

The Influence of the European Union's Preferential Trade
Agreements on Civil Liberties and Political Freedoms in Lesser
Developed Countries: A Quantitative Approach

Carley Panjer

Student Number: 498417

Master Thesis in International Public Management and Policy

Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherlands

Word Count: 22,401

1st Reader: Dr. Stephen Grand

2nd Reader: Dr. Michal Onderco

Completion Date: July 7, 2019

Summary

The European Union (EU) is been increasingly incorporating Non-Trade Issues (NTIs) clauses in their Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) agreements. These NTIs include civil liberties and political freedoms obligations third countries must subscribe to in order to receive the benefits of trade through these agreements. When these agreements are in place, presumably, third countries will be more aware of their practices and ensure a suitable level of civil liberties and political freedoms, so as not to lose the economic relationship with the EU; however, since the EU has never suspended an economic agreement in the event of gross civil liberties violations or sudden political upheaval, the question becomes: are NTIs in PTAs effective in monitoring or regulating civil liberties and political freedoms in third countries? This research finds that the answer to this question is very complicated, and countries who have PTAs with the EU are more likely to be in the lowest category in terms of civil liberties and political freedoms. However, these trade agreements create an open communication channel for the EU and third countries to discuss civil liberties and political freedoms, in the hopes of influencing positive reform.

Acknowledgement

And just like that, this program year is over! Although at times I thought this program would surely kill me, the light at the end of the tunnel is bright, beautiful, and well deserved! There are so many people who have helped me throughout this year and, if it not for them, I wouldn't have been able to make it through. First, I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Stephen Grand; thank you for the support and gently guiding me through this whole crazy process. Second, I would like to thank my fellow classmates I have met this year, it was really great to be a part of a group of students who all got on so well. Special shout out to David Vera Tudela Traverso for teaching me how to use Stata, I do not think I could have figured it out on my own. Second special shout out to Lukas Meier, thank you for coming to my flat every day so we could work on our theses together, you definitely gave me motivation on days when I was trying to find the will to live.

I need to give my biggest thanks to my wonderful partner Rees. I was luckily able to convince him to move across the world with me to pursue my dreams. We had a great life in Calgary, Canada, but we gave it all up at a shot to live and work and learn in the beautiful city of Rotterdam. He has been the sole provider for us and our dog, Novah, for the last year and I can safely say that if it weren't for his support, I would not have been able to do this master's degree at all. Apart from the financial support, I want to thank him for listening to me incessantly talk about civil liberties and quantitative regression methods, I'm sure it bored him to tears, but he was always there to listen and contribute when asked.

A more difficult thank you that I need to give is to my Opa. My Oma and Opa immigrated to Canada in the 1960's from Apeldoorn, the Netherlands. They raised me to take education very seriously and to be very thankful for the life I have. This year, while I was living in Rotterdam, my Opa passed away, peacefully in Calgary, at the ripe old age of 90. It was one of the hardest things I have ever had to go through, especially being so far away from my family. I know that he would be so proud of me for pursuing higher education and I thank him for instilling in me a great love for the Netherlands from a very young age. For these reasons, I dedicate this thesis to him.

Finally, I want to thank my friends and family back home and, in the Netherlands, who have been there for me while I have been doing my studies. Although there is quite a significant

time difference, they were always there to chat and keep me up to date on everything going on back home.

I am hopeful for the future and cannot wait to get started!

Table of Contents

SUMMARY	2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	3
LIST OF FIGURES.....	7
LIST OF EQUATIONS	7
LIST OF GRAPHS	7
1. INTRODUCTION	8
1.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE.....	9
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION.....	10
1.3 RESEARCH APPROACH.....	11
1.4 RELEVANCE	11
1.4.1 <i>Academic Relevance</i>	11
1.4.2 <i>Societal Relevance</i>	12
1.5 OUTLINE.....	13
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	13
2.1 GLOBAL CIVIL LIBERTIES AND POLITICAL FREEDOMS LANDSCAPE.....	13
2.2 HOW HEGEMONS PROMOTE CIVIL LIBERTIES AND POLITICAL FREEDOMS	14
2.3 THE EVOLUTION OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE.....	16
2.4 PREFERENTIAL TRADING WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION	17
2.5 NON-TRADE ISSUES WITHIN PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS.....	21
2.6 NON-TRADE ISSUES WITHIN EUROPEAN UNION PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS.....	23
2.7 TYPES OF NTI CLAUSES	26
2.7.1 <i>Hard Enforcement</i>	26
2.7.2 <i>Soft Enforcement</i>	28
2.8 EFFECTIVENESS OF INCLUDING CIVIL LIBERTIES AND POLITICAL FREEDOMS WITHIN EUROPEAN UNION PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS	29
2.9 EFFECTIVENESS OF OTHER TYPES OF NON-TRADE ISSUES IN EUROPEAN UNION PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS	31
3. RESEARCH DESIGN.....	32
3.1 INTRODUCTION.....	32
3.2 QUANTITATIVE, QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL ORDERED LOGIT DESIGN.....	33
3.3 EMPIRICAL METHOD.....	35
3.4 <i>Ordinal Logistic Regression assumptions and tests</i>	39
3.5 POPULATION AND SAMPLE	41

3.6	OPERATIONALISATION	44
3.6.1	<i>Outcome variable</i>	44
3.6.2	<i>Predictor Variable</i>	48
3.6.3	<i>Alternate Explanation Variables</i>	50
3.6.4	<i>Control Variables</i>	52
3.6.5	<i>Operationalisation Table</i>	53
3.7	HISTOGRAM OF CONTINUOUS VARIABLES	54
3.8	CORRELATION MATRIX.....	57
3.9	TEST FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY	59
3.10	PROPORTIONAL ODDS ASSUMPTION	59
4	ANALYSIS	61
4.1	DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS.....	61
5	FINDINGS	64
5.1	STATUS AND PTA MODEL	64
5.2	STATUS AND ENFORCEMENT MODEL.....	68
6	CONCLUSIONS	71
6.1	SOURCE RELIABILITY.....	71
6.2	LIMITATIONS.....	73
6.3	ANSWERING THE SUB-QUESTIONS OF THIS RESEARCH	74
6.3.1	<i>Sub-Question One</i>	74
6.3.2	<i>Sub-Question Two</i>	75
6.3.3	<i>Sub-Question Three</i>	75
6.4	ANSWERING THE CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION	76
6.5	AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH	77
	REFERENCES	79
	APPENDIX 1. SAMPLE POPULATION GNI PER CAPITA: EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC.....	92
	APPENDIX 2. SAMPLE POPULATION GNI PER CAPITA: EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA.....	93
	APPENDIX 3. SAMPLE POPULATION GNI PER CAPITA: LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.....	94
	APPENDIX 4. SAMPLE POPULATION GNI PER CAPITA: MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA	95
	APPENDIX 5. SAMPLE POPULATION GNI PER CAPITA: SOUTH ASIA.....	96
	APPENDIX 6. SAMPLE POPULATION GNI PER CAPITA: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA.....	97
	APPENDIX 7. COUNTRY LEVEL SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS WITH THE EU.....	98
	APPENDIX 8 DISTRIBUTIONAL FREQUENCY OF CIVIL LIBERTIES CATEGORICAL DATA.....	108
	APPENDIX 9 DISTRIBUTIONAL FREQUENCY OF POLITICAL FREEDOMS CATEGORICAL DATA	109

APPENDIX 10 DISTRIBUTIONAL FREQUENCY OF DUMMY VARIABLE PTA	109
APPENDIX 11 DISTRIBUTIONAL FREQUENCY OF DUMMY VARIABLE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM IN THE EVENT OF A PTA	109

List of Figures

FIGURE 1 PROLIFERATION OF NTIS IN PTAs (HAFNER-BURTON, N.D.).....	21
FIGURE 2 MAIN VARIABLES USED IN PREVIOUS STUDIES ON REPRESSION AND TRADE AGREEMENTS.....	39
FIGURE 3 REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF COUNTRIES IN UNIVERSE AND IN SAMPLE POPULATION.....	43
FIGURE 4 CIVIL LIBERTIES RANKING SCORES.....	45
FIGURE 5 POLITICAL FREEDOMS RANKING SCORES	47
FIGURE 6 FREEDOM SCORE BREAKDOWN FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES AND POLITICAL FREEDOMS.....	48
FIGURE 7 OPERATIONALISATION TABLE	54
FIGURE 8 CIVIL LIBERTIES CORRELATION MATRIX.	58
FIGURE 9 POLITICAL FREEDOMS CORRELATION MATRIX.....	58
FIGURE 10 MULTICOLLINEARITY TEST	59
FIGURE 11 PROPORTIONAL ODDS ASSUMPTION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES	60
FIGURE 12 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS	63
FIGURE 13 REGRESSION OF <i>Status</i> WITH PTA	67
FIGURE 14 REGRESSION OF <i>Status</i> WITH ENFORCEMENT.....	70

List of Equations

EQUATION 1	36
EQUATION 2	36
EQUATION 3	36
EQUATION 4	37
EQUATION 5	37

List of Graphs

GRAPH 1 TRADE HISTOGRAM	55
GRAPH 2 EU AID, POSITIVELY SKEWED.....	56
GRAPH 3 LOGGED EU AID.....	56
GRAPH 4 POPULATION DENSITY, POSITIVELY SKEWED	56

1. Introduction

In 2015, Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, penned a forward in the EU's second action plan on civil liberties and democracy, calling for a renewed dedication "to upholding human rights and supporting democratic values, in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)" (European Union, 2015, p. 5). Similarly, a regulation issued by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (2014) stipulates that the EU must place emphasis on "a commitment to respect, promote, and protect human rights and democratic freedoms, [which are] an *essential element* [emphasis added] of the Union's contractual relations with third countries" (p. 77/85). Indeed, since 1990, the EU has incorporated these civil liberties and democratic freedom 'essential elements' into its external relations in its association agreements, and partnership and cooperation agreements. These agreements, be them preferential, regional, bilateral, or a combination thereof, are increasing in popularity in recent decades and are becoming easier to ratify than multilateral, World Trade Organization (WTO) level agreements. Since these agreements are becoming more widely spread, and therefore more useful for liberalising trade and garnering deeper integration, it begs to reason that civil liberties and political freedoms should also be positively affected in third countries who enter into a trade agreement with the EU. However, not all 'essential element' clauses are created equal. Hegemons, such as the EU, choose to use different types of enforcement mechanisms, typically *sui generis* per individual agreement with the respective contracting state. Previous scholarship has shown that the type of enforcement mechanisms employed in these agreements have an effect on the outcome of civil liberties and political freedoms within the contracting party's territory (Hafner-Burton, 2005a).¹

¹ Also, see Abbott & Snidal, 2000, for a more theoretical institutional approach to understanding why international actors choose different enforcement mechanisms for different agreements.

1.1 Research Objective

Measuring effectiveness in scholarship is generally quite difficult. Regarding the effectiveness of including essential elements clauses in trade agreements, it is difficult to come to a consensus as to what the best strategy is for ensuring compliance and ensuring a higher standard of living for people in these third countries. Similarly, there are often alternative explanations as to why certain countries may see an increase, or a decrease, in particular rights and freedoms separate from the ratification of a trade agreement with the EU. This research hopes to add to the literature on the effectiveness of essential elements clauses to help form a more complete picture of the *ex-post* effects of this phenomenon.

A large portion of quantitative studies on this subject, specifically relating to civil liberties and political freedoms, are outdated in the sense that their time variable stops in the early 2000s² This research aims to add to the literature by including the most recent data up to and including 2017, so it can be combined with other research to form an even longer trend line concerning civil liberties and political freedoms in the world. This research also aims to confirm existing results relating to this subject from previous scholarship, thereby strengthening the causal relationship between essential elements clauses and trade. Previous scholarship on this subject uses the term "Non-Trade Issues" or "NTIs" to refer to essential elements clauses in which civil liberties and political freedoms are mentioned (see Lechner, 2016 and 2018; Milewicz, Hollway, Peacock, & Snidal, 2016; and Raess, Dür, and Sari, 2018, among others). For the remainder of this thesis, NTIs will mostly be used to encompass civil liberties and political freedoms, unless there is a need to separate the two.

² For example, Hafner-Burton (2005) time variable ends at 2002, Spilker and Böhmelt (2012) time variable ends at 2009, Cao, Greenhill, and Prakash (2012) time variable ends at 2004. There are only a few more recent studies (Donno and Neureiter, 2017) whose time variable surpasses the 2010s.

In sum, this research hopes to add to the existing literature on NTI effectiveness in trade agreements to analyse whether these clauses are being used in the most effective manner possible, for both contracting parties, to achieve a high standard of civil liberties and political freedoms for all developing economies in the world, and this thesis hopes to do that by answering the subsequent research question and sub-questions.

1.2 Research Question

Studying the effects of trade in relation to civil liberties and political freedoms, on a large scale, is a difficult task in the sense that there are so many variables that can influence civil liberties and political freedoms in a country. Scholars often find, when conducting a quantitative analysis on this topic that, overall, conditionality clauses relating to civil liberties and political freedoms in trade agreements do not influence these rights and freedoms in third countries (see Neumayer, 2005; Spilker & Böhmelt, 2012; Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2007; Zerk, 2019; among others). On a case study level, however, there is more compelling evidence that, in some instances, civil liberties promotion through trade have a positive effect for people in the case study country (see Bartels, 2005). Indeed Hafner-Burton and Ron (2009) state that "those working in more established case study tradition tend toward greater optimism, while those working in the newer quantitative genre are more skeptical" (p. 363).

This thesis attempts to add to the literature by conducting quantitative analysis on the effectiveness of NTIs in EU Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). This leads to the primary research question:

"To what extent does a Non-Trade Issues clause in European Union Preferential Trade Agreements affect the overall civil liberties conditions and political freedoms in third countries?"

In order to answer this central research question, three sub-questions must be answered as well:

1. *What does the previous literature say about the effectiveness of including NTIs in PTAs for the people living in the third countries?*

2. *Does the type of enforcement mechanism, either hard or soft, in EU PTAs matter regarding the outcome of civil liberties and political freedoms in third countries?*
3. *Does the level of trade in third countries affect the extent to which they will comply with EU standards of civil liberties and political freedoms in PTAs?*

The research approach to the primary research question, and the sub-questions will be explored in the next section.

1.3 Research Approach

Answering the first sub-question is essential if there is to be any coherence in the remainder of this thesis. If this research hopes to add to the existing literature in any way, there needs to be a comprehensive understanding of what scholars in the past have deduced regarding this subject area and areas that previous scholars have left out or have been unable to find concrete causality between the independent and dependent variables; therefore, chapter two is dedicated to exploring previous literature. The answer to the second sub-question will help us to understand the effectiveness of hard enforcement compared to soft enforcement, which will shed light on which mechanism should be used in order to achieve a more significant positive effect on the overall civil liberties and political freedoms in these third countries. The third sub-question will help us to answer the extent to which trade is effective in pursuing better civil liberties and political freedoms in third countries. Once all these questions are answered, it will be possible to answer the main question this research posits.

1.4 Relevance

1.4.1 Academic Relevance

As will be discussed in Section 2.1, recent quantitative studies on the effectiveness of including civil liberties and political freedom NTIs in trade are less prevalent than qualitative studies on the same topic; however, there is more recent quantitative scholarship on the effectiveness of environmental NTIs in trade agreements, which will be explored in Section 2.9. There are many previous studies that focus on the relationship between trade and civil liberties (see Zerk, 2019; Bartels, 2008; Aaronson, 2011; Hafner-Burton, 2005, among others) and several scholars have also studied the effectiveness of NTIs in European PTAs on a case study level (see McKenzie & Meissner, 2016; Bartels, 2005; and Meissner & McKenzie

2018, among others). However, there is some recent scholarship that employs quantitative measures to attempt to understand the influence of NTI additions to trade agreements. For example, Cao, Greenhill, & Prakash (2012) examine how bilateral trade influences exporting countries' physical integrity rights. The population sample for this particular study covers a time frame from 1982 to 2004; therefore, the data is quite outdated, and the use of NTIs has increased quite a lot since then.

The second example of quantitative research regarding this subject matter is Donno and Neureiter (2018), who look more specifically at the EU's trade and aid agreements' inclusion of a civil liberties clause from 1990-2012. This thesis will, for the most part, follow the lines of Donno and Neureiter's research method, however, will use a broader timeframe of 1990-2017. 1990 marked the renewal of a significant trade and aid agreement between the EU and the Africa-Pacific-Caribbean (APC) countries, in which civil liberties and political freedoms first found themselves incorporated into such an agreement with the EU; since then the EU has incorporated NTIs in all of their economic agreements. An added departure from Donno and Neureiter's work is that this thesis includes variables on hard and soft enforcement mechanisms to see if the effectiveness of these clauses change with the degree of enforceability. Hafner-Burton (2005a), studies the consequences of divergent enforcement mechanisms for the effectiveness of NTIs in EU PTAs regarding civil liberties and political freedoms on the ground in third countries. This research hopes to fill the gap in current scholarship by lengthening the timeline and making use of current data with the added value of examining enforcement mechanisms specific to the EU.

1.4.2 Societal Relevance

Civil liberties and political freedoms are an intersubjective societal construct which would cease to exist if people collectively disavowed them. Hegemons such as the EU are important actors in the fight for global recognition and promotion of civil liberties and political freedoms; however, the idea of a hegemon imposing their normative ideologies upon other countries is controversial. It could be concluded that including NTIs in trade agreements actually do not improve the lives of the citizens in these signatory states; instead, their inclusion is merely a way for a hegemon to reassert its power position globally. Furthermore, interest groups can have the power to manipulate agreements to their benefit, not necessarily considering the implications for citizens in the signatory states. This research hopes to shed

more light on the societal implications of these types of economic agreements, especially for lesser developed countries.

1.5 Outline

The outline of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 will focus on the literature, theories, and any background information necessary for understanding the complexities of trade and civil liberties and political freedoms. Chapter 3 is the research design where the types of quantitative analysis will be reviewed and ordered logistic regression analysis will be explained further, as it is the choice of research design for this thesis. Chapter 4 will contain the analysis of the data computed in the STATA software, along with tables and graphs, summarising the data. Chapter 5 will be a discussion chapter focusing on what the data derived from the software shows and to what extent, if at all, the hypothesis for the sub and main research questions are correct. This chapter will also consider alternative explanations for the relationships discovered in the previous chapter, as well as some limitations to the research itself. Chapter 6 is the conclusion, where the entirety of this thesis is succinctly summarised, and suggestions for further research are posed.

