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Social effect of land titling: the link between private property and social cohesion in the case of Greater Tirana, Albania.

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Summary

Land titling policy has been an instrument widely adopted to formalize land tenure and to fight urban poverty. However, it should not be considered only as a fiscal instrument, but also as a social restructuration tool. It is an opportunity to redistribute land and property rights in an equitable way, with repercussion on security, social inclusion and cohesion. The case of transitional countries in Central and Eastern Europe still represents a new perspective on the topic, within the complexity of the socio-political shift from enclosed regime to a market-based economy. In Tirana, the delegitimization of the socialist system has resulted in a drastic reversal in the understanding of property rights. The economic boost since the beginning of the '90s has been reflected in the uncontrolled growth of cities. An increasing internal migration has generated the informal occupation of urban and peripheral land. Moreover, the combination of overgrowth and undermanagement have contributed to generate the dual city, where the formal and informal spheres collide spatially. To solve the issue of the uncontrolled presence of illegal buildings, a land titling policy has been presented as the major key-point in political agenda since 2005. The main objective of this research is to explore the role of land titling policy in changing informal settlers' dynamics and investigate what part has the provision of ownership and the increase of security in building social cohesion in Tirana.

The research explores theories over the effect of land titling and its social consequences, the theory of the commons and the link between private property and social cohesion. A case study is conducted, through the collection of quantitative and qualitative data. The analysis compares three categories of households: informal settlers, applicants and titleholders. The findings highlight how the land policy did not positively influence social cohesion at an urban scale; rather, it seems to increase the socio-economic gap among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. However, a certain variation of social cohesion due to the process of getting ownership could happen at a neighbourhood level. Specifically, the results on the applicants' group confirms the theory that the ones with stronger claims are more likely to have high civic engagement. This group, currently the priority of the institutions in charge of the policy, represents an in-between condition, resulted by the specific contextual conditions of Albania. In conclusion, this research is aligned with the hypothesis that individual rights might weaken collective pro-social behaviour.

Keywords

Land titling, social cohesion, informal settlements, property, urban poor

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Abbreviations

ALUIZNI	Agency for Legalization, Urbanization and Integration of Informal Zone and buildings
ASHK	State Agency of Cadastre
CAF	Charities Aid Foundation
CBOs	Community-Based Organizations
CEE	Central and East Europe
DLP	Detailed Local Plan
EU	European Union
GLP	General Local Plan
IHS	Institute for Housing and Urban Development
IPRO	Albania Central Office of Immovable Property Registration
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In the first chapter, an overview of socio-political and economic background is provided (Section 1.1), as well as an explanation of the land titling policy in the case of Albania (Section 1.1.2). Moreover, Sections 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 set the ground for the research problems, objectives and questions, while Sections 1.5 and 1.6 explain the significance and limitations of the study.

1.1 Background

After the fall of the USSR, transition economy countries in Central and East Europe (CEE) have experienced a radical shift, from enclosed socialist regime to a market-based economy; this transformation has had repercussions on several theoretical and practical matters. From a governance point of view, the shift has challenged the public institutions to embark on a different role, from being the main stakeholder to the secondary; many local institutions are still adapting to co-operative processes to improve their performance. On the other hand, during the transition phase, public institutions assumed a “laissez-faire approach towards planning and policies” (Tsenkova 2011, p. 85), where the under-management led to increasing spatial inequalities, exacerbated in peri-urban areas.

Albania is still moving between residual socialist arrangements and a market-driven economy. Firstly, the concepts of individual property and rights and the role of institutions underwent a drastic overturn of meaning (World Bank 2007, Bardhoshi 2011). The post-socialist city has delegitimated the previous system, by setting clear definitions of individual rights, while belittling collective interest (Bakllamaja 2013, Bardhoshi 2016). As different scholars (Bardhoshi 2016, Nase, Ocakçi 2010) claim, the prevarication of the private interest resulted in a process of de-collectivization of property, that largely affected the trend of land occupancy. This process was facilitated by the Government, who lacked financial, institutional and planning instruments, and generated rapid and impactful privatization all over Albania, strong enough to boost economic growth and competitiveness (Tsenkova 2011). However, this unequal economic development caused fragmentation of properties, land claims, marketization and excludability of public spaces and services (Nase, Ocakçi 2010), growth of social inequalities and overall poverty in the country (Felstehausen 1999, Tsenkova 2011). Consequently, the effects of this process are visible today in the changing role of the public and private agents. Individual rights prevail over the collective and that is reflected in the stakeholders’ actions (Prato 2017); the institutional landscape tends to favour the private sector to the detriment of the public, especially in the context of land development and infrastructure provision (Tsenkova 2012). Former planning instruments have been adapted ad hoc to private interests, and, since the 2000s, the legalization of illegal structures has become a legitimization to build, notwithstanding permits and norms (Tsenkova 2012). Due to a lack of municipal administrative and financial capacity, other agents have set the rules of both private and public land development (Poiani, Maci 2015). The attempts to revert the public laissez-faire attitude are moving today towards participatory and strategic planning, trying to push towards an overall vision of rehabilitation of collective interests (Hirt, Stanilov 2009). Aliaj *et al.* (2003) testify the challenge to build trust among communities’ members and reverse the trend of individual-oriented behaviour.

Secondly, the fall of socialism has resulted in major social issues. The major cities began to receive enormous migration influxes, mainly from the rural areas of the country, looking for economic opportunities. In the case of Tirana, in the ‘90s over 800.000 people converged in informal ghettos within the administrative boundaries (the yellow line) or without, on public-owned agricultural land, generating the so-called “dual city” (Poiani 2010a, p. 65). Due to lack

of planning and mistrust towards the Law, the informal settlements were self-organized on private- or public-owned land, with a mix of formal and customary land occupancy systems (Bardhoshi 2011). In the (in)formal realm of the city, the liberalism has enhanced the uncontrolled growth of cities (Andoni 2003). The overgrowth and under-management of the settlements have resulted in different degrees of tenure status in peri-urban areas (Deda, Tsenkova 2006), the invasion of public property (Prato 2017), the compactness in spatial patterns and a lack of public spaces (Mele 2017). Major distress comes from the lack of infrastructure, social segregation and poverty. In this context, the Municipality decided to start a legalization program in peri-urban areas at the beginning of the '90s (Halilaj 2016).

Within the democratization phase, the process of construction of civil society is still struggling. As Dauti (2017) claim, the decentralization, that took place after the fall of the Soviet Union, has not enhanced participation in decision-making by the community. Due to lack of trust, awareness and willingness to participate in the political life, citizens are still conditioned by the perception of forced participation and control of the socialist regime (Krasniqui 2018), reacting to this by reducing the engagement to their own ethnic community. The diversity of the new migrants in Tirana heightens the conflict for the right to the city, while neighbourhood connections have shifted to a more anonymous and individualistic behaviour (Pojani 2010b). Specifically, Pojani (2010b) claims that social relations are less valuable among informal settlers, due to the increase of wealth - comparing to their previous rural conditions - rivalry and loss of respect of collective spaces.

Thirdly, the economic transition has generated strong exclusionary social structures, where unemployment and social isolation play a major role in impeding the development of social cohesion (La Cava, Nanetti 2000). Moreover, the new migrants experience segregation and stigma, and are exposed to “social partitioning” (Nase, Ocakçi 2010, p. 1857). As reported by Gëdeshi and Shehu (2012), ethnic segregation represents a vicious circle that impedes the efforts of certain groups to escape poverty. Specifically, Roma and Egyptians communities are among the most segregated groups, and several national strategies are in place to increase Roman inclusion and improve their living conditions. Even if both are the poorest ethnic groups in Albania, the Egyptian, although geographically segregated, are better integrated in the society. In terms of social protection, Albania has been taking steps forward in tackling social exclusion, particularly for vulnerable groups, and exclusion from education, decent housing, and formal employment. As an example, in 2017, a new Law on social housing, focused on the implementation of urbanization projects of Roma and Egyptian neighbourhood, and the implementation of their living conditions (United Nations Albania 2017). Erbaş (2014) reports of major steps towards the inclusion of women in political and social decision-making, and the increase the overall awareness of the importance of gender equality. Nevertheless, social cohesion stays quite low in the country. In terms of pro-social behaviour, measured in terms of willingness to help the community, by financial or labour contributions (OECD 2012), Albania is ranked as 108 out of 138 countries, with a score of 26% in social behaviour (CAF 2018).

Fourthly, as in many other transitional countries, the planning system has followed an Europeanization process, adapting to North European examples (Janku *et al.* 2017). The process of decentralization has identified Municipalities and Communes as first level of planning institution (Nientied 1998). Before 1990 the planning framework was mainly restricted to land use guidelines for infrastructure and environmental protection. However, Albania has grown until developing a system of regional and strategic planning (Nientied 1998, Gjoka 2011). After the reforms of 2014, the planning scenario has evolved rapidly in the country, as a way to fight “the public incapacity to control urban development, the unsolved

problem of private property, the enormous and uncontrolled private investments, the lack of social housing stock, the land property fragmentation and the general perception of being legally free to build everywhere” (Berisha 2018, p. 236). The new instruments aim to reverse the process of planning, from occupation-development-permission-implementation, to a Western process, moving from plan to permission-development-occupation (Berisha 2018).

Within this context, it is worth to mention the discontinuous presence of the third sector (Amy, Gjermani 2013). After the fall of the socialist regime, donor-driven NGOs filled the gap of grass-roots initiatives and local associations, which was a consequence of the previous dictatorial system. The emerging third sector set itself between the development-driven force of privatization and the weakness of the public sector, mainly dealing with vulnerable groups. In the transition phase, during what Krasniqui (2012 in Amy, Gjermani 2013) recognizes as “the third phase of civil society development” (p. 12), international agencies and NGOs stabilized in the country, advocating for anti-corruption measures and civil mobilization. However, after 2005, as politics became more authoritarian, the third sector declined, and many representatives moved to Government positions. The construction of the civic society is an extremely relevant topic in Albania. The radical political shift has changed the notion of citizens’ participation. The restriction of freedom, the forced towards volunteering initiative, the lack of stable third sectors has affected the current opinion of civic society (Dhembo *et al.* 2015). In conclusion, the construction of civic society and democracy in Albania still struggles with the ghosts of its past.

1.1.2 Land titling procedure in Tirana


To solve the issue of the uncontrolled presence of illegal building, land titling has been presented as the major key-point in political agenda since 2005 (Bardhoshi 2016) and it has been implemented by different local and international agencies. Dode (2014) reports that Albania had 40% of its built-up area as informal settlements before 2004. This policy has been a necessary step to map the settlements, increase the public revenues, and solve land claims.

The rationale of the land titling process in Albania has followed the paradigm of De Soto, invited in the country to share his vision. Firstly, the Municipalities wanted to increase tax revenues, to transform physical assets in collaterals for loans, and to solve social problems, as criminality and traffic jam (Andoni 2007). Secondly, the integration of informal settlements in the formal market is still today a requirement to access the European Union (Dode 2014). Different international agencies have stressed the urgency in addressing the issue of property rights, as a hampering factor for the integration of Albania in the European Union (European Commission 2010, World Bank 2012). Specifically, the EU Commission required Albania to fight corruption and social conflicts in the judiciary sector, embedded in the system of property restitution and compensation. Thirdly, it was chosen as a more cost-effective solution to deal with informality, rather than the expensive demolition of illegal buildings (Dode, 2014).

Bejtja, Bejtja (2013) and Dode (2014) explain how the legislative framework has changed over time, from the absence of attempts to solve the problem of illegality in 1993 to the recent Laws. Firstly, two major Laws were initially adopted: The Law 9209/2004 “On the legalization of extension to the buildings”, regarding the regularization of additions built prior the Law, and the Law 9404/2004 “On legalization and urban planning of informal zones” on the urbanization of these areas. Afterward, the Law 9482/2006 unified in one legal text the previous two, which were lacking implementation and effectiveness. The local agency ALUIZNI (Agency for Legalization, Urbanization and Integration of Informal Zone and buildings) was founded in 2006, as the main body in charge of legalization procedures and the issue of the final building permit. Another Law, n. 9895/2008, tried to bring clarity to the restitution process. In order to acquire legal ownership, it is necessary to obtain the administrative approval of the Minister

Council of the ownership transfer. In case of state-owned properties, ALUIZNI is in charge of assessing the change of property. In case of plots owned by a third entity, the informal builder becomes the legal owner after the issue of legalization permit; only afterwards, the procedure of expropriation and compensation starts (Petanaj 2018). Therefore, the expropriation procedure is consequent to the legitimization of the informal builder. A major shortcoming of the restitution process is the identification of the rightful owners, due to the fact that the socialist regime has registered only tenants or apartments' owners (Yarwood 2003). The legalization process is initiated by a self-declaration by the illegal builder. In case of irregularities or failure in the provision of technical documents, the building has to be demolished. More legal changes in 2014 and 2016 have resulted in a slightly faster process, by giving more indications on how to deal with the financial inability of illegal builders (Petanaj 2018). From 2014 to 2016, the possibility of legally issuing the permit, even in case of non-payment of the building parcel, generated a peak of successful applications (Figure 1). In this case, ALUIZNI issues the permit and keeps note for the legal mortgage (Petanaj 2018).

Figure 1: The legalization permits during the years.



Source: Petanaj 2018, p. 91.

Nevertheless, the procedure meets several slowdown factors, as corruption, lack of preparatory studies, changes in the legal framework, lack of transparency, cases of co-ownerships and frauds (Bejtja, Bejtja 2013, Dode 2014). One major factor of stall is the overlong procedure of restitution of properties to the owners expropriated in the socialist regime. As Petanaj (2018) claims, the possibility to acquire the legalization permit without any administrative act of right of ownership, which also marks the beginning of the process of compensation of the ex-owner, delays the compensation process. The upgrades of the legal framework have positively influenced the legalization procedures, although without respecting the former owners' claims.

The legalization in the country regards buildings and land, with different classifications (World Bank 2012):

1. Building on legally owned land without permit, equal to 29%
2. Building on state property, up to 24%
3. Building on third person's property, 35%

World Bank (2012) reports that information was not available for 12% of cases. In 2007, with the Constitutional decision n. 35, legalization is acknowledged as a public interest policy; it is hence possible to expropriate the original owner for the major public interest of integrating settlements in the formal urban cities. Another shortcoming in the legalization scenario is the spread and persistence of illegal buildings. This practice has been recognized as a criminal offence since 2008, and the literature stress the importance of prevention of new informal constructions (Dode 2014, Petanaj 2018).

Moreover, the policy of restitution to original owners has generated what Andoni (2003) identifies as a new category of tenants: the ones whose private houses subject to property restitution, that consequently are considered homeless, and hence are helped by the

Government through different social housing programs. Therefore, while the private sector has been focused mainly on the construction of high income residential blocks, the Government has been targeted for subsidies specific groups according to income level, and the informal market has been providing shelters for new migrants. Andoni (2003) highlights how the result of this process is a gap of attention to the urban poor, the ones not able to enter the formal market and unable to be included in public programs. Moreover, as highlighted at the National Conference “Achieving Sustainable Development Goals in Albania” of May 2019 and by several scholars, vulnerable groups, as women, children and minorities, are the ones that suffer the most for lack of security, social stigma and isolation (Friedrichs 2003, Carletto, Zezza 2006, Andoni, Roll 2019). Dode (2014) recommends some solutions to improve the process. The Albanian Government should set realistic goals and prioritize vulnerable groups. Together with ALUIZNI, they should impose greater control over the buildings under legalization, to avoid changes in the meanwhile, and have clear plans and projections on how to compensate the original owners. Moreover, associations of people involved in different steps of the process should be pursued, in order to defend individual interests and have a “single voice in front of the state body” (Dode 2014, p. 404). An example is the association *Pronësi de drejtësi (Property with Justice)*, with the goal of protecting the interests of formal owners. Moreover, *Advokati I Popullit (Advocate of the people)*, an institution that defends individuals from unlawful public bodies or third parties, registers complaints regarding the violation of right of ownership by public entities; between 2010 and 2014, 1375 complaints were filed, related to irregular cartographic documentation, failure to take action to correct documents and to meet deadlines, to disclose rightful information and non-communication and non-release of acts (Advokati i Popullit n.d.). At the beginning of 2019, ALUIZNI – the agency in charge of the issue of the legalization certificate – and IPRO – the agency for the registration of property – have been unified in one agency, the ASHK, Agjencia Shtetërore e Kadastrës (*the State Agency of Cadastre*).

Another issue is the relationship between the planning framework and the legalization process. Strategic planning is seen as a way to overcome the dual cities spatiality; the system, introduced in 2009 and redrafted in 2013, has met lack of institutional capacity and has gone into several changes, until the draw of a General Local Plan (GLP), established in 2014 as a strategic and regulative instrument (Berisha 2018) and the Albania 2003 Manifesto (Janku *et al.* 2017). The development of a single neighbourhood is described in a Detailed Local Plan (DLP), a regulatory document that implements the GLP in specific zone; its lack precludes the issue of development permit. DLPs have met constraints in the implementation due to overlap and miscommunication with legalization and compensation procedures (Tsenkova 2012).

It’s relevant to mention that, due to size, quality of the buildings and their location, informal households have in many cases *de facto* security (Tsenkova 2012); however, on one side, public investments, as ring roads, may imply expropriation processes, and, on the other side, private developers, after the development permit following the DLP, may start negotiation procedures with informal settlers to buy the land once legalized (Berisha 2018). Nevertheless, according to Tsenkova (2012), the implementation of physical upgrading projects of informal settlements has met setbacks due to lack of funding and political will, weak communities’ negotiation ability and adverse conditions of the settlements.

The whole process has followed quite a top-down approach, with lack of citizens’ involvement. One exception is the case of legalization of Breglumasi (1995) and Bathore (1998), two informal settlements in Kamza, North of Tirana. Here, the process of solving land claims has been the occasion to promote community capacity building. Between 1996 and 2000, the

informal settlers, the newly NGO CoPlan and the local Government collaborated to reach consensus for land claims. The major challenge was the construction of social trust, sense of collectiveness and the creation of a bridge between the community and the authorities (Acioly *et al.* 2003). The lack of democratic principles and participation hampered the effort of the stakeholders involved in the project. Eventually, CoPlan, with a bottom-down approach based on learning-by-doing methods, managed to promote a plan for the infrastructure provision and for the construction of shared facilities (Acioly *et al.* 2003). This was a successful example, unique in terms of time and size of the community (Pojani 2013).

1.2 Problem Statement

Within this complex context of socio-political evolution, the process of land titling has peculiar implications for the local Government and the citizens. In a context of weak social relations and individualism, it is relevant to understand the role of land titling policy as a facilitator or impeding factor of social benefits among community's members. Security influences collective and individual behaviour and attitude; theorists, while analysing land titling policy, assess the potential relationship between these programs and social cohesion of the recipients, whether negative or positive (Payne, Durand-Lasserve 2013). Titling, as a way for new titleholders to boost the improvement of their livelihood and neighbourhood conditions, may also generate conflicts between citizens and public authorities, as much as between settlers and original owners. Moreover, in the Albanian context, the baseline for social cohesion is considered quite low (OECD 2012) although it is a key-point for a betterment of the society and a relevant goal to achieve for further development and EU integration (United Nations Albania 2017). Shehaj *et al.* (2016) describe the condition of Albanian society as apathetic, in need of strengthening civil society and participation processes. Therefore, the research investigates whether the titling process increases or decreases the citizens' pro-social behaviour and helps to build social cohesion and integration, in order to overcome the physical and perceptive division of Tirana in the dualistic city: the formal and the informal. The focus of this research is the assessment of the effects of the land titling on the title-holder's relationships, taking into account the cultural and social perception of property. In this sense, the research narrows the topic down to behavioural social externalities of land titling, leaving the attitudinal aspects aside. This is justified, by several cases in literature (see Chapter 2) which verify the existence of this nexus (Lall *et al.* 2004, Durand-Lasserve, Selod 2007, Payne *et al.* 2007, Torres Tovar 2012, Muyeba 2013) and it allows to have a more reliable and valid comparison between title- and non-titleholders.

1.3 Research Objectives

This study follows the main objective of explore the role of land titling policy in influencing community social relations and behaviour and investigate what role has the provision of ownership in terms of increasing of security and building social cohesion of Tirana. To summarize:

- Compare the role of tenure security in affecting social cohesion
- Explore the effects of land titling policy on the community social relations and behaviours

1.4 Provisional Research Question(s)

The research questions addresses the two objectives, with three sub-questions.

- In the post-socialist capitalist context of Greater Tirana, to what extent does the provision of ownership affect households' social cohesion?
 1. How does ownership affect the perception of tenure security?
 2. What is the effect of land titling policies on communities' social relations?

3. How does the social behaviour change according to ownership?

1.5 Significance of the Study

Social cohesion as a pro-social behaviour is globally considered as a key point to build equal and just societies (Stanley 2003). Achieving social cohesion and integration means taking a step towards the SDGs 1,3,4,5,10,11 and 16 and towards meeting the minimum standards of the EU integration Chapters 19,23,24,32 (United Nations Albania 2017) in Albania (Table 1). Furthermore, recognizing the role of land titling not only as a fiscal instrument but also a societal restructuring (Torres Tovar 2012) plays a role in building awareness on the evolving conceptualization of private and collective property, in establishing the effects of an impactful long-term policy, and may suggest different ways of conducting the land titling process (Muyeba 2013).

From an academic perspective, the research adds to the existing body of knowledge an overview of the effect of the land titling policy on the beneficiaries. The literature on the Albanian land titling presents different reviews on how the political transition has affected the ownership status of informal settlers (Andoni 2007, Dino *et al.* 2016, Halilaj 2016), as well as methodological efforts to solve the land claims and implement the legal framework (Bejtja and Bejtja 2013, Dode 2014). This study allows to address the social significance of the policy and explore its effect in the first 15 years since the implementation. Academic research has been focused on land titling socio-economic consequences on informal settlements in different geographical contexts (among others, Atuahene 2006, Franco 2008, Torres Tovar 2012), while little has been found related to the peculiar Albanian context. Moreover, by using a statistical approach, the research fills the lack of quantitative analysis on the matter in Albania.

Table 1: SDGs and EU integration Chapter description.

Mentioned Sustainable Development Goals	Mentioned EU integration Chapter
1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all the ages 4: Quality of education 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls 10: Reduce inequalities within and among countries 11: Make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable 16: Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies	19: Social policy and employment 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights 24: Justice, freedom and security 32: Financial control

Source: United Nations (2019), United Nations Albania (2017)

1.6 Scope and Limitations

In terms of scope, the research focuses on the behavioural aspect of social cohesion, as explained in the following Chapters, leaving the attitudinal factors aside. This decision is supported by the literature review (see Chapter 2), and it allows to collect more valid, reliable and objective information. Clearly, the choice limits the depth of the analysis, by excluding certain factors. Moreover, a broad research is also limited by the exclusion from the analysis of the economic impact of land titling, both on the households and on the housing market, as well as the one on a broader discourse on the original owner target group. Lastly, the policy implementation is not yet concluded, and in the future further analysis can provide new findings.

From a methodological point of view, the main limitation is the sensitivity of the topic and the non-response of the units of analysis. In order to overcome this, during the fieldwork the researcher was helped by an interpreter and local associations. The interpreter played also a role in translating the questionnaire (see Chapter 3). Due to time limitation, questionnaires and interviews were conducted on a limited number of respondents. Furthermore, the recent creation of the ASHK Agency prevented the collection of hard-copy official documents and reports, due to bureaucratic overlaps.

Chapter 2: Theory Review

The research is based on different theories and conceptualizations. The first Section analyses the concepts taken into account in this study. Specifically, it provides an analysis of the concept on informality, both globally (Section 2.1.1) and within the context of post-socialist cities (Section 2.1.2). Section 2.1.3 presents a literature review on land titling and its expected outcomes, while Section 2.1.4 focuses on the concept of security. Section 2.1.5 follows the discourse on social cohesion and collective behaviour. Moreover, Section 2.2 breaks down the concept of social cohesion in measurable components, divided into objective and subjective factors. Section 2.3 regards the study of case studies on social effects of legalization policies and the last Section 2.4 summarizes the theories in a conceptual framework and states the research hypotheses.

2.1 Concepts of the Study

2.1.1 Informality as a global phenomenon

The term informal settlement refers generally to a global phenomenon, where “non-formal or non-statutory tenure and property rights” (Payne 2002, p. 3) are part of the livelihood of urban poor. The term land tenure exemplifies a social construction related to a “set of rules that governs land use and land ownership” (Durand-Lasserve, Selod 2007). The dichotomy between formal and informal land tenure systems has become a relevant issue in assessing solutions for urban poverty.

The vision of informality has evolved over time. Since the ‘80s, scholars have been trying to mediate the debate on informality, influenced by neoliberal theories (Biles 2009). Biles (2009) and Chen (2012) provide a parallel explanation of different theories over the years. The concept has shifted from the dualistic vision of Sethuraman (1976) and the Institute of Liberty and Democracy (ILO), where informal sector is a negative condition that works in the gaps of the formal systems, towards more comprehensive visions. The structuralist post-Marxist vision of Portes (1978 in Chen 2012) supports the existence of a strong relationship between the informal sector and the dominant economy, where the latter exploits the first. The neoliberal De Soto’s perspective (1989 in Chen 2012) sees the generation of the informal sector as a failure of Government; the solution is the de-bureaucratization and creation of policies to manage private property rights, to let informal entrepreneurs and settlers enter the formal market with their property as main asset. Contrarily, other neoliberal theorists claim the existence of a free-choice to operate informally (Maloney 2004). Finally, the post-structuralist vision of Biles (2009) and others highlights a mutual relationship between formal and informal sectors; the latter represents a voluntary decision as a competitive strategy “to mediate the processes of globalization and neoliberalism” (p.233) and the two reinforce each other as two parallel economic regimes.

Today, scholars go along with the idea that the distinction between formal versus informal, legality versus illegality appears blurry and difficult to establish in real cases (Payne, Durand-Lasserve 2013). Academics agree on the definition of a continuum of tenure system, where the bundle of rights of some might be limited by social constructs (Durand-Lasserve, Selod 2007). The differences in legal status, subdivisions and rights, from “informal unwritten agreements to formal contracts” (Durand-Lasserve, Selod 2007, p. 4) result in different ownership patterns and legal frameworks, often mixing customary, religious and statutory regimes (Payne 2002). As a strong critic to neoliberalism, the proposal of titling as panacea for informality disregards the contextual practices, which should be one of the main criteria to achieve just policies.

The nexus between informality and urban poverty has been studied extensively in literature. The global immense urban growth, during the '80s and '90s, was hardly satisfied by the formal markets; hence disadvantaged dwellers were forced to settle outside the legal regime (Berner 2001). This marginal condition is defined by Berner (2001) as the spatiality of the “urbanization of poverty” (p.292), where urban poverty and low-income residents are mainly concentrated. Informality and urban poverty have a mutual reiterative relationship, where they reinforce each other (Hirt, Stanilov 2009). Among other causes of poverty, lack of public infrastructure, financial services and lack of rights’ protection are strictly related to living in an informal settlement (Tacoli *et al.* 2015). Tacoli *et al.* (2015) underline how illegal residents are excluded from infrastructure and services “on the basis of the settlement they live in” (p.17). Different factors may generate informal areas: migration, lack of affordable housing, weak land management, administrative incapability, discrimination and conflicts. Due to the contextuality of their emergence, history, culture and customary traditions are reflected in the preferred typology of tenure (Payne 2002).

The adoption of neoliberal theories have also played a role in this scenario. As explained by Harvey (2013), the global trend of the adoption of free-market and capitalistic principles considers the city as a place of social and geographical concentration of surplus products. “Capitalism needs urbanization to absorb the surplus products it perpetually produces” (p.5). The consequences of this process on the global economy have been huge, benefitting the small portion of wealth and privileged population, able to influence the development of the city, while hitting low-income and vulnerable groups, not to mention the environment. It has generated a socially unjust redistribution of resources; in this panorama, urban poor fight for the right to the city, against dispossession and displacement, revealing the political dimension of urban development. The application of Neoliberal theories has also led to the private control of this surplus, boosting a global growth of privatization trends. Therefore, informality has been in many cases the only solution for low-income settlers to access land and housing. The lack of affordability of both has shaped informality as a coping strategy.

2.1.2 Informal settlements and Post-Socialist Tirana

The development of informal structures in post-socialist countries requires an explanation of the socio-economic changes that happened since the 1990s in Eastern Europe. Bandelj (2016) defines the countries’ transformation as a simultaneous combination of “privatization, deregulation, democratization and neoliberal globalization” (p. 90), using the term of post-socialist capitalism. The author does not consider capitalism according to the neoclassical view of combination of surplus and accumulation but, following the Weberian sense, as “set of interrelated social institutions, understood as formal and informal rules and practices, yielding a particular social, political and moral organization of economy” (p. 90). In this political panorama, three main features appear recurrently:

- Lack of state autonomy
- Legitimation of self-interest
- Persistence of informality of *modus operandi*

The three reinforce each other: the cross-sectorial morality of informality and a variety of self-centred practices, legitimized by capitalism, affect the State authority, which mutually increase the parallel informal structure and greed behaviour. Informality in transitional countries has risen as a secondary economy, a parallel system that ensures that the “collapse of the formal structures of the socialist regime does not result in an institutional vacuum” (Stark 1993 in Bandelj 2016, p. 96). This has resulted in the development of two distinct spheres, where informal is a-way-to-doing-things, in terms of livelihood, economic and political attitudes.

Scholars agree on the occurrence of the post-socialist capitalistic analysis of Bandelj (2016) in the Albanian case (Andoni 2007, Hirt, Stanilov 2009, Bardhoshi 2016, Dino *et al.* 2016, Toto 2017). Here, lack of trust towards public institutions, passive behaviour and social spatial fragmentation are major consequences (Pojani, Maci 2015).

Similarly, the informal settlements show some similarities among post-socialist transitional countries (Nepravishta 2004, Andoni 2007). Specifically, the formation process has begun with the increasing demand of housing, due to high migration, and lack of housing and land accessibility. The absence of a performative response in the Government's actions has generated densification outside the formal sector: "the informal construction activities in the city have overwhelmed the public sector's ability to control the development" (Nepravishta 2004, p. 2). However, Andoni (2007) and Nase and Ocakçi (2010) claim that the Albanian case has peculiar conditions comparing to the other CEEs. On one hand, although the industrial development has globally signed the kick-off of informal or illegal construction of dwellers at the beginning of the XX century, some other post-socialist countries, as Serbia and Croatia have experienced informal sector growth from the '60s, aided by a high demand for housing and a lack of supply. On the contrary, Albanian informal settlements have started to appear at the beginning of the '90s, as a consequence of the political and economic transition, mainly in the capital city. As the densification of the inner city wasn't enough to accommodate new migrants, Tirana also has expanded in peri-urban areas; the outcomes are sprawling low-density suburbs and a compact inner city (Pojani 2010b). The criteria of choosing the land to settle in have been ruled by accessibility and tenure condition: "if it is collective land, it is nobody's property" (Acioly *et al.* 2003). In many cases, new settlers were asked to pay a fee to middlemen or even the original owners, who wanted to subdivide the land (Acioly *et al.* 2003).

Relevant to this study are the social effect of the creation of the informality. According to Pojani, (2010), the adaptation between the residents and the new migrants has originated into new models of living: the disappearing of traditional communities, the "commercialization of social relationship" (p. 487), the lack of respect of public space, which resulted in weak neighbourhood relationships, and strong conflicts for the right to the city. Moreover, the spatial dimension of the city has changed: from uniform service distribution, different degrees of tenure and housing provided by the central Government, to polarized gentrified areas, a predominance of individual owners occupancy and speculative residential development (Tsenkova 2011). Literature has tried to formalize the continuum in land tenure rights. In the broad context of post-socialist cities, Tsenkova (2010 p.75) highlights four different typologies of informal manifestations:

- Squatter settlements on public or private land;
- Settlements for refugees and vulnerable people;
- Improved squatter settlements;
- Illegal suburban subdivisions on private or public land.

In the context of Tirana, the recurrent situations are ownership of land but absence of building permit, and squatting on public or private land, generating various adverse possession claiming, both inside and outside the administrative border (World Bank, 2007). Informal builders actually ensured them self *de facto* security via permanent medium-quality spacious houses. To conclude, this research defines informal settlements in the context of Tirana by adapting the definition of the Vienna Declaration (Demeti *et al.* 2004), supported also by Tsenkova (2010): "human settlements, which for a variety of reason do not meet requirements for legal recognition" (2004 p.1), characterized by informal land tenure, and different degree of accessibility to basic services and financial tools, and an average of semi-permanent structures.

2.1.3 Land titling

Lack of tenure is considered to be a reinforcing factor of urban poverty and social exclusion. Hernando De Soto and the Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD) are the major advocates of the promotion of land titling as a solution to increase tenure security, reduce poverty and give opportunity for the urban poor to access the formal economy (Durand-Lasserve, Selod 2007). Land titling has been defined as the “allocation of real property rights on land [...] that can be transferred, inherited and mortgaged” (Payne *et al.* 2009, p. 444). De Soto, with the support of international agencies, as the World Bank, has promoted land titling since 1989. As stated by Porter *et al.* (2011), De Soto’s legalization is a form of control and marketization of property rights, based on the assumption that urban poor will capitalize the value of their property and enter the formal market. However, although it sounds like a seductive proposal, it underestimates the complexity of reality.

Literature appears divided on the evaluation of socio-economic effects of land titling for the different actors involved. To begin, many scholars have traced consequences of land titling on urban poor’s livelihood in countries across the globe; nevertheless, it remains hard to establish long-term impacts. Boone (2019) highlights two positive different visions of De Soto’s paradigm; on one side, land titling is a commodification process, where land becomes a “tradable asset” (p.384) valued for its best and most productive use, hence making the urban poor entrepreneurs. On the other side, it can be a tool for vulnerable groups to protect their rights and to legitimize customary tenure systems. However, the author, while analysing the case of Sub-Saharan countries, expresses also some criticisms to the practice of land redistribution. First, a title deed does not protect urban poor from the market exploitation. Secondly, there is risk of asymmetrical information, when the governmental policy itself might be biased against the poor. Thirdly, following the theory of continuum of land tenure (Payne 2002), the overlap of land claims embedded in customary tenure systems obstructs the finalization of legalization process. Furthermore, Atuahene (2006) and Payne *et al.* (2009) list a variety of objections towards land titling: among other, it might give rights on environmental risk-prone land, generate gentrification and force residential mobility of urban poor. Nevertheless, as Durand-Lasserve and Selod (2007) suggest, land titling and ownership may provide motivation for households “to invest in community assets that will capitalised in the value of their housing asset” (p. 12). The authors also claim that issuing real property rights empower vulnerable communities, create social inclusion and cohesion. Moreover, working with a collective purpose is “likely to bond the neighbourhood and enable the community to negotiate the group’s claims with the local Government” (Lall *et al.* 2004, p. 23).

To continue, the implementation of the policy could have negative output also on the public authorities in charge. Land titling may put under high level of pressure municipalities with few resources (Payne *et al.* 2007). The main efforts of local authorities are spent in improving time and effectiveness of procedures, often with the help of external agencies. In the case of Albania, the Government has changed the legal framework over the years, in the attempt to provide the most fair and clear procedure (Petanaj 2018). Furthermore, the decentralization of titling programs is recognized as recurrent successful key-factor (Clichevsky 2003 in Payne *et al.* 2007). However, in the Albanian case, decentralization hasn’t been linked to more citizens’ participation in conflicts’ solving and it has not helped the Municipalities to control the growth of illegal buildings (Petanaj 2018). Additionally, less literature has been found on social effects of legalization on former owners, in case of land claims. As explained in Chapter 1 (Section 1.1.2), in the Albanian case the legal procedure of land titling does not benefit the original owners, due to different factors, such as the extension of the process, the lack of protection of

their interests and the overlap of legalization procedures and compensation schemes (Dode 2014, Petanaj 2018).

Lastly, the effects of land titling on vulnerable groups, especially gendered outcomes, are to be taken into account. In some cases, as in Peru (Cantuarias 2004), the juridical security gives the possibility to women, as co-owners or titleholders, to have a voice in decision-making regarding the property. Other positive cases are in Mexico, India, Laos, Colombia; in Albania, the cases of female homeownership are rare, as the society is male-driven (Payne *et al.* 2007).

