“Santa-Claus” Aid:
Coherence-Making and Representations in Triangular Cooperation Between Indonesia, USAID, and Fiji

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## Contents

*List of Figures* v  
*List of Appendices* v  
*List of Acronyms* vi  
*Abstract* vii  

### Chapter 1 Introduction
1. South-South and Triangular Cooperation as Technical and Discursive Practice: Concepts and Literature Review 2  
2. Background: Strengthening Gender Mainstreaming (SGM) Program 4  
3. Research Objectives and Questions 5  
4. Organization of the Research Paper 5  

### Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework and Methodology
2.1 Theoretical Framework: Policy Translation 7  
2.2 Methodology and Data 9  
2.2.1 Socio-Cognitive Critical Discourse Analysis: (Macro-)Policy Documents and Interviews 9  
2.2.2 Ethnography: Meeting, (Micro-)Policy Documents, and Other Artefacts 11  
2.3 Scope and Limitation 12  
2.4 Positionality and Ethical Considerations 13  

### Chapter 3 Global Discourses on Aid and Development
3.1 Indonesia's Annual Reports: Principles, Rhetoric, and (Lack of) Development Goals 14  
3.1.1 Demand-driven 15  
3.1.2 Solidarity 15  
3.1.3 Ownership 16  
3.2 USAID's Policy Framework: “Bankspeak” and the Drive to Teach 18  
3.3 Fiji's Women and Foreign Policy: “Women in Development” and Look North Policy 20  

### Chapter 4 The Cobweb of Contexts: Mediating Global Discourses Through Actors and Meetings 22  
4.1 Actors and Their Cognitions 22  
4.1.1 USAID Indonesia 22  
4.1.2 Indonesia’s Ministry of Women Empowerment and Child Protection (MWECMP) 23  
4.1.3 Government of Fiji 23  
4.2 Meetings 24  
4.2.1 From Joint Technical Working Group to USIP 1 Internal Meetings 24  
4.2.2 From Internal Meetings to Multi-Stakeholder Meeting 25
4.2.3 From Multi-Stakeholder Meeting to Phase III Launch 26

Chapter 5 Translation, Coherence-Making, and Its Rationale 28
5.1 Scale, or the Discursive Isolation of Program 28
5.2 Meaning, or Coherence-Making Through Reverse Translation 29
5.3 Contingency, or the Management of Change Through Articulation 31
5.4 Coherence-Making and Its Rationale 32

Chapter 6 Conclusions 35

Appendices 37
References 42
Notes 46
List of Figures

Figure 2.1 Logic of Analysis of This RP 9
Figure 3.1 Top Words in Indonesia’s Aid Documents 18
Figure 3.2 Top Words in USAID’s Documents 19
Figure 5.1 Evolution of Meanings in SGM 30

List of Appendices

Appendix 1 List of Texts 37
Appendix 2 List of Interviews 40
Appendix 3 List of Meetings 40
Appendix 4 Metaphor Analysis 40
### List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>GRPB</td>
<td>Gender-Responsive Planning and Budgeting</td>
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<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>MNDP</td>
<td>Ministry of National Development Planning of Indonesia</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>Ministry of Economy of Fiji</td>
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<td>MOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance of Indonesia</td>
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<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia</td>
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<td>MSS</td>
<td>Ministry of State Secretariat of Indonesia</td>
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<td>MWCPA</td>
<td>Ministry of Women, Children, and Poverty Alleviation of Fiji</td>
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<td>MWIECP</td>
<td>Ministry of Women Empowerment and Child Protection of Indonesia</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>PDM</td>
<td>Program Design Matrix</td>
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<td>RP</td>
<td>Research Paper</td>
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<td>SGM</td>
<td>Strengthening Gender Mainstreaming</td>
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<td>SSC</td>
<td>South-South Cooperation</td>
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<td>SSTC</td>
<td>South-South and Triangular Cooperation</td>
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<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>UNOSSC</td>
<td>United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USIP 1</td>
<td>US-Indonesia Partnership for South-South and Triangular Cooperation</td>
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Abstract

This Research Paper investigates the designing of Strengthening Gender Mainstreaming (SGM), a triangular aid program between Indonesia, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Fiji. Combining discourse analysis of aid policy documents, interviews, and ethnography of project meetings, this study follows the shrinking aim of SGM from mainstreaming gender perspectives across Fiji’s national planning and budgeting system to mere trainings of few ministries. Despite different agenda from each actor and initial tensions created from the abrupt change, the SGM emerged as a coherent program. This study finds that such coherence is not only produced by the translation of different policy ideas into a single design, but also by the reverse-translation of that design into multiple representations. A core enabler of this process is the Indonesian aid discourse which lacks an ambitious developmental goal—a discourse I call “Santa Claus”—which allows the other actors to articulate separate narratives and purposes to SGM. These include a recipient-oriented program (for Indonesia); a concerted effort between Indonesia, Asian Development Bank (ADB), and Canada demonstrating Fiji’s stronger commitment to gender mainstreaming (for USAID); and a strategic adaptation into existing arrangements with ADB and Canada (for Fiji). On one hand, multiple representations allow the actors to avoid conflict; on the other, they distract actors’ attention from delivering an impactful aid. Coexistence of contrasting representations in SGM demonstrates that triangular cooperation need not be understood as either Southern or Northern discourse, a conclusion so commonly offered by existing literature.

Relevance to Development Studies

This study offers two contributions in understanding the designing of triangular development project, a scope less covered in the analysis of triangular cooperation. First, taking a critical, interpretive approach, it shows representation as a powerful tool actors use in producing “success” in development project. Compared to similar finding from development anthropology, the SGM case is unique in that the actual program design is less important than actors’ representations of it. This might be problematic not only because these representations—such as in the claim of SGM as a success story or being demand-driven—obscure the bare-bones design and diminished outputs that come from it, but also as they preoccupy actors with building relationships rather than developmental outcomes. Second, it gives attention to recipient country, explaining its decisions as a strategy that blends the understanding of donors’ discourses with creative positioning among different donors—an angle that distances the analysis from portrayal of recipient as a passive, weak actor.

Keywords

triangular cooperation, policy translation, coherence-making, South-South Cooperation, development project, aid, discourse analysis, ethnography, Indonesia, USAID, Fiji
Chapter 1
Introduction

In 1955, newly-independent countries from Asia and Africa gathered in Bandung as an act of solidarity against colonialism. Aside from the political motive of the Asian-African Conference, the meeting had developmental aims by declaring the need to promote economic development in the two regions via cooperation among the participants, which marks the start of South-South Cooperation (SSC). More than half a century later, SSC officially remains politically distinctive from Northern aid in terms of stated values and norms while being subjected to the same questions of “transparency, monitoring and evaluation, and impact” (Abdenur and Da Fonseca 2013: 1478) that characterize the Northern-led world of international development.

Indonesia, the host of the Asian-African Conference and focus of this Research Paper (RP), seems to find itself facing these managerial questions in its efforts to improve its aid. As indicated in its policy papers and government-commissioned studies, Indonesian government has been discussing ways of promoting private sector’s participation in aid financing (Doc Policy Papers 2014) or establishing the link between aid and trade and investment (Doc Strategy Papers 2014). Following this issue from this viewpoint tempts us to take for granted the meanings of Indonesian aid policy and policy practice resulted from it—e.g., what Indonesia means by “aid,” what development Indonesia wants to achieve with its aid, or why Indonesia wants to aid—in other words, the discourse of Indonesian aid. Meanwhile, Northern countries and institutions also contribute in Indonesian aid. According to the 2017 Annual Report, 41% of Indonesian aid programs were conducted jointly with Northern donors (Doc Annual Report 2017: v), a scheme known as triangular cooperation. Involvement of “traditional” donors such as World Bank, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), or USAID means that there is a diversity of meanings in Indonesian aid which remains hidden as programs are represented as a singular, coherent whole.

The SGM is one such program with Fiji as recipient and USAID as the Northern funding partner. Started in 2017, SGM aims to proliferate gender-responsive planning and budgeting (GRPBJ) in the Fijian government. As of the time of writing, the program is ongoing with its third phase in 2019 aiming for the advocacy of GRPB to seven Fijian ministries and parliament. However, in the middle of negotiation in August, Fiji called for a major revision in SGM design which would delete the advocacy part, limit the program to capacity building trainings, and reduce the target ministries to three (from the original seven). The change was later known to be related to Fiji’s cooperation with other donors—ADB and Canada—in overlapping areas. Despite early tensions ensuing with Indonesia and USAID, the program continued with the diminished aim and even generated proud reporting from USAID as a success story.

Focusing on SGM’s Phase III, this RP shows a triangular development project as an arena of meanings- and coherence-making tasked with reconciling different discourses from a developing Southern donor, a developed Northern partner, and an aid recipient. I will argue that SGM’s “success” is the product of different representations its three actors made of the program. Instead of one interpretation which finds either the solidarity and equality agenda of the South or the technical, prescriptive image of the North—an argument commonly put forward in the literature on SSC or triangular cooperation—this RP sees discourses representing the same program which, despite their stark contrasts, coexist. At the same time, I investigate the topic at the project level and as translation of various
policy ideas—an angle uncommon, if not entirely missing, in the studies of SSC and triangular development cooperation.

1.1 South-South and Triangular Cooperation as Technical and Discursive Practice: Concepts and Literature Review

Most works surveyed here agree that SSC is not easily defined, both in terms of countries that make up the cooperation (which is related to the blurred boundaries of the “global South”) (e.g., Mawdsley 2012) and its forms of cooperation (technical cooperation, such as training, or economic cooperation, such as loan provision) (e.g., Engel 2019). The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) offers the following definition of SSC: “a broad framework of collaboration among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical domains” (UNOSSC. 2018).

Despite the debate over boundaries, we might delineate several characteristics which differentiate SSC from the “traditional” North-South cooperation. First, in terms of global institutionalization, North-South cooperation involves donor countries which are members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), while SSC may include any other countries outside the DAC as donors (Mawdsley 2012). Because the DAC comes with definitions and guidance on the practice of foreign aid, SSC is often understood as “residual” or “alternative” compared to North-South cooperation (Mawdsley 2012: 257). Second, in terms of donor-recipient relations, North-South cooperation, which is typically between a more developed North as donor and a developing South country as recipient, is characterized by “vertical relationship” (Hidayat and Virgianita 2019: 354), and as replete with economic and political conditionalities (Thérien 2002: 459). Meanwhile, SSC, where both its donor and recipient are developing countries, is seen as representing a “horizontal relationship” built upon “partnership and solidarity for development rather than development assistance or aid” (Kumar 2009: 4), voluntarism (Bracho and Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 2015: 6), and similarities in geography and history (McEwan and Mawdsley 2012, Ashoff 2010) as well as development challenges (United Nations 2009: 3). Third, in terms of history, the birth of North-South cooperation is associated with United States President Harry Truman’s inaugural speech in 1949 which “launched the first American comprehensive development cooperation programme” and became “the founding act of the modern development aid industry” (Bracho and Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 2015: 3). Later, it was caught in Cold War politics as American aid was directed to non-communist countries. Meanwhile, SSC is considered by many as originating in the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Indonesia (Acharya 2016, Harris and Vittorini 2018, Prashad 2007, Bracho and Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 2015). Like its North-South counterpart, SSC was subject to Cold War politics, but instead of belonging in either bloc, its political aspiration went to the newly-independent countries in an anticolonial spirit.

Triangular cooperation, meanwhile, might be understood broadly as a mechanism of SSC which engages a third, Northern donor:

Triangular cooperation is collaboration in which traditional donor countries and multilateral organizations facilitate South-South initiatives through the provision of funding, training, management and technological systems as well as other forms of support. (UNOSSC. 2018)

Literature on triangular cooperation can be classified into two categories according to its view of the nature of the cooperation. The first group of authors focuses on the instrumental significance of Northern country’s involvement in SSC. For this group, the question levelled at triangular cooperation is to what extent Northern capacities may help improve
SSC programs as a rational policymaking. Some works in this group are commissioned by governments or international organizations, such as Ashoff (2010) and Kumar (2009) who review the trends, opportunities, and challenges of triangular cooperation for World Bank Institute and the government of India, respectively. Also included here is various studies commissioned by the Indonesian government, such as on integrating private sector’s resources in triangular cooperation (Emile 2014). Some of these studies have interacted with the different norms encountered in the relations between DAC and non-DAC donors, but the discussion is confined to the technocratic question of implementing the aid effectiveness principles from Paris Declaration in triangular cooperation (Müller, U. and Langendorf 2012).