2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.1 Global Civil Liberties and Political Freedoms Landscape

According to the United Nations (UN) (n.d.), civil liberties are described *inter alia* as "Rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other status. Human rights include the right to life and liberty, freedom from slavery and torture, [and] freedom of opinion and expression" (para. 1). These rights fall under the scope of economic, social and cultural rights, and civil and political rights.

Similarly, regarding political freedoms, beyond the right to vote in fair, multi-party democratic elections, political freedoms also include "an active civil society, a free press, informed and diverse public debate, protest rights and the checks and balances provided by courts and other institutions" (Human Rights Law Centre, n.d., p. 2). The promotion of these rights is seen as integral to a functioning free and just society, and yet, present-day political and civil liberties are in decline. Only 39 percent of the world's population enjoys a "free" status, 24 percent are "partly free" and 37 percent, over a third of the world's population, are

considered "not free" (Freedom House, 2018). Some of the least free countries in the world, as of 2018 are Syria, South Sudan, Eritrea, North Korea, and many others (Freedom house, 2018). Can civil liberties and political freedoms be helped in countries such as these? If so, how and by whom?

While there has been extensive literature on PTAs in world trade, civil liberties and trade, and NTIs in trade agreements, few scholars have examined the effectiveness of the imposition of NTIs in third countries. This chapter begins by describing PTAs' place in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the evolution of PTAs in general, and the proliferation of NTIs within those PTAs. Then the chapter moves on to focus on NTIs in EU PTAs more specifically. From there, the effectiveness of NTIs in PTAs will be discussed, including other forms of NTIs not related to civil liberties or political freedoms.

2.2 How Hegemons Promote Civil Liberties and Political Freedoms

Influencing civil liberties and political freedoms obligations to people around the world is usually done either through aid packages or trade arrangements by large hegemonic states. Regarding aid, conditionality clauses are commonly attached to concessional loan agreements or debt relief packages. For example, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is funded by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and gives government aid for economic development to lesser developed countries (OECD, 2019). Similarly, conditionality clauses are often incorporated into PTAs like association agreements, and partnership and cooperation agreements in trade. Although this thesis focuses on conditionality clauses specifically in trade agreements, another avenue for research would be the effects of civil liberties and political freedoms conditionality when incorporated into aid packages.

Regarding trade, a hegemon like the EU, for example, has engrained this civil liberties and political freedoms - essential elements - clause into the body of every association agreement, and partnership and cooperation agreement since the mid-1990s. Even prior to the formation of the EU, during the Cold War era, some Member States of the then European Community included civil liberties and political freedoms in their foreign affairs (Hafner-Burton, 2005, p. 50). Similarly, the other dominant Western hegemon, the United States has also historically linked civil liberties and political freedoms to its trade negotiations (see Hafner-Burton,

2009). The EU has the power to substantially influence civil liberties and political freedoms as it is the largest economy in the world, champions economic openness, and accounts for 2.79 billion Euros in exports and 2.58 billion Euros in imports every year (European Parliament, 2019, para. 2).

Trade relations are increasingly being used to promote civil liberties and political freedoms. In fact, more than 70 percent (or over 130), of the world's governments participate in PTAs with an NTI style clause of conditionality attached (Aaronson, 2011, p. 443). Within the spectrum of trade relations lie many forms of agreements; this paper focuses on PTAs. PTAs are defined by the World Trade Organization (WTO) (n.d.) as “unilateral trade preferences... which include the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme... as well as other non-reciprocal preferential schemes” (para. 2). The GSP program is a program developed by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which grants additional tariff preferences to developing countries above and beyond the standard Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle (Bartels, 2005, p. 68). Most developed nations employ this GSP in an effort to support developing nations and lift them out of poverty; however, the EU is the only developed nation to attach an 'essential elements' clause to the program (Bartels, 2005, p. 68). PTAs and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) are often coupled together, however, they differ slightly; RTAs are reciprocal in nature, meaning the WTO principle of reciprocity is upheld, and therefore, if one state is benefitting from trade liberalisation by another state, they should offer equivalent concessions in return, whereas PTAs traditionally need not include reciprocal agreements (Ravenhill, 2017, p. 421). However, this difference between PTAs and RTAs seems of little importance when evaluating the effectiveness of civil liberties in trade agreements; therefore, this thesis will follow Hafner-Burton's (2005a) definition of a PTA and interpret them in “the broadest sense possible”, which will include unilateral preferential trade, bilateral and regionalism, reciprocal and non-reciprocal agreements (p. 594).³ With hegemons such as the EU bringing about the practice of incorporating NTIs into their PTAs, there is conceivably an

³ This is done to ensure that the sample size and data collection is large enough and sufficient enough to garner conclusive results.

opportunity to positively impact the civil liberties conditions and political freedoms for peoples whose countries participate in PTAs with the EU and may or may not have lower civil liberties standards or do not subscribe to a fully democratic agenda; so then why has preferential trade become so popular among nations?

2.3 The Evolution of Preferential Trade

Trade agreements have evolved steadily in the post-World War II era. Policy concerns in the 1950s prompted economist Jacob Viner to thoroughly analyse PTAs (Bhagwati, & Panagariya, 1996, p. 82). This Vinerian approach referred to as 'static' concepts, stated that PTAs could either be 'trade creating' or 'trade diverting.' Trade creating refers to how PTAs allow for the import of lower-cost goods, which displaces goods made domestically and trade diversion refers to displacing previous trading partner imports with regional preferential trading partners, who enjoy lower tariffs on goods (Viner, 1950; Ravenhill, 2017, p. 145). If there is more trade diversion than trade creation, the net effect of a "regional scheme on its members' welfare can be negative" (Ravenhill, 2017, p. 145). Bhagwati (1992) adds to the literature with a post-Vinerian view, coining a second term referred to as 'dynamic time-path', which questions "whether PTAs can provide an impetus to, or whether they will detract from, the worldwide nondiscriminatory [*sic*] freeing of trade" (as cited in Bhagwati, Krishna, & Panangariya, 1999, p. xiv). Whether or not there is a definitive answer to the issue regarding the effect of preferential treatment on the multilateral trading order, the proliferation of PTAs can be seen by the sheer increase in numbers that have been announced since the creation of the WTO. Since 1995, the WTO has been notified of more than 400 PTAs, which is more than twice the number of PTAs declared during the pre-WTO, GATT timeframe (1948-1994) (Ravenhill, 2017, p. 142). In practical terms, however, only 16 percent of global merchandise is traded through preferential means; however, they are becoming ever more prominent in world trade (World Trade Organization, 2011, p. 47). One of the primary reasons for the development of PTA activity is the increase of lesser developed countries participation in the multilateral WTO level and divergent interests stemming from the, widely regarded as failed, Doha Round.

2.4 Preferential Trading Within the Confines of the World Trade Organisation

The WTO's core principles are, *inter alia*, reciprocity, and non-discrimination. Reciprocity as a trading principle has been described as "nations giving trade concessions in the form of tariff reduction or market access in order to get similar benefits from their partners" (Capling & Trommer, 2017, p. 118). Non-discrimination encompasses a principle termed Most-Favoured Nation (MFN). This MFN principle requires that "any advantage – such as a lowered tariff – granted by one contracting party to any other country would immediately be accorded to all other contracting parties" (Capling & Trommer, 2017, p. 118). Taking these foundational principles of reciprocity and MFN into account, PTAs are somewhat counterintuitive considering their very nature allows for discrimination. However, the WTO and certain scholars (see Heidrich & Tussie, 2010) believe that PTAs are a positive element of world trade and should complement the multilateral trading system, rather than threaten it; therefore, the WTO allows PTAs via Article 24 of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), Article 5 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the Enabling Clause (WTO, n.d.a, para. 3, 4).

Another reason the WTO allows preferential trade is because of the free-rider issue caused by the MFN principle. Baldwin and Freund (2011), state that although MFN requires countries to extend tariff reductions to all WTO members, "if only a subset of members agrees on significant tariff reduction, other members can... get expanded market access without new commitments" (p. 122). Baldwin and Freund (2011) go on to say that "if all [WTO] members participated equally in MFN tariff reduction; PTAs might not be needed. PTAs enable countries that want to pursue deeper trade liberalization to evade the free-rider problem" (p. 122). This is another reason why PTAs have proliferated in the post-World War II era.

As mentioned in Section 2.3, some scholars suggest some of the reasons for the proliferation of PTAs in recent times, among other things, is due to stagnant developments in the Doha Round of trade negotiations where frustration from lesser developed countries regarding their inability to participate equally with developed countries at the WTO level, coupled with hegemonic decline regarding global influence, and the possibility of PTAs alleviating disruption in commerce relationships lead to this proliferation (Acharya, Crawford, Maliszewska, & Renard, 2011; Bhagwati, 1992; Baldwin, & Freund, 2011; and Mansfield, 1998). The proliferation of PTAs in global trade is a signal of a more significant problem

regarding the functioning of the WTO as a multilateral trade mediator. Using unanimity, as is the practice within the WTO, is becoming ever more cumbersome as the number of states participating in the WTO increases. At the time of its founding in 1994, the WTO had 123 Member States, as of 2016, that number had increased to 164 Member States. The negotiations are especially hard as more and more divergent interests are brought forth. For example, during the Doha Round of 2001, the EU wished for the round to include competition policy, investment, trade facilitation, and government procurement (termed the Singapore Issues); the US was less interested in the Singapore Issues, and more concerned with introducing protectionist measures on labour and the environment, and lesser developed countries, who rejected the inclusion of the Singapore Issues unanimously, were more concerned with addressing the issues related to the partisan results of the previous Uruguay Round regarding agriculture and textiles (Capling and Trommer, 2017, p. 134). The WTO's rounds of trade negotiations are riddled with examples such as the one just mentioned; therefore, it seems inevitable that smaller pockets of trade negotiations between fewer countries have gained in popularity. Preferential trade may have positive effects on trade in general, but it is far from championing the case for multilateralism as a whole.

Scholarship seems to agree with this notion that preferential trade is damaging to multilateralism and is limited regarding the positive effects preferential agreements have on multilateralism as a whole. However, some scholars have argued that regional and preferential trade is a positive evolution from the traditional multilateral, consensus-driven, WTO standard. Some agree that preferential treatment propels world trade into deeper integration and achieves more than what would be possible multilaterally because consensus is easier between "like-minded" countries (see Ravenhill, 2017; and Schott, 2004).

As stated above, consensus between members within the WTO becomes increasingly byzantine, the more additional members (especially hegemonic members) join the organisation. Elaborating from work by Ravenhill (2017), and Schott (2004), it is easier to negotiate trade agreements with fewer participants because there is a lower threshold for finding common ground in negotiations; this is especially true in regional preferential agreements where social, cultural, historical, and economic similarities are often present. This is a strategy the EU employed when negotiating the Lomé conventions, and then the Cotonou agreement with the APC countries. These countries had, for the most part, similar social,

cultural, and economic conditions, therefore, grouping them into one agreement ensured efficient negotiation and substantial rewards for all states once the agreement was concluded and subsequently ratified by the contracting parties. Furthermore, regarding lesser developed countries, PTAs have brought economic or political gains to these developing regions because of easier access for their goods and services to broader, more developed markets (Baier & Bergstrade, 2004; Whalley, 1996, as cited in Hafner-Burton, 2009, p. 6). Additionally, other scholars believe that the WTO has a vital role to play in this new, more fractured trading system, by means of its Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM); however, even this is suffering because of the complexities of multilateralism and the principle of unanimity in the WTO (Gao & Lim, 2010; Heidrich & Tussie, 2010).

The DSM feature concerning regional and preferential trade agreements is utilised relatively infrequently but is quite useful, especially in terms of developing countries and South-South trade agreements. Similarly, the DSM is viewed as the enforcement arm of the WTO (Heidrich & Tussie, 2010; Capling & Trommer, 2017). However, even this feature of the WTO is under attack because of the WTO's unanimity principle. The appellate body which makes up the DSM is at risk of becoming incapacitated because of the US's refusal to vote to elect new judges once previous judges' terms come to an end. Since the current president has been in office, the US has blocked all proposed appointments of judges, leaving the appellate body with just three members,⁴ which is the minimum number of judges needed in order for the DSM to function. By December 2019, when two more judges terms come up for reappointment, the primary enforcement mechanism of the WTO may be unable to provide dispute settlements in the multilateral context. This could further hinder the WTO as a mediator in global trade.

Conversely, other scholarship lends to the idea that preferential trade undermines the WTO as an institution and its regime, as well as the multilateralism trading system as a whole because

⁴ There are only three members at the time of writing, however, if the US continues to block appointments, there will only be one judge left on the appellate body by December 2019, rendering the DSM useless.

of the ability to invoke the Enabling Clause, Article 24 GATT and Article 5 GATS; in a way these Articles are a sort of Achilles heel for the WTO's credibility (see Bhagwati, 1991; Bhagwati, 2008; Schott, 2004; and Picker, 2005). These aforementioned articles and the enabling clause allow for exceptions to the rules set forth by the WTO, and because they are used often for preferential trade, they diminish the authority of the WTO as a trade mediator.

Additionally, some argue that because of the discriminatory nature of these types of preferential agreements, countries the world over will engage in a "race to the bottom with respect to their environmental and civil liberties standards" in order to compete with PTA-induced trade diversion (Cao, Greenhill, & Prakash, 2012, p. 136). This point is particularly important to this thesis because if PTAs cause discrimination between nations and discrimination increases the likelihood of civil liberties violations or decreasing civil liberties standards in signatory states, the very act of having a PTA may be a contributing factor in what the essential elements clause is trying to remedy or positively influence. Baldwin and Freund (2011) believe that preferential agreements can divert limited human capital and additional resources from multilateral negotiations, further undermining the WTO and can lead to a negative balance of world trade where "several trade blocs maintain high external tariffs" (p. 121). Dieter (2009) goes so far as to conclude that PTAs are "suboptimal with regard to economic efficiency, and they are imbalanced because they disadvantage the poor [countries] and systematically strengthen the more developed [countries]" (p. 404).

However, more moderate scholars believe that the effects of preferential treatment in trade are *sui generis* per individual agreement. This seems the most logical explanation regarding the effectiveness of PTAs in general as each contracting state is unique and has distinct economic, political, and social issues at any given time. For example, Schott (2004), believes that the effect preferential agreements have on multilateralism and the WTO, in general, depends on a multitude of factors such as "how the [agreements] are crafted and the volume of trade covered, who participates, and whether significant progress on multilateral reforms proceeds in tandem in the WTO" (p. 4, 5). This thesis may add to the literature in this regard by confirming this belief. Regardless of whether or not preferential trade adds or detracts from multilateralism, PTAs are only increasing in popularity, and the inclusion of NTIs in trade is proliferating right alongside.

2.5 Non-Trade Issues Within Preferential Trade Agreements

International legal doctrines, more specifically the UN human rights treaty bodies, oblige states to do everything in their power to respect, protect, and fulfill civil liberties (Mégret, 2018, p. 97). Contracting parties to these civil liberties treaties have taken this to mean not only respecting, protecting, and fulfilling civil liberties for individuals within their national borders, but also to respect, protect, and fulfill civil liberties for individuals in other states (Mégret, 2018, p. 97). This is often done through the incorporation of NTIs in PTAs. NTIs are non-commercial, or non-economic related clauses which cover areas such as economic and social rights, civil and political rights, and environmental protections (Lechner, 2016, p. 841). The proliferation of NTIs in PTAs can be seen in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1 Proliferation of NTIs in PTAs (Hafner-Burton, n.d.)

The conditionality aspect of NTIs can either be *ex-ante*, *ex-post*, or a combination of the two. *Ex-ante* means that the conditions needing to be met in the agreement are a precondition which must be achieved *before* the signing of the trade agreement, the signatory states must also be able to prove that the conditions can, and will, be maintained throughout the duration

of the trade agreement (at the very least). Proving that conditions inside the state can and will remain above the threshold of what is expected seems an arduous task, for example, since governments change relatively often, social pressures influence changes in policy. An example of an *ex-ante* condition would be monetary policy reform that must be completed before an agreement can be ratified. In the case of civil liberties, certain voting procedures may need to be reformed before the US will ratify an agreement with another state.

Conversely, *ex-post* means that conditions are monitored *after* the agreement is ratified to ensure compliance and continued support. *Ex-post* conditions are also used to guide future decision making for lenders (Shah, 2017, p. 7). As explained further below, the US and the EU, while similar in structure and function (in regard to the fact that both are world hegemonies and they both have a similar western-style belief system), have historically approached conditionality quite differently; the US prefers to use *ex-ante* conditionality, whereas the EU prefers *ex-post* conditionality (Hafner-Burton, 2009, p. 10). This thesis is interested in *measuring the ex-post* effects of EU PTA ratification on civil liberties and political freedoms in signatory states as a means to understand the probability an EU PTA has on effecting positive civil liberties and political freedoms in a third country.

Regarding prior stances on civil liberties obligations and political freedoms, these issues have been noticeably absent from WTO multilateral trade negotiations. There has been some resistance from developing countries to include NTIs in trade agreements. This resistance stems from long-held notions that Western liberal countries incorporate hard to attain standards of civil liberties and political freedoms into trade agreements with developing countries to ensure more protection of their industries (protectionism) from freer trade and deeper integration with less developed countries, all under the guise of promoting civil liberties and political freedoms in third countries (Hafner-Burton, 2009, p. 6). It is easy to see why lesser developed countries feel this way about Western liberal countries, especially after the "inequities" of the Uruguay Round and the general powerlessness lesser developed countries experience within the WTO regarding their hegemonic dependence (Capling & Trommer, 2017, p. 134). The WTO has also, frequently, indicated that its jurisdiction is not in the realm of civil liberties protections, and insists that these protections "should be governed by their own parallel institutions" (Hafner-Burton, 2009, p. 6). For example, in the WTO First Ministerial Declaration (1996), the WTO mentions labour standards and their

“commitment to the *observance* [emphasis added] of internationally recognised core labour standards” and indicates that the International Labour Organisation is the “competent body to set and deal with these standards” (WTO, n.d.b, para. 4). Since civil liberties standards do not fit in line with the multilateral theme, it seems logical that it too would find itself incorporated into PTAs, the other misfit of multilateralism.

