

**Towards Country Ownership?  
An Analysis of Donor-commissioned Evaluations of Aid  
Programs and Projects in the Philippines**

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***Mark Justine B. Gatdula***  
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Members of the Examining Committee:

Dr. Sylvia Bergh  
Dr. Zenzem Shigute Shuka

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***Inquiries:***

International Institute of Social Studies  
P.O. Box 29776  
2502 LT The Hague  
The Netherlands

t: +31 70 426 0460  
e: [info@iss.nl](mailto:info@iss.nl)  
w: [www.iss.nl](http://www.iss.nl)  
fb: <http://www.facebook.com/iss.nl>  
twitter: [@issnl](https://twitter.com/issnl)

***Location:***

Kortenaerkade 12  
2518 AX The Hague  
The Netherlands

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## List of Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
CDD	Community-Driven Development
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
GPH	Government of the Philippines
HQ	Headquarters
IE	Impact Evaluation
IPA	Innovations for Poverty Action
ISS	Institute of Social Studies
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
Kalahi-CIDDS	Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MCA-P	Millennium Challenge Account-Philippines
MES	Monitoring and Evaluation Staff [of NEDA]
NEDA	National Economic and Development Authority
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee
PD	Paris Declaration
SWS	Social Weather Station
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank

## **Abstract**

It has been more than a decade since the development community declared in Paris that aid could and should work, and along with it came the recognition that country ownership is necessary in realizing that goal. Although international assistance has since shifted to emphasizing the importance of this dimension, it is still not being fully espoused in development evaluation, specifically those commissioned by donors. The study endeavors to determine the extent the Philippine government – a long-time recipient of aid – owns and influences donor-commissioned evaluations. The study investigates the main dimensions of evaluation practice wherein political influences may either or allow country ownership to take place: evaluation purpose and intended use, evaluator, and methodology. The analysis involves the review of 90 ex-post evaluation studies commissioned by the top aid donors in the Philippines from 2010 up to present, and used the impact evaluation of the Kalahi-CIDDS program conducted by the Millennium Challenge Corporation as a case study to elucidate the politics involved in donor evaluations. A mix of quantitative (descriptive statistics) and qualitative (key informant interviews, desk review) was employed to provide a robust empirical analysis. The study finds that the Philippine government’s ownership and influence in these evaluations are limited due to a confluence of factors. While both donors and the Philippine government share a common purpose for and intended use of evaluations, the dominant practices of donors limit the actual use of evaluation results for their own organizational needs. Donors also predominantly enlist in-house consultants or heavily rely on foreign expertise to conduct evaluations. Finally, donor evaluations remain conventional in its use of positivist methodologies (such as surveys and experimental designs) in evaluations, and have not yet transitioned to the use of participatory approaches which embody the principle of ownership more. Challenges of the Philippine government and donors, and recommendations to address them are likewise provided.

## **Relevance to Development Studies**

The 2005 Paris Declaration recognizes country ownership as one of the cornerstones of aid effectiveness. But many years after, this principle has not yet fully permeated the field of development evaluations which remains to be dominated by donors. It is thus important to take a closer look on this issue since it relates to the perennial developmental issue of skewed power relations between donors and countries receiving aid. The study provides a timely discussion in light of the implementation of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda which, despite its universality, embodies the principle of country ownership through its call to bring the goals to the national level. Moreover, the extensive review and analysis made for this study reveals the gaps on both parties and provides an opportunity to introduce policy reforms to fully allow Philippine Government’s ownership on all fronts of development. Lastly, the study adds to the scant yet growing literature about country ownership in donor evaluations towards the aim of shedding more light on this concern in the academia.

## **Keywords**

Official Development Assistance, Impact Evaluation, Country Ownership, Paris Declaration, JICA, Asian Development Bank, World Bank, USAID, Philippines

# Chapter 1: Overview of the Research

## 1.1 Introduction

Evaluation has been a key feature of the development sector for decades. This is because evaluations, if done for the right reasons, should aim to answer what works, what does not, why and how – lessons which ultimately should inform the improvement, continuity and replicability of development interventions<sup>1</sup>. Aside from the learning aspect, evaluations also ensure accountability to stakeholders, such as donors and policymakers, on how interventions translated to desired results (OECD 1991). For this reason, programs and projects funded through Official Development Assistance (ODA)<sup>2</sup> are usually subjected to evaluations given the large stake entailed on their implementation. Donors are able to promote economic development and welfare in developing countries (OECD n.d.) through ODA which the Philippines, as a partner country, has been a large recipient of for decades. Throughout the history of ODA in the country, evaluations have become a staple activity of bilateral and multilateral agencies<sup>3</sup> (collectively called “donors”). With the huge amount of money being poured into foreign aid, donors have turned their eyes on evaluations to demonstrate the effectiveness of foreign assistance in the Philippines and have since then become the key players in fostering an evaluation culture in the country.

The prominence of donors on the aid scene has led many to scrutinize the prevailing donor-partner relationship and the unequal power dynamics between them. This is why the development community reached a consensus that rather than just being mere “recipients”, partner countries should “own” development (Watson-Grant et al. 2016). This consensus was cemented when more than a hundred representatives of developed and developing nations, and international organizations endorsed the Paris Declaration (PD) on Aid Effectiveness in 2005. While there has previously been a notion of ownership, the PD explicitly recognized said principle as one of the cornerstones of aid effectiveness (OECD n.d.). It asserts that mutual accountability is paramount towards this agenda: partner countries get to determine their own national development objectives and lead aid-related efforts at all levels, while donors respect partner countries’ leadership and assist them in realizing their goals (ibid.). The importance of ownership was reaffirmed through subsequent aid effectiveness commitments such as the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action and 2011 Busan Partnership Agreement, both of which provided a more detailed operationalization of the country ownership agenda (OECD 2008; OECD n.d.).

Since the PD, ownership has been a buzzword that is prevalent in development speak. The very concept of ownership is broadly appealing and is universally accepted to be an integral dimension of a good aid practice (Carothers 2015). As a party to the PD and other

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<sup>1</sup> The term ‘intervention’, as referred in this study, is the subject of the evaluation involving two distinct modalities of aid delivery: programs and projects.

<sup>2</sup> According to the Philippine’s ODA Act of 1996, a loan or a grant is considered an ODA if it meets the following: (a) geared towards social and economic development of the Philippines; (b) contracted with governments of bilateral and multilateral partners of the Philippines; (c) no available comparable financial institution; and (d) contains at least 25% grant element.

<sup>3</sup>Bilateral donors are government organizations funded by national governments and directly providing assistance to governments of recipient/partner countries. Examples are the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Multilateral donors are international organizations that pool resources from various financial sources (e.g. member governments, private firms) to finance assistance to recipient/partner governments. World Bank and the United Nations Group are among the examples of this (OECD, n.d.)

aid effectiveness commitments, the Government of the Philippines (GPH) has made consistent efforts to secure ownership over its own development processes through the creation of medium-term development plans and the introduction of reforms to facilitate improved aid delivery (Canlas et al. 2011). In fact, the Philippines scored high on ownership in a survey commissioned by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2011 (ibid.)

While the Philippines and other recipient countries have made great strides in this regard, many still argue that ownership, despite the buzzword that it is, largely remains a lip service as far as development evaluation is concerned. Scholars in the international community suggest that the intensified evaluation activities among donors runs the risk of overrepresenting their interests in such undertakings (Cousins et al. 2012). OECD-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) finally acknowledged the issue and stated that donor evaluations which were done “to satisfy donors’ requirements” is indicative of a “lack of country ownership of these evaluations” and a “proliferation of donor evaluations leading to high transaction costs for the countries<sup>4</sup>” (2003: 2). Many observers pointed out that the supply-driven nature of donor evaluations lead to low utilization of findings by partner countries (Carothers 2015). This is a major concern given the donors’ active involvement in the Philippines’ evaluation scene as described earlier.

It is still unclear to what extent the GPH lacks ownership in donor-commissioned evaluations primarily due to the virtual absence of related research. Hence, the study endeavours to provide an analysis on the conditions that may prevent the GPH to own and influence evaluations by closely looking into the major dimensions of evaluation practice constituting donor-commissioned evaluations as identified through the review of related literature: (a) evaluation purpose; (b) evaluator; and (c) methodology. This is done through the review of ODA program/project evaluations commissioned by top donors in the country such as Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), World Bank (WB), and Asian Development Bank (ADB). To further investigate the politics at play in these evaluations, the research zooms in on the case of the MCC-funded impact evaluation of *Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kabirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services* (Kalahi-CIDDS) program.

## 1.2 Research Objectives

The primary aim of this study is to determine if the practices of donors in conducting evaluations enable the Philippine Government to exercise ownership and wield influence on such activities. Specific objectives are as follows:

- provide a clear picture of the donor-led evaluation scene in the Philippines by accounting the various practices prevailing in the dimensions of evaluation purpose, evaluator, and methodology
- classify the top donors in the Philippines based on such practices
- identify if there is an observable trend on how donor evaluations are carried out
- contribute to the growing literature and scholarly debate about country ownership in development evaluations.

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<sup>4</sup> Typically, a certain percentage of loan/grant commitments of an ODA program/project are allocated for the conduct of evaluations throughout its life cycle (ex-ante, midterm, ex-post).



## 1.3 Research Questions

**Main research question:** To what extent do the main dimensions of evaluation practices (objectives, evaluators, methodology) allow the Philippine Government to own and influence evaluations commissioned by donors?

**Sub-questions:**

1. For what purpose/s do donors commission evaluations of ODA programs and projects in the Philippines? How do these purposes align with those of the Philippine Government?
2. Who conducts these evaluations and how is the Philippine Government involved in this decision?
3. What are the methodological preferences of donors in conducting these evaluations and how are the methodology/ies determined?


## 1.4 Contextual Background

### 1.4.1 Donor Involvement in the Philippines

The country's development has long been reliant on ODA. Tadem (2003) claims that ODA was instrumental in urban and rural rehabilitation and institutional development in post-World War Two Philippines, with most aid coming from the United States of America (USA). By the 1970s, it accounted for 14% of the country's foreign exchange reserves (ibid.). Since then, multiple donors have provided assistance in the country, from bilateral to multi-lateral agencies and in the form of loans and grants. These commitments support various development agenda of the country which are all geared towards economic development and poverty alleviation.

Based on most recent figures, (as of December 2019), the country's active<sup>5</sup> ODA portfolio amounts to \$21.62 billion consisting of 84 loans (US\$19.98 billion or 92% of the total portfolio) and 268 grants (US\$1.64 billion or 8%) (NEDA 2020). Figure 1.1 provides a breakdown of the Philippines' ODA portfolio as of December 2019.

**Figure 1.1**  
ODA Distribution by Donor as of December 2019




Source: Own Construction based on the 2019 ODA Portfolio Review Report (NEDA 2020)

<sup>5</sup> Refers to new, ongoing, and completed ODA programs and projects within the reporting year (2019).

Japan, through JICA, consistently topped the donor's list with a total of US\$8.51 billion or 39% share of the active ODA portfolio, followed by ADB and WB. These three agencies are consistently the largest funding source of ODA in the country from the 2000s up to the present (NEDA 2020), with their assistance primarily in the form of low-interest loans. Other major loan providers are South Korea (through the Korea Export-Import Bank), France (through the French Development Agency), the International Fund for Agricultural Development, and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (ibid.). The growing influence of China in Asia has also increased their level of commitments in the country through loans assistance provided by the state-owned Export-Import Bank of China and the China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (DOF 2018). The Philippines also receives grants assistance (capital, technical cooperation, relief and emergency) from donor countries apart from the ones mentioned above such as USA<sup>6</sup>, Australia, Canada, Germany, Spain, New Zealand, Austria, the European Union, and the United Nations System (NEDA 2020). These donors have supported various sectors: infrastructure, social welfare, agriculture and environment protection, industry and trade, and governance (ibid.). The figure below illustrates the share of ODA in the Philippines by sector as of December 2019.

**Figure 1.2**  
ODA Distribution by Sector as of December 2019



Source: Own construction based on 2019 ODA Portfolio Review Report (NEDA 2020)

A significant share of ODA in the country is dedicated to infrastructure development, accounting to 58% (equivalent to \$12.54 billion) of the active ODA portfolio (ibid.). JICA, ADB, WB, South Korea, and China are some of the key donors supporting the infrastructure sector through financing of transport, road and social infrastructure, irrigation, and energy-related projects. ODA is also the preferred financing modality by the current Duterte Administration to fund the bulk (Php1.97 trillion against the total investment requirement of Php2.18 trillion) of the flagship infrastructure projects under the *Build Build Build Program*<sup>7</sup> which aims to reduce poverty and encourage economic growth by ushering in the “Golden

<sup>6</sup> USA has two bilateral agencies providing grants assistance to the Philippines. The first one is the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead development agency of the US Government primarily responsible for administering its foreign assistance to developing nations. While basically similar in nature, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) uses a new approach to bilateral assistance by binding a 5-year contract with partner countries, unlike USAID projects which can extend implemented period.

<sup>7</sup> *Build Build Build Program* is the centerpiece program of President Rodrigo Duterte's administration involving the development and implementation of 75 big-ticket infrastructure projects around the country. The program, which started rolling out upon Duterte's assumption of office in 2016, aims to “increase the [country's] productive capacity of the economy, create jobs, increase incomes, and strengthen the investment climate leading to sustained inclusive growth” (Build.gov.ph, n.d.).

Age of Infrastructure” (de Vera 2019: n.p.). Programs and projects in the social welfare and development sector also constitute a large chunk of foreign aid received by the Philippines, with top providers including the WB, ADB, USAID, Australia and the UN System (NEDA 2020).

#### 1.4.2 The Evaluation Scene in the Philippines

Very few studies provide a clear picture of the evaluation scene in the Philippines. In a 1992 assessment, Khan described monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in the Philippines as mostly donor-driven, project-centric, and lacking a “permanent and efficient M&E covering the entire development [process]” (1992: 29). The influx of ODA in the country in the late ‘80s to early ‘90s resulted in regular evaluation activities in the country which were usually commissioned by donors (Resurreccion 2018). Ex-post evaluations were often required by donors as part of ODA agreements and were seldomly initiated by the government. Khan even went as far as saying that it was never a priority of the government back then (1992). According to Khan, donor-initiated evaluations of foreign-aided projects are “better organized because of inter alia, better staff motivation and commitment resulting from incentive salaries [...] and better logistics” and have “produced beneficial results in the way of improving the project design and planning” (1992: 32, 38). This was understandably the case since the GPH cited the lack of resources as the main culprit, in contrast to the donors funding big-ticket ODA projects in the country. However, Khan determined that there were several challenges in the conduct of donor evaluations in the country. Firstly, the time elapsed between project completion and commencement of ex-post evaluations weakened their usefulness and caused difficulties in harvesting first-hand information from project implementors who are usually co-terminus with the project. Secondly, project management frequently questioned the objectivity of these evaluations, tending to view donor-led evaluations as “fault-finding” missions (Khan 1992: 39).

In a bid to strengthen M&E efforts in the public sector, the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), the country’s central planning agency, was reorganized in 1987 which resulted in the creation of a Project Monitoring Staff (PMS) (Resurreccion 2018). A dedicated Ex-Post Evaluation Division was then created under the PMS primarily to conduct ex-post evaluations of ODA and nationally-funded programs and projects. Being one of the top ODA providers back then (and until now), the WB, as part of its strategic partnership with the GPH, provided technical assistance to PMS to establish a system for conducting ex-post evaluations, which eventually did not materialize (ibid.). At the same time, line agencies also started to establish their own M&E units, specifically those implementing a number of ODA projects such as the National Irrigation Administration and the Department of Agriculture (Khan 1992). The government’s research arm, the Philippine Institute of Development Studies (PIDS) also branched out to conducting evaluations of nationally-implemented policies in the early ‘90s which further cemented the government’s commitment to evidence-based decision-making. However, most of these efforts were either not sustained or only remained on paper. Much focus has been put on the ‘mere’ monitoring activities so that evaluations took a backseat, citing budgetary and manpower constraints as the main impediments (ibid.). For instance, the Ex-Post Evaluation Division created within the NEDA only coordinated evaluation studies instead of conducting them themselves. Said division was dissolved when PMS was transformed to the Monitoring and Evaluation Staff (MES) after NEDA’s reorganization in 2013. This change made NEDA the lead agency in setting and coordinating the country’s efforts towards enhanced evaluation culture in the public sector. But with the M&E efforts of NEDA and the GPH in general not fully shaping

up, the role of donors in the country's evaluation scene continued to be more evident, practically becoming the forerunners of aid effectiveness agenda through various evaluation activities (Resurreccion 2018).

