MDS 2004/05 Th. 158

Institute of Social Studies

Graduate School of Development Studies

Towards Men's Involvement: Masculinities, Change and the International Rescue Committee's Gender-Based Violence Program in Karenni Site 1, Thailand

A Research Paper presented by:

ELIZABETH JOHANNA BREZOVICH
(AUSTRIA/USA)

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Obtaining the Degree of:

Master of Arts in Development Studies
Specialization:

Women, Gender, Development

Members of the Examining Committee:
Thanh-Dam Truong
Dubravka Zarkov



88681

Institute of Social Studies

Graduate School of Development Studies

Towards Men's Involvement: Masculinities, Change and the International Rescue Committee's Gender-Based Violence Program in Karenni Site 1, Thailand

A Research Paper presented by:

ELIZABETH JOHANNA BREZOVICH

(AUSTRIA/USA)

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Obtaining the Degree of:

Master of Arts in Development Studies

Specialization:

Women, Gender, Development

Members of the Examining Committee:

Thanh-Dam Truong

Dubravka Zarkov

The Hague, December 2005

**This document represents part of the author's study programme while at the Institute of Social Studies;
the views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute.**

Research papers and theses are not made available for outside circulation by the Institute.

Enquiries:

Postal Address:
Institute of Social Studies
P.O. Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague
The Netherlands

Telephone: +31-70-4260 460
Telefax: +31-70-4260 799
email: haanappel@iss.nl

Location:
Kortenaerkade 12
2518 AX The Hague
The Netherlands

For displaced women, men and children

Acknowledgments

I owe deep gratitude to Thanhdam Truong for support and guidance, and Dubravka Zarkov for invaluable comments.

Many people, too numerous to count, made my experience in Thailand wonderful, educational and inspirational. I would like to thank IRC staff in New York, Bangkok and Mae Hong Son for providing me with this opportunity. The IRC staff in Mae Hong Son was particularly kind and helpful, and none of this research would have been possible without them. I owe a special thanks and a great deal of admiration to Claudia Pedraglio and the entire GBV team. Many others were extremely generous of time and spirit: those in Karenni Sites 1 and 2 who participated in interviews and in focus group discussions. Numerous NGOs helped open my eyes to the bigger picture of Burmese in Thailand. Two research assistants deserve a special thank you, as their help was instrumental.

I am also grateful to the EU-Asia Link and the Huygens Programme for their financial support during the field research and thesis-writing period respectively.

Thanks to Jeff and John for many enlightening conversations on masculinities....

Finally, thanks to all my friends and family for their support, especially Mariana, Mary and Bruno.

List of Tables and Figures.....iv
Acronyms.....v
Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Background and problem statement.....1
Research objective and questions.....3
Research process and methodology.....3
Scope and limitations.....5
Structure of the paper.....6
Chapter 2. Theorizing Violence, Masculinity and Crisis Tendencies 7
Violence Against Women and women's human rights.....7
Critiques of the Violence Against Women approach.....8
A broad perspective on violence.....9
Gender relations.....11
Masculinities.....12
Theorizing male involvement.....14
Chapter 3. Violence on Both Sides of the Border 15
History.....15
Life in camps in Thailand.....16
Ethnicity.....18
Structural, cultural and direct violence against women.....19
Chapter 4. Gender Relations and Representations of Violence in Karreni Site 1.....21
Changes in gender relations.....21
Crisis tendencies and masculinities.....24
Modern Man.....26
Rain Dance.....28
The "crisis of masculinity" and the language about violence against women.....29
Chapter 5. Towards Male Involvement: Locating Gender Relations in IRC Thailand's Gender-Based Violence Program.....33
Background.....33
Crisis tendencies and debates about GBV program activities.....34
Towards engaging men.....38
Constraints in considering masculinities.....40
Finding men for change.....42
Chapter 6. Conclusion.....44
Appendix 1: List of NGOs/ other agencies interviewed.....49
Appendix 2: Background on the International Rescue Committee.....50
Appendix 3: Discussion Guide for Focus Group Discussions.....51
Appendix 4: Some Questions Used in Interviews.....55
Appendix 5: Map of Burma.....58

List of Tables and Figures

Table 1 Population by ethnicity for Karenni Sites 1 and 2 19

Appendix 5: Map of Burma 58

Acronyms

DARE	Drug and Alcohol Recovery and Education
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KnED	Karenni Education Department
KnHD	Karenni Health Department
KNPP	Karenni National Progressive Party
KnRC	Karenni Refugee Committee
KnWO	Karenni National Women's Organization
MIP	Men Involved in Peace-building
MOI	Ministry of Interior
NGO	Non-governmental organization
RTG	Royal Thai Government
TBBC	Thailand Burma Border Consortium
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VAW	Violence Against Women
VOW	Violence on Women
WCC	Women's Community Center

Chapter 1. Introduction

This research is about gender-based violence and some of the controversies in programs to prevent and respond to it. Taking on "gender-based violence" implies taking on "gender" as an abstract analytical concept, translating it into organizational principles of operation and resolving practical difficulties arising from its application in diverse and complex situations. My main interests are the realities as well as new possibilities for involving men in interventions, and the theoretical assumptions that inform them. I base my study in a particular setting – Karenni Site 1 for refugees in Thailand.

Background and problem statement

As women's studies programs have shifted to gender studies, and Women in Development programs (WID) have become Gender and Development (GAD), a new label has arisen: "gender-based violence." Often used interchangeably with the phrase "violence against women," gender-based violence (GBV) has received a substantial amount of new attention over the past decade, in academic and policy documents and within international agencies and supra-national bodies. New research and programs are illuminating the problem from a variety of perspectives: human rights, reproductive health, international legal context, financial cost to society, etc. The notion that violence against women is a human rights violation has been accepted in international discourse, though not without some controversy around the role of culture. Not surprisingly, the attention on "gender-based violence" is also generating tension and areas of disjuncture on representations of the causes of gender-based violence and the ways to approach it. This seems especially true when the focus of analysis and intervention is on men.

Meanwhile, the past two decades have witnessed an explosion of research in the field of "masculinity studies." These studies challenge essentialism, but in a very different way from feminist analyses of power and focus on the political (Cornwall and White 2000). Rather, masculinity studies focuses largely on the ways that masculinity is constructed through personal experiences of men, grappling with issues like emotions, family realms, workplace and discrimination. The overwhelming majority of this research centers on Western masculinities and historical experience. However, insights from masculinity studies have recently entered the development discourse (see Cleaver 2002). As with the relationship between masculinity studies and women's/feminist studies, there is tension on the role of men and masculinities in "Gender and Development," particularly concern that incorporating

masculinities into development discourse will turn the focus away from questions of power (Cornwall and White 2000).

While most masculinity researchers come from a feminist perspective, masculinities research has yet to lead to concrete strategies or substantial success in transforming masculinities or involving men in preventing gender-based violence. There is a need to develop practical models for the process of change, and how individual and collective action occurs or can be encouraged (Connell 2000). A small number of programs around the world target men to reflect on ways that notions of masculinity impact their lives, with the aim of changing men's relationships with violence and women. Still, "gender" and "gender-based violence" remain the domain of women.

Perhaps nowhere do issues of power, masculinities, gender-based violence and international discourse on GBV meet so closely as in a refugee camp. Far before violent conflict ever begins, the power imbalances in gender relations generate masculinities which are prone to violence. Essentialist gender ideology is used to naturalize and sustain the conflict (Cockburn 2004). Displacement is an equally gendered process, and once in a refugee camp, new family formations, aid dependency, restriction of movement and new power structures all lead to changing gender relations. Refugee camps are often populated by people from various cultures, bringing their own gender relations and practices. Masculinities will naturally be shaped and redefined by these processes.

Unlike in peacetime settings where international discourse makes its way slowly through parliaments, advocacy organizations and local NGOs, international discourse may enter directly into people's lives in refugee camps, in the form of UNHCR or other international organizations. International discourse posits that refugee women are inherently vulnerable to violence. A plethora of new programs have emerged over the past decade to combat gender-based violence in refugee camps. However, little academic research has been conducted on these programs. There is also a dearth of research on ways that gender relations change in a camp setting, and even less research focusing on masculinities. Finally, the number of GBV programs in refugee camps that have explicitly set out to involve men is quite small, and no academic research has yet been conducted on such endeavors.

This study has two levels of analysis. First it examines gender relations and masculinities in a camp in Thailand for refugees from Karenni state, which is internationally considered part of

Burma (Myanmar). The study then shifts focus to activities of the International Rescue Committee (IRC), an international non-governmental organization which is influenced by the international discourse of the violence against women movement, as well as by international and UN organizations. Meanwhile, IRC works directly with refugees to implement GBV programs in numerous refugee camp and post-conflict settings. In Thailand, the IRC aimed to include men in prevention activities virtually from the beginning of their program. An initial report on the Men Involved in Peace-Building program, however, revealed many obstacles in involving men in what proved to be a complex setting (Kim 2004).

Research objective and questions

The objective of the research is to explore changes in gender relations and masculinities in a refugee camp setting, and the ways in which these variables interact with the introduction of a gender-based violence program.

1. How might an analysis of the interaction between changing gender relations, specific masculinities and violence inform gender-based violence program activities?

2. In particular, how can it inform programs that would increase male involvement in the struggle against violence against women?

The following set of sub-questions helped me investigate my main concerns:

- How are gender relations changing in Karenni Site 1? How are masculinities embedded in this these processes of change, i.e. how are masculinities transforming or being reinforced? Are there specific "crises of masculinity" that can be detected?
- To what extent are (representations of) the level and types of violence between men and women affected by changing gender relations?
- How have these gendered dynamics in the Camp been reflected upon, or addressed by the IRC's GBV program, particularly in terms of involving men in prevention activities? What have been the obstacles in reflecting on or addressing these issues?

Research process and methodology

Research on gender-based violence in refugee camps is generally vexed with many logistical and ethical issues. While this paper does not provide adequate space for a thorough

exploration of those issues, I must first note that I initially set out with a slightly different research question, related to the process of measuring changes in men's attitudes towards gender equality. This was assuming that there were some men still involved in the IRC GBV program and/or that GBV prevention activities would be underway at the time of the field research. Upon arrival at the field site, I had to re-evaluate my plan. Since "involving men" and "prevention activities" were not taking place at the time, I concluded that I lacked the necessary contextual background the time and the opportunities to meet people who might assist in such a research. Additionally, given numerous events generating sensitivity at the time, I felt that taking a broader lens to the issue of male involvement in GBV programming would be more successful.

IRC provided logistical support, including transportation between the IRC office in Mae Hong Son town and the camps, and permission from the Thai Ministry of Interior for me to enter the camps. Their support provided crucial access to IRC employees and introductions to key informants in the camps. Because the GBV program was involved in both Site 1 and Site 2, I had originally intended to gather data from both camps. However, the long travel time to Site 2, combined with the fact that Site 2 has very different characteristics, resulted in my decision to focus on Site 1.

Research methods combined structured interviews, review of relevant IRC documents, a limited amount of participant observation within IRC, and focused group discussions.
Structured interviews were conducted with a total of twelve IRC staff members. Interviewees included all current and some former GBV staff, as well as staff members from other programs who have been involved in the issue.

A total of thirteen refugees who serve in various positions in camp and who have somehow been involved with the GBV program were also interviewed. These included Karenni Health Department staff, GBV camp-based assistants, Women's Community Center workers, and representatives from Camp Security, Camp Justice and Camp Committee. Ten of these interviews were with refugee staff in Site 1, and three interviews in Site 2.

Additionally, a total of 12 meetings with 21 other people working with 8 other NGO/iNGOs/ agencies were interviewed in order to gain a broader perspective on life in the camp and various past and ongoing programs. Most of these organizations are directly involved in

activities related to gender-based violence, or are informally addressing the issue through their primary activities. (For a complete list of organizations interviewed, see Appendix 1).

Based on information gathered in the interviews, I designed a focused group discussion guide and revised it with the assistance of two male refugee assistants. There were a total of eight focused group discussions with refugee men in Site 1. Seven groups were composed of men, one group for each of the seven ethnic sub-groups living in Site 1. This was in effect an over-sampling of about five of the sub-groups. One group was composed of (all male) section leaders, all from the dominant ethnic sub-group in camp. These focus group participants ranged in age from 25 to 63 years old. Nearly all were married, and most had children. These discussions were rather structured, with participants asked about topics like gender roles in Karenni state, perceptions on the level of violence in the camp and justifications for committing violence. Participants were also asked to discuss and react to certain slogans about gender equality and domestic violence.

To gain perspectives of the younger, most educated population in camp, I myself conducted four focus groups with refugee students who had relatively advanced English skills. These students are some of the few that have access to schooling beyond grade 10. There were two all-male groups, one all-female group, and one mixed group. Most students were in their late teens or early twenties, and nearly all were unmarried. These discussions were less structured and covered issues facing young people in camp, such as dating and marriage practices, household roles and relations, notions of the "ideal" boyfriend or girlfriend, and their perceptions of violence amongst Karenni people.