Trade has been used to regulate labour and civil liberties standards since the nineteenth century in the positive form of incentives for trade expansion or negative in the form of trade sanctions for non-compliance (Aaronson, 2015, p. 495). More recently, since the 1980s, there has been a proliferation of NTIs in PTAs, and it is predominantly because of the two Western hegemons: the US and the EU; now, more than 131 countries or approximately 70 percent of all countries have participated in a trade agreement containing civil liberties language or requirements (Aaronson, 2011, p. 443). However, even though it is common to find civil liberties language in PTAs, scholars are split about the consequences these NTIs have in preferential trade.

Although the US and the EU are adamant about including NTIs in PTAs, their focus varies rather significantly. Hafner-Burton (2009) finds that the US tends to focus more on labour and children’s rights, often excluding other areas of civil liberties, whereas the EU tends to focus more on the protection of voter and citizen rights and less about worker rights (p. 10).

2.6 Non-Trade Issues Within European Union Preferential Trade Agreements

The first iteration of acknowledging and incorporating civil liberties into EU trade agreements was in the fourth Lomé Convention of 1989, involving the EU and African-Pacific-Caribbean (APC) countries (Haches, 2015, p. 7). The Lomé IV Convention (1989) states, “...respect for and promotion of all human rights...where respect for human rights is recognised as a basic factor of real development and where cooperation is conceived as a contribution to the promotion of these rights” (Art 5.1). However, the inclusion of this clause was most likely only accepted by the APC countries out of necessity and lack of leverage on the APC countries side. Bartels (2005) believes that the APC countries bargaining position was weak because of their worsening economic situation; as well, it was easier to come to an agreement on the inclusion of civil liberties because the APC's aversion to including civil

liberties in trade and aid agreements had lessened, in part, because of previous agreements (p. 15).

Additionally, in this first iteration, there were no negative consequences embedded in the agreement for potential non-compliance; it was merely an attempt to "more precisely define one of the 'objectives and principles of cooperation'" (Hachez, 2015, p. 8). In other words, although it was ground breaking to include civil liberties and political freedoms at all in a trade agreement, the EU took a soft stance on the issue, perhaps to ease the rest of their trading partners into the idea of incorporating these types of NTIs into future agreements. The EU took the lessons from the fourth Lomé Convention and from 1990 onward, under the Commission's authority, within the political framework of the EU (association agreements, partnership, and cooperation agreements), it has incorporated an 'essential elements' clause into the body of these texts (Hachez, 2015, p. 22; Commission, 1995).

Since then, the EU has used different language regarding civil liberties and political freedoms uniquely to different agreements. As will be expanded on in Section 2.7, the EU chose to use soft enforcement in the Lomé convention and took a harder stance on civil liberties and political freedoms in the Baltic States' agreement. A 1998 communication from the Commission provides insights regarding the evolving language, which transformed the mere incorporation of *recognising* civil liberties to adding *consequences* for non-compliance. For example, the phrase "with immediate effect" regarding the suspension of an agreement in instances of a serious breach of civil liberties was incorporated into the Baltic States' agreement (European Commission, 1998, p. 8). This phrasing gives a legal basis for the EU to intervene during occasions of severe civil liberties violations within third countries. This 1998 communication also gives a summary of the consequences possible for non-compliance; for example, "alteration of the contents of cooperation programmes or the channels used; reduction of cultural, scientific and technical cooperation programs; trade embargos; and suspension of cooperation," among others (European Commission, 1998, p. 17). However, it is very seldom that the EU invokes these clauses in light of significant civil liberties breaches in third countries and instead more often chooses to target individuals responsible for violations in order to stave off economic and humanitarian consequences for the general population in third countries (Russell, 2018).

This uncertainty as to when hard or soft enforcement should be used in trade agreements is a signal of something more serious. It is a signal that the EU is still trying to find its footing in regard to its position as an international normative institution. Indeed, sometimes the EU is very adamant about hard enforcement clauses, as was the case with the Canada EU Trade Agreement (CETA) negotiations; while other times, civil liberties and political freedoms language is taken out of the agreement all together, as was the case with the Singapore-EU trade agreement (McKenzie & Messiner 2018; Messiner & McKenzie, 2017). Other scholars indeed argue that the EU is conflicted in its international role, both internally, and externally (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006). Moreover, disagreements within the Union adds to the air of uncertainty regarding the EU as a norm promoter externally, especially considering legitimacy is the "currency" for international normative promotion, the EU must reconcile these contradictions if it ever hopes to influence lasting change through trade (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006, p. 922). On the international level, however, the EU, as a hegemon, has a significant amount of bargaining power, and therefore, can seek to influence freedoms in third countries, if it so chooses. The EU, however, has been known to waiver on its norm promotion, in order to secure lucrative trading relationships (for example in the EU-Singapore trade deal) and this wavering is caused by disagreements between EU-decision makers, which decreases the legitimacy of the EU on an international level because of their lack of a single voice in the international arena (da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014). The EU usually acts as a reformist in relation to bargaining power in that the EU wants to push its norms and values through to third countries by way of trade agreements.

However conflicted the EU may appear to be concerning trade and norm promotion, the EU has many active PTAs with third countries, most of which are in Africa (WTO, n.d.c). Each of these PTAs has a civil liberties and political freedoms' essential elements' clause in one shape or form ingrained in the body of these agreements. Therefore, regardless of the conflicted nature of the EU externally versus internally, the EU has the potential to positively influence civil liberties and political freedoms in at least some of these third countries, with the potential inadvertently to influence other third countries through its legitimacy as well. The next section expands on this further and discusses the ways in which the EU pursues its normative agenda.

2.7 Types of NTI Clauses

Although the practice of inserting NTIs into trade agreements is becoming the norm, there is still much debate on whether or not NTIs belong in trade agreements to begin with, and whether or not they are effective at norm and value promotion in third countries. Some scholars argue that a hegemon only includes NTIs in trade agreements to appease constituencies in their countries (Mosley, 2010, p. 74). Others argue that norm promotion such as civil liberties and political freedoms are more likely to be included in trade agreements insofar as commercial interests will allow (Mckenzie & Meissner, 2017). Donno and Neureiter (2017) posit that third countries will only comply with NTI additions if they are reliant on international benefits (p. 336). An argument for these different conclusions regarding the effectiveness of NTIs in trade is that most scholars will incorporate a variable regarding the type of enforcement mechanism used in each trade agreement. Usually, the hegemon or the more significant trade partner will set the terms of the agreement and will choose one of two types of enforcement mechanisms: hard law or soft law.

2.7.1 Hard Enforcement

Hard Law (or hard enforcement) is defined by Abbott and Snidal (2000) as “legally binding obligations that are precise... and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law” (p. 421). This type of mechanism allows either party to suspend or terminate the agreement in the event of a breach in any of the clauses outlined in the agreement. In other words, if there is a gross overall change in civil liberties or political freedoms in a third country, the EU can chose to suspend or terminate the agreement, and therefore, suspend or terminate the economic opportunities afforded to the third country until such a time that the EU sees fit, if at all.

International actors use hard law for a variety of reasons, mainly to strengthen their credibility among other international actors, as well as ensure they themselves are protected from any non-compliance they may experience from other contracting parties (Shaffer & Pollack, 2010, p. 918). Hard law is also used by international actors to ensure legal action can be brought to international courts or to enable third-party monitoring systems such as the DSM of the WTO to ensure compliance (Shaffer & Pollack, 2010, p. 918).

International hard law does have drawbacks though. First, by restricting the actions a particular state can take, it infringes on that state's sovereignty to act freely whichever way the government chooses (like restricting labour rights, or political rights to its citizens) (Shaffer & Pollack, 2010, p. 719). Second, hard law is sclerotic in the sense that it cannot easily adapt to changing situations, which is especially cumbersome on the international stage where political conditions and formations change often (Shaffer & Pollack, 2010, p. 719).

Finally, employing hard enforcement mechanisms in international relations is difficult since international laws exist only to the extent that contracting parties hold credence in them. In other words, although there are supranational regulatory bodies who adjudicate relations between states, the history of international enforcement has been wrought with complications; this is especially true when states can choose non-compliance and the consequences that brings (whether economic, political, or reputational), rather than comply with supranational rulings on particular cases. A typical example of a state choosing non-compliance despite international ruling is the *US – Gambling* case, in which the US and Antigua utilised the WTO DSM to settle a case where the rules of cross-border provisioning of online gambling services violated specific commitments the US made under the GATS. The WTO ruled in favour of Antigua; however, the case is still being argued 16 years later.

The case for hard enforcement is strong; however, as non-compliance instances are relatively rare, and most states choose to adhere to international law in order to ensure cooperation and more open communication with other states. Lesser developed countries may also be more willing to sign PTAs with hard laws, especially lesser developed countries with new leaders or new democracies, as they can use this as a symbol for commitment to international cooperation and further international integration. In fact, previous scholars have found that hard enforcement is a significant influence over civil liberties and political freedoms standards in third countries when hard enforcement is included in their PTA with the EU (see Spilker & Böhmelt, 2013; and Hafner-Burton, 2005). This leads to the justification and inclusion of the first hypothesis regarding hard enforcement:

H1: EU PTAs with a hard enforcement mechanism are more likely to have a positive impact on the civil liberties conditions and political freedoms in signatory third country states.

2.7.2 Soft Enforcement

Abbott and Snidal (2000) define soft enforcement as "begin[ning] once legal arrangements are weakened along one or more of the dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation... [and] can occur in varying degrees along each dimension and in different combinations across dimensions" (p 422). In other words, soft law is more "commonly defined to include hortatory, rather than legally binding, obligations" (Guzman & Meyer, 2010, p. 172). Based on these two definitions, it is easy to see that soft law has a much looser and fluid definition than hard law does. However, in regard to this thesis, it is crucial to have a concrete definition which allows for the clear distinction between hard law and soft law. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, trade agreements where the inclusion of an article identifying the need for 'respect for civil liberties and political freedoms' *without* the addition of an enforcement mechanism enabling signatories to 'take appropriate measures' to terminate, suspend, or alter the trading relationship if one or both of the parties has failed to fulfill any of its obligations as described in the agreement⁵ is considered soft law or a soft enforcement mechanism. If the agreement has both an essential elements article *and* an enforcement mechanism, the agreement is considered a hard agreement. Soft law, in regard to civil liberties and political freedoms, merely states that the upholding of civil liberties and political freedoms are an essential element of the agreement without the legal opportunity for either party to suspend or terminate the agreement in the event of non-compliance.

Soft law on the international level solves many of the drawbacks of hard law. For example, rationalists would argue soft law does not impede a nations sovereignty, is less costly to negotiate, and is more fluid, allowing for adaptation to the consistent changes in politics and political formations internationally; while constructivists would say that soft law helps in creating open dialogue and channels of communication between international actors, and potentially assist in developing common norms between states (Shaffer & Pollack, 2010, p. 719-721).

⁵ This is an example of the typical phrasing in a standard termination clause within EU trade agreements.

Previous scholarship has indeed focused on the effects of different types of enforcement on the probability of compliance with political and civil liberties obligations. Hafner-Burton (2005a) finds that mere persuasion (soft enforcement) is not enough to affect civil liberties conditions in third countries and coercion (hard enforcement) is needed to garner effective change in these countries. However, other scholarship suggests that third countries only agree to hard law enforcement if their policies and practices are already at a sufficient standard and therefore, these hard laws are more often present in countries where they are needed least (Spilker & Böhmelt, 2013). This leads to the justification and inclusion of our second hypothesis regarding soft enforcement:

H2: EU PTAs with a soft enforcement mechanism are less likely to have a positive impact on civil liberties conditions and political freedoms in signatory third country states.

2.8 Effectiveness of Including Civil liberties and political freedoms Within European Union Preferential Trade Agreements

Presumably, the EU's decision to include NTIs in trade agreements stems from the EU's general interest in being a norm promoter of civil liberties and political freedoms around the world. However, it is still unclear as to whether or not this particular method is the most efficient or effective way of conveying those values. Indeed, Hafner-Burton (2009) suggests that "a sceptic might wonder if these trade regulations are effective against repression or if they are just bits of cheap talk that defy enforcement and are never implemented" (p. 5). In fact, the EU's impact on third-country civil liberties has been "relatively modest" and mostly only spark initial dialogue on the subject, without truly influencing the conditions in third countries (Bartels, 2005, p. 37).

Furthermore, the EU has also been criticized for not putting enough clout into their agreements and are very selective on when they chose to include NTIs in their trade agreements, often choosing whether to include NTIs or not on a "geopolitical" case-by-case basis (Bartels, 2005, p. 40). Other scholars find that the more transparency a lesser developed country has, the more likely the EU is to enter into a PTA with them, leading to the idea that the inclusion of NTIs in trade agreements do not actually help those countries whose civil and political liberties need reform the most (Baccini, 2010; Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2007).

Moreover, the EU to date has never suspended trade preferences with third countries based on civil liberties or political freedoms violations (Zamfir, 2019, p. 7).

However, before concluding that NTIs in EU PTAs is ineffective and fruitless, one must consider the objective of PTAs in the first place. PTAs were not originally designed to influence civil liberties or political freedoms in signatory states, as Hafner-Burton (2005) puts it “they are designed to resolve collective action dilemmas and internalize externalities that cross state borders” (p. 605). Indeed, these clauses give the EU “legal basis to address civil liberties issues with its partners in various other, more constructive ways” (Zamfir, 2019, p. 8). NTIs allow for open communication and political dialogue and allows for the creation of incentives to help improve conditions in lesser developed countries (Zamfir, 2019, p. 8).

Although the EU has never suspended a trade agreement based on civil liberties or political freedoms violations, it has suspended aid packages in light of violations in these categories. More recently, the EU suspended direct financial aid flows to Burundi when a failed military coup created turmoil in Burundi and resulted in a prolonged conflict, over 400 deaths, and over 250,000 Burundian's fleeing Burundi to neighbouring countries (“EU suspends aid to Burundi”, 2016).

Given the EU's intention of positively influencing civil liberties and political freedoms through trade, it stands to reason that, if the level of trade in a third country is high, they will be more reliant on countries or trading bodies like the EU to provide an economically valuable relationship with them and therefore will agree to terms which will solidify the relationship, such as agreements on civil liberties standards and political freedoms. For example, Bangladesh and the EU have a very profitable trading relationship with one another, and they also have a cooperation agreement which includes a hard enforcement mechanism. If Bangladesh experiences some sort of sudden significant change in either civil liberties or political freedoms, the EU has a legal basis to cease trade relations with Bangladesh until the order is restored. The probability of a sudden change in the status of Bangladesh's freedom, by the Bangladeshi government, is presumably lower based in part on their reliance on EU trade and the repercussions of damaging trade relations with the EU. This line of reasoning regarding trade significance and the likelihood of rights and freedoms compliance brings us to our final hypothesis:

H3: The higher the dependency a third country has on trade, the higher the probability of third-country compliance with EU PTAs.

2.9 Effectiveness of Other Types of Non-trade Issues in European Union Preferential Trade Agreements

Civil liberties and political freedoms are not the only non-commercial issues found in PTAs with the EU. Another major issue being studied more and more in this realm of academia is environmental policy as another form of non-commercial conditionality in trade. The first time the EU incorporated environmental provisions into a PTA was the EU-South Africa Trade, Development, and Cooperation Agreement in 2004 (Bastiaens, & Postnikov, 2017, p. 850). Since then, the EU has included environmental protection clauses in many of its trade agreements⁶, but so far, only with soft enforcement mechanism as the EU subscribes to the idea that dialogue is more conducive for influencing environmental policies than coercive action. The United States, on the other hand, has included coercive means to environmental clauses in their trade agreements as well as a higher standard of *ex-ante* compliance (Bastiaens & Postnikov, 2017). Although the EU prefers soft enforcement mechanisms for environmental provisions, they do employ expert panels to review cases in the event of suspected non-compliance; however, if the contracting party is found in violation of the agreement, there is no legal mechanism in which to penalise a country for non-compliance (Bastiaens & Postnikov, 2017).

Environmental protection clauses occur more commonly in trade agreements than do civil liberties and political freedoms. In fact, environmental NTIs are the most common NTI included in trade agreements (46 percent) whereas democracy and civil liberties occur much less frequently (14 and seven percent, respectively) (Milewicz, et al., 2016, p. 751).

Regarding the effectiveness of PTAs and environmental policy outcomes, the literature is

⁶, for example, EU-South Korea Trade Agreement, Canada-EU Trade Agreement (CETA), Japan-EU Trade Agreement, the agreement between the EU and MERCOSUR nations, and many more all include environmental provisions in the text of the agreement.

somewhat mixed. For example, Managi, Hibiki, and Tsurumi (2009) find that the extent to which trade impacts the environment depends entirely on which pollutant is being measured, and which country is being studied (p. 357). However, other scholars have found that there is a significant link between countries who have environmental NTIs in trade agreements and lower levels of environmental pollutants. For example, Baghdadi, Martinez-Zarzoso, and Zitouna (2013) found that carbon dioxide emission per capita was 18% lower in countries who had a trade agreement stipulating environmental provisions than countries who had no such agreement (p. 386). Similarly, Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (1998) find that in general, if trade openness increases output and income by one percent, pollution concentrations fall by the same amount, indicating that freer trade has positive effects on the environment (p. 41).

Colyer (2011) sums up the mixed results quite well. Colyer (2011) says that if the provisions in the trade agreement that indicate a need to enhance and enforce laws for environmental regulation, there are some positive contributions, although enforcement is quite an issue. Furthermore, if the provisions in the trade agreement merely state that a third country cannot lower its current environmental standards (in order to attract investment), then the result is also positive. However, threats and coercive measures in trade agreements seem to have a negative impact on environmental protection measures. In sum, the effectiveness of environmental protection measures in trade agreements seems to be, like civil liberties and political freedoms, unique to each individual agreement and third-country.

3. Research Design

3.1 Introduction

The main objective of any research inquiry is to discover whether or not, or to what extent, a causal relationship exists between a predictor variable (X) and at least one outcome variable (Y). The research design that will be employed for this particular research question is known as a quasi-experimental ordered logit design. This section begins by explaining why a quantitative method was used over a qualitative method. Then, the different general styles of quantitative designs along with the benefits and flaws of these types of research designs will be explored, which will provide the justification for using a quasi-experimental ordered logit design for this specific research. The population sample will then be discussed, including

how the sample was chosen and which criteria were used. Subsequently, the predictor, outcome, and control variables will be listed and explored.