The second group of literature, which I position this RP in, looks at triangular cooperation not as an objective problem-solving effort, but a matter of subjectively interpreting the meanings behind the interactions and their products (such as policy documents, programs) between Southern countries and a “traditional” donor. Morvaridi and Hughes (2018), for example, discuss the interactions between SSC and the aid effectiveness agenda as representing the neoliberal capture of SSC. The original SSC’s political aspirations to represent “oppressed peoples of the formerly colonized world” and “force the reform of...international economic order” have been turned into “technical matters that can be resolved through appropriate strategies of domestic reform and capacity building combined with embrace of liberal property rights and free trade” (2018: 886). The argument on triangular cooperation as more than technocratic development projects but rather a discursive phenomenon has been extended by the view of DAC as an arena for learning (Müller, F. and Sondermann 2016: 261), or triangular cooperation as “a relationship whereby Northern actors can teach local ones about ways of doing things at one remove, via contracted Southern partners” (Morvaridi and Hughes 2018: 880). Similarly, Abdenur and Da Fonseca (2013: 1487) argue that the North’s involvement in SSC constitutes an attempt to “redefine their roles and expand their power, both within and beyond the field of development cooperation” by projecting SSC discourse, such as solidarity, which connotes equal relations between donor and recipient. A different strand of argument comes from Abdenur (2007) and her Brazilian case, which, instead of portraying Southern actor as subordinate to the dominant Northern agenda, point to the way triangular cooperation serves a pivotal South’s self-promotion and foreign policy objectives.

Whether as an instrument or discourse of development, there is still little that we can learn from triangular cooperation. Much of academic attention in the interpretive group has been devoted to the broader interface between the South and the North via multilateral spaces and other arrangements, while triangular project is either treated as multilateral engagement (e.g., Abdenur and Da Fonseca 2013) or discussed in terms of SSC (e.g., Mawdsley 2012), therefore negating the potential discursive contribution of the Northern partner. Likewise, although Abdenur (2007) specifically talks about the Brazilian case, her level of analysis concerns the whole country and not a particular triangular project. Indeed, she recommends for future research “an in-depth study of a specific triangular cooperation arrangement” which “might establish the extent to which the rhetoric of individual members coincide, and whether this rhetoric matches the actual practices” (Abdenur 2007: 13). Her suggestion is channelled in this RP by taking a project scope and looking at each actor and the translation of policy ideas between them.

Despite the broad conceptualization of the South, SSC, and triangular cooperation, we may consider Indonesia and its development cooperation as part of the South and SSC for two reasons. First, Indonesia’s official documents, such as the Annual Reports of Indonesia’s South-South Cooperation, understand Indonesia and its cooperation as such. Second, Indonesia fulfills all three characteristics of SSC I explain above (non-DAC donor, donor-
recipient relations as horizontal (at least in official statements), and a history which started in the Asian-African Conference). Although Indonesian documents use terms such as “assistance” and “cooperation,” I use “aid” in this RP as the more generic and neutral term to describe voluntary granting of resources from one country (donor) to another (recipient), whether conditional or non-conditional.

1.2 Background: Strengthening Gender Mainstreaming (SGM) Program

Despite the long history of Indonesian development cooperation, it was not until 2010 that the institution began to take shape with the establishment of a National Coordination Team (NCT) for SSC consisting of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of National Development Planning (MNDP), Ministry of Finance (MOF), and Ministry of State Secretariat (MSS). As its name suggests, the ministries under the NCT act as policy coordinator while aid programs are designed and implemented by technical ministries.

Fiji has been the second largest recipient of Indonesian aid (behind Timor-Leste) for years. In 2017, for example, eight programs were implemented in Fiji out of 59 Indonesian aid programs in that year (Annual Report 2017). Cooperation between Fiji and Indonesia in the areas of women empowerment began in 2013 with a memorandum of understanding between Indonesia’s Ministry of Women Empowerment and Child Protection (MWECP) and Fiji’s Ministry of Women, Children, and Poverty Alleviation (MWCPA). The bilateral agreement led to the establishment of a joint technical working group which convenes biennially to discuss program ideas. In the 2017 meeting, the two ministries agreed that Indonesia will aid Fiji in “gender mainstreaming” by implementing GRPB in seven key Fijian ministries, and thus the SGM program was born. The program follows a whole-of-government approach and positions Fiji’s MWCPA as “national gender machinery” (PDM SGM). It started with training MWCPA’s staffs and establishing a dedicated unit for advocating GRPB and should proceed by assisting MWCPA in engaging and training the other six ministries to implement GRPB in their systems. Since 2017, two program phases had been completed with a total of six phases planned until 2022. In Phase I (2017), the program produced training curriculum and modules and conducted a training of trainers for MWCPA while in Phase II (2018), MWCPA staffs joined a one-month internship at MWECP in Indonesia. Phase III (2019) is perhaps the most critical since the core mainstreaming activity starts here. It was scheduled to start in April and would see Indonesia assist Fiji to establish a National Gender Policy Unit within MWCPA, which would then advocate the adoption of GRPB system in the other six ministries and to the parliament. By the end of this phase, the seven ministries were expected to delegate their representatives to form a National GRPB Working Group.

The SGM program coincides with a partnership between Indonesia and USAID called US-Indonesia Partnership for South-South and Triangular Cooperation Component 1 (USIP 1). Its mandate is both to support Indonesia’s programs in third countries and give capacity building to the Indonesian government as part of “traditional” aid from the United States to Indonesia. USAID through USIP 1 has been funding the SGM program since its inception in 2017.

SGM’s Phase III in 2019 was expected to start in April. Halfway into 2019, however, there was no response from Fiji to Indonesia’s call to continue. In early July, Fiji finally agreed to meet Indonesia in a joint technical working group which then granted the program its political greenlight. I used this meeting as the starting point of Phase III in this RP.
My observation ended when the three actors agreed to the design and start the implementation in August.

1.3 Research Objectives and Questions

I aim to understand the evolution of SGM which, despite the tensions between its actors and diminishing scope, emerged as a coherent and “successful” program through the process of translation. Such understanding helps us look through the black box that is triangular cooperation, which—as I demonstrate in the literature review—has been imagined in terms of fixed ideological categories of North and South. Simultaneously, it sheds light on the experience of recipient country which so far has been “expected to ‘actively participate’” and imagined as “sharing interests” (McEwan and Mawdsley 2012: 1203) with the other two actors. The academic aim of this RP, as my literature review implies, is to introduce project-level insights and recognize equal contribution of the three actors to the analysis of triangular cooperation. On the other hand, there is the critical function of this objective, that is to make visible the power of representations—such as in the claim of development projects as being successful, impactful, or, indeed, demand-driven—and the chain of actors as translators that make these representations possible. The coherent representation of program, I argue in this RP, transcends the typical dichotomy of powerful donor and weak recipient. For policy workers and academics, the RP is a reminder to be aware and critical of the ways seemingly objective, fixed statements in project documents might be re-interpreted and represented differently by different actors. Such modifications of meanings made possible by translation might distract everyone—including recipient—from the more pressing needs at the grassroots which deserve development’s attention.

The main research question is “How is coherence produced in the SGM program as a triangular cooperation between Indonesia, USAID, and Fiji?” It is made of the following sub-questions:

- What can we learn about policy ideas on development aid from Indonesia’s, USAID’s, and Fiji’s macro-policy documents?
- How do actors’ understanding and interactions in meetings filter and select which policy ideas go into the program design?
- How do actors make different policy ideas coherent through different representations of SGM design?
- What are actors’ rationales for the translation and coherence-making?

1.4 Organization of the Research Paper

Following this introduction, Chapter 2 sets up the theoretical framework on policy translation and methodology. Chapter 3 begins tracing the translation of different ideas into SGM by discussing general (macro-)policy documents from Indonesia, USAID, and Fiji in order to understand their respective global discourse on development cooperation. This chapter thus seeks to answer the first sub-question of this RP. However, documents will only provide limited knowledge of the translation process; they need to be contextualized to the perceptions of individuals representing Indonesia (MWECP), USAID, and Fiji (MWCPA) in the program—this is discussed in Chapter 4 by drawing on my interview results (except for Fiji, where I use information from literature to compensate for the lack of interviews). The other half of the chapter follows these individual actors as they negotiated program design in the meetings and actively made rational system of representations out of the design—this part is primarily based on meeting observations. I address the second sub-
question with this chapter. Subsequently, Chapter 5 explains the findings from the previous two chapters in terms of translation and coherence actors make of it as well as their rationales for doing so—hence addressing the third and last sub-questions. Finally, Chapter 6 presents a conclusion.
Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework and Methodology

2.1 Theoretical Framework: Policy Translation

I employ three frameworks to analyze the designing of SGM program as an act of policy translation, with “policy” here being both policy work (Colebatch 2009) and its expression (in the context of development project) in “development models, strategies and project designs” (Mosse 2004: 648). The frameworks are united in their interest in modification of policy ideas but differ in focus. These differences I utilize complementarily as follows.

First, Mukhtarov (2014: 76) defines policy translation as “the process of modification of policy ideas and creation of new meanings and designs in the process of the cross-jurisdictional travel of policy ideas.” The emphasis on travel is facilitated by three properties of translation: scale, meanings, and contingency, which provide valuable heuristic in understanding the translation process. Scale, socially constructed as “not simply an external fact awaiting discovery but a way of framing conceptions of reality” (Delaney and Leitner 1997: 94-95), is used by Mukhtarov (2014: 77) to point toward the unstable boundaries between the “global,” “regional,” “local,” or any other level of ordering and the material effects they produce. Self-evidently, scale is an inherent property of triangular cooperation as the program acts as an intersection of what otherwise would be three separate actors minding their own business at their own scales. However, which label should be given to the SGM program scale (e.g., “international” because of the actors involved? Or “national” when it pertains to the recipient?) is not clear and thus subject to the meanings assigned by its actors. As an analytical device, I refer to it as simply “program scale” as opposed to the “actor scales” (Figure 2.1), and this is related to the second framework of translation I explain in the next paragraph. Next, the property of meanings relates to “modification of the meaning of a policy idea according to sites, times, negotiation and struggles” (2014: 82). I conceptualize this in the RP in terms of the evolution of the more-or-less objective representation of the program as displayed in its Program Design Matrix (PDM). Lastly, contingency concerns “the inevitability of the unintended, unforeseen and contingent way in which policy ideas travelled” (2014: 83). The unplanned changes in policy ideas are seen as integral, rather than accidental, part of translation and hence analysis of it.

The second framework, drawn from development anthropology, primarily the works of Mosse (2004) and Lewis and Mosse (2006), is used to extend Mukhtarov’s formulation of translation. Translation is understood here as the “mutual enrollment and the interlocking of interests that produces project realities” (Mosse and Lewis 2006: 13), which is built on Latour’s arguments that objects become real by maintaining actors’ interests and thus interpretation of them (Latour and Porter 1996). The emphasis on translation as the act of making real complements the heuristic provided by Mukhtarov in several regards. First, it allows us to see the program as a “special” scale that need not be confined to the hierarchical labels such as international, national, or local; instead, the special attribute of the program scale is in that it represents “unified fields of development” that is not only produced, but also protected, through translation (Mosse and Lewis 2006: 14). Mukhtarov’s (2014: 81) explanation of the interconnectedness of scales implies that inter-scale relations are destined to be fragile and antagonistic as “activity at one scale has serious implications for another scale of governance.” Mosse’s (2004: 659) formulation reminds us instead that material developments and activities, while indeed affect program’s policy, do not determine program’s success or failure: a crisis is not a material one, but a “crisis of representa-
tions.” In the context of SGM, this allows us to look beyond the fact that the program was diminished in size and interrogate whether, despite the material crisis, the policy as a system of representations remains viable for the actors. Second, this framework allows us to investigate not only the meaning of the program as a result of translation, but also how this meaning is received by its translators. This is related to this framework’s emphasis on coherence—essentially how despite myriads of documents and meetings that constitute and feed into the program, actors aim to “make these fragmented activities appear coherent” (Shore and Wright 1997: 5)—which is the ultimate question raised in this RP. Third, focusing on translation as coherence-making might also allow not only to explain the contingent forms of the program, but also the reason the actors were able to manage contingency.

