Realist Paradise: Crises, Conflicts, and Interventions in the Horn of Africa
Abstract

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The international relations theory known as realism has three basic assumptions. First, states are the primary actors in the international system. Second, states’ actions are always motivated by security and/or economic interests. Third, the previous two assumptions result in the conclusion that international institutions and other non-state actors are not relevant. In this thesis the correctness of these assumptions were examined by distilling three hypotheses from them and testing these by applying them to foreign interventions in the Horn of Africa since the end of the Cold War. These interventions, the American-UN intervention in Somalia from 1992-1995; UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea; the Ethiopian-American military actions against Somalia from 2006-2008; and the anti-piracy actions in the Gulf of Aden by a range of actors from 2008 onward; offer a mixed bag when it comes to the correctness of realist theory. This thesis finds that realism accurately captures the impotence of international organizations in the area of security policy. It also correctly predicts that when deciding on whether to continue an intervention states will base their assessment on hard interests at stake. At the same time, realist theory underestimates the potency of armed non-state actors, which have demonstrated in the Horn of Africa that they can have a severe influence on states’ policies and the outcomes of state interventions. Furthermore, when launching interventions, states do not necessarily act only when their interests are threatened. As such, this thesis concludes that while realism is correct in some areas, it needs modification in others.

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Introduction

This thesis will focus on the oldest and most resilient theory in international relations: realism. It will test whether realism’s key assumptions and positions match with reality by looking at foreign interventions in the Horn of Africa since the end of the Cold War. If reality strokes with the theory’s assumptions the theory will have been confirmed. If reality differs from what the theory would predict, the theory will have to be either rejected completely or modified in such a way that it does allow for the outcomes found.

This thesis will construct its argument by first describing realism’s historic development and its key assumptions. Then three main hypotheses that will be tested will be distilled from that. These hypotheses will focus on the reasons why states launched the interventions, on the role non-state actors played in the intervention, and on the outcome of the intervention. A definition of what an intervention is will also be developed.

In four subsequent chapters, four different interventions will be looked at. After describing the background of the intervention, the actual intervention will be examined using the framework of the three hypotheses. The outcomes found in each case will then be brought together in the final conclusion on whether the interventions confirm realism.

What this thesis therefore seeks to find is whether the foreign interventions in the Horn of Africa since the end of the Cold War confirm realists’ assumptions when it comes to the motives behind interventions, to the role of states and non-state actors, and to the final outcome of the interventions.

It should be mentioned here that this thesis builds on the master thesis I wrote for my Master’s degree in American Studies that I obtained at the Radboud University Nijmegen in 2008. In that thesis I examined why the United States kept getting involved in Somalia from the end of the Second World War onward. As such, two of the interventions discussed in this thesis were also discussed in my previous thesis.

While relying partly on my research for the previous thesis, I reread most of the sources used for it and added new ones to fill the gaps that were the result of the different focus of this thesis. Where I relied most on my previous thesis is in the description of Somalia’s history in chapter 2, although it is much briefer here than in the previous
thesis, and on the overview of the political development in Somalia after the failed intervention in the early 1990s, which is also much shorter.
Chapter 1: Realism, Intervention, and the Cases to Be Studied

As stated in the introduction, this thesis will focus on interventions that were conducted in the Horn of Africa in the post-Cold War world. It seeks to find out if the launching, the execution, and the outcome of these interventions confirm the core assumptions of realist theory. Therefore, this chapter will first offer a brief overview of realism’s history as an academic field of study. Then it will offer an overview of key realist concepts. From these concepts I will distill a number of hypotheses that will be tested in the cases studied.

After that this chapter will specify which countries the Horn of Africa is made up of. It will then also define what exactly an intervention is by combining ideas from existing literature on this subject and characteristics of the cases chosen for this thesis. After that there will be an overview of the cases chosen and a brief argument for why they were chosen.

1.1 Realism’s History: Carr and Morgenthau

Realism is a theory in international relations that came up as an academic study during and after the Second World War in response to the theories that had been popular in between the two world wars (Dunne & Schmidt, 2005). However, the origins of realist thought have been traced back as far as Thucydides, a historian from ancient Greece who wrote on the Peloponnesian War. Other well-known realist authors from before realism became an academic study are the Italian philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli and the British philosopher Thomas Hobbes (Ibid). Others do not explicitly trace realism back to ancient Greece but are not afraid to claim that realist ideas have been dominant for “at least twelve centuries” either (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995, p. 45). In spite of realism’s long history, this thesis will only discuss it from its inception as an academic field onward.

As stated above, the rise of realism was partly a response to theories that had become popular after the First World War. In its aftermath, leaders of that war’s victorious nations were driven by “the passionate desire to prevent war” (Carr, 1981, p.
These leaders saw war as “a disease of the international body politic” (Ibid). Based on this assumption they set out to prevent war from even happening again.

The way in which they did this was through the establishment of a collective security system known as the League of Nations. It is this approach and this organ that was criticized by E.H. Carr in his 1939 book *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*, which is seen as one of the classics of realist literature (Carr, 1981).\footnote{Yet, as Cox (2001) explains in the introduction to a reissued version of *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*, Carr himself did not care much for that honor; nor did he care much for the rise of International Relations as an independent study to which his book heavily contributed.} Carr’s (1981) critique on the post-war policymakers was mostly that the goal of no more war had prevented critical thought and had stood in the way of a proper analysis on how to achieve that. When confronted with questions on this, the designers of the system argued that their approach simply had to work because the consequences of failure would be horrible. Carr, however, believed that achieving this goal would be very problematic and that the difficulties in achieving this were “scarcely manifest even to the keenest intelligence” (p. 9). These difficulties did not become fully visible until a rearmed and aggressive Germany, together with its allies Italy and Japan exposed the League of Nations’ weaknesses and unleashed the even more devastating Second World War.

Rather than basing a plan against war on the idealistic vision of world peace, Carr (1981) believed that a “hard and ruthless analysis” of the international system was needed (p. 9). After such an analysis, the conclusion would be that collective security is not feasible because not everyone desires an effective collective security system, and that even those who do mean different things with it. In short, according to Carr the goals and interests of nations diverge. This divergence of goals and interests makes conflict between nations or the threat thereof unavoidable.

The insights in Carr’s book were developed further by Hans Morgenthau in his classic *Politics among Nations* that was published in 1948. This book too is seen as a one of the founding works of realist thought, partly because Morgenthau “created and stressed a realist set of axioms that inevitably had to be followed” (Guzzini, 1998, p. 24). Some believe that Morgenthau created this set of rules as a sort of “crash course” for American diplomats and policymakers to help them play the game of international
politics that they as representatives of one of the world’s two superpowers now had to become skilled in (Ibid, p. ix).

Morgenthau (1978) assumed that this game of international politics was, just like domestic politics, a struggle for power. This struggle could manifest itself in three different patterns: “keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power” (Ibid, p. 42). In doing so, “armed strength as a threat or potentiality is the most important material factor making for the political power of a nation” (Ibid, p. 31). What the above means is that all states seek the same, power, and that to achieve that they need to strengthen their military capability.

While pointing out the centrality of the struggle for power in the behavior of states, Morgenthau (1978) acknowledged that not everyone likes the fact that this struggle exists. Scholars who did not like it tried to establish the cause of this struggle and found causes such as the competition for colonies between European nations, the existence of trade barriers, capitalism, and autocracy. After finding a cause to blame the power struggle on, those scholars then claimed that if humanity would remove it, the power struggle would end.

According to Morgenthau (1978), however, such a finding is false, as the struggle for power is not the result of “social arrangements and institutions created by man” but by “bio-psychological drives” such as the “drives to live, to propagate, and to dominate” (p. 36-37). Since these drives are an inherent part of human nature, it is impossible to overcome humanity’s striving for dominance. As such, it is also impossible that the struggle for power in the international environment will come to an end, as some hope.

1.2 Neorealism

The notion that human nature is the source of the struggle for power has been disputed by later realist scholars such as Kenneth Waltz. In his 1979 book *Theory of International Politics* he claimed the struggle for power was the result of the structure of the global system. He came to this conclusion when he observed that although states behaved very similarly on the international scene, even though they internal structure differed greatly. This means that domestic structure does not influence state’s conduct towards other states. The only explanation for this is that it is the system’s structure that
“works to keep outcomes within narrow ranges” (Waltz, 1979, p. 73). This version of realism is known as neorealism and its approach is called the systemic approach.

Waltz (1979) then pointed out that the central characteristics of the international system were its decentralized and anarchic nature. What this means is that states can only rely on themselves when it comes to their security. As such, “self-help is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order” (Ibid, p. 111). Furthermore, anarchy means that “war may at any time break out” since states can decide at any moment to use force against others (Ibid, p. 102). The result of this is that states will seek to build up as strong an army as possible to prevent being “at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors” (Ibid). What this signifies is that although classical realists such as Morgenthau and neorealists such as Waltz disagree on the source of the struggle for power, they both believe that it compels states to build up their military capability.

In the constant presence of a threat to its security, the main goal of each state is to ensure its survival (Waltz, 1979). This assumption means that cooperation between states is unlikely “because it is constrained by the dominating logic of security competition” (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995, p. 9). Furthermore, this also means that cooperation through international organizations such as the UN is constrained by the same security demands. Therefore these organizations cannot take on a strong role and are not close to becoming some kind of central world government. In the absence of such a government or other supranational authority to enforce international rules, states are the most important actors in the international system.

This treatment of states as the most important actors has been challenged by some theories of international relations. They point out that other actors, such as international institutions and non-state actors like corporations, are active in the international arena. While Waltz (1979) acknowledges that some non-state actors have surpassed some minor powers, he believes that “a theory that denies the central role of states will be needed only if non-state actors develop to the point of rivaling or surpassing the great powers” (p. 95). As of now that has not happened yet.
1.3 Post-Cold War Challenges to Realism and the Intrarealist Debate

As said above, Waltz developed the systemic approach to international relations in 1979. What has also been discussed is the criticism realism received on treating states as the most important actors and ignoring non-state actors such as international institutions. While Waltz dismissed these arguments they regained strength after the end of the Cold War, an event which had not been predicted by realist theory.

One of realisms strongest opponents became the neoliberal school of international relations. Neoliberals argued that “international politics is being transformed and realism is being rendered obsolete as democracy extends its sway, as interdependence tightens its grip, and as institutions smooth the way to peace” (Waltz, 2000, p. 6). Here ‘interdependence’ means that in a globalizing economy states become ever more dependent on one another, making it too costly or straight up undesirable to go to war with each other. This challenges the notion that war is always just one shot away.

The renewed emphasis on the role of international institutions in international relations, and particularly security policy, was the result of the end of the Cold War. Now, the main source of the United Nations “paralysis” in the security area, a veto by either the U.S. or the Soviet Union, no longer existed (Menkhaus & Ortmayer, 1995, p. 8). It seemed that now the UN could finally start playing “the role envisioned by its founders” as American President George H.W. Bush put it in 1990. The more than a dozen UN peacekeeping missions launched from 1988 to the early 1990s are an indication of the increasing activity of that international organization in the security arena (Kennedy, 2006).

Jervis (1999), however, did not agree that neoliberals challenged realist theory. Instead he argued that neoliberals referred to cooperation on matters of international political economy (IPE) and the environment, while realists focused on security issues. In the areas IPE focuses on, “large mutual benefits are believed to be possible” (p. 45). In the security area, however, “there is the constant threat that betrayal will lead to a devastating military defeat” (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 19) As such, states will not cooperate as easily in that area as they do in the other, if they manage to cooperate at all.

While all realists agree that cooperation in security matters is at the very least difficult, they disagree on how difficult it actually is. On one side of the disagreement
there are the offensive realists. They believe that the anarchic nature of the international system makes states want to maximize their power since only the strongest states can ensure their own survival. They do so by expanding whenever the benefits of doing so outweigh its costs (Taliaferro, 2000-2001). This inherently expansionist nature of states means that states either do not seek mutual security because one or more of them seek to expand, or that they cannot achieve it because their security needs conflict (Jervis, 1999).

The other sort of realists, the defensive realists, disagrees with this. They contest the notion that states are inherently expansionist and believe that “often states would be willing to settle for the status quo and are driven more by fear than the desire to make gains” (Jervis, 1999, p. 94). As such, they seek maximum security, not maximum power. When two potential adversaries seek only to maximize security, then defensive realist believe that the states can achieve more security by decreasing their offensive military capabilities in a transparent and coordinated manner, and through information sharing (Ibid, 1999).

At the time of the debates on the merits of Neoliberalism as opposed to realism and the debate between defensive and offensive realists, Joseph Grieco introduced another element into the debate on the possibilities of international cooperation: that of absolute gains versus relative gains. In an article he wrote in 1998, Grieco charged that neoliberals believed that states focus only on absolute gains (more tanks, for example, and more wealth) and that they do not care about how much other states gain.

Realists, however, believe that states also focus on their gains or losses in comparison to others. Grieco (1988) has referred to this as relative gains and losses. Relative gains or losses are important to states because if other states gain much more than they do, they grow weaker in comparison to them. This then means that the states that gain least become less capable of defending their interests and even their own territories against the states that are growing stronger. This relative weakening could therefore invite other states to attack their interests and maybe even the state itself. In the worst case that could even lead to the destruction of the state. As such, a relative weakening of one’s position has to be prevented.
1.4 Development of Hypotheses

The discussion above leads to the conclusion that neorealists and neoliberals agree that cooperation is possible, although the areas in which it is possible and the extent to which it is possible are disputed. Naturally, this also has effects on the perception of international organizations by realists, as those are the product of international cooperation by states. The question then is whether international institutions since the end of the Cold War have demonstrated that they are capable of acting autonomously in the area of security.

Jervis (1999) sees three basic kinds of international institutions. One kind is institutions such as the UN that are autonomous but “are not autonomous in the sense of overriding or shaping preferences of those who established them” (p. 57) (emphasis in original). Since the main preference of states is to ensure their survival, the UN and other international organs are believed by realists to be incapable of acting autonomously in security matters.

This assumption will be tested in this thesis. Is it possible to make the case that in the interventions in the Horn of Africa international institutions behaved autonomously and forced member states to do things that they did not want or that went against their interests? Should this indeed be the case this would mean that international institutions are equally, if not more, important actors than states and this would falsify a core realist assumption. For this test international institutions will also include bodies that were created by states to tackle a specific international problem such as a border dispute.

The two other sorts of institutions that Jervis (1999) distinguishes are institutions that “are potential tools but remain outside the realm of normal statecraft because leaders have not thought of them or do not appreciate their effectiveness” (p. 57). This concept will not be tested as its very definition indicates they are not used, which means that by definition they have no effect. Jervis’s third category is institutions that “[change] beliefs about what is possible and desirable” within states (p. 59). These institutions would alter what its member states want in the longer run. How this would be measurable in a specific intervention is hard to see, however, and will therefore not be tested in this thesis either.
Besides international institutions, this thesis will also look at the role of non-state armed actors (NSAs). According to Holmqvist in the volume edited by Bryden and Hänggi (2005), NSAs are “armed groups that operate beyond state control” (p. 45). She states that “conventional assumptions about the state’s exclusive role in military and security affairs” has come under increased pressure, in particular in South-America, Asia, and Africa (p. 45).

In her article, Holmqvist (2005) labels groups such as rebel opposition groups, local militias, warlords, and private security companies as NSAs. Surprisingly, however, she does not specify terrorist organizations as NSAs. Given the prominence terrorism has gained in international relations since the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, this absence is a bit strange since terrorist networks are armed groups that operate beyond state control. Therefore, this thesis will treat terrorist networks also as NSAs.

The above shows that since the end of the Cold War two (perceived) developments that challenge the primacy of the state as stressed by realists can be distinguished. One development is that an institutional level above states is being constructed through international institutions. The second development is a challenge coming from NSAs who perpetrate violence outside the control of the state.

I already discussed above that the role of international institutions will be tested. Given that NSAs pose a similar challenge to realism I will also look at their role in either triggering an intervention or in deciding its outcome. Should any such group have played a decisive role in the intervention, this again might challenge the realist notion that states are the most important actors. Decisive will mean that the NSAs made the costs of continuing the intervening unbearably high for the intervening party.²

Of course, in intrastate conflicts NSAs by definition play a role, as Holmqvist (2005) also points out. Yet, the interventions in the Horn of Africa that will be discussed in this thesis all include at least one state actor. If that state actor only ends it intervening after achieving what it set out to do, then the state is indeed the most important actor. However, should one or more NSAs prevent the intervening state from achieving its

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² ‘Unbearably high’ costs here can mean absolute and/or relative economic, military, and political costs.
goals then that would indicate that non-state actors can have a decisive influence on state behavior.