3.2 Quantitative, Quasi-Experimental Ordered Logit Design

In general, there are two different schools of research design: qualitative and quantitative. Qualitative research is a broad term to describe social science research which focuses primarily on “non-numerical forms of data” (such as interviews, surveys, and observations), and is best suited for smaller N sample sizes; indeed, a single case can be used in qualitative research (Salkind, 2010, p. 1159).

This research is interested in measuring the overall effectiveness of NTIs in EU PTAs through analysing and measuring specific variables in statistical modelling software, and therefore it would be more impactful if many cases (large N) were observed. Measuring raw numerical data is a crucial component of quantitative research; which is the main divergent point from qualitative analysis. Furthermore, most of the observations come from secondary sources such as databanks and yearly third-party reports, which is typical for a quantitative research design.

Salkind (2010) states, "quantitative research studies produce results that can be used to describe or note numerical changes in measurable characteristics of a population of interest; generalize to other, similar situations; ... and explain causal relationships" (p. 1166).

Quantitative research is fundamentally based on the scientific method, where measurement is a necessary component and involves "an empirical or theoretical basis for the investigation of populations and samples" (Salkind, 2010, p. 1166). Quantitative research designs can be either experimental, quasi-experimental, or non-experimental. This research employs the use of a quasi-experimental design; however, the other designs will be elaborated on to justify the use of quasi-experimental design.

A true experimental design according to Kellstedt & Whitten (2013) is a "research design in which the researcher both controls and randomly assigns values of the [predictor] variable to the participants" (p. 72). In other words, the researcher has control to assign random groups to either receive an intervention or not. In this case, the intervention, or the primary predictor variable is the implementation of an EU PTA with an NTI clause; therefore, it is impossible

to pursue this type of research design since we cannot choose which states receive a PTA arrangement with the EU and which states do not receive a PTA with the EU.

In both quasi-experimental and non-experimental research designs, the researcher cannot randomly assign members to groups, because the groups have already been pre-assigned, or are pre-existing (Salkind, 2010, p. 911). In this instance, the main difference is that quasi-experimental design is best suited if there is a sample population which has experienced some sort of intervention (in this case, the intervention is the ratification of an EU PTA with an NTI clause attached to it). In descriptive research, the researcher is purely comparing existing groups based on non-manipulated variables, which makes it impossible to draw causal inferences on the observed phenomenon. Since this research is measuring the net change in civil liberties standards and political freedoms after the intervention of an EU PTA in third countries, the use of non-experimental research design would be an inappropriate method.

This leads us to the final, and most appropriate, quantitative research design: quasi-experimental. A quasi-experimental research design is often done in retrospect, after a particular phenomenon has occurred and is used when it is impossible to have a true randomized sample population because of ethical or, in this case, practical constraints (Salkind, 2010, p. 1171). Since this paper is concerned with EU PTA agreements already in place in third countries, the research is retrospective; similarly, as mentioned before, having control to manipulate the primary predictor variable is not an option, which is why case selection must be made non-randomly. Because of the lack of a control group in a quasi-experiment, there are some threats to internal validity, the main one being the high likelihood that a reasonable alternative explanation for the outcome exists other than the predictor variable listed (Salkind, 2010, p. 1172). Shadish, Cook, & Campbell (2002) identify more threats to internal validity, *inter alia*, uncertainty regarding which variable occurred first; "selection problems", relating to differences over conditions in respondent characteristics that could also cause the observed effect; "history", where events occur concurrently with the intervention; and "maturation", regarding naturally occurring changes over time (p. 55). However, researchers have statistical control in quasi-experimental research design through the use of controls, which helps to increase the validity of the study. Control can be used to remedy these threats and will be discussed later in this chapter.

3.3 Empirical Method

The scope of quasi-experimental research design is broad. Several research methods fall under this title. For this research, an ordinal logistic regression research design will be employed.⁷ Logistical regression is used predominantly for analysing the relationship between the outcome variable(s) to one or more predictor variable(s) specifically when the outcome variable is categorical or also sometimes referred to as limited variables (Salkind, 2010, p. 731; Williams, 2016, p. 8). In other words, the outcome variable data is ordinal in nature with three or more categories. An example, of an ordinal scale, would be the level of education achieved (less than high school, high school, some post-secondary, post-secondary, and so on). In regard to this research, there is one outcome variable relating to the freedom status of the third country, measured on a scale from one to three, one being "free," two being "partly free," and three being "not free." The freedom status is based on the combined and averaged overall status of civil liberties and political freedoms(which is measured from one to seven). Other scholarship has opted to use panel data when dealing with civil liberties and trade; however, Neumayer (2005) argues that the ideal method to employ for this type of outcome variable is ordered logit (p. 936).⁸ Hafner-Burton (2005) also opts to use ordered logit analysis when testing the level of government repression and PTAs. Ordered logit analysis is interested in "prediction, regardless of whether causality is implied" and therefore this research will follow Salkind (2010) in their use of the term "outcomes" and "predictors" rather than "dependent" and "independent" variables (P. 731).

The general formula for ordered logit regression is:

⁷ The term logistic regression is polyonymous, it is also known as ordered logit, ordered probit, polytomous logistic regression, among others. However, for this text, ordinal logistic regression will be used unless a direct quote is inserted in the text where another author uses another term for this style of regression analysis.

⁸ At the time of Neumayer's publication, 2005, the statistical modelling software was not capable of computing ordered logit. However, this is an available feature now in STATA, and therefore, this research employs ordered logit regression.

Equation 1

$$\text{logit}(Y_m) = \alpha_m + \beta_1 X_{it} + \beta_2 X_{it} + \beta_3 X_{it} \dots + \beta_k X_k$$

Where: Y is the polytomous outcome; $\text{logit}(Y)$ is the natural logarithm of the odds of Y ; α is the intercept, which represents the value of $\text{logit}(Y)$ when all the X_k values are equal to zero; β_k for the regression coefficient; X for the predictor variables; i for the unit of observation; t for the time period.

Adding the variables specific to this research we arrive at the following model:

Equation 2

$$STA_{it} = a_m + \beta_1 PTA_{it} + \beta_2 TRA_{it} + \beta_k X_k$$

Where STA represents the level of overall civil liberties and political freedoms in a given country, i ($i = [1 \dots 44]$), for a given year t ($t = [1 \dots 28]$); PTA is a dummy variable representing if there was a PTA in a given country, i , at a given time, t , 0 denotes “no PTA”, 1 denotes “PTA”; TRA_{it} represents a countries exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP in the given country, i , during a given year t .

Regarding the enforcement mechanism in sub question two we must run another model to see the effect of enforcement on civil liberties, and political freedoms. PTA and ENF cannot be included in the same equation because ENF is a dummy variable which exists only in the event of a PTA, if PTA is coded as a “0” it means there is no PTA and therefore no enforcement mechanism. Enforcement is a common variable included in many quantitative studies regarding civil liberties and political freedoms (see Donno and Neureiter (2017), Hafner-Burton (2005a); Hathaway, (2002); Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui (2005), among others). Coding for enforcement allows this research to answer the sub-question regarding enforcement and our primary research question as well, therefore, there will be a second model to analyse the effects of enforcement specifically which will look like this:

Equation 3

$$STA_{it} = a_m + \beta_1 ENF_{it} + \beta_2 TRA_{it} + \beta_k X_k$$

ENF is the dummy variable representing if the enforcement mechanism when $PTA = 1$ was soft (0) or hard (1) in the given country, i , during a given year, t .

Furthermore, there are other factors that are thought to influence the relationship between freedom and PTAs with the EU. For example, other studies suggest the level of aid dispersed to a country (Donno & Neureiter (2017)); population density (Spilker & Böhmelt (2013); Hafner-Burton (2005b); Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui (2007); Cao, Greenhill, & Prakash (2012); and Neumayer (2005)), involvement in internal or external armed conflict (Donno & Neureiter (2017), Neumayer (2005); Donno (2012); and Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui (2007)), and whether or not a country has ratified the International Convention Against Torture (ICAT), or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (Spilker & Böhmelt (2013); and Donno (2012)), all have an impact on whether or not a country is likely to comply with NTIs in PTAs; Figure 2 below has a visual breakdown of the variables several authors included in the more prominent quantitative studies on this subject. These other variables are important to add to the equation as well since they will have an effect on the probability of compliance in third countries to uphold or improve their civil liberties practices and political freedoms. As well, this research opted for two regressions, one for the *inclusion* of PTA while *excluding* enforcement, and the other *excluding* PTA, while *including* enforcement. This was selected rather than a three-level dummy in order to see the effects on all the variables with each regression. Therefore, the equations below are the final equations for this research:

Equation 4

$$STA_{it} = \alpha_m + \beta_1 PTA_{it} + \beta_2 TRA_{it} + \beta_3 \log EUA_{it} + \beta_4 RAT1_{it} + \beta_5 RAT2_{it} + \beta_6 \log POP_{it} + \beta_7 CON_{it} + \beta_\kappa X_\kappa$$

Equation 5

$$STA_{it} = \alpha_m + \beta_1 ENF_{it} + \beta_2 TRA_{it} + \beta_3 \log EUA_{it} + \beta_4 RAT1_{it} + \beta_5 RAT2_{it} + \beta_6 \log POP_{it} + \beta_7 CON_{it} + \beta_\kappa X_\kappa$$

As will be explained in chapter four, two of the variables were logged to create a more normal distribution. Therefore, EU aid and population density are both shown in their log format. *CON* is a dummy variable where 0 represents a year in which there was no internal or external armed conflict involving the state, and 1 denotes a year in which there was either internal or external armed conflict involving a state, or if there was both internal and external armed conflict in a given state, *i*, at a given time, *t*; and *RAT1* and *RAT2* are categorical

dummy variables where *RAT0* would be no ratification of the ICAT or the ICCPR and therefore, *RAT1* is one ratification of either convention, and *RAT2* is ratification of both conventions at a given time, *t*. Ratification has been included in other scholarly work and has been specified in this way to see if the propensity to adhere to and improve civil liberties and political freedoms increases with more ratifications to international covenants regarding these topics (see Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005). This ratification variable was operationalised in this way, rather than two separate variables because the ICCPR and the ICAT are considered the most important effective international treaties regarding civil liberties and political freedoms and it was thought that to distinguish between a country signing the ICCPR versus the ICAT or vice versa was redundant and would prove the same point; however, signing both may prove to be more influential than just signing one (Hathaway 2002).

Author/Control Variables	Population	Political stability	GDP	Trade	Internal + External armed conflict	Aid	Ratification of ICCPR or ICAT (0-2)
Spilker + Böhmelt (2013)	• (density)	• (polity scale)	• (pc)	• (%GDP)			•
Hafner-Burton (2005)	• (density)	• (polity scale)	• (pc)	• (%GDP)			
Donno + Neureiter (2017)	• (> 1 million)		• (pc)	• (%GDP)	• (Civil War)	• (%GDP)	
Cao, Greenhill, Prakash (2012)	• (density)	• (Polity Scale)	• (pc)	• (%GDP)			
Neumayer (2005)	• (density)	• (Polity Scale)			•		
Donno (2012)	• (> 1 million)		• (pc logged)	• (%GDP)	• (Civil War)	• (%GDP)	• (ICAT)
Hafner-Burton + Tsutsui (2007)	• (density)	• (Polity Scale)	• (pc logged)	• (%GDP)	•		

Figure 2 Main variables used in previous studies on repression and trade agreements

3.4 Ordinal Logistic Regression assumptions and tests

Logistic regression is quite different than linear regression and general linear models in the sense that it does not make the same key assumptions as the linear models do, which are based on ordinary least squares algorithms. This is especially the case regarding “linearity, normality, homoscedasticity, and measurement level” (Statistic Solutions, n.d., para. 1). There need not be a linear relationship between the outcome and predictor variables, and therefore, it is much more complex and can handle a variety of units of measurements for the

individual variables. However, there are four assumptions one must take into account when conducting an ordinal logistic regression.

First, the outcome variable must be ordinal in nature. In this case the outcome variable is ordinal because the freedom status outcome variable is measured on a scale from one to three, much like a point scale in surveys (one for strongly agree, two for agree, three for neither agree nor disagree, and so on). Therefore, this assumption has not been violated by the data.

Second, one or more predictor variables are continuous, ordinal, or categorical (including dichotomous variables) (Laerd Statistics, n.d.a, para. 8). The first predictor variable is dichotomous in nature (dummy variable) where 0 denotes no PTA and 1 denotes there is a PTA. The second predictor variable is type of enforcement mechanism, which is also a dichotomous dummy variable. The third predictor variable is the influence of trade in a third country, which is measured as a percentage and, as such, is considered a continuous variable. A continuous variable is also known as a quantitative variable, meaning their defining characteristic is that they need be measured along a “continuum” and that they “have a numerical value” (Laerd Statistics, n.d.b, para. 16). The last predictor variable is EU aid as a percentage of third country GDP, this, like trade as a percentage of GDP. This, like trade as a percentage of GDP, is also considered a continuous variable. Therefore, none of the predictor variables violate the second assumption of ordinal regression analysis.

Third, there must be no multicollinearity. Multicollinearity occurs where there are two or more predictor variables which are highly correlated with one another (Laerd Statistics, n.d.a, para. 9). If statistical results show that there is multicollinearity, it leads to problems in understanding which predictor variable explains the phenomenon the research is trying to discern. For example, if there is multicollinearity between PTA_{it} and EUA_{it} , it will be difficult to discern if it is the PTA which is affecting civil liberties and political freedoms in the third country, or if it is the EU aid that is affecting civil liberties and political freedoms in the third country. This multicollinearity can be checked for with the statistical software, which, in Section 4.4 will be discussed.

Finally, assumption four require the data meet the proportional odds assumption. Proportional odds assumption assumes that “for each term included in the model, the slope estimate

between each pair of outcomes across two response levels are assumed to be the same regardless of which partition [is] consider[ed]” (Statistical Consultancy Team, 2016, para. 6). In other words, because the outcome variables are categorical, it is assumed that the probabilities between each level (one to three) is the same, so moving from one to two is the same as moving from two to three. Furthermore, proportional odds assumption can also be called parallel-lines assumption because in this assumption, if it is not violated, the regression lines of the ordinal dependent variable will be parallel to one another. However, unfortunately for this type of regression, the proportional odds assumption is often violated because the regression coefficient (β) often differ across values and therefore, the proportional odds assumption is “overly restrictive” (Williams, 2006, p. 60). There is a test that can be used to check if this assumption has been violated, and if so, there are ways in which the model can be adjusted to correct for the violation. This will be expanded upon in Section 4.5.

3.5 Population and sample

As stated before, the inclusion of civil liberties and political freedoms in trade agreements with the EU has been commonplace since the fourth Lomé Convention in 1990, therefore, the time period in this research will be from 1990 up to and including 2017, a period of 28 years. 2017 was the most recent year that included all the data for the variables selected. Furthermore, preferential treatment in trade is usually reserved for developing economies, where tariff reductions are given to them to allow greater access to foreign markets. Similarly, some scholars argue that the hegemonic nature of the EU allows it to successfully pressure lesser developed countries into ratifying PTAs with NTIs attached because the value of the trade agreement outweighs the cost of implementing civil liberties reforms (Milewicz, et al., 2016). Therefore, this research narrowed down the pool of candidate countries first by controlling for any country that, on average from 1990 to 2017, was considered middle-income or higher; the sample, therefore, consists of countries whose average GNI over the 28-year period was either low-income countries or low-middle-income countries. Low income countries are defined by the World Bank as having a Gross National Income (GNI) of 995 US per capita or less in 2017, low-middle income is a GNI between 996 USD and up to and including 3,895 USD per capita (World Bank, 2018, para. 3). Appendices one to six show the trend of GNI for each of the countries in each region over the 28-year period.

Another filter that was added to the initial population was omission based on lack of data. Since GNI per capita was a crucial component in categorising low and low-middle income countries, if more than 20 percent of the data was missing in the 28-year period, the country was omitted. 20 percent of 28 is 5.6 missing data points, however if more than five data points were missing, the country was omitted. Once this filter was applied, there were a significant amount of omissions, because of a lack data in the early 90s from developing countries. Of the countries that fell within the 20 percent threshold, any data that was missing was filled in using the average GNI per capita three years surrounding the missing data point. These filters led to the final sample population of 44 countries, dispersed in six of the seven world regions (as defined by the World Bank). The one region not included in the sample was North America, which is comprised, according to the World Bank, of Canada, the United States, and Bermuda, all of which do not qualify as low or low-middle income countries. This thesis chose to omit all the countries who had more than 20 percent of the data missing, rather than fill in the missing sources because most of the data regarding the freedom status came from Freedom House, which has a unique methodology based on over 60 data points to conclude a single country's freedom status. Freedom house has dozens of sections for awarding points to countries on the basis of their civil liberties and political freedoms standards, as such, it would be close to impossible to attempt to measure the countries with the missing data as accurately as Freedom House has done, while simultaneously decreasing this study's validity because of the subjective nature of the task.

The sample population is comprised of nine percent East Asia and Pacific, 11 percent Europe and Central Asia, 18 percent Latin America and the Caribbean, 11 percent Middle East and North Africa, nine percent South Asia, and 41 percent Sub-Saharan Africa. The disproportionate amount of countries residing in Sub-Saharan Africa in the sample population is attributed to the large number of countries party to the single overarching Cotonou

Agreement⁹, which is a PTA between the 79 APC countries and the EU. The breakdown of countries can be seen in Figure 3.

Regions	Number of Countries in Region	Number of Countries in Region in Sample	Percentage of Countries in Region in Sample	Number of Countries in Sample	Percentage of Sample Countries in Region
East Asia and Pacific	38	4	11%	44	9%
Europe and Central Asia	58	5	9%	44	11%
Latin America and the Caribbean	42	8	19%	44	18%
Middle East and North Africa	21	5	24%	44	11%
North America	3	0	0%	44	0%
South Asia	8	4	50%	44	9%
Sub-Saharan Africa	48	18	38%	44	41%
Total	218	44	20%	44	99%* * Rounding error

Figure 3 Regional Distribution of Countries in Universe and in Sample Population.

⁹ The Cotonou Agreement is the evolution of the Fourth Lomé Convention, which expired in 1999. The Cotonou Agreement is valid from the time period of 2000 – 2020 and focuses on growth and development for the APC countries and deeper integration with the EU.