How do we observe the process and outcomes of translation? The third framework, drawing on Freeman (2012: 15), offers an operationalization of translation as “essentially that of meeting, talking, and writing.” Focusing on the media of policy (re-)production, Freeman looks at documents and meetings as the sites where policy ideas develop and between which policy as translations “reverberate”:

the knowledge brought to meetings is transformed as it is expressed in words; it is set down differently again in writing, as words on paper, and reinvented in the actions of professionals, practitioners, and public officials. (Freeman 2012: 15)

Taken together, these frameworks guide this RP in identifying which aspects and relations to interrogate in the designing of the SGM. Scale is used to explain how the gathering of triangular actors in the program reflects an inter-scale movement from actor scales to program scale, which entails explaining and juxtaposing different discourses that actors use in their own scales and the discourse and reality of the program. It also affects the methodological approach used, where cognition is taken as the mediator between actors and program. Meanwhile, meaning of the program is used to trace the evolution of SGM’s design as a discursive and contingent process. The focus on coherence is added to the dimensions of scale, meaning, and contingency so that the analysis not only illuminates how translation happened but also how it was justified for each actor. Finally, Freeman’s attention to documents and meetings and what gets added or deleted in between informs the kind of data collected (documents and observational materials, plus in-depth interviews to introduce the cognitive medium actors employ in moving between documents and program meetings) and overall methodology (discourse analysis and ethnography).
2.2 Methodology and Data

2.2.1 Socio-Cognitive Critical Discourse Analysis: (Macro-)Policy Documents and Interviews

I combine in this RP discourse analysis and ethnography due to the diversity of data collected and analyzed as well as the context-dependent nature of tracing policy ideas between documents, actors, and meetings. This methodological choice echoes Krzyżanowski (2011) who provides an excellent review of academic movement that brings Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and ethnography closer as research problems call for an examination of contexts beyond mere textual analysis and increasingly through fieldwork and actor-based analysis. CDA is distinguished by its three characteristics: recognition of the social dimension of discourse, systematic analysis, and critical standpoint (Fairclough 2010). Discourse is understood here as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena” (Hajer 1993: 45). My selection of CDA bears in mind the RP’s aspiration to link texts to social practices of designing the SGM (the act of translation) and investigate representations actors make and their social effects. Van Dijk’s socio-cognitive CDA is relevant here for its emphasis on contexts and the way they help “language users adapt their discourse to the social environment, so that it is socially appropriate” (van Dijk 2009: 73).

Per usual practice of discourse analysis and, more generally, interpretive policy analysis, this RP involves analysis of documents. The overall steps of this RP reflect Yanow’s (2000) guideline, in which she advises starting with document analysis, before proceeding to interviews with key actors and complemented with observations of meetings. I share Yanow’s (2000) view on documents as a source of background information, treating them as con-
tainers of global discourse, the local meanings of which should be obtained from further interviews and observations, leading to identifications and interpretations of artefacts. There seems to be no theoretical guideline on how to select texts for discourse analysis. Instead, identification of documents should apparently be based on the specific research problem and the case under study. Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012: 70) offer the following advice: “the interpretive documentary researcher wants not just any text but those that matter (or mattered) to the agents under study.” I therefore select documents which contain general aid policy (for the donors: Indonesia and USAID) and those that illustrate development plan and foreign policy from which we may understand the attitude to aid (for the recipient: Fiji). For the donors, I expected to include four or five latest documents to account for trend, but also to avoid policies from older administration that might not be relevant today. For Indonesia, it culminates in selecting the latest four Annual Reports reflecting the current Widodo administration, in addition to several other documents selected based on currency. Unfortunately for USAID and Fiji, selection was hampered by availability on the internet; that said, currency is the principle followed here. Specific discourse analysis techniques applied include content analysis (word frequency, keywords, and collocation analyses) following Alexander (2009), metaphor analysis following Schmitt (2005), and rhetoric analysis. List of documents and specific techniques applied to them is provided in Appendix 1.

Van Dijk adds to CDA an emphasis on cognition, that CDA studies mental representations and the processes of language users when they produce and comprehend discourse and participate in verbal interaction, as well as in the knowledge, ideologies and other beliefs shared by social groups. (van Dijk 2009: 64)

This affects my view of the interviews as a medium bridging the global discourse found in macro-policy documents and the local practice of the program with two implications. First, macro-policy documents are interpreted in light of actors’ cognition. This makes interviews a medium to interpret the movement from discourses found in the documents to the social practices of the program (meetings, negotiation, designing), which we might call the translation. Second, I also use the interviews to examine what I call the reverse-translation: how actors strive to rationalize program practices as a coherent representation of the discourse. The rationale for this two-way analysis is not only informed by my research question on coherence-making, but also the dialectical relationship between discourse and social practice, where discourse “is socially shaped, but it is also socially shaping, or constitutive” (Fairclough 2010: 92). In terms of the real conduct of interviews, this means that I attempted to clarify aspects of documents and practices through the questions. I asked, for example, how the MWECP person would describe Indonesian aid policy and how she would evaluate SGM’s developments. Discrepancies between discourse in documents and my observations of the meetings on one hand, and interview accounts on the other are introduced and highlighted. Following Fairclough (1992: 4) who understands “text” as referring to “any product whether written or spoken, so that the transcript of an interview or a conversation, for example, would be called a ‘text’,” I apply discourse analysis techniques as necessary to interview accounts, highlighting for example uses of certain metaphors or line of arguments.

Following semi-structured, qualitative interview technique, I devised beforehand interview guides containing “an outline of topics to be covered, with suggested questions” (Kvale 2007: 57). I outlined several broad topics and sub-topics, with questions to “probe” for each item. Because these are not strict questions, I re-phrased the questions and the sequence according to the replies—also because the interviews were in Indonesian while the guides were in English. Sometimes I followed up on interesting answers given by my interviewees although the topics were not in the guides. Three key interviews were made,
each with MWECP, USAID, and Fiji. Considering the small number of people participating in designing the program, the small interview size is natural. I made sure however that the interviewees are the key decisionmakers acting on behalf of their respective institutions in the program. Additionally, I interviewed people from MOFA, MSS, USIP 1, Pattiro (the consultant-cum-trainer for SGM), and a university researcher to corroborate accounts from the key interviews. I do not consider consultants key interviewees because their roles were limited to programmatic inputs, the adoption of which was further decided in the triangular meetings due to the intergovernmental nature of the project. See Appendix 2 for full list of interviews and links to the guides.

2.2.2 Ethnography: Meeting, (Micro-)Policy Documents, and Other Artefacts

The other half of the methodology involves observing program meeting as I expect them to be the sites where different actors, each having different understanding of aid or development, gather and negotiate program design. Echoing Freeman (2012) and his “reverberation” of policy ideas between documents, meetings, and more documents, I also followed the trails from the integrative meeting to the different artefacts produced from the meetings, such as meeting minutes, case study, revised Terms of Reference (TOR), and revised PDM—or the micro-policy or project documents. Artefacts, however, are not confined to these documents; they also include offices, staffs, and other objects which have constructed the social order of the program (Latour 2000) and hence affected the (reverse-)translation. Other than the interviews, these documents and other artefacts provide additional evidences to ascertain the different representations actors made of the agreed design.

To document the real-world translation of ideas into the program, I originally decided to observe multi-stakeholder meetings during my fieldwork in July and August 2019 (Phase III). To be clear, the SGM program (or any other Indonesian aid programs) does not have its own office and staffs. Instead, the three key stakeholders meet to negotiate or decide a matter, usually at the MWECP office, with Fiji joining through internet call. Sometimes, when the matter to be decided calls for brainstorming or long debate, they would rent a place for a day or two. As a former USIP 1 staff who was involved in the program in its first phase, I thus expected to see regular meetings at MWECP. However, and to my initial concern, only one such meeting (on August 8) occurred during my fieldwork. For the remainder of my fieldwork, I chose instead to stay at USIP 1, which is my former office, and observe the work there. Despite the lack of meetings, I realized that program designing still happened, only this time revolving between USIP 1 staffs and Pattiro behind emails and other personal communications without the decision-makers from MWECP, USAID, and Fiji needed to be involved. In total, I observed four meetings: 9 July (USIP 1 internal), 30 July (USIP 1 internal), 8 August (multi-stakeholder), and 13 August (USIP 1 and USAID). Appendix 3 provides a list of meetings and my notes of them.

My approach to the observation can be described as ethnographic for several reasons following Hammersley and Atkinson (2007): observation as the data collection method is relatively unstructured, it was conducted within its natural context without modification from my part, and the observed consisted of a small group of people. Related to the last trait, my initial intention for staying at the USIP 1 office was to “shadow” the project managers as they move between internal and external meetings. However, the dearth of multi-stakeholder meeting forced me to give up this direction. Instead, I extended the observation to the whole staffs (there were only nine of them) to grasp what they were doing and thinking in the idleness. Typically, I arrived in the morning, sat together in the open-plan office with the regular staffs, and kept my awareness open of what everybody was doing and what happened “out there” with the other actors. When a new development broke, I
would note staffs’ reactions. Similarly, my presence was natural and non-intrusive in the meetings, both internal and multi-stakeholder. As a former project worker, my role can be described as that of observing participants: “insiders who observe and record some aspects of life around them” (Bernard 2011: 260). The observations resulted in fieldnotes, which I compared and complemented with interviews, meeting minutes, and other artefacts. The rationale for documenting only meetings and not the on-field project implementation follows the event ethnography approach by Brosius and Campbell (2010: 247) where project meetings are seen as sites of “politics of decision-making that shape the ideological and practical orientation of institutions.”

2.3 Scope and Limitation

To clearly demarcate the scope of this RP, some clarifications are necessary. First, this RP focuses on the third and latest phase of the program (2019)—a scope informed by practical and methodological considerations. The former relates to the limitation of my fieldwork, where I could only observe the program during the designing of the third phase in Jakarta. Meanwhile, the latter relates to the necessity of conducting observations given my interest in documenting real-time evolution of the program. I expect a few questions to arise regarding this position. These and my answers to them are as follows:

a. *Can this RP account for the whole SGM by only focusing on Phase III?* Data that specifically concern Phase III mostly come from observations. With documents and interviews, I took a broader stance, analyzing the global discourse or asking what actors think of the program so far. Indeed, representativeness might be considered cumulative: I can account for SGM's developments and representations by Phase III, but not after that.

b. *What is the rationale for analyzing program design but not implementation?* On one hand, the reason is practical: documenting implementation would require traveling to Fiji, which I simply could not afford. On the other, I am interested in the politics of decision-making, which is manifested in the designing and protection of the decisions through representations. The RP thus excludes direct beneficiaries from its main analysis. When “recipient” is mentioned, such as in “recipient strategy,” I refer to the Fijian government, especially MWCPA.

Second, I occasionally refer to SGM as a case, which is true so long as it is “a spatially delimited phenomenon…observed at a single point in time or over some period of time” (Gerring 2007: 19). The findings however are not intended to be generalizable to any population of cases of triangular cooperation as my selection of SGM did not consider variables that might be present in triangular programs and their distribution across the population. Rather, as I explain above, the selection was based on the practicality of conducting a study that observes an Indonesian triangular cooperation as it happens. That said, I do wish to make a theoretical contribution to the study of development cooperation as a discursive space by juxtaposing the results of this RP with the current literature on triangular cooperation.

Third, I was unable to perform interviews with Fiji as an important window to recipient’s understanding of and contribution to the program. I managed to communicate with several MWCPA’s officials, including a high-level one, whose contacts I obtained from my MWECP’s informant. However, my attempts to get them to answer my questions, even in writing, have been met with unresponsiveness. As a workaround, I draw on Fiji’s development planning documents and literature on Fiji’s development cooperation. Put under the socio-cognitive lens and triangulated with data from the multi-stakeholder meeting where
Fiji was present, I hope to illuminate Fiji’s expectations and how they discursively shape the program.

