concerns of democratic theory is the responsiveness of governments to preferences of the citizens through its policy (Dahl, 1956). Franklin and Wlezien (1997) even argue that being responsive to public opinion is an important requirement for a well-functioning democratic institution. Scholars use two concepts when they investigate the relationship between public opinion and policy outcomes, *policy responsiveness* (which is also called *dynamic responsiveness*) and *congruence*, or *congruent responsiveness* (Beyer & Hänni, 2018). The first, dynamic responsiveness, looks at changes in public opinion and to what extent this also leads to changes in governmental policies. This concept therefore requires a larger timeframe (Caughey & Warshaw, 2018). Research on congruence investigates the overlap between the citizens' preferences and public policy in governments at one point in time (Beyer & Hänni, 2018).

The main difference between the two concepts according to Beyer and Hänni (2018) is that policy responsiveness answers questions about representation better because it checks whether governments react to changes in public opinion in their constituencies. Congruence however, has more to do with majority representation. The main question it answers is whether the majority gets what it wants, because congruence measures if governments respond to the dominant preferences in society at one point in time.

Policy responsiveness within states

In the remainder of this paragraph I will focus on the existing literature on (dynamic) policy responsiveness, first within states. There has been a vast amount of research about the influence of public

opinion on governmental policy. When governments react to public opinion, this is called *political responsiveness* or *responsiveness of the government* (Page & Shapiro, 1983). Page and Shapiro investigated the relationship between public opinion and the policy making process and found the first empirical evidence. They saw that policy issues that citizens find important have a significantly higher chance to appear on the agenda and eventually become policy proposals (Page & Shapiro, 1983). However, there are conditions to this. Firstly, there must be an apparent opinion change and the issue has to be salient in society. This condition therefore clearly links to the concept of dynamic responsiveness. Secondly, the government must also have the resources and competences to pick up the change in opinion.

After this article by Page and Shapiro (1983), much more scientific research has been done on it at the state level, most of them focusing on the United States. Manza and Cook (2002) conducted a meta-analysis on the available literature about policy responsiveness within states. They conclude that policy responsiveness within countries happens 'sometimes'. Manza and Cook conclude that "*where measured public opinion expresses a coherent mood or view on a particular policy question (…) in a way that is recognizable by political elites, it is more likely than not that the movement of policy will tend to be in the direction of the public opinion*" (Manza & Cook, 2002, p. 657). However, they also argue that although evidence for responsiveness is often found, it varies greatly between different issues and points in time. Therefore, more work is needed to understand the factors that explain the variation.

Democratic Deficit in the European Union

Before this thesis goes deeper into research on policy responsiveness in the EU as a whole and its individual institutions, the theory on *democratic deficit* in the EU will be discussed. This is relevant for the literature review, because there is a debate to what extent the democratic base between states and the EU is different. In national governments, there usually is a direct link between constituents and their (elected) politicians through representation. However, this is not the case for all institutions within the EU. This leads to the democratic base of the EU being debated and research on policy responsiveness more complex. The difference in democratic base could therefore create different results and mechanisms in the EU than in states. Whether or not there actually is a democratic deficit in the EU, which means that the it has a lower degree of democracy than regular states (Hix & Høyland, 2011), is debated. Hix and Høyland argue that the EU has a democratic deficit, but Moravscik (2003) and others disagree.

Hix and Høyland (2011) argue that there is democratic deficit and this results in *policy drift* by EU policy makers, meaning they move away from the preferences of their constituents. Hix and Høyland give two causes for the existence of democratic deficit in the EU. Firstly, because there is no direct accountability mechanism. A direct accountability mechanism means that constituents can correct policy makers directly through elections. When policy makers do not act according to the preferences of the constituency, they can simply vote away politicians. Secondly, politicians move away from

preferences because Brussels is isolated from the domestic environment. The only institution that has its members directly elected is the European Parliament. However, according to Hix and Høyland (2011) this makes no real difference for the democratic base because the EP has not enough power in the decision making and is therefore too weak to strengthen it.

Moravscik (2003) and others disagree that the EU has become a distant, unaccountable institution. He argues that Member State governments still run the EU decision making and therefore keep a tight leash on EU institutions. Moreover, this also ensures that citizens can hold the governments accountable for EU policies. The debate on democratic deficit and policy drift is important to be aware of in research on policy responsiveness in the EU. The presence of democratic deficit can lead to a different relationship between citizens the EU and their governments and also change the way governments work at the 'higher' EU level.

Policy responsiveness in the European Union as a whole

Policy responsiveness has been investigated within the EU as a whole. Earlier work by Føllesdal and Hix (2006) and others argue that EU policy making is not responsive to public opinion and that results of policy responsiveness are not significant. However, there is a growing number of researches stating that national governments' responsiveness to public opinion is no "*happy coincidence*" (Wratil, 2018: p. 54).

This section puts forth the two main arguments for and against policy responsiveness set out by Alexandrova, Rasmussen & Toshkov (2015). The first theory argues that public opinion does influence policy making within the EU because the policy makers want to be re-elected. They therefore have an incentive to act on the citizens' concerns. The second theory entails that there is no such thing as political responsiveness within the EU, because the public has little information about the EU, its institutions and its policies compared to national politics. EU policy makers therefore have little reason to react to public concerns in EU policy making. Brussels is too far away from its citizens and policy makers consciously react to this through policy drift. According to Haverland, de Ruiter and Van de Walle (2016), the European Commission tries hard to close this gap between citizens and the EU. The Commission is increasingly seeking opinion directly from EU citizens through *Eurobarometers*, in an attempt to overcome the democratic deficit in the Commission and also tackle the perceived distance between the European Union and its citizens.

Research on policy responsiveness within the EU focuses mostly on policy outputs and how the EU as a whole reacts to EU-wide public opinion (Wratil, 2018). They do not look at the micro level, they assume policy responsiveness is the result of responsiveness by multiple actors. An important study is done by Toshkov (2011) who was one of the first to find that policy outputs on European integration were correlated to public opinion in the EU. He argues that public support in favour of EU-integration leads to a higher number of laws. This means that when EU citizens look more positive towards the EU,

it adopts more laws than when citizens are more negative towards EU-integration. What has to be noted that Toshkov finds this relationship until the 1990s, after that time the relationship was lost.

Responsiveness in European Union institutions

There is also a vast amount of research on responsiveness in the individual EU legislative institutions, so the 'law-makers' of the EU. Most research on policy responsiveness in a single institution has been done on the European Parliament, mainly because its democratic deficit is less debated than other institutions (members are directly elected) and is therefore the most suitable unit of study for policy responsiveness within the EU. For the European Parliament, evidence for political responsiveness has been found multiple times (Williams, 2016). This relationship exists according to Williams because the European Parliament is chosen by the public and therefore feels obliged to act on the opinion of EU citizens. This research focuses mostly on the voting behaviour of members of the European Parliament (MEP). MEP's therefore directly feel the pressure and act on the preferences of their constituents. Results on the European Parliament therefore overlap the most with policy responsiveness within states.

On the next main body of the European Union, the Commission, there is little empirical information on policy responsiveness (Bølstad, 2014; Wratil, 2018). This is caused by the fact that the Commission needs approval of the Council when it produces legislation. However, Bølstad (2014) argues the Commission does want the legislation to stay in tune with public opinion. The Commission does this by stressing its importance to the Council during the development of legislation. Hence, we will explore literature on policy responsiveness in the Council next.

In recent years, policy responsiveness in the Council has been researched by Arregui and Creighton (2018), Wratil (2018) and Hagemann, Hobolt and Wratil (2017). Hagemann, Hobolt and Wratil investigate conflict within the Council. They see that governments oppose legislative proposals on policies that give more power to the EU when citizens' opinion is against it. They also find that salience of the issue increases the responsiveness. Wratil's (2018) research contradicts this, because he only finds evidence for policy responsiveness on left-right issues and not on pro-anti integration issues. This contradiction is peculiar, especially because both operationalise public opinion on integration issues similarly. In Wratil's article, the relationship between responsiveness and left-right issues only holds when domestic elections are close to the negotiation. While the relationship to integration issues is debated, both find evidence that domestic elections are an important factor as a condition for policy responsiveness. Arregui and Creighton (2018) investigate policy responsiveness for a single issue, immigration. They find that there is no policy responsiveness for immigration. This could be an indicator that the sensitivity of an issue also plays a role in policy responsiveness. Issue sensitivity is the next concept I will explore in this literature review.

2.2 Issue Sensitivity

Issue sensitivity in itself is an ambiguous concept. There are not only different definitions of sensitive issues, an issue can also be sensitive for multiple reasons. This subchapter will start with IR theories on issue sensitivity, namely *high* and *low politics*. Thereafter, I will discuss how scholars separate sensitive from non-sensitive issues in the EU.

In IR theory, issue sensitivity is conceptualised as *high* and *low politics.* High and low politics are part of the 'realist' framework in IR theories, which entails that states are the dominant actors in world politics and are in a constant struggle for power (Keohane & Nye, 2012). Some issues are more important to gain or preserve power, some are less. The realist way of thinking therefore leads to a hierarchy of policy issues. One the one hand, policy issues that directly threaten security and sovereignty (thus the power), which are called high politics. On the other hand, there are issues that do not threaten security and sovereignty directly. Those are called low politics (Hoffmann, 1966). High policy issues are considered more sensitive because they consist of real or perceived threats to states. The content of high politics issues are also known in politics as *national interests* (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013). According to Keohane and Nye (2012), what is considered high and low politics issues changes over time. This has to do with the circumstances within (international) society. During an economic crisis for example, monetary policies are high politics issues. However, when policies are in place and the crisis is over, they become low politics issues again. Thus, one always has to look at the environment to determine what is considered high and low politics instead of only focusing on the fixed security and sovereignty issues.

Keohane and Nye (2012) argue that agenda-setting and bargaining between states become much more complex in modern international politics. This mostly has an effect on high politics issues, where cooperation is traditionally difficult (especially from a realist perspective). There is a growing interdependence in international politics what results in the line between domestic and foreign policy becoming more unclear. This will eventually lead, according to them, to political agendas being affected by both international and domestic problems. Domestic groups will also politicize issues on the international agenda instead of the domestic agenda, because political power is increasingly shifting from the state level to the international level. This theory by Keohane and Nye (2012) justifies and also puts importance on looking at policy responsiveness at the EU level. Member state citizens will increasingly try to put issues on the EU agenda instead of their own domestic agenda or use their government representatives to do this for them. This does not only count for low politics issues but also for high politics issues, as the lines between state and the international realm become blurred and high politics issues also become more and more discussed at the international stage. This changes the traditional view that high politics issues were something for the state and low politics issues can be better dealt with by international institutions (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013). International institutions are getting more capable to create policy on security issues because these issues transcend borders and therefore countries are willing to give up on their sovereignty to handle international security issues

effectively. Thus, international institutions now discuss and create policies on both high and low politics issues.

Supranationalism and Intergovernmentalism

The European Union legislative bodies are a prime example of institutions that create and discuss policies on both high and low politics issues. McKibben (2010) explores how issue sensitivity of the issue influences bargaining strategies between the Member States. She finds that when sovereignty is at stake, states tend to focus more on 'relative' gains rather than 'absolute' gains. It therefore becomes more of a zero-sum game than about creating a win-win situation for all policy makers. Policy makers want to 'win' in bargaining on high politics issues in the EU. Moreover, she also sees that high politics issues also create more aversive behaviour, so states have stronger positions and the bargaining process is much tougher. This creates differences in bargaining processes between high and low politics issues.

Risse-Kappen (1996) argues there is also a difference in the bargaining process between high and low politics issues because in the EU low politics issues can be depoliticised easier. This has everything to do with the EU structures and two main theories on EU politics, the *intergovernmentalist* theory and the *supranationalist* theory. The former is commonly used for high politics issues, in which the policy making framework also supports a different bargaining process. The latter, the supranational framework is used more often for low politics issues and is more inviting to win-win situations in the bargaining process. Therefore, issues that fall under the supranational mode of decision making are easier to agree upon.

The theory of intergovernmentalism states that the policy making process is driven by the individual Member States, in which the 'bigger' Member States have the most influence (Hix & Høyland, 2011). This also refers back to the realist framework that was discussed earlier, where states are the dominant actors in international politics (Keohane & Nye, 2012). The individual governments have large resources (bureaucracies), clear preferences and are well-informed about the positions of the other Member States. The Member States are also hesitant to pass on powers to the overarching EU institutions and rather keep the policy making powers to themselves. This way of decision making preserves their sovereignty.

Supranationalism means that Member States outsource the policy making process to the EU institutions and are less involved in the policy making process (Hix & Høyland, 2011). The Member States believe that the EU institutions are competent enough to make decisions on EU policy and are willing to give up sovereignty to be able to deal with issues on a larger scale.

2.3 Issue Salience

Issue salience is a concept that is often used to define the importance of an issue in relation to other issues (Spendzharova & Versluis, 2013). This influences the attention actors assign to the issue, because

actors have limited space for issues to spend their cognitive resources on (Oppermann, 2008). An issue can be salient for both the public and the policy makers. When an issue is more important to the public, it will be more visible in society (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008). Franklin & Wlezien (1997) theorize salience and argue that the public behaves much like a thermostat. When governments discuss issues (the *policy temperature*) that do not match with the issues that play in the public (the *public temperature*), the public produces a signal. When the government adjusts its own temperature to that of the public, the signal stops. Weaver (1991) explains this phenomenon in his article by saying that issue salience strengthens itself. When an issue becomes more salient, citizens will gain more knowledge on it, which leads to stronger opinions, less neutral stances and even more willingness to participate in the political realm. Salient issues therefore catch the attention of governments because the visibility in society. This is how the public signal of the thermostat works.

Salience is not only influenced by the relationship between citizens and governments, but also by the relationship between governments and the opposition (Oppermann, 2008). If there is a high amount of 'electoral competition' on the issue, the salience of the issue will increase. When the government official is not working well, they will be punished by the opposition and later on by the citizens in their re-election. Therefore, there is also a procedural determinant of issue salience, meaning that the structure of a political system also opens up the opportunity to punish policy makers for their performance.

These notions imply that governments react to public opinion when it becomes visible enough, either through the public or through the opposition. Then governments feel they need to do something about it (when the signal from the thermostat becomes too loud), but the question that can be asked then is: *to what extent?* Franklin & Wlezien (1997) conclude that issue salience does influence EU policy, but only when salience increases over time. Bélanger and Meguid (2008) argue this has to do with the fact that policymakers take 'ownership' of issues. When an issue becomes salient, the government considers itself as most competent to take on the issue and solve it. This leads to the issue appearing on the agenda and eventually to a higher chance of becoming policy.

While 'issue ownership' is more common in states, domestic issue salience can also have effects on the bargaining positions of national representatives in international negotiations. Stasavage (2004) argues that when domestic audiences are more aware of the issue, the representatives present themselves as highly inflexible in negotiations and take up the position of the domestic public opinion. This is caused by the fact that the bargaining process then becomes more 'public', making the process more transparent. Then policy makers feel that they need to respond to public opinion, because they will be punished by their constituents otherwise. This is the case for both *high* and *low* politics issues (McKibben, 2010). Therefore, when an issue becomes salient in individual Member States or in the EU as a whole, it will have consequences for bargaining positions in EU policy making.

Media and lobby groups

Next to governments, government representatives and citizens, there are also other actors that can influence salience of an issue. The most important actors for issue salience are the media. Epstein and Segal (2000) argue that politicians and citizens both respond differently to issues that are salient to them. However, it is hard for researchers to survey politicians and public. Therefore, the media are very important actors. Media coverage provides a reproducible, valid and transportable method to see whether an issue is salient or not (to all actors involved). Media report what is important in society at that moment in time and therefore reflect the salient issues to the public. The media therefore clearly show the temperature of the public opinion thermostat. Both governments and scholars therefore can use the media as a thermometer of public opinion (Epstein & Segal, 2000).

Other actors that are important in issue salience (mostly in the EU) are interest groups. Klüver (2011) states that dominant interest groups both use and strengthen the salience of issues in societies to increase their support for policy outcomes. Interest groups do this successfully because dominant interest groups have a significant effect of success in policy outcomes when an issue is salient. For inferior policy groups, the chance decreases.

2.4 Elections, electoral system and governmental ideological position

Next to issue sensitivity and issue salience, other factors are known to (possibly) influence policy responsiveness. The first is elections. Wratil (2018) shows that when elections are close, governments are more responsive to their constituents. Wratil argues that this is a *systematic* way of responsiveness because governments consciously choose to be more responsive because they think it will lead to a slimmer chance of getting punished in the next elections.

Second, the electoral system of a Member State can have an influence on the extent to which a government is responsive. This has to do with the vote-seat elasticity (Kayser & Lindstädt, 2015). Vote-seat elasticity entails the impact a few changes in vote shares can have on the number of seats in the domestic parliament. When there is a small difference between two parties, a small difference in votes has a bigger impact in majoritarian systems than in proportional systems (Wratil, 2018). Therefore, governments in majoritarian systems have a bigger incentive to be responsive to the public.

Third, the general (ideological) position of the government can also influence responsiveness. This has to do with the specific issue that has to be discussed. If the opinion of the public and the position of the government overlap in terms of left-right position, then they will be more responsive to the public (Stimson, 1999). When this happens, it looks like the government is responsive to the public, but this relationship is spurious because they already had the same ideological position.

3. Theoretical framework

The previous chapter gave a broad overview of exiting literature on the core concepts used in this thesis. This chapter will discuss theories based on the literature that are directly related to the research question. Firstly, the dependent and independent variables that this paper uses will be elaborated, which are based on the research question. Secondly, three different characteristics of policy (issues) will be explained, which are derived from both earlier research on the topic and the concepts from the literature review. All paragraphs are closed off with hypotheses that will be tested later in this thesis.

3.1 Changing the causal relationship

As explained in the literature review, the concept of policy responsiveness investigates if changes in public opinion lead to changes in the position of policy makers on a certain topic. Policy responsiveness therefore consists of two variables, public opinion and the policy makers' position. These two have to be investigated in relation to each other. Thus, the causal relationship that underlies in the research question has to be adjusted to answer the research question effectively. The research question investigates what the effect is of policy issue characteristics on policy responsiveness. However, because policy responsiveness consists of both public opinion and policy makers' position, these two variables are necessary to answer the research question. Therefore, these two concepts are the dependent and independent variable of this thesis. Thereafter, I am able to add policy issue characteristics as confounding variables to this relationship, which will ultimately answer the research question.

The policy makers' position, the dependent variable of this thesis, can have many forms. This thesis will conceptualise the policy makers' position as the initial position of the policy makers on the policy proposal or topic. In other words, the position of policy makers with which they start negotiations with others. Wratil (2018) calls this the *bargaining position*. For research on policy responsiveness this is the best conceptualisation because it shows the 'pure' position of policy makers, before the bargaining process starts. From now on, this thesis will therefore refer to the policy makers' position on a certain topic with the bargaining position.

3.2 Policy Responsiveness

The main causal relationship in this thesis thus is the relationship between public opinion and the bargaining position of the policy makers in the Council of Ministers. As argued in the literature review, Wratil (2018), Arregui and Creighton (2018) and Hagemann, Hobolt and Wratil (2017) already researched this relationship. The conclusion from the literature review is that the extent to which policy responsiveness exists in the Council of Ministers is still debated.

The two articles that investigate policy responsiveness for all issues in the Council of Ministers (Hagemann, Hobolt & Wratil, 2017; Wratil, 2018) agree that there is policy responsiveness on left-right issues, but also argue there are conditions to it. Domestic elections play a large role in the extent to

which government representatives in the Council respond to public opinion (Wratil, 2018). When domestic elections are nearby, the degree of policy responsiveness grows significantly. This is caused by what he calls *"rational anticipation"* (Wratil, 2018: p. 69). Governments anticipate that voters will care about the issues they find important in the next elections, therefore governments respond to those issues to increase their chances of getting re-elected. Wratil (2018) argues that because voters always care about left-right issues, governments set up a long-term and structured plan that ensures rational anticipation. He calls this *systematic responsiveness*.

For integration issues, this theory does not hold, according to Wratil (2018). In his research, he does not find evidence for policy responsiveness on these issues. He argues this could be caused by the fact that voters care less about integration issues. This leads to no structured, long-term plan to respond to public opinion on those issues. Wratil (2018) thinks that on integration issues, governments respond more on an ad-hoc basis. Governments only respond to those integration issues they regard as important for the next elections. He calls this *sporadic responsiveness*.

The lack of responsiveness conflicts with the results of earlier work by Hagemann, Hobolt and Wratil (2017), who do find evidence for policy responsiveness in the Council of Ministers. Their article shows that governments do reject legislative proposals that give more power to the EU when citizens are against it. These results are interesting, because they use the same data for public opinion and bargaining position to measure policy responsiveness on integration issues. One can assume that the difference in findings could be caused by the confounding variables in the articles. Therefore, investigating the basic relationship of policy responsiveness is still important, as it contributes to the available findings which are conflicting.

The main point here is that a lot of questions about policy responsiveness remain for the Council of Ministers. I will add information for both types of issues. For left-right issues this thesis will research whether issue characteristics also influence policy responsiveness (next to elections). For integration issues, the main goal is first to contribute to the general debate on policy responsiveness on these issues. Moreover, this thesis will investigate whether policy issue characteristics influence the responsiveness on integration issues. The following sections of the theoretical review will go into the policy issue characteristics that I investigate; (1) policy dimensions, (2) decision making procedure and (3) salience. The first is based on earlier research, the decision making procedure flows from the literature on policy sensitiveness and salience is based on the paragraph on issue salience from the literature review.

3.3 Policy areas

There could be multiple reasons why the articles by Wratil (2018) and Hagemann, Hobolt and Wratil (2017) show conflicting results. For instance, they use different explanatory factors, which they test on the same basic relationship (for the integration issues). Moreover, another reason for conflicting results on policy responsiveness within the articles could be because the two scales that Wratil (2018) uses in

his article are too broad. I will investigate this in this thesis. Wratil separates policy issues into those that are on the *left-right* dimension and on the *pro-anti integration* dimension. According to Dalton (2017), these two dimensions are often used in research on policy responsiveness. However, he argues that these dimensions "*constitute an identity that transcends specific policy positions"* (p. 618). For example, for the left-right issue, one can identify himself as being left or right, but has a different position for each issue topic. Hence, Dalton argues that within these dimensions there is still a lot of diversity. The question then is to what extent this distorts the results by Wratil (2018). The two scales therefore have to be nuanced and specified to get more accurate findings, which is the first issue characteristic: *content of the issue*.

For policy issues on the left-right scale, two types of issues can be identified. Dalton (2017) makes a distinction between cultural and economic issues in the left-right dimension. The cultural dimension entails issues that are about cultural conflict. Issues in the cultural policy area are for example immigration and criminality. For immigration, a 'rightist' view is about constraining immigration flows, where a 'leftist' view is more open towards immigration. The economic dimension contains issues that focus on the economic and socio-economic situation in the EU. This entails economic ownership, income distribution, the role of businesses and the single market. 'Rightist' ideas are more in favour of open trade, where 'leftist' ideas would like more government control on businesses and trade. Putting these two types of issues together in one scale gives inaccurate information, as both policy areas are completely different in nature (Dalton, 2017).

After explaining the different dimensions, the question is how policy responsiveness could be different for cultural and economic issues. Often when policy responsiveness is researched within different issues, there are differences in results. For economic issues significant evidence for policy responsiveness is found (Hobolt & Klemmemsen, 2005; Wlezien, 2005). For cultural issues such as immigration, the evidence is less found (Dalton, 2017). To sum up, there is more congruence between citizens and government officials in economic issues than in cultural issues. Dalton (2017) argues this is the case because issues on immigration and authority strongly polarize the citizens and party elites, which negatively effects the policy responsiveness. Public opinion and political preferences get shattered over the whole political spectrum. Less people agree on the issue, so there is little common public opinion to respond to for the government. This also decreases the chances of getting re-elected in the next elections.

When this happens, major parties in the ideological middle will try to solve this problem by de-emphasising cultural issues and emphasising economic issues, as there is less competition within society and governments on these issues (Dalton, 2017). This mechanism also called an *inverted-u hypothesis* (De Vries & Edwards, 2009). This leads to the following first hypothesis for this thesis:

H1: Within policy issues on the left-right dimension, the Council of Ministers is more responsive to public opinion on economic issues than on cultural issues.