### 1.4.3 Donor Evaluations in the Philippines

While the Philippine public sector is still building up its evaluation capacity, donors gained a more prominent role in leading evaluation efforts in the country (Resurreccion 2018). Many completed and ongoing ODA-funded interventions have been subjected to evaluations. Top donors such as WB, JICA, and ADB usually commission evaluations of their funded projects to ensure that ODA programs and projects are being implemented according to plan and are delivering intended results. Evaluation activities are usually part of the program/project design, constituting to a certain percentage of its loan or grant proceeds. Ex-post evaluations are now staple of technical cooperation programs of donors, usually performed jointly with the GPH implementing and oversight agencies (*ibid.*). For instance, joint evaluations with WB mostly focus on social welfare. Recent evaluations carried out by the WB include the *Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program* (World Bank 2013), a conditional cash transfer program, and the KALAHYAN-CIDDS program (Beatty et al. 2018) a community-driven rural poverty alleviation program. On the other hand, JICA-led evaluations are more into agriculture, infrastructure and environment, reflecting the sectors wherein the donors mainly give support (Resurreccion 2018).

## 1.5 Scope and Limitations

The scope of this study is limited to ex-post evaluations of completed ODA programs and projects since it is the most common form of evaluation in the Philippines. Only evaluation reports published online were covered due to time and capacity constraints. For a more focused study coverage, the study does not include thematic evaluations assessing development policies, donor country strategies, and country portfolio performance. Moreover, the study veers away from critiquing the quality and veracity of the evaluation studies as the focus is only on why, who, and how these were carried out. Finally, the decision to limit the analysis to three evaluation dimensions (objective, evaluator, and methodology) is based on the review of relevant literature and my understanding on where country ownership should manifest based on professional experience.

## 1.6 Positionality

Working for the Philippine Government as an M&E specialist for six years now, I am well aware of the various issues surrounding development cooperation and how its efficacy impacts the lives of Filipinos. This awareness became heightened knowing the inadequacy of the country's evaluative capacity. Dealing with aid donors as part of my profession exposed me to their evaluation works and made me aspire for the Philippine Government to achieve that same level of 'intensity' and 'expertise' when it comes to conducting our own evaluations. However, being an MA student at ISS made me more cognizant on the politics at play in these activities and helped me realize how a sense of ownership among developing countries is important in achieving genuine development. Having committed to various aid effectiveness agenda mentioned earlier, it piqued my interest if donor institutions fully adhere to ensuring the GPH's ability to exercise full ownership on its own public sector management processes, which in principle, should include the conduct of evaluations. Answering this can

help me identify problematic areas in the field, and in my own capacity, influence both parties to improve the way these activities are carried out.

## **1.7 Research Structure**

This paper is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 introduced the study by providing the nature of the problem that the research attempts to address, the research objectives and questions, and the contextual background of the study. Chapter 2 discusses the key concepts which serves as the study's theoretical framework used in analyzing the data collected for the study. Chapter 3 discusses the methodology used for data collection and analysis. Chapters 4, and 5 present the findings based on the research questions identified earlier. Lastly, Chapter 6 provides a conclusion and ways forward.

## ***Chapter 2: Country Ownership and the Politics of Evaluation: Theoretical and Analytical Frameworks***

### **2.1 Country Ownership in Evaluations**

Much has been said about the effectiveness of foreign aid, with its success or failure extensively documented over the course of the development cooperation history. The mere existence of such debate tells that there is still some gaps on the delivery of aid and what is causing these gaps needs to be addressed. The endorsement of the PD in 2005 paved the way for fully acknowledging that development aid works best when partner countries have more say on their development processes (OECD n.d.). Watson-Grant et al. (2016) claimed that there is no universal definition of country ownership. However, for the purpose of this research, the term is defined as the “effective exercise of a government’s authority over development policies and activities, including those that rely – entirely or partially - on external resources” (OECD 2007: n.p.). Country ownership involves donors’ responsibility to respect and support the policies and development agenda of partner governments. It is exhibited when donors harmonize their efforts with the development plans of partner countries, and utilize their existing government systems and processes in coordinating and managing aid instead of creating their own. As the main tenet of the PD, the ownership agenda also calls for a higher involvement of government of partner countries in the activities of donors towards improved delivery of aid.

Levine and Griño (2015) observed that the post-Paris Declaration period saw a significant shift in international assistance, with donors supporting nationally-driven development processes and partner governments taking more active roles in coordinating international assistance coming in to their countries. However, they claimed that this change has not fully translated yet to the conduct of aid evaluations. Donor requirements remain largely to be the driving force in carrying out evaluations. Processes involved in evaluations such as determination of programs/projects to be evaluated, development of indicators and key evaluation questions, crafting of evaluation terms of reference, selection of evaluators and evaluation methodology, and collection and interpretation of evaluation data largely remain donor-centric (ibid.). Moreover, the Global Partnership monitoring process determined that in 2015, donors’ utilization of existing partner M&E systems to track results of aid interventions is still low (in OECD 2017). The perpetuation of such practice tends to demotivate the stakeholders from the partner side, resulting in little use of evaluation findings which are intended to inform the design of future interventions (Lundgren and Kennedy n.d.).

Segone argued that “as the development [cooperation] framework changes, the evaluation function should also change accordingly” (2006: 10). For the ownership agenda to be fully realized, partner government should be in control in all stages of the public sector management cycle<sup>8</sup> and not just in the planning stage where development objectives are set. In short, partner governments should be co-owners and end-users in donor-led evaluations. The logic of country ownership in evaluations is simple: if a partner government is in the best position to determine its countries’ needs, then it should also be the best judge on how aid met those needs. Benefits of ownership in donor-commissioned evaluations include: (a)

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<sup>8</sup> Public sector management refers to the five management components situated in the country context: planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation (APCop 2011)

increased legitimacy and use of evaluations; (b) more accurate view of an intervention's success through local lenses; and (c) improved communication and understanding among all stakeholders involved (Levine and Griño 2015).

Lungdren and Kennedy (n.d.) argues that true country ownership will only be realized if the existing power dynamics between donors and partner governments is challenged. Although earlier arguments may imply that more responsibility rests on the donors' side, achieving genuine country ownership in donor-commissioned evaluations is a two-way street. Partner countries will enable their ownership in these evaluation by: (a) establishing their own country-led evaluation systems (Segone n.d.); and (b) strengthening their evaluative capacity (Lungdren and Kennedy n.d.). In this way, partner countries have the tools to counter donor-centric practices that are commonly present in these evaluations. However, these suggestions are easier said than done as they require significant amount of resources – human and financial – which developing countries do not abundantly have. This is why donors also need to assist in building the capacity of partner countries to improve their own evaluation systems and processes (ibid.).

## **2.2 Politics of Donor-Commissioned Evaluations**

Politics in evaluations is a “fact of life” (Bamberger 1991: 325). This is what Bamberger claimed when he investigated the unspoken yet always-present factor at play in every evaluation. The politics in donor-commissioned evaluations is characterized by power dynamics between donors and partner countries. It goes without saying that country ownership, especially in donor-commissioned evaluations wherein this power dynamics is in full display, is very much political in nature (Besson 2009; Booth 2011).

The crux of this study is understanding the politics involved in donor-commissioned evaluations to determine the extent to which country ownership is being espoused in such activities. The subsequent discussions present the main dimensions of evaluation practices wherein political influences may affect the Philippine Government's ownership and influence in donor evaluations.

### **2.2.1 The Purposes of Donors in Commissioning Evaluations and Intended use of Evaluation Findings**

Many scholars (Bamberger 1991; Cousins et al. 2012; Levine and Griño 2015; Lungdren and Kennedy n.d.; Weiss 1998) claim that development evaluations often take place to satisfy donor requirements, leaving little to no room for partner governments to influence the decision on why evaluations should be carried out in the first place. Weiss (1998) pointed out that most of these evaluations are designed to respond to the operational or foreign policy concerns of the funding agency and do not normally question the basic assumptions and objectives of the program. It is common sense that donors demand results and value for money of ODA programs/projects they finance. Yet, the fixation to this objective has been detrimental in addressing the informational needs of partner governments they intend to support (Segone n.d.).

Inevitably, the objectives of donors in commissioning evaluations do not always align with the interests of partner countries (Bamberger 1991). This divergence reflects on the intended use of evaluation findings, with one party putting more premium on one type over the other. Patton (1997) provides three categories of possible evaluation use. The first type

is judgement-oriented or *summative* evaluation assesses the overall merit or worth of an intervention. Summative evaluation approaches include performance measurement for the primary purpose of accountability. This type of evaluation use is concerned on knowing if the intervention worked and attained its goals, or if the use of funds produced a proportionate number of outputs and disbursed according to the budget program. The need to answer these questions is driven by the increased pressure among stakeholders, specifically donors, to demonstrate that funds allocated to a particular intervention translated to results (Levine and Griño 2015). The next type of evaluation use is *formative* in nature which focuses on ways to improve and enhance the intervention rather than rendering judgment on its merit or worth (Patton 1997). Oriented towards seeking improvement on a program, a formative evaluation assesses an intervention's strengths and weaknesses, and opportunities for improvement, as well as taking stock of implementation issues encountered and lessons learned generated. Formative evaluations are done to improve the program during implementation phase, or to harvest lessons learned for program scale-up/extension. Given its nature, government agencies or program staff in-charge of designing and implementing programs/projects (whether ODA- or locally-funded) are more likely the users of findings of formative evaluations. The last type is *knowledge-oriented* evaluation which is used to generate new knowledge or improve theories about a particular developmental issue. Findings generated from such evaluation contribute to increasing the knowledge in a particular program model and testing the theories surrounding it. (Patton 1997). However, there is a more 'unofficial' use of evaluations which is legitimation. Evaluation findings are used to justify the decision to fund, implement, or in most cases, institutionalize a certain intervention. Bamberger (1991) claims that donor-driven evaluations have a tendency to legitimize advocacies or economic and political interests through evaluation findings.

I put forward that determining the purpose for carrying out evaluations and the intended use of evaluation findings is the first key step in answering the main research question as it reveals if the motivations of donors allow aid partners such as the Philippine Government to exercise ownership in donor-led evaluations.

### **2.2.2 Evaluators of Donor-Commissioned Evaluations**

There is no doubt that evaluators play a huge role in any evaluation. Hence, another important question that needs to be asked is who actually evaluates the ODA programs and projects in the Philippines. The discussions above already established that evaluations are inherently political. Thus, the same can be said on the role of evaluators as they have the huge responsibility of identifying the evaluation stakeholders and managing their various interests (Bamberger 1991).


There are many political considerations in selecting evaluators. As enumerated by Bamberger et al. (2012), entry points of political influence which may affect evaluation are the evaluator's professional orientation (technical, social, organizational), values (impartial, sympathetic or critical towards the intervention or a specific stakeholder) and citizenship. In particular, Bajaj (2012) claimed that the importance given by donors to objectivity reflects on their prioritization of evaluator expertise. This led them to "neglect" the ownership dimension of evaluations in fear of running the "risk of co-option" if they allow huge involvement of partner governments in their evaluations (Bajaj 2012: 14). Donor evaluations are commonly carried out either by external consultants or by in-house independent evaluation units (Bamberger 1991). Moreover, donors are also criticized for selecting foreign external evaluators even though it is widely accepted that local experts have more knowledge on the historical and the contextual background of the intervention being evaluated (Bamberger et.



al 2012). But perhaps the most discussed issue concerning country ownership in development cooperation which has permeated the field of evaluation is about tied aid. Traditionally, many bilateral donors still hire external consultants from their own countries as lead evaluators. OXFAM claims that this practice results in “needless mark-ups for goods and services that reduce the aggregate value of the aid” (in Piccioto n.d.) since budget for evaluations are usually tucked-in the project total cost, and is therefore included in the amount to be repaid by partner countries.

There has been a resounding call for partner governments and other local stakeholders to have more prominent roles in donor-commissioned evaluations. The call was primarily driven by the recent wave of participatory thinking among development actors. The premise is that such approach “provides a better opportunity for development organizations to focus better on their ultimate goal of improving people’s lives” (OECD 2001: 75) and is step towards “empowering and strengthening developing country institutions” (Bajaj 2012: 6). In fact, recent studies show that the application of more participatory approaches in evaluations positively affects the use of findings (Bajaj 2012). OECD claims that the shift towards more inclusive donor evaluations have been observed since the 2000s (in Particip 2016). Evidence to this is the numerous joint evaluations which have been carried out by donors in collaboration with partners in the last decade. However, a 2015 Global Partnership study reveals that partner government’s engagement in evaluations remains low (Ahmad 2017). Moreover, such collaborations tend to have skewed power relations as evidenced by the donor-oriented evaluation team leadership and dissemination efforts in most joint evaluations (Particip 2016).

According to Bajaj (2012), attributes of evaluators chosen to undertake donor evaluations can be distinctly categorized into two: expertise (international vs. local) and sense of ownership or objectivity. In his framework (see Figure 2.1), these two attributes are represented as separate axes. Moving along one axis results in trading off the other attribute. The intersection of these axes divides the area into four quadrants of evaluator typology which are commonly featured in donor evaluations.



Source: Adapted from Bajaj (2012: 14)

Country ownership is more prominent when evaluation team composition features a combination of ownership and local knowledge, which Bajaj claims has not been widely explored yet by donors (2012). For a more robust analysis, this study will use Bajaj's framework to identify the key attributes of evaluators who have been commissioned by donors to carry out evaluations in the Philippines for the past 10 years, and to situate the donors within the four quadrants of evaluator typology based on their prevailing practice in procuring evaluators.

### 2.2.3 The Methodological Preferences of Donors in Conducting Evaluations

Development evaluation actors recognize the inescapable political nature of the field (Bamberger 1991). Scholars have come to terms that no evaluation is value-free and that any choice made in shaping an evaluation is always in pursuit of one's values (Bamberger et al. 2012). Every evaluation stakeholder has values which determine how evaluations should be conducted. It goes without saying that the chosen methodology or approach is a manifestation of such values (Stuart et al. 2015).

Over the years, donors have developed standardized ways to conduct evaluations. Early history of development assistance centered on the use of Economic Cost-Benefit Analysis (ECBA) which identifies an intervention's Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR). The shift in development paradigm from economic to multi-sectoral led to a more normative approach in assessing aid success. With this, the exclusive use of ECBA was effectively replaced by the OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria<sup>9</sup> as the standard evaluation framework which is comprised of the following:

**Table 2.1**  
OECD-DAC Criteria for Development Evaluations

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>Question Aimed at Answering</b>
Relevance	Is the intervention doing the right things?
Efficiency	How well are resources being used?
Effectiveness	Is the intervention achieving its objectives?
Sustainability	Will the benefits last?
Impact	What difference does the intervention make?

Source: Adopted from OECD (n.d.)

These criteria are primarily used by donors to demonstrate results of aid and accountability in utilizing resources (Save the Children n.d.) and still include the ECBA-related efficiency criteria. However, the consistent use of these criteria as a standard practice in evaluations "fosters a rigid structure that produces same old reports" and inhibits flexibility to assess project performance against other dimensions of development (World Bank 2017: n.p.).

In terms of epistemological foundations of evaluations, positivism has governed the fields of natural science and economics for so many years, and has also been embedded in

<sup>9</sup> Coherence was recently added as the 6<sup>th</sup> criterion to better capture how an intervention support other development efforts (OECD n.d.). Hence, project/program performance was not assessed against this criterion in the evaluations covered by this study.

development evaluations which has long been considered as an extension of the aforementioned fields (Garbarino and Holland 2009). Positivist evaluation is associated with the use of quantitative methods which is characterized by objective measurements and statistical analysis of data generated by questionnaires, surveys, or computer-assisted data manipulation to establish either relationships or causality between variables (Babbie 2010). Positivism's adherence to scientific rigor gave rise to the following approaches in evaluation design: (a) experimental or randomized control trial (RCT) to compare results at ex-ante and ex-post of treatment and control groups with members randomly selected; and (b) quasi-experimental to compare results of a treatment group with a non-randomized comparator (Save the Children n.d.). The use of both addresses two major challenges encountered in impact evaluations: (a) measuring the intended results; and (b) attributing these results to that intervention (Centre of Excellence for Evaluation 2012). As with the methodological rigor involved in scientific researches, the approach is built on the need to estimate the counterfactual (i.e. what would have happened without the intervention) to establish the causal linkage between the intervention and the observed results. In particular, RCT is regarded as the "gold standard" of quantitative research. Garbarino and Holland (2009) state that the preference for using RCT is usually based on its generalizability, replicability, and reliability, all of which are the main goals of positivism (Stuart et al. 2015). Chen (2005) argues that donors in particular subscribe to positivist methods mainly to fulfil their accountability requirements. This is because the use of such robust methods generates a statistical counterfactual which is needed to establish a causal link between an intervention's net effect on a specific goal. Moreover, the theoretical underpinnings of positivism among donor evaluations also results in the prominent use of economic cost-benefit analysis (ECBA) to objectively estimate an intervention's economic gains vis-à-vis resources used (Clements 2019).