2.4 Positionality and Ethical Considerations

My choice for this topic and data—despite my utmost effort to justify it with existing literature and rigorous theoretical and methodological considerations—is in no small part related to my previous employment at USIP 1 from 2016 to 2018. As part of the team, my daily work revolved around project design and proposing them internally as well as to the Indonesian government. This experience has provided me with knowledge of the field and access to documents and formal and informal meetings with Indonesian aid stakeholders from the government and donor community. These are not only practical resources with which this study was made feasible, they are also impactful in shaping my perspective and interpretation of the research problem. This includes knowing which parts of the text and the project process to further subject to critics or elaboration as well as which supporting data are needed and where to seek them to illuminate findings. For example, my judgment in Chapter 4 about the project’s seeming idleness being a good sign is informed by this position—because it happened before and I realized it. Based on this knowledge, I could then ask what the USIP 1 manager thought about the idleness or share my opinion about it.

On the other hand, such background also opens possibilities for bias, not only in terms of privileging certain ways of interpretation but also the kinds of data available to me. The latter is perhaps quite noticeable in how I stayed in USIP 1 office for most of my fieldwork duration, choosing to observe USIP 1’s day-to-day work. As explained earlier, this is mostly due to external meetings happening much less than I had expected. To avoid my data being dominated by information about USIP 1, I treated my stay there as a “window” to the program. Because nowadays interactions happened increasingly in a screen—via emails, text messages, files shared across computers—it was not impossible to sit in USIP 1’s office while getting a sense of the program developing and its actors interacting. Meanwhile, to mitigate interpretive bias, my strategy was twofold. First, I triangulated different types of data. Second, I confirmed an information provided by an informant, or one I heard in a meeting, to the other actors and compared their accounts.

Standard ethical procedure is applied in this study. This includes obtaining permissions to obtain and cite documents that are not publicly accessible. This also means that I always announced my role as researcher in every meeting (because otherwise it was easy to be mistaken as colleague). As an insider, access to project activities was rather easy to obtain. Nevertheless, I provide anonymity to all meeting participants and informants, keeping only their affiliations and, in some cases, initials in this RP. Translations are provided as necessary for quotes from texts in Indonesian.
Chapter 3
Global Discourses on Aid and Development

3.1 Indonesia’s Annual Reports: Principles, Rhetoric, and (Lack of) Development Goals

Indonesia’s aid policy is structured around several documents: National Medium-Term Development Plan, Annual Reports, and several internal studies or policy papers. For conciseness, I discuss the first two only with an emphasis on Annual Reports, although for definitions I also refer to some of the policy papers.

The National Medium-Term Development Plan is a quadrennial planning document that lays out Indonesia’s multisectoral development priorities. The 2015-2019 National Medium-Term Development Plan situates Indonesia’s development cooperation with Southern countries under Agenda 1: Bringing the State Back to Protect the Whole Nation and Provide Security to All Citizens (Doc RPJMN 2015: 6-1 (translated)). The Agenda implies a state-centric approach to aid provision—the sub-agenda containing the aid programs is called “Strengthening Role in Global and Regional Cooperation” (Doc RPJMN 2015: 6-7 (translated))—as well as how Indonesian aid is framed within security and foreign policy objectives.

The Annual Reports are perhaps the flagship documents of Indonesian aid equivalent to USAID’s Policy Framework or similar documents from other donors. However, unlike the Policy Framework which “articulates USAID’s approach to providing development and humanitarian assistance” (USAID 2019: 6) and is thus future-oriented, the Annual Reports look back at the previous year’s activities to “record significant accomplishments of works/programs…and as a way of achieving accountability, while promoting Indonesia’s SSC to both the international and domestic publics” (Doc Annual Report 2017: ii). The documents are available in Indonesian and English. The English version is used in this RP.

Indonesia’s approach to development in its aid programs is guided by principles of Indonesian SSC, which are based on Indonesian foreign policy and serve to “help each other achieve mutual independence, promote development, and strengthen solidarity between developing countries” (Doc A1 2016: 43 (translated)). As stated in the policy paper “South-South Cooperation as Instrument of Indonesian Foreign Policy” published by MOFA, these principles include

- mutual respect for national sovereignty; equality; independence and non-conditionality; solidarity; national ownership; non-interference; mutual opportunity, mutual benefit; demand-driven; comprehensive, transparent, and sustainable; contributing to the achievement of global development agenda; and mutually beneficial economic relationship. (Doc A1 2016: 43 (translated))

However, not every principle receives equal mentions in the Annual Reports. Moreover, although the above policy paper mentions that the principles were agreed on in an FGD (Doc A1 2016: 43), the document or the Annual Reports never define their meanings clearly. This might mean that the authors prefer to keep them abstract—perhaps to elongate their meanings—and this invites an investigation to what each of the principles connotes. Across documents, and in interviews when I asked respondents to explain Indonesian aid policy in general, three principles stand out: demand-driven, solidarity, and ownership.
3.1.1 Demand-driven

As far as official statements are concerned, this is perhaps the most identifiable principle of Indonesian aid. The term “demand-driven” in Annual Reports of Indonesia’s SSC sometimes coincides with “principle” and is written in English even in the Indonesian version, which appears to give it a “brand” status.

From Doc Academic Paper (2014: 75), “demand-driven approach would mean carrying out activities specifically based on the needs of the beneficiary countries.” However, it is not clear how “needs” is defined. Searching for “demand-driven” in Paris Declaration—a milestone that marks OECD DAC’s recognition of Southern donors’ role in international development—we see that the term is used in relation to ownership, one of the principles agreed in the Declaration: “Donors’ support for capacity development will be demand-driven and designed to support country ownership” (OECD 2005: 16).

Noticeably, there is no “demand from” in the reports; instead, besides “demand-driven,” the word that collocates the most with “demand” is “for.” Not only does it highlight the emphasis on what program or resources is demanded (”demand for knowledge exchange” (Doc Annual Report 2014: 35), “demand for skilled personnel” (Doc Annual Report 2014: 17)), “demand for” is also used to stress the importance and relevance of Indonesia’s aid:

Demand for Indonesian development assistance has continued to increase. By the end of 2014 there had been more than 300 requests from 42 countries. This has motivated Indonesia to continually develop new methods for improving coordination and implementation in the interests of more effective programs. (Doc Annual Report 2014: 2-3)

More importantly, “demand” is always written as a noun and never as a verb. This represents nominalization of development cooperation which emphasizes what is demanded (the program) and who answers the demand (Indonesia), and de-emphasizes who demands (the recipient). This feature seems to facilitate the promotional and celebratory language of the reports.

3.1.2 Solidarity

Semantically, we can understand this term to connote agreement or unity: entities that possess solidarity are homogenized in their actions and purpose. “Solidarity” co-occurs mostly with “developing countries” or “Southern countries”—unlike “demand,” “solidarity” recognizes its agents but present them as generalized developing or Southern countries with which Indonesian programs attempt to connect. In several instances, “solidarity” is formed as adverbial (“[a]s an act of solidarity and cooperation” (Doc Annual Report 2014: 12), “[i]n the spirit of solidarity, Southern countries are trying to increase their capacity” (Doc Annual Report 2017: 29)) which suggests a common goal that not only Indonesia, but also the recipients of its aid strive for. Someone or something shares a goal with an in-group, therefore it also marks a division between SSC as a project between developing countries and traditional aids that belong to the North. This principle therefore serves a rhetorical purpose: to convince readers of the unity of agenda among developing countries that might render Indonesian aid more acceptable.

In the contexts where “solidarity” is found, rhetoric on unity is most effectively exercised by appealing to history. For example:

South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) has come as an initiative and act of solidarity from developing countries since 1960s. The main focus of SSTC is development cooperation to produce development solutions including on infrastructure, economic development, governance, social protection, education and health services, food and energy, environment
and climate change, and others. Entering the 21st century, SSTC has become an important forum for developing countries to exchange information and experience, and to improve knowledge on development. (Doc Annual Report 2016: 13)

The passage comes from a section called “Indonesia’s SSTC at a Glance” but starts with a general discussion of SSTC. In an attempt to connect with the developing world, it paints an impersonal picture that not only roots SSTC in history, but also Indonesia’s aid in SSTC’s (purported) history. The use of historical relations as a basis for solidarity among developing countries seems to be shared by other SSC practitioners as exemplified in the Bogota Statement: “SSC is a historical process, with unique characteristics, which reflects solidarity” (OECD 2010: 1). Alluding to history and historical narrative gives Indonesia the authority to show that its recipients welcome the aid and the cooperation. After all, this is not Indonesia speaking, but history.

3.1.3 Ownership

This term occurs in far fewer instances throughout the documents. “Ownership” is only mentioned eight times in four editions of the Reports and the policy paper, although in two of the instances it coincides with “principle,” just like “demand-driven.” Less frequent mentions despite the emblematic status might be due to how “ownership” serves similar function as “demand”: to appeal for acceptance or attention by making Indonesia and what it has achieved more prominent. The way “ownership” is phrased as a result of Indonesia’s action in the following instances exemplifies this function:

“Alignment between the needs of beneficiary countries and Indonesia’s own development goals is of paramount importance for fostering a sense of ownership” (Doc Academic Paper 2014: 95).

“Development cooperation: Activity that…is based on cooperative relationships that seek to enhance developing country ownership” (Doc Annual Report 2014: 46).

Again, these constitute nominalization of the recipients’ act to “exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions,” (OECD 2005: 3) assuming that the texts are inspired by the same meaning of “ownership” found in Paris Declaration. Instead of “a country owns (or other similar word or construction that suggests recipients actively doing or producing) something,” “ownership” is made possible by other subjects: Indonesia and its aid. Through “fostering” and “enhance” in above instances, the discursive effect is to say that Indonesia is responsible for enabling recipients to empower themselves.

At face value, the three principles serve to identify Indonesia with other developing countries with whom it cooperates. Each puts Indonesia on equal grounds with its beneficiaries, and this is facilitated by euphemisms, such as “cooperation” in lieu of “aid” or “assistance,” or “partners” in lieu of “beneficiaries” or “recipients.” Although the documents regard SSC not as substitute, but “an effective complement to existing cooperation efforts” (Doc Annual Report 2014: iii), I see more an attempt to distance the programs from the “traditional” North-South relations. This is shown by the use of “(Indonesia’s) SSC” in contexts where “aid” or “programs” is the more accessible terms. (As an aside, searching for “Indonesian aid” on the internet might lead to incorrect results on foreign aid received by Indonesia. To get relevant results—including news and academic articles—search instead for “Indonesia SSC,” which seems to demonstrate the government’s successful control of the discourse across media, international organizations, and academia.)
However, contents analysis above also reveals the rhetoric function of the principles which works with appeal to SSC history and nominalizations to amplify the ethos—or assumed character of the author—of an ambitious, proud Indonesia. Pathos—appeal to emotion—works insofar as the solidarity principle and historical device evoke an in-group feeling among the developing country readers. Meanwhile, logos—formation of reasoned arguments—appears to be the least convincing among the three rhetoric devices. Occasional grammatical errors and syntax that does not sound natural help exacerbate the logos.

Development discourse strives “by creating “abnormalities”…which it would later treat and reform” (Escobar 1995: 41). What “abnormalities” does the aid discourse want to “cure”? Running a simple word frequency analysis, I am confronted by a lack of words that indicate objects of development (Figure 2.1). Words which suggest development problems, or areas, or topics do not appear at the top of the list. Among the top 100 words, these terms start to appear only on the 32nd with “economic.” Countries or regions receiving “treatment” are mentioned more, starting with “Timor” on the 22nd and followed by “Myanmar,” “Fiji,” “Pacific,” and so on. Also interesting is the prominence of “was” and “were” which are 8th and 18th on the list. Not only does this indicate the appeal to history discussed before, sentences formed in past tense facilitate the descriptive language of the Reports. Their other function is to facilitate passivization of these events, further aiding the omission of agents participating in them. Meanwhile, the lexical composition also lacks terms which indicate expected quality of aid, such as “inclusive” or “impact.”