2.1.4 Security of Tenure

Land titling has been proved to be beneficial in certain conditions: it ensures security of tenure in eviction-prone areas (Payne *et al.* 2009) and it might lead also to an increase of residential investments (Field 2005). It is clear in literature that land titling may affect directly tenure security, although it is not the only way to obtain it. As many authors claim, fear and expectation of evictions may be reduced also by other means, such as housing improvements (Arnot *et al.* 2011). Tenure security is defined by the “changes in expected benefit streams while holding the resource constant and considering differing set of rules” (Arnot *et al.* 2011, p. 299); it involves perception of *de facto* situation at least as much as definition of legal status (Payne *et al.* 2009, p. 7). In this sense, land conflicts are a manifestation of a lack of security: as Udry (2011) claims, different individual claims on a single piece of land imply that not all of those individual rights are secure. Conflicts are generated both on vertical and horizontal levels (Payne *et al.* 2007). Inequalities may be generated in the same community (Franco 2008), among the State and civil society (Bottazzi and Rist 2012), between former owners and illegal settlers – as an example, the Albanian Parliament declared that over 8000 died in property disputes registration process (Advokati i Popullit n.d.). Similarly, Pojani (2013) reports the case of Bathore as a place of armed conflicts between residents and CoPlan’s employees. Additionally, the more the transaction of property is unclear, the more the risk of conflicts within the family or in case of inheritance is higher (Chaveau *et al.* 2006). Tensions among groups increase conflicts, exclusion and enhance class formation; the sense of belonging shifts from “someone belonging to a place to a property belonging to someone” (Peters 2004, p. 305). In conclusion, promoting this policy as panacea for urban poverty is reductive and counter-productive, but a contextual proposal may bring benefits to the urban poor. Since it is a practice of redistribution of land, hence implying a rebalance of power and wealth, it has been often used as a political instrument (Udry 2011). Therefore, it is relevant to analyse this practice in terms of political and social repercussions.

2.1.5 Social Cohesion and its spatial manifestation

Urbanists have assessed in different occasions the role of public spaces in building public and collective culture (Amin 2008). Historically, the size, the morphology and the spaces of the cities were clearly set; the urban sprawl and expansion over the borders, in addition to huge movement of people, have generated polycentric urban agglomeration, with mixed cultures and traditions. The use of public spaces has also lost importance due to increased use of social media and online sources. The lack of a strong presence of the central State has led to the neighbourhood scale taking high-priority in determining a sense of identity; the dispersive urban scale hardly represents citizens’ sense of belonging. Globally, as stated before, privatization and commodification of land has generated the erosion of public space, and that’s also visible in the periphery of Tirana.

Literature hardly manages to explain univocally the concept of social cohesion. Schiefer and van der Noll (2017) provide a literature review on the trending analysis. The concept encompasses a positive feature of the contemporary society, implying notions as solidarity, participation, inclusion, and social capital. It is also often seen in contraposition of some impeding and corroding socio-economic factors. Firstly, globalization, migration and social diversity are factors that could undermine or change social structure of communities. Then, technologies may alter the way of communicating, hence the social relations. Lastly, the authors highlight how social cohesion is visible also at a national scale: today, in the European Union case, the inclusion of new members collaborates in reshaping national identities. All these rationales made social cohesion a key-point of political agenda in many European countries, such as the United Kingdom since 2011 (Schiefer, van der Noll 2017). The main rationale for advocating for social cohesion is the reduction of inequality and social exclusion (Vergolini 2011). Moreover, the concept of social cohesion is composed by the coexistence of individual, organizational and societal features (Chen, West 2008, Tang 2008, Schiefer, van der Noll 2017), crosscutting from attitudinal to behavioural perspectives. To conclude, for the purpose of this research, social cohesion is defined as “a state of affairs concerning both the vertical and the horizontal interactions among members of society as characterized by a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate and help, as well as their behavioural manifestations” (Chan *et al.* 2006, p. 290).

Social cohesion plays a role in explaining the implications of individual and collective behaviour; in this sense, it is interpreted as a way to define moral norms and non-market relations (Katz 2000). A fruitful relation between social cohesion and governance would create social justice, equal redistribution of resources and democracy (Maloutas, Pantelidou Malouta 2004). The behaviour of individuals towards the collective sphere is deeply related to the theory of commons. Authors assert the relationship between private and open-access property in highlighting the role of “communing” as the practice of taking care of collective shared property (Williams 2018). In the case of little cooperation in maintaining collective resources, the individualism prevails and the tragedy of commons may occur (Fehr, Leibbrandt 2011). The understanding of commons has met some shared conceptualizations by different theorists. Firstly, the meaning has shifted from the perception of environmental rural resources, as air, forests or waterbodies, to a broader sense, including urban spatial manifestation and practices: natural resources, parks, public spaces, transportation, sanitation, public services and streets (Gidwani, Baviskar 2011). Secondly, commons are strictly related to communities able to create, protect and maintain them (Siefkes 2009). Thirdly, many scholars have conceptualized urban commons in opposition to private property (Needham 2005, Davy 2014, Moss 2014).

The definition of spatial commons by Davy (2014) analyse the common as “shared land uses typical of cities and other human settlements” (p. 475). Davy (2012), in his book *Land policy. Planning the spatial consequences of property*, identifies eight typologies of shared and restricted land uses, each one with its own property rules. The mono-rational point of view is actually quite distant from reality, where the distinction of public and private use is hard to grasp purely. Most likely, private and public are in a “balance between, on the one hand, a simple dichotomy of private and common property and, on the other hand, a multitude of singular arrangements no one can understand or map” (p.480), which Davy summarizes in the poly-rational theory. Equally, Blomley (2004) summarizes the mono-rational idea of predominance of private property in the ownership model, where there are only two ranges of ownership: public and private. The two do not collide, the majority of land is privately owned and the hierarchy is clearly set, as common property is nullified (Figure 2). Moreover, this model excludes other tenure manifestations, such as customary and religious systems. However, as

Needham (2005) argues, the ownership model goes across an ideological misconception. When it comes to land and buildings, the bundle of rights is highly diversified (Blomley 2004, Needham 2005). If this dichotomy was ever true, the “complexity of modern capitalism” (Blomley 2004, p. 13) has contributed to break and recombine the bundle, generating the death of the classical liberal conception of private versus public property. Furthermore, Enemark *et al.* (2014) and Moss (2014) follow Davy’s conceptualization (2014), assessing the dependence of private property on collective material and non-material spaces.

Figure 2: The ownership model.

	Private property	State ownership
Title	Clear—no prior or competing claims	Clear—no prior or competing claims
Owner	Single identifiable owner	Vested in the state as fictive individual
Priority	Anterior and superior	Secondary—guarantor of private rights
Property rights	Consolidated bundle (alienation, use, exclusion, etc.)	Rights presumptively inferior to those of private owner
Spatial organization	Clearly fixed by objective boundaries	Spatially delimited and finite
Spatial archetype	Private, detached house	City park or street

Source: Blomley, 2004.

According to Bhattacharya (2014), urban commons are relevant, even if less-recognized, in the livelihood and informal production systems of informal settlements. Many informal settlers base their subsistence within informal market: when they are excluded by formal market and commodity space, they base their livelihood on the commons. Here, the use-right takes place, even without the juridical ownership. The author criticizes De Soto’s position, as he misses the “heterogeneity of informal sector” (p. 48), the value of informality and the right to use space and resources, even without legal ownership. To conclude, the simplification of the urban land uses of a city in private versus common is hardly true. “Spatial commons are a prerequisite of private property” (Davy 2014, p. 476), they have a mutual relationship, as the value of the first increases according to a proper planning of the latter; restricted spaces exists in connection with shared spaces and vice-versa.

The attitude towards the commons in post-socialist capitalism is influenced by the legitimacy of greed (Streeck 2010, Bandelj 2016), explained in Section 2.1.2. According to the authors, capitalism prioritizes the private agents and its contractual relationships with others, for a materialistic gain. The neoliberal globalization, the new conception of private property and its freedom of exchange in the economic market have legitimized the individual greed and self-serving behaviour, in opposition with the previous regime. The run for the maximization of gain degenerates in the depletion of commons resources, as they become a collateral “product of the self-interested pursuit of private goods” (Streeck 2010, p. 13). As Stanilov (2007) claims, in CEEs, the restitution of properties has generated the reduction of public space, especially in peripheries; the private development has taken place over community resources, with little concern of public domain. Similarly, Ruijsink *et al.* (2013), based on Needham (2005) research,

connect Albania's perception on property to the model of dualistic ownership of Blomley (2004). To overcome the distinction, the authors wish for more respect and legitimacy toward the public actions by citizens, more possibilities for them to influence public policies, a balance between private and public interests, a clear legislative framework and a growth in awareness among citizens.

2.2 Factors of social cohesion

Authors have made several attempts to explain measurable factors of social cohesion. Jenson *et al.* (1998), supported by Beauvais (2002), propose a set of five contrasting concepts: belonging vs. isolation, economic inclusion vs. exclusion, participation in public affairs vs. disaffiliation, recognition vs. rejection of diversity, legitimization or delegitimization of institutions. Chan *et al.* (2006) subdivide the concept in a 4x4 matrix, where subjective and objective components are linked to horizontal and vertical dimensions (Figure 3). The authors identify trust, sense of belonging, willingness to cooperate and formal and informal participation as part of the framework. Forrest and Kearns (2001) show five theoretical different domains of social cohesion (Figure 4). According to the literature, all these components mutually influence each other, both as causes and effects (Chan *et al.* 2006). Consequently, this research summarizes the concepts by Forrest and Kearns (2001) and Chan *et al.* (2006), as in Figure 5. The subjective components are trust, place attachment/sense of belonging and orientation towards the common good, while the objective are formal and informal civic engagement, social order and social network. In terms of scale of analysis, there is a peak of interest in measuring social cohesion at a neighbourhood scale. As Castells (1997 in Forrest, Kearns 2001) claims, the interactions within the local environment usually define territorial identity and the "individual and collective time-geographies and action-spaces within the urban arena" (Forrest, Kearns 2001, p. 2130). Neighbourhoods become the extension of private realm and include a multitude of social relations.

Figure 3: Measuring social cohesion: a two-by-two framework.

	Subjective component (People's state of mind)	Objective component (Behavioural manifestations)
Horizontal dimension (Cohesion within civil society)	General trust with fellow citizens	Social participation and vibrancy of civil society
	Willingness to cooperate and help fellow citizens, including those from "other" social groups	Voluntarism and donations
	Sense of belonging or identity	Presence or absence of major inter-group alliances or cleavages
Vertical dimension (State-citizen cohesion)	Trust in public figures	Political participation (e.g. voting, political parties etc.)
	Confidence in political and other major social institutions	


Source: Chan *et al.* (2006).

Figure 4: The domain of social cohesion.

Domain	Description
Common values and a civic culture	Common aims and objectives; common moral principles and codes of behaviour; support for political institutions and participation in politics
Social order and social control	Absence of general conflict and threats to the existing order; absence of incivility; effective informal social control; tolerance; respect for difference; intergroup co-operation
Social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities	Harmonious economic and social development and common standards; redistribution of public finances and of opportunities; equal access to services and welfare benefits; ready acknowledgement of social obligations and willingness to assist others
Social networks and social capital	High degree of social interaction within communities and families; civic engagement and associational activity; easy resolution of collective action problems
Place attachment and identity	Strong attachment to place; intertwining of personal and place identity

Source: Forrest, Kearns (2001).

Figure 5: Factors of Social Cohesion.



Source: Author (2019).

2.2.1 Objective factors

2.2.1a Social Network

Social networks are essentially connected to urbanization policies (Crowe 2010). Grootaert *et al.* (2004) introduce two lines of thoughts regarding social network. The first, including the reflections of sociologists such as Ronald Burt and Alejandro Portes, considers social network as the degree of social interaction thanks to which individuals gain access to different kind of resources. The second, which follows Putnam's conceptualization, unifies social relation and civic engagement. For the purpose of this research, civic engagement and social network are analysed separately, although it is recognized that all the components of social cohesion mutually reinforce each other (Grootaert *et al.* 2004, Chan *et al.* 2006). Social network is therefore defined through the social interactions at a local scale, a base factor of a bottom-up process resulting in social cohesion (Forrest, Kearns 2001). Regarding indicators of social relations, Crowe (2010) measures social networks in terms of strength of formal ties, individual neighbourhood satisfaction and attachment. The author claims that individual factors, such as residential stability, have a more relevant role than communities' factors in driving social behaviour. Moreover, Grootaert *et al.* (2004) focus on the variable of inclusion and tolerance of diversity, meaning the degree of acceptance of diversity in the background of people whom the household have regularly relations with. Lastly, Rakodi (1999) confirms the robustness of

social networks when related to security, residential stability and homogeneity. The author also claims that an increase in security might generate a growth of social network and social capital.


2.2.1b Social order

Social order is delineated as “absence of general conflict and threats to the existing order” (Forrest, Kearns 2001, p. 2129). Disturbing factors are the one changing the balance between power, interest and relations. In particular, land conflicts are often related to property rights disputes; it might happen at the households level, among ethnic groups, between illegal settlers and original owners or public institutions (Chaveau *et al.* 2006, Deininger, Castagnini 2006, Udry 2011). Land reforms “transform social relations around land, its use and exploitation” (Triantis, Vatavali 2016, p. 290). Changes in property rights related to land, such as disputes over land and housing rights, equal distribution of resources, intergenerational disputes and land claim, are often a source of conflicts (Hurwitz *et al.* 2005, Bottazzi, Rist 2012). In the case of Albania, many conflicts happened inside rural and urban communities. Zhllima *et al.* (2010) study the reality of Albanian rural communities and their perception of the property right. The data analysis from different focus groups confirms that property issues and overlaps of rights between old and new owners are the root of many social conflicts, hampering land transaction as well as land productivity. A conflict is defined by Torre *et al.* (2014) as an “opposition marked by an engagement or a commitment between two or several parties, [...] in relations to local material objects” (p. 3). For the purpose of this research, a property is considered the presence of legal conflicts and judicial litigations, in case of illegal building on public or private land, as well as the case of illegal building on legally owned land (World Bank 2012). Torre *et al.* (2014) and Deininger and Castagnini (2006) measure property conflicts on focusing on motives of conflicts, resolution and socio-economic impacts on households.

2.2.1c Civic Engagement

The meaning of civic engagement is used synonymously by different authors: collective action (Barr *et al.* 2014), community participation and social mobilization (Gaventa, Barrett n.d.) political involvement (McBride *et al.* 2006), pro-social behaviour (Nikolova *et al.* 2017). For the purpose of this research, the concept follows the adapted definition of McBride *et al.* (2006): a behaviour “towards collective action, care, concern [...] and societal decision making” (p. 153). It can be an expressive type of engagement, in case of actions “motivated by a sense of identity” (p. 734), or an instrumental one, when actions are goal-oriented, functional to community goals. The first is often labelled in literature as political engagement. Adler and Goggin (2005) mention the continuum of forms of civic engagement, which may vary from political participation, to volunteering to community organizations (Figure 6). Moreover, it can be a tool to empower vulnerable groups (Mansuri 2004). As mentioned in Chapter 2.1.5, technological transformations, as social networks, can be included as a tool for both community and political engagement. Moreover, residential stability, diversity and personal interest, (Lall *et al.* 2004), collective efficacy and economic return (Barr *et al.* 2014) are other triggers of civic engagement. Therefore, participation can be formal, in term of memberships, informal, namely collective action, and potential. The latter is express by the concept of collective efficacy, meaning the expectation of success of collective actions by individuals (Carbone, McMillin 2019).

Figure 6: The continuum of Civic Engagement.



Source: Adler, Goggin (2005).

2.2.2 Subjective factors

2.2.2a Trust

The concept of trust has been integrated into socio-political researches since Putnam's work (Putnam 1994). As reported by Hooghe (2007), some theorists refer to trust as a contextual feature that relates to the expectation of other's behaviour, while others as a moral individual disposition. According to the first group, trust is a response to a risk condition, where individuals act towards a specific interest or expectation. Therefore, it is an expression of rationality and self-interest (Luhmann 1988, Hardin 1993 in Hooghe 2007). In this sense, closed or open social networks have a role in the occurrence of trust, as well as group identification. Moreover, risk, uncertainty and vulnerability may obstacle the development of trust. Trust is expected to be the most vulnerable aspects of social cohesion, as the degree of homogeneity might generate different responses. The heterogeneity of the current societies, in terms of social conflicts and ethnicity, affect trust, as much as ethnical and gender predominance (Hooghe 2007). Trust may also enable positive behaviour in terms of obligations: the more the citizens trust the Government, the more they are willing to pay taxes (Wintrobe, Gërxhani 2004). Institutionally, trust towards national or local level may vary; corruption and economic performance influence the citizens' attitudes and trust (Horne 2012).

2.2.2b Place attachment

Place attachment (Lewicka 2011), defined also as sense of identity or belonging (Stewart *et al.* 2009) is the sentiment that reflects the feeling of being congruent to a certain situation or with certain people (Hagerty *et al.* 1996 in Stewart *et al.* 2009). In line with Perkins and Long (2002), sense of belonging is enhanced by participation, collective efficacy and neighbourhood satisfaction. Moreover, Brown *et al.* (2003) recognize that the concept is promoted by ownership (versus rentals) and length of residence, and are measured in the degree of participation in neighbourhoods' activities. As stated in Arifwidodo and Chandrasiri (2013), security of tenure influences indirectly place attachment: renters are less attached to the context they live in, hence having a worst performance in community management practices, because they do not own the land. However, many other factors influence place attachment, such as social interactions and participation.

2.2.2c Orientation towards the common good

As Schiefer and Van der Noll (2017) assess, cultural, ethnic, religious features of a community play a role in determining social cohesion. The wider the discrepancy of values, the harder will the construction of shared practices. The authors identify this concept with orientation towards common good: the need of commitment, solidarity, responsibility as individual attitude for a collective long-term benefit (Ritzen 2001). As said in Chapter 2.1.4, Albanian individualistic behaviour may generate in the worsening of cohesion and its collective spatial manifestation. As assessed by Mandic and Clapham (1996), individualism and collectivism influence the culture of home ownership. In case of the former, it is possible to observe a predominance of owner occupation, while the former of state rental housing stock. The authors present the case of Slovenia to prove that the increasing preference of home ownership is a political symbol, as well as a way to easily satisfy the pressing housing shortage.

2.3 Review of social effects of legalization in literature

The management of common resources requires collective action; many authors have argued that privatization may erode it (Braten 2015). As seen in Section 2.1.2, this is also the main trend in Albania since the fall of the socialist regime. However, authors report case studies where titling awakes civic mobilization and demands of social rights. In many cases, social mobilization is the trigger for the legalization to happen, as in the Philippines (Franco 2008), or a key to solve land claims (Lall *et al.* 2004, Franco 2008).

However, some authors have focused on the social consequences after the legalization; in this case, land titling is seen not only as fiscal tools but also as societal restructuration process, which always involves a new balance of social relationships and of new rights and obligations (Torres Tovar 2012). In this sense, Torres Tovar (2012) has studied the legalization of Bogotá and the *barrio* Ciudad Bolívar between 1990 and 2012. The process has resulted in an indirect authorization to negotiate for the provision of urban services by the community itself. The ownership has generated a wave of social mobilization, to overcome the organizational limits of the public sector. Moreover, Bottazzi and Rist (2012) define land reform as an act of reorganization of stakeholders, which modify social mobilization and power. In the case of West Africa, Chaveau *et al.* (2006) recognizes the “social embeddedness of rights” as a “structural given of land relations” (p. 71); any property reform is a political act that affect balance between stakeholders. Furthermore, Kay (1998 in Bottazzi, Rist 2012) claims how land reforms triggers politicization and social mobilization of civil society. Similarly, also Lanjouw and Levy (2002) prove that, in Ecuador, the ones with stronger property claims are more likely to be engaged in communities’ activities. Then, Braaten (2014) analyses the degree of community cooperation in condition of individual or joint land rights. Using a quasi-experiment data collection method, he measures the willingness to cooperate in supporting public works in joint infrastructure, according to different tenure status. The relevant factors are measured on both individual and organizational basis, as supported also by Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011). His findings set clearly that cooperation is more likely to happen in regime of collective ownership, although it is present in both conditions of tenure. As Sjaastad and Bromley (2000) claim, the individualized approach of individual land titling programs is implemented at the expenses of social cohesion and can result not sustainable on a long run.


The rationale that individual property rights will provide more security, rather than collective rights, collide with social costs and externalities. Contrarily, many authors prove that a legal right is not a precondition of tenure security (De Souza 1999, Van Gelder 2009, Arnot *et al.* 2011). Nevertheless, in some cases obtaining the title has led to little interest towards the commons, hence resulting in undermanagement and resource depletion, as in the case in

Uganda (Gomis 2014). Moreover, the study by Muyeba (2013) for human and social effect of land titling in South Africa provide mix results. Land titling has a positive effect on education, status attainment, satisfaction of life, political awareness and neighbourhood satisfaction, while it does not affect civic participation, sense of belonging and place attachment. Lastly, as reported by Payne *et al.* (2009), in South Africa households feel empowered to defend their land rights, holding a title deed; here, the social dynamics play a role in the individual ability to defend land claims. To conclude, it is hard to draw a pattern of the effect of private ownership on social cohesion; however, it is proved the impact on property conceptualization and social relations. Literature appears more compact in assessing direct effects on objective factors of social cohesion, rather than subjective ones, as changing individual behaviour, first economically then socially, is the main objective the land titling policy (Payne *et al.* 2007).

2.4 Conceptual Framework

The relationship between legal ownership and social cohesion lacks a clear resolution in the reviewed theory. This research takes into account the following relevant concepts in a conceptual framework (Figure 7). First, the context of Post Socialist Capitalism implies a normative behaviour based on political ideology. This will influence particularly the preference for tenure condition and the orientation towards the common good (Mandic, Clapham 1996). Secondly, the ownership status is the condition of legal status, in terms of presence of legal title for the land or the building (Arnot *et al.* 2011). Thirdly, tenure security is in literature strictly associated with land titling policy; it doesn't only relate to the presence or absence of legal title, but also to other factors, such as fear and expectation of eviction; these might affect residential mobility and civic commitment (De Souza 1999, Van Gelder 2009, Arnot *et al.* 2011). Therefore, it is included in the research as a subjective aspect, able to influence behavioural patterns. Lastly, this research considers the objective factors of social cohesion: civic engagement, social order and social network (Forrest, Kearns 2001, Chan *et al.* 2006). This is due to the clear link establish in literature, as explained in Section 2.3 (Lall *et al.* 2004, Bottazzi, Rist 2012, Torres Tovar 2012, Muyeba 2013), between behavioural aspects of social cohesion generated by land tiling policies. Moreover, a narrower scope of the research, due to time and resource limitation, increases validity and reliability of it (Thiel 2014). See Chapter 3 for the operationalization.

Figure 7: Conceptual framework.



Source: Author (2019).

The conceptual framework is based on hypotheses drawn from the theories explained in this Chapter. Firstly, the provision of legal ownership is proved in theory to be deeply connected to an increase in perception of security, even though ownership is not the only way to ensure security of tenure. Therefore, although the expectation is that titleholders are secure about their right (hypothesis 1), it is worth to measure to what extent this security is related to title, or, for example, not feeling any real threat (De Souza 1999, Payne *et al.* 2007, Van Gelder 2009, Arnot *et al.* 2011). A certain degree of security, derived from ownership status, which acts as a mediating variable, might cause a positive or negative variation in the behavioural aspects of social cohesion and its components. Other examples in literature are explained in Section 2.3. A second hypothesis regards social network, one of the factors that mostly drives social behaviour and cohesion (Forrest, Kearns 2001). It might be influenced positively or negative during the process of provision of ownership by finding support among neighbours, or being involved in conflicts, or feeling excluded and isolated (Grootaert *et al.* 2004, Crowe 2010). Thirdly, as stated in Section 2.1.3 and 2.2.1b, land conflicts imply a lack of security and they might generate direct economic costs and social distress in case of violence or social isolation (Deininger, Castagnini 2006). Therefore, it is expected that the presence of formal and informal conflicts decrease social order (hypothesis 3). Lastly, civic engagement is expressed by social mobilization in different forms (see Section 2.2.1c). In this sense, when considering land titling as a social transformative tool, the expectation is that households would increase their engagement in order to solve their property issues (hypothesis 4).

To summarize, the research tests four main hypotheses:

1. The process of provision of full ownership increases the perception of security.
2. The process of provision of full ownership influences social networks.
3. The process of provision of full ownership generates property conflicts that decrease social order.
4. The process of provision of full ownership increases civic engagement.

Chapter 3: Research Design and Methods

Chapter 3 translates the theoretical findings of Chapter 2 into an empirical research. In Section 3.1 the research questions are revised according to the literature review. In Section 3.2 the theories and concepts are divided into measurable indicators. Section 3.3 explains the chosen research strategy, namely the case study. Section 3.4 presents the sample size and selection, while Section 3.5 the data collection methodology. Validity and reliability are explained in Section 3.6, while Section 3.7 describes the fieldwork phase. Section 3.8 regards the data analysis methodology. The chapter concludes with the description of the areas of study (Section 3.9).

3.1 Revised Research Question(s)

The revised research questions address the objective of Section 1.3, while including the theories presented in the literature review.

- In the post-socialist capitalist context of Greater Tirana, to what extent does the provision of ownership affect households' social cohesion?
 1. How does ownership affect the perception of tenure security?
 2. How does ownership affect the single behavioural components of social cohesion?
 3. How does the overall social cohesive behaviour change according to ownership status?

The revised research questions aim to assess the effect of the provision of ownership, firstly, on the single behavioural components of social cohesion, and then on the sum of the three. Doing so, the research is able to assess both the single and aggregate correlation between the variables.

3.2 Operationalization: Variables, Indicators

From the literature review, this research acknowledges that legal ownership might affect social cohesion differently at individual, organizational and cultural level (Tang 2008). The variable of social cohesion is unpacked in its behavioural components, namely social network, social order and civic engagement. The measurement of social cohesion does not describe the whole spectrum of social cohesion, but only the behavioural aspects of it, representing of the contribution that a land policy is most likely able to give. Variables and indicators derived from the literature review are operationalized as follows.

3.2.1 Ownership status

Land titling is defined as the “allocation of real property rights on land [...] that can be transferred, inherited and mortgaged” (Payne *et al.* 2009, p. 444). Considering the peculiar context of Albania, where the same area could be legally informal but physically upgraded and vice versa, it is worth to define informality from a legal perspective, as in Tsenkova (2010): “human settlements, which for a variety of reason do not meet requirements for legal recognition” (2004 p.1), characterized by different degree of accessibility to basic services and financial tools, and an average of semi-permanent structures. In order to clarify the definition, land titling is a land redistribution policy, whose outcome is the provision of full ownership. For the purpose of this research, the assessment of the ownership status is used to measure the position of a single household within the policy framework. In this sense, ownership is not considered as binary category (title: yes/no). Three legal conditions of ownership are considered: informal settlers, meaning the ones without title, informal settlers who applied for

title, and titleholders. Moreover, the capability to finalize the process is also a predictor of ownership status; as said in the literature review, many households do not fit into the legalization requirements and it is reasonable to expect a different social behaviour, especially in social order and civic engagement. In the analysis phase, in the case of a mismatch between ownership of land and building, the items are considered individually, and the perception of security is used to make a correspondence with one of the groups. Moreover, the year of the title, the mean of obtaining the dwelling and the information on who is the owner of the property are considered.

Table 2: Ownership status operationalization.

Concept	Variables	Indicators	Data type	Data source	Source
Ownership	Ownership Status				
		Presence of land title	quantitative - nominal	primary, secondary	Arnot, Boxall, Lucker, 2011
		Presence of building permit	quantitative - nominal	primary, secondary	Arnot, Boxall, Lucker, 2011
		Year of land permit issue	quantitative - ratio	primary, secondary	Arnot, Boxall, Lucker, 2011
		Year of building permit issue	quantitative - ratio	primary, secondary	Arnot, Boxall, Lucker, 2011
		Public owner of land	quantitative - nominal	primary, secondary	Arnot, Boxall, Lucker, 2011
		Private owner of the land	quantitative - nominal	primary, secondary	Arnot, Boxall, Lucker, 2011
		Means of obtaining dwelling	quantitative, qualitative-nominal	primary, secondary	Mandic, Clapham, 1996, Deininger, Castagnini 2006
	Capability to legally register the land				
		Capability to legally register the land	quantitative, qualitative-nominal	primary, secondary	Arnot, Boxall, Lucker, 2011

Source: author, 2019.

3.2.2 Tenure Security

Tenure security is considered as a mediating variable, as depending by the condition and certainty of ownership (Place *et al.* 1994). Tenure security is defined by the “changes in expected benefit streams while holding the resource constant and considering differing set of rules” (Arnot *et al.* 2011, p. 299); the concept involves the perception of de facto situation at least as much as the definition of the legal status (Payne *et al.* 2009, p. 7). As a possible outcome of the land titling program and as a factor of social cohesion, security of tenure is measured as the duration of right, meaning residential stability (Place *et al.* 1994), and the assurance of right, as the perceived fear and expectation of eviction (Van Gelder 2009). The first is measured by the length of residency, while the latter is explained by perception of concern of losing the property, the degree of prioritization of security comparing to other livelihood aspects, the willingness to move in order to have a more secure dwelling and, lastly, the increase of perceived security once obtaining the title deed.

Table 3: Tenure security operationalization.

Concept	Variables	Indicators	Data type	Data source	Source
Tenure Security	Duration of right: residential stability				
		Length of residence	quantitative - ratio	primary, secondary	Arnot, Boxall, Lucker, 2011
	Perception of concern over security				
		Perception of personal concern of security among other aspects in livelihood	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Grootaert et al. 2004
	Assurance of right: perception of Security				
		Perception of fear of eviction	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Van Gelder 2009
		Presence of threat of eviction	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Van Gelder 2009
		Willingness to move to have residential security	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Van Gelder 2009
		Perception of security related to title deed	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Van Gelder 2009

Source: Author, 2019.

3.2.3 Social Network

The concept of social network embraces the social interactions at a local scale, as a bottom-up process resulting then in social cohesion (Forrest, Kearns 2001). It is divided in three variables: social relations at a local scale, inclusion, meaning the perception of social differences in the neighbourhood, and support. The first is measured by assessing the frequency of meetings within the neighbourhood, the number of neighbours known by name and friends living in the same area. The second is calculated by the individual perception towards diversity, the criteria driving the preferences in choosing personal relations, and the importance of ownership and property conflict in shaping social relations (Grootaert *et al.* 2004, Crowe 2010). The last is measured by the perception of support, or, contrarily, social loss, that a household has received in the neighbourhood during the process of getting ownership. It is an expression of how social relations might evolve and change due to titling process.

Table 4: Social network operationalization.

Concept	Variables	Indicators	Data type	Data source	Source
Social Network	Social Relations				
		Number of neighbors known by name	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Crowe 2010
		Number of friends living in the same neighborhood	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Crowe 2010
		Frequency of neighbours meetings	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Grootaert et al. 2004
	Inclusion				
		Perception of presence of background differences	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Grootaert et al. 2004
		Perception of importance of background differences in personal relations	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Grootaert et al. 2004
		Perception of social issue caused by background differences	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Grootaert et al. 2004
	Support				
		Perception of creating new social relation in the neighborhood	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Crowe 2010
		Perception of losing social relation in the neighborhood	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Crowe 2010
		Perception of support received in the neighborhood	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Crowe 2010

Source: Author, 2019.

3.2.4 Social Order

The concept is considered as the “absence of general conflict and threats to the existing order” (Forrest, Kearns 2001, p. 2129). For the purpose of this research, the analysis on social order is restricted to land and property conflicts, as major factor deriving from an unclear ownership condition. A conflict, where in theory is as an “opposition marked by an engagement or a commitment between two or several parties, [...] in relations to local material objects” (Torre *et al.* 2014 p.3), in the case of Albania, it is considered as the presence of legal conflict and judicial litigation, in case of illegal building on public land or land owned by third party (World Bank 2012). The concept is split in three sets of indicators. The first explains the objective existence of conflicts, related to indicators such as actors involved, the type of conflict or negotiation on going, motives and resolutions (Torre *et al.* 2014). The second focuses on the economic impact of these conflicts on the households, in terms of affordability and economic burden. The last involves the social impacts: experience of physical violence, isolation and exclusion (Deininger, Castagnini 2006, Wehrmann 2008).

Table 5: Social order operationalization.

Concept	Variables	Indicators	Data type	Data source	Source
Social Order	Involvement in property conflicts				
		Number of households currently involved in property conflicts	quantitative - ordinal	primary, secondary	Deiningner, Castagnini 2006
		Number of households currently involved in conflicts with private owners	quantitative - ordinal	primary, secondary	Deiningner, Castagnini 2006, Torre et al. 2014
		Number of households currently involved in conflicts with public institutions	quantitative - ordinal	primary, secondary	Deiningner, Castagnini 2006, Torre et al. 2014
		Number of pending negotiation for selling	quantitative - ordinal	primary, secondary	Deiningner, Castagnini 2006
		Number of formal resolutions	quantitative - ordinal	primary, secondary	Deiningner, Castagnini 2006, Torre et al. 2014
		Number of informal resolutions	quantitative - ordinal	primary, secondary	Deiningner, Castagnini 2006, Torre et al. 2014
		Length of conflicts	quantitative - ordinal	primary, secondary	Deiningner, Castagnini 2006
	Economic Impact of conflicts				
		Frequency of economic loss due to legal support	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Deiningner, Castagnini 2006
		Frequency of economic loss due to compensation	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Deiningner, Castagnini 2006
		Frequency of economic loss due to legalization fee	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Deiningner, Castagnini 2006
	Social Impact of conflicts				
		Frequency of violent episodes due to property conflicts	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Deiningner, Castagnini 2006
		Frequency of social relations' disruption due to property conflicts	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Deiningner, Castagnini 2006
		Perception of exclusion due to property conflicts	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Wehrmann 2008
		Perception of stigma due to property conflicts	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Wehrmann 2008

Source: Author, 2019.

3.2.5 Civic Engagement

The concept is defined as a behaviour “towards collective action, care, concern [...] and societal decision making” (McBride *et al.* 2006, p. 153), expressed by four sub-variables. The formal participation includes frequency of political and social activities in the neighbourhood, organized via formal membership and frequency of voting. Informal participation is measured as the frequency of participation in non-organized political or social activities. It is also taken into account the influence that property issue may have on households motivation in voting and participatory behaviour (De Souza 1999). In addition, the degree of potential participation measures the willingness of individuals to collaborate for a collective purpose (Carbone, McMillin 2019).

Table 6: Civic engagement operationalization.

Concept	Variables	Indicators	Data type	Data source	Source
Civic Engagement	Formal Participation				
		Number of membership in associations/clubs	quantitative - ratio	primary	Muyeba 2013, Grootaert et al. 2004
		Number of volunteerings activities	quantitative - ratio	primary	Muyeba 2013
		Number of monthly participated community meetings	quantitative - ratio	primary	Muyeba 2014
		Number of participated administrative elections in the past 10 years	quantitative - ratio	primary	Muyeba 2013, Schiefer, Van del Noll 2016
	Informal Participation				
		Frequency of protests participation	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Muyeba 2013
		Frequency of community activities	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Muyeba 2013, Carbone, McMillin 2019
		Frequency of social media shares/posts for political support	quantitative -ordinal	primary	Chan 2006
		Frequency of participation in protests regarding property issue	quantitative - ordinal	primary	De Souza 1999, Grootaert et al. 2004
		Frequency of informal meetings regarding property issue	quantitative - ordinal	primary	De Souza 1999, Grootaert et al. 2004
	Willingness to contribute				
		Willingness to contribute in community projects in labour	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Grootaert et al. 2004, Carbone, McMillin, 2019
		Willingness to contribute in community projects financially	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Grootaert et al. 2004, Carbone, McMillin, 2019
		Willingness to contribute in community projects both in labour and financially	quantitative - ordinal	primary	Grootaert et al. 2004, Carbone, McMillin, 2019
	Motivating factors				
		Voting decision related to property issue	quantitative - ordinal	primary	De Souza 1999, Grootaert et al. 2004
		Perception of civic participation due to property concern	quantitative -ordinal	primary	De Souza 1999, Grootaert et al. 2004
		Perception of exclusion due to ownership status	quantitative -ordinal	primary	De Souza 1999, Grootaert et al. 2004
		Perception of exclusion due to conflicts	quantitative -ordinal	primary	Grootaert et al. 2004

Source: Author, 2019.

3.2.6 Control variables

As Lall *et al.* (2004) claim, demographic and wealth differences directly affect community behaviour. As control variables, this research considers demographic information regarding the representative of the household and the household's composition itself. Moreover, in order to establish the economic status of the households, proxy indicators are used to measure expenditures, savings, employment, and participation in public social welfare programs. The literature review allows to estimate the most relevant control variables: residential stability, income and age are expected to explain variations in the conceptual framework.

Table 7: Control variables operationalization.

