The Mainstreaming of Climate Migration within the European Commission

Thesis Research
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Abstract and Keywords

The growth in public and policy attention for climate change and its ramifications has led to an increased recognition at the global level for climate migration and its many nuanced aspects. Such increased attention has highlighted the multi-disciplinary characteristic of climate migration and the necessity for the subject to be addressed across a wide range of disciplines. Within the EU-sphere, this need for a multi-disciplinary approach has translated into an exigency for mainstreaming. The requirement for mainstreaming within the realm of this topic has been advocated for by the global community with its mention in the Paris Agreement, the COPs and the Global Compact for Migration. In light of the global promotion for climate migration mainstreaming, this study has asked; how is climate migration mainstreamed within the European Commission, and what hinders and facilitates it? In order to answer this research question, a content analysis was conducted of 24 key documents from DG ECHO, DG DEVCO, DG HOME and DG CLIMA – the four sample DGs upon which this study was based. This data was compounded with the inclusion of 7 semi-structured interviews with policymakers from the abovementioned DGs, and 2 semi-structured interviews with external experts from IOM and the EU-UN Delegation in Geneva. The culmination of the data collated, in line with the theory, was the deduction that climate migration is not currently mainstreamed within the European Commission. Furthermore, the initiation of mainstreaming is currently hindered by the sample DGs failure to fulfil the prerequisites required for the successful initiation of mainstreaming.

Keywords: climate migration, mainstreaming, European Commission, forced displacement, directorate general, climate change, mobility.
This thesis is dedicated in loving memory to Catherine Baker.
“Time and again, the EU has proven to be able to meet new migration challenges as they have arisen. But we have not yet built a sustainable system capable of preventing and mitigating future challenges. It is time we switched from being reactive to being proactive. Whenever we have worked together, we have obtained results.”

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<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate General</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>DG CLIMA</td>
<td>Directorate General for Climate Action</td>
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<td>DG HOME</td>
<td>Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs</td>
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<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>Directorate General for European Civil and Humanitarian Aid Operations</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation of Migration</td>
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<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>GCM</td>
<td>Global Compact for Migration</td>
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<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>UNISDR</td>
<td>United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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Acknowledgements

At the beginning of this thesis process, the words ‘empirical’, ‘qualitative’, ‘quantitative’ and ‘methodology’ all meant nothing to me. Research methods? Conceptual framework? Thesis proposal? Zip, nada; no clue. So, for this final product to have come to fruition there are, obviously, several people to whom I owe many thanks.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The function of this chapter is to provide an introduction to this research. This will include an outline of the study including its main aims, central research question and will clarify its societal and academic relevance. The primary intention of this chapter is to underline the relevance of this thesis.

1.1 Introduction

Migration, oft described a wicked policy problem, is a complex and multi-faceted field within which multiple disciplines converge and interweave (Scholten and Van Nispen, 2015). At the EU-level, disciplines such as labour and employment, regional security, foreign policy, and domestic policies are combined, to a certain degree, with the field of migration (Europa, 2018). However, until recently, the intersection between migration and climate change/the environment has been broadly neglected. It is only within the past 5 to 10 years that the complexity, immediacy and significance of climate-induced mobility has started to breach the surface of the global discourse on climate change (IOM-UN Migration, 2018). As a result, many legislative, policy and knowledge gaps still exist within this field (Olsson, 2015). With the EU being the most advanced instance of institutionalised governance and holding a momentous position of influence over member state collaboration, its opportunity to formulate and distribute effective policy for climate migration is substantial (Blocher, 2015). However, climate migration is inherently multi-disciplinary and, necessary to this phenomenon, is the incorporation of migration into the field of climate change and the environment, international development and humanitarian aid (IOM, 2017). Thus, if climate migration is addressed by only one European directorate with a singular field of expertise and set of objectives, its many nuanced characteristics will be neglected or overlooked. This heightens the risk for poor migration governance and holds detrimental consequences for the migrants themselves (IOM representative, 2019). This results in the exigency for mainstreaming climate migration throughout several directorate generals within the EU if effective and successful policy is to be formulated in the future (IOM representative, 2019). Thus, mainstreaming of the topic, and responsibility sharing between several directorate generals within the EU is paramount if effective and successful policy is to be formulated in the future (IOM Representative, 2019). Therefore, this small-scale, qualitative study asks:

How is climate migration mainstreamed within the European Commission, and what hinders and facilitates it?

In order to answer such a question, this research will first provide a contextual basis for the social, policy and political attention trajectory of both climate change and climate
migration, followed by the necessity of mainstreaming for such a phenomenon. The theoretical consideration of mainstreaming is subsequently discussed including selected definitions and the prerequisites for the initiation of effective mainstreaming. This will be followed by the data collection which entails the examination of key documents referencing climate migration from four European Commission directorates generals (DGs) (DG DEVCO, DG CLIMA, DG HOME and DG ECHO to ascertain if mainstreaming of climate migration is present, and, if so, in what ways. In addition, EU policymakers from the same four directorates are interviewed in order to establish the perceptions of their roles and how they perceive their directorate’s endeavours to mainstream climate migration alongside other directorates within the Commission. The combined analysis of said data sources will allow for conclusions to this research’s central question to be reached. In doing so, this research will fulfil its practical and theoretical aims outlined below.

Societal Relevance
The societal relevance of this research results from the necessity for clearer and more coherent governance of climate migrants. The phenomenon of climate migration involves, at a minimum, the combination of migration and climate change. If it is to be thoroughly addressed these two fields must be fully integrated to ensure effective policymaking and programming. The necessity for proper governance of climate migration derives from the lacking protection provision at regional, national and local levels. Poor, vulnerable communities across Viet Nam, Papua New Guinea, Haiti, the Republic of Mauritius, Kenya and the Dominican Republic were followed by the largest IOM report on climate induced migration (IOM, 2017) and it was found that intensifying climate pressures make everyday life unbearable and arduous, especially for the most marginalised and impoverished (IOM, 2017). Further examples include the recent estimates that suggest that roughly 90% of the surrounding area of Mumbai have fled their villages due to desertification, drought and soil loss (The Guardian, 2019). However, despite this indisputable suffering of individuals and communities, there is currently no legal protection framework for those who are displaced or ‘voluntarily’ migrate as a result of climate pressures. No official protection is offered for those displaced by natural disasters and no visa schemes are in place for those migrating as a result of climatic pressures (European Parliament, 2019). This often results in the forced irregular entrance of climate migrants to neighbouring countries, heightening the risk of detention and voluntary return (IOM, 2017). This return is to fragile communities where
conditions will perpetually worsen, and individuals become more desperate, as climate pressures intensify the areas existing fragility (IOM, 2017). The EU is a highly influential regional institution and, given sufficient prioritisation and political attention, could implement measures and soft laws on climate migration to alleviate the suffering of millions of human beings worldwide. This study, thus, aims to highlight the necessity of mainstreaming as a step towards tackling the protection gap through inter-directorial policy formulation and only with a coordinated effort and sharing of responsibility by all relevant directorates and sectors can innovative progress be made (IOM Representative, 2019).

A further relevance notes that climate migration, be it forced displacement or climate migration in reaction to slow-onset degradation, is a field still very much in its infancy, both globally and within the EU (IOM Representative, 2019). Thus, it is a relatively understudied field compared to other sectors of migration such as economic or irregular which also holds true within the regional sphere of the EU. This study, therefore, aims to provide knowledge for the European Commission concerning the status of climate migration within their institutions and to highlight where progress can be made in light of global commitments. In order to do so effectively, this research will culminate with several concrete policy recommendations the Commission can implement to forward the plight of climate migration.

**Academic Relevance**

As noted, the field of climate migration is very much in its infancy with practical gaps present in protection provision and migration management. Reflecting this, it is also greatly under-researched in academic circles with many gaps present in the literature. Mainstreaming is also a relatively novel field, borne of both policy in practice and academic literature in equal measure. Thus, there are also many gaps, both in practice and the literature. Therefore, this thesis provides much relevance for theory primarily by expanding the existing literature in both fields.

The first relevance entails assessing whether the strategies and prerequisites for mainstreaming collated from mainstreaming literature can be applied to the mainstreaming of climate migration at the EU level. The strategies and prerequisites were claimed to be applicable at all institutional levels be it local, national or regional. However, this has yet to be fully proven empirically, and considering the unique governance framework and formation of the European Commission, this constitutes a gap in the literature which this study will address.
Secondly, a further gap involves the lack of empirical proof to establish whether said strategies and prerequisites for mainstreaming can be applied to climate migration; an emerging topic. Previous research on mainstreaming at the European level has focused on wide-reaching, well-studied fields such as gender, disability and human rights. Therefore, this research will analyse the application of said mainstreaming strategies and prerequisites to a smaller, lesser studied field.

Finally, the theoretical discourse on migration mainstreaming appears to be largely focused on the mainstreaming of migrant integration, or the mainstreaming of migration into the field of development. This research will build on this, and address the literature gap concerning, both, the intersection of migration and climate change and, subsequently, the mainstreaming of climate migration.

Thus, to conclude, this research aims to develop a better understanding, and greater awareness, of climate migration and the process of its mainstreaming within the Commission. It aims to address the gaps in the literature surrounding mainstreaming of the novel topic of climate migration at the EU level, as well as highlighting the importance of mainstreaming for fulfilling the protection gaps for climate migrants. In doing so, this may stimulate debate on the Commission’s approach to addressing climate migration, leading to a more integrated and unified attitude to the multi-disciplinary phenomenon of climate migration. The most important beneficiaries of such a development would be those individuals and communities most affected by climatic pressures who will be provided full support and aid with all the nuances of their situation taken into consideration.

CHAPTER 2: CONTEXT FOR STUDY

The aim of this chapter is to present a contextual review which will outline the growing public and policy attention accorded to climate change. This growth will be linked with the recent increase in attention for climate migration. Following this, the development of the intersection between climate change and mobility will be discussed highlighting the multi-disciplinary nature of climate migration. In light of this revelation, the necessity of mainstreaming for climate migration will be evidenced. The recognition and comprehension of these contextual aspects are necessary to fully understand the development of climate migration in tandem with climate change in global political discourse to its position in today’s discourse within the Commission.
2.1: Climate Change: its accorded attention and connection to mobility
Since its scientific recognition in the mid-19th century, climate change has experienced varying peaks and troughs in terms of its media, public and policy attention (Moser, 2010). However, it is only within the last 5 to 10 years that attention for climate change has extended beyond the parameters of mainly policymaker, scientific and academic interest to garner significant public attention (Moser, 2016). This increasing public attention has put pressure on both governments and global institutions such as the UN, prompting more concentrated policy attention on climate change and the wide scope of its adverse consequential effects (Moser, 2016). In reflection of this growing political attention, the EU has committed to mainstreaming climate change into the EU’s directorial policies such as infrastructure, agriculture and forestry, water management, health and biodiversity (Climate Action, 2019a). Against the backdrop of increasing public and policy attention for climate change, Dina Ionesco of IOM Migration, Environment and Climate Change notes: “we’ve had 16 years of climate discussion and negotiations where there was nothing on human mobility” (IOM-UN Migration, 2018) Despite the calls for human mobility to be seen as the human face of climate change, Geddes and Jordan (2012) explain its lacking attention due to the hesitancy of officials to involve themselves in contentious political issues that deeply affect national interests. The strident rise in nationalism across Europe presenting the most common deterrent for discussing migration issues (Geddes and Jordan, 2012). This creates a general tendency for migration and asylum policies to idle behind other policy areas (Popp, 2014). That is, until now; awareness for climate change has grown to such an extent within public and policymaking spheres that Ionesco grants the heightened interest and alarm provoked by climate change as exponentially raising global awareness for migration as a response to climate change, and thus, it’s growth on the global agenda (IOM-UN Migration, 2018).

2.2: The intersection of climate change and migration, and its development
When the notion of climate migration first started to garner attention in the 1980s, it was seen predominantly as a direct consequence of natural disasters and was visualised as an inevitable mass migration from the global South to the global North (cf. Hartmann, 2010; Homer-Dixon, 1999). This produced a disquieted ripple effect within the security, migration and climate change fields, prompting a fervent debate on whether those displaced by climate change could truly qualify for refugee protection (Rodrigues de Brito, 2012; Trombetta, 2014; cf. el-Hinnawi, 1985). This is the first strand of climate migration recognised, otherwise known as forced displacement.
However, in light of several independent, EU- and IOM-led studies, it was recognised that this interpretation of a solely linear causality between climate change and migration was “overly deterministic” and did not cover all aspects or nuances of climate migration (European Commission 2013, p.7). A study by the UK advisory body, Foresight, in 2011 describes how climate change can both directly and indirectly influence individuals’ migration decisions (Foresight, 2011). Much research has proven it is difficult to establish a direct link between climate change and migration, even if the mobility is as a direct result of natural disaster (Foresight, 2011; IOM, 2017; 2018). Climate change on its own rarely creates migration, and the decision to migrate is also influenced by other determinants of migration such as a country’s weak economy, labour shortages, war and conflict to name but a few (see figure 1) (IOM, 2017; Foresight, 2011).

In reality, climate change tends to exacerbate and intensify weaknesses already present in the communities and countries affected by out-migration and is more likely to compound current patterns of internal movement or that between neighbouring countries (IOM, 2017; Foresight, 2011).

This development has paved the way for the second strand of climate migration, that being the facilitation of legal migration as a response to climate change. It has been touted as a fundamental strategy for increasing communities’ resilience (IOM, 2017; UN Brussels Liaison Offices, 2012; UN Brussels Team, 2012; IOM, 2012; Foresight, 2011). In this sense, climate migration is a form of adaptation to climatic or environmental pressures. The working
definition for adaptation used within the EU was coined by the IPCC which denotes adaptation as “any adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (IOM, 2017, p.7). In short, adaptation entails predicting the detrimental effects of climate change and reacting in such a way that these effects are minimised. Thus, the second strand of climate migration facilitates adaptation due to its role in strategically diversifying income patterns (Massey et al., 1998; Castles and Miller, 2003) and indirectly diminishing population pressures in areas affected by climate change (Gray, 2009). It also allows for the continuous return of social and financial remittances to fragile communities which can be utilised to increase the resilience of fragile communities (de Haas, 2007; 2007b). Examples include financial investment in flood barriers and mangrove trees, bringing new knowledge and financial investment for advancement of agricultural irrigation, investment in GMD crops etc (IOM, 2017). However, this second strand of climate migration is controversial, with many claiming that the indirect nature of this form of climate migration cannot be quantified or measured accurately. It has been noted by policymakers that a lack of empirical evidence or scientific proof to concretely establish a connection with legal channels of migration and climatic adaptation leads to inherent difficulties when implementing this form of climate migration in policy.

To summarise, the recognition of a non-linear causality between climate change and mobility, combined with the understanding of climate migration’s multidisciplinary character has led to the acknowledgement of two strands of climate migration. Both forced displacement and climate migration provoked by slow-onset degradation fall within the fields of migration, climate change and the environment, international development and humanitarian aid.

2.3: The Case for Mainstreaming
The IOM Representative (2019) stressed the necessity of mainstreaming to address climate migration. It was noted that migration’s role as a facilitator for adaptation to climate change inherently implicates DG DEVCO who work on international development and increasing resilience via communities’ adaptation to climate pressures (IOM representative, 2019). This in turn implicates DG HOME who must have policies in place to provide equal opportunities for legal migration to and from Europe to allow migration to act as a facilitation strategy for adaptation (IOM representative, 2019). DG HOME are also implicated via the asylum perspective for those fleeing natural disasters. The inherent climatic nature of climate
migration also incorporates DG CLIMA as migration facilitates the adaptation of communities to climatic pressures and degradations (IOM, 2017). Finally, DG ECHO’s perspectives on Disaster Risk Reduction and humanitarian aid are also required when considering forced displacement.

Secondly, various advisory bodies have strongly recommended the importance of mainstreaming to ensure effective further action on climate migration. The EU has committed to fulfil the 2030 Agenda and its subsequent 17 SDGs, all of which call for the immediate mainstreaming of climate change and the environment with several advocating for the importance of migration (European Commission, 2016). Importantly, a notion inherent to the 2030 Agenda is “Leave No One Behind” and the wider global society have sworn to uphold this (UNDP, 2018). When discussing climate migration, this is a prescient phrase, as climate migrants are currently experiencing marginalisation, isolation and a lack of recognition at the global, regional and national levels. In an advisory document to the EU, the UN Brussels Liaison Office (2012, p.1) noted the complexity of climate migration and it’s “multi-dimensional character” which “requires integrated, multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder approaches at various levels”. The IOM has also forcefully stated the need for mainstreaming of migration across various fields of expertise in many publications and public discourses (IOM, 2012; 2017; 2018). There are also several treaties and commitments which highlight the necessity of mainstreaming climate migration of which the EU is a signatory. Preliminary examples being; The Paris Agreement which “openly call[ed] for more policy convergence and synergies” regarding climate migration (IOM, 2018, p.8); and the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) urges for policy coherence in noting that the GCM was borne from varying global devices on climate change, migration, development and the environment (IOM, 2018). The European Union is a “staunch supporter” of the GCM and has ardently committed to ensuring its success (EEAS, 2018). The EU has also committed to the COP24 in Katowice (2018) in which “coordination, coherence and collaboration” were strongly recommended alongside integrating climate migration into national planning processes (UNFCC, 2018 p.5). These are a selection of many treaties and commitments adhered to by the EU in which the necessity of mainstreaming to migration is explicitly clear.

Finally, the link between mainstreaming and agenda-setting highlights the importance of mainstreaming for this issue. Mainstreaming as a mechanism for agenda-setting entails, exemplifying the gender debate, “re-orienting the mainstream political agenda from a gender perspective” (Lombardo 2005, p.413). It is in this respect, that the mainstreaming of climate migration within the Commission would integrate climate migration into the mainstream,
thus potentially acting as a means to create soft laws rather than full legislative frameworks for climate migrants. There are many inherent complexities and difficulties to formulating and implementing a legislative framework for climate migrants such as their exclusion from the refugee convention, global actors hesitancy to open and amend the convention, and national governments unwillingness to provide protection for those fleeing climatic events due to rising populist pressure to restrict immigration. In light of these dilemmas, mainstreaming provides a fruitful opportunity to raise climate migration in the policy agenda of the European Commission avoiding the obstacles inherent to the creation of a legislative protection framework.

In summary, the mainstreaming of climate migration throughout other departments and fields of expertise is necessary for the advancement of more effective policy formulation. It is only through a shared sense of responsibility from actors through diverse fields of expertise that these gaps can be addressed effectively and policy formulation, and potentially the formulation of legislation on protection provision, can be promoted (IOM Representative, 2019).

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In light of the necessity of mainstreaming for climate migration, this section aims to describe this study’s self-determined definition of mainstreaming derived from literature on environmental mainstreaming, migration mainstreaming and guidelines for mainstreaming in the European Commission. Firstly, the trajectory of mainstreaming as an approach is briefly analysed with the necessity for a more precise and concrete definition of mainstreaming for this study highlighted. Subsequently, three key pieces of literature from the aforementioned fields are discussed with their criticisms highlighted. These literatures are then built upon with their criticisms addressed in order to form a new definition of mainstreaming which best applies to climate migration within the European Commission. The prerequisites for effective mainstreaming are then established. The culmination of presenting the self-determined definition of mainstreaming and climate migration, alongside the prerequisites for mainstreaming, will allow the expectations for this research to be presented.

