

Get on My Level: An Intractable Policy Controversy Through a Multi-Layered Lens

A comparison between the local policy responses and national-local governance relations of Rotterdam and Amsterdam concerning the intractable policy issue of reception facilities for migrants with an irregular status



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i. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACVZ – Advisory Committee for Alien (Foreign) or Immigration Affairs (*Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken*)

DT&V – Service Return and Departure (*Dienst Teugkeer & Vertrek*)

CRvB – (*Centrale raad van Bestuur*)

LVV – National Foreign Reception Facility (*Landelijke Vreemdelingen Voorziening*)

VBL – Freedom-Limiting Reception Facility (*Vrijheidsbeperkende Locatie*)

WODC – Scientific Research and Documentation Center (*Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek en Documentatie Centrum*)

VNG – Association of Dutch Municipalities (*Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten*)

VVD – People Partij voor Freedom and Democracy (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*)

ii. ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the differences in multi-level or national-local governance relation between two local governments in the Netherlands regarding the reception of migrants with an irregular status. The case of the Bed-Bath-Bread crisis marks an intractable policy controversy between the national and local governments due to the contested nature of the issue, and diverging interests and priorities of both government levels. The two case studies, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, often face the consequences of the policy created on the national level. The Bed-Bath-Bread facilities were created to combat ‘humanitarian issues’ that local governments were faced with. However, these same Bed-Bath-Bread facilities could counter the efficiency of the rather restrictive national policy set up to reduce irregular or illegal migration. Therefore, this study investigates how two cities, similar in size, economic climate and percentage of foreign born population, have responded to national policy changes regarding these reception facilities since the MatchingLaw in 1998. The study has found that the two largest municipalities in the Netherlands diverged in framing and multilevel governance configuration due to the political composition of the municipalities and the local contextual factors which shaped the national-local government relations. There were for example more instances of significant economic frames found in Rotterdam, mostly originating from policy documents which were influenced by Livable Rotterdam – framing the reception facilities of irregular migrants as a ‘costly issue’. Whereas Amsterdam showed more indicators of humanitarian frames, often influenced by policy documents from GroenLinks which objected against national policy in light of the safety, health and vulnerability of the migrants with irregular status. Both municipalities were often in friction with national policy, due to local events which triggered a decoupled period with the national government. Yet, considering the opposing differences in political climate between both cities, there were a surprising number of similarities between municipalities, both in frames and tumult relations with the national government regarding the issue. There is a “red-line” which can be traced through both the framing and national-local governance configurations of both cities. This red-line entails that both municipalities at the start of the MatchingLaw showed signs of governance decoupling and resistance for this national restrictive turn in policy. However, thereafter coinciding with the ‘assimilationist turn’ local policy became more restrictive as well. This means that the implemented or framed ‘restrictive’ national policies converged more with local policies than hypothesized, especially considering the expected ‘local turn’ of migration policies and the contested nature of the policy issue at hand.

1. INTRODUCTION

“In recent decades the new social figure of the ‘illegal migrant’ has proliferated in the Western world. Although there were illegal migrants before the 1970s, particularly in the United States (Ngai 2004), their number appears to have increased in spite of (and indeed owing to) current restrictive immigration politics” (Leerkes, 2010, p. 15)

As the quote above suggests the salience of “illegal migrants¹” or rather irregular migrants as a social construct and the importance of ‘managing’ and regulating migration in Europe through border control, has significantly increased since the 1990’s (Geddes & Scholten, 2016, p. 3). The most recent estimate of migrants with an irregular status residing in the Netherlands ranges from 22.881 to 48.179 from the 1st of July 2012 until the 30th of June 2013 (WODC, 2015). Often these migrant groups find themselves in vulnerable or precarious situations, on the outskirts of Dutch society (Engbersen et al. 2002). Joppke (1998) explains how immigration is an inherent ‘challenge to the nation-state’ (p. 5). He argues that the notion of immigration creates the perception of states as being passive receivers, forced to respond and thereby justifying the restrictive border controls currently in place. Therefore, implementing strict immigration regulations has become a central measure of the national government to counter the in-stream of migrants with an irregular status (Brouwer, van der Woude, van der Leun; 2017). According to Brouwer et al. (2017), ‘Over the past two decades a large number of policy measures have been implemented to deter, exclude and remove unauthorized migrants in particular, policies that increasingly focus on detection, detention and deportation’ (p. 101). Many of these “harsh” regulations may have paradoxically resulted in an increase in the amount of migrants with an irregular status in the Netherlands (Brouwer et al., 2017). Yet, actively keeping migrants outside of the strong Dutch welfare state has become important since the implementation of the Matching Law in 1998, which strips all irregular immigrants or rejected asylum seekers from any social services in the Netherlands (AdviesCommissie VreemdelingenZaken ‘ACVZ’, 2018).

¹ Throughout this thesis the term ‘illegal’ as well as ‘irregular migrant’ or ‘undocumented migrant’ will only be incorporated if this term has been used *literally* by the local government or actor in question. This is necessary to showcase how certain protagonists frame the situation and actors involved. Generally, the use of the term should be avoided because it refers to ‘*illegality*’ or ‘*irregularity*’ as pertaining to or being an inherent description of a person and often times this term could and has been used in a derogatory fashion (Bacon, 2008). Therefore, this study will solely use the terming ‘migrant with an irregular status’, emphasizing the temporality and bureaucratic entity of the labeling through the emphasis on a *status*.

Despite restrictive national immigration policies against irregular migrants, various actors in the Netherlands are known to continuously offer support (Staring, 2015; Dirks, 2016). The turn against national policy and the explanation for local support are often thought to be due to a difference in interests or rather motivations, between national and local levels (Dekker, Emilsson, Krieger, & Scholten, 2015; Spencer, 2017). According to Spencer (2017), who conducted a broad study on the responses of local authorities to irregular migrants in many different European countries, ‘National governments bear primary responsibility for immigration controls while local authorities bear greater responsibility for service provision and experience the direct consequences of exclusion’ (p. 14). Thus, the effects of national immigration policies are felt at the local level, which may result in imperative challenges between both levels.

A case in which these tensions are felt between local and national levels is the case of the Bed-Bath-Bread crisis in the Netherlands. Since the implementation there has been a struggle regarding a group of migrants with irregular status which no longer have an “official” right to stay in the Netherlands, and therefore would have no legal right to reception (Staring, 2015; Spencer, 2017; ACVZ, 2018). These tensions became heightened in 2007, when the state mandated an abrupt end to all forms of support and municipal reception facilities by the end of 2009 (ACVZ, 2018, p. 6). In 2015, the government proposed a regulation named “Bed, Bath, Bread”, which stated that the national government would offer “sober” reception facilities (offering a Bed, a place to shower or bathe and a minimal supply of food) in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag, Utrecht and Eindhoven, to migrants with an irregular status for twelve weeks if they were devoted to work on return to the place of origin. These locations were named “shared” facilities for the national and local governments but would only be realized if all other municipalities in the Netherlands would permanently close their reception facilities. However, this regulation was never officially implemented as a national policy and led to further frictions which caused a sudden halt in the negotiations about the contested reception facilities at the end of 2016. According to the ACVZ (2018) this was due to the municipalities still taking too much liberty in providing space to shelter migrants with an irregular status, which countered the significance of the nationally organized facilities (LVV’s) in the five previously stipulated Dutch cities. Finally, the national government reached a conclusion in 2017, and a change in policy was implemented which stipulated that eight facilities, run by the state, would “manage” these migrants. This ‘new’ implemented policy in 2017, is in line with the proposed 2015 policy change. Yet, this new policy appeared to be slightly less restrictive than the previous 2015 one where more nationally organized facilities were planned to be organized

and maintained. Additionally, more cooperation between local and national government levels was to be supported and almost an imperative condition to the new implemented policy.

Motivation & Relevance

This power struggle between different governmental levels, with regards to the reception of migrants with an irregular status has been ongoing in the Netherlands for many years (Staring, 2015). According to Scholten and Penninx who researched the multilevel governance of migration and integration in the European Union (2016), ‘Migration and migrant integration policies have become increasingly dispersed over various levels of government. Besides the national level, the European Union level and the regional and local levels have become more involved’ (p. 91). Furthermore, Alexander (2003) who configured a local host-stranger typology explains that, ‘local authorities are increasingly autonomous’ (p. 412), in their local policy responses. This developed ‘local turn’ makes it valuable to examine how different local governments actually responded to the national policy changes since 1998, with regards to the reception of irregular migrants. Thus, it would be significant to distinguish what type of national-local governance was prominent in this relation and whether this type of governance differs in different cities in the Netherlands. Therefore, the research question this thesis aims to address is: ***How have local governments in the Netherlands responded to national policy changes regarding the reception facilities of irregular migrants and does this national-local governance configuration differ between cities?***

The goal of this research is to understand how different cities or local governments have responded or acted upon national policy in the light of a controversial or contested issue such as the reception facilities of irregular migrants in the Netherlands. A power struggle between levels is to be expected because of the likelihood that different actors have diverging interests concerning the “issue”. The chairman of the council of all municipalities in the Netherlands, Jos Wienen, for example indicated that it is up to the local government to face the reality that takes place on street level (VNG, 2016). Whereas, the policy of the national government is known to be characterized by a ‘discouragement’ policy, where living in ‘illegality’ is strongly dissuaded by emphasizing the importance of return (Staring, 2015). Staring (2015) in a WODC report on reception for migrants with an irregular status, emphasizes that the national government has a rather restrictive policy with regards to the reception facilities of migrants with an irregular status because, ‘a further increase in illegality should be prevented at all costs’ (Staring, 2015, p. 24). Thus, this may conflict with local governments who ‘face’ the result of this rather restrictive policy in the municipality itself. Due to the complexity of the issue, it

may be difficult to find accurate differences in actual policy implementation between local governments. Therefore, this research will specifically focus on the framing of the issue in policy documents, and how the problems and solutions are referred to or constructed (Rein & Schon, 1993). Framing theory will thereby also help determine what type of national-local governance configuration characterizes the relation between the national and local government in question, and whether this type of governance typology differs between two big Dutch cities, or not. By process tracing this ‘issue’ to the implementation of the Matching Law in 1998, this analysis thereby also addresses whether there have been fundamental changes in local responses throughout the years and whether the national-local governance configuration has changed or evolved significantly since then.

It is possible that one municipality has diverged more from national policy than the other, depending on contextual factors within that city. The local policies may not only differ based on contextual factors but also due to historical institutionalism, and the path dependency of the local government in question (Hall & Taylor, 1996). According to Scholten in his study on the agenda dynamics and multi-level governance of intractable policy controversies (2013), ‘A better understanding is required of under what conditions coordinated forms of multi-level governance will emerge or rather one of the other governance in multi-level settings’ (p. 218). Scholten (2013), focused specifically on the multi-level governance of integration policies in the Netherlands. Therefore, this focus on the multi-level governance of intractable policy controversies in relation to reception facilities of irregular migrants, will offer a different ‘issue’ or ‘context’ to identify how national-local governance configurations (may) differ between local governments.

After Scholten’s (2013) publication Spencer (2017) also conducted a relatively broad study on multi-level governance of migrants with an irregular status in Europe. Yet, Spencer’s (2017) research design is a comparative analysis between European countries, and does not analyze the differences between local governments *within* nation-states in detail. Thus, this thesis will offer new insights in the area of multi-level governance of intractable policy problems, especially because there have been many recent developments on the “issue” of the reception facilities or Bed, Bath, Bread regulations in the Netherlands (ACVZ, 2018). Therefore, understanding these differences between government levels, may help shed light on the potency of multilevel governance, or a coordination and collaboration between levels, due to diverging positions and unwillingness to comply with one another.

This research will first outline the theoretical framework on which it grounds its analytical lens. Therefore, the importance of the local turn in migration research and the

different national-local governance configurations will first be explained and justified. By outlining these different national-local governance typologies, I hope to portray the significance of viewing the issue of reception facilities for irregular migrants, through a multi-level governance lens. Furthermore, the second aspect of the theoretical framework, will involve an explanation of intractable policy problems and why framing is a fruitful theoretical perspective to analyze such a contested and problematic issue through. After the theoretical framework, the methodology, including research design, operationalization and methods will be listed and specified before the analysis. In order to adequately understand the local responses of the two case studies, the context or national policy changes will also be briefly touched upon. This is necessary to fully understand the national-local governance configurations between the two Dutch cities, and what actually led to the local responses. After the national context, each case study will present an in-depth historical analysis of the two different local responses tracing back to the Matching Law in implemented in 1998. As briefly mentioned, this will offer the opportunity to fully get a grasp and understanding of the intricate processes and complications that surround this “issue” of reception for the migrants with an irregular status. After having outlined the findings in both separate case studies, the next chapter will combine and contrast both separate case studies in a comparative analysis, through which the main findings and differences between local responses will become evident. Furthermore, the last chapter will outline the possible conclusions to be made based on the analysis. Finally, it will shed light on the study’s limitations and recommendations for future research.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Multi-level governance

It is important to understand methodological nationalism and the local turn in migration research to further understand the significance of multilevel governance and national-local governance configurations. Methodological nationalism has shaped or molded, concepts,

perspectives and theories in the political sciences and specifically the migration field (Wimmer & Schiller, 2001; Favell, 2010). It is a frame through which methods are often unwillingly shaped, and theories are subsequently formed, 'Framing the world as a global market place cannot begin to explain why, under specific circumstances, not only political entrepreneurs but also the poor and disempowered continue to frame their demands for social justice and equality within a nationalist rhetoric and why migrants sometimes embrace versions of long distance nationalism' (Wimmer & Schiller, 2001, p. 326). Favell (2010), also explains that the nation state is seen as the 'principal organizing unity of society' for those who contend to this paradigm (p. 371). Yet Favell (2010) believes it is not sufficient to understand relations between immigrants and their host societies through this paradigm or lens. The continued focus and importance of integration is in and of itself a method through which immigrants are seen as juxtaposing the entity of a geographically bounded nation.

The last two decades there has been a focus on the 'local turn' of migration. Alexander (2003a; 2003b), explains that cities have often taken more liberty and independence in formulating different local responses than the national government. The research conducted by Alexander (2003a), formulated and set up a typology configuring different of phases or even 'municipal attitudes' (p. 411), toward the migrant population within a host society. This typology was based on a different study in which he compared host-stranger relations in different cities such a Rome, Tel Aviv, Paris and Amsterdam (Alexander, 2003b). It is important to note that with this configuration, the local turn or shift in responsibility from national to local policy authorities, became more significant in migration research, which previously may have been 'overlooked' (p. 425). Therefore, this research will emphasize the importance of the local turn in migration policy research, by investigating how two different municipalities have acted toward irregular migrants and the reception thereof.

By examining the local turn of migration, this research thereby also focuses on its relation to the national government, emphasizing how and why the local governments may have acted autonomously or in convergence with its national government. Multi-level governance of migration may help explain how different levels advocate for different types of policies (Scholten & Penninx, 2016). Multi-level governance entails the study of the relationship between different levels of government and whether the implementation of certain policies or felt responsibility thereof is similar (converging) or different (diverging) (Zincone & Caponio, 2006; Spencer, 2017; Scholten & Penninx, 2016; Scholten 2013). Scholten (2012), explains that there are four different perspectives on how government levels interact, distinguishing between; centralist, multi-level, localist and decoupling.

The **centralist perspective** focuses on a top-down approach, in which local policy implementation depends on the formulated national policy (Scholten, 2013), and a convergence between levels would be expected. In other words, the local government levels in the centralist national-local governance configuration ensure that local policy exactly follows as is stipulated by the national government. Thus, cooperation is there yet, there is no much room for the local government to offer any autonomous or divergent perspective on a problem, issue, or policy.