Concept	Variables	Indicators	Data type	Data source	Source
Demographic Economic Conditions	Demography				
		Age	quantitative - ratio	primary	
		Number of households members	quantitative - ratio	primary	
		Highest education level in the family	quantitative - ordinal	primary	
		Gender	quantitative - nominal	primary	
		Religion	quantitative - nominal	primary	
		Ethnicity	quantitative- nominal	primary	
		Birth place	quantitative - nominal	primary	
	Economic status				
		Amount of monthly expenditure on basic need (travel to work, housing maintenance, housing bills, clothing, healthcare)	quantitative - ratio	primary	
		Amount of monthly expenditures on luxury goods (car, entertainment, travels)	quantitative - nominal	primary	
		Amount of monthly saving	quantitative - nominal	primary	
		Employment status	quantitative - nominal	primary	
		Part of public social housing program	quantitative - nominal	primary	
		Part of employment program	quantitative - nominal	primary	

Source: Author, 2019.

3.3 Research strategy

This research has an exploratory purpose, in order to investigate the strength of the correlation between land titling programs and social cohesion, as well as the effect of titling on the community's dynamics. The research is based on a case study strategy, in order to achieve deep knowledge over the studied phenomena.

According to Thiel (2014) and Yin (2013), the case study is a suitable research strategy when there are few units of analysis and large number of variables, known and unknown, and the researcher needs to rely on a detailed questioning into a specific and complex phenomenon (the case), within its broader context. The congruence analysis typology allows to test plurality of theories in hypothesis and take advantage of multiple source of observation of the phenomenon (Blatter, Blume 2008). This methodology is theory-based and seeks coherence at an abstract level. Congruence analysis moves from concrete – the deductions from theories observed in few cases – to abstract – the theoretical concepts. In this case, theories provide a framework to explain certain empirical phenomena (Blatter, Blume 2008, Yin 2013).

The case study is the most appropriate choice for this research, for multiple reasons. First, the topic requires an in-depth and detailed investigation, as well as the consideration of real-life setting and the context (Thomas 2011). Moreover, since the main goal of land titling is not the increase of social cohesion among informal settlers, it would be hard to isolate the policy and the effect, following a quasi-experiment strategy. Contrarily, the researcher assumes the presence of multiple and unknown variables that may affect the outcome of the process. Similarly, this research was not suitable for a desk analysis, since there were no recent documents available on the effects of land titling on the households at the time of the data collection, hence a new set of primary data is required. However, secondary data is included, as explained in the next Section. Lastly, a survey is not the correct instrument, due to limited number of units available, and to the need of depth instead of breadth.

For the purpose of this research, a single case study was conducted, in the geographical context of Tirana. Three subgroups, identified by degree of tenure, were identified and compared:

- A. households without title deed, who did not yet apply for it;
- B. households with pending application for legalization;

C. households with title of land or building.

The unit of analysis was a representative of the household, in condition of ownership, as main target group of the land titling process. The research methodology included primary and secondary data collection. The first relied on written questionnaire and in-depth semi-structured interviews to households and different institutions' members, in order to collect respectively quantitative and qualitative data. The second implied the analysis of official reports.


3.4 Sample Size and selection

In the case study strategy a mix method is recommended, in order to increase validity of the research (Thiel 2014). In this study, the data collection process included primary and secondary data collection, as well as a mix of qualitative and quantitative data.

3.4.1 Sample selection and size for primary data collection: questionnaire

The sample selection for the questionnaire was done via two-step sample selection. Firstly, a probability stratified random sample established which geographical area was the most suitable for the research. A first strata was the selection of the informal areas (purple in Figure 8), revised according to the latest available map from the Municipality of Tirana. A second one was the selection of the suitable urban districts (Figure 9), while a further choice was made by proximity, distance of the neighbourhood from the city centre, safety for the researcher and characteristics of the settlement. Therefore, the research focused on the first periphery of the city, outside the first ring road, which delineates the city centre, and where several Municipality plans were in place at that time. The urban Administrative Units included were 3,6,7,8,9,11. The areas are all in the North-West side of Tirana, as the one where the majority of informal settlements took place. The administrative units were composed by an equal distribution of population in terms of income, education and ethnicity. Within the selected areas, a quota sample was made to select the number and characteristics required for the respondents.


Figure 8: Map of informal areas in Greater Tirana.



Source: Author (2019).

Red: radius; Yellow: data collection area.

Figure 9: Map of administrative units of Greater Tirana.



Source: Bashkia Tiranë, 2019.

The districts identified by numbers are urban districts, while the others are rural.

In terms of sample size, the respondents were chosen via quota sampling among +18 years old owners with Albanian nationality, with mix demographic features. Moreover, the study addressed only residents living in the neighbourhoods for at least 5 years, as proven by Keene *et al.* (2013) as minimum value of residential stability to observe social cohesion behaviour. The sample size was calculated using the Yamane formula (1967):

$$n = N / (N \cdot e^2 + 1)$$

Where **n** is the sample, **N** is the population size and **e** is the margin of error. For the purpose of this research, the margin of error was considered as 10%, due to time and resource limitation. Therefore, given the population (number of households in all the Units considered) equal to 103006 (Bashkia Tiranë 2019), the sample was calculated as follow:

$$n = \frac{103006}{(103006 \times 0,1 \times 0,1 + 1)} = 99,9 \cong 100$$

To conclude, the minimum number of respondents for the questionnaire was set at 33 households per typology of ownership. The questionnaire was carried out face to face, in anonymous way, in an English or Albanian version. See Section 3.5 for the description of the implementation of the questionnaire.

Generally, the chosen sampling method involves methodological limitations. Although the quota sampling method is often used in order to account population proportions and to reach a representative sample in a cost- and time-effective way, the researcher might incur in difficulties in terms of sampling bias (Thiel 2014). To overcome this, the researcher relied on different nuclei of respondents based on the strata; the stratified sampling allowed the researcher to be aware of the composition of the sample prior to build the sample itself.

3.4.2 Sample selection and size for primary data collection: in-depth interviews

Two target groups for interviews were selected: households and institutions' members. For the first group, the sample size was selected similarly to the questionnaire, via two-step sample. The first selection was the stratified random typology, in order to identify the same geographical area of the questionnaire; moreover, a further selection of respondents was made by non-probability quota sample. The language issue forced the researcher to reduce the

number of interviews to the households or use a written form. Interviews were used to triangulate the findings of the questionnaire.

In case of interviews to institutions members, the sample was selected purposively among key-informants of several institutions: ALUIZNI and ASHK, the main public institutions responsible for legalization process; the Advocati I popullit, a legal entity that collects a variety of claims; the Housing Department at the Ministry of Finance and Economy; the Qendra për Advokim Sociale (the Association for Social Advocacy), an NGO which implements plans for the Open Society Foundation for Albania; lastly, the Municipality of Tirana. See Section 3.5.2 for the description of the interview method.

3.4.3 Sample selection for secondary data collection

Regarding secondary data collection, the research relied on the analysis of official reports from ALUIZNI and Advocati I popullit. The reports were used to gather qualitative data regarding progress of legalization, rationales, development and resolution of property conflicts and civic engagement level. Moreover, social indicators collected by international agencies were revised to have an overall perspective of the country's performance. Specifically, institutions as World Bank and UN provided various Country Reports. The research focused on information between 2009 and 2019.

3.5 Data collection method

3.5.1 Data collection method: questionnaire

The questionnaire was done face-face, to increase responsive respondents and confidence. It was translated in Albanian (Annex 2.2), and the researcher was helped by an interpreter. The questionnaire was tested for 2 days in a pilot at the beginning of the field work. The quantitative data was based on a scoring system, registered in a Code book (Annex 1) to evaluate perceptions, opinions and personal characteristics and further move to statistical analysis (Thiel 2014). The questionnaire opened with the less sensitive questions, proceed with the most sensitive ones, and ended with personal information. See Annex 2 for the questionnaire.

As a research instrument, the questionnaire implies some constraints: respondents might not be truthful in their answer or some questions might be left empty; moreover, the used wording could be too hard to be comprehended for non-specialists or being open to misleading interpretations. The pilot phase and the peer-reviews with other researchers, as well as with local representatives, helped in overcome these limitations and increase the validity of the tool.

3.5.2 Data collection method: interviews

The interviews were semi-structured and based on quantitative data collection. The indicators were used as a guideline (Thiel 2014); this allowed the respondents to be free to ask for clarification or add information. Moreover, it increased the validity of the findings. The interviews' guidelines were divided by target, one for ALUIZNI and Advocati I Popullit, the agencies dealing directly with legalization issues, a second the representatives of the Housing Department and the Municipality of Tirana, which might have a broader knowledge on urban-scale processes, and a last one for NGOs respondents, which have a direct connections with the households' concern. Participants were asked to be recorded; however, the transcription were kept anonymous. See Annex 3 for interviews' guidelines.

The fieldwork took place in Tirana from the 1st of July to the 5th of August. In the week of 24th-30th of June the preparatory phase took place, along with the secondary data analysis. The data was mainly collected from the 1^s of July to the 3rd of August. From the 5th-11th of August, the

data was transcribed, and the data analysis began. The interviews with the households and community members happened parallelly to the questionnaire phase. The interviews with institutional members took place according to the availability of respondents. See the Annex 4 for the fieldwork schedule.

3.6 Validity and Reliability

Validity and reliability of scientific researches vary according to the chosen method. Validity explains the adequate operationalization of the research and a certain generalization degree. Reliability expresses the accuracy and consistency of the measurements (Thiel 2014).

The case study strategy has an overall high degree of internal validity and instead low probability to achieve external validity. In the case of this research, internal validity was high due to the use of triangulation data collection. The use of questionnaires, semi structured interviews and secondary data collection provided a variety of data to check the correlation of the findings. Moreover, the decision to narrow the scope of the research down to objective factors of social cohesion helped to achieve a more sound and verifiable research.

In terms of external validity, since the policy was applied geographically homogeneously in the city, the findings could be applied in neighbourhoods with similar demographic conditions. Furthermore, the operationalization could be also be implemented in other studies to assess the relationship between the degree of tenure and a certain degree of social behaviour.

The reliability of the research was ensured by piloting the questionnaires and interviews, as well as keeping track of the methodology and progress of the data collection phase (Thiel 2014). The main limitation was the sensitivity of the topic; the residents might not be willing to answer questions about property or social conflicts. In order to solve this, the researcher relied on a local interpreter, to increase the confidentiality in the response. Another methodological shortcoming was the conflicting information in official reports. At the time, different sectors of public institutions dealt independently with informal settlers and titling process; hence, the official report might provide overlapping and confused data. To overcome this, the research focused mainly the legalization reports issued by ALUIZNI.

3.7 Fieldwork report: description and limitations

The questionnaire was piloted with different experts. Specifically, the members of Qendra për Advokim Sociale, who implement plans for the Open Society Foundation for Albania, and the Qendra Sociale Multidisciplinare. Moreover, Fatjona Çaka, as a local researcher, activist, paralegal, and consultant for Qendra për Advokim Sociale, helped in the translation of the questionnaire and interviews, as well with daily data collection. Some parts of the questionnaire itself were rephrased during fieldwork, as the wording was difficult to understand by the households. However, to avoid misunderstanding, the whole data was collected via a guided fill-in process. The language was an issue for the self-conduction of interviews and questionnaire by the researcher. The help of the local interpreter was substantial in co-conducting the questionnaires and translating. This limitation, combined with a lack of availability of the interpreter, forced to reduce the number of interviews with household. The researcher took advantage of the comments section in the questionnaires. Here, the households were free to leave comments and asked to share their stories. See Annex 7 for the comments' transcription. The comments were used as qualitative data instead of interviews. Due to the summer holiday, some agencies' representatives were not responsive. A representative of the Municipality of Tirana was available only via Skype after the end of the fieldwork. The research followed an iterative process between qualitative and quantitative data collection, to overcome the troubles encountered in the fieldwork.

3.8 Data Analysis Techniques

The quantitative data was analysed via statistical analysis using the computer program SPSS. After the data collection, the research proceeded with the data transcription, parallelly conducting a data inspection to check for any mistakes and look for standard deviations. A Code Book (Annex 1) kept track of the values given to each indicator. The qualitative data was used to support and explain the quantitative ones. The analysis of qualitative data began with the process of ordering the collected data. The researcher selected then the relevant information, based on theoretical hypothesis via content analysis (Thiel 2014) and compared to the quantitative data.

3.8.1 Data Preparation

The collected data went through a preparatory phase. Firstly, the ethnicity answers (item 10.6) were transformed into numerical values (1= Albanian, 2=Roma, 3= Egyptian). Secondly, the answers of possession of land and building titles (item 1.1 and 1.2) were summarized into the ownership categories previously explained: respondents with no title for both fell into category A, the ones who declared to have applied for land ownership into category B, the one with full land ownership into category C. Few respondents declared that they only have the ownership of the dwelling or the land; here, the strategy was to consider the two main cases. In the case of an absentee owner, if the answers about security items showed a sense of fear and uncertainty the respondent was considered as type A. If the respondent claimed to have the property of a building on public land with the possibility to register a house, he was aligned to the type C, as his perception of security was high. These strings were recoded into dummies variables, in order to be used for the regression analysis. Moreover, in SPSS, missing data was generated correspondingly to 999-items. Finally, Value Labels were added.

3.9 Area of study description

The study areas were involved in different processes of legalization at the time of the fieldwork. The Unit 3, precisely the areas of Kinostudio, Allias and Shkoze, includes formal areas where legalization was partially completed. Most of the households obtained the property certificate, but some residents were still involved in property conflicts, mainly with private owners – in some cases, family members. Part of the Shkoze residents lived in poor illegal dwellings and did not applied for the legalization. Overall, the houses were permanent but in poor conditions. In the Unit, where 15612 families were registered, there were several social services and schools. Several infrastructure improvement projects were reported on the Municipality Website (Bashkia Tiranë 2019).

The Unit 6, with 25360 families, includes the areas of Kombinat, Unaza I Re and Yzberish. With the help of the Qendra për Advokim Sociale, some minorities exposed to relocation were asked to respond to the questionnaire, as well as other households who lived in isolated single-family houses that they built irregularly on public land (Picture 1). Here, there was a high presence of low-income groups and minorities. The district was born in the '50s around an industrial complex. In the '90s, with the migration boom, it drastically changed in social and demographic composition. Many factories closed, and people from the rural side of the country occupied the free public space illegally. The neighbourhood maintained at the time of the fieldwork the image of “working neighbourhood” and many people still were working in some foreign-owned industries in the area.

Selite, in Unit 7, is a neighbourhood adjacent to the first periphery and where several households were facing legalization issue due to the construction of the new Ring Road of

Tirana. This highway is supposed to light the traffic on the Tirana-Durres arteria and to connect the periphery to the city centre. As the case of the New Boulevard in Unit 8, several households had their legalization process on-hold for years, until they were forced to leave the area. Here the legalization topic was still particularly sensitive, and several protests were on-going at the time of the fieldwork. For a deeper understanding, see the interview with Advocati I Popullit representative.

Unit 8 is the area of the New Boulevard. The new axis is planned as the continuation of the historic boulevard that runs across the institutional centre of Tirana. Here, many people were unable to finalize the legalization of land, due to a Detailed Local Plan that imposed the new development of the area. The situation was quite uneven, as the land close to the North Boulevard had a higher value than the adjacent properties. Households' main issue was the lack of information regarding a possible eviction, which forced them to an uncertain future. The houses' quality was better than the other Units; some were flats, other isolated single-family houses in good conditions (Picture 2 and 3).

Unit 9 is an area at the heart of the city. Part of the residents settled in after 1944, while some in the 1990s. At the time of this research, it included informal settlements on the east side of the Don Bosko Road, close to the New boulevard area. Close to the river, there were some informal settlements, exposed to environmental risk.

Unit 11 is located in the peripheral side of the “yellow line”, a division revoked at the time of the research. It was highly populated in the ‘90s, mainly from people coming from the North of the country. Since 2000, it included the informal area of Laprakë. As in Unit 9, the residents close to the river faced many property issues: most of them were still illegal and were threatened by the construction of the new Ring Road of Tirana. In the area of Instituti Bukqësor, the residents applied in the past, and still was, at the moment, one of the hot spots in Tirana for property protests.

Picture 1: Unit 6 – single-family house.

Picture 2: Unit 8 – single-family house.

Picture 3: Unit 8 – Condominium.



Source: Author (2019).

Chapter 4: Research Findings

Chapter 4 unpacks the data collected into quantitative and qualitative analysis. Section 4.1 describes the overall data collected. Followingly, the sample characteristics are described in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 explains the data inspection procedure. Moreover, the quantitative primary data is analysed in Section 4.4 and 4.5, the qualitative primary data in Section 4.6 and secondary data in Section 4.7. The last Section 4.8 combines the data collected into a comprehensive discussion.

4.1 Data description

The case study methodology was based on triangulation; Table 8 presents the data collected in the fieldwork, as well as the different sources and methods. Triangulation, which, as said in Section 3.6, enhances the validity and the reliability of the research, was applied to data sources. The data, conducted through documents, reports, interviews and questionnaires, provided a diversified approach that helped the researcher in assessing the validity of data, even with a small sample. See Annex 6,7,8 for the full transcriptions. Furthermore, the various background and social position of both questionnaire and interviews respondents increased the representativeness of the sample. Moreover, since multiple sources confirmed the same data, inconsistencies were easier to be individualized and minimized (Thiel 2014).

Table 8: Final data collection method and sample size.

Data collection method	Data		Sample size	Sampling Method	Comments
Questionnaires to households	Primary	Quantitative	113	Two step Sample: stratified sample and quota sample	Type A: 37 Type B: 36 Type C: 40
In-depth interviews with households		Qualitative	1	Two step Sample: stratified sample and quota sample	Type C
Households comments			23	Two step Sample: stratified sample and self-selection	Types A,B,C
In-depth interview with staff from ALUIZNI			1	Purposive sample	Architect
In-depth interview with Director of ASHK			1	Purposive sample	Live translation
In-depth interview with staff from Advocati I Popullit			1	Purposive sample	Lawyer
In-depth interview with staff from Ministry of Finance and Economy			1	Purposive sample	Head of Budget of Housing Department
In-depth interview with staff from Qendra për Advokim Sociale			2	Purposive sample	Activists and lawyers
In-depth interview with staff from the Municipality of Tirana			1	Purposive sample	Conducted via Skype
Report ALUIZNI 2018			Secondary	1	Purposive sample
Advokati I Popullit: Special Report: On issues related to the right of Property	1	Purposive sample		Self-translated	
UN Report 2018 - Albania	1	Purposive sample		Country Report	
Word Bank Report 2018	1	Purposive sample		Country Report	
Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018	1	Purposive sample		Country Report	
IDM, UNDP, Civicus Report 2010	1	Purposive sample		Country Report	

Source: Author (2019).

4.2 Quantitative Primary Data Description

In this Section, the collected sample is described. See Annex 5 for the Graphs.

4.2.1 Distribution of respondents per administrative unit

As previously described, the respondents from Units 3 and 6 fell into different ownership conditions. Almost all the households from Unit 7 and 11 were waiting for the legalization process to be completed. In Unit 8 only 7 questionnaires were conducted, while in Unit 9 the cases of two extremes were collected. On one side, there were households with full ownership, as it is one of the oldest and most stable neighbourhood in Tirana; on the other side, settlers located on the riverside, not allowed to legalize their dwellings.

4.2.2 Length of residency

As stated in Chapter 3, the minimum length of residency for being accountable for changes in social behaviour, is 5 years. None of the respondents was a new incomer in the neighbourhoods. 68% of them declared to live in the same neighbourhood for more than 15 years. Only 14% of the respondents were living in the area since 5 to 10 years.

4.2.3 Education

Only 7% of respondents were illiterate, concentrated among applicants. The 18% of respondents whose at least one family member had professional education were concentrated in the group of titleholders. This category was composed of households whose family members completed secondary and tertiary education, testifying a higher educational level than the other two categories. In the data analysis, education was recoded in dummies variables.

Green and Preston (2001) consider the difference between having completed secondary or tertiary education as the threshold to establish a low or high level of education. This research decided to separate and created then three variable: illiterate households and who completed only primary education, recoded as low educated; households who completed the secondary school; respondents who were enrolled or had finished tertiary education.

4.2.4 Gender

Overall, the respondents were 53% male and 47% female. The respondents were asked to fill the questionnaire as a representative of the households. Female respondents were more responsive to the interviewers.

4.2.5 Ethnicity

69% of respondents were Albanian, while 31% from minorities groups. The titleholders were mainly Albanian. However, among the group of informal settlers and applicants, Albanian nationalities respondents counted for more than 50% of the items.

4.2.6 Religion

The majority of respondents, equal to 63%, were Muslim, while 35% were Christian and only 2% preferred not to say.

4.2.7 Means of obtaining property

The majority of the respondents illegally occupied the land (62%). 51% of them are informal settlers or applicants. The number of people who obtained the property by inheritance or trade, corresponded to almost 60% of the concluded applications.

4.2.8 Income

The variable of income was measured by the use of proxy indicators, related to the affordability of basic or luxury goods. With a Cronbach's alpha value of 0.852, the combination of the indicators into a new variable was considered reliable. The new variable was recoded to form three groups: poor, low income and middle income. Since the values were overall very low (Mean:1.9), the sample did not correspond to whole financially able population. The distribution per ownership status (see Annex 5.8) highlights a disparity between the

beneficiaries of the land titling policy; more than 60% of titleholders were part of low-middle income.

4.3 Quantitative Primary Data Inspection

Data inspection is used to make an informed choice on which statistical technique is the most suitable for the analysis and to check whether the sample is representative.

According to the theoretical framework, three main categories of ownership conditions are considered: informal settlers (A), applicants (B), titleholders (C). In the analysis, the independent variables are expressed as three dummies variables, meaning that a value of 1 indicates the presence of a determined category, while 0 the absence.

After seeing the pattern of ownership status of the respondents, it was possible to add other categories, in order to expand the research and includes different conditions of ownership, according to the continuum of property concept. The group D includes households without title deed, but for whom legalization could be possible, while, in case of group E, legalization was not possible. Lastly, the category F includes the respondents who declared to be involved in property conflicts. The data analysis of the extra two independent variables, namely the capability to legalize the property and the involvement in property conflicts, is presented in Annex 10.

The three dependent variables are generated by aggregation of indicators. Security is treated as a mediating variable. Every variable is explained in a descriptive statistics tables in the Annex 9, reporting the mean and the standard deviation. According to Thiel (2014) the higher is the standard deviation, the more disperse - hence heterogeneous - are the data.

In order to measure the reliability of the indicators for the aggregation phase, a reliability analysis is conducted, with minimum three indicators. The value of Cronbach's alpha is significant reliable for values higher than 0.7. This value is taken as a baseline for reliability test. However, in case of limited number of respondents, the value of 0.5 is used as a referring point for reliability analysis.

The variables are also verified in terms of normality. A normal distribution of data, expressed by a graph, is the base of statistical analysis. In the case of non-normality of data, the outlier values are eliminated, or a natural logarithm transformation is applied to the continuous variables, in order to reduce the skewness and resemble a normal distribution. Mediating variables do not have to respect the assumption of normal distribution. However, if these conditions did not help to achieve a normal distribution of data, the regression analysis considers the original variable, as it is meaningful to the sample.

When comparing three or more different independent groups, another assumption is the homogeneity of variance, which aims to prove that the data are comparable, because the distribution of the outcome is comparable. This is assessed by the Levene Test. To have homogeneity of variance, the p value should be above 0.05.


Lastly, a correlation test measures the strength of the relation between two variables. The correlation coefficient range between 0 and 1, where the higher is the number, the stronger the variable are statistically correlated. The signs +/- indicate a positive or negative correlation. However, this parametric test does not explain a causal relation, but testifies only if a general relationship exists. There are several assumptions for the correlation tests. Firstly, the level of measurement: the Pearson correlation r is used in case of a continuous variable, the Spearman

correlation rho for ordinal variables. Secondly, the data should have a normal distribution, and thirdly, it should exclude outliers, hence having the standard deviation less than 3.29.

The regression analysis expresses via mathematical equation the linear relation of two or more variables. If the relation is positive, an increase of the independent variable leads to an increase in the dependent. For the purpose of this research, a multiple regression is chosen.

In regression analysis, the first assumption is a linear relationship between the variables; secondly, the dependent variable has to follow a normal distribution. Thirdly, no outliers should be present, and, fourthly, there should be homogeneity of variance, as well as, lastly, independence of observations. The R square represents the percentage of variation in the data expressed by the model. It is used as comparison in different models with the same dependent variable. Moreover, the significance is valid at 0.1 significant level ($p < 0.1$), at 0.05 significant level ($p < 0.05$), at 0.01 significant level ($p < 0.01$). The coefficient B expresses a negative or positive relationship between the variables, and the degree to which each variable influences the dependent one when the others are constant. See Annex 9 for the details of the data inspection. Chart 1 explains the variable aggregations. Ownership status, Gender, education, ethnicity and income are also expressed as dummy variables.

Chart 1: Operationalization indicators for ownership status.



Source: Author (2019).

4.4 Quantitative Primary Data Analysis

The detailed aggregation and statistical analysis of the variables is presented in Annex 9.

4.4.1 Ownership categories description

The respondents of group A, the one without title and who also did not apply for it, were in total 38 respondents (33%). Only in 2 cases, their property could be legalized, as in the case of Selite. For 35 of them, legalization was not possible because of future public investment or being on environmental risk area. The respondents of this category were part of the administrative units 3, 6, 8, 9. In the case of Selite, Unaza I Re and Kombinat the areas were most likely to be occupied by public infrastructure; however, since the decision hadn't been taken at the time of the fieldwork, the residents were on hold, without any solution for legalization or an eventual relocation. Most of the households in this category were poor, living

in barracks in bad conditions. In the case of Unaza I Re, respondents claimed that the land where they settled was owned by different absentee owners.

The category B included households who applied for the title, equal to 36 (32%) respondents. The most common condition was the case of an application made at the beginning of the 2000s, not yet fulfilled by the Municipality. 33 respondents declared that their dwelling could be legalized. As it appeared from the interviews n. 01 and n. 07 (see Annex 6), in the case of a public infrastructure project, the households might receive an eviction notice even only one month in advance. The data collection on this group was done in the units 3,6,7,11.

The group C included respondents with title, equal to 40 respondents, 35% of the total. This group was found in the administrative units 3,6,8,9. The timeframe of obtaining the title deed for the property was from 1994 to 2015, and only three respondents in 2016, 2017 and 2019.

4.4.2 Security

As shown in Chapter 2 and 3, in many cases the provision of title is connected to an increase in the perception of security. The **perception of security** of the respondents was measured by the following items, ranked from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree):

7.3 I am worried about being evicted by my property.

7.4 I am willing to change residence in order to have a more secure dwelling.

7.5 I feel more secure with a title deed.


The indicators were also combined with the item of length of residency, which expressed the residential stability and resulted in literature as a factor able to generate security of tenure.

2.2 How many years have you been living in your house?

1. 0 to 5 years. 2. 5 to 10 years 3. 10 to 15 years 4. 15 to 20 years 5. More than 20 years

The Cronbach's alpha value indicates the compatibility of indicators, when above 0.5. The value of the indicators 7.3, 7.4,7.5 and 2.2 was 0.58, acceptable. The variable was recoded from low security (1) to high (5). See Annex 9 for the descriptive statistics of the indicators. Chart 2 shows a clear pattern: the presence of title increases the perception of security. Worth to mention, the majority of titleholders ranked security as average, and only 3 claimed to feel fully secure of their tenure condition.

Chart 2: Subdivision respondents by type of ownership and perception of security



Source: Author (2019).

A second aspect of security, the **personal concern over security**, was considered. As explained by Lanjouw and Levy (2002), being worried about the possibility of eviction on a short run is different from long-term perception. This indicator was measured by asking the respondents to rank from 1 to 5 security of tenure among other aspects of their livelihood.

2.3 What is the importance of the following aspects in your family?


1. Minimum importance
2. Low importance
3. Average importance
4. High importance
5. Maximum importance

a	Lack of monthly saving	
b	Employment	
c	Tenure security and land ownership	
d	Health	
e	Other, specify:	

The majority of the respondents, almost equal to 60%, rated security of tenure as high or maximum importance in their livelihood concern. The subdivision per category of ownership (Chart 3) shows that for the majority of non-titleholders (A+B) security of tenure had high or maximum importance. For the majority of titleholders (C) security had low importance in their livelihood (15 respondents); however, for 13 of them, security had a high or very high importance in their everyday concern.

To conclude, although having a title clearly increases the perception of security, it stays a topic of high concern among the majority of respondents, whether they have title or not.

Chart 3: Subdivision respondents by type of ownership and concern over security.



Source: Author 2019.

The Spearman correlation of the variables shows where significant correlation can be found.

Table 9: Security correlation table

	Informal settlers (A)	Applicants (B)	Titleholders (C)	Perception of security	Concern over security
Informal settlers (A)	1				
Applicants (B)	-.480**	1			
Titleholders (C)	-.520**	-.499**	1		
Perception of security	-.405**	.260**	.654**	1	
Concern over security	.346**	-.236*	-.547**	-.358**	1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author (2019).

A strong negative correlation between perception of security and lack of title is found households with title feel more secure. The applicants have a higher perception of security than informal settlers, while the titleholders positively outclass the other two. Similarly, the group A ranks very high their personal concern over security, while it is lower for the other two categories. Moreover, there is a negative relation between perception of security and perception of concern: the more a household feels secure, the less he considers security an issue in his livelihood.

4.4.3 Social Network

The variable social network was measured by the degree of social relations in the neighbourhood, the degree of social relations related to the process of getting ownership, as well as the perception of social differences in the neighbourhood.

Firstly, the **social relations** of the respondents were measured by the following questions, whose Cronbach's alpha is 0.821:

3.1 How many people do you know by name in your neighbourhood?

3.2 How many of your close personal friends live in your neighbourhood?

3.3 How often do you meet your neighbours to share a meal, visit at home, have a talk with?

Secondly, the variable of **support**, expressing how social relations might change due to the process of provision of full ownership, was measured by the following indicators, which respondents had to rank from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

3.7 During the process to get ownership, I met new people in my same situation.

3.8 During the process to get ownership, I lost social connection in the neighbourhood.

3.9 During the process to get ownership, I found support in the neighbourhoods and friends.

The three expressed the contribution of the legalization process to the social relations. The Cronbach's alpha was 0.557, still above the minimum baseline.

Lastly, the variable of **inclusion** summarized the perception of social differences in the neighbourhood. It was composed of indicators 3.4, 3.5, 3.6. As in the case of the item 2.3, the respondents were asked to rank different options in comparison, in order to get a more valid answer, as claimed by Thiel (2014). The questions ranked from 1 to 5 the extent to what the households perceived differences in the neighbourhood, in terms of ethnicity, religion, tenure, income, age and gender; to what extent the same characteristics were common among their friends or created issues in the neighbourhood. Doing so, the indicators measured the perception of homogeneity of the neighbourhood: the lower, the ranks, the higher the homogeneity. Regarding the component of tenure, the neighbourhoods appeared quite homogeneous; respondents had relations with households with the same condition of tenure, and 47% of the respondents claimed that there was a relatively small possibility that ownership issues might generate an issue in the neighbourhood. All the indicators part of the questions 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 were aggregated into the variable Inclusion, with a Cronbach's Alpha value of 0.807. In order to achieve a normal distribution, 5 outlier values below 2 were eliminated.

The combination of social relations, support and inclusion generated the dependent variable of **social network**. Following, the correlation table.

Table 10: Social network correlation table.

	Informal settlers (A)	Applicants (B)	Titleholders (C)	Social Network
Informal settlers (A)	1			

Applicants (B)	-.480**	1		
Titleholders (C)	-.520**	-.499**	1	
Social Network	.105	-.303**	.198**	1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author 2019.

The table shows a strong positive correlation between social network and titleholders. On the contrary, the applicants have a strong negative correlation, and informal settlers a positive one, although not strong. See Annex 9.2 and the Discussion Section 4.8.9 for the correlation of the sub-variables.

4.4.4 Social Order

Social order is interpreted as the absence of conflicts. The impact of conflicts was measured by economic and social perceived loss. The analysis took into account only the 31 respondents who declared to be involved in property conflicts. From this group, 69% were involved in disputes with public institutions, mainly Municipality and Aluizni, while 31% with third private parties. Of this group, 22 households were involved in on-going conflicts. The 10 titleholders completed the legalization and resolved the disputes.

The **economic loss** was measured by the aggregation of indicators 9.1,9.2,9.3. These related to the amount of expenses for legal support, compensation and overall legalization. The Cronbach's alpha value was 0.842.

For the second variable, the **social loss**, the Cronbach's alpha value for the aggregation of the indicators 9.4,9.5,9.6,9.7 was 0.832. The items, ranked from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) were the following:

9.4 Due to property disputes/conflicts I have experienced physical violence to myself, my family or our personal belongings.

9.5 Due to property disputes/conflicts I have lost social relations.

9.6 Due to property disputes/conflicts I have the feeling of being isolated.

9.7 Due to property disputes/conflicts I have the feeling of being unpopular.

The aggregate variable to measure **social order**, which expresses the impacts and effects of conflicts on the households, was composed by the sum of the economic and social loss indicators.

Table 11: Social order Correlation table.

	Informal settlers (A)	Applicants (B)	Titleholders (C)	Social Order
Informal settlers (A)	1			
Applicants (B)	-.480**	1		
Titleholders (C)	-.520**	-.499**	1	
Social Order	.438*	.242	-.665**	1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author 2019.

Since there is a strong positive correlation between the social order and informal settlers, it is possible to conclude that the one with the title but who were previously involved in conflicts, suffered less from isolation and exclusion. Worth to mention, the same group was the one resulting the more financially better-off and educated from the questionnaire. See Annex 9.2 and the Discussion Section 4.8.9 for the correlation of the sub-variables.

4.4.5 Civic Engagement

The concept of civic engagement is intended as formal participation, informal participation, collective efficacy and the contribution of property issues in participatory attitudes.

Formal participation was expressed by the number of household part of clubs or volunteering associations, participating in community meetings and administrative elections. The reliability analysis over the indicators of formal participation (4.1,4.2,4.3,4.4) presented a Cronbach's alpha value of 0.724.

The **informal participation** was calculated as political support via social media, participation to community activities or events, to protest for general reason or related to legalization, through the questions 5.1,5.2, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, with a Cronbach' alpha value of 0.558, still valid. The **willingness to contribute** was measured asking the respondents to rank from 1 to 5 (1. Almost never, 2. Few times, 3. Average, 4. Often, 5. Very frequently) with the following items, with a Cronbach's alpha value of 0.910:

5.3 My family would contribute in case of (physical or social) infrastructure upgrading projects in the neighbourhood with physical contribution (labour or time to finalize the project).

5.4 My family would contribute in case of (physical or social) infrastructure upgrading project in the neighbourhood with financial contribution.

5.5 My family would contribute in case of (physical or social) infrastructure upgrading project in the neighbourhood with both financial and physical contribution.

The measurement of the extent of legalization as a **motivating factor** to an increase in participation or, contrarily, to social isolation, took into account the indicators 6.1 to 6.4. The questions to this section were referred to events in the present or in the past: voting, participation in formal or informal legalization protests, feeling of isolation or exclusion due to ownership condition. The combination of all the **civic engagement** indicators was computed in a new variable, with Cronbach's alpha of 0.734. Followingly, the correlation table for civic engagement. See Annex 9.2 and the Discussion Section 4.8.9 for the correlation of the sub-variables.

Table 12: Civic engagement correlation table.

	Informal settlers (A)	Applicants (B)	Titleholders (C)	Civic engagement
Informal settlers (A)	1			
Applicants (B)	-.480**	1		
Titleholders (C)	-.520**	-.499**	1	
Civic engagement	-.146	.241**	-0.60	1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author 2019.

Civic engagement is positively correlated to only the category of applicants. Contrarily, the other two groups have a negative non-significant relations, close to 0 for titleholders.

4.4.6 Social Cohesion

The three variables social network, social order and civic engagement were combined in one variable, social cohesion. See Annex 9.5 for the analysis.

Table 13: Social cohesion correlation table.

	Informal settlers (A)	Applicants (B)	Titleholders (C)	Social Cohesion
Informal settlers (A)	1			

Applicants (B)	-.480**	1		
Titleholders (C)	-.520**	-.499**	1	
Social Cohesion	.073	.161	-.230*	1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author 2019.

The Spearman's rho shows only one strong correlation, a negative one with titleholders. Non-titleholders show a positive, although not significant, correlation. Similarly, applicants have a higher, although yet not significant, positive correlation with social cohesion. Contrarily, social cohesion among titleholders is significantly low.

4.5 Quantitative Primary Data Inferential Statistics

As previously describes, the research is based on a regression analysis, which digs deeper into the supposed causal relationship between the variables. Although not all the dependent variables showed a significant correlation with all the independent variable considered (See the previous correlation tables), the research conducted the regression without excluding any combination, in order to measure the influence of the control variables and see which demographic characteristics hamper the increase of social cohesion. Therefore, every regression was conducted in three models: the first with only the independent and dependent variable, the second with the introduction of the control variables and the last with the addition of the mediating variable. The regression on the extra independent variables, namely the capability to legalize the property and the involvement in property conflicts, can be found in Annex 10.