Scope and limitations

The research will analyze changes in arenas of gender relations, and how masculinities are embedded in this. While I do address some ways that women's roles are changing in the camp, a detailed analysis of femininities is beyond the scope of this research. Nor are women's perspectives on gender-based violence adequately represented here. As my research focuses on men and their involvement, opinions from women are limited to those I interviewed, i.e. those working within organizations.

Other limitations and biases may have been brought about by attempting to conduct research as an outsider in such a complex setting. Non-refugees are not allowed to live in camp, which greatly limits observation and questioning about social relations. Also, six weeks of the

fieldwork is a very limited amount of time in which to gather information, particularly combined with the lack of published material available on Karenni cultures and gender roles with which to prepare in advance. The lack of vocabulary in Burmese and the Karenni languages to describe issues related to gender and violence was also an issue, with numerous clarifications sometimes necessary. My affiliation with the IRC may have limited my own perspectives as well as the information others shared with me. Nor did I want my presence, in probing about male attitudes and violence, to be counter-productive to their programs. Finally, time limitations precluded training the research assistants to go into great depth with men about attitudes towards violence. This is a sensitive issue in the camps, and ethical considerations were paramount in making decisions about how much to ask and whom to interview. I did not wish for research assistants, who live in the community, to later encounter difficulties based on their work. Therefore, questions were screened with them in advance. Some questions were not and some focus groups were not organized based on discomfort.

Structure of the paper

Following this introduction, Chapter 2 introduces some key theories and debates about violence, violence against women, masculinity and gender relations. Chapter 3 utilizes these concepts to give a background on the refugees and the forms of violence they currently face in Karenni Site 1. Chapter 4 describes the changes that have occurred in gender relations in the camp and investigates the ways that men and notions of masculinities are responding to these changes. Chapter 4 also explores the connections between the changing gender relations and representations of violence. Chapter 5 uses the insights gained on masculinities to examine the IRC GBV program and its attempts to involve men. Chapter 6 offers some concluding remarks.

Chapter 2. Theorizing Violence, Masculinity and Crisis Tendencies

This chapter attempts to combine background on an international movement with theories that will inform the analysis of primary data. Three major areas of debate within theory and practice emerge from this discussion. First is the tension between universalism and an emphasis on contextualization, historical analysis, and intersections of spaces and identities. The second area is the debate within feminism on the possibilities for ending patriarchy by challenging and cooperating with the state and formal institutions, particularly over more psychological and de-constructivist approaches to transforming gender relations. Finally, and connected with the previous tension, is the debate about whether and how individuals, specifically individual men, can be stimulated or encouraged to actively transform gender relations.

Violence Against Women and women's human rights

The end of the Cold War brought new opportunities for the international feminist movement. Whereas social and economic rights had previously been associated with communism, and civil and political rights were associated with the "capitalist" countries, violence against women was in the 1990s was exposed in terms of its connections to women's social and economic inequality (Carrillo et al 2003: 17). Legal arguments previously used on a national level were brought into the international arena by arguing for women's rights as human rights, putting sex as a category that is targeted for violence. This violence not only reflects but also perpetuates a systematic denial of women's civil, political, economic and social rights (Carrillo et al 2003: 17).

Notable moments in the human rights approach include the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, where "women's rights as human rights" came out as the conference's core statement (Carrillo et al 2003: 19). Shortly thereafter, the 1993 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women acknowledged violence against women as about power relations in multiple spheres. It also established the most commonly used definition now of violence against women:

> [...] the term "violence against women" means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life (Carrillo et al 2003: 19).

The notion that women had human rights even in the private sphere was a breakthrough. This perspective has shifted: violence against women is no longer a private matter, or a matter of criminal law, but a violation of human rights obligations. The arena for action is broadened by asking for states to *prevent* violence in all spheres as well as prosecute perpetrators; still, the emphasis remains on the *state* as protector and enforcer of women's rights. Meanwhile this language and these values have made great impacts on international and supra-national organizations, such as the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 which establishes sexual violence in conflict as a war crime, and calls for protection for refugee women (UN Security Council 2000).

Critiques of the Violence Against Women approach

While these developments gave feminists in many countries a sense of moral authority in fighting violence against women, the "power of international law to bring about change" (Carrillo et al 2003: 19) has generally been low. Ultimately enforcement of these issues goes back to national and local-level advocacy by women's groups, facing very different historical, political and cultural contexts. The focus on states to remedy violence also does not address the situations of people living in places where state presence and control is often questionable or nonexistent, e.g. refugee camps. Though protection afforded by UNHCR can be seen as an attempt to provide refugee populations the protection normally afforded by citizenship, this usually fails (Bartolomei et al 2003). Additionally, many question whether the state, as a patriarchal structure, will not actually co-opt or diffuse attempts towards transformational change, and whether emphasis on other arenas, such as women's individual empowerment, might not be more useful.

Other critiques concern using the notion of group rights, thereby positing women as a disadvantaged, marginalized group across societies. Ratna Kapur (2002: 10) argues that this feminist legal "victim" approach arises from the tension between the diverse experiences of women and the reality of the high rate of violence against women across societies. While partly strategically successful, it reinforces gender essentialism, thereby ultimately ignoring intersectionality and the variety of experiences that women across cultures and classes have, in terms of power, resistance, relationships with women of other ethnic groups, etc. While the VAW approach notes that various forms of violence manifest themselves differently in each society, many critics argue that the framework privileges a Western perspective and Western feminist agenda, and reinforces stereotyped, racist representations of Third World cultures (Kapur 2002). Mohanty notes the tendency of "women as a category of analysis" to

homogenize and de-historicize (2003: 23). Linked with the argument that is the criticism that it simplifies by creating victim/perpetrator dichotomies, freezing "[...](every) society into powerless (read: women) and powerful (read: men) groups of people" (Mohanty 2003: 24).

The approach has also led to confusion and disagreement about the place of "gender" in the movement. "Gender" has gained increased use in international discourse, though often as a synonym for "women." The 1993 UN Declaration set the stage for confusion by defining "violence against women" as "any act of gender-based violence that results in... [a series of types of harm that result.]" without defining gender or gender-based violence. The term "gender-based violence" is now widely adopted by many international organizations (along with SGBV: "Sexual and Gender-Based Violence"), but there is a wide range of definitions. Some use the term synonymously with "violence against women" (see for example www.unifem.org), using it to give greater moral and human rights authority. Others claim it includes against men and boys, if they are targeted by women generally, or if they are targeted for challenging gender norms. Still another common definition is that it is violence "in order to preserve the existing hierarchy of unequal gender relations and benefiting from them" (Vlachova and Biason 2003: 10); motivation and placement within a presumed hierarchy define the act. Despite the confusion, most programs tackling gender-based violence are targeted to women as victims (or "survivors," which is the current term used to emphasize agency of the person who has experienced violence). A GBV training manual notes: "[...] in this workshop and in the world, people will probably use various terms including GBV, SGBV, and VAW—and we will all be talking about the same thing" (Vann 2004:2-15).

In addition to confusion about "gender," the 1993 UN Declaration also does not define "violence." Considering women's social and economic rights, and acknowledgement of the source of GBV as power inequalities, some would now broaden the definition of gender-based violence to include structural issues such as women's lower pay in the job market and discrimination in employment. The variety of definitions, combined with the confusion around the victim, perpetrator and motives necessary to qualify an act for "gender-based violence," trickles down to those working on such programs. Given the critiques and confusion around GBV, I find it useful to turn to Johan Galtung's perspective on violence to help re-frame some of these issues.

A broad perspective on violence

Galtung defines "violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations" (1969: 169). Following from this, there are forms of violence which are unseen which keep people below their potential realizations. Perhaps his most famous distinction is between direct/personal and structural violence: "There may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances." (Galtung 1969:171) The concept of structural violence has proven useful for analyzing women's economic and political inequality.

Galtung also discusses latent violence: "something which is not there, yet might easily come about" (1969: 172). In a society in which violence against women is acceptable, many women live with in a state of latent direct violence. This constrains women in their words and actions, and may prevent both women and men from challenging what Galtung refers to as "cultural violence," defined as those aspects or parts of culture which legitimate structural or direct violence (1990: 291). He introduces domains in which cultural violence appear, such as religion and ideology, language and art, and empirical and formal science. Galtung envisions the three types of violence as a triangle, where violence in any corner easily spreads to the others. Thus, direct forms of gender-based violence cannot be eliminated without targeting the cultural and structural violence against women. The vision of violence is now broadened beyond the individual or the state.

By emphasizing that only certain *aspects* of cultures lead to violence, Galtung manages to escape some of the cultural essentialism discussed earlier, and his explorations of cultural and structural violence move past the victim/perpetrator and woman/man dichotomy. Yet he describes cultural violence as an "invariant, a permanence" (1990:295). In his many analyses of the "causal flows," violence, including direct violence, begins to seem not only omnipresent but *inevitable*, determined only by structural and cultural conditions. While domains like language, art or empirical science are not easily challenged or erased, but the *individual* who would challenge aspects of any of the domains is virtually absent from his analysis. Yet not all men beat their wives; not all draftees go to war; not all members of a nationality passively accept nationalist ideology. Many rebel against cultural violence, yet this model would not tell us which people or why. The intersections between aspects of identity also deserve more theorizing, as the existence of multiple identities generally mean

that power relations are not as hierarchical and topdog/underdog as he suggests. Lived realities are much more complex.

Galtung's frameworks provide excellent tools for mapping violence against certain groups *within* one theoretically homogenous culture and thus can help avoid de-historicizing or focusing only on the state and the individual perpetrator. However, we still need a framework for making connections between different forms of violence against different groups of people, particularly when each group is actually heterogeneous. We also need to further develop theories of cultural change and how individuals may be involved in this; for this we turn to gender relations theory.

Gender relations

Connell provides a useful definition of gender: "the structure of social relations that centres on the reproductive arena, and the set of practices (governed by this structure) that bring reproductive distinctions between bodies into social processes" (Connell 2002:10). While structures are important here, a focus on "the set of practices" highlights the ability for fluidity, change and individual agency. Gender is dynamic and can change based on circumstances "as human practice creates new situations and as structures develop crisis tendencies" (Connell 2002: 10). Individuals may use agency to reinforce or resist gender norms based on their own personal interests or desires. The intersection of gender with class, race and other factors may lead to new constructions, or resistance. A gender relations approach allows for exploration of moments of resistance and processes of change, thus taking the debate beyond constructivism versus essentialism and introducing instrumentalism and the performance of gender.

Connell (2002) outlines four fields of "gender relations" which provide a framework for analyzing change. For **power relations**, it is important to distinguish between institutional, organized power, and diffuse, discursive power such as Foucoult theorized. The arena of **production relations** covers the sexual division of labor, the gendered accumulation process and those systems (e.g. educational) that reinforce these divisions. **Emotional relations** include positive and negative feelings towards others and can go beyond known individuals and extend to the collective, e.g. homophobia, or nationalist gender imagery. Finally, **symbolic relations** relate to the ways in which we interpret the world (Connell 2002).

Connell eschews gender or cultural essentialism, and provides some tools for theorizing change. He notes that most discussions on gender relations have focused on changes originating external to the gender order, but argues there is also a tendency towards change originating within the gender order. The sources of such change are *crisis tendencies*, the "internal contradictions or tendencies that undermine patters and force change in the structure itself" (Connell 2002:71). However, I would argue that it is usually external change that *exposes* such internal contradiction/crisis tendencies.[1] We must see crisis tendencies, then, as internal tensions or contradictions which can be easily exposed. A situation of rapid external change, such as migration to a refugee camp, would likely expose more crisis tendencies, more forcefully. The concept of crisis tendencies is useful for locating those interest groups within a diverse, unequal society who have vested interests in favor or against change, and for noting how they mobilize for change or attempt to reinforce the order (Connell 2002).

Yet, where is the space for the individual, unconnected to an "interest group," before a moment of social mobilization ever occurs? It will be useful to remember Connell's clarification that crisis tendencies occur both on a broader societal level as well as on individual, psychological level. On an individual level, "[c]risis tendencies arise when personal practice is structured around commitments which are both urgent and contradictory" (Connell 2002:74). Thus, I argue that the moments in which such internal contradictions are exposed are spaces for individuals to challenge or reinforce the prevailing gender relations and gender order; a thoughtful reflection on the crisis tendency will more likely lead to change, while defensiveness or avoidance will more likely lead to an individual's reinforcement of the gender order. An individual's reaction to a crisis tendency will depend on a variety of factors of material interests and circumstance. Noting these societal as well as individual crisis tendencies will enable location of "entry points" for a program to attempt to re-shape masculinity towards non-violence, and to locate men who would advocate for such change.