The other type of issue this thesis investigates are integration issues. As the theories in the literature review showed, the scientific evidence on policy responsiveness in this policy area is debated. Hagemann, Hobolt and Wratil (2017) find evidence for a significant effect of public opinion on integration issues. When public opinion opposes integration, governments will also oppose legislative proposals on integration. Alexandrova, Rasmussen and Toshkov (2015) and the *sporadic responsiveness* theory by Wratil (2018) argue that responsiveness within this policy area has to be nuanced. Policy makers focus more on policies in the left-right dimension than integration when seeking re-election. Governments only respond to integration issues to issue they think will matter to the public in the next elections.

Wratil (2018) distinguishes two main policy areas in integration issues, namely the harmonisation of national standards and issues that discuss decision making power. Within the policy area of integration, the strongest responsiveness will be on the enforcement of harmonisation of rules (Hagemann, Hobolt & Wratil, 2017). Hix & Høyland (2011) argue this is the case because business and labourers in Member States find their own national standards very important. They are not willing to adopt the rules of others and are therefore unwilling to compromise on their national standards, as it gives them benefits over their competition within the single market. An example is labour wages, which are lower in Eastern Europe. Increasing their labour wages will decrease their competitiveness because they cannot compete in quality. Based on this argument and the theory on *sporadic responsiveness*, this thesis expects that issues on harmonisation of standards are regarded as important to governments in next elections. Therefore, governments will strongly oppose harmonisation of standards when the public wants them to, making them responsive to public opinion (Hagemann, Hobolt and Wratil, 2017).

The other issues on integration focus on the *decision making power*. Issues on decision making power entail two types of issues. Firstly, where within the European Union the issue has to be discussed, so which type of decision making procedure has to be followed. Secondly, whether the power of decision making on the issue should be (mostly) with the Member State or the EU. I expect policy responsiveness to be less apparent here. Authority often shifts, the citizens know little about the EU policy making process and also lack the interest to investigate it (Alexandrova, Rasmussen & Toshov, 2015). Therefore, these issues are less important to the public and the position of the citizens is also unclear. These issues can still be politicized, but I expect them to be less influenced by public opinion domestically than when national standards are discussed.

Based on this theory, this thesis therefore also expects (similar to the left-right scale) that there will be differences within this scale from Wratil's (2018) research. More specifically, that responsiveness on issues about harmonisation of national standards will be higher than on issues that focus on decision making power. This leads to the following hypothesis for the pro-anti integration scale:

H2: Within the pro-anti integration scale, governments are more responsive to issues about harmonisation of standards than issues on decision making power.

3.4 Decision making procedures

Based on the literature on intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, the main conceptualisation for issue sensitivity in this thesis will be the decision making procedures in the European Union. Within the EU there are three main decision making procedures; (1) the consultation procedure, (2) the co-decision procedure and (3) the consent procedure. These procedures are the result of decades of negotiations and attempts to developing the most effective decision making procedures (Hix & Høyland, 2011).

Within the consultation decision making procedure, the European Parliament can only issue an opinion on the legislation by simple majority. Therefore, after the Commission proposes legislation, the main actor to accept or decline legislation is the Council. The Council has the most power and this is often used for policy areas where the Member States want to remain the main actor with the most power (Hix & Høyland, 2011). Theoretically, this procedure fits with the 'intergovernmentalist' framework.

The co-decision procedure is the most used decision making procedure, where the power is divided between both the EP and the Council. Hix and Høyland (2011) explain how this procedure works. Firstly, the Commission sends a legislative proposal to the EP and the Council. The EP then issues an opinion by simple majority, where they can also amend the legislation. The Commission decides whether or not to incorporate the amendments, after which it is sent to the Council. The Council then accepts the proposal or states a position by QMV or double majority. If the Council adopts a different position than the EP, it goes to a second reading. The EP then amends or accepts the position from the Council by an absolute majority. If there is no absolute majority in the EP, the Council position becomes law. If it differs, it goes back to the Council who can adopt the amendments (supported by the Commission) by double majority. If they do not adopt, a conciliation committee is composed of one representative per Member State. They need to come to agreement because if they do not, the legislation does not become law. This procedure fits with the supranational framework and covers issues where Member States think the EU is suitable to adopt legislation on. Only when it fails, the power goes back to the Member States.

The third main decision making procedure in the EU is the consent procedure (Hix & Høyland, 2011). Within this procedure the Council also responds to a Commission proposal. They adopt a common position, after which the Parliament can agree on the position by simple majority. However, the Parliament needs an absolute majority for the admission of new Member States and the amendment on rules for the Parliament elections. What is important in this procedure is that the Council needs approval on their position by the Parliament. This gives the Parliament more power in this procedure than in the consultation procedure.

These three decision making procedures can be linked to the two frameworks of European Union politics, supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. As Hix & Høyland (2011) argue, these three procedures and which issues fall under it are the result of decades of politics. Therefore, the three procedures can also be used to investigate the sensitivity of the issue. One could expect that there are differences in responsiveness between the procedures, because the characteristics of issues within them are different. The issues that require consultation procedure are seen as more sensitive and are therefore more intergovernmental. As a result, in consultation procedure issues the ministers in the Council hold more power over the policy process than in the co-decision procedure. This has a consequence for the extent to which ministers respond to public opinion. When an issue is more sensitive, politicians are more likely to not incorporate public opinion because they feel like they have more competences than the public and therefore know better what the policy should look like (Bélanger & Meguid, 2007). According to Eberlein & Newman (2008) consultation procedures are more sensitive, because the Member States want to remain their power on these issues and not delegate it to the Commission and Parliament. On issues that are not sensitive, they prefer to delegate them to the other bodies of the European Union. Co-decision procedure issues are regarded as less sensitive, as they are issues that have been delegated to other institutions next to the Council (McKibben, 2010).

The delegation of powers can lead to multiple arguments why there is more responsiveness in issues that require co-decision procedure. Firstly, because the policy process involves (and is controlled by) the European Parliament. The EP is regarded as the most 'democratic' institution, in the sense that it is the only institution with directly elected politicians. Moreover, as discussed in the literature review, research has often found significant evidence for policy responsiveness in the European Parliament (Williams, 2016). When the EP is more involved in the policy making process, this could lead to more responsiveness by the Council as well. However, it has to be noted that the European Parliament responds to public opinion in the European Union as a whole and the ministers in the Council to the public in their own member state. Secondly, issues that require the co-decision procedure are usually less sensitive issues and therefore it is easier to respond to public opinion, because the issue is not politicised. Examples of issues that fall under the co-decision procedure are for example issues about the single market. These are not politicised issues, in the sense that it can be expected that all Member States and the citizens want more (open) trade within the EU (Hix & Høyland, 2011).

Based on the previous arguments, one could expect ministers to be less responsive to issues that require the consultation procedures. However, there are also theories that expect issues in this procedure to be more open to responsiveness. When most power remains with the Member States (in the consultation procedure), there can also be an opportunity for more policy responsiveness because the Council of Ministers has direct influence in the policy making (they do not have to account for other institutions) and can therefore respond to public opinion. The Council is less concerned with politics and bargaining. This relates back to McKibben's (2010) argument in the literature review chapter who said that when issues become sensitive, ministers will focus more on relative gains and will try to 'win'

issues that are important to them. Then, issues will become important to them if their public think it is important. This will lead to more responsiveness on consultation issues. Because of these conflicting expectations, this thesis chooses to test two hypotheses for this paragraph and check which one holds.

H3a: Governments will be more responsive to public opinion on issues that have the co-decision procedure than the consultation procedure.

H3b: Governments will be more responsive to public opinion on issues that have the consultation procedure than the co-decision procedure.

3.5 Issue salience

This causal relationship is derived from the 'thermostat' theory from Franklin and Wlezien (1997) that was discussed in the literature review. The basic causal relationship of policy responsiveness consists of both the *public temperature* and the *policy temperature*. When there is a disconnection between the public and policy makers, issue salience comes into the equation to establish the relationship again. In practice, when the issues important to the public do not match the policy (and policy agenda) of the Council of Ministers, the public will create a signal, which then has to influence the policy makers to respond to the public opinion.

Franklin & Wlezien (1997) argue that this theory holds in practice. However, there is some debate on how the causal relationship between issue salience and policy responsiveness works. It seems from literature that the relationship is circular, where both influence each other continuously. EU citizens, lobby groups, the media and the EU policy makers themselves all are important in the relationship. In this paragraph I will try to explain this as accurately as possible.

The first possible relationship is defined by Bélanger and Meguid (2008), who argue that citizens make an issue salient. When an issue becomes more important to the public, for example because it is something that is impacting their daily life, the issue becomes more visible in society. Media are important actors that create visibility, according to Epstein & Segal (2000). Media stories reflect what is most important in society at that point in time. This increases salience and also the chance of the issue appearing on the political agenda. Politicians actively use media to investigate what issues are regarded as urgent in society. To conclude Bélanger and Meguid's argument, when citizens find an issue important, governments will do so as well and this leads to them being responsive.

Other actors that citizens can use when an issue is important to them, is interest groups. Businesses and individuals who think a particular issue is very important, can form an interest group together or join one that is already active in the field (Hix & Høyland, 2011). Lobby groups work based upon the interests of society (for both citizens and businesses) to strengthen the salience of an issue in an attempt to get it on the political agenda. This can also work the other way around, when interest

groups try to make an issue they care about salient in society. According to Klüver (2011), the dominant interest groups (the biggest interest groups within a policy field) do this successfully, dominant interest groups have a higher chance of getting policy in their favour.

According to Hix and Høyland (2011), one could expect that the bargaining positions of Council members are influenced by the salience of an issue, irrespectively of the way the issue becomes salient, through the public, the media or interest groups. This does not mean that the actors have the same effect on the responsiveness of policy makers. When a policy is salient in interest groups but not in society, this can lead to less responsiveness. When interest groups have divergent interests from the public, higher salience also leads to less responsiveness (Klüver & Pickup, 2019). These two arguments link to the argument by Klüver (2011) that dominant interest groups have the most influence on responsiveness. However, this thesis will not focus on the influence of different actors, more on the influence of salience in general on policy responsiveness. What is most important here is that the previous theories work similar to the argument by Bélanger and Meguid (2008). When important actors in society find an issue important and it becomes salient, governments will respond to this in the policy making process.

The relationship I expect derived from these theories is that issue salience is a 'moderating' variable. This means that when salience is higher, the relationship between public opinion and government positions will be stronger. In the next chapter I will explain in more detail what a moderating relationship is. The influence of salience shows through the media and interest groups picking up the changes in society to get it on the political agenda. The boundaries for governments to move in will tighten, because information in society on the issue grows (Oppermann, 2008). This will push governments to be more responsive. The hypothesis for issue salience I derive from this theoretical framework is:

H4: When an issue is salient to the public, governments will also find it more important and will become more responsive to public opinion.

3.6 Control variables

The three factors mentioned in chapter 2.4 (elections, electoral system and governmental ideological position) that can influence responsiveness or the bargaining position will be added as control variables in this research. The first factor (elections) which is mentioned by Hagemann, Hobolt and Wratil (2017) and Wratil (2018) show that the pressure of domestic elections, so national elections within the Member States, have a big influence on policy responsiveness. Therefore it is important to include this as a control variable in all analyses to ensure there are no distorted results. However, elections are not the only known explanatory variable that needs to be included in the analyses.

The other two factors mentioned in the literature review, electoral system and ideological position, will also be included as control variables. Wratil (2018) distinguishes different two different electoral systems in his article, the single member district (SMD) and proportional representative (PR)

system. The SMD is an electoral system where in every district one person wins, that person will represent the district in domestic parliament. The UK for example uses this system. The PR system is an electoral system where the total votes for political parties are devided proportionally over the seats in parliament. This system is used in many Member States, for example the Netherlands. Wratil argues the type of electoral system can have an influence on the bargaining position, because in the SMD a small loss in votes can lead to a completely different government outlook. In PR voting systems, a small loss in votes changes the outlook of the government less. Therefore, in SMD voting systems policy makers are much more incentivised to respond to public opinion.

Ideological position of governments is another concept Wratil (2018) uses as a control variable that I will take over in this thesis. This variable is used to rule out coincidence in the test. Wratil argues that the ideological position of a government is important (on both his scales), because it can influence the bargaining position. When governments have the same (ideological) position as the public on a certain issue, then the government is not responsive to the public, but to its own ideological position. Therefore it is important to include this concept in this research. This makes sure that governments are responsive to changes in public opinion and that this research does not test the overlap between ideological positions between the government and the public.

Moreover, because Wratil (2018) and Hagemann, Hobolt and Wratil (2017) do a similar research, this thesis will also take over some of their control variables. The fourth added control variable is annual net receipts from the EU budget. According to Bailer, Mattila & Schneider (2015) this can influence the positioning of governments in the EU, because countries who are net receivers rely more on the EU for their income. Lastly, this thesis will include unemployment and inflation rates, so the bargaining position is not caused by the macro economic situation of a country (Ferguson, Kellstedt & Linn, 2013).

4. Methodology

This chapter will discuss which method is most suitable to answer the research question of this thesis: "*What is the effect of policy issue characteristics on policy responsiveness in the Council of Ministers?"*. To achieve this, I will first give an overview of different qualitative and quantitative methods and discuss how they would fit this thesis in paragraph 4.1. This paragraph also touches upon the reliability, validity and feasibility of those methods. After the overview the most suitable method is chosen.

In the second paragraph of this chapter, the data that this thesis uses will be explained. In the second paragraph, the basic premises of linear regression are discussed. The last three paragraphs of the methodology will elaborate on the operationalisation of the three concepts that I discussed in the theoretical framework. The three tests are: (1) the separation of the two scales by Wratil (2018), (2) the influence of decision making procedures on policy responsiveness and (3) the influence of salience of an issue on policy responsiveness.

4.1 Possible research methods

This paragraph goes into the possible research methods to answer the research question. I will begin with two qualitative methods, the co-variational analysis and the congruence analysis. Thereafter, I will explore three quantitative methods, the cross-sectional analysis, time-series analysis and panel-data design.

Qualitative methods

Qualitative research can be used to dig deeper into a small amount of cases (small N) to find underlying meanings, causes and explanations for a certain phenomenon (Neumann, 2014). The first qualitative method this thesis will discuss is the co-variational analysis. The central aim of the co-variational analysis is to seek a causal relationship between an independent and dependent variable. This goal is therefore similar to a quantitative analysis (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). The most important difference between co-variational analysis and quantitative analysis is the sample size. Co-variational analysis wants to go deeper into the cases and therefore has a smaller N (usually two). This opens up opportunities to go deeper into the selected cases and investigate explanatory factors of the causal relationship.

Blatter and Haverland (2012) discuss the benefits of this research method. Because it is possible to dig into the small amount of cases, the internal validity for this method is usually high. The reliability is also high because the structured way of research (as a result of the similarities with quantitative research) makes it easier for other scholars to replicate it. The main issue with this research method lies with the external validity. A co-variational analysis only looks at two cases, which means that the results can only be generalised to cases with the exact same characteristics (Blatter & Haverland, 2012).

This research method is not suitable for this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, because this research aims to investigate trends in policy responsiveness and look for patterns over all Member States of the

European Union. The co-variational analysis is too limited for this. This method would be suitable if I chose to compare two Member States and look at the influence of one issue characteristic. I want to investigate multiple characteristics. Moreover, Blatter and Haverland also go into the types of research questions that are common for co-variational analysis. These are different from the research question of this thesis. Co-variational research questions need to be very specific, where the causal relationship of one independent variable is tested on one dependent variable. The research question in this thesis is less specific, more open and aims to investigate effects of multiple characteristics. Therefore, I have to look at other research methods.

The next qualitative method that is discussed is the congruence analysis. The main idea of the congruence analysis is to explore which theory explains a real world phenomenon best. A scholar usually takes two or three theories and tests which theory explains the phenomenon better. This means the sample size is always one. The researcher will test multiple theories on this one case. A typical research question for a congruence analysis is: *"Does theory A provide a better explanation than theory B (and C) for 'the case'?* (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). The researcher makes a prediction about which theories fit which parts of the case and investigates it thereafter. The underlying reason within congruence analysis to look at multiple theories is because it is often hard to explain a social phenomenon with one theory. Moreover, a scholar also risks a confirmation bias, meaning that one tries to fit the theory with the phenomenon when it is actually not there (Blatter & Haverland, 2014).

Using multiple theories also increases the internal validity because the theories control each other. However, the fact that congruence analysis often looks at focus events decreases the external validity. The findings on these types of events are hard to generalise (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). However, according to them this is less important, just because the congruence analysis tries to explain that specific focus event. After explaining this research method, it is clear that a congruence analysis is not a suitable method for this thesis. This thesis focuses on more than one case and uses theory to explain effects, not the case itself. Therefore, quantitative methods will now be explored to check whether those fit the research question and aims better.

Quantitative methods

The first type of quantitative method is a cross-sectional analysis (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013). Cross-sectional analysis means that one investigates a causal relationship at one point in time. It examines the influence of individual spatial units on a dependent variable. Because the cross-sectional analysis measures at one point in time, it could be hard to conclude a causal relationship. Is does not always show if the independent variable precedes the dependent variable. However, this can be prevented either by theories or measuring at different points in time.

The second type of quantitative research is a time-series study. A time-series study involves a comparison over time within a single spatial unit (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013). This therefore differs with the cross-sectional design, where different spatial units are explored. The benefit of doing a time-

series study is that you overcome the biggest downside of the cross-sectional design because scholars can ensure that the independent variable precedes the dependent variable. However, this study is more limited because it only looks at a single spatial unit. Therefore in this method it is very important to include control variables, to make sure that other possible explanations for the causal relationship are ruled out. It is also very important to make sure that the independent and dependent variable co-vary.

The third quantitative method is the panel-data design. This is a combination of the previous two designs, in the sense that it looks at different spatial units over different points in time (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013).

There are several threats to internal validity for quantitative methods. The first is the omitted variable bias. This means that within the research, a relevant variable is excluded in the research, which distorts the results (Clarke, 2005). The second is that the researcher includes an irrelevant variable, that does not add to the results (Graddy, 1999). In this thesis, I overcome both these threats by using control variables based on previous research. This ensures I only use control variables that are known to have influence on policy responsiveness. The third threat is not using enough cases. Using as much cases as possible benefits the research, because it increases the resemblance with the population and it decreases the chances of making a type I or type II error. A type I error is when one rejects a null hypothesis when it is actually true, where a type II error is when a false null hypothesis is not rejected (Graddy, 1999).

Based on my research question, the most suitable method for this thesis is the cross-sectional design. I will use multiple spatial units (the three concepts) and conduct several multiple linear regression analyses. To assume causality, this theory will not only use theory but also measure at different points in time. This will be further explained in paragraph 4.2, where policy responsiveness is operationalised.

4.2 Data

As this thesis builds on Wratil's article (2018), it will use his replication data for this thesis. Therefore I will explain his data in this paragraph. Wratil used a dataset that is based on another dataset, the *Decision Making in the European Union II* (DEU-II) dataset. This dataset provides the starting positions of the governments of 27 Member States on 331 specific pieces of legislation in the Council of Ministers between 1994 and 1999 and 2004 and 2009. The data was derived from 349 interviews with key informants (Thomson et al., 2012). Since its creation in 2012, it has been the most widely used dataset on EU policy making (Wratil, 2018). The starting positions of governments are the positions they have on the specific issue before discussing it amongst each other in the Council of Ministers (bargaining position).

Wratil (2018) separated these issues in two scales, left-right and pro-anti integration, which cover 78% of the DEU issues. The other 22% of DEU issues is not incorporated in the dataset. However, this still leaves 3812 issue positions on 218 legislative issues in total in the dataset. Thereafter, Wratil rescaled the positions of governments on every issue in the scales from zero to a hundred, where a score

of hundred is the most 'right' on the left-right scale and the most integrationist in the pro-anti integration scale. By doing this, Wratil ensured that all issues are comparable to each other. In the DEU dataset the score of positions could not be compared. What the scale looks like is shown in figure 1 in an example on legislation on CO2 emissions. Here, a score of zero on the left-right scale means a government wants the strictest emission legislation, and a score of zero on the pro-anti integration scale means that governments want extensive Member State involvement.



Figure 1: Illustration of the dependent variable. Source: Thomson et al. (2012)

The other variable, public opinion, is measured based on questions in the standard Eurobarometer that ask how left or right people consider themselves. Wratil (2018) measured public opinion on the left-right scale by averaging the citizens' ideological self-placement from one (left) to ten (right). Public opinion on pro-anti integration is measured by support for EU membership, by using the question (*Generally speaking, do you think your country's membership in the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good or bad?)*. Wratil chose this question because other scholars already have shown that this survey item represents citizens' attitudes on EU policy activity (Toshkov, 2011). The score for this scale is converted to a score between zero (no support for EU membership) and one (full support for EU membership). An overview of the descriptive statistics of these four variables are shown in table 2. To ensure causal relationships, Wratil (2018) used a six months lag for

opinion variables. This ensures that governments have six months to notice public opinion and have time to respond to it.

The control variables of this thesis are also operationalised by Wratil (2018). The first control variable, elections, is operationalised by using the days that are left until the next *planned* elections (in 100 day units). The government ideological position is measured by government ideological positions at the latest elections from the Comparative Manifesto Project's (CMP) database (Mertz, Regel, & Lewandowski, 2016). Electoral systems are operationalised by mapping systems on a continuum from majoritarian to proportional (Wratil, 2018). The net receipts from the EU budget is measured by deducting the payments to the EU from the receipts in a percentage of the GDP. Unemployment is calculated by the yearly rate in percentages, based on World Bank data. The last variable, inflation, is measured by the change in consumer prices as a yearly rate in percentages.

The most important benefit of using the replication data from Wratil (2018) is that for the data this thesis does not have to test for validity and reliability, because Wratil has done multiple robustness checks. Therefore within this thesis I only have to consider the validity and reliability within the data that I add. I will discuss this in the separate paragraphs for the tests. Using an existing dataset makes this thesis also more feasible within the timeframe that is given, because data does not have to be gathered.

	Nr. of issues	**Total N**	**Range**	**Mean**	**SD***
Left-right position	172	2983	0-100	51.11	44.98
Left-right public opinion	172	2983	1-7	5.30	0.35
Pro-anti integration position	82	1487	0-100	53.10	45.80
Pro-anti integration opinion	82	1487	0-1	0.43	0.21

Table 2: Descriptive statistics independent and dependent variable.
**SD = standard deviation*

4.3 Linear regression

In chapter 4.1 was mentioned that this thesis will use multivariate linear regression. This section explains the general premises of linear regression and why it is suitable for this thesis.

The first type of linear regression is simple regression. This investigates the relationship between two variables, one dependent and one independent variable. According to Agresti and Finlay (2009), linear regression analyses three different aspects of a possible relationships: (1) whether there is a relationship; (2) the strength of the relationship; and (3) it estimates a regression equation that predicts the value of the dependent variable based on the value of the independent variable. The latter aspect is also the goal of linear regression. The relation equation is a formula, which in simple regression looks like this: $Y' = b + ax$. Y' is the predicted value of the dependent variable, a the regression coefficient, b

the value of *y* when the independent variable is zero and *x* the value of the independent variable with which you want to predict the value of y. The correlation coefficient *(x)* is important, because this is how much the value of the dependent variable increases when the independent variable increases with one unit.

To be able to interpret the results of simple regression, it is very important to know the ranges of the variables. When the range of both the independent and dependent variable (public opinion and bargaining position) are the same, an increase of one unit means the same for both. However, in this thesis this is not the case (see table 2). This is very important to keep in mind when investigating the results of the thesis. An increase of one unit in both public opinion variables represents a much larger increase in bargaining position.

When one aims to predict the dependent variable based on multiple independent variables, it is called *multiple linear regression analysis* (Field, 2013). The equation changes to $y' = b + a1x1 + a2x2 +....$ According to Agresti and Finlay (2009) there are many different relationships within multiple regression analysis. In this section I will touch upon three, *multivariate regression, mediation* and *moderation*. A conceptual model for all three is visualised in figure 2. In a multivariate regression (or *multiple causes*) model (model 1 in figure 2), different independent variables are included to research the relationship with the independent variable together. Then, the influence of different variables can be tested to answer the question which variables explain the dependent variable significantly. A mediating relationship (model 2 in figure 2) is when a researcher investigates the relationship between an independent variable (x) and a dependent variable (y), but it seems that the association is at least partly explained by a *confounding* variable (z). Confounding means that the relationship is distorted by another variable (Agresti & Finlay, 2009). Lastly, a moderating relationship (model 3 in figure 2) tests whether an amount of the confounding variable (z) influences the association between the dependent and independent variable. An example is when a scholar wants to research the relationship between perceived threat and support for extreme right political parties and checks whether the relationship changes for different socioeconomic classes.