The discussion on NSAs is also related to the evolution in the thought on when an intervention can be classified as self-defense, as will be discussed below. If it can be shown that the presence of NSAs in a country in the Horn of Africa triggered the intervention, then that will show that states have also expanded the concept of what they see as threats beyond the traditional threat of an enemy state. This would pose a challenge to the realist assumption that states are the most important actors.

Of course, the above also demands a description of what a threat is. In this thesis I will distinguish two types of threats. The first threat is that to the survival of the state and the threat of physical violence against the state. If a country participating in the intervention in the Horn of Africa does so because it believes there is a threat to its physical survival realism would be confirmed. In this thesis a threat of physical violence against a state’s facilities is also seen as a threat to one’s security.

The second type of security is the security of a state’s vital economic interests. Morgenthau (1978) made a distinction between economic policies undertaken because they make economic sense and economic policies that are carried out “from the point of view of their contribution to national power” (p. 34). Waltz (1979) noted that “states use economic means for military and political ends; and military and political means for the achievement of economic interests” (p. 94).

What can be derived from the above is that a state’s power position also depends on its economic strength. Hence, a severe threat to a state’s economic stability could undermine that state’s power position. If there is a threat to resources or other interests that a state’s economy needs to function, for example oil, realists would not be surprised if the threatened state undertakes military action to remove that threat. Should it be found that an intervening power has such economic interests at stake in the Horn of Africa and launches an intervention because of it, realist theory will be confirmed.

So far, the tests specified above focus on the reasons states had to launch an intervention and on what the role of non-state actors in those interventions was. What these grounds do not fully cover is the outcome of the intervention. However, the outcome should also be taken into account. After all, as seen in the case of the League of
Nations and its collective security system, states sometimes have policies that go beyond their concrete interests. In the end, however, the League was unable to prevent and then stop expansionist powers Germany, Japan, and Italy from launched an expansionist war. This failure confirmed realist theory, even though the policies of the League’s members defied realism before that.

Therefore, this thesis will also study the outcomes of the interventions, to the extent that this is possible. Should it turn out that an intervention started on grounds other than the interests of states was nonetheless successful in achieving its goals, then that would disprove realist theory. Should it turn out that non-state actors have an autonomous (in the case of international organs) and/or decisive role (both international organs and armed non-state actors) in bringing the intervention to an end, then that would falsify realism too.

While the hypotheses I will test have been elaborated on above, there will now follow a short overview to make it clearer. The interventions in the Horn of Africa since the end of the Cold fit realist theory because:

1. States carried out interventions in the Horn of Africa only because they believed their interests were at stake;
   a. The participating state(s) believed there was a threat to their physical security;
   b. The participating state(s) believed there was a threat to vital economic interests in the Horn of Africa.

2. States were the key actors in launching the interventions and non-state actors did not play a decisive role in them.
   a. International organizations, such as the United Nations and the European Union, and other supranational bodies did not play an autonomous role in the operations and could not force states to do anything they did not want;
   b. Armed non-state actors (NSAs) active in the Horn of Africa did not trigger or alter the outcome of the intervention.

3. The intervention came to an end because the participating state(s), and not non-state actors, decided they had met the goals they set out to achieve.

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3 Since the anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden is not yet over it impossible to look at its outcome.
1.5 Defining the Horn and Defining ‘Intervention’

Above has been established what the historic background and key assumptions of realism are. The hypotheses this thesis will test have also been stated above. Now it is time to define two key concepts this thesis will use: the Horn of Africa and the concept ‘intervention.’

1.5.1 Horn of Africa:

As said before, this thesis will focus on interventions in the Horn of Africa. Before laying out the reasons for choosing this region it is important to define what countries make up the Horn of Africa, as there is no agreement in the literature on this. The U.S. military’s Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa Combined Joint Operation Area states the Horn consists of Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, and Seychelles (CJTF-HOA, 2009). Others state that the Horn also includes Uganda and Tanzania (IRC, 2005). The Encyclopedia Britannica (2009), however, states that the Horn consists only of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. Since the interventions that will be discussed in this thesis all took place in the countries mentioned in the definition by the Encyclopedia Britannica, this is the definition that will be used in this thesis. A map of the Horn can be found in Appendix A on page 83.

Another reason for limiting the Horn of Africa to those four countries is that, as will be discussed throughout this thesis, the (recent) history of those countries is highly interconnected. For example, they have all coveted territory belonging to one of the other states at some point in recent history. In fact, they have all gone to war over a territorial dispute with at least one of the other countries in the Horn since the 1960s. A final reason is that each country in the Horn either hosts peoples belonging to the dominant ethnic group of one of the other Horn states, or has part of its dominant ethnic group living outside of its country. As such, these four countries form a distinct group of countries on the African continent.

There were three reasons for choosing the Horn of Africa as testing ground for realism since 1990. The first one is that I believe that conclusions drawn from the various conflicts and interventions there can be applied to other countries and regions too. After all, the Horn has experienced both interstate and intrastate conflicts. It has experienced
violent border disputes. International Islamic terrorists have been and are still present there. All these problems face the international community in other parts of the world as well. Secondly, the interventions that will be discussed had a range of different goals such as monitoring a peace process, halting a humanitarian disaster, securing sea lanes, and helping rebuild a failed state. These differences in goals can possibly lead to different outcomes that can demand a modification of realist theory. A final reason to choose the Horn of Africa was that international institutions have been involved in some of these interventions, as have NSAs.

1.5.2 Intervention

In order to be able to test whether the interventions in the Horn of Africa confirm realist theory it is necessary to define what an intervention actually is. A good starting point for this is the list of intervention instruments that have been used in the past as put together by Duyvesteyn (2009). These instruments are: military intervention, political intervention and negotiations, economic sanctions, humanitarian aid, and international tribunals such as the International Criminal Court. These various instruments are meant to “resolve war and to reduce its effects” (Ibid, p. 99).

This means that interventions are sent to areas where there is an armed conflict of some kind and are undertaken to end the conflict and alleviate human suffering at the same time. Since there is no specification it means interventions are possible in both interstate and intrastate conflicts. It also indicates that interventions are carried out only by parties that were not involved in the conflict before the intervention. Had that been the case, the intervening parties would not seek to ‘resolve’ the war, but to win it. The difference is that resolving indicates that you seek a solution acceptable to all parties, while a party that fights a war tries to everything it wants without regard for the opponents’ desires.

It should be pointed out, however, that whether a party was or was not involved in the conflict before it began its active military involvement can be debated. This debate hinges on the question when a state’s military actions can be classified as self-defense. When acting in self-defense, a state responds to actions by an enemy that threaten its national security. This means that even though it was not engaged in hostilities yet, the
party launching defensive actions was involved in a conflict, even though it did not choose to be.

As Colijn (2009) points out, the question on when one has the right to invoke self-defense has been heavily debated in recent years. Self-defense used to be legal only when under actual attack. Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, people such as former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and former U.S. President George W. Bush have called for a broader right to self-defense. This broader right can mean that self-defense is also legal when a state takes out an “evident albeit latent threat,” but can go as far as to include taking action to prevent a threat from ever materializing to begin with (Ibid, 2009, p. 380).

Given the shifting and differing opinions on what constitutes self-defense, it could turn out that what one would call an intervention without any national security interests is called an act of self-defense in response to a future threat by others. Given the legal uncertainties involved here, I will use the narrow interpretation of the right to self-defense in this thesis. As such, if there has not been an armed attack on the intervening party, any military action by that party will be treated as an intervention.

Having discussed what an intervention generally seeks to do, it is now time to define what its characteristics are. As already listed above, military intervention, political intervention and negotiations, economic sanctions, humanitarian aid, and international tribunals such as the International Criminal Court are all means that can be used to intervene (Molier & Nieuwenhuys, 2009).

As will be demonstrated throughout this thesis, a number of these instruments were used in every single intervention in the Horn of Africa. For one, all interventions discussed included the deployment of troops by the intervening party or parties. UNITAF and UNOSOM I and II consisted of American and other forces. Both UNMEE and the anti-piracy mission that was started in 2008 consisted of troops and ships of many different nationalities. The intervention in the intrastate conflict in Somalia between the Islamic Courts Union and the Transitional Federal Government from 2006 to 2008 was conducted by both Ethiopian and American troops.

In most cases discussed in this thesis there was also an intervention on the political level by outside powers in the hope of convincing the parties involved to
conclude a peace agreement. This is probably clearest in the case of UNMEE where two states, Ethiopia and Eritrea, signed the so-called Algiers Agreement that should have led to a final solution to the border disputes that existed between the two countries. Yet UNOSOM also led a peace process between some of the warring factions in Somalia, albeit unsuccessfully. It could also be argued that the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government for Somalia with the help of Ethiopia and Kenya was a political intervention meant to help Somalis solve their political problems. In the case of Somali piracy, the deployment of naval forces was accompanied by the so-called Djibouti Process.

While economic sanctions are also listed as an instrument of intervention, I disagree with that assessment. It is true that economic sanctions can be used against states that are deemed to violate international norms. In fact, they were imposed on Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000. However, they were imposed before UNMEE was sent and before a peace agreement was signed. As such, I would argue they were more of a punitive action to show the parties their behavior was deemed unacceptable, rather than as a design to permanently end the war.

After all, if the sanctions had ended the war, the Algiers Agreement and UNMEE would not have been necessary. Since as discussed above an intervention is meant to end war, economic sanctions are not a part of it. Indeed, Duyvesteyn (2009) herself also admits that “economic sanctions hardly ever achieve the intended effect” (p. 118). Besides that, the other three cases discussed in this thesis did not involve economic sanctions (although a weapons embargo was in place against Somalia). This indicates that internationally, economic sanctions are not considered a necessary part of an intervention.

The inclusion of humanitarian aid in the list of intervention instruments is also debatable. The reason for this is that, as Duyvesteyn (2009) herself also acknowledges, it is “heavily geared toward [war's] symptoms” (p. 119). As such it does not help in ending the conflict, which, as has been established above, is the main goal of an intervention. I will therefore not include humanitarian aid in my definition of an intervention either.

The same thing goes to a certain extent for the inclusion of international tribunals such as the International Criminal Court in the list of intervention instruments. This
inclusion is problematic for three reasons. First, tribunals such as the Yugoslavia Tribunal are established after the war is over and as such they do not help in ending it. Secondly, such courts are “supposed to act as a deterrent” for those who would commit war crimes and human rights violations (Duyvesteyn, 2009, p. 121). However, “there is no evidence that either the ICC or the ad hoc tribunals [possess] any kind of deterrent power” (Ibid, p. 121). This means that such tribunals are ineffective on their own terms. The third reason to exclude tribunals in the definition of an intervention is that no tribunals were established for any of the cases discussed here.  

In the case of the Eritrea-Ethiopian border conflict, however, the Algiers Agreement that ended that war did establish a Boundaries Commission to draw the new borders. As will be discussed in chapter 3 this commission had supranational competences and is in that sense similar to a tribunal. However, it was established by the parties involved as part of the final agreement that ended the war. As such it is the result of the political intervention and negotiation process and is it not an independently deployed intervention instrument.

The case of the Boundaries Commission, however, does add another element that should be present in order to speak of an intervention. The intervening power or powers should have the capability and/or authority to force the parties involved to do something they might not want. The Boundaries Commission for example was asked to draw the final border between Ethiopia and Eritrea. This new border could directly contradict what either state wanted. Yet, because the agreement that established the Commission was binding, both states had to comply with the ruling. What matters here is not if the Commission could enforce its ruling, what matters is that the states involved were no longer the ones who had a final say over the matter.

Even if there is no organ established to issue a ruling on whatever problem exists, an intervention can still have similar powers. If the intervening parties are authorized to use force against those who would seek to prolong the conflict, that can have a similar effect to a binding ruling by a commission. It too can take away the root cause of a conflict by taking out the fighting capabilities of the fighting parties.

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4 Although some, including the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs have called for the creation of a UN tribunal to try pirates arrested in the Gulf of Aden. Yet, is by no means sure yet if that will even be created.
All in all, the above discussion means that for this thesis ‘intervention’ means the following. An intervention is the deployment of military and political means to an armed conflict with the goal of ending it, and is carried out by actors with no direct security and/or vital economic interest at stake in that conflict but have the capability and/or authority to influence the behavior of the warring parties involved to achieve its goal.

1.6 The Cases to Be Examined

The last thing to do now is to briefly describe the four cases I have chosen to examine and explain why those cases qualify as an intervention. All information in the brief descriptions below will be elaborated on in the chapters that discuss the individual intervention.

U.S.-led intervention in Somalia 1993

In 1992 and 1993, Somalia was suffering from a major famine after the country had descended into civil war. In response to the humanitarian crisis the U.S. and the United Nations launched a humanitarian effort to provide aid to the suffering population. When roving gangs and militias prevented the delivery of aid, three successive interventions, UNOSOM, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II, were sent to not only stop the gangs but also to set up a peace process to bring peace to the war-torn nation.

All in all this means there was both a military and political component to the intervention. The intervention was carried out by states and institutions that had no direct stake in the conflict. Finally, both UNITAF and UNOSOM II were authorized by a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, meaning they could use force against actors in Somalia that did not cooperate.


The intervention known as UNMEE was launched in 2000 after Ethiopia and Eritrea had signed the Algiers Agreement that ended their two-year-long armed border conflict. This intervention fits the definition for the following reasons. It had both a military component and a political component in the form of the Algiers Agreement.
What is interesting about this case is that it involves a supranational body, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission that was established by the Algiers Agreement. This Commission had the authority to issue a binding ruling on the final border between the two countries. This case will therefore offer insight into the effectiveness of such organizations.

2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia with American backing

In 2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia and overthrew its Islamist government and sought to bring Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government to power. As such, it intervened in the intrastate conflict between those two fighting parties. This invasion signaled Ethiopia’s capability to change the behavior of the Islamist government by trying to destroy its fighting capability. It was backed in this endeavor by the U.S. The political component is Ethiopia’s attempt to forge a new government in Somalia.

In this case, the UN did not get involved directly, although it did support the transitional government. There are, however, a number of NSAs involved in this case. There are those supporting the overthrown Islamist government. Foreign fighters and terrorist organizations were also active in the theater. Examining their role in the conflict could shed light on the role of NSAs in intrastate conflicts.

Global anti-piracy mission off the Somali coast

In 2008, shipping routes near the Somali coast were made unsafe by Somali pirates. In response, many countries sent warships to the area to deter the pirates from hijacking more ships. Interestingly, the EU coordinated the ships sent by European states. Clearly they can influence the Somali pirates by, for example, sinking their ships and/or capture the pirates.

This case fits the definition firstly because of its massive military component. Secondly, it is an intervention because it intervenes in a conflict with on the one hand Somali pirates, and on the other hand the shipping companies whose ships are threatened. While there is no clear political component to this case at the moment, there are indications that that will be coming soon. As such, while it does not completely fit the definition, it probably will in the near future. Also, NSAs play a central role in this case.
Unfortunately, the mission is not over yet, so it cannot be tested if the outcome of the mission squares with realist predictions.
Chapter 2 UNOSOM & UNITAF

The first intervention in the Horn of Africa that will be examined is the intervention in Somalia that started in 1992 and ended in 1995. The intervention saw large-scale United Nations and United States involvement with occasionally deadly consequences.

2.1 Somalia’s Historic Background

The country that is now known as Somalia was, like many other African countries, colonized by European powers in the eighteenth century, in this case by Great Britain and Italy. Also like many other African countries, Somalia embarked on a path towards independence after the Second World War. This independence was proclaimed on July 1, 1960 (Contini, 1969).

Although the independence of Somalia was celebrated across the country, the seeds for future intrastate conflicts as well as interstate conflicts with other countries in the Horn of Africa had been sown. The most potent seed was the fact that the new Somali state did not include all territories where Somali tribes lived. Substantial Somali minorities lived in Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia (Lewis, 1981). The roots of this seemingly strange spread of the Somali people lay in the scramble for Africa in the eighteenth century when European powers, as well as the powerful Ethiopian empire, carved up and divided the Somali populated territories between themselves (Egal, 1968).

