Exploring Political Imaginations of Indian Diaspora in Netherlands
In the context of Indian media, CAA and Modi's politics

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List of Acronyms

BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
CAA	Citizenship Amendment Act
INC	Indian National Congress Party
NPR	National Population Register
NRC	National Register of Citizens
NRI	Non-Resident Indian
OCI	Overseas Citizen of India
PIO	Person of Indian Origin
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
VHP	Vishva Hindu Parishad

Abstract

In this study I have attempted to explore the role of news media in shaping the political imagination of the Indian diaspora in relation to home country politics. This paper uses qualitative data obtained from seven in-depth interviews to answer how the recent political events in India, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's regime, in particular the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) reported by the mainstream news media, shape the political imagination of the Indian diaspora in the Netherlands. This study uses a theoretical approach of Stuart Hall's representation theory and Michel Foucault's power relations to answer the research question. The research findings show that the contested images offered by the media reporting of anti-CAA protests create contesting ethnonationalist identities. The Indian diaspora in the Netherlands interpret the media images of political events as "rational" individuals who situate themselves in contrast to the "irrational" other who are manipulated by the media. The research also shows that pragmatic agendas like development, global Indian image appeal more than normative values like human rights, minority rights, etc. There is also a disenchantment with the Indian media, where the diaspora relies on the social networks such as family to create and sustain their imagination of the homeland. The implications of these are also discussed in the ways political engagement is enacted within the diaspora.

Relevance to Development Studies

Diasporas make significant economic, sociocultural and political contribution to their homeland. Inherent to this process is the idea of belonging and identity. Identities in relation to homeland and host country are constructed through a process of inclusion and exclusion which are rooted in historical and socio-political conditions. Studying diasporas is relevant to development studies, in this sense, to understand identities that are deterritoralised from nation-state yet are understood within this framework. Secondly, in today's media saturated world, diasporic identities are created and sustained by communication networks. Nations can reach out to their overseas citizens to mobilise them through media technologies; new forms of political identities are constructed through social media. Social associations around ethnicity and religion are formed through formal and informal communication channels with families, friends, and transnational organisations. This study will contribute to this understanding of how diaspora's political identities are shaped by media reporting of political events.

Keywords

Media, Indian Diaspora in the Netherlands, Citizenship Amendment Act, Hindutva, Modi

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Research Problem Statement

In December 2019, the Indian media was taken by storm by massive protests that broke out across the country protesting against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), a citizenship bill passed by the ruling Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP). The bill amended the Citizenship Act of 1955 by allowing migrants from neighbouring countries to gain Indian citizenship based on their religion, ostensibly excluding Muslims (Rao 2020; Nigam 2020). In contemporary India, high profile political events have taken up central stage in media since Narendra Modi's rise to power in 2014. Just months before the implementation of CAA, the Supreme Court of India gave its verdict on the controversial Babri Masjid case. In August 2019, Jammu and Kashmir's special status as a state was revoked, demoting it from a state to union territory, and placing the state under a communication lockdown (Goel and Gettleman 2020). Students from leading liberal universities of the country have been repeatedly targeted by the police and groups affiliated to BJP. The anti-CAA protests which began in December, too, ended in a bloodbath of communal violence as Delhi riots in February 2020. These are some of the examples of the political events under the Modi government which unfolded on traditional and social media, where outrageous claims were made, misleading video footages were circulated and no questions were asked to hold the government or its institutions accountable (Sahay 2020; Kumar 2019).

The implications of these mediated political events are discernible in the Indian society. Dissenters and non-conformist of the regime, have become the seditious *"anti-nationals"* while on the other hand, the supporters, have become "*Modi bhakts"* (Rao 2018; Sinha 2017). These new identities in contemporary India, are contested not only on traditional media platforms, but on social media and communication media such as Whatsapp, Twitter, Facebook.

This contemporary media-society relationship, was aptly utilised by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his BJP party during their electoral campaign in 2014 to sell the dream of modern India where "good times" will be brought by Modi (Kaur 2015). Modi and his government continue to effectively wield the media both traditional (through curbing dissenters) and digital (through online Hindutva volunteers) to discredit and delegitimise dissent and further their agenda.