However, there has been a general shift in understanding that development is a social and complex process. The main criticism on positivistic methods centers on its lack of contextual details (Babbie 2010; Garbarino and Holland 2005) as these methods "don't actually tell us anything meaningful about the behaviors they are supposed to represent" (Stuart et al. 2015: 35). With this, constructivism (or interpretivism) as a research paradigm rose to prominence over the past few years. Constructivism in development theory advocates that the various stakeholders of development interventions and their subjective realities should be recognized in evaluations (ibid.). The wider call for constructivism is equivalent to the use of more participatory approaches in evaluations (Douthwaite et al. 2003). Such approaches often employ the use of qualitative methods (e.g. case studies, ethnographic research, and participant observation) to produce contextual narratives explaining how and why results of interventions are observed – question that cannot be answered with the exclusive use of quantitative methods (Babbie 2010; Garbarino and Holland 2005). Lincoln and Guba (in Shadish et al. 1991: 46) supported this by highlighting the notion of reality as a social construct, thus "causality, generalizability [as the goals of positivism] have little useful meaning for [evaluations]."

The aid effectiveness agenda calls for a more participatory approach in delivering and managing aid through greater ownership of partner countries. Therefore, this should also translate to the way evaluations of foreign assistance are evaluated. It is therefore this study's interest if the donors in the country are putting this commitment to action by taking stock of the methodologies and approaches being used in donor-commissioned evaluations and investigating how these are being determined.

## 2.3 Chapter Summary

The discussions above presents the concepts of country ownership and the three main dimensions of evaluation practice which serve as the theoretical framework of this research. I will use Patton's typology of evaluation use as a framework to analyze the purpose and intended use of both donors and the GPH in commissioning evaluations in response to the first sub-question. As for the 2<sup>nd</sup> sub-question, I will use Bajaj's data-method framework to classify each of the ex-post evaluation covered by this study and categorize the donors based on their evaluator preferences. Lastly, I will identify the methodologies used by donors in evaluations and situate them within the positivism-constructivism debate. Details on how data for the analysis was sourced is provided in the next chapter.

## **Chapter 3 Research Methodology**

The study employs both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods and analysis to answer the afore-cited research questions. Mixed methods are used to gain more understanding of the topic by approaching the same question using one or more research technique (known as triangulation) (O’Leary 2017). Doing so either disproves or reinforces findings gathered from different methods, making the analysis more robust and valid. Primary data was generated through key informant interviews, while secondary data was sourced from desk review of relevant evaluation documents (e.g. ex-post evaluation reports, evaluation manuals).

### **3.1 Primary Data: Qualitative Interviews**

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with relevant government personnel from implementing and oversight agencies, and donor institutions. Interviewees are classified as follows: (a) involved in the impact evaluation of the Kalahi-CIDDS program which is the case selected for the study; and (b) NEDA-MES which is the oversight agency in-charge for setting the overall direction for the evaluation practice in the Philippine public sector. I identified and reached out to the interviewees mostly through professional connections made during my six-year tenure in the government. List and description of interviewees are provided in *Appendix A*. Requests for interview were made through formal letter with an attached endorsement from my research supervisor, and were sent through e-mail (see *Appendix B*). Interviews were conducted between 17 to 26 August 2020 via Zoom and lasted from 30 to 75 minutes. Interview guides were tailored for each respondent, depending on his/her involvement in the subject (see *Appendix C* for a sample interview guide). All interviews were conducted in a mixture of English and Filipino to facilitate easier communication. Respondents were asked for consent to record the interview and were ensured of their anonymity when citing them in this paper. Interview responses were transcribed and compiled in one document to easily interpret the data gathered for each question.

The original plan was to return to the Philippines during the research period and conduct face-to-face interviews with the respondents. However, the situation brought by the Covid-19 pandemic limited the conduct of interviews through online means. I did not encounter much difficulty in securing interviews from the identified respondents since most of them are either from my organization or from other government agencies whom I have previously worked with. I intended to interview relevant personnel from donors apart from MCC but decided to drop the plan due to the limited time and information about potential respondents.


### **3.2 Secondary Data**

The main endeavor of this study is to analyze the evaluation practices of donors and the GPH through the review of the following evaluation-related outputs:

- Published evaluation guidelines and manuals of bilateral and multilateral agencies
- Published evaluations reports of completed ODA programs/projects uploaded in donors’ online databases
- Evaluation-related documents (policy issuances, frameworks, etc.) released by the Philippine Government.

For ease of access, I only covered evaluation studies that are published in donor websites/databases using convenience sampling (O’Leary 2017). Evaluations covered were commissioned by the biggest bilateral (JICA and USAID and MCC for USA) and multilateral (World Bank and ADB) donors in the Philippines as of December 2019. Despite ranking higher than USA in terms of latest ODA portfolio share, South Korea and China were not covered in the study since evaluation studies of their funded ODA projects are either not available online or were commissioned by the Philippine Government or local CSOs. The choice of 2010-2020 as the study’s time frame is deemed appropriate to cover the span of two administrations: former President Benigno Aquino III (July 2010 – June 2016) and President Rodrigo Duterte (July 2016 – present). This is also because the change in administration marked the country’s reduced dependence on ODA.

Sample size of studies to be reviewed should be large enough to arrive at a more generalizable conclusion regarding the donor practices in evaluations (O’Leary 2017). Thus, the study used a sufficient sample size of 90 evaluations of programs/projects commissioned by the five donors from 2010 up to present. Among these, 71 are loans while 19 are grants, all of which were implemented by the Philippine Government or jointly with the donors themselves. Five out of the 90 studies covered are explicitly labelled as “impact” evaluations, while the rest are ex-post programme evaluations usually conducted by donors at program/project completion. Disaggregation of these 90 studies by donor and by sector are provided in the figures below. The complete list of evaluation studies covered in the study is provided in *Appendix D*.



Source: Author’s own construction based on the 90 evaluations covered by the study

Data gathered from these evaluation reports were compiled in an Microsoft Excel. Some of the relevant information gathered include project title, cost, donor agency, evaluation duration, overall rating, criteria used, and methodologies, among others. Information consolidated in the matrix was used for the quantitative analyses (mostly descriptive statistics) done for this study.

### 3.3 Case Study

The review of published evaluation studies cannot fully flesh out the political nature of donor evaluations. Hence, I zoomed in on the impact evaluation of the MCC-funded Kalahi-CIDDS implemented by the Philippines' Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). The selection of this particular evaluation study is primarily because impact evaluations are not common in the Philippines and the sheer scale of the program in terms of cost, coverage area, and the involved technical rigor makes it an interesting case for the study. Additionally, the choice was driven by some arguments about the tacit nature of evaluating poverty alleviation programs such as Kalahi-CIDDS for being "expensive, time consuming, and technically complex, and because the findings can be politically sensitive" (Baker 2000).

The Kalahi-CIDDS uses the community-driven development (CDD) approach to achieve three main objectives: reduced poverty, enhanced participation in local governance, and increased social capital. Towards this end, the program provides trainings and financing to beneficiary communities to propose, design, and implement sub-projects based on their self-identified development needs (DSWD n.d.). Eligible sub-projects to be financed under the program could be in the form of infrastructure (e.g. roads, water systems, electrification), agriculture (e.g. post-harvest facilities) or social services (e.g. health centers, school buildings). The Kalahi-CIDDS program was preceded by two similar national programs which DSWD claims to have made significant impacts on reducing poverty (*ibid.*). First incarnation of the program was officially approved in 2003 with a mix of local (US\$82 million) and loan financing from the WB (US\$100 million) (World Bank 2013). The parent program ended in 2010 but was extended until 2014 with the additional US\$59 million financing from WB to scale-up the CDD operations. As a part of its five-year agreement with the GPH, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), through the Millennium Challenge Account-Philippines (MCA-P)<sup>10</sup>, provided a US\$120 million grant assistance to support the program's second phase. MCC financing for the program closed in 2016 and MCA-P was dissolved in the same year. Currently called the National Community Driven Development Program (NCDDP), Kalahi-CIDDS' latest incarnation continued and scaled up the use of the CDD approach in combating poverty through a fresh loan from WB amounting to US\$479 million and complementary support from ADB.

An impact evaluation of the program's first phase was commissioned by WB in 2003 to evaluate the attainment of its objectives in the dimensions of poverty reduction, social capital, governance, and community empowerment. Under the program's Phase 2, the program was subjected to a 2<sup>nd</sup> Wave Impact Evaluation in 2011 covering the MCC funding and WB additional financing portions of the program. The funding for the impact evaluation was separate from Kalahi-CIDDS program's total cost, amounting to approximately US\$3.4 million (M01 interview). For clarity, the focus of this study is the 2<sup>nd</sup> Wave Impact Evaluation only due to the reasons cited earlier.

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<sup>10</sup> MCA-P is the local counterpart of the MCC and was created in virtue of the five-year compact signed between the Philippine and USA in September 2010. MCA-P serves as the oversight and implementing arm of all projects financed by the MCC in the Philippines.

## ***Chapter 4: Answering the “Why” and the “Who” in Donor-Commissioned Evaluations***

This chapter discusses the first two dimensions of evaluation practice as exhibited in donor-commissioned evaluations: (a) purpose for conducting evaluations; and (b) who does the evaluations. On the first item, I analyzed the underlying reasons of donors for commissioning evaluations and how these align with those of the Philippine government. As Carothers (2015) argues that utilization of partner countries of evaluation findings is an indication of country ownership in donor evaluations, the analysis also involved determining how both the donors and the Philippine government intend to use evaluation findings through the case of the Kalahi-CIDDS program impact evaluation. Regarding the second item, I discussed the dominant practices of donors in procuring evaluators and categorized them using Bajaj’s (2012) framework of evaluator category.

### **4.1 Why Evaluate?**

The active engagement of donors in various evaluation activities remain to be one of the key features of international assistance in the Philippines. The review of 90 ex-post evaluation studies made for this research only scratches the surface of the role of donors in shaping the country’s evaluation scene. However, the question still remains on the extent to which the voluminous amount of evaluation reports that have been produced and published over time only fulfils the political and organizational requirements of donors, or also those of the Philippine government.

The two main objectives of conducting evaluations – accountability and learning – are the main driving force of donors for conducting evaluations, with the common goal of supporting evidence-based decision-making and enhancing the results of development aid. Donors explicitly mentioned these motivations in their published evaluation reports and evaluation-related guidelines and manuals (ADB Independent Evaluation Department 2014; JICA 2014; Millennium Challenge Corporation 2017; USAID 2016; World Bank 2019), with the terms “accountability” and “learning” appearing several times throughout the reviewed documents.

As members (USA and Japan) and long-time partners (ADB and WB), these donors carry the principles established by OECD in doing development evaluations, and thus use the five OECD-DAC criteria – relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, and impact – to assess program/project performance. As Chianaca (2008) observed, donors typically tweak this approach by assessing projects in other important and/or emerging development areas which the projects aim to contribute. For example, USAID has been a long-standing champion for increasing gender equality, which is reflected on its foreign aid policy and always integrated in its funded interventions (USAID 2012). It is thus unsurprising that USAID included ‘gender’ as a standalone criterion in evaluating five out of seven ODA projects covered by this study. Meanwhile, ADB uses institutional development and environment impact as additional criteria in evaluating its projects which reflects the organization’s recognition of the need to enhance said development areas to reduce poverty (ADB 2002). These themes are consistent with the priorities stated in the Philippine Development Plans



(PDP)<sup>11</sup> of the administrations covered by this study. Lastly, the 90 ex-post evaluation reports have a discussion on the program/project's alignment with the PDP in consistency with the OECD's call for donors to align their efforts with the partner countries' development strategies.

Analyzing the primary objectives of donors in carrying out evaluations reveals that the Philippine Government gives the same importance to the accountability and learning functions of evaluations. In her 2018 research paper, Resurreccion identified that “in terms of [...] types and purpose of evaluations, according to the Philippine government's policy issuances, evaluations are to be conducted to ensure accountability to its stakeholders and to support evidence-based decision-making in the public sector” (2018: 50). And this alignment is exhibited in the case of the impact evaluation of the MCC-funded Kalahi-CIDDS program. The interview with the various involved stakeholders revealed the convergence of MCC's and the Philippine Government's intent to evaluate the program. The first (and seem to be the most important one) is for accountability purposes. As M01 recalled during the interview, MCC and DSWD mutually agreed at the onset to carry out a rigorous impact evaluation for the program. For both, there is a high stake involved in the implementation of Kalahi-CIDDS. The program uses the CDD approach to tackle local poverty by empowering communities to identify their development needs and decide on what appropriate interventions the resources will be allocated (World Bank 2020). Kalahi-CIDDS has been a banner anti-poverty program of DSWD for years, although the efficacy of the CDD approach in the Philippine setting has not been proven (Interview with D01). The financial assistance given by MCC to the program is purely in the form of ODA grants, meaning, the entire cost of US\$120 million plus other program-related cost (including the budget for the impact evaluation) are all charged to the American taxpayers, and no repayments and corresponding interests are expected in return from the GPH in the future. This makes MCC's investment on the project so crucial. Technically, Kalahi-CIDDS is an investment on MCC's part, and as any investor would do, MCC wanted to assess if their investment is worth it (M01, D01, D02). The final report for Kalahi-CIDDS evaluation made this intent explicit.

“The principal goal of this report is to serve as an independent assessment of the impact of KC generally, and specifically of the returns to the Millennium Challenge Corporation's (MCC) investment in [Kalahi-CIDDS]” (Beatty et al. 2018: 10).

As far as DSWD and MCC are concerned, Kalahi-CIDDS is the biggest intervention (in terms of scale) they have been involved in which uses the CDD approach to tackle poverty. Hence, both stakeholders wanted to evaluate the program to assess the efficacy of said approach. As Patton (2008) puts it, this reason for carrying out evaluation is a summative one as it attempts to make a definitive judgement of the intervention's worth in terms efficiency and effectiveness.

Having funded mostly infrastructure projects in the past, MCC really wanted a rigorous evaluation of the program since this is its first huge foray into the CDD approach (I01), and has plans to apply the same to other partner countries it supports. On the other hand, DSWD has full confidence on the CDD as a poverty alleviation mechanism that WB and ADB loan financing for the program's next phase had already been secured even prior to the release of the evaluation findings (D01, D02). This is apart from the fact that Kalahi-CIDDS

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<sup>11</sup> The timeframe set for this study covers the administrations of Aquino (2010-2016), and Duterte (2016-2022), each one having their own medium-term national development plan. Relevance of ODA programs/projects were evaluated depending on which term they were incepted, implemented, or subjected to ex-post evaluation.

has been effectively institutionalized as one of the agency's main poverty alleviation programs having been implemented since the early 2000's. In a way, the program's evaluation, not only confirmed its worth but also legitimized MCC's venture into this relatively unproven approach and DSWD's decision to secure additional donor funding for its expanded implementation. It can then be surmised that more than being summative in nature, the evaluation was also a mechanism to demonstrate the legitimacy of choice to finance and implement a particular intervention (Jones et al. 2009).

The next reason falls on the learning function of evaluation which is a formative one (Patton 2008). With its continuity already certain, it was important for DSWD that the evaluation findings inform the design and implementation of Kalahi-CIDDS' next phase. For DSWD, the impact evaluation was very instrumental in harvesting lessons learned which was taken into account in the design of the program's next phase (D01). But in order to do this, it was important for DSWD for the evaluation to answer not just the "what" (i.e. the presence of impact and its size), but also the "why" and the "how" (D02). For its part, MCC also wanted to learn from the implementation of Kalahi-CIDDS through evaluation since it is very keen to adopt the CDD approach to their aid assistance in other countries (M01). However, DSWD thinks that the learning function of evaluation is not paramount to MCC.

"MCC is more concerned on the "what" since they need to determine the return on investment of their grant" (D02).