The presence of Somalis in Ethiopia’s Ogaden province deserves a separate mention. The reason for this is that the Ogaden province, Ethiopia’s most eastern province is “populated almost entirely by ethnically Somali pastoralists” (Connors, 2007). This is important because unifying all of the Somali people in one Greater Somalia became, as one of the first Somali prime ministers put it “the utopia of all our endeavors and our diplomacy” (Egal, 1968, p. 222). Thus, Somalia “found itself in

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5 A map of Somalia can be found in Appendix B on page 85.
confrontation with these African states” (Ibid, p. 224). Because of its size and large Somali population, the Ogaden province was a prime target for Somali nationalists.⁶

Another seed of conflict was the clan structure that characterizes Somali society. Although one people, the Somalis are divided into six main clans. In turn, these six clans are divided into a number of sub clans themselves. These sub clans are then further divided into families. It is with their family that their first loyalty lies. After that their loyalty lies with the sub clan, followed by the clan as a whole. Only then comes loyalty to the Somali people in general. While not created by the act of declaring independence, these clan divisions would have devastating results in the future (Laitin & Samatar, 1987).

One of the tough issues confronting the newly independent state was the question how to establish the authority of the central government throughout a country that had never had a central government before. One problem was the above mentioned strong clan allegiances. Another problem was that the new government had to merge the Italian colonial system and the British colonial system, which were quite different, into a functioning unity. According to Ahmed and Green (1999) an additional problem facing the central government was that the Somalis in the north had different needs and ideas on the union than those in the south. This friction did not strengthen the new government at all.

Yet, the government that had set itself up in Mogadishu was a democratically elected government, which was something the Somalis had never had before. While democratic, the government proved to be unable to govern effectively for two reasons. The first reason was the government’s push to take power from the clan elders and centralize it in Mogadishu (Doornbos & Markakis, 1994). Somalis were used to the old way of doing things did not appreciate the attempt to do things differently. The second reason was the loss of credibility by their new leaders for failing to live up to promises they had made. Accusations of personal enrichment while in office and involvement in corruption cases did not help either (Samatar, 1994).

The diminishing faith in the country’s leaders polarized the political system. This polarization eventually led to the violent elections and the assassination of President

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⁶ The map found in Appendix C on page 85 clearly shows the size of the Ogaden province.
Sharmarke in 1969 (Samatar, 1994). In the wake of that assassination, an army commander named Mohamed Siad Barre staged a successful coup. After this coup he dismantled all democratic institutions including parliament and made himself the new ruler of the country (Ibid, 1994).

In spite of the undemocratic nature of his regime, Barre was quite popular for some time. The main reason for his popularity was that he was a vocal proponent of establishing a Greater Somalia. It was for this ideal that Barre even went to war with Ethiopia in 1977 in the hope of annexing the Ogaden province (Makinda, 1993).

As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3, the invasion of Ethiopia was launched at a time when that country suffered serious domestic problems. The Emperor had been overthrown and replaced by the Communist Derg regime led by Mengistu, which was far from stable. On top of that, Ethiopia was engaged in conflict with rebels fighting for Eritrean independence in the north and that fight was not going well (Brind, 1983-1984). Barre believed that these problems had weakened Ethiopia to such an extent that it would not be able to mount a successful defense of the Ogaden province. He then launched a military invasion of Ethiopia to try and take the Ogaden.

Initially it looked like Barre had correctly gauged Ethiopia’s strength, as the Somali army made substantial gains. These gains were lost, however, when Ethiopia strengthened its ties with both the Soviet Union and Cuba. These ties earned Ethiopia large amounts of weapons, as well as the direct help of 13,000 Cuban troops, to successfully beat back the Somalis (Brind, 1983-1984). Somalia’s defeat in the Ogaden War would mark the beginning of the end for the Barre regime itself, as well as of Somalia as a functioning unified state.

After the defeat, many ethnic Somalis living in the Ogaden fled to Somali. There they made their homes in regions in which their clan historically did not belong, which created inter-clan tensions. The failed war also led to increasing dissatisfaction with Barre’s rule across Somalia. This in turn led to the formation of rebel groups to fight him and even to a coup attempt (Ahmed and Green, 1999). All in all, tensions were running high across Somalia.

It was not for long until the tensions between the clans itself, as well as tensions between some clans and the central government turned violent. This violence became
increasingly brutal, especially the violence perpetrated by Barre in defense of his rule. When in the mid-1980s his forces lost control of the north to guerilla groups operating there, Barre ordered retributions that “included aerial bombardment and brutal massacres of civilians, including women and children” (Hirsch & Oakley, 1995, p. 11). The death toll up to Barre’s fall in the north of the country alone is estimated by some to be as high as 100,000 (Ahmed & Green, 1999).

After intense fighting against groups coming from the north as well as from the south, Barre was driven from Mogadishu on January 26, 1991. In spite of his fall, Barre’s remaining troops continued to fight the forces that had pushed him out of the Somali capital for over a year. While it did not bring Barre back to power, the fighting did destroy the local infrastructure and the means to produce food. When on top of that destruction a severe drought hit the war zone, a famine followed. In this famine somewhere between 300,000 and 500,000 people perished, with another 3 million affected (Ahmed & Green, 1999).

2.2 U.S. and UN Intervention and Their Motives for Going in

2.2.1 American exceptionalism

Around the time the famine hit Somalia, the international system was in flux. The bipolar structure of the Cold War had ended along with the Soviet Union. The result was that the U.S. now found itself in a dominating position on the world stage, as it no longer faced any challengers to its global leadership.

This uniquely dominant position in many ways fit the American psyche and the view Americans had of their own country. Ever since Puritan colonist leader John Winthrop held forth to his followers in 1630 that the colony they were about to found in the New World would be “as a city upon a hill,” Americans have seen their country as exceptional (Beardsley, 2001).

Boosted by strong economic growth and peace on their continent, Americans increasingly began to believe that their way of doing things was best. From that belief it was a small step to believing that the country had a mission to spread this way of life and to believing that the United States should have “a leadership role in world affairs” (Hastedt, 1991, p. 25). Anyone who is only slightly familiar with American political
rhetoric will recognize that this belief that was formulated centuries ago by John Winthrop is still a staple of American political rhetoric today. In his 2008 presidential campaign, for example, John McCain stated flat out: “I do believe in American exceptionalism” (CNN, 2008).

This rhetoric and history indicate that there might be a strong missionary aspect to American foreign policy. Of course, political rhetoric does not always automatically match actual policies. However, statements such as “America is never wholly herself unless she is engaged in higher moral principle” by President George H.W. Bush in his 1989 Inaugural Address, are at least remarkable because they indicate a belief that American foreign policy should not focus only on interests. As such, American foreign policy is potentially at odds with realist theory.

2.2.2 The New World Order

The belief that the U.S. was indeed exceptional was boosted by the collapse of its ideological adversary the Soviet Union. The new-found status as sole superpower combined with American exceptionalism led President Bush to declare the ‘New World Order’ in the run-up to the 1990-1991 Gulf War. In this New World Order, “the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations” (Bush, 1991). Furthermore it would be “an order in which a credible United Nations [could] use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the UN’s founders” (Ibid).

A discussion of the concept of the New World Order is necessary because it raises two interesting points in relation to realist theory. One, its very name signals the belief that with the end of the Cold War the international system had changed fundamentally. The fundamental change would probably be that states’ behavior was no longer driven by power but that international law would shape the behavior of states instead. Realists, however, would dispute that was the case. They would argue that although the structure of the system changed from bipolar to unipolar, that does not mean that the system’s characteristics such as its anarchic nature and the primacy of states have changed. With

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7 Coincidentally, Bush first mentioned the New World Order on the day Iraq invaded Kuwait. However, it was first mentioned in a prime time address to the nation when the President announced that military action against Iraq had been launched.
the system’s essence unchanged, power would still drive the conduct of nations, regardless of what politicians and people might say or hope.

The second point worth discussing is the emphasis on the role of the United Nations. The statement that the UN would become ‘credible’ seems to indicate that Bush believed the UN would become stronger in asserting itself. The reference to UN peacekeeping seems to indicate that he expected the UN to become active in the security field, a field where realists contend very little cooperation by member states or international organizations is possible. This is therefore also at odds with realist theory.

However, as I pointed out in my 2008 thesis, there were not only idealistic motives behind the proclamation of the New World Order. After all, “the U.S.’s position in the world would also be served well if all countries were to follow this new model of international cooperation within the UN” (Van den Berk, 2008, p. 55). The reason for this was that “the U.S., being the UN’s most powerful member state and largest donor, would have much influence on shaping that cooperation.” Another advantage that this model of cooperation offered the U.S. was that since it had “the strongest and most advanced army in the world, any UN-authorized military action would have to be executed by the U.S., putting it in an excellent position to shape policy in such a way that it would best fit its own interests” (Ibid).

When looked at it in this light, it could be argued that the proclamation of the New World Order fits realist theory as it was designed to maximize the U.S.’s relative power position in the international system. At the same time, as I also noted in my earlier thesis, having an abstract notion like the New World Order at the center of one’s foreign policy strategy could force a state to act in countries where none of the interests laid out in this thesis’s hypotheses are at stake, which would then be at odds with realism. As will be discussed below in the rest of this chapter, that is what happened in Somalia in 1992.

2.2.3 An Agenda for Peace

When it comes to the role of the UN in the post-Cold War world, President Bush was not the only one who expected its role to change. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali also had a vision on how the UN would and should operate in the post-Cold War world. He laid out that vision in a 1992 report called An Agenda for Peace:
Preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacemaking that he prepared on request of the Security Council. In this report he gave an “analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping.” Clearly, the report sought to find out how the UN could best get involved in the security field.

While it offers many interesting points, the Agenda for Peace is too long to be discussed in detail here. However, a few key passages will be highlighted and discussed in the light of realist theory and some of this thesis’s hypotheses.

Probably the most important point, at least for this thesis, is found in Article 43 of the Agenda for Peace. This Article calls upon the member states to “[bring] into being, through negotiations, the special agreements foreseen in Article 43 of the Charter” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Article 43 of the Charter is the article that requests member states to “make armed forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Council (…) on a permanent basis” (Ibid). Cold War superpower rivalry had up to that point proven to be a formidable obstacle to carrying out Article 43 of the Charter. The call to reexamine it was caused by the belief that with the Cold War over “the long-standing obstacles to the conclusion of such special agreements should no longer prevail” (Ibid).

Had this plan been executed (which it never was), then the Security Council would have been able to send troops on missions that the country they were from had not explicitly agreed to. While those members would still have to volunteer those troops to the permanent UN force first, their troops’ mission could be decided on by an international organization and they would “be under the command of the Secretary-General,” not the member states themselves (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, Article 44).

It is, of course, true that the UN had commanded missions in the past, such as for example the UN mission to Egypt and Israel that was started after their 1973 conflict (Kennedy, 2006). However, the countries participating in that mission had agreed to send troops to that particular mission. The proposal in the Agenda, however, called upon member states to donate troops to a UN force pool before their mission was decided upon. While the specifics of how that would have worked were never worked out, it was
an indication that the UN (and member states) sought to expand the UN’s capacity to play a role in the security field.

The above discussion of the New World Order concept and the *Agenda for Peace* demonstrates that some people in positions of power believed that the end of the Cold War had fundamentally altered the international system. This change was believed to have had a severe impact on the role of the UN and on how security in the world would be established. As President Bush indicated, power would no longer drive international politics. This is all more in sync with neoliberal beliefs than with realism.

### 2.3 The Intervention

It is in the above described context that the images of suffering Somalis were broadcast on TV. These images shocked the Western public and led to mounting pressure on governments and the UN to step up their efforts to tackle the humanitarian crisis in Somalia (Lyons & Samatar, 1995).

The first attempt by the UN and the U.S. to do this was UNOSOM, which was authorized in August of 1992 and was supposed to consist of 4,000 troops. However, member states were slow to send troops to get UNOSOM going and the humanitarian effort stalled. This was partly because “fighting and looting by various factions seeking to control ports and distribution routes [had become] an important factor in the political economy of the militia” (Lewis & Mayall, 1996, p. 108). The militias wanted the food for themselves, regardless of what effect that would have on the starving population.

The problem was that UNOSOM was not given a Chapter VII authorization by the Security Council, meaning it could not use force except to defend itself. This meant it depended on the cooperation of the local parties. Since there were too many of them it was impossible to get consent from all of them, which made operating effectively virtually impossible (Lewis & Mayall, 1996). As a result, the famine raged on.

With the UN and the U.S. failing quite visibly in solving the crisis in Somalia, both President Bush and Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali had a problem. Their visions of a New World Order and a stronger, more effective UN were being wrecked by Somali gangs and militias. What this meant for President Bush was “that the New World Order, which was identified with U.S. leadership, was now characterized by the mass starvation
of Somali children” (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, p. 24-25). This was of course very embarrassing and could not be tolerated.

In response to this, the U.S. took the lead and requested, and got, in December 1992 a mandate by the Security Council under Chapter VII to send in a large number of troops to get the job done. This Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was allowed to use all necessary means to establish “a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations” (Bellamy, Griffin & Williams, 2004, p. 158). This mission, called Operation Restore Hope, was supposed to be short and was mostly meant to pave the way for “the unique UN peacemaking military administration” UNOSOM II, which would replace both UNITAF and UNOSOM (Lewis & Mayall, 1996, p. 112). UNITAF itself, however, was under American command.

2.4 Analysis Hypotheses 1 and 2

2.4.1 Hypothesis 1

When it comes to the states that contributed to UNOSOM and UNITAF, it is clear that their main reason for intervening was to alleviate the famine and suffering that had hit Somalia. Regrettably, UNOSOM, the first attempt, proved to be incapable of doing so. This failure threatened to undermine the vision, hopes, and assumptions the U.S. and many others had had for the post Cold War world, in particular the assumption that the UN would have a stronger role and that international law would trump power. It was in response to this threat that the U.S. asked for the creation of UNITAF.

This means that the troops participating in UNOSOM or UNITAF were not sent in response to a threat to their country’s interests. None of the participating countries in UNOSOM or UNITAF were physically threatened by the famine they responded to, or by the gangs that prevented the effective delivery of aid. The possible failure of the post-Cold War vision by the situation in Somalia was not a territorial or physical threat either.

When it comes to threats to vital economic interests, the answer is equally clear. No threat to economic interests such as oil emanated from Somalia. If economic reasons had been driving the intervening countries they probably would have decided to not participate and spare themselves the costs of sending troops. It could even be argued that the countries that were acting the way realists would expect them to were the ones that
decided to not participate at all and let others try to solve the problem. As such, the reasons for intervening conflict with hypothesis 1.

Here a reference to the relative gains idea is in order. In a way no absolute gains were to be had by intervening in Somalia and as such intervening was not attractive. When looking at relative gains it can be concluded that no one would be hurt if the situation in Somalia improved. Yet, as stated above, not participating in the successful operation would be both beneficial and cheap. Participating in a failed mission would potentially be very expensive and a too big a loss of, for example, troops or capital could weaken one’s relative position in comparison to its enemies. So from a relative gains point of view, participating in the mission was highly unattractive, which would explain the slowness with which countries offered troops to UNOSOM.

Interestingly, the only country that eventually really stepped up was the richest and strongest country: the U.S. Yet, the U.S. did not act because of threats to its security or economic interests, but to defend the prestige it had put on the line when proclaiming the New World Order. Not mounting a serious defense against that by refusing to step up to the plate in Somalia might have undermined U.S. prestige and credibility. This could indicate that the U.S. concluded that the loss of credibility and prestige a failure in Somalia would bring was a bigger threat to its relative power position as leading power than the absolute costs of the intervention. In that sense, the American intervention would confirm realist theory. Yet, this interpretation falls outside of this thesis’s hypotheses.

2.4.2 Hypothesis 2

When it comes to the involvement of international organizations, in this case the UN, the conclusion in regard to the second hypothesis is a bit more mixed. An independent UN Special Representative was involved in the peace process and UNOSOM proceeded “at the discretion of the Secretary-General” (Security Council Resolution 794, 1992). This might seem to contradict realist expectations. However, it should be noted that UNOSOM was ineffective to a large extent because member states were slow to commit troops and because the UN could not force them to do so (Lewis & Mayall, 1996). As such, the UN did not operate autonomously but was at the mercy of the member states.
This becomes even clearer when we look at UNITAF. This force was the result of an American decision to step up to the plate. A state took the lead here, not the UN. Furthermore, UNITAF, the mission that was designed to demonstrate that the international community meant business, consisted mostly of American troops and was under American command. The UN was in that way not even involved. Clearly, when push comes to shove, only a powerful state is capable of leading the international community into joint action against its opponents.

All in all, after a start in which the UN commanded the operations, it was soon relegated to the sidelines by the U.S.-led force. The UN would again assume command over UNOSOM II but that was again not successful, as will be discussed below. It can therefore be concluded that when it comes to the Somalia intervention, states were the most important actors, not the UN. This confirms realist theory and hypothesis 2A of this thesis.