The **multi-level approach** emphasizes a horizontal form of governance, where interaction to solve a common policy problem is present on all levels, thus in this perspective convergence between frames would also be more likely (Scholten, 2013). There is a significant focus on cooperation and collaboration in this national-local governance configuration. It involves the discussion and even could pertain to certain sacrifices which each government level should make in order to come to a shared mutual understanding of the problem and fitting solution or resulting policy implementation.

Then, **the localist perspective**, argues for a more bottom-up approach where the local governments are policy-makers themselves as well and have can have an influence on national policy making, thus in this approach both convergence is most likely between the national and local government level. Scholten and Penninx (2016) explain this configuration as, ‘policy competencies follow the principle of subsidiarity; that is, what can be done locally should be done locally’ (p. 94). In other words, in this typology it involves the creation of vertical connections of initiative of the lower government levels. One could also see this national-local governance typology the opposite as the centralist typology because it is more ‘bottom-up’ rather than ‘top-down’. This configuration does involve a ‘coupling’ or convergence between levels because it is the initiative of the local government which could drive a change or new policy on the national level (Scholten, 2013; Scholten & Penninx, 2016).

Finally, the **decoupling approach** argues that there is no relationship between government levels whatsoever and that policies between levels can even be inherently different or contrasting by nature of the problem definition (Scholten, 2013), implying a divergence in frames is most likely. Thus, one may see this governance configuration as the opposite of the multi-level typology, due to a lack in cooperation or collaboration. Additionally, Scholten (2013) explains that in light of intractable policy controversies, ‘Governments at different levels will not only prefer very different policy measures, but also have very different ideas about what the problem is in the first place’ (p. 219). Therefore, it may be likely that if a problem of such magnitude arises, especially concerning irregular migrants, the chance for governance decoupling or a divergence in governance framing might be more predictable.

Before turning to framing theory, it is relevant to underline what recent literature has configured about the national-local governance configurations, to understand which relation or typology may be more likely. As stipulated before, there has been an important local turn in policy making in recent decades (Alexander 2003a; Alexander 2003b; Scholten & Penninx, 2016). Scholars have argued that one of the reasons for this local turn, can be attributed to “pragmatic problem coping” on the lower government levels. Dekker et al. (2015), who investigated the local dimension of integration policies argues, argues that, ‘local governments are confronted with migrant integration issues more directly than national governments’ (p. 298). Additionally, another reason for this given by Dekker et al. (2015), is mostly because local governments are also closer in touch with (im)migrant organizations and therefore tend to be more ‘accommodative’.

A study by Poppelaar and Scholten (2008) also confirms this notion of local pragmatism resulting in a more decoupled national-local governance configuration. The article illustrates this is because of a multiplicity of reasons, one being the inherently different interest and perception of the problem, ‘A local government official responsible for managing a culturally diverse city may have a differing perception of policy problems than a national politician responsible for voicing the wishes of the electorate’ (p. 339). Another significant reason for the duality in problem perception and possible implementation of diverging policy solution is the ‘wickedness’ or ‘intractability’ of the policy problem which touches upon framing theory and therefore will be elaborated on in the section below.

In the Netherlands, research thus has mostly indicated that in the last couple of years, national and local governments have often diverged in the context of integration policies (Poppelaar & Scholten, 2008; Scholten, 2013; Scholten & Penninx, 2016). Scholten & Penninx (2016) who conducted a broad study on multi-level governance in relation to migration and integration claim that, ‘policies [in the Netherlands] are being developed at different government layers without structural connections’ (p. 105). This implies that there can be substantial conflicts or a result in policy contradictions between the national and local levels.

However, Scholten & Penninx (2016), also indicate that the multilevel governance of integration has differed significantly than to that of the multilevel governance of immigration (p. 98). Thus, as stipulated above the ‘local turn’ has been prominent for multilevel governance in integration policies. On the other hand, the multilevel governance of immigration policies pertains more to national-EU relations (Scholten & Penninx, 2016, p. 97). This difference is important to note due to the ‘gray area’ in which the policy for the reception facilities of irregular migrants lies. It does not necessarily pertain to immigration policies because many

people in this group find themselves *in* the country and facilities themselves for many years. Therefore, the municipalities are in contact with the migrants directly which makes it inherently different than an immigration issue. Yet, it also does not fully correspond with the multilevel governance of integration policies either. Scholten and Penninx (2016), do state that cities have also been important in the multilevel governance of immigration policies, because they face the “consequences”, ‘the human consequences of deportation and irregular migration are often most evident at the local level’ (p. 98). The analysis of this ‘gray’ area concerning the reception facilities of migrants with an irregular status, can further be explained through the understand of its multilevel governance relation. Thus, the type of national-local governance configuration will be more characteristic of the issue, will help clarify whether the multilevel governance of the reception facilities of migrants with an irregular status pertains more closely to the multilevel governance of integration or immigration.

2.2 Framing of an intractable policy controversy

Approaching public policy from a constructivist perspective has become a crucial aspect of policy analysis since, ‘the so-called discursive turn’ which became prominent in the 1990s (Verduijn, Meijerink & Leroy 2012; Dekker & Scholten, 2017). Framing refers to how knowledge is represented, and critically determines the type of lens through which a problem and following solution is formulated (Rein & Schon, 1993). Rein & Schon (1993) define stubborn policy controversies as, ‘enduring, relatively immune to resolution by reference to evidence, and seldom finally resolved’ (p. 145). Additionally, Poppelaar and Scholten (2008), explain integration has been a “wicked” policy problem on a national level, due to the discontinuity of national integration policies throughout the years, ‘Different policy frames have succeeded each other during the past 30 years, thereby illustrating the wicked or ill-structured nature of the policy problem’ (p. 340). This same discontinuity is characteristic for the national policies with regards to the reception facilities of irregular migrants. Therefore, considering the amount of conflict and controversy raised since the 1998 Matching Law (Staring, 2015; ACVZ, 2018) and the policy concerning the reception facilities of migrants with an irregular status, we could consider this issue to be an “intractable” policy controversy.

The responses by local governments are often characterized by the way they frame solutions to certain policy problems. According to Penninx and Garces-Mascarenas (2016), ‘... politically debated statements in and about policy documents contain the essential elements of policy frames’ (p. 21). They explain that the general assumptions and orientations about the

causes of the problem and its remedies, as well as the most commonly used phrases and constructions are crucial elements to be studied when investigating integration policies. The study by Penninx and Garces-Mascareñas focuses mostly on integration, yet as Scholten (2013) has emphasized before integration as well as the reception of irregular migrants (Spencer, 2017), are both intractable policy issues. Therefore, it is most beneficial to look at how the solutions to local policy problems in local policy documents have been framed as a response to the national policy changes with regards to the reception facilities of migrants with an irregular status in the Netherlands.

There are various “master-frames” in immigration related policy or ‘issues’, formulated in the policy agenda or in media frames namely, ‘human-interest frame, a threat frame, an economic frame, and a managerial frame’ (Dekker & Scholten, 2017, p. 205). A *human-interest* frame withholds that the immigrant’s livelihoods and their safety or general wellbeing is of utmost importance, often displaying the person in question as a victim, and using emotions or personal side of the story (d’Haenens & de Lange, 2001, p. 850). Furthermore, the *threat* frame uses more of a negative lens toward immigrants or the consequences of migration, displaying it as an inherently troublesome and unfavourable. Another critical frame, is the *economic frame* or *economic consequences frame* (d’Haenens & de Lange, 2001, p. 850). Thereby implying or questioning what the impact is on the economic climate, often used to make the issue relevant or salient to the public. The *managerialist* frame or rather the *responsibility* frame (d’Haenens & de Lange, 2001, p. 850), emphasizes where the responsibility lies to manage the group or problem in question. This managerial frame often places the responsibility of the issue or problem with either the government, an individual, organization, or other group. It is important to note, that these frames offer guidelines to the investigation or analysis of the local policy responses. This is mostly because other crucial frames may become apparent, which are not pertinent in previous research.

Another crucial characteristic of intractable policy controversies is that it may be troublesome to detect a salient frame, due to the controversial nature of the problem. Dekker & Scholten (2017) explain it is possible that frame ambiguity is present in the case of intractable policy controversies, because it can be a way out of a “deadlock” caused by the policy issue, which must be taken under consideration when analyzing the data.

2.3 Multilevel Governance and the Framing of an Intractable Policy Controversy

Combining framing theory and that of multilevel governance will be conducive in investigating the intractability of difficult policy issues such as integration, or in this case the reception

facilities of irregular migrants. This way by focusing on framing, small differences between levels may become more visible through wording and constructed language in policy documents (Rein & Schon, 1993; Verduijn et al., 2012; Penninx and Garces-mascareñas, 2016). As noted above local pragmatism and problem solving tends to imply that cities become more accommodative towards immigrants (Poppelaar & Scholten, 2008; Dekker et al., 2015; Scholten & Penninx, 2016). Therefore, I expect that the local governments will mostly frame the issue of providing reception facilities for irregular migrants in a *human-interest frame* (Dekker & Scholten, 2017; d’Haenens & de Lange, 2001). Whereas, the national government may frame the issue more in a *threat frame*, because “facilitating” the reception of illegal migration may result in more illegal migration and therefore be a significant threat to the host society. Mostly because the national government does not “face” the humanitarian issues on the lower government levels, I expect there to be a huge friction and divergence between the national and local government levels, I believe governance **decoupling** in *both* local governments would be most prevalent.

3. METHODOLOGY

Research Question: *How have local governments in the Netherlands responded to national policy changes regarding the reception facilities of irregular migrants and does this national-local governance differ between cities?*

3.1 Sub-questions

The following sub-questions have been formed to provide an answer to the main research question:

1. How has national policy regarding the reception facilities of migrants with an irregular status changed since the implementation of the Matching Law in 1998?

2. What have the local responses toward the main national policy changes been in Rotterdam and Amsterdam?
 - a. General Context: Rotterdam & Amsterdam
 - b. To what extent have the four master frames been used in the formulation of local policy responses in Amsterdam and Rotterdam? Are there ‘new’ frames used independent from the master frames?
3. What characteristic governance typologies have proliferated in Amsterdam and Rotterdam based on their local responses and framing?
4. How can the local policy responses in the two cities explain differences or similarities in governance typologies?
 - a. The turn of the century – New Restrictive National Law & Policies
 - b. National-local Restrictive Reception Facility Policies
 - c. Medically Vulnerable and the We Are Here Group Resulting in Decoupling Government Levels?
 - d. A New Era of Collaboration?
5. To what extent did the political composition of the local government influence the national-local governance configuration?

3.2 Research Design

The empirical analysis will involve a deductive qualitative comparative most similar case study design. The research will be deductive mostly due to the nature of the frame analysis and the open-ended format regarding the context and factors which could have influenced local government policies and formulations thereof. The four ‘master frames’ will be operationalized and used as a guiding tool to analyze the text, which is a predominately deductive manner of conducting research (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008).

First, this study will analyze the responses and solutions to this national policy problem by one city, in this case, Rotterdam. By tracing back how the governments have responded on a local level since the “Matchinglaw” (Koppelingswet) of 1998, one can determine how the local responses may have changed or developed since then (Pavone, 2017). Then by selecting a most similar case such as Amsterdam one can determine whether there are any similar or different explanatory factors in Rotterdam to explain the local responses in the two cities (Pavone, 2017). Amsterdam is most similar due to its relative size, composition of national and foreign born population, and due to the fact that it falls under the same national political sphere in the Netherlands as Rotterdam does. By comparing the two cities, one can determine

whether both governments have developed similar policies as a response to the national policy over time, or whether they have diverged substantially. Additionally, by incorporating a most similar case study design, one can examine how the national-local governance typology may (not) differ between two cities. Therefore, it is most fruitful to use a most similar case study design with a focus on Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

Case Study

The cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam have been chosen as case studies to determine the governance configuration and use of framing as a strategy between the local governments and national government concerning the reception of migrants with an irregular status. Within the scope of the selected cities as case studies, the implemented policies and frames of the national government of the Netherlands will be incorporated as a point of comparison in order to understand to what extent the national-local governance relation differs between the two cities. The cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam will be chosen to analyze framing on the local level due to their similarity in size and migrant population (Scholten, 2013; AlleCijfers 2017). However, their political composition is rather different, which may influence the local responses in both municipalities. Rotterdam has had a more centre/rightist coalition whereas Amsterdam's political composition has been more centre-leftist in the last two decades (van Ostaijen & Scholten, 2014).

Therefore, another expectation based on the case selection, might be that there will be a difference in responses due to the political composition of the local government parties in both municipalities. I believe there may be a difference in framing of local governance responses between Amsterdam and Rotterdam due to this composition. Where Rotterdam may show more convergence with the more restrictive national government policies, due to its centre/rightist political composition. In opposition to Amsterdam's centre leftists' composition, which may frame the situation in more 'human-interest' frames and implement slightly more 'liberal' policies. A more detailed description of the political compositions and local contexts is detailed in both case study chapters.

3.3 Operationalization

Multi-level Governance Configurations

Based on Scholten (2013) and Scholten and Penninx's (2016) explanation of the different national-local governance configurations, the following four differing type of relations are operationalized (table 1) below. This will help determine whether the type of governance

approach/typology can explain how different localities responded to national policies regarding reception of migrants with an irregular status:

Table 1: Operationalization Governance Typology and Framing Relation

National-Local Governance Typology	Characteristics	Framing
Centralist	Top-down approach; local government implements a strong national policy framework; national rules are followed.	Framing of problem/solution converges between national and local government; shared framing, but less (willing) signs of collaboration
Localist	Local solution for a local problem; what can be done locally should be done locally; horizontal policy exchange with other local governments; the creation of vertical connections on the initiative of 'lower' governments so there is a coupling between levels	Framing of problem/solution is mostly defined as a 'local solution for a local problem'; Convergence of national-local framing is possible due to the local initiative and solution of the problem connecting "bottom up"
Multi-levelled	Sharing of responsibility, less hierarchy, effective policy coordination	Framing of problem/solution converges between national and local government; shared framing, more signs of collaboration
Decoupled	Absence of policy coordination; contradictory policies and frames; Conflict between government levels; decrease of policy effectiveness; conflicting messages sent to target groups; no working relation between national and local	Framing of problem/solution diverges between national and local government; Conflicting policy (framing of) messages

Critical Frame Analysis

To analyze the different framing strategies used by the involved actors in both policy outcomes, this study builds on policy frame analysis (Rein & Schon, 1993; Roggeband & Vliegthart, 2007; Scholten, 2011). The method for detecting these frames will be based on Scholten's (2011) theoretical frame analysis on migrant integration policies in the Netherlands. Thus, the first step will be identifying the **problem or issues** in terms of 'concepts and metaphors' (Scholten, 2011, p. 37). The second step, to identify **who** the problem is in this issue, is already rather predictable, namely it involves the group of irregular migrants which 'need' or 'request' reception. However, it will be necessary to still establish how this group is framed. The choice of words toward this group, might be very telling due to how the local government categorizes. 'Illegals' for example is much more derogatory than 'migrant with an irregular status' or 'rejected asylum seeker' or even 'undocumented migrant', which are more neutral terms (Bacon, 2008). Then the third step is understanding the narrative behind the problem and protagonists involved, this focuses more on **what** causes the problem and why it illustrates causality in a story line. Furthermore, the last step is to analyze what the **solution or call for action** is based on the problem definition. This details how the problem should be resolved and what means should be used to do this (Roggeband & Vliegthart, 2007).

Additionally, the four master frames (*human-interest frame; economic; threat frame; managerialist/responsibility frame*) stipulated in the theoretical framework, will simultaneously also offer a guideline or lens through which to find certain themes and codes most prevalent in the policy documents (d'Haenens & de Lange, 2001; Dekker & Scholten, 2017). However due to the nature of this research, the analysis will not restrict itself to these four master frames, and will therefore also adopt a more open coding as stipulated above. This is mostly because other crucial frames may become apparent, which are not pertinent or have not been found in previous research.