Based on the theoretical framework and these explanations, this thesis will use two of the three linear regression methods discussed. For the variables that assume an influence on policy responsiveness (which is the relationship between public opinion and the bargaining position), the relationship is moderating. This holds for the variables of policy areas, decision making procedure, salience and the control variable elections. For other variables, to which this thesis expects to have an influence on the bargaining position, the relationship is multivariate. What this entails in practice in this thesis and how the concepts are operationalised is discussed in the next paragraph.



Figure 2: Conceptual models multiple linear regression.
(1) multivariate analysis (2) mediating relationship (3) moderating relationship

4.4 Policy areas

In the next paragraph I will discuss how the policy areas based on the two scales are operationalised and how they will be tested in this thesis.

Cultural and economic issues

Wratil (2018) separated twelve different categories within the DEU dataset before he created the two scales. Then, he combined eight categories into the left-right scale and four into the pro-anti integration scale. Based on the policy dimensions made by Dalton (2017), this thesis separates the eight categories in the left-right scale into cultural and economic issues. The categories are put in table 2, with descriptions that are made by Wratil (2018).

Category	**Description**
Economic issues	
Consumer protection	Legislation on rights and obligations between consumers and producers of goods.
Environmental protection for businesses	Product or processing standards for businesses to protect the environment.
Economic regulation	Regulating or intervening in markets to discourage or prohibit certain activities.
Protectionism	Opening or closing markets to European or international competitors
Cultural issues	
Employees' rights	Standards for organisation of work.
Equality	Affirming or undermining equal rights for all individuals.
Immigration	Legislation on migration, visa requirements and procedures for foreign nationals from outside the EU.
Civil and Human rights	Legislation on the collection and usage of private data of individuals.

Table 3: Cultural and economic issues. Source: Wratil (2018)

The operationalisation of these two policy areas is to test the first hypothesis, whether there are differences in policy responsiveness between the two. In order to achieve this, an additional variable has to be created where economic issues are scored 1 and cultural issues 0. Economic issues are scored 1 because this is the policy area I expect to be more policy responsiveness present. Thereafter, this variable is added to the 'regular' policy responsiveness analysis, so the linear regression analysis between public opinion and the bargaining position on the left right scale. This means that this analysis is a multivariate or multiple causes analysis. Then, its influence on the bargaining position is measured.

After the multivariate test, the moderating relationship between the policy areas and policy responsiveness will be investigated. This means that an interaction variable has to be created, which will be added to the previous test. This is done by multiplying the independent variable (public opinion) and the moderating variable (policy areas). By doing this, I am able to measure what the effect is of the two policy areas on policy responsiveness and am therefore able to test the first hypothesis. However, according to Agresti and Finlay (2009), a robustness check has to be conducted first before an interaction variable can be created. These robustness checks will be discussed in the next chapter. The descriptive statistics of both economic and cultural issues are shown in table 5.

Harmonising national standards and decision making power

The issues within the pro-anti integration scale will also be separated into two dimensions, namely issues that discuss harmonising national standards and the power of decision making. These two dimensions than can test the second hypothesis, whether governments are more responsive to issues regarding decision making power than harmonisation of standards. These two dimensions are based on Wratil's (2018) four issue categories in the pro-anti integration scale. Table 3 shows the categories and their descriptions.

Category	**Description**
Harmonising national standards	
Harmonisation versus national standards	Harmonising or retaining national standards and rules, deciding whether there should be EU minimum rules and/or Member States can deviate from EU rules.
Decision making power	
Wide versus narrow scope	Should unaffected policy areas fall under EU legislation?
EU versus Member State authority	Extending or restricting the rights of the EU institutions.
Speeding up versus blocking of EU legislation	Speeding up, or postponing legislation's implementation where the EU has not been active before.

Table 4: Harmonising national standards and decision making power. Source: Wratil (2018).

The test for the pro-anti integration scale will be similar to the previous described test for the left-right scale. I will create a new variable, where issues that fit the decision making power are scored 1 and issues that entail harmonising national standards are scored 0, based on the direction of the hypothesis. Thereafter a multivariate linear regression analyses will be conducted to test the differences between the two dimensions on the bargaining position. Thereafter, an interaction variable will also be made for this analysis (similar to the left-right scale) to test the influence of these policy areas on policy responsiveness as a whole. The descriptive statistics of these two policy areas of the pro-anti integration scale are also included in table 5.

4.5 Decision making procedure

After testing the first and second hypothesis the third concept, decision making procedure, will be added to the first analyses to test hypothesis 3a and 3b. As mentioned in the theoretical review, there are arguments to assume that policy responsiveness is both higher for issues that require the consultation procedure and the co-decision procedure. As this has not been done by Wratil (2018), each proposal in Wratil's dataset will be assigned to the correct decision making procedure. I will use the legislative observatory from the European Parliament to investigate which issues require which decision making procedure. This website has all basic information on legislative proposals in the European Union and is an easy way to investigate which issues require the consultation procedure or co-decision procedure. The variable for decision making procedure looks as followed: a categorical variable will be made, where issues with co-decision procedure are scored 0 and those with the consultation procedure 1. An overview of how many issues fall under both procedures is shown in table 5.

Thereafter, an interaction variable between public opinion and decision making procedure will be created to test its influence on policy responsiveness. The decision making procedure variable and interaction variable will be added to the first multivariate analyses, which means that the interaction variable of policy areas and public opinion will be excluded here. This is the case, because I would like to have a maximum of two interaction variables in one model, as more interaction variables can distort the results.

In the analysis, the test on decision making procedure will be separate for the two scales. This is necessary, because the observations in the dataset are separated into the two scales and therefore I am not able to test the influence of decision making procedure on all issues. However, this also gives the opportunity to explore whether there are differences in the findings between the two scales.

4.6 Salience to the government

This thesis operationalises salience as the degree to which an issue is important to the government. Within the interviews for the data in the DEU dataset, the respondents were asked how important the bargaining position was to the government. They had to score this on a scale from zero to a hundred.

This therefore reflects the intensity of the policy position. Wratil (2018) did not change this in his dataset, so it remains the same from the original DEU dataset. The salience score is suitable to measure the hypothesis on salience, because it reflects the importance of the issue to the government. I will add the salience score as a moderating variable in the two multivariate analysis (including the control variables), to test whether the importance to the government influences the relationship between public opinion and the responsiveness.

The importance of the media in the salience of issues is covered in the data. The dataset only contains issues that has been mentioned in the media, as it was one of the requirements for the issue to be included in the DEU dataset. Therefore the salience to the government is regarded as a response to salience in society, which is shown through the issue appearing in media outlets (Thomson et al., 2012).

As the fourth hypothesis also investigates the influence of salience on policy responsiveness as a whole, an interaction variable will be made that includes salience to the government and public opinion. The descriptive statistics for the variable salience are made visible in table 5. The individual variables of policy areas and decision making procedures will be added to this model as control variables, the other interaction variables are therefore excluded in the model for this test.

	Nr. of issues	**Total N**	**Range**	**Mean**	**SD***
Economic dimension	126	2174	0-100	50.65	45.14
Cultural dimension	46	809	0-100	53.39	45.11
Harmonisation of national standards	62	1080	0-100	51.53	46.11
Decision Making Power	20	407	0-100	56.26	45.74
Co-decision procedure	150	2759	0-1		
Consultation procedure	68	1053	0-1		
Salience to the government	218	3774	0-100	55.62	24.88

Table 5: Descriptive statistics independent variables.
**SD = standard deviation*

5. Results

The methodology section explained that the intention of this thesis is to use multiple linear regression to test the hypotheses of this thesis. However, Field (2013) argues linear regression has to account for four *assumptions*, to ensure the data is suitable for linear regression. These four assumptions are (1) a linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables; (2) the dependent variable has to be *normally distributed*; (3) *homoscedasticity* and (4) *independence*. In the first part of the results chapter, these four assumptions are discussed to examine whether linear regression is suitable to analyse the data.

When all assumptions are accounted for, the results of the analyses will be discussed in order of the hypotheses from the theoretical framework. First the analyses for the policy areas within the left-right scale and pro-anti integration scale. Second, the results of the decision making power, and lastly the results of the analysis on salience.

5.1 Assumptions

This paragraph sets out four assumptions for linear regression by Field (2013). Assumptions, according to him, are conditions to ensure that what a scholar does works. Moreover, the main source of bias in an analysis is the violation of assumptions. Therefore, this thesis will test the four assumptions before the data is analysed. All four assumptions will be investigated for both the left-right scale and pro-anti integration scale.

Additivity and linearity

The first assumption Field (2013) describes is additivity and linearity. When a researcher wants to use linear regression and also interpret it based on a linear regression formula *(Y' = b + a1x1 + ...)*, the relationship between the variables actually has to linear. For this dataset I therefore have to investigate whether the relationship between public opinion (both on the left-right and pro-anti integration scale) and the bargaining position on the both scales are linear. I will test this by creating two regression scatterplots where the regression line is included. These two scatterplots are shown in figure 3 (left-right scale) and figure 4 (pro-anti integration scale).



Figure 3: Regression scatterplot left-right scale.

What is clearly visible in both figures is that there is a linear relationship, but the regression coefficient is rather small. This thesis will now discuss the second assumption, *normality*.



Figure 4: Regression scatterplot pro-anti integration scale.

Normality

The second assumption Field (2013) discusses relates to normal distribution. A normally distributed variable is according to him relevant for multiple things when a researcher wants to assess a model.

Firstly, a normally distributed variable ensures that the model is not biased by extreme scores, or *outliers*. Secondly, a normally distributed variable is essential to be able to reject or accept hypotheses. Especially that is of importance for this thesis, as it will test hypothesis with the data. Lastly, Field (2013) argues that any model will include some error, meaning that it will not predict outcomes perfectly. If a variable is normally distributed, the model will predict outcomes as best as possible. I will therefore test the bargaining position for both scales to check how they are distributed.



Figure 5: Distribution bargaining position left-right scale.



Figure 6: Distribution bargaining position pro-anti integration scale.

Figure 5 (left-right scale) and figure 6 (pro-anti integration scale) show the distributions for the dependent variable, the bargaining position within the Council of Ministers. The two figures clearly show that both dependent variables are not normally distributed, as they are both skewed heavily at both tails. In practice, this means that in the dataset the scores of 0 and 100 are overrepresented. Wratil (2018) also acknowledged this fact and conducted a logistic regression as a robustness check. This thesis will do the same. Before I discuss the specifics of logistic regression analysis in this case, I will first shortly explain what logistic regression is.

Logistic regression

According to Agresti and Finlay (2009), linear regression is an analysis that predicts dependent variables as a linear combination of a group independent variables. It assumes that the dependent variable is continuous and normally distributed. However, not all variables meet these requirements. Examples are yes/no questions and also categorical variables such as gender. Then, a researcher cannot investigate linear regression but can use logistic regression.

Because linear regression is easy to use and interpret, scholars wanted the equation for logistic regression to look similar. To achieve this, log-odds are used instead of the intercept (Y'). Then, the rest of the formula can remain the same as with linear regression (Agresti & Finlay, 2009). The formula for logistic regression therefore looks like this:

$$\log\left(\frac{\pi}{1-\pi}\right) = a + b_1X_1 + \ldots + b_kX_k$$

That way it is ensured that the researcher still gets a regression coefficient, constant and a significance (*p*) level. However, the interpretation is a bit different. In linear regression one can talk about the chance the dependent variable changes significantly with a change in the independent variable, because the variable is normally distributed. In logistic regression, one has to talk about log-odds for the change in the dependent variable. Log-odds are not the same as chances (Agresti & Finlay, 2009).

This thesis will use the logistic regression analyses similar to Wratil (2018). The logistic regression in this thesis will be a robustness check to ensure whether linear regression is allowed. The bargaining position for both scales will be transformed into a categorical variable, where all bargaining position scores of 0 to 49 will become a zero and all scores from 50-100 a one. Thereafter, the logistic analysis will be conducted. If the results of the logistic results do not differ from the linear regression results, I am allowed to use the linear regression results. If not, then the logistic regression results will be used instead. The linear regression results will be compared to the logistic regression results in each analysis.

Homoscedasticity of variance

Field (2013) argues that the assumption of homoscedasticity entails that when a researcher wants to test different samples, that those samples need to come from populations with the same variance. That matters according to him, because significance tests are measured using the standard error. When there are differences in variance, the standard error becomes biased and therefore the confidence intervals and significance tests become inaccurate.

This looks complicated, but in practice homoscedasticity is easily checked (Field, 2013). Homoscedasticity can be tested by using the same scatterplot as for the assumption of additivity and linearity. Within the two scatterplots (figure 3 and 4) all observations have to be funnelled out. If there are no outliers, when all observations are (on average) the same distance from the regression line then homoscedasticity can be assumed. As the two figures show, this is the case in this thesis. Therefore we can go on to the last assumption, independence.

Independence

The assumption of independence means that the errors in the model are not associated. In simpler terms, it means that observations in the dataset should be independent from each other. When observations are dependent on each other, it is impossible to interpret the individual effect of an observation on the dependent variable (Field, 2013). In this thesis, I will do two robustness checks for independence. Firstly whether different independent variables measure the same concept, which is called *multicollinearity*

(Agresti & Finlay, 2009). Secondly, the independence of the units of measurement, in this case the policy issues in the dataset.

Multicollinearity

Multicollinearity is when there is strong correlation between two or more variables in the dataset (Agresti & Finlay, 2009). When the correlation is very high (or even perfect), it is impossible for the analysis to obtain unique results, because the results are interchangeable. Field (2013) argues that high collinearity has three consequences. Firstly, the variables become untrustworthy, because when they are not unique they are hard to interpret. Secondly, it limits the correlation coefficient of the model, because when two variables have high collinearity, it adds little added explanatory value. Thirdly, it is hard to predict the individual importance of the predictor.

Multicollinearity is easily measured in statistical software, by using the *variance inflation factor (VIF)*. Related to the VIF is the tolerance statistic. There are according to Field (2013) some general guidelines: (1) when the VIF is higher than 10 the researcher should assume multicollinearity and (2) tolerance below 0.1 indicates a serious problem.

As mentioned in chapter 4.4 on policy areas, before a moderating relationship can be tested an important robustness check has to be conducted (Agresti & Finlay, 2009). Before it is allowed to create an interaction variable, I first have to prevent that the two variables that are multiplied do not measure the same concept (multicollinearity).

Because interaction variables show high collinearity in the output, I am not able to look at the SPSS results of the models in this chapter. Therefore, a multivariate linear regression analysis of all variables used in this research. The results are in appendix 4. What is important to mention is that the control variable *electoral system* is excluded in this appendix. This is caused by issues later in this thesis, which will elaborated on in the next paragraph, 5.2. The output shows there is no multicollinearity, which means that the interaction variables can be created. Moreover, it shows that I can move on to the second independence check, independence of policy issues.

Independence of policy issues

This thesis analyses the policy issues individually. However, as figure 7 shows, multiple policy issues can fall under one policy proposal. Therefore it could be the case that the separate policy issues are not independent. The policy proposal in figure 7 shows what this looks like in the data, this proposal includes two policy issues, number 44 and number 45.

Proposal for a directive on the taking up, the pursuit and the prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions (COD/1998/252)
1. The extent to which the activities of electronic money institutions should be regulated. (44)
    0: No regulation
    50: Liberal approach to regulation – few restrictions on institutions that may issue electronic money
    100: Only credit institutions should be able to issue electronic money
2. Derogations to the directive. (45)
    0: No regulation / complete national discretion
    17: Flexible approach (SE/FI proposal)
    33: Considerable amount of derogations
    75: Some derogations
    100: No derogations
    (NB: unusual numbers due to fact that reference point was coded outside the 0-100 range during the interview)

Figure 7: Proposals and issues in DEU-II dataset. Source: Thomson et al. (2012)

The most suitable way to check whether the policy issues are independent or whether they are influenced by other issues in the overarching proposal, is by conducting a multilevel analysis. A multilevel analysis allows a researcher to investigate variables that are clustered or nested within other variables, much like is the case here (Field, 2013). The results of the multilevel analysis for issues nested in policy proposals are put in appendix 3. The most important factor to look at in the output is the intercept. When the intercept is significant, the policy issues are not independent. However, for both scales this is not the case. Therefore I can treat the policy issues as individual and am allowed to continue treating them as such.

To conclude, based on the analysis of the four assumptions linear regression seems a suitable way to conduct the analysis. However, each test will be checked with a logistic regression to ensure the lack of normal distribution in the dependent variable is accounted for.

5.2 Models results

The results of the linear regression analyses are shown in table 6 (left-right scale) and table 7 (pro-anti integration scale). Both tables show four models. The first model tests the influence of public opinion and the different policy areas for both scales on the bargaining position. Therefore, this first model most importantly tests the 'basic' relationship between public opinion and bargaining position for both scales.

The second model adds the first interaction variable to analyses to test whether policy responsiveness differs for the two policy areas in both scales (hypothesis 1 and 2). The third model tests hypotheses 3a and 3b by adding the interaction variable for decision making procedure to both scales. The fourth model visualises the results of the moderating influence of salience on policy responsiveness, so the test of hypothesis 4.

Before the results are discussed, two points have to be made. Firstly, this thesis also accounts for country level differences. Twenty-six dummy variables were created for each Member State (with Austria as the reference group) and added to the multiple regression analysis. For the sake of readability,

the individual country level results are not included in the models below, but they can be found in the full SPSS output in appendix 1.

Secondly, one of the control variables, *electoral system*, has been excluded from the analysis by the statistical software. The tolerance level was too low (<0.1), violating one of the general guidelines of multicollinearity. SPSS excludes variables based on tolerance when a variable can perfectly be predicted from the other independent variables in the analysis (Field, 2013). When the country-level dummies were added, the statistical software dropped electoral systems. This means that the individual country-level dummies already account for the electoral systems. Moreover, this means the variable only varies across countries and not across issues or over time.

Model left-right scale

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Public opinion	30.935***	25.818**	28.542***	36.290***
Economic issues	-3.370	-37.908	-3.329	-2.946
Economic issues * public opinion		6.525		
Decision making procedure			-32.009	4.022*
Decision making procedure * public opinion.			6.839	
Salience				0.533
Salience * public opinion				-0.119
Elections	3.796	3.769	4.099	3.562
Elections * public opinion	-0.691	-0.687	-0.752	-0.651
Government ideological position	0.155	0.150	0.138	0.124
Net receipts	-3.236	3.196	2.847	3.155
Unemployment	-2.415***	-2.367***	-2.333***	-2.350***
Inflation rate	0.198	0.204	-0.134	-0.009
Number of policy issues	172	172	172	172
Number of counties	27	27	27	27
N	2964	2964	2964	2964
R^2	0.039	0.039	0.041	0.044

Table 6: Results for the multivariate regression analysis of the left-right scale.
****p<0,001; **p<0,01; *p<0,05.*
NB: results for country level variables can be found in appendix 1.

Model pro-anti integration scale

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Public opinion	31.907	51.869*	42.728*	51.443*
Decision making power	-5.561*	5.762	-7.860**	-6.459*
Decision making power * public opinion		-26.742*		
Decision making procedure			29.493***	12.988***
Decision making procedure * public opinion			-39.339***	
Salience				-0.024
Salience * public opinion				-0.329
Elections	-0.444	-0.487	-0.620	-0.495
Elections * public opinion	1.312	1.423	1.600	1.222
Government ideological position	0.147*	2.074**	1.527	1.638
Net receipts	6.838*	7.297*	-7.461*	-7.128*
Unemployment	-1.103	-1.103	-0.752	-0.836
Inflation rate	0.346	0.292	-0.018	0.189
Number of policy issues	82	82	82	82
Number of counties	27	27	27	27
N	1482	1482	1482	1482
R^2	0.049	0.051	0.071	0.07

Table 7: Results for the multivariate regression analysis of the pro-anti integration scale.
****p<0,001; **p<0,01; *p<0,05.*
NB: results for country level variables can be found in appendix 1.

5.3 Policy areas

Left-right scale

This paragraph will discuss the results for the policy areas on the left-right scale, which are set out in models 1 and 2 of table 6. Firstly, this thesis elaborate on the results of model 1. What becomes apparent immediately is that the relationship between public opinion and the bargaining position in the left-right scale is significant. When public opinion on the left-right scale increases with one, the bargaining position increases by 30.935. So, when public opinion shifts one unit more towards the political right, the bargaining position shifts significantly to the right as well.

There is no significant difference between economic and cultural issues. However, this is caused by both policy areas being significant ($p < 0.01$). The regression coefficient is a minus, meaning that for economic issues (which I scored one) the bargaining position is lower than for cultural issues when public opinion is held constant. Of the other control variables, only the unemployment rate within a country significantly decreases policy responsiveness within the left-right scale.

The results for the logistic regression are slightly different from the results of linear regression. The main relationship between public opinion and bargaining position does not differ from the linear regression, but the results for the policy areas do. In the logistic regression results, there is a significant difference between the cultural and economic dimension ($p<0,05$). The bargaining position for cultural issues is significantly more to the left (-0.050) than economic dimension with the same score on public opinion. So, the bargaining position of cultural issues shifts less with changes in public opinion than economic issues. In principle, this means that the assumption of normality is violated. However, this thesis will remain using the linear regression analysis as leading, as it is the only result that is different of all tests. Possible implications of the differences will be discussed in the discussion and conclusion.

In model 2 the interaction variable *economic issues*public opinion* is added to model 1, to test hypothesis 1 for the left-right scale. This hypothesis was: *"The Council of Ministers is more responsive to public opinion on economic issues than on cultural issues."*. As there is no significant interaction effect, I reject this hypothesis.

Pro-anti integration scale

The results for the analyses on the pro-anti integration scale are shown in model 1 and 2 of table 7. Model 1 shows no significant relationship between public opinion and the bargaining position. However, there is a significant difference in the bargaining position between issues about harmonisation of national standards and decision making power. When the score on public opinion is held constant, the bargaining position for issues on decision making power is 5.561 lower than issues on harmonisation. In practice, this means that the bargaining position on decision making power is more 'anti' integration than harmonisation of national standards (figure 1). In the first model, the government ideological position

and net receipts also significantly influence the bargaining position. Higher net receipts result in a more 'integrationist' bargaining position when other variables are held constant.

In the second model the interaction variable *decision making power * public opinion* was added to model 1 to test the second hypothesis: "*Within the pro-anti integration scale, governments are more responsive to issues about harmonisation of standards than issues on decision making power".* As can be seen in model 2, there is a significant interaction effect on the policy areas within this scale. This means that the relationship between public opinion and the bargaining position is moderated by the policy areas. However, the next step is to interpret how policy responsiveness differs between harmonisation of national standards and decision making power. According to Agresti and Finlay (2009), the easiest way to interpret the differences is by visualising the relationships in a graph, where the regression lines are created by the regression formula. This graph is visualised in figure 8.



Figure 8: Results model 2 pro-anti integration scale

Figure 8 clearly shows that the relationship between public opinion and the bargaining position is stronger for issues about harmonisation of national standards. When public opinion increases on this issue type, the bargaining position increases with it. For the other issue type, decision making power, the bargaining position is less influenced by differences in public opinion. This means that policy responsiveness is higher for harmonisation issues and therefore I am allowed to accept the second hypothesis.

Similar to the results for the left-right scale in the previous paragraph, the logistic regression analysis (appendix 2) shows different results for the second model of the pro-anti integration scale. In the logistic regression analysis, there is no significant interaction effect of policy areas on policy responsiveness. I will also reflect on this in the conclusion and discussion.

5.4 Decision making power

The next part of the results focuses on the analysis regarding the decision making procedure to test hypothesis 3a and 3b. In model 3 of table 6 and 7, the decision making procedure and interaction variable (*decision making procedure * public opinion)* were added to investigate their influence on policy responsiveness. As a result of using an existing dataset which was already separated into the two scales, testing the influence of the decision making power for all issues together was not possible. Hence, the variable has been added to the analysis of model 1 for both scales. In appendix 1, the full SPSS output including the country level dummies can be found.

For the left-right scale, the addition of the decision making procedure variable does not change the p-score of the relationship between public opinion and the bargaining position in the Council of Ministers (table 6). The p-score of the economic and cultural policy issues also do not change. There is also no significant interaction effect of decision making procedure on policy responsiveness.

For the pro-anti integration scale (table 7), the results are completely different. The p-score for public opinion and the policy areas both are significant. This means that by the addition of decision making procedure, there is evidence for policy responsiveness within this scale. Moreover, there is also a significant difference between the two different policy areas on the bargaining position, where it is again lower for issues on decision making power (-7.860). For the control variables, only the net receipts variable remains significant.