The implications of these developments are far reaching, as 28 million Indians live outside the territorial borders accounting for the largest diaspora (Sahoo 2018). For instance, for the first time ever in contemporary Indian politics, Modi and BJP party were successful in mobilising large-scale diaspora support through new leverages offered by social media (Hegde 2018; Roy and Chakravartty 2015). In an attempt to further consolidate his power, Modi, since his electoral victory has made several foreign trips and addressed large Indian gatherings in countries with broad diaspora base like USA, UK and Australia. His addresses have encouraged Indian diaspora to invest in the new modern India proclaiming them as "ambassadors of India" (Palit 2019; Hegde 2018). Ethnic identity and collective relation to the homeland are important in holding diaspora communities together (Sahoo 2018). In case of Indian diaspora, several studies have noted the rise of Hindu nationalist sentiments. This can be attributed to reasons such as; multicultural host societies where Indian diaspora mobilise around religious identity conflating it with national identity (Kurien 2004; Rajagopal 2001); the years of grassroots work carried out by BJP's ideological parent Rashtriya

Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its transnational organisation Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) or the World Hindu Council among the diaspora communities, most notably in the USA (Rajagopal 2001); the modern communication technologies which have changed the ways individuals perceive themselves and articulate their identities. However, these processes have to be understood in the larger historical socio-political context such as contemporary migration patterns, network societies, the post-colonial Indian nation building struggle between secularism and religious nationalism, social structural issues such as caste and class, and neo-liberal regime. The overlapping interaction of each of these factors have witnessed rise in ethnonationalist identity politics among the Indian diaspora in USA and UK.

Studies on Indian diaspora and the role of homeland politics in their identity construction has predominantly focused on the role of religious organisations in communities in the USA and UK (Reddy 2011; Kurien 2004; Rajagopal 2001). While some studies have focused on the media's role it has pertained to social media, Bollywood and restricted to UK and USA (Webb 2020; Zavos 2015; Therwath 2012) where the Indian diaspora is of significant size. There is relatively less literature on smaller Indian diasporas in Europe and elsewhere. Secondly, media reporting has been relatively less studied in conjunction with constructing India diasporic identities.

To address this gap, in this research I will focus on the role of media reporting of the recent controversial political events in India, especially CAA, in shaping the political imagination of the Indian diaspora in the Netherlands. The Indian Diaspora in the Netherlands is a new and emerging diaspora with a population of 32,682 in 2016. This number has grown significantly since the 1990s as the demand for highly skilled migrants increased globally (Krik et al. 2017). The highly skilled migrant category is the fastest growing population of the Indian diaspora in the Netherlands, who are first generation migrants mostly of age group 25 and 35 (ibid). When the anti-CAA protests broke out in India, the Indian community in the Netherlands mobilised to hold multiple demonstrations in the Hague and Amsterdam condemning the discriminatory bill and police brutality against peaceful student protestors. The mobilisation effects also reflected on the European Parliament deciding to hold a vote on a joint resolution against CAA. These occurrences need to be studied in a wider context to understand how the political imagination of the individuals in the Indian diaspora in the Netherlands is shaped by the political events in India. What role does media play in this imagination by re-presenting the reality of these events? How do the transnational networks especially with their families back home, facilitated by media, add to the identity construction? How do the underlying power relations of class, caste, gender, age, profession, mutually shape the diasporic identities in this context? What are the ideological messages in the media reporting of political events under the BJP regime and how do the Indian diaspora in Netherlands make sense of these? And how are these diasporic identities enacted? These questions, guide my research process and motivation. To this end, I will be guided by the research questions I have listed below.

1.2 Research Questions

How does the media reporting of recent political events in India under Modi's regime, particularly CAA, shape the political imagination of the Indian diaspora in the Netherlands?

I will answer the main question by answering three sub questions:

1)How does the media reporting of CAA shape the political identity construction of the Indian Diaspora in NL?

2) How does the political social cultural related content used by media reporting of the recent political events enable discursive construction of diasporas political imagination in relation to home country?

3) What does this mean for the political engagement of the Indian Diaspora in NL with home country politics?