3.1: Mainstreaming: its policy trajectory and definition

The study of mainstreaming has been present across many cross-cutting fields such as gender, human rights and disability (Collett, Petrovic and Scholten, 2017). Mainstreaming has been particularly prevalent in the field of gender literature (cf. Booth and Bennett 2002; Caglar 2013; Lombardo 2005) and it was in 1985 that mainstreaming as a policy tool was first introduced (Scholten and Van Breugel, 2018). In 1997, the UN implemented it as a “strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the
design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres…” (United Nations 1997, I.A). Thus, it is evidenced that the notion of mainstreaming was borne of both policy and literature to equal extents. Following the prevalence of mainstreaming in the gender field, the approach became a widespread policy mechanism, diffused throughout many fields, recently finding its way into environmental and climate change literature. Within said literature, mainstreaming is now a prominent aspect and, due to the growing policy attention attributed to climate change and the environment, significant progress has been made concerning the mainstreaming of climate change and the environment throughout the Commission (European Commission, 2016; Pauleit and Wamsler, 2016).

Mainstreaming of migration is a more novel concept and one that has predominantly been discussed in terms of the mainstreaming of migrant integration policies into more generic policy areas at the regional, national and local levels (Collett, Petrovic and Scholten, 2017). A central element of mainstreaming in this field involves the rejection of target group-specific policies focusing on ethnic or migration-background diversity, in favour of more generic policies bringing those requiring ‘integration’ into the mainstream (Collett, Petrovic and Scholten, 2017). The notion of mainstreaming migration and integration is a relatively new concept championed primarily by the Dutch academics Peter Scholten and Ilona Van Breugel in the last few years, with mainstreaming of migrant inclusion and integration at the national and local level its main prerogative.

However, despite the prominence of mainstreaming across many conceptual fields, definitions of the approach differ. As mainstreaming has developed from policy to the same extent as from academic literature, a general theory, or all-encompassing definition of mainstreaming, which provides measurements and criteria by which mainstreaming initiatives may be comprehended and evaluated, has not yet been produced (Pauleit and Wamsler, 2016; Collett, Petrovic and Scholten, 2017). In the absence of a precise, all-encompassing definition of mainstreaming, the many academic definitions which currently exist do not adequately correspond to the circumstances of ‘climate migration’ and ‘the European Commission’. This is due to the following reasons; i.) most academic studies on mainstreaming have focused on local, national, regional (out with the EU) and global institutions, and when the EU institutions have been assessed its primarily been in relation to their effect on member states rather than on internal institutional dynamics (cf. Rauken, Mydske and Winsvold, 2014; Collett, Petrovic and Scholten, 2017; Pauleit and Wamsler, 2016). For multiple reasons such as its composition, structure and the way in which
commissioners are voted in (cf. Kassim et al, 2013), the European Commission has a very different framework and modus operandi compared to local or national governments, or other regional institutions, on which most mainstreaming studies have been focused. ii.) In addition, most articles and studies on mainstreaming have focused on well-studied and discussed topics such as gender, disability and human rights. Climate migration, as a field of study, is very much in its infancy, which denotes a necessity to adapt current mainstreaming definitions of more well-versed topics to correspond with those that are less researched.

Therefore, by means of a literature review, and considering the scope of my topic falling within the fields of migration and climate change, I will develop my own definition of mainstreaming by building on two pieces of academic literature from the lesser studied fields of migration mainstreaming (Collett, Petrovic and Scholten, 2017) and climate change mainstreaming (Pauleit and Wamsler, 2016). In a similar vein to climate migration, both of these topics are less prominent within the realm of mainstreaming. Therefore, their definitions of mainstreaming will be taken into consideration in order to ascertain if any divergences occur as a result of their novelty. This will be alongside a policy document published by the European Commission (2016) which provides guidelines for the mainstreaming of the environment. In doing so, the unique Commission framework and its effect on mainstreaming will be incorporated, as well as any dissimilarities present with more academic definitions. The decision to base the mainstreaming definition on two academic literatures and a policy document stems from mainstreaming being as much borne of policy documentation and its implementation in practice as through academic and theoretical consideration. The aspects of these definitions which are most in accordance with climate migration within the Commission will be utilised, and criticisms of these aspects will be addressed accordingly. The aspects that do not correspond accurately to the mainstreaming of climate migration within the Commission will be discarded. In doing so, a definition of mainstreaming which best fits the mainstreaming of climate migration within the European Commission will be devised.

Thus, to begin, Pauleit and Wamsler’s (2016) definition of mainstreaming involves radical change to the current framework of an institution as well as its surrounding discourse on the issue in question across varying levels of governance. As a result, mainstreaming ensures a broader range of responsibility-sharing for said issue (Pauleit and Wamsler, 2016). To further their definition, Pauleit and Wamsler (2016) have also devised a mainstreaming
framework (see figure 2 and Appendix 1) constituting strategies for the multi-level mainstreaming of climate change.

For context, this framework embodies seven different strategic activities for mainstreaming and as the primary focus of this study is the European Commission, I shall be focusing on ‘mainstreaming at the institutional level’ (see figure 2) and disregarding the other levels, as I believe this to hold the closest equivalence with the Commission. The authors note that their framework can be applied to institutional bodies at all levels and to all policy fields. (Pauleit and Wamsler, 2016). ‘Mainstreaming at the institutional level’ involves mainstreaming strategies number 3, 4 and 5; that being managerial mainstreaming, intra-organisational mainstreaming and regulatory mainstreaming (see figure 3).
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy of Mainstreaming</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managerial Mainstreaming</td>
<td>“Modification of managerial and working structures such as internal (in)formal norms and job descriptions to better address aspects related to climate change and adaptation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-organisational Mainstreaming</td>
<td>“Promotion of collaboration and networking with other departments to generate a shared understanding and knowledge, develop competence and steer collective issues of climate change and adaptation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory Mainstreaming</td>
<td>“Modification of (in)formal planning procedures such as planning strategies and frameworks, regulations, policies and legislation, and related instruments to lead to the integration of adaptation and climate change”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These three aspects strengthen and expand Pauleit and Wamsler’s central characteristic of mainstreaming i.e. the radical change to the institution’s framework and discourse. As a result, the internal modification of informal norms, job descriptions and (in)formal planning procedures alongside the promotion of collaboration and networking are thus aspects also included in Pauleit and Wamsler’s definition of mainstreaming. As a result, the authors note that the successful mainstreaming of the topic would entail the institutionalisation of the topic’s aims, practices and objectives i.e. the object of a mainstreaming process would attain the status of a norm or guiding principle which affected behaviour, policy content and practice at all levels of the EU (Pauleit and Wamsler, 2016). Thus, the aspects from Pauleit and Wamsler’s definition that I will be including in this
study’s definition are firstly that mainmainstreaming involves radical changes to the current framework in order to create wider responsibility sharing, and, as a result, the object of mainstreaming becomes a norm which influences all phases of policy and practice.

However, criticisms of this aspect of mainstreaming are present. Caglar (2013, p.340), for instance, highlights the risk that if attention for an issue is decentralised and accountability is diffused then a topic may “becoming everyone’s responsibility, yet nobody’s at the same time”. This is relevant to this definition as Pauleit and Wamsler denote the need for more generic policies for which all parties are equally responsible, which could lead to an absence of anyone taking explicit responsibility for the issue. In response to this criticism, this study’s self-determined definition will include the requirement of mutual accountability mechanisms as these ensure that all parties who have agreed to partake in the mainstreaming of climate migration are held to account and their progress monitored and evaluated. This will guarantee that responsibility is being equally shared, and if certain departments are lacking or falling short, sanctions can be put in place to ensure a full, shared responsibility (Scholten and Van Breugel, 2018).

The second definition from Collett, Petrovic and Scholten (2017) notes that, in terms of governance, mainstreaming is split into two dimensions; i.) it involves the rejection of ethnic or minority target group specific policies in favour of more generic policies, whilst ii.) it also requires a shift from state-centric governance, to poly-centric modes of governance that intersect with multiple policy sectors and involve a variety of actors. This is often linked to the multi-level governance approach concerning actors from both hierarchical and horizontal levels such as civil society, regional, national and local institutions and divergent policy levels. My definition will focus primarily on the latter dimension as in order to move from target group specific policies to more generic policies there must first be a concretely defined target group from which policies move away. Currently, an explicit definition of who and what constitutes a climate migrant has not yet been established and thus this aspect of mainstreaming is not currently applicable – although it would be an interesting avenue for future research (European Parliament, 2019). Therefore, the focus will concentrate primarily on the shift to poly-centric governance. However, my criticism of Collett, Petrovic and Scholten’s definition is that it cannot be applied to the level of internal operations within the European Commission. Within the Commission, poly-centric governance involves responsibility-sharing between horizontal DGs alone rather than amongst horizontal and hierarchical governance institutions and actors as although there are varying levels of seniority within DGs, no DG holds a horizontally higher position than any other. Thus, my
own inclusion of poly-centric governance in mainstreaming at the Commission level will diverge from other variants in that its notion of state-centric governance would refer to a central minister or directorate within the Commission whose role lies with a specific policy field or sector, and poly-centric governance will denote the responsibility-sharing of the issue at hand between several directorate generals. This will be reflected in my definition.

Finally, in terms of mainstreaming at the EU level, the Commission refers to mainstreaming as ‘the process of systematically integrating a selected value/idea/theme into all domains of the EU…to promote specific as well as general…outcomes’ (European Commission 2016, p.1). It involves the modification of the culture and behaviour of the various EU institutions, alongside the methodical incorporation of an issue throughout the variant programming and project cycles (European Commission, 2016). This is in accordance with the unique Commission framework as, although policy mainstreaming is a common occurrence, mainstreaming is also heavily based in programming and projects – i.e. in practice. The heightened inclusion of mainstreaming in projects and programming within the Commission will be reflected in this study’s definition of mainstreaming.

Thus, to summarise, the mainstreaming definition from the European Commission (2016), Collett, Petrovic and Scholten (2017) and Pauleit and Wamsler (2016) will be combined and built upon, with their criticisms addressed (see figure 4), in order to create a new definition of mainstreaming for climate migration within the European Commission.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literature</th>
<th>Aspect of mainstreaming extracted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pauleit and Wamsler (2016)</td>
<td>- Changes to the current framework to create wider responsibility sharing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Object of mainstreaming becomes a norm which affects policy and practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism</td>
<td>- Issue becomes everyone’s problem and no one’s at the same time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collett, Petrovic and Scholten (2017)</td>
<td>- Shifting from state-centric governance to policy-centric governance i.e. decentralising attention for a particular issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism</td>
<td>- The internal workings of the European Commission do not concern different policy levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Commission (2016)</td>
<td>- Process of systematically integrating selected idea into all domains of the EU to promote both specific and general outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Heavily linked to projects and programming.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: Extracts of mainstreaming definitions and their criticism that will inform this study’s definition of mainstreaming

As a result, extracts from the three definitions derived from the literature (figure 4) which chime with climate migration mainstreaming at the European level are included in this study’s self-determined definition. The criticisms of the definitions present are addressed. The first criticism conveys the concern that the issue to be mainstreamed could become both everyone’s problem, and no one’s, at the same time. This is addressed by the inclusion of accountability mechanisms to ensure that all parties who have agreed to partake in mainstreaming are held to account. Furthermore, the criticism that poly-centric governance often denotes multi-level governance will be confronted as it is not appropriate in the Commission setting. Thus the definition of poly-centric governance within the Commission entails a topic being actively decentralised from one directorate and diffused throughout many DGs. Therefore, the definition of mainstreaming used in this study will be: **the active**
modification of each Directorate General’s internal actions and behaviour to ensure that climate migration is integrated into all phases of projects, programming and policymaking. Thus, causing the responsibility-sharing of climate migration, invoking a poly-centric mode of governance and a decentralised attention for climate migration throughout the European Commission, reinforced by mutual accountability mechanisms.

Chapter 3.2: Prerequisites for mainstreaming

With this definition employed, it must be noted that certain prerequisites are required for effective mainstreaming to take place. Much research has been carried out which highlights the reasons for why the mainstreaming of gender was not particularly successful in its initial stages (Eveline and Todd 2009, Meier 2006). In light of this research, Scholten and Van Breugel (2018) have categorised the well-known prerequisites for effective mainstreaming. Nine inter-related justifications were noted as prerequisites for mainstreaming (see figure 5). Firstly, support of the issue on the table to be mainstreamed is essential; it must be “considered as high-value work” and thus a priority for all (Scholten and Van Breugel 2018, p.173). Additionally, it must be perceived as a shared responsibility for all rather than solely that of fringe departments with little influence on the policy-making process. Relatedly, sufficient funding for mainstreaming initiatives, developing and operationalising mainstreaming tools, and hiring staff with the relevant expertise is required, alongside sufficient human resources. In relation, continuous training and instruction for those involved with the issue, be it directly or indirectly is a necessity for mainstreaming. In order to share knowledge, good practices and tools for mainstreaming, Scholten and Van Breugel also note the necessity for “coordination and communication across policy-making units and departments” (p.173). In a similar vein, outreach and inclusion of external experts is required alongside enhancing and increasing the capacity of data collection. Accountability mechanisms are also denoted essential with sanctions exemplified as a means to ensure compliance via legislative procedures. The final prerequisite for mainstreaming involves the necessity for monitoring and evaluation to ensure and increase efficiency and effectiveness of the current modus operandi (Scholten and Van Breugel, 2018). In light of these nine requirements, the two authors note “While they may not be sufficient prerequisites, there needs to be no doubt about the fact that they are—to a larger or lesser extent—necessary ones” (p.174).
3.3: Climate Migration: Definition

Finally, in order to apply the concept of mainstreaming to climate migration, an official description of said migration has to be established. However, an internationally accepted definition specifying individuals who are forced to migrate as a result of environmental and climatic pressures does not currently exist. As terms such as ‘climate refugee’ have no basis in law, the IOM has put forward the most widely-accepted working definition of a climate or environmental migrant; “persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of
sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad” (Environmental Migration Portal, 2011). I believe the term climate migration to denote an element of choice and voluntary movement and, thus do not agree with its usage, preferring the term climate-induced displacement. However, I will employ the umbrella term ‘climate migration’ to refer to both forced displacement as a result of natural disasters, and to mobility as a result of slow-onset degradation. This is because the term ‘climate migration’ is most commonly used in Commission documents, as well as being used prolifically by IOM and other external partners. In using this term, I hope to alleviate and reduce any confusion that may arise over terminology as many variations exist with nuanced differentiations.

To conclude, the trajectory and recent developments within the field of mainstreaming have elucidated three key pieces of literature spanning the conceptual fields of climate change, the environment and migration; Collett, Petrovic and Scholten, the European Commission and Pauleit and Wamsler. Elements from these definitions of mainstreaming have been collated and combined to form this research’s mainstreaming definition. In order to assess whether this definition is present in practice and policy, the nine prerequisites for mainstreaming, collated and categorised by Scholten and Van Breugel, have been addressed, allowing for this selected definition to be comparatively analysed in line with the data collected.

3.4: Expectations

In light of the chosen definitions for mainstreaming and climate migration employed in this research, it is now possible to explicate my expectations.

Based on the fruitful mainstreaming attempts in the past within the EU of the previously mentioned fields of the environment and climate change, gender, human rights and disability, I do expect there to be instances of mainstreaming of climate migration within the Commission (Collett, Petrovic and Scholten, 2017). The EU has often been cited as a good practice example by external actors or institutes evaluating its extent of gender mainstreaming (EIGE, 2013), which thus implies that the Commission is capable of mainstreaming issues it deems important and necessary. This strengthens my expectation that mainstreaming of climate migration will be present. The gender mainstreaming discourse provides a clear exemplar of full, effective mainstreaming of an issue within the EU sphere. The perspective of gender equality has been integrated, both horizontally and hierarchically,
into every policy (International Cooperation and Development, 2019). There has also been the development of targeted action for gender equality and women’s rights (International Cooperation and Development, 2019). There has also been a toolkit on Mainstreaming Gender Equality in the European Commission, as well as a Resource Package on how to advance the 2030 SDGs and Gender Equality (International Cooperation and Development, 2019).

Despite this exemplar of full, effective mainstreaming, my expectations of widespread climate migration mainstreaming are tempered by the literature speaking to the duration required to operationalise mainstreaming within several of the aforementioned fields (EIGE, 2019). Taking climate change and the environment as an example, the EU’s first policy commitment to mainstream the fields of climate and the environment was in 2005 with the European Consensus on Development. This Consensus noted that the preservation of the environment should be implemented into all EU-led policies to further promote sustainable development (European Commission, 2016). However, we are now in 2019 and 14 years have since passed, yet the mainstreaming of climate change and the environment is not as wide-spread and institutionally embedded as was desired back in 2005. For example, it cannot be said that climate change and the environment is mainstreamed into all EU-led policies, rather it is fairly established in specific sectors such as development and urban restructuring, but less so in others i.e. migration (Moser, 2016). Thus, when relating this consideration to climate migration, I expect climate migration mainstreaming to be present, but to a very limited extent. As mentioned in the introduction, the policy attention for climate change and its ramifications has been steadily growing over the past ten to twenty years, however, it is only within the last five to ten years that an understanding of, and attention for, climate migration has broached the surface of the global policy discourse. Therefore, the dialogue on climate migration is still primarily occurring at the global level with treaties such as the Paris Agreement, the COPs and the Sendai Framework (UNFCCC, 2019a; UNFCCC, 2019b; UNDRR, 2019). Therefore, as a result of the commencing global discourse, I expect to find instances of climate migration mainstreaming within the selected policy documents so as to fulfil requisites awaited by global actors. These instances will be primarily in order to fulfil these requisites and, thus, I expect them to constitute a mere acknowledgement of climate migration and the importance of mainstreaming i.e. the minimal requisite required of the global society. In a similar vein, I expect to find in the policy a decentralisation of the dialogue on climate migration away from the inherently climate centred DGs but still expect to find DG CLIMA taking precedence in this issue over other DGs in light of their mandate.
on climate action.

In light of the majority of the discourse occurring at the global level, I also expect there to be a mismatch between policy and practice. This expectation is based on the gender literature in which it is denoted that implementing gender mainstreaming in practice can be very difficult due to the diverse priorities of the actors involved (Walby, 2005). For example, gender mainstreaming may be highlighted as a priority in policy, but a potential gap arises when equating this to the priorities of the individuals who must implement it. Therefore, I expect for there to be minimal mainstreaming at the policy level, but do not expect this to translate into practice.