Masculinities

In popular writing of the past decade, many have written of a "crisis of masculinity," largely referring to various phenomena arising from the supposed loss or confusion of identity which

[1] For instance, Connell locates one crisis tendency in power relations as the contradiction between women's subordination and the abstract equality that states and markets endow on individuals as citizens and participants in the economy (2002: 72). However, that abstract notion of equality did not arise internally, but historically, as a result of a series of economic and political developments, from colonialism and capitalism, to the emergence of the modern nation-state.

(white) American men have experienced since feminism (Gardiner 2002: 10). However, Connell argues that there can only be crisis in a coherent system (Connell 1995:84). Since masculinity is not a coherent system, but a set of social practices embedded in the system of gender relations, we can speak only of crisis in the gender order, and of disruptions, transformations or reinforcements of masculinities (Connell 1995:84).

Other evidence about masculinities will prove useful in providing a broader perspective on men, from seeing them as inherently oppressive, or socialized to control, to a view that shows the complex ways that men subscribe to or resist gender norms. In *The Men and the Boys*, Connell outlines the key conclusions of recent research about masculinities. First, there are multiple masculinities, as in multiple values and ways of expressing and acting masculinity within one culture or setting as well as across time. However, there is a hierarchy and hegemony amongst these different forms which values one form of "hegemonic" masculinity above all others and may punish those who resist it. Masculinities are often formed and acted upon collectively, as witnessed in studies of workplaces, educational institutions, sports teams and the military. Bodies are arenas for the gender order. Masculinities require active construction, meaning that there is a performative aspect. Masculinities are marked by internal complexity and contradiction. And finally, masculinities are dynamic, changing in response to the world (Connell 2000). I would also add that masculinities are not the domain of men only; women engage with and enact masculinities as well.

The concept of "hegemonic masculinity," for which Connell (1995) is well known, is broadly used in literature on masculinities. However, it is unclear in its explanation of diversities in masculinities. It refers to a singular masculinity, to which many men will aspire but few will ever achieve. This form is situated in a hierarchy with many alternative types of masculinity below it, such as a homosexual identity, or a minority group's "protest" masculinity as a form of resistance. Connell emphasizes the importance of exploring the relationship between such masculinities. However, the ways in which sub-cultures may operate their own "hegemonic masculinity" and the ways that individuals may don or discard certain masculinities as they enter or leave those sub-cultures, are not adequately addressed. The concept of hegemonic masculinity might also be questioned in situations such as a refugee camp, where men from multiple cultures meet.

The concept also does not create enough space for an analysis of the way that some men perform masculinity in ways that are neither aspiring/conscribing to the hegemonic nor

challenging it. Wetherell and Dudley's (1999) research shows that men may simultaneously challenge and be complicit in hegemonic masculinity. For instance, men may reject "macho" masculinity as a way of defining themselves as independent self-assured individuals, characteristics described as hegemonic ways of being a person in the Western world. Wetherell and Dudley argue for a vision of hegemonic masculinity that puts emphasis on the particular content of hegemonic masculinity and more on the "exact mobilization of accounts within a discursive field" arguing that hegemonic masculinity is "...a relative position in a struggle of taken-for-grantedness" (1999:353). It is these individual struggles and contradictions that are especially important to consider in terms of preventing male violence.

Theorizing male involvement

I would argue that a complete theorizing of targeting men's involvement in anti-violence work must involve a combination of concepts and methods. An analysis of crisis tendencies in gender relations may expose the spaces in which change can occur, and the individuals or interest groups who might be motivated for or against change. Discursive and psychological accounts grounded in theories of masculinities may explore men's micro-level struggles with these crisis tendencies and the ways in which individual men enact or resist change. However, in terms of determining whether men will be capable of intervening to reduce all forms of violence against women, we must refer back to Galtung. There may be forms of latent violence enacted against men who would try to stop violence against women, e.g. they may be labeled as "gay" (De Araujo 2004) which in many societies subjects will subject them to various other forms of violence. A complete exploration of male involvement in anti-violence programs must take all these levels into account.

GBV programs in refugee camps are largely a consequence of the international Violence Against Women movement. However, criticisms of some aspects of the movement point to some theoretical and practical issues that may arise in operationalizing the concept of gender-based violence, particularly in terms of involving men in GBV programs. A broad range of concepts will therefore be used in the analysis of empirical data. In the following chapter, Galtung's triangle will enable an analysis of primary and secondary data on the cultural, structural and direct violence Karenni people experience in Karenni state and in refugee camps in Thailand.

Chapter 3. Violence on Both Sides of the Border

History

Karenni people are considered a sub-group of the broader Karen ethnic group. The Karenni mini-states managed to gain an identity of political independence from outsiders by assimilating the political system of the Shan ethnic group to the north (Smith 1991: 31, 52). Despite numerous colonial enquiries into the matter, the Karenni states remained separate from Burma and were never incorporated into British rule (Smith 1991: 52). Despite a British promise that no ethnic groups would be incorporated into Burma without their consent, a 1947 conference included Karenni states despite there being the absence of Karennis in attendance. This conference was interpreted in London as the basis of an agreement with all of Burma's minority ethnic groups, and in the subsequent constitution of Burma, the Karenni states were reconstituted as one state, with the right to secession.

In 1948, within months of Burma's independence, dissatisfaction with the constitution and the situation of minorities led to outbreaks of fighting in many ethnic minority areas, including Karenni state. Characterized by small skirmishes and guerilla strikes, and shifting alliances and off-shoot groups, these insurgencies have created a "culture of insurgency," shattering millions of lives in mostly rural areas, and paralyzing the national economy at level lower than it was under the British (Smith 1991: 101). This conflict has been reinforced by cultural violence which places a Burmese nationalism above other interests.

The Karenni armed self-determination movement is led by the Karenni Progressive People's Party (KNPP) and its army, the Karenni Army. While there have been other splinter groups and movements, the KNPP is seen as the party with the most legitimacy from the Karenni people (Smith 1991). In 1962, Burma came under military rule. In 1988, massive student protests against the military were put down with severe violence, leading to international attention. In 1990, the democratic opposition, led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, won a landslide elections victory, but the military refused to transfer power and clamped down further on democracy activists as well as in the ethnic insurgent areas (Fink 2001:1).

The Burmese military uses a "Four Cuts" policy to cut off food, intelligence, financial support and new recruits from the ethnic armies. In the process, they commit massive human rights violations in many ethnic areas: forced relocation to camps with inadequate conditions; forced labor including using humans as minesweeps; destruction of crops and villages; and

widespread rape, torture, and killings of those suspected of any kind of collaboration with the ethnic nationalist armies (Fink 2001). An estimated 50,000 Karennis live as internally displaced persons in Burma, many hiding in the jungle with little access to sanitation, health care or education (TBBC 2002). Others cross the border to Thailand where they also face uncertainty, since Thailand is one of a very few countries that has not signed the 1951 Geneva Convention on the status of refugees. In a 2001 study, most Karenni refugees reported having experienced hiding in the jungle; half reported experiencing forced labor and destruction of crops and houses; 22% had experienced combat and 19% had experienced torture (Lopes Cardozo et al 2004).

Life in camps in Thailand

The Royal Thai Government (RTG) refers to refugees as "persons of concern" and camps are referred to as "sites." Because "persons of concern" are defined as those fleeing fighting, Burmese originating from ceasefire areas cannot access the status of "person of concern," despite human rights violations by Burmese military. They are referred to as "migrants" (Human Rights Watch 2004). Until the mid-90's, the RTG allowed refugees from Burma to live in small, open villages on the border, maintaining a relatively independent way of life and largely administering the camps and assistance programs themselves (Bowles 1998). As Thailand began warming its relationship with the Burmese government in the early 1990's, due largely to investment and trade interests, it changed its policies towards Burmese refugees and migrants. The RTG began consolidating refugee camps and making them closed communities in the mid-90's. It sometimes allows UNHCR to conduct refugee status determination procedures, but sometimes revokes this permission. Meanwhile, forced deportations to Burma have been reported, even of Burmese refugees with official UNHCR status-granted refugee cards (Human Rights Watch 2004).

There are currently roughly 143,000 Burmese refugees living in camps along the Thai-Burma border (IRC Thailand 2004b). Most refugees from Karenni state live in two camps in the northwestern Thai province of Mae Hong Son. In early 1996, the total Karenni refugee population was about 5,500. By 1999, as a result of Four Cuts operations, it was approximately 16,500 (Dudley 1999). The camps currently called "Karenni Site 1" and "Karenni Site 2" were previously five separate sites before the RTG forced their consolidation. Site 1 is the larger camp with approximately 18,500 refugees, while Site 2 has about 4,000 refugees. Both sites are surrounded by jungle and located only a few kilometers

from the Burmese border. The RTG has increasingly restricted access to the camp by outsiders, whether journalists or NGO workers.

The existence of the refugee camp may be seen as a form of structural violence, given the wealth of evidence that camps, as forms of refugee housing and organization, are detrimental to human well-being (Black 1998; Harrell-Bond 1998). The notion of a restricted camp denies freedom of movement, not directly by the soldier at the security checkpoint but by "the rules" and the threat of punishment. One of the physical consequences is a lack of nutritious food: the rations of rice, oil, salt are monotonous and inadequate for a balanced diet. The larger consequences of restriction of movement are psychological. Bamboo huts spaced close together deny families privacy or space in which to be apart. A conglomeration of people from a variety of villages, ethnic groups, religions and education levels (who have often had to re-locate upon camp consolidation) leaves many people feeling disconnected and without any sense of community. The predominantly agricultural and foraging Karennis are unable to work freely or exercise traditional ways of life. Unofficial "shortcuts" out of camp are common and referred to laughingly; however, those who manage to find daily labor jobs are paid a shockingly low wage and vulnerable to other forms of exploitation, particularly women. The consequence is that in 2001, forty-two percent of Karenni refugees surveyed reported symptoms of depression (Lopes Cardozo et al 2004).

The camp is administered by the Camp Committee, supposedly elected positions but traditionally with strong ties to the KNPP. Camp Committee is in charge of the day-to-day workings of the camp, from administering rations to keeping the dirt road that goes through camp in good condition. Camp Committee also works with Camp Security and Camp Justice, in charge of enforcing rules and punishing violators. In practice, though, Camp Justice handles relatively few cases.

Specific forms of structural violence arise from the organization of power in the Karenni camps. The hierarchical nature of the KNPP and the camp organization results in corruption amongst some camp leaders, preferences given to certain people for jobs, stifling of free speech, and political power gained by controlling people's movements in and out of camp. The political system in camp also subjects refugees to forced labor, both inside and out of camp- - in nearby Thai villages or across the border, into the jungle, to deliver supplies to the Karenni Army base or to help provide additional security to the Thai soldiers. As one male camp resident in a focus group said, "*Now we are here we think we are free but it is not like*

that. We still have to work for them, we have to carry rice for them, we still have to pay tax, ten baht per month."

Galtung's concept of latent violence will prove useful in analyzing the insecurities and changing nature of life in camp. Given many refugees' personal experience in combat, few trust the ability of the young Thai soldiers to protect against a potential Burmese army attack. In early 2005 attacks were launched on the Karenni Army military base, located only 5km from the Karenni camps (Beh Reh 2005:4). The camp provides opportunities for education and health care; the structural violence that would result as a loss of these services if refugees were forcibly repatriated to Karenni state is a form of latent violence. It was also reported that most conflicts are not resolved by the Camp Justice system but through other means, occasionally resulting in extrajudicial punishment such as expulsion from camp, forced labor or execution. Even for more minor and informally solved disputes, two interviewees noted that one's political connections often determine the "judgment," with potentially disastrous consequences to one's reputation. Latent violence is a fact of life in camp.

Ethnicity

The people living in Karenni camps are far from a homogenous group. Karenni state is home to numerous ethnic groups and sub-groups, though here I will discuss only those most represented in the camps. The largest group is the Kayah, and in 1951 Burmese government their distinctiveness and cut them off from joining forces with rebellious Karen by re-naming the Karenni state as "Kayah state." (Smith 1991:145) Indeed, when referring to Karenni language, most people are referring to Kayah dialect. Other ethnic groups and sub-groups include the Paku (Karen), Kayan (Padaung or "Longneck"), Kayaw and M'nou-Mnaw, all close "cousins" of the Kayah. Shan and PaO people also live in Karenni state though they have larger populations in Shan state. Some of the above languages are mutually intelligible though most are not. Various religions are also represented in Karenni state and in the camps. Buddhism and animism (with elements often mixed) were most common until Christian missionaries began entering Burma, preaching, starting schools, and successfully converting a significant portion of the population.

Given the context of a self-determination movement, ethnicity and language have taken on great importance. Some of the above ethnic groups such as Shan, PaO and Kayan have had their own insurgency movements (which have sometimes allied with the KNPP but sometimes with the Burmese military), though it is unclear the extent to which this effects

relationships in the camp. However, some non-Kayah refugees reported overt discrimination or marginalization. Different waves of migration have also brought different groups of people into the camp. Dudley (1999) describes how a wave of arrivals in 1999 were more likely to be "traditional," animist, less educated, and from even more remote villages than the earlier arrivals; though they were also Kayah, this led to a certain amount of tension within the camps.