Table 2: Operationalization "Master" Frames

"Master" Frame	Characteristics
<i>Human-Interest Frame</i>	Migrants as "victims"; Focusing on the livelihoods and safety of the migrant in question;

<i>Economic Frame</i>	Focus of frame lies on the economic impact that the group of irregular migrants may have on the current economy; Reception is also costly therefore this may become the focus arguing against reception facilities;
<i>Threat Frame</i>	Irregular migrants being a threat to the host society; This may be framed in public safety matters;
<i>Managerialist/Responsibility Frame</i>	Responsibility may be framed as either that of the local government, the national government, or the migrant with irregular status him or herself; Emphasis may be placed on that the situation needs to be managed effectively

3.4 Methods (Data Collection & Data Analysis)

Policy Documents

To understand what type of national policies have been implemented and how problems and solutions to the reception facilities for irregular migrants have been formulated, the data from national policy documents shall first be collected and analyzed. Following, the data from the local policy responses from 1998 onwards, will be collected from policy documents. The policy agenda will be analysed with policy documents in the digital records of the parliamentary archives, which on the national level entails the documents from meetings held in the second house of Parliament (allows for research back to 1995). How certain policy is formulated is crucial for the analysis because it may accurately illustrate or explain what types of frames are most commonly used in both local governments and the national government (Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016).

In a Boolean string search on the local level policy documents were researched in the Rotterdam and Amsterdam online government database, based on the following terms; rejected asylum seeker ('uitgeprocedeerd(e)'), illegals ('illegalen'), reception ('opvang'), Undocumented ('ongedocumenteerde'), and Bed Bath Bread ('Bed-Bad-Brood'). Rotterdam and Amsterdam both have similar online databases regarding the information that is shared to

the public. Therefore, the database gave access to multiple different types of policy documents including motions ('moties'), commitments ('toezeggingen') and questions from the different parties to the bench of mayors and aldermen.

The documents will be analyzed with qualitative analysis (Bowen, 2009). Codes according to the different elements of framing (**issue/diagnoses, roles/who, causality/narrative, solution/prognosis**) with certain questions (i.e. What is the problem. How is it presented and why?) shall be used as a guide to understand what type of frame of theme would be most applicable. The other four master frames will be detected through the characteristics offered in the operationalization, through key words, and signifies hinting toward the hypothesized frame. A coding program, 'Atlas.ti', will be used to accurately order and organize the frame analysis and codes.

Interviews

To understand the context, values, interests and positions of the different actors in this process, interviews with policy makers on the local level would be most fruitful. This will also help understand *why* certain frames may have been used and to what goal. Thus, it will be most beneficial to conduct these interviews before, during and after the policy document analysis, because they might lead to new insights with regards to new documents or insights which may be of importance for the analysis. For the interviews, I will use a semi-structured format (Boeije, 2009), since I want a thorough understanding of why certain frames were being used and the context in which these were formulated (context, values, interests, positions, etc.). Therefore, a list of topics will be formulated beforehand to guide the interview process in a more structured manner, yet also leave room for interpretation and new information by the interviewee. Additionally, the interviews with policymakers were planned through snowballing (Boeije, 2009; Bryman, 2012). This was beneficial because the contacts of different policymakers allowed for the possibility to plan new interviews with different policymakers from other municipalities. The choice for the interviewee or policymaker of each city was mostly based on who actually specialized on the issue within that local government. The relative availability of multiple policymakers who specialize of the topic of reception facilities for migrants with an irregular status within one municipality is rather limited. Therefore, the choice or selection criteria of policymaker was mostly based on which policymaker specialized on the issue within the local governments of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. As indicated before, the contact to the interviewed policymaker mostly went through referral. In the case of Rotterdam this was facilitated by university staff who simultaneously worked at the

municipality of Rotterdam. The policymaker in Rotterdam was able to bridge contact for the second interview in Amsterdam with the local policymaker who specialized on the issue of reception in that municipality.

Ethical Considerations, Reliability, Validity & Limitations

In this study one of the ethical considerations is the labeling of undocumented migrants as “illegals”. Labeling undocumented migrants as “illegal”, can be used to demonize these individuals (Bacon, 2008) because the wording and construction thereof could imply the term illegality is an inherent characteristic of the migrant in question. This study wishes to avoid such characterization by mostly using the label of undocumented and migrant with an irregular status because it has less negative connotations (Bacon, 2008). However, if the data refers to migrants in this way, i.e. either illegals, undocumented, etc., it will be pertinent for the frame analysis, to distinguish between these labels on the different levels.

Furthermore, another ethical consideration is the anonymity of the policy makers or advisors, who have been involved in the study or analysis. Due to the sensitivity of the contested issue, the policymakers want to maintain anonymity and therefore it is best to approach the interviews and interviewees with full transparency. By communicating and checking the content of the thesis and quotes with the policymakers throughout the process, this will most likely be achieved.

In the manual coding of frames, complete reliability can never be guaranteed. However, it can be argued that the coding of frame elements, which is the case in this study, is substantially more reliable than the coding of abstract frames (Matthes & Kohring, 2008, p. 276). Furthermore, by systematically outlining which frame elements will be used for analysis this research is accessible to anyone who questions the nature of its reliability.

Internal validity is often referred to as credibility and whether the nature of the analysis and interpretations of causal relations is conducted in an adequate manner (Bryman, 2012). By determining how framing strategies by different actors can have an influence on policy outcomes, this study has chosen to compare two different policy outcomes, to determine whether framing strategies differed. By outlining the context of the contested issue in the different time frames which led to the policy change, the study hopes to be able to identify which framing strategies were a cause for change, or whether the change was based on other contextual factors.

External validity refers to the generalizability of the research (Bryman, 2012). This study determines how the framing of a contested policy controversy and different government

levels can determine the eventual policy outcome and is mostly based on different theoretical frameworks proposed in the literature. Despite, the issue of reception of undocumented migrants and the crises about the reception facilities being a very current issue in the Netherlands, a case study incorporating the same approaches could be conducted in other contexts where a multi-level governance and an intractable policy issue is present.

One of the most important limitations of this study will be the inherent subjectivity of interpreting frames (Matthes & Kohring, 2008). By using theoretical frameworks to distinguish the different frame elements I hope to combat this, however full objectivity is inherently impossible and a slight bias due to the researcher's own constructed "lens" is inevitable.

4. CONTEXT: National Policy

How has national policy regarding the reception facilities of migrants with an irregular status changed since the implementation of the Matching Law in 1998?

1998/2000 – VreemdelingenWet & KoppelingsWet

The Matchinglaw (Koppelingswet) was implemented in 1998 and withholds that the (social) services a foreigner receives in the Netherlands, depends on the legality of his or her stay in the country. The law was meant to promote return to the country of origin among rejected asylum seekers or migrants with an irregular status. The national government did not fund or invest in any reception facilities and this had allegedly caused tension between the national and local governments since the implementation of the Matchinglaw (ACVZ, 2018). This had been causing tension because (some) local governments were subsidizing NGOs and churches to offer reception to rejected asylum seekers or undocumented migrants who ended up homeless².

² It will become clear in the in-depth comparative analysis of Rotterdam and Amsterdam whether this was also the case in these two municipalities. It is important to note this tension beforehand to understand why the administrative agreement was implemented in 2007.

This went against national policy because it did not ensure the return of the rejected asylum seeker or undocumented migrant.

2007/2008 – Ending Un-clarity Through New Restrictive National Policy?

Due to the tensions between national and local governments, the national government attempted to end this “un-clarity” (ACVZ, 2018) with a clear-cut and somewhat strict new administrative agreement (bestuursakkoord) in 2007 (Kamerstukken II 29 344 nr. 67, 2007/2008). The policy letter was a guideline to a more efficient and effective asylum procedure, thereby also promoting the return of rejected asylum seekers. The national government also frames the issue in light of wanting to keep the migrants off the streets, ‘We strive to prevent as much as possible that rejected asylum seekers with illegitimate residence end up on the street, with the socially undesirable consequences’ (Kamerstukken II 29 344 nr. 67, 2007/2008; p. 8). The national government intended to retain full responsibility over the ‘freedom restrictive’ reception facilities, because reception measures would be more beneficial if the foreign national was in the ‘government’s view’. Thereby, the goal was to ensure that all municipalities stopped funding and closed the reception facilities by 2009. In return, the national government would ensure that it would facilitate the return process for the migrant, back to the country of origin. This entails that the rejected asylum seeker would have to go to a ‘freedom restricting location’, where the duration of placement would be a maximum of twelve weeks (Kamerstukken II 29 344 nr. 67, 2007/2008; p. 14). The policy brief concludes by stating that this new agreement, due to the improved asylum procedure, the prevention of repeated applications, and the supplementary guidance on returning from a freedom restrictive location, substantially decreases the likelihood that rejected asylum seekers will end up on the streets. Additionally, it is also emphasized that interaction between the Repatriation and Departure Service (DT&V) and the municipalities about the “return files” will be increased.

Overall, this Administrative Agreement of 2007/2008, highlighted that the responsibility of the reception for the rejected asylum seeker would be mostly that of the national government. The national government claims, ‘In this way, the problems of municipalities surrounding the implementation of the immigration policy are met as much as possible. This also removes the reason for maintaining the municipal emergency shelter’ (Kamerstukken II 2007/2008, 29 344 nr. 67,; p. 10). Thereby, the solution is framed as it being more “effective” and should “solve” the problems for the municipalities which no longer need to face the issue of migrants ending up on the streets.

2014/2015 – Verdict of the European Committee for Social Rights (ECSR) and the (unofficial) Bed-Bath-Bread regulation

On the 1st of July in 2014, the ECSR stipulated that the Netherlands was *required* to offer reception to rejected asylum seekers and migrants with an irregular status. The municipalities, who were often still offering reception (ACVZ, 2018), were thereby able to use this verdict as grounds or justification, countering national policy in the process. In 2015, the council of municipalities (VNG), requested that the Minister of Safety and Justice offer a compensation for the money spent on these facilities. The Minister agreed to offer compensation for a maximum of two months, until a further compromise was reached because he stated that reception and return was in fact the state's responsibility (Kamerstukken II 2014/2015, 19 637 nr. 1994, p. 1). However, this compensation would only be given if the municipalities still ensured that return was the end goal of these reception facilities.

On the 22nd of April, 2015, the Bed-Bath-Bread regulation was proposed. This new regulation stipulated that the national government will now provide five different reception facilities in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht, and Eindhoven. The main argument for this solution aimed at preventing municipalities to take the responsibility for reception upon themselves in the future. Hereby, the national government once again claimed that if the municipalities take on this responsibility, there is a fear that they might lose track of the rejected asylum seeker or undocumented migrant. Thus, the solution appears to mostly be framed in light of being able to 'control' and oversee the situation, which might not be possible if the municipalities, independently of the state offer reception themselves. Additionally, the national government states that these improvements in the return policy, there is no necessity for local governments whatsoever to continue to offer reception or subsidize organizations who take on this responsibility (Kamerstukken II 2014/2015, 19 637 nr. 1994, p. 4). However, this Bed-Bath-Bread regulation was never stipulated in an official administrative agreement and due to many different discussions, the agreement fell through and was not officially implemented until 2017.

2017 – The official implementation of the Bed-Bath-Bread regulation

After many discussions and a cabinet which was one the verge of collapsing due to this specific issue (Jannink, 2017), a final agreement was reached in 2017, right before the publishing of the national coalition agreement in October. The previous five centralized reception facilities, regulated by the government, were changed to eight in total in the new coalition agreement (Regeerakkoord 2017-2021, p. 54). Additionally, it is specified that there

is no requirement for the rejected asylum seeker to cooperate on the return process in the first two weeks. However, if the migrant does not agree to work on their return after this time, the reception and support from the national government will be withheld. In this agreement, the national government also specifies that local governments will be allowed to offer reception the first couple of days, yet are then obligated to direct the migrant to one of the eight facilities run by the national government.

5. FINDINGS

What have the local responses toward the main national policy changes been in Rotterdam and Amsterdam?

5.1 Case A – Local Context Rotterdam

Rotterdam has a population of 634.660, and is the second largest city in the Netherlands after Amsterdam, where the non-national local population counts a little over half (50.3%) of all citizens (AlleCijfers Rotterdam, 2017). It is important to outline what type of integration policies Rotterdam has implemented and in the manner they have been framed, because this may explain or predict the local response concerning reception facilities for migrants with an irregular status in the city. Rotterdam is a ‘working-class city’ (van Ostaijen and Scholten, 2014, p. 684), and has been mostly led by labour parties. According to Dekker et al. (2015), the city had ‘accommodative policies toward migrant integration’ (p. 11), except for a short time period in the 1970s and then a major assimilationist turn in 2002, when the right wing party “Livable Rotterdam” gained the majority of the votes. Scholten (2013) explains this ‘integrationist’ time-period actually started and was ongoing since the end of the 1970s, marking only a brief liberal period in the 1990s where diversity was celebrated (Scholten, 2013,

p. 229). Therefore, there is some divergence in consensus regarding Rotterdam's historical institutionalism to integration measures. Yet, for this thesis, the time-period between 1998 until today is most important.

Focusing on that time-period (1998-2018), the assimilationist turn in 2002 was striking for Rotterdam's general stance toward migrants in the city. This assimilationist turn was also in congruence with a crucial event in Dutch politics, namely the killing of a Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, by a 'Dutch-Moroccan radical' (Scholten, 2013, p. 227). Livable Rotterdam gained the majority of votes in 2002, when it was led by the 'charismatic Pim Fortuyn' (van Ostaijen and Scholten, 2014, p. 685). The party is mostly known for its, 'popular resentment with diversity, in particular with Muslim immigrants' (Dekker et al., 2015). Livable Rotterdam has since remained to have a significant impact in the local municipality and its policies.

An important example of Livable Rotterdam's influence was a law it implemented in January 2005, named the Rotterdam-law or act, which stipulated that it allowed, 'municipal governments to exclude people who depend on social security and cannot financially support themselves, and who have not lived in the municipal region in the preceding 6 years, from the rental housing market in so-called problem areas' (Bolt and van Kempen, 2013, p. 203). Thus, this form of exclusion is used as a method to manage a certain problem or target area in the city. Due to Rotterdam's initiative and this local law, a new national policy was created giving cities the opportunity to implement a divergent housing allocation policy. In other words, this housing initiative, and influence from local to national government illustrates a characteristically localist governance configuration. Additionally, from this example it becomes evident that this populist party has had an influence on important municipal policies. Van Ostaijen and Scholten (2014) claim a tendency for 'othering' and juxtaposition of 'us and them' has been a rather consistent factor in Rotterdam's integration policies. Therefore, the centre/right political composition and path dependency (Hall & Taylor, 1996), of the municipality in Rotterdam may influence the local stance and policies regarding the reception facilities for migrants with an irregular status.