Chapter 2 Contextual Background

2.1 Citizenship Amendment Act

On December 12, 2019, the Indian government passed the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act in the Indian Parliament which revised the eligibility to Indian citizenship for illegal migrants from neighbouring countries belonging to the religious groups of Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Parsi, Buddhists, and Jains. According to the act, if the minorities of these religious backgrounds from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh had entered the country by or before 31st of December 2014, fearing religious prosecution in their country, they are considered eligible for Indian citizenship. The CAA intentionally excluded the Muslim migrants from the neighbouring South Asian countries. This has many repercussions. Not only will the Muslim migrants in India become illegal, they will be excluded from applying for the citizenship despite having proper documents. The CAA amended the Citizenship Act of 1955, by scrapping the provision of applying for Indian citizenship after completing five years of residency irrespective of the religious affiliation. Just months before the CAA, in August 2019, the National Register for Citizens (NRC) in Assam was updated, where around 2 million people were listed as "illegal" failing to provide proper documentation to prove their citizenship. The NRC combined with CAA will ensure that the undocumented citizens who are excluded by NRC can apply for citizenship through CAA, however, the Muslims will remain excluded (Chapparban 2020).

Right after this, protests broke out across the country protesting against CAA and NRC. The largest of these was at Shaheen Bagh, a neighbourhood in Delhi, were Muslim women gathered on December 16 to conduct sit-in peaceful protest, condemning CAA, NRC, and the police brutality against the students of Jamia Millia University that had taken place a day ago (Nigam 2020).

Image 1 Women Protesting at Shaheen Bagh

In the days that followed, brutality against anti-CAA and NRC protestors ensued, more protestors joined in from various parts of the country, but Shaheen Bagh protests emerged as the focal point of media coverage due to its scale, creativity and tenacity (ibid). The CAA a blatant action by the ruling BJP party, was seen as an unabashed declaration of Hindu Nation were Muslims are excluded as the "illegitimate" "other". The Shaheen Bagh protest went on for more than 100 days. In this time, it gathered a large media coverage. The right wing Indian mainstream media called the protests "violent" (Fayan and Amin 2020). Prime time debates on these media channels claimed the protests to be "paid by Congress" and framed protestors as "Pakistan supporting anti-nationals" (Amish and Tiwari 2020; Pande 2020). On the other hand, the liberal media wrote "Women, Homemakers lead protests against CAA" (Kumar 2019) focusing on the hijab wearing Muslim women who led the protests at Shaheen Bagh. The international media like New York Times wrote "India erupts in protests as Modi presses vision for Hindu Nation" (*DH* 2019). Contested images of the protests were presented by the traditional and social media, while the government claimed "Indians have nothing to worry" (*The Hindu* 2019). In response of this, the Indian community in Europe, North America etc joined in with demonstrations demanding the Indian government to scrape the CAA (Gatade 2020).

Such highly mediated political events in India, where Muslims and minorities are constructed as the "other" (love jihad, cow vigilantes)[1], where masculine nationalism (Kashmir lockdown, Uri surgical strike)[2] is celebrated have become common in recent times since Narendra Modi's rise to power in 2014. However, these current developments have to be understood within the historical, socio-political context.

2.2 Media role in Nationalist Identity construction at Home

Highly mediated political events are not new to BJP. BJP captured the political imagination of the Indians in 1992 by instigating the demolition of Babri Masjid in Ayodhya by a Hindu mob. The Babri Masjid in Ayodhya was claimed by BJP and its ideological parent RSS and VHP as the birthplace of Ram where supposedly a Ram temple was demolished by the Mughals in the 16th century to build a mosque (Ludden 1996). Arvind Rajagopal (2001) in his seminal book "Politics after Television" notes that in the 1980s *Ramayana*, a Hindu epic, was televised as a series in the government run broadcast channel called DD National. His argument is that, this televised series entered the everyday imaginations of the Indian public and installed imagery of distinguished Hindu civilization, which was appropriated by the BJP to mobilize Hindu nationalist sympathizers.

The *Ramjanmabhoomi (*Lord Ram's birthplace) movement was covered contrastingly by the national English-speaking media and the vernacular regional media, which Rajagopal (2002) calls "split publics". Farmer (1996) notes, how the Hindi media, fabricated images of riots, misappropriated information during the riots to create mass hysteria and communal hatred. This horrifying event, telecasted by television media, incited riots in cities across the country and signaled BJP's fascist bent that paralleled Germany and Italy (Sarkar 1993 cited in Reddy 2011)

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[1] Love jihad is a conspiracy floated by Hindu organisations which claims that Muslim men target Hindu women for conversion to Islam through marriage. Cow-vigilante are Hindu mobs who attack Muslims for consumption of cow which is considered sacred to Hindus

[2] The BJP government in August 2019 placed the entire state of Kashmir under communication lockdown claiming security reasons. In 2016, surgical strikes were carried out by Indian army at the India-Pakistan border to kill the militants. The government and Indian media popularised this event as a great victory to India.