As model 3 of table 7 shows, there is evidence for a significant interaction effect of the decision making procedure on policy responsiveness within this scale. This means that within the pro-anti integration scale, the decision making procedure moderates the relationship between public opinion and the bargaining position. I will interpret the moderating relationship similar to the result in the previous paragraph. Figure 9 visualises the influence of the two decision making procedures on policy responsiveness. On consultation procedures, the bargaining position is almost constant, regardless whether the score on public opinion increases. For co-decision procedure, the relationship is much different. The graph shows that the bargaining position shifts with public opinion. When public opinion increases, the bargaining position increases as well.



Figure 9: Results model 3 pro-anti integration scale

The two hypotheses for this analysis were (H3a and H3b): "*Governments will be more responsive to public opinion on issues that have the co-decision procedure than the consultation procedure."* and "*Governments will be more responsive to public opinion on issues that have the consultation procedure than the co-decision procedure."*. Based on the results in this paragraph, I can reject hypothesis H3b fully. Hypothesis H3a can be accepted, but only for the pro-anti integration scale. The logistic regression output (appendix 2) show the same results for these analyses.

5.5 Salience

Model 3 specifies the results of the analysis with salience added as a moderating variable. The results show that salience does not moderate the relationship between public opinion and the bargaining position in the Council of Ministers, both for the left-right scale and the pro-anti integration scale. The logistic regression results do not show different results. Therefore I reject the fourth hypothesis (H4), "*When an issue is salient to the public, governments will also find it more important and will become more responsive to public opinion."*. In addition to there being no effect, there could be other reasons why there is no evidence. I will reflect on these reasons in the discussion and conclusion.

6. Discussion

The research question "*What is the effect of policy issue characteristics on policy responsiveness in the Council of Ministers?"* has been answered in three steps by looking at different policy areas, decision making procedures and salience. This discussion will return to the most important theories and expectations from the literature review and theoretical framework to explain the results. Firstly, this discussion will present a short summary of the results. Thereafter, the general relationship between public opinion and the bargaining position (policy responsiveness) will be elaborated on. Subsequently, the research question will be answered in order of the three paragraphs of the results chapter.

6.1 Summary of the results

In the methodology chapter, this thesis concluded that linear regression is the most suitable method for the analysis of the data in this thesis. However, to ensure these four assumptions needed to be tested first (Field, 2013). These were (1) additivity and linearity; (2) normality; (3) homoscedasticity and (4) independence. While the first and third were successful for both scales, the second and fourth were not. The normal distribution for both scales were skewed at both tails, for which a logistic regression was conducted as a robustness check. For two models, model 1 of the left-right scale and model 2 of the pro-anti integration scale, the logistic regression analysis showed different results. Later in the conclusion will be reflected on the differences there. The fourth assumption, independence, consisted of two parts. First, multicollinearity (appendix 4). The second part concerned the independence of policy issues. Due to policy issues being nested in policy proposals (making the variable possibly hierarchical) a multilevel was also conducted as an extra robustness check. The multilevel analysis showed no evidence for policy issues being dependent on each other on the policy proposal level, ensuring that the policy issues were independent. Lastly, country level dummies were included in the analyses as well.

After testing die four assumptions, the four models for both scales were set out and elaborated upon. The first model overlaps with Wratil's (2018) findings, that there is evidence for general policy responsiveness on the left-right scale and not for the pro-anti integration scale. Moreover, the first model showed that issues on decision making power are more anti integration than issues on harmonisation of national standards when public opinion is held constant. The second model showed no difference in policy responsiveness for cultural and economic issues, meaning that the first hypothesis had to be rejected. For the pro-anti integration scale, there is evidence for an interaction effect of policy areas on policy responsiveness. Policy responsiveness is stronger for issues on harmonisation of national standards than issues on decision making power. The third model showed that for the pro-anti integration scale, policy responsiveness is stronger for issues that require the co-decision procedure. For consultation procedures, there is little responsiveness to changes in public opinion. The final model showed no evidence for both the salience and the interaction variable. In the next parts, this thesis will

return to the most important theories and expectations for all three tests and explain the results based on those theories to give more insight to the results.

6.2 Policy responsiveness

As mentioned in the theoretical framework, the extent to which there actually is policy responsiveness in the Council of Ministers is still debated. Alexandrova, Rasmussen and Toshkov (2015) explain why policy responsiveness does or does not occur in the Council of Ministers. The theory that supports policy responsiveness argues that even though the ministers transcend the national level, they are still elected government officials with a strong preference to become re-elected. To achieve this, they need support from their constituents. As a result, they are incentivised to respond to public opinion, because otherwise they will be punished in the next election. According to Wratil (2018), ministers do this through long term strategies for issues on the left-right scale. He calls this *systematic responsiveness*. This thesis supports this strategic responsiveness theory, as it also finds evidence for policy responsiveness on the left-right scale. However, Wratil (2018) argues that these long term strategies are based on the anticipation towards next elections. As this thesis does not find indication of an influence of elections on policy responsiveness, it could also be argued that these strategies are made regardless of elections being close.

Another theory argues that policy responsiveness does not necessarily appear in the Council of Ministers. According to Alexandrova, Rasmussen and Toshkov (2015), the distance between the constituents and the European Union is simply too great. Citizens are not well-informed on what happens at the European level, creating less incentive for the ministers to respond to public opinion. Wratil's (2018) results and the results of this thesis thesis seem to support this theory for general policy responsiveness on the pro-anti integration scale.

On average, people are more concerned with left-right issues than integration issues in the European Union (Wratil, 2018). Therefore the incentive to respond to left-right issues is higher. According to Wratil, this has implications for responsiveness on issues of the pro-anti integration scale. For issues that are on this scale, there is no need for systematic responsiveness as a result of the lack of interest within the EU. Ministers only respond to public opinion on integration issues when it could become important for the next elections. This is called *sporadic responsiveness*. However, the question that Wratil's research does not answer is when responsiveness does appear on this scale. This thesis finds factors that activate the (sporadic) responsiveness on the pro-anti integration scale. These will be discussed in the next paragraphs.

6.3 Policy areas

The main rationale to split the left-right scale came from an article by Dalton (2017). He argued that for political research, using a left-right scale is simply too broad because within the scale there is too much

diversity to investigate and interpret issues accurately. This led to the separation between economic and cultural issues based on two factors. Firstly, because Dalton (2017) explains this is a better specification. Secondly, because for cultural issues evidence for policy responsiveness is not widely investigated. Cultural issues are rarely investigated and when they are, they usually pick one policy field such as Arregui and Creighton (2018) do with immigration. The central expectation was therefore that there would be more responsiveness for economic issues than cultural issues. The results show no difference between the two policy areas. This is probably caused by the theory on systematic responsiveness, as both the general scale and the two individual policy areas show high policy responsiveness.

The effect of the policy areas on the bargaining position is different, at least based on the results of the logistic regression. The results of the logistic regression show a more 'right' bargaining position for cultural issues than economic issues. A possible explanation for this can be politization of those issues (McKibben, 2010). She argues that politization of issues can lead to the bargaining game being less concerned with 'relative gains' and becoming more of a 'zero-sum game'. The positions that are taken become more rigid and strict. When we look back at the type of issues that are in the cultural policy area, for instance immigration, these types of issues can be expected to be politicised more than economic issues. This then leads to more extreme positions on cultural issues, in this case they shift more towards the political right. For the example of immigration this means positions that are stricter on immigration.

For the pro-anti integration scale, the results of this thesis show that the Council of Ministers is less responsive to issues about decision making power than issues about the harmonisation of national standards. This overlaps with the general expectations as set out in the theoretical framework. This can be explained by Hix and Høyland (2011), who argue that Member States regard their national standards as imperative because it gives them benefits within the European market. This works differently in Western and Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, the member states are keen on their own high standards, which gives them an edge on quality. In Eastern Europe, the member states focus on cheap labour and lower labour standards, which gives them an edge on price. Especially these types of issues are often important to society, both for labourers and businesses. Hence, governments respond to public opinion on these issues.

This also leads to the first condition when responsiveness does appear on the pro-anti integration scale, namely the type of issue. Based on the theory of sporadic responsiveness, the ministers choose issues to be responsive to that are important to the public (Wratil, 2018). This thesis shows that the subject of the issue is important for the responsiveness. Issues on harmonisation of national standards are regarded as important to the public by the ministers, leading to more responsiveness on those types of issues in comparison to issues on decision making power.

6.4 Decision making procedure

The main reason for testing decision making procedure on policy responsiveness was based on theories on issue sensitivity. In international relations theory, issues that are seen as sensitive are called *high politics issues* (Keohane & Nye, 2012). In the European Union a same kind of separation is made theoretically, namely between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. The two decision making procedures investigated in this thesis both represent one, consultation the *intergovernmentalist* framework and the co-decision procedure the *supranationalist* framework.

The results for the test on decision making procedure on the left-right scale shows no evidence for differences in policy responsiveness between the consultation and co-decision procedure. The main rationale for this is similar to that of the previous paragraph. The theory on systematic responsiveness would argue that there should be no difference in responsiveness, as there is a long term strategy in place for all issues on the scale.

For issues on the left-right scale, one could assume there is a different responsiveness mechanism for issues that require the consultation and co-decision procedure. Hix and Høyland's (2011) argue that in the consultation procedure Member States have more power in the policy making process. Therefore there is power to the individual Member States to respond to their own constituency. For the co-decision procedure this changes, as they have to share the power with other institutions. In the end, this does not change the amount of responsiveness. I expect this, because the power is shared with the European Parliament and that institution also responds to public opinion (Williams, 2016). One argument can be raised against this reasoning, as the European Parliament responds to public opinion from the whole European Union and the Council to public opinion in their national constituency. The results of this thesis show no discrepancy between the two, as policy responsiveness seems apparent in both decision making procedures.

For the pro-anti integration scale, figure 8 shows a big difference in policy responsiveness between the consultation procedure and the co-decision procedure. For issues that require the consultation procedure, the bargaining position remains (fairly) constant, regardless of how pro or anti integrationist public opinion is. For co-decision procedure issues, the bargaining position shifts with public opinion. The latter can also be caused by the argument made for the left-right scale, that the share of power with other institutions ensures responsiveness. That would also mean that for issues on this scale, ministers in the Council are not responsive when they have more power over the policy making process.

Another reason for these results could be based on other theories on issue sensitivity mentioned in the theoretical framework. As issues that require the consultation procedure are somewhat more sensitive (Eberlein & Newman, 2008), ministers think they are more competent to handle the issue and therefore are not eager to incorporate public opinion. Not delegating power on these issues is therefore also a deliberate choice, as they want to remain the main actor in the policy making process (Bélanger & Meguid, 2007). Then there is no place for public opinion in the bargaining position. The decision

making procedure therefore is the second condition for (sporadic) responsiveness to appear for issues on the pro-anti integration scale.

6.5 Salience

This thesis tested the influence of salience on policy responsiveness in the Council, by using the salience to the government. This represents to what extent the salience in society is picked up by the governments. One of the criteria for a policy issue to be incorporated into the dataset was that the issue needed to have appeared in (domestic) media. The expectation was that the more salient an issue was, the more it would get picked up by the policy makers and therefore also influence policy responsiveness. However, based on the results there is no influence of the salience of an issue on both the bargaining position and policy responsiveness.

In this paragraph I will try to unravel why this is the case from a theoretical point of view. The next chapter will elaborate on the results from a technical point of view in the limitations. A reason why salience does not influence policy responsiveness is linked to the quotes by Juncker that were presented in the introduction. Bélanger and Meguid (2008) argue that when an issue is salient, policy makers take 'ownership' of that issue. They see themselves as the most competent to take on the issue and also solve it. This can be interpreted both ways, by solving the problem in the way the public would want it solved, but also in a way the policy makers think it should be solved, based on their most important competency. The former is the most likely scenario in a country, also based on Stasavage's (2004) research that shows representatives become inflexible in negotiations and take over public opinion when an issue becomes salient.

The latter argument could become a likely scenario in the European Union, when the distance to the constituents grows. This is illustrated and explained by Juncker's quotes, who argues that they (the policy makers) are the ones that are most competent and should not be bothered by public opinion, which is flawed. Then, salience of an issue does not increase policy responsiveness, it actually decreases.

The source of salience could also be an important factor for its influence on responsiveness. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, Klüver and Pickup (2019) researched the influence of interest groups on governmental responsiveness and saw that when an issue is not salient in public but only in interest groups, it leads to less responsiveness. Moreover, when interest groups have divergent interests, this also decreases responsiveness. This thesis did not look at the source of salience, which could be an important driver of the results.

7. Conclusion

In the discussion, the theories from the literature review and theoretical framework have been used to put the results in a broader theoretical perspective. It discussed how the results could be explained by theory. This chapter will elaborate on the added value of this thesis is by giving a critical analysis of the study. Firstly, by reflecting back to the main results. Thereafter, the limitations will be discussed. Thirdly, the scientific and societal implications will be discussed. These implications will be linked to the scientific and societal relevance from the introduction. Finally, this thesis will end with suggestions for future research on this topic.

7.1 Reflection on results

The discussion focused on the theoretical explanation of the results of this thesis. This paragraph will look at the results from a statistical/methodological point of view. First, I will reflect on the results of what should be the main explanatory factor of policy responsiveness for the left-right scale, elections. As discussed earlier, this thesis is based heavily on the article by Wratil (2018). This thesis used the same dataset, meaning that the variables for policy responsiveness and elections are the same. Still, Wratil found that elections are the main driver of policy responsiveness. In the results of this thesis, all four models did not find a significant interaction effect. The contrasting results could be caused by the fact that this thesis uses different control variables. For example, Wratil includes opposition party emphasis and whether an EU-related event occurred as interaction variables. This thesis, as a result of also adding interaction effects to test the hypotheses, chose to exclude these moderating control variables as there would be to many interaction variables in one model.

Moreover, this thesis researches different concepts than Wratil (2018). Hence, based on the literature review and theoretical framework, I chose the control variables from the dataset that would fit these analyses best. Therefore, it is difficult to compare the results of this thesis to Wratil's, albeit that the same dataset has been used and this thesis is largely based on the article.

Secondly, I will shortly reflect on the differences in results between the logistic and linear regression analyses. Officially, because the linear regression results are the main results in this thesis, I conclude that there is no significant difference between policy responsiveness on cultural and economic issues. However, as the logistic regression does show significant results, I also elaborated on this theoretically in the discussion.

The other difference in results was in the second model of the pro-anti integration scale, where the linear regression did show a moderating effect of policy areas on policy responsiveness and the logistic regression did not. To me, the most logical explanation is that the scores other than 0 and 100 drove the results in the linear regression. When these scores in the middle were assigned to the same score, the significant effect of the policy areas disappeared.

The final reflection this thesis will present is a reflection on the final test on salience. In the conclusion, this thesis tried to build an argument that would explain the results on salience, namely that there is no influence of salience of an issue on policy responsiveness. This result is contrary to a substantial body of literature arguing that it does have an effect. Therefore, it is important to go back to the operationalisation of salience in this thesis and reflect if there are any flaws in the data that could have caused these results. I will do this in the next section, the limitations of the research.

7.2 Limitations

For a thesis, it is imperative that the author critically reflects on the choices made. I will do this in this paragraph for the methodological chapter.

The first limitations of this thesis are about reliability, mostly based on the dataset. This thesis used an existing dataset, which made it difficult to determine the underlying principles and coding of the variables, as not all information was available. Wratil (2018) provided a lot of information on the dataset online, but sometimes this remained difficult.

Due to not all information on the dataset being available, I had to do some of the operationalisations myself. For the issues that fall under the scales, Wratil (2018) provided general descriptions of the types of issues. However, there was no clear data on which issues fell under which scale. I therefore categorised them myself. This could have led to differences between this thesis and Wratil's article, but in the end the amount of issues in both scales were the same. Therefore, it seems like the separation is done similarly. Unfortunately, I am not sure whether this is the case.

A next limitation based on the data could be that crossed issues drive the results. Within the dataset, not all issues are either on the left-right scale or pro-anti integration scale. In the dataset around 12% of the issues were assigned to both scales. Therefore, the result could be changed by the issues that appear on both scales. This could have been prevented by conducting a Chow test, which tests whether the coefficients in two linear regression models on different data are equal (Wratil, 2018). However, Wratil also conducted this test and he did not find evidence for this. Due to using different variables, this thesis would have benefitted from a Chow test as an extra robustness check.

This thesis could also have a limitation regarding internal validity, namely that the concept of salience was wrongly measured. In the operationalisation, I expected all issues to be salient based on the characteristics of the dataset. In order to be included in the dataset, an issue had to be mentioned in (domestic) media outlets. With the results as they are, maybe this was wrongly assumed. It could be the case that the dataset simply lacked the data to correctly measure salience. Therefore, the reason why no significant effect was found could be because salience was not specified enough, so the concept did not measure what it was supposed to.

In the end, it could be the case that logistic regression would have been the most suitable method for this case. Although there are no big differences in the results of the analysis, it still could be the most

accurate way of analysing this data. I stuck with linear regression as it was the same method as Wratil (2018) used, and using logistic regression as a robustness check was the way to pass the assumptions. However, my statistical knowledge is too narrow to conclude which of the two methods would have been better to use to analyse the data.

7.3 Implications

In this paragraph, this thesis will return to the scientific and societal relevance of the thesis and discuss how the findings of this thesis may be important for policy, society and theory.

Firstly, this study adds to the limited existing body of scientific literature on policy responsiveness in the European Union and more specifically the Council of Ministers. The findings support evidence in favour of Wratil's (2018) theory on systematic responsiveness for left-right issues, as policy responsiveness on left-right issues in general was consistently found. Moreover, it is according to the results of this thesis, not influenced by the prospect of elections. This would suggest a fixed long term strategy to respond to left-right issues, regardless of the prospect of elections.

Based on the results, this thesis recommends that policy makers can be more open about their policy making process, especially when they can argue that public opinion is important in it. The ministers in the Council do care about public opinion and incorporate it in their bargaining position. When they do this, it can decrease the felt distance between European citizens and Brussels and also reduce the issue of democratic deficit.

Along the lines of the democratic deficit, the findings of this thesis also increase the legitimacy of policies made by the Council, as it seems they are at least partly influenced by public opinion. Increasing legitimacy of the policies made by the Council can also increase the trust numbers in the European Union as a whole, which are low. However, according to Alexandrova, Rasmussen and Toshkov (2015) policy makers also have to make sure European citizens become more informed on what the EU does and why to achieve increase trust. This finding also justifies the use of the Eurobarometer by the European Commission. Contrary to what Junker believes, public opinion can be regarded as important in European Union policy making, at least on left-right issues. Seeing that this is the type of issues people are most concerned with (Wratil, 2018), this is important. For pro-anti integration issues, there are conditions to the appearance of responsiveness.

Secondly, this thesis adds new information on what factors activate sporadic responsiveness in the pro-anti integration scale. In general, this thesis confirms Wratil's (2018) conclusion that on integration issues responsiveness is not automatic. This thesis found two important conditions for policy responsiveness, that should be seen as separate. The first condition is the type of issue, issues on harmonisation of national standards do show policy responsiveness. On issues about decision making power this is not the case. The second condition is the decision making procedure, as the Council responds to public opinion on issues that require co-decision procedure, but not on issues that require

the consultation procedures. In practice, these findings can be important for society and interest groups. For society, they show that they have a say in issues on harmonisation of national standards and on issues that require the co-decision procedure. The findings are important for interest groups as they show under which conditions lobbying have a higher change of being successful.

7.4 Future research

The last paragraph of this thesis will discuss suggestions for further research. These are based on the limitations and interesting points that came up during this thesis.

The first suggestion for further research is about factors that activate the sporadic responsiveness. This thesis investigated the influence of the decision making procedure and two types of issues on this scale. Further research could also look at not only other policy areas within the pro-anti integration scale, but also other factors that could lead to responsiveness in the Council. Moreover, this thesis did not find evidence for an influence of elections in both scales. Hence, further research on the explanatory value of elections is meaningful.

Moreover, future research could also look more into issue linkage. This thesis solely tested to what extent there was hierarchy on the policy proposal level, but issues might be linked differently as well. Along these lines, future research could also look at what the influence is of issues that are both on the left-right scale and pro-anti integration scale and to what extent these issues drive the results. The third suggestion is about salience. This thesis did not find evidence for an influence of salience, but it could be the case the internal validity was lacking. Lastly, further research could also investigate the influence of other issue characteristics to further explain the relationship between public opinion and policy in the European Union.

Another reason why this thesis did not find evidence for salience was theorised in chapter 6.5. Future research could explore this idea, that when an issue becomes salient, policy responsiveness does not increase, but actually decreases. This was based on two arguments. Firstly, Juncker's quotes in the introduction, that when an issue becomes salient, it becomes more important to solve. Then, policy makers see themselves as most competent to solve it and actually move away from what the people want and only look at their own policy solutions. Secondly, further research could look at sources of salience and how that influences responsiveness, such as Klüver and Pickup (2019) did for interest groups. For media this could also be interesting to explore.

This thesis was quantitative in nature, therefore looking focusing on the quantity of issues and trends in policy responsiveness. It could also be important to dig deeper into the issue by looking at the research question more qualitatively, for instance by investigating why policy responsiveness happens and to what extent policy makers respond to public opinion consciously. The latter example gives more insight into the explanatory value of this thesis, whether policy makers in the Council of Ministers

respond to public opinion consciously and if so, why they do it. This is especially important for the pro-anti integration scale.