From preceding discussion, we can infer that the Annual Reports celebrate Indonesia’s implementation of its programs. Indonesia positions itself as sharing common history and experience with its recipient, and its programs as demanded. At the same time, development objects (or “abnormalities”) in recipient countries are little mentioned. This language of aid stands in contrast to, for example, USAID’s Policy Framework (discussed below), which prides itself on its achievements to address famine, diseases, natural disasters, to mention a few. With a lack of mentions of development objects and desired qualities of the aid, Indonesia’s lauded “achievements” seem to signify little developmental purpose and we are left wondering what developmental effects Indonesia wants to create in recipient countries. On the other hand, the prominence of the principles seems to suggest that catering to demands, fostering ownership, and acting in solidarity have indeed become both the means and ends of Indonesian aid.
Figure 3.1 Top Words in Indonesia’s Aid Documents

Source: author’s analysis using AntConc

3.2 USAID’s Policy Framework: “Bankspeak” and the Drive to Teach

Two editions of USAID’s “Policy Framework” are available on the web and make up my analysis: the 2011-2015 Policy Framework and the current 2019 Policy Framework. As noted earlier, these documents function as a guideline. Therefore, unlike Indonesian Annual Reports’ more descriptive recounting of past events, USAID relies more on present and present perfect tenses to summarize results and generalize them beyond temporal confines. Apparently, as a result of this language, USAID makes it clear what objectives it wants to serve. Terms indicating objects of the aid programs appear more in the documents, starting with “growth” and “reliance” in the top 20 (Figure 2.2). Meanwhile, unlike Indonesia’s, USAID’s documents do not feature their recipient countries or regions as prominently. Instead, recipients are more often homogenized as “countries,” “many countries,” or “some countries.” This lexical composition reminds me of “Bankspeak”—or the language the World Bank uses in its reports—one of whose hallmarks is the declining specificity: solutions “are the same for everybody, everywhere” (Moretti and Pestre 2015: 87).

Country names not appearing higher in the word frequency rank might be due to two possible explanations. First, Indonesia simply gives aid to limited number of countries and mentions them repeatedly, while USAID covers more countries than the texts can concentratedly discuss about. Or second, Indonesia’s reports are structured around individual programs with recipient countries and regions, so they get the spotlight; meanwhile, USAID
uses categories such as “Vision” and “Mission.” In the latter structure, country names are used as mere examples to support more general arguments of each chapter. Finally, USAID includes terms that indicate expected quality of their aid—such as “effective,” “sustainable,” “impact,” and “inclusive”—which Indonesia sorely lacks.

Other discursive features of the Frameworks are as follows. First, there is the motivation for USAID as donor to teach, and expectation for recipient to learn as pointed out by Müller, F. and Sondermann (2016) and Morvaridi and Hughes (2018) to be one of the traits of “traditional” North-South relations. “Self-reliance,” as the theme and mission of the 2019 Framework, is understood in this vein as “help[ing] countries go from being recipients to partners to, one day, fellow donors” (USAID 2019: 8) and not simply as “Ending the Need for Foreign Assistance” (my emphasis) as the report’s subtitle proclaims. Second, it subscribes to the professionalization of development where “projects became synonymous with development itself” (Porter 1995: 69). Therefore, when recipients are considered having met “self-reliance,” USAID’s next step is to commence strategic transitions, which “does not necessarily signal the end of USAID’s engagement but, more typically, its evolution” (USAID 2019: 39). The fruit of development projects is therefore more projects.

Figure 3.2 Top Words in USAID’s Documents

Source: author’s analysis using AntConc
3.3 Fiji’s Women and Foreign Policy: “Women in Development” and Look North Policy

Fiji’s current National Development Plan has a section on women empowerment called “Women in Development.” The section noticeably divides issues faced by women, such as gender-based violence and access to education, and the planning process in which it promises to include and consult women: “Women will be included and consulted in all planning for future development projects, and their input will be translated into tangible project outcomes” (Ministry of Economy 2017: 5). Another document, the National Gender Policy, has a section called “Responsive Gender Budgeting and Planning,” reflecting the language used in SGM. Unlike the Plan, which seems to limit women participation in “projects”—which apparently means implementation of programs at the community level—the National Gender Policy promises consultation with “NGO gender based groups both before the Budget has been drawn up and after the Budget has been announced” (Ministry for Social Welfare, Women and Poverty Alleviation 2014: 21)—hence at the national level.

Policy language behind “Women in Development” seems to imply a market-oriented women empowerment, where women are seen “as an important resource and asset” and empowerment is designed to help women “reach their full development potential” in order “to be fully harnessed for the benefit of the entire nation” (Ministry of Economy 2017: 55). The problem of equality and representation is therefore an economic problem, a matter of missing resources that otherwise would have contributed in the country’s national accounts. Combined with both documents’ segregation of policymaking (planning and budgeting) from objects of policy (issues women face), Fiji’s women policy seems to illustrate the Foucauldian notion of governmentality:

The art of government…is essentially concerned with answering the question of how to introduce economy—that is to say, the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family…and of making the family fortunes prosper—…into the management of the state. (Foucault 1991: 92)

There are considerable mentions of “development partners” in the National Development Plan, which might explain Fiji’s substantial amount of aid received—according to World Bank (2017), aid made up about 10% of Fiji’s government expenditure in 2017. In terms of Fiji’s relations with donors, it is relevant to discuss the Look North policy. Following a series of military coups—the latest of which happened in 2006—and a military government coming out of them, there were attempts from Australia and New Zealand as Fiji’s traditional partners to “[pressure] Fiji to restore democratic institutions” (Wesley-Smith 2013: 366). These include cutting access to loan and aid and suspending Fiji’s membership in the Pacific Islands Forum and the Commonwealth (Komai 2015: 112). The Look North policy, spelled out in Fiji Minister for Foreign Affairs’ speech in 2013 Australia-Fiji Business Forum, embodies Fiji’s stance regarding its isolation by its traditional partners:

Fiji no longer looks to just Australia and New Zealand as our natural allies and protectors, we look to the World. Jolted from our complacency by the doors that were slammed in our faces, we looked North—to the great powers of Asia, especially China, India and Indonesia and more recently to Russia. We looked South, to the vast array of nations, big and small, that make up the developing world and we currently chair the G77, the biggest voting bloc at the United Nations. And we looked to our Melanesian neighbours, to forge closer ties with them and use our collective strength to make our voices heard in global forums and secure better trading deals for us all. (Kubuabola. 2013)
The statement highlights Fiji’s eagerness to establish diplomatic and economic ties with all countries beyond its traditional partners, provided that they respect and do not interfere with Fiji’s internal politics (Komai 2015: 114).
Chapter 4
The Cobweb of Contexts: Mediating Global Discourses Through Actors and Meetings

Hugh Heclo (1974: 316) has an interesting metaphor to describe the movement of policy ideas: that of “cobweb of socioeconomic conditions, policy middlemen, and political institutions [which] reverberates to the consequences of previous policy.” It suggests that policy travels through layers of individuals and institutions, each of which adds modifications as the ideas pass through while simultaneously ensuring that the original policy endures in some form. As discussed above, this metaphor of “reverberation” of policy has been extended by Freeman (2012) in his analysis of policy as movement between meetings and documents. Adding into this a socio-cognitive analysis, this chapter discusses the three main actors in SGM and the meetings between them not merely in terms of “cobweb” of institutions and individuals, but of contexts. It means paying attention, inter alia, to the fact that the USAID person is a local staff, not an expatriate; or the possibility that the Fijian government has been overburdened by the management of aid and how these have contributed in the modifications of global discourses.

4.1 Actors and Their Cognitions

4.1.1 USAID Indonesia

The USAID person assigned to supervise USIP 1 is an Indonesian, a local staff. He has the final say to any proposal or decision made by USIP 1 before the project team brings that proposal or decision to the Indonesian government. Normally, USAID is not involved in the direct negotiation with the Indonesian government or in trilateral negotiation. USIP 1, as USAID’s current project in supporting the Indonesian aid, instead represents USAID in those meetings.

At USAID Indonesia, the USAID person is involved in SSTC-related activities—thus, working closely with the Indonesian government—and not so much in bilateral USAID programs for Indonesia. This is an important context that seems to explain his familiarity with two aspects of Indonesia’s global discourse. First, that Indonesia’s foreign-policy framing is well understood as a result of “dominant role of Indonesia’s MOFA in determining priority countries” (Interview USAID) and second, that “number of demands determines priority” (Interview USAID). This familiar use of “demand” in the interview extends to his explanation of USAID’s own approach in assisting Indonesia, that USAID’s programs are “harmonized with Indonesia’s demands as indicated in its National Medium-Term Development Plan” (Interview USAID). Indeed, USIP 1’s Project Principles include a demand-driven principle which applies to both “demands of GOI [Government of Indonesia]” and “requests provided directly to the GOI by third-countries” (USAID 2015: 18). This usage of “demands” is absent from USAID’s Policy Framework, the global USAID’s policy document. USAID’s adoption of Indonesia’s demand-driven principle in its project and local communication seems to indicate the existence of “local meanings” (van Dijk 2009: 69) which function to make its language, and hence its practice, more understandable, and hence more acceptable, by its Indonesian partners and that might be different from the global discourse.
However, the shared language seems to end there. In the interview, USAID stresses not only its financial contribution in Indonesian aid, but also the opportunity to share knowledge and experience (Interview USAID). This echoes the documentary finding on USAID’s motivation to teach Indonesia as a “new” donor. Furthermore, USIP 1’s goal is seen as to build capacity of the Indonesian government to provide aid, while aid programs assisted by USIP 1 (including the SGM) are seen only as pilot programs (USAID 2015, Interview USAID). This perspective is interesting because surely Indonesia does not see the programs as pilot—after all Indonesia has been providing aid for decades. Not only does it restate USAID’s view of this cooperation as a learning arena—to say that USIP 1 aims to build Indonesia’s capacity and that its programs are pilot evokes the image of USAID assisting Indonesia in assembling the programs as an exercise of learning-by-doing—it also highlights how USAID still sees the mechanism as traditional North-South relations, where Indonesia, and not the third-country recipient, is the beneficiary that matters.

4.1.2 Indonesia’s Ministry of Women Empowerment and Child Protection (MWECP)

The role of MWECP is to decide on program design in coordination with its Fijian counterpart. Like other Indonesia’s SSC programs, SGM started from intergovernmental arrangement, in this case a joint technical working group meeting between the two ministries in 2017 (Interview MWECP). Every year, before a new phase was launched, the Indonesian and Fijian ministries would gather—either in inter-government meeting or together with USAID, in person or via web conferencing. The room for discussion was thus limited to few meetings on a yearly basis, but they were always collaborative.

My MWECP informant did not mention any principle of Indonesian aid, but she did state that Fiji was chosen following “MOFA’s direction,” therefore situating the discourse still within foreign policy and strategic approach. The interview revolved around MWECP’s inability to keep participants’ retention of knowledge and commitment for the project over the years, which would be understood as “too interfering” (Interview MWECP). For example, it was recently known that Fiji’s MWCPA had been drafting a new master plan assisted by the Canadian government which gives focus on women’s economic empowerment and elimination of violence against women for 2020-2024 (Interview MWECP). This sudden development created tension on the Indonesian side as Fiji demanded that all programs going forward, including Phase III of SGM, be aligned with the master plan (MOM JTWG: 1). Furthermore, MWECP allowed Fiji full control in determining which agencies to train and engage with across program’s phases, and the composition has been dominated by government agencies. In this third phase, all participants are decided to be from the national government, both before and after the big design change. The consultants initially tried to offer a technocratic reason for including non-government elements—that the design would include advocacy to local governments where inputs from community or NGOs are necessary—but Fiji was not convinced (Interview Pattiro).

4.1.3 Government of Fiji

As stated earlier, the main limitation of this RP is its inability to obtain firsthand recipient’s perspective through interviews. An improvisation is therefore applied, which involves guesswork on the contexts that might help in interpreting Fiji’s reception of the cooperation based on literature findings.