The case of the Kalahi-CIDDS impact evaluation demonstrates that the intended use of evaluation may not be exclusive to a particular type (Patton 1997). Moreover, knowing that both MCC and the Philippine Government wanted to conduct impact evaluation to ensure accountability, facilitate learning, and institutionalize the program and the CDD approach seem to disprove most of the scholars' assumption about evaluations only serving the donors' interests. However, the case of Kalahi-CIDDS impact evaluation appears to be an exception if we carefully examine the practice of donors in conducting evaluations in the country. As the government agencies overseeing evaluations in the public sector, NEDA-Monitoring and Evaluation Staff (NEDA-MES) has been involved in many evaluation activities of donors over the years. NEDA-MES officials interviewed for this study raised a very important issue about most of the donor-commissioned evaluations.

"Donors mainly carry out evaluations in compliance with the loan/grant covenants. They use it to account for the funds utilized in the implementation of their projects. Hence, they only [evaluate] the portion<sup>12</sup> of the ODA project that they financed and report the corresponding accomplishments thereof" (N02).

True enough, this is exactly the case specifically for JICA-led evaluations, with 48 out of 51 evaluation studies covered in this research only accounted for the loan portion of the ODA projects being evaluated. NEDA-MES officials admitted that such practice is understandable given that an 'investor' only cares about his 'investment', if we speak in business terms. But while this may not be the case for all, it still shows some donors' lack of regard to see the "bigger picture" (N01) in terms of viewing an intervention's impact holistically.

"The only way the Philippine Government can ensure that projects are evaluated in its entirety is for agencies to conduct their own evaluation in parallel to the

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<sup>12</sup> Usually, an ODA program/project has a mixed financing composed of loan and/or grant proceeds, and local counterpart from the national and/or local government unit budget.

efforts made by the donors. Case in point, WB and ADB advise [partner] agencies to also produce ex-post evaluation reports of their projects. World Bank and ADB will then produce their own completion reports based on the submission of agencies, highlighting only the portion of the project they funded” (N01).

Donors also carry out country-level evaluations from time to time, but only to assess the aggregate performance of their assistance in the Philippines. To a large extent, donor evaluations remain at program/project-level only. While this is done by donors to be “in control of the aid given”, Bajaj argues that in general, the practice of confining evaluations to the program/project mode is “not necessarily as efficacious if broader developmental goals are considered” (2012: 4). He further criticized the status quo by stating that the narrow view of project-level evaluations results in “compartmentalization of learning by recipients”, thus limiting its application on a project-specific basis instead of a broader, institutional-level one (Bajaj 2012: 5). With the donors in the country not keen on conducting thematic or sectoral evaluations, it is thus the Philippine Government who should take the lead in assessing the extent to which collective assistance of donors support the priority development themes of the country (N01).

Additionally, ODA programs/projects due for completion within a particular year are usually automatically programmed by donors for ex-post evaluations without the need to inform the government. In this case, the Philippine Government cannot fully dictate what donors should evaluate, or more generally, what should their evaluation agenda be. This is mainly because there is no policy that empowers the Philippine Government to do so. A memorandum circular entitled National Evaluation Policy Framework (NEPF) was jointly issued by NEDA and the Department of Budget and Management<sup>13</sup> in 2015 with the aim of setting a framework “for the purposive conduct of evaluations in the public sector in support of good governance, transparency, accountability, and evidence-based decision-making” (NEDA and DBM 2015). However, the policy only covers evaluation activities of government agencies and excludes donors. The NEDA-MES staff who helped craft the issuance has this to say:

“We do not include [in the NEPF the] donor-led evaluations because it is their own resources they are using and it is their discretion on why and how they should conduct evaluations. NEPF was conceptualized to only cover government-led and funded evaluations” (N01).

Moreover, President Rodrigo Duterte’s Socioeconomic Agenda and the 2017-2022 PDP - both serving as bases of donors in harmonizing their aid efforts with the national development objectives of the Philippine Government - do not mention anything about the need to implement a national evaluation agenda (Resurreccion 2018). Both the aforementioned directives highlight President Duterte’s objective to accelerate infrastructure spending through the *Build Build Build* program. Some of the big-ticket infrastructure projects under the program are funded by JICA, ADB, and WB, among other donors. With the absence of binding evaluation policies and agenda which they can adhere to, donors are left to conduct evaluations out of their own volition and in their own terms. Considering the GPH’s lack of capacity to carry out evaluations (as discussed in Chapter 1.4.2), there is therefore less likelihood in guaranteeing that the infrastructure projects financed through huge borrowings from said donors, and the *Build Build Build* program as a whole, are producing desired results. As the NEDA-MES officials resolves:

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<sup>13</sup> The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is an executive agency of the Philippine Government responsible for the formulation and implementation of the National Budget (Official Gazette PH n.d.)

“It is therefore the responsibility of partner implementing agencies to ensure that donor evaluations will synchronize or complement the evaluation efforts of the Philippine Government, with the various national development directives such as the PDP serving as the guiding document in doing so” (N01).

Finally, NEDA-MES officials also narrated that most of the ex-post evaluation reports are not actively shared by donors with partner agencies or NEDA, and that in general, there is no feedback mechanism to convey evaluation findings to the concerned stakeholders (N01). This is surprising given that as previously mentioned, all the 90 evaluation reports reviewed for this study documented lessons learned and provided recommendations to the partner implementing agencies to some extent. Besides, having a good feedback mechanism would also be in the donors’ interest as lessons learned generated from evaluations, if actively shared and discussed with partner agencies involved, would also inform the design of subsequent projects they will (most probably) finance. The onus is on the Philippine Government to actively follow through the proceedings of evaluation missions and patiently sift through donor websites to access published evaluation reports. The scenario now begs a very important question. If the donors just leave the results of ODA interventions ~~die~~ unread in internal reports, then how it will support accountability and learning – the fundamental functions of evaluations – on the side of the Philippine Government?

The findings discussed above present the various reasons why donors in the Philippines carry out evaluations, and how these converge and diverge with the evaluation objectives of the Philippine Government. Both stakeholders seem to recognize the accountability and learning functions of evaluation in improving aid effectiveness through evidence-based decision-making. Both also value evaluation for its summative and formative use, even utilizing evaluation findings to legitimize themselves and the public value they create. Yet, basing on the general sentiments of the interviewed GPH officials, it may be surmised that these convergences are not exactly the case for all donor-commissioned evaluations. Given the case of JICA evaluations only covering the ODA loan/grant portions of the project, and the dominant donor practice of conducting project-specific evaluations and lack of ample feedbacking of evaluation findings, it can thus be argued that donor-commissioned evaluations are designed and implemented in consonance with the donors’ need for accountability and learning only. I contend that evaluations which only support the donor’s and not the recipient’s side go against the very essence of development cooperation. Learning from and ensuring accountability through evaluations could be of more value to the Philippine Government if the objectives of conducting one in the first place are rearticulated based on the partner government’s development goals and strategies. That being said, this is where the position made by Segone (n.d.) and Lungdren and Kennedy (n.d.), proves to be really important: ensuring ownership in donor-commissioned evaluations is as much the responsibility of the Philippine Government as of the donors. It is necessary that partner countries receiving high levels of ODA (such as the Philippines) actively come-up with mechanisms to ensure that donors’ evaluation activities will be useful not just to themselves but to the governments they intend to assist as well.

## 4.2 Who Evaluates?

The next discussion attempts to answer the second research sub-question on who are the evaluators in donor-commissioned evaluations in the Philippines. Chapter 2.2.2 introduced the framework developed by Bajaj (2012) which visualizes the choices and trade-offs made by donors in the selection of evaluators for the studies they commission. This framework is


used by the study to locate the top donors in the Philippines within the intersection of evaluator expertise (local vs. international) and degree of ownership vs. independence. The 90 evaluation studies were reviewed to identify the composition of evaluation team (or lead evaluator in case team membership is not disclosed) and categorize them into the four quadrants of evaluator categorization. Except for the Kalahi-CIDDS impact evaluation, all information herein was purely based on the review of the published evaluations studies. Information on the characteristic, composition, and nationality of evaluation teams (or sole evaluator in some cases) was collected from the evaluation reports published on the internet. Evaluation teams with one or more members coming from the Philippine Government (implementing and oversight agencies) are assigned at Quadrant 3 (local consultants) to simplify the process. The analysis is limited to the composition and team set-up of the evaluating entity only as the reviewed evaluation report do not reveal much about the extent of influence of each member in the evaluations. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the analysis grouped by donor, while Figure 4.1 illustrates the donors location within the quadrants of evaluator category.

**Table 4.1**  
Summary of Evaluators of Donor-Commissioned Evaluations in the Past 10 Years

Donors	Total Number of Evaluation Studies Covered	Quadrant 1 (International Consultants)		Quadrant 2 (Donor Agency)		Quadrant 3 (Local Consultants)		Quadrant 4 (Government Agency)		Dominant Evaluator Categorization
		Count	% of Evaluation Studies	Count	% of Evaluation Studies	Count	% of Evaluation Studies	Count	% of Evaluation Studies	
ADB	25	-	-	25	100	-	-	-	-	Donor Agency
JICA	51	45	88	2	4	2	4	2	4	External Consultants
MCC	1	-	-	-	-	1	100	-	-	Local Consultants
USAID	7			-	-	7	100	-	-	Local Consultants
WB	6	-	-	5	83	-	-	1	17	Donor Agency
<b>Total</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	

Source: Author's own construction based on the review of 90 evaluation studies

**Figure 4.1**  
Categorization of Donors Based on Evaluator Category



Source: Own construction based on Bajaj's (2012) Framework

Placement of donors in Quadrants 1 and 2 signifies a more conventional practice in enlisting evaluators which is more independent and reliant to foreign expertise. Quadrants 3 and 4 are more inclusive and valuing the understanding of local context in evaluations, with the latter regarded as more ideal as far as country ownership is concerned. The figure above illustrates the dominant practice within the past 10 years among donors in the Philippines in terms of evaluators they engage with in their evaluations. It can be inferred that evaluator selection in donor-commissioned evaluations remain conventional in general, with prime importance given to foreign technical expertise and independence at the expense of understanding local knowledge and commitment to country ownership. Bamberger pointed out in his 1991 paper that evaluations in developing countries financed and controlled by donors typically use foreign expertise or re internally conducted. Years after, this still holds in the local context given that evaluation teams are predominantly comprised of either foreign external consultants or donors staff/independent evaluation units. NEDA-MES officials offer one reason for this:


“Evaluation as a practice is not yet a big industry domestically<sup>14</sup>. Hence, there is a little pool of local experts in the field. Donors do not want to procure the same local firms over and over again to avoid accusations of patronage and to ensure objectivity in their evaluations” (N01).

Having the most number of evaluation studies reviewed for this study, it is interesting to discuss JICA's dominant practice of hiring external evaluators for its evaluations and see if the reason cited above is accurate. Most of the evaluations commissioned by JICA are conducted by foreign external evaluators (45 out of 51 evaluation studies). In its evaluation guidelines, JICA explicitly stated its preference on hiring highly-skilled external evaluators from universities and research institutions that were not involved in the design and implementation of ODA programs/projects being evaluated (JICA 2004). Each evaluator undergoes a rigorous performance quality check based on JICA's standardized criteria. JICA also highlights the indispensability of local ownership in its evaluations by seeking inputs from

<sup>14</sup> Although I am aware of this fact based on professional experience, I still attempted to corroborate this claim. However, there is an absence of concrete data about this on the web or from my professional connections.

partner agencies regarding consistency of evaluations with other related efforts initiated domestically (JICA 2004). It appears that this is the only extent JICA puts in practice its commitment to ownership as far as its engagement with evaluators is concerned. External evaluators hired by JICA to conduct ex-poste evaluations in the Philippines over the past 10 years are overwhelmingly sourced from Japanese firms (see Figure 4.2).

**Figure 4.2**  
Evaluators of JICA-Commissioned Evaluations



Source: Author's own construction based on the review of 51 JICA evaluation studies

A quick Google search shows that the firms highlighted above are indeed from Japan. Although not explicitly stated in any of its published documents, it appears that JICA has an unwritten rule of hiring Japanese consultants for its evaluations. Despite the resounding call to untie aid, JICA's Special Term for Economic Partnership with the Philippine Government provides conditionalities that requires ODA projects under infrastructure and environment sectors to employ Japanese expertise and technologies (NEDA 2019), which seemingly also applies even to the conduct of evaluations. As shown in Table 4.2, the top four Japanese consultancies carried out 37 of the 47 evaluation studies within six years (2011 to 2016). In most instances, consultants are hired to undertake several evaluation studies for a particular year.

**Table 4.2**  
Japanese Consultants Hired by JICA from 2011 to 2018

<b>Japanese Consultants hired by JICA</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>Total</b>
Sanshu Engineering Consultant		5		5					10
Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting Co., Ltd.	3	3	3						9
Octavia Japan Co., Ltd.		2	3		2	2			9
IC Net Limited	8	1							9 <sup>15</sup>
ICONS Inc.	2								2
International Development Center of Japan, Inc.								2	2
Japan Economic Research Institute Inc.				2					2
OPMAC Corporation							2		2
Global Group Japan 21	1								1
Sophia University					1				1
<b>Total</b>	14	11	6	7	3	2	2	2	47

Source: Author's own construction based on the review of 90 evaluation studies

The table above shows that JICA only engaged with a limited number of Japanese consultancies during the past 10 years. This is ironic considering that the rationale in sourcing evaluation consultants overseas (as stated by NEDA-MES officials cited in the previous quote) is due to the supposedly larger pool of foreign experts than local ones.

As identified using Bajaj's framework, ADB and WB primarily enlists its in-house, independent evaluation groups to carry out ex-post evaluations of ODA programs/projects. Both multilateral donor agencies state that their respective evaluation groups are entirely independent and have not prior interface with those responsible for the design and implementation of the intervention (ADB Independent Evaluation Department 2014; World Bank 2019). Activities of independent evaluation groups are also budgeted separately to ensure functional and structural independence from their parent donor organizations. Both evaluation groups also directly report to the board of directors at the headquarters level to limit interaction with the project management units as much as possible. In fact, the performance of WB and ADB in terms of ensuring quality at entry of the ODA projects, coordination with the Philippine Government, and performing oversight function are even assessed in all of their published evaluation reports reviewed for this study. In this case, it may be said that through their respective evaluation units, both ADB's and WB's evaluation practice lean towards independence. Be that as it may, both independent evaluation groups are technically attached to the donor agencies, thus, the decision to place them on Quadrant 2.

Having categorized JICA, ADB and WB into the more traditional way of commissioning evaluators, it would also be of interest to this study to investigate if there is a relationship between the type of evaluator and the final overall rating of ODA programs/projects subjected to donor-commissioned evaluations reviewed. A uniformed rating scheme was devised to standardize the different rating schemes used by the donors (see Table 4.3). Out of the 90 evaluation studies reviewed, only 77 have a definitive overall rating on the intervention's performance<sup>16</sup>.

**Table 4.3**  
Uniformed Rating Scheme for the Overall Performance of ODA Programs/Projects

<sup>15</sup> Two of these studies were jointly conducted with NEDA, and thus were categorized under Quadrant 4.

<sup>16</sup> The remaining 13 evaluation studies are not included due to the following reasons: (a) donors (e.g. USAID and MCC) do not assign a final rating for the intervention being evaluated; (b) nature of the intervention (e.g. program/budget support loans of JICA); and (c) different evaluation procedure and reporting format (as in the case for the 5 full-blown impact evaluation studies).



Uniformed Rating Scheme		Original Rating Scheme Used		
		JICA	WB	ADB
Positive Overall Rating	Highly Successful	Highly Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory	Highly Successful
	Successful	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Successful
Negative Overall Rating	Partially Successful	Partially Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Partly Successful
	Unsuccessful	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory	Unsuccessful

Source: Author's own construction

Table 4.4 summarizes the overall ratings of ODA programs/projects evaluated by JICA, ADB, and World Bank in the past 10 years categorized by evaluator type. In making the analysis, the hypothesis is that ODA programs/projects evaluated by donor agencies (Quadrant 2) tend to have more positive overall rating (i.e. highly successful and successful) than those by foreign external consultants.