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Appendix 1: SPSS output multivariate regression analyses

SPSS output policy areas left-right scale

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,197[a]	,039	,028	44,49120	1,903

b. Dependent Variable: Left-right position (0-100)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	-89,053	39,960		-2,229	,026		
	Public opinion on left-right	30,935	7,869	,242	3,931	,000	,087	11,542
	Cultural or Economic Dimension (LR)	-3,370	1,847	-,033	-1,824	,068	,986	1,014
	Days to next elections (as planned)	3,796	3,041	,384	1,248	,212	,003	289,091
	ELEC_POLR	-,691	,573	-,372	-1,206	,228	,003	289,670
	Government left-right position (CMP)	,155	,100	,042	1,551	,121	,450	2,223
	Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP)	3,236	2,358	,075	1,372	,170	,110	9,105

	Unemployment rate	-2,415	,517	-,186	-4,674	,000	,207	4,825
	Inflation rate	,198	,931	,007	,212	,832	,346	2,890
	BE=1	-7,359	6,279	-,036	-1,172	,241	,340	2,944
	BU=1	4,973	15,285	,007	,325	,745	,655	1,528
	CY=1	-8,255	7,758	-,025	-1,064	,287	,578	1,729
	CZ=1	-7,343	8,326	-,024	-,882	,378	,430	2,327
	DE=1	11,928	5,750	,060	2,074	,038	,391	2,558
	DK=1	-26,170	6,189	-,128	-4,228	,000	,358	2,791
	EE=1	-13,967	9,009	-,046	-1,550	,121	,378	2,646
	EL=1	-21,237	10,056	-,103	-2,112	,035	,138	7,229
	ES=1	21,112	8,262	,106	2,555	,011	,190	5,250
	FI=1	-10,312	7,365	-,050	-1,400	,162	,256	3,902
	FR=1	11,455	6,585	,059	1,740	,082	,290	3,452
	HU=1	-6,364	8,199	-,020	-,776	,438	,478	2,094
	IE=1	-14,597	7,642	-,070	-1,910	,056	,246	4,069
	IT=1	-3,267	5,822	-,016	-,561	,575	,388	2,577
	lt=1	-5,652	9,017	-,019	-,627	,531	,356	2,807
	LU=1	-11,827	5,949	-,054	-1,988	,047	,450	2,222
	LV=1	-32,530	11,657	-,093	-2,791	,005	,296	3,374
	MT=1	-1,404	8,208	-,004	-,171	,864	,492	2,034
	NL=1	-6,777	5,316	-,034	-1,275	,202	,455	2,199
	PL=1	9,054	9,608	,032	,942	,346	,290	3,454
	PT=1	-11,166	7,899	-,054	-1,414	,158	,223	4,489
	RO=1	6,422	13,953	,010	,460	,645	,730	1,370
	SE=1	-11,036	5,966	-,055	-1,850	,064	,372	2,690
	SI=1	-9,587	7,525	-,030	-1,274	,203	,595	1,682

	SK=1	25,285	8,904	,081	2,840	,005	,399	2,508
	UK=1	1,813	5,275	,009	,344	,731	,476	2,103

a. Dependent Variable: Left-right position (0-100)

SPSS output policy areas pro-anti integration scale

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,221[a]	,049	,026	45,26124	1,946

b. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration position (0-100)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	46,901	9,389		4,995	,000		
	Public opinion on pro-anti integration	31,907	19,770	,140	1,614	,107	,088	11,390
	Decision Making and Harmonisation (INT)	-5,561	2,674	-,054	-2,080	,038	,973	1,028
	Days to next elections (as planned)	-,444	,639	-,044	-,695	,487	,166	6,025
	ELEC_POINT	1,312	1,350	,081	,972	,331	,095	10,581

	Government pro-anti integration position (CMP)	2,102	,805	,092	2,610	,009	,534	1,871
	Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP)	6,838	3,339	,153	2,048	,041	,118	8,490
	Unemployment rate	-1,103	,699	-,082	-1,578	,115	,243	4,111
	Inflation rate	,346	1,242	,012	,279	,780	,353	2,833
	BE=1	10,981	10,252	,053	1,071	,284	,267	3,745
	BU=1	-12,173	19,151	-,022	-,636	,525	,562	1,778
	CY=1	3,598	10,172	,011	,354	,724	,632	1,581
	CZ=1	-15,862	10,632	-,051	-1,492	,136	,562	1,780
	DE=1	-2,002	9,744	-,010	-,205	,837	,285	3,508
	DK=1	5,554	8,935	,026	,622	,534	,365	2,740
	EE=1	-25,460	11,871	-,085	-2,145	,032	,414	2,416
	EL=1	-15,234	13,822	-,072	-1,102	,271	,153	6,557
	ES=1	-9,724	12,795	-,048	-,760	,447	,167	5,977
	FI=1	21,443	8,919	,101	2,404	,016	,376	2,660
	FR=1	2,648	9,352	,013	,283	,777	,306	3,269
	HU=1	-9,043	11,591	-,029	-,780	,435	,473	2,116
	IE=1	-22,477	13,443	-,104	-1,672	,095	,170	5,884
	IT=1	5,728	10,665	,028	,537	,591	,241	4,153
	lt=1	-31,638	13,705	-,108	-2,308	,021	,302	3,308
	LU=1	-10,490	12,071	-,047	-,869	,385	,223	4,485
	LV=1	-23,134	14,982	-,057	-1,544	,123	,487	2,055
	MT=1	-16,532	10,807	-,054	-1,530	,126	,528	1,894
	NL=1	-14,137	11,632	-,069	-1,215	,224	,202	4,940
	PL=1	-14,621	13,572	-,052	-1,077	,282	,279	3,585

	PT=1	-8,742	11,987	-,042	-,729	,466	,200	4,994
	RO=1	-10,176	17,166	-,020	-,593	,553	,584	1,712
	SE=1	18,863	7,900	,091	2,388	,017	,455	2,197
	SI=1	-6,882	10,890	-,022	-,632	,527	,520	1,923
	SK=1	-18,828	13,977	-,060	-1,347	,178	,335	2,986
	UK=1	2,025	7,690	,010	,263	,792	,463	2,159

a. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration position (0-100)

SPSS output model 2 left-right scale

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,199[a]	,039	,028	44,48739	1,905

b. Dependent Variable: Left-right position (0-100)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	-62,216	45,563		-1,365	,172		
	Public opinion on left-right	25,818	8,907	,202	2,899	,004	,068	14,793
	Cultural or Economic Dimension (LR)	-37,908	28,241	-,374	-1,342	,180	,004	237,035

	POLR_PALR	6,525	5,324	,345	1,226	,220	,004	241,327
	Days to next elections (as planned)	3,769	3,041	,382	1,240	,215	,003	289,107
	ELEC_POLR	-,687	,573	-,370	-1,200	,230	,003	289,678
	Government left-right position (CMP)	,150	,100	,041	1,500	,134	,449	2,227
	Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP)	3,196	2,358	,074	1,356	,175	,110	9,107
	Unemployment rate	-2,367	,518	-,182	-4,568	,000	,206	4,853
	Inflation rate	,204	,931	,007	,219	,827	,346	2,890
	BE=1	-7,645	6,283	-,038	-1,217	,224	,339	2,948
	BU=1	4,982	15,284	,007	,326	,744	,655	1,528
	CY=1	-8,140	7,758	-,025	-1,049	,294	,578	1,729
	CZ=1	-7,306	8,325	-,024	-,878	,380	,430	2,327
	DE=1	11,759	5,751	,059	2,045	,041	,391	2,559
	DK=1	-26,023	6,190	-,127	-4,204	,000	,358	2,792
	EE=1	-14,002	9,008	-,046	-1,554	,120	,378	2,646
	EL=1	-21,378	10,056	-,104	-2,126	,034	,138	7,230
	ES=1	20,571	8,273	,103	2,487	,013	,190	5,265
	FI=1	-10,379	7,364	-,050	-1,409	,159	,256	3,903
	FR=1	11,040	6,593	,056	1,674	,094	,289	3,461
	HU=1	-6,435	8,199	-,021	-,785	,433	,478	2,094
	IE=1	-14,473	7,642	-,069	-1,894	,058	,246	4,069
	IT=1	-3,444	5,824	-,017	-,591	,554	,388	2,579
	lt=1	-5,674	9,016	-,019	-,629	,529	,356	2,807
	LU=1	-11,906	5,949	-,054	-2,001	,045	,450	2,222

	LV=1	-32,167	11,660	-,092	-2,759	,006	,296	3,377
	MT=1	-1,187	8,210	-,004	-,145	,885	,492	2,035
	NL=1	-6,730	5,316	-,034	-1,266	,206	,455	2,200
	PL=1	8,772	9,610	,031	,913	,361	,289	3,456
	PT=1	-11,207	7,898	-,054	-1,419	,156	,223	4,489
	RO=1	6,120	13,954	,009	,439	,661	,729	1,371
	SE=1	-11,098	5,966	-,055	-1,860	,063	,372	2,690
	SI=1	-9,546	7,525	-,030	-1,269	,205	,595	1,682
	SK=1	24,928	8,908	,080	2,799	,005	,398	2,510
	UK=1	1,821	5,274	,009	,345	,730	,476	2,103

a. Dependent Variable: Left-right position (0-100)

SPSS output model 2 pro-anti integration scale

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,226[a]	,051	,028	45,21689	1,955

b. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration position (0-100)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	39,228	10,165		3,859	,000		

	Public opinion on pro-anti integration	51,869	22,223	,227	2,334	,020	,069	14,420
	Decision Making and Harmonisation (INT)	5,762	6,366	,056	,905	,366	,171	5,834
	POINT_PAINT	-26,742	13,647	-,150	-1,960	,050	,112	8,948
	Days to next elections (as planned)	-,487	,639	-,048	-,763	,445	,166	6,032
	ELEC_POINT	1,423	1,350	,088	1,054	,292	,094	10,599
	Government pro-anti integration position (CMP)	2,074	,805	,090	2,577	,010	,534	1,872
	Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP)	7,297	3,344	,163	2,182	,029	,117	8,532
	Unemployment rate	-1,103	,698	-,082	-1,580	,114	,243	4,111
	Inflation rate	,292	1,241	,010	,235	,814	,353	2,834
	BE=1	10,440	10,246	,051	1,019	,308	,267	3,748
	BU=1	-13,196	19,139	-,024	-,689	,491	,562	1,780
	CY=1	3,437	10,162	,011	,338	,735	,632	1,581
	CZ=1	-16,425	10,626	-,053	-1,546	,122	,561	1,782
	DE=1	-2,631	9,740	-,013	-,270	,787	,285	3,512
	DK=1	4,824	8,934	,023	,540	,589	,364	2,745
	EE=1	-26,600	11,874	-,089	-2,240	,025	,413	2,422
	EL=1	-16,738	13,830	-,080	-1,210	,226	,152	6,577
	ES=1	-10,730	12,793	-,053	-,839	,402	,167	5,986
	FI=1	21,024	8,912	,099	2,359	,018	,376	2,661
	FR=1	2,191	9,345	,011	,234	,815	,306	3,271
	HU=1	-9,201	11,580	-,030	-,795	,427	,473	2,116

	IE=1	-23,970	13,452	-,111	-1,782	,075	,169	5,903
	IT=1	5,369	10,656	,026	,504	,614	,241	4,154
	It=1	-33,393	13,721	-,114	-2,434	,015	,301	3,322
	LU=1	-11,240	12,065	-,051	-,932	,352	,223	4,490
	LV=1	-24,406	14,981	-,060	-1,629	,104	,486	2,059
	MT=1	-17,103	10,800	-,056	-1,584	,113	,528	1,895
	NL=1	-14,639	11,624	-,072	-1,259	,208	,202	4,942
	PL=1	-16,256	13,585	-,058	-1,197	,232	,278	3,598
	PT=1	-10,122	11,996	-,048	-,844	,399	,200	5,011
	RO=1	-11,890	17,172	-,023	-,692	,489	,583	1,717
	SE=1	18,503	7,894	,089	2,344	,019	,455	2,198
	SI=1	-7,567	10,885	-,025	-,695	,487	,519	1,925
	SK=1	-19,796	13,972	-,063	-1,417	,157	,335	2,989
	UK=1	1,854	7,683	,009	,241	,809	,463	2,159

a. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration position (0-100)

SPSS output decision making procedure left-right scale

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,202[a]	,041	,029	44,46046	1,901

b. Dependent Variable: Left-right position (0-100)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	-77,305	40,597		-1,904	,057		
	Public opinion on left-right	28,542	7,988	,223	3,573	,000	,084	11,910
	Cultural or Economic Dimension (LR)	-3,329	1,847	-,033	-1,803	,072	,985	1,015
	Decision Making Procedure	-32,009	29,188	-,313	-1,097	,273	,004	248,511
	DMP_POLR	6,839	5,525	,354	1,238	,216	,004	249,535
	Days to next elections (as planned)	4,099	3,051	,415	1,344	,179	,003	291,495
	ELEC_POLR	-,752	,575	-,405	-1,308	,191	,003	292,125
	Government left-right position (CMP)	,138	,100	,037	1,373	,170	,447	2,239
	Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP)	2,847	2,362	,066	1,205	,228	,109	9,151
	Unemployment rate	-2,333	,518	-,180	-4,502	,000	,206	4,857
	Inflation rate	-,134	,941	-,004	-,143	,886	,338	2,958
	BE=1	-8,194	6,285	-,041	-1,304	,192	,339	2,954
	BU=1	6,944	15,298	,010	,454	,650	,653	1,532
	CY=1	-6,830	7,776	-,021	-,878	,380	,575	1,739
	CZ=1	-5,306	8,366	-,018	-,634	,526	,425	2,352
	DE=1	11,085	5,763	,056	1,924	,055	,389	2,573
	DK=1	-25,789	6,187	-,126	-4,168	,000	,358	2,793
	EE=1	-11,792	9,046	-,039	-1,304	,192	,374	2,671
	EL=1	-20,083	10,061	-,097	-1,996	,046	,138	7,246
	ES=1	20,352	8,263	,102	2,463	,014	,190	5,259

	FI=1	-10,685	7,364	-,052	-1,451	,147	,256	3,907
	FR=1	10,227	6,600	,052	1,549	,121	,288	3,473
	HU=1	-4,557	8,226	-,015	-,554	,580	,474	2,111
	IE=1	-13,464	7,651	-,064	-1,760	,079	,245	4,084
	IT=1	-3,647	5,826	-,018	-,626	,531	,387	2,583
	lt=1	-3,998	9,036	-,013	-,442	,658	,354	2,823
	LU=1	-11,952	5,945	-,054	-2,010	,044	,450	2,222
	LV=1	-27,649	11,846	-,079	-2,334	,020	,287	3,490
	MT=1	-,196	8,218	-,001	-,024	,981	,490	2,041
	NL=1	-7,164	5,315	-,036	-1,348	,178	,454	2,202
	PL=1	10,122	9,611	,035	1,053	,292	,289	3,461
	PT=1	-10,665	7,898	-,052	-1,350	,177	,223	4,494
	RO=1	6,633	13,952	,010	,475	,635	,729	1,372
	SE=1	-11,684	5,969	-,058	-1,957	,050	,371	2,696
	SI=1	-8,274	7,540	-,026	-1,097	,273	,592	1,690
	SK=1	26,035	8,913	,084	2,921	,004	,397	2,517
	UK=1	1,464	5,274	,007	,278	,781	,475	2,105

a. Dependent Variable: Left-right position (0-100)

SPSS output decision making procedure pro-anti integration scale

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,266[a]	,071	,047	44,77002	1,970

b. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration position (0-100)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	41,431	9,389		4,413	,000		
	Public opinion on pro-anti integration	42,728	20,050	,187	2,131	,033	,084	11,973
	Decision Making and Harmonisation (INT)	-7,860	2,682	-,076	-2,931	,003	,947	1,056
	Decision Making Procedure	29,493	5,881	,302	5,015	,000	,178	5,631
	DMP_POINT	-39,339	12,212	-,204	-3,221	,001	,160	6,257
	Days to next elections (as planned)	-,620	,634	-,061	-,978	,328	,165	6,062
	ELEC_POINT	1,600	1,339	,099	1,195	,232	,094	10,640
	Government pro-anti integration position (CMP)	1,527	,803	,067	1,902	,057	,526	1,900
	Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP)	7,461	3,306	,167	2,257	,024	,118	8,504
	Unemployment rate	-,752	,695	-,056	-1,083	,279	,241	4,148
	Inflation rate	-,018	1,232	-,001	-,015	,988	,351	2,850
	BE=1	9,558	10,154	,046	,941	,347	,266	3,755
	BU=1	-13,663	18,969	-,024	-,720	,471	,561	1,783
	CY=1	5,260	10,069	,017	,522	,601	,631	1,584

	CZ=1	-15,855	10,526	-,051	-1,506	,132	,561	1,784
	DE=1	-4,939	9,656	-,024	-,512	,609	,284	3,520
	DK=1	3,277	8,854	,016	,370	,711	,364	2,750
	EE=1	-23,770	11,759	-,080	-2,021	,043	,413	2,423
	EL=1	-18,989	13,701	-,090	-1,386	,166	,152	6,585
	ES=1	-12,535	12,674	-,061	-,989	,323	,167	5,994
	FI=1	17,515	8,848	,082	1,980	,048	,374	2,675
	FR=1	1,360	9,254	,007	,147	,883	,306	3,272
	HU=1	-8,851	11,480	-,028	-,771	,441	,471	2,122
	IE=1	-24,278	13,332	-,112	-1,821	,069	,169	5,914
	IT=1	3,675	10,561	,018	,348	,728	,240	4,162
	lt=1	-33,605	13,586	-,114	-2,473	,013	,301	3,322
	LU=1	-11,303	11,975	-,051	-,944	,345	,222	4,512
	LV=1	-21,527	14,828	-,053	-1,452	,147	,486	2,057
	MT=1	-17,025	10,692	-,056	-1,592	,112	,528	1,895
	NL=1	-13,876	11,526	-,068	-1,204	,229	,202	4,957
	PL=1	-18,648	13,448	-,067	-1,387	,166	,278	3,597
	PT=1	-11,343	11,876	-,054	-,955	,340	,200	5,010
	RO=1	-11,180	16,984	-,022	-,658	,510	,584	1,713
	SE=1	16,438	7,825	,079	2,101	,036	,454	2,203
	SI=1	-6,656	10,786	-,022	-,617	,537	,519	1,928
	SK=1	-20,229	13,843	-,064	-1,461	,144	,334	2,994
	UK=1	,929	7,609	,005	,122	,903	,463	2,160

a. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration position (0-100)

SPSS output salience left-right scale

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,209[a]	,044	,032	44,42692	1,908

b. Dependent Variable: Left-right position (0-100)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	-113,495	48,520		-2,339	,019		
	Public opinion on left-right	36,390	9,389	,284	3,876	,000	,061	16,380
	Cultural or Economic Dimension (LR)	-2,946	1,853	-,029	-1,590	,112	,982	1,018
	Decision Making Procedure	4,022	1,902	,039	2,115	,035	,948	1,054
	Salience of position to government	,533	,507	,292	1,050	,294	,004	234,876
	Public Opinion Left-right * Salience	-,119	,095	-,346	-1,256	,209	,004	231,107
	Days to next elections (as planned)	3,562	3,046	,361	1,169	,242	,003	289,329
	ELEC_POLR	-,651	,574	-,350	-1,134	,257	,003	289,722

	Government left-right position (CMP)	,124	,100	,033	1,234	,217	,447	2,236
	Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP)	3,155	2,367	,073	1,333	,183	,109	9,159
	Unemployment rate	-2,350	,518	-,181	-4,535	,000	,206	4,844
	Inflation rate	-,009	,936	,000	-,010	,992	,342	2,925
	BE=1	-8,194	6,287	-,041	-1,303	,193	,340	2,940
	BU=1	4,060	15,339	,006	,265	,791	,648	1,543
	CY=1	-8,824	7,781	-,027	-1,134	,257	,573	1,744
	CZ=1	-7,093	8,350	-,024	-,849	,396	,426	2,347
	DE=1	11,987	5,751	,061	2,084	,037	,390	2,565
	DK=1	-25,902	6,198	-,126	-4,179	,000	,359	2,789
	EE=1	-13,775	9,054	-,045	-1,521	,128	,373	2,680
	EL=1	-21,020	10,117	-,101	-2,078	,038	,139	7,196
	ES=1	20,352	8,284	,102	2,457	,014	,190	5,262
	FI=1	-10,706	7,372	-,052	-1,452	,147	,255	3,920
	FR=1	10,370	6,615	,053	1,568	,117	,288	3,473
	HU=1	-6,647	8,240	-,021	-,807	,420	,471	2,121
	IE=1	-14,070	7,671	-,067	-1,834	,067	,245	4,083
	IT=1	-2,741	5,829	-,014	-,470	,638	,388	2,574
	lt=1	-5,795	9,060	-,020	-,640	,522	,352	2,842
	LU=1	-12,192	5,985	-,055	-2,037	,042	,453	2,206
	LV=1	-31,793	11,748	-,091	-2,706	,007	,291	3,437
	MT=1	-,910	8,306	-,003	-,110	,913	,495	2,021
	NL=1	-6,783	5,312	-,034	-1,277	,202	,454	2,201
	PL=1	9,016	9,639	,031	,935	,350	,291	3,441

	PT=1	-11,644	7,909	-,057	-1,472	,141	,222	4,512
	RO=1	5,258	13,954	,008	,377	,706	,728	1,375
	SE=1	-11,355	5,967	-,057	-1,903	,057	,371	2,697
	SI=1	-10,819	7,602	-,034	-1,423	,155	,591	1,693
	SK=1	25,319	8,936	,082	2,833	,005	,395	2,533
	UK=1	2,041	5,270	,010	,387	,699	,475	2,104

a. Dependent Variable: Left-right position (0-100)

SPSS output salience pro-anti integration scale

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,264[a]	,070	,046	44,69403	1,944

b. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration position (0-100)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	45,880	11,103		4,132	,000		
	Public opinion on pro-anti integration	51,443	23,741	,226	2,167	,030	,060	16,630

	Decision Making and Harmonisation (INT)	-6,459	2,700	-,063	-2,392	,017	,940	1,064
	Decision Making Procedure	12,988	2,631	,134	4,936	,000	,892	1,121
	Salience of position to government	-,024	,114	-,013	-,210	,833	,160	6,244
	Public Opinion Integration * Salience	-,329	,233	-,117	-1,413	,158	,095	10,497
	Days to next elections (as planned)	-,495	,634	-,049	-,781	,435	,167	5,995
	ELEC_POINT	1,222	1,345	,076	,909	,363	,095	10,564
	Government pro-anti integration position (CMP)	1,638	,805	,072	2,036	,042	,526	1,901
	Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP)	7,128	3,338	,160	2,136	,033	,116	8,614
	Unemployment rate	-,836	,703	-,062	-1,189	,235	,238	4,208
	Inflation rate	,189	1,242	,007	,152	,879	,356	2,810
	BE=1	9,711	10,205	,047	,952	,341	,266	3,756
	BU=1	-14,309	19,703	-,025	-,726	,468	,575	1,738
	CY=1	1,914	10,124	,006	,189	,850	,623	1,606
	CZ=1	-16,956	10,658	-,054	-1,591	,112	,562	1,780
	DE=1	-3,074	9,703	-,015	-,317	,751	,284	3,522
	DK=1	4,436	8,883	,021	,499	,618	,365	2,739
	EE=1	-26,904	11,910	-,089	-2,259	,024	,424	2,358
	EL=1	-19,097	13,788	-,092	-1,385	,166	,150	6,685
	ES=1	-10,696	12,749	-,053	-,839	,402	,166	6,008
	FI=1	17,591	8,924	,083	1,971	,049	,371	2,693

	FR=1	3,495	9,348	,017	,374	,709	,302	3,307
	HU=1	-9,562	11,570	-,031	-,826	,409	,477	2,097
	IE=1	-25,807	13,481	-,120	-1,914	,056	,167	5,980
	IT=1	5,358	10,645	,026	,503	,615	,239	4,188
	lt=1	-33,924	13,687	-,115	-2,478	,013	,304	3,293
	LU=1	-12,290	12,063	-,055	-1,019	,308	,221	4,524
	LV=1	-24,605	14,899	-,061	-1,651	,099	,480	2,084
	MT=1	-18,299	10,845	-,060	-1,687	,092	,527	1,899
	NL=1	-14,423	11,594	-,071	-1,244	,214	,201	4,968
	PL=1	-16,914	13,609	-,060	-1,243	,214	,284	3,519
	PT=1	-10,865	11,981	-,052	-,907	,365	,198	5,048
	RO=1	-11,317	17,514	-,021	-,646	,518	,597	1,676
	SE=1	17,264	7,860	,084	2,196	,028	,449	2,228
	SI=1	-8,822	10,916	-,029	-,808	,419	,520	1,924
	SK=1	-20,802	14,034	-,066	-1,482	,139	,334	2,992
	UK=1	1,737	7,699	,009	,226	,821	,451	2,217

a. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration position (0-100)

Appendix 2: SPSS output logistic regression analyses

SPSS output policy areas left-right scale

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,183[a]	,034	,022	,493	1,915

b. Dependent Variable: Left-right scale position (binary)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	-,777	,443		-1,756	,079		
	Public opinion on left-right	,291	,087	,206	3,336	,001	,087	11,542
	Cultural or Economic Dimension (LR)	-,050	,020	-,045	-2,456	,014	,986	1,014
	Days to next elections (as planned)	,048	,034	,438	1,417	,156	,003	289,091
	ELEC_POLR	-,009	,006	-,429	-1,386	,166	,003	289,670
	Government left-right position (CMP)	,002	,001	,044	1,606	,108	,450	2,223
	Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP)	,031	,026	,065	1,187	,235	,110	9,105

	Unemployment rate	-,024	,006	-,167	-4,185	,000	,207	4,825
	Inflation rate	,004	,010	,011	,361	,718	,346	2,890
	BE=1	-,057	,070	-,026	-,823	,410	,340	2,944
	BU=1	,067	,169	,009	,396	,692	,655	1,528
	CY=1	-,057	,086	-,016	-,661	,509	,578	1,729
	CZ=1	-,042	,092	-,013	-,454	,650	,430	2,327
	DE=1	,118	,064	,054	1,859	,063	,391	2,558
	DK=1	-,224	,069	-,099	-3,268	,001	,358	2,791
	EE=1	-,108	,100	-,032	-1,087	,277	,378	2,646
	EL=1	-,175	,111	-,077	-1,570	,116	,138	7,229
	ES=1	,193	,092	,088	2,113	,035	,190	5,250
	FI=1	-,072	,082	-,032	-,885	,376	,256	3,902
	FR=1	,135	,073	,062	1,849	,065	,290	3,452
	HU=1	-,052	,091	-,015	-,577	,564	,478	2,094
	IE=1	-,086	,085	-,037	-1,012	,311	,246	4,069
	IT=1	-,036	,064	-,016	-,554	,580	,388	2,577
	lt=1	-,023	,100	-,007	-,234	,815	,356	2,807
	LU=1	-,086	,066	-,035	-1,303	,193	,450	2,222
	LV=1	-,303	,129	-,078	-2,343	,019	,296	3,374
	MT=1	,027	,091	,008	,302	,763	,492	2,034
	NL=1	-,054	,059	-,024	-,909	,363	,455	2,199
	PL=1	,118	,106	,038	1,112	,266	,290	3,454
	PT=1	-,101	,087	-,044	-1,151	,250	,223	4,489
	RO=1	,102	,155	,014	,663	,507	,730	1,370
	SE=1	-,087	,066	-,039	-1,314	,189	,372	2,690
	SI=1	-,075	,083	-,021	-,896	,371	,595	1,682