4.5.1. Social Network

IV: informal settlers (A), applicants (B)

DV: Social Network

titleholders (C), middle income, tertiary education, Albanian ethnicity are used as a baseline.

Table 14: Regression Social Network - categories ABC.


Social Network	Model 1. Only Theoretical Variable		Model 2. Theoretical Variable + controls v.		Model 3. Theoretical Variable + control v. mediating v.	
Model						
Constant	3.015		2.791		2.698	
Significance	.006*		.074*		.165	
R square	.093		.172		.207	
Variable						
	B	p	B	p	B	p
Informal settlers (A)	-.075	.383	-0.10	.940	-.383	.477
Applicants (B)	-.275	.002**	-.324	.022**	1.100	.109
Poor			-.112	.342	-.078	.582
Low income			.062	.613	.035	.802
Low education			.035	.828	-.015	.936
Secondary Education			.089	.459	.037	.763
Ethnic Minority			.224	.038**	.305	.013**
Gender			.100	.219	.105	.256
Age			.011	.815	.028	.609
Residential stability			-.013	.756	.001	.981
Perception of security (A)					.102	.371

Concern over security (A)					.049	.679
Perception of security (B)					-.260	.095*
Concern over security (B)					-.199	.137

Source: Author 2019.

Model 1 significantly explains a variation in social network ($p=0.06^{**}$). Specifically, looking to the coefficient B, the influence of applicants group B is negative and significant, when it is not significant for informal settlers. The predicted value in the case of full ownership is, therefore, significantly positive. However, the R squared is low: only 9.3% of the variation in social network is accounted for a change between typology of property A and B and having full ownership. Model 2, where the analysis is controlled for income, education, ethnicity, gender, age and time of residency, shows a higher R square (0.172) then the previous one, Holding the other variables constant, a significant contribution is given by being part of ethnic minority groups ($B=0.224$, $p=0.038^{**}$). Therefore, minorities have higher social network when compared to Albanians. Model 3, where the mediating variables are included, is not significant. Chart 4 shows the pattern of social network responses per ownership group, in comparison to the average value.

Chart 4: Subgroup comparison according to social network.



Source: Author 2019.

4.5.2 Social Order

IV: informal settlers (A), applicants (B)

DV: social order

titleholders (C), middle income, tertiary education, Albanian ethnicity are used as a baseline.

Table 15: Regression Social order - categories ABC.

Social order	Model 1. Only Theoretical Variable		Model 2. Theoretical Variable + controls v.		Model 3. Theoretical Variable + control v. mediating v.	
Model						
Constant	1.643		1.431		.414	
Significance	.000**		.000***		.002**	
R square	.511		.871		.920	
Variable						
	B	p	B	p	B	p
Informal settlers (A)	1.446	.000***	.829	.027**	1.576	.108
Applicants (B)	1.170	.000***	.714	.053*	.802	.760
Poor			.319	.413	.387	.397
Low income			-.133	.704	.167	.703
Low education			-.978	.023**	-.678	.143
Secondary Education			-.634	.045**	-.481	.167

Ethnic Minority			-.870	.004**	-.881	.015**
Gender			-.177	.411	.040	.889
Age			.437	.007**	.467	.015**
Residential stability			.177	.113	.296	.057*
Perception of security (A)					.214	.405
Concern over security (A)					-.321	.153
Perception of security (B)					-.268	.518
Concern over security (B)					-.032	.951

Source: Author 2019.


In Model 1, 51.1% of the variation in socio-economic impact due to property conflicts is explained by condition of ownership A and B. In Model 2, the R square increases up to 85.7%. Significant predictors are having a low education, being part of ethnic minorities and age; the first three variables have a negative coefficient, while age a positive one.

Households who completed only primary or secondary education have negative influence on the perception of impacts. This means that households with low education perceived the conflicts less impactful than the other 2 groups, who have a higher level of education. Similarly, Albanian respondents and older ones claim social impacts to be stronger. In Model 3, security is not significant. Significant predictors are age, residential stability, with positive coefficients, and ethnic minorities, with a negative one.

The R square is significantly higher than the regressions conducted on the other dependent variables, because the number of respondents involved in conflicts – hence the number valid for this model – is lower. Therefore, the variables included in the Models are more likely to describe a small sample, rather than a big one.

To conclude, although respondents in all the categories A, B and C claimed to have been part of property conflicts, the socio-economic impacts are perceived as significant only by the non-titleholders and applicants. Chart 5 presents the subgroups' comparison.

Chart 5: Subgroup comparison according to social order.



Source: Author 2019.

4.5.3 Civic Engagement

IV: informal settlers (A), applicants (B)

DV: Civic engagement

titleholders (C), middle income, tertiary education, Albanian ethnicity are used as a baseline.

Table 16: Regression Civic Engagement – categories ABC.


Civic engagement	Model 1. Only Theoretical Variable	Model 2. Theoretical Variable + controls v.	Model 3. Theoretical Variable + control v. mediating v.
Model			

Constant	2.190		2.248		2.474	
Significance	.033**		.001***		.007**	
R square	.060		.282		.323	
Variable						
	B	p	B	p	B	p
Informal settlers (A)	.008	.943	.195	.176	1.135	.080*
Applicants (B)	.262	.020**	.236	.144	-.401	.620
Poor			-.452	.001***	-.397	.012**
Low income			-.081	.562	-.016	.917
Low education			.128	.493	.126	.551
Secondary Education			.181	.178	.213	.126
Ethnic Minority			.127	.309	-.015	.912
Gender			-.085	.361	-.063	.559
Age			-.127	.021**	-.151	.016**
Residential stability			.092	.061*	.036	.539
Perception of security (A)					-.293	.028**
Concern over security (A)					-.109	.439
Perception of security (B)					-.108	.558
Concern over security (B)					.178	.262

Source: Author 2019.

Model 1 shows the ownership condition B as a significant variable in predicting civic engagement. In other words, applying for the title is a predictor of a positive ($B=0.262$) variation in civic engagement. However, when looking to R square value (0.060), the Model, although significant, does not explain a huge variation in the data. In Model 2, the R square shows that 28.2% of the variation of civic engagement is explained by the Model. Holding the other variables constant, the Model is negatively predicted by age and being in poor conditions, and positively by residential stability. The last Model predicts around 32% of changes in the variable. In the case of non-ownership, a lack of security predicts a positive variation in civic engagement, when compared with group C, while group B shows a non-significant difference from group C. See Chart 6 for the subgroups' comparison.

Chart 6: Subgroup comparison according to civic engagement.



Source: Author 2019.

4.5.4 Social Cohesion

IV: informal settlers (A), applicants (B)

DV: social cohesion

titleholders (C), middle income, tertiary education, Albanian ethnicity are used as a baseline.


Table 17: Regression Social cohesion – categories ABC.

Social cohesion	Model 1. Only Theoretical Variable		Model 2. Theoretical Variable + controls v.		Model 3. Theoretical Variable + control v. mediating v.	
Model						
Constant	2.524		2.197		2.124	
Significance	.044**		.001***		.070*	
R square	.055		.280		.251	
Variable						
	B	p	B	p	B	p
Informal settlers (A)	.164	.075*	.298	.015**	.345	.540
Applicants (B)	.224	.017**	.166	.218	.865	.226
Poor			-.407	.000***	-.349	.012**
Low income			-.108	.355	-.108	.436
Low education			.169	.279	.067	.718
Secondary Education			.174	.122	.150	.218
Ethnic Minority			-.151	.149	.127	.303
Gender			-.006	.940	-.014	.886
Age			-.019	.675	-.018	.744
Residential stability			.092	.027**	.115	.026**
Perception of security (A)					.116	.312
Concern over security (A)					-.049	.689
Perception of security (B)					-.198	.222
Concern over security (B)					-.084	.547

Source: Author 2019.

Model 1 confirms that a condition of non-ownership A and B is a predictor of a positive variation of social cohesion. However, the Model does not explain a huge variation, since the R square is limited only to 5.5%. In the second Model, holding the other variables constant, a variation of social cohesion might be caused by being in category A or B, income and residential stability. Specifically, poor households have lower social cohesion than the other income groups. In Model 3, the most significant variable is poor income. Therefore, non-titleholders accounts for an increase in social cohesion, as their coefficient is positive. However, a variation is more significantly explained by income and residential stability. See Chart 7 for a comparison.

Chart 7: Subgroup comparison according social cohesion.




Source: Author 2019.

The following scatterplots (Charts 8 and 9) visualize the relationship between the two significant control variables and the three different ownership status. The informal settlers and applicants have answered almost homogeneously to the questionnaire, while the titleholders quite differently. An increase in income corresponds to an increase in social cohesion for all the groups. The three categories follow the same pattern, although the titleholders have a lower


baseline. Holding constant the low income, applicants have the highest rank, followed closely by informal settlers, while titleholders have the lowest scores in social cohesion. The length of residency is a highly significant predictor to an increase of social cohesion only for group C; contrarily, the variation of the non-titleholders is less evident.

Chart 8: Social cohesion, ownership status and income scatterplot.



Source: Author 2019

Chart 9: Social cohesion, ownership status and residential stability scatterplot.



Source: Author 2019

4.6 Qualitative Primary Data Analysis

The interviews were collected during the fieldwork, beside one, conducted via Skype in August. They were taken in English and recorded. Only one case, for the interviewee n. 05, the interpreter helped with a live translation.

The interview sample included two representative from NGOs, two from the agencies responsible of the process of legalization, one from the Municipality of Tirana and one from the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Only one household was interviewed, in Italian, and translated by the researcher. Due to the language issue, it was impossible during the fieldwork

conduct extensive interviews with other households. However, the comments left at the end of the questionnaire might provide some insights of the households' conditions.

Overall, the interviewees had different point of view on the matter, mainly due to the different role of each agency in the process. Similarly, respondents of the same agency provided similar answers. A strong difference between the interviewees' opinion regards the topic of collaboration and the strength of social relations related to the process of legalization. On one hand, according to NGO members, households find solidarity and support in their neighbourhood and share information about the process. On the other hand, State institutions deal directly with households and do not get in touch with this scenario. Moreover, the technical agencies (ALUIZNI and ASHK) representatives were more focused on the economic implications of the implementation of the policy, rather than the social ones.

The representatives of ALUIZNI, ASHK, the Municipality and the Ministry of Finance mentioned the issue of planning and services' provision and their relationship with land titling. Overall, corruption and politicization were mentioned as strictly interconnected to the land titling policy. See Annex 6 and 7 for the transcription. The interviews are extensively cited in the Discussion Section for an in-depth analysis and a comparison with the other data sources.

4.7 Secondary Data Analysis

Reports of Advokati I Popullit and ALUIZNI were collected to analyse the status of the implementation of the policy. These documents were in Albanian, and they were translated by the researcher. Social indicators for Albania were also studied; the sources were mainly UNDP, World Bank and Bertelsmann Stiftung. See Annex 8 for a summary.

The ALUIZNI 2018 Report provides an overview of the annual achievements and future plans. There were no documents found that were able to offer a panoramic view of the extent of legalization in quantitative terms. However, by comparing this report with the previous ones, it was possible to see the progresses made by the agency. The report from 2013-2014 states that in 2014 only 6% of the informal buildings were legalized; the number increased from 2005 to 2013 up to 13%.

The Advokati I Popullit 2018 Report presents a point of view in between the legal understanding of the policy implications and its framework, and the households' point of view. The main issues hampering the finalization of the policy are wrong documentations and lack of local monitoring of the situation; the case-by-case system lacks coordination and vision. The document also mentions different cases of social conflicts and violence; it is reported that around 800 people died in property disputes, testifying the risk of these processes and the violence that might occur. The Agency recommends an upgrade of the legal framework, including both national and supra-national institutions, the creation of a special commission, the finalization of real estate registration and the digitalization of data.

What appears from these reports is that, although some signs of progress have been made, still efforts are needed to make the legalization process just and shorten the timeframe. The administration is facing at the moment the challenges regarding the union of ALUIZNI and IPRO in the Cadastre office; this might result as another reason to delay some of the applications. In terms of social impacts, the reports account for several examples and cases of physical violence among contenders and protests during the legalization. Several international agencies report low score in civic engagement, while higher in corruption.

The analysis on social indicators is explained in Annex 8.3. Civil society participation has increased over time; citizens participate in policymaking and implementation. However, the

politicization of the third sector and the weak institutional capacity undermine civic society engagement. The Transformation Index BTI in the Country Report (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018) covers an analysis from 2006 to 2018 and provides a rank from 1 to 10 of certain social indicators. Firstly, social capital is barely sufficient, decreasing from 7 to 6 in 2007 and then remaining stable. The report explains this by comparing the strength of clans, families or ethnic structures in building social network and support, with a lack of a broader civic culture; the latter is explained by an individualist behavioural trend, confirming what explained in Chapter 2. Secondly, the socio-economic barriers to reduce poverty also ranks between 5 and 6 in the set timeframe. This is expected to increase due to the willing of access the EU. Thirdly, the indicators of interest groups, stable at 6, testifies an increased number of NGOs in the country, as assessed also by the Advokati I Popullit representative during his interview, although donor-driven and strongly linked to politics. Fourthly, the country has high performance in civic right (scoring 8/10), although the reports specifies that the broad range of regulations in place to protect civic rights is not effectively implemented. Fifthly, the juridical framework is highly affected by corruption and favouritism. Lastly, however in terms of association and assembly right, Albanian have a fluctuant score of 9, civil society participation is lower (7/10). The same indicator is only rated as 47.6% in 2010 by the Civic Society index (IDM *et al.* 2010). Therefore, it is possible to assume an increase between the time the two reports were drafted, the first in 2018 and the second in 2010.

4.8 Discussion

4.8.1 Criticisms to the policy

Moving to an analysis across the primary and secondary data, some elements were recurrent in the interviews and reports. The scale of the problem was explained by the interviewee n.08 (Annex 6.8): *“In terms of numbers, the recognition of half a million of illegal structure in the territory is not a scary amount when you compare it to informal settlements in other countries around the globe. However, in terms of percentage of population, the number becomes a very scary one, and that’s why the issue becomes more political than economical. When you take for granted that in the country there are no more than 3 million inhabitants, if you translate it into families of three members- it just a rough calculation-, it comes out the ¾ of the families in the country have been affected, involved to partial or full informal structure around the country. It has become a real political, economic and sociological issue, because public authorities failed to cope with it”*. The property issue has generated *“not only [...] social turmoil, but also [...] an economic burden for many days to come”* (Annex 6.8).

The Report from ALUIZNI presents the figures of the status quo in 2018, which can be compared to 6% of the informal buildings legalized 2006. This confirms what said by the interviewee n. 04 from the Central Office of ALUIZNI *“a good job has been done. From 350.000 to 190.000 to in 5 years, including the 100.000 shelters that do not fit into the Law”* (Annex 6.4). The prioritization is currently set on protected areas, and on the finalization of the requests on-hold since 2005. However, the housing alternatives in case of expropriation still need a resolution. Households receive public housing only for a limited time (1 or 2 years), which is often not enough to be financially better-off (Annex 6.3).

Moreover, the same report presents some of the main shortcomings; among others, the lack of coordination and monitoring, reported also by the interviewers of ASHK and ALUIZNI (Annex 6.4, 6.5). Moreover, the nexus between the implementation of the policy and the planning instruments of the city has still to be solved; extra efforts have been made to align the two, as explained extensively by interviewee n. 08 (Annex 6.8).

From a quantitative point of view, the policy looks to have made huge progresses; however, the “quality” – and equality - of the process is still open to discussions. What holds for all the interviewees, is that the politicization trend has made the policy an inequitable instrument for land redistribution; it has given an advantage to only a few in the country, while leaving behind who is actually in need of tenure security, such as vulnerable groups. The Report from Advokati I Popullit, as well as the interviewee’s opinion (Annex 6.2), asserts the high social impact of the policy on the livelihood of both original owners – who don’t recognize themselves as former owners, as they are often called – and illegal settlers. In this sense, there are two perspectives. On one side, the institutional representatives from Housing Department, NGOs and Advokati I Popullit considered formal owners the ones which the policy is more unfair to. On the other side, the interviewees from ALUIZNI and ASHK referred to the compensation at the market value, guaranteed only recently, as a fair financial reparation. Pressing issues are the length of the process, the lack of coordination between agencies and the complexity of the legal framework. The interviews show that many institutional representatives considered the policy as an unfair tool of land distribution, where corruption and politicization play a major role in hampering the finalization. Corruption was highlighted not only the interviewee n. 02 from Advokati I Popullit, but also by the n. 07, a legal consultant, and in the Advokati I Popullit Report. Similarly, the interviewed household (Annex 6.6) reported cases of informal payments to developers or original owners to solve conflicts.

Moreover, the representatives of the Municipality and ALUIZNI reflected over the economic impact of the policy. The whole process has been free of charges since 2013; this has made the process affordable for the majority of informal settlers, for high- and medium-income beneficiaries. However, property issues and, mostly, compensation issues, have been one of the major social burden of the country, which the Municipality has to take into account in the everyday decision-making (Annex 6.8). The head of planning also recognized the informal settlements as underdeveloped in terms of services and amenities; the infrastructure development adds another level of complexity and constitutes a second burden, following the compensation, that the interviewee recognized existing in the development of the country. The third and last is the management of the real estate and the private sector development.

Furthermore, the head of Macroplanning Department said that, when the policy was initially implemented, households were consequently improving their living. However, *“In the last ten years I’d say that, both by the evaluation of the prices of properties as well as the value on property real estate market [...] and taxes, that not necessarily it was the legalization process the main factor affecting economically the individuals, but most likely the neighbourhood and urban conditions, which have an imminent influence on the property value and economic level of individuals”* (Annex 6.8).

4.8.2 Property right and right to decent housing

“From an institutional point of view, to have a house today is a privilege, not a life right. They do not recognize it as important as other human rights. It is more a political issue for them.” (Annex 6.1). This comment from the interviewed NGO activist highlights the double face of the policy and its politicization. The use of legalization as a political promise is confirmed by the pattern of responses for the questionnaire item 6.1, where respondents were asked to rank from 1 to 5 if their decision to vote for a certain political party has ever been influenced by the party’s legalization proposal. 48% of respondents agreed with the sentence, 15% ranked as neutral and 37% disagree. The one suffering the most are the “poorest of the poor” (Annex 6.3). and the original owners. Interviewee n.02 claimed that the former owners feel full owners and are experiencing a violation of their right: *“The agency ATP treats the compensation*

procedure. They give the title deed to the new owners and the money to the former owners. The property has a new compensation scheme: compensation in-kind and financial resources. In terms of financial compensation, they also have another framework: you can't be compensated more than 10 million Leks, divided in 10 years, and you can't pay more than 10% of the financial evaluation of your property. It is very complicated. According to my opinion, it is a violation of the property rights of former owners. Keeping tracks of the process is also very hard. We are working on a number of zones and we see that in a close distance in the same neighbourhood one property is legalized, the next one is not. Why is that? This is also a corruption problem" (Annex 6.2). The whole process is in most of the cases affordable for the informal settlers, as the administrative fees are very low. However, they have the right to decent living condition, and there is still a lack of response by the public institutions to provide the service. Original owners might also be absentee owners, as the case of the interview n.06. The family of the respondent's husband built a house on a vacant land 25 years ago. They obtained the building property deed in 2010, as the house fit the requirements of the Law, and there was no high-density development planned. However, they couldn't legalize the land as it was owned by an absentee owner: *"The owner of the land didn't come to declare that the land where you built your house is his. We don't know him, or where he is. Therefore, even the State, when a developer came to increase density and build a tower, doesn't know whom to talk to. They could check the cadastre, but I don't know, they don't do that. I'm not sure what we are supposed to do, or what it's their responsibility"* (Annex 6.6). Worth to mention that in this case, the respondent ranked security as high.

4.8.3 Social impact

The NGOs representatives claimed that households result extremely empowered during the process of getting the title; this not only thanks to the community support, but also due to the full understanding of their rights. The lawyer from Advokati I Popullit stated that the main concerns for the households are *"fear of losing the house, fear of losing the money during the process, and losing a social status as well"* (Annex 6.2). Fear was also recurrent topic in the households' comments. See Annex 7 for the transcription. Following, the deposition of a household from the administrative unit 11. Here the tension was very high, since the Municipality was implementing the plan of the Ring Road of Tirana, hence expropriating many residents. The respondent described the condition of his neighbourhood.

n. 91 – type B: *"I applied for the legalization in 2005 for a house I built in 1994. After 14 years, and after paying the administrative fee, no further steps have been taken. With all these people here, we went to the office, paid money, they made us promises during the election and nothing happened. I have heard so many things on the news, so many scandals, I don't trust them anymore. I maintain a family of 6 members with low income. Now, my only choice is to go to the Court, because their legal deadline expired long ago"*.

Overall, respondents of the applicant group testified the struggle in investing in their property without security and in doing everything they could to finalize the legalization, without a response from the Municipality or ALUIZNI. Some examples:

n. 108 - type B: *"I have invested all my life in this building and yet, nothing has happened. I cannot follow the process any longer, my children will inherit the same problem."*

n. 113 – type B: *"We came here 15 years ago. The State didn't help us to legalize the house. Now the owner of the land wants to invest here. For sure he will not give us any compensation, and ALUIZNI will not accept our application."*

Respondents from group A claimed that *"Nobody has shown interest in our condition so far"* (n. 57, Annex 7), *"In our barracks we don't have light. We don't have events organized in the area. We are informal, and we are cut out"* (n. 65, Annex 7).

The overall social impacts of land conflicts are also presented by the Advokati I Popullit Report, which highlights the risk of violence, social disruption and death embedded into such a sensitive topic as property issues. Worth to specify that only one interviewee (Annex 6.5) recognized the motivation to apply for the title only as economic factor, rather than socio-economic.

4.8.4 Security

Security was one of the most recurrent topics in all the interviews and comments. The fear of losing the shelter and having an alternative was common among the non-titleholders. Many said that *“without housing, life is uncertain”* (n. 68, Annex 7). Moreover, some respondents from group C – titleholders- expressed concerned opinions on that. The respondent n. 09, who finalized the legalization in 2008, spontaneously said: *“Thank you, when you own the property, life is quieter.”* The condition of respondent n. 31 was more recent. *“I informally inherited my house. We managed to legalize it, first the house in 2018 and then the land in 2019. We were threatened by the police several times. I was scared of losing everything. For the last 6 years, we have involved in a property dispute with my husband’s cousin regarding the property limit. We have an informal discussion about the position of the wall, 1 meter on our or his side. If I had the possibility, I would leave the country. I love Albania, but I hate, and fear, politics.”* Households willing to leave comments from group A appeared overall hopeless and scared; the ones who applied for the title fear to lose shelters on which they invested so many efforts. The titleholders remembered the struggle they have been through and the sense of relief afterwards. Similarly, from the questionnaires’ respondents, it is possible to assert that the provision of ownership certainly increases the perception of security of beneficiaries, as also confirmed by the literature review.

The perception of security and concern over security follow two divergent pattern. The first is higher among titleholder, who, consequently, have lower concern over security of tenure in their livelihood; informal settlers present the opposite trend. On this topic, the interviewee n. 07, a lawyer with 8 years of experience, offered an interesting perspective: *“I don’t think with a title you increase your possibility to escape poverty. It is more on a psychological point of view”*. Similarly, the interviewee n. 03 claimed that *“When it started in the early 2000s, there was a huge pressure from international organizations to solve the issue. The notion of security of tenure was translated into ownership, where if you read of the explanation of what is security of tenure, it doesn’t mean having a piece of paper, everywhere for everyone.”* To conclude, land ownership is not only a piece of paper, it involves emotional aspects as well. A lack of security, although it doesn’t affect social cohesion, might generate for non-titleholders an increase of social network and civic engagement. The first can be accounted for an increase in support received by the neighbours, while the second for consider property as a motivating factor to take actions.

4.8.5 Social Network

From a statistical point of view, social network is negatively correlated to the applicants; the same, although not significantly, happens for the group of informal settlers. Moreover, the groups of informal settlers and titleholders rank inclusion positive, although not significant (Annex 9.2). This means that a different ownership condition is neither perceived as a difference, nor it generates tensions among informal settlers, and titleholders. Moreover, it is possible to conclude that the formal owners have stronger social relations. Significant changes are visible in social network due to ethnicity of respondents: being part of Egyptian or Roman minorities corresponds to a higher degree of social network. Contrarily to the literature review

and the interviewees' impressions, residential stability is not a factor that affects social network in these models.

The high homogeneity of the neighbourhoods where respondents from group C and A were located, and the low social network performance of applicants and informal settlers can be confirmed by the interviewee n.01, n. 03, n. 06. An interesting point was made by the member of the Ministry of Finance and Economy: *"After that, when the first Law of 2004 came in power, I don't think there have been protests anymore. This is because there is a process on-going and everyone is expecting to have the right fulfilled. However, there are still some families who applied in 2006 and have yet not received any confirmation. Perhaps the protests do not happen as before because people are spread in the urban area, and there is a lack of local agglomeration and network. Informal settlers, like Roman, they have the advantage of being easily identified as a target group for policy issue; policymaker know where they live, and the features of their settlements. It is harder to identify where the homeless of families that need an improvement of their living conditions, because they are spread in the city. Even if for voting, it is not so much relevant, as it is difficult to localize them."* (Annex 6.3)

Surely, looking to the maps (Pojani 2013, Bashkia Tiranë 2019) and the progress of the policy implementation, the mapped informal settlements have been extremely reduced during the implementation phase of the policy. However, many small niches or neighbourhoods are still involved in the process. Moreover, as proved by the analysed social indicators (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018) explained in Section 4.7 and Annex 8.3, in the country households often base their social network on family or clan ties, rather than on a broader scale. As stated before, this was explained by interviewees and reports by noticing the individualist behavioural pattern in Albania, which, after the transition phase, seems hard to break.

4.8.6 Social order

Non-titleholders (group A and B) resulted to be the groups most impacted by property conflicts. As the economic loss is not significantly correlated to any group (see Annex 9.3.3), it is possible to conclude that the impact of these conflicts, which in most of the cases were still on-going, regards mainly social loss, exclusion, social stigma, violent episodes and isolation, which also appeared from the households' comments (Annex 7). Therefore, who had a property title at the time of the fieldwork, but was previously involved in conflicts, did not felt isolated or excluded as much as the other groups. Moreover, although security is not a predicting factor of high perception of impacts of conflicts, households with high scores in age, residential stability and education level are the ones who perceive as more impactful these conflicts.

The reason for these property conflicts can be accounted not only for family claims, as the households n. 31, but also for the overlap and mismatch of legal documents and the asymmetrical information. The legal and juridical procedures in the country were still on the process of reforming during the fieldwork, slowing the conflicts' resolution down. Corruption is recognized as a factor embedded into a quick resolution of conflicts (Annex 6.7).

Moreover, as stated in 4.8.2, the reports and interviews highlight the high risk of incurring into land conflicts and the social consequences on the households, from isolation to even death (Annex 8.2).

4.8.7 Civic engagement

When looking to the qualitative data, according to the interviewee n. 08 (Annex 6.8) the initial momentum of legalization, at the beginning of the policy implementation, is today reduced to some critical areas. From huge scale mobilization, it is currently hard to see *"the same type of protests escalating to wider range of population [...] not legalized but not affected by any imminent infrastructure project."* In this sense, what was mentioned by the interviewee n. 03

(Annex 6.3), regarding the “*a lack of local agglomeration and network*” might also affect civic engagement. However, in some urban niches, like Selite and the ones affected by the construction of the new Ring Road, mostly with households waiting for the application to be finalized for years, property issues are still a motivating factor for an increase in civic engagement.

The quantitative data is aligned with the interviews’ findings. Being part of the group of applicants generate a variation in civic engagement. Among the control variables, income, age and residential stability are predictors of a variation of civic engagement. Moreover, a lack of security for the informal settlers, acts generates a variation in civic engagement. As stated in Section 4.5, an increase of civic engagement happened between 2010 and 2018 (IDM *et al.* 2010, Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). However, this value is based only on the country performance in political decision-making.

4.8.8 Social Cohesion

Looking to the quantitative variable of social cohesion, its variation might be significantly accounted for groups A and B, with a higher value for B. Moreover, households with high scores in income and residential stability are more likely to have a stronger pro-social behaviour. Social cohesion was also mentioned in the interviews. The interviewee n. 01 blamed low education and low income as factors that make households more exploitable. “*In Albania, it may look like we are a cohesive society, but there is a strong discrimination against the urban poor. The background of people does make a difference*” (Annex 6.1). The same respondent also saw a “*the desire to live in a group. The good point of the process is that they keep the relations they built thanks to our help and during the process of legalization, and they also help the families that are struggling with the same issue*”. A pattern of cooperation among households in the same condition was explained also by the household’s interview (Annex 6.6). Moreover, as said before, lack of local agglomeration was reported by the interviewees to decrease social strengths, collaboration and protests.

To conclude, social cohesion is affected by the condition of ownership, although other factors contribute in explaining its variation. Households who applied for the title are more involved in civic society than the other groups and rank higher in social cohesion. Clearly, applicants feel less secure than the titleholders. Moreover, they find the highest support in their neighbours, and are also the most informally active, both in terms of civic participation, and taking part of collective action to assure their right. Their pro-active behaviour contrasts with the passive one of informal settlers; this can be explained by crossmatching the capability of legalizing the property, which is negative for the majority of informal settlers, the already mentioned geographical fragmentation and the low income and education. A long-term pending application moves the households towards an increase pro-social behaviour, increase their internal social cohesion within their neighbourhood, their informal participation in public and community activities, as well as in civic protests to obtain legalization.

4.8.9 Categories A, B, C, a summary

In this Section, the correlations between the main dependent variables and the sub-variables, reported in Annex 9, are summarized.

The category A of informal settlers have a positive correlation with social support received ($\rho=0.262^{**}$), social impact of conflicts ($\rho=0.411^{*}$), overall social order ($\rho=0.438^{*}$), and motivation of actions related to property ($\rho=0.255^{**}$). They experience a lack of security and high concern over tenure security in their livelihood. Being informal settler is also significantly negatively correlated to formal ($\rho=-0.350^{**}$) and informal participation ($\rho=-0.272^{**}$). To explain this result, different factors should be taken into account: not only the geographical

dispersion of informal settlers, but also the incapability to legalize the property for most of the informal settlers; hence, they are more “passive” than the ones who have applied for the title, which, for the majority, can be fulfilled. The low performance in social network and relation compared to the other groups could be explained by the geographical disaggregation of informal settlements (see Paragraph 4.8.5). When it comes to inclusion, a positive correlation implies that informal settlers, as well as titleholders, live in homogeneous neighbourhoods in terms of ownership. However, this correlation is not significant.

Moving to the group of applicants, they have a positive significant correlation with social support due to the process ($\rho=0.274^{**}$), informal participation ($\rho=0.334^{**}$), civic engagement ($\rho=0.241^{**}$), using property as a motivation to take action ($\rho=0.408^{**}$). They also have a positive correlation with security perception ($\rho=0.260^{**}$) and negative with the personal concern over security ($\rho=-0.236^{*}$), formal participation ($\rho=-0.257^{**}$) and inclusion ($\rho=-0.232^{*}$). Therefore, being with a pending application, which, as seen from the interviews, in most of the cases has been on hold since 2005, adds an emotional component, which also appeared from the interviews and the questionnaires’ comments, that increases the pro-social behaviour.

Lastly, the group of titleholders has a positive correlation with security ($\rho=0.654^{*}$), social network ($\rho=0.215^{**}$), social relation ($\rho=0.387^{**}$) and willingness to participate ($\rho=0.540^{**}$). Contrarily, the group has a negative correlation with concern over security ($\rho=-0.547^{**}$) and support ($\rho=-0.521^{**}$). Clearly having a title deed increases the perception of security; the willingness to participate should also be explained by the income; from the questionnaires’ responses, willingness ranked low by the informal settlers as they were very poor and couldn’t afford to contribute in any community project.

The extra independent variables of capability to legalize the property and involvement in property conflicts are explained in Annex 10. The capability to legalize the property might be a cause of a significant increase in the perception of conflicts and a decrease in civic engagement. Households whose property could not be legalized rank higher in civic engagement. This might be explained by the formal or informal mobilization of households to ask for alternatives solution in the case of public infrastructure projects, as in the case of the areas around the Ring Road project mentioned in the interviews. The variable does not influence social cohesion. Similarly, there is a relationship between involvement in property conflicts and civic engagement, although limited, and no correlation with social cohesion.

Overall, the most significant control variables are income, education, ethnicity, age and residential stability. Since gender is not significant in any model, it is possible to say that the male or female respondents gave similar answers to the questionnaires, and that the effect of the policy can be measured at the household level. In terms of income, poverty results to be significant to explain a weak social network, low civic engagement and social cohesion. Contrarily, to a high level of education corresponds a strong perception of social effects of conflicts, in terms of isolation and exclusion.

Chapter 5: Conclusions and recommendations

This chapter provides a conclusive explanation of the research findings. The answer to the research sub-questions (Section 5.1.1, 5.1.2) leads to the resolution of the main question (Section 5.1.3). Section 5.2 presents recommendations for further study over the subject.

5.1 Conclusions

Transitional economies in CEE have experienced in the last 25 years different socio-economic and political transformations. In the case of Albania, the economic boost has been reflected in the uncontrolled growth of cities, due to an increasing internal migration. In Tirana, at the beginning of the '90s, informal settlements occupied urban and peripheral land; as said by different authors (Tsenkova 2011, Pojani 2015, Pojani, Maci 2015) the overgrowth and undermanagement have contributed to generate the dual city, where the formal and informal spheres still collide spatially, economically and socially.

Within these informal areas, it is difficult to draw the boundaries of tenure condition. Literature talks about the continuum of property right (Payne 2002), where a dichotomy between formal and informal is lost within a mix of customary and statutory regimes. Another issue regards some forms of social exclusion and isolation, related to unemployment, segregation and spatial isolation (La Cava, Nanetti 2000). Moreover, the trend towards individualization is theoretically connected to the post-socialist transformation. According to Bandelj (2016), the post-socialist capitalistic economic model has concurred in generating individual greed and self-serving behaviour, in opposition to the previous regime, where the collective sphere was predominant. This behavioural and attitudinal trend has caused the depletion of the commons, referring to public spaces and more in general, public domain. Private property has taken the lead in setting priorities regarding urban development and morphology, supported by a wave of privatization of physical assets (Bardhoshi 2016, Nase, Ocakçi 2010).

A land titling policy has been implemented in the country since the beginning of 2000s, following the main rationale of transforming physical assets in collaterals and address social problems and property issues. The policy is part of the instruments adopted in order to access the European Union; prior to that, Albania has to meet some criteria, regarding solving property issues, increasing social cohesion, and fighting corruption and social injustice (European Commission 2010, World Bank 2012). As stated by Stanilov (2007), in transitional economies, the restitution of properties has contributed to the reduction of public space and the predominance of the private development.

Land titling is a long-term policy, that covers an extensive period of time. In the case of Albania, its implementation has begun in 2005, and yet today around 100.000 buildings in the country have to be taken care of (Annex 6.4). The capacity of the Municipality has made major steps forward in setting a legal framework that could bring clarity to the procedure, speed up the process and set just criteria for the finalization. The decision, at the beginning of 2019, of merging the IPRO and ALUIZNI in one agency - the ASHK – will also contribute to a future improvement of the policy' implementation. However, land titling cannot be considered only as fiscal instrument but also as social restructuration tool, as it involves a rather just and equitable redistribution of land and property rights. In this sense, the purpose of this research is to assess the social impact of land titling on the households and investigates whether it increases or not the citizens' pro-social behaviour in this particular socio-political context, in order to overcome the physical and perceptive division of Tirana in the dualistic city: the formal and the informal.

The research questions of this research are the following:

- In the post-socialist capitalist context of Greater Tirana, to what extent does the provision of ownership affect households' social cohesion?
 1. How does ownership affect the perception of tenure security?
 2. How does ownership affect the single behavioural components of social cohesion?
 3. How does the overall social cohesive behaviour change according to ownership status?

5.1.1 The effect of provision of ownership over security

The first sub-question regards the link between ownership and security of tenure. The hypothesis is that the provision of ownership positively influences security. The main conclusion drawn by the literature review shows a direct correspondence between land titling policy and security. The provision of full ownership generates an increase in the perception of security among the beneficiaries. However, as stated by Arnot *et al.* (2011) and other, the fear of eviction might be reduced also by other means, such as housing improvements. Moreover, security could be threatened by the long-term cost of titling, as in the case presented by Muyeba (2013). In case of no real threat, a household can feel secure in occupying a piece of land even without a document to confirm his right. In this sense, the collected primary data showed different perspectives. Firstly, security is directly proportional to having a title, hence confirming the hypothesis. However, even the average titleholder does not rank security at its maximum score, and a certain degree of concern of security still pervades titleholders' livelihood. Secondly, in Albania, security is not influenced by the economic cost of the legalization, because, as said by the interviewees, it is an affordable process. However, its role as a mediating variable to explain the conceptual framework is non-significant. Thirdly, relevant is the case of absentee original owner: in this case, security, although occupying a high place in the rank of livelihood concern, is perceived as high.