3.6 Operationalisation

In order to statistically test the relationship between the outcome variable and the predictor variables, we must operationalise these variables, and the controls in this research. This section discusses each variable, where their information and data comes from, and the justification for the use of each of the specific variables. See Section 3.5.4 for the whole operationalisation table.

3.6.1 Outcome variable

The main research question in this thesis discusses the likelihood that civil liberties and political freedoms in third country trade partners increase after a PTA with an NTI clause is introduced between the EU and said third country. The unit of analysis therefore is the net change in civil liberties and political freedoms over a period of time, rather than the consequences afforded to third parties in the event of non-compliance. The data collection for both civil liberties conditions and political freedoms will rely heavily on third party indices such as the Freedom House index and Human Rights Watch.

The outcome variable is comprised of the data for ranking civil liberties and political freedoms and put together into one outcome variable indicating the overall status of the third country (either free, partially free, or not free). This combination of both civil liberties and political freedoms was done because of the lack of evidence that the two are wholly different from one another, or different enough to warrant them as two separate outcome variables. For example, Langois (2003), states that “without democracy, human rights are at the discretion of the sovereign, and thus not rights at all” (p. 1019). Focusing on both civil liberties and political freedoms as one unit of measurement streamlines the outcome of the analysis, as well as more succinctly describes the relationship between trade and the rights of the person. Also, since the two freedoms are so intertwined with one another, separating them, as many scholars do, detracts from any definitive conclusion regarding trade and civil liberties or political freedoms while simultaneously creating a confusing landscape for “readers and policy makers alike” (Hafner-Burton & Ron, 2009, p. 385).

3.6.1.1 Civil liberties conditions

As explained in Chapter Two, this research follows the definition of civil liberties as described by the UN. The main index used to measure each country's level of civil liberties in a given year is Freedom House. Similarly, Freedom House's methodology also follows in line with the Universal Declaration of Civil liberties and believes that these "standards apply to all countries and territories, irrespective of geographical location, ethnic or religious composition, or level of economic development" (Freedom House, 2019, para. 2). Freedom House categorises civil liberties on a scale from one to seven, one being the "freest" and seven being the "least free". However, ordered logistic regression assumes that larger values are associated with higher outcomes, therefore, the scores of each sample were inverted, where now, one denotes the "least free" and seven is the "freest". Each year, each country has a total possible score of 60 regarding civil liberties, the Figure 4 below is a breakdown of total scores to civil liberties rating.

Total Scores	Civil Liberties
53-60	7
44-52	6
35-43	5
26-34	4
17-25	3
8-16	2
0-7	1

Figure 4 Civil Liberties Ranking Scores

Similarly, in order to group these ordinal outcome values into an easier to interpret model, we will follow Freedom House's methodology and group the values further, together with

political freedoms. The categorisation can be seen in Figure 6 below and has been inverted from the original Freedom House methodology since ordinal regression assumes higher values are more positive than lower values. The distributional frequencies of civil liberties can be found in Appendix 8.

The topics which are covered under the civil liberties umbrella include, *inter alia*, freedom of expression and belief, academic freedom, freedom of assembly, independent judiciary, equal treatment under the law, personal autonomy, and equal opportunity (Freedom House, 2019). Freedom House is a US-based Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) that has been releasing yearly reports on civil liberties and political rights, among other things, since 1941. Although a large portion of their funding comes from the US government, they are a very transparent organisation, publishing their financial statements every year, as well as employing third party auditors to independently assess Freedom House's financials, which lends to their commitment to transparency and non-partisan nature of the organisation. Any large net change in civil liberties conditions from one year to the next will be corroborated with reports from Civil liberties watch publications

3.6.1.2 Political freedoms

The data for political freedoms also comes from Freedom House. When evaluating political freedoms, Freedom House is more concerned with the “real-world rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals, rather than governments or government performance per se” (Freedom House, 2019, para. 3). This allows Freedom House to evaluate political freedoms of the individual apart from the effects of both state and non-state actors, making their data ideal for measuring the overall condition of political freedoms for individuals in a state. The methodology for political freedoms is the same as civil liberties, where there is a scale from one to seven, seven being “freest” and one being “least free”.¹⁰ Each year, each country has a total possible score of 40 regarding political freedoms; Figure 5 below is a breakdown of total

¹⁰ Again, this ranking has been inverted from the original Freedom House data to suit ordinal regression models.

scores to political freedoms rating. A country is considered “free” if they have a combined average score from both the civil liberties and political freedoms categories between one to two and a half, they are considered “partly free” if the country’s overall score is between three and five, and they are considered “not free” if their overall score is between five and a half and seven; this data can be found in Figure 6 (Freedom House, 2019, para. 16). The distributional frequencies of political freedoms can be found in Appendix 9.

The topics which are covered under the political freedoms umbrella include, *inter alia*, electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government (Freedom House, 2019). However, with political freedoms, it is possible for a country to receive a score of less than zero if it receives mostly zeros in all the political freedom categories and receives a “sufficiently negative score” in their “discretionary political rights question”, which measures the extent to which an oppressive regime deliberately alters the ethnic composition of a state, either through economic incentives, forcible removal, disproportionate incarceration, or killings of certain ethnic groups, to favour another group; however, even if these acts are being committed, the state’s score would still be a seven (Freedom House, 2019).

Political Freedoms							
Total Scores	Political Freedoms	Total Score	Political Freedoms	Total Scores	Political Freedoms	Total Scores	Political Freedoms
36-40	7	30-35	6	24-29	5	18-23	4
12-17	3	6-11	2	0-5	1		

Figure 5 Political Freedoms Ranking Scores

Combined average score of civil liberties and political freedoms (freedom score)	Freedom Status
1.0 to 2.5	Not Free
3.0 to 5.0	Partly Free
5.5 to 7	Free

Figure 6 Freedom score breakdown for civil liberties and political freedoms

3.6.2 Predictor Variable

Predictor variable is a term used for an independent variable in regression analyses and “provides information on an associated dependent variable regarding a particular outcome” (Salkind, 2010, p. 1079). The term comes from applied mathematics which uses “probability theory to estimate future occurrences of an event based on collected quantitative evidence” (Salkind, 2010, p. 1079). In this research, the main predictor variable is whether or not the EU has a PTA with a third country in which there is an NTI essential elements clause attached. The second predictor variable deals with the enforcement mechanism included in the PTA between the EU and a third country. The data for EU PTAs, as well as the enforcement mechanism was collected through a comprehensive treaty database provided by the European Union External Action Service.

3.6.2.1 Non-trade issues clause in a preferential trade agreement with the European Union

As explained in Chapter 2 this research follows in line with the definition of a PTA as described by Hafner-Burton (2005), which includes and interprets PTAs very broadly to include unilateral PTAs, bilateral PTAs, regionalism, and reciprocal and non-reciprocal trade agreements. These agreements mostly fall under the scope of association agreements, partnership agreements, or cooperation agreements. An overview of each of the countries included in the final sample, along with their respective agreements can be found in Appendix 7.

Previous scholarship suggests that preferential trading is an effective way to promote civil liberties and political freedoms in lesser developed countries (see Aaronson, 2011; Donno & Neureiter, 2017; De Santis & Vicarelli, 2006; and Sicurelli, 2017). Conversely other scholarship suggests that preferential trading is ineffective for supporting and promoting civil liberties and political freedoms in lesser developed countries, or that the EU makes concessions on civil liberties obligations when economic interests are more pertinent (see Hafner-Burton, 2007, Hafner-Burton, 2005; Mckenzie & Meissner, 2017; Meissner & Mckenzie, 2018; Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006). This research intends to add to the existing literature on the extent to which PTAs with NTIs influence civil liberties and political freedoms in third countries and has therefore chosen NTI PTA with the EU as the first predictor variable.

3.6.2.2 Enforcement mechanism in a Preferential Trade Agreement

The second predictor variable, which will help to answer the first sub-question is the type of enforcement mechanism the EU chooses to employ in trade agreements. Exploring the idea that there may be a link to types of enforcement and the probability that third countries will comply with civil liberties and political freedom standards as set out in the UDHR will help to provide a more thorough explanation to the central research question in this thesis. As explained in Section 3.3, enforcement is a common variable in quantitative studies dealing with civil liberties and political freedoms (see Donno and Neureiter (2017), Hafner-Burton (2005a); Hathaway, (2002); Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui (2005)). Although in the past the EU may have been more prone to using soft enforcement in its trade agreements, our sample population shows that the distribution of hard versus soft enforcement is nearly 50/50;¹¹ this could be an indicator that, in more recent years, the EU has begun pursuing a more coercive foreign policy strategy.

¹¹ The distributional frequency of enforcement mechanisms in the sample population can be found in Appendix 11.

As explained above, all the data for PTA and enforcement mechanisms were obtained from a treaty database provided by the European External Action Service and an overview of the population sample and the enforcement mechanism used in their respective agreements with the EU is in Appendix 7 and the distributional frequency of PTAs in the sample population can be found in Appendix 10.

3.6.2.3 Trade Openness

The final predictor variable employed in this research is the level of trade in the sample population. Previous scholarship suggests that the more significant the trade or trading partner is in regard to GDP of a third country, the more likely they are to comply with NTIs in trade agreements. The raw data was collected from the World Bank Data Bank in the form of exports as a percentage of GDP and imports as a percentage of GDP, then it was operationalised to fit in line with this research in the final form of exports as a percentage of GDP plus imports as a percentage of GDP. The traditional purpose of a PTA is to allow less barriers to entry of smaller economies into larger economies, in other words, the smaller countries would be privy to less tariffs on their exports to developed larger economies; however, if a developing country is a net importer, the reduction of tariffs for export seems to matter less. Most of the previous quantitative research has this variable included in their equations (see Spilker & Böhmelt, 2013; Hafner-Burton, 2005; Donno & Neureiter, 2017; Cao, Greenhill & Prakash, 2012; and Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2007).

3.6.3 Alternate Explanation Variables

There are other factors that could very well influence civil liberties and political freedoms in lesser developed countries. This model will also consider potential alternate elements which can affect these conditions.

3.6.3.1 Level of EU Aid dependence in third country

The level of aid dependence a third country has may be significant in the probability of compliance of trade agreements. More specifically, to add to the robustness of the research, EU specific aid will only be included. If a third country is significantly dependent on the EU as a source of aid, they could be more likely to comply with civil liberties and political freedom standards imposed by the EU in trade agreements. Donno and Neureiter (2017)

hypothesise that civil liberties commitments become more effective for decreasing repression the more dependent the trading partner is on EU aid (p. 340). To collect this data, information was collected regarding net Official Development Assistance (ODA) given by EU institutions to portions of the sample population in constant US dollars from the OECD STAT Databank. Next the individual GDP of the sample population was collected from the World Bank Databank in constant US dollars, and from there EU funded ODA was calculated into a percentage of the third country's GDP. Some countries received no ODA funding from the EU, while other countries have received funding every year of the sample. Constant dollars are used without exception in regard to any dollar amount in these variables. Constant dollars are the most appropriate method when examining trends over time, as constant dollars corrects for inflation. EU aid was logged to show a more normal distribution.

3.6.3.2 Internal or External Armed Conflict

A second alternate explanation that could influence the level of civil liberties and political freedoms in third countries is internal or external armed conflict. This research will code internal or external armed conflict as a dummy variable for any year a state was involved in an internal or external armed conflict. One can reasonably assume that if a state, at any time, is involved in an armed conflict, the chances of civil liberties and political freedoms becoming compromised is higher than if the state is experiencing a time of peace. Indeed, Donno and Neureiter (2017) find that there is a statistically significant relationship between armed conflict and physical integrity rights and political rights when determining the effects of civil liberties clauses on these rights. For this dummy variable the data was collected through Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), from the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at the University of Uppsala in Sweden. UCDP is the world's main provider of data regarding organised violence and the longest running data collection program for civil conflict (Uppsala Universitet, n.d.a, para. 1). UCDP's definition of what constitutes armed conflict is rather precise and states that armed conflict is "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year" (Uppsala Universitet, n.d.b, para. 3).

3.6.3.3 Ratification of the ICCPR or ICAT or both

A final alternate explanation variable that will be employed in this research is the extent to which the third country has ratified either the ICCPR or the ICAT or has ratified both. A state which has signed and ratified the ICCPR or the ICAT presumably is a state which is committed to ensuring a high standard of civil liberties. It is also a symbol to the international community as a whole that the state holds similar values and beliefs as other states who have also ratified one or both of the conventions. This has been shown in previous studies (see Spilker & Böhmelt, 2012) to be very statistically significant regarding hard law PTAs and civil liberties compliance. Presumably, the years following the ratification of these conventions would show a high level of civil liberties and political freedoms in the signatory states and therefore should be included and tested as a potential alternate explanation. The data about ratification of these conventions comes from the United Nations Treaty Database¹² where each state is listed and the status of ratifying the convention is documented.

3.6.4 Control Variables

Control variables are necessary to help ensure reliability and validity in a study and are used to ensure the individuals in a sample population is as similar to one another as possible. Below population density is described as a control variable.

3.6.4.1 Population Density

Studies have found a link between government repression and population density. Henderson (1993) suggests that population pressures can increase resource scarcity and therefore increase the likelihood that states will violate civil liberties to control civil violence or civil outbursts; however, Henderson (1993) found that there was a stronger correlation between repression and level of population growth rather than population density. Almost every

¹² The UN Treaties Database also notes if states have accession or succession to the conventions, however, since ratification is the final step in a state's commitment to these conventions, only years where states have ratified one or more of the conventions will be included.

quantitative study encountered regarding the subject of civil liberties and political freedoms and trade included either a population density control, or a population minimum control (for example Donno and Neureiter (2017) limited their sample to populations over one million). This research will follow in line with the majority of previous scholarship, see Spilker & Böhmelt (2013); Hafner-Burton (2005); and Cao, Greenhill, Prakash (2012) among others, and include population density as the control measure rather than a minimum number in the population. The population density in this researched was logged to create a more normal distribution, which will be expanded on in chapter four. The operationalisation of all the variables can be seen in Figure 7 below

3.6.5 Operationalisation Table

Outcome Variable				
Variable	Measures	Variable type	Unit of Measurement / Coding	Source
Overall Status <i>(STA)</i>	Overall standard of civil liberties and political freedoms conditions in a country in a given year	Ordered Polytomous (ordinal scale variable)	1: Not Free 2: Partly Free 3: Free	Freedom House – Freedom in the World Report
Predictor Variables				
Variable	Measures	Variable type	Unit of Measurement / Coding	Source
PTA with EU with NTI clause attached <i>(PTA)</i>	Years in which a third country has a PTA with the EU and there is an NTI clause attached to the agreement	Dichotomous	0: No 1: Yes	European Union External Action Services – Treaty Database
Enforcement Mechanism <i>(ENF)</i>	If the answer to the above measure is 1 or “yes” then which type of enforcement mechanism is employed in the agreement? Hard or soft?	Dichotomous	0: Soft 1: Hard	European Union External Action Services – Treaty Database


Trade <i>(TRA)</i>	Exports less imports as a percentage of GDP, constant US 2010 dollars	Continuous	Total trade as a percent of GDP	World Bank – World Development Indicators Database
Alternative Explanatory Variables				
Aid logged <i>(EUA)</i>	EU institutional aid as a percentage of GDP, constant US 2010 dollars	Continuous	Total EU aid as a percent of GDP	OECD Stats – Data Bank
Internal or External Armed Conflict <i>(CON)</i>	A state’s involvement in either internal or external armed conflict, or both, in a given year	Dichotomous (dummy variable)	0: No 1: Yes	Uppsala Universitet – Uppsala Conflict Data Program
Ratification of ICCPR or ICAT or Both <i>(RAT)</i>	Whether or not a state has ratified the ICCPR, the ICAT, or has ratified both in a given year	Ordered Polytomous (ordinal scale variable)	0: No ratification 1: Ratification of one 2: Ratification of both	United Nations – Treaty Database
Control Variable				
Variable	Measures	Variable type	Unit of Measurement / Coding	Source
Population Density logged <i>(POP)</i>	Population density per square kilometre of a state in a given year	Continuous	Whole numbers	World Bank – World Development Indicators Database

Figure 7 Operationalisation Table


3.7 Histogram of Continuous Variables

Most of the variables in this research are either categorical, or dichotomous; however, *TRA*, *EUA*, and *POP* are all continuous meaning their values can be any real number. Before the regression can begin, it is important to check to see if all of the continuous data is normally


distributed, or if it is skewed one way or another. If a variable is normally distributed, it means that the number of occurrences are equally dispersed about the mean. In other words, if you were to draw a perpendicular line at the mean point, each half of the curve would be a perfect mirror of one another (Salkind, 2010, p. 381). Graph 1 shows the distribution of trade as a percentage of GDP. This variable is relatively normally distributed, so no alterations need be made; however, it is often the case that data is not normally distributed and is instead skewed in one direction or another. If nonnormally distributed, data can be positively skewed or negatively skewed and can have a large or a small kurtosis, if normally distributed, the skewness will be the zero and the kurtosis will be three. Graph 2 and Graph 4 are examples of positively skewed distribution because the tail of the bell curve is longer on the right. Positive skewness occurs when the mean and median if the data is greater than the mode. Graph 2 shows EU aid as a percentage of GDP, it shows a positively skewed bell curve, indicating that most of the countries in the sample population only receive a small portion of aid (as a percentage of GDP) from the EU. Graph 4 also shows a positively skewed data set regarding population density per square kilometre. In regard to kurtosis, both EU aid and population density have a very large kurtosis, the former being 17 and the latter being 19. Kurtosis measures extreme values in the tails of the distribution curve. The higher the kurtosis the more outliers there are in the data sample, which can be verified by the skewness and the distribution of the sample for both EU aid and population density. In order to have a more normal distribution, to ensure more accurate results, the *EUA* was logged, transforming it into *logEUA*, once that was done the data set became more normally distributed, as depicted in graph 3 Similarly, *POP* was logged, creating the variable *logPOP* which created a more normal distribution as well, see graph 5.




Graph 1 Trade Histogram




Graph 2 EU Aid, Positively Skewed



Graph 3 logged EU Aid



Graph 4 Population Density, Positively Skewed



Graph 5. Logged Population Density

3.8 Correlation Matrix

This section deals with the correlation between *Status* and the rest of the variables.