5.2 Case B - Local Context Amsterdam

Amsterdam counted 844.947 citizens in 2017, and with that is the largest city in the Netherlands. Furthermore, 52.5% of the city's population is of non-national background and it has been mostly led by broad or centre coalitions or leftist coalitions (Van Ostaijen & Scholten, 2014). The recent elections the party with the majority of votes was the GreenLeft party, in an overall leftist coalition (Couzy & Koops, 2018). According to Scholten (2013), Amsterdam

was most commonly known for its 'pluralist' or 'multicultural model of integration' (p. 226). Yet, from this multicultural approach it developed a more general and universalist model without focusing on any target groups (Vermeulen & Stotijn, 2010). An example of this almost more celebrative reaction to diversity can be found in a statement by one of the previous mayors Job Cohen who believed, 'immigrant religious organisations can play an important role in keeping the people of Amsterdam together' (p. 115). Another example is given by Dekker et al. (2015), who emphasize that cities like Amsterdam or London, have branded themselves explicitly as 'multicultural and cosmopolitan cities' (p. 4). In Amsterdam, this contributes to a city brand which announces the importance of tolerance in ethnic, cultural and religious diversity (Dekker et al., 2015, p. 4)

Similar to Rotterdam, Amsterdam also had a populist surge, which was mostly present in the 2002-2006 time-period, again coinciding with the killing of Theo van Gogh which occurred in the city of Amsterdam itself (Scholten, 2013; van Ostaijen & Scholten, 2014). Van Ostaijen and Scholten (2014) conclude that although clear characteristics of populism in Amsterdam are not actively present, policy documents still contain some small traces of populist elements such as 'categorization' and 'distinction', thereby actively othering immigrant groups in policy formulation and implementation (p. 695). Yet, overall the broad, centre and leftist's coalitions have shown a more universalist approach (Vermeulen & Stotijn, 2010), emphasizing and celebrating diversity, which might imply the city to be more lenient and less restrictive with regards to reception facilities for migrants with an irregular status.

5.3 Frames

To what extent have the four master frames been used in the formulation of local policy responses in Amsterdam and Rotterdam? Are there ‘new’ frames used independent from the master frames?

Humanitarian Interest Frame - indicators

Migrants as “victims”; Focusing on the livelihoods and safety of the migrant in question.

Rotterdam

The human-interest frame has been prevalent in Rotterdam’s case, employed frequently as a local response in four different periods (1998, 2007, 2011, 2017). In 1997, right before the official implementation of the Linkage Act in 1998 and later the AlienAct (Vreemdelingen Wet) in 2000, Apeldoorn a local municipality, claimed they would not let any rejected asylum seekers sleep on the streets. Soon after this many of the other bigger local municipalities agreed (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht). The reported problem was framed by the local governments in light of humanitarian reasons, where they state, ‘*As a local municipality one should never leave children out on the streets*’ (R1). Thereby, emphasizing the characteristics of the frame, namely migrants as “victims” and focusing on their livelihoods, especially that of children.

Then, the following important national policy change in 2007, also marked a resurgence of the human-interest frame in the policy documents. This was mostly originating from the GreenLeft party, where the migrants were not necessarily framed as victims, but that it was rather more the duty or the ‘humanitarian plight’ of a local government to take care of people especially rejected asylum seekers in despair (R3);

‘GreenLeft is worried about the new national policy which stipulates that municipalities will in the future no longer be allowed to offer reception, directly or indirectly, to rejected asylum seekers. We [the GreenLeft party] are of the opinion that the municipality will always have a duty of care toward people in need (R3)’

Thereby resonating with the human-interest frame indicators; ‘safety of the migrant’, as duty of the municipality of Rotterdam.

In the case of Rotterdam the humanitarian plight frame was also used many times to defend critical questions from the party Livable Rotterdam. This party critically questioned policies employed for the safety of this target group. In 2011, the humanitarian frame was used to defend the opening of a bed-bath-bread facility for the medically vulnerable. The municipality of Rotterdam supports the need for this bed-bath-bread facility due to humanitarian reasons and public safety (R4);

As long as return is not possible and there is no right to national reception, and medical care appears necessary, one needs to take into account the importance of public health and safety, and sober reception should be offered (R4).

This was confirmed by the local policymaker at the Rotterdam municipality who claimed this reception was essential to prevent a humanitarian crisis, and that; *‘this particular target group was extremely vulnerable due to health and medical issues’* (Appendix Interview Rotterdam). Thereby the indicators for the humanitarian frame, are focused on the (medical) livelihoods of the migrants in question, and the possible crises which could cause other humanitarian issues and problems concerning the public health of the city. The same was the case for 2017, whereby the municipality of Rotterdam defends why they offered reception in a hotel facility to certain families of migrants with an irregular status. The bench of mayor and aldermen emphasizes that in utmost emergencies it will do whatever it must, for the *‘wellbeing of the children’* (R12).

Thereby within the humanitarian frame focusing on the livelihoods of especially the children and their safety.

Amsterdam

In Amsterdam the human-interest frame was employed in five different time frames and local policy reactions to national policy (2000/2001, 2004, 2011, 2016, 2017). In 2000 and 2001, two years after the implementation of the Matching law, and right after the implementation of the Alien Law, the municipality of Amsterdam had many critical questions about the new national Dutch immigration law (A2, A3). In 2001 (A3), a long detailed reaction from the municipality of Amsterdam was published where their stance on the new Alien Law of 2000 became evidently clear. The local policymaker (Appendix Interview) confirmed that a budget were to be created of 800.000 euros to offer support to the group of migrants which enters a certain ‘gray zone’ due to the effects of the 2000 Alien Law (A3). The government of Amsterdam accentuates that it seems ‘logical’ and ‘evident’ that this fund should be in place, due to a *humanitarian crisis situation*, which may unfold if the migrants were be left to their own devices. In this case the human-interest frame, is employed to emphasize what may happen if this budget is not set up. The following quote portrays how the human-interest frame was employed to describe how the livelihoods or the jeopardized safety of the migrants are crucial, emphasized by the word ‘bottlenecks’;

‘This new policy will result in poignant humanitarian bottlenecks, and this municipality with other NGOs and organizations have hitherto unsuccessfully appealed to the government to offer reception to these target groups’ (A3).

In 2004, the council in the local municipality of Amsterdam disagreed with the bench of mayor and aldermen for not discussing or communicating about an agreement with the minister of justice and safety about this new upcoming policy in 2007 (A5). This agreement withheld that the municipalities were to reconsider or evaluate whether all rejected asylum seekers currently in the reception centers in Amsterdam are rightfully there. Thus, this year the human-interest frame was mostly used to emphasize the importance of the livelihoods of the migrants in question in these reception centers. In terms of framing in a human-interest perspective, the livelihoods of children and the *‘importance of having roots in Dutch society’* (A5) were indicators and characteristics of the human-interest frame used to argue against the restrictive upcoming policy in 2007.

In 2011, the mayor of Amsterdam at the time, Eberhard van der Laan, was in discussion with the minister of Immigration and Asylum (G.E.M Leers) regarding some local ‘issues’ with the national return policy of rejected asylum seekers or undocumented migrants (A6). Van der Laan proposed that people in illegality are afraid to go to the police for a statement when problems arise, which puts their ‘safety in jeopardy’ (A6). Additionally, he emphasizes medical care for this ‘vulnerable’ group should be increased.

Furthermore, 2016 marked a year where Amsterdam also used the human-interest frame to argue against the proposed national policy in 2015, regarding the centralized national reception facilities. It claims that, ‘*Amsterdam will never let people sleep on its streets*’ (A9), thereby mostly directing to the humanitarian duty or plight that the city of Amsterdam puts upon itself for the sake of the livelihoods of the migrants, and the otherwise possible fate of facing the streets by not having reception.

Finally, in 2017, the 2015 Alien Program was revised (Appendix Interview) and is now the only version publicly accessible (A10). It is a detailed guide stipulating all steps required to offer ‘durable solutions’ when possible, in order to ensure either ‘*voluntary return*’ or a pathway to legal stay in the Netherlands. Thereby is emphasized that the local government hopes the reception facilities will work in a ‘supportive’ manner to the medically vulnerable and ‘entices’ others to work on return. One requirement for reception in Amsterdam, is that the migrant in question agrees to ‘cooperate’ to find one of these two solutions. An exception to this rule are the medically vulnerable, who since 2016 receive 24 hour reception instead of 12 (A10). The entire document is framed mostly on *humanitarian grounds* with as primary goal that ‘people should not sleep on the streets’ and where counseling is offered to work on a ‘future perspective’ which facilitated and encouraged by the municipality of Amsterdam (A10). Therefore, the human-interest frame was employed in combination with a newly found ‘effective return as end-goal’ frame, which will be discussed later. This year there seems to be a compromise where there a mutual recognition should be attained where the migrant chooses to work on effective return as and counseling as a conditional step of sorts.

Economic Frame:

Focus of frame lies on the economic impact that the group of irregular migrants may have on the current economy; Reception is also costly therefore this may become the focus arguing against reception facilities;

Rotterdam

The Economic Frame was mostly present in the last two years in Rotterdam (2016 & 2017). This frame was only employed by the far-right party Liveable Rotterdam, to critically question the impact that the migrants with irregular status on the taxes of its citizens (R10).

In 2016 the party Liveable Rotterdam submitted questions to the bench of mayors and aldermen in which the party frames the national Beth-Bad-Bread regulation from 2015 as a ‘weak’ commitment and believe this reception will only lead to an increase in undocumented and ‘illegal’ migrants in the future. The party proposes a ‘Bed-Bath-Bread barometer’ to check on whether return of ‘illegal migrants’ is actually taking place, and to monitor the budget, thus this mostly coincides with the *economic threat* frame. Mostly because the party wants clarity for the citizens of Rotterdam on how much money is being spent where and why. The questions are concluded with the statement,

‘Do you agree with the party Liveable Rotterdam that the illegals from the six bed-bath-bread facilities should be returned to their country of origin instead of being on a holiday in Rotterdam on the expense of the local taxpayer?’ (R10)

The bench of the mayor and aldermen replies by stating that they will in fact publish a bi-annually report on the expenses to the Bed-Bath-Bread facilities. Thus, this frame coincides with both indicators where the costs of the reception facilities are emphasized by claiming this target group is on a ‘holiday on the expense of the taxpayer’, in combination with the ‘barometer’ which should be implemented to check up on the budget and therefore the monetary impact of the reception facilities in Rotterdam.

On the 18th of April 2017, the Liveable Rotterdam party questions why a certain group of ‘illegal’ migrants received reception in a hotel facility. The party claims that this group immediately contacts public caretakers of the municipality of Rotterdam right after their arrival at Schiphol because, ‘They haven’t organized their arrival properly’ (R11). This critical view and opinion then also employs an economic frame because the costs rather than the well-being or other characteristics of the migrant are repeatedly emphasized;

‘How many people from outside of the Netherlands have used this type of reception after arrival in the Netherlands, and what were there costs thereof?’ (R11)

As a response, the bench of the mayor and alderman shed light on the social support law of 2015 (Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning, 2015) and claim that if a person is in direct danger as for example a result of abuse the municipality of Rotterdam is obliged to offer reception, thus mostly being due to *humanitarian plight*.

Amsterdam

In Amsterdam the only time an economic frame was used was in 2016, when there was a tension between the local parties within the government itself with regards to the ‘We Are Here’ (WAH) group (A8). The We Are Here group are a number of migrants with irregular status, who set up tents in the backyard of the Protestant Church ‘Diaconie’ in September 2012 (Appendix Interview, De Zeeuw, 2017; Van Unen, 2018). Since then, a reception facility was created called the pilot RefugeHarbour, which offered guidance and counseling to the growing group (Evaluatie Vluchthaven Amsterdam, 2014). This pilot was then stopped by mayor Van der Laan, because many of the migrants in the group did not agree to return to their country of origin, despite the counseling and guidance offered by the municipality (Appendix Interview).

The use of the economic frame becomes evident when the VVD (People’s party for Freedom and Democracy), a right-winged liberal party, indicates it was ‘*worried*’ about the costs that have been amounted due to the WAH group. Furthermore, the VVD party does not understand why the municipality is facilitating this ‘hopeless situation’ which they call ‘undesirable for all involved parties’ (A8). Thereby also hinting that the costs might have a further impact on the government budget. The bench of mayor and aldermen agrees that this situation is in fact good for nobody, and has therefore implemented the (unsuccessful) pilot Refugeharbour (Appendix Interview), as previously specified. It is evident, however, that the bench and the local policymaker both agree that the circumstances of the WAH group in Amsterdam are difficult and but they are going to continue to search for a ‘durable solution’.

Threat Frame:

Irregular migrants being a threat to the host society; This may be framed in public safety matters;

The threat frame was not present in the policy documents or interviews. The only time reference to the frame indicator of public safety was made, was in what could be considered more of a human-interest frame, where the lack of medical help to the medically vulnerable could have possible consequences to public health and therefore public safety in Rotterdam

(R4). However, both Amsterdam and Rotterdam did not frame the issue as a direct threat to the host society

Managerialist/Responsibility Frame:

Responsibility may be framed as either that of the local government, the national government, or the migrant with irregular status him or herself; Emphasis may be placed on that the situation needs to be managed effectively. Within the managerial/responsibility frame a new indicator was found, namely a 'lack of transparency'. First, it appeared as if this indicator could comprise an autonomous frame. However, ultimately the lack of transparency is rather a characteristic of the managerial/responsibility frame because it indicates a lack of transparency or un-clarity regarding the tasks and responsibilities pertaining to each government level.

Rotterdam

The managerialist/responsibility frame was employed regularly in Rotterdam (1997, 2011-2012, 2017). Thereby, the main characteristics of the managerial frame found in the policy documents were mostly where the municipality emphasizes that the responsibility should be that of the national government.

This occurred in 1997 already, right before the implementation of the Matching Law in 1998. Rotterdam, together with 4 other big municipalities (Amsterdam, Apeldoorn, The Hague, and Utrecht) state that the local governments do not wish to take the juridical responsibility of having to 'return' rejected asylum seekers. The solution given by the national government to this problem is that they indeed recognize that it is responsibility of the state to provide reception for families with children. The national government would thereby provide reception for these families in the national reception facility in Ter Apel. Furthermore, the national government also agreed to take ownership of the financial responsibility (*managerial frame*) for return and reception of the rejected asylum seekers (R1). Two years later, a policy document (R2) indicates that the national government has in fact committed to its promises by not allowing women or children to sleep on the streets by facilitating reception in Ter Apel. Additionally, in this document the national government requests that the municipality of Rotterdam adheres to a step-by-step plan which would help facilitate return. Rotterdam thereby accepts the request to adhere to this plan if the national government agrees to a number of mandates, such as more clarity on the return facility in Ter Apel, a common consensus on the 'safe countries', and budget neutrality, implying that Rotterdam will not need to finance any

of these costs (R2). This mandate emphasizing more clarity, illustrates the previous lack of transparency or ambiguity surrounding the 1999 policy right after its implementation. Therefore, the main indicators for the managerial frame in the first years before and after the implementation of the Matching Law, were mostly pointed towards the un-clarity or lack of transparency and following responsibility of the reception for this group. Whereby, at that point in time, both parties agreed that it lay within the duties of that of the national government.

In 2011, this responsibility of the national government is confirmed once more when the reception costs for the medically vulnerable is brought into question by the municipality of Rotterdam. The municipality claimed the costs for this facility should be reimbursed by the national government because the return of this target group is their responsibility, yet it is unclear whether this money was in fact reimbursed (R4).

In the final year of 2017, after the implementation of the new policy with the centralized 8 LVV's, the local policymaker in Rotterdam indicated that the detailed plan and implementation specifications of the new national policy have yet to be completed (Appendix Interview). Subsequently, it is specified again that it is the '*responsibility of the national government*' to come with a detailed agreement which suits both the local and national government levels. Additionally, one of the requirements is that the financial responsibility will remain on the national level, in combination with a certain freedom that local municipalities maintain to design these LVVs in cooperation with local NGOs and other organizations.

Amsterdam

In Amsterdam, the managerial frame was also significantly employed in three important time frames or local government responses (2000, 2016, 2017). This is mainly evident in the last two years, when the dispute amongst the national government and Amsterdam was heightened due to the un-clarity of where the responsibility of reception within the 2015 planned policy actually lay.

In 2000, the local council of Amsterdam states that a dilemma is created between national and local governments because of the 'autonomous local duty to offer care and humanitarian aid', and thereby feels responsible to offer reception because the city of Amsterdam faces the issues in its municipality hinting toward a *local pragmatism* frame. The local government claims,

‘The Alien policy is not responsibility of the lower administrative bodies [local governments], however the municipality of Amsterdam believes they have a role to fill and will take a central place in the social problems associated with this new policy’ (A3).

