ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM
Erasmus School of Economics

The Wall of Nationalism

Can the veil of ignorance help in developing refugee policies?

Master Thesis Behavioural Economics

Name student: Marijn van de Vaate

Student number: 434476

Supervisor: M.A.J. van Hulsen

Second assessor: K.I.M. Rohde

Date final version: 17-4-2020

Abstract

Using a survey, this paper tries to determine whether decision making for one's own country, another country, or behind a veil of ignorance could improve the refugee policies in Europe, where a new form of nationalism rises. In addition, the effect of choosing behind a veil of ignorance on the general risk aversion and the influence of risk aversion on the number of refugees chosen to be hosted are obtained. Firstly, this study finds no significant effect that choosing for another country leads to more refugees hosted than when choosing for one's own country or behind a veil of ignorance. Additionally, no significant effects are found that nationalism has an effect on the number of refugees chosen. Lastly, no evidence was found that the risk attitude influences the amount of refugees that is chosen to be hosted. Mainly, the results of this study imply that the European refugee policies cannot be improved with decision making for another country or behind a veil of ignorance or explained by looking at the risk aversion of the deciders.

Table of contents

Introduction

One of Europe's largest and most discussed social problems is the situation around refugees. Over the period 2011-2018, more than 5 million people from outside the European Union applied for asylum in a European Union state. The situation peaked in 2015, when more than a million migrants and refugees arrived at the shore of Europe (Eurostat, 2019). Discussion points such as which countries have to take care of the refugees and what happens with the refugees when the situation in their home country stabilizes, lead to heated discussions in the European Parliament and countries itself (European External Action Service, 2016; NOS, 2017; The Guardian, 2017).

The number of refugees that want to come to the European Union is so high, that not all refugees can follow a safe route to Europe. This leads to a lot of risky traffic of desperate refugees towards European countries (UNHCR, n.d.). Doing so, the refugees are dependent on smugglers to reach their destination (UNHCR, n.d.). Smugglers ask a lot of money to arrange the journey towards Europe, leaving the refugees behind empty handed. Furthermore, the smugglers do not guarantee a safe and pleasant journey to Europe. On the contrary, the risky routes can be life threatening. Refugees, that mostly cannot swim, are for example put in overcrowded boats without adequate precautionary measures, which leads to many accidents with many fatalities (The Guardian, 2019). Even when these refugees reach the shore they do not know where they will end up, because they practically entered the country in an illegal way. Clear policies about how many refugees are welcome in which European state could ease these journeys and uncertainties.

The policies regarding the hosting of refugees are very different between the members of the European Union. Germany for example, opened her borders and hosts more than a million refugees according to the latest numbers, which is a huge contrast to a country as Spain, which hosts just over 20.000 refugees (The World Bank, 2019). These numbers imply that the burden of hosting refugees can be eased if the refugees are more evenly spread across the European Union members.

In 1990, twelve members of the European Union signed the Dublin Convention, which was brought into force in 1997 (*Dublin Convention*, 1990). The most important part was that the member of the European Union where a refugee hands in his or her asylum claim or where the fingerprint of a refugee was taken first, stays responsible for the asylum claim. The Dublin Convention was followed up by the Dublin Regulation II in 2003 *(Dublin Regulation II*, 2003) and finally by the Dublin Regulation III in 2013 (*Dublin Regulation III*, 2013). This last regulation is, except for Denmark, signed by every member of the European Union. The principle about which country was responsible for which refugee, remained the same.

However, when the flow of incoming refugees in Europe increased, it became clear that the Dublin Regulation III was not sufficient. Greece, Italy and Hungary could not host the entire flow of refugees. As a response, the European Union decided to reallocate 60.000 refugees over the members of European Union (*Refugee Crisis*, 2015). However, further, concrete changes in the refugee policy of the European Union were not made. Concluding, the European Union lacks an organized and responsible system to deal with refugee crises, also acknowledged by Constant & Zimmermann (2016).

Another ongoing development in Europe (and the rest of the world) is the rise of nationalism (Time, 2018; The Washington Post, 2019). Recently, radical parties in the right-wing spectrum gained support and attention. Examples are the PVV in the Netherlands, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, or Rassemblement National in France. One of the characteristics of this recent nationalism is an anti-immigrant attitude (Gingrich, 2006), which implies a link with the refugee crisis Europe is facing. This raises questions about how the rise of this nationalism should be taken into account during the negotiations for a new refugee policy of the European Union. One of these questions is whether these nationalists keep the same beliefs, if the source of their beliefs, their home country, is not considered in the decision?

A theory that can be applied here is the veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1971). The veil of ignorance is typically explained by the example of slavery. Suppose that people can design their most preferable society, where a part of the society is enslaved to maximize the utility of the society. However, the choice about which percentage is enslaved is made behind a veil of ignorance. This means that the decision maker does not know whether he is going to be a part of the enslaved part of the society or not, after he has made his decision. Rawls argues that choosing behind a veil of ignorance ultimately leads to the fairest way of designing the society. When deciding behind a veil of ignorance, people would not benefit one group at the cost of another group as they do not know to which group they will belong when making their decision. With the veil of ignorance, personal preferences are thus minimized when taking a decision. Instead, moral considerations dominate the decision-making process. This would thus mostly lead to the fairest society in the eyes of the decision maker. Decision making behind a veil of ignorance can therefore be applied when decisions about moral or social dilemmas have to be made, for example the refugee crisis.

Since Rawls introduced the veil of ignorance, the concept is used in various manners. Sutter and Weck-Hannemann (2003) used it in research on the tax system and found that a higher tax efficiency is chosen behind the veil of ignorance compared to when the subjects knew whether they were the tax authority or the tax-payer. Hereafter, Kriss et al. (2011) applied the veil of ignorance to the self-serving bias in climate change negotiations and found that the self-serving bias completely disappears when the decision

is made for country A or B instead of for the United States or China. In addition, Norton and Ariely (2011) used the veil to select the most desirable wealth distribution. Subjects had to choose between two of the following three wealth distributions: an equal wealth distribution, Sweden's wealth distribution (kind of equal) and the wealth distribution of the United States (unequal). However, the subjects did not know in which part of the society they would belong after their decision. This resulted in a preference for the equal distribution and the distribution of Sweden, as expected. Furthermore, Andersson and Lyttkens (1999) combined the veil of ignorance with the health sector. Here, it is found that the outcome for the group that is worst-off is not always maximized. This is explained by the fact that improving the life expectancy of the worst-off group can decrease the life expectancy of the groups that are better off more, than the increase in the worst-off group. The total life expectancy would therefore decrease when the life expectancy of the worst-off group is maximized. The willingness to increase the life expectancy of the worst-off is therefore dependent on the decrease in life expectancy for the better off groups it has as consequence.

This study tries to answer the question how the decision about hosting refugees differs if the decision is not made for one's own country, but for another country or behind a veil of ignorance and additionally, what the influence of nationalism and risk aversion are on the decision about hosting refugees. Here, a total of three hypotheses are tested. To collect the data needed, a survey is used. In this survey, the subjects will be randomized into three groups to make the decision about how many refugees they are willing to host. One group makes this decision for their home country, one for another country and one group makes this decision behind a veil of ignorance. The main finding of this study is that there is no significant evidence that choosing for another country, choosing behind a veil of ignorance, nationalism, or risk aversion influences the decision regarding the amount of refuges that is chosen to host.

The outline of this paper is as follows. First, previous literature on the veil of ignorance and nationalism will be discussed in the literature review. From this literature review, three hypotheses are derived. Hereafter, the experimental design is elaborated on, where the survey will be explained. Then the methodology to test the three hypotheses will be discussed, followed by the results and the discussion.

Literature review

In the following section, earlier literature is discussed. From the review of the literature, hypotheses are formed that will be tested in this study. Two main topics will be discussed in this section. First, earlier research regarding the veil of ignorance and decision making for others is examined. Hereafter, the existing literature on nationalism will be discussed.

Decision making for others or behind a veil of ignorance

In his book, A Theory of Justice, Rawls (1971) introduces the veil of ignorance. As explained before, it is assumed that if one makes decisions behind a veil of ignorance, the most justified decisions are made, as the decider does not know which role he has in the society he makes decisions for. This way, personal preferences are removed from the decision making.

Those justified, most fair decisions come forward in the earlier discussed research of Sutter and Weck-Hannemann (2003), who combined the veil of ignorance with taxation. The authors designed a two-person experiment with two stages where one person represented the tax authority and one person the tax-payer. The income the tax authority can tax is generated with real effort, in the form of solving mathematical equations. However, in the treatment group the subjects did not know whether they were the authority or the tax-payer until after all the decisions were made. After the experiment, both subjects got their pay cut. However, the tax-payers first had to put in the agreed upon real effort. With this experiment, the authors find that subjects behind the veil of ignorance are willing to put in more effort when the tax rates are relatively high, resulting in a more beneficial situation for the entire society.

Furthermore, Kriss et al. (2011) apply the veil of ignorance to obtain the self-serving bias in climate change negotiations. The authors performed a survey on students, which were partly American and partly Chinese. The students were randomized into three groups. One group decided how the United States and China should divide the expenses that need to be made to cut down the green gas emissions. Another group decided how a country A and country B should divide the economical sacrifices that need to be made to build a dam to avoid impactful floods in the future. The last group had to divide economical sacrifices between farmer A and B to divert a stream in order to protect their farms in the future. All three decisions are based on preventing future problems, but in the first decision the countries are named, in the second decision the countries are unnamed and in the last decision the countries are completely removed. From here, they conclude that the students show more self-interested behavior when the

decision is made for the United States and China. Here, national interests play a role. The national interests completely disappeared in the second group, that decided for country A and country B. The authors therefore conclude that the self-serving bias can influence decisions made in climate change negotiations. This paper will build on this finding by looking at the effect the veil of ignorance and the belonging removal of the self-serving bias can have on the refugee policies.

The theory is also applied to the health sector. Andersson and Lyttkens (1999) designed an experiment using a questionnaire where students had to choose between two societies. One society had a high life expectancy group and a low life expectancy group and the other society had the same groups, but then with a higher life expectancy for the low life expectancy group and a lower life expectancy for the high life expectancy group. In other words, in one society the difference in life expectancy between the two groups was smaller than in the other society. All students could choose between the two societies, but one group of students made the decision behind the veil of ignorance. With this experiment, the authors found that people who choose behind the veil prefer a more equal distribution for the society in terms of life expectancy. This paper tries to use the finding of a preference for a more equal distribution in the allocation of refugees across Europe.

Another effect that the veil of ignorance has, is investigated by Carlsson, Gupta and Johansson-Stenman (2003). They dedicated their study to the veil of ignorance in combination with risk attitude in an experiment where subjects had to choose a society their imaginary grandchildren would end up in, without knowing if they would end up in the rich or poor side of the society. The subjects could choose between societies A and B, where the only differences were that society B had a more equal income distribution and that the mean income of A would always be higher than B. The income distribution in society A did not change, but for society B there were eight variations. Variation one had the highest minimum, mean and maximum income and the same mean income as society A. Hereafter, all three variables decreased until variation eight, where the minimum income was the same as in society A. Rationally speaking, one would always prefer society A over the eight variation of society B as society A is better or the same in all three aspects of the society. With this experiment, the authors could elicit the risk aversion of the subjects behind the veil of ignorance. Consistent with their expectations, they found that their subjects were relative risk averse while choosing behind a veil of ignorance.

This research is extended by Carlsson, Daruvala and Johansson-Stenman (2005), who designed two experiments to measure risk attitude. Again, in both experiments subjects made the decisions for their imaginary grandchildren. In the first experiment the income distribution in the future society is fixed, but

the income of the grandchildren is unknown. In the second experiment the subjects could choose between different income distributions for the future society, but the subjects' grandchildren would always earn the average income of the chosen income distribution. Doing so, the authors found that most people are inequality averse, which means that they would also be willing to pay if they could live in a more equal society. This study tries to use the finding of inequality aversion to distribute the refugees more equally over Europe, while removing the self-interest behavior.

Furthermore, Pronin, Olivola & Kennedy (2008) find that decisions that are not made for someone itself lead to more socially desirable outcomes with the performance of four experiments. In the first experiment, subjects had to decide for their present self, future self, or another subject how many of a disgusting beverage they would drink. The second experiment regarded a decision about how many times the subject was willing to spend on the tutoring of peer students. The decision was again made for their present self, future self or for another student. Additionally, the third experiments included the same decision groups, but now the subjects had to choose how many emails they would want to receive in the name of charity. The last experiment included the decision on receiving less money now or more money in the future. This decision was made for themselves or another student. With these experiments the authors obtained that the decisions people make for others or future selves are comparable to each other, but different to the decisions they make for their present selves. Present selves are mostly spared, where the decisions for others or future selves are thus believed to be more morally justified. These effects are similar to the effects that a veil of ignorance has. Therefore, this study uses decision making for others next to the veil of ignorance.

The rise of right-wing parties in Europe and (Neo-)Nationalism

The next part of the literature review will discuss the rise of right-wing parties in Europe and the corresponding increase of (neo-)nationalism. First, the development of nationalism will be discussed. Hereafter, the characteristics of the new form of nationalism are elaborated on.

Development of nationalism

The Oxford Dictionary defines nationalism as ''the identification with one's own nation and support for its interests, especially to the exclusion or detriment of the interests of other nations.'' Nationalism first

arose in England, around the time Europe started to explore and colonize the world (Greenfeld, 2012). Hereafter, nationalism developed and reached its dark peak in Europe during the Second World War. When this war ended, the support for nationalism dropped as well (Rydgren, 2005). In this study, Rydgren explains that the society had developed a poor association with everything that had something to do with nationalism. Furthermore, the economy in Western-Europe started to grow again in the period after the Second World War. This, in combination with trust in the political systems, left the nationalistic parties without much support. A new frame was needed in which these parties could present their opinions without being labelled as racists or anti-democrats. Such a 'master frame' developed and was proven to work first in 1984, when the far-right party in France, *Front National*, experienced a breakthrough. With this master frame, far-right parties in Western-Europe could express their beliefs towards immigrants again. This development led to a grow in support of far-right parties in Western-Europe (Greven 2016).

These far-right parties want to conserve the culture within the country as much as possible, just as they want to mitigate the number of immigrants in order to maintain the society as it is ethnically (Rydgren, 2007). This second part is defined as ethnic nationalism. Although the far-right parties are often defined as populist parties, Rydgren (2017) argues that they are better defined as ethnic nationalistic parties.

Furthermore, in a study that focused on Western-Europe, Ivarsflaten (2008) finds that right-wing parties that did not address the immigration issue performed poorly in elections. In contrast, examples were found where right-wing parties that did include the immigration issue but did not focus on economic reorganizations or corrupt politics experienced electoral success. This illustrates the importance of the anti-immigrant attitudes for the right-wing parties in Western-Europe. This finding is confirmed by Yilmaz (2012), who states that European far-right wing parties successfully gained support due to their anti-immigrant attitudes, specifically towards Islam and Muslim immigrants. By repeatedly presenting these immigrants as harmful for the Western-European culture, the far-right parties continued to grow. An example is Germany, where the right-wing, nationalistic party *Alternative for Germany* (AFD) is gaining support for the first time since the 1950's (Lees, 2016). The AFD even rose to become the third largest party in Germany with 12.6 percent (BBC, 2019), after the two traditional large parties, the *Christian Democratic Union* (CDU) and the *Christian Social Union* (CSU).

This new kind of nationalism among these far-right parties is defined as neo-nationalism. Gingrich and Banks (2006), describe neo-nationalism as *"the re-emergence of nationalism under different global and transnational conditions"*. Furthermore, Gingrich (2006) identified three characteristics for European parties on the far right, which are the parties that are linked to neo-nationalism. The first characteristic is

that these parties are against an intensified European Union, the second is that these parties are against the admission of new countries to the European Union, and the third is that they are fierce against the hosting of immigrants. This research focuses primarily on the third characteristic, but the other two will be shortly discussed as well.

Euro-scepticism

To understand the rise of the right-wing parties it is important to understand all three characteristics of these parties. The first and second argument will be discussed shortly in this section and could be taken together into one definition: Euro-scepticism. Defining Euro-scepticism has been a discussion in the literature (Harmsen, 2010), mostly because the term is used for different purposes. The most precise definition is perhaps given by Flood (2002), whose definition of Euro-scepticism can be summarized as everything that expresses doubt to any aspect of European integration. Within this definition, Flood also argues that there is a distinction between soft and hard Euro-scepticism. Here, the hard variant could lead to the abandon of the European Union by a certain country, of which Brexit is the first, and most recent example. The soft version on the other hand is mostly based on a single argument and will not lead to drastic decisions.

Attitudes toward immigrants

The third characteristic of neo-nationalism is an anti-immigrant attitude. Esses, Hamilton, and Gaucher (2017) find that the increase of the right-wing parties in Europe causes a negative view towards immigrants. As discussed earlier, many original residents are afraid that their own well-being will be affected when immigrants enter the country. These prejudices towards immigrants are obtained in Australia (Leach, 2003; Schweitzer et al., 2005), Canada (Hier and Greenberg, 2002), the United States (Stephan, Ybarra & Bachman, 1999) and Europe (Wike, Stokes, and Simmons, 2016) and are mostly the result of residents that feel a certain kind of threat because of the newcomers (Stephan, Ybarra & Bachman, 1999; Riek, Mania and Gaertner, 2006).

In order to shed another light on the discussion, Hamilton and Whalley (1984) calculated that when the world did not have immigrant controls and had a corresponding worldwide labor market the world would benefit enormously. This benefit arises since low wage workers could be moved to high productivity countries, leaving the world to benefit. However, one reason that people tend have against immigration

is that not everyone benefits. When new workers enter the market, the original workers have to compete with them. This leads to a decrease in the income of the original workers (Borjas, 1995) and a general increase of income for the companies as their labor costs decrease. Logically thinking, original workers could therefore have a negative attitude to the immigration of new workers based on economic grounds. This hypothesis is tested and proven by O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006). They find that low-skilled workers are more against immigration than high-skilled workers. In a cross-country investigation Mayda (2006) concludes that "*labor-market variables continue to play a key and robust role in preference formation over immigration policy*" as an increase in individual skill leads to a decrease of anti-immigration attitudes.

Next to pure economic reasons, people tend to have nationalistic reasons against immigration. In 2002, Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers performed a large survey-based research on the European Union and Norway. Next to the fact that the authors find that people that compete with immigrants are more likely to vote for the far-right, the authors find proof that when anti-immigrant attitudes increase, the support for far-right parties increases as well. With the finding that people who are more nationalistic tend to have a more anti-immigrant attitude, O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) confirm these findings using a worldwide survey that covers 24 countries, which also is in line with the earlier mentioned research of Gingrich (2006). This study tries to elicit the effect that a nationalistic attitude has on the decision on the number of refugees that is chosen to host when that decision is made for another country or behind a veil of ignorance instead of for the home country.

Hypotheses

From the literature review above, three hypotheses are derived. These hypotheses will be presented in this section. The first part of this study is of a more general form and does not take nationalism into account. Here, the relation between the number of refugees per thousand residents[1] and the veil of ignorance is obtained. From the literature, many applications of the veil of ignorance are found. This study uses the theory for the number of refugees. Since Carlsson, Gupta and Johansson-Stenman (2003) showed that people have a relative risk averse attitude when choosing behind a veil of ignorance, it is expected that people that choose behind a veil of ignorance will also choose a lower amount of refugees than when choosing for another country. The first hypothesis is therefore as follows:

---

[1] Further mentioned as number of refugees

People choose a higher number of refugees that should be hosted if they make the decision for another country or behind a veil of ignorance instead of for their home country.

The second part of the research takes nationalism into account. As discussed, nationalism is part of right-wing ideologies, which are on the rise in Europe (Greven, 2016). Esses, Hamilton and Gaucher (2017) note that the rise of right-wing ideologies causes a negative view towards refugees, which is one of the characteristics of the new kind of nationalism as discussed in the literature review. This makes the distribution of refugees over Europe harder, as not every country is willing to host the same number of refugees relatively to its residents. Typically, countries that are more right-wing dominated stagnate these negotiations as they do not want to host (large amounts of) refugees. As this study attempts to show whether the attitudes towards the hosting of refugees change when the decision is not made for the home country, the veil of ignorance is applied again in an attempt to reach a social justified distribution. Therefore, the second hypothesis is stated as follows:

Nationalism decreases the number of refugees less when the decision is made for another country or behind a veil of ignorance instead of for the home country.

In addition, a third hypothesis is tested. Because choosing behind a veil of ignorance comes with handling risk, it is additionally interesting to see whether this risk attitude has an effect on the number of refugees chosen on its own. This hypothesis focuses on the relation between risk aversion and the number of refugees chosen. Here, it is tested whether risk aversion has any effect on the number of refugees chosen. The hypothesis is therefore as follows:

Risk averse people choose less refugees than risk seeking people.

Experimental design

Survey

The data needed for the study is obtained using a survey. A total of 130 subjects filled in a complete survey, which is a relatively small dataset considering the fact that the subjects will be divided into three groups in the survey. The survey exists out of four parts and can be found in its exact form in Appendix B. Firstly, the demographics are obtained. Most important here is the question what the subject's home

country is. This is needed in the next part of the survey, where the subject's nationalism is measured. Hereafter, two parts of the survey are randomized to control for order effects. Those parts are about the nationalistic attitude of the subjects and the number of refugees the subjects choose to host. The randomization is included to ensure that thinking about nationalism does not influence the number of refugees that are chosen and, the other way around, to make sure that the number of refugees chosen does not influence the nationalistic attitude of the subjects.

The nationalistic attitude of the subjects is measured with the validated scale developed by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989). The scale originally existed out of eight statements, where two statements were taken out by the authors themselves. The other statement included the fact that the US has the largest contribution to the UN, but as this research does not focus solely on the US this statement is left out. As explained before, the home country that the subjects filled in earlier in the survey is used in this part. This leads to the following statements to obtain the subjects nationalistic attitude in this survey. The subjects had to indicate how much they agreed with the statement, on a 5-point Likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Also note that question number five is reversed scored and should be interpreted the other way around, a high score on this question indicates less nationalism.

1. The first duty of everyone from *[home country]* is to honor its history and heritage.
2. The important thing for *[home country]* foreign aid program is to see to it that the *[home country]* gains a political advantage.
3. Generally, the more influence *[home country]* has on other nations, the better of they are.
4. It is important that *[home country]* win in international sporting competitions like the Olympics.
5. It is really not important that *[home country]* is number one in whatever it does.

In the second part of the randomization the subjects have to decide for a country how many refugees it should host. The subjects have to select the number of refugees per thousand residents. To give a clue on the norm right now, some statistics about how many refugees are hosted right now per thousand residents in Europe are shown. Although these statistics could lead to an anchoring bias, the decision is made to show the figures in order to obtain more realistic amounts of refugees chosen. The statistics are given for Spain (relative low refugee hosting country), The Netherlands (relative middle refugee hosting company) and Germany (relative high refugee hosting country). The subjects are randomized into three groups in this part. One group decides for its own country how much refugees it should host per thousand residents, one group makes this decision for another, unnamed, European country, and one group makes

this decision behind a veil of ignorance, not knowing if they make this decision for their own or for another country. This way, it can be obtained what difference it makes whether a decision is made for one's home country, another European country or behind veil of ignorance.

Lastly, the risk attitude of the subjects is obtained. This is done for the third hypothesis, which tests the relation between risk attitude and the amount of refugees chosen. The risk attitude will be measured by means of a Multiple Price List, first used by Binswanger (1980). Although there are many ways to measure one's risk attitude, the Multiple Price List is chosen because it reveals risk attitude while it is easy for subjects to use. The Multiple Price List in this survey is used in the format of Holt and Laury (2002) and can be found in Appendix B.

Research methodology

Influence of choice mode

As stated before, the study is divided into three general hypotheses. Here, the different research methodologies for each hypothesis will be discussed. The first general hypothesis is as follows:

People choose a higher number of refugees that should be hosted if they make the decision for another country or behind a veil of ignorance instead of for the home country.

To test this hypothesis, two Mann-Whitney U tests will be used. This test is used because the data is not suited for parametric tests as the data is not normally distributed. Furthermore, two different groups are compared, which means that the Mann-Whitney U test is the most suited test for this hypothesis. These tests will show whether the two samples come from the same population. The first test will test whether the group that chose for another country significantly chooses another number of refugees than the group that chose for their own country does. It will thus measure the null hypothesis that the number of *refugees chosen to host by the group that chose for another country is equal to the number of refugees chosen to host by the group that chose for their own country.*

Additionally, the second Mann-Whitney U test will test whether the group that chose behind the veil of ignorance significantly chooses another number of refugees than the group that chose for their home country does. It will thus measure the null hypothesis that the number of *refugees chosen to host by the*

group that chose behind a veil of ignorance is equal to the number of refugees chosen to host by the group that chose for their home country.

The effect of nationalism

In the second part, nationalism is incorporated, and the following general hypothesis is tested:

Nationalism decreases the number of refugees less when the decision is made for another country or behind a veil of ignorance instead of for the home country.

Expectation is that people with a relatively high nationalistic attitude choose a lower number of refugees than people with a relatively low nationalistic attitude. This implies a negative correlation between nationalism and the number of refugees. Furthermore, it is expected that nationalism decreases the number of refugees less when the decision is made for another country or behind a veil of ignorance instead of for the home country.

This hypothesis will be tested by the help of a linear regression. For this regression, a dummy is made to identify the treatment group of each subject. This dummy is then multiplied with nationalism to obtain interaction terms that measure the effect of nationalism for the three different treatment groups separately. The three treatment groups here are the subjects who decided for the home country, the subjects who chose for another country, and the subjects who decided behind a veil of ignorance. The regression will be performed with robust standard errors, as the data suggests that heteroskedasticity is an issue. The independent variable in the regression will be nationalism, where the number of refugees chosen will be the dependent variable. Afterwards, the coefficients of the regression will be interpreted to observe the difference between the three groups (home country, another country and behind a veil of ignorance) regarding the impact of nationalism on the number of refugees.

Because of the small dataset, another test is performed to test the second hypothesis. For this hypothesis, the subjects are divided into three groups per refugee subgroup. The three refugee subgroups are the group that chose for their country, the group that chose for another country and the group that chose from behind a veil of ignorance. The subjects are divided based on their total nationalism score. Here, the subjects with the relatively lowest total nationalism scores are labelled as "Low", the subjects with relatively medium nationalistic scores as "Medium", and the relatively most nationalistic subjects are labelled as "High". This is done for all three refugee subgroups as well as for the entire sample, resulting

into four new variables where the nationalistic attitude is labelled as low, medium or high. The exact distinction of subjects can be found in Appendix A, table 6. With these new variables, it is possible to perform a non-parametric test. As the groups within the low-medium-high variables are expected to have a ranked order regarding the number of refugees chosen, the Jonckheere-Terpstra test is performed. The hypotheses of this test are as follows:

$$HO : \vartheta_{High} = \vartheta_{Medium} = \vartheta_{Low}$$

$$H1 : \vartheta_{High} \leq \vartheta_{Medium} \leq \vartheta_{Low} \text{ with at least on strict inequality}$$

$$\text{Where } \vartheta_i \text{ is the median of group i.}$$

Here, the expectation is that the high nationalism groups will choose less or the same number of refugees as the medium nationalism groups. The medium nationalism groups are expected to choose less or the same number of refugees as the low nationalism groups. The Jonckheere-Terpstra is performed three times, once for the group that chose for their own country, once for the group that chose for another country and once for the group that chose from behind a veil of ignorance.

Risk aversion and the amount of refugees chosen

The third general hypothesis tests the effect of risk attitude on the refugees chosen and is therefore as follows:

Risk averse people choose less refugees than risk seeking people.

This hypothesis is tested with multiple Jonckheere-Terpstra tests, similar to the second part of the second hypothesis. Again, the subjects are divided over a relatively low, medium and high group. The distinction is made on the obtained risk aversion of the subjects and can be found in Appendix A, table 7. This is done for each subsample (group that chose for the home country, group that chose for another country and the group that chose behind a veil of ignorance), resulting in four new variables that indicate whether the subjects belongs to the relative low, medium or high group. Then, four Jonckheere-Terpstra tests are performed to test whether there is a difference between the low, medium and high risk aversion groups regarding the amount of refugees chosen. The hypothesis for these Jonckheere-Terpstra tests are as follows:

$$HO : \vartheta_{High} = \vartheta_{Medium} = \vartheta_{Low}$$

$$H1 : \vartheta_{High} \leq \vartheta_{Medium} \leq \vartheta_{Low} \text{ with at least on strict inequality}$$

Where ϑ_i is the median of group i.

With this test it will be obtained whether the different risk aversion groups significantly differ in the number of refugees chosen.

Results

Descriptive statistics

Before the results are discussed, the used variables and their belonging descriptive statistics are presented. The fifteen variables used to test the hypotheses are presented in Appendix A, Table 4. They include variables such as the total nationalism score, the total risk aversion score, the number of refugees chosen and some demographics as age, gender, enrollment and education.

From the descriptive statistics (Appendix A, Table 5), it is obtained that the majority of the 130 subjects come from The Netherlands (88.5%). Also, men are more represented among the subjects than females as the women only represent 38.5% of the subjects. Furthermore, the average age is a little over 29 years. This can be seen by the fact that 44.6% of the subjects still identifies itself as a student. Lastly, the subjects are relatively high educated, as 73.9% possesses a bachelor or master's degree. Therefore, it can be concluded that this sample is not representative for the European population, as most subjects originate from the Netherlands. The sample is also not representative for the Netherlands as the average age is too low and the average level of education is too high. This is important to note before interpreting the results.

Influence of choice mode

In this part, the results of the tests connected to the first hypothesis are presented and discussed. Following the literature, it is expected that the subjects who choose the number of refugees for another country choose a higher amount of refugees than subjects that make the same decision for their own country or behind a veil of ignorance. Here, Mann-Whitney U tests are used.

The first Mann-Whitney U test performs the test between the group that chose for their own country and the group that chose for another country. The test returns a p-value of 0.852, which means that the null hypothesis that the group that chose for their own country and the group that chose for another country do not differ from each other, cannot be rejected at the 10% level. In other words, this means that there is no evidence found that the subjects who chose for another country chose a higher number of refugees than the group that chose for their own country.

Next to that, the test is also performed without the subjects that did not have a European country as their home country. When those thirteen subjects are removed from the dataset, the test returns a p-value of 0.859, which means that the null hypothesis that the group that chose for their own country and the group that chose for another country do not differ from each other, cannot be rejected at the 10% level. In other words, this means that there is no evidence found that the subjects who chose for another country chose a higher number of refugees than the group that chose for their own country.

Hereafter, the second Mann-Whitney U test is performed. This test performs the test between the group that chose behind a veil of ignorance and the group that chose for their home country. The test returns a p-value of 0.386, which means that the null hypothesis that the group that chose behind a veil of ignorance and the group that chose for their home country do not differ from each other, cannot be rejected at the 10% level. In other words, this means that there is no evidence found that the subjects who chose for their home country chose a higher number of refugees than the group that behind a veil of ignorance.

Next to that, the test is also performed without the subjects that did not have a European country as their home country. When those thirteen subjects are removed from the dataset, the test returns a p-value of 0.418, which means that the null hypothesis that the group that chose behind a veil of ignorance and the group that chose for their home country do not differ from each other, cannot be rejected at the 10% level. In other words, this means that there is no evidence found that the subjects who chose for their home country chose a higher number of refugees than the group that chose behind a veil of ignorance.

The reason that all four Mann-Whitney U tests performed show insignificant results could therefore simply be that it does not matter for the amount of refugees chosen, whether this decision is made for the home country, for another country or behind a veil of ignorance. The results suggest that the choice mode does not change the way people look at refugee policies.

The effect of nationalism

Next, the second hypothesis is tested. Here, nationalism is incorporated and with the help of a linear regression it is investigated whether nationalism has a smaller effect on the number of refugees when the decision is made for another country instead of for the home country, or behind a veil of ignorance. As explained before, the linear regression controls for the different treatment groups and certain demographics. Furthermore, the treatment groups "Other Country" and "Veil of Ignorance" should be compared to the treatment group "Own Country", the education variables must be compared to "High School Graduate", the country variables to "EU but Dutch" and the employment variables to "Employed Full Time". Also note that the variables "Less Than High School" and "Retired" are omitted from the regressions, because they occur too little in the dataset. The results of the performed regressions are presented in Table 1.

Table 1

Obtained coefficients of the linear regression with robust standard errors where the chosen number of refugees is the dependent variable and nationalism is the main independent variable.

Dependent variable	Chosen amount of refugees
Nationalism	0.247 (0.808)
Other Country	5.680 (18.931)
Veil of Ignorance	13.781 (19.585)
Nationalism Other Country	-0.181 (1.172)
Nationalism Veil of Ignorance	-0.454 (1.203)
Age	-0.082 (0.120)
Female	3.852 (3.193)

Bachelor Degree HPU	-8.599** (3.615)
Bachelor Degree Uni	-5.161 (4.196)
Master Degree HPU	-12.271*** (4.103)
Master Degree Uni	-0.599 (5.794)
SVE	7.661 (8.528)
Dutch	2.152 (3.322)
NonEU	19.886** (8.614)
Student	-2.346 (4.170)
Employed PT	-5.672 (4.024)
Unemployed	-4.684 (7.030)
Constant	10.854 (12.760)
Obs.	130
R-squared	0.267

Note. *** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, * indicates p < 0.1

The results in Table 1 serve to test what effect nationalism has on the number of refugees selected per subgroup. First, it is observed that nationalism has an overall positive effect on the number of refugees chosen, which is against expectation. Furthermore, it is obtained that an increase of nationalism in the other country group or veil of ignorance group has an negative effect on the amount of refugees chosen relative to someone who makes this decision for their home country. The result that nationalism has a more negative effect for the other country and veil of ignorance group is also against expectation. However, none of the aforementioned results are statistically significant.

Secondly, some interesting obtained results are discussed. The first noteworthy result is that subjects with an HPU background at most choose significantly less refugees compared to the subjects that are high school graduates. This result is significant at the 5% level and for the group that has an HPU master at most even at the 1% level. This result could occur due to the fact that people who finished a HPU study are closer to the labor market than people who finished high school. From the data it is shown that most subjects that were high school graduates at most belonged to the age group 18 till 24 and still identified themselves as student, which implies that they are further away from the labor market than the subjects who finished an HPU study. The subjects who finished an HPU master could therefore feel more threat of refugees regarding the search for a job in the future, because they are closer or already participating in the job market. They could feel like the new refugees limit their changes of job security in the future. Although this explanation sounds probable, it is still speculating and nothing can be said with certainty until further research elaborates on this finding.

In addition, the result for the subjects that originated from outside Europe compared to the group that originates from inside Europe (except the Netherlands) is noteworthy. The results suggest that being from a country from outside Europe significantly leads to choosing almost twenty more refugees to host per thousand inhabitants compared to the group that is from Europe but the Netherlands at the 5% level. A reason for this finding could be that those people can relate more to the situation of the refugees. This is however pure speculation, further research is needed to elaborate more on the underlying reasons of this finding.

Concluding, these results do not prove that nationalism has a lesser effect on the number of refugees when the decision is made for another country instead of for the home country or behind a veil of ignorance. If anything, the results suggest that nationalism decreases the number of refugees chosen for the home country and increases the amount of refugees chosen for another country or when the decision is made behind a veil of ignorance. However, the results were not significant.

The second part of the testing of the second hypothesis includes the Jonckheere-Terpstra test. The three refugee choice variables are divided into three groups. Each refugee choice variable has a low nationalistic group, a middle group and a high nationalistic group. For each variable a different distinction is made, based on the distribution of that specific variable. The distinctions can be found in Appendix A, Table 6. The p-values of the Jonckheere-Terpstra tests are presented in Table 2. For completeness, the Jonckheere-Terpstra test is also performed for the entire sample.

Table 2

P-values of Jonckheere-Terpstra tests, performed for three subsamples and the entire sample. Within the samples, the subjects are divided in three groups (Low, Medium and High) based on their total nationalism score. The variable that these tests are performed on is the number of refugees chosen to host per thousand residents.

(Sub)sample	Own Country	Other Country	Veil of Ignorance	Entire sample
JT-test p-value either direction	0.174	0.097	0.673	0.325
JT-test p-value descending order	0.087	0.049	0.664	0.163
JT-test p-value ascending order	0.913	0.951	0.337	0.837

First, the Jonckheere-Terpstra test applied on the group that chose for their own country is discussed. The performed Jonckheere-Terpstra tests suggests that the medians of the three groups within the own country subsample are not significantly different at the 10% level. When looking further, it can be obtained that the medians are significantly ordered at the 10% level when the groups (Low, Medium and High nationalism) are descending. In this case, it means that the order Low ≤ Medium ≤ High significantly holds with at least one strict inequality at the 10% level. The group with the highest total nationalism score is obtained to choose a higher number of refugees than the group with the lowest nationalism score. This is against expectation, because the order was expected to appear the other way around.

Secondly, the Jonckheere-Terpstra test applied on the group that chose for another country is discussed. The performed Jonckheere-Terpstra tests suggests that the medians of the three groups within the own country subsample are significantly different at the 10% level. Furthermore, it can be obtained that the medians are significantly ordered at the 5% level when the groups (Low, Medium and High nationalism) are descending. In this case, it means that the order Low ≤ Medium ≤ High significantly holds with at least one strict inequality at the 5% level. The group with the highest total nationalism score is obtained to choose a higher number of refugees than the group with the lowest nationalism score. This is against expectation, as it was expected that people with a higher nationalistic attitude would choose a lower

number of refugees. However, this expectation is mostly based on people who choose for their own country and this sample is based on the decision for another country. It could therefore mean that nationalistic people think that the refugees should be given shelter, but not in their own country. This however, is not in line with the earlier obtained result of the group that chose for their own country.

Additionally, the other Jonckheere-Terpstra tests are discussed. For the sample that chose behind the veil of ignorance and the entire sample the results are the same for interpretation and could thus be discussed together. These two performed Jonckheere-Terpstra tests give p-values that are higher than 0.1, which means that the medians from the groups within these samples do not significantly differ from each other at the 10% level. In other words, this implies that for these two samples there is no significant difference in the number of refugees chosen between the three decision groups.

Risk aversion and the number of refugees chosen

The third and final hypothesis of this study is discussed in this section. This hypothesis includes the relation between risk aversion and the number of refugees chosen by the subjects. To test this relationship, four Jonckheere-Terpstra tests are performed. The results of the Jonckheere-Terpstra tests are presented in Table 3 and will be discussed below.

Table 3

P-values of Jonckheere-Terpstra tests, performed for three subsamples and the entire sample. Within the samples, the subjects are divided in three groups (Low, Medium and High) based on their total risk aversion score. The variable that these tests are performed on is the number of refugees chosen to host per thousand residents.

(Sub)sample	Own Country	Other Country	Veil of Ignorance	Entire sample
JT-test p-value either direction	0.515	0.344	0.490	0.791
JT-test p-value descending order	0.257	0.828	0.245	0.395
JT-test p-value ascending order	0.743	0.172	0.755	0.605

Here, the results of the four performed Jonckheere-Terpstra tests to test the hypothesis that different risk attitude groups make different decisions in the number of refugees they decide to host are discussed. The implications of these tests can be interpreted together as the results of all four tests are the same. Moreover, all four Jonckheere-Terpstra tests give p-values that are higher than 0.05. This means that the null hypothesis that the low, medium and high risk aversion groups within each (sub)sample are equal to each other regarding the amount of refugees chosen to host cannot be rejected. In other words, this implies that risk aversion does not have any significant effect on the chosen number of refugees.

Conclusion

The refugee crisis has been one of Europe's largest social issues in the 21th century until now. In the same period, far-right nationalistic parties increased in size all over Europe. In some countries this occurred for the first time since the Second World War. One of the characteristics of those parties is an anti-immigrant attitude, which makes finding a solution to host the refugees more complicated. This paper aims at finding a solution for this problem by using a survey that enables some subjects to make decisions for another country or behind the veil of ignorance, as introduced by Rawls in his book *A Theory of Justice* in 1971. Moreover, this study firstly tries to test the hypothesis that people that choose behind a veil of ignorance or choose for their own country are willing to host less refugees than people who choose for another country. Additionally, the hypothesis that nationalism has a lesser effect on the number of refugees chosen when the decision is made for another country instead of for the home country or behind a veil of ignorance is tested. Lastly, it is obtained whether choosing behind a veil of ignorance leads to an increase in general risk aversion, as indicated by previous literature.

For the first hypothesis, four Mann-Whitney U tests are performed to test whether different groups choose different amounts of refugees to host. Here, the group that chose for another country is first compared with the group that chose for their own country and hereafter, with the group that chose behind a veil of ignorance. As some subjects had home countries outside of Europe, both tests are performed twice. Once with the group outside of Europe and once without. However, no significant results were found that the means of the groups differed from each other.

Secondly, it is tested which effect nationalism has on the number of refugees chosen for the three different groups within the sample. A linear regression is used to test this. Here, the chosen number of refugees is regressed on nationalism and different demographic control variables. The results show that

nationalism does not have a significant effect at the 10% level on the number of refugees chosen for any of the treatment. Hereafter, several Jonckheere-Terpstra tests were performed. The test is performed four times, once for every group and once for the entire sample. Each group is divided in three groups, based on nationalism. The low group holds the part of the (sub)sample that showed the lowest amount of nationalism relatively, the medium group the relative medium part of the (sub)sample and the high group the part of the subjects that showed the highest amount of nationalism relatively. The Jonckheere-Terpstra tests shows significant effects for the group that chose for their own country and the for the group that chose for another country. The order Low ≤ Medium ≤ High with at least one strict inequality significantly holds at the 10% level for the own country group and even at the 5% level for the group that decided for another country. This is however the opposite order than expected.

Lastly, risk aversion is incorporated. Here, this study tried to obtain a relationship between the risk attitude and the amount of refugees chosen. This was done by the help of four Jonckheere-Terpstra tests, similar to the second part of the second hypothesis. First, the subjects were once again divided over a relatively low, medium and high group for each (sub)sample. Hereafter, the tests could be performed. The results of these tests did not show any significant proof that risk aversion has an effect on the number of refugees chosen.

Concluding, this study shows with a survey including 130 subjects that when deciding on the number of refugees that a country should host, it does not matter whether this decision is made by someone from the country itself, someone from another country or by someone who does not know for which country the decision is made. Additionally, this study does not find any evidence that nationalism has any effect on the number of refugees chosen to host. Logically, this study neither finds any evidence that nationalism has a stronger or weaker effect in any of the three subsamples (own country, another country and behind a veil of ignorance). Furthermore, no evidence is found in this study that risk attitude influences the number of refugees chosen to host.

Next, the limitations of this study are discussed. First of all, the size of the sample limits the effect of the tests performed. The effect of the tests becomes even weaker when the sample is divided over multiple groups. Furthermore, the subjects had to choose the number of refugees without any foreknowledge, which does arguably not present anti-immigrant attitudes the most accurate. Additionally, the subjects could have anchored their decisions on the presented statistics with the question. When looking at the data, it is likely that anchoring occurred as the current amount of refugees in the Netherlands per thousand residents (five) is the mode. Therefore, it could be that the subjects did not show their real

preferences. In addition, this survey did not use real incentives, which could lead to the fact that subjects did not use all of their needed mental effort (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). Further research could extend this study by using a larger sample and measuring anti-immigrant attitudes in a different, more precise, manner. With real incentives, subjects could show more real preferences as they probably use more mental effort. It could however be difficult to apply real incentives to this particular study as the results of hosting more or less refugees are hard to simulate.

Furthermore, future research could elaborate on the findings that people with an HPU study at most choose less refugees compared to people who are high school graduates at most. The underlying reasons of this finding are unknown and could be investigated in the near future. Additionally, future studies could investigate why people from outside Europe choose substantially more refugees than people from inside Europe. The reasons behind this result could be very interesting in designing future policies.

References

Andersson, F., & Lyttkens, C. H. (1999). Preferences for equity in health behind a veil of ignorance. *Health Economics*, *8*(5), 369-378.

Asylum Statistics. (2019, May 10). *Eurostat.* Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat

Binswanger, H. P. (1980). Attitudes toward risk: Experimental measurement in rural India. *American journal of agricultural economics*, *62*(3), 395-407.

Borjas, G. J. (1995). The economic benefits from immigration. *Journal of economic perspectives*, *9*(2), 3-22.

Bremmer, I. (2018, September 18). These 5 Countries Show How the European Far-Right Is Growing in Power. *Time.* Retrieved from: https://time.com

Camerer, C. F., & Hogarth, R. M. (1999). The effects of financial incentives in experiments: A review and capital-labor-production framework. *Journal of risk and uncertainty*, *19*(1-3), 7-42.

Carlsson, F., Gupta, G., & Johansson-Stenman, O. (2003). Choosing from behind a veil of ignorance in India. *Applied Economics Letters*, *10*(13), 825-827.

Carlsson, F., Daruvala, D., & Johansson-Stenman, O. (2005). Are people inequality-averse, or just riskaverse?. *Economica, 72*(287), 375-396.

Constant, A. F., & Zimmermann, K. F. (2016). Towards a new European refugee policy that works. *CESifo DICE Report, 14*(4), 3-8.

Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities ("Dublin Convention"), OJ C 254 1990. Retrieved from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu

Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, OJ L 50 2003. Retrieved from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu

Esses, V. M., Hamilton, L. K., & Gaucher, D. (2017). The global refugee crisis: Empirical evidence and policy implications for improving public attitudes and facilitating refugee resettlement. *Social Issues and Policy Review*, *11*(1), 78-123.

Europe and right-wing nationalism: A country-by-country guide. (2019, November 13), *BBC*. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com

European External Action Service. (2016, September 15). *Federica Mogherini debates refugees & migration crisis at the European Parliament Plenary_II* [Video File]. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com

Europe situation. (n.d.). *UNHCR*. Retrieved from: https://www.unhcr.org

Flood, C. (2002, September). Euroscepticism: A problematic concept (illustrated with particular reference to France). In *32nd annual UACES conference, Belfast* (pp. 2-4).

Gingrich, A., & Banks, M. (Eds.). (2006). *Neo-nationalism in Europe and beyond: perspectives from social anthropology*. Berghahn Books.

Gingrich, A. (2006). Nation, status and gender in trouble? Exploring some contexts and characteristics of neo-nationalism in Western Europe. *Neo-nationalism in Europe and beyond: perspectives from social anthropology*, 29-49.

Greven, T. (2016). The rise of right-wing populism in Europe and the United States. *Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Washington DC Office*.

Hafez, F., Heinisch, R., & Miklin, R. (2019, July 24). The new right: Austria's Freedom Party and changing perceptions of Islam. *The Brookings Institution.* Retrieved from: https://www.brookings.edu

Hamilton, B., & Whalley, J. (1984). Efficiency and distributional implications of global restrictions on labour mobility: Calculations and policy implications. *Journal of Development Economics*, *14*(1), 61-75.

Harmsen, R. (2010). Concluding comment: on understanding the relationship between populism and Euroscepticism. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, *11*(3), 333-341.

Hier, S. P., & Greenberg, J. L. (2002). Constructing a discursive crisis: Risk, problematization and illegal Chinese in Canada. *Ethnic and racial studies*, *25*(3), 490-513.

Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. *American economic review*, *92*(5), 1644-1655.

Ivarsflaten, E. (2008). What unites right-wing populists in Western Europe? Re-examining grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases. *Comparative Political Studies*, *41*(1), 3-23.

Klaver en Rutte vinden elkaar niet in vluchtelingendebat. (2017, March 14). *NOS.* Retrieved from: https://www.nos.nl

Kosterman, R., & Feshbach, S. (1989). Toward a measure of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes. *Political psychology*, 257-274.

Kriss, P. H., Loewenstein, G., Wang, X., & Weber, R. A. (2011). Behind the veil of ignorance: Self-serving bias in climate change negotiations. *Judgment and Decision Making*, *6*(7), 602.

Leach, M. (2003). " Disturbing practices": dehumanizing asylum seekers in the refugee" crisis" in Australia, 2001-2002. *Refuge*, *21*(3), 25-33.

Lees, C. (2018). The 'Alternative for Germany': The rise of right-wing populism at the heart of Europe. *Politics*, *38*(3), 295-310.

Lubbers, M., Gijsberts, M., & Scheepers, P. (2002). Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, *41*(3), 345-378.

Mammone, A. (2019, April 7). Right-wing nationalists are on the rise in Europe — and there's no progressive coalition to stop them. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com

Mayda, A. M. (2006). Who is against immigration? A cross-country investigation of individual attitudes toward immigrants. *The review of Economics and Statistics*, *88*(3), 510-530.

McVeigh, K. (2017, November 22). 'Shocking' political rhetoric on refugees aims to poison debate, UN official warns. *The Guardian.* Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com

Norton, M. I., & Ariely, D. (2011). Building a better America—One wealth quintile at a time. *Perspectives on psychological science*, *6*(1), 9-12.

O'Rourke, K. H., & Sinnott, R. (2006). The determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration. *European journal of political economy*, *22*(4), 838-861.

People smuggling. (n.d.). *UNHCR*. Retrieved from: https://www.unhcr.org

Pronin, E., Olivola, C. Y., & Kennedy, K. A. (2008). Doing unto future selves as you would do unto others: Psychological distance and decision making. *Personality and social psychology bulletin, 34*(2), 224-236.

Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. *Harvard university press*.

Refugee Crisis – Q&A on Emergency Relocation. (2015, September 22). Retrieved from: http://europa.eu

Refugee population by country or territory of asylum. (2019, July 9). *The World Bank*. Retrieved from: https://data.worldbank.org

Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, OJ L 180 2013. Retrieved from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu

Riek, B. M., Mania, E. W., & Gaertner, S. L. (2006). Intergroup threat and outgroup attitudes: A meta-analytic review. *Personality and social psychology review*, *10*(4), 336-353.

Rydgren, J. (2005). Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family. *European journal of political research*, *44*(3), 413-437.

Rydgren, J. (2007). The sociology of the radical right. *Annu. Rev. Sociol.*, *33*, 241-262.

Rydgren, J. (2017). Radical right-wing parties in Europe: What's populism got to do with it?. *Journal of Language and Politics*, *16*(4), 485-496.

Schweitzer, R., Perkoulidis, S., Krome, S., Ludlow, C., & Ryan, M. (2005). Attitudes towards refugees: The dark side of prejudice in Australia. *Australian Journal of Psychology*, *57*(3), 170-179.

Stephan, W. G., Ybarra, O., & Bachman, G. (1999). Prejudice toward immigrants 1. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *29*(11), 2221-2237.

Sutter, M., & Weck-Hannemann, H. (2003). Taxation and the Veil of Ignorance–A real effort experiment on the Laffer curve. *Public Choice*, *115*(1-2), 217-240.

Tondo, L. (2019, May 10). Up to 70 dead after boat capsizes trying to reach Europe from Libya. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com

Wike, R., Stokes, B., & Simmons, K. (2016). Europeans fear wave of refugees will mean more terrorism, fewer jobs. *Pew Research Center*, *11*, 2016.

Yılmaz, F. (2012). Right-wing hegemony and immigration: How the populist far-right achieved hegemony through the immigration debate in Europe. *Current sociology*, *60*(3), 368-381.

Appendix

A. Tables

Table 4

Description of variables

Variable	Description
Age (in years)	Represented in average age groups, average for "under 18" is 16, for 18-25 is 21, for 25-34 is 29,5, for 35-44 is 39,5, etc.
Female	Binary variable, 1 = female, 0 = male
Education	Categorical variable, where 1 = Less Than High School, 2 = High School Graduate, 3 = SVE (Secondary Vocational Education), 4 = Bachelor Degree HPU, 5 = Bachelor Degree Uni, 6 = Master Degree HPU and 7 = Master Degree Uni
Nationality	Categorical Variable, where 1 = Dutch, 2 = EU but Dutch and 3 = outside EU
Current Enrollment	Categorical Variable, where 1 = Student, 2 = Employed PT, 3 = Employed FT, 4 = Unemployed, 5 = Retired
Refugee own country	Amount of refugees chosen to host by the subject's home country per 1000 residents
Refugee other country	Amount of refugees chosen to host by an random European Union country but the subject's home country per 1000 residents
Refugee veil of ignorance	Amount of refugees chosen to host behind a veil of ignorance per 1000 residents
Risk Aversion Total	Total score of how risk averse a subject is, the higher the score, the more risk averse. Measured with a Multiple Price List. The lowest score is 10, the highest 20.
Nationalism Total	Total score of how nationalistic a subject is, the higher the score, the more nationalistic. Measured with 5 questions on a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 = "Strongly Disagree" and 5 = "Strongly Agree". The lowest possible score is 5, the highest 25.
HMLNatOwnC	Subjects who chose amount of refugees for their own country divided over three groups (1, 2 and 3), based on nationalism. 1 if they belong to the lowest 30%, 2 if middle 40 %, 3 if highest 30%
HMLNatOtherC	Subjects who chose amount of refugees for another country divided over three groups (1, 2 and 3), based on nationalism. 1 if they belong to the lowest 30%, 2 if middle 40 %, 3 if highest 30%

HMLNatVOI	Subjects who chose amount of refugees behind the veil of ignorance divided over three groups (1, 2 and 3), based on nationalism. 1 if they belong to the lowest 30%, 2 if middle 40 %, 3 if highest 30%		
HMLNat	All subjects divided over three groups (1, 2 and 3), based on nationalism. 1 if they belong to the lowest 30%, 2 if middle 40 %, 3 if highest 30%		
Choice Mode	Represents whether subjects chose for their own country, another country or behind a veil of ignorance		

Table 5

Descriptive statistics of different variables

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Standard Deviation
Age	130	29.077	13.168
Female	130	0.385	0.488
Less_Than_High_School	130	0.015	0.124
High_School_Graduate	130	0.169	0.367
SVE	130	0.077	0.268
Bachelor_Degree_HPU	130	0.308	0.463
Bachelor_Degree_Uni	130	0.231	0.423
Master_Degree_HPU	130	0.069	0.255
Master_Degree_Uni	130	0.131	0.338
Dutch	130	0.885	0.321
NonEU	130	0.1	0.301
EUnonDutch	130	0.015	0.124
Student	130	0.446	0.499
Employed_PT	130	0.138	0.347
Employed_FT	130	0.338	0.475
Unemployed	130	0.062	0.241

Retired	130	0.015	0.124

Table 6

(Sub)samples divided over three groups, Low, Medium and High, based on their total nationalism score. The table shows with what score a subject qualifies for which group within the different samples. Between brackets the amount of subjects belonging to a group is presented.

(Sub)sample	Own Country	Other Country	Veil of Ignorance	Entire sample
Low	10 – 15 (15)	8 – 14 (12)	9 – 14 (13)	8 – 14 (34)
Medium	16 – 17 (11)	15 – 17 (17)	15 – 17 (15)	15 – 17 (49)
High	18 – 25 (16)	18 – 22 (15)	18 – 22 (16)	18 – 25 (47)

Table 7

(Sub)samples divided over three groups, Low, Medium and High, based on their total risk aversion score. The table shows with what score a subject qualifies for which group within the different samples. Between brackets the amount of subjects belonging to a group is presented.

(Sub)sample	Own Country	Other Country	Veil of Ignorance	Entire sample
Low	13 – 14 (17)	12 – 14 (19)	11 – 14 (14)	11 – 14 (50)
Medium	15 – 16 (17)	15 – 16 (18)	15 – 16 (22)	15 – 16 (57)
High	17 – 18 (8)	17 – 18 (7)	17 – 18 (8)	17 – 18 (23)

B. Survey

Thank you in advance for filling in this survey. The purpose of this survey is to gather data for my thesis, which is part of the master Behavioural Economics at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The survey is completely anonymous and will not take more than 5 minutes. Please answer the questions truthfully.

What is your age?

○ Under 18 (1)

○ 18 - 24 (2)

○ 25 - 34 (3)

○ 35 - 44 (4)

○ 45 - 54 (5)

○ 55 - 64 (6)

○ 65 - 74 (7)

○ 75 - 84 (8)

○ 85 or older (9)

What is your gender?

○ Male (1)

○ Female (2)

○ Other (3)

What is your highest level of education? *If currently enrolled, highest degree received.*

○ Less than high school (1)

○ High school graduate (2)

○ Secondary Vocational Education (MBO) (3)

○ Bachelor degree (Higher professional education) (4)

○ Master degree (Higher professional education) (5)

○ Bachelor degree (University) (6)

○ Master degree (University) (7)

What is your country of birth?

_____

What is your current employment status?

○ Employed full time (1)

○ Employed part time (2)

○ Unemployed looking for work (3)

○ Unemployed not looking for work (4)

○ Retired (5)

○ Student (6)

○ Disabled (7)

*Subjects were shown one of the following three questions, dependent on the treatment group they were in.*

Home country variant

In Europe, the amount of refugees hosted varies per country. To give an idea, Germany hosts the most refugees, with more or less 13 refugees per 1000 residents, The Netherlands currently hosts about 5 refugees per 1000 residents and Spain hosts less than 1 refugee per 1000 citizens. Now, imagine that you decide how many refugees *Chosen Home Country* will host per 1000 residents. Please select the amount of refugees you are willing to host if you were in this position.

	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Amount of refugees per 1000 residents ()	

Other country variant

In Europe, the amount of refugees hosted varies per country. To give an idea, Germany hosts the most refugees, with more or less 13 refugees per 1000 residents, The Netherlands currently hosts about 5 refugees per 1000 residents and Spain hosts less than 1 refugee per 1000 citizens. Now, imagine that you decide how many refugees another European country but *Chosen Home Country* will host per 1000 residents. Please select the amount of refugees you are willing to host for this country if you were in this position.

	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Amount of refugees per 1000 residents ()	

Veil of ignorance variant

In Europe, the amount of refugees hosted varies per country. To give an idea, The European country with the most refugees hosts more or less 13 refugees per 1000 residents, The average is around 5 refugees per 1000 residents and the countries that host the least refugees host less than 1 refugee per 1000 citizens. Now, imagine that you decide how many refugees an European country will host per 1000 residents. You do not know whether this country is *Chosen Home Country* or another European country. Please select the amount of refugees you are willing to host if you were in this position.

	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Amount of refugees per 1000 residents ()	

Please answer the following questions.

	Strongly agree (1)	Somewhat agree (2)	Neither agree nor disagree (3)	Somewhat disagree (4)	Strongly disagree (5)
The first duty of everyone from *Chosen Home Country* is to honor its history and heritage. (1)	○	○	○	○	○
The important thing for *Chosen Home Country* foreign aid program is to see to it that the *Chosen Home Country* gains a political advantage. (2)	○	○	○	○	○
Generally, the more influence *Chosen Home Country* has on other nations, the better of they are.. (3)	○	○	○	○	○
It is important that *Chosen Home Country* win in international sporting competitions like the Olympics. (4)	○	○	○	○	○
It is really not important that *Chosen Home Country* is number one in whatever it does. (5)	○	○	○	○	○

The table below shows 10 choices you have to make. For each choice, the left column represents lottery A and the right column represents lottery B. Each lottery has two possible outcomes, the probabilities

for those outcomes are stated per choice. Please state for each choice whether you rather have option A (left choice) or option B (right choice).

A	1 (1)	2 (2)	B
10% at €2,00, 90% at €1,60	○	○	10% at €3,85, 90% at €0,10
20% at €2,00, 80% at €1,60	○	○	20% at €3,85, 80% at €0,10
30% at €2,00, 70% at €1,60	○	○	30% at €3,85, 70% at €0,10
40% at €2,00, 60% at €1,60	○	○	40% at €3,85, 60% at €0,10
50% at €2,00, 50% at €1,60	○	○	50% at €3,85, 50% at €0,10
60% at €2,00, 40% at €1,60	○	○	60% at €3,85, 40% at €0,10
70% at €2,00, 30% at €1,60	○	○	70% at €3,85, 30% at €0,10
80% at €2,00, 20% at €1,60	○	○	80% at €3,85, 20% at €0,10
90% at €2,00, 10% at €1,60	○	○	90% at €3,85, 10% at €0,10
100% at €2,00, 0% at €1,60	○	○	100% at €3,85, 0% at €0,10