Correlation coefficients give shed light on the extent to which one can surmise the value of one variable, given another variable. If the correlation coefficient is positive, it indicates that as one variable increases, so does the other. Conversely, if the correlation coefficient is negative, it indicates that as one variable decreases, the other increases. Finally, the closer the correlation coefficients are to one (or a negative one), the more highly correlated they are to one another. Figure 8 shows the correlation of freedom status with *PTAs*, and all the other variables save *ENF*, then Figure 9 shows the correlation between freedom status with *ENF*, and all the other variables save *PTA*. These correlations are quite low, showing little collinearity between the variables.

	STA	PTA	TRA	logEUA	RAT1	RAT2	logPOP	CON
STA	1.0000							
PTA	-0.01365	1.0000						
TRA	0.1485	-0.0279	1.0000					
logEUA	-0.2082	0.2636	-0.2301	1.0000				
RAT1	0.1209	-0.1753	-0.0544	-0.3353	1.0000			
RAT2	0.1416	-0.0462	0.1216	0.0657	-0.1518	1.0000		
logPOP	-0.0028	-0.1802	0.0648	-0.2717	-0.0079	0.0172	1.0000	
CON	-0.0408	-0.1598	0.1168	-0.2325	-0.0612	0.0234	0.2928	1.0000

Figure 8 Civil liberties Correlation Matrix.

	STA	ENF	TRA	logEUA	RAT1	RAT2	logPOP	CON
STA	1.0000							
ENF	-0.1103	1.0000						
TRA	0.1624	0.0879	1.0000					
logEUA	-0.1893	0.1780	-0.2547	1.0000				
RAT1	0.1441	-0.2374	-0.0614	-0.2340	1.0000			
RAT2	0.1438	0.1705	0.0849	0.0686	-0.1304	1.0000		
logPOP	-0.0329	0.1324	0.0563	-0.2234	-0.1112	0.0020	1.0000	
CON	-0.0561	0.0347	0.0649	-0.1711	-0.1660	0.0191	0.2637	1.0000

Figure 9 Political freedoms Correlation Matrix

3.9 Test for Multicollinearity

Collinearity is a statistical phenomenon that occurs when two or more variables are nearly perfectly linearly related. In regard to regression models, if two or more variables share a high degree of linearity, the estimates of the coefficients become unstable, and the standard errors of the coefficients can become "widely inflated" (UCLA, n.d.). As a further test to check the multicollinearity of the variables, a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test was employed. VIF tests are used to check the degree of multicollinearity and, generally speaking, if the VIF values are above 10, the correlation between the variables may be too high (UCLA, n.d.). According to Figure 10, there is no multicollinearity between the variables listed; however, the *ENF* variable was deliberately excluded because there is obviously a collinear relationship between the enforcement mechanism used in the PTA and the PTA itself.

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
PTA	1.12	0.892118
TRA	1.10	0.909901
logEUA	1.40	0.712115
RAT1	1.22	0.821649
RAT2	1.05	0.954943
CON	1.16	0.863763
logPOP	1.17	0.855568
Mean VIF	1.17	

Figure 10 Multicollinearity test

3.10 Proportional Odds Assumption

One of the functions often employed to test the proportional odds assumption in STATA is called *omodel* test. An *omodel* tests that there is no difference in the coefficients between

models, and if the proportional odds assumption is met, then there will be a non-significant result. If there is a significant result, the model must be changed to a generalised ordered logistic model. In other words, if there is a statistically significant result (<0.05), then the null hypothesis, which is that there is no difference in the coefficients between models, must be rejected, indicating that the proportional odds assumption has been violated. Having variables which violate the proportional odds assumption leads to misleading conclusions about the relationship between the outcome and explanatory variables. Moreover, the more explanatory variables there are the higher the chance that at least one of them does not meet the proportional odds assumption, and if even one violates the assumption, the interpretation of the whole regression could be incorrect (Williams, 2016, p. 11). Figure 11 shows the results from the *omodel* test; in both cases, the p-value of the whole test shows a statistically insignificant result, and therefore the null hypothesis must be rejected, and an alternative model must be chosen.

STA	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P > z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
PTA	-.4874186	.1739165	-2.80	0.005	-.8282886	-.1465485
TRA	.0060642	.0021358	2.84	0.005	.0018781	.0102503
logEUA	-.2607013	.053485	-4.87	0.000	-.36553	-.1558725
RAT1	.3239573	.1789791	1.81	0.070	-.0268352	.6747499
RAT2	1.029612	.2288844	4.50	0.000	.5810065	1.478217
logPOP	-.0610406	.0540183	-1.13	0.258	-.1669145	.0448333
CON	-.4392169	.146442	-3.00	0.003	-.7262379	-.1521959
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories: chi2(7) = 102.58 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000						

Figure 11 Proportional Odds Assumption for Civil liberties

Since it is common to have a violation of the proportional odds assumption, because the constraints to meet the assumption are so strict, researchers often use the *gologit2* regression model instead. The *gologit2* method is used to compensate for data which has violated the proportional odds assumption. This *gologit2* function runs a regression on each different category of the outcome variable (one to three) rather than running the same model on all the categories, as was the case with the original ordinal logistic regression this research chose.

4 Analysis

This chapter aims to describe the data from the variables, which were retrieved from the statistical software. As explained in the previous chapter, the sample are 44 less than or equal to low-middle income countries, with greater than 80 percent of the data for the variables available and covers a timeframe from 1990 (being the first year NTIs were included in EU PTAs) to 2017 (most recent year for complete data). The key outcome variable is categorical, where one is considered most free, and three is considered least free. The first and second hypotheses postulate that hard enforcement will have a more significant effect on civil liberties and political freedoms in third countries than soft enforcement will. The third hypothesis posits that the level of trade in the third country will influence the probability of compliance in trade agreements because of the reliance the country will have on trade relations. A possible alternative explanation is that the level of EU aid is related to the level of civil liberties and political freedoms in the third country recipient. In the research, 75 percent of the observations included a PTA clause, as will be expanded upon in Section 4.1.

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Generally speaking, it is a good idea to include a descriptive statistics model in the research to allow the reader to see a general overview of the data, regarding frequency of variables,

minimum and maximum values, mean of variables, and standard deviation. See Figure 12 (next page) for the descriptive statistics.¹³

¹³ Both outcome variables can be included in this descriptive statistics table because the table only lists the characteristics of the variables by themselves and separate from one another.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Variance	Skewness	Kurtosis
Status	1,232	1.833469	.6752074	3	1	.455905	.2135873	2.170694
Preferential Trade Agreement	1,232	-	.4303389	0	1	.1851915	-1.18499	2.404201
Enforcement Mechanism	930	-	.4999728	0	1	.2499728	-.068858	1.004741
Trade Percentage of GPD	1,218	69.16976	32.70118	11.08746	200.3846	1069.367	.8372001	3.156928
EU Aid Percentage of GDP (logged)	926	-5.766891	1.432201	-11.25843	-2.706988	2.0512	-.696481	3.488279
Ratification of One International Convention	1,232	-	.4082117	0	1	.1666368	1.416316	3.005951
Ratification of Two International Conventions	1,232	-	.3345001	0	1	.1118903	2.223642	5.944582
Population Density (logged)	1,232	4.133353	1.216436	.6931472	7.142856	1.479717	-.135506	2.914043
Internal or External Armed Conflict	1,232	-	.4791092	0	1	.2295456	.5999767	1.359972

Figure 12 Descriptive Statistics

Regarding Figure 12 there are 1,232 observations of all the variables in which there was full data, *ENF* has only 930 points because there are some instances wherein a given year, there was no PTA with the EU, and therefore, no enforcement mechanism was coded. The average *STA* number in this data set is 1.8, meaning that the average state in the sample population is considered “partly free.” *PTA*’s occurred in 75 percent of the sample, and of the 75 percent, 51 percent had a hard *ENF* mechanism attached to the agreement. Imports plus exports are,

on average, 68 percent of GDP in the sample, and *EUA* made up, on average, 0.5 percent of GDP revenue in the sample. However, there is a significant outlier in this sample, Mauritania, in 2001 and 2002 derived over six percent of its GDP from EU institutional aid. Note that ratification was broken down into two dummy variables, with $RAT = 0$ as the base for both $RAT = 1$ and $RAT = 2$. The ratification of one of the two conventions, occurs in 21 percent of the observations (as you can see by the mean of $RAT1$), and ratification of both of the conventions occurs in 12 percent of the observations (again as you can see by the mean of $RAT2$), therefore, $RAT = 0$ occurs in 67 percent of the time. Regarding *POP*, the average population density of the sample population was 125 people per square kilometre, with a significant maximum of 1,265 people per square kilometre in Bangladesh in 2017, this information was gathered from the unlogged *POP* variable. Finally, regarding conflict, in the sample, internal or external armed conflict occurred 36 percent of the time.

5 Findings

This chapter discusses the outcomes of the different regression models illustrated in the previous chapter. This chapter also elaborates on the findings in order to evaluate the hypotheses and the research questions and sub-questions.

5.1 Status and PTA Model

The model ultimately chosen for this research reflects the constraints of the data and the narrowing down process based on the tests. *gologit2* measures ordinal logistic regression with lighter constraints than traditional logistic regression. It is primarily used when traditional logistic regression models have violated the proportional odds assumption. A key advantage of the *gologit2* function in Stata is that it is more interpretable than those models which are estimated by a non-ordinal method (for example, multinomial logistic regression) (Williams, 2005, p. 1). Furthermore, by relaxing the proportional odds assumption, *gologit2* “allows the effects of the explanatory variables to vary with the point at which the categories of the dependent variable are dichotomized” (Williams, 2005, p. 1).

The first *gologit2* model, as shown in Figure 13, which was conducted for overall status, PTAs, and the rest of the variables save enforcement, as described in Equation 4. The Wald test for parallel lines assumption, automatically run by Stata found that, once the model was

transformed into `gologit2`, the data no longer violated the proportional odds assumption. The Wald test tests to see whether coefficients differ across equations and test this parameter on all the variables in the equation, to see if each variable on its own passes the proportional odds assumption (Williams, 2006, p. 64).

When interpreting `gologit2`, it is important to note that the output shows multiple regressions for a single equation and is dependent on how many ordinal outcomes the outcome variable has. For example, in this thesis, there are two regressions for status and PTA; the first one is the probability of the first ordinal outcome divided by the probability of the second and third ordinal outcomes. The second regression is the probability of the first and second ordinal outcomes divided by the third ordinal outcome. The more ordinal outcomes the outcome variable has the more regressions per equation. "Positive coefficients indicate that higher values on the explanatory variable", in this case being partly free or free "make it more likely that the [state] will be in a higher category" than the one they are currently in, "while negative coefficients indicate that higher values on the explanatory variable increase the likelihood of being in either the same, or a lower category" (Williams, 2006, p. 63).

The results of the first regression show that nations that have a PTA with the EU are 1.45 times more likely to be in the lowest category of freedom status, than the countries who do not have a PTA with the EU. Furthermore, states which ratify one international rights convention treaty are .77 times more likely to be in either partly free or free status. However, if states sign both of these international human rights treaties, they are 1.1 times more likely to be in the partly free or free status. This finding is similar to Hafner-Burton (2007), who found that human rights treaties are the most effective when implemented by countries who have secure democratic practices already in place (p.418). This, however, seems rather obvious, if a country has a stable democratic background, then they are more likely to be compliant with international human rights norms, as confirmed theoretically by Langois (2003), since the extent to which there are civil liberties, relies on the extent to which there is a democracy.

Internal and external armed conflict is significant as well, indicating that if a state engages in internal or external armed conflict, they are .80 times more likely to be in the not free category of states. This is confirmed by the findings in Donno and Neureiter (2017), who

found that internal or external armed conflict affects the extent to which a country experiences civil liberties and political freedoms.

Trade is significant in the second regression (probability of being not free or partly free over free); however, the coefficient is minimal. Finally, if a state received EU aid, they are .34 times more likely to be in either the partly free or not free category. This is also relatively straight forward as, presumably, countries that are considered "free" are more likely to be economically self-sufficient and therefore would require no aid assistance from the EU.

Probability of <u>Not Free</u> (Partly Free+Free)	STA	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P > z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
	PTA	-1.449641	.2949434	-4.91	0.000***	-2.027719	-.8715626
	TRA	.0015901	.0026035	0.61	0.551	-.0035125	.0066928
	logEUA	-.1366785	.0640455	-2.13	0.033*	-.2622053	-.0111516
	RAT1	.7675786	.262229	2.93	0.003**	.2536192	1.281538
	RAT2	1.083189	.229391	4.72	0.000***	.63359061	.532787
	logPOP	.0593274	.0658849	0.90	0.368	-.0698047	.1884595
	CON	-.7990997	.170062	-4.70	0.000***	.2313302	2.269888
	Legend: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001						
Probability of <u>Not Free+Partly Free</u> Free	STA	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P > z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
	PTA	.1419472	.2404869	0.59	0.555	-.3292986	.6132929
	TRA	.0087111	.0027039	3.22	0.001**	.0034116	.0140107
	logEUA	-.3426734	.0682078	-5.02	0.000***	-.4763582	-.2089887
	RAT1	.0788774	.2393366	0.33	0.742	-.3902136	.5479684
	RAT2	1.083189	.229391	4.72	0.000***	.6335906	1.532787
	logPOP	-.2740875	.0857831	-3.20	0.001**	-.4422193	-.1059557
	CON	.2527285	.20628	1.23	0.221	-.1515729	.65703
	Legend: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001						

Figure 13 Regression of Status with PTA

5.2 Status and Enforcement Model

The second gologit2 regression, shown in Figure 14, involved the exclusion of $PTA = 0$ and therefore, if $PTA = 1$, then there is an enforcement mechanism in the agreement ($ENF = 0$ or $ENF = 1$, soft enforcement being the former, hard enforcement, the latter). This regression model is to test whether the type of enforcement mechanism adds to the probability of higher civil liberties standards in third countries and is illustrated in Equation 5. The Wald test was run to check again whether any of the variables violated the proportional odds assumption, of which they do not.

Enforcement was statistically significant and negative, indicating that soft enforcement may be more effective than hard enforcement in EU PTAs. Hafner-Burton (2005a) concludes that persuasion alone (or soft enforcement) is not effective, counter to what this thesis finds, however, as explained previously, soft enforcement opens the door for dialogue on the subject of civil liberties and political freedoms, allowing perhaps for the EU to push for better standards in third countries. However, Chayes and Chayes (1998) argue the opposite, of Hafner-Burton (2005a), and agree more along the lines of this thesis, that coercion is likely to be inefficient and creates high costs to the trade negotiators with little change in behaviour (as cited in Hafner-Burton, 2005a, p. 623). However, Cao, Greenhill, and Prakash (2012) found that enforcement mechanisms are not statistically associated with physical integrity rights at all, indicating more research should be done in this area (p. 154). Therefore, based on these results, we can reject both hypotheses two and three.

Ratification is significant again in this enforcement model, indicating that ratification of international rights treaties increases the probability of having a higher freedom status. These findings differ from the findings of Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005), and Donno (2012). Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) found a negative correlation between ratification of civil liberties treaties and the right of security of the person, they attribute this to governments signing the treaties because of the relatively low cost of ratification, but perhaps sign the treaty before the infrastructure is in place in their countries to align their domestic policies to the convention (p. 1402). Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) found that, although their analysis showed statistically significant positive results, through further research, they found that these results are only applicable in a small number of states and therefore cannot be used as a marker for the sample population as a whole (p. 423). The findings in this thesis most

likely represent the results from the aforementioned study, however, for this thesis, since the ratification of international civil liberties conventions is not the main focus of the study, no further research will be done in this area.

Population density is negative and significant in this regression, indicating that a country's population density has a negative effect on civil liberties and political freedoms. Similar to the findings of Henderson (1993) which concluded that rights might be restricted when population density is high, because of resource scarcity and environmental pressures. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005), Hafner-Burton (2014), Donno and Neureiter (2017) also all found significance between population density and some form of repression.

Again, trade is significant; however, the coefficient is minimal, indicating marginal change when moving from one status level to another. Therefore, we can accept hypothesis one with the caveat that the impact trade has, although statistically significant, is relatively small. Similar to the first model, aid, and conflict are both significant and negative, indicating that conflict has a negative relationship with a high freedom status, as does aid.

Probability of <u>Not Free</u> (Partly Free+Free)	STA	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P > z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
	ENF	-.3643037	.1571704	-2.32	0.020*	-.6723521	-.0562553
	TRA	.0014543	.0026806	0.54	0.587	-.0037996	.0067083
	logEUA	-.0809068	.0688193	-1.18	0.240	-.2157901	.0539765
	RAT1	1.402344	.3361195	4.17	0.000***	.7435614	2.061126
	RAT2	1.242551	.2576129	4.82	0.000***	.7376387	1.747463
	logPOP	.0920765	.0688283	1.34	0.181	-.0428245	.2269775
	CON	-.6605137	.1776645	-3.72	0.000***	-1.00873	-.3122976
	Legend: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001						
Probability of <u>Not Free+Partly Free</u> Free	STA	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P > z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
	ENF	-.3643037	.1571704	-2.32	0.020*	-.6723521	-.0562553
	TRA	.0131121	.0029766	4.41	0.000***	.007278	.0189463
	logEUA	-.281394	.0775102	-3.63	0.000***	-.4333113	-.1294768
	RAT1	.1673334	.2915669	0.57	0.566	-.4041272	.7387941
	RAT2	1.242551	.2576129	4.82	0.000***	.7376387	1.747463
	logPOP	-.2645893	.0978817	-2.70	0.007**	-.456434	-.0727447
	CON	.5453985	.2315926	2.35	0.019*	.0914854	.9993116
	Legend: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001						

Figure 14 Regression of Status with enforcement

6 Conclusions

This final chapter first discusses the answers to the sub-questions and then the primary research question. The subsequent sections discuss the limitations of this research and possible areas for further study on this topic.

6.1 Source Reliability

This section speaks to the reliability and validity of this research and will assess the research design, assumptions of logistic regression, and the quality of the data of the variables.

Reliability in research refers to the consistency of the measure and the extent to which the same results will appear after multiple iterations. In other words, the extent to which something is replicable. In quantitative analysis, the reliability of research relies heavily on the credibility of the data sources used.