Mostly framed due to *humanitarian grounds* and ‘crisis situations’ which the local government will be confronted with, thus, the city continuously emphasizes it feels responsible for this ‘dilemma’. Additionally, after the Matching Law and Alien Law in 2000, there was a significant focus in the policy documents on the unclarity of the new national policy regarding the responsibilities and tasks of the local government. As a reaction on this mandate from the national government, Amsterdam initially in 2000 indicated that it would wait until the new implementation of the edited Alien Law in the summer of 2000 (A2), mostly because details about the ‘step-by-step plan’ were still rather unclear. This is an evident example of a lack of transparency or clarity indicator for who was responsible in this situation.

Towards the end of 2016, Amsterdam and its local council decided to be more lenient with regards to its reception policy for migrants with an irregular status. The new motion in 2016 specified that the medically vulnerable who already stayed longer than the given time allowed in the Bed-Bath-Bread facility, were allowed to stay 24 hours instead of 12 (A7). Additionally, the local council emphasizes that this ‘problem’ should be the responsibility of the national government but it evades this responsibility, that therefore *‘the merciful city of Amsterdam will take this task upon themselves’* (A7). Two months later a new motion is published (A9), which highlights that *‘evidently the national Bed-Bath-Bread administrative agreement of 2015 has failed’*. This motion explains that the national government expects that the municipalities close their reception facilities and will not financially compensate the localities. It emphasizes that the administrative agreement offer reception only if the migrants agrees to work on his or her return is not effective and thereby, *‘does not benefit a sustainable solution for rejected asylum seekers’* (A9). Thereby this policy document is concluded by stipulating that the municipality of Amsterdam;

‘...will continue its reception for rejected asylum seekers and this should be a clear sign to the national government that Amsterdam will never let people sleep on its streets’ (A9).

Whereby this responsibility frame is incorporated in combination with a human-interest frame, that illustrates the duty or responsibility the city of Amsterdam feels towards the group of migrants with irregular status.

In 2017, the revised Alien Program of 2015 was published. This document emphasizes that Amsterdam will remain to offer local reception long as the national government does not take on its *own responsibility*. Thus, the managerial frame is mostly used as a manner by the municipality of Amsterdam to defend why they take responsibility, namely in light of humanitarian reasons, and the lack of responsibility that the national government has taken regarding the issue of reception.

‘Effective return as end-goal’ frame

Indicators: the importance of the return of the migrant with irregular status, if there really is no possibility to stay; related to ensuring the return process does not take too long, thereby minimizing waiting time for the migrant; emphasizing the importance of making the return process efficient, quick, coordinated, etc.

Rotterdam

The effective return as end-goal, or rather the effectiveness of return was a newly found significant frame in Rotterdam’s response to national policy. It was mostly used in Rotterdam to defend restrictive national policy by emphasizing that the efficiency of the return process is incredibly important to ensure a quick and well-managed return trajectory. Additionally, the far-right party has used the frame to critique why there were a significant amount of migrants with irregular status in the reception facilities in Rotterdam. Thereby arguing that the national policy goal of effective return had not been realized because many migrants were left ‘lingering’ in the reception facilities (R10). In Rotterdam this frame was found significant in three different periods (2007, 2011, 2016).

In 2007 the national government implemented a new strict administrative agreement, which aimed to end all local reception facilities, so that it could effectively manage a ‘freedom restrictive’ reception facility and thereby maintain a clear overview of who came in and who came out. The national government framed this policy in light of its *effectiveness of return* and also emphasized that this effectiveness of the national state run reception facility would decrease the likelihood of rejected asylum seekers ending on the streets in cities. The policymaker at the Rotterdam municipality confirmed that local reception facilities were not present at the time. It did refer to national policy, wherein the council of municipalities (VNG) will consult and cooperate with the national government to maximize the *effectiveness of return policy*, on behalf of the municipality of Rotterdam. Thus, in 2007 it is argued by both the

national government and the municipality of Rotterdam, that centralized freedom restrictive facilities are most effective to ensure the return of the migrant with irregular status. Thereby the indicators of efficiency and a coordination in the return process were mostly emphasized.

In 2011, the municipality of Rotterdam opens a ‘sober’ bed-bath-bread facility in Rotterdam for rejected asylum seekers with medical problems. It is argued that to ensure the effective and safe return of the medically vulnerable, it is of importance that this medical reception facility would be opened, ‘*The goal remains to ensure effective return of the rejected asylum seeker to the country of origin*’ (R4).

In 2016, Livable Rotterdam employs the effective return frame in a rather critical manner toward the bench of mayor and aldermen to critique that the Pauluskerk, a church offering reception to migrants with irregular status. Liveable Rotterdam claims that the Pauluskerk has not helped with the *effective return* of any of the ‘illegal’ migrants. The questions are concluded with the statement, ‘*Do you agree with the party Liveable Rotterdam that the illegals from the six bed-bath-bread facilities should be returned to their country of origin instead of being on a holiday in Rotterdam on the expense of the local taxpayer*’ (R10). The bench of the mayor and aldermen replies by stating that they will in fact publish a bi-annually report on the expenses to the Bed-Bath-Bread facilities. In terms of the budget the bench claims to have spent 1.6 million euros of which 665.144 was refunded by the national government in light of the European verdict of the ECSR and the national jurisprudence end 2014 (R10). Additionally, they counter LR by stating that they do believe that the Pauluskerk has ensured *effective return* of a number of undocumented migrants and rejected asylum seekers.

Amsterdam

The effectiveness of return or return as end-goal frame was also found in Amsterdam, in two different time frames and policy responses (2007, 2017). It is used mostly by the bench of mayor and aldermen to defend the implementation of national policy, thereby emphasizing that the national policy and the centralized reception facilities ensure the efficiency of return, whereby the national government maintains a good oversight.

In 2004, the council in the local municipality of Amsterdam was upset with the bench of mayor and aldermen for not discussing or communicating about an agreement with the minister of justice and safety about this new upcoming policy in 2007 (A5). This agreement withheld that the municipalities were to reconsider or evaluate whether all rejected asylum seekers currently in the reception centers in Amsterdam are rightfully there. The idea is that of

the 29.000 rejected asylum seekers at that time, around 800 should be sent to the “return facilities” to facilitate and make *effective return* more realistic. The only group exempt from the re-evaluation are the medically vulnerable, which will still be allowed reception on *humanitarian grounds*. The local council requests the bench of mayor and aldermen to counter this restrictive policy, emphasizing the fact that many people in this target group, including children, have their roots in Dutch society and the VNG together with the 4 big municipalities (Utrecht, Rotterdam, The Hague, Amsterdam), should agree to a more lenient agreement (A4). This matter and agreement is defended by the bench of mayor and aldermen because they emphasize the return centers will increase the likelihood for *effective return* with proper guidance and professional help. Additionally, the bench claims that the likelihood for people to end up on the streets is much higher for the rejected asylum seekers who have been in the local reception facilities for a very long time. Therefore, the return centers would offer more specific and directed guidance for this target group, and will decrease the likelihood of ending on the streets.

In 2017, the new revised Alien Program emphasized that the local government hopes the reception facilities will work in a ‘supportive’ manner to the medically vulnerable and ‘entices’ others to work on return (A10). One requirement for reception in Amsterdam, is that the migrant in question agrees to ‘cooperate’ to find one of these two solutions. An exception to this rule are the medically vulnerable, who since 2016 receive 24 hour reception instead of 12 (A10). The entire document is framed mostly on *humanitarian grounds* with as primary goal that ‘people should not sleep on the streets’ and where counseling is offered to work on a ‘future perspective’ which facilitated and encouraged by the municipality of Amsterdam (A10). Therefore, in this case the effectiveness of return is mostly incorporated in combination with the humanitarian frame where is emphasized that the city of Amsterdam will offer reception, but solely if there are clear indications that the migrant is willing to work on a solution, being either return or naturalization in the Netherlands.

Local-pragmatism frame – Indicators;

The local pragmatism frame can be recognized by indicators; having to ‘deal’ with the effects of national policy on the local level; emphasizing that it is the duty of local governments to take care of the local problems arising in the cities. It became evident that the local pragmatism frame was an autonomous frame because it formed the essence of an argument, and thereby was not only a characteristic national-local governance relation but was also used to defend

or criticize national policy for example. It formed the essence of an autonomous frame because it's indicators are mostly related to solving a problem found on the streets. Thereby pragmatically trying to address an issue, of which someone could claim it is part of the 'managerial' frame, however I believe in this case the indicators differ in which the focus lies more toward 'pragmatic problem solving' rather than the dispute about the responsibility of the pertaining government.

Rotterdam

2017

In Rotterdam the local pragmatism frame was not used very frequently. Solely once in 2017, as a reaction from the local policymaker in Rotterdam. The local policymaker claims that Dutch cities were faced with the effects or results of restrictive national policies on the local level,

'A frequently heard statement from the national government level and from the service of return and departure (DT&V) is that if someone wants to return to their country of origin then they can return. I know that there are situations where this is not the case, and the local governments deal with these exceptions' (Appendix Interview).

Hereby the policymaker from Rotterdam emphasize the effects of Dutch national policy and that these are really felt on the local levels. It is framed it in a manner where having to 'deal' with what is unsolved on a national level, and therefore becomes something the local government levels need to address.

Amsterdam

In Amsterdam the local-pragmatism frame was used in 4 different instances (2004, 2016, 2017). The local-pragmatism frame appears to be used more frequently in recent years.

In 2004, in a large document where questions are answered from council member Ms Kalt with regards to the agreement between 4 big municipalities (Utrecht, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague) and minister Verdonk, the following is stated by the four local governments;

'The practical situation and evidence will have to show whether the envisaged approach to assisted return will lead to the effective return of asylum seekers who have exhausted all legal remedies' (A4).

Thus, the emphasis here is laid upon the pragmatic manner and actual situation will have to show whether the policy agreement will in actual fact ensure the return of the undocumented migrants. Thereby laying the focus on the local, practical and actual situation and illuminating the discrepancy between policy and what local governments practically deal with on a day to day basis.

Towards the end of 2016, Amsterdam and its local council decided to be more lenient with regards to its reception policy for migrants with an irregular status. The new motion in 2016 specified that the medically vulnerable who already stayed longer than the given time allowed in the Bed-Bath-Bread facility, were allowed to stay 24 hours instead of 12 (A7). Additionally, the local council emphasizes that this ‘problem’ should be the *responsibility of the national government* but it evades this responsibility, that therefore ‘the merciful city of Amsterdam will take this task upon themselves’ (A7). This sentence highlighting that it is the ‘role and task of the *merciful* city of Amsterdam’ to offer reception to the undocumented migrants emphasizes how deeply the city believes that they are the ones responsible now to deal with this problem pragmatically.

Two months later a new motion is published (A9), which highlights that ‘evidently the national Bed-Bath-Bread administrative agreement of 2015 has *failed*’. This motion explains that the national government expects that the municipalities close their reception facilities and will not financially compensate the localities. The municipality of Amsterdam emphasizes that ‘*the national policy agreement to force people to work on his or her return in order to stay in a reception facility, does not benefit a sustainable solution for rejected asylum seekers*’ (A9). Thereby this policy document is concluded by stipulating that the municipality of Amsterdam ‘will continue its reception for rejected asylum seekers and this should be a clear sign to the national government that Amsterdam will never let people sleep on its streets’ (A9). Therefore, repeatedly framing the issue on the grounds of *local pragmatism* and a *humanitarian plight*. Hereby, again an indicator becomes clear stating the problem; ‘people sleeping on its streets’, and Amsterdam thereby taking ownership to address this problem itself.

In 2017, in the developed ‘Alien Policy Program’ (A10) the following is stated;

‘In the case that the administrative agreement does not seem to be implemented in the near future, and as long as the government does not take its responsibility, Amsterdam wants to prevent people from forcibly being thrown out on the streets’ (A10).

Thereby the first part of this sentence directs to a managerial frame due to the ‘responsibility’ indicator. The second part of this frame refers to the local-pragmatism frame, mostly because the emphasis is on Amsterdam wanting to ‘prevent’ this problem from occurring in its government and within its city. It wants to deal with the situation that these migrants will be faced with if national policy is implemented, therefore I believe it highlights the ‘problem-solving’ aspect of the local-pragmatism frame.

5.4 Governance Typologies

What characteristic national-local governance typologies have proliferated in Rotterdam and Amsterdam based on their local responses and framing?

Centralist Governance Typology - indicators

The characteristics of the centralist governance typology are: top-down approach; local government implements a strong national policy framework; national rules are followed. And the pertaining frames are; Framing of problem/solution converges between national and local government; shared framing, but less (willing) signs of collaboration

Rotterdam

In Rotterdam there were two main instances in which the centralist policy frame became evident (2007, 2013).

In 2007, (R3) the local government of Rotterdam frames the problem and solution to a similar manner as the national government, which leads to the conclusion that a **centralist or multileveled** national-local governance typology was prevalent. The following is stated as a response to a Member of the Greenleft party (J.J. Verwijs);

‘The municipality of Rotterdam does not know of any reception facilities for undocumented migrants and will not implement these. The agreement between the Ministry of Justice and the VNG will be followed when the further policy decisions surrounding undocumented migrants will be discussed’ (R3).

It shows indicators of either a centralist frame because the wording of ‘the agreement will be followed’ directs toward an agreement which needs to be adhered to top-down. Additionally,

this policy statement (R3) clearly counters Rotterdam's previous interests in 1997/1998 to always keep all rejected asylum seekers, including single women or men without families, off the streets, which is another reason why this shows signs of a centralist policy period.

In 2013, (R5) there is another clear indication that national policy has been strictly adhered to by the municipality of Rotterdam, when a previously opened reception centre has closed its doors. The party of Leefbaar Rotterdam had questioned the municipality of Rotterdam;

'With great amazement and indignation, Liveable Rotterdam has taken note of this [the reception of undocumented migrants] as the government has forbidden the reception of illegal immigrants by the municipalities' (R5).

As a response the municipality states that the only subsidized reception facility the NAS night reception facility (R4) was closed on the 31st of august in 2011. Thereby implementing national policy and showing identical frames to the national government, that the local governments would and should not offer reception to undocumented migrants.

Amsterdam

Amsterdam showed less frequent indicators of a centralist governance configuration. Namely only once in 2004, when Ms. Kalt from Greenleft party in Amsterdam questioned whether the bench of mayors and aldermen should have agreed with the national government and three other municipalities on an upcoming policy in 2007 (A5), which asked all municipalities to re-evaluate all current rejected asylum seekers in reception centres.

'Does the bench of mayor and aldermen agree that this subject, and the position taken by the municipality of Amsterdam should have been discussed in the council meeting beforehand? If so, why did this not happen?' (A4).

The document continuously repeats that Amsterdam should not comply with this 'sweeping action', and if it does it should only send rejected asylum seekers with a criminal record to these return centers. Thereby Ms. Kalt's reaction is characteristic of a decoupling governance typology. However, the stance of the bench of mayor and aldermen in Amsterdam, initially appears to be a multilevel configuration mostly because they highlight they have agreed with the minister of Justice and Peace (Verdonk), to evaluate development on this agreement and to

‘discuss arising bottlenecks with mutual agreed solutions’ (A4). However, considering the municipalities previous stance in this area and subject, and the internal friction in the local council regarding this topic, the national-local configuration may be characterized more as a centralist typology, because the agreement was an initiative top-down from the national government, which was (with some resistance, both within the local municipality of Amsterdam and toward the national government) agreed to by the local government of Amsterdam.