Table 1 Population by ethnicity for Karenni Sites 1 and 2

Ethnicity	Kayah (Karenni)	Paku (Karen)	Kayan (Padaung)	Shan	Kayaw	Others	Total
Est.	14,953	3861	1120	1007	896	560	22,397
%	67	17	5	4.5	4	2.5	100

Source: Kim (2004)

Structural, cultural and direct violence against women

Structural violence against women includes the extreme under-representation of women in positions in power, such as the Camp Committee, Camp Security, Camp Justice and Section Leaders, religious leaders and traditional leaders. There are few separate areas for women to bathe. Other structural violence reported includes rules that if a girl marries, she must drop out of school. While the gender ratio is relatively balanced in early education, gendered expectations can be seen in the higher grades: at the Post-10 school, there is an approximately 2:1 male-to-female ratio. Rations are distributed not by persons but by household, with one ration book per household and reports that some men sell the rations to buy alcohol.

In terms of cultural violence, Karenni gendered culture in general assumes that men are "above" women. This manifests itself physically, in that women should never stand above men, such as on stairs above them. Men's clothes should also hang above women's clothes to dry, and men should not touch or wash their wives' longyis (a type of wrap-around skirt commonly worn by Burmese) or underwear. Women are not considered fit to be traditional or religious leaders. Girls are told they are not as smart as boys. There is the belief that women are unclean, therefore they cannot participate in certain cultural ceremonies or enter certain sacred places, such as the site of the pole dance or certain areas of temples. Women who are menstruating should keep a physical distance from men. Sex is for men's pleasure, and

women are generally seen as not having pleasure from sex, but rather being obligated to provide their husbands with sex and children. A "good woman" should be good at housework and taking care of the children. Femininity is linked to shyness, passivity and obedience. Masculinity is linked with strength, leadership and providing for the family.

This cultural violence perpetuates direct violence. Upon marriage, husbands own their wives. Domestic violence seems to be the most common form of direct violence, including verbal and physical assaults by husbands and marital rape. People I spoke with gave prevalence estimates ranging from 10%- 80%. Given the difficulty in defining violence and confusion over the concept, it is not surprising there was such a wide range; but even restricting the question to "physical violence like hitting" resulted in a wide range of answers.[2] Other reported forms of direct violence that refugees in Karenni Site 1 had experienced or heard about included sexual assault and rape (by other refugees as well as by Thai soldiers or villagers); belittling and humiliation by teachers; being forced by a sexual partner to have an abortion; men's refusal to use family planning resulting in undesired pregnancies; forced and/or early marriage; forced and/or early engagement. The lack of freedom of movement seems to affect couples' "cooling off" ability, and the lack of social control and/or relatives to intervene in violence for mediation or punishment has also worsened the problem. Women living in the camp without relatives, particularly young women, seem especially vulnerable to violence.

[2] It may be useful to note that in a Karen-Burmese camp further south, 34% of women reported that their husband had forced sexual relations and 16% reported that their husband had hit them with a fist or something else. (Tomczyk et al 2002)

Chapter 4. Gender Relations and Representations of Violence in Karreni Site 1

In this chapter I will apply Connell's gender relations theory to map the crisis tendencies of the gender order which are being experienced in the camp. I will also explore the ways that masculinities are embedded in gender relations and responding to (exposure of) crisis tendencies. I will particularly explore the ways in which men's discussions about violence reflect how masculinities are being challenged, reinforced or complied with. This discussion might be useful for exploring the "spaces" for individual action and resistance to norms of masculinity.

Before beginning, it is important to note some limitations of the data. In addition to those mentioned in the methodology section, I found that interviews and focus groups were often filled with contradictions. These are important to consider and analyze. Interviews and focus groups are not just sites for fact-finding, but also sites for performing gender. Because masculinity is collectively and discursively constructed, men's and women's representations (of gender roles, behavior, etc.) may have reflected an attempt to conform to or challenge certain ideas in relationship to their audience. Also, since gender relations are historical products, it follows that there are indeed a diversity of practices and a variety of masculinities, both on an individual level as well as on the level of village of origin or ethnic sub-group.

Changes in gender relations

I begin with **production relations** because most people in the camp are very concerned about it, and the effects of the changes seep into all other arenas of gender relations. Most camp residents previously lived in small, remote villages in Karenni state. In focus groups and interviews, people listed the following mostly "productive labor" as jobs men did: slash-and-burn farming, various cultivation including planting and harvesting rice and beans, going to jungle to find food, hunting, fishing, finding firewood and trees, building houses, fixing roofs, working in the mine, trading and blacksmithing, watching the children, helping in the home. The most commonly mentioned tasks for women were nearly all "reproductive labor" and included caring for children, raising chickens and pigs, washing, weaving, pounding rice, cleaning inside and outside house, working in the fields, selling goods, carrying water, cooking, nursing children, gathering firewood. The gendered division of labor was said to be strong in some places, while some men said that in their village, men and women performed

the same tasks. The types of tasks that men or women should each do also varied. The contradictions evident throughout my research process were prominent here.
For instance, one male interviewee reported:

> **A**: *...[some other karenni groups think] all the household work is the women's work. So even carrying the water, firewood, washing, cooking those kinds of stuff.*
>
> **EJB**: *Why do you think they have a different idea [about gender roles] than your ethnic group?*
>
> **A**: *I don't know- - in our community, both [men and women] we are doing.*

Yet in a focus group of men from that ethnic group, another man said "*...[back in Burma] women usually take care household such as cleaning home, carry water, cooking...*" Finally, a man from a different ethnic group reflected on this ethnic group: *My experience in [that ethnic group's] village- - when the time is farming men only cut tree and dig the soil and they say their job is finished, the rest is women's job. Women have to take care of the paddy the whole year, but their husband just stays at home.*

Thus, refugees arrive in the camp with a variety of experiences and ideas about gender roles. Living in the refugee camp leads to radical changes in the organization of productive and reproductive labor. Rations of rice, oil, salt and cooking fuel are provided by the Thailand Burma Border Consortium. Some refugees are lucky to have plots to grow vegetables or space to raise animals, but most cannot. More educated refugees try to get highly-coveted jobs within the camp, such as with the health clinics or in schools. Most refugees must try to leave camp and work on local Thai farms to earn money. They also forage in the nearby jungle for extra vegetables or to fish and hunt, though this activity is seen as increasingly dangerous; before I arrived, two refugee men had recently been killed near or beyond the border, ostensibly by Burmese soldiers.

What disrupts gender relations is not only the lack of opportunity for men, but the fact that many, if not most, jobs available in camp are occupied by women. Compared to 144 male workers in the Karenni Health Department, 196 employees are women.[3] There were 234 female employees of the Karenni Education Department, compared to 173 men.[4] The

[3] Private correspondence with IRC GBV program. Figures for Sites 1 and 2 combined.
[4] Private correspondence with Jesuit Refugee Service. Figures for Sites 1 and 2 combined.

development of nursery schools funded by a women's NGO has provided nursery teachers with paid employment while simultaneously providing mothers with more time to try to work or forage themselves. With so many women in paid employment, other women are being hired by working mothers for jobs like baby-sitting or tending house. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss it in great detail, the situation of the Padaung ("Longneck") sub-group has particularly altered production relations. They are permitted to live in a separate section of the camp, closer to the main road, and attract tourists who pay a fee to walk through the "village" to admire the "traditional" women, who wear distinctive heavy metal coils around their necks. According to informants, Padaung are the only sub-group in camp who have traditionally required brideprice, and the amount required has increased considerably now that marriage to a Padaung woman provides certain financial privileges.

The second field is that of **power relations**. Several issues have challenged men's "right" to "discipline" women: GBV and gender trainings by the Karenni National Women's Organization (KnWO) and UNCHR; the presence of expatriate women from many countries who have leadership positions in national and international NGOs; the establishment of a domestic violence shelter in Site 1, and murder of one husband by a battered woman in Site 2. Donors and other external agents are beginning to question those they support, including NGOs and the male-dominated camp leadership, about their gender balance. The camp is quite urban compared to the remote villages of many refugees, giving women more opportunities to be exposed to new people and ideas. Young Karenni girls are being educated at radically higher rates than their mothers or their fathers, who generally have little or no formal education. Meanwhile, in Karenni state girls' education received low priority. Men's strength is further called into question by having to submit to "volunteer" labor, (some men's) not understanding the predominant language of the camp, having children more educated than themselves, etc.

Emotional relations are also in flux in camp. Many of the marriages in camp were arranged, and some of them were early marriages. However, in the crowded camp setting, young men and women have more chances to meet and fall in love, and they increasingly want to choose their partner. Interviewees and focus groups talk about general "breakdown of community" and continuous threats to the old norms of gender and sexuality: premarital sex, adultery, abandonment of young pregnant women by their partners. Some young people may be getting pregnant as a way to forcibly establish a "love marriage" that their parents oppose. I was

astonished by how many young people asked me "You know what is a shotgun marriage?" referring to it as an important issue in camp.

Life in Thailand and the refugee camp also alters **symbolic relations**, bringing numerous challenges to cultural symbols and traditions: from difficulty in maintaining traditional dress, native language, and religious traditions; to the availability of movies that show alternative gender relations. As a result of NGO involvement and trainings, the community is literally acquiring new languages about gender, violence, masculinity, women's rights and human rights.

Crisis tendencies and masculinities

A few crisis tendencies become evident from an examination of gender relations. I would classify most of the following as occurring on a societal level, as they were mentioned so often by so many. First, the notion of man as having a deep obligation to provide for the family contradicts with the reality of women's wage labor and the lack of jobs for men. Men cited not being able to earn money or provide food for their families as their number one problem in camp, as in this focus group: "*Sometimes, I feel sorry for my family because I could not provide them enough as before. I think of myself as useless for my family also.*" Many women are attempting to reinforce the traditional notion of masculinity by shouting and nagging men for not fulfilling this role. Many men seem suspicious that their wives will commit adultery in order to find a man who can provide better. Approximately10-20% of men in the camp are soldiers for the Karenni Army. Men describe soldiers' status as dropping as the movement loses hope and as soldiers are now paid less; some men seem to feel they are heavily burdened with obligations but not respected.

The second crisis tendency centers on changes in power relations. There is a stark contrast between the image of a man as strong, powerful leader, whether of a community or of a family, and men's disempowerment in the refugee camp. The traditional belief of women as submissive is challenged by the fact that women are increasingly employed and in some positions of power. Women also have the option to divorce or receive support (by UNHCR, domestic violence shelter) if their husbands mistreat them. The discomfort of men with the changed gender (im)balances is evident in repetitive jokes and comments about women not being "ready" or "able" to claim their rights, against the evidence that at least some women are doing exactly this. This crisis tendency is also connected to the fact that human rights violations are the source of the refugees' displacement, and the concepts of human rights

provide moral legitimacy to their struggle against the Burmese government. However, the human rights language has brought up the issue of individual rights, women's rights and equality, aspects of which go against "traditional" values and social control. This contrasts with framing the plight of the Karennis as a self-determination movement fought in order to maintain "traditional" ways of life.

Another crisis tendency is the notion that household work is for women and that it is demeaning or taboo for a man to engage in such work, as he might lose his "man power." This idea is colliding with the notion that a man must do what is best for his family, and a man must adapt to circumstances to serve his family. This crisis tendency has been exposed due to the large number of wage-earning women, as well as the rise of the "nuclear family," i.e. for some, the breakdown of community/village life may has resulted in the inability to rely on other women in the community to do "women's work."

At least on the individual level, another site of crisis tendencies is love and emotional relations. The ideology that a woman is "below" men or "unclean" clashes with a husband's feelings of love or desire for his wife. As one man said *"I disagree with this idea that a man cannot touch or wash his wife's underwear or he will lose his man power. I mean, you touch them when you want to have sex with her, right? So why can't you wash it if that will help her and help your family?"* This crisis tendency may be, or may become, a societal-level one, as people increasingly want "love" marriages, and some girls demonstrated contempt for sexist beliefs.

I must note that despite commonalities in gender relations and crisis tendencies, I cannot conclude with certainty that one hegemonic masculinity exists among all groups in the camp, particularly not beyond the basic ideals of strength and providing for the family. Even the strong notion of being obliged to provide for the family is challenged by the small number of examples given in focus groups of men who just "stay home," or do the same work as women. Further in-depth interviews are needed on the ways in which Karenni men perceive of masculinity for themselves and others.

A crisis tendency is a point where something must shift in order to resolve the tension. Connell (1995) notes that masculinities are embedded in crisis tendencies, and they may be reinforced or transformed depending on how they react. Two specific examples will illustrate this in Site 1.