Central to the claim to Babri Masjid was made on the grounds of Hindu *rashtra,* a hindu nation that belongs to the Hindus, whereas Muslims and other minorities like Christians have no place in this nationalist identity (Sarkar 1996). A quick recap to the genealogy of this idea is required here. The term Hindutva was first coined by V.D. Savarkar in his political manifesto *Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?* in 1923, where he defined Hindutva based on territory and common race. According to him anyone belonging to the Sindh region, whose ancestors were from the region, was a Hindu by territory. Secondly, he believed, a common civilization that of Hindu culture equates to nationhood (Bhatt and Mukta 2000; Sarkar 1996). In 1925 inspired by Savarkar's writings, Hedgewar founded Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) a volunteer organization aimed at building Hindu nation through grassroots volunteer work, surrounding Hindu ceremonies and rituals to educate the public of the glorious past of the Hindu civilization. It wasn't until under the leadership of M.S Golwalkar, a Hindutva ideologue that RSS reoriented itself as a religious organization which looked at the minorities as a threat to Hindu nation and Hindu identity (Rajagopal 2001). In 1948, the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi by Nathuram Godse a RSS associate led to the banning of RSS in India, however, in 1949 the ban was lifted following RSS swearing allegiance to the Constitution of India, and the Indian National Flag (Banaji 2018). In the subsequent years, under the leadership of Golwalker, RSS branched out into several *Shakas* (branches) and affiliated organisations, such as Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) or the World Hindu Council which together are called *Sangh-Parivar*.

A significant turn of events, during the Babri Masjid was the economic liberalization. With, economic liberalization, came the arrival of satellite televisions and dismantling of State's control over broadcast. New television and print media houses were established, as new consumer products flooded the market, so did the advertisements (Chaudhri 2010). Though the neo-liberalisation was rolled out in the 1990s by then ruling party Congress, BJP made free market reforms central to its party mandate. This appealed to several groups within the Indian society, who had been victims to unequal growth in the post-independence India. Particularly, the caste and class-based groups. The rural and the middle class saw themselves as victims of unequal development under the Congress rule, they saw the promise of free market without losing their cultural, caste, and class-based identity in BJP's positioning. Caste, a social hierarchical system particular to India and Hinduism, arranges groups of individuals in a social order by maintaining endogamy. In Indian society, the caste groups finding themselves in lower rungs suffer exclusion and ostracization in day-to-day practices. The neo-liberalisation combined with Hindu nationalism, appealed to the lower caste groups, as a means to improving their standing in the society through Hinduization. On the other hand, the upper caste Hindus found it appealing on the basis of maintaining their caste dominance (Rajagopal 2001). Thus religious nationalism, that is India belonging to Hindus found purchase among diverse groups which were concerned with their own social positioning.

This political imagination of India belonging to a particular group of people, namely Hindus and the emergence of religious nationalism, has its roots in colonial history. The British colonisers instilled colonial codes of identities to bring together diverse communities and classes. The post-colonial nation building project adopted these identities to address to a nation of diverse language and regional culture. In this process, religious identity evolved as the meta identity to bring together a range of identities (Rajagopal 2016). This was further solidified during the India-Pakistan partition in 1947 where the partition happened based on religion. The congress party which led the nation after its independence adopted a secular nation ideology which promised equality to all religion. However, in the 1980s the Congress Party is known to have demonstrated religious nationalism by appealing to the majority Hindus (Kinnvall and Svensson 2010).