The strong American presence in the country, however, was not meant to be permanent. UNITAF would only stay in Somalia until May 1993 and after that the UN would be in charge its replacement, UNOSOM II. Unlike UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II had a Chapter 7 mandate and the UN would command the troops that were part of it. This was in itself quite unprecedented and potentially undermines the idea that states are the most important actors in the international system. This threat to realism, however, seems to be thoroughly destroyed by the events that were soon to follow.

2.5 UNOSOM II and the End of the Intervention

In spite of UNOSOM II’s Chapter VII mandate and its troop strength of 20,000, “there was a widespread Somali perception that the UN-led forces would be weaker than UNITAF” (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, p. 115). This perception emboldened some Somali factions, in particular the faction in Mogadishu led by General Aideed. Soon after UNITAF had left, these factions started to test the UN’s resolve.  

Over the summer of 1993, these tests led to increasing tensions between Aideed and the UN which culminated in a number of deadly incidents. These incidents put the

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8 Although UNITAF had left, the U.S. still maintained 4,000 troops in the country including a Quick Reaction Force.
The international community and Aideed on a path towards all-out confrontation in which only one could win. This confrontation took place on October 3, 1993 when U.S. Special Forces launched a raid into a hostile part of Mogadishu to capture some of Aideed’s top lieutenants (Van den Berk, 2008). When militiamen shot down two Black Hawk helicopters, the U.S. forces were stuck in the city and what should have been a quick raid turned into “the biggest firefight involving American soldiers since Vietnam” (Bowden, 1999, p. 481). When it was over after a long night, eighteen American troops and many more Somalis were dead.

This fight had significant effects on the American and UN mission in Somalia. The eighteen American casualties and the images of American bodies being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by a cheering crowd of Somalis set off a political firestorm in Washington. The firestorm and the public’s anger were so intense that only four days after the incident President Clinton announced the U.S. would no longer fight Aideed and that all U.S. troops would be out of Somalia on March 31, 1994 (Lewis & Mayall, 1996).

In spite of the American withdrawal, UNOSOM II continued. Yet, without the American military punch and the departure of all major industrial countries (France, Italy, and Belgium), the UN could not cut it. Soon, UNOSOM II’s mandate was revised so that it no longer operated under Chapter VII. After that change, the UN forces withdrew from the countryside and fell back to Mogadishu and prepared for their full withdrawal in March 1995 (Lewis & Mayall, 1996). When the last UN troops finally left “under protection of U.S. Marines,” violence in Mogadishu and the rest of the country was again surging (Ibid, p. 121). All in all, the international intervention in Somalia from 1992 to 1995 was “a horrible failure” (Kennedy, 2006, p. 96).

2.6 Analysis Hypothesis 3

It was demonstrated above that the intervention in Somalia was launched for reasons that did not confirm realist theory. Yet, as pointed out in chapter 1, the outcome also matters. In this case, the outcome in many ways does fit realist theory.

First there is the departure of the U.S. after losing eighteen troops in one battle. Those losses demonstrated that enforcing the New World Order could have high costs in
American lives. The American public’s demand for withdrawal demonstrated it was not willing to pay that price when abstract notions such as the New World Order were at stake. The lack of interests, security or economic, made the U.S. decide it could afford to withdraw from the intervention, even though Aideed was not defeated. Since the lack of interests was decisive when it came to ending the intervention, realist theory is in that sense confirmed.

The utter impotence shown by the UN in achieving its goals and the collapse of the mission after the U.S. and other major industrial powers left, show that the UN could not operate successfully without the support of major states. This fully supports Waltz’s (1979) statement that international organizations must “acquire some of the attributes and capabilities of states (...) or they soon reveal their inability to act in important ways except with the support, or at least, acquiescence, of the principal states concerned with the matter at hand.” The outcome for the UN therefore also confirms realist theory and hypothesis 2A again as well.

**Role of NSAs**

What so far has not yet been discussed is the role of armed non-state actors in the start and end of the intervention. Yet, their influence has been quite substantial.

Whether NSAs triggered the intervention is debatable. On the one hand, they did frustrate the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Somali people. Addressing this situation was the main goal of UNOSOM and UNITAF. On the other hand, they were not responsible for the drought that caused the famine to begin with. Nor were the gangs (fully) responsible for the civil war that destroyed much of the country’s food production. Here the Somali state, led by Barre, also carried a large responsibility.

The NSAs influence on the outcome, however, is clearer. It were militias that inflicted so many casualties on the U.S. in one single battle that that country decided that the costs of continuing the mission were too high (in terms of American lives) and ended its intervention without having achieved its goals. In the longer run, this led to the collapse of the entire intervention, well before a new stable Somalia government had been created.
This chain of events after October 3 indicates that NSAs are capable of having a severe impact on the behavior of states in circumstances where there are no vital interests at stake. This fully rejects this thesis’s third hypothesis.

When it comes to the hypotheses of this thesis, the case of the UNOSOM and UNITAF intervention offers mixed results. On the one hand, the reason for going into Somalia directly contradicts the hypothesis that states only act when their interests are at stake. Furthermore, there was a strong drive by both the U.S. and the UN itself to create a strong UN that would be able to operate effectively within the security area. Finally, NSAs had a decisive impact on the outcome of the intervention. All this contradicts realist expectations.

On decisive moments, however, the UN faltered and needed the support of the U.S. in particular to carry the mission forward. When the U.S. withdrew that support because it was no longer willing to incur the costs that came with it, the UN mission came undone and failed. When looking at the outcome, state interests trumped concerns for the Somali population, and the international institution involved proved impotent. This confirms realist expectations.
Chapter 3: UNMEE

3.1 Overview Ethiopian-Eritrean History

As said in the previous chapter, Somalia’s current borders were drawn not by Somalis themselves but by European powers and Ethiopia. Yet, some of those European powers, especially Italy, had flocked towards the Horn because they sought to add Ethiopia to their collection of colonies (Lewis, 1981). Ethiopia, however, had some expansionist plans of its own.

This Ethiopian expansion had begun in earnest when the Abyssinian Christians living in the highlands had fought with European powers against the spread of Islam in the mid-nineteenth century. This cooperation with the Europeans had won them weapons and expertise which they later used to subdue their Muslim competitors in the region. In this way the Abyssinians founded their empire state Ethiopia. The expansion of this state was completed by Emperor Menelik “through the intensive conquest and incorporation of various groups” that lived in the area (Selassie, 1994, p. 95). It was also under the leadership of Menelik that Ethiopia defeated Italy in a direct confrontation in March 1896 (Marcus, 1966). That victory firmly established Ethiopia as “an African power to be reckoned with” (Selassie, 1994, p. 111).

Before the Italians were defeated, however, they established themselves in northern Ethiopia and created the so-called ‘colonia Eritrea.’ According to Selassie (1994), “it was from this time on that Eritrea entered a process as a separate identity laying the ground for the current conflicts” (p. 117). Before that, it had been “an integral part of Ethiopia” (Ibid, p. 141). It were also the Italians, however, who reunified Eritrea and Ethiopia (together with Italy’s part of Somalia) into one entity, Italian East Africa, after they had conquered Ethiopia in 1935 (Ibid).

After the war, the British, who had administered the territory after ousting the Italians, retransferred power to Emperor Selassie. After that Ethiopia’s territory included both the Ogaden and Eritrea, as it had before. However, this was done only after intense debate within the British colonial administration on whether the Ogaden should be

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9 A map of Ethiopia and Eritrea can be found in Appendix D on page 86.
assigned to Somalia and whether Eritrea should become a separate entity. Even though this did not happen, the plans fueled desire for a Greater Somalia with the Somali people, as well as a desire for independence amongst Eritreans (Selassie, 1994). For the time being, however, Eritrea would not become an integral part of Ethiopia but form a federation with it instead.

The notion of a federation, however, was inherently incompatible with the expansionist nature of the Ethiopian state and was seen by Ethiopia as “a temporary aberration” (Iyob, 2000, p. 661). For this reason, Ethiopia terminated the federation in 1962 and fully absorbed Eritrea into the state structure again (Selassie, 1994). This move enraged the Eritreans and some already-existing resistance movements, which now launched a guerilla war against the Ethiopian state. The war over Eritrea, combined with the grievances of other groups, eventually led to the overthrow of the imperial regime and brought the Derg, a military junta led by Mengistu, to power.

Under the Derg, the war over Eritrea continued. Furthermore, the Derg also faced armed opposition groups within Ethiopia itself. Given their joint interest in opposing the Derg, Ethiopian and Eritrean opposition groups joined forces. In May 1991 these groups seized power in Asmara, the Eritrean capital, and overthrew the Derg. In May 1993 Eritrea gained its formal independence from Ethiopia (Anonymous, 1998). It should be noted that the newly independent country was much smaller than the country it had been separated from: some 5.5 million inhabitants as compared to 85 million in Ethiopia as of 2008, according to the CIA Factbook.

3.2 1998-2000 Border Conflict

After Eritrea gained its independence in 1993, Ethiopia and Eritrea were at peace for the first time in over thirty years. However, the two countries did not formalize a number of aspects of their relations, such as economic relations, monetary issues, and the status of Ethiopians living in Eritrea and the other way around (Iyob, 2000).

The most pressing and contentious matter, however, proved to be that of both countries’ boundaries. Right after independence, Eritrea had assumed that the borders would be those drawn by the colonial powers, as had been accepted across Africa in the
1964 Cairo Declaration (Iyob, 2000). However, this assumption was never formalized with Ethiopia in an official treaty of agreement.

Iyob (2000) gives as reason for this failure that the respective leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia knew and trusted each other from their joined fight against the Derg. They appear to have assumed that the camaraderie that had existed in wartime would automatically expand in peacetime. However, the situation on the ground in some areas was that they fell under Eritrean jurisdiction but were administered by Ethiopia. This practice proved to be problematic to say the least.

The awkward arrangement led to violence on May 6, 1998 when Ethiopian police ordered Eritrean troops who were patrolling near the border town of Badme to disarm. The Eritreans refused as they claimed to be on their territory. The situation got heated and turned into a firefight that killed four Eritreans. In response, Eritrea sent mechanized forces into the area (Iyob, 2000).

From then on the situation rapidly spun out of control. On May 12, 1998 Ethiopia declared that Eritrea had committed an act of aggression and began massing troops in the border region. Naturally, Eritrea did the same. International efforts to stop the slide to war were to no avail, as the rhetoric on both sides got more and more heated. As a result, the positions of both sides hardened, which made reconciliation impossible. After an initial round of skirmishes in May 1998, both parties agreed to a cease-fire but no lasting solution was found.

In the winter of 1998, international efforts were made to get the parties to stop the fighting and sign a peace agreement. These efforts were to no avail as in February 1999 a round of heavy fighting broke out along the entire border (ICG, 2003). During this round of fighting Ethiopia pushed Eritrea out of the Badme area, hereby demonstrating that Eritrea was the weaker party. After that retreat, Eritrea accepted a peace proposal by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and peace negotiations between the two parties soon followed. These negotiations led to the so-called Modalities for the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement that was accepted (but not signed) by both parties on August 30, 1999. Before it would sign, Ethiopia demanded some points be clarified, even though it agreed to the general content (UNMEE, 2008a).
In spite of the Framework Agreement hostilities restarted on May 12, 2000. On that day Ethiopia launched a large-scale offensive and broke through the Eritrean lines on a number of places. Yet, the international community did not let renewed hostilities go by unpunished. Within five days, the Security Council imposed sanctions on both parties (ICG, 2003).

It could be argued that these sanctions were effective as the peace talks with strong involvement from a number of outside people and organizations such as the African Union, the EU, an Algerian minister, and an American representative, resumed on May 30 and the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities was signed on June 18, 2000 (UNMEE, 2008b). In this agreement Ethiopia and Eritrea promised to cease all hostilities and pledged support for a UN mission to the region to monitor the ceasefire. It is estimated that at least 45,000 to 50,000 people lost their lives before this agreement was reached (Iyob, 2000).

3.3 The Algiers Agreement

3.3.1 Algiers Agreement’s independent bodies

After the peace agreement was signed, negotiations on a final settlement continued under the chairmanship of the Algerian president (UNMEE, 2008b). The agreement was signed in Algiers, Algeria on December 12, 2000 and is called the Algiers Agreement. This Algiers Agreement authorizes the UN Secretary-General to create three separate independent bodies to solve three separate war issues. One of the three bodies was to investigate the incidents that triggered the war (Algiers Agreement, 2000, Article 3). The second body would be the so-called Claims Commission (Article 5). The third body that was created was the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, also referred to as EEBC (Article 4).

While the Algiers Agreement was an interstate agreement, its effects can be classified as an intervention for two reasons. One, the Agreement allowed foreign troops under UN command to enter both countries. Secondly, the Agreement established three bodies that would conduct investigations into separate aspects of the conflict that had just ended. As will be discussed below, some of those bodies, especially the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), would be independent from the parties and had some
authorities that could alter state behavior. As such, these bodies could undermine realist theory.

The independent body to investigate the causes of the initial hostilities might look supranational, but upon closer reading of the Algiers Agreement it turns out it is not. It is true that it is appointed by the Secretary-General and that the parties were obliged to “cooperate fully” (Algiers Agreement, 2000, Article 3(4)). After the investigation the body would produce a report but there are no references in the Agreement that indicate that state that the report will have any consequences whatsoever.

The second commission established by the Algiers Agreement, the Claims Commission, was to address “the negative socio-economic impact of the crisis on the civilian population” (Algiers Agreement, 2000, Article 5(1)). It was possible for both states and for citizens of those states to file a claim against one of the states. However, claims would only be reviewed if the damages had been incurred during the 1998-2000 conflict. Another prerequisite of a claim was that the damages had to be the result of “violations of international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or other violations of international law” (Ibid).

The latter specification severely limits the possibilities to claim damages, as it only applies to war crimes. It makes it impossible for anyone, for example, to claim damages for a relative killed in regular battle or for a house destroyed during military operations, as those are not in and of themselves war crimes. In spite of this, upon signing the Agreement the parties did oblige themselves to finance the Commission and pledged to pay all damages the Commission awarded against them. This means the parties allowed an independent international organ to exercise some authority over them. However, the area it covers is economical and as discussed in chapter 1, realists do believe cooperation in that area is possible. Therefore, the Claims Commission does not present a threat to realist theory.

This becomes less clear when it comes to the Boundaries Commission. This Commission too was an independent body. Its task was to determine the Ethiopian-Eritrean border and it was to base its decision on all relevant treaties, as well as oral and written arguments by the parties (Algiers Agreement, 2000, Article 4(1)). Most importantly, upon signing both Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed “that the delimitation and
demarcation determinations of the Commission shall be final and binding” (Ibid, Article 4(15)). Furthermore, after the final boundary had been established both countries were to allow the Commission to enter their countries to physically demarcate the new border.

The above means that the EEBC is very different from the commission to investigate the causes of the war. The EEBC’s rulings were guaranteed to have an effect on the countries involved and they were obliged to compel with the ruling. Since the EEBC would operate independently from both parties, it was an international institution that in some aspects was above the states involved in its creation.

The authorities of the EEBC went beyond what realists would expect international organizations to be able to do. After all, realists believe the main priority of a state is to protect its territory against others and, if you are an offensive realist, to expand it whenever possible. By establishing the EEBC, however, Ethiopia and Eritrea allowed an international institution to determine its territorial boundaries. It can therefore be argued that the task of the EEBC cuts to the core of a state’s responsibility. What is more, the EEBC, if successful would demonstrate that when it comes to security issues, cooperation is possible, even between parties that have just been at war. Therefore the EEBC presents a strong threat to realist theory, at least on paper.

3.3.2 UNMEE

Part of the Algiers Agreement (and the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities and the 1999 Framework Agreement) was that both parties agreed to let UN troops into their countries to monitor the implementation of the Algiers Agreement and to help keep the peace. The first such UN troops were sent after the cessation of hostilities in June 2000 under the banner of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).

Initially UNMEE consisted of only one hundred troops, but on September 15, 2000 Security Council Resolution 1320 allowed it to expand to 4,200 troops. These troops were to, amongst other things, monitor the cessation of hostilities, monitor the positions of both parties’ troops, assist with demining operations, and to coordinate all humanitarian activities conducted in the area.

What is remarkable about Resolution 1320 is that it did not invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter, meaning that UNMEE was not allowed to use force to enforce
compliance if a state would violate the Algiers Agreements. At the same time, those agreements “[linked] the termination of the United Nations peacekeeping mission with the completion of the process of delimitation and demarcation of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border” (Security Council, 2001, Resolution 1344, clause 3).