Localist Governance Typology - indicators

*Framing of problem/solution is mostly defined as a ‘local solution for a local problem’;
Convergence of national-local framing is possible due to the local initiative and solution of the problem connecting “bottom up”*

Rotterdam

In Rotterdam there was only one instance where the localist governance typology proliferated clearly. In 1997 (R1), bigger local municipalities agreed they would not let anyone sleep on the streets in the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht). Thus, there is a short period of about one year, where resistance is shown from the municipality of Rotterdam with relation to the reception of undocumented migrants. This could be categorized as a localist governance typology, because it sparked bottom-up change on a national level in 1999 when a policy document indicates that the national government has in fact committed to its promises to not allowing women or children to sleep on the streets by facilitating reception in Ter Apel. Additionally, in this document the national government requests that the municipality of Rotterdam adheres to a step-by-step plan which would help facilitate return. Rotterdam thereby accepts the request to adhere to this plan if the national government agrees to a number of mandates. These indicators which briefly resembled a localist governance configuration by multiple governments then resulted in a multilevel typology, due to clear signs of cooperation and mandates which were stipulated and followed by the national government as well (R1, R2). More on this multilevel typology in the next section.

Amsterdam

The same localist period seen in the 1997 objection from the 4 municipalities as stipulated above in the Rotterdam case, could also adhere to Amsterdam however no viable documents stating the same could prove this.

In 2012 the municipality of Amsterdam showed clear signs of a localist governance typology. A critical event, namely when a group of undocumented migrants set up tents in the backyard of the Protestant Church ‘Diaconie’ (Appendix Interview, De Zeeuw, 2017; Van Unen, 2018), showed indicators of a localist governance configuration. According to the policymaker in Amsterdam, this event was the *only* moment in which the national government showed willingness to collaborate and offer reception to the group of around 5-10 undocumented migrants (Appendix Interview). A reception facility was created with funding of the national government called the pilot RefugeHarbour, which offered guidance and counseling to the growing group (Evaluatie Vluchthaven Amsterdam, 2014). I believe this is a localist governance configuration rather than a multileveled one, because the local policymaker in Amsterdam emphasized the initiative to, ‘do more for the undocumented migrants’ which came from one of the GreenLeft party members in Amsterdam. Interestingly this event did not gain widespread media attention until the previous two years (De Zeeuw, 2017; Krakergroep We Are Here in 2012 Ook Actief: ‘Nu Meer Weerstand, 2018; Van Unen, 2018).

This is mostly because the group grew from a small amount to almost two-hundred people in the last two years (Appendix Interview). A reception facility was created called the pilot RefugeHarbour, which offered guidance and counseling to the growing group (Evaluatie Vluchthaven Amsterdam, 2014). This pilot was then stopped by mayor Van der Laan, because many of the migrants in the group did not agree to return to their country of origin, despite the counseling and guidance offered by the municipality (Appendix Interview). This again shows indicators of a localist governance typology. The local solution wasn’t working to the local problem because the increase in return did not occur; so the local solution was also brought to a halt by the mayor himself. However, this localist pilot program were the grounds for the ‘Alien Program’ which then was implemented in 2015, and specified that Amsterdam would actively provide reception and invest more in counseling for the group of migrants with irregular status.

Multilevel Governance Typology - *indicators*

Sharing of responsibility, less hierarchy, effective policy coordination. Framing of problem/solution converges between national and local government; shared framing, more signs of collaboration

Rotterdam

In Rotterdam there were two main periods of multi-level governance (1997, 2017). After an initial protest to national policy in 1997, the municipality of Rotterdam slowly started to show more indicators of cooperation, and shared framing, thereby presenting more signs of a multilevel governance typology (R1). The local government thereby accepts the request to adhere to this plan if the national government agrees to a number of mandates, such as more clarity on the return facility in Ter Apel, a common consensus on the ‘safe countries’, and budget neutrality, implying that Rotterdam will not need to finance any of these costs (R2). Thus 1999 shows signs of negotiation between the national government and municipality of Rotterdam. Indicators which briefly resembled a localist governance configuration by multiple governments in 1997 then resulted in a multilevel typology, due to clear signs of cooperation and coordination between both levels (R1, R2).

In 2017, the local policymaker in Rotterdam (Appendix Interview) emphasizes that the new coalition agreement of 2017 was the official stipulation in which compliance and convergence between the municipality and the national government was promised through the creation of the national LVV’s in collaboration with all local governments (Lokale Vreemdelingen Voorzieningen). The policymaker did specify that the municipalities have yet to come to established agreements about the details of these LVVs. However, it was indicated that the policymaker believes cooperation is bound to occur and is extremely hopeful about the future of the reception facilities. Framing in 2017 appears to have converged where both governance levels emphasize the will and ‘necessity for cooperation’, characteristic of multilevel governance. Additionally, it is specified again it is the ‘*responsibility of the national government*’ to come with a detailed agreement which suits both the local and national government levels. One of the requirements is that the financial responsibility will remain on the national level, in combination with a certain freedom that local municipalities maintain to design these LVVs in cooperation with local NGOs and other organizations. Yet, what is also emphasized by the policymaker is that Liveable Rotterdam will remain to have a significant influence on the design and implementation of this policy, because they have the majority of seats on the local council. Therefore, this may have a significant influence on the final design of the reception facilities or new LVVs in Rotterdam.

Amsterdam

In 2004 there appeared to be indicators of multi-level governance, between the bench of mayor and aldermen mostly because they highlight they have agreed with the minister of Justice and Peace (Verdonk), to evaluate development on this agreement and to *'discuss arising bottlenecks with mutual agreed solutions'* (A4). However, considering the municipalities' previous stance in this area and subject, and the internal friction in the local council regarding this topic, the national-local configuration may be characterized more between a centralist and multi-levelled national-local governance relation.

Decoupled Governance Typology - indicators

Absence of policy coordination; contradictory policies and frames; Conflict between government levels; decrease of policy effectiveness; conflicting messages sent to target groups; no working relation between national and local. Framing of problem/solution diverges between national and local government; Conflicting policy (framing of) messages

Rotterdam

The decoupled governance configuration was detected in multiple different time periods in the municipality of Rotterdam (2011, 2014, 2016).

In 2011 (R4) a medical facility for migrants with irregular status was opened in the city which was financed by the local government, and thereby directly goes against national policy. This break from national policy in 2011, is in line with the ACVZ report from 2018, which states that some municipalities started opening reception facilities again in 2010 due to *humanitarian reasons*, municipal responsibility and public health (p. 6). Additionally, the municipality claimed the costs for this facility should be reimbursed by the national government because the return of this target group is their *responsibility*, yet it is unclear whether this money was in fact reimbursed (R4). Therefore, the years of 2011-2012 mark a short decoupled period. Yet, a policy document two years later (R5), indicates that this facility for the municipality had closed its doors again, which might be due to the strictly top-down centralized national-local relation prevalent in these years.

There was a big turn in 2014 (R6), when the ECSR mandated that the Netherlands was required to offer reception to rejected asylum seekers or migrants with an irregular status. Due to this verdict from the European Commission, the Central Appeals Tribunal (CRvB) in the

Netherlands found that, *'Municipalities were required to provide overnight shelter with a bed, shower, evening meal and breakfast, or at any rate, up to two months after the resolution adopted by the Committee of Ministers'* (European Social Charter, 2016, p. 4). Interestingly, the municipalities were mandated directly from the CRvB, that they would have to provide these reception facilities for at least two months until the national government came with an overarching solution. According to the local policymaker in Rotterdam, there were no prerequisites to enter the reception facilities at the time the CRvB mandated that the municipalities open these centres. The policymaker in Rotterdam emphasized that most of the developments in light of the Bed-Bath-Bread facilities were due to the jurisprudence and did not directly come from Rotterdam's own initiative as a municipality (Appendix 1 Interview). Therefore, it was open to all rejected asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. It was stated that this was the case for a year, until 2015, when the jurisdiction (CRvB), claimed that the local governments allowed to set limits and requirements to the people who applied for reception (Appendix 1 Interview). The Rotterdam municipality indicated relief that there were in fact requirements, otherwise the reception facilities may become 'congested' and 'colossal' (Appendix interview 1). The policymaker claims,

'We see that many who did not require reception did in fact make use of the reception facilities, despite having a strong social network to fall back on. Many applicants had been living in illegality in the Netherlands for years, but had been self-sufficient, so did not adhere to this "vulnerability" required for reception' (Appendix Interview 1).

Despite Rotterdam's relative relief with the new (unofficial) national policy in 2015, which mandated some entry requirements to the reception to ensure it would not become 'congested', the local policymaker emphasized that they did not agree with the 2015 national stipulation to close ALL local reception facilities and redirect all migrants with an irregular status to the national facilities (LVV's). Thus, it is difficult to inherently classify this period as distinctly 'decoupled' in the municipality of Rotterdam, because they continue to offer reception, which goes against the national policy however there are clear indications that offering reception without any entry requirements was met with resistance. Additionally, the party Leefbaar Rotterdam showed clear signs that it was very much against the local reception facilities the municipality of Rotterdam was offering,

'If reception remains to be offered to undocumented migrants and there is no priority or need for them to leave the Netherlands, this will lead to even more migrants coming to Rotterdam. If it is up to Leefbaar Rotterdam there should be no Bed, Bath and Bread, but a ticket back home'. (R7)

However, I believe that the municipality of Rotterdam emphasized that there was a lack of coordination and cooperation between the national and local governments at this stage, and they still offered local reception which went against national policy and is therefore characteristic of a **decoupled** national-local governance configuration.

Amsterdam

The municipality of Amsterdam showed many different occasions where the decoupled governance configuration proliferated based on the before mentioned indicators (2000, 2014/2015, 2016, 2017). This first became visible at the turn of the century after the implementation of the Matching law and Alien Law.

Two years after the implementation of the Matching law, and right after the implementation of the Alien Law, the municipality of Amsterdam had many critical questions about the new national Dutch immigration law (A1). The national government requests compliance by the municipality of Amsterdam, in light of effective return, to follow a step by step plan to effectively carry out the new policy. This implies to immediately halt the ROA- (Regeling Opvang Asielzoekers) reception facilities, which were part of the old regulation. The national government emphasizes that if Amsterdam does not comply with this regulation, and maintains to offer reception, this will 'encourage' and 'increase the likelihood for illegal migration' (A1). Additionally, the national government emphasizes that if the migrant refuses to cooperate 'forced return' may be necessary, and that in all cases it is mandatory to stop local reception to facilitate 'effective return', otherwise 'national return policy will come under pressure' (A1). Overall, the national government emphasizes the utmost importance of the step-by-step plan to ensure effective return and thereby decrease 'illegality' in the Netherlands. As a reaction on this mandate from the national government, Amsterdam initially in 2000 indicated that it would wait until the new implementation of the edited Alien Law in the summer of 2000 (A2). Mostly because details about the 'step-by-step plan' were still rather unclear. In 2001 (A3), a long detailed reaction from the municipality of Amsterdam was published where their stance on the new Alien Law of 2000 became evidently clear. The first point, confirmed by the local policymaker (Appendix Interview), is the beforementioned budget of 800.000 euros

created to offer support to migrants in this ‘gray zone’ and that this policy was a ‘direct response against this national policy’ (Appendix Interview). The municipality specifies that this target group consists of mostly ‘the Dublin claimants’ and ‘applicants for a new asylum permit’ and ‘rejected asylum seekers of which their country does not cooperate for return’ (A3). Furthermore, it is highlighted that this budget will be joint with the previous 1998 Funds created short after the Matching Law, in order to support this specific group and the help fund the organizations invested in the cause. Thereby the decoupling of policy, and the created budget is mostly defended in light of humanitarian reasons by the municipality of Amsterdam (A2, A3).

One could conclude that 1998 due to the construction of the Fund for this target group, and subsequently in 2000 and 2001, Amsterdam’s policy documents and specifically the frames thereof, are characteristic of a decoupling governance configuration. This governance decoupling also becomes evident out of the managerialist and human-interest frame, which where used to argue *why* the local municipality of Amsterdam is countering national policy in light of ‘humanitarian bottlenecks’ and a ‘local responsibility’. Interestingly, it does not become evident out of the policy documents if Amsterdam actually offered reception, and according to the local policymaker Amsterdam only really started offering reception from its own initiative in 2014 (Appendix Interview). Thus, the framing in this situation is more characteristic of decoupling than the actual policy implementation thereof.

In 2014 and 2015 there were local initiatives to start the Bed Bath Bread reception facilities which were characteristically decoupled (not localist), because the offered facilities then did not coincide with the national government’s more restrictive return policies. The local policymaker in Amsterdam stated that the negotiations with minister Dijkhoff at the time fell through because he had told the city of Amsterdam, ‘*The municipalities are allowed to offer reception but this should be as short and effective as possible, where the DT&V (Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek) takes over and directs the person in question to a Freedom Restrictive Location (VBL), where they can prepare for return*’. The minister claimed that he did not believe the local municipalities would implement this reception in light of effective return. Therefore, Dijkhoff did not agree to subsidize the Bed-Bath-Bread locations, which led to the negotiations falling through, illustrating that the interests of both government levels did not coincide.

Then towards the end of 2016, a new motion is published where the municipality of Amsterdam clearly states it will actively go against national policy, and continue to offer local reception. It is concluded by stipulating that the municipality of Amsterdam ‘will continue its

reception for rejected asylum seekers and this should be a clear sign to the national government that Amsterdam will never let people sleep on its streets' (A9). This clear friction exemplifies the decoupled relation between Amsterdam and the national government at the time.

In 2017, the decoupling governance configuration still remains evident in Amsterdam especially after the Alien Program was revised in 2015. Thereby is emphasized that the local government hopes the reception facilities will work in a 'supportive' manner to the medically vulnerable and 'entices' others to work on return. A larger budget would be made available for this group of migrants with irregular status mostly due to the local governance elections which resulted in the GreenLeft party winning the majority of votes (Appendix Interview). Additionally, it is emphasized that Amsterdam will remain to offer local reception long as the national government does not take on its *own responsibility*. Thus, this year a national-local governance configuration is still very much decoupled from the national government. Although the local policymaker in Amsterdam does see prospects for collaboration and cooperation with the national government regarding this topic in the future (Appendix Interview).

6. Comparative Analysis

This chapter will compare the local government responses of Amsterdam and Rotterdam in relation to the national policy changes since the implementation of the Matching Law in 1998. First, the two tables with main findings, including frame analysis (*Table 3*), and national-local governance configurations (*Table 4*), will be presented with a brief explanation. Following, the main findings from the national-local configuration and frame analysis perspective will be combined to offer an in-depth comparative analysis to accurately display the differences and similarities between both local governments.

6.1 How can the local policy responses in the two cities explain differences or similarities in governance typologies? What other factors or main events influenced this?

The main findings of the more prevalent frames from the analysis can be found in table 3.