As the neoliberalisation brought in independent media and influx of capital, a new "Indian middle class" emerged (Fernandes 2004; Chaudhuri. 2010). Fernandes (2004) argues, the modern means of communication, through advertisements, print magazines, and television programs created aspiring middle class as the new "new rich". The media representation she argues depict a new relationship between national and global, transforming the relationship of the Indian urban public with the world economy (ibid). In this market-oriented media sphere the Indian traditional media defended the "unbridled market" while attacking the idea of "interventionist welfare state" (Chaudhuri 2010). However, during BJP's rule in 1996, the government took a different approach. While celebrating free market and consumerism in their economic reforms, the government tried to oppose the consumerism by using the rhetoric of culture. Fernandes (2004) notes several instances of censorship of movies and selective global culture slogans like "computer chip not potato chip" etc, indicating the idea of preserving the heritage while embracing modernity. Another instance of media role in effective nationalist identity construction, is the case of Pokhran II, a series of nuclear bomb tests carried out during Prime Minister Vajpayee's BJP rule in 1998. Manchanda (2002) argues that influential elite media presented a unified case of nuclear bomb necessary for "country's pride" while sidelining several peace rallies that opposed the testing. In the following years, other such events such as Kargil War, Gujarat Riots, Manchanda (2002) argues led to minority communities such as Muslims and Christians being perceived as "others" and demonizing them in the process of building a "militarized Hindu nationalist public sphere" (Manchanda 2002:320).

The Present

In the above section I have briefly discussed the national identity construction and the significant role BJP, India media, and neoliberal reforms played in the process. The emergence of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014, utilized these past strategies by combining the tools offered by new communication technologies. The 2014 election, was the first election in modern post-colonial India which was determined by an unprecedent use of media technologies both traditional and new (Kaul 2017). Modi constructed an image of himself as the "*vikas purush (development man)*" who promised "*acche din (good times)"* to the middle and rural class of Indian society. Modi positioned himself as the common man who sold tea at railway stations and made his name in politics through hard work, a calculated positioning against his opposition the Indian National Congress Party (INCP) which had a popular reputation of conducting elitist family-based politics (Srivatsava 2015). Before becoming the prime ministerial candidate, Modi was the chief minister of the Gujarat state. In 2002, communal riots broke out between Hindus and Muslims in Gujarat under his rule. While Modi was accused of instigating the violence and taking no actions to stop the riots, he was never proven guilty. However, from the instigator of communal violence, he rose as the astute pro-development politician who made 'Gujarat model' possible. The state's alleged growth and development called "Gujarat Model" attributed to Modi's astuteness as a politician and it became a determinant in deciding the national elections in 2014 (Jaffrelot 2015).

Modi's emergence as a single powerful political icon was carefully orchestrated by his political campaign. His political campaign presented powerful masculine image of Modi, who is tech-savy, against political corruption, and focused on infrastructure development, consciously distancing from religious rhetoric which had tainted his image since the Gujarat communal riots in 2002 (Leidig 2020). Another interesting aspect was the Modi's political campaign also addressed the Indian diaspora at an unprecedented scale. Twitter and Facebook groups run by volunteers popped up, mobilizing the diaspora on online platforms. While a huge support from the NRI groups to the BJP, a few pockets of resistance to his communal politics was

also observed (Palit 2019). The Indians who make up most of the Indian diaspora population, are affluent upper-class, upper-caste Hindus who believed Indian politics under Congress was corrupt, and saw a chance of change with Modi and his development agenda. By promising unfettered access to Indian cultural identity, and investments, without having to compromise on religious identity, Modi offered the diaspora an ideology they couldn't resist (Hegde 2018; Kaul 2017).

2.3 Identity Construction in the Diaspora and role of Media

In the above section I discussed the identity construction at home, here I will discuss the identity construction in the Diaspora and the role of Media.

Indian migration has a long history. Migration has been noted since the time of indentured labourers of colonised India who were taken to countries such as Fiji, South Africa, Surinam by the British. The second wave of migration was noted after independence and during the 1990s post neo-liberalisation. Most of them were upper-caste upper class Hindus, who migrated as aspirational migrants to gain higher education or as tech professionals predominantly to USA and UK. The recent wave of this migration is the new wave where Indians have migrated to more than 200 countries. At present, according to the Ministry of Overseas affair 25 million Indians are accounted as Diaspora (Sahoo 2018).