**Table 4.4**  
Summary of Overall Ratings of ODA Programs/Projects Covered by the Study  
Using the Uniformed Evaluation Scheme

Donor/Evaluator Type	Total Number of Evaluation Studies Covered	Highly Successful		Successful		Positive Overall Rating (%)	Partially Successful		Unsuccessful		Negative Overall Rating (%)
		Count	%	Count	%		Count	%	Count	%	
<b>JICA</b>	47	10	21.28	22	46.81	68.09	9	19.15	6	12.77	31.91
Quadrant 1 (Foreign Evaluators)	43	9	20.93	20	46.51	67.44	9	20.93	5	11.63	32.56
Quadrant 2 (Donor Agency)	2	1	50.00	1	50.00	100.00	-	-	-	-	-
Quadrant 4 (Government Agency)	2	-	-	1	50.00	50.00	-	-	1	50.00	50.00
<b>ADB</b>	25	2	8.00	9	36.00	44.00	12	48.00	2	8.00	56.00
Quadrant 2 (Donor Agency)	25	2	8.00	9	36.00	44.00	12	48.00	2	8.00	56.00
<b>World Bank</b>	5	-	-	1	20.00	20.00	2	40.00	2	40.00	80.00
Quadrant 2 (Donor Agency)	5	-	-	1	20.00	20.00	2	40.00	2	40.00	80.00
<b>Total</b>	77	12	15.58	32	41.56	57.14	23	29.87	10	12.99	42.86

Source: Author's own construction based on the review of 90 evaluation studies

It may be inferred from the table above that the inverse is the case. Looking at JICA-commissioned evaluations, more programs/projects have been evaluated positively with foreign external consultants at the helm. One factor that could be attributed to this observation is because all external evaluators procured by JICA are of Japanese origin and were hired multiple times over the course of ten years, making them more sympathetic towards the agency. This case seemingly exhibits a clientelistic relationship: JICA frequently hiring same set of consultants in exchange of positive findings. On the other hand, evaluation studies by ADB and World Bank which are all conducted by in-house evaluators are more likely to have less-than-positive overall rating. A possible explanation to this is that, as described earlier, the independence of these evaluation units shield them from potential influence, pressure and potential threats from inside and outside their agencies. Moreover, both donor organization likewise have internal audit and integrity/anti-corruption units (independent from the management) wherein they can report instances of external pressure or corruption (ADB n.d.; World Bank Independent Evaluation Group n.d.).

On a related note, USAID and MCC – both bilateral agencies of USA – are widely known to engage local expertise in their operations in the Philippines. Both donors emphasize in their published evaluation guidelines the importance of building local ownership, while also committing to independence in conducting evaluations (USAID 2016; MCC 2017). It is thus not surprising that evaluations commissioned by both donors primarily have local consultants as principal members of evaluation teams. One such case was exhibited in the impact evaluation of the Kalahi-CIDDS program, with the local consultant hired for said evaluation being one of this study’s interviewees (I01). It is interesting to zoom in on this case and investigate how the institutional set-up of the Kalahi-CIDDS impact evaluation allowed the ownership and influence of the Philippine Government and other local actors.

#### **4.2.1 Institutional Set-up of the Kalahi-CIDDS 2<sup>nd</sup> Wave Impact Evaluation**

MCC funded the Kalahi-CIDDS 2<sup>nd</sup> Wave Impact Evaluation through a separate grant. MCC directly hired Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), a USA-Based non-profit research organization, as the external evaluator of the program. IPA was on board the program at the very beginning and was primarily in charge of the evaluation design (interview with I01, D02). MCC sought a no-objection from DSWD before hiring IPA. IPA then formed a team of experts as principal investigators composed of four foreign and one local consultant (I01). The local consultant, who is incidentally a research fellow at the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (the Philippine Government’s main think-tank arm), was hired since he is a known expert in the evaluation field and MCC wanted someone with knowledge on the local background as member of the evaluation team (M01, D01). The local consultant was involved from the evaluation inception up to report writing (I01).

As MCC’s implementing arm in the Philippines, the Millennium Challenge Accounts-Philippines (MCA-P) served as the main point of contact of DSWD in matters concerning the evaluation. Leading the MCA-P side is a local M&E specialist (M01) who has worked with the organization since it was created in 2011. World Bank was also on board the evaluation in a consultative capacity being the main funder of the program’s initial phase and its 1<sup>st</sup> Wave Impact Evaluation and having relative expertise in the field of development evaluation. MCA-P directly hired Social Weather Station (SWS), a Philippine-based non-profit research organization, to perform the interim and endline data collection. A steering committee composed of representatives from MCC, MCA-P, World Bank, DSWD, government agencies (NEDA, Department of Finance, Department of Budget and Management, Department of Interior and Local Government, and National Anti-Poverty Commission) and civil society was formed to provide inputs to the evaluation and was periodically convened to discuss progress on the same.

IPA directly reported to MCC at the headquarters level about the progress of evaluation, with the MCA-P, DSWD and World Bank always included in the loop. Decisions regarding the evaluation proceedings were usually discussed and agreed upon at the level of MCC, WB, and IPA (M01). All decisions and directives discussed at their level were then cascaded to MCA-P and is coordinated with DSWD. To ensure impartiality, DSWD’s role in the evaluation was limited to provision and collection of data, and coordination with program field officers. In short, DSWD was completely hands-off in the evaluation (D02). DSWD coursed all its inputs to MCA-P before reaching MCC, which it then cascaded to IPA for consideration. Instances of major dispute among MCA-P, DSWD, and IPA were raised to the Steering Committee for discussion (D02). One such dispute involves the inaccurate translation of IPA of the survey questionnaire to the local language (Visayan), which DSWD managed to flag and correct (D02).

#### 4.2.2 Involvement of the Philippine Government in Donor Evaluations

The case of Kalahi-CIDDS impact evaluation provides a model on how donors can allow country ownership in evaluations through engagement with various local actors. First, tapping local experts is a guaranteed way to inject contextual knowledge in an evaluation. Second, donors having a local counterpart (MCA-P in this case) is important in bringing upstream and downstream stakeholders together. Third, involvement of the partner agency (DSWD in this case) facilitates faster mobilization on the ground and reduces the risk of inaccuracies in preparing evaluation instruments. However, this model is still far from ideal as it also brings to light how impartiality as the core value of evaluations results in the asymmetrical power dynamics among the involved actors, with the Philippine Government at the disadvantaged side. DSWD did not have much control on how the evaluation was carried out as all decisions were made at the donor headquarters level. D02 narrated how difficult it is sometimes to send their comments across the other side since everything has to go through the donor higher-ups. NEDA-MES officials corroborated this finding and shared that this is the common practice in donor-commissioned evaluations in the Philippines.

“Implementing agencies are usually not heavily or directly involved in donor evaluations to ensure objectivity. If they are somehow involved, they still do not have much say on who should be the evaluation consultants or how the reports will be finalized since all major decisions come from the donor headquarters. NEDA, on its part, do not really have the opportunity to provide inputs or vet the evaluation findings since we are always out of the loop” (N01).

This seems to be the case even for joint evaluations with donors and the Philippine Government. JICA, ADB, and World Bank used to be active in conducting joint evaluations with NEDA and implementing partners, but this waned down in recent years (N01). Joint evaluations are conducted from time to time to help improve the evaluation capacity of partner agencies. However, donors have standard procedures in carrying out such activities which leaves no room for partner agencies to have influence on the process. The situation is much worse for purely donor-led evaluation as the Philippine Government is most likely to be completely out of the loop and loses its oversight function (N01). NEDA-MES consistently aired these concerns to the donors, but the latter always respond that it is up to the management at the headquarters level whether or not to increase the involvement of government agencies in their evaluations (N01).


Using the data from 90 donor-commissioned evaluations and the case of the Kalahi-CIDDS impact evaluation, it can be surmised that ownership and influence of the Philippine Government in donor-commissioned evaluations is achieved to a limited extent, as far as the second dimension of evaluation practice is concerned. Donor evaluations remain largely conventional in its choice of evaluators. Foreign expertise and objectivity appear to be the dominant characteristics of most evaluators commissioned by donors. Moreover, tied aid as a discipline is still present in evaluations, as proven in the case of JICA-led evaluations. In general, the Philippine Government’s involvement in donor-commissioned evaluations is still limited to being the source and/or collector of data. There is still a huge power imbalance between the donors and the Philippine Government in terms of decision-making and control in donor evaluations, which hinders collaborative donor-partner evaluations in the country to reach its true form.

## Chapter 5: Methodologies and Approaches Used in Donor Evaluations

Rounding off the main dimensions of evaluation practice, this chapter answers the third sub-question about the epistemological preferences of donors which manifests in the methodologies and approaches used in evaluations. The analysis in the previous discussions determined the limited role of the Philippine Government in shaping donor-commissioned evaluations. This section investigates if the same can be said in the determination of methods to be used in such evaluations.

### 5.1 Methodological Preferences in Donor Evaluations

Upon the review of 90 ex-post evaluation studies commissioned by donors from 2010 to present, it is noticeable that an overwhelming majority (83 out of 90 or 92%) uses the OECD-DAC criteria in evaluating completed ODA programs/projects. Meanwhile, seven programs/projects were identified to use other approaches. Five<sup>17</sup> of these used either experimental or quasi-experimental designs, all of which are full-blown impact evaluations. The remaining two are USAID advocacy projects<sup>18</sup> and did not use the OECD-DAC criteria to judge performance. See Figure 5.1 for more details.



Source: Author's own construction based on the review of 90 evaluation studies

Japan (JICA) and USA (USAID) have been members of the OECD since the 1960's while ADB and World Bank have long-standing strategic partnership with the organization (OECD, n.d.). It is thus not surprising that these donors evaluate their funded ODA programs/projects against the five OECD-DAC criteria as these are “undoubtedly the most known and adopted feature that emerged from the OECC-DAC evaluation guidelines” (Chianca 2008: 1). It appears that the OECD-DAC criteria is used as a standard framework

<sup>17</sup> The five impact evaluation studies are *Third Elementary Education Project* (JICA), *Bohol Irrigation Project Phase 2* (JICA), *ARMM Social Fund for Peace and Development Project* (JICA), *Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program* (World Bank) and the *Kalahi-CIDDS Program* (MCC)

<sup>18</sup> *Tuberculosis Program and Family Planning and Maternal and Child Health Program*

for evaluating completed ODA programs/projects (regardless of amount or sector). Typically, loan and grant agreements between donor agencies and the Philippine Government provide that programs/projects be subjected to evaluation upon completion. Given the number of ODA interventions being implemented in the country, it seems reasonable to use a standardized approach to efficiently produce ex-post evaluations. The criteria-based approach also facilitates easier framing and understanding of evaluation questions (Heider 2017). This is evident on how discussion of findings are structured around the five criteria. Each donor has a standard report template and it is noticeable that reports look similar to one another. Assessment of relevance is commonly based on an intervention's consistency with the priorities in the PDP and adherence to donor organization's foreign aid policies and strategies (and also corporate goals specifically for ADB and WB). Basis for efficiency rating is generally outputs vis-a-vis amount of inputs (time and cost) required to produce them. ECBA is also performed in most of JICA and ADB evaluations to objectively estimate a project's economic gains vis-à-vis use of its resources to assess efficiency. EIRR of program/projects is recomputed ex post and is compared with the value at appraisal. If ex ante EIRR is lower than ex post, then rating on efficiency is most likely less. Sustainability of project impacts are usually framed on the adequacy of technical and human resources needed to sustain project benefits. Evaluations of infrastructure projects particularly look at the operations and maintenance of hard outputs (e.g. roads, equipment) beyond completion.

A mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods is used to collect data about program/project higher-level results (i.e. outcome and impact). Qualitative data collection methods used commonly include desk review of monitoring reports and key informant interviews with government officials. It is noteworthy that only USAID used focus group discussions extensively to provide contextual analysis in its evaluations. Outcomes are primarily assessed quantitatively by comparing baseline and endline values of pre-determined indicators (e.g. "cropped area in hectares" and "per-hectare yield" for irrigation projects; "dropout rate" and "student-classroom ratio" for education projects). As for impact, findings are usually quantitatively analyzed using household and beneficiary satisfaction surveys. In the case of JICA's *Arterial Road Links Development Project* ex-post evaluation, measurement of the project's economic impacts were quantified using surveys (see Figure 5.2 for illustration).

**Figure 5.2**

Sample Screenshot of Discussion under Project Impact Using Results of Beneficiary Survey




Figure 10: Do you think that marketing opportunities expanded for agricultural products after the completion of the targeted section? (n=39 farmers)




Figure 11: Do you think your agricultural income increased after the completion of the targeted section? (n=39 farmers)




Figure 12: Do you think transportation of goods such as agricultural products increased after the completion of the targeted section? (n=50 drivers)




Figure 13: Do you think the local economy improved after the completion of the targeted section? (n=64 residents)

Source: Arterial Road Links Development Project V Ex-Post Evaluation Report (JICA 2014)

Technically speaking, these ex-post evaluation studies applied mixed methods in measuring program/project higher-level results. Either quantitative or qualitative method is used to assess each indicator or answer a specific evaluation question. However, as observed, the combination of both methods are not used to supplement or complement the data generated by each. Scholars nowadays advocate the use of mixed methods in such manner that qualitative methods generate measurement of effect size, while quantitative methods provide a better contextual understanding on why and how such effect is observed (Garbarino and Holland 2009). It appears that donors still have not adopted this new thinking on what constitutes “mixed methods”. This remains consistent with Bamberger’s observation decades ago on how donor evaluations tend to “pay lip service to the importance of the multi-method approach and the use of triangulation” (1991: 327).

On the other hand, the five impact evaluations covered by this study vastly differ from those using the OECD-DAC criteria as a standard framework in terms of structure and technical rigor involved. For the latter, the assessment of impact is basically an accounting of the “positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention on identifiable population groups, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended” which is aligned with OECD’s definition of the term (n.d.: n.p.). On the other hand, the full-blown impact evaluations attempted to “measure” impact through more sophisticated approaches. These evaluations used either experimental or quasi-experimental designs to establish a counterfactual needed to attribute net effect to the intervention being evaluated. In these evaluations, impact is defined as the “difference in the indicator of interest (Y) with the intervention ( $Y_1$ ) and without the intervention ( $Y_0$ )” (White 2010: 7). According to Bamberger (2012), the subscription to the latter definition resulted in the usual association of the term “impact” with the use of RCT and quasi-experimental designs, which has long been a convention in development impact evaluations. However, the faithfulness in using either of the two often results in evaluation findings that are devoid of context. This is precisely the case in the JICA-funded impact evaluation of *ARMM Social Fund for Peace and Development Project (ASFPDP)* wherein ‘trust’ on the government and within the community facilitated by the project is quantitatively measured (see Figure 5.3 for a screenshot from the evaluation report).

**Figure 4.5**  
Screenshot of ASFPDP Impact Evaluation Report Discussing 'Trust'  
Generated by the Project

### 5.3.8. Trust

Table 5-38 shows trust in people belonging to the same or different social groups, village officials (i.e., village chairpersons), the local government, and the national government<sup>5</sup>. As shown in Table 5-39, some estimators indicated positive impacts of 3-5% on trust in people belonging to, for example, different clans and the same ethnicity. For trust in officials, opposite effects were observed between national government officials, who gained trust, and village chairpersons, who lost it. Similar results were confirmed for the low-education households, though the statistical significances of the estimators became weaker (Table 5-40 and Table 5-41).

**Table 5-38 Trust in People and Officials: All Households**

	Unit: Binary (Yes:1 or No:0)				
	Treatment		Control		Difference (t-test)
	N	Mean	N	Mean	
People in Same Community	735	0.976	735	0.978	-0.003
People in Different Communities	735	0.899	735	0.902	-0.003
People of Same Clan	735	0.986	735	0.981	0.005
People of Different Clans	735	0.835	735	0.805	0.030
People of Same Ethnicity	735	0.947	735	0.917	0.030**
People of Different Ethnicities	735	0.702	735	0.673	0.029
People of Same Religion	735	0.917	735	0.894	0.023
People of Different Religions	735	0.565	735	0.556	0.008
Village Chairperson	735	0.940	735	0.969	-0.029***
Local Government Officials	735	0.959	735	0.946	0.014
National Government Officials	735	0.921	735	0.897	0.024

Source: Impact Survey of ASFPDP

Note: \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

Source: ASFPDP Impact Evaluation Report (JICA 2016)

'Trust' generated by the project was generalized by aggregating quantifiable data without probing the reasons for the observed behavior or explaining the contextual differences in the quality of the same, which would otherwise have been done through more contextual methodologies. Soft outcomes like trust are not easily amenable to quantification and thus should be measured in non-conventional way (Garbarino and Holland 2009).

The conventional way of analyzing results of interventions through positivistic means removes the varied yet rich experiences of local people from the narratives of evaluation reports. This is why there is now a wider call for practitioners to shift from positivist to more interpretative and participatory approaches (or at least strike the balance between the two) in conducting evaluations to allow partner government and other stakeholders to own evaluation results (Kuster 2017; White 2009). As it appears, such shift is not yet observed in donor-commissioned evaluations in the Philippines. The next discussion may provide clarity on why conventional methods (e.g. RCT) are still preferred in donor evaluations despite the presence of new trends brought by the participatory movement.