In practice therefore the UN said its presence was linked to the completion of the borders demarcation process by the EEBC. At the same time, the absence of a Chapter VII mandate ensured it could not make this happen on its own, but depended fully on the cooperation of the two state parties. The same goes for the redeployment of Ethiopian and Eritrean troops that was part of agreement. That too could not be forced by the UN troops and if either side decided to not comply, there was nothing the UNMEE troops could do about that.

Regardless of the mandate of UNMEE, there are some potentially interesting aspects to it in relation to realism. One interesting aspect is that the parties allowed the troops of other states to enter their territory peacefully. The voluntary nature indicates that perhaps cooperation in security areas between states and with international organizations is possible, even though realists claim that is very hard, if not impossible.

In this sense UNMEE differs greatly from the UNITAF and UNOSOM II missions in Somalia discussed in the previous chapter. There, the militias did not consent to the presence of foreign troops and resisted them violently. For this thesis it means that the different political context between UNMEE and UNOSOM/UNITAF could lead to different outcomes and different conclusions on the correctness of realist theory.

3.4 Ethiopian Obstructionism and the EEBC’s and UNMEE’s Failure

In April 2002 the EEBC made public its report in which it laid out its binding ruling on the Ethiopian-Eritrean border. Possibly the most anticipated part of the ruling was what would happen to Badme, as the war was started over this town. However, because different governments and organizations, including the EEBC, used differently scaled and sometimes unclear maps, the final status of Badme was unclear even after the ruling (Bhalla, 2002). It would only become clear when the physical demarcation would start. In spite of this Eritrea (and Ethiopia) “promised to respect the decision” (BBC News, 2002). This means that, in accordance with the Algiers Agreement, the parties now
had to allow EEBC personnel to enter their countries to start physically demarcating the border. However, both the implementation of the EEBC decision and UNMEE ran into serious problems after the ruling. These problems are closely interconnected.

An early indication that Ethiopia did not fully accept the ruling by the EEBC after all can be found in the EEBC’s eighth report that was sent to the Security Council in February 2003.\(^{10}\) It states that “there have been developments which are a cause of concern” (EEBC, 2003a, p. 17). Upon reading the report it is found that after the initial ruling both parties sent comments to the Commission. This was allowed, but only if they were of a “technical nature” (Ibid). While the EEBC acknowledged the technical nature of Eritrea’s comments, it believed that “in a number of significant respects, the comments (by Ethiopia, Berk) amounted to an attempt to reopen the substance of the April decisions” (Ibid).

What this means is that Ethiopia in its first opportunity to address the ruling tried to find out how far it could go with the EEBC and the UN. It clearly sought ways to influence and challenge the process in such a way that the end result would be more favorable. This was surprising since in its initial response to the ruling Ethiopia had stated that “Eritrea had lost the case, just as it had lost the war” (BBC News, 2002). This indicated that Ethiopia was initially happy with the ruling.

The main thrust of the Ethiopian argument against the EEBC’s ruling was based mostly on the fact that the new border would run straight through villages and communities. In its response the Commission recognized that this was indeed the case but it pointed out that the Algiers Agreement explicitly denied the EEBC the authority to include such considerations in their final ruling. It was told to base its ruling only on previous treaties on the boundary (EEBC, 2003a).

Since Ethiopia had been involved in the drafting of the Algiers Agreement and had signed it voluntarily, this objection was brought up too late and is therefore not valid. Yet, since there were no enforcement mechanisms available to the EEBC and because it

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\(^{10}\) The EEBC sent such reports to the Security Council every three months to keep the Council informed of its progress.
needed Ethiopia’s consent to physically demarcate the border (because of the lack of Chapter VII authority for UNMEE) it could not simply disregard its opinion.\footnote{It should be noted here that the eighth report of the EEBC lists a couple of other actions by Ethiopia that seem to have as main goal to challenge other aspects of the Algiers Agreement too and to intimidate the Commission.}

After issuing its eighth report, the EEBC was confronted with more challenges and problems, mostly emanating from Ethiopian non-cooperation on several fronts. In the EEBC’s eleventh report for example, the Commission notes Ethiopian non-compliance when it comes to appointing liaisons officers, paying its contributions to the Commission (which was a direct violation of the Algiers Agreement), and providing comments on some of the maps it was sent (EEBC, 2003b). In its thirteenth report, the EEBC (2004) noted that it could not start new activities because Ethiopia still had not paid its dues, even after having been called upon by the Security Council to do so. In its sixteenth report the EEBC (2005) announced that it would close down its field offices “if Ethiopia [did not abandon] its present insistence on preconditions for the implementation of the demarcation” (p. 16). In its seventeenth report it announced it had indeed closed its offices in the field. In November 2007, the EEBC dissolved itself without even having started the demarcation of the border (VOA News, 2007).

Before the EEBC dissolved itself, Eritrea had begun to take matters into its own hands. Furious over the international community’s failure to make Ethiopia comply with its duties under the Algiers Agreement, Eritrea redeployed troops to the previously demilitarized zone along the border in early 2008. Furthermore, Eritrea cut off the diesel supply to the UNMEE forces in the country, which in the end forced the UN to get its troops out of Eritrea (ICG, 2008). A few months after this, the Security Council decided that there was no point in continuing UNMEE under the circumstances at that time and terminated the mission on July 30, 2008 (UNMEE, 2008).

While in the end it was Eritrea that forced UNMEE out, there should be no doubt that Ethiopia’s constant challenges to the EEBC and its regular reinterpretations of the Algiers Agreement were the root cause of the failure of the peace process. At present, Ethiopia and Eritrea have again massed troops along the border. It is feared that in the absence of the UNMEE buffer between the two adversaries a minor incident could lead to another “full-fledged war” (ICG, 2008, p. 6).
3.5 Analysis of Hypotheses

3.5.1 Hypothesis 1

In the discussion above, the focus has mostly been on Ethiopia and Eritrea and on the EEBC. The focus has been less on actual UNMEE military actions and on the states participating in the intervention.\(^{12}\) The reason for this is that UNMEE troops were there to monitor the implementation of the Algiers Agreement and to assist the EEBC with demarcating the border. The absence of a chapter VII mandate made it impossible for UNMEE forces to actively enforce the implementation. Therefore, the theater where the intervention was decided was the EEBC, and not on the ground.

While the states participating in UNMEE have not been discussed it is still possible to discuss whether they had interests at stake by looking at the conflict itself. The conflict was over where the boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea was. Regardless of how this would turn out, it would not affect the territory of other countries. Besides that, the fighting parties were only focused on each other and it was therefore highly unlikely that the conflict would spill over to other regions. This means there cannot have been a physical threat to other states.

When it comes to economic interests, the answer is similar. The violence was contained to a specific region and it did not affect any major trade routes. It also did not threaten the flow of vital resources. Finally, the countries involved were amongst the poorest on the planet so even as a market for products, the drop in their demand that must have followed the outbreak of the conflict cannot possibly have been high enough to warrant an intervention.\(^{13}\) So all in all it can be said that whatever reason the participating countries had for doing so must have been different than what realism assumes and what the hypotheses for this thesis predicted. Hypothesis 1 is therefore not confirmed by this case.

\(^{12}\) Perhaps superfluously but to be sure anyway, neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea counts as an intervening party in this conflict. They were the main protagonists and since their border was involved they had a direct stake in the conflict making it impossible they were an intervening country.

\(^{13}\) According to the CIA World Factbook, Ethiopia and Eritrea ranked 219\(^{th}\) and 223\(^{rd}\) on GDP per capita in 2008.
3.5.2 Hypothesis 2

The answer to the second hypothesis is more complicated than the answer to the first one. The first issue is who was the decisive actor in launching UNMEE. It was authorized by the Security Council and was the result of a peace agreement drafted with the help of a range of actors. Furthermore, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed after the Security Council had imposed sanctions.

In the end, however, I believe it was the willingness to come to an agreement on by both Ethiopia and Eritrea that was decisive. Ethiopia had been advancing militarily and chose to halt that advance and cut a deal, rather than continue fighting. Eritrea, which had lost territory, could have made an Ethiopian withdrawal a precondition for signing any of the agreements, but it did not. The other actors and the sanctions may have had influence but that was not decisive.

Another argument in favor of this view is the absence of a Chapter VII mandate for UNMEE. As demonstrated above, this put Ethiopia and Eritrea in charge. As soon as Eritrea did not want UNMEE within its borders anymore, UNMEE had no choice but to pack its bags and leave. In this case, the UN did therefore not play a decisive role either.

What deserves a separate discussion here is the EEBC. On paper, that Commission had the authority to issue a binding ruling on the final boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In theory this means that the countries gave up some of their sovereignty here and placed it in a supranational organ. The EEBC’s problem, however, was that it could not enforce its ruling. When faced with determined and persistent opposition from Ethiopia to the ruling itself and to Commission in general by withholding the funds it was obliged to pay, the EEBC came to a grinding halt and never even got to start demarcating the new border.

This failure should not have come as a surprise to realists. In a sense, the Algiers Agreement sought to create through the EEBC a hierarchical structure in which an independent body with far-reaching authority could solve the problem Ethiopia and Eritrea were unable to solve themselves. However, what is necessary for having a hierarchical structure are means to enforce the decisions of the upper body in the structure, in this case the EEBC. Those enforcement means were not created by the

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14 Since NSAs did not play a role in this interstate conflict, they will not be discussed here.
Agreement, nor were they created by the Security Council, which did not give UNMEE forces a Chapter VII mandate.

While an attempt was made to circumvent the anarchy that is an inherent characteristic of the international system, the attempt failed to change it. Therefore, the system that was supposed to be led by the EEBC remained controlled by the states. So while publicly expressing their desire to cooperate, Ethiopia and Eritrea both did not do so, although Eritrea tried longer than Ethiopia, which put its heels in the sand the first chance it got. Its victory was total when the EEBC dissolved itself well before its task was done. All this confirms hypothesis two.

3.5.3 Hypothesis 3

The answer to hypothesis 3 can be very brief. Clearly, the intervention was not terminated because it had achieved its goals. However, the actors that actually brought on the end of the intervention carried out by an international organ and the UN were the states intervened in. In that way, realist theory on the central role of states is confirmed, even though the intervening states did not get what they wanted this time.

All in all, it can be concluded that the case of UNMEE confirms realist theory. It were states who played a decisive role in authorizing the intervention. The fact that the warring parties themselves were willing to cooperate with the intervening forces have shed some doubts on the opposition by some realists to the idea that cooperation in security areas is impossible.

Yet, it soon showed that Ethiopia and Eritrea remained fully in charge of their own fate. Ethiopia’s sabotage of the EEBC in the end ensured that the Commission did not do what it was supposed to do at all, which is what Ethiopia wanted. When the EEBC dissolved itself the political component of the intervention was over. The military component of the intervention was killed off after that when Eritrea, angry about the failure of the EEBC and international community to enforce Ethiopian compliance, made it impossible for UNMEE to function. When that happened UNMEE too was terminated, and the entire intervention had ended without even coming close to solving the root cause of the conflict.
Chapter 4: U.S.-Ethiopian invasion Somalia 2006

4.1 Somalia after the Failed 1992-1995 Intervention

4.1.1 Continuing disintegration

As discussed in chapter 2, the American and UN intervention in Somalia that was launched in 1992 collapsed when the U.S. pulled out its troops after the deadly incident on October 3, 1993. When the UN left, the situation on the ground in Somalia had not changed substantially. The clan rivalries and violence that had led to the international intervention in the first place had not been solved when the UN left and the humanitarian crisis continued.

The result was a continuation in many parts of the country of the lawless and anarchic situation that has become the hallmark of present-day Somalia. Of course, Somalia is not the only state whose government has collapsed. According to Menkhaus (2003), however, “Somalia’s inability to preserve even a minimal figleaf of central administration over twelve years puts it in a class by itself amongst the world’s failed states” (p. 407). He further states that Somalia is “the most protracted and comprehensive instance of state collapse in the contemporary era” (Ibid, p. 405).

In spite of the collapse of the central government, not all of Somalia has been without some kind of government since the early 1990s. The prime example of this is Somaliland, a region in the northwest of the country. Somaliland declared its independence on May 18, 1991, but that has never been recognized by any other state. During UNOSOM, however, no international troops were sent to Somaliland because the situation there was considered to be stable (ICG, 2006a). Recently, however, Somaliland has experienced unrest after its presidential elections were repeatedly postponed. In the aftermath of the postponement, Somaliland’s president adopted a set of measures that seemed to be aimed at “restricting political freedoms in order to guarantee an easy victory during the election to be held in September (of 2009, Berk)” (Kleingeld, 2009).

A similar development took place in the northeast of Somalia, where on May 5, 1998, the Puntland Regional State was formed. While this is similar to the developments

\[15\] Menkhaus wrote that in 2003, but now in 2009 the situation has not changed a bit, which means Somalia is in chaos for over eighteen years now.
in Somaliland, they are differences too. Where Somaliland seeks independence, Puntland sees itself as “a part of an anticipated Federal State of Somalia” and as such strives for “the unity of the Somali people and the creation of a Somali government based on a federal system” (Puntland Government, 2009).

In spite of the Puntland Government’s ambition to establish a federal Somalia, there were no signs that was ever going to arrive, as a number of attempts to create a new government before 2004 failed. In 2004, however, two developments made it look like change was coming to Somalia. The first development was the creation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) by a number of Somali factions in Kenya. The second development was the formation of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Mogadishu. At the same time, these developments would lead to another large-scale intervention in Somalia.

4.1.2 The Transitional Federal Government

The TFG was the second major attempt at creating a government for Somalia after the Transitional National Government (TNG) that was founded in 2000 and which “was never able to project its authority beyond portions of the Mogadishu area” (Menkhaus, 2005, p. 29). After the TNG’s failure, a new attempt to form a government was launched in Kenya in 2002 and in 2004 it yielded the TFG. Although potentially a reason for joy, the TFG fell victim to internal squabbling almost immediately after it was established. The very first TFG cabinet was dissolved almost as soon as it was sworn in (ICG, 2004).

Naturally, all this infighting did not enhance the confidence the average Somali had in the TFG. A number of other factors did not do so either. One factor was the overrepresentation of supporters of interim-president Abdullahi Yusuf in the interim cabinet. This fed the suspicion that the new TFG did not represent all Somalis but only his and allied factions (ICG, 2004). Another factor was that supporters of the TNG had not been included in the negotiations about the TFG. This included a number of Islamists, who the new TFG president Abdullahi Yusuf staunchly opposed. These groups were located mostly in Mogadishu, which made it impossible for the TFG to go there after it was formed (Menkhaus, 2005).
The opposition the TFG ran into as soon as it was created should not have come as a surprise. The main reason for this was that it was backed by, amongst others, Kenya and especially by Somalia’s arch enemy Ethiopia. As discussed in chapter 2, the relation between Somalia and Ethiopia has always been hostile, in particular when it comes to the Somali-populated Ogaden region. The Christian nature of the Ethiopian regime also does not sit well with Islamists (nor does the Islamist presence in Somalia sit well with Ethiopia, as will be discussed below).

4.1.3 The Islamic Courts Union

Where the TFG was an outside attempt to unify and stabilize Somalia, developments in Somalia themselves led to a similar attempt from the inside in 2004. It was in that year that the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was founded in Mogadishu.

The creation of the ICU was a result of the chaos in Somalia. In the absence of a government, Islamic organizations took on a number of tasks normally carried out by a state. For one, “the absence of a formal judiciary [enabled] shari’a courts to step into a vacuum” and as such they became “one of the most important forms of local rule of law” (Rotberg, ed., 2005, p. 29). Besides judiciary functions, Islamic organizations have also been involved in providing education and healthcare.

A final characteristic of the ICU that deserves mentioning is that it also developed a military capability. Unlike other Somali militias, however, these militias consisted of members of different clans, instead of just one clan, demonstrating cross-clan support. Furthermore, these militias were not just some ragtag group of armed men but rather a well-organized group led by professional military officers who had had proper training and were disciplined (ICG, 2006b).

At the time of its founding, the ICU’s reach was limited to Mogadishu (although Islamic groups were active in other parts of the country as well). Yet, even in Mogadishu, the ICU soon found itself opposed by the so-called Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT). It was the creation of this group, which was backed by the U.S., that triggered an ICU response that led it to take over most of the country and

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16 Islamist here means solely that the organizations’ ideological foundation stemmed from Islam and does not mean radical or violent in any way unless so specified explicitly. This is important because many versions of Islam exist in Somalia, ranging from militant to conservative to progressive.
threaten the TFG in the town of Baidoa near the Ethiopian border. The details of that will be discussed below, but first it is important to sketch the global-political context at the time of the ICU’s formation.