Most of the data this research uses come from three quality organisations: Freedom House, European External Action Service (EEAS), the World Bank, the OECD, the UCDP, and the UN. First, regarding the data used for the outcome variables, Freedom House is a transparent organisation, who publishes their financial statements each year and has third-party auditors audit their financials (Freedom House, 2019). Although a majority of their funding comes from the United States' government, Freedom House has a positive record in regard to conducting evaluations on each country, each year in an impartial manner.

Secondly, Freedom House publishes its full methodology each year and includes a section where changes in methodology from one year to the next are explained; these changes in methodology are usually evolutions from potential criticisms of methodology in prior years. It is, therefore, safe to assume that Freedom House is a reliable source for the outcome variables. Second, the EEAS treaty database is used for both main predictor variables. This database is comprehensive and comes straight from the EU; in addition, Donno and Neureiter (2017) also used this database to code for their enforcement mechanism variable.

Third, the World Bank Development Indicators database is a reasonably comprehensive database regarding development. However, the World Bank (n.d.b) states itself that “many factors affect data availability, reliability, and comparability” (para. 3). It is quite challenging

to have a standardized methodology, statistical framework, and data collection infrastructure for all 217 countries that the World Bank documents. Furthermore, data collection can, at times, be wholly unavailable or disrupted, especially in cases of civil conflicts (World Bank, n.d.b, para. 3). Although the data collected by the World Bank is self-reported, for the most part, they do their best to standardise the data in a way that allows for the researcher to “indicate trends and characterise major differences among economies rather than as offering precise quantitative measures of those differences” (World Bank, n.d.b, para. 4). Many other scholars use the world development indicators offered by the World Bank, and the World Bank is known as the most accurate database for these indicators; therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, the world development indicators database is a sufficient and useful data source.

Fourth, the OECD stats databank is "one of the world's largest and most reliable sources of comparable statistical, economic, and social data" (OECD, 2013, p. 2). The OECD stats databank was used to collect information on aid disbursements from EU institutions, which is well documented and comprehensive. The OECD aims to promote economic and social wellbeing globally, and collects data in a multitude of areas including, among other things, gender, development, education, finance, trade, health, and science (OECD, 2013). This database is used by many other scholars and is therefore deemed reliable in this thesis research.

Fifth, the UCDP is the “oldest ongoing data collection project for civil war,” which has been ongoing for 40 years (Uppsala Universitet, n.d.b, para. 1). The UCDP’s methodology is extensively explained on their website, including definitions as to what constitutes different types of conflict, evaluation of the sources of their data, coding of their data, and more (Uppsala Universitet, n.d.c). The UCDP divides its data into groups such as armed conflict, one-sided violence, non-state conflict issues, peace agreement data sets, and more. Regarding internal and external armed conflict, and based on the review of the methodology, it has been determined that the data comes from a reliable third-party source.

Finally, the last variable concerning the ratification of the ICCPR or the ICAT, the UN treaty database was consulted. The UN is privy to all treaties and international agreements. The UN is commonly used by other academics from various fields, and can be heavily relied on for

accurate information, especially in this case as its purpose in this research is only to provide information regarding the potential ratification date of these conventions.

In sum, the data sources come from experts in their respective fields and are used in a variety of other scholarship. For the purposes of this thesis, these were the best options in terms of data collection for the specific variables laid out in the operationalisation section.

6.2 Limitations

Studying effectiveness is quite difficult; the word itself implies subjective interpretation. One of the main limitations of this study is that there is no clear-cut rule or method for defining and evaluating the effectiveness of trade agreements and non-trade conditionality. Therefore, this research chose to use different methods from previous studies, to try and patch together a suitable way to study effectiveness.

Second, another limitation was the lack of available data. The research time period was quite long (28 years) and, unfortunately, there was a lot of missing data from the early 1990s, which shrunk the sample size of the countries significantly. Similarly, the countries where the most data was missing, were countries whose civil liberties and political freedoms records were lowest. Therefore, the data focused on less on countries who scored very low, which is where also the countries who had the most opportunity for positive change through trade.

Third, this research chose to analyse the effects of trade as a whole on civil liberties and political freedoms, although another avenue to pursue would be to include only EU trade with third countries, rather than trade with all countries. This is a limitation because one of the hypotheses stated that the level of trade should affect the probability of compliance in countries with trade agreements with the EU. However, the results showed a statistically insignificant result.

Fourth, coding for EU PTAs and the inclusion of NTIs in those PTAs have their own limitations. For example, it could be inferred that there is a selection bias when countries agree to the terms set out in the PTA. In other words, countries who already "mostly comply" with international civil liberties standards and are, for the most part, a democratic nation, will more easily sign an agreement with these clauses in them, especially since the EU focuses more on the standards ex-post. As well, this thesis focused only on EU PTAs as a dummy

variable, rather than PTAs as a whole. This was done to focus more on the EU as a hegemon in the promotion of civil liberties and political freedoms. However, it left out the possibility that PTAs with other hegemons (such as the United States) could influence the promotion of these rights as well; although the United States does tend to focus more on labour rights rather than other forms of civil liberties, it none the less could have an influence on civil liberties practices overall.

Fifth, the propensity for most of the variables to be linked to each other, even in a small, seemingly insignificant way, is high and could affect the results of the study as a whole. This is, to some extent, unavoidable since the functioning of an individual country is massively complex, with most high-level processes interacting with one another at some level. Therefore, it is hard to come to a concrete conclusion on the effectiveness of NTIs in PTAs because they are just one variable in a much larger process.

Finally, civil liberties and political freedoms are very complex, and the issues that arise in these areas are not easily solved. Often, civil liberties abuses are systemic and therefore take a long time to change, in regard to cultural change, social change, and normative change. Similarly, the UNDHR definition of civil liberties and political freedoms is mostly a Western version of civil liberties and is not fully recognised in other "non-Western" style nations. Civil liberties and political freedoms are interpreted and dealt with differently in different countries and therefore are *sui generis* per individual countries, to a point, of course. Therefore, it is perhaps too crude of a measurement to categorise every country in a simple 1-7 rating for civil liberties or political freedoms.

6.3 Answering the Sub-Questions of this Research

6.3.1 Sub-Question One

What does the previous literature say about the effectiveness of including NTIs in PTAs for the people living in the third countries?

The previous literature focuses mainly on civil liberties, rather than human right and political freedoms; therefore, the effectiveness of NTIs in PTAs was not well documented for political freedoms. Regarding civil liberties, however, there has been some significant work, both qualitatively and quantitatively, done on the effectiveness of civil liberties. Unfortunately,

there is no clear, concise answer to the question of the effectiveness of NTIs in PTAs. It seems that, in some instances, NTIs have a positive effect on civil liberties, whereas, in others, there seems to be little to no effect at all. Hafner-Burton (2005a) finds that including a hard enforcement mechanism in PTAs does seem to increase the effectiveness of these agreements, but Cao, Greenhill, and Prakash (2012), do not find any correlation between enforcement mechanism and PTA effectiveness at all.

Most of the literature infers that even if there is no apparent effect regarding the inclusion of NTIs in PTAs at least the inclusion opens the door for conversations about civil liberties and political freedoms standards. Furthermore, through dialogue, rather than coercion, civil liberties, and political freedoms can be influenced in a positive way for the betterment of the citizens in lesser developed countries.

6.3.2 Sub-Question Two

Does the type of enforcement mechanism, either hard or soft, in EU PTAs matter regarding the outcome of civil liberties and political freedoms in third countries?

Previous scholarship regarding the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms in trade has led to mixed results. For example, Cao, Greenhill, and Prakash (2012) find that, regarding physical integrity rights, there is no association between those rights and hard or soft enforcement in PTAs. Conversely, Hafner-Burton (2005a) find that only hard enforcement mechanisms in PTAs assist in reducing repression. This thesis found a slight link between soft enforcement and better civil liberties and political freedoms, indicating that perhaps coercive measures in trade are not the way to pursue the EU's normative agenda.

6.3.3 Sub-Question Three

Does the level of trade in third countries affect the extent to which they will comply with EU standards of civil liberties and political freedoms in PTAs?

The analysis of these models has shown us that the level of trade in a third country is not of significant importance in influencing freedoms in third countries. Although, this research originally posited that, since the EU uses PTAs to, at the very least, open a dialogue for civil liberties obligations and political freedoms conversations, the level of trade in a country

could potentially influence the probability of compliance. Through all the regression models, trade rarely made it past the $p < 0.05$ level of confidence, and even if it did, the coefficients were quite low. Therefore, we can conclude that total trade in a third country does not influence the level of compliance in civil liberties and political freedoms in regard to EU PTAs.

6.4 Answering the Central Research Question

To what extent does a Non-Trade Issues clause in European Union Preferential Trade Agreements affect the overall civil liberties conditions and political freedoms in third countries?

Based on the answers to the sub-questions, and the results from the quantitative analysis, we can say countries who have a PTA with the EU are 1.45times more likely to be in the lowest category of freedom and considered not-free. However, the results also show that these trade agreements are but a cog in a much more sophisticated machine, where the amount of conflict a country experiences, the level of aid received from the EU, and even population density all have an impact on the level of civil liberties and political freedoms citizens experience in their respective countries.

The findings from Hafner-Burton (2005a) fall under the scope of this conclusion as well, indicating that perhaps PTAs are not the "ideal forum" to influence civil liberties and political freedoms and indicates that the WTO would better influence these rights through multilateralism (p. 624). Spilker and Böhmelt (2012) consider the fact that if countries are aware of the "shadow of the future" they will likely be in the process of adjusting their civil and political processes in order to be able to fully comply with the requirements of the EU and therefore will only agree on specific standards insofar as they know they have the institutional capacity to do so (p. 345). Perhaps this means that hard enforcement actually is not necessary, especially if countries in the pre-ratification or pre-negotiation phase are already adjusting their policies to conform with EU standards; it could be argued that soft enforcement is a better method because it creates a window for open dialogue and communication between the EU and third countries regarding these rights. Soft enforcement, historically speaking, was the EU's preferred method of enforcement but, as our sample showed, increasingly the EU is using hard enforcement to govern NTIs. However, it could be

inferred that the EU is beginning to add more hard enforcement mechanisms to their trade agreements for other reasons such as appeasing constituents within the EU or championing themselves as norm entrepreneurs in the international arena (Mosley, 2010, p. 74)

The negative correlation between democracy and PTAs indicates a few things. First, the central purpose of PTAs is to assist lesser developed countries in international trade. In other words, it is to liberalise their trading scheme and allow them easier access to international markets. Lesser developed countries also have a higher probability of being rights abusers. The correlation that PTAs are more prevalent among "not free" countries could just simply be because of the nature of PTAs in their most basic form. The second and more significant possibility of this negative correlation between freedom and PTAs is that the EU might need to look at different methods of promoting their values and norms, because PTAs may not be the most effective manner to do so. If the EU's primary goal is to promote and achieve greater freedoms for all, trade might not be the best way to do that; instead, they should maybe focus their efforts on other avenues.

6.5 Areas for Further Research

Democracy and political freedoms are seldom included as an outcome variable in quantitative studies, and since democracy, on a global level, has been in decline for over a decade, it would be valuable to study the influence of trade in stabilising democracy globally.

Furthermore, comparison of the main influencers of civil liberties and political freedoms, the EU and United States, in countries who have trade agreements with either of these hegemon but not both, would be interesting to see if one hegemon has more influence over these rights areas than the other.

Studying the citizen level opinions on the EU's attempt to influence civil liberties standards and political freedoms would be a good avenue for further research, since it is unclear if the citizens in these third countries actually see value in what the EU is attempting to do or if they would prefer less interference from a hegemon in their respective governments, especially in countries who are less ideologically or normatively aligned with the EU's beliefs.

Finally, studying the differences between the possibility of the WTO taking on a more significant role in the promotion of civil liberties and political freedoms rather than the EU or

the United States. This would be a beneficial area of research, especially considering the legitimacy question of the WTO, or supranational organisations in general, and the different effects of multilateralism versus regionalism or bilateral agreements.

References

- Aaronson, S. A. (2011). Human Rights. In J.P. Chauffour, & J.Ch. Maur (Eds.), *Preferential Trade Agreement Policies for Development: A Handbook*, Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, pp. 443-466
- Aaronson, S. A. (2015). A match made in heaven? The wedding of trade and human rights. In L. Martin (Eds.), *The Political Economy of International Trade, the Oxford Handbook of*, (pp. 493-517). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press
- Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (2000). Hard and soft law in international governance. *International Organization*, 53, 421-456. <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551280>
- Acharya, R., Crawford, J., Maliszewska, M., & Renard, C. (2011). Landscape. In J.P. Chauffour, & J.Ch. Maur (Eds.), *Preferential Trade Agreement Policies for Development: A Handbook*, Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, pp. 37-67
- Antweiler, W., Copeland, B.R., & Taylor, S.M. (1998). *Is free trade good for the environment?*(working paper No. 6707) Retrieved from the National Bureau of Economic Research, <https://www-nber-org.eur.idm.oclc.org/papers/w6707.pdf>
- Baccini, L. (2010). Explaining the formation and design of EU trade agreements: the role of transparency and flexibility. *European Union Politics*, 11, 195-217. <https://dio.org/10.1177/1465116509359431>
- Baier, S.L., & Bergstrand, J.H. (2004). Economic Determinants of Trade Agreements. *Journal of International Economics*, 64, 29–63. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996\(03\)00079-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(03)00079-5)

- Baldwin, R., & Freund, C. (2011). Preferential trade agreements and multilateral liberalization. In J.P. Chauffour, & J.Ch. Maur (Eds.), *Preferential Trade Agreement Policies for Development: A Handbook*, The World Bank, Washington, DC, pp. 121-141
- Bartels, L. (2005). *Human Rights Conditionality in the EU's International Agreements*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press
- Bartels, L. (2008). The application of human rights conditionality in the EU's bilateral trade agreements and other trade arrangements. Retrieved May 10, 2019 from <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=EN>
- Bastiaens, I. & Postnikov, E. (2017). Greening up: the effects of environmental standards in EU and US trade agreements. *Environmental Politics*, 26, 847-869.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2017.1338213>
- Bhagwati, J. (1991). *The World Trading System at Risk*. Princeton: Princeton University Press
- Bhagwati, J. (1992). Regionalism versus multilateralism. *The World Economy*, 15, 535-556.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.1992.tb00536.x>
- Bhagwati, J. (2008). *Termites in the trading system: how preferential trade agreements undermine free trade*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press
- Bhagwati, J, Krishna, P., & Panagariya, A. (1999). Introduction, *Trading Blocs: Alternative Approach to Analyzing Preferential Trade Agreements*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

- Bhagwati, J., & Panagariya, A. (1996). The theory of preferential trade agreements: historical evolution and current trends. *The American Economic Review*, 86(2), 82-87
- Cao, X., Greenhill, B., & Prakash, A. (2012). Where is the tipping point? Bilateral trade and the diffusion of human rights. *British Journal of Political Science*, 43, 133-156.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712341200018X>
- Capling, A., & Trommer, S. (2017). The evolution of the global trade regime. In J. Ravenhill (Eds.), *Global Political Economy* (5th ed., pp. 111-140). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press
- Chayes, A., & Chayes, A.H. (1998). *The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press
- Colyer, D. (2011). Impacts of environmental provisions. *Green Trade Agreements* (pp. 195-238). Hampshire, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Commission. (1995). On the inclusion of respect for democratic freedoms and human rights in agreements between the Community and Third Countries. Com (95) 216
- Crawford, G. (1997). Foreign aid and political conditionality: issues of effectiveness and consistency. *Democratization*, 4, 69-108.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510349708403526>
- da Conceição-Heldt, E. & Meunier, S. (2014). Speaking with a Single Voice: Internal Cohesiveness and External Effectiveness of the EU in Global Governance. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21(7), 961–979.

- De Santis, R. & Vicarelli, C. (2006). The European Union trade strategy. An empirical evaluation of preferential trade agreements' effects on EU import flows. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229050426_The_European_Union_Trade_Strategy_An_Empirical_Evaluation_of_Preferential_Trade_Agreements'_Effects_on_EU_Import_Flows
- Dieter, H. (2009). The multilateral trading system and preferential trade agreements: can the negative effects be minimized. *Global Governance*, 15(3), 393-408
- Donno, D. (2012). Legalization and leverage: Human rights conditionality in the European Union's economic agreements. Working paper retrieved April 5, 2018 from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2108882
- Donno, D., & Neureiter, M. (2017). Can human rights conditionality reduce repression? Examining the European Union's economic agreements. *Review of international organizations*, 13, 335-357. <https://dio.org/10.1007/s11558-017-9283-2>
- EU suspends aid to Burundi's government. (2016, March 15). *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/mar/15/eu-suspends-aid-to-burundi-government>
- European Commission. (1998). On the inclusion of respect for democratic freedoms and human rights in agreements between the community and third countries, COM (95) 216. Retrieved 28 April 2019, from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:51995DC0216&qid=1556458896120&from=EN>

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2014). *Regulation (EU) No 235/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for democracy and human rights worldwide.*

Retrieved from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0235&from=EN>

European Parliament. (2019). *European Union and its trade partners.* Retrieved June 10, 2019 from <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/160/the-european-union-and-its-trade-partners>

European Union. (2015). *EU action plan on human rights and democracy.* Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_action_plan_on_human_rights_and_democracy_en_2.pdf

European External Action Services. (n.d.). *Treaties Office Database.* Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/Login.do?message=SessionExpired>

Freedom House. (2018). *Democracy in crisis.* Retrieved May 8, 2019 from <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018>

Freedom House. (2019). *Methodology 2019.* Retrieved June 4, 2019 from <https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2019>

Gao, H., & Lim, C. L. (2010). Saving the WTO from the risk of irrelevance: the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as a 'common good' for RTA disputes. In D. Steger (Eds.), *Redesigning the World Trade Organization for the Twenty-first Century* (pp. 389-416). Ottawa, CA: Wilfred Laurier University Press

Guzman, A. T., & Meyer, T. L. (2010). International soft law. *Journal of legal analysis*, 2(1), 171-225.