5.1.2 Behavioural components of social cohesion and ownership

To answer the second research question, the research tested three hypotheses:

1. The process of provision of full ownership influences social networks.
2. The process of provision of full ownership generates property conflicts that decrease social order.
3. The process of provision of full ownership increases civic engagement.

To begin, households in condition of full ownership have a stronger social network, comparing to applicants and non-titleholders; moreover, the latter has a better performance than the second. This is explained in theory by different aspects. First, as explained in the discussion (see Section 4.8), the land titling policy has been implemented all over the city, mainly following the pattern of the self-declaration, rather than the geographical location. Therefore, the fragmentation of informal areas has also reduced the network of informal settlers and applicants. Secondly, as Pojani (2010b) explains, not only social relations among informal settlers are restricted to familiar and ethnic bounds, but this also happens due to a prevalent individualistic behaviour, within the fight for the right to the city (see Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.5). Thirdly, although non-titleholders claimed to experience higher support from other households than the current titleholders, informal settlers also lived in enclosed small communities, as proved not only by the result in the variable of inclusion and social relations, but also by the demographic data of the areas where the questionnaire was conducted.

To conclude, social networks have a minor although significant change according to ownership status; therefore, the hypothesis is confirmed. Since the contribution is low, it is possible to say that ownership is a secondary factor to explain social networks.

Moving to the impact of conflicts, although households involved in property conflicts or disputes could be found in all the three category groups, social order is negatively correlated to the group of titleholders. The impact of these conflicts is mainly related to isolation, violence, exclusion. Old respondents and high educated ones have also a high perception of socio-economic impacts. This is explained by different factors. Firstly, the length of conflicts, still on-going for the majority of respondents of group A and B, can be translated into an emotional and stressful component that heightens the effects of land conflicts. Clearly, the titleholders, who found a formal or informal resolution, most likely rate low the impact. Secondly, residential stability has a strong influence in the perception of conflicts; as explained by different households' comments and by the interviews, the more stable is a household in the area, the more will feel the burden of conflicts. Therefore, the variable of social order contributes to highlight a gap among the respondents from different ownership groups, in terms of social isolation and exclusion. To conclude, the hypothesis is confirmed. This result should be computed to the way the policy has been implemented; delays, corruption and frauds were addressed by the interviewees and some authors (Bejtja, Bejtja 2013, Dode 2014) as key factors hampering the resolution of property claims.

Lastly, a variation of civic engagement between ownership category is significant, although low; specifically, the group of applicants ranks higher in civic engagement than titleholders and informal settlers. The reason might be that they have a right on-hold, which, in most of the cases could be legally finalized by the Municipality. They are in a legal condition to hold the institutions accountable to have their right fulfilled. Therefore, the hypothesis is partially supported as follows. On one side, the overall civic engagement has the lowest value for the formal residents; this can be connected to a lack of civic participation, corresponding to an overall trend of individualistic behaviour (Shehaj *et al.* 2016). On the other side, the applicants have the highest relation to civic engagement, which does not significantly change according to income. Therefore, independently from income distribution, informal participation, participation to protests and voting are variable driven by the need to fulfil the property right.

5.1.3 Land titling and social cohesion

When looking to social cohesion, the pattern is descendent: titleholders have the lowest cohesion, while informal settlers and applicants follow a similar trend. For the same income, the gap between A and B, which almost overlaps, and C still persists. Overall, the applicants have a higher social cohesion and civic engagement than titleholders and informal settlers, but they are the ones who perceived the most the impacts of conflicts and with weaker social network. Literature is often focused on the assessment of the policies' effects on beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. However, following the findings of this study, the applicants, who would be expected to be aligned to the informal settlers due to their legal status, result to be an autonomous group, which deserves higher consideration among policymakers and academics.

Comparing the findings with what presented in other case studies (see Section 2.3), Tirana presents a different pattern. Contrarily to the case of Bogotá (Torres Tovar 2012), the households do not show solidarity or collective engagement, neither to ensure services nor to express solidarity to non-beneficiaries. Moreover, Mueba (2013) verifies different cases in Latin America where land titling has a low, if any, influence on formal and informal participation; contrarily, in Tirana, civic engagement and informal participation are higher among non-titleholders, especially applicants. Lastly, opposite to the cases in the Philippines or in India by Lall *et al.* (2004) and Franco (2008), in Tirana there is a lack of recognized community cooperation prior and during the process of getting the title. The initial social

mobilization expired and protests, at the time of the research, are limited (see interviews). Nevertheless, the findings are aligned to the case of Ecuador, where Lanjouw and Levy (2002) prove that the ones with stronger claims are more likely to have higher engagement.

To come to a conclusion, the provision of ownership has a significant but low influence on social cohesion in Tirana; land titling does not seem like a process helpful in building a cohesive society. Going back to the initial problem of the so-called “dual city” (Pojani 2010a, p. 65), it is worth to wonder if the policy has helped in bridging the formal and informal realm in Tirana. As shown in Chapter 4, the way the policy has been implemented over 15 years has highlighted the socio-economic gap between the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. In this sense, two correlated reflections are made: the first regards the demographic background of the respondents per ownership group, while the second the scale of analysis of social cohesion.

Regarding the first, it is possible to see a polarization of society: high education and middle income are features mainly describing the titleholders, while the other groups are distributed among lower ranks. Since these two variables are significant to a certain variation in social cohesion and pro-social behaviour, it implies that the policy has intensified the socio-economic differences. Worth to mention that the interviewed applicants were in between formal residents and informal settlers in terms of income and education. Secondly, at an urban scale, although limited to the number of respondents of this research, the land titling policy in Tirana not only does not cause a significant increase in social cohesion, but also, recalling the statement of Sjaastad and Bromley (2000), it is implemented at the expenses of social cohesion. However, when looking at informal niches, the data collected confirms solidarity and collaboration among households in the same condition, at a neighbourhood scale.

To conclude, although many residents have entered the formal housing system, it seems the discrepancy between formal and informal is wider, as the informal settlers not touched by the policy are mainly urban poor and vulnerable groups. The group of applicants, currently the priority of the institutions in charge of the policy, represents an in-between group, resulted by the specific contextual condition of Albania.

5.2 Recommendations

For a further step in academic research, firstly, the attention should be moved towards the group of applicants. Comparative research can be drawn, in order to find other examples worldwide where the policy, due to its length and *modus operandi*, have resulted in generating this group of households with the property right on-hold. In this sense, policymakers and researchers should pay attention not only to the starting and ending point of land-related policies, but also on the implementation phase, and to predict side effects. Moreover, a layered approach should be taken into account in order to study social cohesion, and in general social issues, at different scales, looking to a contextual indicators. Lastly, comprehensive research on the social effects of land titling should address the group of original owners, excluded by the scope of this one.

From a practical point of view, the institutions in charge are already aware of the errors made in the past and the issues they are facing today. A way to increase the possibility for a quick and just finalization of the policy is to work closely with the NGOs. There are still organizations working with property issues, even if the momentum around the legalization of informal settlements of the ‘90s expired. A strong collaboration among public institutions could mitigate social tensions and speed up the process. Lastly, high consideration should be given to the neighbourhood scale, where socio-political solidarity based on shared values, are more likely to happen, as well as the fight for the right to the city (Harvey 2013); investments in education and neighbourhood community building might be a way to increase pro-social behaviour.

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Annex 1: Code book

Code: reference number per indicators.

Section: order in the questionnaire.

Item: number of questions in the questionnaire.

Value: numeric value assigned to each item.

Section	Indicators	Data type	Items	Values
1	Ownership Status		8	
	Presence of land title	quantitative - nominal	1.1	0=no, 1=yes, 2=self-declaration
	Presence of building permit	quantitative - nominal	1.3	0=no, 1=yes
	Year of land permit issue	quantitative - ratio	1.2	0, etc.
	Year of building permit issue	quantitative - ratio	1.4	0, etc.
	Public owner of land	quantitative - nominal	1.5	0=no, 1=yes
	Private owner of the land	quantitative - nominal	1.6	0=no, 1=yes
	Means of obtaining dwelling	quantitative, qualitative-nominal	2.1	1=bought from private, 1=received from municipality, 3= inherited, 4=occupation, 5=other
1	Capability to legally register the land		1	
	Capability to legally register the land	quantitative, qualitative-nominal	1.8	0=no, 1=yes
2	Duration of right: residential stability		1	
	Length of residence	quantitative - ratio	2.2	1= 0 to 5 years, 2=5 to 10 years, 3=10 to 15years, 4=15 to 20 years, 5=more than 20 years
7	Perception of concern over security		1	
	Perception of personal concern of security among other aspects in livelihood	quantitative, qualitative-ordinal	2.3	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
7	Assurance of right: perception of Security		5	
	Perception of fear of eviction	quantitative, qualitative-ordinal	7.1	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
	Presence of threat of eviction	quantitative, qualitative-ordinal	7.2, 7.3	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
	Willingness to move to have residential security	quantitative, qualitative-ordinal	7.4	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
	Perception of security related to title deed	quantitative, qualitative-ordinal	7.5	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
3	Social Relations		3	
	Number of neighbors known by name	quantitative - ordinal	3.1	1=1-5 people, 2=6-10 people, 3= 11-15 people, 4=16-20 people, 5=more than 20 people
	Number of friends living in the same neighborhood	quantitative - ordinal	3.2	1=1-5 people, 2=6-10 people, 3= 11-15 people, 4=16-20 people, 5=more than 20 people
	Frequency of neighbours meetings	quantitative - ordinal	3.3	1= Rarely , 2=Once a week, 3=Twice a week,4=Almost every day,5= Every day
3	Inclusion		3	
	Perception of presence of background differences	quantitative - ordinal	3.4	1= Very small presence, 2= Small presence, 3= Average presence, 4= High presence, 5= Very high presence
	Perception of importance of background differences in personal relations	quantitative - ordinal	3.5	1= Same as me, 2= Almost same as me, 3= Not relevant to me, 4= Different from me, 5=Very different from me
	Perception of social issue caused by background differences	quantitative - ordinal	3.6	1= Very small possibility, 2= Small possibility, 3= Average, 4= High possibility, 5= Very high possibility

Section	Indicators	Data type	Items	Values
3	Support		3	
	Perception of creating new social relation in the neighborhood	quantitative - ordinal	3.7	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
	Perception of losing social relation in the neighborhood	quantitative - ordinal	3.8	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
	Perception of support received in the neighborhood	quantitative - ordinal	3.9	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
8	Involvement in property conflicts		7	
	Number of households currently involved in	quantitative - ordinal	8.1	0=no, 1=yes
	Number of households currently involved in conflicts with private owners	quantitative - ordinal	8.2	0=no, 1=yes
	Number of households currently involved in conflicts with public institutions	quantitative - ordinal	8.3	0=no, 1=yes
	Number of pending negotiation for selling	quantitative - ordinal	8.4	0=no, 1=yes
	Number of formal resolutions	quantitative - ordinal	8.5	0=no, 1=yes
	Number of informal	quantitative - ordinal	8.6	0=no, 1=yes
	Length of conflicts	quantitative - ordinal	8.7	0=less than 6 months, 1=between 6 m. and 1 y., 2=between 1y. And 1,5 y., 3=more than 1,5 y.
9	Economic Impact of conflicts		3	
	Frequency of economic loss due to legal support	quantitative - ordinal	9.1	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
	Frequency of economic loss due to compensation	quantitative - ordinal	9.2	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
	Frequency of economic loss due to legalization fee	quantitative - ordinal	9.3	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
9	Social Impact of conflicts		4	
	Frequency of violent episodes due to property conflicts	quantitative - ordinal	9.4	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
	Frequency of social relations' disruption due to property conflicts	quantitative - ordinal	9.5	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
	Perception of exclusion due to property conflicts	quantitative - ordinal	9.6	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
	Perception of stigma due to property conflicts	quantitative - ordinal	9.7	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree

Section	Indicators	Data type	Items	Values
4	Formal Participation		4	
	Number of membership in associations/clubs	quantitative - ratio	4.1	0, etc.
	Number of volunteerings activities	quantitative - ratio	4.2	0, etc.
	Number of monthly participated community meetings	quantitative - ratio	4.3	0, etc.
	Number of participated administrative elections in the past 10 years	quantitative - ratio	4.4	0, etc.
5	Informal Participation		5	
	Frequency of protests participation	quantitative - ordinal	5.6	1=Almost never, 2=Few times , 3=Average, 4=Often, 5=Very frequently
	Frequency of community activities	quantitative - ordinal	5.2	1=Almost never, 2=Few times , 3=Average, 4=Often, 5=Very frequently
	Frequency of social media shares/posts for political support	quantitative -ordinal	5.1	1=Almost never, 2=Few times , 3=Average, 4=Often, 5=Very frequently
	Frequency of participation in protests regarding property issue	quantitative - ordinal	5.7	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
	Frequency of informal meetings regarding property issue	quantitative - ordinal	5.8	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
5	Willingness to contribute		3	
	Willingness to contribute in community projects in labour	quantitative - ordinal	5.3	1=Almost never, 2=Few times , 3=Average, 4=Often, 5=Very frequently
	Willingness to contribute in community projects financially	quantitative - ordinal	5.4	1=Almost never, 2=Few times , 3=Average, 4=Often, 5=Very frequently
	Willingness to contribute in community projects both in labour and financially	quantitative - ordinal	5.5	1=Almost never, 2=Few times , 3=Average, 4=Often, 5=Very frequently
6	Motivating factors		4	
	Voting decision related to property issue	quantitative - ordinal	6.1	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
	Perception of civic participation due to property concern	quantitative -ordinal	6.2	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
	Perception of exclusion due to ownership status	quantitative -ordinal	6.3	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
	Perception of exclusion due to conflicts	quantitative -ordinal	6.4	1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree

Section	Indicators	Data type	Items	Values
10	Demography		7	
	Age	quantitative - ratio	10.1	1=18-30, 2=31-45, 3=46-60, 4=61-75, 5=more than 76
	Gender	quantitative - nominal	10.2	1=male, 2=female, 3=other
	Number of households members	quantitative - ratio	10.3	1=1, 2=2, 3= 3 to 4, 4= 5 to 6, 5= more than 7
	Highest education level in the family	quantitative - ordinal	10.4	1=illiterate, 2=primary school, 3=secondary school, 4=university
	Religion	quantitative - nominal	10.5	0=Muslim, 1=Christian, 2=Atheist, 3=-1, 4=Other
	Ethnicity	quantitative- nominal	10.6	0, etc.
	Birth place	quantitative - nominal	10.7	0=Tirana, 1=North Albania, 2=East Albania, 3=South Albania 4=Coastal Albania, 5=Other
10	Economic status		6	
	Amount of monthly expenditure on basic need (travel to work, housing maintenance, housing bills, clothing, healthcare)	quantitative - ratio	10.8	1. I can't afford it 2. I can afford it sometimes 3. I can afford it often 4. I can always afford it,
	Amount of monthly expenditures on luxury goods (car, entertainment, travels)	quantitative - nominal	10.8	1. I can't afford it 2. I can afford it sometimes 3. I can afford it often 4. I can always afford it
	Amount of monthly saving	quantitative - nominal	10.9	0=no, 1=yes, sometimes, 2=yes, always
	Employment status	quantitative - nominal	10.10	0=no, 1=yes, temporary, 2=yes, stable
	Part of public social housing program	quantitative - nominal	10.11	0=no, 1=yes
	Part of employment program	quantitative - nominal	10.12	0=no, 1=yes
tot. Items:			68	

Annex 2: Questionnaire

2.1 Questionnaire to households (English version)

Dear Madam, Sir,

My name is Francesca Vanelli, and I am a registered student in the MSc. Course in Urban Management and Development at the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies, Erasmus University, Rotterdam in the Netherlands. As a requirement for my thesis project, I am undertaking a research in Tirana through a questionnaire.

I am studying the process of legalization of informal dwellings in Tirana, and I want to assess the impact that the policy has on the households. The questions will relate to any difficulties in obtaining the title deed for your property and your experience of the policy and its impact on social relations in your neighbourhood. Please be assured that all the information provided will be confidential and used for academic use only.

Please, complete all the following questions. It will take approximately 20 minutes. Only adults of 18 years old or older, living in the area for longer than 10 years and homeowners, not tenants, are being invited to participate. There is no right or wrong answer, I only want to establish your perceptions and opinions.

Number of questionnaires:
Date:
Time:
Location:

Section 1. Status of property ownership.

Here, I am going to ask you to describe your condition of ownership. Please select one option.

1.1 Do you have a legal ownership document for your land? 0. No 1. I have filled the self-declaration form
2. Yes

1.2 Which year did you obtain legal ownership document for your land?
Please write the year: _____

1.3 Do you have a permit for your dwelling? 0. No 1. Yes

1.4 Which year did you obtain the permit for your dwelling? Please write the year:

—————→ If you have a document of legal ownership, please go to **section 2**

1.5 Is your dwelling built on public land? 0. No 1. Yes

1.6 Is your dwelling built on land owned by another person? 0. No 1. Yes

1.7 Is it possible to legalize your property? 0. No 1. Yes

If not, can you explain why?

1. The location overlaps with public infrastructure
2. My property doesn't fit the physical requirements
3. I'm involved in a property conflict
4. I do not care about legalize my property
5. Other _____

Section 2. Residential stability

I would like to continue by asking you to describe your residential history. Please select one option.

2.1 How have you obtained your land?

1. I bought it from private owner
2. I received it from the Municipality
3. I inherited it
4. I occupied the land and build the house
5. Other, please specify: _____

2.2 How many years have you been living in your house?

1. 0 to 5 years.
2. 5 to 10 years
3. 10 to 15 years
4. 15 to 20 years
5. More than 20 years

2.3 What is the importance of the following aspects in your family?

Please rank each item from 1 to 5 in the box.

1. Minimum importance 2. Low importance 3. Average importance
4. High importance 5. Maximum important

a	Lack of monthly saving	
b	Employment	
c	Tenure security and land ownership	
d	Health	
e	Other, specify:	

Section 3. Social relations and tolerance in your neighbourhood

I want to ask you about the groups or organizations, networks, associations to which you or any member of your household belong. These could be formally organized groups or just groups of people who get together regularly to do an activity or talk about things.

3.0 In which neighbourhood do you live? Please write the name _____

3.1 How many people do you know by name in your neighbourhood?

Please write the number _____

1. 1-5 people 2. 6-10 people 3. 11-15 people 4. 15-20 people 5. More than 20 people

3.2 How many of your close personal friends live in your neighbourhood?

Please write the number _____

1. 1-5 people 2. 6-10 people 3. 11-15 people 4. 15-20 people 5. More than 20 people

3.3 How often do you meet your neighbours to share a meal, visit at home, have a talk?

Please write the number _____

1. Rarely 2. Once a week 3. Twice a week 4. Almost every day 5. Every day

There are often differences in characteristics between people living in the same neighbourhood, such as differences in income, social status, ethnic background. I'm going to ask you some questions about this.

3.4 From your point of view, which characteristics are present in your neighbourhood? Please rank each item from 1 to 5 in the box.

1. Very small presence 2. Small presence 3. Average presence
4. High presence 5. Very high presence

a	Difference in Ethnicity	
b	Difference in Religion	
c	Difference in tenure security and land ownership	
d	Difference in Income	
e	Difference in Age	
f	Difference in Gender	

3.5 Which characteristics have the people you have relations with (share a meal, visit at home, have a talk) in your neighbourhood? Please rank each item from 1 to 5 in the box.

1. Same as me 2. Almost same as me 3. Not relevant to me
4. Different from me 5. Very different from me

a	Ethnicity	
b	Religion	

c	Tenure security and land ownership	
d	Income	
e	Age	
f	Gender	

3.6 Which characteristics do you think may cause problems in your neighbourhood? Please rank each item from 1 to 5 in the box.

1. Very small possibility 2. Small possibility 3. Average
4. High possibility 5. Very high possibility

a	Ethnicity	
b	Religion	
c	Tenure security and land ownership	
d	Income	
e	Age	
f	Gender	

Do you agree with the following statement? Please rank each item from 1 to 5 in the box.

1. Strongly disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neutral 4. Agree 5. Strongly agree

3.7 During the process to get ownership , I met new people in my same situation.	
3.8 During the process to get ownership, I lost social connection in the neighbourhood.	
3.9 During the process to get ownership, I found support in the neighbours and friends.	

Section 4. Formal participation

To continue, I want to ask you about your participation in organized associations or meetings.

4.1 How many associations or clubs are you a member of?

Please write the number _____ Which one? _____

4.2 How many volunteering groups are you a member of?

Please write the number _____ Which one? _____

4.3 How many monthly community or administrative meetings do you take part in?

Please write the number _____

4.4 How many times have you voted in administrative elections in the past 10 years?

Please write the number _____

Section 5. Informal participation and collective efficacy

In this section, I am going to ask you how often you participate in non-organized and spontaneous meetings, and to what extent you would be willing to contribute to a community project in your neighbourhood. This might include the construction of new public spaces, community spaces or water infrastructure.

How frequently do you participate in informal activities? Please rank each item from 1 to 5 in the box.

1. Almost never 2. Few times 3. Average 4. Often 5. Very frequently

5.1 I show political support via social media – example: posts shared on Facebook, Twitter.	
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5.2 I participate in community activities, such as meetings, festival, events, etc.	
5.3 My family would contribute in case of (physical or social) infrastructure upgrading projects in the neighbourhood with physical contribution (labour or time, for example, to finalize the project).	
5.4 My family would contribute in case of (physical or social) infrastructure upgrading project in the neighbourhood with financial contribution.	
5.5 My family would contribute in case of (physical or social) infrastructure upgrading project in the neighbourhood with both financial and physical contribution.	
5.6 I take parts of protests against the local authority.	
5.7 I take part of protests regarding legalization issues or property issues.	
5.8 I participate to informal protests or meetings regarding property issue.	

Section 6. Motivating factors

If disputes arise over property would you increase your level of participation in the political and civic life of the city in order to solve the problem?

Do you agree with the following statements? Please rank each item from 1 to 5 in the box.

1. Strongly disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neutral 4. Agree 5. Strongly agree

6.1 My decision to vote for a certain party has been influenced by their proposal regarding legalization, now or in the past.	
6.2 The concern over my property makes me participate more in civic life, now or in the past.	
6.3 I feel excluded from social activities due to my ownership situation, now or in the past.	
6.4 I feel excluded from social activities due to property conflicts or disputes I have been involved with, now or in the past.	

Section 7. Perception of tenure security

Sometimes being secure in your own property is threatened by public or private actors. A household can be afraid of losing its dwelling for a real threat (receiving visits from institutions member, being contacted by private developers, ...) or s/he can be concerned if it has already happened to neighbours. Is this your case?

Do you agree with the following statements? Please rank each item from 1 to 5 in the box.

1. Strongly disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neutral 4. Agree 5. Strongly agree

7.1 I am worried of being evicted by my property but there is no real threat.	
7.2 I am worried of being evicted by my property because there is a real threat.	
7.3 I am not worried of being evicted by my property.	
7.4 I am willing to change residence in order to have a more secure dwelling.	
7.5 I feel more secure with a title deed.	

Is there something else you want to add to describe your sense of tenure security?

Section 8. Property conflicts

Continue by describing property disputes or claims you have been involved in. Please select one option.

8.1 Have you been involved in property disputes? 0. No 1. Yes, I am/was involved.

→ If not, please go to section 10

8.2 Have you been involved in a property dispute with a private owner? 0. No 1. Yes

→ If yes, please go to **question 8.4**

8.3 Have you been involved in a property dispute with a public institution? 0. No 1. Yes

8.4 Are you involved in a negotiation for selling your property? 0. No 1. Yes

8.5 Have you reached a formal resolution in court (local, national or supra-national)?
0. No 1. Yes

8.6 Have you reached an informal agreement with the counter part? 0. No 1. Yes

8.7 How many months has the dispute lasted?

- 0. less than 6 months
- 1. between 6 months and 1 year
- 2. between 1 year and 1,5 year
- 3. more than 1,5 years

Section 9. Impact of property conflicts

Property disputes may have an economic, physical and emotional impact on the household. How have you experienced this?

Do you agree with the following statements? Please rank each item from 1 to 5 in the box.

1. Strongly disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neutral 4. Agree 5. Strongly agree

9.1 Due to property disputes/conflicts I pay high amount of money for legal support.	
9.2 Due to property disputes/conflicts I pay high amount of money for compensation.	
9.3 Due to property disputes/conflicts I pay high amount of money to legalize my property	
9.4 Due to property disputes/conflicts I have experienced physical violence to myself, my family or our personal belongings.	
9.5 Due to property disputes/conflicts I have lost social relations.	
9.6 Due to property disputes/conflicts I have the feeling of being isolated.	
9.7 Due to property disputes/conflicts I have the feeling of being unpopular.	

Section 10. Personal information

Almost done! Please, answer some questions about yourself and your family. Please select one option.

10.1 How old are you?

- 1. Between 18-30 years old 2. Between 31- 45 years old 3. Between 46-60 years old
- 4. Between 61-75 years old 5. more than 76 years old

10.2 What is your gender? 1. Male 2. Female 3. Other

10.3 How many people are in your family, living in the same house?

- 1. only me 2. 2 members 3. 3 to 4 members
- 4. 5 to 6 members 5. More than 7 members

10.4 What is the highest level of education in your family?

1. illiterate 2. primary education 3. secondary education 4. university

10.5 What is your religion?

1. Muslim
2. Christian
3. Atheist
4. Prefer not to say
5. Other, please specify: _____

10.6 Please select your ethnic group:

Albanian	Bosnjcek	Greek	Macedonians	Malazeze
Serb	Villah/rumune	Egyptian	Roma	Other:

10.7 Where are you born?

0. Tirana
1. North Albania
2. East Albania
3. South Albania
4. Coastal Albania
5. Other, please specify: _____

10.8 To what extent can your family afford monthly the following goods? Please rank from 1 to 5 in the box.

1. I can't afford it 2. I can afford it sometimes 3. I can afford it often 4. I can always afford it

a	Food	
b	Clothing	
c	Education	
d	Utilities	
e	Transport (public or private)	
f	Housing maintenance or improvement	
g	Entertainment (cinema, bars, restaurants, ...)	
h	Healthcare	
i	Travels	
j	Private Car	

10.9 Do you savings at the end of the month? 0. No 1. Yes, sometimes 2. Yes, always

10.10 Do you have a job? 0. No 1. Yes, temporary 2. Yes, stable

10.11 Are you part of a social housing program of the Municipality? 0. No 1. Yes

10.12 Are you part of an employment program of the Municipality? 0. No 1. Yes

Do you have any comment you want to add?

Do you want to share your story with me and take part to a short interview in English? If yes, please leave your email or phone number.

Të nderuar zonja, dhe zotërinj

Po studioj procesin e legalizimit të banesave joformale në Tiranë dhe dua të vlerësoj ndikimin që politika ka ndaj familjeve. Pyetjet do të lidhen me çdo vështirësi në marrjen e veprës së titullit për pronën tuaj dhe përvojën tuaj të politikës dhe ndikimin e saj në marrëdhëniet shoqërore në lagjen tuaj. Ju lutemi të jeni të sigurtë se të gjitha informacionet e dhëna do të jenë konfidenciale dhe do të përdoren vetëm për përdorim akademik.

Numri i pyetësorëve:
Date:
Time:
Vendodhja:

Këtu, unë do t'ju kërkoj të përshkruani gjendjen tuaj të pronësisë. Zgjidh një mundësi.

1.2 Cilin vit keni marrë dokumentin ligjor të pronësisë për tokën tuaj?
Ju lutemi shkruani vitin: _____

1.4 Cilin vit e keni marrë lejen për banesën tuaj? Ju lutemi shkruani vitin: _____

1.7 A është e mundur të legalizoni pronën tuaj? 0. Jo 1. Po

1. Vendndodhja mbivendoset me infrastrukturën publike

2. Prona ime nuk i plotëson kërkesat fizike
3. Unë jam i përfshirë në një konflikt pronësie
4. Nuk më intereson të legalizoj pronën time
5. Të tjera _____

Seksioni 2. Stabiliteti i banimit

Do të doja të vazhdoja duke ju kërkuar të përshkruanit historinë tuaj të banimit. Zgjidh një mundësi.

2.1 Si e keni marrë tokën tuaj?

1. Kam blerë atë nga pronari privat
2. E mora atë nga komuna
3. E kam trashëguar atë
4. Unë zinte tokën dhe ndërtoj shtëpinë
5. Të tjera, ju lutem specifikoni: _____

2.2 Sa vjet keni jetuar në shtëpinë tuaj?

1. 0 deri në 5 vjet.
2. 5 deri në 10 vjet
3. 10 deri në 15 vjet
4. 15 deri në 20 vjet
5. Më shumë se 20 vjet

2.3 Cila është rëndësia e aspekteve të mëposhtme në familjen tuaj? Ju lutem renditni nga 1 deri në 5 në kutinë.

1. Rëndësia minimale
2. Rëndësia e ulët
3. Rëndësia mesatare
4. Rëndësi të madhe
5. Madhësia e rëndësishme

a	Mungesa e kursimeve mujore	
b	Punësimi	
c	Siguria e zotërimit dhe pronësia e tokës	
d	Shëndeti	
e	e Tjera, ju lutem specifikoni:	

Seksioni 3. Marrëdhëniet shoqërore dhe tolerancën në lagjen tuaj

Do të doja t'ju pyes për grupe ose organizata, rrjete, shoqata për të cilat ju ose ndonjë anëtar i familjes suaj i përkisni. Këto mund të jenë grupe të organizuara zyrtarisht ose grupe të drejtë njerëzish që takohen rregullisht për të bërë një aktivitet ose për të folur për gjërat.

3.1 Sa njerëz e njihni me emër në lagjen tuaj - Njësia 8 dhe zona e Bulevardit të Veriut?

Ju lutemi shkruani numrin _____

1. 1-5 persona
2. 6-10 persona
3. 11-15 persona
4. 15-20 persona
5. Më shumë se 20 persona

3.2 Sa miq të ngushtë personal jetojnë në lagjen tuaj?

Ju lutemi shkruani numrin _____

1. 1-5 persona
2. 6-10 persona
3. 11-15 persona
4. 15-20 persona
5. Më shumë se 20 persona

3.3 Sa shpesh i takoni fqinjët tuaj për të ndarë një vakt, për vizita në shtëpi, për biseda?

Ju lutemi shkruani numrin _____

1. Rrallë
2. Një herë në javë
3. Dy herë në javë
4. Pothuajse çdo ditë
5. Çdo ditë

Shpesh ka dallime në karakteristikat e njerëzve që jetojnë në të njëjtën lagje, siç janë dallimet në të ardhura, statusi social, prejardhja etnike. Unë do t'ju bëj disa pyetje në lidhje me këtë.

3.4 Nga këndvështrimi juaj, cilat dallime janë të pranishme në lagjen tuaj? Ju lutemi të renditur çdo element nga 1 në 5 në kutinë.

1. Prania shumë e vogël 2. Prania e vogël 3. Prania mesatare
4. Prania e lartë 5. Prania shumë e lartë

a	Një ndryshim në etnicitetin	
b	Diferenca në besim fetar	
c	Ndryshimi në sigurinë e zotërimit dhe pronësinë e tokës	
d	Diferenca në Të Ardhurat	
e	Ndryshimi i moshës	
f	Diferenca në Gjini	

3.5 Cilat karakteristikash kanë njerëzit me të cilët keni marrëdhënie (ndani një vakt, vizitë në shtëpi, keni një bisedë) në lagjen tuaj? Ju lutemi të renditur çdo element nga 1 në 5 në kutinë.

1. Njëjtë si unë 2. Pothuajse njëjtë me mua 3. Nuk është e rëndësishme për mua
4. Ndryshe nga unë 5. Shumë ndryshe nga unë

a	Etnia	
b	Besimi	
c	Siguria e zotërimit dhe pronësia e tokës	
d	Të ardhurat	
e	Mosha	
f	Gjinia	

3.6 Cilat karakteristika mendoni se mund të shkaktojnë probleme në lagjen tuaj? Ju lutemi të renditur çdo element nga 1 në 5 në kutinë.

1. Mundësi shumë e vogël 2. Mundësi e vogël 3. Mesatare
4. Mundësi e lartë 5. Mundësi shumë e lartë

a	Etnia	
b	Besimi	
c	Siguria e zotërimit dhe pronësia e tokës	
d	Të ardhurat	
e	Mosha	
f	Gjinia	

Pajtoheni me deklaratën e mëposhtme? Ju lutem renditni nga 1 deri në 5 në kutinë për çdo deklaratë

1. Nuk pajtohem aspak 2. Nuk pajtohem 3. Neutral
4. Bie dakord 5. Pajtohem fort

3.7 Çështja e pronësisë më ka vendosur mua me fqinjët në të njëjtën situatë.	
3.8 Gjatë procesit të marrjes së pronësisë, kam humbur lidhjen sociale në lagje.	
3.9 Gjatë procesit të marrjes së pronësisë, gjeta mbështetje nga miqtë dhe fqinjët	

Seksioni 4. Pjesëmarrja formale

Për të vazhduar, unë dua t'ju pyes për pjesëmarrjen tuaj në shoqatat ose mbledhjet e organizuara.

4.1 Sa shoqata apo klube ju jeni anëtare?

Ju lutem shkruani numrin _____ Cila? _____

4.2 Sa grupe vullnetare jeni anëtare?

Ju lutem shkruani numrin _____ Cila? _____

4.3 Sa takime mujore komunitare ose administrative ju merrni pjesë?

Ju lutemi shkruani numrin _____

4.4 Sa herë keni votuar në zgjedhjet administrative në 10 vitet e fundit?

Ju lutemi shkruani numrin _____

Seksioni 5. Pjesëmarrja joformale dhe efikasiteti kolektiv

Në këtë seksion, unë do t'ju pyes se sa shpesh ju merrni pjesë në takimet jo të organizuara dhe spontane dhe në çfarë mase jeni të gatshëm të kontribuoni në një projekt të komunitetit në lagjen tuaj. Kjo mund të përfshijë ndërtimin e hapësirave të reja publike, hapësirave të komunitetit ose infrastrukturës ujore.

Sa shpesh ju merrni pjesë në aktivitetet informale? Ju lutem renditni nga 1 deri në 5 në kutinë për çdo aktivitet.

1. Pothuajse kurrë 2. Disa herë 3. Mesatare 4. Shpesh 5. Shumë shpesh

5.1 Unë tregoj mbështetje politike përmes mediave sociale - shembull: postimet e shpërndara në Facebook, Twitter.	
5.2 Unë marr pjesë në aktivitete të komunitetit, si takime, festivale, ngjarje etj.	
5.3 Familja ime do të kontribuonte në projektet e përmirësimit të infrastrukturës (fizike apo sociale) në lagje me kontributin fizik (puna dhe koha personale, për shembull për hartimin e projektit).	
5.4 Familja ime do të kontribuonte në rast të përmirësimit të infrastrukturës (fizike apo sociale) të infrastrukturës në lagje me kontribut financiar.	
5.5 Familja ime do të kontribuonte në rast të përmirësimit të infrastrukturës (fizike apo sociale) të projektit në lagje me kontribut financiar dhe fizik.	
5.6 Unë marr pjesë në protesta kundër autoriteteve lokale.	
5.7 Unë marr pjesë në protesta lidhur me çështjet e legalizimit ose çështjet e pronësisë.	
5.8 Unë marr pjesë në protesta informale ose takime lidhur me çështjen e pronësisë.	

Seksioni 6. Faktorët motivues

Nëse lindin mosmarrëveshje mbi pronën, a do ta rrisni nivelin e pjesëmarrjes në jetën politike dhe qytetare të qytetit me qëllim që të zgjidhni problemin?

Pajtoheni me deklaratën e mëposhtme? Ju lutem renditni nga 1 deri në 5 në kutinë.