	SK=1	,249	,099	,073	2,528	,012	,399	2,508
	UK=1	,054	,058	,024	,923	,356	,476	2,103

a. Dependent Variable: Left-right scale position (binary)

SPSS output policy areas pro-anti integration scale

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,217[a]	,047	,025	,491	1,949

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	,555	,102		5,448	,000		
	Public opinion on pro-anti integration	,310	,214	,125	1,447	,148	,088	11,390
	Decision Making and Harmonisation (INT)	-,069	,029	-,062	-2,383	,017	,973	1,028
	Days to next elections (as planned)	-,011	,007	-,104	-1,656	,098	,166	6,025
	ELEC_POINT	,023	,015	,130	1,552	,121	,095	10,581
	Government pro-anti integration position (CMP)	,025	,009	,101	2,865	,004	,534	1,871

	Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP)	,055	,036	,114	1,524	,128	,118	8,490
	Unemployment rate	-,008	,008	-,057	-1,093	,275	,243	4,111
	Inflation rate	-,010	,013	-,031	-,707	,480	,353	2,833
	BE=1	,103	,111	,046	,929	,353	,267	3,745
	BU=1	-,102	,208	-,017	-,492	,623	,562	1,778
	CY=1	,053	,110	,016	,484	,629	,632	1,581
	CZ=1	-,181	,115	-,054	-1,568	,117	,562	1,780
	DE=1	-,066	,106	-,030	-,622	,534	,285	3,508
	DK=1	,067	,097	,029	,694	,488	,365	2,740
	EE=1	-,255	,129	-,079	-1,979	,048	,414	2,416
	EL=1	-,122	,150	-,054	-,816	,415	,153	6,557
	ES=1	-,138	,139	-,062	-,992	,321	,167	5,977
	FI=1	,178	,097	,077	1,844	,065	,376	2,660
	FR=1	-,042	,101	-,019	-,415	,679	,306	3,269
	HU=1	-,071	,126	-,021	-,563	,573	,473	2,116
	IE=1	-,231	,146	-,099	-1,587	,113	,170	5,884
	IT=1	,024	,116	,011	,210	,833	,241	4,153
	lt=1	-,297	,149	-,093	-1,998	,046	,302	3,308
	LU=1	-,102	,131	-,042	-,780	,436	,223	4,485
	LV=1	-,135	,162	-,031	-,831	,406	,487	2,055
	MT=1	-,163	,117	-,049	-1,387	,166	,528	1,894
	NL=1	-,179	,126	-,081	-1,416	,157	,202	4,940
	PL=1	-,183	,147	-,060	-1,242	,214	,279	3,585
	PT=1	-,082	,130	-,036	-,634	,526	,200	4,994
	RO=1	-,150	,186	-,027	-,808	,419	,584	1,712

	SE=1	,144	,086	,064	1,679	,093	,455	2,197
	SI=1	-,079	,118	-,024	-,666	,506	,520	1,923
	SK=1	-,208	,152	-,061	-1,372	,170	,335	2,986
	UK=1	,030	,083	,013	,355	,723	,463	2,159

a. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration scale position (binary)

SPSS output model 2 left-right scale

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,183[a]	,034	,022	,493	1,916

b. Dependent Variable: Left-right scale position (binary)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	-,630	,505		-1,248	,212		
	Public opinion on left-right	,263	,099	,186	2,663	,008	,068	14,793
	Cultural or Economic Dimension (LR)	-,239	,313	-,214	-,765	,444	,004	237,035
	POLR_PALR	,036	,059	,171	,606	,545	,004	241,327

	Days to next elections (as planned)	,048	,034	,436	1,413	,158	,003	289,107
	ELEC_POLR	-,009	,006	-,428	-1,383	,167	,003	289,678
	Government left-right position (CMP)	,002	,001	,043	1,580	,114	,449	2,227
	Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP)	,031	,026	,065	1,179	,239	,110	9,107
	Unemployment rate	-,024	,006	-,165	-4,126	,000	,206	4,853
	Inflation rate	,004	,010	,011	,364	,716	,346	2,890
	BE=1	-,059	,070	-,026	-,845	,398	,339	2,948
	BU=1	,067	,169	,009	,396	,692	,655	1,528
	CY=1	-,056	,086	-,016	-,653	,514	,578	1,729
	CZ=1	-,042	,092	-,013	-,452	,651	,430	2,327
	DE=1	,117	,064	,054	1,844	,065	,391	2,559
	DK=1	-,223	,069	-,099	-3,255	,001	,358	2,792
	EE=1	-,109	,100	-,032	-1,089	,276	,378	2,646
	EL=1	-,176	,111	-,077	-1,577	,115	,138	7,230
	ES=1	,190	,092	,087	2,078	,038	,190	5,265
	FI=1	-,073	,082	-,032	-,889	,374	,256	3,903
	FR=1	,133	,073	,061	1,816	,070	,289	3,461
	HU=1	-,053	,091	-,015	-,581	,561	,478	2,094
	IE=1	-,085	,085	-,037	-1,004	,315	,246	4,069
	IT=1	-,037	,065	-,017	-,568	,570	,388	2,579
	lt=1	-,024	,100	-,007	-,236	,814	,356	2,807
	LU=1	-,086	,066	-,035	-1,309	,191	,450	2,222
	LV=1	-,301	,129	-,078	-2,327	,020	,296	3,377

	MT=1	,029	,091	,008	,315	,753	,492	2,035
	NL=1	-,053	,059	-,024	-,904	,366	,455	2,200
	PL=1	,117	,106	,037	1,097	,273	,289	3,456
	PT=1	-,101	,088	-,044	-1,153	,249	,223	4,489
	RO=1	,101	,155	,014	,652	,514	,729	1,371
	SE=1	-,087	,066	-,039	-1,319	,187	,372	2,690
	SI=1	-,074	,083	-,021	-,893	,372	,595	1,682
	SK=1	,247	,099	,072	2,507	,012	,398	2,510
	UK=1	,054	,058	,024	,924	,356	,476	2,103

a. Dependent Variable: Left-right scale position (binary)

SPSS output model 2 pro-anti integration scale

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,221[a]	,049	,026	,490	1,955

b. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration scale position (binary)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	,487	,110		4,419	,000		

	Public opinion on pro-anti integration	,486	,241	,196	2,014	,044	,069	14,420
	Decision Making and Harmonisation (INT)	,030	,069	,027	,439	,660	,171	5,834
	POINT_PAINT	-,235	,148	-,122	-1,586	,113	,112	8,948
	Days to next elections (as planned)	-,012	,007	-,108	-1,711	,087	,166	6,032
	ELEC_POINT	,024	,015	,135	1,618	,106	,094	10,599
	Government pro-anti integration position (CMP)	,025	,009	,100	2,839	,005	,534	1,872
	Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP)	,059	,036	,122	1,632	,103	,117	8,532
	Unemployment rate	-,008	,008	-,057	-1,094	,274	,243	4,111
	Inflation rate	-,010	,013	-,032	-,743	,458	,353	2,834
	BE=1	,099	,111	,044	,887	,375	,267	3,748
	BU=1	-,111	,208	-,018	-,535	,593	,562	1,780
	CY=1	,052	,110	,015	,471	,638	,632	1,581
	CZ=1	-,186	,115	-,055	-1,611	,107	,561	1,782
	DE=1	-,071	,106	-,032	-,674	,500	,285	3,512
	DK=1	,061	,097	,027	,628	,530	,364	2,745
	EE=1	-,265	,129	-,082	-2,055	,040	,413	2,422
	EL=1	-,135	,150	-,059	-,903	,367	,152	6,577
	ES=1	-,146	,139	-,066	-1,055	,291	,167	5,986
	FI=1	,175	,097	,076	1,806	,071	,376	2,661
	FR=1	-,046	,101	-,021	-,454	,650	,306	3,271
	HU=1	-,072	,126	-,021	-,575	,566	,473	2,116

	IE=1	-,244	,146	-,104	-1,675	,094	,169	5,903
	IT=1	,021	,116	,010	,183	,855	,241	4,154
	It=1	-,312	,149	-,098	-2,098	,036	,301	3,322
	LU=1	-,109	,131	-,045	-,830	,407	,223	4,490
	LV=1	-,146	,162	-,033	-,900	,368	,486	2,059
	MT=1	-,168	,117	-,051	-1,430	,153	,528	1,895
	NL=1	-,183	,126	-,083	-1,452	,147	,202	4,942
	PL=1	-,197	,147	-,065	-1,338	,181	,278	3,598
	PT=1	-,095	,130	-,042	-,727	,468	,200	5,011
	RO=1	-,165	,186	-,030	-,888	,375	,583	1,717
	SE=1	,141	,086	,062	1,643	,101	,455	2,198
	SI=1	-,085	,118	-,026	-,717	,474	,519	1,925
	SK=1	-,216	,152	-,063	-1,428	,153	,335	2,989
	UK=1	,028	,083	,013	,337	,736	,463	2,159

a. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration scale position (binary)

SPSS output decision making procedure left-right scale

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,189[a]	,036	,024	,492	1,915

b. Dependent Variable: Left-right scale position (binary)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	-,636	,450		-1,413	,158		
	Public opinion on left-right	,262	,088	,186	2,963	,003	,084	11,910
	Cultural or Economic Dimension (LR)	-,050	,020	-,044	-2,430	,015	,985	1,015
	Decision Making Procedure	-,403	,323	-,357	-1,247	,213	,004	248,511
	DMP_POLR	,085	,061	,397	1,386	,166	,004	249,535
	Days to next elections (as planned)	,052	,034	,473	1,526	,127	,003	291,495
	ELEC_POLR	-,010	,006	-,466	-1,501	,134	,003	292,125
	Government left-right position (CMP)	,002	,001	,039	1,431	,153	,447	2,239
	Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP)	,027	,026	,056	1,014	,311	,109	9,151
	Unemployment rate	-,023	,006	-,160	-4,005	,000	,206	4,857
	Inflation rate	-9,843E-5	,010	,000	-,009	,992	,338	2,958
	BE=1	-,067	,070	-,030	-,961	,336	,339	2,954
	BU=1	,090	,169	,012	,530	,596	,653	1,532
	CY=1	-,040	,086	-,011	-,470	,639	,575	1,739
	CZ=1	-,018	,093	-,006	-,199	,842	,425	2,352
	DE=1	,108	,064	,049	1,699	,089	,389	2,573
	DK=1	-,220	,069	-,097	-3,208	,001	,358	2,793

	EE=1	-,084	,100	-,025	-,838	,402	,374	2,671
	EL=1	-,162	,111	-,071	-1,451	,147	,138	7,246
	ES=1	,185	,092	,084	2,017	,044	,190	5,259
	FI=1	-,077	,082	-,034	-,941	,347	,256	3,907
	FR=1	,121	,073	,056	1,653	,098	,288	3,473
	HU=1	-,032	,091	-,009	-,352	,725	,474	2,111
	IE=1	-,073	,085	-,032	-,859	,391	,245	4,084
	IT=1	-,040	,065	-,018	-,626	,531	,387	2,583
	lt=1	-,005	,100	-,001	-,047	,962	,354	2,823
	LU=1	-,087	,066	-,036	-1,324	,186	,450	2,222
	LV=1	-,246	,131	-,064	-1,876	,061	,287	3,490
	MT=1	,041	,091	,012	,449	,653	,490	2,041
	NL=1	-,058	,059	-,027	-,985	,325	,454	2,202
	PL=1	,130	,106	,041	1,224	,221	,289	3,461
	PT=1	-,095	,087	-,042	-1,083	,279	,223	4,494
	RO=1	,104	,155	,014	,674	,501	,729	1,372
	SE=1	-,094	,066	-,043	-1,427	,154	,371	2,696
	SI=1	-,060	,084	-,017	-,714	,475	,592	1,690
	SK=1	,257	,099	,075	2,604	,009	,397	2,517
	UK=1	,050	,058	,022	,854	,393	,475	2,105

a. Dependent Variable: Left-right scale position (binary)

SPSS output decision making procedure pro-anti integration scale

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,255[a]	,065	,042	,486	1,970

b. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration scale position (binary)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	,504	,102		4,943	,000		
	Public opinion on pro-anti integration	,404	,218	,163	1,854	,064	,084	11,973
	Decision Making and Harmonisation (INT)	-,092	,029	-,083	-3,162	,002	,947	1,056
	Decision Making Procedure	,279	,064	,264	4,367	,000	,178	5,631
	DMP_POINT	-,354	,133	-,170	-2,666	,008	,160	6,257
	Days to next elections (as planned)	-,013	,007	-,119	-1,898	,058	,165	6,062
	ELEC_POINT	,025	,015	,144	1,736	,083	,094	10,640
	Government pro-anti integration position (CMP)	,019	,009	,078	2,221	,027	,526	1,900
	Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP)	,061	,036	,126	1,699	,090	,118	8,504
	Unemployment rate	-,005	,008	-,033	-,634	,526	,241	4,148
	Inflation rate	-,013	,013	-,043	-,993	,321	,351	2,850

	BE=1	,091	,110	,041	,822	,411	,266	3,755
	BU=1	-,114	,206	-,019	-,552	,581	,561	1,783
	CY=1	,070	,109	,021	,643	,521	,631	1,584
	CZ=1	-,179	,114	-,053	-1,568	,117	,561	1,784
	DE=1	-,094	,105	-,043	-,892	,373	,284	3,520
	DK=1	,046	,096	,020	,479	,632	,364	2,750
	EE=1	-,236	,128	-,073	-1,851	,064	,413	2,423
	EL=1	-,157	,149	-,069	-1,055	,291	,152	6,585
	ES=1	-,164	,138	-,074	-1,188	,235	,167	5,994
	FI=1	,140	,096	,061	1,457	,145	,374	2,675
	FR=1	-,054	,101	-,025	-,538	,591	,306	3,272
	HU=1	-,067	,125	-,020	-,539	,590	,471	2,122
	IE=1	-,246	,145	-,105	-1,699	,090	,169	5,914
	IT=1	,005	,115	,002	,047	,963	,240	4,162
	lt=1	-,314	,148	-,099	-2,124	,034	,301	3,322
	LU=1	-,107	,130	-,045	-,825	,410	,222	4,512
	LV=1	-,118	,161	-,027	-,733	,464	,486	2,057
	MT=1	-,167	,116	-,050	-1,435	,152	,528	1,895
	NL=1	-,174	,125	-,079	-1,389	,165	,202	4,957
	PL=1	-,221	,146	-,073	-1,512	,131	,278	3,597
	PT=1	-,106	,129	-,047	-,824	,410	,200	5,010
	RO=1	-,159	,185	-,029	-,863	,388	,584	1,713
	SE=1	,120	,085	,053	1,410	,159	,454	2,203
	SI=1	-,075	,117	-,023	-,638	,524	,519	1,928
	SK=1	-,220	,150	-,064	-1,460	,145	,334	2,994
	UK=1	,019	,083	,009	,229	,819	,463	2,160

a. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration scale position (binary)

SPSS output salience left-right scale

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,200[a]	,040	,028	,491	1,920

a. Predictors: (Constant), UK=1, Cultural or Economic Dimension (LR), BU=1, RO=1, LV=1, SI=1, SK=1, MT=1, CY=1, HU=1, EE=1, CZ=1, lt=1, PL=1, LU=1, IE=1, Decision Making Procedure, EL=1, FI=1, Public Opinion Left-right * Salience, PT=1, DK=1, BE=1, ELEC_POLR, SE=1, IT=1, NL=1, DE=1, ES=1, Government left-right position (CMP), FR=1, Inflation rate, Unemployment rate, Public opinion on left-right, Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP), Salience of position to government, Days to next elections (as planned)

b. Dependent Variable: Left-right scale position (binary)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	-,897	,537		-1,672	,095		
	Public opinion on left-right	,326	,104	,231	3,143	,002	,061	16,380
	Cultural or Economic Dimension (LR)	-,045	,020	-,041	-2,217	,027	,982	1,018
	Decision Making Procedure	,044	,021	,039	2,071	,038	,948	1,054

	Salience of position to government	,003	,006	,130	,468	,640	,004	234,876
	Public Opinion Left-right * Salience	-,001	,001	-,199	-,721	,471	,004	231,107
	Days to next elections (as planned)	,044	,034	,405	1,311	,190	,003	289,329
	ELEC_POLR	-,008	,006	-,397	-1,284	,199	,003	289,722
	Government left-right position (CMP)	,001	,001	,035	1,300	,194	,447	2,236
	Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP)	,030	,026	,063	1,152	,249	,109	9,159
	Unemployment rate	-,023	,006	-,161	-4,023	,000	,206	4,844
	Inflation rate	,001	,010	,003	,109	,913	,342	2,925
	BE=1	-,072	,070	-,032	-1,037	,300	,340	2,940
	BU=1	,049	,170	,007	,289	,773	,648	1,543
	CY=1	-,070	,086	-,020	-,815	,415	,573	1,744
	CZ=1	-,047	,092	-,014	-,510	,610	,426	2,347
	DE=1	,121	,064	,055	1,901	,057	,390	2,565
	DK=1	-,226	,069	-,100	-3,292	,001	,359	2,789
	EE=1	-,114	,100	-,034	-1,134	,257	,373	2,680
	EL=1	-,176	,112	-,077	-1,571	,116	,139	7,196
	ES=1	,189	,092	,086	2,068	,039	,190	5,262
	FI=1	-,084	,082	-,037	-1,031	,302	,255	3,920
	FR=1	,129	,073	,060	1,760	,079	,288	3,473
	HU=1	-,061	,091	-,018	-,670	,503	,471	2,121
	IE=1	-,085	,085	-,037	-,998	,318	,245	4,083

	IT=1	-,032	,064	-,014	-,490	,624	,388	2,574
	It=1	-,031	,100	-,010	-,313	,754	,352	2,842
	LU=1	-,092	,066	-,037	-1,387	,166	,453	2,206
	LV=1	-,302	,130	-,078	-2,323	,020	,291	3,437
	MT=1	,022	,092	,006	,242	,809	,495	2,021
	NL=1	-,054	,059	-,025	-,914	,361	,454	2,201
	PL=1	,110	,107	,035	1,029	,303	,291	3,441
	PT=1	-,107	,087	-,047	-1,225	,221	,222	4,512
	RO=1	,083	,154	,011	,540	,589	,728	1,375
	SE=1	-,094	,066	-,043	-1,431	,153	,371	2,697
	SI=1	-,102	,084	-,029	-1,208	,227	,591	1,693
	SK=1	,244	,099	,071	2,471	,014	,395	2,533
	UK=1	,057	,058	,026	,980	,327	,475	2,104

a. Dependent Variable: Left-right scale position (binary)

SPSS output salience pro-anti integration scale

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,257[a]	,066	,042	,485	1,961

b. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration scale position (binary)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	,501	,121		4,151	,000		
	Public opinion on pro-anti integration	,610	,258	,247	2,367	,018	,060	16,630
	Decision Making and Harmonisation (INT)	-,078	,029	-,071	-2,667	,008	,940	1,064
	Decision Making Procedure	,131	,029	,125	4,598	,000	,892	1,121
	Salience of position to government	,001	,001	,029	,450	,653	,160	6,244
	Public Opinion Integration * Salience	-,005	,003	-,167	-2,009	,045	,095	10,497
	Days to next elections (as planned)	-,012	,007	-,108	-1,722	,085	,167	5,995
	ELEC_POINT	,021	,015	,122	1,466	,143	,095	10,564
	Government pro-anti integration position (CMP)	,020	,009	,082	2,315	,021	,526	1,901
	Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP)	,059	,036	,122	1,616	,106	,116	8,614
	Unemployment rate	-,005	,008	-,037	-,697	,486	,238	4,208
	Inflation rate	-,011	,013	-,036	-,834	,404	,356	2,810
	BE=1	,086	,111	,039	,777	,437	,266	3,756
	BU=1	-,133	,214	-,021	-,620	,536	,575	1,738
	CY=1	,039	,110	,012	,359	,720	,623	1,606
	CZ=1	-,194	,116	-,057	-1,677	,094	,562	1,780

	DE=1	-,082	,105	-,037	-,774	,439	,284	3,522
	DK=1	,054	,096	,024	,560	,576	,365	2,739
	EE=1	-,272	,129	-,083	-2,102	,036	,424	2,358
	EL=1	-,167	,150	-,074	-1,114	,265	,150	6,685
	ES=1	-,152	,138	-,069	-1,096	,273	,166	6,008
	FI=1	,134	,097	,058	1,387	,166	,371	2,693
	FR=1	-,040	,102	-,018	-,392	,695	,302	3,307
	HU=1	-,077	,126	-,023	-,614	,540	,477	2,097
	IE=1	-,273	,146	-,117	-1,865	,062	,167	5,980
	IT=1	,018	,116	,008	,156	,876	,239	4,188
	lt=1	-,326	,149	-,102	-2,190	,029	,304	3,293
	LU=1	-,126	,131	-,052	-,961	,337	,221	4,524
	LV=1	-,148	,162	-,034	-,912	,362	,480	2,084
	MT=1	-,177	,118	-,053	-1,503	,133	,527	1,899
	NL=1	-,185	,126	-,084	-1,469	,142	,201	4,968
	PL=1	-,212	,148	-,069	-1,435	,151	,284	3,519
	PT=1	-,108	,130	-,048	-,831	,406	,198	5,048
	RO=1	-,172	,190	-,030	-,905	,366	,597	1,676
	SE=1	,124	,085	,056	1,454	,146	,449	2,228
	SI=1	-,100	,119	-,030	-,844	,399	,520	1,924
	SK=1	-,234	,152	-,068	-1,533	,126	,334	2,992
	UK=1	,020	,084	,009	,241	,809	,451	2,217

a. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration scale position (binary)

Appendix 3: Results multilevel analyses

SPSS output policy areas left-right scale

Type III Tests of Fixed Effects[a]

Source	Numerator df	Denominator df	F	Sig.
Intercept	1	2994,000	3,523	,061
lrs_lag6m	1	2994,000	16,137	,000
distance_elect_planned	1	2994,000	1,867	,172
ELEC_POLR	1	2994,000	1,722	,190
majoritarian	0	.	.	.
gov_lr_cmp_static	1	2994,000	2,083	,149
eu_cont_gdp	1	2994,000	1,659	,198
unemployment_wb	1	2994,000	20,540	,000
inflation_wb	1	2994,000	,065	,798
BE	1	2994,000	1,587	,208
BU	1	2994,000	,074	,786
CY	1	2994,000	1,065	,302
CZ	1	2994,000	,619	,431
DE	1	2994,000	4,039	,045
DK	1	2994,000	19,099	,000
EE	1	2994,000	2,378	,123
EL	1	2994,000	4,534	,033
ES	1	2994,000	6,423	,011
FI	1	2994,000	2,451	,118
FR	0	.	.	.

HU	1	2994,000	,563	,453
IE	1	2994,000	4,157	,042
IT	1	2994,000	,290	,590
LIT	0	.	.	.
LU	1	2994,000	4,175	,041
LV	1	2994,000	8,022	,005
MT	1	2994,000	,016	,901
NL	1	2994,000	2,016	,156
PL	1	2994,000	,799	,371
PT	1	2994,000	2,070	,150
RO	1	2994,000	,181	,671
SE	1	2994,000	4,063	,044
SI	1	2994,000	1,540	,215
SK	1	2994,000	7,896	,005
UK	0	.	.	.

a. Dependent Variable: Left-right position (0-100).