## 5.2 How are the Methodologies Determined?: The Case of the Kalahi-CIDDS Impact Evaluation

The case study of the Kalahi-CIDDS program impact evaluation may provide clarity on why conventional methods (e.g. RCT) are still preferred in donor evaluations despite the presence of new trends brought by the participatory movement.

As previously mentioned, RCT was used to evaluate the program. From the very beginning, MCC was sure that the impact evaluation of Kalahi-CIDDS should aim for attribution (instead of mere contribution) to ascertain if the program's implementation is responsible for the observed impact. Resources seem to be not a problem as MCC was ready to go all out to ensure that the "most robust" (I01) method shall be used to evaluate the program. Hence, IPA recommended the use RCT as it should be the "only choice" when resources are not an issue (I01). MCC then approved IPA's recommendation. WB protested on the idea for reasons that M01 opted not to disclose due to confidentiality.

"As the gold standard (of research methods), randomized control trial (RCT), always allow attribution of impacts with a certain intervention. [It] does not have any disadvantages apart from the cost involved" (M01)

Admitting that it has little expertise on the evaluation field, DSWD concurred with MCC's decision (D01). There is, however, one more reason why DSWD welcomed the use of RCT which was alluded to in the Chapter 5.1:

"The use of RCT was an improvement from the methodology used in the 1<sup>st</sup> Wave (WB-funded) impact evaluation. There were aspects in the first wave which came out with less desirable findings, especially in the level of community participation in project-related activities. WB's impact evaluation only used quasi-experimental method (regression discontinuity design (RDD) with matching). With RDD, you are only matching (treatment vs. control groups) those that are slightly above and slightly below the poverty threshold. In RCT, all sample households are below the cut-off line and thus more comparable." (D02)

As it was "universally accepted" that the use of RCT yields more "accurate" results than quasi-experimental methods (D02, M01), then the favorable findings of 2<sup>nd</sup> Wave Impact Evaluation about the program's impact on social capital is more credible (D02). Therefore, the use of RCT and MCC's commitment which made it possible proved to be really advantageous for DSWD in ensuring the worth of the program.

"If not for the use of RCT on Kalahi-CIDDS 2nd Wave IE, then findings of the 1st Wave would not be corrected"

WB was not happy with the outcome of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Wave IE as it disputed one of the major findings of the previous evaluation. This also stemmed from the fact that the 2<sup>nd</sup> Wave IE applied a more robust methodology and a more expansive sample coverage, which had somehow invalidated the major findings of the 1<sup>st</sup> Wave IE (D02).

The responses presented above are worth noting. Firstly, there is a preoccupation among donors such as MCC for attribution and in establishing causal inference, and thus prefer a particular approach to evaluation which is RCT. This is consistent with Jones (in Kusters 2017) observation regarding the preferential use of RCT in impact evaluations as it



is the most guaranteed way to ensure accountability for results. Secondly, there is a common belief among evaluation stakeholders that rigorous impact evaluations should automatically involve the use of RCT, as also noted by Bajaj (2012). It appears that using other methodologies, especially the more interpretative ones, is not an option when resources to carry out RCT are available. Lastly, it may not always be a case of donors not involving or allowing partner agencies to decide on what methodologies to use. As in the case of Kalahi-CIDDS, the little influence of the Philippine Government on such decision may be due to its perceived lack of technical know-how in evaluations.

“The issue is always about the [Philippine] government’s evaluation capacity. Can we really advise donors on what methodology to use when we do not have enough expertise to do so? (N01)”

Despite donors having provided the Philippine Government with technical capacity building on evaluations in the past, it seems insufficient to fully allow the latter to make decisions or recommendations involving the technical aspects of evaluations. Lungdren and Kennedy (n.d.) stresses that developing the evaluative capacity of partner governments is prerequisite to co-ownership of evaluations. Such capacity building will only take place when donors do not just **involve** partner governments in evaluations, but **collaborate** with them.

Based on the data presented above, there is a strong indication that the methodological preferences of donors in carrying out evaluations in the Philippines still fall within the realm of traditional evaluation. Ex-post evaluations conducted by donors at program/project completion follow a standard format based on the OECD-DAC criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, and impact. The fact that report formats have not changed over time represents the rigid standards of donors in evaluations and the lack of flexibility in adopting recent trends in terms of approaches used. Positivism prevails as the dominant epistemology in assessing results of ODA interventions. There is still consistent attempt to quantify outcome and impact through the application of surveys, and more specifically, RCT or quasi-experimental designs for impact evaluations. The continued subscription to such methodological rigor is primarily driven by the need of donors and the GPH alike to ascertain causality in evaluations, which can be advantageous to both parties as demonstrated in the case of Kalahi-CIDDS impact evaluation. However, the lack of evaluative capacity hinders the GPH from proactively asserting its ownership in donor evaluations by having little say on what methodology/ies should be used.

## ***Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations***

### **6.1 Research Summary**

Based on the findings presented above, this research suggests that the extent of the Philippine government's ownership and influence over donor-commissioned evaluations are limited. In general, evaluation practices of top donors in the country do not fully allow country ownership to manifest in these undertakings. This conclusion is substantiated by a detailed examination of the main dimensions constituting evaluation practices of donors.

The first sub-question deals with the first dimension of evaluation practice regarding the purpose and intended use of ex-post evaluations. Ensuring accountability and generating lessons learned remain to be the overarching rationale in conducting ex-post evaluations for donors and the GPH alike, due largely to their commitment to improve the delivery of aid through evidence-based decision-making. The mutual recognition of these two important functions of evaluation was made explicit in the published evaluation materials and related researches reviewed for this study, and is evident in the responses of key actors from both sides based on the interviewees made. Using the MCC-funded impact evaluation of the Kalahi-CIDDS program, this research determines that both value ex-post evaluation for its summative and formative use, and also tacitly, for legitimization of program/project implementation and the use of a particular approach (e.g. application of the CDD approach to alleviating poverty in the Philippines). However, the research also showed that the case of Kalahi-CIDDS impact evaluation is an exception as far as the general evaluation practice of donors is concerned. By and large, ex-post evaluations are conducted by donors primarily to serve their own needs, and without regard for the usefulness of evaluation results in the development objectives of the government. The mere fact that JICA only evaluates the loan/grant portion of the intervention instead of its entirety supports this claim. In addition to this, ex-post evaluations of donors remain confined to the project/program mode which only provides a narrow view of the bigger development picture. More importantly, results and lessons generated from ex-post evaluations are not actively shared nor discussed by donors with partner agencies, only fulfilling the need for accountability and learning of the former. The status quo presents a challenge to the Philippine government to step up its evaluation game to fill the gap left by donors, which it has committed to undertake through the issuance of the NEPF. However, the non-inclusion of donors in the NEPF is a missed opportunity for the GPH to fully assert its ownership over evaluation activities in the country.

The second research sub-question poses the question on who are the evaluators doing the evaluations commissioned by donors. By and large, donors in the Philippines conduct in-house evaluations of their ODA programs/projects, or tap mainly foreign consultants. Using Bajaj's (2012) framework of evaluator category, this research determines that the combination of objectivity and international expertise takes precedence in donor's choice for evaluators. Donors have yet to heed the call for more partner country participation in evaluations since collaboration with GPH implementing and oversight (e.g. NEDA-MES) agencies are still far and between. While USAID and MCC have been observed to include local experts in their evaluations, the slow growth of evaluation practice in the country seems to hinder most of the donors in incorporating local expertise in evaluations. But as the track record of JICA suggests, this may not be exactly the case. Despite OECD's call for the opposite, the practice of tying aid in evaluations still persists (albeit implicitly), resulting in donor evaluations' propensity for positive bias. Moreover, zooming in on the case of Kalahi-

CIDDS impact evaluation and analyzing its institutional set-up reveal the tokenistic participatory nature of donor evaluations. Partner agencies may be involved in these evaluations although their role is limited to data provision and collection. Strictly speaking, however, donors are not to be fully blamed for this since GPH also resigns to the idea of impartiality in donor evaluations. However, by keeping the GPH completely out of the loop in most instances, donors' seemingly neglect the important oversight function of the former, which further precludes country ownership to take place in these evaluations.

Lastly, the methodological preferences of donors, as analyzed in this research, substantiates the conclusion about the limited extent of country ownership in donor-commissioned evaluations. In most cases, donor ex-post evaluations are characterized by rigid standards and procedures, evident with the consistent use of the OECD-DAC criteria as an approach in evaluating the performance of completed ODA programs/projects. As established in the theoretical framework, the use of more participatory and interpretative methods in evaluations would signify the donors' regard for ownership by substantiating quantitative findings with contextual details and highlighting real life experiences of people in connection with the interventions being assessed. Unfortunately, as it is right now, the predominant use of quantitative methods such as surveys and RCT to assess program/project impact reduces the varied experiences of beneficiaries to numbers and charts in evaluation reports. Donor evaluations predominantly subscribe to the gospel of positivism in applying methodological rigor in evaluations. Unsurprisingly, there is neither observable trend, nor a considerable shift towards the introduction of more participatory and constructivist methods. This is because the preference for quantitative methods is primarily driven by the donors' heightened need for accountability for results, as exemplified in the case of the Kalahi-CIDDS impact evaluation. Investigating the choice of RCT as the main methodology reveals the politics involved in such decisions, specifically in legitimating an intervention's worth which proved to be advantageous to both parties. However, GPH admits that its lack of technical know-how limits its influence over the choice of which methodologies to use, which ultimately reduces its ownership in the process.

## 6.2 Policy Recommendations

Overall, the findings of the research pose a challenge to donors to do away with the traditional, gatekeeping practices in evaluations and move towards more collaborative partnership with GPH agencies. It goes without saying that donors need to build ownership of partners such as the Philippines by collaborating with relevant local actors from evaluation design up to feedbacking of findings and tracking of recommendations. But staying true to the mutual accountability commitment in country ownership entails proactive action from the Philippine government insofar as donors' adherence to country's evaluation systems and regard for local knowledge are concerned. Serving as a foundation to a more encompassing policy, the issuance of NEPF and its guidelines establishes a framework for evaluations in Philippines' public sector. However, it should also encompass evaluations involving donors (e.g. purely donor-led and joint) since these activities likewise form part of the public sector processes, more so, entail higher stakes due to the huge sums of borrowings involved. The NEPF already sets the rationale for conducting evaluation, provides guidance for its use, and lays out the standard procedures in every step of the evaluation process (NEDA and DBM 2015). Based on the findings presented here, NEPF should enhance its guidelines by incorporating provisions on team compositions which strike the balance between impartiality and ownership, and by prescribing the use of more participatory methodologies. This way, the GPH can ensure that evaluations are done by donors with the intent of meaningful use for both parties, rather than just mere box-ticking exercises to satisfy donor requirements. Such

changes may be introduced in the National Evaluation Policy Act which seeks to institutionalize the NEPF through legislation, pending Senate deliberations.

### **6.3 Implications to Theory**

The study enhances the theorization of country ownership and its importance in the context of donor-commissioned evaluations. Firstly, it establishes the three dimensions of evaluation practice (purpose, evaluator, and methodology) as the loci for country ownership, which should be carefully considered by donors in designing and implementing evaluations. Secondly, it provides empirical evidence on the mutual accountability clause of country ownership such that ownership will only be fully realized if partner governments are responsible in steering the direction of evaluation practice in the country, just as much as donors are responsible for following the partners' lead. Finally, it adds a different angle on how 'ownership' should be conceived in relation to the debate on whether it should emanate from/apply to partner governments or the community at large (Carothers 2015; Levine and Griñó 2015). It establishes that country ownership at the government level should be realized first before 'local' ownership at the community level could take place, given that governments should represent the interests of beneficiaries and can invoke ownership more at their level. Further research related to this discourse may be explored by focusing more on how the beneficiaries of aid themselves are able to assert ownership in these evaluations.

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### *Appendix A: List of Key Informant Interviewees*

No.	Position	Role	Date of Interview	Code
<i>Department of Social Welfare and Development–Kalaha-CIDDS National Program Management Office</i>				
1	M&E Officer	Helped with the data collection for the evaluation	17 August 2020	D01

2	M&E Specialist (2008-2016) Deputy Manager for Operations (2016-2018)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Developed the M&amp;E manual of the program</li> <li>• Gave institutional support to external evaluators (e.g. fieldwork coordination, provision of M&amp;E data)</li> <li>• Provided inputs on the evaluation proceedings and findings</li> <li>• Led the internal process evaluation of the program</li> </ul>	21 August 2020	D02
<b><i>Millennium Challenge Corporation – Millennium Challenge Account Philippines</i></b>				
3	M&E Specialist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Part of the team that designed the evaluation</li> <li>• In-charge of overseeing the progress of evaluation</li> <li>• Provided inputs on the evaluation proceedings and findings</li> <li>• Helped develop the questionnaire in coordination with IPA and the additional consultant hired for data collection</li> </ul>	25 August 2020	M01
<b><i>Kalahi-CIDDS 2<sup>nd</sup> Wave Evaluation Team/Philippine Institute for Development Studies</i></b>				
4	Principal Investigator	Involved in the design of evaluation, team supervision, and data analysis, and report writing.	26 August 2020	I01
<b><i>National Economic and Development Authority – Monitoring and Evaluation Staff</i></b>				
5	Official (Director)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Oversight unit which steers the evaluation agenda of the GPH.</li> <li>• Working with UNDP to develop the National Evaluation Policy Framework Guidelines</li> </ul>	19 August 2020	N01
6	Official (Assistant Director)			N02
7	Senior Technical Staff			N03

***Appendix B: Sample Letter Request for Interview***

August 11, 2020

**DR. ANICETO C. ORBETA, JR.**

Research Fellow  
 Philippine Institute for Development Studies  
 18F Three Cyberpod Centris – North Tower  
 EDSA cor. Quezon Ave., Quezon City

Dear **Dr. Orbeta**,

I hope this letter finds you well. I am Mark Justine B. Gatdula, a Senior Economic Development Specialist at the Monitoring and Evaluation Staff of the National Economic and Development Authority (or NEDA-MES). I am on official study leave to pursue my master's degree at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) of the Erasmus University of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. I am currently conducting my master's thesis entitled "*Determining 'Success': Analysis of Donor-Led Evaluations of Official Development Assistance (ODA) Programs and Projects in the Philippines*".

My work at NEDA-MES involves monitoring and evaluation of development programs and projects of the Philippine Government, primarily those financed through Official Development Assistance. Given my background, I am interested in the factors involved in determining the 'success' (or rather 'failure') of some on-going and completed development interventions in the country which were subjected to donor-commissioned evaluations from 2010 to present. Specifically, I am looking at the processes, criteria and methodologies (among other factors) used in these evaluations, as well as the extent of influence of the Philippine Government in the same.


Based on my knowledge working at NEDA-MES and the preparatory research I made, two programs of the Department of Social Welfare and Development had undergone impact evaluations within the past decade, namely the *Kapit-Bisig Laban Sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (KALAHI-CIDSS)* and the *Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps)*. Thus, I intend to highlight the evaluations of these programs as case studies for my research. With your huge involvement in both of these evaluations, your knowledge will provide a wealth of insights and validity to my study.

In view of this, may I schedule a 30-minute to one-hour online interview with you within 17 to 28 of August 2020 at any time convenient for you. In support of my request, I have attached the endorsement letter from my supervisor Dr. Sylvia Bergh. I am providing herewith my contact details for your confirmation or for any questions regarding this request.

Platform	Contact details
E-mail	475226mq@student.eur.nl / jugsgatdula@gmail.com
Skype	Profile Name: Mark Justine Biboso Gatdula (Username: jugsgatdula)
Zoom	Profile Name: Mark Gatdula (Personal Meeting ID: 916-010-06905)
Microsoft Teams	Profile Name: Mark Justine Gatdula

I am hoping for your favorable response. Thank you very much.

Sincerely,



**MARK JUSTINE B. GATDULA**

MA Student, International Institute of Social Studies (ISS)  
 Senior Economic Development Specialist, National Economic and Development Authority (on official study leave)

Interviewer: Hello! Thank you for agreeing to participate in my study. Before we start with the interview proper, may I ask if I can record our conversation? Rest assured that the recording will only be used in validating your answer. I will also delete the file once I'm done with the thesis. I also guarantee that your identity will be kept in anonymity as I will be using codes names in the actual report.