Modern Man

A women's NGO, WEAVE, published a brochure which has been distributed by various organizations along the Thai-Burma border. It largely speaks to public health issues, but the brochure generated much discussion in the camps. From the introduction:

> Nowadays in our community or in the world it is not only men who can change political or other problems. Also, in the family it is not only women's job but men can help in the house for the family[...] A father really has to take responsibility for his family. A father who cannot take care of his family- - how can he help care for his community or people? Peace can only start from the family (WEAVE).

By asking men to take responsibility for their families, the brochure may be seen as reinforcing a hegemonic masculinity of man as leader. Yet the brochure actually uses this aspect of hegemonic masculinity to attempt to reform it. Modern Man should nurture his pregnant wife for her physical and mental health and that of the baby; he should never beat his wife or he will lose respect. He is shown happily sweating while washing clothes as his wife contently breast-feeds in a reclined position in their bamboo hut. Modern Man should discuss family planning with his wife and never have sex with other women. Children can bring great happiness to a father, and Modern Man must show them right from wrong, teach by example, provide both boys and girls with all possible opportunities and take care of their physical safety.

The "Modern Man" concept was introduced consistently by interviewees, often with laughter. Nearly everyone referred to the Modern Man as the image or epitome of the new helping, sensitive man. Modern Man discussions demonstrate how masculinities are multiple, historically specific and collectively constructed amongst men. One older man in focus group said *"What's this Modern Man stuff? We have been doing this since before, I guess we were always Modern Men."* This man does not seem to have suffered as much as another: *"When I got married in the camp, when I was carrying water, everyone was laughing at me. They said 'you are doing women's job.' I said 'what?' And they were laughing at me when I was washing."* Teasing is a way of reinforcing hegemonic masculinity, but those attempts seem have been unsuccessful: *"At first I was very embarrassed that somebody might see I am washing my wife's clothes, so I would go to the water tank and wash them at night. But now everyone is doing the same thing so nobody is embarrassed anymore."* New meanings are

being attached to men's cooking, washing, hanging and touching laundry. When asked, what do men think about those who do traditionally "women's work?" most men answered *"Some people say he loves his wife so he helps his wife. But some people say he's afraid his wife so he does everything for his wife."*

Meanings and taboos are changing, but this is not a linear, uniform process. The number and frequency of men doing housework in the camp is contested by men and women, with women rating men's household participation much lower on average. Some men still report considering housework "women's work" or sound angry at the idea of men doing it, while others report enjoying having more free time, staying at home, being with the children or doing more housework, i.e. not being the breadwinner. For every example where a man reported being teased by other men for performing "women's" work, another man would report that men really feel "nothing" or "don't mind" the changing gender roles, often framing it in terms of helping the family. One young man framed gender roles in terms of poverty: *"when you are poor, you have no choice. Husband and wife work whatever they have to. Whichever one cannot work must do the chores at home."* This contrasts with the fact that the focus group of section leaders reported the most conservative gender roles in their families. While my sample is not large enough to conclude anything, perhaps their greater access to power enables them to continue to subscribe to traditional notions of hegemonic masculinity, while poorer men or those whose wives are working must re-shape their notions. For some, Modern Man provides a legitimate label for this change.

I have no baseline data from when refugees were living in Karenni state; therefore I can only cautiously venture to propose that a lack of work opportunities for male adults, combined with the new opportunities for education for their boy and girl children and women's employment opportunities, had led to the emergence of a "new" notion of masculinity that is more focused on the nuclear family and success for the children. Equally, this change may simply make some men's formerly "alternative" masculinities (for the camp) mainstream now.

Rain Dance

Masculinities may be transformed in some ways and reinforced in others: "crisis tendencies may, for instance, provoke attempts to restore a dominant masculinity" (Connell 1995:84). The following conversation with a male refugee in a leadership position demonstrates ways that this man uses biological destiny to adapt notions of gender equality, in an attempt to resolve contradictions without radically challenging gender relations.

> **EJB:** *Is there any element of different cultures from Karenni states that are against violence? Are there some specific traditions?*
>
> **A:** *There is. We give every chance to the woman, but there is only one chance... in our tradition, we have a pole tradition, once a year, what they have is they dance around the pole, but in this place we cannot let the woman dance.*
>
> **EJB**: *Why is that?*
>
> **A:** *Because if the woman dance there will be no rain! This is what they believe, so we cannot let. But the other, we can accept everything, only this one we cannot accept and let them do. ..*
>
> **EJB:** *What do most men think about women being leaders?*
>
> **A:** *As my idea, I don't care who is working, man or woman. I have to care for one thing, if what they are doing is good or not. They have to achieve what they are doing. This I have to care for. Before, we were really controlled by our tradition, because we always said [...] girls always have to be under the man. We could not balance, we could not have equal rights. But now, we understand and we can have equal rights, and some kind of things woman can do.*
>
> **EJB:** *Are there any kinds of things women should not do?*
>
> **A:** *You mean like jobs?*
>
> **EJB:** *Yeah.*
>
> **A:** *In this situation everyone is equal.*

I initially thought that the example of dancing around the pole for rain was brought up rather randomly. It was not until a subsequent interview with another man that I learned more about the recent changes in this tradition which may be seen as "threatening" male power. Apparently, following a human rights training, a group of young people approached the Karenni Culture Committee, asking for women to be allowed to participate in this event. In conjunction with some human rights trainers and a shaman, they created a new space where women could dance and perform, close to the sacred site, though they still could not actually dance at the sacred site. Five years later, this challenge to male power and privilege was well-

remembered, and the resistance to it was reinforced. Greig et al (2000:3-4) write that ethnic nationalism may use symbols in an attempt "to claim a distinct 'manhood' along religious or ethnic lines to which others do not have access." Meanwhile, the Camp Committee has supported human rights trainings; some human rights concepts are being accepted, at least by some. Thus, change is not a linear and uniform process.

Interesting in this conversation are apparent contradictions: first that Kayah culture traditionally gives women all opportunities, but later acknowledgment that tradition dictated that women were below men and could not have equal rights. With my question about non-violent elements of culture I was not only looking for concrete answers, but for the ways that people might recognize or present internal contradictions, i.e. crisis tendencies. The answer, jumping immediately into to a defense of symbolic relations (religious/traditional practices), shows that the "cracks" in the gender relations are being quickly exposed. He tries to resolve the contradiction between women's theoretical equality and their absence in leadership positions by implying that if women are not ultimately represented at the highest levels, this is merely a sign of their incompetence or lack of ambition– a perception related in numerous jokes by Karenni men, and even a couple women.

The "crisis of masculinity" and the language about violence against women

In the above sections, I have tried to note some of the changes and crisis tendencies in gender relations and how masculinities are being challenged or reinforced as a result. Before moving on to discuss ways that this might inform GBV interventions, I would first like to examine the ways that masculinities are embedded in the ways that people discuss violence.

Considering only structural and cultural violence, life in the camp might actually be leading to a decrease in violence against women, compared to the structural and cultural violence described in the lives of women in Karenni state. By all accounts, women and girls in the camps are achieving their potential to a greater degree, in terms of education, career opportunities, maternal health, etc. However, the majority of interviewees reported that direct violence against women, in the form of domestic violence and rape, *seemed* much more prevalent in the camp than in Karenni state.

Whether or not this is true is difficult to ascertain, partially because of confusion around the definition of violence. I asked women who had received IRC's GBV training about their perception about the rate of domestic violence or rape in Burma. Many said they did not

know, simply because they did not know then what violence was. Even now, use of the term "GBV' is unclear. Some people mentioned phenomena like teenage pregnancy, adultery, abandonment, and some apparently consensual sexual acts as "violence," i.e. it seemed the word was often being used to include anything classified as a social or moral problem. Hearn (1996) notes that the process of defining violence is a social process. Thus, adopting the word "violence" inherently identifies the given phenomenon as wrong, and as a problem. Many men do not consider hitting their wives to be violence; violence is seen as different from "teaching a lesson." Or, as one man in a focus group requested, *"We should not use the term violence; violence is for terrorists."*

Both men and women described the cause of domestic violence as a combination of alcohol, gambling, low income in camp, and lack of freedom of movement. Masculinities are embedded in each of these factors. Drinking alcohol and gambling with a group of friends is a traditionally male-only activity; this is a site of collective construction of masculinity. One female interviewee noted that drinking men were likely to gossip and cast doubt on another's wife's fidelity. Another male interviewee reported that drinking was a way for a man to make himself feel powerful and important, while another man said that if a man was angry at his wife, he would go drink alcohol first as an excuse and then beat her. Alcoholism is a widespread problem in camp, and the image of the "bad" constantly drunk man who sells the family rations, does not work and causes violence contrasts sharply with the Modern Man.

While everyone could name causes of GBV, a large number of men in focus groups said that hitting one's wife is never acceptable. However, contradictions emerged, with some of those same men later describing reasons they might engage in violence against their wives. The most common was adultery, which can again be traced back to the crisis tendency. (Though I do not have any information on the frequency of adultery in Karenni State, it is considered one of the highest forms of sin and despicable. The frequency with which men mentioned fear of adultery or actual adultery occurring in camp was quite surprising.) Other common reasons included "not obeying" or "needing to teach a lesson."

A common "story" of the dynamics of domestic violence emerged. It begins with a tired man coming home, expecting to have hot food waiting for him, and confronted with his wife's nagging and shouting over not earning enough money, or with her talkativeness and impatience (wife goes against norms of femininity, then challenges her husband's masculinity). This provokes him until he needs to hit her, perhaps going out to drink first. In

another version of the dynamics, if the food is not ready when he has arrived, he suspects her of having an affair, which leads to violence. From focus groups: "*For me it is ok to hit my wife like if I come back from job and my wife does not cook for me but visit other man.*"

I was surprised to hear interviewees saying *"hey it is not only men who use violence; women are violent too!"* Other men said that a "Women's Community Center" (shelter) was not fair; men also needed a "Men's Community Center." It is interesting to note that these defensive comments arise in the context of asking *men* to change their behavior or attitudes towards violence against women, i.e. intervention into power relations leads many men to say *"women care only for their own rights."* However, focus group discussions presented the "battered man" as a rare phenomenon in camp; many men enacted masculinity by trivializing the idea of a woman being violent, thereby naturalizing the notion that violence is the exclusive province of men (Anderson and Umberson 2001). It appears that most of the stories of women being "violent" are concerning their verbal violence, which is considered on at least the same par of "wrongness" as men's physical violence, and as provoking men's physical violence. These findings indicate that the ways in which camp residents define and conceptualize violence needs further research.

Many men indicated there would be great shame generally if others knew they were beating their wife, that they would be seen as a "bad man," and that most men, when sober again or when their temper cools, regret this deeply. This is of course in contrast to some men who focused again on the "blame" issue: "*For me I am not ashamed if I am right.*" I noted repetitive emphasis amongst men in the importance of determining who is "right" and who is "wrong" in a conflict, revealing that physical violence is acceptable if another's verbal violence or other actions are "wrong." Within discourse on violence, I noted two or three different enactments on masculinity: one emphasizing the acceptability of violence, another that it was not right but that one might simply lose one's temper, and another that blatantly condemned violence against women, connecting it to shame in a country that is not one's own, or simply saying it can never be acceptable.

Thus, the crisis tendencies around power and production relations can be seen evidently in the discourse around violence against women. The consequent threats to traditional masculinities, which largely emphasize men's power and leadership, can also be seen. However, we must keep in mind that most of the changes in gender relations, exposing crisis tendencies, are resulting from external changes in the refugees' lives, i.e. displacement to the

camp. Violence against women results from the structural violence of the camp, especially those regulating freedom of movement and employment, access to cheap alcohol, presence of too much free time, lack of sense of community, inability of the family members to intervene – and all this is a context of violent conflict directly across the border, as well as the traumatic experiences of many refugees.

Chapter 5. Towards Male Involvement: Locating Gender Relations in IRC Thailand's Gender-Based Violence Program

The situation in Karenni Site 1 provides a challenge for any actor wanting to intervene into the contentious field of gender relations. In this chapter I link the theories in Chapter 2 and the analysis from Chapters 3 and 4 to explore the IRC's Gender-Based Violence program. A brief overview of the program is followed by discussions on the ways in which the program interacts with masculinities and crisis tendencies in the camp. The constraints in making the program interest men are discussed, followed by some speculation on potential for targeting individual men for involvement.

Background

The IRC received funding in 2004 to begin implementing gender-based violence prevention and response programs in the two Karenni camps. The program began with a small grant from Johnson & Johnson, and then continued with support from the U.S. Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM). The program stems from an increasing awareness by many organizations of the problem in Thai-Burma border communities, including a few high-profile rape cases of refugee women by Thai soldiers. The IRC program takes the philosophy of a multi-sectoral, multi-agency response to the problem, and IRC is the lead "coordinating agency" for the various NGOs, camp-based organizations and Thai authorities involved in the issue. Other specific activities include developing the capacities of camp-based organizations to respond to survivors of GBV, such as assisting with the development of medical protocols and screening techniques for rape and domestic violence. Trainings for Karenni Health Department staff and community leaders on the causes and consequences of gender-based violence are also a main activity.