The first, argued by Murray and Overton (2011), relates to the contradictory effect of ownership agenda on Pacific island countries which promises recipient’s sovereignty in aid management but results in overburdening recipient governments in program implementa-
tion. The “rhetoric of state control” of the ownership agenda has produced a new kind of conditionalities, one that requires recipient governments to set up new management functions for activities such as “[t]he drawing up of poverty reduction strategies, the design of projects and programmes and, critically, the dispersal of financial resources to support these activities” (2011: 280). For small island countries like Fiji, such functions are taxing, especially as they have small bureaucracy and administrative system and culture that are not adapted to donors’ programs (2011: 281). The second context pertains to the strategy that Fiji might employ in its relations with donors. In terms of foreign policy, I allude to this above by discussing the Look North policy representing Fiji’s maneuver between traditional and “emerging” donors. In terms of aid relations, it might be useful to interpret the SGM program in light of Fiji’s other commitments with ADB and Canada and its strategy to manage relations with the different donors.

4.2 Meetings

4.2.1 From Joint Technical Working Group to USIP 1 Internal Meetings

This third phase of the program was opened with the biennial joint technical working group meeting between MWECP and MWCPA on July 5, 2019. It is in this meeting that the Indonesian delegation knew that Fiji’s MWCPA had been drafting with Canadian assistance “a 5-year Master Plan for the Department of Women (2020-2024), which is a merger of [Fiji’s] National Gender Policy and Women Empowerment Programs” (MOM JTWG: 1). Other than the sudden demand that Indonesia adjust its training curriculum to the master plan, Fiji admitted that it had not conducted follow-up actions as agreed since Phase II, notably to submit to Fiji’s Prime Minister a request for endorsing MWCPA as “national gender machinery” (MOM JTWG: 1). The MWECP representative—who is also my interviewee—was perceptibly baffled by this development which might be due to Fiji’s new preoccupation with Canada.

The joint meeting happened early in my fieldwork. Although certainly the new development was unwelcome, especially for the Indonesian government, USIP 1 team seemed to be more poised. The meeting came after no response from Fiji since the end of Phase II (2018)—despite the plan to initiate Phase III in April 2019—so it finally happening gave a degree of assurance that the third phase would at least commence. In addition, as one of USIP 1’s project managers told me, “program design is always changing, it’s a common thing [in development work]” (Interview YP). This guarded confidence permeated the project during half of my fieldwork. Despite the work that will come once the requested modifications to the training become better known, everything went normally: USIP 1 and Pat-tiro started drafting the TOR, timeline was proposed, and based on them, a budget was made and cost-sharing between USIP 1/USAID and the Indonesian government negotiated. All these happened in personal emails or text messages between project managers-consultants-government officials where my only window to them was through quick mentions in USIP 1 meetings. In fact, the USIP 1 office—where I was staying during most of my fieldwork—was very quiet: one month in and there was no meeting with other stakeholders, only project staffs working day in, day out behind their desks with occasional meetings between them.

But it was actually a sign that the program worked; that its policy overall, understood as “development models, strategies and project designs” (Mosse 2004: 648), was coherent enough to survive the turn of events. “Minor” disruption such as those resulted from the MWECP-MWCPA meeting needed only be met by small note in the PDM’s assumption.
that “curriculum and training modules are customized and adjusted to the Fijian government system” (PDM SGM). As Mosse (2004: 648) has argued, the relations between program’s policy and its practices/events are one where the former legitimizes, rather than orientates, the latter; in other words, project design is a system of representations that is always in flux following the project’s practices. And I was apparently right about the seeming idleness being a sign for stability: when in early August the manager announced that the Indonesian MWECP had called for a meeting with USIP 1, Pattiro, the MSS, and Fijian MWCPA, I knew an unwelcome development had happened. Another disruption had occurred to the then-stabilized system of representations.

4.2.2 From Internal Meetings to Multi-Stakeholder Meeting

On August 7, one day before the big meeting, USIP 1 program manager received an invitation to meet from MWECP following news from the ministry’s communication with Fiji. The manager highlighted four points from the news which include his thoughts. First, it was revealed that Fiji’s Ministry of Economy (MOE), which presides over planning and budgeting of the whole government, had been assisted by ADB in conducting budget assessment for the upcoming fiscal year, including in gender perspective. Second, MWCPA was concerned that the GRPB component and the whole-of-government approach championed by the SGM program would mean stepping into the arrangement set by ADB. Therefore, MWCPA offered instead to change SGM’s goal to include “Institutional Capacity Building.” Third, MWCPA would reduce the number of target ministries from seven (as agreed after the joint meeting) to three since the remaining ministries would cooperate with MOE and ADB instead. Lastly, the manager was concerned that USAID would cancel Phase III altogether considering the new developments which significantly deviate from the PDM. MWECP hoped that USIP 1, Pattiro, and MSS could help convince MWCPA, which joined via internet call, to stick to the plan.

In the meeting, the MWCPA official confirmed most of the above information. Notably, she wanted to revise the program’s goal into “Strengthening Institutional Capacity and Structure on Gender Transformative Programming.” I understand this as Fiji trying to synchronize the different programs it receives from Indonesia, Canada, and ADB. On one hand, the description reflects the wording in the new master plan with Canada where GRPB component is found. On the other, it means that the “mainstreaming” part, where participating ministries are expected to work together to establish a National GRPB Working Group, will be deleted. This effectively limits SGM program to trainings only, and even with fewer participating ministries than planned because they are split up with the Canadian and ADB programs.

Meanwhile, the advocacy part now falls under MOE’s program with ADB. It seems that MOE, which is responsible for the government’s budget, was not interested in GRPB. But this changed when ADB came:

MWCPA: Ever since we started this GRPB project, we have not been able to have a working relationship with Ministry of Economy. Our trying to get their buy-in for the whole-of-government approach in implementing GRPB has not been successful. We cannot do GRPB with other agencies without the buy-in of Ministry of Economy, and that we did not have, until the ADB came in.

Pattiro: I think this is a good opportunity for you—for MWCPA—to collaborate with MOE because they are now concerned, leading, and just work together…

MWCPA: Exactly. That’s what ADB has managed to do for us. They opened up the door, so now…You know…it’s not only the gender-responsive budgeting. They actually came in for something else…on loan concession. So ADB would ask you, ‘Where is the gender
component of all this? We will not look at any loan application if it does not have a gender perspective.' So the Ministry of Economy wrote us in. (August 8 meeting)

Clearly, this meeting highlights the unequal power of Fiji’s MOE vis-à-vis that of MWCPA, and perhaps also between ADB with more financial incentives and Indonesia. More interestingly, however, the exchanges show how reluctant Indonesia was to act assertively despite its donor status. From Indonesia, there were more careful questions clarifying what Fiji wanted to do (“we would like to clarify which driver ministries will be involved in the project” (MOM 8-8: 2), “since gender mainstreaming is a collaborative work, can we invite MOE?” (MOM 8-8: 5)) rather than statements or even reminders about existing project design or timeline. When MWECP finally pointed out what the parties had agreed to before, it was met by MWCPA’s fierce remark:

MWCPA: Office of the Prime Minister is not included, Ibu.¹ [replying to MWECP reading out list of participating agencies in the current plan]

MWECP: It’s not included? It was included before, Ibu...? I’m so sorry.

MWCPA: 'Before.' But it’s not included now. Cause we revised the plan. (August 8 meeting)

MWECP’s accommodating attitude reminds me of an interesting metaphor from the USIP 1 manager: that Indonesia in giving aid acts like “Santa Claus” (Interview YP). Contextually, he employed the term with a negative association: “Indonesia in this regard is still a Santa Claus. The concept of economic gain, despite being frequently touted, has not been practiced from the start of project planning” (Interview YP). There are a few other metaphors from the interviews denoting similar associations—e.g., “Indonesia is still too hesitant as a donor, whether it would play its national interest with strategic value or just [act] as a helper or charity” (Interview AV); “this is what I have, are you interested?” (Interview WS)—which together speak of a concept of aid ascribed by the interviewees to the Indonesian practice: the concept of aid as gift. Compared with metaphors of aid I found elsewhere, this is only one of three conceptual domains employed in describing aid with the other two being aid as tool and aid as resource (see Appendix 4).² Aid as gift is distinguishable from the other concepts in its attribution of quality to the receiver. It therefore has a somewhat middle-ground position: On one hand it is viewed negatively and contrasted with the use of aid as tool (for economic gain or strategic value, as in above quotes), an aspiration yet unattainable. On the other, being a “Santa Claus” or “charity” is still more positively received than a failure to use aid as tool (compare “waste” or “band aid solution” in Appendix 4).

My government informants never used these metaphors in the interview—they were found only in interviews with USIP 1 managers and an international relations scholar from Universitas Indonesia who is a longtime consultant for the government. Nevertheless, the tendency to act as a selfless helper was implied in some of the officials’ answers, which they connected to the aid principles. For example, when I asked a question on participation of communities or other non-state actors, the MOFA person said, “We [conduct cooperation] from government to government, we cannot [do it] directly because it is not in the principles. It depends on them [the recipient government] to recommend [which participants]” (Interview MOFA). This seems to demonstrate the power of the principles in sanctioning Indonesian aid approach, which again supports the metaphor of aid as gift.

4.2.3 From Multi-Stakeholder Meeting to Phase III Launch

Based on above description, it is not surprising to see that Indonesia’s MWECP was the first to accept Fiji’s demanded changes without many complaints. MWECP only requested
that Fiji allowed it to talk to ADB to synchronize the different training modules, which did not change the fact that it had to share participating agencies and reduced mainstreaming to training. USAID's reception, however, was a different story. Rumors ensued among the USIP 1 staffs that USAID was considering to stop funding the program. Eventually, however, it took USAID less than a week to approve to launch Phase III with all the changes.

USAID-USIP 1 meeting on August 13 is the key decisive moment where USAID attempted to rationalize the changing design. The atmosphere was stressing, with the USAID person repeating the same statements urging USIP 1 staffs to justify “what impact we [USAID] can claim if only three [ministries] we can get hold of” and furnish “a sustainable storytelling” (August 13 meeting). However, it also shows that the project’s crisis, as Mosse (2004) has theorized, primarily concerns representation, not material development. To solve the crisis, getting the “storytelling” correct is therefore more important and feasible. Indeed, in the multi-stakeholder meeting, USIP 1—acting on behalf of USAID—was quiet most of the time. The USIP 1 manager only spoke when Fiji mentioned that program’s description needed to change following the wording in MWCPA’s master plan, arguing that for consistency’s sake, SGM should keep “GRPB” in the documentation. Fiji agreed to this shortly after the meeting, although it only helped clarify that the trainings will concern GRPB, but not mainstreaming of the GRPB system.

The third phase of SGM finally started in October with the sending of Pattiro trainers to Fiji. Tensions in the negotiation were none to be seen. In the TOR and PDM, they were resolved by simply revising program’s purpose to reflect the change. It is however in USAID’s case study—in which projects are expected to report “success stories” to headquarter—that the most exaggerated representation is found. The document explains that Fiji continues to show its commitment to gender equality with the recent changes on MoWCPA’s Master Plan and development of new GRPB projects with Canada and ADB. These changes led to the increase of number of key ministries from 4 to 10. (USAID Case Study, no page)

Granted, the statement is followed by a clarification that “as a triangular technical assistance between Indonesia, Fiji, and the USA, the number of key ministries that will be supported is reduced…[to] three driver ministries” (Ibid.). However, the case study’s framing of SGM as a success story of “strengthened institutional framework of Fiji’s GRPB policy” (Ibid.) still indicates USAID’s deliberate attempt to create more positive “storytelling” of the program.
Chapter 5
Translation, Coherence-Making, and Its Rationale

This chapter serves to tie the discussion together to understand how program ideas are translated from the discursive elements of aid policy documents and actors’ understanding of them into the actual program design. Policy translation and its properties of scale, meaning, and contingency as laid out by Mukhtarov (2014) provides a useful framework here. However, the value added of this discussion, by drawing on Mosse’s (2004) framework, is to show how coherence is produced after the translation. Additionally, I discuss the political and strategic rationale for engaging in translation and coherence-making.