To conclude, due to the EU’s productive history of mainstreaming predominantly within the field of gender, I do expect to find instances of mainstreaming climate migration within the Commission. However, due to the infancy of the field of climate migration and its growing but still negligible policy attention at the global and regional levels, I expect the mainstreaming of climate migration to be minorly present in policy, i.e. fulfilling the minimum requirements of the global community, but comparatively less in interview. Furthermore, rather than climate migration being fully shared between DGS, I expect climate migration to predominantly remain an issue for DG CLIMA.

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY (RESEARCH DESIGN)

The function of Chapter 3 is to provide this study’s research question and to present the operationalisation of mainstreaming from the three key theoretical literatures selected. This is a transitional chapter which involves the translation of abstract mainstreaming theory into practical concepts for research. Furthermore, its aim is to describe and justify the use of carefully selected methodology and research methods in this study. This includes the use of a singular case study analysis, preliminary and conclusive expert interviews, a key document analysis and interviews with members of the European Commission. The limitations to the research and ethical considerations are then noted.

4.1: Operationalisation

This study aims to answer the following research question:

**How is climate migration mainstreamed within the European Commission, and what hinders and facilitates it?**

To answer such a question, first the notion of mainstreaming must be operationalised. To recap, from the three pieces of literature in the theoretical framework by Pauleit and Wamsler (2016), Collett, Petrovic and Scholten (2017), and the toolkit by the Commission
(2016), including their criticisms, the concept of mainstreaming climate migration that will be employed in this study is; **the active modification of each Directorate General’s internal actions and behaviour to ensure that climate migration is integrated into all phases of projects, programming and policymaking. Thus, causing the responsibility-sharing of climate migration, invoking a poly-centric mode of governance and a decentralised attention for climate migration throughout the European Commission, reinforced by mutual accountability mechanisms.**

**Preliminary Dimension of Research Question**

In order to operationalise this conceptualisation of mainstreaming and to develop an analytical lens, the self-determined definition has been divided into two fundamental aspects of mainstreaming. Those being; i.) **the active modification of each Directorate General’s internal actions and behaviour to ensure that climate migration is integrated into all phases of projects, programming and policymaking**, and ii.) **responsibility-sharing of climate migration, invoking a poly-centric mode of governance**. To answer the first half of the research question, namely **how is climate migration mainstreamed within the European Commission**, this operationalisation has been furthered by means of literature-based self-constructed sensitising concepts derived from Pauleit and Wamsler (2016), Collett, Petrovic and Scholten (2017), and the toolkit by the Commission (2016) which each fall within the two central categories of mainstreaming highlighted by this study’s definition. These sensitising topics entail ‘strategies’ by which the Commission may mainstream climate migration.
The first category entails **the active modification of each Directorate General’s internal actions and behaviour** which encompasses the strategies of “modification of job descriptions” and “shared reports and studies” derived from Pauleit and Wamsler, “inter-directorial policy dialogue” from Collett, Petrovic and Scholten and “practical tools” and “shared projects and programmes” from the Commission.

The strategy “modification of job descriptions encompassing climate migration” fits within the preliminary dimension as Pauleit and Wamsler’s institutional framework for mainstreaming climate policy highlights the adjustment of internal arrangements such as internal norms and job descriptions as an essential aspect of mainstreaming. Furthermore, they also include, within the internal modification of behaviour and actions, the rearrangement of financial means and resources within an institution, thus the strategy “co-funding” also emerges. Finally, although the strategy “shared reports and studies” does have similarities with the dimension concerning responsibility sharing and poly-centric governance, it primarily involves internal modifications. Pauleit and Wamsler (2016) have

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modification of DGs internal actions and behaviour</th>
<th>Responsibility sharing and poly-centric governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modification of job descriptions related to climate migration</td>
<td>Partnership and networking between directorates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical tools</td>
<td>Mutual accountability mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared projects and programmes</td>
<td>Inter-directorial policy dialogue on climate migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared studies and reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-funding</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

*Figure 6: operationalisation of literature based mainstreaming strategies*
highlighted these internal modifications as the adjustment of formal and informal planning such as strategies, frameworks and related instruments.

The strategies “shared projects and programmes” and “practical tools” were highlighted by the European Commission’s (2016) toolkit on EU International Cooperation and Development Towards Sustainable Development which focuses on the integration of climate change and the environment into the programming and project cycle. Although there are again aspects of responsibility sharing and poly-centric governance in the concept shared projects and programming, it is primarily an internal modification. This is due to the fact that is concerns the modification of the programming, identification and formulation, the implementation and evaluation phases within the project and programme cycle to ensure the inclusion of climate migration at every step. In order to ensure these steps are effectively performed, the Commission document also includes the necessity of modifying internal practices with the inclusion of “practical tools” to evaluate and implement mainstreaming.

The secondary category of responsibility-sharing of climate migration, invoking a poly-centric mode of governance involves “partnership and networking between directorates” and “inter-directorial policy dialogue on climate migration” from Collett, Petrovic and Scholten (2017) and “mutual accountability mechanisms” from the Commission (2016).

From the literature of Collett, Petrovic and Scholten (2017), a clear characteristic of mainstreaming involves poly-centric modes of governance involving diverse actors and policy sectors. This has been categorised into “partnership and networking between directorates” and “inter-directorial policy dialogue on climate migration”.

Furthermore, the European Commission’s (2016) guidelines focus on the necessity to ensure all stakeholders share responsibility equally: “mutual accountability mechanisms”. Additionally, in light of the criticism regarding a mainstreamed issue becoming both everyone’s and no-one’s responsibility at the same time, mutual accountability mechanisms are essential to ensure responsibility is shared equally and that poly-centric governance is successful. These strategies have been displayed in the graphic below. It is important to note, however, that these sensitising concepts-cum-strategies are not set in stone, and are open to re-modification and change over the course of this research in line with the data collection. This is in accord with the researcher’s chosen methodology.
**Subsidiary dimension of Research Question**

This study will also answer the second half of our research question; what hinders and facilitates the mainstreaming of climate migration within the Commission? The prerequisites for mainstreaming derived from the literature by Scholten and Van Breugel (2018) are aspects which are inherent to the process of mainstreaming, in other words, without the inclusion of these requirements, mainstreaming will not occur. Therefore, each requirement is also vital to our definition of mainstreaming; **the active modification of each Directorate General’s internal actions and behaviour to ensure that climate migration is integrated into all phases of projects, programming and policymaking.** Thus, causing the responsibility-sharing of climate migration, invoking a poly-centric mode of governance and a decentralised attention for climate migration throughout the European Commission, reinforced by mutual accountability mechanisms. Each requirement is included in this study’s mainstreaming definition and is placed under either dimension i.) active modification of DGs internal actions and behaviours, or dimension ii.) responsibility-sharing and poly-centric governance (see figure 7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modification of DGs Internal Actions and Behaviours</th>
<th>Responsibility-Sharing and Poly-Centric Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Considered a Priority</td>
<td>Shared Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding and Human Resources</td>
<td>Coordination and Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous Training and Instruction</td>
<td>Accountability Mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of External Experts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing Capacity of Data Collection</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 7: Prerequisites for mainstreaming categorised in line with mainstreaming definition*

The first category of **modification of DGs internal actions and behaviours** involves considering the issue to be mainstreamed as a priority, funding and human resources being dedicated to mainstreaming, the continuous training and instruction of mainstreaming, the inclusion of external experts, the increase in the capacity of data collection and monitoring...
and evaluation.

Considering a topic and its mainstreaming a priority entails the modification of internal behaviours to accord the issue more political attention such as advocating for, and including, climate migration in projects and programmes and boosting it in the agenda. Furthermore, the prerequisite of monitoring and evaluation entails internal modifications to include goals and objectives for mainstreaming which must be consistently analysed by all DGs with progress monitored to ensure effective mainstreaming. Interlinked is the requirement of funding and human resources which denote the necessity to modify internal actions throughout all DGs to accord funds explicitly to mainstreaming of climate migration. In doing so, this will herald further changes such as sufficiently funded continuous training and instruction on mainstreaming. Finally, the inclusion of external experts, and enhancing and increasing capacity of data collection, are both key prerequisites for mainstreaming and involve the modification of internal actions and behaviour. DGs must adapt to, and utilise, said experts and the latest data to inform their policy, projects and programmes.

The second category of responsibility-sharing and poly-centric governance involves effectively sharing responsibility for mainstreaming, effective coordination and communication and accountability mechanisms. The justification for including the requirement of sharing responsibility within this dimension is evident, due to its mention within the dimension title. However, the reason for including coordination and communication is due to the necessity for effective coordination and communication to the success of poly-centric governance and responsibility-sharing. Finally, accountability mechanisms were ascertained a prerequisite for mainstreaming as they ensure the compliance of other actors as regards the mutual accountability and responsibility sharing of an issue. They directly address criticism of mainstreaming and as a result they are fundamental to the success of the second dimension of the mainstreaming dimension.

4.2: Methodology

The decision to apply template coding through the use of a-priori sensitising concepts rather than through a more open and flexible means is derived from the purpose of this research being to answer the concrete question of how climate migration is mainstreamed within the Commission. Therefore, an a-priori explicit conceptualisation and operationalisation of mainstreaming as a phenomenon is essential for the legitimacy of this study. It is also in order to acknowledge the researcher’s subjective position when interpreting the data. A more open approach necessitates that the researcher describes emergent codes according to their
subjective interpretation of the data, whilst template coding reduces this subjectivity to a
certain extent as it allows the researcher to rely on already established theoretical literature as
a means to derive codes through which the data will be analysed and categorised (Blair,
2015).

To explore the aforementioned expectations, I shall be executing a small-scale
qualitative case-study research design following an interpretivist epistemology. This
methodology was chosen due to individuals’ subjective interpretation of the world around
them, a trope inherent to human beings (Bryman, 2012; Walliman, 2011). Through
qualitative research, this subjective interpretation is then understood in line with the
researcher’s subjective world view – thus interpretivism as a concept insinuates that research
cannot be achieved objectively (Bryman, 2012; Walliman, 2011). The acknowledgement of
this subjective and interpreted situation provides justification for the chosen methods of data
collection and analysis. Qualitative research can be divided into experiential and critical
(Braun and Clarke, 2013), with experiential qualitative research examining “the meanings,
views, perspectives, experiences and/or practices expressed in the data” (Braun and Clarke
2013, p.21). This form of qualitative research engages with sense-making of the world around
the participant from their perspective (Braun and Clarke, 2013). Qualitative data is seen as
“being produced in particular contexts, by participants who come from, and are located
within, specific contexts” (Braun and Clarke 2013, p. 21). Qualitative research works well
with the case study approach as it focuses on the process by which an outcome appears; it
explains why certain outcomes happen rather than just describing the outcomes (Denscombe,
2007). It also allows the researcher to understand the complexity of detailed relationships and
social processes rather than just focusing on the physical outcomes (Denscombe, 2007). This
adheres with the aim of this research to assess policymakers’ attitudes, perceptions and ideas
about mainstreaming climate migration within the context of the European Commission,
compared to more objective policy documents. The methods used to ascertain the
expectations will involve desk research of secondary sources (content analysis of key
documents), and semi-structured interviews.

4.3: Single Case Study Analysis
The European Commission was chosen as this research’s case study from the fourteen
institutional bodies which include the European Parliament, European Council, Council of
the European Union, Court of Justice of the European Union, European Central Bank,
European Court of Auditors, European External Action Service, European Economic and
Social Committee, European Committee of the Regions, European Investment Bank, European Ombudsman, European Data Protection Supervisor and Interinstitutional Bodies (Europa, 2018). The singular case study approach was chosen to allow for a more in-depth assessment of one of the EU’s institutional bodies. The Commission was chosen for its previous engagement with climate migration including its publication of the 2013 Staff Working Document in which public commitments were made to tackle climate-induced migration (European Commission, 2013). The Commission was also selected for its role in policy and legislation production and implementation as the Commission proposes both legislation and policies to the European Parliament which then votes on their implementation (Europa, 2018). Once voted in, the Commission subsequently puts legislation and policies into effect. The Commission also represents the EU internationally and negotiates international agreements on behalf of the EU (Europa, 2018). The sub-units of this single case-study are the Commission’s thirty-four Directorates-General (DGs). The DG’s are branches of the Commission which govern and advise on specific policy fields (Europa, 2018). By focusing on in-depth research on a singular case study, I am able to delve into the sub-units of the Commission. In total, 53 DGs and executive agencies exist within the European Commission however, a sample of only four DGs were selected; DG DEVCO, DG CLIMA, DG HOME and DG ECHO. This selection was based on these DGs relevance to the issues of migration and adaptation to climate change and the environment, and the quantity of published key documents pertaining to these issues. Further DGs of potential relevance were considered but were found to not be as relevant as the four selected. DG AGRI (Agriculture and Rural Development) was an option considering the link with slow-onset desertification and the necessity for rural development to address climate migration. However, on contacting policymakers within this department it was reported that DG AGRI was not explicitly working on issues of climate migration and there were no officials who felt they had the expertise to comment on the issue at this stage. DG ENV (Environment) was also contacted, however, it’s principle aim was focusing on internal EU policy rather than internationally. The department that was concerned with global sustainable development replied that they were not working on the subject of my research interest and could not assist further. DG NEAR (European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations) would have been an interesting DG with which to discuss climate migration as not only do they receive substantial funding but they also have a department that focuses on migration assistance to neighbouring countries, thus potentially dealing with examples of climate migration to the EU. However, this DG did not have the time to contribute to this study. The European
External Action Service (EEAS) was also mentioned in these documents and in interview as a key actor, however, this is an independent agency to the Commission, rather than a DG, and thus falls outwith the scope of this research. Finally, DG JRC (Joint Research Centre) was a viable option for examination having produced a report for the European Parliament concerning climate ‘refugees’. Interesting insights could have been elicited from interviews with DG JRC, however, despite my persistent attempts, no member of their directorate replied. Further justification for the sample DG selection is provided in 3.4 – content analysis and 3.5 – semi-structured interviews.

**DG DEVCO**

Formed in 2011, DG DEVCO constitutes 8 directorates and 57 departments (see Appendix 2). Of the four DGs analysed, it is the largest. In terms of funding, DEVCO receives its funding from two main sources; the European Development Fund (EDF) and the European Budget (International Cooperation for Development, 2019a) The EDF is the principle instrument for delivering development aid and amounts to 30.5 billion EUR. DEVCO’s second source of funding is from the European Budget which is delegated by means of the Multi-Financial Framework (MFF). It is seen as translating the European political priorities into financial terms, and thus DEVCO receives roughly 95 billion EUR for the period 2014-2020 (International Cooperation for Development, 2019a). In terms of its objectives and goals, DEVCO formulates the EU international cooperation and development policy, as well as delivering aid globally. It focuses primarily on long term programming for development.

![Figure 8: International Cooperation and Development (2019a) Funding categorisation](image-url)
**DG CLIMA**

Following a separation from DG Environment in 2010, DG CLIMA is the directorate leading the EU’s attempts to confront climate change at both the EU and international level (see appendix 3). Their work centres primarily on reducing emissions, formulating and implementing climate-oriented policies and promoting adaptation measures. Another major aspect of their work is “ensur[ing] climate change is taken into account in all other EU policies”, resulting in their role as a prominent climate change mainstreaming engine (Climate Action, 2019c). In terms of funding, DG CLIMA is funded by the EU budget which constitutes roughly 3.4 billion EUR for the period 2014-2020.

**DG HOME**

Split from DG Justice, Freedom and Security in 2010, DG HOME’s main objectives are to guarantee the security of the EU, to create an EU migration and asylum policy, and to further develop and support external dialogue with third countries. DG HOME has received roughly 9.2 billion EUR for the period 2014-2020, which has been divided into the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Internal Security Fund (ISF). The AMIF constitutes 3.1 billion EUR for the seven-year period of 2014-2020. This is managed by DG HOME to implement goals and objectives relating to the creation of a Europe-wide common Asylum System. The ISF receives 3.8 billion EUR for the same seven-year period and focuses on the fortifying of the EU’s external borders and the Internal Security Strategy (Migration and Home Affairs, 2019b) (see appendix 4).
DG ECHO

DG ECHO’s mandate involves providing humanitarian aid and is split into a Civil Protection Strand and a Humanitarian Aid strand (see appendix 5). Within the Humanitarian Aid strand are the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) which tracks risks, be they conflict related or environmental disasters, around the globe. In terms of funding, according to the Multi-annual Financial Framework, ECHO was accorded 7.1 billion EUR over the course of the seven-year period 2014-2020. This amounts to approximately 1 billion EUR a year. This is purely dedicated to the humanitarian aid strand. In addition to this budget, an Emergency Aid Reserve can be used to tackle unforeseen emergencies which constitutes 280 million EUR per year (in 2011 prices).

Figure 10: funding subdivisions within DG ECHO for humanitarian aid

4.4: Methods – Content Analysis

This small-scale qualitative research will require a content analysis of key documents which make reference to migration, climate change/the environment and adaptation. A content analysis was chosen as it will allow the researcher to establish the extent of the mainstreaming of climate migration within European Commission policy as well as any strategies for mainstreaming utilised. The content analysis involves the selection of key documents from DGs within the European Commission between the period of 2011 until 2019 for their relevance to climate migration. This time period was chosen due to the GAMM’s release in 2011 which constitutes the first major EU report on climate migration as an adaptation strategy to climate pressures. 2019 was chosen as, due to this field’s infancy, some of the most influential reports and studies are currently in operation, resulting in the recent publication of key documents. The selection of the key EU documents first involved the selection of the most relevant and appropriate DGs. In line with the scope of this research, DGs were chosen according to their relevance to the issues of migration and adaptation to
climate change and the environment. This selection was executed via the assessment of each DGs mission statements and institutional objectives\(^1\) and a preliminary assessment of policy reports using specific selection criteria.\(^2\) The DGs selected were DG HOME (DG for Migration and Home Affairs), DG DEVCO (DG for International Cooperation and Development), DG CLIMA (DG for Climate Action) and DG ECHO (DG for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations).

The document selection entailed using the DGs webpage filters to select relevant documentation, this varied per DG. DG DEVCO’s were ‘climate change, disaster risk reduction and desertification’, ‘migration and asylum’ and ‘environment and green economy’. DG CLIMA’s filters were ‘adaptation to climate change’, ‘mainstreaming climate action’ and ‘EU external climate finance’. DG HOME’s filters were ‘legal migration and integration’, ‘international affairs’ and ‘European Agenda for Migration’. Finally, DG ECHO involved ‘Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)’, ‘Food Assistance’, and ‘Protection’. This resulted in 130 combined documents, requiring a selection step. By searching within the documents for phrases such as ‘climate migration’, ‘climate mobility’, ‘environment’, ‘climate’, ‘migration’ and ‘integration’ (given the language used in the GCM, integration was used in place of mainstreaming (cf. United Nations 2018, p.20)) coupled with a brief reading of abstracts or executive summaries, the number of documents was reduced to 24. These documents were then confirmed as key documents in interview alongside the verification that no other relevant documentation had been published by the DGs in question.

Difficulties in the selection process arose primarily as a result of ambiguity within the documentation. Certain documents discussed climate adaptation and resilience building in developing countries but did not explicitly mention climate migration as an adaption strategy. In this case, climate migration as an adaptation strategy could have been implicit, however, due to the little attention this topic has been accorded, this could not be presumed, and these documents were therefore omitted. Further difficulties included those articles promoting the mainstreaming of climate change and the environment but again without explicitly mentioning migration, perhaps seeing it as intrinsic to the fields of climate change and the environment. Once again, this form of document was excluded unless climate migration was

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1. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/about-development-and-cooperation-europeaid_en example of such a DG’s online platform.
2. Document selection from the websites of the 4 DGs selected due to the relevancy of their objectives was filtered through date and time to adhere to 2011-2019, document type was ‘policy’, ‘communication’ and ‘report’.
explicitly mentioned. Further difficulties arose in attributing ownership over the documents selected. All documents were denoted as being published by the European Commission, rather than by a specific DG, and it was hard to ascertain which DGs were involved in which publications. Thus, ownership was accorded based on the which DG had published the document on their online platform, and in the cases where multiple publications exist this was denoted a joint document. However, it was thus challenging to determine which DG held principle ownership, if either, and which had instigated the publication.

In light of these selection difficulties, the number of key documents selected from DG DEVCO is 8, from DG CLIMA is 4, from DG ECHO is 5 and from DG HOME is 7, bringing the total number of key documents to 24. Abductive analysis will then be initiated via the a-priori sensitising concepts derived from the operationalisation of mainstreaming. The key documents will be coded in Atlas.ti according to the sensitising concepts-cum-strategies in figure 6, with codes derived from both the data and the theoretical literature (see appendix 6). Thus, the coding was carried out abductively, adhering to the previous sensitising concepts but allowing for the creation, modification and change of codes. The sensitising concepts were also open to re-modification and alteration should the need have arisen.

4.5: Methods – Semi-Structured Interviews
The research method of interviewing will be applied due to its opportunity to explore interviewees beliefs, understanding and perceptions of mainstreaming climate migration within their directorate or others (Denscombe, 2007). Interviews will provide data that both discerns what individuals believe, but also ultimately why they hold such beliefs (Denscombe, 2007). A semi-structured interview will be undertaken so the researcher may produce stimuli and prompts to encourage and incite discussion but will merely guide the interview, reducing the subjective intervention of the researcher (Denscombe, 2007).

Expert Interviews \[n=2\]
The preliminary expert interview was conducted with a member of IOM Brussels. The intention of such an interview was to explore the importance of mainstreaming within the realms of climate migration and to discover to what extent climate migration was being mainstreamed at the EU level from an external perspective.

The concluding expert interview was conducted with a member of the EU delegation to the UN who worked on the platform for Disaster Risk Reduction and allowed for an over-arching view of the interconnections within the Commission concerning climate migration.
Several findings were put to this interviewee in order to ascertain their legitimacy and to compare the action at the regional level with that at the global level.

**Commission Interviews**

Data collection took place between April 2019 and May 2019 and interviews were carried out with policymakers from four DGs [n=7]. In line with the explanation in 4.4, the following DG samples have been selected; DG CLIMA, DG DEVCO, DG ECHO and DG HOME. The selection of interviewees involved purposive sampling, that being, ‘handpicking’ individuals for the research. Individuals were selected according to whom I believe knew the topic well and would provide the best, or most useful information, for this research. This encompassed an element of snowball sampling as certain individuals were too busy or not currently working on the topic so suggested other policymakers. The following criteria was considered in the selection of interviewees; i.) they are policymakers at the EU-level, ii.) they are all working on climate-induced migration within their directorates and iii.) they have been active within the EU sphere from 2011 until the present day (see figure 11).

| DG DEVCO 1 | Interviewee A | Migration and Employment Unit; B.3 |
| DG DEVCO 2 | Interviewee B | Sustainable Energy and Climate Change Unit; C.6 |
| DG HOME 1 | Interviewee C | Legal Migration and Integration Unit; B.1 |
| DG HOME 2 | Interviewee D | Asylum Unit; C.3 |
| DG ECHO 1 | Interviewee E | Policy Support Unit; C.1 |
| DG ECHO 2 | Interviewee F | Northern Africa, Iraq and Arabian Peninsula Unit; C.4. |
| DG CLIMA 1 | Interviewee G | Adaptation Unit; A.3 |

*Figure 11: Interviewees and their DGs and departments*

From DG DEVCO, two interviews were conducted with Interviewee A from the Migration and Employment Unit and Interviewee B from the Sustainable Energy and Climate Change Unit. Both were senior policy makers within the Commission, with Interviewee A holding the position of programme manager and migration expert and Interviewee B was also a programme manager. This position involves developing projects and programmes and ensuring their implementation. In terms of responsibility for climate migration, their adherence varied somewhat. Interviewee A was ardently against their department claiming responsibility as they are uncertain as to whether climate migrants should be treated
differently to generic migration, i.e. economic. They, thus, believed climate migrants to already be included within their current policies and programming. Interviewee B, however, did believe climate migration to be somewhat of a responsibility for their unit especially in terms of adaptation and in response to natural disasters. Despite professing divergent levels of responsibility ownership for climate migration, both interviewees were open to discussing climate migration within the Commission. They noted the growing importance of climate change and its ramifications in European policy and foresee climate migration becoming an issue for both their departments in time.

From DG HOME, Interviewee C represented the legal migration and employment unit as a senior policymaker with Interviewee D being a lawyer from the Asylum unit. Interviewee C was open when discussing this topic, having had previous professional links to the field of climate change and the environment. Interviewee C claimed responsibility for the issue of climate migration, if their DG was called upon by DG CLIMA for assistance. Interviewee D was more reserved in interview and tended to tout the Commission’s line on climate migration. Furthermore, they did not believe climate migration was inherently their responsibility, but rather that of DG CLIMA.

DG ECHO also presented two interviewees; Interviewee E a senior policymaker, representing the policy support unit and Interviewee F, a senior policymaker from the geographic unit Northern Africa, Iraq and Arabian Peninsula. Interviewee E described the policy support unit as the in-house think tank and it develops policy objectives and strategies, subsequently evaluating said strategies to feed into new policy discussions with other DGs. Interviewee E was very knowledgeable about climate migration and willing to discuss the issue and the Commission’s shortcomings, also highlighting the likelihood that attention for climate migration would increase. They were clear that climate migration was a responsibility of their unit and it was shared to an equal extent with other DGs. Interviewee F, however, was adamantly against this perspective; they believed responsibility lay solely with ECHO and that if they did not act on it, no one would. Interviewee F was very forthcoming with strong opinions regarding ECHO’s role within the field of climate migration.

Interviewee G was a policymaker from the Adaptation unit in DG CLIMA and was a desk working policymaker with an average level of seniority. Interviewee G was forthcoming in interview. However, CLIMA could only attribute one interviewee per research project which hampered my ability to gain may varying opinions from CLIMA. Interviewee G did note that climate migration was CLIMA’s responsibility, and that they were the DG taking most responsibility for it at the moment, however, more could definitely be done.
All interviews were audio-recorded. The organisation of a comfortable and private space within the European Commission was arranged together with interviewees prior to the interview using their knowledge of the Commission building and free spaces. The opinions expressed are the interviewees own and do not represent those of their department or directorate general. In order to analyse the data obtained from all nine interviews, the recordings were transcribed to provide an easier unit of analysis than the original audio recording. The transcription was then combined with informal notes made during the interview on gestures, silences, external intrusions, the general ambience etc (Denscombe, 2007). Coding was performed in line with the a-priori sensitising concepts derived from the operationalisation of mainstreaming.

4.6: Limitations and ethical considerations

The limitations inherent to this project involve the difficulty in securing interviews with busy European policymakers, especially given the nicheness and novelty of this topic. Many interviewees felt they did not have enough professional experience in this field and securing interviews proved to be challenging. This, thus, led to the further limitation in that only seven policymakers were available for interview in the short-time frame permitted for this thesis. It is not possible to generalise from seven policymaker interviews and, thus, the data collected can only represent the opinions and perceptions of those interviewed. A further limitation is the cap on interviews within DG CLIMA as, to a given research project, this directorate can only provide one interview. With each directorate including several sub-departments, and DG CLIMA being a key player in the field of climate migration, it would have been interesting to conduct interviews with members, for example, from both the ‘adaptation’ and ‘governance and effort sharing’ departments within DG CLIMA – this was, however, not possible.

The ethical considerations vary according to the stage of research. In terms of data collection, the full disclosure of the study’s aim and purpose is essential if requested alongside the assurance of complete confidentiality of all interviewees and participants. This will be ensured via the communication of an ethical consent form, in which interviewees consent to their interview data being used and understand their rights and that they will be anonymised. During interviews, details and data provided by other interviewees shall not be shared to safeguard anonymity. Further considerations involve the safe storage of data, in my case, I will use an external hard drive. In terms of the analysis of data, considerations include attempting to remain as objective as possible and to present the true results rather than manipulated data to suggest a higher explanatory power.
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Following the clarification of both mainstreaming and climate migration, this section will present the results of mainstreaming climate migration within the European Commission. The results entail the data collated from a content analysis of key documents and interviews with policy makers from DEVCO, CLIMA, HOME and ECHO. An answer to the research question how is climate migration mainstreamed within the European Commission, and what hinders and facilitates it will be provided following the analysis of said results in line with mainstreaming theory highlighted in the theoretical framework. The results and analysis section shall be presented as follows; A preliminary overview of i.) the interaction between DGs concerning climate migration will be provided, followed by ii.) an analysis of the mainstreaming strategies employed within the Commission on this issue, culminating in iii.) an examination of the DG’s adherence to the prerequisites for mainstreaming and whether this hinders or facilitates mainstreaming of climate migration within the Commission.

5.1: Interaction between DGs concerning climate migration

In order to answer the research question how is climate migration mainstreamed within the European Commission, and what hinders and facilitates it, the varying interactions on climate migration between DGs and their internal departments must first be established, for contextual purposes, before delving into which mainstreaming strategies these interactions entail. Therefore, this data has been visualised in graphic form below (see figure 12), denoting which DGs and departments stated mutual interactions on the issue of climate migration. In relation to said graphs, it is necessary to state that they have not been based on quantitative results, but rather on qualitative data collected from interviews. The extraction has been purely from interview as DGs key documents referred to units no smaller than the ‘European Commission’ and, thus, the interaction between the various DGs was impossible to gauge. In order to categorise these interactions, information concerning who DGs work with and the degree of these interactions, followed by who instigates these interactions, were extracted from interviews. This data was then placed into categories ranging from low degree-cum-intensity of interaction, to a high degree or intensity of reaction. Being classified as a low intensity interaction, entails the DGs in question having no regular interaction concerning climate migration bar infrequent, concentrated bursts of interaction primarily as a result of requested expertise on projects. Low intensity also implies that the number of projects or reports over which these DGs interact are minimal; no more than 2. Medium intensity denotes the continuous involvement of, for example, DG A in the quality review processes for DG B’s projects, programming, studies and reports. Finally, high intensity also involves the continuous involvement of, e.g., DG A in the quality review processes for DG B’s projects, programming, studies and reports but also encompasses, as an additional aspect, elements of informal dialogue or a greater degree of intensity and involvement on specific
programmes, projects and reports. A further visualisation of the data follows (see figure 13), in which the DGs are placed on a spectrum in light of their initiation and instigation of interactions on climate migration with other DGs.

Figure 12: Intensity/degree of Interactions between DGs and departments concerning climate migration; attained from interviews.
From the sample of the four DGs analysed and interviewed, the noted interactions are as follows. As is clear from the graphic above, variations arise between both DGs and departments in terms of who is interacting with whom concerning climate migration. All DGs appear to interact on this issue to some degree, and yet there is a divergence amongst the interactions held by departments. As the self-proclaimed mainstreaming DG for climate issues, DG CLIMA is clearly the most active in terms of interactions with other DGs and departments, and is the most pro-active in instigating interactions with other DGs. This is likely due to the fact that their mandate focuses purely on climate action, into which climate migration firmly falls, and they are the self-titled ‘mainstreaming machine’. The combination of these two factors justifies the prevalence of DG CLIMA, and its high degree of involvement, in interactions on climate migration. CLIMA works collectively, or separately, with ECHO and DEVCO and the degree or intensity of their interactions is relatively high. With HOME, however, CLIMA only works on a one-on-one basis and their relationship is minimal on the issue of climate migration.

DG DEVCO and DG ECHO have a similar frequency of interactions with other DGs on this issue, although slight variations exist. DEVCO primarily works with CLIMA, and to a lesser extent, ECHO, whilst their interaction with DG HOME is minimal and only with the asylum unit. From interview, it was extrapolated that DEVCO rarely instigates said interactions; CLIMA and ECHO approach DEVCO, while DEVCO often approaches HOME.

In a similar vein, DG ECHO primarily works with CLIMA and DEVCO with the only variation being that both departments ranked their interaction with CLIMA as higher than that noted by DEVCO. Unlike DEVCO, there is currently no interaction with DG HOME on the issue of climate migration. Finally, ECHO was also noted to rank quite highly on the initiating interaction on climate migration spectrum. This was primarily due to its central role in the debate on forced displacement and its interaction with external actors in the global
sphere. In accordance with this, ECHO worked in close partnership with CLIMA to achieve requirements for global treaties of which the EU is a signatory.

DG HOME’s two units have quite different patterns of interaction, with DG HOME’s legal migration department only engaging with DG CLIMA on this issue, but their asylum department interacting with both DEVCO and CLIMA on climate migration. These latter partnerships were formed primarily in reaction to external projects and initiatives out with the EU such as the Nansen Initiative in which DEVCO and CLIMA required an asylum perspective. It was noted by both HOME departments, that they were approached by both CLIMA and DEVCO in relation to these interactions, denoting HOME the least pro-active when initiating interactions on climate migration. Diversely, the asylum department describes a divergent level and intensity in their interactions comparatively with CLIMA and DEVCO. The asylum unit have noted they are currently working more with DEVCO due to CLIMA’s differing and unique organisational structure. They are said to have sub-committees i.e. structures and frameworks under the UNFCC that are handled quite autonomously compared to the EU governance framework. This has resulted in CLIMA’s work apparently being a continuation of that which had been initiated in the sub-committees, pre-designed under the UNFCC. This autonomy and pre-design of internal layout and mandates has apparently led to a more diluted form of interaction between CLIMA and HOME. Comparatively, the Nansen Initiative created a different environment as “you had to start from scratch, which included setting up the cooperation” (DG HOME, Interviewee D, line 43). The open-ness and malleability of the Nansen Initiative’s initial phases allowed the DGs to mainstream climate migration with greater ease, explaining the greater intensity of interaction between HOME’s asylum unit and DEVCO.

Conclusion
To conclude, from the two graphic visualisations above, it is clear that there is a degree of interaction between DGs on the issue of climate migration. This interaction, however, is messy and ad hoc; DGs do not interact with each other in stable, equal measure on this issue, with great divergence occurring at department-level. The greatest internal variation exists between departments in DEVCO and departments in HOME; and the greatest external variation exists between DG CLIMA and DG HOME. The picture painted is that of several departments working separately with other departments, often in relation to projects, with little consistency or coherence present. The highest degree of interaction intensity is also noted to be predominantly cross-departmental, between colleagues working within a specific
DG, rather than interactions conducted across various DGs. There is also great variation in those who initiate or instigate interaction on climate migration, with CLIMA initiating the most and HOME the least. This is predominantly due their diverging mandates and objectives.

This study will now conduct a more in-depth analysis on the ‘interactions’ discovered between DGs relating to climate migration. The interactions will, thus, be categorised according to the sensitising concepts-cum-strategies collated from this study’s three key pieces of theoretical literature and optimised through this study’s definition of mainstreaming.

5.2: How is climate migration mainstreamed: Strategies for mainstreaming

In this chapter, the primary aspect of this study’s research question shall be addressed, namely; how is climate migration mainstreamed within the European Commission? This will be answered by comparing the data procured from interviews and key documents with the eight strategies for mainstreaming derived from theoretical literature. Analytically, the eight strategies will be assessed through the perspective of this study’s mainstreaming definition in order to ensure that all facets of the definition are fulfilled.

As a further reminder, Figure 14: eight strategies for mainstreaming derived from three key pieces of theoretical literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modification of DGs internal actions and behaviour</th>
<th>Responsibility sharing and poly-centric governance</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modification of job descriptions related to climate migration</td>
<td>Partnership and networking between directorates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical tools</td>
<td>Mutual accountability mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared projects and programmes</td>
<td>Inter-directorial policy dialogue on climate migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared studies and reports</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-funding</td>
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As a further reminder,
the two dimensions of this definition and their subsequent eight strategies have been presented below (see figure 14).

To clarify the outline of this section, the first strategies to be analysed are those which constitute the preliminary dimension of our mainstreaming definition; i.) the modification of DGs internal actions and behaviours. They will be discussed in line with their prevalence in interview and policy from greatest to least. Subsequently, the strategies encompassed under the dimension of ii.) responsibility-sharing and poly-centric governance will also be discussed from greatest to least prevalence in interview and documents. Following this, additional findings are examined which highlight shortcomings in the existing mainstreaming literature and further strengthen and legitimise the conclusion of this section.

5.2.1 Modification of Internal Actions and Behaviours
The modification of each DG’s internal actions and behaviour is an essential preliminary dimension of our mainstreaming definition. It ensures that climate migration is integrated into all phases of projects, programming and policymaking within the Commission. There are several strategies of mainstreaming which fit within this dimension; the most prevalent being shared projects and programmes, and shared reports and studies, followed by the second most prevalent; the use of practical tools. The modification of job descriptions and co-funding will be the final strategies due to their negation in both interviews and key documents.

**Shared Projects and Programmes and Shared Reports and Studies**
Pauleit and Wamsler (2016), combined with the guidelines from the Commission (2016) have denoted shared projects, programming, reports and studies as strategies inherent to the realisation of this study’s definition of mainstreaming. They are considered mainstreaming strategies as they involve the modification of internal actions and behaviours. To contextualise, this indicator entails both contributing to another DGs project or programme, and having others contribute to your work by means of either informal contributions or institutionally embedded quality review processes. It also involves being in partnership with another DG so as to contribute to external projects, as well as a fully shared responsibility over internal projects and programmes. Shared reports and studies is of a very similar ilk, however contributions and responsibility sharing is in relation to reports and studies rather than projects and programmes. Said strategies are the internal modifications which ensure that all the relevant expertise and information on climate migration is included within the initial phases of projects, programmes, reports and studies. This then has an impact
on all subsequent stages in the programming and project cycle, ensuring the consistent mainstreaming of climate migration (European Commission, 2016). The modification of internal actions and behaviour via shared projects, programmes, reports and studies is of the utmost importance as it changes the Commission’s output to include climate migration, thus potentially influencing international organisations, other regional governments and member states. Thus, it is interesting to note that shared projects and programmes, and reports and studies were two of the most employed strategies elicited from the data for mainstreaming climate migration and were utilised by all four DGs. However, through interview, it was discovered that this was most commonly as a result of the inter-service consultations (ISCs) which greatly affect both how climate migration is mainstreamed and the influence of shared projects, programmes, reports and studies as strategies for mainstreaming.

**Inter-Service Consultations**

The inclusion of ISCs as an inherent aspect of the mainstreaming strategy shared projects and programming, and reports and studies highlights a shortcoming in the mainstreaming literature. ISCs involve the submission of projects and programmes, reports and studies in the planning and editing phases to be reviewed by as many DGs as wish to contribute their expertise to the topic and deem such an input necessary. Advice, thoughts and alterations are then reported back to the DG with project ownership from other DGs who often have more expertise or experience in certain areas. This institutionalised system of project, programme, study and report review is unique to the Commission and was designed to ensure cross-directorial collaboration. As this system is specific to the Commission, it has not been considered in the existing literature and thus, the influence of the ISCs on mainstreaming strategies is not considered in the literature. The data has revealed that ISCs can have a negative effect on mainstreaming’s preliminary dimension of internal modifications as they reject the need for active changes to decision-making regarding sharing projects, programmes, reports and studies, but rather, dilute this aspect of mainstreaming by reducing any active modification to internal actions or behaviours. However, as will be shown, DG CLIMA is taking advantage of the minor modifications to internal actions and behaviours that the ISCs provide.

Primarily, the negative effect of ISCs on the modification of internal actions and behaviour is coupled to the notion that the ISC process is an inherent aspect of the EU governance framework and large publications, projects or programming cannot be initiated or
implemented without undertaking this process. This is an institutionally embedded form of mainstreaming that is intrinsic to the European Commission and all DGs are involved by default. In discussion on institutionally embedded mainstreaming, DG ECHO’s interviewee E noted;

“The commission is a public administration, there are very set procedures for all of this. It’s not about, you know, calling each other and informal coordination.” (DG ECHO, Interviewee E, lines 137-138)

In light of this extract, it is noted that informal forms of mainstreaming, such as informal dialogue or networking on this issue, are said to be, at the minimum, far less influential, and at the most, to not exist. Thus, the aforementioned mainstreaming strategies of shared projects, programmes, reports and studies within the Commission concerning climate migration are institutionally embedded. The outcome is that the advice and suggestions resulting from these consultations can then either be integrated into the projects and programmes, reports and studies of the DG in question, or ignored – it is entirely the prerogative of the DG with project/study ownership. One must then ask oneself; can the sharing of projects and programmes, reports and studies through ISCs be denoted as the true modification of internal actions and behaviour, in line with the preliminary dimension of mainstreaming, if very little action, or changes in behaviour out with the usual decision-making process, are required for this mainstreaming strategy to occur? To answer such a question, the minor internal changes such as the inclusion of climate migration into the ICS process must be noted, however, this is alongside the knowledge that very few active changes in behaviour or actions are made. Thus, in light of the minor internal modifications oft-undermined by the lack of active changes, the inter-service consultations are deemed a passive form of mainstreaming. As a result, the preliminary dimension of our mainstreaming definition is not fulfilled.

Furthermore, the passive element of the inter-service consultations has led to a policy outcome gap regarding the extent to which the four DGs projects and programmes, and reports and studies are shared. The language used in all documentation implied that there was an equal sharing of ownership over projects and programmes, reports and studies concerning climate migration between all relevant directorates. In all DGs documentation there is often reference to mainstreaming within the European Union or Commission and the DGs which are engaged in these aspects of mainstreaming are rarely specified. At first glance, it would therefore appear that mainstreaming of climate migration is wide-spread throughout the
Commission to an equal extent as it is not possible to ascertain who is attempting to mainstream with whom.

“The EU and its Member States are committed to coordinated action to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, such as…environmental degradation, including climate change” (European Commission 2017, p.37)

However, in interview, it was made clear that this interaction is predominantly via the inter-service consultations rather than by active changes to the decision-making process and actor behaviour. This vagueness and ambiguity at the policy level concerning terminology, leads to an incidental policy outcome gap, as what is implied in policy is not implemented in practice. This policy outcome gap was uncovered throughout all four DGs.

Despite the passive mainstreaming characteristic of these consultations, for DG CLIMA, ISCs hold fleeting opportunities to modify internal actions and behaviours. Due to the infancy of the topic of climate migration, they are the prime opportunity for CLIMA to include climate migration, as well as to contribute specific climate expertise, throughout various DGs projects and programmes, reports and studies. As a result, this is CLIMA’s most successful strategy for mainstreaming climate migration throughout the Commission. For DG DEVCO, CLIMA’s role in the mainstreaming of climate migration is primarily from a project. Comparatively, however, for ECHO and HOME, CLIMA’s influence on their actions and behaviours has been primarily in terms of documentation as all recent key documents published by these DGs have, at least, made reference to climate migration. This is including the first significant mention of climate migration in a key DG HOME document, the 2019 Staff Working Document on a Fitness Check for EU Legislation on Legal Migration. In this domain, CLIMA’s active modification of HOME’s actions and behaviours is illustrated in the following extract from the CLIMA interviewee;

“This was more me pushing. Because for them it…it didn’t really cross their minds, at least the unit I worked with I must say, legal migration. I think DG HOME has been more concerned, in the past years, with the emergency and with dealing with it rather than anything else; fair enough. And to me, for them, it’s still too much of a fringe issue – it’s not very embedded”. (DG CLIMA, Interviewee G, lines 222-227)

CLIMA’s insistence during inter-service consultations on the inclusion of climate migration in HOME’s fitness check document highlights the more active influence such embedded, advisory consultations can have on mainstreaming. However, this instance of active
persuasion and dialogue was only detected in this particular exchange between CLIMA and HOME, in which a level of informal dialogue was also observed as both policymakers were interested in climate migration and its mainstreaming. Therefore, the active dimension of these inter-service consultations on internal modifications cannot be confirmed through this instance.

To summarise, the strategies for climate migration mainstreaming of shared projects and programmes, and reports and studies inherent to the modification of internal actions and behaviours do occur within the European Commission, however, they are primarily by means of inter-service consultations. In concordance with the research question asking how is climate migration mainstreamed within the Commission it is note that, despite the occurrence of shared projects, programmes, reports and studies, it is not possible to state that they are strategies employed within the Commission explicitly to ensure the mainstreaming of climate migration. This is primarily due to said inter-service consultations acting as institutionally embedded forms of mainstreaming to which policymakers are bound to employ. The researcher has, thus, denoted these strategies as ‘passive’ in lieu of their impediment to actively change the decision-making process or actors’ behaviours concerning the inclusion of climate migration. As a result, the preliminary dimension of this study’s definition of mainstreaming is not fulfilled. Furthermore, this passivity has resulted in an illicit policy outcome gap as implications of wide-spread active interaction and responsibility-sharing in key documents published by the Commission are not occurring in practice. Thus, in conclusion, it cannot be confirmed that shared projects, programmes, studies and reports are strategies employed by the Commission to mainstream climate migration.

**Practical Tools**

Practical tools have been denoted a strategy for mainstreaming due to the role they play in the modification of internal actions and behaviours. They entail instruments through which policymakers can monitor and evaluate the mainstreaming of a topic and highlight any issues or more appropriate channels of action in order to increase the effectiveness of mainstreaming. Furthermore, the use of training and guidelines are a very effective strategy for mainstreaming as Scholten and Van Breugel (2018) note that the absence of knowledge, expertise and skills in relation to embedding mainstreaming policies will lead to a diluting, or even the lack, of significant mainstreaming initiatives. Thus, all elements pertaining to practical tools are an essential strategy for mainstreaming as they are a means to modify internal actions and behaviours. Based on both the data collected and the theoretical
literature, practical tools were established as constituting training on both climate migration and its mainstreaming, published guidelines on how to mainstream climate migration, and toolkits such as impact assessments and risk assessments for monitoring and evaluation (European Commission, 2016).

For DEVCO, CLIMA and HOME there were no practical tools to ensure the mainstreaming of climate migration within the Commission. For ECHO, however, many practical tools did exist but were primarily focused on disaster risk reduction and reducing the risk of forced displacement rather than the full spectrum of climate migration. This is due to ECHO’s mandate for humanitarian protection and its primary focus being reducing the risk of forced displacement as a result of natural disasters. Although, in comparison to other DGs, ECHO’s implementation and use of practical tools is extensive, there are still calls from ECHO policymakers for more practical tools such as;

“more systematically environmental, climate and disaster risk assessments, integrate them into early warning systems to identify the potential impact of catastrophic sudden and slow onset risks, as well as to identify and prioritise preventive and/or adaptive measures for risk informed investments” (European Commission 2017, p.7).

This desire for more tools in order to better assess and monitor the impact of projects and humanitarian aid intervention, insinuates that the full opportunity inherent to practical tools as a strategy for implementing mainstreaming is yet to be fully exploited. Thus, behaviour and actions have not yet been fully modified.

To conclude, in answering the research question how is climate migration mainstreamed within the European Commission, it is evident that the strategy of practical tools is not currently being employed to its full potential as a means to modify internal behaviour and actions. Despite the use of practical tools within ECHO, they are employed for a very specific form of climate migration within one centralised DG.

Modification of Job Descriptions and Co-Funding
The final two strategies have been grouped together due to their noted absence in relation to climate migration mainstreaming highlighted by all four DGs. Modification of job descriptions is considered a strategy for mainstreaming as it involves the adjustment of internal roles or professional remits in line with the inclusion of climate migration. Furthermore, it decentralises the issue in need of mainstreaming from one central department or DG, allowing other DGs or department to better address climate migration (Pauleit and
Wamsler, 2016). Thus, this strategy is deeply inter-twine with the preliminary dimension of mainstreaming. In relation to the data, all four DGs noted that there had been no modification of internal job descriptions or departments to account for climate migration. Notably, despite CLIMA’s mandate as the climate change DG and the mainstreaming machine, it was mentioned in interview that their directorate is still not fully modified to reflect climate migration and there are still no strategical DG objectives on climate migration.

Co-funding as a strategy for mainstreaming encompasses the rearrangement of financial resources to better approach and embed mainstreaming in institutional practices (Pauleit and Wamsler, 2016). This has been denoted a strategy for mainstreaming as it involves internal modifications to behaviour and actions by ensuring that those DGs without adequate funding to implement mainstreaming or climate migration initiatives or projects are able to do so, thus enhancing the sense of responsibility-sharing (Pauleit and Wamsler, 2016). However, in both interview and key documents, it was noted that no co-funding was occurring.

In conclusion, despite their relevance as strategies for mainstreaming, neither modification of internal job descriptions, nor co-funding were uncovered within the field of climate migration at the Commission level. Thus, the preliminary dimension of our mainstreaming definition remains, once again, unfulfilled. Furthermore, in answering the research question, climate migration is not mainstreamed within the Commission by means of modification of internal job descriptions or titles, nor by means of co-funding.

5.2.2 Responsibility-Sharing and Poly-centric Governance
The second dimension of this study’s definition of mainstreaming is full responsibility-sharing of climate migration, invoking poly-centric governance and the decentralised attention for climate migration. Once again, the three strategies that fall within this dimension will be discussed according to their prevalence in interview and key documentation from greatest to least. Partnership and networking was found to be the most prevalent mainstreaming strategy within this dimension, followed by inter-directorial policy dialogue, and ending on the least wide-spread strategy; mutual accountability mechanisms.

**Partnership and Networking**

The partnership and networking indicator is at the core of the second dimension of this research’s definition for mainstreaming and is thus an essential strategy for its implementation. This is primarily due to the fact that it is essential for the formation of poly-centric governance and responsibility sharing (Scholten and Van Breugel, 2018). Within
Scholten and Van Breugel (2018, p.13), partnership and networking forms a “deconcentrated form of governance mainstreaming” which “promotes a general and shared responsibility…rather than a stand-alone policy within a separate department or ministry”. It is thus utterly essential as a strategy for mainstreaming. For reference, partnership and networking between DGs as a strategy for mainstreaming requires DGs to hold an open dialogue on issues pertaining to climate migration and to engage in regular meetings both internally, and with external partners. For all DGs, within partnership and networking, the most prevalent means of mainstreaming was holding an open dialogue, to varying degrees of intensity, on issues pertaining to climate migration. However, in connection to the former section, this open dialogue is very much linked to the inter-service consultations on DGs projects and programming, and reports and studies. Once again, the shortcoming of the mainstreaming literature is its failure to capture the ICSs’ diluting and detrimental effect on the influence of partnership and networking as a strategy for mainstreaming. As other DGs are able to give advice and suggestions for the inclusion of climate migration in others’ projects and programmes, this often results in a degree of open-ness in the dialogues surrounding mainstreaming climate migration. These open dialogues are inherent to the governance structure of the Commission and do not require the change of actors’ behaviours or the decision-making process. It is, thus, also considered a passive means of mainstreaming and does not fulfill our secondary dimension of true mainstreaming; that being responsibility-sharing and poly-centric governance.

To conclude, partnership and networking is a common strategy employed by all DGs for mainstreaming climate migration at the Commission level. It is utterly essential to the secondary dimension of our mainstreaming definition as responsibility-sharing and poly-centric governance are reliant on partnership and networking in order to reach fruition. Within partnership and networking, the most employed strategy for mainstreaming is the use of an open dialogue on issues pertaining to climate migration, however, with the research question asking how is climate migration mainstreamed within the Commission, it is again hard to pinpoint whether the strategy of partnership and networking can be deigned a mainstreaming strategy at play. This is due to the fact that the open dialogue inherent to all DGs is intrinsic to the inter-service consultations and, thus, does not constitute an active, open dialogue on climate migration. In sum, there is a reliance on institutionally embedded dialogue on this issue rather than a pro-active informal dialogue which is at odds with the innovative and subversive nature of mainstreaming. Thus, the secondary dimension of our
mainstreaming definition is unfulfilled, as true responsibility-sharing and poly-centric governance is not taking place.

**Inter-directorial Policy Dialogue**

Inter-directorial policy dialogue is a necessary strategy for mainstreaming as it opens and strengthens channels of communication which are inherent to notions of responsibility-sharing and poly-centric governance (Collett, Petrovic and Scholten, 2017). This has been further supported in Scholten and Van Breugel (2018, p.175) where it’s stated that; “adopting a mainstreaming approach makes policymaking a very complex process. Smart policy processes and tools, including coordination and cooperation mechanisms are therefore of crucial importance”. Thus, inter-directorial policy dialogue is a necessary strategy for mainstreaming as it is a means by which to alleviate the complexities inherent to the mainstreaming approach, resulting in a more effective and successful implementation.

To contextualise, inter-directorial policy dialogue as a strategy for mainstreaming was deemed to involve the outcomes of dialogue being internal policy, as well as said dialogues contributing to external policy. This, thus, highlights a shortcoming inherent to the theoretical literature; that being that there is no differentiation between policy dialogue contributing to either internal or external policy. Adding to the literature, the researcher chose to distinguish between internal and external policy as great variation existed between the two in the implementation of this strategy.

Concerning internal policy, i.e. policy dialogue between DGs for the creation of internal EU policy concerning climate migration within any of the DGs, it was not witnessed in either policy or practice amongst the four sample DGs. Thus, in this sense it is clear there is no responsibility-sharing or poly-centric governance for climate migration within the Commission. However, examples were found of inter-directorial policy dialogue contributing to the formulation of external policy at the global level. The asylum unit of DG HOME, DG CLIMA and DG DEVCO all engaged in policy dialogue with external partners (such as the UN and UNFCC) concerning the Nansen Initiative, with the HOME interviewee noting;

“The policy dimension is mainly external relations, something we contribute to.” (DG HOME, Interviewee D, line 21)

For the Nansen Initiative, all three DGs united on a common ‘EU position’ on climate migration and its mainstreaming in order to fulfil the requirements demanded of the European Union by its global partners. However, this ‘EU position’ only fulfils the minimum
requirements, in that the Commission recognises there to be a link between climate change and mobility and supports further research and global initiatives (DG HOME, Interviewee D, line 61-64). However, as it currently stands, the Commission goes no further than this. Thus, it is clear that there is more active policy engagement with external partners, however, these policy outcomes do not appear to have found their place in any internal dialogue between the DGs.

To conclude, inter-directorial policy dialogue is only present in DGs’ contribution to external policies within the global sphere. Furthermore, it does not fulfil the secondary dimension of our definition of mainstreaming as full responsibility-sharing and poly-centric governance within the Commission require the opening and strengthening of internal communication channels. Thus, in relation to the research question asking how is climate migration mainstreamed within the European Commission, inter-directorial policy dialogue is not a strategy currently employed.

**Mutual Accountability Mechanisms**

Mutual accountability mechanisms is the final strategy for mainstreaming and it entails both the assessment and evaluation by DGs of other DGs attempts to mainstream climate migration and the implementation of sanctions inherent to the failure to meet adequate standards. It’s importance for our mainstreaming definition’s secondary dimension of responsibility sharing and poly-centric governance is so great, that it was even highlighted explicitly in the mainstreaming definition. Not only does it ensure equal responsibility sharing, but it addresses the criticism that if a topic is mainstreamed it can become both everyone’s and no-one’s responsibility at the same time (Scholten and Van Breugel, 2018). However, despite their necessity in mainstreaming, the existence of mutual accountability mechanisms to ensure the full implementation of climate migration mainstreaming were firmly denied by all DGs interviewed, and no mention was present in the documentation of any DG.

To conclude, the lack of mutual accountability mechanisms has, as Mary Hawkesworth stated (2012, p.238) caused a situation in which climate migration is “everyone’s responsibility but no one’s job.” No-one need commit to mainstreaming climate migration as there are no sanctions in place and no one is held accountable for an absence of equal responsibility sharing and poly-centric governance. Thus, the secondary dimension of our mainstreaming definition is entirely undermined as responsibility-sharing and poly-centric governance cannot be guaranteed without accountability mechanisms to insure their
effective implementation. Therefore, in line with this study’s research question, it has been qualified that mutual accountability mechanisms are not strategies for mainstreaming climate migration currently employed within the Commission.

**Additional Findings**

Additional findings were elucidated from the data which do not fall within the 8 aforementioned strategies, and thus, cannot be explained by the current theory as it stands. They will therefore be discussed in this separate section entitled ‘additional findings’. These additional findings which arose in interview are proposed additional strategies for mainstreaming not covered in the literature and, thus, some shortcomings in the ‘strategies for mainstreaming’ literature have been uncovered. The first, was the self-determined role of all DGs to raise awareness for climate migration and the second, was the strategy of ‘selling’ mainstreaming as a means to avoid the creation of a complex legislative framework for climate migrants. Both strategies culminate in the need for more mainstreaming. The function of highlighting these auxiliary patterns is to provide additional weight to the results for this section and to allow for a more secure and legitimate overall conclusion when answering the research question; how is climate migration mainstreamed within the Commission?

**Awareness Raising**

Awareness raising was extracted from the data as a common theme inherent to all DG’s action on climate migration. It was realised by heightening attention for the issue by means such as denoting climate migration a priority for the DG in question and including it in projects, programming, reports and studies without it being a reactionary inclusion at the behest of other DGs. It also involved the highlighting of other DGs interaction on climate migration within the DGs own reports and studies. It was particularly prevalent within the interviews and key documents pertaining to DG CLIMA. Within these arenas, awareness raising was seen to be highly interlinked with the notion of mainstreaming;

“I think mainstreaming is absolutely necessary at the beginning. Also, before it becomes absolutely clear whether this is an issue for Europe or not. So, mainstreaming does the trick of awareness raising, it’s a bit of an indirect way...” (DG CLIMA, Interviewee G, lines 298-301)

Due to the absence of this aspect in the literature, and in line with this extract, awareness raising could thus either be considered as one of two possible options for mainstreaming. It could be i.) a strategy for mainstreaming that is divergent from the aforementioned pre-
defined strategies due to the infancy of this field and the layout of the Commission’s governance framework; and thus, constitutes a shortcoming in the strategies for mainstreaming literature. Or, awareness raising could embody ii.) an essential first step towards the possibility of mainstreaming. To answer this quandary, this researcher will take into account the widespread recourse of DGs to resort to awareness raising for climate migration rather than applying the aforementioned mainstreaming strategies. As a result, I believe the role of awareness raising within the field of climate migration and mainstreaming to be that of a prerequisite to the initiation of mainstreaming, thus implying that mainstreaming, as an approach, is yet to be implemented. This deduction is supported by comments made by ECHO’s interviewee E, who compared climate migration to other fringe issues within ECHO’s remit that have since joined the mainstream, such as displaced children and gender issues. It was noted that ECHO followed a strategic framework for integrating these topics into the mainstream which initially concentrated on raising awareness for these topics amongst other DGs, culminating in the publication of a communication on the relevant issue throughout the Commission. In doing so, ECHO could then mainstream these issues around key policy frameworks to politically lift said fringe topics into the mainstream. Thus, awareness raising for climate migration by all four DGs, but primarily that of DG CLIMA, corresponds to DG ECHO’s initial awareness raising for displaced children and gender issues before they reached the agenda.

**Mainstreaming replacing a legislative framework**

From the data analysis, a further strategy for initiating or strengthening the mainstreaming process for climate migration came to light which was also not captured in the mainstreaming literature. It involves ‘selling’ mainstreaming to other DGs as an option to replace the formation of a legislative framework for climate migrants. This is a notoriously difficult framework to develop for many reasons which are out with the scope of this research and was cited in interview as being a principle obstacle in addressing climate migration for the EU as a whole. In interview, ECHO noted that their other topics of concern, such as children on the move or gender issues, were initially on the fringe of the mainstream. However, the key was to slowly build awareness on the importance of this topic, an example given was to publish a communication rather than form a legislative framework, with the result being that; “you don’t have to have a separate policy framework for it, but you mainstream it around key policy frameworks that exist, then you lift it politically to a number of commitments.” (DG ECHO, Interviewee E, lines 276-277). It was noted that this is currently the angle that is
being employed at the Geneva level. The interviewee from the EU-UN Delegation noted that the platform on disaster displacement does not specifically focus on the creation of a unique legal framework for those displaced by natural disasters, but rather, it focuses more on the exchange of good practices, supporting these measures and building the capacities of global actors to engage in poly-centric, and multi-level, governance.

Therefore, in this instance, shortcomings were exposed in the mainstreaming literature, as the ‘selling’ of mainstreaming as a way to avoid the rigours of forming a legislative framework have not been addressed. This researcher believes this strategy to be inherent to emerging topics, which explains its lack of prevalence in previous mainstreaming literatures centered around well-studied issues such as gender, human rights and disability. The call for mainstreaming to replace a legislative framework for climate migrants highlights the notion that mainstreaming is not currently in operation, a concept further supported by awareness raising.

Thus, to conclude, the research question asks how is climate migration mainstreamed within the European Commission and, in light of the reliance of DGs on awareness raising and policymakers’ desire for mainstreaming to avoid the creation of a legislative framework, this researcher believes that climate migration is not mainstreamed within the Commission.

**Conclusion**

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<tr>
<th>STRATEGIES OF MAINSTREAMING</th>
<th>DG DEVCO</th>
<th>DG HOME</th>
<th>DG CLIMA</th>
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<td>Modification of Job descriptions related to climate migration</td>
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<td>Practical Tools</td>
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<td>Shared Projects and Programming</td>
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<td>Shared Reports and Studies</td>
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<td>Co-funding</td>
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<td>Partnership and Networking</td>
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<td>Mutual Accountability Mechanisms</td>
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<td>Inter-directorial Policy Dialogue</td>
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Scholten and Van Breugel (2018, p.96) have observed that “the European institutions have never articulated a clear strategy for mainstreaming at the EU level.” In light of this
absence, this section has tried to provide insight into the strategies for mainstreaming of climate migration currently at play within the Commission. It has answered the initial dimension of the research question; how is climate migration mainstreamed within the European Commission. From the above graph (figure 15), it is clear that several strategies for mainstreaming of climate migration, derived from the theoretical literature, have been uncovered from the data. The strategies employed by all DGs for the mainstreaming of climate migration within the Commission are that of partnership and networking, shared projects and programming and shared reports and studies. However, these results arise alongside the elucidation of several shortcomings in the ‘strategies for mainstreaming’ literature which undermine their position as mainstreaming strategies.

The first major shortcoming is inherent to the modification of internal actions and behaviours via shared projects, programmes, studies and reports, as well as responsibility sharing and poly-centric governance via partnership and networking. The literature neglects to address the divergent framework and modus operandi of the Commission and, thus, overlooks the detrimental impact of Inter-Service Consultations on mainstreaming strategies. These infer an institutionally embedded form of mainstreaming to which policymakers are obliged to adhere before publishing documents or implementing projects or programming. Due to the lack of behavioural or belief change required to implement this form of mainstreaming, it has been designated ‘passive’ mainstreaming. Policymakers do not need to believe in, support or advocate for climate migration to adhere to this form of mainstreaming. This is in comparison to ‘active’ mainstreaming which would entail changes to the usual decision-making process to include climate migration. With shared projects and programmes as an example, actions that could constitute their active mainstreaming include full responsibility-sharing of projects and programming concerning climate migration, supported by equal co-funding, rather than one DG holding full ownership while another merely adds snippets of expertise via an institutionally embedded instrument. This enforced adherence to ISCIs, and the effect this has on mainstreaming, is not considered in the literature and, thus, several strategies of mainstreaming may seem present on the surface level, but the way in which mainstreaming strategies are implemented, be it actively or passively, can greatly affect its influence.

A secondary shortcoming is evidenced within the dimension of responsibility-sharing and poly-centric governance via inter-directorial policy dialogue. In the literature, no differentiation is made between the dialogue informing either internal or external policy, but rather the two were merged under the umbrella title of ‘policy dialogue’. Within such an
emerging topic, where the majority of publicity and attention is played out on the global stage, internal regional policies would entail a translation of this global attention for climate migration to the internal, regional level. However, as the results have shown, the inter-directorial policy dialogue is purely in relation to external policy as the EU must fulfil several requirements on the global stage in order to fully carry out its role as signatory of several global treaties and agreements concerning climate migration. In light of this study’s amendment to the literature, it is clear that inter-directorial policy dialogue is not a strategy for mainstreaming currently employed within the Commission.

Finally, additional mainstreaming strategies were uncovered in the data which were not featured in the existing literature; primarily, the strategies of awareness raising and ‘selling’ mainstreaming as a means to avoid implementing a legislative framework for climate migrants. The need to ‘sell’ mainstreaming implies that mainstreaming as an approach is not being fully exploited. This consideration, when combined with the eight strategies for mainstreaming being neglected and the finding that awareness raising constitutes a prerequisite for mainstreaming, rather than a mainstreaming strategy, culminates in the conclusion to our research question which asks how is climate migration mainstreamed within the European Commission? The conclusion being that; climate migration is not currently mainstreamed within the Commission.

In light of this finding, it has been established that the pre-defined mainstreaming strategies derived from the theoretical literature can assist in the analysis of how climate migration is mainstreamed within the Commission. However, they cannot provide a justification for why this mainstreaming is not occurring.

5.3: Prerequisites required for Mainstreaming

Through the first section of the data results and analysis, it is clear that the mainstreaming of climate migration is not widespread throughout the assessed Commission DGs. This leads to the second half of this study’s research question: How does the European Commission hinder or facilitate the mainstreaming of climate migration? As our mainstreaming definition requires the full attainment of each prerequisite in order to be realised, the data and theory from Scholten and Van Breugel (2018) will be analysed via the lens of our definition so as to ensure that each prerequisite is sufficiently examined. To clarify the outline of this section, the nine strategies will be discussed following the format of the graphic below; the first six will be discussed under the preliminary dimension of our mainstreaming definition –
i.) the modification of DGs internal actions and behaviours - , while our last three will be discussed through the lens of the secondary dimension – ii.) responsibility sharing and poly-centric governance. Several prerequisites have been analysed collectively due to their inherent connection which will be expressed in the relevant sub-sections.

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<tr>
<th>Modification of DGs Internal Actions and Behaviours</th>
<th>Responsibility-Sharing and Poly-Centric Governance</th>
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<tr>
<td>Considered a Priority</td>
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<td>Inclusion of External Experts</td>
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<td>Increasing Capacity of Data Collection</td>
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*Figure 16: Nine prerequisites for effective mainstreaming through analytical lens of mainstreaming definition*

5.3.1: Modification of DGs Internal Action and Behaviours

The prerequisites for mainstreaming categorized under this study’s primary dimension of mainstreaming all necessitate changes in internal actions and behaviours of DGs. Such changes in behaviour and environment of DGs are essential to this study’s definition of mainstreaming.

**Considered a Priority; and Necessity for Monitoring and Evaluation**

Considering a topic and its mainstreaming a priority entails the modification of internal behaviours to accord the issue more political attention such as advocating for, and including, climate migration in projects and programmes and boosting it in the agenda. This prerequisite is considered one of the most critical factors at play when initiating mainstreaming as, if an issue is not deemed a priority, it will receive little political attention, few financial and human resources and will remain trapped at a low position on the agenda i.e. internal actions and behaviours will not change (Scholten and Van Breugel, 2018). Thus, the first hurdle to mainstreaming involves the DGs lack of consideration for climate migration, let alone it’s mainstreaming, as a priority for their directorate. On the odd occasion when it was determined a priority, it was ad hoc and irregular, with DG CLIMA and ECHO denoting it a priority, and HOME and DEVCO considering it less so.

Scholten and Van Breugel (2018) noted that the issue must remain a priority both
hierarchically and horizontally, which has been a notable issue for DG HOME. The primary obstacle was the perceived lack of priority hierarchically higher in the institution. When discussing more senior colleagues, Interviewee C stated;

“I had to insist that this angle had to be addressed as well. A little bit more scepticism then... what I mean by the perception is that it was maybe met with a little bit of ‘why do we need to bother about this, this is not going to happen’” (DG HOME, Interviewee C, lines 128-131)

The asylum department of DG HOME attests to follow the line of the commission in respect to climate migration, which is simply that they acknowledge there is a link between climate change and mobility and that they support international research, structures and the Global Compact for Migration in relation to issues regarding climate change. However, “at this stage, no one has seen the need to reinforce the structures to meet this commitment and to support the international initiatives based on these current structures.” (DG HOME, Interviewee D, lines 50-51). From this statement, climate migration would appear to lack priority status at all hierarchical levels within the EU.

However, a shortcoming of this ‘priority’ prerequisite is that it does not take into account the unique and divergent framework of the Commission. This was exemplified by data arising in interview, as most interviewees denoted the importance of climate migration and its mainstreaming, stating their desire to learn more and to ascertain where climate migration could fit within their DGs mandate. Thus, on an individual level, for policymakers, climate migration and its mainstreaming would appear to be deemed a priority. However, undermining this individual prioritisation, is the Commission’s reliance on evidence-based policymaking, followed by the Commission-specific framework and set-up.

The first aspect not considered in the literature involves the necessity for scientific evidence to inform evidence-based policymaking. Evidence is required which proves, beyond all reasonable doubt, that there is a i.) a causal link between climate pressures and mobility, ii.) that climate migrants must be treated differently to other migrants such as economic migrants in order to effectively assist them and iii.) that legal channels of climate migration are empirically proven to be a facilitating strategy for adaptation. This was a justification provided by all four DGs in interview. In line with this, the DEVCO interviewees denoted climate migration’s lack of priority within their two departments to derive primarily from the absence of solidifying scientific evidence. For DEVCO, this primarily concerned the absence of evidence proving that a different approach had to be employed for climate migrants to that of other migrants.
“I don’t think we recognise it [climate migration] as a problem as such. We try and deal with the results of climate induced migration without actually distilling climate change as the source as opposed to critical conflict, demographics etc.” (DG DEVCO, Interviewee A, lines 349-351)

As far as interviewee A was concerned, climate migration falls within the remit of DEVCO’s usual activities and policies regarding migration and thus acknowledging it as a priority would not affect their daily practice or approaches. Scientific evidence was highlighted as a requirement to prove that different strategies and instruments would be needed to tackle climate migration in a diverse manner to other forms of displacement and migration. Due to the EU’s reliance on evidence-based policymaking, unless there is evidence that legal channels of migration can build resilience in communities to climatic pressures and events, policy cannot, and will not, be made. Interestingly, a lack of scientific evidence also affected the priority status of climate migration within DG CLIMA. Despite raising awareness for climate migration and being the self-titled mainstreaming machine for issues pertaining to climate change, this lack of solid scientific evidence has formed a dichotomy within CLIMA. As a result of this dichotomy, climate migration is seen within CLIMA as “the last resort type of action” (DG CLIMA, Interviewee G, line 173) and, therefore, work is primarily being done on those aspects which are not seen as a last resort, such as decreasing risks and increasing resilience.

Secondly, a further justification for climate migration and its mainstreaming not qualifying for priority status involves the Commission-specific framework which has been overlooked in the literature. Each DG has a very particular mandate and set of objectives it must focus on and fulfil which can undermine the individual prioritisation of certain issues, in this case the mainstreaming of climate migration. A clear example of this divergence concerns the mandate of DG DEVCO which is to integrate member states priorities into their own DGs priorities. This focuses on the way in which DEVCO works in partnership with national governments to provide development aid and increase national resilience building. While this approach allows for partnership with nation states, rather than ownership and the top-down implementation of development plans, it is not beneficial to mainstreaming attempts.

“Not many African countries have put climate change as a priority. Their priorities are building security forces, finding jobs, maybe some infrastructure projects but they are not civil society or climate change.” (DG ECHO, Interviewee F, lines 301-304)
DEVCO must thus work within the parameters of that which national governments have denoted to be a priority for them.

This shortcoming is further exemplified within ECHO, as the notion of climate migration as a priority is a complex one. CLIMA noted that, within ECHO, the mainstreaming of forced displacement is deemed a priority but the mainstreaming of legal channels of climate migration into adaptation policies is “not priority number one... because they’re more focused on the consequences.” (DG CLIMA, Interviewee G, lines 95-96) For context, ECHO implements Disaster Risk Reduction which constitutes three characteristics; prevention, preparedness and response. Their preparedness and response angle i.e. addressing forced displacement following a natural disaster, holds much more focus than their prevention angle. Therefore, through interview it has been highlighted that reducing forced displacement following a natural disaster is deemed a priority, but the other more nuanced aspects of climate migration are not. This is likely due to the fact that ECHO’s main priority, in light of their mandate, is the preservation of life regardless of status or condition. Therefore, their priority entails the action of saving life and providing humanitarian aid rather than specifically targeting climate migration and climate migrants.

However, this lacking priority for climate migration and its mainstreaming is firmly interlinked with the absence of monitoring and evaluation of the climate migration perspective and its mainstreaming in projects, programmes and policies. The prerequisite of monitoring and evaluation entails internal modifications to include goals and objectives for mainstreaming which must be consistently analysed by all DGs with progress monitored to ensure effective mainstreaming. Nonetheless, the lacking priority status for climate migration has meant that no desired goals, outcomes and objectives for the mainstreaming of climate migration have been established, and thus, their monitoring or evaluation is not possible. Therefore, the lack of clear objectives and goals undermines the possibility for the necessary monitoring and evaluation, thus hindering the mainstreaming of climate migration.

To conclude, climate migration and its mainstreaming are considered important on an individual level within the sample DGs but are not considered a priority for the DGs as a whole nor the Commission. This finding contributes to the existing mainstreaming prerequisite literature as it highlights the shortcomings in the necessity to consider a topic a ‘priority’. On an individual level, climate migration and mainstreaming may be judged a priority, however, the Commission-specific framework is overlooked, alongside the Commission’s reliance on evidence-based policymaking. These aspects deprioritise the issue
and lower it on the political agenda. Thus, the justifications for why DGs do not prioritise climate migration and its mainstreaming are primarily as a result of climate migration’s weak scientific backing, compounded by individual DGs specific mandates rather than policymakers not deeming it a priority. In light of this lack of priority perception, goals, outcomes and objectives for mainstreaming have not been set and therefore, monitoring and evaluation cannot be implemented. Thus, in answer to the research question, it can be deduced that the absence of priority status for issues of climate migration greatly hinders the mainstreaming of said issue within the Commission. This also detrimentally impacts the possibility for monitoring and evaluation, resulting in a further compounded hindrance to mainstreaming.

**Sufficient Funding and Human Resources; and Continuous Training and Education**

A further prerequisite for mainstreaming includes the necessity for sufficient resources such as funding and human capital (Scholten and Van Breugel, 2018). Funding and human resources denote the necessity to modify internal actions throughout all DGs to accord funds explicitly to mainstreaming of climate migration. In doing so, this will herald further changes such as sufficiently funded continuous training and instruction on mainstreaming. However, a consensus inherent to all DGs was the agreement that there was no specific funding that targeted mainstreaming initiatives for climate migration within the Commission. A possible explanation for this is supported by the mainstreaming literature (Havinsky, 2016, as cited in, Scholten and Van Breugel, 2018) and denotes the inter-reliance between sufficient funding and priority status of the issue. The inter-relation between funding and perceived priority status are effectively exemplified by the comparison between CLIMA and ECHO on this issue. CLIMA acknowledges climate migration as a priority but lacks the funding to implement initiatives. This is compared with DG ECHO’s similar acknowledgement of specifically forced displacement as a priority but its divergent decision to target funds for climate migration and mainstreaming. ECHO are accorded a modest funding, roughly one billion EUR a year with accessible emergency budgets (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, 2019). ECHO’s designation of climate-induced displacement as a funding priority has resulted in the formulation and implementation of practical tools such as the Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, risk assessments and early warning signals for climatic events which are all strengthened by high level involvement at the Geneva level. These divergent results between CLIMA and ECHO, highlight the importance of targeted funding combined with priority perception of climate migration for
effective mainstreaming. This finding is in line with Scholten and Van Breugel’s (2018, p.178) findings that funding is highly related to the failure of mainstreaming. This results in CLIMA’s policy ambition of mainstreaming not being matched by proper funding, which thus greatly hinders the implementation of mainstreaming initiatives for climate migration.

In line with this, the subsequent prerequisite of mainstreaming - continuous training and education - is greatly influenced by the extent of both funding and human resources and expertise. Without adequate funding, a high standard of continuous training cannot be realised, and the absence of experts or those able to provide this training will also have a detrimental influence. In light of the lack of funding and priority status attributed to climate migration, continuous training and education on the mainstreaming of this issue is not currently in place in any of the European Commission’s DGs that were assessed.

To conclude, the current funding and human resources available within the Commission for the mainstreaming of climate migration are deficient and, as a result, there is no continuous training or education for staff within the Commission regarding climate migration and its mainstreaming. The consequence being that there are currently no mainstreaming initiatives for climate migration and staff lack the knowledge to ensure such initiatives future implementation. In light of the research question, these deficits greatly hinder the mainstreaming of climate migration within the Commission as there are no internal modifications to behaviour and action.

**Inclusion of External Experts and Enhancing and Increasing of Data Capacity**

The inclusion of external experts, and enhancing and increasing capacity of data collection, are both key prerequisites for mainstreaming and involve the modification of internal actions and behaviour. DGs must adapt to, and utilise, said experts and the latest data to inform their policy, projects and programmes. Scholten and Van Breugel (2018) also highlight that without the means to develop sufficient expertise on an issue and its mainstreaming, mainstreaming initiatives and policies cannot come to fruition. In light of this theory, it is notable that both the abovementioned prerequisites to mainstreaming were prevalent in both documentation and interviews.

It was noted that the Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography both research climate migration and have been asked by all four DGs to present their findings and engage in academic discussion concerning climate migration. DEVCO has been instrumental in funding the IOM-based project ‘Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy’ (MECLEP) which aimed to provide
empirical evidence in order to influence policy formulation on climate migration. In doing so, experts from IOM, other external platforms and organisations on climate migration, and academics were included in providing empirically based recommendations for climate migration and mainstreaming policy. As a result, there has been an increase in empirical data and the inclusion of experts. However, from the analysis of the data, a shortcoming has been made apparent in the literature. Due to the nature of emerging topics, such as climate migration, external experts and the enhancing and increasing of data capacity may be present, but the topics are still too novel for these prerequisites of mainstreaming to have much effect. Thus, the data gathered through external experts and an increased data capacity is still being debated and contradicted by other experts, and has yet to be fully integrated into, or to inspire, policy, projects or programming within the Commission.

Therefore, to conclude, the Commission is active concerning the prerequisite to include external experts and enhance and increase data capacity. However, due to the very recent publication of said expertise it has yet to be fully and effectively incorporated into DGs policies, projects or programming, and thus loses its facilitating feature for mainstreaming climate migration. The novelty of topics effecting the influence of these prerequisites are notions this research has added to the existing literature. Therefore, in response to the research question, the lack of efficient inclusion of external experts and thus enhancing and increasing of data capacities, constitutes a hindrance for climate migration mainstreaming within the Commission.

5.3.2: Shared Responsibility and Poly-Centric Governance

Three prerequisites for mainstreaming have been categorised under the umbrella title of ‘shared responsibility and poly-centric governance’. Such effective responsibility-sharing and poly-centric governance is essential to our definition of mainstreaming.

Shared Responsibility
This prerequisite is at the crux of this research’s definition of mainstreaming to such an extent that it is explicitly mentioned in the secondary dimension. It entails the exigency for the issue in question to be shared ubiquitously between all relevant DGs and departments, rather than remaining restricted to a fringe department with limited influence (Scholten and Van Breugel, 2018)

However, the perception of climate migration as a shared responsibility varies not only per DG, but even per department within DGs. Adding further complexity, the self-
evaluated perception of responsibility sharing by policymakers was both haphazard and often undermined later within the interviews by the interviewees themselves.

The interviewees from HOME’s asylum unit and from ECHO’s policy support unit described responsibility sharing of the issue as each DG contributing by providing their own expertise, and thus, different perspectives. In this light, both departments believe there is full responsibility sharing of climate migration.

“We have a dedicated DG, CLIMA, and they are of course the lead because even the name is self-explanatory. They will lead in most of this and that’s fair enough and how it should be. Now for the others, they come in depending on the angle and depending on the level of funding...I think there is a fair share in the sense of directorates coming in in relation to their mandates” (DG ECHO, Interviewee E, lines 312-319)

However, this sentiment was not shared by the other interviewees. Interviewees from both HOME’s legal migration department, ECHO’s regional department and DG CLIMA themselves declared climate migration the sole responsibility of DG CLIMA. However, adding further complexity, progressing into the interview the same DG ECHO interviewee stated that the responsibility for climate migration lies with “us or nobody” (DG ECHO, Interviewee F, line 65). Finally, within DEVCO, at least the consensus was clear.

“It could be possible [mainstreaming climate migration into adaptation policies], it’s just a matter of seeing, first of all, if this becomes a priority for us.” (DG DEVCO, Interviewee B, line 165)

Responsibility sharing of the issue was a possibility in the future if climate migration was ever designated a priority within DEVCO.

To conclude, there is a great deal of ambiguity and haphazardness in the interviewees’ designation of perceived responsibility regarding climate migration. The lack of any form of consensus on this issue between DGs, or even between departments, shrouds the aspect of responsibility sharing in confusion. This element of confusion and ambiguity surrounding whether or not the responsibility for climate migration is shared greatly hinders the mainstreaming of climate migration within the Commission and undermines mainstreaming’s second dimension.
Coordination and Communication

This prerequisite is also at the crux of this research’s mainstreaming definition’s secondary dimension due to its importance for poly-centric governance and responsibility sharing. Its importance has been highlighted by Scholten and Van Breugel (2018) who note that due to the complexity inherent to the mainstreaming approach, effective and explicit coordination and communication is required across policy making units. In light of this, it is significant to note that coordination and communication are present within the Commission concerning climate migration. This fulfilment of coordination and communication is due to the fact that, as an interviewee put it, “the European Commission is unique…it is built to take collective decisions” (DG ECHO, Interviewee F, line 199). However, this Commission-intrinsic framework has been denoted a shortcoming overlooked in the existing ‘mainstreaming strategies’ literature (cf. section 5.2) as policymakers are obliged to adhere to a Commission-specific governance framework before publishing documents or implementing projects or programming. They do not need to believe in, support or advocate for climate migration to adhere to this form of mainstreaming. These embedded tools denote that all major documents, projects, programming, requests for funding and policy are put through institutionally embedded quality reviewing and decision-making processes. Therefore, the current coordination and communication between DGs regarding climate migration is a direct result of the Commission’s institutionalised governance. It was noted by DEVCO, ECHO and HOME that all their documents and projects are subject to quality review by CLIMA, who often suggest and advise inclusion of specific aspects related to the consideration of climate migration. As a result, at document level, an open dialogue on climate migration appeared to have been instigated, however, it was rarely found to be deeply manifest on the level of practice, highlighting the shortcoming inherent to the existing mainstreaming prerequisite literature. Thus, re-attributing the conclusion from the previous chapter, this form of communication and coordination was said to be passive, rather than active, which had an effect on the influence of mainstreaming. To conclude, in answering the research question, although the Commission is fulfilling the coordination and communication prerequisite for mainstreaming, it is doing so passively and thus not to its full potential. As a result, this still constitutes a hindrance of climate migration mainstreaming as this communication and coordination is not explicit, nor is it particularly effective, as mainstreaming has still not occurred.
Accountability Mechanisms

Accountability mechanisms were ascertained a prerequisite for mainstreaming as they ensure the compliance of other actors as regards the mutual accountability and responsibility sharing of an issue. They directly address criticism of mainstreaming and as a result they are fundamental to the success of the second dimension of the mainstreaming dimension. This is an integral aspect of mainstreaming and must be safeguarded (Scholten and Van Breugel, 2018). However, the concept of accountability mechanisms to ensure the mainstreaming of climate migration was firmly dismissed by all interviewees. In conclusion, the lack of accountability mechanisms within the Commission ardently undermines mainstreaming’s second dimension and, thus, greatly hinders the mainstreaming of climate migration as it allows for DGs to neglect mainstreaming without fear of sanctions or reprisals.

Conclusion

To conclude, the outcome of the former section determined that climate migration mainstreaming was not occurring within the European Commission and thus the second section of this study’s research question asked; how does the Commission hinder or facilitate the mainstreaming of climate migration? To provide an answer, Scholten and Van Breugel’s nine prerequisites for initiating mainstreaming were compared with the collated data through the analytical lens of this study’s mainstreaming definition. It was insisted that these nine prerequisites are, without doubt, utterly necessary to initiate mainstreaming and are all essential to this study’s definition of mainstreaming (Scholten and Van Breguel, 2018). However, from the data, it was noted that action was being taken on only three prerequisites for mainstreaming climate migration; coordination and communication across policy-making units, inclusion of external experts and enhancing and increasing capacity of data collection (see figure 17). Not only is this far from the basic fulfilment of the prerequisites required for the initiation of mainstreaming, but it was deduced that these three prerequisites are not even adequately fulfilled so as to equate facilitators for mainstreaming. In fact, this lack of complete fulfilment was denoted a hindrance to mainstreaming of climate migration within the European Commission.

Compounding these hindrances to climate migration mainstreaming, it was established that the Commission hinders the mainstreaming of climate migration by i.) not considering it a priority, and thus as a result ii.) being unable to monitor and evaluate goals and objectives, iii.) by having a messy, ambiguous and ad hoc perception of climate migration as a shared responsibility, iv.) by having insufficient funding and human resources to instigate any
mainstreaming initiatives, and therefore v.) foregoing the possibility for continuous training and instruction. The Commission also hinders mainstreaming by vi.) foregoing accountability mechanisms to ensure the implementation of effective mainstreaming throughout DGs. Interestingly, one of the most central explanations for the EU’s hindrance of climate migration mainstreaming, is the topic’s perceived lack of priority across all four DGs. How DGs deemed the priority status of an issue and it’s mainstreaming greatly influenced the fulfilment of the other prerequisites. On this notion, Scholten and Van Breugel (2018, p.176) note that “policy choices are in many cases not an issue of the incapacity to act but of priorities set elsewhere. It is not as if scholars and policy makers would be ignorant on what is required”. This lack of priority status for climate migration is widespread both horizontally and hierarchically within the Commission and, as a result, this mentality has been allowed to descend the hierarchy and diffuse throughout the DGs.

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<th>PREREQUISITES</th>
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<td>Coordination Communication</td>
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*Figure 17: Prevalence of mainstreaming prerequisites across four sample DGs.*
CHAPTER 6.0: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Conclusion

The theoretical concept of mainstreaming has gained traction since its prevalence in the 1980s gender literature. It has been diffused throughout divergent and variant fields such as disability, human rights and, most recently, integration policies for migrants. Mainstreaming has developed in an interesting fashion, being as much borne of policy documents and its implementation in practice as through academic and theoretical consideration. Due to the growth in attention for climate change and its many ramifications in both the public and policymaking spheres, the attention for climate migration has also grown. In light of these advancements, this research aimed to answer **how is climate migration mainstreamed within the European Commission, and what hinders and facilitates it?**

Thus, in answering this question, it first had to be established **how is climate migration mainstreamed within the Commission.** My expectations were that due to the long time-duration it takes to implement a mainstreaming process, in combination with the infancy of the climate migration field, it was not expected that many instances of mainstreaming would be found. A further linked expectation was that although there would be an aspect of decentralisation of the issue from climate centric DGs, DG CLIMA would still hold most of the responsibility for this issue. A final expectation was that there would be fewer instances of mainstreaming in practice than in policy due to the historic difficulties to enforce the prioritisation of the gender mainstreaming debate.

To answer these expectations and the preliminary section of the research question, key documents and interviews with policy makers in the relevant DGs were analysed in line with the strategies for mainstreaming derived from three principle theoretical literatures on mainstreaming and assessed through the analytical lens of the study’s own mainstreaming definition. To respond to this study’s first expectation, 3 of the 8 strategies derived from the literature were witnessed in both interview and key documentation of the four DGs analysed. Those strategies explicitly not present included co-funding, mutual accountability mechanisms, modifications of internal job descriptions and practical tools. However, those strategies that were present, although to a divergent extent, denoted shared projects and programmes, shared reports and studies, inter-directorial policy dialogue and partnership and networking. Therefore, roughly half of all strategies for mainstreaming derived from literature were present. However, the analysis of said strategies in comparison to the data accrued from interview and policy documents has highlighted several shortcomings in the
literature which undermine the presence of these strategies. These shortcomings further support this research’s conclusion that mainstreaming of climate migration is not occurring within the Commission.

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<th>STRATEGIES OF MAINSTREAMING</th>
<th>DG DEVCO</th>
<th>DG HOME</th>
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<td>Modification of internal actions and behaviour</td>
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<td>Modification of Job descriptions related to climate migration</td>
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<td>Practical Tools</td>
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<td>Shared Reports and Studies</td>
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<td>Partnership and Networking</td>
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<td>Mutual Accountability Mechanisms</td>
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<td>Inter-directorial Policy Dialogue</td>
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The preliminary finding and its link to the existing literature was the discovery that the three strategies; shared projects and programmes, shared reports and studies and partnership and networking were all utilised as strategies for mainstreaming. The literature thus insinuates that these strategies all involve some form of radical modification of internal actions and behaviours and, thus, a greater degree of responsibility sharing and poly-centric governance for climate migration. However, in reality, contradicting this literature was the intense intertwinement of these strategies with the instrument of Inter-Service Consultations. These consultations are inherent to the framework of the Commission and all policymakers are bound to their use before any projects, programmes, reports, studies or policies can be implemented. Therefore, although strategies of mainstreaming were discovered, they were all elements of the Commission’s intrinsic governance framework and were thus dubbed ‘passive’ mainstreaming. In other words, these strategies would occur whether policymakers deemed climate migration a priority and worth mainstreaming or not, as this is simply the modus operandi of the Commission. Furthermore, no active changes to the decision-making process or internal actions occur as a result of the ISCs. Thus, the way in which climate migration was mainstreamed, i.e. passively, was deemed to have a detrimental effect on the
influence and weight of the mainstreaming strategies. Therefore, mainstreaming strategies linked to the ISCs were impaired and their characteristic of radical internal modification was undermined. The result being that the four strategies associated with the ISCs could not be confirmed as legitimate strategies of mainstreaming, thus not fulfilling this study’s mainstreaming definition. The relevance of this finding is that it highlights the divergence between the mainstreaming literature and the unique framework of the Commission. It denotes the necessity to adapt the current mainstreaming literature for the Commission, bearing in mind the independent and divergent nature of the Commission’s framework. This would, therefore, ensure that the Commission was included in the mainstreaming literature, ergo, guaranteeing that the Commission is being effectively held accountable for its mainstreaming, rather than hiding behind a veil of ambiguity. Furthermore, it could also help the Commission to implement, monitor and evaluate their mainstreaming of climate migration in a more effective way.

In line with this noted passivity of mainstreaming strategies, a further expectation can be answered. This study’s second expectation held that a policy outcome gap concerning the mainstreaming of climate migration was expected in practice. As climate migration was mentioned within most key documents of all four DGs, denoting the action by ‘the European Union’ or ‘the European Commission’ there was an expectation that there would be widespread mainstreaming of the issue in practice. However, in reality, when present, mainstreaming was primarily passive as a result of the ISCs and adhered to the minimal line set by the Commission regarding climate migration. Said line merely recognises the link between mobility and climate change and the necessity to mainstream, as do the policymakers interviewed in practice. In light of this ambiguity, it is challenging to assert that a policy outcome gap concretely exists when it is based on vague terminology employed in policy, and thus the presence of a policy outcome gap cannot be clarified.

The second principle finding was that inter-directorial policy dialogue, and thus the mainstreaming dimension of responsibility-sharing and poly-centric governance, was a utilised strategy for mainstreaming occurring within the Commission. However, this again brought to light a shortcoming in the literature whereby inter-directorial policy dialogue was used as an umbrella term referring to contributions to both internal and external policy outcomes. Adding to the literature, this study found there to be a need to differentiate between internal and external policy outcomes as it is essential for emerging topics such as climate migration where there is the heightened policy attention at the global level amongst
actors such as the UN, UNFCC, IOM. As the topic is still emerging, this sense of attention and urgency has yet to trickle down into the very institutionalised and inflexible Commission framework and thus, the Commission performs inter-directorial policy dialogue primarily in order to present an external European standpoint on global climate migration policy rather than create internal policy. This highlights that inter-directorial policy dialogue cannot be confirmed as a strategy for mainstreaming as no responsibility-sharing or poly-centric governance have occurred within the Commission, rather the contribution to external policy is instead a means to fulfil the EU’s signatory obligation to international treaties and accords. Thus, the relevance of this finding is that this study has added to the canon of mainstreaming literature the necessity to differentiate between dialogue contributing to internal or external policy for emerging topics.

The final findings entailed i.) the potential use of awareness raising as a strategy for mainstreaming, and ii.) policymakers ‘selling’ mainstreaming as a means by which to avoid the creation of a complex and difficult legislative framework for climate migrants. A prominent theme arising from the data was DGs’ perceived commitment to awareness raising for climate migration and its mainstreaming. The quandary thus arose that awareness raising could constitute either i.) a strategy for mainstreaming that is divergent from the aforementioned pre-defined strategies due to the infancy of this field and the layout of the Commission’s governance framework of ii.) a step towards mainstreaming. However, the finding that DGs mainly resort to awareness raising rather than utilising the eight mainstreaming strategies derived from the literature gives the implication that rather than being an additional strategy for mainstreaming, it is rather, an essential first step towards the possibility of mainstreaming. This thus denotes that mainstreaming is not occurring. This was further support by all interviewees highlighting the need for more mainstreaming, which brought an additional strategy to light. This strategy encompasses ‘selling’ mainstreaming as a means to avoid creating a complex legislative framework for climate migrants. However, it was also noted to be a strategy the Commission needed to implement, thus implying it was yet to be put in place, again supporting the conclusion that mainstreaming was not present. The relevance of these additions to the mainstreaming literature is that it provides an adaptation to encompass strategies implemented for emerging topics, rather than solely for those which are well-studied and well-known.

The two additional findings, in tandem with only 4 of the 8 mainstreaming strategies being present, and those 4 constituting passive, ineffective mainstreaming, have instigate the conclusion that mainstreaming of climate migration is not occurring. Thus, by lieu of this
study, the aforementioned preliminary expectation – that mainstreaming would not be heavily present- was proven, on the whole, to have a basis in reality.

However, this study has aimed to go beyond simply stating whether mainstreaming of climate migration in the Commission is present or not and, therefore, the secondary aspect of the research question asked **how has the Commission facilitated or hindered mainstreaming of climate migration?** It aimed to further discuss explanations, based on theoretical mainstreaming literature concerning the prerequisites for mainstreaming, for why mainstreaming of climate migration is not present. In line with the gender mainstreaming literature, the expectation here concerned the notion of priorities and that climate migration, being a field in its infancy, would not be considered a high priority throughout all DGs. Through the analytical lens of this study’s mainstreaming definition, Scholten and Van Breugel’s (2018) prerequisites for mainstreaming are employed to analyse key documents and interviews (see figure 19).