At the time of my field research, the Gender-Based Violence (GBV) program in Mae Hong Son was staffed by one expatriate manager, two ethnically Burman training officers, one ethnic Karen translator, and one ethnic PaO refugee as counselor. Additionally, inside the camp the program provided stipends for two caretakers of the Women's Community Center, a shelter for survivors of GBV which is affiliated with the Karenni National Women's Organization. Four "Camp-Based Assistants" in Site 1 were to provide a program presence in the camp, and assist with trainings or other activities as needed. The program had also recruited and trained women for the Helping Group, a group of grassroots women who could provide emotional support and referrals to survivors of violence. One of the largest logistical

hindrances reported by staff was that of language: only two staff members could speak Karenni, the most common language in camp.

In 2004, the GBV program had begun a Men Involved in Peace-Building (MIP) program. It planned for a group of men to implement a program in three phases: an information-gathering phase to determine attitudes about GBV, an information-sharing phase to get community feedback on potential plans, and a phase to implement the action activities. A report written on the activities of Phase I and Phase II, noted that some of the male members of the community volunteer team revealed personal attitudes condoning violence towards women. They succeeded in conducting focus group discussions, but by the end of the program, all but one male member of the community volunteer team had dropped out (Kim 2004). By the time of my fieldwork, the MIP program was in a phase of transition. Trainings for Thai soldiers, male camp leaders and security were ongoing, but no large-scale community education prevention or awareness campaigns had begun.

The IRC program uses conflicting language on the meaning of "Men Involved in Peace-building," in some cases referring to men's active involvement in preventing violence, in others seemingly referring to trainings within male-dominated structures, such as Camp Committee or amongst Thai soldiers. My discussion assumes that the ultimate goal is encouraging men to address gender inequality generally, or violence against women specifically. This may vary from informally intervening in a sexist joke, or giving community outreach on solving marital conflict peacefully. The extent to which IRC can affect this will depend, first, on its ability to target, find and support individual men for leading trainings, workshops, awareness-raising campaigns or other activities.[5] Additionally, men's receptiveness to such attending or leading such events will likely depend on how men in camp generally perceive the IRC GBV program, since hegemonic masculinity can be quite influential. Thus ways in which the GBV program interacts with masculinities and crisis tendencies will have a large effect.

Crisis tendencies and debates about GBV program activities

Many feminists worry that in focusing attention on states, institutions and other power structures and trying to "mainstream" gender, feminist principles may get watered down and

[5] This is based on the idea by most IRC GBV staff that any campaign aimed at the larger community (beyond camp leadership, KnHD, NGOs, etc.), and particularly at men, should not be designed or carried out without men involved.

over-technicalized, losing sight of the vision of transforming gender relations at all levels. For instance, Hyndman (2004) argues that in Kenya, UNHCR failed to prevent GBV in the Dadaab camps largely because of a technical framework that ignores the gender relations that are not connected to "space." Interestingly, IRC manages to intervene precisely in those non-physical spaces of gender relations, while still working largely within the context of institutions and power structures. Many participants reported learning from training that "we should not separate the jobs," or even "gender means men should be the ones to cook and clean and wash." IRC's ability to discuss transformations in gender relations seems based on its power and trust in the camps: the long and ongoing history providing food and health services to the camp population, training refugees and turning over management of the health system, etc... IRC demonstrates that precisely because the refugee camp leadership does not have the power of a "state," a refugee camp situation is a unique setting in which an international NGO can exert its influence on gender relations.[6]

The IRC uses the term "gender-based violence" to refer to its programs across the globe. Staff members in Thailand, however, reported that the program name had switched more than once throughout the one and a half years of the program, from GBV to Violence on Women to GBV again. They described a variety of reasons for the switch, mainly focusing on a previous manager's opinion (for using VAW) or as a response to men's protests (switching to "GBV"). The previous manager's (supposed) motivations, as well as the men's, are both quite valid. Violence on Women (or Against Women) is a clear term, with a relatively clear notion of the phenomena to be tackled, population for whom to provide services, etc... By removing the word "women," "women" as a category of analysis disappears. (I should note that, since there is no word for gender in Burmese, the translation for GBV can be loosely translated back as "violence that is based on man-or-woman") The fact that women are the overwhelming majority of those experiencing domestic violence or rape may be obscured. Indeed, some men I interviewed reflected this: "*Both men and women can make violence...we have to be careful who is starting the problem.*" Men in focus groups reacted strongly against any slogans that implied men were responsible like "Respect Your Wife" or "Men Can Stop Domestic Violence." Men in camp leadership positions referred to a program just for women as "giving women favors." Thus use of the term "VAW" highlights the disruptions in power relations, while calling the problem "GBV" ameliorated this crisis for some men.

[6] There are more complicated issues at play here, related to Thailand's lack of a refugee policy. The result is that UNHCR has a very limited mandate, and the restrictions on outsiders' access to the camps has led to a refugee-administered camp. The result of this is trainings and activities delivered directly to refugee leaders and health workers.

Meanwhile, men may also be correct in their sense that the program does not serve their interests, at least, not as victims/survivors of gender-based violence. Language in the GBV global strategy refers repeatedly to women and girls (17 times on one page alone), while the word "men" appears only three times in the document, twice in comparison to women's disadvantaged position and once in a footnote acknowledging that "[g]ender-based violence can and does impact men and boys however this is neither the focus nor area of expertise of IRC programs at this time" (IRC 2004:6).[7] The IRC structures of support are designed for women survivors of violence; GBV program staff are currently all women; trainings question traditional gender roles (most of which seem to benefit men in the form of more power and leisure time than their wives); and trainings use a paper cut-out of a woman's body to train on the effects of VAW/GBV. Trainers report that they try to show men that the program is also for them by emphasizing that men can also suffer from GBV and should report it. Yet being a "battered man" calls a man's masculinity into question far more than being a "battered woman" would call a woman's femininity into question - - most men in focus groups laughed about the idea of a battered man, saying it would be next to impossible, though phrases like "she will feel shame" and "she will keep it deep in her heart" appeared about battered women. I believe a broader "Galtung" interpretation of gender-based violence would include the ways that men are prevented from realizing their potential because of cultural, structural or direct violence. Yet I noted little attention in the program on the ways that men may suffer as a result of gender roles and expectations: pressure to join the army, pressure to always be strong or to earn money; health problems as part of traditionally gendered activities, such as the high rate of alcohol and tobacco use.

The next discussion is on power and structures in programming. One and a half years into the program, few men in focus groups knew or had heard of the IRC GBV program, reflecting the program's decision to start with developing services to respond to the needs of survivors, and then move on to prevention work so that survivors do not come forward without support available. The result is that men in leadership positions in the camp, as well as many clinic workers, are reasonably familiar with the program. However, some IRC employees mentioned that access to trainings of any kind brought a certain amount of status. Combined with the structural violence that many refugees mentioned experiencing, the program's initial collaboration only with those in power may have served to further marginalize some men. On

[7] Meanwhile, an equal number of men and women reported having experienced rape in a study in Karenni camps (Lopes Cardozo et al 2004).

the other hand, for some training participants, despite the fact that they are in relatively advantageous positions in camp, the trainings reinforced their lack of education vis-à-vis the (female) IRC trainers, which in the case of men might particularly bring out the crisis tendencies in power relations.

Women, however, even those not in positions of power, have often heard about or been involved with the program through the KnWO or the Women's Helping Group.[8] This left some men in focus groups feeling "out in the cold" about the program and what it offered them and their families, particularly as concerned the Women's Community Center (WCC). Most men actually had heard of the WCC, but some mentioned they did not have enough information about it and would like to know more. The possibility that they would have to "call their wife" back from the WCC, exposing themselves to community shame, was mentioned. The existence of a WCC seemed to further challenge power relations in camp and threaten masculinity: *"About safe house- - one way it is good but one ways it is like encourage women, like one of my neighbor she shouts at her husband when her husband comes home, and she also tells him if you beat me I will go and stay in safe house."* The idea of women "abusing" the safe house, i.e. sheltering there after only a "small argument" came up often, and men in the section leader focus group (who were better-informed about the GBV program) worried that the GBV program might "protect" their wives if their wives had committed adultery. This, coupled with the fact that there is no "safe house" or recourse for men experiencing physical or verbal violence from their wives, led to some men's hostility or mixed feelings.[9]

During my research period, at least two staff members of the GBV program gave trainings as their primary duty, with two others assisting based on circumstances. Trainings on gender-based violence have been given to a variety of organizations in the camp, from Karenni Health Department staff to Camp Committee to other NGOs working in the camps. The introductory modules combine learning about concepts of gender and sex, the types and causes of GBV, potential effects on the survivor, and ways to respond to survivors, including information about the referral system. A good deal of time is devoted to activities and discussion of sex and gender, defined as

> [...]the socially defined differences between men and women. By **socially defined differences** we mean the roles and responsibilities assigned to each person based on whether they are men or women.

[8] However, none of the young female students in my focus group had heard of the program.
[9] I must note, though, that many men were quite supportive of the idea of a Safe House.

> Society decides what the acceptable roles and responsibilities are for each gender. Gender roles and responsibilities can be changed, but it is often a long-term process. [emphasis in original] (IRC Thailand 2004a).

Participants are given a list of tasks/situations and asked "which is sex, which is gender?" People I interviewed who had attended training reported understanding that "gender means we should share the jobs." It did not seem that these trainings discussed that gender is also the way that masculinities and femininities are constructed on an individual level between a man and woman, or that gender might exist amongst a group of men, or amongst a group of women. (Some IRC staff discussed this as part of their own theoretical knowledge, but said that was difficult to implement or fully consider in GBV activities in camp.)

Indeed, the very concept of "gender" was reported as difficult to understand, amongst all the categories of people I interviewed. GBV trainers also found it particularly difficult to teach. Certain symbolic issues became debates: whether or not men's laundry should be hung higher than women, or whether a man forcing his wife to have sex could be considered rape. For some, these were crucial issues- - an attack on the traditions and symbolic relations that were already in crisis.

Towards engaging men

Having shown how the program framework does not address men, I turn now to the ways in which concepts introduced earlier might be applied to engage men's interest. The Men's Liberation movement of the 1960's and 1970's aimed to transform masculinities into more gender-equitable form, but it failed because it was based on directly challenging patriarchy, which men have a material interest in defending (Connell 1995). Connell concludes that this "patriarchal dividend" means that the familiar forms of a mass movement (e.g. feminist, workers', national liberation) are impossible to achieve- - there cannot be a broad men's movement against sexism. However, coordinating with other movements may offer opportunities.

> Although gender can be a fundamental vehicle for determining power relations, gender works in conjunction with other power structures, such as those based upon differences in ethnicity, class and race. When we ask "What's in it for men?" it becomes clear that gender equality is part of a broader social justice agenda that will benefit most men materially and all men psychologically/spiritually. (Greig et al 2000: 19)

Rather than focusing only on some of the ways that men are oppressed by gender norms, one might invite men to think of ways that gender norms are used to oppress another aspect of their identity, e.g. ethnicity. If men see the overlap between gender-based oppressions and other forms of oppression, and the way that gender systems are used to further other forms of injustice, then they might renounce the gender order.

This might, for instance, result in discussion around how ideals of manhood perpetuate armed conflict. In studying American veterans of the Vietnam War, Karner notes that the pursuit of manhood leads many men into combat, makes it possible to commit gross violations and then leaves men in a "suspended in a state of hypermasculinity that did not leave them upon their return home" (1998: 230). It may be too sensitive to discuss this with refugees in the context of Karenni soliders, but could be possible in terms of the Burmese military's work. This would thus expand the general understanding from "they rape our women to try to beat us," which relies on the image of the woman as cultural symbol of purity, to understanding how notions of masculinity enable those Burmese soldiers to commit gross violations.

These types of discussion and workshops, though, involve men in a very personal way. "Gender" is unlikely to be successful with most people as a "taught" concept (see De Araujo 2004). Therefore, trainings with pre-determined schedules and topics are less likely to be successful in transforming personal attitudes. Many programs around the world have taken a different approach, engaging men to reflect about their own experiences, or respond to role plays, or discuss issues in participants' everyday lives. (De Araujo 2004, Barker et al 2004) In Brazil, Insituto Promundo has proved their success in using a package of open-ended activities that invite young men to reflect on how gender has shaped their lives (Barker et al 2004). This gives men a chance to introduce their own issues around masculinity. For instance, masculinities are also contested and constructed by women, and some Karenni women are asking their husbands to conform in some ways (earning income) but not in others (doing housework). One NGO working in Karenni camps reported that using open discussions and role plays seemed to work successfully for them, both in terms of engaging participants and changing attitudes. These discussions might question the changes already occurring in camp, why certain men and women have made those changes, or deconstructing "tradition" to show how certain things viewed as positive now (e.g. universal education, health clinics) were not part of "tradition." A crisis tendency is an inherent contradiction within a system. Allowing men to expose the crisis tendencies themselves may lead to deeper transformation.