5.1 Scale, or the Discursive Isolation of Program

The quality of scale as highlighted by Mukhtarov (2014: 81) is its interconnectedness which enables (political) activities at one scale to “spill” over to another scale. In the case of SGM, the inter-scale interaction is evident in how material and discursive developments in Fiji, Indonesia, and USAID are translated into program design. Indonesia, USAID, and Fiji each assigns distinct meanings to development cooperation in their own scale (e.g. USAID’s global policy or Fiji’s national development priority), but these change as they are translated to the SGM program scale. However, as we see from previous discussion, unexpected development from the Fijian side has forced actors to agree on program meaning that is different from each actor’s global discourse. From USAID’s perspective, for example, Indonesia’s willingness to accept changes made by Fiji, which resulted from the latter’s overlapping commitment with other donors, must be hard to accept. Indeed, it created tensions with USAID and USIP 1 as discussed in previous chapter, but this was temporary. How did then USAID manage to reconcile its outcome-driven and Indonesia-focused (instead of Fiji-focused) discourse with the drastic changes made to the design? I argue that the answer lies in the program’s “discursive isolation,” where the meaning actors give to the program stays in the program. When program design is reported back to each actor, their representation is tuned to each actor’s context. This “reverse translation” also prevents inter-scale conflict as discrepancies in the program scale are ironed out as they travel back to each actor. This explanation differs from the one provided by Mukhtarov (2014) in his case of policy translation in Turkey’s regional development project. His interpretation presents inter-scale relations as an “overspill”—“when activity at one scale has serious implications for another scale of governance” (Mukhtarov 2014: 81)—which eventually resulted in the project’s declining significance. In SGM’s case, “overspill” arguably happened when Fiji’s business with the other donors created tensions with Indonesia and USAID and led to, indeed, objectively smaller aim of SGM. The story however did not end there as each actor managed to justify the new design through reverse-translation.

Meanings produced from the (reverse-)translation are discussed in the next section. For now, I show how the discursive isolation of the program scale is facilitated by separate artefacts—reports, case studies, or other documents which contain representations of the program—produced by Indonesia, USAID, and Fiji which reflect their respective global discourse. Program reports made by MWECP, for example, are more descriptive—when, where, with what activities and outputs is the program implemented; it basically mimics how the Annual Reports describe Indonesia’s aid programs. USAID’s reports—case studies, success stories, and to some extent USIP 1 quarterly and annual reports—go beyond the descriptive and are full of meanings- and claims-making. There is no artefact that be-
longs solely to the SGM program as artefacts are produced by different organizations to serve different representations. Objects like artefacts, but also offices and staffs (there is no “SGM program office,” only MWECP’s office, USIP 1’s office, USAID’s office, and MWCPA’s office, each with its own staffs—the multi-stakeholder meetings are the closest SGM program has to an office), help sustain different discourses in the translation process (Mosse 2004: 647). It is now clear that these separate artefacts and assets also help prevent inter-scale tension.

5.2 Meaning, or Coherence-Making Through Reverse Translation

Meaning of the SGM program has changed drastically in its Phase III from mainstreaming, which entails a whole-of-government approach in advocating a gender-based planning and budgeting in seven Fijian ministries, to “Institutional Capacity Building,” which confines the program to separate trainings for three ministries without establishing a National Working Group. However, as I touch on above, meaning connoted in the program design (in the PDM) and what each actor represents it to be remain different because the program scale is discursively isolated and separated from the actor scale. USAID, therefore, could even enlarge its claim that now ten ministries (instead of seven in mainstreaming or three in training) are participating because Indonesia was able to enlist ADB and Canada in the cooperation (USAID Case Study, no page). In other words, USAID disregards the change from mainstreaming to training, and instead frames the involvement of ADB and Canada as a proof of Fiji’s increased commitment to and acceleration of GRPB (Ibid.). “Indonesia with the support of USAID has successfully furthered Fiji’s commitment in gender mainstreaming in policymaking as proven by ADB and Canada joining the arena” is roughly the claim USAID is making in its documents. MWECP, although clearly disappointed by the turn of events, was the first in the big meeting to relinquish the ambition for mainstreaming. For Fiji’s MWCPA, meanwhile, the trainings are just one of the programs it currently receives from Indonesia, ADB, and Canada. Change from mainstreaming to training therefore does not represent SGM’s downsizing, but its shaping into the mold provided by Fiji’s cooperation with the other donors. As I explain further in the next section, this apparently demonstrates Fiji’s recipient strategy. At the same time, the smaller scope—Indonesia basically only training Fiji to learn and use tools such as Gender Analysis Pathway and Gender Budget Statement with the hope that Fijian agencies will develop their own—fits and sustains Fiji’s gender policy discourse which emphasizes women as resources to be managed in a technocratic manner.

I depict the changes in meaning and how the actors represent them differently to achieve coherence (translation and reverse-translation) in the figure below.
Figure 5.1 Evolution of Meanings in SGM
As seen above, the only actor’s representation that did not change when reverse-translated is Indonesia’s. More precisely, Indonesia’s representation of its aid as embodied in its principles acts as a metaphor: word for word, the principles do not change, but the meaning they contain can fluidly adapt to the contingency of the program. Whatever meanings the design contains—be it advocacy or training—they can be coherently labelled “demand-driven” as long as they follow the will of the Fijian government. A “good” program metaphor, argued Mosse (2004: 663), is one “whose vagueness, ambiguity and lack of conceptual precision is required to conceal ideological differences.” As we see in the document analysis, the principles are not defined, which allow them to become versatile metaphors. Another feature of program metaphor is the “continuity of master metaphors from global through to local scales of practice” (Porter 1995: 62). As discussed earlier, the principles of Indonesian aid (local metaphors) are apparently tied to international commitments on aid effectiveness such as Paris Declaration as well as the assumed political solidarity among the Global South (global metaphors). Local metaphors inspired by an amalgam of these global metaphors have apparently produced a discourse that has never escaped the sovereignty-respecting ideal which limits the program’s thrust beyond the government domain but regardless always succeeds in representing participatory development.

5.3 Contingency, or the Management of Change Through Articulation

At this point, the contingent program design is evident and should not be reiterated. As one USIP 1 manager put it, which I use in my observational chapter to illustrate project workers’ familiarity with it, program design is always changing, and it is common. I find it more useful now for my attention to coherence-making to explain how actors resolved or managed the contingent changes. A remarkable feature of actors’ interactions in SGM is its lack of conflict. Tensions clearly developed when Fiji forced to make changes in the design, especially when it became clear that the demands were related to their other cooperation with Canada and ADB. This conflict, however, remained latent. It was expressed in separate communications, such as when MWECP summoned USAID and the consultants for the meeting to help deter the proposed changes (with little success, as we have seen), or in USAID’s meeting with USIP 1 staffs after the multi-stakeholder meetings. But it never manifested when the three actors assembled—in such situation, the floor was given entirely to the recipient and all Indonesia and USAID did was acquiesce. In other words, tensions are ironed out in the separate representations actors make of the program design—this is what the USAID official means by “storytelling” in its meeting with USIP 1. What is it that enabled actors to keep sustaining coherent representation despite the drastic change in program design?

I argue that this is another function of the discourse brought by Indonesia to the program via its principles. Recalling my word frequency analysis of the Annual Reports, Indonesia’s written aid policy is remarkable in how little it talks about its developmental objects and desired qualities. Instead, principles have apparently become both the means and ends of Indonesia’s program due to their prominence in the documents. In other words, Indonesia seems to place greater importance to answering demands, identifying recipient’s “needs” as echoing its own developmental experience, and giving space for recipient country to exercise control over program design than delivering effective results. My observation of the SGM negotiation shows that the principles were visibly applied, but program goal remained vague. After the last meeting, the revised SGM’s TOR mentions that the program’s purpose is “to strengthen gender-responsive programming and budgeting capacity of personnel from three key ministries in Fiji” (TOR SGM), which sounds more like an
output, not a program goal. This is slightly more modest than the original purpose of strengthening “gender mainstreaming capacity of seven key ministries” (PDM SGM), which was to be verified against number of trainings and dissemination activities performed by the key ministries. The program therefore lacks theory and ambition, and pleases itself with output-level indicators, not real improvements on gendered policymaking that those outputs might bring.

In the absence of broader claim, it is possible to articulate other goals or purposes to the program. This is precisely what USAID and Fiji has done in their respective scales. Other than claiming that gender mainstreaming has been accelerated with concerted efforts from ADB and Canada, USAID boasts that “the success story of Indonesia in supporting GRPB Fiji has encouraged other countries such as Afghanistan to initiate a similar program with GOI [Government of Indonesia]” (USAID Case Study, no page). With this statement, USAID effectively fits program’s reality in its narrative of grooming a new, professional donor—which means there is the expectation for more projects coming from Indonesia. Meanwhile, Fiji was able to frame the assistance as a capacity building under its new master plan, which was developed later and secretly with Canada. Arguably, it would have been more difficult for Fiji to assign the trainings and mentoring a different meaning had the SGM come with strict program theory and require demanding means of verification, such as implementation of certain policies or allocation of greater budget for gender-responsive programs. What it tells us about program’s contingency is that its effect is cushioned by the ability to articulate different claims to the same activities. The relevant concept here is “articulation,” borrowed from Stuart Hall, which explains that the

“unity” of a discourse is really the articulation of different, distinct elements which can be rearticulated in different ways because they have no necessary “belongingness.” The ”unity” which matters is a linkage between that articulated discourse and the social forces with which it can, under certain historical conditions, but need not necessarily, be connected. (interview with Stuart Hall in Grossberg 1986: 53)

Thus, Indonesia’s “Santa-Claus” aid need not be associated with greater goal or claim, but if the actors need to establish one to cater to an audience (American people, headquarters, or other donors), they can conveniently attach it to the program. Apparently, the articulation of different discourses has also allowed SGM to evade conflict and maintain coherence.

5.4 Coherence-Making and Its Rationale

Preceding discussions have traced the discursive practices going through documents, actors, meetings, and artefacts as media of translation and, using the same media, examined the reverse-translation with which SGM’s design as the translation product is made coherent for the different actor scales. I wish now to discuss actors’ rationale behind the coherence-making.

Firstly, for the Indonesian side, the “Santa-Claus” logic means that developmental outcome never matters in SGM. Relevant to the following discussion is two different purposes of aid: indirect and direct purposes. The former may be understood as the unstated or “real” purpose of aid; it is “evident not only in what [donors] said the goals of their aid were but in the decisions they made on its amount, country allocation, and use” (Lancaster 2007: 13). Lancaster (2007: 13) identifies four of them: “diplomatic, developmental, humanitarian relief, and commercial” purposes. Based on interviews and documents, the “unstated” purpose of Indonesian aid revolves between diplomatic and commercial. There are mentions about the aid being directed to open the market for Indonesian products (Interview MSS,
Interview YP) and, as I write earlier, Indonesia’s National Medium-Term Development Plan situates the aid programs as an instrument of foreign policy. The commercial purpose, however, has been limited to engaging few state-owned companies as providers for goods and services procured through aid (Interview MSS). Indeed, as the comments on “charity versus economic gains” show, Indonesia clearly leans toward the former. Being a charity provider or Santa Claus, however, does not mean that Indonesia cannot benefit strategically from its aid. What these terms connote is that the strategic orientation of the aid is not located in the programs, but before them, i.e., in selecting the recipient countries. The rationale of aid is then as a vote-buying: to generate positive attitude in recipient countries so they will “support Indonesia’s agenda in the UN, Security Council, General Assembly, and other international organizations” (Interview MSS). Specifically, aid to Pacific countries might be part of “Indonesia’s attempt to gain votes for a non-permanent Security Council seat in 2018” (Interview YP), where seats are allocated by regional bloc. This diplomatic purpose is only remotely connected to programs and all the programs need to do is create favorable reception in recipient countries, hence the image of Santa Claus or charity.