Basically, what I am trying to investigate are the factors that primarily govern the conduct of evaluations in the Philippines which are commissioned/funded by donors, and by extension, how donors shape the evaluation practices of the Philippines given that we are still lacking on that department. More specifically, I want to look at the processes, criteria and methodologies (among other factors) prescribed by donors in the evaluations they funded, and how it influences the Philippine Government in the development of its own evaluation practices.

### ***NEDA-MES***

1. How did the partnership between NEDA and UNDP to improve the evaluation capacity of the Philippine Government materialize?
2. Can you describe the consultation process involved in crafting the evaluation module which shall serve as basis of the PH Government in conducting its own evaluations?
3. Based on the NEPF draft guidelines, there seems to be no mention of how the Philippine Government agencies should be involved in evaluations that are commissioned by donors. How can we address
4. Are there efforts to employ alternative or emerging approaches/methodologies in doing our own evaluations?
5. Does NEDA and other PH Government agencies have a say on the processes, criteria, methodologies, etc. which should be institutionalized and reflected in the said module?
6. What are the PH Government's guidelines to ensure that evaluations commissioned by donors adhere to the country's own processes in terms of conducting evaluations?
7. What are the PH Government's strategies to ensure that evaluations commissioned by donors are as objective as possible with respect to determining a project's level of success?

*Appendix D: List of 90 Ex-Post Evaluation Studies Reviewed for the Study*

Name of Project	Category	Type of Assistance	Donor	Cost	Implementing Agency	Project Start Date	Project End Date	Sector	Year of Evaluation	Lead Evaluator	Quadrant Based on Bajas's Framework	Final Rating	Final Rating (based on Uniformed Rating Scheme)	Rating Scheme	Criteria	Processes Involved	Methodology	Baseline info?	Evaluation Approach	Evaluation Design	Methodology Category
<i>Asian Development Bank (ADB)</i>																					
Integrated Coastal Resources Management Project	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$36.03 million	DENR	2007	2014	Agriculture and Environment	2019	ADB IED	2	Less than successful	Partially Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs. endline, beneficiary survey, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Governance in Justice Sector Reform Program	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$600 million	DOJ	2009	2012	Governance	2017	ADB IED	2	Successful	Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs. endline, beneficiary survey, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Credit for Better Health Care Project	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$20.37 million	DBP	2009	2015	Social Welfare	2017	ADB IED	2	less than successful	Partially Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs. endline, beneficiary survey, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Increasing Competitiveness for Inclusive Growth Program (Subprograms 1 and 2)	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$800 million	DOF	2012	2015	Governance	2016	ADB IED	2	Highly successful	Highly Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance, New: Institutional development	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs. endline, beneficiary survey, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Emergency Assistance for Relief And Recovery from Typhoon Yolanda	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$500 million	DOF	2014	2015	Governance	2016	ADB IED	2	Highly successful	Highly Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs. endline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Electricity Market and Transmission Development Project	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$90.4 million	NPC	2002	2009	Infrastructure	2015	ADB IED	2	Successful	Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	(i) a desk review of project documents and reports; (ii) a review of available annual reports and financial statements of the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM), the Energy Regulatory	Baseline vs. endline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed

Name of Project	Category	Type of Assistance	Donor	Cost	Implementing Agency	Project Start Date	Project End Date	Sector	Year of Evaluation	Lead Evaluator	Quadrant Based on Baja's Framework	Final Rating	Final Rating (based on Uniformed Rating Scheme)	Rating Scheme	Criteria	Processes Involved	Methodology	Baseline info?	Evaluation Approach	Evaluation Design	Methodology Category
Philippine Energy Efficiency Project	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$43.65 million	DOE	2009	2014	Infrastructure	2015	ADB IED	2	Successful	Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	KIIs, no beneficiary survey	Baseline vs. endline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Health Sector Development Program	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$217.9 million	DOH	2005	2013	Social Welfare	2014	ADB IED	2	Less than successful	Partially Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	KIIs, no beneficiary survey	Baseline vs. endline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Local Government Financing and Budget Reform Program Cluster	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$337.5 million	DOF	2008	2010	Governance	2013	ADB IED	2	Successful	Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	KIIs, no beneficiary survey	Baseline vs. endline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Financial Market Regulation and Intermediation Program	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$200 million	SEC	2006	2012	Governance	2013	ADB IED	2	less than successful	Partially Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	KIIs, no beneficiary survey	Baseline vs. endline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Small and Medium Enterprise Development Support Project	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$26.1 million	SBC	2006	2012	Industry and Trade	2014	ADB IED	2	Unsuccessful	Unsuccessful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Impact, Investment Profitability, Work Quality, Additionality	KIIs, no beneficiary survey	Baseline vs. endline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Southern Philippines Irrigation Sector Project	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$80.94 million	NIA	1999	2011	Infrastructure	2013	ADB IED	2	Partly successful	Partially Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	KIIs, no beneficiary survey	Baseline vs. endline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs, CBA, beneficiary survey	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Technical Education and Skills Development Project and Fund for Technical Education and Skills Development	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$56.26 million	TESDA	2001	2009	Social Welfare	2012	ADB IED	2	Successful	Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	tracer study of beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs. endline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs, CBA, tracer study	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Microfinance Development Program	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$200 million	CDA	2005	2007	Industry and Trade	2012	ADB IED	2	Successful	Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Institutional Development	KIIs	Baseline vs. endline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed

Name of Project	Category	Type of Assistance	Donor	Cost	Implementing Agency	Project Start Date	Project End Date	Sector	Year of Evaluation	Lead Evaluator	Quadrant Based on Baja's Framework	Final Rating	Final Rating (based on Uniformed Rating Scheme)	Rating Scheme	Criteria	Processes Involved	Methodology	Baseline info?	Evaluation Approach	Evaluation Design	Methodology Category
Power Sector Development Program	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$750 million	DOF	2007	2009	Infrastructure	2012	ADB IED	2	Less than successful	Partially Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	KIIs	Baseline vs. endline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Metro Manila Air Quality Improvement Sector Development Program	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$241.87 million	DENR	1998	2008	Agriculture and Environment	2012	ADB IED	2	Less than successful	Partially Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	KIIs	Baseline vs. endline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Pasig River Environmental Management and Rehabilitation Sector Development Program	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$98 million	PRRC	2000	2009	Agriculture and Environment	2012	ADB IED	2	Unsuccessful	Unsuccessful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	KIIs	Baseline vs. endline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Agrarian Reform Communities Project	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$119.69 million	DAR	1999	2007	Agriculture and Environment	2012	ADB IED	2	Successful	Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	KIIs	Baseline vs. endline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Development of Poor Urban Communities Sector Project	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$25.6 million	DBP	2004	2010	Social Welfare	2012	ADB IED	2	Successful	Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	KIIs	Baseline vs. endline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Secondary Education Development and Improvement Project	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$136.9 million	DepEd	1999	2008	Social Welfare	2011	ADB IED	2	Successful	Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	KIIs	Baseline vs. endline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Bukidnon Integrated Area Development Project	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$6.5 million	Provincial Government of Bukidnon	1997	2004	Agriculture and Environment	2011	ADB IED	2	Partly successful	Partially Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	KIIs	Baseline vs. endline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Mindanao Basic Urban Services Sector Project	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$40.33 million	LBP	2002	2009	Infrastructure	2010	ADB IED	2	Partly successful	Partially Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	KIIs	Baseline vs. endline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed



Name of Project	Category	Type of Assistance	Donor	Cost	Implementing Agency	Project Start Date	Project End Date	Sector	Year of Evaluation	Lead Evaluator	Quadrant Based on Bajaj's Framework	Final Rating	Final Rating (based on Uniformed Rating Scheme)	Rating Scheme	Criteria	Processes Involved	Methodology	Baseline info?	Evaluation Approach	Evaluation Design	Methodology Category
Metropolitan Wastewater and Sewerage System New Water Source Development Project	Ex-post	Loan	ADB	\$1.42 million	MWSS	2004	2008	Infrastructure	2011	ADB IED	2	Partly successful	Partially Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	KIIs	administrative data analysis, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Environmental Standards for Selected Industry Subsectors	Ex-post	Grant	ADB	\$378,000	DENR	1997	1998	Agriculture and Environment	2010	ADB IED	2	Partly Successful	Partially Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	KIIs	Baseline vs. codline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Capacity Building Support for the Pasig River Environmental Management and Rehabilitation	Ex-post	Grant	ADB	\$998,000	PRRC	2000	2002	Agriculture and Environment	2010	ADB IED	2	Partly Successful	Partially Successful	Highly successful, successful, less than successful, unsuccessful	Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, "Impact", Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	KIIs	Baseline vs. codline, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
<i>Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)</i>																					
Third Elementary Education Project	Impact Eval	Loan	JICA	US\$221.16 million	DepEd	2000	2006	Social Welfare	2010	International Food Policy Research Institute	3	n/a	n/a	n/a		surveyed beneficiaries (students, HHs, local government, PTA, schools), KIIs, verification work on surveyed beneficiaries	PSM, Double difference, tracer survey, beneficiary interviews, Regression analysis, secondary data analysis	N	Others	Quasi-experimental	Quan
Bohol Irrigation Project (Phase 2)	Impact Eval	Loan	JICA	6,078 million yen	NIA	2000	2009	Infrastructure	2011	International Rice Research Institute	3	n/a	n/a	n/a		surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs, behavioral games,	secondary data analysis, counterfactual case on the basis of reasonable criteria (in the absence of baseline), Double difference without PSM, behavioral games (artefactual field experiment), beneficiary survey, household interviews.	N	Others	Quasi-experimental	Quan
ARMM Social Fund for Peace and Development Project	Impact Eval	Loan	JICA	\$88.30 million	ARG	2003	2012	Social Welfare	2015	Sophia University	1	n/a	n/a	n/a	No criteria	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	DID, PSM, HH surveys, beneficiary survey,	Y	Others	Quasi-experimental	Quan
Pinatubo Hazard Urgent Mitigation Project (Phase III)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	7,604 million yen	DPWH	2007	2018	Infrastructure	2018	International Development Center of Japan, Inc.	1	Partially Satisfactory	Partially Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"		CBA (BIRR recomputation at ex-post)	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed

Name of Project	Category	Type of Assistance	Donor	Cost	Implementing Agency	Project Start Date	Project End Date	Sector	Year of Evaluation	Lead Evaluator	Quadrant Based on Beju's Framework	Final Rating	Final Rating (based on Uniformed Rating Scheme)	Rating Scheme	Criteria	Processes Involved	Methodology	Baseline info?	Evaluation Approach	Evaluation Design	Methodology Category
Logistics Infrastructure Development Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	50,380 million yen	DBP	2009	2016	Infrastructure	2018	International Development Center of Japan, Inc.	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	Qualitative interview involved the IA only	Baseline vs Endline	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Development Policy Support Program – Investment Climate	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	7,775 million yen	DOF	2012	2012	Infrastructure	2017	OPMAC Corporation	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	None indicated	Baseline vs Endline	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Post Disaster Stand-by Loan	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	50,000 million yen	DOF	2013	2015	Governance	2017	OPMAC Corporation	1	n/a	n/a	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	None indicated	Baseline vs Endline	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Memo Iigan Regional Infrastructure Development Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	4,328 million yen	Provincial Government of Lanzo del Norte	1999	2010	Infrastructure	2015	Octavia Japan Co., Ltd.	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	Surveyed beneficiaries	Beneficiary survey, Baseline vs endline	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Post Onzoy and Paping Short-term Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	9,912 million yen	DPWH	2010	2013	Infrastructure	2015	Octavia Japan Co., Ltd.	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	Surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary survey,	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project (V)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	951 million yen	DILG	1999	2015	Infrastructure	2014	Sasaku Engineering Consultant	1	Unsatisfactory	Unsuccessful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	Surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary survey, Baseline vs endline	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Malibog-Mandagao Irrigation Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	4,867 million yen	NIA	1990	2014	Infrastructure	2014	Sasaku Engineering Consultant	1	Unsatisfactory	Unsuccessful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	Surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary survey, CBA, Documentary review	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
KAMANAVA Area Flood Control & Drainage System Improvement Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	8,929 million yen	DPWH	2000	2012	Infrastructure	2014	Sasaku Engineering Consultant	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	Surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Documentary review, KIIs, beneficiary surveys	N	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
ARMM Social Fund for Peace and Development Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	2,470 million yen	ARMM Govt	2003	2012	Infrastructure	2014	Sasaku Engineering Consultant	1	Partially Satisfactory	Partially Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	Surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	beneficiary Surveys, HH survey, DID, FSB	N	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Subic Bay Port Development Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	18,172 million yen	SBMA	2000	2010	Infrastructure	2014	Sasaku Engineering Consultant	1	Unsatisfactory	Unsuccessful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	Surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	CBA (efficiency), Baseline vs endline, beneficiary survey	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Iloilo Flood Control Project (I) (II)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	7,248 million yen	DPWH	1998	2012	Infrastructure	2013	Octavia Japan Co., Ltd.	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	Surveyed beneficiaries, Interviewed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs Endline, beneficiary survey, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed

Name of Project	Category	Type of Assistance	Donor	Cost	Implementing Agency	Project Start Date	Project End Date	Sector	Year of Evaluation	Lead Evaluator	Quadrant Based on Bajaj's Framework	Final Rating	Final Rating (based on Uniformed Rating Scheme)	Rating Scheme	Criteria	Processes Involved	Methodology	Baseline info?	Evaluation Approach	Evaluation Design	Methodology Category
Aerial Road Links Development Project (V)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	8,294 million yen	DPWH	2001	2014	Infrastructure	2013	Octavia Japan Co., Ltd.	1	Partially Satisfactory	Partially Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries; Interviewed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary survey, baseline vs endline	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Central Mindanao Road Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	3,717 million yen	DPWH	2003	2011	Infrastructure	2013	Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting Co., Ltd.	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries; Interviewed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary survey, baseline vs endline, Beneficiary interviews, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Ugnet Bridges Construction Project for Rural Development	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	18,488 million yen	DPWH	2002	2014	Infrastructure	2013	Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting Co., Ltd.	1	Partially Satisfactory	Partially Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries; Interviewed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary survey, baseline vs endline, Beneficiary interviews, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Rural Road Network Development Project (Phase III)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	6,205 million yen	DPWH	2001	2013	Infrastructure	2013	Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting Co., Ltd.	1	Partially Satisfactory	Partially Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries; Interviewed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary survey, baseline vs endline, Beneficiary interviews, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Metro Cebu Development Project (III) (Cebu South Reclamation and Cebu South Coastal Road)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	30,706 million yen	DPWH	1995	2010	Infrastructure	2012	Senshu Engineering Consultant	1	Unsatisfactory	Unsuccessful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries; Interviewed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary Survey, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Second Mandau -Macran Bridge (Phase II) and Metro Cebu Road Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	6,593 million yen	DPWH	1997	2004	Infrastructure	2012	Senshu Engineering Consultant	1	Partially Satisfactory	Partially Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries; Interviewed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary Survey, KIIs, Baseline vs endline, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Agno River Flood Control Project (Phase II) (Phase II-B)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	9,523 million yen	DPWH	1998	2010	Infrastructure	2012	Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting Co., Ltd.	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries; Interviewed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary survey, baseline vs endline, Beneficiary interviews, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Bobol Irrigation Project (Phase II)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	6,078 million yen	NIA	1999	2008	Infrastructure	2012	Octavia Japan Co., Ltd.	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries; Interviewed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary survey, baseline vs endline, Beneficiary interviews, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
LRT Line 1 Capacity Expansion Project (II)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	22,262 million yen	LRTA	2000	2009	Infrastructure	2012	Senshu Engineering Consultant	1	Partially Satisfactory	Partially Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Second Maguway Bridge and Bataan City Bypass Road Construction Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	3,549 million yen	DPWH	2000	2008	Infrastructure	2012	Senshu Engineering Consultant	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed

Name of Project	Category	Type of Assistance	Donor	Cost	Implementing Agency	Project Start Date	Project End Date	Sector	Year of Evaluation	Lead Evaluator	Quadrant Based on Beju's Framework	Final Rating	Final Rating (based on Uniformed Rating Scheme)	Rating Scheme	Criteria	Processes Involved	Methodology	Baseline info?	Evaluation Approach	Evaluation Design	Methodology Category
Aerial Road Links Development Project (V)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	8,294 million yen	DPWH	2001	2014	Infrastructure	2013	Octavia Japan Co., Ltd.	1	Partially Satisfactory	Partially Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries; Interviewed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary survey, baseline vs endline	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Central Mindanao Road Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	3,717 million yen	DPWH	2003	2011	Infrastructure	2013	Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting Co., Ltd.	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries; Interviewed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary survey, baseline vs endline, Beneficiary interviews, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Urgent Bridges Construction Project for Rural Development	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	18,488 million yen	DPWH	2002	2014	Infrastructure	2013	Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting Co., Ltd.	1	Partially Satisfactory	Partially Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries; Interviewed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary survey, baseline vs endline, Beneficiary interviews, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Rural Road Network Development Project (Phase III)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	6,205 million yen	DPWH	2001	2013	Infrastructure	2013	Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting Co., Ltd.	1	Partially Satisfactory	Partially Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries; Interviewed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary survey, baseline vs endline, Beneficiary interviews, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Metro Cebu Development Project (III) (Cebu South Reclamation and Cebu South Coastal Road)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	30,706 million yen	DPWH	1995	2010	Infrastructure	2012	Sasaku Engineering Consultant	1	Unsatisfactory	Unsuccessful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries; Interviewed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary Survey, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Second Mindanao-Mactan Bridge (Phase II) and Metro Cebu Road Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	6,593 million yen	DPWH	1997	2004	Infrastructure	2012	Sasaku Engineering Consultant	1	Partially Satisfactory	Partially Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries; Interviewed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary Survey, KIIs, Baseline vs endline, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Agno River Flood Control Project (Phase II) (Phase II-B)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	9,523 million yen	DPWH	1998	2010	Infrastructure	2012	Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting Co., Ltd.	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries; Interviewed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary survey, baseline vs endline, Beneficiary interviews, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Bohol Irrigation Project (Phase II)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	6,078 million yen	NIA	1999	2008	Infrastructure	2012	Octavia Japan Co., Ltd.	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries; Interviewed beneficiaries, KIIs	Beneficiary survey, baseline vs endline, Beneficiary interviews, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
LRT Line 1 Capacity Expansion Project (II)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	22,262 million yen	LRTA	2000	2009	Infrastructure	2012	Sasaku Engineering Consultant	1	Partially Satisfactory	Partially Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, KIIs, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Second Magway Bridge and Bataan City Bypass Road Construction Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	3,549 million yen	DPWH	2000	2008	Infrastructure	2012	Sasaku Engineering Consultant	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed

Name of Project	Category	Type of Assistance	Donor	Cost	Implementing Agency	Project Start Date	Project End Date	Sector	Year of Evaluation	Lead Evaluator	Quadrant Based on Bajaj's Framework	Final Rating	Final Rating (based on Uniformed Rating Scheme)	Rating Scheme	Criteria	Processes Involved	Methodology	Baseline info?	Evaluation Approach	Evaluation Design	Methodology Category
Mindanao Sustainable Settlement Area Development Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	6,515 Million yen	DAR	2001	2009	Agriculture and Environment	2012	IC Net Limited	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Agro River Flood Control Project (Phase I) (Phase II-B)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	9,523 million yen	DPWH	2001	2009	Infrastructure	2012	Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting Co., Ltd.	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Laog River Basin Flood Control and Sabo Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	6,309 million yen	DPWH	2001	2009	Infrastructure	2012	Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting Co., Ltd.	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	59,037 million yen	BCDA	2001	2008	Infrastructure	2012	Sansu Engineering Consultant	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Bago River Irrigation System Rehabilitation and Improvement Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	3,224 million yen	NIA	2003	2010	Infrastructure	2012	Octavia Japan Co., Ltd.	1	Highly satisfactory	Highly Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Development Policy Support Program (I)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	18,513 million yen	DOF	2009	2010	Governance	2011	Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting Co., Ltd.	1	Highly satisfactory	Highly Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Effectiveness, Impact	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Development Policy Support Program (II)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA		DOF	2009	2010	Governance	2011	Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting Co., Ltd.	1	Highly satisfactory	Highly Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Effectiveness, Impact	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Emergency Budget Support Japanese ODA Loan	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	13,830 million yen	DOF	2010	2010	Governance	2011	Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting Co., Ltd.	1	Highly satisfactory	Highly Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Effectiveness, Impact	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Pampanga Delta Development Project (Irrigation Component)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	9,427 million yen	NIA	1991	2003	Infrastructure	2011	IC Net Limited	1	Unsatisfactory	Unsuccessful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Calaca Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant No. 1 Unit Environmental Improvement Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	6,112 million yen	NPC	1993	1999	Infrastructure	2011	IC Net Limited	1	Highly satisfactory	Highly Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Social Reform Related Feeder Ports Development Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	5,746 million yen	DOTs	1997	2008	Infrastructure	2011	ICONS Inc.	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Batangas Port Development Project (Phase II)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	14,555 million yen	PPA	1999	2008	Infrastructure	2011	IC Net Limited and NBDA	4	Unsatisfactory	Unsuccessful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews, CBA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed

Name of Project	Category	Type of Assistance	Donor	Cost	Implementing Agency	Project Start Date	Project End Date	Sector	Year of Evaluation	Lead Evaluator	Quadrant Based on Bejj's Framework	Final Rating	Final Rating (Based on Uniformed Rating Scheme)	Rating Scheme	Criteria	Processes Involved	Methodology	Baseline info?	Evaluation Approach	Evaluation Design	Methodology Category
Central Luzon Irrigation Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	14,136 million yen	NIA	1997	2008	infrastructure	2011	IC Net Limited	1	Partially Satisfactory	Partially Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Secondary Education Development and Improvement Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	7,210 million yen	DepEd	1999	2008	Social Welfare	2011	ICONS Inc.	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Sustainable environmental conservation project in northern Palawan	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	2,094 million Yen	DOT, DPWH, PCSDS	2001	2007	Agriculture and Environment	2011	Global Group Japan 21	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	beneficiary survey, workshops with local government stakeholders, hearing survey, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Arterial Road Links Development Project (VI)	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	6,723 million yen	DPWH	2002	2010	Infrastructure	2011	IC Net Limited	1	Partially Satisfactory	Partially Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews, CRA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Agrarian Reform Infrastructure Support Project Phase II	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	16,990 Million yen	DAR	1999	2007	Agriculture and Environment	2011	IC Net Limited	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews, CRA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Orillana Road Improvement Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	5,852 million yen	DPWH	1999	2008	infrastructure	2011	IC Net Limited and NEDA	4	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews, CRA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
New Iloilo Airport Development Project	Ex-post	Loan	JICA	14,724 million yen	DOTr	2000	2007	infrastructure	2011	IC Net Limited	1	Highly Satisfactory	Highly Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, Beneficiary satisfaction survey, beneficiary interviews, CRA	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
The Project for improvement of the Meteorological Radar System	Ex-post	Grant	JICA	26.169 million yen	PAGASA	2009	2013	Agriculture and Environment	2016	Octavia Japan Co., Ltd.	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	Surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews, KII	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
The Project for Evacuation Shelter Construction in Disaster Vulnerable Areas in Province of Albay	Ex-post	Grant	JICA	715 million yen	Albay Provincial Government	2011	2013	Infrastructure	2016	Octavia Japan Co., Ltd.	1	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	Surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews, KII	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
The Project for Flood Disaster Mitigation in Camiguin Island	Ex-post	Grant	JICA	868 million yen	DPWH	2009	2011	Infrastructure	2014	Japan Economic Research Institute Inc.	1	Highly satisfactory	Highly Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	Surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews, KII	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
The Project for Improvement of Aurora Memorial Hospital	Ex-post	Grant	JICA	1,028 million yen	Aurora Provincial Government	2010	2011	Infrastructure	2014	Japan Economic Research Institute Inc.	1	Highly satisfactory	Highly Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	Surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews, KII	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed

Name of Project	Category	Type of Assistance	Donor	Cost	Implementing Agency	Project Start Date	Project End Date	Sector	Year of Evaluation	Lead Evaluator	Quadrant Based on Beja's Framework	Final Rating	Final Rating (based on Uniformed Rating Scheme)	Rating Scheme	Criteria	Processes Involved	Methodology	Baseline info?	Evaluation Approach	Evaluation Design	Methodology Category
The Project for Improvement of Flood Forecasting and Warning System in the pampanga and Agno River Basin	Ex-post	Grant	JICA	1,055 million yen	PAGASA	2007	2011	Agriculture and Environment	2013	Octavia Japan Co., Ltd.	1	Highly satisfactory	Highly Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	Surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews, KII	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
The Project for the Bridge Construction for Expanded Agrarian Reform Communities Development	Ex-post	Grant	JICA	530 million yen	DAR	2009	2010	Agriculture and Environment	2014	JICA Philippine office	2	Highly satisfactory	Highly Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	Surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews, KII	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
The Project for Enhancement of Communications System for Maritime Safety and Security	Ex-post	Grant	JICA	607 million yen	DOTr	2007	2009	Infrastructure	2013	JICA Philippine office	2	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability, "Impact"	Surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	Baseline vs endline, beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews, KII	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
<b>Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)</b>																					
Kapit-Batig Lahan sa Kahimpap-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (Kalabi-CIDDS)	Impact Eval	Grant	MCC	\$120 million	DSWD	2011	2016	Social Welfare	2016	Innovations for Poverty Action (with local consultant)	3	n/a	n/a	n/a	No criteria. Results were analyzed across 3 domains that align with the program's 3 goals: socioeconomic, institutional, and community empowerment	Surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs, FGDs, observation, community meetings, behavioral games (to measure social capital aspect of the program)	RCT, HH survey, beneficiary satisfaction survey, beneficiary interviews, KIIs, FGDs, Baseline vs endline, CBA	Y	Other	Experimental	Mixed
<b>United States Agency for International Development (USAID)</b>																					
Growth with Equity in Mindanao 3 Project	Ex-post	Grant	USAID	\$99 million	MinDA	2008	2012	Social Welfare	2012	Social Impact	1	n/a	n/a		Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Gender, Sustainability	It involved over six weeks of fieldwork in Manila and Mindanao and utilized a mixed-methods approach involving a desk review of relevant secondary sources, key informant and	Administrative data analysis, KIIs, FGDs, HHs survey, beneficiary interview	N	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Alliance for Mindanao Off-Grid Renewable Energy (AMORE) 3 Program	Ex-post	Grant	USAID	\$7.3 million	WINROCK, Inc (in cooperation with the PH Government)	2009	2013	Infrastructure	2013	Sustainable Development Solutions	1	n/a	n/a		Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, Gender	KIIs, FGDs, Triangulation of data sources, interview beneficiaries	HHs Survey, FGDs, KIIs, secondary data analysis, beneficiary interview, Quant and Quali analysis	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed

Name of Project	Category	Type of Assistance	Donor	Cost	Implementing Agency	Project Start Date	Project End Date	Sector	Year of Evaluation	Lead Evaluator	Quadrant Based on Baiji's Framework	Final Rating	Final Rating (based on Uniformed Rating Scheme)	Rating Scheme	Criteria	Processes Involved	Methodology	Baseline info?	Evaluation Approach	Evaluation Design	Methodology Category
Literacy for Peace and Development (LIPAD) Project	Ex-post	Grant	USAID	\$1.24 million	Maghassa Kita Foundation Inc (in cooperation with DepEd and DSWD)	2010	2013	Social Welfare	2013	CPRM (local)	3	n/a	n/a		Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability	KIIs, FGDs, interviewed beneficiaries	HHs Survey, FGDs, KIIs, secondary data analysis, beneficiary interview, Quant and Quali analysis	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Microenterprise Access to Banking Services Program- 4	Ex-post	Grant	USAID	\$9.67 million	USAID (in cooperation with RBAP and Minda)	2008	2012	Industry and Trade	2013	Sustainable Development Solutions	1	n/a	n/a		Relevance, Effectiveness, Sustainability, Gender, Enabling Environment, Contractor Performance, Innovative Outcomes	KIIs, FGDs, interviewed beneficiaries	HHs Survey, FGDs, KIIs, secondary data analysis, beneficiary interview, Quant and Quali analysis	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Private Sector Mobilization for Family Health Phase II (PRISM2) Project	Ex-post	Grant	USAID	\$35 million	Chemomics International (in cooperation with the PH Government)	2009	2014	Social Welfare	2014	Social Impact	1	n/a	n/a		Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Gender, Sustainability	KIIs, FGDs, interviewed beneficiaries	Administrative data analysis, KIIs, FGDs, beneficiary interview	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
USAID Tuberculosis Program Portfolio	Ex-post	Grant	USAID		USAID (in cooperation with the PH Government)	2006	2011	Social Welfare	2012	Global Health Technical Bridge Project	1	n/a	n/a		n/a	KIIs, FGDs, interviewed beneficiaries	Administrative data analysis, KIIs, FGDs, beneficiary interview	Y	Others	Non-experimental	Mixed
Family Planning and Maternal and Child Health Program Portfolio	Ex-post	Grant	USAID	\$76.9 million	USAID (in cooperation with the PH Government)	2006	2012	Social Welfare	2012	Global Health Technical Bridge Project	1	n/a	n/a		n/a	KIIs, FGDs, interviewed beneficiaries, surveyed beneficiaries	HHs Survey, FGDs, KIIs, secondary data analysis, beneficiary interview, Quant and Quali analysis	Y	Others	Non-experimental	Mixed
Growth with Equity in Mindanao 3 Project	Ex-post	Grant	USAID	\$99 million	Minda	2008	2012	Social Welfare	2012	Social Impact	1	n/a	n/a		Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Gender, Sustainability	It involved over six weeks of fieldwork in Manila and Mindanao and utilized a mixed-methods approach involving a desk review of relevant secondary sources, key informant and	Administrative data analysis, KIIs, FGDs, HHs survey, beneficiary interview	N	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
<b>World Bank (WB)</b>																					
Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program	Impact Eval	Loan	WB		DSWD	2008	2011	Social Welfare	2011	WB Human Development Sector Unit (with DSWD)	4	n/a	n/a	n/a	No criteria	Peer reviewed by personnel from WB, AusAID and ADB, surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs	RCT, RDD (for quasi part of the evaluation), HH survey, HH interviews, beneficiary survey, beneficiary interviews, KIIs	Y	Others	Experimental	Quant



Name of Project	Category	Type of Assistance	Donor	Cost	Implementing Agency	Project Start Date	Project End Date	Sector	Year of Evaluation	Lead Evaluator	Quadrant Based on Bija's Framework	Final Rating	Final Rating (based on Uniformed Rating Scheme)	Rating Scheme	Criteria	Processes Involved	Methodology	Baseline info?	Evaluation Approach	Evaluation Design	Methodology Category
National Program Support for Basic Education	Ex-post	Loan	WB	\$200 million	DepEd	2007	2012	Social Welfare	2017	WB IEG	2	Moderately satisfactory	Partially Successful	Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficacy, Efficiency, Risk to Development Outcomes, Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs, Involved stakeholders from government (oversight agencies such as NEDA)	Baseline vs. endline, HH survey, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs, Coefficient of variation (to measure performance of students in achievement test)	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Support for Basic Education Sector Reform Project	Ex-post	Grant	WB	\$37.7 million	DepEd	2008	2013	Social Welfare	2017	WB IEG	2	Moderately unsatisfactory	Unsuccessful	Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficacy, Efficiency, Risk to Development Outcomes, Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs, Involved stakeholders from government (oversight agencies such as NEDA)	Baseline vs. endline, HH survey, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
National Sector Support for Health Reform Project	Ex-post	Loan	WB	\$104.72 million	DCH	2006	2012	Social Welfare	2017	WB IEG	2	Moderately unsatisfactory	Unsuccessful	Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficacy, Efficiency, Risk to Development Outcomes, Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs, Involved stakeholders from government (oversight agencies such as NEDA)	Baseline vs. endline, HH survey, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Second Women's Health and Safe Motherhood Project	Ex-post	Grant	WB	\$16 million	DCH	2005	2013	Social Welfare	2017	WB IEG	2	Moderately satisfactory	Partially Successful	Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficacy, Efficiency, Risk to Development Outcomes, Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	surveyed beneficiaries, KIIs, Involved stakeholders from government (oversight agencies such as NEDA)	Baseline vs. endline, HH survey, administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	Y	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed
Disaster Risk Management and Development Policy Loan	Ex-post	Loan	WB	\$500 million	DOF	2011	2014	Governance	2016	WB IEG	2	Satisfactory	Successful	Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory	Relevance, Efficacy, Efficiency, Risk to Development Outcomes, Donor Performance, Borrower Performance	KIIs, Involved stakeholders from government (oversight agencies such as NEDA)	administrative data analysis, beneficiary interview, KIIs	N	Criteria-based	Non-experimental	Mixed