Finally, just as women are not a unitary group, men have a variety of needs and interests in exploring masculinities. Considering masculinities might mean providing extra support to husbands whose wives are rising to powerful positions, so that they can transform their own notion of masculinity to accommodate, and so the couple can be a role model to others. Issues of young men will be very different than those of the old; soldiers will have different issues than health care workers. A small number of men in Site 1 already demonstrate understanding of gender issues, and many, if not most, men in focus groups condemned violence against women. A few men in focus groups even defended women after a negative comment about them. After one man said a man should "give a wife a lesson" if she committed adultery, this man jumped into the discussion: *"Men also have mistakes too. They gamble and try to make problems with their wives. It [violence] is not acceptable."* Resolving, or openly discussing, issues of latent violence in camp might be important for men such as the one above. Men reported that their main reason for not interfering with domestic violence would be fear of the other man attacking or blaming him. A certain amount of law, order and faith in the administration of justice in the camp would be required to ensure a man feels comfortable confronting another man inflicting violence.

Constraints in considering masculinities

I have proposed some alternative possibilities for addressing men within a GBV program, involving attention to men's experiences of violence, crisis tendencies, masculinities and the intersections of GBV with other forms of oppression. However, there are a number of constraints to this utopian "solution" to male involvement. First, the framework of Violence Against Women does not provide sufficient space for an analysis and deconstruction of masculinities. The VAW strategy has generated funding for programs as a response to a violation of human rights. The focus is on group rights of women, not on issues facing men. For instance, the IRC GBV global strategy does not use the word "masculinity(ies)" once (IRC 2004). Considering violence in its broadest form, the majority of the violence men experience because they are men is structural and cultural violence; direct violence men experience at the hands of women, or based on being men, pales in comparison to the direct violence women experience at the hands of men. This naturally affects the sense of priorities and urgency in funding and developing programs, with a focus on responding to survivors' needs and raising awareness about the problem generally.

Additionally, having one framework for analyzing an issue globally may result in an inability of gender or culture to "change the assumptions of the overall planning framework in which field staff work" (Hyndman 2004:202). IRC recognizes the debate around universalism: "GBV programs recognize the commonalities of women's and girl's experience of violence, but also recognize that solutions need to be appropriate to the local contexts and cultures and that it is the role of IRC to support local actors to develop these solutions." (IRC 2004:11) Still, IRC aims to apply "a consistent, methodologically sound framework to all [GBV] interventions" (IRC 2004:20). The program uses a technical, tools-oriented approach.[10] Trainings used in Thailand are adapted from trainings designed to assist GBV programs in a number of countries. This is part of a broader approach that includes a large number of sources available by UNHCR and Reproductive Health Response in Conflict Consortium (of which IRC is a member) that serve as general guides in setting up GBV programs in conflict-affected areas, including protocol development, trainings, and checklists. Toolkits may be helpful in setting up plans to implement international agreements. However, when discussing a relatively "outside the box" issue like involving men in a traditionally women-only issue, frameworks and toolkits might close the necessary space for changes in assumptions.

Cultural expertise is important for awareness of masculinities, gender relations, and previous violence experienced, in order to appropriately modify a framework or change its assumptions entirely. However, I did not note any institutionalized mechanisms by which non-refugee staff could learn about life in camp or Karenni culture, or check the implications their actions might have on camp culture and politics. There had not been an in-depth situational analysis about gender relations and ways that they might impact on the GBV program, and vice-versa. Though I witnessed these activities and learning processes happening on an ad-hoc, informal level, institutionalization of such considerations would be especially important because of the high rate of turnover amongst non-refugee staff, and the regulations against non-refugees spending the night in camp.

The constraints working in such an environment are many, in terms of logistics, languages, political sensitivities, etc... An organization is automatically embedded in a complex web of actors and power relations. It is no easy task to work between the competing desires and interests of donors, the organization itself and its policies, the Thai government, the Camp

[10] I note, though, that many of their programs are in emergency settings, where a concrete framework might be necessary to begin immediately. However, in camps like Karenni Site 1 or Dadaab, it seems that some extra time could be taken for contextualization.

Committee, UNHCR, the Karenni Health Department, etc... IRC already tackles some issues of structural violence (e.g. advocacy with the Thai government on behalf of Burmese refugees and migrants), but many issues of structural violence simply cannot be addressed by IRC, at least not alone.

Perhaps because of the IRC Thailand GBV program's newness, a great deal of openness was part of all discussions. The change back to the name GBV was to address men's concerns and respond to the "community's" request and at the time of field research; the program was considering approaches that go beyond toolkits or checklists. Staff wanted to modify training, and there were discussions about refugees' desire for conflict resolution trainings and an expansion of the types of violence that the program addressed. Many IRC staff also expressed a desire to re-name the program to something more positive, like "Peaceful Communities," that would include other types of violence that people in the camp are experiencing. The program was in the process of arranging a sub-grant to a drug and alcohol education organization to implement a range of GBV prevention activities.

Finding men for change

There are thus many sources of difficulty in engaging men in GBV programs: frameworks, logistics, funding, and other political sensitivities may preclude a comprehensive approach from developing any time soon. However, GBV programs still need individual men to be involved, to constantly "pilot-test" activities and challenge women's assumptions, as well as to support women in their difficult work. Also, having some men available to do trainings and prevention work might improve success even without any other program changes, given that many studies have shown that men respond better to a man leading the training, or at least to a mixed-sex training team. Thus, the presence of one or two actively engaged men can make a difference within a program.

The six members of the now-defunct community volunteer group for the IRC's MIP program were recruited based on the ability to communicate in Burmese and English and to volunteer the period of time for trainings and focus group discussions. I believe that queries related to the crisis tendencies, as well as the intersections of gender relations and other power hierarchies, may reveal whether men are able to challenge or see contradictions in current norms of behavior.

As noted earlier, there are already men who think about these issues, and who feel like oppression anywhere is wrong. For instance, one PaO man in a focus group seems to have made a connection between various forms of structural, cultural and violence, at least implicitly. Early in the discussion he indicated sadness that children in the camp were unable to learn or read PaO literature. Then he noted that he did not speak Burmese or Kayah, so he knew nothing about the GBV program or shelter. However, when later asked what the community thinks about the domestic violence shelter, he said "*We are glad about this program implement in our camp. When we were in our village, Burmese military raped our women and tortured men to carry heavy load. We had no rights at all.*" With support, training and guidance on working with other men, such men might be part of a small, new vanguard.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

This research began with the intention to explore how an analysis of interactions between changing gender relations, masculinities and violence could inform gender-based violence program activities. The empirical data has shown that refugees currently living in Karenni Site 1 did not all have the same structures of gender relations before migration. There were diverse masculinities among them. Meanwhile, life in the camp has lead to rapid changes in gender relations for most, exposing crisis tendencies and thereby threatening the gender order. For many men, traditional norms of masculinity associated with strength, leadership and providing have been challenged by life in camp, and men are using a variety of strategies to either attempt to re-assert masculinity or to transform masculinities. These processes can be witnessed in discussions about gender-based violence.

The International Rescue Committee's Gender-Based Violence program is uniquely situated to intervene in gender relations. An analysis of some aspects of the program reveals that the program encounters crisis tendencies in the gender order throughout its work, though the approach does not consciously address them, nor does it fully address issues of masculinities. The Violence Against Women approach may provide a limiting framework in terms of creating a program that will engage men. I hope the theories and concepts I have used throughout this analysis (gender relations; masculinities; crisis tendencies; structural, cultural and direct violence; intersecting identities) may be useful in guiding others to consider these issues as they develop structures, programs and activities which will engage men in pursuing gender equality.

Finally, while there is certainly no profeminist movement in Karenni Site 1, there are men in Karenni Camp 1 who display anti-sexist attitudes, and there are men working in movements for social justice, such as human rights, youth groups, etc. Many men in camp want more information about gender-based violence and ways to "keep peace" in the community. There is also an entire population of men whose own experiences of (gendered) violent conflict and oppression could be drawn upon in discussing issues of hierarchy and marginalization.

Every day the IRC GBV program in Mae Hong Son handles cases of women who have been beaten by their husbands, girls whose stepfathers have sexually assaulted them, etc... The reality in camp is stark for women surviving violence, and the GBV program must often push against great resistance to ensure women receive the support and response they need.

Ultimately it will require a change in awareness from men to ensure proper response as well as prevention of GBV. This, in turn, requires a shifting in the notion of masculinity, away from violence, strength and domination and towards understanding, nurturing and equality with others.

References

Anderson, K. and D. Umberson (2001) "Gendering Violence: Masculinity and Power in Men's Accounts of Domestic Violence" *Gender and Society* 15 (3): 358-380.

Angeles, M.B. (2005) "Evaluation of the Gender-Based Violence Program in the Karenni refugee camps, Mae Hong Son Province, International Rescue Committee"

Barker, G., M. Mascimento, M. Segundo and J. Pulerwitz (2005) "How do we know if men have changed? Promoting and measuring attitude change with young men: Lessons from Program H in Latin America" in S. Ruxton (ed.) *Gender Equality and Men.* London: Oxfam.

Bartolomei, L. E. Pittaway and E.E. Pittaway (2003) "Who am I? Identity and citizenship in Kakuma refugee camp in Northern Kenya" *development* 46 (3): 87-93.

Beh Reh (2005) "Beyond the Fighting at Nyar Moe" *Burma Issues* 15(3):4-5.

Bryson, V. (1992) *Feminist Political Theory: An Introduction.* London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

Belton, S. and C. Maung (2004) "Fertility and abortion: Burmese women's health on the Thai-Burma border" *Forced Migration Review* 19:36-37.

Black, R. (1998) "Putting refugees in camps" *Forced Migration Review* 2:4-7.

Bowles, E. (1998) "From village to camp: refugee camp life in transition on the Thailand-Burma Border" *Forced Migration Review* 2: 11-14.

Carrillo, R. M. Connor, S. Fried, J. Sandler, L. Waldorf (2003) Not a Minute More: Ending Violence Against Women. New York: United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). Accessed at http://www.unifem.org/resources/item_detail.php?ProductID=7 [accessed 10 Nov 2005].

Cockburn, C. (2004) "The Continuum of Violence: A Gender Perspective on War and Peace" in W. Giles and J. Hyndman (eds.) *Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Connell, R.W. (1995) *Masculinities.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Connell, R.W. (2000) *The Men and The Boys.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Connell, R.W. (2002) *Gender: Short Introductions.* Malden: Blackwell Publishing.

Cornwall, A. and S. White (2000) "Men, Masculinities and Development: Politics, Policies and Practice" *IDS Bulletin* 31(2): 1-6.

De Araujo (2004) "Liberation for Everyone, Not Just Men: A Case Study of the Men's Association Against Violence (AMKV) in Timor Leste" in S. Ruxton (ed.) *Gender Equality and Men.* London: Oxfam.

Dudley, S. (1999) "'Traditional' culture and refugee welfare in north-west Thailand" *Forced Migration Review* 6: 5-8.

El-Bushra, J. (2000) "Gender and forced migration: editorial" *Forced Migration Review* December 2000, 9:4-8.

Fink, C. (2001) *Living Silence: Burma under Military Rule.* London: Zed Books.

Galtung, J. (1969) "Violence, Peace and Peace Research." *Journal of Peace Research* 6(3) 167-191.

Galtung, J. (1990) "Cultural Violence." *Journal of Peace Research* 27 (3): 291-305.

Gardiner, J (2004) "Introduction" in J. Gardiner (ed.) *Masculinity Studies and Feminist Theory: New Directions.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Greig, A., M. Kimmel and J. Lang. (2000) "Men, Masculinities and Development: Broadening our work towards gender equality." Gender in Development, Monograph Series #10, UNDP.

Harrell-Bond, B. (1998) "Camps: literature review" *Forced Migration Review* 2: 22-23.

Hearn, J. (1996) "Men's Violence to Known Women: Historical, Everyday and Theoretical Constructions by Men" in B. Fawcett, B. Featherstone, J. Hearn and C. Toft (eds.) *Violence and Gender Relations: Theories and Interventions.* London: Sage.

Human Rights Watch (2004) "Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Thai Policy toward Burmese Refugees." Accessed at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/thailand0204/ [accessed 15 June 2005].
Hyndman, J. (2004) "Refugee Camps as Conflict Zones: The Politics of Gender" in W. Giles and J. Hyndman (eds.) *Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kapur, R. (2002) "The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the 'Native' Subject in International/ Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics" *Harvard Human Rights Journal* Vol. 15. Accessed at http://www.law.hardvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss15/kapur.shtml [accessed 15 Nov 2005]

Kim, K and H. Lehmann (2004) "Men Involved in Peace-building Project, Report on Phase I, Site 1." IRC Thailand.

IRC (2004) "Gender-Based Violence Program Strategy: From Service Delivery to Social Change."

IRC (2005) "What is the International Rescue Committee?" [website] Accessed at <http://www.theirc.org/about/index.cfm> [accessed 15 October 2005].