However, only in the 1980s did the Indian government formally acknowledged the Indian diaspora. Today, the Indian diaspora have access to India legally through statuses such as Non Resident of India (NRI), Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) and Person of Indian Origin(PIO). The diaspora because of its significant size and economic status, sends substantial remittances, investment and funding to organisations (Kirk and Bal 2019). The noticeable support for Hindu nationalist politics among the Indian diaspora is not a new phenomenon. It could be attributed to many reasons. Scholars like Kurien (2004) and Rajagopal (2001) have noted that in multiculturalist society like USA, race becomes an important marker for identity. The highly-skilled professionals who bring with them class and caste privileges find themselves suddenly as racialised minorities. In this case, they prefer identifying themselves by their religious identity where Hindu identity is conflated with national identity. Secondly, activities carried out by religious organisation namely VHP such as organising summer camps, fundraising and so on has been successful in capturing the imagination of the Indian diaspora for the Hindutva cause. Also, as social media has reduced the distance between homeland and diaspora, individuals in the diaspora can experience the events in India in real time. This has allowed for online political engagement where the main contestations are between Hindu nationalist identities and secular Indian identities (Webb 2020). In UK, Zavos (2015) writes, that the mobilisation of Hindu nationalist organisations happens through a web of social relations, using the "landscape of friendship and business association".

However, the identities within an Indian diaspora cannot be homogenised. As Ashutosh (2019) has argued in his ethnographic study that "the global Indian is a divisive figure", where internal contestations over language, religion, ideology etc challenge the idea of single national identity. While the diaspora's identity construction in relation to India and BJP has been recorded by a large scholarship, there is a lack of literature which enquires the relationship between Indian media and its impact on diaspora's identity construction.

2.4 Background of Indian Diaspora in Netherlands

In the above sections I discussed the India diaspora profile and the role of media and Hindu nationalist ideas in creating diasporic identities. In this section, I will present a profile of the Indian diaspora in the Netherlands and discuss existing literature.

In Netherlands, Indian diaspora is a relatively new and emerging diaspora. It is becoming a popular destination to migrate. One of the main reasons for this can be attributed to the introduction of the Knowledge migrant visa in 2004 which gives special visa allowances to migrants from India who can be classified as specialized technical laborers who hold expertise in the fields of relevance to the Netherlands, which are technology, consultancy and engineering (Kirk et al. 2017; Bailey 2017). In 2011, the total Indian population living in Netherlands was 21, 729 out of which 15164 were first generation Indians. (Bal 2012). Following the knowledge migrant visa, the flow of the migrants to the Netherlands increased considerably leading to up to 30,000 applications for this visa till 2011 (Bailey 2017). As of 2016, 32,682 Indians were recorded, who were mostly of age group 24-35 and 86% were male (Kirk et al. 2017). The number of fast-growing IT companies in Amsterdam region; higher education facilities in Netherlands, have also contributed to the migration of Indians to NL

Netherlands also has a large Surinamese community, who though originated from India, differentiate themselves from as Hindustanis. However, most of their social practices, including Hindu rituals, weddings, festivals are similar to Indian culture. (Bal 2012). Swamy (2018) in her ethnographic research on Surinamese community notes that there could be 100,000 and 215,000 Hindus in the Netherlands out of which 80% are Surinamese. In her study conducted in the summer camp organised by the RSS and Hindu volunteer branch in Netherlands (HSS) she argues that groups protect the Hindu identity through contestations, either against the "racialised and culturalised regimes of citizenship in the Netherlands" or through maintaining the status quo with the Dutch citizenship (ibid).

There are several organisations in NL which target Indian diaspora. Such as Foundation for Critical choice for India (FCCI), Indian Expat Society (IES), Amsterdam Indian Desk, and Global Organisation of People of India Origin (GOPIO) which organise various cultural and social events. On social media, many such groups and pages can be found started by Indians for sharing practical information like visa matters, housing issues, naturalisation process, events, Indian businesses and so on. During the anti-CAA protest, a Facebook invite called India against CAA – the Hague was made to mobilise support. More such posters about protest in Amsterdam, Hague was widely circulated on Facebook and Twitter. In some of these Facebook groups, bickering and arguments over political events in India, including CAA can also be witnessed.