On the other hand, direct or stated purpose of aid, which is the focus of this RP’s discursive orientation, is necessarily developmental. However, on this front too, developmental goal is vague or diminished, as I discuss above by referring to language used in macro-policies and evolution of program design. What is problematic here is that this discursive effect on developmental goal might not be visible to the Indonesian government. Inability to aim for development impact has been primarily understood as a function of small aid budget (Interview MSS), institutional constraints due to the absence of a dedicated aid agency (Alta and Pamaswi 2018), and unpredictability of Fiji’s domestic policies (Interview MWECP). Little is it realized that—without downplaying resources or recipient’s domestic politics—negotiation might play a role: MWECP’s passivity during the meeting probably indicates presuppositions equating its demand-driven and ownership principles with complete subjugation to recipient government’s stated needs. Such presuppositions might be traced to the broad meanings of “demand,” defined in Indonesia’s Annual Reports simply as “needs,” which leaves many questions, for example, around whose needs and how needs are identified. As a result, “demand” is understood to extend to everything asked by Fijian government in the negotiation. Asking MWECP why certain Fijian agencies were included or why training participants were all from the government, the answer I received is that the Fijians knew better of their needs (Interview MWECP).

Secondly, there might be strategic gain arising between Indonesia and USAID for mutually endorsing or at least tolerating each other’s representation and conduct. Despite the tensions brewing after the multi-stakeholder meeting, USAID’s framing of the program in terms of Indonesia’s success story in its case study has allowed it to construct coherent “storylines,” which as I argue above is indirectly enabled by Indonesia’s lack of bigger claim of its own program. Apparently, Indonesia’s pattern of conduct is favored by USAID. In one meeting with USIP 1, the USAID representative stated that its Mission Director, who will be promoted to ambassador to Pacific Island Countries, applauded Indonesia’s cooperation in the Pacific which she characterized as “non-political, as opposed to what China and Russia have been doing” and encouraged USAID and Indonesia to continue similar partnerships in the future (July 9 Meeting). On the other hand, MWECP too welcomes USAID’s role as a triangular partner, which is characterized as allowing “flexibility in determining program’s contents” (Interview MWECP). This mutual endorsement might amount to Indonesia becoming a “donor darling,” or a “showcase [of] a successful example of [donor’s] prescribed reforms or aid interventions working” (Whitfield and Fraser 2009: 41)—a status not only conferred unilaterally by donors, but also indicative of recipient’s strategy by playing the donor’s game (Whitfield 2009: 344). Commonly used to describe donor-recipient relations in bilateral aid, how an “emerging” donor strategically acts as do-
nor darling in triangular cooperation might be an illuminating topic to explore in further research.

Thirdly, coherence-making might have facilitated a second yet different kind of recipient strategy from Fiji, the true beneficiary of the program. As I state earlier, without interview accounts as evidence, my arguments here stand at most as a best guess. However, in seeing how Fiji’s cooperation with ADB and Canada in the overlapping sectors was only known later rather than informed from the beginning, I think it is reasonable to suspect that its unfolding and subsequent effect on SGM was indeed strategic. Assuming the contexts of small bureaucracy and overburdening aid requirements from traditional donors by Murray and Overton (2011) apply in this case, then Fiji might be trying to tick several boxes on gender-responsive capacities that might be required by ADB or Canada by “enlisting” Indonesia’s help. Therefore, by sending Pattiro to Fiji to help train bureaucrats and develop policy tools, Indonesia has possibly alleviated the burden of Fiji performing these tasks on its own. Such conclusion is supported by MWCPA’s admission in the August 8 meeting that the collaboration with ADB is tied to loan concession with the condition of gender-informed governance practices. Despite the clear incentives from the bigger donors, participants of August 8 meeting were puzzled over why Fiji—a long-time Indonesian aid recipient—would prioritize other donors’ programs over Indonesia’s. But the long partnership seems to be the exact factor that enabled this strategy: Rossi (2006: 29) argues that strategies of development actors follow from awareness “of the chances available to them within policy discourses.” In other words, MWCPA seems to know well that its imposition would be tolerated on the basis of demand-driven and ownership principles.
Chapter 6
Conclusions

When it comes to the interactions between an entity and its supposed polar opposite—donor and recipient, developed and developing countries, international and local, and so on—our instinct tells us to treat them as irreconcilable: as “lifeworlds” operating under contrasting social and epistemological rules (Rossi 2006: 27). Apparently, such logic has pervaded the discursive analyses of triangular development cooperation (e.g., Morvaridi and Hughes 2018, Engel 2019, Abdenur 2007, Abdenur and Da Fonseca 2013), seeing it as compromise: for one actor to succeed, it must to some extent adopt the discourses espoused by its partner, which leads to an either/or situation between neoliberal hegemony of the North or horizontality of relations of the South.

However, this RP disagrees: the case of SGM shows that its actors can agree on a single program design while maintaining multiple narratives of that design. The task of triangular actors is therefore twofold: to translate different policy ideas into a single design, and to reverse-translate design into different representations for different actors. Throughout this RP, I show the former as the more-or-less objective change from gender mainstreaming to training. Meanwhile, the latter means demand-driven, recipient-oriented program (for Indonesia); or the combined efforts by Indonesia, ADB, and Canada showcasing Fiji’s stronger commitment to gender mainstreaming (for USAID); or strategic adaptation into existing arrangements with ADB and Canada (for Fiji). The existence of multiple representations, inscribed in TOR, PDM, success stories, reports, and/or reflected in interviews, makes coherence possible. For Fiji, however, due to the lack of interviews, my interpretation is built by linking observational data with contextual information derived from literature on Fiji as recipient.

This RP has shown that SGM design and its evolution from the greater aspiration of gender mainstreaming to the smaller aim of training (“institutional capacity building”) is the translation product of different policy ideas of its actors. I trace the translation from each actor’s documents containing global discourse on aid and development, to mental and social contexts embedded in individuals representing respective actors in the projects, to the meetings where these discursive and contextual bits of information coalesced into program design. For Indonesia, this means the rhetoric and promotional language found in its Annual Reports gives way to an aid conduct that is permissive and overly accommodating its recipient’s stated demands—a discourse I call “Santa Claus.” USAID, meanwhile, adapts its generalizing Policy Framework in the cooperation with Indonesia by adopting the demand-driven principle while simultaneously maintaining its narrative of grooming Indonesia as an emerging donor in the professional aid business. Fiji tried to maintain its relations both with Southern partners such as Indonesia and traditional donors such as ADB and Canada—the design change thus appears to be a compromise between the different arrangements.

However, the translation story as compromise ends there. Through reverse-translation, each actor was able to tune SGM design to their respective discourses and audiences, representing it as a perfectly coherent product of official policies. Fragmentation therefore becomes strength in this process. I show this not only in terms of the relations between actors—for example, Indonesia cannot tell USAID what to write in the latter’s reports—but also between SGM program and its actors/translator. While the goal of SGM is the product of negotiation, nobody can negotiate what USAID, Indonesia, or Fiji writes, talks about, and generally interprets of that goal—this is the “discursive isolation” of the pro-
gram scale which separates it from the actor scale. That said, although representation is made separately, actors have mutual, rational interests to produce coherence—because policy coherence equals project’s success (Mosse 2004). Whether to elicit votes in international organizations (Indonesia), or support depoliticized aid agenda (USAID), or manage different aid sources creatively (Fiji), actors have stake in avoiding conflicts and making representations work coherently. Here lies the danger of coherence-making: actors become more invested in creating success by maintaining good relations rather than delivering effective development outcomes. While everybody in the triangular scheme eventually won something, this was only achieved by “colluding” in favoring development as a depoliticized domain—"public good, essentially uncontested and objectively known” (Hughes and Hutchison 2012: 17)—at the expense of citizen’s inputs.

Does this conclusion apply to other triangular development arrangements? Because the selection of SGM is not designed to represent certain values in triangular cooperation, I have no intention to generalize the results beyond the present case. The disclaimer is partly informed by the “peculiar”—again, I cannot ascertain if this is really so because I did not look at other cases—“Santa Claus” approach which becomes the “glue” that sticks together contingent events and enables actors to avoid conflict. Of course, Indonesia did not invent the ownership or demand-driven principles, but what might be against our intuition when faced with such claims is how truly recipient-accommodating Indonesia’s practice has been to the extent that it does not impose a considerable developmental goal. Granted, I also argue that Indonesia’s political interest lies in the selection of recipient, so developmental goal at project level is not as important. Additionally, the rudimentary form of Indonesia’s aid—limited resources, no local office in recipient country—is a factor behind any ambition the program can expect to achieve. My point on generalization here is that until we find these characteristics in other triangular arrangements—which is not impossible since many projects claim themselves to be driven by “ownership” or similar values—then my conclusions might apply to SGM only.

With this conclusion, I wish to contribute to the policy translation scholarship, especially to the arguments of Mukhtarov (2014) by contending that policy as an outcome of translation does not create coherence per se. Moreover, my results mimic those found by Mosse (2004) with an important distinction: While the project he observed sustained coherence by relying on seemingly robust project theory and model, where “a considerable amount of effort went into formulating and explicating the assumptions of” (2004: 656), SGM keeps its theory simple and its ambition modest. However, it is precisely its bare-bones design that enables actors to frame the program differently and exaggerate outputs. Simultaneously, looking at triangular cooperation as translation and coherence-making allows us to evaluate each actor’s contribution equally, including that which comes from recipient’s strategic calculation.
# Appendices

## Appendix 1 List of Texts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference Code</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<th>Genre</th>
<th>Methods of Analysis</th>
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<tr>
<td>Doc A1</td>
<td>Kerja Sama Selatan-Selatan sebagai Instrumen Kebijakan Luar Negeri Indonesia (South-South Cooperation as an Instrument of Indonesian Foreign Policy)</td>
<td>Government of Indonesia</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Principles, policy direction, and strategy of Indonesia SSC</td>
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<td>Government of Indonesia</td>
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<td>Executive summary</td>
<td>Policy paper</td>
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<td>Unpublished</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td>Policy paper</td>
<td>Background information, triangulation with interview and observations</td>
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<td>2017</td>
<td>Women in Development Planning document</td>
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<td>SGM project</td>
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<td>Whole Project document/artefact</td>
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<td>Pattiro Inception Report</td>
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<td>2019</td>
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<td>MOM 8-8</td>
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<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Metaphor analysis, triangulation with documents and observations</td>
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Appendix 2 List of Interviews

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<td>USIP 1</td>
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<td>Universitas Indonesia, International Relations Department</td>
<td>August 9, 2019</td>
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<td>Tiro</td>
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Appendix 3 List of Meetings

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<th>Reference Code</th>
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Appendix 4 Metaphor Analysis

*(based on procedure proposed by Schmitt (2005))*

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Metaphorical Concepts (Source → Target)</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Sources</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Identifying target area</td>
<td>Nature of aid</td>
<td>“signal of diplomatic approval” (useful); “[aid is to] strengthen a military ally” (useful); “driver of development” (useful); “band aid solutions” (little use); “complete waste of money” (no use); “aid...is usually so badly done that it’s not worth doing” (no use)</td>
<td>News articles, Wikipedia articles, academic sources on development/foreign aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Broad-based collection of background metaphors</td>
<td>Aid is a tool or activity for specific purpose (use is determined by provider)</td>
<td>“aid is flowing,” “aid was flown in rapidly,” “foreign assistance...when deployed effectively,” “where aid goes and for what purposes”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aid is a resource (use undetermined)</td>
<td>“aid as expression of charity”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aid is a gift (use is not</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Analysis of a sub-group</td>
<td>Aid is a gift (use is not determined by provider)</td>
<td>“aid should be consulted with recipient country;” “Indonesia is still a Santa Claus;” “charity;” “this is what I have, are you interested?;” “helper”</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
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**Notes**

1 “Ibu” is an Indonesian title for an adult woman, comparable to "Mrs." or "Madam."

2 Granted, the quoted contrast between Santa Claus and economic gain shows that the other metaphorical concepts are indeed understood. However, my point here is that the other two are not ascribed to the Indonesian practice. Actors’ ascription is meaningful because metaphors bring along evaluation of practice as discussed above.

3 Apparently, there is an ex-ante evaluation to determine “initial conditions” in recipient country (Interview MSS). Additionally, a “scoping mission” was conducted in 2017 which consisted of consultations with Fijian agencies about their “needs.” Pattiro as consultants also conducted a desk study in 2018 to get an “overview of Fiji” in terms of governmental structure and planning and budgeting cycle (Pattiro Inception Report: 6). However, this study was conducted after initial project design had been decided and therefore more concerned about field implementation than agenda setting or design. How “needs” is defined has thus remained vague and government-centric.