4.2 The Global Context of the ICU’s Rise

The overarching issue in international politics, and in particular in American foreign policy, around the time the ICU was formed established was the issue of global terrorism. In response to Al Qaeda’s direct attack against it on September 11, 2001, the U.S. launched a Global War on Terror in which it claimed some far-reaching rights. Most important for Somalia, however, was that Islamic groups everywhere, including the ICU, were viewed with increasing suspicion by Washington.

What did not help abate Washington’s fear of the ICU were its links to radical Islamists and radical Islamic organizations. One on the ICU’s deputy chairmen, Hassan Dahir Aweys, had been a member of Al Itihad Al Islamiya (AIAI), which was on the U.S. terror list and had been involved in a number of religiously motivated attacks in the past, including in Ethiopia (Menkhaus, 2005). Furthermore, the leader of the ICU’s militias (the Al Shabaab) was believed to be “Al Qaeda’s de facto leader in East Africa” and had allegedly trained in Afghanistan with Bin Laden himself (Bloomfield, 2008).

Another international fear was that the lawlessness in Somalia could turn it into a transit place for terrorist activities. This suspicion was fueled by the fact that in 1998, Somalia had been used “as a transit point for bomb materiel” that was later used in the bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed over 200 people (Menkhaus, 2005, p. 41). After a bomb attack on a hotel in Mombassa in 2002, the investigation into it uncovered that the perpetrators had acquired explosives in Somalia and had also trained there for a month (Ibid). An important detail is that the suspected perpetrators of the attacks described above had found shelter in Somalia (Bloomfield, 2008).

The presence of Al Qaeda affiliates and other known terrorists combined with the rise of an Islamic movement was unacceptable to the U.S. Therefore it decided that the ICU needed to go and approached an opposition group to take care of that. The

17 The American claims will be discussed below.
opposition group the U.S. turned to in February 2006 was the earlier-mentioned Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ICG, 2006b).

Unfortunately for the U.S., this plan did not work out as hoped. The reason for this was that the ICU perceived correctly that the ARPCT was out to get them. Instead of waiting for them to attack, the ICU decided to go on the offensive itself. After a series of fights, the ICU managed to expel the ARPCT from Mogadishu. When some members of the Alliance even joined the ICU, it was clear that the ARPCT, and America’s counter-terrorism effort in Somalia along with it, were done for (ICG, 2006b).

After defeating the ARPCT, the ICU did not end its offensive, but pursued its remainders across southern Somalia and to the north of Mogadishu. The advance also brought the ICU closer to the seat of the Transitional Federal Government in Baidoa. This ICU advance posed a threat to the TFG, especially since the ICU had demonstrated in its victory over the ARPCT that it was a military force to be reckoned with.

In response to the threat to the TFG, Ethiopia stepped up its intervention. Before the ICU’s advance, Ethiopia’s involvement had been political and had focused on assisting the negotiations on the creation of the TFG. Now, however, Ethiopia’s involvement had a military component too. For one it supplied the TFG’s troops with materiel and training. At the same time Ethiopia sent troops into Somalia to create a buffer zone around Baidoa to protect the TFG from its enemies (ICG, 2006b). This move by Ethiopia led hardliners within the ICU to call for a holy war against Ethiopia (Plaut, 2009).

4.3 2006 Invasion

As discussed above, the U.S. was weary of the ICU because of its connections to terrorism. Ethiopia was worried about the ICU because it threatened the TFG which it had help create. An additional reason for Ethiopia to distrust the ICU was that ICU officials had talked about wanting to add the Somali-populated regions outside of Somalia’s border to Somalia (Barnett, 2007). Ethiopia, having the largest of such territories, would most likely be the victim of such an attack, as it had been in past. Therefore, the ICU could pose a threat to Ethiopia, should it ever manage to take control of all of Somalia.
What the above means is that Ethiopia and the U.S. both had the same goal: to drive the ICU from power and install a friendly government. With the ARPCT gone, the TFG was the one group that could meet that demand. However, radical measures would have to be taken to get the TFG into Mogadishu and the ICU out.

These radical measures were launched on December 26, 2006. On that date Ethiopia invaded Somalia with the goal of overthrowing the ICU government. By the time it had done so its close alliance with the U.S. had earned it millions of dollars worth of military equipment. Furthermore, it has been reported that the Ethiopian offensive was partially directed by CIA agents that traveled along with the Ethiopian troops (Van den Berk, 2008). With such an overwhelming military force deployed against it, the ICU simply could not win in a direct confrontation.

Indeed, within days after the Ethiopian assault had started, the ICU dissolved itself (ICG, 2007). After that, the TFG moved to Mogadishu to assume power. This seemingly quick success, however, in no way ended the conflict. Within weeks, the remnants of the ICU had regrouped and started a guerilla war against the Ethiopians in the country. Some put the figure of Ethiopian troops in the country at 30,000 at its peak (Bloomfield, 2008).

Shortly after the ICU had been driven from Mogadishu, the U.S., which up to that point had only covertly and mostly indirectly intervened in Somalia, launched a direct intervention itself. On January 8, 2007, the U.S. Air Force conducted air raids that were aimed at people the U.S. suspected of involvement in the bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (MSNBC, 2007).

Besides the air raids, of which there would be at least three more before the end of 2007, T.P.M. Barnett reported in Esquire Magazine in June 2007 that the U.S. had also sent in Special Forces to hunt down and kill all ICU militiamen and their Al-Qaeda allies. This was supposedly easy because the quick Ethiopian advance had them “so confused, they were running around like chickens with their heads cut off” (Barnett, 2007).

### 4.4 Analysis Hypotheses

When discussing the intervention in Somalia in 2006 Ethiopia and the U.S. have to be discussed separately, since they might have had different reasons for intervening.
Furthermore, by discussing the U.S. separately it is possible to see if there are parallels with the earlier intervention in Somalia.

4.4.1 Hypothesis 1 in Regard to Ethiopia

When it comes to Ethiopia, one would have to conclude that the main motive behind Ethiopia’s intervention was to defend itself. It is true that Ethiopia had supported the TFG before the ICU was formed and that it had been involved in the process that led to the TFG’s creation. This could indicate that Ethiopia was genuinely committed to the peace process, for the sake of the people of Somalia.

Earlier and subsequent Ethiopian actions belie that idea, however. Firstly, the International Crisis Group (2006) has blamed the failure of the TFG’s predecessor, the TNG, partly on Ethiopia. Apparently, the Islamic elements present in the TNG concerned Ethiopia. It therefore decided to sponsor opposition groups to “cripple and eventually replace the interim government,” which in the end they did (p. 3). It were these opposition groups that were then invited to create the TFG, while the Islamic elements from the TNG were kept out.

The reason for why Ethiopia was so fearful of the Islamic elements in the TNG became clear when the ICU was on the ascendance: its more radical elements were adherents of the Greater Somalia ideology and in favor of a holy war against Ethiopia. The last time a pro-Greater Somalia leader was in charge of a unified Somalia the Somali army invaded the Ogaden. It is therefore a national security interest of Ethiopia to prevent any such government from ever being formed again.

The ICU threatened to become exactly such a government. As demonstrated Ethiopia initially tried to counter this indirectly by propping up the TFG. When it turned out that the ICU was stronger than expected, Ethiopia felt it had no choice but to take out the threat of the ICU itself through the deployment of massive military force in Somalia.

All in all, both the political involvement by Ethiopia to establish a friendly government and the military campaign against the ICU were designed to protect itself. When looked at it closely it is not clear if the ICU posed a latent threat, however. While it had defeated the ARPCT and was advancing everywhere in Somalia, it is far from clear that the ICU had any concrete plans to invade the Ogaden, let alone to do that any time
soon. The fact that the ICU disbanded only a few days into the war indicate it probably did not have the capability to threaten Ethiopia and invade the Ogaden even if it had wanted to.

While the motive behind Ethiopia’s actions is clear, their legality is not. Ethiopia’s intervention is legal only if one believes in the more expansive notion of self-defense mentioned in chapter 1. In the classical legal understanding of self-defense, Ethiopia had no right to fight as it was not under attack yet. Since in this thesis I stuck with the classic legal notion of self-defense, I would argue Ethiopia’s invasion was illegal. Whether it was legal or not and regardless of one’s definition of self-defense, it can be concluded that a national security interest was the motive behind Ethiopia’s intervention and as such it confirms realism and hypothesis 1.

An interesting side note to Ethiopia's involvement is that it made Eritrea step up its involvement in Somalia too. Soon after Ethiopia increased its support to the TFG, Eritrea began assisting the ICU. This Eritrean decision coincided with the increasingly hostile atmosphere between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the UNMEE-led peace process. The conclusion that this decision was, like earlier acts of support for groups hostile to Ethiopia, “driven almost entirely by desire to frustrate Ethiopian ambitions” is therefore justified (ICG, 2006, p. 20).

4.4.2 Hypothesis 1 in Regard to the U.S.

The reason the U.S. went into Somalia is similar to the reasons Ethiopia had for its intervention. True, unlike Ethiopia, the ICU could never hope to launch an attack against the U.S. homeland, let alone take some of its territory. This means that in the territorial sense, the U.S. was not threatened. On 9/11, however, the U.S. had seen that terrorists and their networks could inflict massive damage within the U.S. This event came on top of the attacks against American embassies in Africa mentioned above; whose suspected perpetrators were key figures in the ICU.

The 9/11 attacks led to changes in U.S. foreign policy in regard to acting on terrorist threats. The most important change is probably the one stated in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States. In that document the U.S. stated explicitly that it would not be afraid to act “preemptively against such terrorists, to
prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.” This notion of preemptive attacks against terrorists was further expanded by President Bush on May 1, 2003 when he stated that “any person, organization, or government that supports, protects, or harbors terrorists is complicit in the murder of the innocent and equally guilty of terrorist crimes.”

What this means is that the U.S. considered terrorism such a dangerous national security threat that it would take action against terrorists, their networks, and state sponsors if necessary, before they could pose a threat. By conflating terrorism and states that harbored them, the U.S. opened the door to preemptively striking at governments as well. The situation on the ground in Somalia in late 2006, with terrorists being part of a movement poised to take control over large parts of Somalia, perfectly fit the threat description that the U.S. found unacceptable since 9/11.

Therefore, the American political involvement with the ARPCT can be seen in the light of U.S. anti-terrorism policies. The subsequent support given to Ethiopia in its invasion of Somalia also fits that policy, as Ethiopia sought to take out the movement that might harbor terrorists when in power. The climax of the American involvement, the overt air attacks and the covert deployment of Special Forces, was meant to permanently take out those that might consider launching terrorist attacks against American targets in the future.

The American policy towards Somalia since 2004 was driven by concerns for its physical security in the long run. While there was no direct threat, an expansive definition of self-defense would see Somalia as a potential threat that had to be taken out before it could materialize. The U.S. did this. Whether that was justified or legal is open to debate. For this thesis, however, it does not matter since it confirms realist theory and hypothesis 1 as well.

When it comes to potential economic interests being threatened the answer for both Ethiopia and the U.S. can be brief, as it is similar to that given in chapter 2 for the intervention in Somalia. There was no threat to vital resources coming from Somalia. It was purely a security threat, which is the most dangerous threat to a state.
4.4.2 Hypothesis 2

The main Somali protagonists were the TFG and the ICU. The main interveners were Ethiopia and the U.S. Besides the Ethiopian and American military operations, another intervention into Somalia was launched in the wake of the Ethiopian invasion by the African Union. This mission, AMISOM (African Union Mission to Somalia), had been in preparation since 2005 but was not deployed until after the ICU had been dislodged by the Ethiopians (AMISOM, 2009). This mission also received the support of the UN Security Council in Resolution 1744. It was also given a Chapter VII mandate.

What is important about Resolution 1744 is that it did not take a neutral position in the conflict. It sided with the TFG and authorized the African Union troops to “provide, as appropriate, protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions to help them carry out their functions of government, and security for key infrastructure” (Security Council Resolution 1744, 2007, clause 4(b)). This is interesting since, as discussed in this chapter, the TFG was opposed by a significant part of the Somalia people and was completely unable to establish itself militarily in Somalia. Not at all surprisingly, the TFG’s enemies regularly attacked the African Union forces that entered the country from early 2007 onwards and regularly inflicted casualties while doing so (BBC News, 2008).

Two conclusions for the hypotheses of this thesis can be drawn from the international support for the TFG. The first conclusion is that the international community sided with the most powerful country in the Horn of Africa itself, Ethiopia, and with the most powerful country in the international system, the U.S. It did not come to an independent conclusion that supporting the TFG had a very small chance of succeeding. If getting a stable government was the goal, the international community probably would have had more success had it supported the ICU, in spite of its inclusion of some Islamic militants. That demonstrates the UN follows the lead of its most powerful members, and cannot act autonomously.

The second conclusion that can be drawn is that international institutions do not have the muscle to operate effectively in conflict situations. The basis for this conclusion is that AMISOM never even managed to get the number of troops it needed. As of March 2009, a full two years after the mission was authorized, only 3,750 of the 8,000 authorized troops are in Somalia (Opération de paix, 2009). Had the African Union had
any means to compel its member states to contribute forces it would have achieved its targets, but it did not.

The failure to gather the troops to fill the mandate does not even take into account whether that troop strength would have been sufficient to begin with. In 1993, 30,000 heavily armed American troops failed to effectively pacify Mogadishu when they were confronted by opposition of just one warlord. Now, less than a third of that force, with probably less high-tech equipment, was asked to create a secure environment across the country against a battle-hardened guerilla movement that had broad public support.

What this means is that neither the UN nor the African Union developed their policies towards Somalia independently. The UN followed the lead of its most powerful member and the most powerful regional state, while the African Union committed itself to a policy even though it did not have the means to carry it out. This demonstrates that, as realism predicts, cooperation in the security area through international institutions is very hard to achieve.

When it comes to the role of NSAs the picture is also clear. First of all, the presence of radicals linked to transnational terrorist networks in Somalia drew the attention of the U.S. This presence in combination with a non-state political-religious movement that was growing more powerful made both Ethiopia and the U.S. itchy. Out of fear that these groups would threaten their security sometime in the future, both states decided to use their militaries to take it out. Clearly, an NSA triggered this intervention.

All in all this means that hypothesis 2A on the role of international institutions is confirmed. At the same time, hypothesis 2B on the role NSAs played in triggering the intervention is proven to be incorrect. This mixed bag demonstrates that at least in some cases realism’s assumptions on the central role of states can be challenged.

4.5 The Invasion’s Aftermath

Although Ethiopia’s invasion was highly successful initially, that country got more than it bargained for in the end. As stated above, the ICU regrouped within weeks and launched guerilla operations against the occupiers. After one of such skirmishes, Somali insurgents dragged the bodies of slain Ethiopian soldiers through the streets of Mogadishu in a scene reminiscent of 1993 (USA Today, 2007).
What did not help the cause of Ethiopia and the TFG were the violent and heavy-handed counter-insurgency tactics deployed by the Ethiopian army and TFG troops, which included the use of heavy artillery and tanks in urban settings. This even led to accusations that Ethiopia was committing war crimes in Mogadishu and other parts of the country (ICG, 2008). In spite of their military strength, the Ethiopians could not pacify Somalia and after having sustained heavy losses, Ethiopia announced in 2008 it would withdraw from Somalia at the end of that year. Upon leaving, Ethiopia transferred the responsibility for security to an alliance of TFG troops and some moderate Islamist factions that had left the ICU (BBC News, 2009).

When Ethiopia left, however, Islamists were in control of most of the south of the country (BBC News, 2009). This means that the main goal of Ethiopia and the U.S., destroying the future threat of radical Islamists, had not succeeded at all. At the same time, some moderate Islamists that had been in power as part of the ICU in 2006 to begin with, were now again part of the country’s leadership. This too signifies failure, as those moderate Islamists might have been able to check the more radical elements within the ICU. Now that the ICU had fallen apart, they could no longer be expected to do so, meaning the radicals will at some point have to be confronted with force by the TFG (or the radicals might seek a confrontation with them). Therefore, the reason Ethiopia left was not success but the recognition that it could not win in Somalia and that the costs of staying were higher than any possible gains.

Another point that should be made about the timing of the Ethiopian withdrawal is that it occurred at a time when tensions with Eritrea were steadily increasing and the chances of a new war with that country were growing, as discussed in the previous chapter. Staying longer in Somalia would further weaken Ethiopia in regard to Eritrea. Similarly, Eritrea would continue to sponsor the ICU as long as Ethiopia was in Somalia, which would even further weaken Ethiopia.