Table 3: Main Findings - Comparative Frame Analysis of Rotterdam & Amsterdam

Year	Frames: Rotterdam	Frames: Amsterdam
1997-2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ‘Human-interest’ • ‘Lack of Transparency with national government’ ; part of managerial frame • ‘Managerial’: national government’s responsibility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ‘Human-Interest’ • ‘Lack of Transparency with national government’ ; part of managerial frame
2007-2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ‘Effective Return as end-goal’ • <i>Within</i> local government (GreenLeft): ‘Human-Interest’ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ‘Effective Return as end-goal’ • ‘Local Pragmatism’ • <i>Within</i> local government: (GreenLeft): ‘Human Interest’
2011-2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ‘Human-Interest’ (Related to medically vulnerable) • ‘Managerial’ • ‘Effective return as end-goal’ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ‘Local pragmatism’
2014-2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ‘Human-Interest’ • ‘Effective Return as end-goal’ 	-

2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Within</i> local government: ‘Economic threat’ (Livable Rotterdam) • <i>Within</i> local government: ‘effective return’ (Livable Rotterdam) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ‘Managerial’: responsibility of the national government • ‘Human-Interest’ (Merciful city of Amsterdam) • <i>Within</i> local government: ‘Economic threat’ (VVD)
2017	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local pragmatism • ‘Managerial’ responsibility of the national government • <i>Within</i> local government: ‘economic threat’ (Livable Rotterdam) • <i>Within</i> local government Human-interest against LR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ‘Effective return & human-interest’ (framed together) • ‘Managerial’ responsibility of the national government • <i>Within</i> local government: ‘Economic threat’ (VVD)

Before the comparative analysis it is crucial to underline which ‘new’ frames have been found alongside the expected ‘master’ frames (d’Haenens & de Lange, 2001; Dekker & Scholten, 2017). Three of the four expected master frames were present in the frame analysis namely; *human-interest* frame, *managerial* frame and the *economic threat* frame. New frames found were; *effective return as end-goal* frame, and the *local-pragmatism* frame. The ‘*lack of transparency*’ as a clear indicator which was not part of the indicators of the four master frames. I believe the ‘lack of transparency is an indicator of the managerial frame, which withholds that especially at the start of the implementation of the Matching Law, it was relatively unclear which groups of people would completely fall within this regulation, and who would be taking responsibility over what. Therefore, both local governments continuously emphasized a lack of communication with the national government, also characteristic of the decoupled national-local governance configuration. The ‘*effective return as end-goal*’ frame, was also prominent in both local governments. Interestingly, this frame was used to defend why local reception facilities ought to be created, namely to ensure the migrants would get time and rest to prepare for return. Yet, this frame was also used to argue why there should only be national reception facilities to counter local initiatives of any sorts, which is mostly because these facilities would ‘entice illegality’ and a longer stay than necessary. The last new frame was the ‘*local pragmatism*’ frame, which was hypothesized as a reason for governance ‘decoupling’ but not one of the expected four master frames. Yet, there was so much emphasis on the matter, and mostly constructed as a problem and reasoning for a solution of new policy implementations. Therefore, I believe it to be a separate autonomous frame, mostly found alongside the human-interest frame, where governments emphasized the important of the confrontation and

responsibility of the local government to face these problems or rather avoid ‘humanitarian issues’ through local problem solving.

Table 3: Main Findings - National-local Governance Configuration of Rotterdam & Amsterdam

Year	Governance Configuration: Rotterdam	Governance Configuration: Amsterdam
1997-2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Localist • Multi-level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decoupled
2007-2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Centralist • Multi-level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Centralist • Multi-level • Friction <i>within</i> local government (from GreenLeft)
2011-2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decoupled • Centralized 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Centralized • Localist
2014-2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decoupled • Friction <i>within</i> local government (from Livable Rotterdam) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decoupled • Friction <i>within</i> local government (VVD)
2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decoupled • Friction <i>within</i> local government (from Livable Rotterdam) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decoupled
2017	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multi-level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decoupled • Friction <i>within</i> local government (from VVD)

Despite national changes in policy regarding the reception of migrants with an irregular status in the Netherlands, there have been significant differences between the local responses in the city of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Table 4 lists the main findings regarding the national-local governance configurations. The following sub-headings align the main events and factors which may have triggered national as local policy changes and the thereby matching governance configurations.

6.1.1 *The Turn of the Century – New Restrictive National Laws & Policies (1997-2000)*

It becomes evident that the city of Amsterdam showed more resistance when the restrictive national immigration law was first implemented at the turn of the century. Compared to Rotterdam, the municipality of Amsterdam was extremely critical and had created a separate budget of 800.000 to offer support to a group of migrants (mostly Dublin claimants and applicants for a new asylum permit), who found themselves in a 'gray zone' after the implementation of the 'Alien Law' in 2000 (A3; Appendix Interview). Yet, it should be emphasized that Rotterdam also showed some resistance to the implementation of the MatchingLaw in 1998. However, also showed more signs willing to cooperate and collaborate with the national government, thereby categorizing its governance typology between the **centralist** and **multilevel** governance configuration. Both cities formulated the local resistance in a '*human-interest*' frame, where Rotterdam emphasized the importance that women and children should under no circumstance end up on the streets. Amsterdam on the other hand took it one step further by creating the separate local budget, and stressing how this national policy may result in '*poignant humanitarian bottlenecks*' (A3). The municipality explicitly states that this new law and policy implementation (Alien Law 2000), has created a dilemma between the city and the national government of the Netherlands (A3). Furthermore, the local policymaker emphasized the creation of this budget was a direct response and reaction *against* the national policy implementation (Appendix Interview), which Rotterdam did not have.

Therefore, the years between 1997 and 2000 there was a marked difference between the national-local governance configuration of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The framing, however, was rather similar in many ways, where both governments emphasized a *human-interest* frame, and both announced there was a *lack of transparency* with the national government. The difference in framing is subtle, yet what Amsterdam formulates and repeatedly emphasizes, is that when the national government fails to take on this responsibility and duty to care for this group of people (*managerial frame*), it will take on this responsibility in light of its 'autonomous local duty to offer care and humanitarian aid' to avoid *humanitarian crises* that the local government would be faced with (A3). Illustrating through its framing and discourse that it heavily disagrees with national policy. The reasoning to want to avoid problems on the lower government levels, caused by national policy, pertains to the *local pragmatism* theory (Popperlar & Scholten, 2008; Dekker et al. 2015), which became so pertinent that it is categorized as an autonomous frame

6.1.2 National-Local Restrictive Reception Facility Policies (2000-2011)

In the years after the implementation of the restrictive new immigration laws and policies, there was a decade of a rather more **multi-level** and **centralist governance** configuration, despite friction and tension *within* both local governments. The GreenLeft party in the local council in Amsterdam *and* in Rotterdam actively opposed the fact that local policies were in convergence with the national government (R3, A4). The GreenLeft party in both governments mostly framed the situation in light of a *human-interest* frame. The bench of mayor and aldermen in both cities mostly responds that this ‘restrictive’ policy will ensure the effective and efficient return of this target group, thereby decreasing the chance for ‘illegality’. Interestingly, Amsterdam framed this problem of illegality in light of *local pragmatism* frame, seemingly implying that the restrictive policy would counter and thereby decrease illegality faced as a ‘problem’ on the streets.

I believe Amsterdam showed signs of a **multi-levelled** and **centralist** governance configuration, because the national rules appear to be followed, despite frictions *within* the local council, and despite previous indication that the municipality were rather opposed to the national restrictive laws. However, in the policy documents discussion, the bench of aldermen continuously refer to ongoing discussion, deliberation and compromise between the national government. This was similar in Rotterdam, there were signs of a **multi-level** governance configuration, because the bench of mayor and aldermen appeared to defend national policy which was under critique from *within* the local government (GreenLeft). However, there were also signs of a **centralist** governance configuration, because the local council municipality appeared to not completely agree with the policy but signs of top-down hierarchical structure were definitely present. An example of these strong national policy frameworks in the local policy implementation was a continuous reference to these overarching national policies and guidelines (R3, A4). Therefore, as is the case in Amsterdam, it would be difficult to conclude whether the cities were completely in compliance with the national government, due to the tensions and disagreements regarding the somewhat more ‘restrictive’ policy within the local councils.

One of the reasons for the ‘restrictive time-period’, could be the coinciding assimilationist turn in integration policies (Dekker et al., 2015; Scholten, 2013; van Ostaijen and Scholten, 2014). According to Duyvendak & Scholten, (2011), ‘Later, just after the turn of the millennia, an assimilationist turn took place in Dutch integration policy. In fact, a (second) broad national debate took place in 2000 in response to claims that Dutch policy had become a “multicultural tragedy”’ (p. 339). This does not imply that a turn toward assimilationist policies, inherently would result in a more ‘restrictive’ policy for the reception of migrant with

an irregular status and centralized national-local governance configuration. However, the events which sparked this assimilationist turn, such as the killing of Theo van Gogh (van Ostaijen & Scholten, 2014), could have increased the likelihood for local governments to comply with the rather restrictive national policy for the reception facilities.

6.1.3 Medically Vulnerable and the We Are Here Group Resulting in Decoupling Government Levels? (2011-2016)

This changed in 2011, which is in accordance with the report published by ACVZ (2018), who claim some municipalities started offering reception for a group of migrants with an irregular status around this time-period. In Rotterdam, this sober reception facility was opened in 2011 for solely the ‘medically vulnerable’ in light of a *human-interest* frame. Interestingly, this is then backed up with the ‘effective return as end-goal’ frame, thereby emphasizing that reception is not unlimited (R4), and only for this specific vulnerable group. This is mostly to ensure the facility does not crowd or too full (Appendix Interview). However, a year later this facility appeared to be closed again (R5), hinting at the centralized national-local relation pertinent in these years. The national government in this time-period did not appear to allow any room for any local reception facilities, therefore the city of Rotterdam at the beginning of 2011 (R4) marks a **decoupled** governance configuration in this time-period, yet later in 2013 (R5), this national-local governance relation appears to be top-down and centralized due to the closing of the facility.

In Amsterdam, there were some initial signs of discontent from the mayor (van der Laan) with the national policy a letter to the minister of Immigration and Asylum, about certain issues which had arisen regarding the group of migrants with irregular status (A6). Initially, no new policies or reception facilities were created despite the discontent, marking a **centralized** top-down governance configuration in 2011. Yet, a year later the We Are Here group occupied ground outside a church in the city of Amsterdam. The GreenLeft party initiated a pilot ‘Refugeeharbour’, meant to host this group of migrants and work on their return through guidance and counselling. This initiative was funded by the national government, and it showed willingness to collaborate with the local pilot. The We Are Here group had gained some attention in the media, and besides that had created its own website (...). I believe, this was grounds for the national government to cooperate with the local initiative in fear of politicization (Popperlaar & Scholten, 2008) and increased widespread media attention (De Zeeuw, 2017; Krakergroep We Are Here in 2012 Ook Actief: ‘Nu Meer Weerstand, 2018; Van Unen, 2018). This initiative, which then sparked the national government to comply with

the municipality of Amsterdam shows more of a **localist** governance configuration, although national policy did not necessarily change and this pilot was rather the exception.

The following years, as specified in both individual case analyses, mark a long time-period of **decoupling** with the national government. Specifically, in 2014 when jurisprudence stipulated local governments ought to provide reception to this vulnerable group in light of a *human-interest* frame (European Social Charter, 2016, p. 4). This long period of governance **decoupling** in both Amsterdam and Rotterdam comes paired with a resistance and tension *within* the local government councils, which mostly becomes apparent in the policy documents in 2016. The party Livable Rotterdam is giving the municipality critique in Rotterdam, framing the reception to the irregular status group mostly as an *economic threat* (R10). Whereas, the VVD is critical toward the We Are Here group in Amsterdam, also framing this problem as an *economic threat* costing the tax payers sums of money (A8, A11). Thus, this time-period both local governments do not differ substantially in national-local governance configuration. However, framing does differ where Amsterdam appears to have more policy documents directly criticizing national policy in light of *managerial* (it should be the national government's responsibility) and *human-interest* frames, which seems less prevalent in Rotterdam's policy documents.

6.1.4 A New Era of Collaboration? (2017 - 2018)

The last important and marked difference between Amsterdam and Rotterdam has taken place between 2017 and 2018, after the new national policy change regarding the reception facilities (Regeerakkoord 2017-2021, p. 54). In Rotterdam, there are evident signs of a **multilevel** governance configuration. The policymaker uses terms as 'hopeful' (Appendix Interview) and confirms there has been more collaboration and especially communication regarding the issue from the national government. Rotterdam has been selected has a 'pilot-city' to run the LVV's, and the policymaker mostly emphasized that the local governments will now also have a significant influence in the design of the new reception facilities, run nationally, but in collaboration with the local governments.

Amsterdam, has responded differently and has not shown a similar degree in signs of collaboration and coordination (yet). According to the local policymaker, 'The previous council and mayor Van Aardsen have agreed to the collaboration regarding the new national policy of 2018, but have not agreed to become a pilot LVV city like Rotterdam did' (Appendix Interview). Mostly because there are certain disputed issues, which remain unresolved, like the reception of the Dublin claimants (Appendix Interview). The policymaker also claimed that

since the local government elections took place in 2018, the municipality suspected that local policy toward the reception facilities would change drastically and become less restrictive. Therefore, it decided not yet to agree to collaborate with the national government to the same extent as Rotterdam in light of expected changes in local policy (Appendix Interview). The party with the majority of votes in the 2018 local elections was GreenLeft, who have been attempting to make Amsterdam's local policy increasingly more lenient throughout the years (Appendix Interview). Therefore, despite willingness to collaborate, the local policymaker claims that, 'the collaboration is not as significant yet between Amsterdam and the national municipality because some municipalities already established official local cooperation agreements, whereas we are not quite as far' (Appendix Interview).

6.2 To what extent did the political composition of the local government influence the national-local governance configuration?

This analysis illustrates that it is crucial not too 'gloss over' the importance of context and political party composition in each municipality. As the spokesperson from the VNG emphasizes, 'both cities have a completely different political climate, implying they will have different approaches to the matter' (Appendix Interview VNG). The composition of the local municipality in Rotterdam has comprised of the right-wing party, Livable Rotterdam with most votes since 2002, whereas Amsterdam had a more leftist government throughout this time-period. This has possibly resulted in Rotterdam's local responses to be relatively more in convergence with the more 'restrictive' national policy than Amsterdam. Rotterdam has had slightly more motions, submitted questions, and criticism from Livable Rotterdam, for its policies not always coinciding with that of the national government. Thus, Rotterdam's national-local governance configuration resulted in a more frequent **multilevel** and **centralist** governance relations than Amsterdam. Although, this difference in national-local governance configuration was not as big as expected, and in both case-studies the local responses to many crucial national policy changes were rather similar.

The framing of the intractable policy controversy and solutions thereof, also differed. Rotterdam focused mostly on *effective return as end-goal* which converges with national policy, and could therefore also explain why Rotterdam has a more **centralist** and **multi-levelled** governance configuration. Amsterdam had focused more on the 'human-interest' and *local pragmatism* frame, which could be argued that this is largely due to the leftist political composition. The GreenLeft party for example mostly stands for equality in society, where the *human-interest* frame is a primary element of many of their positions. Yet, there were also

significant similarities in frames employed by both local governments, where the difference in political composition and local context became less visible. Similarities in the frames used are that both local governments employed; the *lack of transparency* frame, ‘managerial’ frame, and *economic threat* frame in equal frequencies. The *managerial* frame with the ‘lack of transparency’ indicator illustrates the apparent frustration with the national government. The *economic threat* frame was mostly present in objections and critique from various parties *within* the local government, worried about the costs reception facilities and thereby criticizing its usefulness in light of *return as end-goal*.

The spokesperson from the VNG describes the relation between the national and local governments regarding the reception facilities, as one with many ‘ups and downs’, mostly due to the ‘political sensitivity of the issue’ (Appendix Interview). Yet, it seems as if 2017 and 2018 mark the beginning of a mutual understanding where both the local and national governments appear more willing to collaborate. Amsterdam may not be as far in this process as Rotterdam, and the new more leftist government may complicate future agreements with the national government. However, it does seem as if the previous years of **decoupling**, have been marked by a new era where ‘hope’ for a more efficient collaboration and relation between national and local could be achieved regarding the reception facilities of migrants with an irregular status.

7. CONCLUSION

Conclusions

This study investigated how local governments in the Netherlands have responded to national policy changes regarding the reception facilities of migrants with an irregular status, and whether the national-local policy configuration differed between these two cities. Amsterdam and Rotterdam are the two biggest cities in the Netherlands, contextualized in similar national economy with similar national political factors. Despite similar national factors, local contextual factors and the political climate and composition of the local municipalities influenced the manner of response toward national policy in differing ways.