Hachez, N. (2015). 'Essential elements' clauses in EU trade agreements making trade work in a way that helps human rights? (working paper No.158). Retrieved from Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies,
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/2015/158hachez

Hafner-Burton, E. (n.d.). *Forum shopping for human rights: the transformation of preferential trade*. [Graph]. Retrieved June 11, 2019 from
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228765180_Forum_shopping_for_human_rights_the_transformation_of_preferential_trade

Hafner-Burton, E. (2005a). Trading human rights: how preferential trade agreements influence government repression. *International Organization*, 59, 593-629.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818305050216>

Hafner-Burton, E (2005b). Right or robust? The sensitive nature repression to globalization. *Journal of Peace Research*, 42, 679-698. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343305057887>

Hafner-Burton, E. (2009). *Forced to be good: why trade agreements boost human rights*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press

Hafner-Burton, E., & Ron, J. (2009). Seeing double: human rights impact through qualitative and quantitative eyes. *World Politics*, 61, 360-40.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887109000136>

Hafner-Burton, E., & Tsutsui, K. (2005). Human rights in a globalizing world: the paradox of empty promises. *American Journal of Sociology*, *110*, 1373-1411. <https://doi.org/10.1086/428442>

Hafner-Burton, E., & Tsutsui, K. (2007). Justice lost! The failure of international human rights law to matter where needed most. *Journal of Peace Research*, *44*, 407-425. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307078942>

Hathaway, O.A., (2002). Do human rights treaties make a difference? *The Yale Law Journal*, *111*(8), 1935-2042.

Heidrich, P. & Tussie, D. (2010). Regional agreements and the WTO: the gyrating gears of interdependence. In D. Steger (Eds.), *Redesigning the World Trade Organization for the Twenty-first Century* (pp. 417-436). Ottawa, CA: Wilfred Laurier Press

Henderson, C.W. (1993). Population pressures and political repression. *Social Science Quarterly*, *74*(2), 322-333.

Human Rights Law Centre. (n.d.). *Safeguarding democracy*. Retrieved from http://static1.squarespace.com/static/580025f66b8f5b2dabbe4291/5812996f1dd4540186f54894/581299ee1dd4540186f55760/1477614062728/HRLC_Report_SafeguardingDemocracy_online.pdf?format=original

Kellstedt, P. M., & Whitten, G. D. (2013). *The fundamentals of political science research* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press

Laerd Statistics. (n.d.a). Ordinal regression using SPSS statistics. Retrieved June 1, 2019 from <https://statistics.laerd.com/spss-tutorials/ordinal-regression-using-spss-statistics.php>

Laerd Statistics. (n.d.b.). Types of variables. Retrieved June 1, 2019 from
<https://statistics.laerd.com/statistical-guides/types-of-variable.php>

Langois, A.J. (2003). Human rights without democracy? A critique of the separationist thesis.
Human Rights Quarterly, 25(4), 990-1019.

Lechner, L. (2016). The domestic battle over the design of non-trade issues in preferential trade agreements. *Review of International Political Economy*, 23, 840-871.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2016.1231130>

[Lechner, L. \(2018\). Good for some, bad for others: US investors and non-trade issues in preferential trade agreements. *Review of International Organisations*, 13, 163-187.](#)
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9299-2>

Lomé IV Convention, 15 December 1989, 17.8.91, No L 229/19, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:5fc60e77-0b35-4b68-88bf-de7b2cf8edd4.0008.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

Managi, S., Hibiki, A., & Tsurumi, T. (2009). Does trade openness improve environmental quality? *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, 58, 346-363.
<https://10.1016/j.jeem.2009.04.008>

Mansfield, E. (1998). The proliferation of preferential trading agreements. *Journal of conflict resolution*, 42, 523-543. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002798042005001>

McKenzie, L. & Meissner, K. (2016). Human rights conditionality in European Union trade negotiations: the case of the EU-Singapore FTA. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 55, 832-849. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12522>

- Mégret, F. (2018). Nature of obligations. In D. Moeckli, S. Shah, & S. Sivakumaran (Eds.), *International Human Rights Law* (3rd ed., pp. 86-109). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press
- Meissner, K. & McKenzie, L. (2018). The paradox of human rights conditionality in EU trade policy: when strategic interests drive policy outcomes. *Journal of European Public Policy*, (2008). [https://doi.org/ 10.1080/13501763.2018.1526203](https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1526203)
- Meunier, S. & Nicolaïdis, K. (2006). The European Union as a conflicted trade power. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13, 906-925.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760600838623>
- Milewicz, K., Hollway, J., Peacock, C., & Snidal, D. (2016). Beyond trade: the expanding scope of the nontrade agenda in trade agreements. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 62, 743-773. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716662687>
- Mosley, L. (2010). *Labor Rights and Multinational Production*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Neumayer, E. (2005). Do international human rights treaties improve respect for civil liberties? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49, 925-953.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705281667>
- OECD. (2013). *OECD work on statistics*. Retrieved from <http://www.oecd.org/sdd/OECD-Work-on-Statistics-brochure2013.pdf>
- OECD. (2019). *Official development assistance*. Retrieved from <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/What-is-ODA.pdf>

- OECD.Stat. (n.d.). Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [database]. Retrieved on July 1, 2019 from <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=42231&lang=en#>
- Picker, C. (2005). Regional trade agreements v. the WTO: A proposal for reform of article xxiv to counter this institutional threat. *University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law*, 26(2), 267-319
- Raess, D., Dür, A., Sari, D. (2018). Protecting labour rights in preferential trade agreements: the role of trade unions, left governments, and skilled labour. *The Review of International Organisations*, 13, 143-162. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9301-z>
- Ravenhill, J. (2017). Regional trade agreements. In J. Ravenhill (Eds.), *Global Political Economy* (5th ed., pp. 141-173). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press
- Russell, M. (2018). EU sanctions: a key foreign and security policy instrument. *European Parliamentary Research Service*. Retrieved from [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621870/EPRS_BRI\(2018\)621870_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621870/EPRS_BRI(2018)621870_EN.pdf)
- Salkind, N. J. (2010). *The sage encyclopedia of research design*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. doi: 10.4135/9781412961288
- Schott, J. (2004). Free trade agreements: boon or bane of the world trading system? *Free Trade Agreements: US Strategies and Priorities*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics
- Shadish, W. R., Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D.T. (2002). *Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for generalized causal inference*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin

- Shaffer, G.C., Pollack, M.A. (2010). Hard vs. soft law: Alternatives, compliments, and antagonists in international governance. *Minnesota Law Review*, 94(3), 706-799.
- Shah, A. (2017). *Development assistance and conditionality: challenges in design and options for more effective assistance*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
- Sicurelli, D. (2017). The conditions for effectiveness of EU human rights promotion in non-democratic states. A case study of Vietnam. *Journal of European Integration*, 39, 739-753. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2017.1327527>
- Spilker, G., Böhmelt, T. (2013). The impact of preferential trade agreements on government repression revisited. *Review of International Organizations*, 8, 343-361.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-012-9155-8>
- Statistic solutions. (n.d.). Assumptions of logistic regression. Retrieved June 13, 2018 from <https://www.statisticssolutions.com/assumptions-of-logistic-regression/>
- Statistical Consultancy Team. (2016). Understanding the proportional odds assumption in clinical trials. Retrieved June 21, 2019 from <https://www.quanticate.com/blog/understanding-the-proportional-odds-assumption-in-clinical-trials>
- UCLA. (n.d.). Regression with STATA chapter 2 – regression diagnostics. Retrieved June 18, 2019 from <https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/webbooks/reg/chapter2/stata-webbooksregressionwith-statachapter-2-regression-diagnostics/>
- United Nations. (n.d.). Human rights. Retrieved May 8, 2019 from <https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/human-rights/>

Uppsala Universitet. (n.d.a). *About UCDP*. Retrieved June 12, 2019 from

<https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/about-ucdp/>

Uppsala Universitet. (n.d.b). UCDP. Retrieved June 12, 2019 from

<https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/>

Uppsala Universitet. (n.d.c). *Definitions*. Retrieved June 12, 2019 from

<https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/>

Viner, J. (1950). *The customs union issue*. New York, NY: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Whalley, J. (1996). *Regional Trade Arrangements in North America: CUSTA and NAFTA*. In *New Dimensions in Regional Integration*, ed. Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya, 352–81. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Williams, R. (2005). *Gologit2: a program for generalized logistic regression/partial proportional odds models for ordinal dependent variables*. Retrieved from <https://www.stata.com/meeting/4nasug/gologit2.pdf>

Williams, R. (2006). Generalized ordered logit/partial proportional odds models for ordinal dependent variables. *The Stata Journal*, 6(1), 58-82


Williams, R. (2016). Understanding and interpreting generalized ordered logit models. *The Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 40, 7-20.

<https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2015.1112384>

- World Bank. (2018). Classifying countries by income. Retrieved June 3, 2019, from <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/stories/the-classification-of-countries-by-income.html>
- World Bank. (n.d.). World development indicators [database]. Retrieved May 10, 2019 from <https://databank.worldbank.org/data/source/world-development-indicators>
- World Trade Organization. (2011). *World Trade Report 2011. The WTO and preferential trade agreements: from co-existence to coherence*. Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report11_e.pdf
- WTO. (n.d.-a). Regionalism: friends or rivals? Retrieved April 21, 2019, from https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey1_e.htm
- WTO. (n.d.-b). Singapore ministerial declaration. Retrieved April 26, 2019, from https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm
- WTO. (n.d.-c). Preferential trade agreements [database]. Retrieved 29 April 29, 2019 from <http://ptadb.wto.org/SearchByCountry.aspx>
- Zamfir, I. (2019). *Human rights in EU trade agreements: the civil liberties clause and its application*. Retrieved from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637975/EPRS_BRI\(2019\)637975_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637975/EPRS_BRI(2019)637975_EN.pdf)
- Zerk, J. (2019). Human rights impact assessment of trade agreements. *Chatham House*. Retrieved from <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-02-18HumanRightsTradeAgreements.pdf>

Appendix 1. Sample Population GNI Per Capita: East Asia and Pacific


GNI per Capita & Income Thresholds



Country Name
Multiple values

Appendix 2. Sample Population GNI Per Capita: Europe and Central Asia


GNI per Capita & Income Thresholds



Country Name
Multiple values

Appendix 3. Sample Population GNI Per Capita: Latin America and the Caribbean


GNI per Capita & Income Thresholds



Country Name
Multiple values

Appendix 4. Sample Population GNI Per Capita: Middle East and North Africa


GNI per Capita & Income Thresholds



Country Name
Multiple values

Appendix 5. Sample Population GNI Per Capita: South Asia


GNI per Capita & Income Thresholds



Country Name
Multiple values

Appendix 6. Sample Population GNI Per Capita: Sub-Saharan Africa

GNI per Capita & Income Thresholds



Country Name
Multiple values

Appendix 7. Country level specific agreements with the EU

Country	Date of entry into force	Type of agreement	Agreement where civil liberties and political freedoms first appears	Enforcement mechanism	Clause for inclusion of civil liberties and political freedoms	Clause for suspension in case of non-compliance
Algeria	2005	Association agreement	Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the other part - Annexes - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations	Hard	Article 2 Agreement	Article 104 Agreement
Armenia	Pending	Partnership agreement	Comprehensive and enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part	Soft	Article 2 Agreement	N/A
Bangladesh	2001	Cooperation agreement	Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the People's Republic of Bangladesh on partnership and development	Hard	Article 1 Agreement	Article 16 Agreement
Belize	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Belize	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement
Bolivia	1998	Cooperation agreement	Framework Agreement on Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the Cartagena Agreement and its member countries, namely the Republic of Bolivia, the Republic of Colombia, the Republic of Ecuador, the	Soft	Article 1 agreement	n/a

			Republic of Peru and the Republic of Venezuela - Exchange of Letters on shipping			
Bolivia	Pending	Cooperation agreement	Political dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Andean Community and its Member Countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela), of the other part	Hard	Article 1 agreement	Article 56(3) agreement
Burkina Faso	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Burkina Faso	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement
Cambodia	1999	Cooperation agreement	Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Cambodia - Joint Declarations - Exchange of letters on maritime transport	Hard	Article 1 agreement	Article 19 agreement
Cameroon	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Cameroon	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement
China	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Comoros	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Comoros	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement

			the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations			
Congo, Democratic Republic ¹⁴	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Congo, Democratic Republic	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement
Congo, Republic	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Congo, Republic	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement
Egypt	2004	Association agreement	Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part	Hard	Article 2 agreement	Article 86 agreement
El Salvador	1999	Cooperation agreement	Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,	Soft	Article 1 agreement	N/A

¹⁴ Before 1997, the Democratic Republic of Congo was known as Zaire so in the Lomé Convention, the party name is Zaire.

			Nicaragua and Panama - Exchange of letters on maritime transport - Unilateral Declarations			
El Salvador	2014	Cooperation agreement	Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama	Hard	Article 1(1) agreement	Article 56 agreement
Guatemala	1999	Cooperation agreement	Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama - Exchange of letters on maritime transport - Unilateral Declarations	Soft	Article 1 agreement	N/A
Guatemala	2014	Cooperation agreement	Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama	Hard	Article 1(1) agreement	Article 56 agreement
Haiti	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Haiti	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement
Honduras	1999	Cooperation agreement	Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama - Exchange of letters on maritime transport - Unilateral Declarations	Soft	Article 1 agreement	N/A

Honduras	2014	Cooperation agreement	Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama	Hard	Article 1(1) agreement	Article 56 agreement
India	1994	Cooperation agreement	Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of India on partnership and development - Declaration of the Community concerning tariff adjustments - Declarations of the Community and India	Soft	Article 1 agreement	N/A
Jordan	2002	Association agreement	Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part - Protocol 1 concerning the arrangements applicable to the importation into the Community of agricultural products originating in Jordan - Protocol 2 concerning the arrangements applicable to the importation into Jordan of agricultural products originating in the Community - Protocol 3 concerning the definition of the concept of 'originating products' and methods of administrative cooperation - Protocol 4 on mutual assistance between administrative authorities in customs matters - Joint Declarations - Final Act	Hard	Article 2 agreement	Article 101 agreement
Kenya	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Kenya	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement
Kyrgyz Republic	1999	Partnership and cooperation agreement	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz	Hard	Article 2 agreement	Article 92 agreement

			Republic, of the other part - Protocol on mutual assistance between authorities in customs matters - Final Act - Joint Declarations - Exchange of Letters in relation to the establishment of companies - Declaration of the French Government			
Madagascar	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Madagascar	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement
Mali	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Mali	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement
Mauritania	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Mauritania	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement
Morocco	2000	Association agreement	Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part - Protocol 1 on the arrangements applying to imports into the Community of agricultural products originating in Morocco - Protocol 2 on the	Hard	Article 2 agreement	Article 90 agreement

			arrangements applying to imports into the Community of fishery products originating in Morocco - Protocol 3 on the arrangements applying to imports into Morocco of agricultural products originating in the Community - Protocol 4 concerning the definition of originating products and methods of administrative cooperation - Protocol 5 on mutual assistance in customs matters between the administrative authorities - Final Act - Joint Declarations - Agreements in the form of an Exchange of Letters - Declaration by the Community - Declarations by Morocco			
Mozambique	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Mozambique	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement
Nicaragua	1999	Cooperation agreement	Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama - Exchange of letters on maritime transport - Unilateral Declarations	Soft	Article 1 agreement	N/A
Nicaragua	2014	Cooperation agreement	Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama	Hard	Article 1(1) agreement	Article 56 agreement
Nigeria	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Nigeria	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement

			States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations			
North Macedonia	2004	Association agreement	Stabilisation and association agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part	Soft	Article 2 agreement	N/A
Pakistan	2004	Cooperation agreement	Cooperation agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, relating to the partnership and to development	Hard	Article 1 agreement	Article 19 agreement
Paraguay	1992	Cooperation agreement	Framework Agreement for cooperation between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Paraguay - Exchange of Letters	Soft	Article 1 agreement	N/A
Philippines	2018	Partnership and cooperation	Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of the Philippines, of the other part	Soft	Article 1 agreement	N/A
Rwanda	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Rwanda	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement

Senegal	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Senegal	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement
Sri Lanka	1995	Cooperation agreement	Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka on partnership and development	Soft	Article 1 agreement	N/A
Sudan	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Sudan	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement
Swaziland, eSwatini	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Swaziland, eSwatini	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement
Tanzania	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Tanzania	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement

			on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations			
Tunisia	1998	Association agreement	Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part - Protocol No 1 on the arrangements applying to imports into the Community of agricultural products originating in Tunisia - Protocol No 2 on the arrangement applying to imports into the Community of fishery products originating in Tunisia - Protocol No 3 on the arrangements applying to imports into Tunisia of agricultural products originating in the Community - Protocol No 4 concerning the definition of originating products and methods of administrative cooperation - Protocol No 5 on mutual assistance in customs matters between the administrative authorities - Joint Declarations - Declarations	Hard	Article 2 agreement	Article 90 agreement
Uganda	1991		Fourth ACP-EEC convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	Soft	Article 5 Agreement	N/A
Uganda	2003	Partnership agreement	Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 - Protocols - Final Act - Declarations	Hard	Article 9 agreement	Article 96 agreement
Ukraine	2017	Association agreement	Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part	Soft	Article 2 agreement	N/A
Uzbekistan	1999	Partnership and cooperation agreement	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Uzbekistan, of the other part - Protocol on mutual assistance between authorities in customs matters - Final Act - Joint	Hard	Article 2 agreement	Article 95 agreement

			Declarations - Exchange of Letters in relation to the establishment of companies - Declaration of the French Government			
Viet Nam	1996	Cooperation	Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam	Soft	Article 1 convention	N/A
Viet Nam	2016	Partnership and cooperation	Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, of the other part	Soft	Article 1 agreement	N/A
Data compiled from European Union External Action Treaties Database http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do						

Appendix 8 Distributional Frequency of Civil liberties Categorical Data

Civil Liberties	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	83	6.74	6.74
2	147	11.93	18.67
3	305	24.76	43.43
4	328	26.62	70.05
5	302	24.51	94.56
6	67	5.44	100.00
Total	1,232	100.00	

Appendix 9 Distributional Frequency of Political freedoms Categorical Data

Political Freedoms	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	181	14.69	14.69
2	267	21.67	36.36
3	151	12.26	48.62
4	233	18.91	67.53
5	225	18.26	85.80
6	139	11.28	97.08
7	36	2.92	100.00
Total	1,232	100.00	

Appendix 10 Distributional Frequency of Dummy Variable PTA

PTA	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	302	24.51	24.51
1	930	75.49	100.00
Total	1,232	100.00	

Appendix 11 Distributional Frequency of Dummy Variable Enforcement Mechanism in the Event of a PTA

ENF	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	449	48.28	48.28
1	481	51.72	100.00
Total	930	100.00	