Therefore, it can be argued that the relative loss of power by Ethiopia in regard to Eritrea led to the decision to withdraw. Furthermore, the absolute costs that Eritrea incurred when sponsoring the ICU lead to a relative power gains by Eritrea, since that country would have a better chance of winning should hostilities with Ethiopia break out again.
As far as realism is concerned, the developments in Somalia from the invasion onward show how that NSAs can in fact be the decisive factor in whether to end an intervention. Furthermore it shows that non-state actors can inflict severe damage on regular armies and that they can resist what the international community wants. This disproves hypothesis 3 and demonstrates again that realists should pay more attention to the effects of non-state actors on the policies of states.

The case of the Ethiopian-American intervention confirms most of realist theory. Both countries were driven by a perceived threat to their future security. In addressing this they succeeded in getting the UN and the African Union to go along with their goals and to help in propping up a government that was perceived as illegitimate by many Somalis. Their efforts, however, in particular the Ethiopian military effort, were frustrated by NSAs, who made the intervention a costly endeavor. The NSAs resistance even convinced Ethiopia that it was better to pull out, even though the TFG and the African Union troops are not in charge of large parts of the country and cannot be expected to take charge anytime soon.

What is also interesting to see is the contrast with the 1992-1005 intervention in Somalia. Then, the U.S. and UN intervened in an attempt to broker a peace and to help the Somali people. Now, the UN was on the side of a government that lacked public support. At the same time the U.S. carried air raids combat missions without even pretending that would do Somalia any good.

There are, however, also similarities between the interventions. The reality on the ground in Somalia proved to be resilient. In both cases the interveners were unable to defeat the threat from NSAs. In both cases the interveners left before Somalia was stabilized. In both cases it was clear that the suffering of the Somali people would not end anytime soon.
Chapter 5: Anti-Piracy Mission Somalia

As discussed in the previous chapter, Ethiopian troops departed from Somalia in late 2008 after their failed attempt to root out the ICU. When they left, the TFG in which they had invested so much was “on the brink of total collapse” (Hara & Vertin, 2008). An international coalition tried to prevent this collapse in the so-called Djibouti process, whose aim was to bring the warring parties together.

Unfortunately for that process, the Islamists in control of most of the south of the country were not involved. Another unfortunate aspect was the power struggles within the TFG itself, showing itself to be nothing more than “a crumbling charade of a government” with “no credibility among the Somali people” that existed “in an internationally-supported bubble” (Ibid). With these two factors going against it, the Djibouti process had no chance of ever leading to a unified and peaceful Somalia, making the Djibouti process look a bit like a charade too.

Up to this point, however, the Somali problem was serious but still mostly a domestic problem that did not affect other countries. From 2008 onward, however, pirates with Somalia as their home base began hijacking commercial ships off the Somali coast with increasing frequency. It was this increase in ship hijackings, and the costs and threats to international trade associated with it, that led to another intervention into the area. This intervention will be discussed in this chapter.

5.1 Origins and Economic Effects of Somali Piracy

Even though Somali piracy has only recently been brought to the attention of the world public, piracy in the Gulf of Aden is no new phenomenon. It first arose when the Somali state definitively disintegrated in the early 1990s and has been a recurring phenomenon ever since (Feffer, 2009). The coinciding of the state collapse and the appearance of Somali pirates demonstrates that the problems on sea are connected to the problems on land.

This interconnectedness is further demonstrated by the timing of the recent upsurge in acts of piracy. The upsurge followed after Ethiopia and the U.S. overthrew the
ICU, which had previously taken action against pirates on a number of occasions (Maliti, 2007). When foreign troops invaded their land, expelling them naturally became the ICU’s top priority. In fact, parts of the ICU even forged a working relation with the pirates who donated (part of) the ransom money they received to the militias so they could step up their fight against Ethiopia (Wallis, 2008). So ironically, the actions by both Ethiopia and the U.S. did not only fail to permanently remove the Islamists as an important factor in Somalia, it also gave a huge boost to the problem of Somali piracy.

The piracy problem, however, has not only been caused by domestic Somali problems and the Ethiopian invasion, but can also be blamed on other external actors. These external actors are mostly European and Asian companies who used the absence of a Somali government to illegally fish on a large scale in Somalia’s territorial waters and to dump their toxic waste there, as this was cheaper than processing it in Europe (Phillips, 2009).

The problem for the Somalis was that the fishing operations drove the Somali fishermen out of business while the waste made them sick. In the absence of a government to stop the outside companies, Somalis began to patrol the waters themselves as an unofficial coast guard. In this capacity they hijack ships and demand a ransom fee to be paid. The result has been a “resource swap” between the lawbreaking companies, who make an estimated 300 million dollars a year in the Somali waters, and the pirates, who collect up to a 100 hundred million dollars in ransom (Salopek, 2008).

Besides the large amount of money that is taken by Somali pirates, Somali piracy is also a problem due to the location of Somalia. As can be seen in the map in Appendix B on page 84, Somalia’s coast (which is 3,025 kilometers long according to the CIA World Factbook) offers access to the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. From here one can go either to Europe via the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, or one can head to the oil-rich Persian Gulf area and Asia. This route through the Gulf of Aden is the fastest shipping route between Asia and Europe and therefore “forms an essential oil transport route between Europe and the Far East” (ESA, 2006). This fact in itself makes the piracy threat a point of concern to many major powers, since their economies depend on oil.

Besides for transporting oil, this route is also heavily used for other commercial shipping, which has also suffered from the piracy problem. For example, AP Mollar-
Maersk, Europe’s largest shipping company decided after one of its ships had been hijacked that it would no longer send its ships through the Gulf of Aden but around Cape Hope instead (Biegon, 2009). This shift brings with it longer shipping times, as well as higher costs. Furthermore, the costs for shipping companies increase even if they keep using the Gulf of Aden because of the risk of high ransoms, higher payroll costs, and higher insurance costs (Ibid).

5.2 Convergence of States’ Interests and Cooperation

A point that has not been mentioned yet is that piracy threatens ships of all nationalities. In one of the piracy incident-richest days, pirates hijacked ships from Germany, Iran, and Japan, while at the same time holding ships from Malaysia, Thailand and Nigeria (Wallis, 2008). Because everyone was threatened, there was no state that benefited from it. Even in Somalia itself the benefactor was not the TFG but those who opposed this widely-supported (at least outside of Somalia) government.

Therefore, around Somalia, there was a threat to economic interests of all countries either directly or indirectly. The direct threat was having a ship under your country’s flag hijacked. The indirect threat was to the flow of oil which could lead to rising oil prices. Very few states, with the exception maybe of oil exporting states, would benefit from a higher oil price.

What this means is that on the state level, there was a global convergence of interests in favor of putting an end to piracy, rather than the perpetual clash of interests realists believe exists. The absence of this clash of interests, which is assumed to be a barrier for cooperation in the security area, means that cooperation might be possible, even under realist assumptions. Indeed, as will be discussed below, joint action was taken, both by individual states such as the U.S. and China, as well as through international organizations such as the UN, NATO, and the EU.

5.2.1 The UN

Given the convergence of interests it should come as no surprise that the Security Council managed to unanimously pass a resolution that authorized anti-piracy actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This resolution, Resolution 1816 passed on June 2,
2008, authorized all states to “enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea” and to “use (…) all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery” (clauses 7A and 7B). The one limitation was that this authorization only applied to states that cooperated with the TFG. Since virtually all member states did this, that exception was pretty meaningless.

What was also pretty meaningless was the specification that the actions would have to be carried out in cooperation with the TFG. Since the TFG was barely able to hold itself together in the few areas in Somalia where it had any authority, it could not even be hoped it could participate in the fight against pirates. In that sense, the results of the resolution would be a large foreign naval presence in Somalia’s territorial waters. This shows that in the absence of a functioning government it is fairly easy for other states to send troops to that state’s territory if they choose to.

In response to the Security Council Resolution, states swung into action against the pirates, which for some states was easier to do than others. The first ones to respond were those who already had a naval presence in the area.

The country with the strongest naval force in place was the United States because it had increased its naval presence soon after the 9/11 attacks, so they could keep an eye out for terrorist movements in the area. Now the naval presence would not only be there to protect the U.S. against terrorists, but also to protect the flow of oil and other commercial shipping, which are (vital) economic interests.

At the same time, it is questionable whether the UN resolution made any difference to U.S. behavior there. After all, it had not had UN permission to launch its strikes against Somalia in 2007 but had done so anyway. There is no reason to believe the U.S. would not have taken out some pirates without UN approval if the opportunity had presented itself.

5.2.2 NATO

While some of these anti-terrorism missions were carried out unilaterally, the U.S. also increased its naval presence in Somali waters after Resolution 1816 was adopted, with the explicit goal of going after pirates. It did this in cooperation with a number of NATO allies in the NATO operation Allied Protector, whose concrete goal was to
“enhance the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation in the area” (NATO, 2009).

What is interesting about the Allied Protector mission is that it is carried out by the Standing NATO Maritime Group 1, which is a part of the NATO’s Response Force. This Response Force consists of forces from a number of NATO member states. Membership of the Force rotates, which means not every state is on the Response Force all the time. The interesting part is that when a decision to deploy the Response Force has been taken by the North Atlantic Council, “member nations must transfer the authority for their committed forces to SACEUR” (Supreme Commander Europe, Berk)(NATO, 2007).

This means de facto that NATO takes over national troops and from then on can command them as it sees fit in order to achieve the goals set. However, the North Atlantic Council, the NATO body that authorizes NATO missions, operates on the basis of consensus, which means that if one state opposes a specific plan, it can block it. Should a state that has committed troops to the Response Force oppose a mission, that mission will not be carried out. So while NATO has possibilities to operate autonomously, that autonomy is severely restricted by the consensus-based decision-making process in the organ that authorizes all missions.

One could argue that a joint NATO operation was to be expected since NATO is a military alliance, which implicates that the member states’ security interests coincide. However, in NATO’s history there are a number of examples where serious disagreements between members led to a failure to agree on a joint NATO course, which demonstrates that even cooperation within alliances should not be taken for granted. One recent example is the disagreement between the U.S. and some European states about how far to expand NATO (Radio Free Europe, 2009). Another recent example is the disagreement on how to conduct the war in Afghanistan. In that case many European nations are weary of sending more combat troops, even though the U.S. believes they are needed (Ibid).

What the above demonstrates is that cooperation in the security area is not to be taken for granted, even between strong allies, as realists would expect. Yet, in the case of Somali piracy, there is a clear convergence of interests for all partners and cooperation
does happen. This case therefore seems to demonstrate that the defensive realist proposition regarding cooperation has some merit to it.

5.2.3 The European Union

What further strengthens this point is that the NATO operation cooperated with another anti-piracy mission active in the region, this one carried out by the EU. This EU naval force was established on November 10, 2008 by the Council of the European Union and was called EU Naval Force Somalia, but it is also known as Operation Atalanta (EU Council, 2008).

Operation Atalanta too is a prime example of international cooperation through an international institution. In fact, this mission has been billed as “the first EU maritime operation,” which gives the impression that the EU, rather than the member states, is conducting this mission.

A number of facts contradict this, however. The first fact against this is that the operation was authorized by the Council of the European Union within the framework of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP, however, falls under the second pillar of the EU structure, meaning that the decision process is intergovernmental and not supranational (Dover, 2007). This means that policies in this framework cannot be substantially influenced by EU institutions. Another characteristic of this framework is that every policy needs to be approved unanimously and that every member state can veto a proposal it disagrees with. The result is that policy outputs are “extremely conservative” (Ibid, p. 241).

It can be concluded that just as in NATO, cooperation within the EU when it comes to security policy is difficult to achieve. Yet, in the case of Somali piracy, the policy undertaken is quite aggressive and, since the use of force is allowed, potentially quite lethal too. This is probably also the result of the convergence of interests, as the piracy in the Gulf of Aden threatens the flow of goods and oil to the single European market, which as such threatens the economic interests of every member state.

In spite of the fact that Operation Atalanta was the result of an intergovernmental and not of a supranational policymaking process, it might be the case that the EU could conduct the mission autonomously after it was approved. This would mean that while the
core decision making power lies with states, the EU is strong enough to execute it as it sees fit.

Indeed, the Council created a Commission of Contributors (CoC) on which all participating countries are represented individually. This Commission has the authority to “take decisions on the day-to-day management of the Operation” and to “make recommendations on possible adjustments to operational planning, including possible adjustments to objectives” (EU Council, 2009, p. 2). However, the CoC also has to accept every proposal unanimously, which means the member states are the decisive actors in this body, too (Ibid).

All in all, the creation of Operation Atalanta and the decision-making structure within that operation show two things. First it shows that cooperation on security issues is indeed possible, but that it is hard to achieve because every state has a veto. Secondly it shows that the EU cannot create operations on its own in the way it can create policy in other areas, such as the single European market. It also shows that member states do not trust others with their troops as they maintained their veto power in the CoC.

While the driving force behind the creation of both the NATO mission and the EU mission to Somali waters is the threat to American and European economic interests, the EU in its official documents states another reason first. That is “the protection of vessels of the WFP (World Food Programme) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia” (Council, 2008, p. 2). To deter pirates is only mentioned second.

While tragic, the problems in delivering food to Somalis in need are in itself not a threat to the EU’s physical or economic security. Indeed, the Somalis have had to survive under dire circumstances from at least 1991 onward. Before the problems that came with the state’s collapse spilled over into the Gulf of Aden where European and Europe-bound ships were sailing, the EU did not see the need to send a strong naval force to help the Somalis. The launching of the mission coincided with an increased threat to European economic activities in the Gulf of Aden.

Besides that, getting the food to the Somali ports is not in itself enough to tackle the humanitarian crisis. The ongoing conflict on land between the TFG and its opponents also has a negative impact on the delivery of humanitarian aid, yet the EU does not send ground forces to Somalia to do something about that. Given the negative experiences
international forces have had with land interventions in Somalia on earlier occasions this is not strange, but it does seriously undermine the claim that Operation Atalanta is designed to help the Somali people.

5.2.4 Chinese Involvement

Along with the Western countries, other countries sent ships to the area too. One of them was China, the up and coming superpower. The Chinese mission to Somalia marked “its first active deployment beyond the Pacific” (Marcus, 2008). This indicates that China is not a nation with a long track record of conducting foreign interventions, at least not in the modern time. In 2008, it did have a little under 2,000 troops active in nine UN missions, but for a country that is believed to be on its way towards superpower status and that has a population of well over a billion people, that number is negligible (Wolfe, 2009). Therefore, the Chinese decision to send ships to Somalia is significant and indicates that China felt that something important was at stake.

When looking at a number of statistics one can indeed see that China has considerable economic interests in a secure Gulf of Aden. For one, it gets sixty percent of its oil from the Middle East and most of that sixty percent comes through the Gulf of Aden (Marcus, 2008). Furthermore, Europe is China’s largest export market and represents more than 19 percent of China’s external trade (European Commission, 2006). A disruption of the fastest shipping route from China to Europe could hurt that position and China’s strong economic growth with it. These massive interests deserve protecting and are probably the main reason why China sent ships.

So just like the U.S. and the EU, China sent ships in response to the threat to its economic interests posed by Somali pirates. As the deployment happened within the framework of Security Council resolutions, China demonstrates here that cooperation on security issues is possible and that there is not always a clash of interests, even though the Bush administration had described China as a strategic competitor.
5.3 Analysis of Hypotheses

5.3.1 Hypothesis 1

As has been mentioned above a couple of times already, the main reason why the U.S., many European countries (through NATO or the EU), China, and a range of other countries sent ships to the Gulf of Aden was to stop the pirates from hijacking their ships and from threatening the flow of oil and disrupting trade. While some, most notably the EU, gave as one reason for participating that they wanted to help aid being delivered to Somalia, this claim is not credible. Firstly, the humanitarian situation in Somalia had been disastrous for over sixteen years and that had not lead to EU intervention. Secondly, the means that were used, a naval force, were not suitable for the problems with food delivery on land. As such, the humanitarian angle can be summarily dismissed.

Besides the timing of the intervention, the lackluster efforts to solve the root causes of Somali piracy, the chaos on land, demonstrate that that is not a high priority for those intervening either. True, there is the so-called Djibouti peace process, but since that does not involve the Islamist factions fighting in the south; it cannot possibly lead to a structurally peaceful and stable Somalia.

In this case, however, there is no real threat to the physical security of the intervening countries. The pirates may manage to occasionally hijack a ship; they are not even strong enough militarily to dare attack any of the warships in their waters. Therefore it cannot be argued that protecting their physical security is what drives the intervening states. What drives them instead is a threat to their economic interests. As such hypothesis one of this thesis is confirmed.