IRC Thailand (2004a) "Gender Training Module for Health Staff: Facilitator's Notes." Mae Hong Son: IRC Thailand.

IRC Thailand (2004b) "International Rescue Committee- Thailand: 2003 Annual Report." Bangkok: IRC Thailand.

IRC Thailand (year unknown) "International Rescue Committee: Mae Hong Son Program" (promotional pamphlet). Mae Hong Son: IRC Thailand.

Lopes Cardozo, B., L. Talley, A. Burton, C. Crawford (2004) "Karenni refugees living in Thai-Burmese border camps; Traumatic experiences, mental health outcomes, and social functioning" *Social Science & Medicine* 58 (2004): 2637-2644.

Mohanty, C. (2003) Feminism *Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity.* Durham: Duke University Press.

Pease, B. and K. Pringle (2001) "Introduction: Studying Men's Practices and Gender Relations in a Global Context" in B. Pease and K. Pringle (eds.) *A Man's World? Changing Men's Practices in a Globalized World.* London: Zed Books Ltd.

Silberschmidt, M. "Disempowerment of Men in Rural and Urban East Africa: Implications for Male Identity and Sexual Behavior" *World Development* 29 (4): 657-671.

Smith, M. (1991) *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity.* London: Zed Books Ltd.

Thailand Burma Border Consortium (2002) "Internally Displaced People and Relocations Sites in Eastern Burma." Accessed at <http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/BBC_Relocation_Site_Report_(11-9-02).htm> [accessed 5 July 2005].

Tomcyzk, B., M. Hynes, H. G. Wilson, G. Dahl, M.K. Larson (2002) "An Assessment of Reproductive Health Issues Among Karen and Burmese Refugees Living in Thailand." Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Division of Reproductive Health, and American Refugee Committee.

UN Security Council (2000) *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.* New York: United Nations. Accessed at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/sc2000.htm>

Vann, B. (2004) *Training Manual Facilitator's Guide: Multisectoral and Interagency Prevention and Response to Gender-based Violence in Populations Affected by Armed Conflict.* Washington DC: Global GBV Technical Support Project, JSI Research and Training Institute/RHRC Consortium.

Vlachova, M. and L. Biason (2003) "Violence Against Women as a Challenge for Security Sector Governance" in H Hänggi, T.H. Winkler (eds) *Challenges of Security Sector Gvoernenace.* Accessed at http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/challenges_SSG.cfm?nav1=4&nav2=2 [Accessed 15 Oct 2005].

WEAVE (year unknown) "Modern Man" Chiang Mai: WEAVE. [Translated from Karen.]

Wetherell, M. and N. Dudley (1999). "Negotiating Hegemonic Masculinity: Imaginary Positions and Psycho-Discursive Practices." *Feminism and Psychology* 9(3): 335-356.

Appendix 1: List of NGOs/ other agencies interviewed

Bangkok:	Burma Issues (BI)
Mae Sariang:	Drug and Alcohol Recovery and Education (DARE Network)
Chiang Mai:	Human Rights Education Institute of Burma (HREIB)
Mae Hong Son:	Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS)
Mae Hong Son:	Karenni National Women's Organization (KnWO)
Chiang Mai:	Migrant Assistance Program (MAP)
Mae Hong Son:	UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Mae Hong Son:	Women's Education for Advancement and Empowerment (WEAVE)

Appendix 2: Background on the International Rescue Committee

The International Rescue Committee was founded in 1933 and according to its website is "a global leader in emergency relief, rehabilitation, protection of human rights, post-conflict development, resettlement services and advocacy for those uprooted or affected by conflict and oppression" (IRC 2005). Based in New York City, the IRC runs programs in more than twenty conflict-affected countries across the world, as well as refugee resettlement offices in the United States. GBV programming began in 1996 (IRC 2004), and numerous IRC field sites now include GBV programs. IRC Thailand provides support to Burmese refugees and migrants in Thailand, and indirectly to IDPs in Burma. The main focus of IRC activities in Mae Hong Son province is on Karenni Sites 1 and 2: financial and capacity-building support to the Karenni Health Department, community development programs and the GBV program. The largest is the health program, which has been working in the camps since 1992. In 2002 they turned over management of the health programs in camp to the Karenni Health Department as part of a strategy towards capacity-building, moving from emergency humanitarian assistance to development and return-oriented assistance.

Appendix 3: Discussion Guide for Focus Group Discussions

Hello, my name is ________________. I am interested in learning about men's lives in camp and some of the problems men have in the camp. This information will be used for a student's research paper. This information will also be used to help the IRC design and improve programs to promote peace in this community.

Participation in this discussion is voluntary, if anyone wants to leave now, or at any point during the discussion, it's okay. Nothing bad will happen; I will not tell your section leader or anyone else.

I will be recording the discussions to make sure we accurately record your opinions, but we will not be using your names.

Your names will not be used anywhere. In fact, you do not even need to tell your name or section. However, I do need some basic information before we get started. Can everyone please tell me the following? Your age, married or not, number of children, languages you speak, your ethnic sub-group. How good is your Burmese? Can you understand a little, or a lot? Can you read in Burmese? Do you speak any of the Karenni languages?

What you say in the group will remain confidential. However, there are 3 exceptions to that confidentiality, when we would have to tell someone else.

These are

1. **Emergency situations where a person's life might be in danger.**
2. **Situations where a child might be in danger.**
3. **Information about an NGO worker causing harm to a refugee.**

The ground rules for the group are as follows:

1. **There are no right or wrong answers, only different ideas.**
2. **You don't need to agree with others, but please listen respectfully.**
3. **Do not share what people have said in this group to others. What is discussed in this group, remains in this group.**
4. **Do not use any names or identifying characteristics when talking about other people.**
5. **We are tape-recording this discussion, so please speak one at a time and loudly.**

Are there any questions about this?

SECTION 1

Now, let's get started. Let's start by talking about some of the things that men and women used to do in Burma.

1. In your village, what were some of the jobs that men *usually* did?

Probe: carry water, farm, gather firewood, clean house, care for children, care for sick, cook food, mining. *How often?*

2. What were the jobs that women *usually* did?

Probe: When did they help with farming? What kind of work?

3. Do you think these jobs are different for your ethnic sub-group than for other sub-groups?

Probe: Did people in your village divide the work differently than people in other places?

SECTION 2

Now I want us to talk a little bit about men's life in the camp.

4. How do you think the jobs of men and women are changing now that people are in Thailand?

Probe: women working for NGO, women working for women's group, teaching, clinic. Men carrying water or firewood, men caring for children.

5. How many men are now spending a lot of time helping with things like washing, caring for children?

Probe: A lot of men? Just a few?

6. How do you think most men feel about these changes?

Probe: Does it hurt their pride? Or are they glad to do different things? Proud if their wives have career?

7. What happens now to men who do "women's jobs"? What do people say about that?

Probe: Do they say he is weak? Losing his manhood? Do they say he respects his wife?

8. Is this different for men from different ethnic sub-groups?

Probe: Do more men from your sub-group do this kind of work? Is it different if a man from your sub-group does "women's work" or a man from a different sub-group?

9. What are some of the problems that *men especially* have in the camp? I want to hear about the problems that women's don't have, or that don't affect women as much. (Let the group list their problems. Write on the board. Ask for group to rank the problems: "Which problem is worst? Which problem is second worst?")

Probe: How is this problem different for men than for women?

SECTION 3

Now I want to ask you some questions about peace and violence in the camps.

10. Do you feel that violence is a problem in the camp? What kinds of violence?
[**Be clear** on whether they are talking about physical abuse (beating, hitting, kicking, slapping) or verbal abuse (shouting, calling names) or something else…]

11. In what situation would it be ok for a man to hit his wife?
Probe: Adultery. Does not obey. Bad cooking. Never.

12. In what situation do wives not listen to their husbands? What might make a husband want to "give a lesson?"

13. In what situation would it be ok for a woman to hit her husband?
Probe: Adultery. Does not earn money. He drinks too much. Never.

14. What do you think are things that cause violence in families?
Probe: Is it because of living in camps? Because of our culture/traditions? Because of the individual's behavior?

15. Do you think a man who helps his wife a lot in the house could still be violent with his wife?

16. What would you do if you see violence in your neighbor's home?
Probe: Do nothing. Talk to the husband. Talk to the wife. Talk to section leader. Talk to camp committee

17. What would you do if you saw violence in your sister's home or daughter's home?

SECTION 4

Now I'd like us to spend some time talking about a program to stop violence between men and women.

18. Have you heard about the IRC program in the camp to stop violence?
Probe: Or about a safe house for women?
Probe: Find out exactly which men have heard about it!

19. Where did you hear about this program?
Probe: Friends? Family? Health clinic?

20. What do most men think about this program?
Probe: Are any men worried about "women's rights"? Divorces? Are they glad there is a place for help?

21. Is it embarrassing for a man if neighbors know he is beating his wife? Or if his wife goes to the Safe house?

22. Is it embarrassing if his wife is beating him?

23. What about the wife? Is it shameful for her if her husband is beating her?

SECTION 5

Now I want us to talk about what you think are some good ways to try to stop violence.

24. What do you think about these messages for peaceful family life? Which one do you think is best? Second best? (See other sheet, and read out loud slowly and clearly) Get men's comments on all the messages!

25. What are the ways that people like to hear information, or messages like this?
Probe: Brochure? From friends? Loudspeaker? Dramas? Comic books? Posters? Trainings?

26. For people who cannot read very well, how do you think they like to get information?

27. Who do people trust to help solve problems in the home?
Probe: Parents. Brother. Religious leader. Other relatives. No one. Section leader. Traditional leader.

Section 6: Closing

That is all of the questions. Before we finish do you have anything else to add?

Thank you for participating. This information is very useful.

____
(name of facilitator)

____
(ethnic group)

____
(date)

Appendix 4: Some Questions Used in Interviews

First I want to ask some questions about your work so I can get an idea of the things you have been involved with.

When have you started at IRC?

What kind of work do you do (trainings, interpreting, cases, etc)

In what ways have your worked with IRC on GBV so far?

Now I want to ask some questions about your ideas of gender and gender-based violence.

How do you see gender? What do you think is gender?

In the camps, what are some of the ideas about what is it to be a good woman? What do you have to do to be a good man?

In camp, are there certain ideas of things only men are supposed to do, and things only women are supposed to do?

Is this different from your own idea of what women should do/ what men should do?

Do you think these ideas are different now in camp than before?

Do you think the things men and women are supposed to do are causing problems or conflict in camp?

Who do men and women go to talk about their feelings? Is it ok for people in camp to tell others when they feel sad? Men's feelings about living in camp? Women's feelings?

Some questions about what you think about Gender-based violence

How do you define gender-based violence for yourself?

Do you think there is a difference between gender-based violence and violence against women?

How do you think people thought about this problem before IRC trainings? Do they think gender-based violence is a Western idea?

What do you think are some of the causes of gender-based violence?

Who commits gender-based violence? Why?

Who is victim of gender-based violence?

How is gender-based violence connected to reproductive and child health?

Do you think GBV is more of a health problem or more of a problem about women's rights? Or more of a problem in the community issues?

Do you think there was more GBV in the camps or back in Burma?

If you could estimate, what do you think is the prevalence rate of GBV in camp?

Now some more questions about your work on GBV and prevention

Which is more important to prevent gender-based violence: educating men, or educating women?

What other NGOs have you talked to or worked with about GBV in camps? Camp-based organizations? Outside organizations, like NGOs working with migrants or working inside Burma?

How do you think IRC views refugees? How do other NGOs (within camp, outside) view refugees? Helpless, strong, need support, etc.?

How do you feel delivering the GBV trainings (or whatever other work you do? Talking to health staff, etc.) To women? To men? Is there tension sometimes?

How do you think women are changing as a result of IRC GBV trainings?

How do you think men are changing as a result of IRC GBV trainings? How do you think men feel about the IRC GBV program?

How do you think people within IRC understand or feel about having a GBV program?

How do you think people within the camp understand or feel about having a GBV program? Is there a difference in how men feel and how women feel?

What ideas about men and women do you think the IRC GBV program has? Are these ideas different than ideas in camp (equality, sharing, etc...)? Is there a way to address GBV differently, to work around these differences?

Finally, a few questions about preventing GBV

Were there any ways to prevent GBV on the other side of the border?

Do you think trainings for health department, creating protocols, etc... do you think all these activities lead to more GBV or less GBV?

Are there many men interested in preventing GBV?

In general, why should men be interested in preventing GBV?

What do you think would be the best way to prevent GBV in the camps?

What kinds of ideas or values would need to change to prevent GBV? What traditions or parts of culture are against violence? Which traditions support violence?

How would we know if we are successful at preventing GBV? How do we know if we have only made things worse?

Do you have anything else you would like to add?

How has this interview been for you? Are there any questions you would like to ask me?

Appendix 5: Map of Burma

Source: Smith (1991)