1. Nuk pajtohem aspak 2. Nuk pajtohem 3. Neutral
4. Bie dakord 5. Pajtohem fort

6.1 Vendimi im për të votuar për një parti të caktuar është ndikuar nga propozimi/premtimi i tyre lidhur me legalizimin, tani ose më parë	
6.2 Shqetësimi për pronën time më bën të marr pjesë më shumë në jetën qytetare, tani ose më parë.	
6.3 Ndjem i përjashtuar nga aktivitetet sociale për shkak të gjendjes sime pronësore, tani ose më parë	
6.4 Ndjem i përjashtuar nga aktivitetet sociale për shkak të konflikteve pronësore apo mosmarrëveshjeve me të cilat jam përfshirë, tani ose më parë	

Seksioni 7. Perceptimi i sigurisë së qëndrimit

Ndonjëherë siguri në pronën tuaj kërcënohet nga aktorë publikë ose privatë. Një familje mund të ketë frikë të humbasë vendbanimin e saj për një kërcënim të vërtetë (duke marrë vizita

nga anëtarët e institucioneve, duke u kontaktuar nga zhvilluesit privatë, ...) ose mund të jetë i shqetësuar nëse ka ndodhur me fqinjët. A është ky rasti juaj?

Pajtoheni me deklaratën e mëposhtme? Ju lutem renditni nga 1 deri në 5 në kutinë.

1. Nuk pajtohem aspak 2. Nuk pajtohem 3. Neutral 4. Bie dakord 5. Pajtohem fort

7.1 Jam i shqetësuar për t'u dëbuar nga prona ime, por nuk ka kërcënim real.	
7.2 Jam i shqetësuar për t'u dëbuar nga pronat e mia, sepse ekziston një kërcënim real.	
7.3 Unë nuk jam i shqetësuar për dëbimin e pronës sime.	
7.4 Unë jam i gatshëm të ndryshoj vendbanimin për të pasur një banesë më të sigurt.	
7.5 Ndjem më i sigurt me veprën e titullit.	

A ka diçka tjetër që dëshironi të shtoni për të përshkruar ndjenjën tuaj të sigurisë së qëndrimit?

Seksioni 8. Konfliktet e pronës

Ju lutemi, vazhdoni duke përshkruar nëse jeni përfshirë në kontestet pronësore ose pretendimet. Zgjidh një mundësi.

8.1 A jeni përfshirë në kontestet pronësore? 0. Jo 1. Po, unë jam / isha i përfshirë.

→ Nëse jo, ju lutem shkoni në **seksionin 10**

8.2 A jeni përfshirë në një kontest pronësor me një pronar privat? 0. Jo 1. Po

→ Nëse po, ju lutem shkoni në **pyetjen 8.4**

8.3 A jeni përfshirë në një mosmarrëveshje pronësore me një institucion publik? 0. Jo 1. Po

8.4 A jeni përfshirë në një negociim për shitjen e pronës suaj? 0. Jo 1. Po

8.5 A keni arritur një rezolutë formale në gjykatë (lokale, kombëtare ose supra-kombëtare)? 0. Jo 1. Po

8.6 A keni arritur një marrëveshje informale me personin/institucionin në konflikt? 0. Jo 1. Po

8.7 Sa muaj ka zgjatur mosmarrëveshja?

- 0. më pak se 6 muaj
- 1. midis 6 muaj dhe 1 vit
- 2. midis 1 vit dhe 1,5 vit
- 3. më shumë se 1,5 vjet

Seksioni 9. Ndikimi i konflikteve pronësore

Kontestet pronësore mund të kenë ndikim ekonomik, fizik dhe emocional në familje. Si e keni përjetuar këtë?

Pajtoheni me deklaratën e mëposhtme? Ju lutem renditni nga 1 deri në 5 në kutinë.

1. Nuk pajtohem aspak 2. Nuk pajtohem 3. Neutral
4. Bie dakord 5. Pajtohem fort

9.1 Për shkak të mosmarrëveshjeve / konflikteve pronësore unë paguaj shuma të larta parash për mbështetje ligjore.	
9.2 Për shkak të mosmarrëveshjeve / konflikteve pronësore unë paguaj shuma të larta parash për kompensim.	

9.3 Për shkak të mosmarrëveshjeve / konflikteve pronësore unë paguaj shumë para për të legalizuar pronën time	
9.4 Për shkak të mosmarrëveshjeve / konflikteve pronësore kam përjetuar dhunë fizike ndaj vetes, familjes sime ose sendeve tona personale.	
9.5 Për shkak të mosmarrëveshjeve / konflikteve pronësore kam humbur marrëdhëniet shoqërore.	
9.6 Për shkak të mosmarrëveshjeve / konflikteve pronësore kam ndjenjën e izolimit.	
9.7 Për shkak të mosmarrëveshjeve / konflikteve pronësore, kam ndjenjën e jopopullimit.	

Seksioni 10. Informacioni personal

Pothuajse mbarova! Ju lutemi, përgjigjuni disa pyetjeve për veten dhe familjen tuaj. Zgjidh një mundësi.

10.1 Sa vjeç jeni?

1. Midis 18-30 vjeç 2. Midis 31-45 vjeç 3. Midis 46-60 vjeç
4. Midis 61-75 vjeç 5. Më shumë se 76 vjeç

10.2 Cila është gjinia juaj?

1. Meshkuj 2. Femra 3. Të tjera

10.3 Sa njerëz janë në familjen tuaj, që jetojnë në të njëjtën shtëpi?

1. vetëm mua 2. 2 anëtarë 3. 3 deri 4 anëtarë
4. 5 deri në 6 anëtarë 5. Më shumë se 7 anëtarë

10.4 Cili është niveli më i lartë i arsimimit në familjen tuaj?

1. analfabetë 2. Arsimi fillor 3. arsimin e mesëm 4. Universitet

10.5 Cila është feja juaj?

1. Musliman
2. Të krishterë
3. Ateist
4. Preferoj të mos them
5. Të tjera, ju lutem specifikoni: _____

10.6 Ju lutemi zgjidhni grupin tuaj etnik:

Shqiptar	Bosnjcek	Greke	Maqedonase	Malazeze
Serbe	Villah/rumune	Egyptian	Roma	Other:

10.7 Ku keni lindur?

0. Tiranë
1. Shqipëria Veriore
2. Shqipëria Lindore
3. Shqipëria Jugore
4. Shqipëria bregdetare
5. Të tjera, ju lutem specifikoni: _____

10.8 Deri në çfarë mase familja juaj mund të përballojë çdo muaj mallrat në vijim? Ju lutem renditni nga 1 deri në 5 në kutinë.

1. Unë nuk mund ta përballoj atë 2. Unë mund të përballoj atë ndonjëherë
3. Unë mund ta përballoj atë shpesh 4. Unë gjithmonë mund ta përballoj atë

a	Ushqim	
b	Veshje	
c	Edikim	
d	Fatura	

e	Transportit (publik ose privat)	
f	Mirëmbajtja ose përmirësimi i strehimit	
g	Entertainment (kinema, bare, restorante, ...)	
h	Shendet	
i	Udhetime	
j	Makine Private	

10.9 A kurseni në fund të muajit? 0. Jo 1. Po, ndonjëherë 2. Po, gjithnjë

10.10 A keni një punë? 0. Jo 1. Po, e përkohshme 2. Po, e qëndrueshme

10.11 A jeni pjesë e një programi të strehimit social të Komunës? 0. Jo 1. Po

10.12 A jeni pjesë e një programi të punësimit të Komunës? 0. Jo 1. Po

A keni ndonjë koment që dëshironi të shtoni?

A doni të ndani me mua historinë tuaj dhe të merrni pjesë në një intervistë të shkurtër në anglisht? Nëse po, ju lutemi të lini emailin ose numrin tuaj të telefonit.

Faleminderit për pjesëmarrjen tuaj! Nëse dëshironi të merrni rezultatin e hulumtimit tim, ju lutemi të lënë email-in tuaj.

Annex 3: Interview guideline

Annex 3.1: Interview guideline to households

Number of interviews:
Date:
Location:

Dear Madam, Sir,

My name is Francesca Vanelli, and I am a registered student in the MSc. Course in Urban Management and Development at the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies, Erasmus University, Rotterdam. As a requirement for my thesis project, I am undertaking a research in Tirana through interviews.

I am studying the process of legalization of informal dwellings in Tirana, and I want to assess the impact of land titling on the households. The questions relate on the social relations you hold in your neighbourhood, the difficulties in obtaining the title deed for your property and your experience about that. Please be assured that all the provided information will be confidential used for academic used only. The interview will take approximately 30-40 minutes. Only adults of 18 years old or older, living in the area for longer than 10 years and homeowners, not rentals, will be invited to participate. There is no right or wrong answer, I only want to establish your perceptions and opinions. Can I have your consent to record the interview?

Section 1-2. Status of property ownership, residential stability

- Would you explain to me your ownership status? How long have you been living here? How have you acquired your house?
- What does it mean for you to be homeowner?

Section 3. Social Relations

- Can you tell me about your relationships in this neighbourhood? Who do you have contact with?
- There are often differences in characteristics between people living in the same neighbourhood, such as differences in income, social status, ethnic background. Do you interact mainly with one “type” of person? Which one? Why?

Section 4-5. Participation

- Do you think you are an active citizen in your neighbourhood? Which activities are you involved with? Why?
- Even if you do not participate actively in the neighbourhood life, do you think you and your family you would participate in projects that benefit the community and yourself? Why? How?

Section 6-7. Actions taken to deal with property issues, perception of security

- Do you have property issues, or you are involved in a property dispute, or you feel threat of losing your property? In case yes, how worried are you about securing your dwelling?
- Do you think you are more or less active in politics or neighbourhood association, because of these issues? Why?
- Do you have title deed? In case yes, how did you obtain it? In case no, why? Have you tried to obtain it?
- How would you describe your relationship with the legal owner of your land/dwelling?
- Would you feel / do you feel more secure with a title deed?

Section 8-9. Property disputes/conflicts

- Have you been involved in any property conflict or disputes? Can you tell me more about that, in terms of length of the process, resolution, and other people involved?
- What do you think about impact your family in terms of social or economic loss? Have you made enemies? Have you received support from neighbours or local Government?
- How did you feel during and after the process?

Do you want to add any comments?

Thank you for your participation! If you want to receive the result of my research, please leave your e-mail.

Annex 3.2 Interview guideline for key-informants (ALUIZNI, Advokati I Popullit)

Number of interviewer:
Date:
Location:
Agency representative:

Dear Madam, Sir,

My name is Francesca Vanelli, and I am a registered student in the MSc. Course in Urban Management and Development at the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies, Erasmus University, Rotterdam. As a requirement for my thesis project, I am undertaking a research in Tirana through interviews.

I am studying the process of legalization of informal dwellings in Tirana, and I want to assess the impact of land titling on the households. The questions will relate on the effect you think the titling process is having on the households. Please be assured that all the provided information will be confidential used for academic used only. The interview will take approximately 30-40 minutes. There is no right or wrong answer, I only want to establish your perceptions and opinions. Can I have your consent to record the interview?

Section 1-2-7. Status of property ownership, residential stability and security

- What is the role of your agency in finalizing land titling policy? Which other institutions do you interact with?
- Would you explain to me the progress and problems of the land titling policy, from the point of view of your agency?
- What are the shortcoming your agency struggle with?
- What do you think about the bureaucracy of the process, in terms of length, relations with other agencies?
- Can you tell me about your perception regarding the households who come here to get title or solve property claim? What are their concern?
- Do you think the families are proper informed about the procedure?

Section 3. Social relations

- Have you experience differences in relationship with households from different background, as ethnicity?
- Have you experienced dealing with association of households or NGOs helping them? Or was it normally a discussion with the household only?
- Do you think ownership correspond to a social status?
- Do you think overall background differences, such as income, ethnicity, education makes a difference in how they perceive the value of ownership?
- What do you think of the social relations society in Tirana? Do you think they are polarized in terms of social differences or equally distributed? Do you think the background of people make a difference?

Section 4-5-6. Participation

- What do you think of the participation in politics and civic society in Tirana?
- Do you think households are more or less involved in politics when it is about legalization issue?
- Can you tell me about any protests you have witnessed regarding legalization?
- Do you think ownership make applicant and beneficiaries participate more?
- Do you think that after legalization households are pro-active in accounting the municipality for services?

Section 8-9. Property conflicts

- Would you explain to me the typology of property disputes you happen to get in touch with? Can you tell me more about that, in terms of length of the process, resolution, and other people involved?
- What do you think is the impact of these conflicts on the households and on the process itself?

- Can average household afford the expenses? Do you think property conflicts might generate social isolation and exclusion of the households?

Do you have any comment you want to add?

Thank you for your participation! Can I contact you again for a follow-up interview? In case yes, please leave your phone number.

If you want to receive the result of my research, please leave your e-mail.

Annex 3.3 Interview guideline for key-informants (EKB, Municipality of Tirana)

Number of interviewer:
Date:
Location:
Agency representative:

Dear Madam, Sir,

My name is Francesca Vanelli, and I am a registered student in the MSc. Course in Urban Management and Development at the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies, Erasmus University, Rotterdam. As a requirement for my thesis project, I am undertaking a research in Tirana through interviews.

I am studying the process of legalization of informal dwellings in Tirana, and I want to assess the impact of land titling on the households. The questions will relate on the effect you think the titling process is having on the households. Please be assured that all the provided information will be confidential used for academic used only. The interview will take approximately 30-40 minutes. There is no right or wrong answer, I only want to establish your perceptions and opinions. Can I have your consent to record the interview?

Section 1-2-7. Status of property ownership, residential stability and security

- Where does your agency set the priority regarding housing and private ownership?
- Would you explain to me the progress of the land titling policy, from the point of view of your agency?
- What are the shortcoming your agency struggle with?
- What do you think about the bureaucracy of the process, in terms of length, relations with households or with other agencies?
- Have you experienced dealing with association of households or NGOs helping them? Or was it normally a discussion with the household only?
- Do you think the families are proper informed about the procedure?

Section 3. Social relations

- Have you experience differences in relationship with households from different background, as ethnicity?
- Have you experienced dealing with association of households or NGOs helping them? Or was it normally a discussion with the household only?
- Do you think ownership correspond to a social status?
- Do you think overall background differences, such as income, ethnicity, education makes a difference in how they perceive the value of ownership?
- What do you think of the social relations society in Tirana? Do you think they are polarized in terms of social differences or equally distributed? Do you think the background of people make a difference?

Section 4-5-6. Participation

- What do you think of the participation in politics and civic society in Tirana?
- Do you think households are more or less involved in politics when it is about legalization issue?
- Do you think ownership make applicant and beneficiaries participate more?
- Can you tell me about any protests you have witnessed regarding legalization?
- Do you think that after legalization households are pro-active in accounting the municipality for services?

Section 8-9. Property conflicts

- Would you explain to me the typology of property disputes you happen to get in touch with? Can you tell me more about that, in terms of length of the process, resolution, and other people involved?
- What do you think is the impact of these conflicts on the households and on the process itself?
- Can average household afford the expenses? Do you think property conflicts might generate social isolation and exclusion of the households?

Do you have any comment you want to add?

Thank you for your participation! Can I contact you again for a follow-up interview? In case yes, please leave your phone number.

If you want to receive the result of my research, please leave your e-mail.

Annex 3.4 Interview guideline for key-informants (NGOs, neighborhood associations)

Number of interview:
Date:
Location:
Agency representative:

Dear Madam, Sir,

My name is Francesca Vanelli, and I am a registered student in the MSc. Course in Urban Management and Development at the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies, Erasmus University, Rotterdam. As a requirement for my thesis project, I am undertaking a research in Tirana through interviews.

I am studying the process of legalization of informal dwellings in Tirana, and I want to assess the impact of land titling on the households. The questions will relate on the effect you think the titling process is having on the households. Please be assured that all the provided information will be confidential used for academic used only. The interview will take approximately 30-40 minutes. There is no right or wrong answer, I only want to establish your perceptions and opinions. Can I have your consent to record the interview?

Section 1-2-7. Status of property ownership, residential stability and security

- What does your association do for the neighbourhood?
- What are the shortcoming your agency struggle with? What about the households?
- To what extent do you think the topic of housing and private ownership are present in your everyday activities?

Section 3. Social relations

- What do you think of the social relations society in Tirana? Do you think they are polarized in terms of social differences or equally distributed?
- Do you think the background of people make a difference?
- What is the role of the third sector (NGOs and local association) in building social relations at a neighbourhood scale?

Section 4-5-6. Participation

- What do you think of the participation in politics and civic society in Tirana?
- Do you think households are more or less involved in politics when it is about legalization issue?
- Can you tell me about any protests you have witnessed regarding legalization?

Section 8-9. Property conflicts

- Have you been in touch with property disputes you happen to get in touch with? Can you tell me more about that, in terms of length of the process, resolution, and other people involved?
- What do you think is the impact of these conflicts on the households and on the process itself?

Do you have any comment you want to add?

Thank you for your participation! Can I contact you again for a follow-up interview? In case yes, please leave your phone number.

If you want to receive the result of my research, please leave your e-mail.

Annex 4: Fieldwork schedule


Table 18: Fieldwork time schedule.

Week	Dates	Schedule
1	24 th June-30 th July	Preparatory phase Secondary Data
2	1 st July-7 th July	Pilot questionnaire Pilot interviews to community members Secondary Data
3	8 st July-14 th July	Questionnaire + transcription + interviews
4	15 st July-21 th July	Questionnaire + transcription + interviews
5	22 st July-28 th July	Questionnaire + transcription + interviews
6	29 st July-04 th August	Interviews + Secondary Data
7	05 st August-11 th August	Transcription and analysis

Annex 5: Sample description graphs

5.1 Distribution of respondents per administrative unit

Chart 10: Subdivision respondents by type of ownership and administrative units.




Source: Author (2019).

5.2 Length of residency

Chart 11: Subdivision respondents by length of residency.

Chart 12: Subdivision respondents by type of ownership and length of residency.




Source: Author (2019).

5.3 Education

Chart 13: Subdivision respondents by education level.

Chart 14: Subdivision respondents by type of ownership and education level.




Source: Author (2019).

5.4 Gender

Chart 15: Subdivision respondents by gender.

Chart 16: Subdivision respondents by type of ownership and gender.




Source: Author (2019).

5.5 Ethnicity

Chart 17: Subdivision respondents by ethnicity.

Chart 18: Subdivision respondents by type of ownership and ethnicity.




Source: Author (2019).

5.6 Religion

Chart 19: Subdivision respondents by religion.

Chart 20: Subdivision respondents by ethnicity and religion.




Source: Author (2019).

5.7 Means of obtaining property

Chart 21: Subdivision respondents by means of obtaining property.

Chart 22: Subdivision respondents by type of ownership and means of obtaining property.




Source: Author (2019).

5.8 Income

Chart 23: Subdivision respondents by income.

Chart 24: Subdivision respondents by type of ownership and income.



Source: Author (2019).

Annex 6: Interviews transcription

6.1 Interview 1: NGO member

Number of the Interview: 01
Date: 12/07
Location: Tirana Centrum
Agency representative: Activist and Consultant for NGO which offers legal supports for property issues to households

Researcher: Can you explain to me your job and its role?

Interviewee: I work for a Foundation in charge of a project called “Empowerment for Roma and Egyptians communities for two years. My focus topics are legalization and privatization processes, and social housing, The Foundation’s goal is to help the urban poor part of these minorities group and help them to get the title deed for their property. We are expert in the administrative procedure and give them legal support. They are not aware of the legalization procedure from a legal point of view. Therefore, we explain to them the existing Law and their rights. We also connect them among each other, and we try to increase their level of trust towards the public institutions.

Researcher: While you give them legal support, which other agencies do you talk to?

Interviewee: The Foundation tries to organize formal meetings with the public institutions, such as Aluizni or the Municipality to speak on the behalf of the households.

Researcher: What are the shortcomings that the Foundation struggles with?

Interviewee: I will talk about my personal experience. The major issue is the way the institutions treat people. Discrimination is everywhere, and here is visible against these minorities group. Especially if they see someone coloured and recognize a low education level, they act differently. The second problem relates to the legal criteria that the households have to meet to legalize their house. The Law is from 2006 and some families are waiting for 13 years now. They are tired and frustrated; when we meet with them, they are very aggressive. Our role is kind to be the “middleman” between them and the institutions that release deeds and handle restitution, legalization and property disputes.

Researcher: How important do you think the topic of housing and private ownership is relevant to the people? Is it a major concern to them?

Interviewee: There are two sides of the same coin. From an institutional point of view, to have a house today is a privilege, not a life right. They do not recognize it as important as other human rights. It is more a political issue for them. This is very unfair. From the households’ point of view, having a house means education, personal care, status, protection. When we go to the communities, we can see the big difference in mindset. Since in this project we deal with minorities, which often represents also a low-income group, their concern is to move from shelters to decent houses. The institutions tend to not take responsibilities. However, these problems are common to every household without housing security, since there is an overall problem with the implementation of the legislative framework.

Researcher: Do you feel a strong polarization in society due to ethnicity? Or maybe other factors, such as income, or gender? What do you think it happens when households find themselves in the same condition in terms of housing security?

Interviewee: From my point of view, the major division is from income and education level, because these are the main features that make someone more exploitable. Institutions take

advantage of them if there is asymmetrical information and people are uneducated. In Albania, it may look like we are a cohesive society, but there is a strong discrimination against the urban poor. The background of people does make a difference.

Researcher: What do you think of the role of NGOs, its evolution over time and how are they perceived by the communities?

Interviewee: During the '90s, the number of NGOs and foundations helping the people was limited; today there are too many of them! This is a problem, and, since they all relate to different political visions, households are confused in choosing the best one. Many people in the third sector work for their own interest. However, I can say this kind of association is very needed to solve the legalization issue, as they are a way to connect communities and institutions. They have done a lot of improvement for the cause, thanks also to the knowledge of legal procedures. Having legal support is very important for households.

Researcher: My research also wants to understand the degree of pro-social behaviour before and after obtaining the title deed. What is your opinion about that? Have you seen people behave differently before and after getting the title deed?

Interviewee: I will explain the case of Selite. There are almost 30-35 households we are working with, with different conditions of ownership: some have the title deed, some they do not even know how to start the process. They are part of enclosed minorities communities and are individualistic in the attitude. It was actually very hard for us to gather them together. We started to talk to them, highlighting how the legalization was in their personal interest, but also in the interest of the whole community. They should be together to be stronger to face the process. Getting together increases the possibility of obtaining the title. Therefore, we helped them to think and act as a group. They understand that they have the right of their house. They also did several protests, not only for legalization but also to change the legal framework. Now they are involved in different political activities. The politics see the votes as an exchange for favours. Parties always offer housing security informally, and since they didn't accomplish the promises, families now have a lack of trust towards institutions. Also, the less information you have, the more they can play you around. The main issue remains the complexity of the legal framework. What we, as NGO, should do, is get together all the institutions and associations that work in this field and help the poor households. Also including the international agencies. Cooperation is very hard, but it would be the most effective way to solve the issue. It is very hard, though, to make the people think in the same way. The length of the legal procedure is really an impeding factor. The Government hasn't done anything since 2006, and now they are working with the system of self-declaration, but some are still on-hold since 2005/2006. Too many families are still waiting for the title deed.

Researcher: I would like to hear your opinion on two topics: one is the sense of security. Would the people also be secured only with an informal agreement? The second is the social exclusion. Do you think they might perceive a sense of stigma/ isolation as they are excluded by certain rights?

Interviewee: People want the title to feel secure of their house, and to have the peace of mind that they are not been expropriated by a public institution. The formal agreement is then needed. Also, the households compare their situation to the neighbours. "Why he has the right and I do not?"

Researcher: Households might also be involved in property conflicts. Can you describe the conflicts you have been in touch with? What is the economic and social impact of these conflicts on them? Can they afford the costs?

Interviewee: In the same neighbourhood I was talking about before, the Municipality decided to do a new piece of the ring road, where the condition of ownership was really different. Some households received a public allowance, while others were included in social housing programs for 2 years, built by the Municipality. However, most of the case we have been dealing with in this case, people have been built in public land; hence, the Municipality found a solution to allocate people.

Researcher: How about the legal conflicts towards other owners? Have you witnessed cases that went into national or supranational court?

Interviewee: The cases I'm following now will end up in court. Mainly, the reason is that the institutions didn't respect legal timeframe. The housing sector is still in process in Albania. The people, and often the staff on institutions, do not have enough information. Households place the responsibility on the State. The State is also evolving and changing.

Researcher: Overall, when did you see some kind of cooperation between the people?

Interviewee: Depending on the cases of course, but overall, they build the desire to live in a group. The good point of the process is that they keep the relations they built thanks to our help and during the process of legalization, and they also help the families that are struggling with the same issue. They share information and experiences. This goes also across ethnic differences. We saw people crying in the offices, and people who finalized the process already helping them to get it through. To conclude, we can say what is comes as positive from this process is the empowerment of the households and legal security.

I will share one last thing. At the beginning of the experience, I found the legal framework so complicated that was also very hard for me. Now I'm an expert, and I see how, when you explain the process to someone, they spread the knowledge as well among their circle. I barely have the time to help all of them. The key of success is the willingness of the households to be helped. Asymmetric information is a huge problem. Now, as I am part of an NGO, they treat me with respect, and I feel the responsibility to help the people who come to us. So many people, not only minorities, are facing the same issue. The gap between people and institutions stay huge, and it gets worse with low-income people.

6.2 Interview 2: Advokati I Popullit representative

Number of the Interview: 02
Date: 15/07
Location: Tirana Centrum
Agency representative: Lawyer at Advokati I Popullit

Researcher: What is the role of your agency in the legalization process? Which other agencies do you relate to?

Interviewee: People's Advocates is a Constitutional body with a focus on protecting human rights and an important part of human rights is property right. In Albania since the democratic movement we had many Laws handling property rights, and one of them is legalization Law of 2006. According to this Law, many people have the right to legalize their property built on another property. This Law is in the Constitutional Court. What we are witnessing is that many people could not have the right fulfilled by the other agencies in charge of it. There are many structural bodies dealing with it and the process lasts just too long. The length is the main issue. For example, today we are monitoring a situation in the Ring of Tirana, where the police are demolishing some houses to enlarge the ring road. The problem is that people living in these houses have applied to legalize the properties in 2006 – more than 10 years ago. They have

fulfilled all the obligations to the State bodies, they paid taxes and did all the papers and since then, the State bodies have not yet taken the decision about this case.

Researcher: You said bureaucracy and length are major problems of the process. Do you think some sign of progress have been made?

Interviewee: There is a small positive movement in this field but, in many cases, we are facing the extended length of the process and the bureaucracy. People are forced to pay year after year administration fees to handle the process; it stays one of the biggest issues of the country.

Researcher: Regarding the households that come here for your legal support, what do you think is the main concern for them?

Interviewee: I think it includes fear of losing the house, fear of losing the money during the process, and losing a social status as well. Property is really important, as well as having a document to prove it. Since in many cases the households experience the expropriation from the State, without paper you can't be fully paid.

Researcher: Do you think households are well-informed of the process? What is the role of the NGOs in that?

Interviewee: In Albania, there are many NGOs registered – 2700 in the Parliament website - and some of them face property rights issues. Sometimes they work for categories: women rights, children rights, Roman or Egyptians rights. But a property right is also a women rights, same for minorities. We faced, in the past years, many cases where Roman and Egyptians were evicted from their house. We helped them to find a good place to live and decent living conditions, with water, electricity, healthcare, education. We intermediate with the State agencies and we collaborate with NGOs.

Researcher: What about the property disputes you have been in touch with? What kind of resolution do they meet?

Interviewee: Property rights cases are the most difficult, especially here in Albania. We have many agencies dealing with this issue, and, in many cases, they cooperate. For example, we have now a new Law about property rights in the institutions of Cadastre. Before the had you: registering bureau – IPRO- and legalization bureau – Aluizni. Today these two bodies are together, and this new office is facing many problems from the previous two. There are many overlapped archives, documents which do not corresponds.

Researcher: How about the consequence of these conflicts? Physical violence, social relations disruption?

Interviewee: I think the lack of documentation is the cause of the conflicts. In many cases, we see that two people have the same document, issued by legalization bureau. The State bodies are not fulfilling their competences. If this kind of case comes to us, we try to intermediate with the State and to find the original documents. They are interested to have the property legalized but the problem is that the legalization permit has to be registered. There are two documents and the final certificate of property is the one the confirm that the household is the owner. Many people do not understand that this legalization permit is only the first step to be recognized as owners.

Researcher: Regarding the ex-owner group, what do you think is their level of satisfaction?

Interviewee: It is very low. They don't feel ex-owner. They say "I'm the owner, I have the property from my grandfather, from my father, I have the documents and this X person came to my property and built a house. This house can't be legalized, and I should have a minimum

value for my property if it is legalized”. Normally the State prefers to legalize properties in these cases. But the ex-owners, as they are called from the Law even if they don’t feel this way, don’t accept it. They are paid with a small value. We have a land value map. According to this map, a 1sqm in this zone is 2 euro, while in Durres is 1 euro. If you have a property here you have to be paid 2 euro according to the Law, but the market value of the property here is 100 euro. The agency ATP treats compensation procedure. They give the paper to the new owners and money to the former owners. The property has a new compensation scheme: compensation in-kind and financial resources. In terms of financial compensation, they also have a new scheme: you can’t be compensated more than 10 million Leks, divided in 10 years, and you can’t pay more than 10% of the financial evaluation of your property. It is very complicated. According to my opinion, it is a violation of the property rights of former owners. Keeping tracks of the process is also very hard. We are working on a number of zones and we see that in a close distance in the same neighbourhood one property is legalized, the next one is not. Why is that? This is also a corruption problem.

Researcher: Are there more conflicts between households and State, or households and third parties?

Interviewee: I think the biggest problems are with the ex-owners, because the State give the documents and solve the issue; and probably the household will then vote for the party who gave him the title deed. It is a very political process. If elections are coming, the State starts to release many documents.

Researcher: What is the contribution of international agencies?

Interviewee: I think they monitor and report. In many cases, this agency is the main agency they ask information to.

Researcher: Can the new owners afford the process of legalization?

Interviewee: In many cases they can, because the State has set too low taxes for the legalization process. However, the ex-owners want the market value. If the State wants 2000 for the legalization of an informal house, and the State has to give 20.000 to the ex-owner, the difference is paid by the citizens. And people are not happy about it. For the vulnerable group, the State has provided that they can spread the payment in long term rates. It is a very complicated scheme.

6.3 Interview 3: Ministry of Finance and Economy – Housing Department

Number of the Interview: 03
Date: 16/07
Location: Tirana Centrum
Agency representative: Ministry of Finance and Economy – Housing Department

Researcher: How does this Ministry set the priorities regarding housing provision and private ownership?

Interviewee: This Ministry has an agency under it, the National Housing Agency. The Ministry set the policy guidelines and legal framework and then the agencies and local Government implement them. With regards to setting priorities, there are some preconditions on how to establish priorities: first, we look at what is offered in the market, and secondly what is mostly preferred by households. It is well-known that in Albania, like other countries in the Mediterranean and South Europe, households’ priority is to own the house, because it is seen as an asset that can be inherited. At the same time, it is also a way, although it is not in the mind of the buyer in a first moment, to ensure security for the family. This perhaps can be also

further analysed with the effect of the recent crisis. In countries with high rate of ownership, with no mortgages – this is also another characteristic, that homeownership in this region is mostly owned by freeholds, who don't have mortgages - there are very few loans for housing purposes. This has become also some kind of buffer of these shocks generated by the economic and financial crisis. We also have applications for housing from Municipalities, so people that have applied to different Municipalities. More than 60% of those have applied for affordable housing. Despite this, we know that many households can't afford to become owners; even if we take into consideration different instruments to use to buy a home, like subsidies, but still they can't afford. I have here a case, from a family in Saranda; they are asking for support, but they don't know what kind of housing they can afford. I met them yesterday and I also asked them if they can support a loan, and they no. So, there are categories that need more social support, with financial instruments, like social housing or housing bonus. There is a big question on how we define the findings for different programs. We had a discussion 2-3 days ago with a company that will assist the Ministry in defining priorities and developing budgeting processes. There is mainly the fund for housing, allocated based on historical allocations. It is divided into subsidies and investments funds. Subsidies go mostly for subsidizing interests' rates on the loans, while a small percent goes for housing bonus, which means subsidies for renting an apartment in the market. The investments are targeted, at the moment, for the improvement of existing housing, where poor families are living. Many of these cases are families from Roman and Egyptian communities, but also other categories, such as families that live in rural areas or in informal settlements. They have dilapidated housing or in bad conditions. So, how we define priorities to support homeownership and rental, this is it: historical pattern of fund allocation, households' preferences and at the same time conditions of the market. Since we have a lot of houses provided in the market, we think that this is a good opportunity, a strength that we have to take advantage from, with different instruments like subsidies for rent and interests' rates, to buy a home.

Researcher: What do you think about the progress of the legalization policy? What about bureaucracy and length?

Interviewee: It is a very complex and controversial topic. If you see who is legalized, or the property of whom is legalized, perhaps you would need to research much more on the topic. Who has got the land titling? I worked for a short time in ALUIZNI. For example, the Municipality of Durrës they have operated massively with the legalization. It is a concentration of voting, so it depends on the party ruling. This is only my speculation, not something based on evidence. Who else is still in the legalization process, in my view, are those more well-off and can lobby strongly, with different ways of lobbying. Those who perhaps need mostly security of tenure I'd say, rather than land titling, are the poorest. Those who live in shacks, in barracks, in buildings that are not considered by Aluizni as a house. There is also a misunderstanding of the terminology in the case of legalization. When it started in the early 2000s, there was a huge pressure from international organizations to solve the issue. The notion of security of tenure was translated into ownership, where if you read of the explanation of what is security of tenure, it doesn't mean having a piece of paper, everywhere for everyone. I think this has been huge speculation. It has extended the process of legalization in areas which shouldn't be legalized, for buildings that shouldn't be legalized. It has taken much more strength than the right of ownership of ex-owners for example, that are excluded from the right to take their properties. My belief is that the whole process of legalization has been huge speculation for political and economic reason, from a certain group. The process has not taken into account the poorest of the poor and also the rights of owners of the land. This has created in many cases conflicts. It was interesting what I did with some students 2 years ago. I divided the students into two groups, one to explore empty homes in the city, because there was

pressure from the builders as there are too many vacant buildings, and the second group to make a research on legalization - what is the extent of legalized buildings, the profile of these families who legalized. The outcome was that the first group couldn't find a way to identify vacant houses. This because houses were sold to people who migrated or were not there. It is difficult to identify them. The other group went in the informal settlement of Bathore, and they said it was like a phantom city: very few people were around, mainly old people, as the young have left. So, they have their first home and then they have extended for their children, but the next generation didn't want to live there anymore, so they migrated somewhere else.

Researcher: What do you think of the participation in politics and civic society in Tirana? Do you think households are more or less involved in politics when it is about legalization issue?

Interviewee: In the '90s, when CoPlan was working with the informal settlement and the program of the World Bank, it was when the issues regarding legalization came to a spotlight. There were also some protests organized and supported by NGOs and CBOs, in informal forms. They were asking for legalization, there were also TV channels, documentaries and newspaper that were talking about this. After that, when the first Law of 2004 came in power, I don't think there have been protests anymore. This is because there is a process on-going and everyone is expecting to have the right fulfilled. However, there are still some families who applied in 2006 and have yet not received any confirmation. Perhaps the protests do not happen as before because people are spread in the urban area, and there is a lack of local agglomeration and network. Informal settlers, like Roman, they have the advantage of being easily identified as a target group for policy issue; policymaker know where they live, and the features of their settlements. It is harder to identify where the homeless of families that need an improvement of their living condition, because they are spread in the city. Even if for voting, it is not so much relevant, as it is difficult to localize them.

Researcher: What about the issue of urbanization, and what happens after the legalization? What about the new property tax?

Interviewee: even before legalization, there was a period where they were obliged to pay a property tax, although it was perhaps not constitutional, because they didn't have a registered property. I think that, when Edi Rama was mayor of Tirana, he imposed this tax. I don't know to what extent the informal settlements were paying. With this, I want to say that there no direct connection between paying taxes and having services. In some cases, informal settlers have services even before legalization. Paving streets, providing water and electricity and sewage disposals is not related to a cause-effect relationship to legalization. This is used as an argument, it is more theoretically true, rather than practically. Theoretically, legalization has an impact on the city budget, although I have a house on my property, and I don't if I pay a tax on property. It is not yet organized; 1 or 2 years before the new tax on property – now it is based on market value, while before it was just a tariff- it was included in the water bill. Now I don't know if it still included or not. It has been said that the way it is collected will change, but the modality has not been decided yet.

Researcher: What is the role of NGOs and international agencies in this policy?

Interviewee: it has been very strong in the beginning, both NGOs and CBOs. They were involved in raising awareness about the rights they have, although at that time there were no rights written anywhere, they worked based on international documents. They worked on rising awareness but also improving and implementing pilot projects, supported by the World Bank or Dutch Government. Nowadays, I think their role in the informal settlements in weak. I think households are aware of their entitlement regarding the property rights they have. I don't know

about any NGOs working with informal settlements at the moment. Maybe these NGOs are related to specific target groups.

Researcher: Would you explain to me the typology of property disputes you happen to get in touch with?

Interviewee: These kinds of conflict are among former owners and informal settlers. Anyway, this isn't any public information available. What I know is only informal. Figures and specifics are confidential. The procedures here are very long, and, secondly, for the moment there is no High Court in the country. It is in the process of reforming. There has been kind of pressure from the European Commission to accept what Albania has done until now, like an action plan to solve the property issue. I know the association of former original owners have been in touch with the Constitutional Court and also asked to amend the Law. European Court is waiting for some kind of response from the Government to see how the action plan has been implemented and to see to what extent the people have gone to the Court.

Researcher: What do you think of the participation in politics and civic society in Tirana?

Interviewee: the people you might see in the main Square in Tirana, comes from different areas of the city, However, I believe that most of the people who come in the Square live in the periphery. This is because they enjoy the new space. People are attached to traditions and historic buildings. We have also witnessed a lot of protests here.

6.4 Interview 4: ALUIZNI representative

Number of the Interview: 04
Date: 17/07
Location: Tirana Centrum
Agency representative: Central Office of ALUIZNI - ASHK

Researcher: What is the role of your agency in finalizing land titling policy? Which other institutions do you interact with?

Interviewee: Until few months ago this year, ALUIZNI was the agency in charge of the legalization of buildings in informal areas and their integration in the urban tissue. Today we are ASHK – the State Agency for the Cadastre- which has taken over ALUIZNI and IPRO – the office previously in charge of the registration process – and the Agency with the duty of transferring of public properties from Central Government to Local Government - the Municipalities, *Bashkie*. We deal with informal buildings' legalization and land property issue.

Researcher: Would you explain to me the progress and problems of the land titling policy, from the point of view of your agency?

Interviewee: When we began to work on this topic – and I talk as part of ALUIZNI, because ASHK has been started few months ago – in 2013, there was an amount of 450.000 with legalization in progress. We had to prepare again the statistics: many people had deposited the self-declaration form several times since 2006, while, in other cases, several applications were made for the same building. Therefore, the number from 450.000 has dropped to 350.000. In the meantime, included in this figure, there are objects that are not included in the Legalization Law. At the beginning, every kind of dwelling was accepted to be legalized; after we check whether the building fits the legal and physical requirement prescribed by the Law, and in case it doesn't, we inform the owner. When we start working on this, in 2013, only 21.000 legalization permits have been issued, to cover the 350.000 real amount of illegal buildings in Albania. Until today, the agency have managed to issue 190.000 legalization permits. As next step, the household has to transfer to the Registration Office the permit, in order to finalize the

process. Now we are working to unify the two permits in one. We are now working with three different Laws: one for legalization, one for the cadastre and one for the registration. We are also trying to produce only one Law that may overcome the gaps of the previous three. Before the association, each agency needed also to coordinate with the others to find the information to finalize their own part of the process. The plan is to uniform the legal framework and have only one final document. However, a good job has been done. From 350.000 to 190.000 in 5 years, including the 100.000 shelters that do not fit into the Law: barracks, shacks, non-permanent buildings or in environmental or archaeological protected areas. Regarding this typology, municipalities and other agencies need to find a solution. We have not figure out what to do with them, as we are still trying to complete the legalization of the cases fitting the Law. We could still modify the Law, to increase the typology and number of buildings that are possible to be legalized. Then, the Housing Department could find a solution on where to allocate them. If there is the plant to build a new street, cutting through an informal area, which do not fit into the legal framework for legalization, there are few options: either the Municipality gives the settlers the housing bonus; either the construction permit is subject to the obligation to allocate also the informal settlers on site; or the public institution reallocates them through social housing.

Researcher: At a national or urban scale, how do you set the priority geographically? Such as, in the case of Durrës, legalization on the coastline to increase the tourism.

Interviewee: Our first priority is the finalization of all the constructions that in 2005 and 2006 have been applied to be legalized. The delay has happened for different reasons, I can't tell why. It could have been that some applications got lost, or other reasons. Every case is singular. Another priority regards the informal areas. We drafted in 2015 a map for the informal areas in the country. The procedure of legalization, even if it happens in an informal area, follows the same path. An area is declared informal if it is uniform for the 70-80% in terms of spatial distribution. However, we have here the case of neighbourhoods with a mix tissue: formal and informal. It is hard to identify now an informal area. We are aware that informal settlements are also outside of what we declared as informal area. These areas are also in the Masterplan. Regarding this, we had some problems with the planning instruments. There has to be the possibility for these informal areas to be integrated in the urban fabric. It shouldn't be possible to have an informal area with a park in between, just because this is what a Masterplan says. This happened in some cases, for example in Shkodër. Here, some informal areas - 200/300 buildings for around 600 families- on the riverside could have flooding issues. The idea was to change the riverside in public green recreational area. In doing so, you need to take into account these houses into the Masterplan and find a solution to relocate them. Some Municipalities tend to look the other way. Many times, we found ourselves in this scenario, with the Municipality not taking responsibility for these. They also tend to build in informal areas every kind of projects they cannot do in other – private- areas, just to follow the urban parameters from the Masterplan. During the last meetings, we tried to raise awareness of the issue in the Municipalities, architects and planners.

Researcher: How about the ex-owner group?

Interviewee: This is a sensitive topic. This is also the case where the Masterplan has a role in decision-making. If in the Masterplan a certain area is designated for apartments for more than 7 floors, we are forced to give the right to the landholder. Otherwise, if the urban density is lower, meaning with apartments of less than 7 floors, the informal settler can legalize the building. I don't know whether this is right or wrong. The former owner, in case he loses his land, is then compensated. The informal settler pay for the land a very low fee, but the owner is compensated with the market value of the land. In this sense, it is the State that loses. In the

'90s everything was owned by the State. Then, the new Law began to recognize the original owners 25 years ago, and the process is not done yet. The problem is also related to false declarations by the settlers. We need to refresh the juridical status of the terrain.

Researcher: Do you see NGOs as active part in the process?

Interviewee: We only talk to households. If someone fills in the self-declaration module, we send technicians to take measurements of the plot and of the house. If everything is in order, at the end the household have new plans for free to register the property. If everything fits the spatial, legal and temporal requisites of the Law, then we proceeds with the permit.

Researcher: What about the background of the applicants? Have you also seen a changing trend over time?

Interviewee: We don't really know or care. We just follow the Law criteria. The economic status is visible from the housing condition. There is someone who built in bricks, who didn't manage to build a better structure – or maybe he built that structure only to be entitled to the land. We have cases of fake declaration, or additions of few floors on top of a flat building.

Researcher: Do you think ownership correspond to a social status?

Interviewee: We have this problem, also common in the rural area: someone has built informally on his own terrain. In his mind, he doesn't need the title, and he doesn't care. Also, if he has unpaid taxes, he can't finalize the legalization; the legalization is subject to fiscal fulfilment. Therefore, if this person feels secure, as it happens often in the rural areas of Albania, he wouldn't finalize it. The Municipality is responsible of these taxes. There are different cases related to why or why not people applied to the title.

Researcher: Would you explain to me the typology of property disputes you happen to get in touch with? Can you tell me more about that, in terms of length of the process, resolution, and other people involved?

Interviewee: This is part of our statistics, but I can't tell the numbers. In the cases when legalization is not possible, the decision is made the ALUIZNI Regional Offices. The person has the possibility to appeal to the ALUIZNI Central Office, and therefore, we hold the final decision. After this process, it is possible to appeal to the Court.

I also want to specify that legalization is for free. They only pay fees and obligations to the Municipality, and the land. The whole process has been made free of charges in 2013; it was an electoral promise, well-kept.

Researcher: Do you think households are more or less involved in politics when it is about legalization issue?

Interviewee: I think it was very important for the households have the house legalized. It began as political topic in 2006.

Researcher: Do you think that after legalization households are pro-active in accounting the municipality for services?

Interviewee: The problem is this: when the Law has been made, the newly born agency ALUIZNI incorporated some duties that before 2004 where in the hands of Municipality. This has also generated some missing or overlapping documents. However, the territorial control the urbanization, stays in the hand of the Municipalities. So now, we need to collaborate with the Municipalities, sometimes with a positive outcome, sometimes not. Inside the sigla ALUIZNI, there is also the word "urbanization", but actually we don't do it.

To conclude, ALUIZNI can quantify the issue of informal settlements, while the Municipalities have only an overall view. ALUIZNI should collaborate with the Municipality: the first should work on the legal framework and in raising awareness in the Municipalities' staff, while the second should work on projects, social housing, Masterplan. We are aware that informality and illegal buildings are a social and economic issue. We have around 100.000 left, there is still a lot to do.

6.5 Interview 5: ASHK Director

Number of interview: 05 – in Albanian, live translation by Fatjona Çaca
Date: 18/07
Location: Tirana Centrum
Agency representative: Director of Legal Agency of Cadastre, Tirana South - ASHK

Researcher: What is the role of your agency in finalizing land titling policy? Which other institutions do you interact with?

Interviewee: The institution is called the Legal Agency of Cadastre, Tirana South. This is the agency born few months ago from the union of the others. This has been done to offer the citizens a better service. They don't need to go to other institutions, but they can finalize the procedure in one.

Researcher: Would you explain to me the progress and problems of the land titling policy, from the point of view of your agency?

Interviewee: The main problems are with the buildings that are built close to protected areas, like school, kindergarten, historic areas, buildings too close to the highway. Also, the Law allows the agency to treat only the buildings built prior than 2014.

Researcher: How does the process of legalization fits with the Masterplan approved by the Municipality, for example the one in the new Boulevard area?

Interviewee: We need to follow what the Municipality says. When in the Masterplan, a plot is designed for a building with more than 6 floors and on site there is an illegal building, legalization is not possible. Also, we take care on cases where people built a house under electrical pylons, which is not allowed.

Researcher: Are there negotiations between settlers and developers interested in built in the area?

Interviewee: There are, but only with people who has finalized the legalization.

Researcher: Do you think applicants are well-informed about the procedure?

Interviewee: I think they are. Information are public on website, social, and they can also come and ask. Even in the places where there are investments, the Municipality will allocate them in social housing.

Researcher: What do you think is the main reason for the households to apply?

Interviewee: it is necessary to take the ownership certificate because otherwise you cannot sell the house or take credit. I'd say it has an economic meaning.

Researcher: What do you think is the main reason for the households to apply? Do you think households are more or less involved in politics when it is about legalization issue? What about informal protests?

Interviewee: We can actually say the legalization has collaborated in increasing the number of people who vote, as they feel entitled and encourage to vote.

Researcher: What about the former owners of the land? Have you been in touch with property conflicts between illegal settlers and former owners?

Interviewee: There are a lot of cases, mostly in Tirana. We have regulated this with a Law, which gives the owner financial compensation.

Researcher: Do you think the owners feel satisfied with the compensation? Do they also receive compensation in kind?

Interviewee: Regarding the satisfaction, depends from the area. Every case is singular. They don't receive compensation in kind.

Researcher: Have you been in touch with other conflicts, or case of fake or overlapping documents?

Interviewee: Yes, it happens very often. When people come and declare to have problems like that with their documents, we don't have a procedure to verify the validity of the documents. Therefore, we suggest them to go to Court.

Researcher: Can you say there is a trend in the background of applicants?

Interviewee: I don't know, we treat everyone the same. The procedure is thought to help the poor. They take the building permit and then they pay for the land when they have the possibility. It is a loan.

Researcher: What about the progress of the policy?

Interviewee: In average we finalize 5000 application per year, 450 per month, only in the section of Tirana South.

Researcher: How do you prioritize the areas where to begin the process?

Interviewee: We use the administrative unit to define the areas, and we try to finish one and then move to the next. If someone comes with a self-declaration, we try to help him out.

Researcher: In some other countries which deal with legalization as well, participation of households is extremely important to have the title. Is this the case of Albania?

Interviewee: The participation of the citizens is their obligation. They wait every day for the households to come here at the office. For example, right before the election, here there were 220 people, asking to finalize the application.

Researcher: Do you have anything to add, for example for the area of Tirana South?

Interviewee: We are in the first step of this change. This new agency will help a lot the citizens.

6.6 Interview 6: Household

Number of the Interview: 06
Date: 24/07
Location: Tirana Centrum
Household – group C

Researcher: Would you explain to me your ownership status? How long have you been living here? How have you acquired your house?

Interviewee: My husband's family came in Albania 25 years ago. They chose an area of 800 sqm and built an area, without doing any document or paying fees. The area was free. There is an owner of the land, but we don't know him. We have never spoken to him and he has never asked for his property. We asked for the registration of the house to begin the legalization. We have been living here, for 25-26 years.

Researcher: What does it mean for you not to be a homeowner?

Interviewee: It's difficult. In the area where we live, sometimes there are projects to build new multi-family housing. For example, they build one tower in the plot of 10 houses. When a developer comes to us, we don't have the land property, what do we do? He would allocate us in one apartment in the new building; with the title, we could get more, as much as the value of the house. We are also willing to move in a multi-family building, to stay away from the streets, which are not well-developed.

Researcher: Can you tell me about your relationships in this neighbourhood? Who do you have contact with? What is their ownership condition?

Interviewee: Yes, I know some of the neighbours, since also my family lives close by. The majority lives informally. They came from other cities in Albania and they built their dwelling. I give you the example of my father's condition. My father bought the land from a third owner, so he has land ownership and he is still waiting for the legalization of the house. It is very easy to do it if you have a property deed, but it is very long. My neighbours live in the area for 25/30 years, as my husband's family.

Researcher: In your area have you and your neighbours experience pressures from developers, or do you feel threatened?

Interviewee: It is a problem. In my case, the Municipality cannot do much. The owner of the land didn't come to declare that the land where you built your house is his. We don't know him, or where he is. Therefore, even the State, when a developer came to increase density and build a tower, doesn't know whom to talk to. They could check the Cadastre, but I don't know, they don't do that. I'm not sure what we are supposed to do, or what it's their responsibility.

Researcher: Do you think any background differences may generate a problem in your neighbourhood?

Interviewee: No. It is very quiet. The only problem sometimes is with people that come from different part of Albania, because the culture is very different.

Researcher: Have you been involved in protests for legalization?

Interviewee: No, never. But, in an area close by, where there is the project of the Ring Road of Tirana, people there, both residents and traders, protest every day. Maybe one hour per day, from 7 pm to 8 pm. This is because the State wants to demolish the buildings, but there is no plan for relocation. They began the protests 3 months ago. How things work in Albania is a disaster. This is not the way. We all agree that the road is necessary to reduce traffic jam, but the State needs to find an alternative for them. They suffer a lot. We are talking about 30/40 families living in the same place for 30 years. They are also willing to relocate, but where? It's a community problem, even if the ownership is given on an individual basis. I think that someone with all the documents is individualistic. People with property issue are more supportive.

Researcher: Do you think you are more or less active in politics or neighbourhood association, because of these issues? Why? Is there solidarity among people?

Interviewee: No, I don't think is the case, because we are not afraid. But there is solidarity among people with the same issue. In my case, I do not feel like I'm going to lose my house soon, but I trust to legalization promises from parties.

Researcher: To what extent do you feel more secure with a title deed?

Interviewee: With the title, in case of expropriation you can receive money. It would be a tragedy in my case, if we remain homeless when you worked so hard so many years to build it. When the State come and ask you to move away, it is not normal.

Researcher: Do you know cases when the original private owner is present and establishes a negotiation with the settler to have the property back?

Interviewee: Yes, I do. For example, this friend of mine is wealthy, but, when he came to Albania, he occupied the land without documents. This person is paying off the original owner to keep the land. This has been done just to close an informal deal.

6.7 Interview 7: NGO consultant

Number of the interview: 07 – in Albanian, live translation by Fatjona Çaca
Date: 25/07
Location: Tirana Centrum
Agency representative: Consultant for NGO which offers legal supports for property issues to households

Researcher: Can you explain to me your job and the role of your agency in the legalization process?

Interviewee: I am part of the Open Society Foundation here in Albania, and I work for a project of legal empowerment of minorities. We work on legalization and property issues, as are very common for Egyptian and Roma communities. I have around 8 years of experience.

Researcher: What are the main shortcomings that the Foundation is facing? What about the households?

Interviewee: The first main problem is about deadlines. Institutions do not respect these legal deadlines. People apply for the title deed, but they don't receive a response in time. Secondly, when there are public investments, people affected by these plans cannot legalize their property.

Researcher: What happens in between the application and the actual implementation of public investment?

Interviewee: This happens in many areas of Albania, in different cities: Selite, Elbasan, Vlore, etc. Not only for minorities but also for Albanians, such as the case of Shkoder, Vlore and Tirana with the New Boulevard. If the household applied in 2009, and the public investment happens in 2019, there is 10 years gap. During this period, the families do housing improvement, they push for legalization, they feel like they belong there. They will need to move when the public investment kicks off. In these 10 years, the households are not aware that there will be public investment, but their legal interests increase, as well as a sense of belonging. For them investments on the property and the beginning of the application procedure makes them say "this is my house". The public investments are normally not public; the Municipality counts for an easy expropriation, since the people don't have property there, and they notice the households even 1 month before the demolition. At this point, they are surprised. If they had published a plan 3 years in advance, we could have met the households, informed them and found a solution peacefully. In the Legalization Law, this is ensured for private investment, not public. In case of a private project, the developer has to find an

agreement with the settlers, while the Municipality should monitor. In the case of a public project, the Municipality offers alternative housing solutions, not always good.

A third shortcoming is about administrative procedures, such as the measurements process of the distance between house-rail line or house-river. We have a case like that with 35-40 families in Fier. The experts to take these measures have never been in the site. We, as Foundation, went to the institutions to speed up the process.

I can also give you a positive example. I followed this family in Elbasan in applying for the title in 2005. There was no response for 14 years. In this time, the household paid all the administrative fees, which are affordable, but still, you pay for a service you don't know when you are going to receive it. I filled a complaint about the institution, to ask for feedback and notice them that the Municipality hadn't respect the legal deadline to respond. They didn't respond, again, so we sent the case to the Court. They solved it in the first trial in 6 months.

Usually, the reason why the institutions do not reply in time, is the number of requests they receive. Sometimes if the household gives money, the process is much faster....

Sometimes you can also have this case: imagine an area with 4 houses, only one is legalized. Why is that? The person with the title probably paid. Everyone knows. However, the neighbours don't do anything, they only have conflicts with the institutions.

Researcher: Do you think there is a trend in the background of the applicants?

Interviewee: There is still a high number of wealthy people who need the title deed. But the number of poor is higher. Normally, wealthy people have political influence and they don't need the title. They promise a certain party to get votes with the promise of not being expropriated. If in an area, for example in Selite, we have 40 families, 2 families are wealthy. Often, it happens that only one wealthy family manages to finalize the process, while the other takes a role in getting votes of the whole area.

Another problem is that, even with the legalization certificate for your property, if you register that to the IPRO, you don't have the whole bundle of right. The final verdict over the land property has to go under another decision, by the Council of Minister, which doesn't have to meet any deadline by Law. You can ask for both, but the decision happens in a different time. In this case, you still can't take a loan from the bank. It is a very common situation.

Researcher: What is the role of the civic society in this?

Interviewee: Our role is to force the institutions to respect the deadlines. We also send cases to the Court and offer legal advice. In the case of households with an invalid member, they need to be able to ask for a loan to pay the cure. With ownership, you can get better services. Therefore, the main role of civil society is to create a positive example to change the mentality of both households and institutions.

Researcher: What do you think is the meaning of homeownership?

Interviewee: Psychologically, you feel better. Without it, you feel like from moment to moment, something will happen. I don't think with a title you increase your possibility to escape poverty. It is more on a psychological point of view.

Researcher: Have you even deal with an original owner?

Interviewee: Yes, I have, in a case in Elbasan. This family has self- built a house and they have applied for legalization. The owner of the land is someone known. As Foundation, we used to have very good opinion about him. It turned out he is a real problem for this family he goes there, he threatens them for money, and ask for an informal payment to access the land. Even if he is waiting for compensation, he wants more money. We are trying to find an informal agreement to solve this, besides the formal procedure.

Researcher: Do you have something you want to add?

Interviewee: As I said, the main issue is the number of poor people, including minorities, who applied for the title. We don't have data available. Secondly, the Municipality should inform in advance the households whose property will be affected by public investments, in order to avoid emergencies. Also, the alternative housing solutions are problematic. When they have public investments, they offer other housing solutions, housing grants or social housing. Social housing is not much and many social buildings very crowded already. When the Municipality offers apartments to rent, firstly, sometimes the owners are afraid to rent to minorities, and secondly, they need to pay another tax.

6.8 Interview 8: Municipality representative

Number of the interview: 08
Date: 20/08
Location: Skype
Agency representative: Head of the Macroplanning Department, in the Territorial Planning Directory for the Municipality of Tirana

Researcher: Where does your agency set the priority regarding housing and private ownership?

Interviewee: First of all, I want to say that this is a very interesting topic and a very problematic one, actually. It includes a variety of issues which are very diverse, from the point of view of traditional legal evolutionary process in Europe in general, but also in comparison to Eastern Europe. Here is happening quite a transition regarding property and titling, from totalitarian regime to post-communist period. To come back to your question, the department of Macroplanning is a State authority, so, as such, we have the legal responsibility to address only the properties which are legally recognized under statutory level as private property. In terms of planning, we have come through quite an evolutionary process. I'm doing this opening to give you the idea to where we used to be, and we are now. Only two years ago, after the territorial reform in the country, which has reduced the number of Municipalities from 326 to 161, the public authorities have been immediately brought in front of a wider scale of territories, and also to a very diverse typology of territory. They were used to deal with three types of territory: urban, peri-urban and rural. Now all these three types are within the same public territorial entity, which has to transform themselves, both legally and in terms of infrastructure. What has followed has been the draft of the General Local Plan. This is where we did a radical change to the way we evaluate and address the issue of property. Until 2 years ago, before this territorial reform, the property was only private, in terms of development and expropriation and as well in terms of interventions in properties which were under process of evaluation for registration, or State properties recognized to be of original owners. Those were properties which did not yet had a cadastral title or current private census. As such, they were not dealt with the usual procedural manners in which public authorities were dealing in terms of planning instruments. 2 years ago, things have changed. We started to value property as a property rather than as a property title. Therefore, we pass the ball, you can say so, to the next level, when the project becomes more imminent or detailed, to evaluate it will affect the legislative laws and parameters and frameworks in relation to the specific kind of property. So, either it's a private and we could distribute development rights or expropriate, or if it's a state property, according to which development agency we are talking about, you have different intervention typology relevant to the specific legislation affected by the project.

Researcher: How does the new Masterplan of Tirana deal with property issues? For example, in the case of the orbital forest.

Interviewee: What we did in cooperation with international offices it was very interesting collaboration, where we could gather international experiences. Regarding the orbital forest, we worked on the transformation of a legal obligation. From being the green line that set the boundary of physical sprawl of the urban environment into the rural territory, to an architectural element, which in this case the architects proposed to be a landscape architectural element. The forest will not only mark physically

the end of the territory but will also tackle the issue of pollution of the city. Now, when it comes to implementation, of course there is the issue of properties, because it goes into private and public properties. We have developed instruments in the General Local Plan and then specified into the regulations. Following this, we developed a specific detailed project for the implementation of the orbital forest. For the private properties, we developed two instruments to incentive private owners to implement the given project without having to expropriate them, because it would be too costly. Depending on where the specific properties are or which part of the forest is implemented, on one side we push for public and private partnerships in incentivizing agricultural operation for planting fruit trees. These also triggers a domino effect on how the public authorities will gather the agricultural products and put in the market. On the other side, another mechanism is allowing development rights to build low intensity high-income housing, very required from the real estate market at the moment in the periphery of Tirana, while holding them the responsibility to plant specific typology of trees, decided in the Masterplan, and of a specific age, to have an immediate effect on the territory. As an example, if someone want to develop 3000 sqm plot, for one villa the remaining sqm would have to be planted very dense with the specific tree typology required by the region. On how to retreat the properties, of course depending on the property titling, we develop different typology of mechanism. When it is private property, the responsibility towards the private is more evident and problematic; if it is a State property, depending on which Government entity we are talking about, the issue is resolved between the Government central or local authorities.

Researcher: In my research I have tried to group the ownership condition in three categories: the informal settlers, the applicants and the titleholders. From my interview with ALUIZNI, it is clear that now the applicants are the priority of the legalization. How do you treat them?

Interviewee: First I will explain something in general. Of course, in Albania due to historical reasons, the problem upon development is a very serious one. In terms of numbers, the recognition of half a million of illegal structure in the territory is not a very scary one when you compare it to informal settlements in other countries around the globe, but in terms of percentage of population, the number becomes a very scary one, and that's why the issue becomes more political than economical. When you take for granted that in the country there are no more than 3 million inhabitants, if you translate it into families of three members- it just a rough calculation-, it comes out the $\frac{3}{4}$ of the families in the country have been affected, involved to partial or full informal structure around the country. It has become a real political, economic and sociological issue, because public authorities failed to cope, for still historical reasons. We are also looking to other example of developing countries which have gone through the legalization process. But of course, as you said, this process in itself defines three different stages: full ownership title and are private property just any other property, the intermediate process, the one you call applicants, or the one you get refused, and informal settlers. Now, we are well-aware that there is a huge number of applicants which for various reasons, either for developing into an area where, even when legalization started to be allowed within a certain legal framework, there were specific restrictions - and the informal settlers had to be acknowledged about- that I threat area it is not allowed to legalized, then nevertheless they did constructs anyway and without control. We all well-aware we got a huge number of structures that might not get legalized. So, we have evaluated carefully this issue and we took into consideration that local and central authorities will have to face this issue of social housing, which will constantly be increased along with the legalization process. The process was promised to be over any time soon. We have developed specific planning instruments both in TDRs as well as recognized private projects for specific development private area, where we are planning to increase social housing to a maximum capacity, to deal not only with the current issues but also for the future condition, for the specific target group you are recognizing to be a problem in the future.

One thing I would like to point out from the Albanian case: in comparison to Brazil or other cases this has been the perfect example of all the bad decisions taken at the specific time, rather than an issue of economic growth or industrialism or other processes, which slowly did not continue the evolutionary process in the most tangible and effective way . If we could back in time, no more than 20 years ago, I'd say a few decisions are responsible for this huge process gravating on the society for the decades to come. We are well aware that Albania pasts the totalitarian regime where landownership was not an individual right. Obviously, what follows in this regime was a confiscation of all types of property prior of the establishment of the totalitarian regime. What has followed before the resettlement process being

allowed, was the recognition of all the land properties for the previous owners, whose properties were confiscated in the first place. The process was forced at a political level by the planning authorities. Currently, we have three issues which had a social cost. On one side we have got the necessary compensation, in value or kind, for the property ownership prior to the establishment of the communist regime. Now they cannot be recognized, or the property cannot be returned to them, due to a different geographical condition or because are occupied by others. This a constant burden on the country. On the other side, we have got a burden of infrastructure development in the areas which were informally developed, which are far from the normal urban quality of construction, amenities, infrastructures. The third issue is the real estate. In many suburban areas we see that there is a quite a difference in value in relation to the investment costs when you compare it to the real estate market nowadays. Since the public authorities has woken up from the bad decision taking after the process, we have to deal with these 3 very important and very costly issues at the same time, while trying to address the normal daily urban administrative issues that every city has got, which has to respond to the natural growth of any city.

Researcher: How about the group of former owners? From other interviews, it has been said that what is happening to them is a violation of rights.

Interviewee: Not only this was an issue that has created social turmoil, but it is a very heavy economic burden for many days to come. The Government holds the responsibility to solve it. Of course, it is an economic burden for normal sustainable development of the economy of the country.

Researcher: In terms of background of the applicants, do you think there is some kind of pattern between who have already obtained the title, the applicants and the informal owners? Also, is there a pattern in how the agency decide which area to legalize, geographically?

Interviewee: I will start from the second question. From the legal implications between the institutions, we are involved in a tangible way with ALUIZNI, because they have the specific legal framework to define and generate this pattern, you can say so, of the legalization process. It follows a specific program in cooperation with other agencies. They are obliged to confront to the Municipality prior of their decision-taking. Two are the main important instruments with which they have to take their decision making once the legal documentation is completed. One is that the allowance to legalize something should not conflict with major infrastructure projects. Since 1992, it was not allowed to legalize, at any given moment, informal development on national or local infrastructure. Obviously, for the structure that reside on these terms, cannot be processed. The second one is to do the redevelopment process in terms of planning and there are specifications for this matter as well. For example, you cannot legalize an area where the planning process is combined with the real estate market with private incentives. At the moment the priority of the public authority is the transformation of these areas developed informally, which not only causes a problem for the individuals but also for communities as a whole. Not only in terms of infrastructure, water and electricity, but also in terms of emergency assistance, for example, or normal urban design standard. Going back to the first question, whether the process creates and impact the economic level of the individual who get or not get legalized, I'd say that at the beginning of the process maybe it was something that I would affect, economically speaking, the households. In the last ten years I'd say that, both by evaluation of the prices of properties as well as the value on property real estate market, as well as on the transformation and % of property value growth, and taxes, I'd say that not necessarily it was the legalization process the main factor affecting economically the individuals, but it is the neighbourhood and urban conditions which have an imminent influence on the property value and economic level of individuals. Being informal or not, in a specific block, doesn't affect as much as if the block is developed or far better improved conditions than another block. The economic level of respondents is also affected by the employment opportunities. There is no link between having the title and having highly developed infrastructure.

Researcher: Have you been in touch with property conflicts or protests? Do you think there is some kind of social mobilization before or after getting the title?

Interviewee: Of course, the entitlement does affect pro-social behaviour. We are having a moment regarding conflicts, for example for the Ring Road, quite serious ones, opposing the implementation of the process prior to the legalization process. One interesting factor that we are facing is that, once

everyone agrees in demolishing the dwellings and they have no problems with the implementation of infrastructure, the main requirement for the legalization process is that they can gain the expropriation value on the property development, as well as legal awareness and social value. I do not see the same type of protests escalating to wider range of population which might not be legalized but which is not affected by any imminent infrastructure project. So, the ones who are not yet legalized, they might have or not have applied. I do not have the data at the moment. But I'm quite aware that the numbers say there is a huge number of properties informal which have not yet filed for legalization and this is where they are not affected by any public projects so do not have the issue of facing expropriation any time soon. Therefore, the economic value or the improvement of their economic level is not influenced by property title.

It will be very interesting to see statistical analysis on this topic, as only few people have started it, as well as an evaluation processes. Social integration on the matter and how one issue affects the other are very important for policy making for the future political implementation

Annex 7: Households comments

The comments have been written in the questionnaire comments, in Albanian or English, and are translated by the researcher and the interpreter.

#8 – type B: I have no stable income and I don't know how to finalize the legalization procedure.

#9 – type C: Thank you, when you own the property, life is quieter.

#11 – type A: We are very poor. We don't have a stable job or income. More than 20 people like us live in very harsh conditions and we can't sell because we didn't privatize the property. Due to legal issues, we can't legalize the property. We are 6 people in one bedroom. For years I have been sleeping in the back of the house.

#28 – type A: They decided to build the boulevard, instead let us improve our life.

#29 – type A: We have been kicked out by our house. Housing problems have badly affected my life. After they destroyed the house, I lost everything.

#30 – type A: I came in Tirana in 1992 and I built this house. In 2006 I applied for the legalization, but they have never reacted to that. So, after 13 years from applying, they officially told us that our houses can't be legalized, because there is a public investment project going on. Now the houses are demolished, and we live as tenants. We are still waiting for compensation from the Municipality.

#31- type C: I informally inherited my house. We managed to legalize it, first the house in 2018 and then the land in 2019. We were threatened by the police several times. I was scared of losing everything. For the last 6 years, we have involved in a property dispute with my husband's cousin regarding the property limit. We have an informal discussion about the position of the wall, 1 meter on our or his side. If I had the possibility, I would leave the country. I love Albania, but I hate, and fear, politics.

#57 – type A: Nobody has shown interest in our condition so far.

#58 – type A: We don't know if we will ever have a property.

#61 – type A: In winter our shelters are flooded, and we are in trouble. We can't legalize because we live too close to the river. Until they come, I do not have conflicts.

#64 – type A: My community is not legalized, and we will never get a title deed. As a job, we collect material to be recycled.

#65 – type A: In our barracks, we don't have light. We don't have events organized in the area. We are informal, and we are cut out. We live in very badly damaged slums.

#68 – type A: We don't face any real threat but Aluizni and the Municipality can evict us at any moment. Without housing, life is uncertain.

#82 – type A: We reconverted a formal student house in our home. Now they want us to leave, but we don't know where to go.

#88 – type B: We do not feel safe; we feel threatened by our State. Here nothing works. When they demolish the building, we don't know what will happen.

#91 – type B: I applied for the legalization in 2005 for a house I built in 1994. After 14 years, and after paying the administrative fee, no further steps have been taken. With all these people here, we went to the office, paid money, they made us promises during the election and nothing happened. I have heard so many things on the news, so many scandals, I don't trust them anymore. I maintain a family of 6 members with low income. Now, my only choice is to go to the Court, because their legal deadline has expired.

#97 – type C: We have not yet received the certificate of ownership of the land, so that can be problematic. The original owner should be compensated. If the situation continues, he will react, and we are afraid of that.

#102 – type B: I am in a legal conflict with the Municipality. The process is long and expensive. We don't know about the final decision and our house is at risk.

#103 - type B: We have built this house 15 years ago, and we completed the self-declaration. After so many years, nothing has happened. The owner still wants his compensation and we often have conflicts with him.

#104 - type B: Our challenge is to trust the public institution. We are retired and still, we have problems. We want to leave this house we have invested so much on to our children.

#107 - type A: We live in an illegal structure and we also have fallen into debt. We can't legalize it, because of public investment. Any moment we can be evicted.

#108 - type B: I have invested all my life in this building and yet, nothing has happened. I cannot follow the process any longer, I will leave to my children the same problem.

#113 – type B: We came here 15 years ago. The State didn't help us to legalize the house. Now the owner of the land wants to invest here. For sure he will not give us any compensation, and Aluizni will not accept our application.

Annex 8: Secondary Data transcription

8.1 Report ALUIZNI 2018

ALUIZNI produces a yearly report on the implementation of the legalization and restitution process. The following data refers to the Report 2018:

Applications in Tirana: 97916

Not legalized objects: 47229

Legalized objects: 50678

Number of claims (Tirana north): 220

Number of restitution (Tirana north) 80

The agency expects to legalize 25.000 informal buildings in 2019, based on the “Budget Declaration of the Budget Program for 2019”. This is based on a defined monthly norm for the adoption of legalization permits, which varies from 2000 to 3000 permits per month. Furthermore, it is expected that monthly norms will be reduced to 800-1000 legalization permits, which will also lead to the reduction of the number of legalization permits for 2019 to around 10,000.

The report from 2013-2014 states that in 2014 only 6% of the informal buildings are legalized; the number increased from 2005 to 2013 up to 13%, highlighting an increase of the finalized legalization procedures.

8.2 Advokati I Popullit: Special Report: On issues related to the right of Property

The translation was summarized and interpreted by the author.

Firstly, the report highlights how improving property rights means increasing human rights, however, this is hampered by many legal shortcoming, long decision-making processes, lack of financial funds and know-how. Return and compensation are very sensitive topic, which increase social conflicts. It is also extremely relevant for Albania, as is a prerequisite for the EU admission.

Property is a constitutional right, which can be limited only In the case of public interest. The inequalities of the Law brings evidences on the unfair remuneration in case of expropriation and compensation. All these shortcomings generates a high financial burden on the State. Also, the social impacts of conflicts are mentioned; it is reported that around 800 people died in property disputes, testifying the risk of these processes and the violence that might occur. Moreover, the number of legal cases for property issues increased from 2013 to 2018, with an average length of 1,5 year. More than 80.000 requests on financial compensation of expropriated subjects are waiting to be reviewed by the International Court of Human Right, generating financial burden on the State. Several agencies are in charged to the process: ALUIZNI, IPRO, the Ombudsperson Institution, The National Territorial Defence Inspectorate (INUK and INUV). All of them face the underdevelopment of the administrative procedures, the case of irregular documents, the failure to disclosure information and delays. The Government has set the priority on touristic areas, as hotspot of the economic growth of the country, specifically in the area of Saranda, Vlore and Dures. The Agency recommends an upgrade of the legal framework, including both national and supra-national institutions, the creation of special commission, the finalization of real estate registration and the digitalization of data.

8.3 Social indicators for Albania

Social indicators are used by international agencies to monitor the social system at a national level, compare it with other cases and identify challenges.

Table 19: Social indicators.

Indicator	Year	Source	Value
Human Development Index (HDI)	2018	UN Albania – UNDP	0,716
Human Capital Index (HCI)	2018	World Bank	0,62
Transformation Index BTI	2018	Bertelsmann Stiftung	6.83 /10 (n. 30 out of 129)

Source: Author (2019).