5.3.2 Hypothesis 2

Even though the UN Security Council, as well as NATO and the EU were involved in authorizing and/or conducting the naval operations in Somali waters, none of them took independent action. All decisions made within those bodies were taken by the member states themselves. Even within the EU, a strong international organization with substantial independent authority in for example the economic field, the decision on the operation was taken in a framework that gave all member states veto power. This meant the EU could not force a state to do anything it did not want, nor could a simple majority
of member states do that. Even the decisions on operational issues during the mission itself required unanimity, leaving the member states in power at all times. This is also the case with the NATO intervention. This also confirms hypothesis 2A.

While the role of international organizations in the intervention fits realist theory, the level of cooperation displayed by the international community is higher than some realists might expect. China and the U.S. are both on board. Even Iran has sent ships to the Gulf of Aden to participate in the anti-piracy operations (Reuters, 2009). NATO has come to an agreement, as did the European Council, which is usually very conservative in foreign policy and security issues. All this seems to indicate that the defensive realists’ proposition that cooperation is possible when interests do not clash is correct.

Another point that should be noted here is that it was the absence of a strong government in Somalia that made the operation possible. Had there been a strong government, then that might have opposed having its waters patrolled by large numbers of foreign military ships. As seen in the case of UNMEE, efforts to frustrate the work of the international community can be very effective when done by states actually in charge of their territory. Of course, one should be careful with comparing the two cases, as there are many differences between them, such as the nature of the conflict itself and the mandate given to the international forces.

When it comes to NSAs, their role in triggering the intervention is again big. This conclusion is not surprising. What is interesting is that the other party, shipping companies, were also non-state actors. Apparently, conflicts between two parties (if one treats the shipping companies as one) who both do not seek to control a territory or govern it can be serious enough to make states want to get involved. This again demonstrates that while states might be the most important actors in the international system, they can be steered by events not caused by, or not even involving, other states. This rejects hypothesis 2B.

Whether the NSAs will be able to decide the conflict in their favor this time, as they did during the UNOSOM-UNITAF intervention and the Ethiopian invasion remains to be seen. During these earlier interventions, the NSAs could confront their enemies on

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18 The question is, of course, if there would even be a piracy problem if there was a strong Somali government.
their own turf in an urban setting. There, their light weapons were sufficient to make things very difficult for the foreign forces. On sea, however, they lack the cover a city provides. Furthermore, their small boats and machine guns are no match for an enemy warship. Therefore, confrontation is not an option for them this time.

For this reason I do not believe that the foreign intervention will end because the international forces took too many losses. The outcome of the anti-piracy mission therefore will probably confirm hypothesis 3, although that is by no means certain since the mission is still ongoing.

What will influence the final outcome of the mission depends on whether there can be a successful peace process in Somalia itself. Only if a stable government that is willing to take on the pirates and that can patrol its own waters is formed can the issue of piracy be expected to go away. As long as Somalia is a failed state, the problem will most likely persist. That the Djibouti process will lead to a stable government is unlikely. Whether it can be done at all also remains to be seen as the clan loyalty, warlords, and radical Islam will not go away any time soon.
Conclusion

In the previous five chapters, realism’s key propositions on the role and behavior of states in the international system were tested in four different interventions in the Horn of Africa. There were three main propositions that were tested. The first proposition was that states’ behavior is solely motivated by security and/or economic interests. The second proposition was that states and not non-state actors such as international institutions and armed non-state actors (NSAs) are the primary actors in the international system and also in interventions. The third proposition was related to the second one and claimed that because of their primary role, states were the ones who decided to end the intervention because it had been successful.

States & Interests (hypothesis 1)

Whether interests drive states’ behavior is not confirmed by all interventions discussed in this thesis. In the case of the U.S.-led UN intervention in Somalia in 1992, the U.S. was motivated by a desire to prove that a New World Order had indeed come into being after the Cold War. When the UN was not playing the strong role it was believed it should in dealing with the humanitarian crisis, the U.S. saw its prestige threatened and sent in UNITAF, even though there was no danger to U.S. security or U.S. economic interests.

At the same time, the American reaction to a threatened loss of prestige and credibility that U.S. might have suffered if it failed to act decisively in regard to the Somali crisis, could be interpreted as confirming realism when looked at it from a relative gains theory point of view. From this point of view, losing credibility could have undermined the U.S.’s claim to world leadership and would lead to a relative loss of power in regard to other powers. This loss of relative power was more expensive to the U.S. than the absolute costs of the intervention itself, which was why the intervention occurred.

Another lack of economic or security interests can be found behind the UNMEE intervention between Ethiopia and Eritrea after their border conflict. The countries participating in UNMEE sent troops to assist in the implementation of the Algiers
Agreement that ended that conflict. Since there was little danger of the conflict spilling over to other states’ territories, the intervening parties did not do so to protect themselves but rather out of a genuine desire to help solve the conflict.

The motives behind the last two interventions, however, fit realist predictions better. The 2006 Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in the conflict between the Transitional Federal Government and the Islamic Courts Union stemmed mostly from the fear that the ICU would in the long run develop the capability to try to annex Ethiopia’s Ogaden province by force. This would be a serious threat to Ethiopia’s territorial integrity which had to be preempted.

The American support for Ethiopia and its military activities in Somalia itself support this view. The U.S. also feared that it might be attacked by terrorist groups operating from Somalia should the ICU come to power. That such an attack would not lead to the loss of any American territory did not matter in determining that a threat to U.S. national security existed.

In the final intervention, the international anti-piracy mission in Somali waters, the threat states responded to was a threat to their economic interests, as Somali pirates destabilized commercial shipping between Asia and Europe. It also threatened the flow of oil from the Middle East. Both the disruptions in international trade and the disruption of the flow of oil could have a negative effect on the growth and the stability of the economies of the states affected. This list included major powers such as the U.S. and China, as well as the EU, which although not a state is still a major joint market.

While the cases partly confirm that states are motivated by interests, it demonstrates that especially when launching interventions states can have wholly different motivations. Whether these other motivations can lead to successful interventions will be discussed below. Nonetheless, the cases here demonstrate that states can have other motives behind their interventions too. As such, hypothesis 1 of this thesis is not fully confirmed.

Non-state actors (hypothesis 2)

In this thesis, a distinction between two kinds of non-state actors was made. The first kind was international institutions such as the UN, which especially neoliberals
believed were going to play a strong role in the international system after the demise of the Soviet Union and the Cold War system structure. The other kind was non-state armed actors such as rebel groups, warlords, and terrorists.

The UN was involved in the interventions in Somalia from 1992 to 1995 and in UNMEE. While active in the Djibouti peace process in Somalia from the Ethiopian invasion onward and while having authorized the anti-piracy mission to Somali waters, the UN’s involvement in the intervention’s execution was negligible in both.

In Somalia, UNOSOM II was under UN command and had a mandate to use force to carry out the mission. On paper this might seem like a strong autonomous role, but in practice it was not. Not only did the UN fail to get states to contribute the number of troops that were needed, it also failed to conduct the mission effectively after the U.S. and other industrial powers had withdrawn. This case thus clearly demonstrates the limits of the UN in the security area.

The UN’s involvement in the Ethiopian-Eritrean peace process established in the Algiers Agreement paints a similar picture. Here on paper too, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission had much authority to impose a final and binding ruling on the final status of the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia. However, the strong powers on paper were not translated into an equally strong enforcement mechanism. This meant that Ethiopia and Eritrea, not UNMEE or the EEBC, were in the driver’s seat. Indeed, at the first chance it got, Ethiopia launched a frontal attack on the workings of the EEBC that eventually led to the EEBC dissolving itself. Eritrea in turn frustrated the functioning of UNMEE to such an extent that that mission was terminated too.

While the UN was not active in Somalia when Ethiopia invaded, the African Union was. Through a mission named AMISOM the African Union sought to assist in creating a stable Somalia with a functioning central government. Just as the UN earlier, however, the African Union failed to get the troops it needed. What was also similar to the UN was that the African Union ended up taking losses in Somalia at the hands of opposing groups. All in all, AMISOM was not very effective either.

Against piracy, it was not the UN, but NATO and the EU that commanded the intervening missions. However, these missions can also not be classified as being conducted autonomously. While in both cases the missions were carried out under the
flag of that institution, the decision-making process in both was structured in such a way that every participating state could veto decisions and plans it did not like.

All in all, the four cases studied confirm hypothesis 2A on the inability of international institutions to play an autonomous role when it comes to security policies. Even if they can command troops by themselves, they depend completely on whether states are willing to contribute them. And even if they do, the institutions still cannot operate effectively if either the states that are intervened in, such as Ethiopia and Eritrea, or the important players in the international system, in particular the U.S., are not willing to cooperate with the intervention.

An interesting point is also that especially in regard to Somalia, the UN has not been able to develop a sensible policy that fits the political situation in the country. From UNOSOM onward, the UN has chosen to facilitate peace processes that did not include all relevant parties. During UNOSOM it was the faction of General Aideed that was excluded and confronted. From 2004 onward, the UN has supported the TFG, which had and has very little public support in Somalia because it excludes important parties such as the Islamists, and because Ethiopia and the U.S. have an interest in seeing it come to power. A sensible policy would have been to engage the ICU and see what the possibilities to cooperate with them were. The UN, however, was unable to override the preference of the most powerful state in the international system, as well as the most powerful country in the Horn itself, which also proves its impotence.

This brings us to the role NSAs played in the interventions. Except for UNMEE, all interventions were triggered by NSAs. UNOSOM and UNITAF were initiated when militias and gangs prevented the delivery of humanitarian aid to the famine stricken Somali people. Ethiopia and the U.S., as discussed above, launched their 2006 military actions against Somalia when the ICU threatened to become too powerful. The international naval force in Somali waters was created after pirates had begun attacking commercial ships too often.

An interesting aspect to the anti-piracy mission is that it was in a way an intervention in a conflict between NSAs and commercial companies with no real connection to a state. Furthermore, neither of the parties sought to establish themselves as
a government, but were in it for the money instead. Apparently, even violence without a power aspect to it can be so threatening that states feel forced to intervene.

Another interesting point of the anti-piracy intervention is the strong international cooperation in this mission, even though it is a security issue. Offensive realists would contend this is not possible. In this case, however, interests of all states converged to such an extent that there was no reason for states to block effective cooperation. Indeed, the U.S., the EU, but also China, a country not known for its interventionist spirit, joined forces in the Somali waters. This seems to confirm the defensive realist proposition that cooperation is possible if interests coincide. A reservation that should be made here is that, while conducted with military means, the cooperation was to protect joint economic interests.

All in all, the strong roles NSAs played in triggering state intervention means hypothesis 2B is not confirmed. This means that realism’s insistence that states are the primary actors is at the very least not wholly correct. The extent to which that is incorrect will be discussed below when discussing the interventions’ outcomes.

**Outcome (hypothesis 3)**

What all interventions discussed in this thesis have in common is that they have not been successful in solving the problems they sought to address. UNOSOM and UNITAF did not stop the militias from fighting, did not end the humanitarian crisis, and did not bring a stable government to Somalia. UNMEE and the EEBC failed to solve the Ethiopian-Eritrean border conflict. The Ethiopian-American actions against the ICU that began in 2006 did not permanently eliminate the ICU and Islamists as a factor in Somalia. Whether the anti-piracy mission will succeed is not yet clear. The absence of a sensible approach to the problems on land, where the piracy crisis derives from, however, does not give much hope that there will be more success this time, especially not in the long run.

UNOSOM ended when the U.S. decided to pull out after losing eighteen troops in one fight. This eventually led the entire mission to collapse. What is interesting is that after the fight, the perception of the U.S. on the mission changed. Interests had not
mattered when going in. When the mission became too costly in lives, the U.S. decided it was not willing to incur any more costs and left. This was a realist calculation.

A very similar calculation was made by Ethiopia in 2008 after its disastrous intervention. Then too, Ethiopia decided that the absence of success made the mission too costly. It did so at a time when tensions with Eritrea were on the rise. Continuing the conflict in Somalia would steadily erode its relative power position in regard to Eritrea and put it in a weaker position should a war break out. This is important to countries too, and can evidently lead to far-reaching decisions.

After Ethiopia’s withdrawal, the situation in Somalia was not better than before the invasion (and arguably worse), since the Islamists the invasion was supposed to dislodge now had a strong presence across the south of Somalia. This is interesting since this means that the intervention that fully confirmed realist predictions on states’ motives for action turned out the worst. After all, even though UNOSOM failed, the situation in Somalia did not become worse than before. UNMEE did not solve the border dispute, but even when it left it had achieved a ruling on the border and the violence had not restarted. Somalia in 2008, however, was nowhere close to having a stable government. On top of that, the intervention encouraged the insurgents to form ties with pirates who increased their hijacking of ships of Somali waters, which then required an intervention of its own. Clearly, acting in a way realists believe states should does not at all guarantee success.

The withdrawals of the U.S. and Ethiopia demonstrate that during an intervention, states keep an eye out for the benefits they expect to get out of the costs of the intervention. Even when not motivated by interests initially, countries end interventions when the costs begin to outweigh those expected benefits. It can therefore be argued that while realism regularly does not predict the reasons states can have for starting an intervention, it does accurately predict reasons countries have for ending an intervention. This would confirm realism.

At the same time, the cases demonstrate that NSAs can have a significant impact on the behavior of states if they manage to make the costs of intervening high enough. In the case of the U.S. in Somalia in 1993, losing 18 troops in one day proved to be enough. After that withdrawal the NSAs were able to push out the UN mission by making it impossible for it to do what it had come for. For Ethiopia, two years of fighting in
Somalia without anything to show for it made staying longer also not an option. The anarchic situation that forced earlier interveners out is probably also a main reason that states involved in the anti-piracy mission do not seem anxious to start a mission on land. In that sense, it can be argued that NSAs can even deter states from acting altogether.

This means that hypotheses 2B and 3 are proven incorrect by some of the cases studied. Therefore, scholars should have a long hard look at the role NSAs play in the international system and what that means for the allegedly primary role of states. The failure to accurately incorporate the role of NSAs is in sharp contrast with the very accurate perception of the role of international institutions, which in every intervention studied here proved to be as minor and dependent on states as realism claims.

The reason behind this might be that international institutions such as the UN cannot depend on states for their resources. NSAs, however, do not need state support at all and therefore do not experience the problems international institutions do in building up a military capability and acting autonomously. Therefore, while both NSAs and international institutions are non-state actors, there differ greatly in their characteristics. This difference means international institutions can be controlled effectively by states, while states cannot control NSAs. Therefore, NSAs can put up enough resistance to states that will make them end their interventions, while international institutions cannot force states to do anything.

All in all, the cases studied in this thesis neither fully confirm nor reject realism’s assumptions. The first challenge to realist theory is the finding that states are not always driven by security or economic interests when deciding to intervene, but can be driven by more idealistic reasons, such as addressing a humanitarian crisis and helping in a peace process. There are indications that prestige and credibility, as part of one’s relative power position, can play a role in a state’s calculations on whether or not to act, but more research would be needed to provide a conclusive answer to that.

The second challenge to realism’s assumptions that can be derived from the cases studies here is the strong role of NSAs that was found in three out of four cases here. The decisive role they can play in triggering state interventions and in forcing states to end
them prematurely show that they can play a role similar to states. This challenges the realist notion of states as primary actors.

At the same time, fully rejecting realism on the basis of the cases studied would be incorrect for two reasons. The first reason is that in terminating interventions states do seem to look at whether the costs that continuation of the intervention bring with it, whether absolute or relative, are worth the expected gains. This means that while states can intervene for more frivolous reasons than their own interests, they base their decision on ending it on purely realist calculations.

The second reason is that realism is completely correct when it comes to predicting the small and dependent role international institutions such as the UN will play in the security area. The cases studied show that attempts have been made to get international institutions involved in the Horn of Africa, but they also show how unsuccessful they were and how much international institutions depended on state support. Even the EEBC, which was voluntarily created by Ethiopia and Eritrea themselves, was wrecked by Ethiopian opposition to its ruling, which it could not enforce even though it was binding.

To conclude: the cases studies demonstrate that realism is correct and valuable in areas such as the functioning of international institutions and state calculations on whether to continue or end interventions. At the same time they demonstrate that certain modifications to the theory, especially when it comes to the role of NSAs in the international system in opposition to states, are needed if the theory is to remain relevant.
Appendix A: The Horn of Africa

Appendix B: Somalia

Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6f/Somalia&land_map.png (viewed 14 June 2009)
Appendix C: The Ogaden

Source:
Appendix D: Eritrea and Ethiopia

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ESA; see European Space Agency


ICG: See International Crisis Group


UNMEE: see United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea