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*Figure 19: Repeat reference to, Prerequisites for mainstreaming as seen throughout the sample DGs*
It was discovered mainstreaming of climate migration is primarily hindered by the Commission. This was due to the fact that the sample DGs did not consider climate migration, nor its mainstreaming, a priority and thus had no public objectives or goals to be monitored or evaluated. It was further hindered by the haphazard and ad hoc perception of climate migration as a shared responsibility in some departments and DGs whilst not in others. The absence of sufficient funding and human resources for mainstreaming initiatives and, thus, foregoing the possibility for continuous training and instruction, also greatly hindered climate migration mainstreaming. A final hindering factor for mainstreaming of climate change also included the omission of accountability mechanisms to ensure the implementation of effective mainstreaming throughout DGs.

Shortcomings in the mainstreaming literature arose within three prerequisites for mainstreaming, each pertaining to either the infancy of the topic of climate migration or the unique and divergent framework of the Commission.

The first shortcoming was inherent to the prerequisite that the topic in question, and its mainstreaming, must be considered a priority by all. In interview, it appeared that climate migration and its mainstreaming was a personal priority for many interviewees, which, according to the existing literature, would imply that climate migration and its mainstreaming was being accorded a position of priority. However, it was not; and this was due to a failure of the literature to acknowledge the Commission-specific reliance on evidence-based policymaking and the unique framework innate to the Commission. As a result of evidence-based policymaking, climate migration could not be assigned priority due to the lack of coherent scientific evidence. Such evidence was required to prove the importance of forming policy for climate migration. Furthermore, the Commission-specific framework also undermined the individual prioritisation to mainstreaming climate migration. Each DG has a very particular mandate and set of objectives it must fulfil which has undermined the individual prioritisation of the mainstreaming of climate migration. The relevance of these findings is that it adds the concept that the prioritisation of an issue by individuals can be undermined by the framework in which they operate. Furthermore, it adds consideration of the Commission’s unique framework and set-up to the mainstreaming literature, thus informing future studies on prioritisation of issues within the Commission.

A second finding that elucidated a literature shortcoming arose in the prerequisite ‘inclusion of external experts’ and ‘enhancing and increasing data capacity’. The findings extracted from the data indicated that concerning climate migration and its mainstreaming,
external experts were being included and, as a result, data capacity on the issue was increasing. However, the expertise and new data was not being explicitly included in programmes, projects, reports and studies, nor was it present in any policy due to its novelty and lack of priority. Therefore, the inclusion of experts and the increase in data capacity was not having an effect on the mainstreaming of climate migration. This was due to the literature overlooking the difference this prerequisite can hold for topics in their infancy compared to more developed and well-known topics. Thus, the relevance of this finding is that it adds to the existing literature by highlighting the divergent impact external experts and an increased data capacity can have on topics in their infancy.

The third and final finding was also present in the previous section concerning strategies for mainstreaming. It involves the prerequisite ‘coordination and communication’, a requirement for mainstreaming that was deemed to be present throughout interviews and key documents. However, the mainstreaming literature overlooks the unique framework inherent to the Commission and does not consider the detrimental influence Inter-Service Consultations can have on coordination and communication. As mentioned previously, the Inter-Service Consultations are inherent to the Commission and invoke sharing and collaboration on projects. It was extracted from the data that the requirement of coordination and communication mainly arose as a result of the Inter-Service Consultations and thus mainstreaming was fulfilled only ‘passively’ as sharing projects and programmes, plus an open dialogue by means of an institutionally embedded process did not constitute an active adherence to the prerequisite in question. The relevance of this finding is that it considers the effects of the Commission’s unique framework on the prerequisite of coordination and communication, developing this prerequisite further within the mainstreaming literature.

To conclude, in answering the second dimension of our research question **how has the Commission facilitated or hindered mainstreaming of climate migration**, the fact that a mere 4 of the 9 prerequisites for mainstreaming were witnessed in the interview and key documents constitutes a major hindrance at the behest of the Commission. Furthermore, the four prerequisites present cannot be considered facilitating factors to mainstreaming due to the concerns held with the existing literature derived from the data analysis. Thus, the above reflection illustrates the current failure of mainstreaming climate migration within the European Commission.
Discussion

This study is concluded with some reflections on its contribution to the theoretical literature, as well as providing policy recommendations to indicate its more practical contribution. As is inherent to studies of this nature, selective decisions had to be made resulting in several limitations which will be considered in order to provide avenues for future research.

To begin, a primary contribution to the literature involved addressing the literature gap of whether the ‘mainstreaming strategies’ literature, and the ‘mainstreaming prerequisites’ literature would correspond to the unique framework present within the Commission. Most literature asserted that their strategies were multi-level appropriate and could be applied to all governance institutions. Regarding the strategies, this study contributed to the literature by elucidating that the Commission-specific framework is having a detrimental effect on the mainstreaming strategies that were present. The framework is inflexible and constitutes several embedded forms of mainstreaming which undermine the approach’s more radical nature, discounting the need for active modification of internal actions and behaviours, and active responsibility sharing and poly-centric governance. Furthermore, the study also added to the literature concerning the Commission-specific framework on the prerequisites for mainstreaming. A similar conclusion was reached as the unique Commission framework outweighs individual prioritisation of topics and their mainstreaming, whilst also weakening the active modification of internal actions and behaviours. Thus, this paper contributed to the literature by highlighting the diverse institutional nature of the Commission and underlining the framework’s absence from the mainstreaming literature.

A secondary contribution to the literature was highlighting the literature gap within ‘mainstreaming strategies’ literature and the ‘mainstreaming prerequisites’ literature in terms of emerging topics. Most literature discussed strategies and prerequisite in terms of well-developed and prevalent topics such as gender, human rights and disability. However, in terms of strategies for mainstreaming, this study contributed to the literature by proposing two strategies for mainstreaming extracted from the data; awareness raising and ‘selling’ mainstreaming in lieu of creating of a complex legislative framework for climate migrants. These strategies are both inherent to the mainstreaming of emerging topics and were, thus, overlooked in the existing literature. Furthermore, regarding the mainstreaming prerequisites, the existing literature overlooked the effect the novelty of a topic can have on the inclusion of external experts and enhancement of data capacity for an issue. The external expertise and
additional data have yet to be fully integrated into Commission-led reports and studies due to the novelty of the topic, thus undermining the element of active modification of internal actions and behaviour, and responsibility sharing and poly-centric governance.

A final contribution entails the development of a mainstreaming definition which best encompasses the emerging topic of climate change, as well as the unique framework and structure of the European Commission. Such a definition can act as a

**Building on Limitations**

Three of this research’s selective limitations and their implications for future research will now be discussed. An interesting discussion which falls out with the scope of this research involves assessing the role of awareness raising within the field of mainstreaming. In the case of mainstreaming climate migration, awareness raising could be either a strategy of mainstreaming, a coping mechanism for when mainstreaming cannot be achieved or a prerequisite for future mainstreaming. This researcher believes its role within the field of climate migration and mainstreaming to be that of a prerequisite. This is highlighted by the ECHO interviewee who compared climate migration to other fringe issues dealt with by ECHO that have since become the mainstream, such as displaced children and gender issues. It was noted that ECHO followed a strategic framework for integrating these topics into the mainstream. They initially concentrated on raising awareness for these topics between the DGs culminating in the publication of a communication on the relevant issue throughout the Commission. In doing so, ECHO could then mainstream these issues around key policy frameworks to politically lift said fringe topics into the mainstream. Thus, it would appear that awareness raising for climate migration plays a similar role to ECHO’s awareness raising for displaced children and gender issues. Both ECHO and CLIMA are the predominant DGs employing this tactic with climate migration and it must be said to be working, as all DGs who have been involved in this study have been aware of climate migration and have repeated the need for more mainstreaming and responsibility sharing. Thus, the role of awareness raising in the field of mainstreaming climate migration is a very interesting avenue for future research.

An area for further study related to this research’s theoretical framework could be the investigation of alternative integratory mechanisms which may diffuse climate migration to a certain extent throughout DGs but in a less all-encompassing manner than mainstreaming. In light of this study’s results being that mainstreaming is not present, further studies could assess if the agenda-setting power of such alternatives may be more successful than
mainstreaming given the unique institutional framework of the European Commission.

Another future avenue is linked to the oft-cited lack of scientific evidence to support climate migration as constituting the main justification for climate migration’s lack of priority status. Thus, a third avenue for research could also assess the Precautionary Principle in relation to the Commission’s involvement with climate migration. The Precautionary Principle comes from the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and is employed when obstacles to decision-making arise in light of a lack of scientific evidence to fully and flawlessly prove that action is required on a certain topic. However, if there is enough proof that no-action would be detrimental, the precautionary principle allows for the concept of ‘better safe than sorry’. Policymakers can thus invoke the precautionary principle when action is not being carried out as a result of lacking scientific evidence (European Commission, 2000). This notion was discussed at length with several interviewees but was notably absent in all key documentation from the DGs. In discussion, it was noted that the precautionary principle is notoriously vague. It is a call to action, but what qualifies as action; mentioning climate migration in passing at a conference, or in a quality review session, or creating a fully policy and legal framework for the issue in question. Future research analysing the role of the Precautionary Principle within the field of climate migration and whether this could instigate further mainstreaming would be interesting and bring much academic value to the field.

To further contribute to the field on a more practical level, I have attached policy recommendations which could forward the mainstreaming of climate migration at Commission level.
CLIMA’s mandate on climate change action and their status as ‘the mainstreaming machine’ for all aspects of climate change, they hold a great deal of the influence within this field. CLIMA was established in 2010 with a unique purpose, to raise awareness for, and promote ramifications of climate change that required a specialised DG. In relation to climate migration, DG CLIMA is not currently leading by example. In light of this weight, but the lack of pro-active initiatives and mainstreaming attempts, specific recommendations for DG CLIMA have been included.

Policy Recommendations

1.) With the instatement of the new Commission, DGs must send their priorities to the new Director General and the 28 new Commissioners constituting the College. DG ECHO, DG CLIMA, DG DEVCO and DG HOME should include climate migration as a priority of their directorate general in their communication to the new Commission. In doing so, they will raise climate migration on the policy agenda and will allow for instances of mainstreaming to occur. Only by DGs denoting climate migration a priority can other DGs, who have chosen to not prioritise the issue, be highlighted.

2.) Resulting from the former recommendation, due to the governance framework of the Commission, the prioritisation of climate migration by DGs will then translate into a priority for the upper echelons of the Commission. This involves the Director General and the College of Commissioners. If climate migration is denoted a priority at such a high level, the likelihood of mainstreaming occurring would increase due to their high hierarchical influence on future funding, objectives and goals.

3.) An updated communication on climate migration including a development, humanitarian aid, and legal migration perspective is required. This should be an evaluation and improvement on the Staff Working Document of 2013 but re-evaluated to 2019 standards. It should encompass the growth of knowledge and data. DG ECHO, DEVCO, CLIMA and HOME, as a minimum, should contribute to the Communication with DG NEAR, EEAS, AGRI, EMPLI and Environment also requested to contribute.

Figure 20: Policy Recommendations for the European Commission
To conclude, this study aimed to highlight the importance of mainstreaming for the issue of climate change and to assess whether this importance was being translated into the European sphere. As it stands; it is not. Raising awareness for, and the mainstreaming of, climate migration is a means to assist, the 1 in 7 people of Bangladesh who will be displaced due to climate change, with up to 18 million alone moving due to sea rise; the inhabitants of Samoa, Vanuatu, French Polynesia, Fiji, Hawaii, Kiribati who will lose their entire countries and ways of life due to rising sea levels; the roughly 4.2 million people in the Sahel region forced to leave their homes, with desertification and soil loss doubtless a major contributor; the quarter of a million Afghans displaced due to severe drought – to name but a few cases (Environmental Justice Foundation, 2018; ReliefWeb, 2019, UNHCR, 2018). Climate migration is not a problem that will arise in the future, it is occurring already and will only
worsen with increased suffering and forced displacement. One must ask oneself, will climate migration become a priority for the EU when sea levels start to urgently threaten the Netherlands, or wild fires cause mass destruction across Sweden, or when severe droughts affect Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain, or when current migratory routes from North Africa and the Middle East become compounded with more migrants seeking employment due to severe droughts and desertification in their countries of origin? The EU has often been criticised as being more reactionary than pro-active (den Hertog, 2018) and in the case of climate migration this is hard to deny. Despite the opportunity that mainstreaming brings to effectively and efficiently tackle these kinds of global issues, this research shows that the Commission is not fully capitalising on this and is relegating it to a problem for the future, rather than the urgent issue that it is, which must be addressed immediately.
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Migration and Home Affairs (2019b) *Funding Home Affairs*. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings_en [Accessed: 18/06/19]


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**Reports**


IOM (2018) *Mapping Human Mobility (Migration, Displacement and Planned Relocation) and Climate Change in International Processes, Policies and Legal Frameworks*. IOM: Geneva


YouTube Videos


PowerPoint


Interviews

## APPENDICES

1.0: Mainstreaming Framework: Strategies and levels of mainstreaming (Pauleit and Wamsler, 2016).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies (and levels) of mainstreaming</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Add-on mainstreaming</td>
<td>The establishment of specific on-the-ground projects or programmes that are not an integral part of the implementing body’s sector work but directly target adaptation* or related aspects.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) Programmatic mainstreaming</td>
<td>The modification of the implementing body’s sector work by integrating aspects related to adaptation* into on-the-ground operations, projects or programmes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) Managerial mainstreaming</td>
<td>The modification of managerial and working structures, including internal formal and informal norms and job descriptions, the configuration of sections or departments, as well as personnel and financial assets, to better address and institutionalize aspects related to adaptation*.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4, 6) Intra- and inter-organizational mainstreaming</td>
<td>The promotion of collaboration and networking with other departments, individual sections or stakeholders (i.e., other governmental and non-governmental organizations, educational and research bodies and the general public) to generate shared understanding and knowledge, develop competence and steer collective issues of adaptation*.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(5) Regulatory mainstreaming**</td>
<td>The modification of formal and informal planning procedures, including planning strategies and frameworks, regulations, policies and legislation, and related instruments that lead to the integration of adaptation*.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(7) Directed mainstreaming***</td>
<td>Higher level support to redirect the focus to aspects related to mainstreaming adaptation* by e.g., providing topic-specific funding, promoting new projects, supporting staff education, or directing responsibilities.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2.0: organigramme DG DEVCO
Appendix 3.0: Organisational Structure DG CLIMA

[Diagram showing the organisational structure of DG CLIMA]
Appendix 5.0: Organisational Structure DG ECHO
## Appendix 6.0: Codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership and Networking between Directorates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular meetings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agreeing on a joint ‘line’ before meetings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Open dialogue on issues pertaining to climate migration</td>
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<tr>
<th>Co-funding</th>
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<tr>
<td>Overlapping funds for projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Working on a project funded by another DG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Providing funding to another DG</td>
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<tr>
<th>Shared Projects and Programmes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contributing to another DGs project or programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fully sharing (both having equal responsibility in project or programme)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other DGs quality review your project or programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contributing with another DG to external projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other DGs do not object to a DG including CM in its projects and programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quality reviewing another DGs project or programme</td>
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<tr>
<th>Shared Reports and Studies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Referring to other DGs studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contributing to other DGs studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other DGs contribute to your studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fully sharing (both have equal responsibility in project or programme)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Inter-directorial policy dialogue on climate migration</th>
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<tr>
<td>Outcomes of dialogue being policy (internal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dialogues contribute to external policy</td>
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<tr>
<th>Mutual accountability mechanism</th>
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<tr>
<td>Assessment of DGs contributions</td>
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<td>Evaluation of DGs contributions</td>
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<tr>
<th>Modification of job descriptions related to Climate migration</th>
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<tr>
<td>To include climate change</td>
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<tr>
<td>To include migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>To include mainstreaming</td>
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<tr>
<th>Practical Tools</th>
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<tr>
<td>Toolkit</td>
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<td>Guidelines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training</td>
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Appendix 7.0: Template for interview guide (Ex. DG HOME)

Contextual and Introductory

1. Can you tell me a bit about who you are, your professional background? (What directorate do you work for now? What does your work focus on? Have you always worked for the same directorate?)

2. What is your relationship with climate migration? (How long have you worked on it? In what capacity? How did you get involved with CM?)

3. Can you describe the evolution and trajectory of how the migration-climate nexus has been discussed at the EU level by European institutions? (Has policymaker attention for the issue grown? Why? Would you consider climate migration as high on the policy agenda?)

4. How would you characterize the EC’s position on climate migration today? In what ways is it discussed? (Why do you believe it holds this position? What obstacles are keeping it there? What has brought it forward?)

Specific to DG HOME

5. How would you describe DG HOME’s role in integrating migration into the field of climate change and the environment? (Is climate migration considered when implementing your projects and programmes? Are there practical tools to help officials integrate climate migration into your work? Do you believe climate migration to be within your responsibilities?)

6. How do you perceive your directorates’ position on climate-change induced migration? (Does it believe that integrating migration into climate change is urgent/necessary? How is climate migration perceived? Why? Could it be more progressive? Why?)

A-priori sensitising concepts:

- Shared funding
- Shared reports and studies
- Mutual accountability mechanism
- Shared projects and programmes
- Climate migration considered when implementing projects and programmes
- Inter-directorial policy dialogue concerning climate migration
- Practical tools
- Effective partnership and networking between directorates
- Modification of internal and informal norms and job descriptions

7. Can you describe with what other directorates your directorate liaises/cooperates in terms of climate migration? (Is their shared funding for projects or programmes? Are there co-authored or collaborative reports and studies? Is there a means by which the two directorates can hold each other accountable for their involvement with climate migration? Are their shared projects and programmes? Have job descriptions been altered to include climate migration? Is there a strong sense of shared responsibility between DG HOME and DG CLIMA? Are there any practical tools to assist policymakers to mainstream migration and climate change such as toolkits?)
8. What about DG CLIMA?
9. DG DEVCO?
10. DG ECHO?

EU Commission; more generalised

11. How would you perceive the extent of responsibility-sharing of this issue throughout the EU directorate generals? (Is it effectively shared? Could more be done to increase responsibility sharing? Who is taking the most responsibility? Who the least)
12. In what ways is the involvement of the different directorates similar? In what ways does it differ? (Follows from question above)
13. How would the integration of migration into climate change enhance the support/forward the current policy framework for climate migrants?
14. Are there any points you’d like to raise or any final thoughts that you felt weren’t covered in my questions about responsibility sharing of climate migration throughout EU directorates?
### Key Documents Analysis

#### DG DEVCO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of report</th>
<th>ID Code</th>
<th>When</th>
<th>From where</th>
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<tr>
<td>Maximising the Development Impact of Migration: The EU contribution for the UN High-level Dialogue and next steps towards broadening the development-migration nexus (2013)</td>
<td>007</td>
<td>07/05/19</td>
<td><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0292&amp;from=EN">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0292&amp;from=EN</a></td>
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<td>Accompanying The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (2011)</td>
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<td><strong>DG CLIMA</strong></td>
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<td>DG ECHO</td>
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