The HDI is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living (UNDP 2019). The HCI measures the human capital that a child born today can expect to attain by his 18th birthday, given the risks of poor health and poor education in the country where he lives. The unit represents the productivity relative to a benchmark of complete education and full health, on a scale of 0 to 1 (World Bank 2019).

Part of the Transformation Index BTI (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018) are the following indicators:

Table 20: Indicators of the Transformation Index BTI.

Indicator	Year	Source	Value
Association/ Assembly right	2018	Transformation Index BTI Bertelsmann Stiftung	9/10
Independent judiciary	2018	Transformation Index BTI Bertelsmann Stiftung	5/10
Civil right	2018	Transformation Index BTI Bertelsmann Stiftung	8/10
Interest group	2018	Transformation Index BTI Bertelsmann Stiftung	6/10
Social Capital	2018	Transformation Index BTI Bertelsmann Stiftung	6/10
Socio-economic barriers	2018	Transformation Index BTI Bertelsmann Stiftung	6/10

Source: Author (2019).

The indicators Civil rights remained stable from 2006 to 2018, thanks to monitoring activities. Legal regulations are in place but the implementation of the same rules is not effective. The main issues still to be faced are property rights, living condition for Roma communities and domestic violence.

The indicator of Interest group refers to the high number of NGOs today present in the country; however, they donor-driven and often in political conflicts of interests.

Social capital is quite strong in the traditional society, based on families or clan loyalties. Nevertheless, the enclosed nature of these social relations hamper the creation of a civic culture of participation outside the restricted circle. Moreover, the report claims the existence of an individualist trend; as a prove, in a Survey of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 2016, only 17% of Albanian population declared that most people can be trusted. This result is the lowest among 17 CEEs and South European countries.

The rate of socio-economic barriers testify the improvements needed in reducing poverty and social exclusion.

The Governance performance indicators are the following:

Table 21: Governance Performance Indicators of the Transformation Index BTI.

Indicator	Year	Source	Value
Policy learning	2018	Transformation Index BTI Bertelsmann Stiftung	7/10 – increasing from 2006 to 20018
Efficient use of assets	2018	Transformation Index BTI Bertelsmann Stiftung	5/10
Policy coordination	2018	Transformation Index BTI Bertelsmann Stiftung	7/10
Anti-corruption policy	2018	Transformation Index BTI Bertelsmann Stiftung	5/10
Civil Society participation	2018	Transformation Index BTI Bertelsmann Stiftung	7/10

Source: Author (2019).

Lastly, the United Nations Albania (2018) report presents the step forward to reach SDGs 1,3,4,5,10, 11 and 16 and EU integrated chapter 19,23,24,32 in the field of Social Cohesion, explained in Chapter 1. The concept is here seen as a factor to achieve gender equality, education, child protection, health and social inclusion and protection. Many agencies, as UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, collaborate to help the country to increase the performance in this field. The Civic Society index (IDM *et al.* 2010) reports the following scores, which highlight poor results in terms of engagement:

Table 22: Engagement Indicators for the Civic Society Index IDM.

Indicator	Year	Source	Value
Civic engagement	2010	IDM	47.6 %
Political engagement	2010	IDM	35.1%
Practice of Values	2010	IDM	62.4

Source: Author (2019).

Annex 9: Dependent Variables analysis

9.1 Security

9.1.1 Perception of Security

Descriptive statistics

Table 23: Perception of security descriptive statistics.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
7.3_FearEviction	114	1	5	3.72	1.199
7.4_SecurityChangeResidence	114	1	5	3.09	1.424
7.5_SecurityWithTitle	111	1	5	4.34	1.116
Residential Stability	113	2	5	3.99	1.098
Perception of Security	114	2	4	2.07	.08517
Valid N	95				

Source: Author (2019).

The Cronbach's alpha value indicates the compatibility of indicators, when above 0.5. See the Data inspection section for further explanation. The value of the indicators 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 and 2.2 is 0.58, still acceptable.

Normality Test


The Shapiro-Wilk test significance is 0.00; although the data is not normally distributed, it is not required to be, in order to conduct a regression model. The Normality Histogram presents a bell-shape figure.

Table 24: Perception of security normality test.

	Test of Normality					
	Kolmogorov-Smirnov test			Shapiro-Wilk test		
	Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
Perception of Security	.241	114	.000	.814	114	.000

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
Source: Author (2019).

Graph 1: Perception of security normality histogram.



Source: Author (2019).

Homogeneity of variance test

The homogeneity of variance test shows a significance of 0.05, acceptable.

Table 25: Perception of security homogeneity test.

	Test of Homogeneity of Variance				
		Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Perception of Security	Based on Mean	3.071	2	111	.050

Source: Author (2019).

9.1.2 Concern over security

Descriptive statistics

Table 26: Concern over security descriptive statistics.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Concern Over Security	97	1	5	3.75	1.146
Valid N	97				

Source: Author (2019).

Frequency Statistics

Table 27: Concern over security frequency statistics.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative percent
Valid	Minimum importance	3	2.6	3.1	3.1
	Low importance	17	14.9	17.5	20.6
	Average importance	9	7.9	9.3	29.9
	High importance	40	35.1	41.2	71.1
	Maximum importance	28	24.6	28.9	100
	Total	97	85.1	100	
	Missing	17	14.9		
	Total	114			

Source: Author (2019).

Normality Test


Table 28: concern over security normality test.

Test of Normality						
	Kolmogorov-Smirnov test			Shapiro-Wilk test		
	Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
Concern Over Security	.287	97	.000	.838	97	.000

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Source: Author (2019).

Graph 2: Concern over security normality histogram.



Source: Author (2019).

The normality histogram shows a bell-shape graph (Graph 2). The homogeneity of variance shows a non-acceptable significant value (Table 10). However, as said before, the analysis can continue with the mediating variables not normally distributed and with a non valid homogeneity of variance.

Homogeneity of variance test

Table 29: Concern over security homogeneity test.

Test of Homogeneity of Variance				
	Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.

Concern Over Security	Based on Mean	21.967	2	94	.000
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Source: Author (2019).

Correlation

The Spearman correlation table shows where a correlation can be found.

Table 30: Security Correlation table.

	Informal settlers (A)	Applicants (B)	Titleholders (C)	Perception of security	Concern over security
Informal settlers (A)	1				
Applicants (B)	-.480**	1			
Titleholders (C)	-.520**	-.499**	1		
Perception of security	-.405**	.260**	.654**	1	
Concern over security	.346**	-.236*	-.547**	-.358**	1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author (2019).

9.2 Social Network

9.2.1 Social relations

Descriptive statistics

Table 31: Social relations descriptive statistics.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
3.1_NameNeigh	114	1	5	3.868	1.2158
3.2_FriendsNeigh	114	1	5	2.34	1.268
3.3_FrequencyMeeting	87	1	5	2.91	1.226
Social relations	114	1	5	3.0585	1.0585
Valid N	87				

Source: Author (2019).

The Cronbach's alpha is 0.821.

9.2.2 Support

Descriptive statistics

Table 32: Support descriptive statistics.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
3.7_MeetPeople	111	1	5	3.41	1.066
3.8_LostConnections	99	1	5	2.41	1.116
3.9_SupportFriends	99	1	5	3.14	1.030
Support	111	1	4.33	3.0781	.81272
Valid N	99				

Source: Author (2019).

The Cronbach's alpha is 0.557, still above the minimum baseline.

9.2.3 Focus on indicators 3.4c,3.5c,3.6c

The **indicator 3.4c** has a value of 2.95 as mean. The frequency table shows an overall different presence of tenure conditions, not polarized: 28.9% of respondents claim a small presence of differences, while 30% high presence and 36.8% an average presence.

Frequency tables

3.4 From your point of view, which characteristics are present in your neighbourhood? Please rank each item from 1 to 5 in the box.

1. Very small presence 2. Small presence 3. Average presence 4. High presence 5. Very high presence

Tenure and land ownership

Table 33: Inclusion 3.4c frequency statistics.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative percent
Valid	Very small presence	16	14	14	14
	Small presence	17	14.9	14.9	28.9
	Average presence	42	36.8	36.8	65.8
	High presence	35	30.7	30.7	96.5
	Very high presence	4	3.5	3.5	100
	Total	114	100		

Source: Author (2019).

When analysing the **indicator 3.5c**, it is clear how the people in the same neighborhood are often in the same condition of ownership. The response “same as me” and “almost same as me” covers the 46% of respondents, when 15% says it is not relevant, and 38.6% relates with people in different conditions.

3.5 Which characteristics have the people you have relations with (share a meal, visit at home, have a talk) in your neighbourhood? Please rank each item from 1 to 5 in the box.

1. Same as me 2. Almost same as me 3. Not relevant to me 4. Different from me 5. Very different from me

Tenure and land ownership

Table 34: Inclusion 3.5c frequency statistics.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative percent
Valid	Same as me	19	16.7	16.7	16.7
	Almost same as me	34	29.8	29.8	46.5
	Not relevant to me	17	14.9	14.9	61.8
	Different from me	41	36	36	97.4
	Very different from me	3	2.6	2.6	100
	Total	114	100		

Source: Author (2019).

Looking to the **indicator 3.6c** related to tenure and land ownership, the mean is 3.04. 47% respondents claim that there is a relatively small possibility that the topic may generate an issue in the neighbourhood.

3.6 Which characteristics do you think may cause problems in your neighbourhood? Please rank each item from 1 to 5 in the box.

1. *Very small possibility* 2. *Small possibility* 3. *Average* 4. *High possibility* 5. *Very high possibility*
Tenure and land ownership

Table 35: Inclusion 3.6c frequency statistics.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative percent
Valid	Very small possibility	9	7.9	8	8
	Small possibility	17	14.9	15	23
	Average	54	47.4	47.8	70.8
	High possibility	27	23.7	23.9	94.7
	Very high possibility	6	5.3	5.3	100
	Total	113	99.1		

Source: Author (2019).

9.2.4 Inclusion

All the indicators of the questions 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 are aggregated into variable Inclusion, with a Cronbach's Alpha value of 0.807.

Descriptive statistics

Table 36: Inclusion descriptive statistics.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
3.4a_DiffPres_Ethnicity	114	1	5	2.44	1.056
3.4b_Relig	114	1	4	2.16	.771
3.4c_DiffPres_TenSec	114	1	5	2.95	1.080
3.4d_DiffPres_Income	114	1	5	3.02	.986
3.4e_DiffPres_Age	114	1	5	2.04	.882
3.4f_Diff_Pres_gender	114	1	3	1.94	.695
3.5a_DiffRel_Ethnicity	114	1	5	2.25	1.247
3.5b_DiffRel_Relig	114	1	5	2.49	1.146
3.5c_DiffRel_TenSec	114	1	5	2.78	1.181
3.5d_DiffRel_Income	114	1	5	2.91	1.027
3.5d_DiffRel_Age	114	1	4	2.38	.866
3.5f_DiffRel_gender	113	1	4	2.26	.971
3.6a_DiffIssue_Ethnicity	113	1	5	2.12	.810
3.6b_DiffIssue_Relig	113	1	5	1.97	.738
3.6c_Diff_Issue_TenSec	113	1	5	3.04	.963
3.6d_DiffIssue_Income	113	1	5	2.88	.923
3.6e_DiffIssue_Age	113	1	5	1.73	.720
3.6f_DiffIssue_gender	113	1	5	1.66	.663
Inclusion	114	1.11	3.33	2.3885	.45573
Valid N	113				

Source: Author (2019).

9.2.4 Social Network

Descriptive statistics

Table 37: Social Network descriptive statistics.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
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Social Network	109	2.17	3.89	2.8985	.38099
Valid N	109				

Source: Author (2019)

Normality Test

The Shapiro-Wilk p value shows a significance $p < 0.05$ ($p = 0.100$), obtained by eliminating outliers. The data resembles a bell-shape distribution.


Table 38: Social Network normality test.

Test of Normality						
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test			Shapiro-Wilk test			
	Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
Social Network	.068	109	.200*	.980	109	.100

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Source: Author (2019).

Graph 3: Social network normality histogram.



Source: Author (2019).

Homogeneity of variance test

The homogeneity test gives a significant p value above 0.05.

Table 39: Social network homogeneity test.

Test of Homogeneity of Variance					
		Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Social Network	Based on Mean	.298	2	106	.743

Source: Author (2019).

Correlation

Table 40: Correlation table Social network.

	Informal settlers (A)	Applicants (B)	Titleholders (C)	Social Network
Informal settlers (A)	1			
Applicants (B)	-.480**	1		
Titleholders (C)	-.520**	-.499**	1	
Social Network	.105	-.303**	.198**	1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author 2019

Table 41: Sub-variables Social network correlation table.

	Informal settlers (A)	Applicants (B)	Titleholders (C)	Social relations	Support	Inclusion
Informal settlers (A)	1					
Applicants (B)	-.480**	1				
Titleholders (C)	-.520**	-.499**	1			
Social Relations	-.092	-.303**	.387**	1		
Support	.262*	.274**	-.521**	-.117	1	
Inclusion	.062	-.232*	.164	.224**	-.179	1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author (2019).

9.3 Social Order

9.3.1 Economic Loss

The economic loss is measured by the aggregation of indicators 9.1,9.2,9.3. The Cronbach's alpha value is 0.842.

Descriptive statistics

Table 42: Economic loss descriptive statistics.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
9.1_EcLoss_Money- legal support	31	1	4	2.52	1.180
9.2_EcLoss_Money- Compensation	31	1	4	1.97	1.140
9.3_EcLoss_Money- legaliz	31	1	5	2.52	1.480
Economic Loss	31	1	4	2.333	1.1122
Valid N	31				

Source: Author 2019

9.3.2 Social Loss

For the second variable, the social loss, the Cronbach's alpha value for the aggregation of the indicators 9.4,9.5,9.6,.9.7 is 0.832.

Descriptive statistics

Table 43: Social loss descriptive statistics.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
9.4_SocLoss_Violence	31	1	5	2.13	1.310
9.5_SocLoss_SocRel	31	1	5	2.74	1.154
9.6_Exclusion_Isolation	31	1	5	2.90	1.274
9.7_Exclusion_Unpopular	31	1	5	2.77	1.230
Social Loss	31	1	5	2.63	1.014
Valid N	31				

Source: Author 2019

9.3.3 Social order

Descriptive statistics

Table 44: Social order descriptive statistics.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Social Order	31	1	3.71	2.5069	.86255
Valid N	31				

Source: Author 2019

Although the Shapiro-Wilk test gives a significant value below 0.05, the K-S test significance is $p > 0.05$. Since it is a borderline case between the two test, the research considers the data normally distributed.

Normality Test


Table 45: Social order normality test.

Test of Normality						
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test				Shapiro-Wilk test		
	Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
Social order	.143	31	.105	.927	31	.037

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Source: Author 2019

Graph 4: Social order normality histogram.



Source: Author (2019).

Homogeneity of variance test

The homogeneity test gives a significant p value above 0.05.

Table 46: Social order homogeneity test.

Test of Homogeneity of Variance					
		Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Social Order	Based on Mean	.452	2	28	.641

Source: Author 2019

Correlation

Table 47: Social order correlation table.

	Informal settlers (A)	Applicants (B)	Titleholders (C)	Social Order	Economic Loss	Social Loss
Informal settlers (A)	1					

Applicants (B)	-.480**	1				
Titleholders (C)	-.520**	-.499**	1			
Social Order	.438*	.242	-.665**	1		
Economic Loss	.234	.244	-.476**	.753**	1	
Social Loss	.411*	.250	-.649**	.834**	.346	1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author (2019).

9.4 Civic engagement

9.4.1 Formal participation

Descriptive statistics

Table 48: Formal participation descriptive statistics.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
4.1_Clubs	114	0	4	.57	.882
4.2_Volunt	114	0	3	.24	.569
4.3_commMeet	114	0	5	.58	1.072
4.4_election	114	0	4	1.59	1.159
Formal participation	114	0	3.25	.7398	.69855
Valid N	114				

Source: Author (2019).

The reliability analysis over the indicators of formal participation (4.1,4.2,4.3,4.4) presents a Cronbach's alpha value of 0.724.

9.4.2 Informal participation

The variable of informal participation is calculated by the sum of indicators 5.1,5.2, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, with a Cronbach' alpha value of 0.558, still valid.

Descriptive statistics

Table 49: Informal participation descriptive statistics.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
5.1_FBPost	114		5	1.91	1.209
5.2_CommAct	114	1	5	2.32	1.179
5.6_Protest	114	1	5	2.09	1.118
5.7_LegProtest	114	1	5	2.11	1.236
5.8_InfLegProtest	114	1	5	2.11	1.218
Informal participation	114	1	4.6	2.1088	.73226
Valid N	114				

Source: Author 2019

9.4.3 Willingness to contribute

The willingness to contribute has been measured asking the respondents to rank from 1 to 5 the items 5.3, 5.4, 5.5. The Cronbach's alpha value is 0.910.

Descriptive statistics

Table 50: Willingness to contribute descriptive statistics.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
5.3_LabContrib	114	1	5	1.91	1.102
5.4_FinanceContrib	114	1	4	1.73	.823
5.5_Lab+Finance	114	1	4	1.74	.853
Willingness to contribute	114	1	4	1.7953	.85934
Valid N	114				

Source: Author 2019

9.4.5 Property as motivating factor

The measurement of civic engagement when it comes to assurance of property rights takes into account the indicators 6.1 to 6.4. The questions to this Section related to action taken to deal with property issue are referred to events in the present or in the past. The Cronbach's alpha value is 0.734, valid.

Descriptive statistics

Table 51: Property as motivating factor descriptive statistics.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
6.1_Vote	114	0	5	3.03	1.068
6.2_LegProtest_Formal	114	0	5	3.11	1.116
6.3_ActExclusion	114	0	5	2.69	1.074
6.4_ExclusionDisputes	114	0	5	2.54	1.006
Motivating Factor	114	0	4.25	2.8421	.7956
Valid N	114				

Source: Author 2019

9.4.6 Civic Engagement

The combination of all the civic engagement indicators is computed in a new variable.

Descriptive statistics

Table 52: Civic engagement descriptive statistics.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Civic engagement	114	0.83	3.50	2.2749	.49343
Valid	114				

Source: Author 2019

Normality Test

The significance is above 0.05, hence the distribution is normal.


Table 53: Civic engagement normality test.

Test of Normality						
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test			Shapiro-Wilk test			
	Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
Civic engagement	.109	114	.002	.985	114	.216

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Source: Author 2019

Graph 5: Civic engagement normality histogram.



Source: Author (2019).

Homogeneity of variance test

The homogeneity test gives a significant p value above 0.05.

Table 54: Civic engagement homogeneity test.

Test of Homogeneity of Variance				
		Levene Statistic	df1	df2
Civic engagement	Based on Mean	2.637	2	111
				Sig. .076

Source: Author 2019

Correlation

Table 55: Correlation table civic engagement.

	Informal settlers (A)	Applicants (B)	Titleholders (C)	Civic engagement	Formal participation	Informal participation
Informal settlers (A)	1					
Applicants (B)	-.480**	1				
Titleholders (C)	-.520**	-.499**	1			
Civic engagement	-.146	.241**	-.060	1		
Formal participation	-.350**	-.257**	.557**	.184	1	
Informal participation	-.272**	.334**	-.058	.855**	.114	1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author 2019

Table 56: Civic engagement correlation table 2.

	Informal settlers (A)	Applicants (B)	Titleholders (C)	Willingness	Motivating factors
Informal settlers (A)	1				
Applicants (B)	-.480**	1			
Titleholders (C)	-.520**	-.499**	1		
Willingness	-.147	-.405**	.540**	1	
Motivating Factor	.255**	.408**	-.649**	.493**	1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author 2019

9.5 Social cohesion

Descriptive statistics

Table 57: Social cohesion descriptive statistics.

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Social Network	109	2.17	3.89	2.8985	.38099
Social order	31	1	3.71	2.50	.86255
Civic engagement	114	.83	3.50	2.27	.49343
Social Cohesion	114	1.13	3.68	2.64	.42081
Valid N	31				

Source: Author 2019

Normality Test

The normality value, according to the K-S test shows a significant result ($p > 0.05$).


Table 58: Social cohesion normality test.

Test of Normality						
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test				Shapiro-Wilk test		
	Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
Social Cohesion	.101	114	.006	.952	114	.000

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Source: Author 2019

Graph 6: Social cohesion normality histogram.



Source: Author (2019).

Homogeneity of variance test

The homogeneity test gives a significant p value above 0.05.

Table 59: Social cohesion homogeneity test.

Test of Homogeneity of Variance					
		Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Social Cohesion	Based on Mean	2.261	2	105	.109

Source: Author 2019

Correlation

Table 60: Social cohesion correlation table.

	Informal settlers (A)	Applicants (B)	Titleholders (C)	Social Cohesion
Informal settlers (A)	1			
Applicants (B)	-.480**	1		
Titleholders (C)	-.520**	-.499**	1	
Social Cohesion	.073	.161	-.230*	1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author 2019

Annex 10: Capability to legalize the property and involvement in property conflicts as independent variables

The number of respondents allowed to make extra consideration over the independent variables and to expand the concept of ownership. Since a minimum number of respondents involved in conflicts was collected, the research tested the performance over social cohesion also on this category. Moreover, it was possible to test the differences in pro-social behaviour between households whose property could be legalized, or, contrarily, cannot.

The items for these control variables were:

1.1 Do you have a legal ownership document for your land?

1.7 Is it possible to legalize your property?

8.1 Have you been involved in property disputes?


Including these categories was a way to expand the continuum of property over the binary interpretation of ownership as yes/no category. In this sense, the following extra categories were considered:

Table 61: Extra category of ownership.

D	Households without title deed and legalization is possible	35
E	Households without title deed and legalization is not possible	41
F	Households involved in conflicts	32

Chart 25: Subdivision respondents by type of ownership and capability to register the property.

Chart 26: Subdivision respondents by type of ownership and involvement in property conflicts.



Source: Author (2019).


It appears that the majority of respondents without title (A) did not fall into the requirement of legalization, while who applied (B) had the possibility to finalize the process. Therefore, this analysis regards mainly the difference between informal settlers and applicants.

Households involved in property disputes could be found in all the three categories of

ownership. See the following tables for the operationalization for these two extra independent variables.

Chart 27: Operationalization indicators for possibility to legalize the property.

Char 28: Operationalization indicators for involvement in property conflicts.



Source: Author (2019).

10.1 Data Analysis

The data inspection and preparation followed the same structure of the analysis of Chapter. For this reason, see Section 4.1 for data description, Section 4.2 for sample description, Section 4.3 for data inspection and Annex 9 for the dependent variables' aggregation.

In the following tables, the Spearman correlation.

Table 62: Extra correlation table security

	Possibility to legalize the property (D)	Involvement in property conflicts (F)	Perception of security	Concern over security
Possibility to legalize the property (D)	1			
Involvement in property conflicts (F)	-.204	1		
Perception of security	-.308**	.059	1	
Concern over security	.137	.184	-.358**	1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author 2019

Perception of security is significantly negatively correlated to the possibility of legalizing the property with it is positive, although not significant, for the other relations. Not being able to legalize the property is linked to a lack of security. The concern over security is positively linked to both variables, although not significantly.

Table 63: Extra correlation table social network

	Possibility to legalize the property (D)	Involvement in property conflicts (F)	Social Network	Social Relations	Support	Inclusion
Possibility to legalize the property (D)	1					
Involvement in property conflicts (F)	-.204	1				
Social Network	.137	.166	1			
Social Relations	.050	.104	.767**	1		
Support	-.020	.095	.286**	-.117	1	
Inclusion	.127	.196*	.304**	.224**	-.179	1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author 2019

Social network is positively correlated to both variables, but not significantly. Households involved in property conflicts also have a significant positive correlation with inclusion; they don't feel the pressure of any issues in the neighbourhoods. Interestingly, support is the only variable with a negative correlation, specifically with the capability to legalize the property. This relation can be explained by the reasons behind the exclusion from the legalization process, such as the case of public investment in a specific area or shelters built in environmental risk areas. These Municipal rules create specific geographical area, where the households are in the same ownership condition, as the case of Selite or along the river.

The variable of property conflicts was not considered as the only values different from 0 corresponds to category E, therefore SPSS could not compute any correlation or regression. This also is explained theoretically, as social order can only be measured if you have been involved in conflicts.

Table 64: Extra correlation table Social order

	Possibility to legalize the property (D)	Social Order	Economic Loss	Social Loss
Possibility to legalize the property (D)	1			
Social Order	.419*	1		
Economic Loss	.221	.753**	1	
Social Loss	.458*	.834**	.346	1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author 2019

Households whose property could be legalized suffer from social loss and impact of conflicts, and, less strongly, economic loss. Therefore, people whose property could be legalized (D) were involved in stressing conflicts, while the households who knew the land cannot be legalized (E), even when involved in conflicts, did not feel a change in the perception of isolation.

Table 65: Extra correlation table civic engagement.

	Possibility to legalize the property (D)	Involvement in property conflicts (F)	Civic engagemen t	Formal participat ion	Informal participat ion	Willingness	Motivat ing factors
Possibility to legalize the property (D)	1						

Involvement in property conflicts (F)	-.204	1				
Civic engagement	-.288**	.194*	1			
Formal participation	-.233*	.078	.184	1		
Informal participation	-.406**	.181	.855**	.114	1	
Willingness	-.001	.022	-.364**	.579**	.148	1
Motivating Factor	.078	.076	.493**	-.303*	.239*	.335**
						1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author 2019

The households able to legalize their property are negatively significantly correlated to civic engagement, formal and informal participation. Moreover, civic engagement ranks higher among households involved in property conflicts than the one not, as well as among households whose property cannot be legalized. To be noticed that that formal and informal participation are quite low among both informal settlers A and households whose property cannot be legalized – the correspondence between the two groups happens also because most of the respondents of group A also fall into the category E, meaning they can't legalize the property.

Table 66: Extra Correlation Table social cohesion.

	Possibility to legalize the property (D)	Involvement in property conflicts (F)	Social Cohesion
Possibility to legalize the property (D)	1		
Involvement in property conflicts (F)	-.204	1	
Social Cohesion	-.075	.081	1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author 2019

None of the variables has a significant correlation with social cohesion. However, households involved in property conflicts have a positive relation, and the households whose property can be legalized a negative one.

10.2 Regression analysis

Similarly as explained in Section 4.5, the category E, which includes households who could not finalize the legalization process, was taken as baseline of category D. The involvement in property conflicts was analysed in comparison of not being involved in any.

Social Network

IV: Possibility to legalize the property (D)

DV: Social Network

Table 67: Extra Regression Social Network 1.

Social Network	Model 1. Only Theoretical Variable	Model 2. Theoretical Variable + controls v.	Model 3. Theoretical Variable + control v. mediating v.
Model			
Constant	3.091	3.080	2.716

Significance	.311		.309		.396	
R square	.012		.134		.148	
Variable						
	B	p	B	p	B	p
Possibility to legalize the property (D)	.086	.311	.167	.110	-.293	.546
Poor			-.188	.162	-.211	.125
Low income			-.067	.604	-.082	.534
Low education			-.172	.315	-.272	.254
Secondary Education			-.097	.517	-.108	.478
Ethnic Minority			.250	.036**	.254	.034**
Gender			.075	.440	.070	.479
Age			.016	.775	.012	.839
Residential stability			-.068	.156	-.071	.189
Perception of security (D)					.024	.821
Concern over security (D)					.103	.292

Source: Author 2019

The three models are not significant. However, ethnicity is a predicting variables of social network, with a positive coefficient. Therefore, being in a condition where the property can be legalized does not generate a significant variation in social network.

Social Network

IV: Involvement in property conflicts (F)

DV: Social Network

Table 68: Extra Regression Social Network 2.

Social Network	Model 1. Only Theoretical Variable		Model 2. Theoretical Variable + controls v.		Model 3. Theoretical Variable + control v. mediating v.	
Model						
Constant	2.847		2.892		2.668	
Significance	.025**		.125		.129	
R square	0.046		.143		.171	
Variable						
	B	p	B	p	B	p
Involvement in property conflicts (F)	.181	.025**	.237	.015**	.237	.688
Poor			-.214	.063*	-.203	.074*
Low income			-.157	.164	-.186	.096*
Low education			.022	.876	.048	.739
Secondary Education			.035	.765	.039	.732
Ethnic Minority			.128	.225	.139	.185
Gender			.104	.206	.068	.406
Age			.035	.476	.025	.623
Residential stability			-.057	.165	-.047	.286
Perception of security (F)					.010	.924
Concern over security (F)					.011	.927

Source: Author 2019

Model 1, where the independent variable is being involved in property conflicts, shows a significant relation, although limited (R square = 4.6%). Similarly, in Model 2, R square is higher (R square=0.143) and being involved in conflicts is a positive predictor of a variation

in social network. Another significant contribution is given by income: poor households ranks low in social networks. In the third Model, which includes perception of security and personal concern, only income groups give a significant contribution to the model. The perception of security has a non-significant influence over social network.

Social order

IV: Possibility to legalize the property (D)

DV: Social Order

Table 69: Extra Regression Social order.

Social order	Model 1. Only Theoretical Variable		Model 2. Theoretical Variable + controls v.		Model 3. Theoretical Variable + control v. mediating v.	
Model						
Constant	2.307		.766		.007	
Significance	.029**		.000***		.000***	
R square	.164		.854		.912	
Variable						
	B	p	B	p	B	p
Possibility to legalize the property (D)	.756	.029**	.406	.128	1.915	.031**
Poor			.867	.039**	.818	.032**
Low income			.449	.203	.485	.115
Low education			-.627	.111	-.580	.086*
Secondary Education			-.338	.271	-.382	.154
Ethnic Minority			-1.105	.000***	-1.012	.000***
Gender			-.122	.585	-.048	.798
Age			.376	.041**	.391	.018**
Residential stability			.294	.026**	.432	.002***
Perception of security (D)					.171	.466
Concern over security (D)					-.415	.021**

Source: Author 2019

In the first Model, the difference between capability and non-capability of finalizing the legalization process might explain a significant variation of 16.4% in the perception of socio-economic impacts of conflicts. When introducing the control variables in Model 2, other predicting variables are income, ethnic minority, age and residential stability. In the last model, around 91% of the variation in the perception of impacts due to property conflicts might be explained by the mentioned control variables, the dependent variable, as well as the concern over security. Significant predictors are income, education, ethnicity, age, residential stability and concern over security.

Civic engagement

IV: Possibility to legalize the property (D)

DV: Civic engagement

Table 70: Extra Regression Civic Engagement 1.

Civic engagement	Model 1. Only Theoretical Variable		Model 2. Theoretical Variable + controls v.		Model 3. Theoretical Variable + control v. mediating v.	
Model						

Constant	2.428		2.189		2.322	
Significance	.019**		.008**		.001**	
R square	.060		.260		.343	
Variable						
	B	p	B	p	B	p
Possibility to legalize the property (D)	-.231	.097*	-.107	.335	.958	.055*
Poor			-.307	.035**	-.290	.039**
Low income			.052	.702	.056	.673
Low education			.243	.182	.349	.052*
Secondary Education			.241	.124	.289	.056*
Ethnic Minority			.018	.883	-1.476	1
Gender			-.057	.583	-.020	.839
Age			-.120	.044*	-1.114	.045**
Residential stability			.114	.030**	.054	.328
Perception of security (D)					-.312	.006**
Concern over security (D)					-.143	.153

Source: Author 2019

The first Model is significantly explained by the capability of legalizing the property (B=-.231, p=0.097*): the condition of not being able to register the property counts for a negative variation in civic engagement; however, the variation of this model is only 6%. In the second Model, the independent variable does not have a significant relation. The 26% of variation in civic engagement is therefore accounted for poor households (p=0.035**), age (p=0.044*) and time of residency (p=0.030**); only the last one has a positive coefficient. The last Model significantly explains 34% of variation in civic engagement. Significantly relevant predictors are, beside the ones of Model 2, education – with the two lowest categories of education with a positive coefficient- and perception of security, with a negative coefficient.

Civic engagement

IV: Involvement in property conflicts (F)

DV: Civic engagement

Table 71: Extra Regression Civic Engagement 2.

Civic engagement	Model 1. Only Theoretical Variable		Model 2. Theoretical Variable + controls v.		Model 3. Theoretical Variable + control v. mediating v.	
Model						
Constant	2.212		2.122		2.263	
Significance	.030**		.000***		.000**	
R square	0.041		.289		.360	
Variable						
	B	p	B	p	B	p
Involvement in property conflicts (F)	.222	.030**	.196	.014**	1.837	.003**
Poor			-.434	.001***	-.437	.001***
Low income			-.050	.692	-.001	.994
Low education			.330	.041*	.267	.087*
Secondary Education			.240	.061*	.249	.044**
Ethnic Minority			.052	.664	.103	.087*
Gender			-.079	.395	-.069	.444
Age			-.115	.036**	-.133	.015**

Residential stability			.111	.016**	.083	.075*
Perception of security (F)					-.343	.004**
Concern over security (F)					-.248	.049**

Source: Author 2019

In Model 1, civic engagement is significantly explained by involvement in property conflicts, although it explains a limited variation. Model 2 indicates that the difference in civic engagement can be caused by income, level of education, age of respondents and residential stability in the neighbourhood. In the last Model, a variation of 36% in the Model is explained by the same control variables. In addition, ethnicity and security are significant predictors. Being involved in property conflicts has a positive significant contribution ($p=0.003^{**}$); moreover, middle income, less educated, stable in the neighbourhood and young respondents are more likely to be more civic involved. Lastly, the lower the security, the higher the civic engagement.

Social Cohesion

IV: Possibility to legalize the property (D)

DV: social cohesion

Table 72: Extra Regression Social cohesion 1.

Social cohesion	Model 1. Only Theoretical Variable		Model 2. Theoretical Variable + controls v.		Model 3. Theoretical Variable + control v. mediating v.	
Model						
Constant	2.701		2.341		2.346	
Significance	.879		.114		.204	
R square	0.00		.174		.180	
Variable						
	B	p	B	p	B	p
Possibility to legalize the property (D)	-.012	.879	.062	.495	.339	.427
Poor			-.275	.021**	-.267	.029**
Low income			.032	.778	.036	.755
Low education			.263	.079*	.286	.065*
Secondary Education			.197	.123	.207	.112
Ethnic Minority			.085	.411	.081	.439
Gender			.019	.820	.026	.764
Age			-.016	.739	-.014	.776
Residential stability			.056	.191	.047	.321
Perception of security (D)					-.053	.579
Concern over security (D)					-.048	.577

Source: Author 2019

The three Models are not significant. Therefore, no correlation can be found between social cohesion and possibility to legalize the property. Predictors of a change in social cohesion are income and education.

IV: Involvement in property conflicts (F)

DV: social cohesion

Table 73: Extra Regression Social Cohesion 2.

Social cohesion	Model 1. Only Theoretical Variable		Model 2. Theoretical Variable + controls v.		Model 3. Theoretical Variable + control v. mediating v.	
Model						
Constant	2.622		2.162		2.346	
Significance	.285		.002**		.000**	
R square	0.10		.238		.331	
Variable						
	B	p	B	p	B	p
Involvement in property conflicts (F)	.094	.285	.102	.280	1.366	.010*
Poor			-.361	.001***	-.357	.001***
Low income			-.071	.516	-.053	.615
Low education			.380	.007**	.340	.012***
Secondary Education			.231	.037**	.247	.021*
Ethnic Minority			.054	.606	.114	.263
Gender			.006	.943	-.015	.842
Age			-.009	.854	-.039	.402
Residential stability			.094	.018**	.072	.073*
Perception of security (F)					-.315	.002**
Concern over security (F)					-.154	.154

Source: Author 2019

Being involved in property conflicts do not explained a certain degree of social cohesion, as shown in Model 1. In Model 2, a 23.8% of variation in the model is explained by control variables: poor households, education and length of residency. In the last Model, predictors of social cohesion are income, education, length of residency, perception of security and lastly, being involved in property conflicts.

10.3 Discussion

Regarding social network, having the legal possibility to legalize the land does not imply a variation in social network. On the other hand, being involved in property conflicts (F) might account for a significant, although low, variation in social network. Moreover, poor and low-income households account for a negative variation in social network.

Furthermore, households, whose legalization could be possible, are involved in s conflicts and perceive the social impact as quite significant (Social order: $\rho=0.419^*$, Social impact: $\rho=0.458^*$). Poor households ranked as high the perception of impacts of conflicts in the questionnaire, comparing to the two higher income groups.

Furthermore, being in a condition where the property can be legalized causes a significant difference in civic engagement, with a negative variation. Households whose property could not be legalized have higher civic engagement. Their right might be blocked by public infrastructure and, therefore, protests and social mobilization might take place, as the ones mentioned in Selite or around the Ring Road projects.

Furthermore, it is hard to draw a significant correlation between social cohesion and the possibility to legalize the property or being involved in property disputes. However, households with low education, middle income, low security and high residential stability account for an increase in social cohesion.

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
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