Estimates of Fixed Effects[a]

						95% Confidence Interval	
Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Intercept	-213,246521	141,952513	2994,000	-1,502	,133	-491,580853	65,087811
lrs_lag6m	31,215297	7,770550	2994,000	4,017	,000	15,979140	46,451454
distance_elect_planned	4,101945	3,001900	2994,000	1,366	,172	-1,784051	9,987940
ELEC_POLR	-,741762	,565318	2994,000	-1,312	,190	-1,850214	,366689
[majoritarian=0]	-,590321	5,208480	2994,000	-,113	,910	-10,802882	9,622240

[majoritarian=1]	-5,951105	8,632315	2994	-,689	,491	-22,876975	10,974764
gov_lr_cmp_static	,142483	,098731	2994,000	1,443	,149	-,051104	,336070
eu_cont_gdp	2,996513	2,326486	2994,000	1,288	,198	-1,565159	7,558185
unemployment_wb	-2,316999	,511240	2994,000	-4,532	,000	-3,319417	-1,314581
inflation_wb	,235971	,922579	2994,000	,256	,798	-1,572983	2,044924
[BE=0]	7,817045	6,205834	2994,000	1,260	,208	-4,351085	19,985175
[BU=0]	-4,129583	15,190749	2994,000	-,272	,786	-33,914946	25,655779
[CY=0]	7,879164	7,635522	2994,000	1,032	,302	-7,092235	22,850564
[CZ=0]	6,465608	8,217354	2994,000	,787	,431	-9,646623	22,577839
[DE=0]	-11,412636	5,678808	2994,000	-2,010	,045	-22,547398	-,277875
[DK=0]	26,721696	6,114508	2994,000	4,370	,000	14,732633	38,710759
[EE=0]	13,716000	8,894422	2994,000	1,542	,123	-3,723797	31,155797
[EL=0]	21,141734	9,928419	2994,000	2,129	,033	1,674520	40,608948
[ES=0]	-20,663548	8,153542	2994,000	-2,534	,011	-36,650659	-4,676437
[FI=0]	11,388976	7,274575	2994,000	1,566	,118	-2,874696	25,652648
[FR=0]	-9,762484	6,104293	2994	-1,599	,110	-21,731517	2,206550
[HU=0]	6,055956	8,073674	2994,000	,750	,453	-9,774553	21,886466
[IE=0]	15,378165	7,542092	2994,000	2,039	,042	,589958	30,166373
[IT=0]	3,098136	5,748545	2994,000	,539	,590	-8,173362	14,369635
[LU=0]	12,000457	5,873200	2994,000	2,043	,041	,484541	23,516372
[LV=0]	32,681841	11,538693	2994,000	2,832	,005	10,057272	55,306410
[MT=0]	1,010756	8,085124	2994,000	,125	,901	-14,842205	16,863717
[NL=0]	7,452219	5,248332	2994,000	1,420	,156	-2,838484	17,742922
[PL=0]	-8,485357	9,490663	2994,000	-,894	,371	-27,094238	10,123523
[PT=0]	11,210440	7,792006	2994,000	1,439	,150	-4,067788	26,488668
[RO=0]	-5,902373	13,886913	2994,000	-,425	,671	-33,131229	21,326483

[SE=0]	11,881038	5,894515	2994,000	2,016	,044	,323328	23,438749
[SI=0]	9,190905	7,406690	2994,000	1,241	,215	-5,331812	23,713621
[SK=0]	-24,672385	8,780130	2994,000	-2,810	,005	-41,888083	-7,456687

a. Dependent Variable: Left-right position (0-100).

b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

SPSS output policy areas pro-anti integration scale

Type III Tests of Fixed Effects[a]

Source	Numerator df	Denominator df	F	Sig.
Intercept	1	1448,000	,220	,639
eum_lag6m	1	1448,000	2,525	,112
distance_elect_planned	1	1448	,492	,483
ELEC_POINT	1	1448	,912	,340
majoritarian	0	.	.	.
gov_eu_cmp_static	1	1448	6,518	,011
eu_cont_gdp	1	1448,000	4,004	,046
unemployment_wb	1	1448,000	2,769	,096
inflation_wb	1	1448	,259	,611
BE	1	1448,000	1,218	,270
BU	1	1448,000	,467	,495
CY	1	1448	,152	,697
CZ	1	1448,000	2,046	,153
DE	1	1448,000	,029	,864
DK	1	1448,000	,392	,531
EE	1	1448,000	4,582	,032

EL	1	1448,000	1,165	,281
ES	1	1448,000	,506	,477
FI	1	1448,000	5,902	,015
FR	0	.	.	.
HU	1	1448,000	,653	,419
IE	1	1448,000	2,732	,099
IT	1	1448,000	,323	,570
LIT	0	.	.	.
LU	1	1448,000	,743	,389
LV	1	1448,000	2,539	,111
MT	1	1448,000	2,142	,144
NL	1	1448,000	1,441	,230
PL	1	1448,000	,996	,318
PT	1	1448,000	,493	,483
RO	1	1448,000	,328	,567
SE	1	1448,000	5,906	,015
SI	1	1448,000	,376	,540
SK	1	1448,000	1,663	,197
UK	0	.	.	.

a. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration position (0-100).

Estimates of Fixed Effects[a]

						95% Confidence Interval	
Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Intercept	-117,863672	203,540151	1448,000	-,579	,563	-517,128772	281,401428

eum_lag6m	31,451179	19,791644	1448,000	1,589	,112	-7,372181	70,274540
distance_elect_planned	-,448336	,639485	1448	-,701	,483	-1,702752	,806079
ELEC_POINT	1,290949	1,351498	1448	,955	,340	-1,360154	3,942051
[majoritarian=0]	-2,019126	7,699212	1448,000	-,262	,793	-17,121928	13,083675
[majoritarian=1]	-33,269641	13,388272	1448,000	-2,485	,013	-59,532124	-7,007158
gov_eu_cmp_static	2,057868	,806031	1448	2,553	,011	,476754	3,638981
eu_cont_gdp	6,688165	3,342400	1448,000	2,001	,046	,131700	13,244630
unemployment_wb	-1,163696	,699348	1448,000	-1,664	,096	-2,535540	,208148
inflation_wb	,629182	1,235925	1448	,509	,611	-1,795213	3,053576
[BE=0]	-11,326017	10,262719	1448,000	-1,104	,270	-31,457404	8,805369
[BU=0]	13,091917	19,167833	1448,000	,683	,495	-24,507775	50,691609
[CY=0]	-3,969708	10,182000	1448	-,390	,697	-23,942757	16,003341
[CZ=0]	15,219821	10,639775	1448,000	1,430	,153	-5,651200	36,090843
[DE=0]	1,674594	9,754122	1448,000	,172	,864	-17,459126	20,808314
[DK=0]	-5,600005	8,945506	1448,000	-,626	,531	-23,147543	11,947533
[EE=0]	25,439237	11,884816	1448,000	2,140	,032	2,125937	48,752536
[EL=0]	14,934605	13,837398	1448,000	1,079	,281	-12,208886	42,078096
[ES=0]	9,111728	12,806223	1448,000	,712	,477	-16,009006	34,232462
[FI=0]	-21,690419	8,928022	1448,000	-2,429	,015	-39,203660	-4,177178
[FR=0]	-1,212404	8,948506	1448,000	-,135	,892	-18,765826	16,341017
[HU=0]	9,376564	11,603653	1448,000	,808	,419	-13,385204	32,138332
[IE=0]	22,244325	13,458455	1448,000	1,653	,099	-4,155830	48,644480
[IT=0]	-6,067603	10,676117	1448,000	-,568	,570	-27,009912	14,874706
[LU=0]	10,415997	12,084761	1448,000	,862	,389	-13,289514	34,121508
[LV=0]	23,893410	14,994450	1448,000	1,593	,111	-5,519759	53,306578
[MT=0]	15,825493	10,813587	1448,000	1,463	,144	-5,386479	37,037465

[NL=0]	13,976896	11,645195	1448,000	1,200	,230	-8,866362	36,820153
[PL=0]	13,553686	13,578009	1448,000	,998	,318	-13,080986	40,188358
[PT=0]	8,427181	11,999502	1448,000	,702	,483	-15,111086	31,965449
[RO=0]	9,848188	17,185228	1448,000	,573	,567	-23,862418	43,558794
[SE=0]	-19,216188	7,907067	1448,000	-2,430	,015	-34,726720	-3,705656
[SI=0]	6,683407	10,901891	1448,000	,613	,540	-14,701782	28,068596
[SK=0]	18,035846	13,987464	1448,000	1,289	,197	-9,402014	45,473706

a. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration position (0-100).

b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

SPSS output model 2 left-right scale

Type III Tests of Fixed Effects[a]

Source	Numerator df	Denominator df	F	Sig.
Intercept	1	2929,000	3,203	,074
lrs_lag6m	1	2929	15,837	,000
POLR_PALR	1	2929	3,028	,082
distance_elect_planned	1	2929,000	1,565	,211
ELEC_POLR	1	2929,000	1,461	,227
majoritarian	0	.	.	.
gov_lr_cmp_static	1	2929,000	2,417	,120
eu_cont_gdp	1	2929,000	1,876	,171
unemployment_wb	1	2929,000	21,889	,000
inflation_wb	1	2929	,047	,828
BE	1	2929,000	1,365	,243
BU	1	2929,000	,104	,748
CY	1	2929,000	1,128	,288

CZ	1	2929,000	,772	,380
DE	1	2929,000	4,310	,038
DK	1	2929,000	17,871	,000
EE	1	2929,000	2,395	,122
EL	1	2929,000	4,442	,035
ES	1	2929,000	6,543	,011
FI	1	2929,000	1,951	,163
FR	0	.	.	.
HU	1	2929,000	,600	,439
IE	1	2929,000	3,639	,057
IT	1	2929,000	,312	,576
LIT	0	.	.	.
LU	1	2929,000	3,944	,047
LV	1	2929,000	7,788	,005
MT	1	2929,000	,029	,865
NL	1	2929,000	1,628	,202
PL	1	2929,000	,898	,344
PT	1	2929,000	1,991	,158
RO	1	2929	,213	,644
SE	1	2929,000	3,411	,065
SI	1	2929,000	1,621	,203
SK	1	2929,000	8,078	,005
UK	0	.	.	.

a. Dependent Variable: Left-right position (0-100).

Estimates of Fixed Effects[a]

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	t	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Intercept	-204,153238	143,548623	2929,000	-1,422	,155	-485,619680	77,313204
lrs_lag6m	31,380781	7,885385	2929	3,980	,000	15,919320	46,842242
POLR_PALR	-,606083	,348290	2929	-1,740	,082	-1,289002	,076835
distance_elect_planned	3,803919	3,040826	2929,000	1,251	,211	-2,158455	9,766292
ELEC_POLR	-,692192	,572763	2929,000	-1,209	,227	-1,815250	,430866
[majoritarian=0]	-1,810356	5,275185	2929,000	-,343	,731	-12,153803	8,533091
[majoritarian=1]	-7,441785	8,757281	2929,000	-,850	,396	-24,612836	9,729265
gov_lr_cmp_static	,155480	,100000	2929,000	1,555	,120	-,040597	,351558
eu_cont_gdp	3,229727	2,357719	2929,000	1,370	,171	-1,393226	7,852681
unemployment_wb	-2,418078	,516840	2929,000	-4,679	,000	-3,431485	-1,404670
inflation_wb	,202489	,931277	2929	,217	,828	-1,623535	2,028512
[BE=0]	7,336653	6,279427	2929,000	1,168	,243	-4,975885	19,649191
[BU=0]	-4,919156	15,285730	2929,000	-,322	,748	-34,891022	25,052710
[CY=0]	8,240071	7,758664	2929,000	1,062	,288	-6,972918	23,453059
[CZ=0]	7,317358	8,326023	2929,000	,879	,380	-9,008095	23,642810
[DE=0]	-11,938416	5,750392	2929,000	-2,076	,038	-23,213637	-,663196
[DK=0]	26,166980	6,189821	2929,000	4,227	,000	14,030139	38,303822
[EE=0]	13,943949	9,009355	2929,000	1,548	,122	-3,721362	31,609261
[EL=0]	21,196022	10,056372	2929,000	2,108	,035	1,477746	40,914297
[ES=0]	-21,136338	8,263310	2929,000	-2,558	,011	-37,338824	-4,933852
[FI=0]	10,287012	7,365165	2929,000	1,397	,163	-4,154412	24,728437
[FR=0]	-9,669545	6,178279	2929	-1,565	,118	-21,783755	2,444666
[HU=0]	6,349851	8,199420	2929,000	,774	,439	-9,727360	22,427063

[IE=0]	14,579755	7,642695	2929,000	1,908	,057	-,405843	29,565354
[IT=0]	3,253763	5,822846	2929,000	,559	,576	-8,163523	14,671049
[LU=0]	11,813876	5,949029	2929,000	1,986	,047	,149173	23,478580
[LV=0]	32,533204	11,657922	2929,000	2,791	,005	9,674651	55,391757
[MT=0]	1,396592	8,209147	2929,000	,170	,865	-14,699692	17,492876
[NL=0]	6,784397	5,316695	2929,000	1,276	,202	-3,640442	17,209235
[PL=0]	-9,102727	9,608384	2929,000	-,947	,344	-27,942598	9,737145
[PT=0]	11,146028	7,899325	2929,000	1,411	,158	-4,342766	26,634822
[RO=0]	-6,440235	13,953877	2929	-,462	,644	-33,800637	20,920167
[SE=0]	11,018893	5,966490	2929,000	1,847	,065	-,680046	22,717832
[SI=0]	9,580152	7,525517	2929,000	1,273	,203	-5,175689	24,335993
[SK=0]	-25,307771	8,904344	2929,000	-2,842	,005	-42,767180	-7,848361

a. Dependent Variable: Left-right position (0-100).

b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

SPSS output model 2 pro-anti integration scale

Type III Tests of Fixed Effects[a]

Source	Numerator df	Denominator df	F	Sig.
Intercept	1	1447,000	,313	,576
eum_lag6m	1	1447,000	4,633	,032
POINT_PAINT	1	1447,000	7,354	,007
distance_elect_planned	1	1447,000	,539	,463
ELEC_POINT	1	1447	1,047	,306
majoritarian	0	.	.	.
gov_eu_cmp_static	1	1447	6,775	,009

eu_cont_gdp	1	1447	4,562	,033
unemployment_wb	1	1447,000	2,446	,118
inflation_wb	1	1447,000	,045	,832
BE	1	1447,000	1,071	,301
BU	1	1447,000	,434	,510
CY	1	1447,000	,114	,735
CZ	1	1447,000	2,356	,125
DE	1	1447,000	,062	,803
DK	1	1447,000	,329	,566
EE	1	1447,000	4,851	,028
EL	1	1447,000	1,369	,242
ES	1	1447,000	,664	,415
FI	1	1447,000	5,636	,018
FR	0	.	.	.
HU	1	1447,000	,614	,433
IE	1	1447,000	3,030	,082
IT	1	1447,000	,262	,609
LIT	0	.	.	.
LU	1	1447,000	,823	,365
LV	1	1447,000	2,516	,113
MT	1	1447,000	2,476	,116
NL	1	1447,000	1,548	,214
PL	1	1447,000	1,349	,246
PT	1	1447,000	,642	,423
RO	1	1447,000	,429	,513
SE	1	1447,000	5,547	,019

SI	1	1447,000	,452	,501
SK	1	1447,000	1,956	,162
UK	0	.	.	.

a. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration position (0-100).

Estimates of Fixed Effects[a]

						95% Confidence Interval	
Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Intercept	-136,238862	203,208008	1447,000	-,670	,503	-534,852660	262,374936
eum_lag6m	43,583326	20,248742	1447,000	2,152	,032	3,863297	83,303354
POINT_PAINT	-15,530278	5,726730	1447,000	-2,712	,007	-26,763859	-4,296697
distance_elect_planned	-,468518	,638130	1447,000	-,734	,463	-1,720276	,783240
ELEC_POINT	1,380467	1,348946	1447	1,023	,306	-1,265632	4,026566
[majoritarian=0]	-1,926755	7,682449	1447,000	-,251	,802	-16,996684	13,143173
[majoritarian=1]	-34,654135	13,368744	1447,000	-2,592	,010	-60,878326	-8,429943
gov_eu_cmp_static	2,093700	,804377	1447	2,603	,009	,515831	3,671570
eu_cont_gdp	7,131762	3,339100	1447	2,136	,033	,581768	13,681756
unemployment_wb	-1,092254	,698316	1447,000	-1,564	,118	-2,462074	,277565
inflation_wb	,263281	1,240581	1447,000	,212	,832	-2,170248	2,696809
[BE=0]	-10,603437	10,243740	1447,000	-1,035	,301	-30,697606	9,490733
[BU=0]	12,599558	19,126775	1447,000	,659	,510	-24,919615	50,118732
[CY=0]	-3,436146	10,161637	1447,000	-,338	,735	-23,369262	16,496970
[CZ=0]	16,305961	10,624058	1447,000	1,535	,125	-4,534241	37,146164
[DE=0]	2,427072	9,736744	1447,000	,249	,803	-16,672572	21,526715
[DK=0]	-5,121462	8,927687	1447,000	-,574	,566	-22,634054	12,391131

[EE=0]	26,126167	11,861529	1447,000	2,203	,028	2,858534	49,393800
[EL=0]	16,162203	13,814555	1447,000	1,170	,242	-10,936494	43,260899
[ES=0]	10,420030	12,787320	1447,000	,815	,415	-14,663638	35,503697
[FI=0]	-21,154677	8,910687	1447,000	-2,374	,018	-38,633923	-3,675431
[FR=0]	-,349277	8,934606	1447,000	-,039	,969	-17,875443	17,176889
[HU=0]	9,073977	11,578814	1447,000	,784	,433	-13,639079	31,787034
[IE=0]	23,386174	13,435621	1447,000	1,741	,082	-2,969205	49,741552
[IT=0]	-5,457279	10,655145	1447,000	-,512	,609	-26,358463	15,443904
[LU=0]	10,938921	12,059873	1447,000	,907	,365	-12,717784	34,595626
[LV=0]	23,733985	14,961773	1447,000	1,586	,113	-5,615100	53,083071
[MT=0]	16,992690	10,798519	1447,000	1,574	,116	-4,189736	38,175115
[NL=0]	14,458091	11,621082	1447,000	1,244	,214	-8,337879	37,254061
[PL=0]	15,765232	13,572835	1447,000	1,162	,246	-10,859306	42,389770
[PT=0]	9,600569	11,981075	1447,000	,801	,423	-13,901566	33,102703
[RO=0]	11,231293	17,155227	1447,000	,655	,513	-22,420483	44,883068
[SE=0]	-18,589311	7,893160	1447,000	-2,355	,019	-34,072572	-3,106051
[SI=0]	7,316252	10,880551	1447,000	,672	,501	-14,027089	28,659594
[SK=0]	19,534822	13,967814	1447,000	1,399	,162	-7,864509	46,934154

a. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration position (0-100).

b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

SPSS output decision making procedure left-right scale

Type III Tests of Fixed Effects[a]

Source	Numerator df	Denominator df	F	Sig.
Intercept	1	2992,000	1,467	,226
lrs_lag6m	1	2992,000	8,867	,003
distance_elect_planned	1	2992,000	2,747	,098
ELEC_POLR	1	2992,000	2,603	,107
majoritarian	0	.	.	.
gov_lr_cmp_static	1	2992,000	1,785	,182
eu_cont_gdp	1	2992,000	,815	,367
unemployment_wb	1	2992	14,980	,000
inflation_wb	1	2992	,009	,923
BE	1	2992,000	,992	,319
BU	1	2992,000	,224	,636
CY	1	2992,000	,174	,677
CZ	1	2992,000	,000	,997
DE	1	2992,000	2,669	,102
DK	1	2992,000	10,915	,001
EE	1	2992,000	,655	,418
EL	1	2992,000	2,038	,154
ES	1	2992,000	4,126	,042
FI	1	2992,000	1,087	,297
FR	0	.	.	.
HU	1	2992,000	,099	,753
IE	1	2992,000	,855	,355
IT	1	2992,000	,320	,572
LIT	0	.	.	.
LU	1	2992,000	1,874	,171

LV	1	2992,000	3,541	,060
MT	1	2992,000	,251	,616
NL	1	2992,000	1,220	,269
PL	1	2992,000	1,475	,225
PT	1	2992,000	1,101	,294
RO	1	2992,000	,425	,515
SE	1	2992,000	2,336	,126
SI	1	2992,000	,455	,500
SK	1	2992,000	6,586	,010
UK	0	.	.	.
Consultation	1	2992	1,843	,175
DMP_POLR	1	2992,000	2,297	,130

a. Dependent Variable: Left-right scale position (binary).

Estimates of Fixed Effects[a]

						95% Confidence Interval	
Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Intercept	-1,555499	1,594942	2992,000	-,975	,330	-4,682793	1,571795
lrs_lag6m	,261087	,087681	2992,000	2,978	,003	,089166	,433008
distance_elect_planned	,055533	,033505	2992,000	1,657	,098	-,010161	,121228
ELEC_POLR	-,010181	,006310	2992,000	-1,613	,107	-,022554	,002192
[majoritarian=0]	-,038034	,057921	2992,000	-,657	,511	-,151602	,075535
[majoritarian=1]	-,039170	,096372	2992,000	-,406	,684	-,228132	,149791
gov_lr_cmp_static	,001471	,001101	2992,000	1,336	,182	-,000688	,003631
eu_cont_gdp	,023397	,025922	2992,000	,903	,367	-,027430	,074224

unemployment_wb	-,022064	,005701	2992	-3,870	,000	-,033241	-,010886
inflation_wb	,001001	,010380	2992	,096	,923	-,019351	,021352
[BE=0]	,068824	,069097	2992,000	,996	,319	-,066658	,204306
[BU=0]	-,080091	,169128	2992,000	-,474	,636	-,411710	,251529
[CY=0]	,035506	,085130	2992,000	,417	,677	-,131413	,202426
[CZ=0]	,000293	,091843	2992,000	,003	,997	-,179789	,180376
[DE=0]	-,103412	,063304	2992,000	-1,634	,102	-,227535	,020712
[DK=0]	,224617	,067989	2992,000	3,304	,001	,091307	,357928
[EE=0]	,080395	,099347	2992,000	,809	,418	-,114401	,275191
[EL=0]	,157713	,110487	2992,000	1,427	,154	-,058925	,374352
[ES=0]	-,184240	,090701	2992,000	-2,031	,042	-,362083	-,006397
[FI=0]	,084350	,080913	2992,000	1,042	,297	-,074300	,243000
[FR=0]	-,076015	,067966	2992,000	-1,118	,263	-,209280	,057250
[HU=0]	,028347	,090110	2992,000	,315	,753	-,148336	,205031
[IE=0]	,077666	,083992	2992,000	,925	,355	-,087023	,242354
[IT=0]	,036185	,063973	2992,000	,566	,572	-,089250	,161620
[LU=0]	,089375	,065288	2992,000	1,369	,171	-,038640	,217390
[LV=0]	,245390	,130396	2992,000	1,882	,060	-,010285	,501065
[MT=0]	-,045106	,090042	2992,000	-,501	,616	-,221656	,131444
[NL=0]	,064465	,058366	2992,000	1,104	,269	-,049976	,178907
[PL=0]	-,128252	,105602	2992,000	-1,214	,225	-,335312	,078808
[PT=0]	,090941	,086659	2992,000	1,049	,294	-,078975	,260858
[RO=0]	-,100671	,154453	2992,000	-,652	,515	-,403516	,202175
[SE=0]	,100269	,065598	2992,000	1,529	,126	-,028354	,228891
[SI=0]	,055684	,082548	2992,000	,675	,500	-,106174	,217541
[SK=0]	-,250891	,097766	2992,000	-2,566	,010	-,442587	-,059195

[Consultation=0]	,437556	,322294	2992	1,358	,175	-,194384	1,069495
DMP_POLR	,092469	,061009	2992,000	1,516	,130	-,027155	,212093

a. Dependent Variable: Left-right scale position (binary).

b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

SPSS output decision making procedure pro-anti integration scale

Type III Tests of Fixed Effects[a]

Source	Numerator df	Denominator df	F	Sig.
Intercept	1	1447,000	,139	,709
eum_lag6m	1	1447,000	1,552	,213
distance_elect_planned	1	1447	,396	,529
ELEC_POINT	1	1447,000	,735	,391
majoritarian	0	.	.	.
gov_eu_cmp_static	1	1447	5,489	,019
eu_cont_gdp	1	1447,000	3,945	,047
unemployment_wb	1	1447,000	2,195	,139
inflation_wb	1	1447,000	,124	,725
BE	1	1447,000	1,385	,239
BU	1	1447	,357	,550
CY	1	1447,000	,239	,625
CZ	1	1447,000	1,761	,185
DE	1	1447	,030	,864
DK	1	1447,000	,437	,509
EE	1	1447,000	4,012	,045
EL	1	1447,000	1,081	,299

ES	1	1447,000	,450	,502
FI	1	1447,000	5,503	,019
FR	0	.	.	.
HU	1	1447,000	,489	,485
IE	1	1447,000	2,340	,126
IT	1	1447,000	,368	,544
LIT	0	.	.	.
LU	1	1447,000	,500	,480
LV	1	1447,000	2,298	,130
MT	1	1447,000	2,015	,156
NL	1	1447,000	1,125	,289
PL	1	1447,000	,978	,323
PT	1	1447,000	,428	,513
RO	1	1447,000	,295	,587
SE	1	1447,000	5,530	,019
SI	1	1447,000	,240	,624
SK	1	1447,000	1,429	,232
UK	0	.	.	.
DMP_POINT	1	1447	6,824	,009

a. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration position (0-100).

Estimates of Fixed Effects[a]

						95% Confidence Interval	
Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Intercept	-98,722777	203,264197	1447,000	-,486	,627	-497,446796	300,001243

eum_lag6m	24,806271	19,915094	1447,000	1,246	,213	-14,259273	63,871815
distance_elect_planned	-,401910	,638450	1447	-,630	,529	-1,654296	,850477
ELEC_POINT	1,156969	1,349763	1447,000	,857	,391	-1,490732	3,804671
[majoritarian=0]	-1,813525	7,684179	1447,000	-,236	,813	-16,886847	13,259796
[majoritarian=1]	-31,570236	13,377259	1447,000	-2,360	,018	-57,811131	-5,329341
gov_eu_cmp_static	1,890594	,806960	1447	2,343	,019	,307658	3,473530
eu_cont_gdp	6,625913	3,335784	1447,000	1,986	,047	,082423	13,169404
unemployment_wb	-1,036574	,699641	1447,000	-1,482	,139	-2,408992	,335845
inflation_wb	,434894	1,235687	1447,000	,352	,725	-1,989036	2,858823
[BE=0]	-12,059674	10,245993	1447,000	-1,177	,239	-32,158264	8,038915
[BU=0]	11,443532	19,139810	1447	,598	,550	-26,101210	48,988274
[CY=0]	-4,969929	10,168798	1447,000	-,489	,625	-24,917093	14,977234
[CZ=0]	14,101623	10,627068	1447,000	1,327	,185	-6,744486	34,947731
[DE=0]	1,673320	9,734566	1447	,172	,864	-17,422051	20,768691
[DK=0]	-5,900762	8,928314	1447,000	-,661	,509	-23,414585	11,613062
[EE=0]	23,789843	11,877784	1447,000	2,003	,045	,490326	47,089361
[EL=0]	14,357111	13,811426	1447,000	1,040	,299	-12,735448	41,449670
[ES=0]	8,574270	12,782204	1447,000	,671	,502	-16,499363	33,647903
[FI=0]	-20,913075	8,915091	1447,000	-2,346	,019	-38,400959	-3,425190
[FR=0]	-1,612362	8,931878	1447,000	-,181	,857	-19,133176	15,908452
[HU=0]	8,103845	11,590634	1447,000	,699	,485	-14,632398	30,840089
[IE=0]	20,569250	13,446772	1447,000	1,530	,126	-5,808002	46,946501
[IT=0]	-6,468298	10,655817	1447,000	-,607	,544	-27,370799	14,434202
[LU=0]	8,543457	12,081817	1447,000	,707	,480	-15,156294	32,243207
[LV=0]	22,694905	14,971420	1447,000	1,516	,130	-6,673105	52,062914
[MT=0]	15,323047	10,793621	1447,000	1,420	,156	-5,849772	36,495866

[NL=0]	12,344606	11,638635	1447,000	1,061	,289	-10,485795	35,175007
[PL=0]	13,397861	13,550918	1447,000	,989	,323	-13,183685	39,979407
[PT=0]	7,836873	11,977577	1447,000	,654	,513	-15,658399	31,332145
[RO=0]	9,309362	17,152014	1447,000	,543	,587	-24,336111	42,954835
[SE=0]	-18,566827	7,895129	1447,000	-2,352	,019	-34,053950	-3,079704
[SI=0]	5,338225	10,892214	1447,000	,490	,624	-16,027994	26,704444
[SK=0]	16,699592	13,968790	1447,000	1,195	,232	-10,701654	44,100838
DMP_POINT	13,907889	5,324198	1447	2,612	,009	3,463916	24,351861

a. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration position (0-100).

b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

SPSS output salience left-right scale

Type III Tests of Fixed Effects[a]

Source	Numerator df	Denominator df	F	Sig.
Intercept	1	2957,000	4,100	,043
lrs_lag6m	1	2957,000	11,036	,001
distance_elect_planned	1	2957,000	1,221	,269
ELEC_POLR	1	2957,000	1,123	,289
majoritarian	0	.	.	.
gov_lr_cmp_static	1	2957,000	2,038	,154
eu_cont_gdp	1	2957,000	2,433	,119
unemployment_wb	1	2957,000	16,478	,000
inflation_wb	1	2957,000	,009	,926
BE	1	2957,000	2,111	,146
BU	1	2957,000	,004	,951

CY	1	2957,000	2,600	,107
CZ	1	2957,000	,743	,389
DE	1	2957,000	3,507	,061
DK	1	2957,000	17,429	,000
EE	1	2957,000	3,904	,048
EL	1	2957,000	5,804	,016
ES	1	2957,000	4,290	,038
FI	1	2957,000	2,963	,085
FR	0	.	.	.
HU	1	2957,000	1,344	,246
IE	1	2957,000	4,913	,027
IT	1	2957,000	,478	,489
LIT	0	.	.	.
LU	1	2957,000	4,080	,043
LV	1	2957,000	9,059	,003
MT	1	2957,000	,351	,553
NL	1	2957,000	1,568	,211
PL	1	2957,000	,097	,755
PT	1	2957,000	3,076	,080
RO	1	2957,000	,017	,896
SE	1	2957,000	4,202	,040
SI	1	2957,000	3,152	,076
SK	1	2957,000	5,361	,021
UK	0	.	.	.
salience	20	2957	4,651	,000
POLRsalience	1	2957,000	,234	,629

a. Dependent Variable: Left-right position (0-100).

Estimates of Fixed Effects[a]

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	t	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Intercept	-239,423921	143,606661	2957,000	-1,667	,096	-521,003061	42,155219
lrs_lag6m	30,731647	9,250726	2957,000	3,322	,001	12,593132	48,870162
distance_elect_planned	3,298740	2,985268	2957,000	1,105	,269	-2,554674	9,152154
ELEC_POLR	-,595827	,562193	2957,000	-1,060	,289	-1,698156	,506502
[majoritarian=0]	-1,937066	5,167926	2957,000	-,375	,708	-12,070163	8,196031
[majoritarian=1]	-12,840710	8,626472	2957,000	-1,489	,137	-29,755208	4,073788
gov_lr_cmp_static	,140109	,098151	2957,000	1,427	,154	-,052342	,332561
eu_cont_gdp	3,617538	2,319008	2957,000	1,560	,119	-,929496	8,164573
unemployment_wb	-2,068679	,509606	2957,000	-4,059	,000	-3,067898	-1,069460
inflation_wb	-,085009	,917115	2957,000	-,093	,926	-1,883259	1,713240
[BE=0]	8,936113	6,150089	2957,000	1,453	,146	-3,122775	20,995002
[BU=0]	,923505	15,085504	2957,000	,061	,951	-28,655647	30,502656
[CY=0]	12,278131	7,615097	2957,000	1,612	,107	-2,653297	27,209560
[CZ=0]	7,038242	8,167736	2957,000	,862	,389	-8,976781	23,053266
[DE=0]	-10,540242	5,628721	2957,000	-1,873	,061	-21,576851	,496367
[DK=0]	25,375888	6,078381	2957,000	4,175	,000	13,457601	37,294175
[EE=0]	17,489038	8,851034	2957,000	1,976	,048	,134226	34,843850
[EL=0]	23,869391	9,907566	2957,000	2,409	,016	4,442967	43,295814
[ES=0]	-16,834320	8,128088	2957,000	-2,071	,038	-32,771603	-,897036
[FI=0]	12,419347	7,214604	2957,000	1,721	,085	-1,726807	26,565501

[FR=0]	-6,393019	6,087595	2957,000	-1,050	,294	-18,329372	5,543334
[HU=0]	9,299759	8,022082	2957,000	1,159	,246	-6,429672	25,029189
[IE=0]	16,629374	7,502276	2957,000	2,217	,027	1,919163	31,339586
[IT=0]	3,944973	5,706175	2957,000	,691	,489	-7,243504	15,133451
[LU=0]	11,820393	5,851908	2957,000	2,020	,043	,346167	23,294618
[LV=0]	34,565389	11,484162	2957,000	3,010	,003	12,047628	57,083151
[MT=0]	4,817871	8,127356	2957,000	,593	,553	-11,117977	20,753718
[NL=0]	6,504567	5,194871	2957,000	1,252	,211	-3,681363	16,690497
[PL=0]	-2,950669	9,465814	2957,000	-,312	,755	-21,510922	15,609583
[PT=0]	13,591415	7,749838	2957,000	1,754	,080	-1,604207	28,787038
[RO=0]	1,811680	13,795315	2957,000	,131	,896	-25,237713	28,861073
[SE=0]	11,979407	5,843950	2957,000	2,050	,040	,520786	23,438029
[SI=0]	13,171887	7,419386	2957,000	1,775	,076	-1,375796	27,719571
[SK=0]	-20,236579	8,740370	2957,000	-2,315	,021	-37,374404	-3,098754
[salience=0]	-31,492458	52,340115	2957,000	-,602	,547	-134,119206	71,134290
[salience=5]	21,003450	50,150351	2957,000	,419	,675	-77,329682	119,336583
[salience=10]	-18,464477	45,733774	2957,000	-,404	,686	-108,137731	71,208778
[salience=15]	-58,368124	48,262671	2957,000	-1,209	,227	-152,999956	36,263708
[salience=20]	-7,338956	40,648176	2957,000	-,181	,857	-87,040539	72,362628
[salience=25]	-15,361984	39,336602	2957,000	-,391	,696	-92,491879	61,767910
[salience=30]	-15,842242	35,472337	2957,000	-,447	,655	-85,395214	53,710730
[salience=35]	-47,614286	34,195438	2957,000	-1,392	,164	-114,663557	19,434986
[salience=40]	-26,783239	30,285305	2957,000	-,884	,377	-86,165652	32,599175
[salience=45]	13,133447	35,065741	2957,000	,375	,708	-55,622286	81,889181
[salience=50]	-22,057811	25,159706	2957,000	-,877	,381	-71,390122	27,274500
[salience=55]	-9,713420	26,539959	2957,000	-,366	,714	-61,752083	42,325244

[salience=60]	-10,951483	20,258440	2957,000	-,541	,589	-50,673556	28,770589
[salience=65]	-26,971448	20,148561	2957,000	-1,339	,181	-66,478073	12,535177
[salience=70]	-20,389687	15,398009	2957,000	-1,324	,186	-50,581588	9,802215
[salience=75]	-8,781109	13,457167	2957,000	-,653	,514	-35,167473	17,605254
[salience=80]	-9,696284	10,621950	2957,000	-,913	,361	-30,523449	11,130881
[salience=85]	10,233544	19,588631	2957	,522	,601	-28,175188	48,642277
[salience=90]	-10,643760	6,810773	2957,000	-1,563	,118	-23,998097	2,710576
[salience=95]	13,341360	8,715938	2957,000	1,531	,126	-3,748559	30,431279
POLRsalience	-,046073	,095220	2957,000	-,484	,629	-,232778	,140632

a. Dependent Variable: Left-right position (0-100).

b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

SPSS output salience pro-anti integration scale

Type III Tests of Fixed Effects[a]

Source	Numerator df	Denominator df	F	Sig.
Intercept	1	1404,000	,047	,828
eum_lag6m	1	1404,000	4,386	,036
distance_elect_planned	1	1404,000	,367	,545
ELEC_POINT	1	1404,000	,679	,410
majoritarian	0	.	.	.
gov_eu_cmp_static	1	1404,000	6,193	,013
eu_cont_gdp	1	1404,000	3,183	,075
unemployment_wb	1	1404	4,296	,038
inflation_wb	1	1404,000	,591	,442
BE	1	1404,000	1,306	,253

BU	1	1404,000	,130	,718
CY	1	1404,000	,216	,642
CZ	1	1404,000	1,985	,159
DE	1	1404,000	,000	,995
DK	1	1404,000	,345	,557
EE	1	1404,000	3,207	,074
EL	1	1404,000	,768	,381
ES	1	1404,000	,167	,683
FI	1	1404,000	7,116	,008
FR	0	.	.	.
HU	1	1404,000	,489	,485
IE	1	1404,000	2,595	,107
IT	1	1404,000	,633	,426
LIT	0	.	.	.
LU	1	1404	1,111	,292
LV	1	1404,000	2,182	,140
MT	1	1404,000	1,191	,275
NL	1	1404,000	1,951	,163
PL	1	1404,000	,230	,631
PT	1	1404,000	,265	,607
RO	1	1404,000	,095	,759
SE	1	1404,000	6,370	,012
SI	1	1404,000	,180	,671
SK	1	1404,000	,936	,333
UK	0	.	.	.
salience	19	1404,000	2,999	,000

POINTsalience	1	1404,000	1,196	,274

a. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration position (0-100).

Estimates of Fixed Effects[a]

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	t	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Intercept	-67,897620	204,475560	1404,000	-,332	,740	-469,008139	333,212899
eum_lag6m	50,130507	23,937936	1404,000	2,094	,036	3,172532	97,088481
distance_elect_planned	-,384815	,635635	1404,000	-,605	,545	-1,631711	,862081
ELEC_POINT	1,111841	1,348975	1404,000	,824	,410	-1,534382	3,758065
[majoritarian=0]	-4,079755	7,709347	1404,000	-,529	,597	-19,202834	11,043325
[majoritarian=1]	-30,164544	13,502360	1404,000	-2,234	,026	-56,651517	-3,677570
gov_eu_cmp_static	2,007967	,806873	1404,000	2,489	,013	,425160	3,590773
eu_cont_gdp	5,977666	3,350275	1404,000	1,784	,075	-,594418	12,549749
unemployment_wb	-1,462887	,705756	1404	-2,073	,038	-2,847337	-,078437
inflation_wb	,950207	1,236143	1404,000	,769	,442	-1,474680	3,375094
[BE=0]	-11,667498	10,207783	1404,000	-1,143	,253	-31,691648	8,356652
[BU=0]	7,162009	19,835904	1404,000	,361	,718	-31,749192	46,073210
[CY=0]	-4,719515	10,151907	1404,000	-,465	,642	-24,634055	15,195026
[CZ=0]	15,064058	10,690772	1404,000	1,409	,159	-5,907548	36,035664
[DE=0]	-,061147	9,722161	1404,000	-,006	,995	-19,132674	19,010381
[DK=0]	-5,210690	8,871938	1404,000	-,587	,557	-22,614373	12,192993
[EE=0]	21,451600	11,979551	1404,000	1,791	,074	-2,048148	44,951347
[EL=0]	12,184356	13,899939	1404,000	,877	,381	-15,082531	39,451242
[ES=0]	5,234467	12,793959	1404,000	,409	,683	-19,862867	30,331802

[FI=0]	-23,837527	8,936046	1404,000	-2,668	,008	-41,366967	-6,308087
[FR=0]	-,431875	8,941565	1404,000	-,048	,961	-17,972141	17,108392
[HU=0]	8,088680	11,568949	1404,000	,699	,485	-14,605607	30,782967
[IE=0]	21,856332	13,567609	1404,000	1,611	,107	-4,758637	48,471301
[IT=0]	-8,487665	10,664717	1404,000	-,796	,426	-29,408161	12,432830
[LU=0]	12,714385	12,062850	1404	1,054	,292	-10,948766	36,377536
[LV=0]	22,010255	14,901177	1404,000	1,477	,140	-7,220714	51,241223
[MT=0]	11,891668	10,897415	1404,000	1,091	,275	-9,485301	33,268637
[NL=0]	16,185051	11,587015	1404,000	1,397	,163	-6,544676	38,914779
[PL=0]	6,582541	13,716375	1404,000	,480	,631	-20,324255	33,489338
[PT=0]	6,220510	12,090436	1404,000	,514	,607	-17,496755	29,937774
[RO=0]	-5,448423	17,722585	1404,000	-,307	,759	-40,214021	29,317175
[SE=0]	-19,826450	7,855648	1404,000	-2,524	,012	-35,236522	-4,416379
[SI=0]	4,653736	10,967776	1404,000	,424	,671	-16,861256	26,168729
[SK=0]	13,661935	14,119759	1404,000	,968	,333	-14,036162	41,360031
[salience=0]	9,227478	15,432810	1404,000	,598	,550	-21,046372	39,501328
[salience=5]	8,236977	19,925080	1404,000	,413	,679	-30,849157	47,323111
[salience=10]	15,432522	12,722418	1404	1,213	,225	-9,524473	40,389518
[salience=15]	16,212374	19,570398	1404,000	,828	,408	-22,177996	54,602744
[salience=20]	-1,474733	10,826385	1404,000	-,136	,892	-22,712365	19,762899
[salience=25]	6,584407	13,422152	1404	,491	,624	-19,745225	32,914038
[salience=30]	3,624199	9,737877	1404,000	,372	,710	-15,478156	22,726555
[salience=35]	29,437665	27,495015	1404,000	1,071	,285	-24,498070	83,373399
[salience=40]	7,878240	9,674570	1404	,814	,416	-11,099930	26,856409
[salience=45]	-23,705939	21,649314	1404,000	-1,095	,274	-66,174426	18,762548
[salience=50]	12,757248	8,025371	1404,000	1,590	,112	-2,985762	28,500258

[salience=55]	9,337073	21,270048	1404,000	,439	,661	-32,387424	51,061570
[salience=60]	12,027176	8,030348	1404,000	1,498	,134	-3,725597	27,779950
[salience=70]	15,500513	7,307976	1404,000	2,121	,034	1,164786	29,836240
[salience=75]	-2,355347	9,941726	1404,000	-,237	,813	-21,857583	17,146890
[salience=80]	18,252633	7,312683	1404,000	2,496	,013	3,907671	32,597595
[salience=85]	-23,824319	19,304094	1404,000	-1,234	,217	-61,692294	14,043655
[salience=90]	7,264756	7,051134	1404,000	1,030	,303	-6,567138	21,096649
[salience=95]	-43,937638	11,738656	1404,000	-3,743	,000	-66,964833	-20,910443
POINTsalience	-,256514	,234531	1404,000	-1,094	,274	-,716584	,203555

a. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration position (0-100).

b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Appendix 4: Multicollinearity output

Left-right scale

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	-40,671	30,638		-1,327	,184		
	Public opinion on left-right	22,790	6,075	,178	3,752	,000	,146	6,860
	Cultural or Economic Dimension (LR)	-2,985	1,852	-,029	-1,611	,107	,983	1,018
	Decision Making Procedure	3,981	1,901	,039	2,094	,036	,948	1,054
	Salience of position to government	-,103	,034	-,056	-2,995	,003	,928	1,078
	Days to next elections (as planned)	,143	,192	,014	,742	,458	,868	1,153
	Government left-right position (CMP)	,101	,097	,027	1,047	,295	,482	2,074
	Country holds presidency (+/- 3 months)	-5,286	3,024	-,035	-1,748	,081	,808	1,238
	Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP)	3,147	2,365	,073	1,331	,183	,109	9,150
	Unemployment rate	-2,230	,508	-,172	-4,394	,000	,215	4,649
	Inflation rate	,149	,935	,005	,159	,873	,343	2,919
	BE=1	-10,742	6,309	-,053	-1,703	,089	,338	2,963
	BU=1	-,489	15,348	-,001	-,032	,975	,647	1,545

	CY=1	-10,068	7,817	-,031	-1,288	,198	,568	1,761
	CZ=1	-7,496	8,354	-,025	-,897	,370	,426	2,350
	DE=1	11,246	5,767	,057	1,950	,051	,387	2,581
	DK=1	-27,415	6,238	-,134	-4,395	,000	,354	2,825
	EE=1	-14,181	9,052	-,046	-1,567	,117	,373	2,680
	EL=1	-23,160	10,150	-,111	-2,282	,023	,138	7,246
	ES=1	16,391	8,269	,082	1,982	,048	,191	5,244
	FI=1	-10,230	7,383	-,050	-1,386	,166	,254	3,934
	FR=1	8,307	6,628	,042	1,253	,210	,287	3,488
	HU=1	-8,438	8,284	-,027	-1,019	,308	,466	2,144
	IE=1	-15,063	7,687	-,072	-1,960	,050	,244	4,102
	IT=1	-4,526	5,878	-,023	-,770	,441	,382	2,619
	lt=1	-7,900	9,119	-,027	-,866	,386	,347	2,880
	LU=1	-13,400	6,009	-,060	-2,230	,026	,450	2,224
	LV=1	-30,670	11,658	-,088	-2,631	,009	,295	3,386
	MT=1	-2,900	8,352	-,009	-,347	,728	,489	2,044
	NL=1	-8,077	5,365	-,041	-1,505	,132	,445	2,247
	PL=1	6,255	9,586	,022	,652	,514	,294	3,404
	PT=1	-12,813	7,916	-,062	-1,619	,106	,221	4,522
	RO=1	6,069	13,886	,009	,437	,662	,734	1,362
	SE=1	-12,999	6,008	-,065	-2,163	,031	,365	2,736
	SI=1	-12,132	7,604	-,038	-1,596	,111	,590	1,694
	SK=1	22,227	8,971	,072	2,478	,013	,392	2,554
	UK=1	2,387	5,252	,012	,454	,650	,478	2,091

a. Dependent Variable: Left-right position (0-100)

Pro-anti integration scale

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	50,123	8,492		5,902	,000		
	Public opinion on pro-anti integration	44,350	15,863	,195	2,796	,005	,135	7,417
	Decision Making and Harmonisation (INT)	-6,415	2,702	-,063	-2,375	,018	,940	1,064
	Decision Making Procedure	12,891	2,632	,133	4,899	,000	,893	1,120
	Salience of position to government	-,169	,049	-,095	-3,425	,001	,859	1,164
	Days to next elections (as planned)	,037	,275	,004	,135	,892	,891	1,123
	Government pro-anti integration position (CMP)	1,531	,795	,067	1,925	,054	,539	1,857
	Country holds presidency (+/- 3 months)	-2,531	4,234	-,017	-,598	,550	,839	1,192
	Net receipts from EU budget (%GDP)	6,975	3,336	,157	2,091	,037	,116	8,594
	Unemployment rate	-,815	,701	-,061	-1,163	,245	,240	4,171
	Inflation rate	,128	1,242	,004	,103	,918	,357	2,804
	BE=1	9,017	10,324	,044	,873	,383	,260	3,840
	BU=1	-14,279	19,780	-,024	-,722	,470	,571	1,750

	CY=1	,310	10,247	,001	,030	,976	,608	1,643
	CZ=1	-17,666	10,785	-,057	-1,638	,102	,549	1,820
	DE=1	-3,249	9,691	-,016	-,335	,737	,285	3,509
	DK=1	3,346	9,022	,016	,371	,711	,354	2,822
	EE=1	-27,253	12,034	-,090	-2,265	,024	,416	2,405
	EL=1	-19,462	13,879	-,093	-1,402	,161	,148	6,766
	ES=1	-11,959	12,827	-,059	-,932	,351	,165	6,074
	FI=1	18,178	8,907	,086	2,041	,041	,373	2,680
	FR=1	3,553	9,407	,018	,378	,706	,299	3,346
	HU=1	-10,580	11,702	-,034	-,904	,366	,467	2,143
	IE=1	-25,505	13,508	-,118	-1,888	,059	,167	5,998
	IT=1	4,230	10,733	,021	,394	,694	,235	4,253
	lt=1	-34,488	13,770	-,117	-2,504	,012	,300	3,329
	LU=1	-11,410	12,104	-,051	-,943	,346	,220	4,550
	LV=1	-25,162	15,002	-,062	-1,677	,094	,474	2,110
	MT=1	-19,526	10,972	-,064	-1,780	,075	,515	1,942
	NL=1	-15,140	11,664	-,074	-1,298	,195	,199	5,023
	PL=1	-17,490	13,695	-,062	-1,277	,202	,281	3,560
	PT=1	-10,925	11,991	-,052	-,911	,362	,198	5,050
	RO=1	-12,176	17,539	-,023	-,694	,488	,595	1,679
	SE=1	17,042	7,982	,083	2,135	,033	,436	2,295
	SI=1	-9,277	10,972	-,030	-,845	,398	,515	1,942
	SK=1	-21,121	14,126	-,067	-1,495	,135	,330	3,028
	UK=1	1,704	7,605	,008	,224	,823	,463	2,161

a. Dependent Variable: Pro-anti integration position (0-100)