The findings were not in line with the first expectation which hypothesized that both national-local governance relations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam would be more likely to have a **decoupled or localist** national-local governance relation due to ‘the local turn’ in migration policies (Alexander 2003a; Alexander 2003b; Scholten and Penninx, 2016) and due to the ‘intractability of the policy controversy’ (Dekker & Scholten, 2017). This was mostly because there were time-periods since the Matching Law in 1998, when the national policy framework was implemented in a rather hierarchical top-down structure. Thus, both government at certain points did show actually show more signs of a **centralized or multi-levelled** government relation than expected. This, restrictive turn in local policy, interestingly coincided with the national ‘assimilationist turn’ in Dutch integration policy (van Ostaijen & Scholten, 2014; Duyvendak & Scholten, 2011) at the turn of the millennia. Thus, there may be a link in the compliance between national and local governance with regards to events such as the killing of Theo van Gogh (van Ostaijen & Scholten, 2014), and the general heated national debate regarding immigration and integration during first decade after the turn of the century (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2011).

Interestingly, the cases where there was in increased **decoupled or localist** national-local governance configuration, this was mostly due to critical events occurring in the local municipality itself and the chance of politicization of certain problems or issues of these critical events. Such as opening a shelter or reception facility for the medically vulnerable in Rotterdam, or opening a reception facility for the We Are Here group or migrants with irregular status in Amsterdam. Furthermore, this decoupled relation was also then further ‘legitimized’ to the jurisprudence in 2014 (European Social Charter, 2016, p. 4), which also developed this local turn further.

The findings were in line with the second expectation that Amsterdam would employ *human-interest* frames (d'Haenens & de Lange, 2001; Dekker & Scholten, 2017) more frequently than Rotterdam due to the opposing leftist and rightist local government composition. This also resulted in Amsterdam's national-local governance relation to be slightly more **decoupled** than Rotterdam. Rotterdam more often framed problems and solutions in an *effective return as end-goal* which was often used in line with national policy to argue against local reception facilities. Rotterdam's national-local relation can therefore be characterized as relatively more **centralized** and **multi-levelled** than Amsterdam. Interestingly, Rotterdam also used the 'effective return as end-goal' as a frame to argue for the benefits of these facilities, to emphasize the importance of rest and counselling in order to prepare for return.

It should be argued that the differences between local governments were relatively small and not as big as would be expected with the opposing political climates in both cities. The governments correspondingly referred to the importance of the well-being of the migrants with similar concern, and shared an apparent frustration with the national government regarding a lack of collaboration and '*transparency*'. Furthermore, both cities continuously emphasized that this problem or issue should in fact be resolved by the national government, because it is their responsibility, in accordance with the '*managerial*' frame. Additionally, both governments had similar periods in which they received critique from certain parties. During the centralized and restrictive period from 2000-2011, this was Groenlinks in both governments with a '*human-interest*' frame arguing against the top-down restrictive national implemented policy, and other time-periods these were other parties such as VVD or Liveable Rotterdam, criticizing the leniency of the policy regarding the reception facilities in an '*economic threat*' frame. Moreover, both municipalities responded to 'humanitarian crises' in their government, such as the reception of the medically vulnerable in Rotterdam in 2011 and the reception and counselling for the 'We Are Here' group in Amsterdam in 2012. This contextual similarity was signalled that both local governments acted out of local problem solving or 'local pragmatism' (Dekker et al., 2015; Scholten and Penninx, 2016) in light of public safety, and possibly the fear of further politicization of the issue (Poppelaar and Scholten, 2008), illustrating a striking parallel between the two cities.

Overall, I believe the sensitivity of the issue, and the differing interests between national and local levels, implied that the potency of multilevel and a complementarist national-local governance relation was inhibited at certain time-periods since the implementation of the Matching Law in 1998. These diverging interests, differing frames, and decoupling of national-

local relations were most pertinent when there was an ‘issue’ in the local municipality which had to be resolved or dealt with, in line with ‘local pragmatism’ theory. Thus, Scholten’s (2013) theory on the challenge and ineffectiveness of policy coordination between levels holds true not only when faced with the intractable policy problem of integration, but also with that of the reception facilities for migrants with an irregular status. However, despite large differences in political composition in local governments, local responses between the Dutch cities differed less than expected, mostly due to political composition of both governments and due to the restrictive assimilationist turn which may have influenced the stance of both municipalities toward the reception of migrants with an irregular status in a significant manner.

Examining the development of the government relation regarding the “issue” in the future could shed light on whether the cooperation between national and local government levels will be maintained, or whether the difficulty of the problem will always have a marked influence on the efficacy of the national-local governance relation. As could be perceived in this research, this national-local relation is not stable throughout time, and can differ based on local contextual factors, and significant national changes. Therefore, the relation as described by the spokesperson of the VNG illustrated the relation as one with “ups and downs”, which accurately defines the often tumultuous collaboration between government tiers

Limitations

Several limitations in this study might have an influence on overall generalizability of the research. One main limitation in this research was the nature of the governance typologies which were used for analysis of the governance relations. By trying to assess what these governance configurations were in the policy documents in several time periods, it was argued that there were four *distinct* governance typologies that the national-local governance relation could be classified in. However, it could also be argued that varying governance configurations could be present at the same time. A ‘decoupled’ governance configuration could be significant whilst also showing distinct signs of a ‘localist’ governance relation, because it is plausible that policy and the framing thereof is distinct on both levels. Therefore, viewing the governance typologies as completely separate categories, may have inhibited the depth of the analysis, and conclusions thereof.

This limitation also relates to the second part of the main research question which asks; ***and does this national-local governance differ between cities?*** Due to the nature of this yes or no question but also the rather large time-period that has been taken for analysis, namely 20 years – it is out of the scope for this research to be able to answer the question in detail on

why this national-local governance differed every single time-period. The political composition, contextual local factors, political events, and the saliency in the media are plausible factors that have been steered towards in this research however it remains difficult to find one main explanatory factor behind the difference in governance relations. Therefore, being able to indicate that the governance configurations did in fact differ between the cities throughout different time-periods is possible and has been done, but due to the nature of the question and elements on design in this study it is difficult to conclude on factual explanations on what this actually implies.

Another limitation was the issue that the interviews with the local policymakers were not fully representative of the time-period since 1998, because both interviewees had only occupied this position for no longer than five years. This was combatted by the policy documents which fortunately did trace back to the year that the Matching Law was implemented. Additionally, it would have been fruitful to interview multiple policymakers within one municipality. Yet, this was not possible due to the specificity and niche of the issue in question, implying that the government solely had one policymaker specialized in the ‘problem’.

Moreover, one main limitation for the generalizability of the study was the amount of local Dutch governments included in the analysis. It would be more fruitful for the overall generalizability of Dutch municipal responses to national policy regarding the reception of migrant with an irregular status, to include most municipalities in the Netherlands in the analysis. However, the scope of this research did not allow to include as many municipalities due to time limits and the historical process tracing. This method offered a glimpse into whether national-local governance configuration between the different local governments had changed throughout time. Another research design, which focuses on one time frame only, yet includes many different local governments, may be more efficient to generalize about Dutch local responses toward national policy concerning this ‘issue’.

Furthermore, as specified in the methodology, another significant limitation was the inherent subjectivity when interpreting frames (Matthes & Kohring, 2008). A holistically objective frame analysis would be difficult to achieve because the interpretation is often influenced on the researcher’s own inherent framework and analytical lens. Yet, this research has attempted to combat this by describing the indicators in the operationalization of the four master frames, and the method or indicators of a frame (issue/diagnoses, roles/who, causality/narrative, solution/prognosis) that was implemented for ‘newly found’ frames. Another limitation related to the subjectivity of the interpretations of frames in an analysis is

the subjectivity and framing of the local policymaker, which may not have been representative of the entire municipality. However, as previously noted, in-depth analysis of the policy documents hopefully helped prevent a skewed perspective.

Future Research

For future research, it a wider selection of municipalities could be chosen to make more generalizable predictions about all local government responses in the Netherlands. Additionally, this method could offer a manner to analyze the differences between the bigger and smaller cities and whether there are large differences in the way they deal with reception facilities for migrants with an irregular status. The local policymakers both indicated that Utrecht and Groningen had rather unique policies regarding the reception facilities for this target group (Appendix Interview), therefore it would be of value to include these cities in a research project regarding the reception facilities in the future.

Furthermore, it would be intriguing to include a large media analysis to discover whether certain crises within the local governments concerning migrants with an irregular status, would have had an influence on the policy formulation or implementation regarding the reception facilities. It could be possible that significant focus or attention from the Dutch media, would have led to substantial politicization of the issue, which could then have influenced new policies and framing thereof. This could have also led to an influence on the potency of multilevel governance, thus the inclusion of the media and importance thereof would also be an intriguing viewpoint.

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9. APPENDICES

9.1 Appendix 1 – Interview Questions with policymaker from the municipality of Rotterdam

1. What have been the biggest changes in Rotterdam's local policy regarding the reception of undocumented migrants, since the introduction of the Linkage Act in 1998? If this is too far back, what are the most significant changes you remember?
2. Did the municipality of Amsterdam cooperate with the national government in 2007 to stop municipal reception? Why yes / no?

3. There is a document in the online database which indicates that there was a temporary and sober Bed, Bath, Bread facility offered to medically vulnerable migrants with an irregular status. Was this in collaboration with the national government or an autonomous initiative of the municipality of Rotterdam itself?
4. How did the city of Amsterdam respond to the jurisprudence of the ECSR and CRvB, which states that the municipalities should open bed-bath-bread locations?
5. How much changed after the ruling of the national government in 2015, when it mandated to only offer reception that was organized by the state (landelijke vreemdelingen voorzieningen)? Did the municipality of Amsterdam offer shelter from its own initiative?
6. How did the municipality respond to the new national policy of 2017 regarding the more centralized reception facilities?
7. Has the municipality of Rotterdam ever diverged from national policy with regards to the reception of migrants with an irregular status?
8. To what extent has the VNG determined what the municipality of Amsterdam would do with regards to reception? How was VNG important in this process?
9. To what extent have different parties in the local council influence local policy regarding the reception of migrants with an irregular status. I saw for example, that Livable Rotterdam had submitted many questions to bench of mayor and aldermen compared to other parties.

9.2 Appendix 2 – Interview Questions with policymaker from the municipality of Amsterdam

1. What have been the biggest changes in Amsterdam's local policy regarding the reception of undocumented migrants, since the introduction of the Linkage Act in 1998? If this is too far back, what are the most significant changes you remember?
2. In a policy document in the online database, the municipality of Amsterdam in 2000, after the introduction of the new Aliens Act itself, would set up its own budget to continue to provide shelter to this target group, is this correct?
3. Did the municipality of Amsterdam cooperate with the national government in 2007 to stop municipal reception? Why yes / no?

4. How did the city of Amsterdam respond to the jurisprudence of the ECSR and CRvB, which states that the municipalities should open bed-bath-bread locations?
5. How much changed after the ruling of the national government in 2015, when it mandated to only offer reception that was organized by the state (landelijke vreemdelingen voorzieningen)? Did the municipality of Amsterdam offer shelter from its own initiative?
6. Did the Alien Program of 2017 (Programma Vreemdelingen), start from Amsterdam's own initiative? Does the 1.7 million euros set aside for this program come out of the municipality of Amsterdam's own budget?
7. To what extent have different local parties in the municipal council influenced the policy regarding the reception of undocumented or irregular migrants? I saw that Groenlinks for example, had submitted many written questions in the online archive (Administrative Information System) compared to other parties.
8. To what extent has the VNG determined what the municipality of Amsterdam would do with regards to reception? How was VNG important in this process?

9.3 Appendix 3 - Interview Questions VNG

1. When did the VNG get involved with the policy regarding the reception facilities of undocumented migrants? The media claims the VNG had an important role in 2015, is this true?
2. How was the VNG involved with the negotiations between the national and local governments regarding reception facilities for irregular migrants?
3. To what extent did you notice any difference between the responses of Amsterdam and Rotterdam concerning the reception of irregular migrants?

4. How would you characterize the collaboration between the national government and the two municipalities (Amsterdam and Rotterdam)?
5. Has this relation concerning the reception facilities changed throughout the years?

9.4 Appendix 4 - POLICY DOCUMENTS

Case A: Rotterdam

R1 – Submitted Documents (Ingekomen Stukken), 29 April 1997: Rejected Asylum Seekers

R2 – Council Meeting of the Committee for Urban Renewal Public Housing and Immigrant policy, 24th of February 1999: Work agreements between the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND), Foreigners Department (VD) and the Migration, Integration and Participation department (MIP) of the SoZaWe department concerning the return of asylum seekers who have exhausted all legal remedies

- R3** – Submitted Documents, 3 July 2007: Answer written questions from Mrs. J.J. Refer with regards tot he responsibility of the municipality for asylum seekers who have exhausted all legal remedies
- R4** – Commitment/Agreement (Toezegging), 23 February, 2011: Reception for the Medically Vulnerable
- R5** – Submitted Questions (Schriftelijke Vragen): 11 April, 2013: Illegal Reception by NAS (Nico Adriaans Institution)
- R6** - Commitment/Agreement: 6 maart, 2015: Temporary Provision Bed Bath Bread.
- R7** – Submitted Questions: M.G.J. van Elck (Liveable Rotterdam), 15 december 2015: About direct end Bed-Bath-Bread.
- R8** – Commitment/Agreement, 17 December, 2015: Information after discussion of WMO action program (O) MHC / Earlier Home in Commission WIPV 9 December 2015.
- R9** – Submitted Questions from Council member v M.G.J. van Elck (Liveable Rotterdam), 24 May, 2016: About the Bed-Bath-Bread monitor.
- R10** – Commitment/Agreement, 7 September 2016: Prosecution Bed-Bad-Bread Arrangement
- R11** Submitted Questions, 4 April, 2017: Answer submitted questions from the council member T.C. Hoogwerf (Leefbaar Rotterdam) about ‘Reception Safe at Home’ (Opvang Veilig Thuis)
- R12** - Schriftelijke Vragen, 18 April, 2017: Answer submitted questions from the council member M.G.J. van Elck (Liveable Rotterdam) about Reception of ‘hopeless’ migrants

Case B: Amsterdam

- A1** - Policy Recommendation (Voordracht). 4 January, 2000: Policy regarding the rejected asylum seekers which fall under the previous ‘Pardon’ Agreement.
- A2** - Policy Recommendation. 12 January, 2000. Motion [Motie] from councilmember Ms. Kalt [party: Amsterdam Anders/De Groenen] regarding the rejected asylum seekers which fall under the previous Agreement about reception for asylum seekers.
- A3** - Policy Recommendation. 21 june, 2001. Proposal regarding the Alien act 2000, named: Reception and return in motion; Measures for groups of (rejected) asylum seekers which do not receive reception from the national government anymore.

- A4** - Policy Recommendation, 4 February 2004. Motion from council member Alberts [party SP] with regards to the proposal to deport 26.000 rejected asylum seekers.
- A5** - Policy Recommendation. 24 February, 2004. Answer Questions from council member Ms. Kalt with regards to the agreement between the 4 big municipalities [Utrecht, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague) and minister Verdonk about the reception of rejected asylum seekers.
- A6** - Letter from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Kingdomrelations. 1st of December, 2011. Return in the “Alien” Policy.
- A7** - Accepted Motion. 18 November, 2016. Reception Vulnerable Rejected Asylum Seekers.
- A8** - Questions for the Bench of mayor and aldermen (College B&W). 5 December, 2016. Answer Questions from member Yeşilgöz-Zegerius with regards to the ‘We Are Here’-group, the group rejected asylum seekers without valid reason for stay.
- A9** - Accepted Motion. 9th of December, 2016. Reception Rejected Asylum Seekers in Amsterdam.
- A10** - Developed Policy Implementation. 16 February, 2017. Alien Program 2.0.
- A11** - Questions for the Bench of Mayor and Aldermen. 16 January, 2018. Answer Questions from council member Poot with regards to the 29th time that this group squats/occupies a building.