Research on the Indian diaspora in Netherlands is not expansive. Most studies are focused on the lived experiences of the migrants in terms of acculturation, and migrant practices. For instance, Kou et al. (2015) in their study claim that migration process of these highly skilled migrants are interdependent on their family and social networks and are culturally conditioned. Krik et al. (2017) show how their research participants, highly skilled migrants from affluent class and caste backgrounds are stuck between what they perceived and expected out of western culture and their own "beliefs about Indian culture". They also show, how these migrants are transnationally connected with their families back home through regular communication and travel. Kirk and Bal (2019) in their study addressing flexible citizenship show that most of these highly skilled Indian migrants take up Dutch citizenship for practical purposes like opportunities for children, and travel. However, economic political situation in India, family and financial matters contribute to this decision making. Secondly, the recent migrants have limited contact with the Dutch society and prefer

to "engage with social groups that cultivate ethno-cultural, linguistic, regional, religious and national identities" (ibid:8). In their study, the informants felt they can be Dutch for practical purposes but emotional about Indian identity. However, giving up voting rights or full political participation does not seem to have an influence. The scholarship on the Indians in Netherlands is limited. One such area is the media practices of the Indian diaspora in Netherlands and its role in producing and sustaining identities and imagination in relation to India. I hope this research can contribute to this gap.

2.5 Justification for the Study

This research is focused on media's role in shaping the political imaginations of the Indian diaspora in the Netherlands. Given the rise of populist governments in not only India but globally, this study finds itself situated in the larger geo-political context.

When the anti-CAA protests broke out in Europe and in the Netherlands, the European Parliament was facing a vote on a joint resolution against the controversial citizenship law. However, the voting was deferred as an attempt to not interfere in the internal matters of the country and to not jeopardize Narendra Modi's visit to Brussels for the EU summit which was scheduled in March and was postponed due to Covid19 (*The Week* 2020). Recently the Indian-EU summit web conference took place in July 2020 where EU and India renewed their agreements on trade and investment. Several areas of cooperation were discussed ranging from technology to mobility to cultural relationships. While CAA was brought up in the summit, the EU council president said he trusts the Indian institutions taking a diplomatic route (Haidar 2020). These growing relationship between India and EU, makes it relevant to study an Indian diaspora in Europe.

Secondly, much of the literature on the Indian diaspora in the Netherlands focuses on their migration, assimilation and acculturation. In a media saturated society, which creates diverse transnational networks of flows, its role in identity construction among Indian diaspora in NL is not sufficiently explored.

Chapter 3 Methodology

3.1 Qualitative Approach

In this research, I have adopted a qualitative approach where the main methods of data collection used are semi-structured interviews and participant observation. A qualitative approach best suits my research objective to understand how political identity construction happens discursively through media images. As O'leary (2017: 272) puts it semi structure can be used to "explore and understand the interactions, processes, lived experiences and belief systems that are part of individuals, institutions, cultural groups and even the everyday" (O'leary 2017:272).

In a qualitative study there are three kinds of data collection a) in-depth interviews where people's feelings, opinions, experiences are obtained through direct quotes b) participant observation where people's behaviours, actions, and interactions are captured and c) textual documents where data is collected from official records, publications and reports. (Patton 2002:4). In this research, I have used participant narratives gathered through in-depth interviews as the main data. I have supported it with participant observation, which gives insights into complexities of everyday interpersonal interactions of my participation. I will also be relying on the existing literature, and my own observation of the Indian media reporting of CAA. As I was part of the anti-CAA protests, during the months of December 2019 and January 2020, I was actively involved in following the developments around the protests, by reading news article, social media forwards and watching Youtube news channels.

3.2 Sampling and Data Collection

Conducting fieldwork during the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic was challenging, in terms of recruiting participants, sampling, and conducting interviews. Therefore, I decided to use "insider assistance" in recruiting participants (King et.al 2019: 60). This is also due to the reason that I was interviewing a group (the Indian Diaspora in the Netherlands) I wasn't directly part of. I acknowledge that sometimes insider assistance can have a larger influence on selecting participants, who have a particular viewpoint. To balance this, I reached out to two of my friends and colleagues at ISS who are part of the social circles of Indian diaspora. By briefing them thoroughly about my study I was able to ensure to get access to their diverse contacts with no overt bias (King et.al 2019:60). Additionally, I sent a brief about my research to be forwarded in their social circles through WhatsApp following which I directly contacted the interested individuals to discuss my study in detail and get their oral consent for participation. Given the Covid19 constraints on accessing participants, I tried to use a simple sampling criterion. My sampling was based on considerable years of living in the Netherlands, socio-economic status especially in terms of their employment in the Netherlands (as I was focusing on highly-skilled migrants), and self-identification as Indian. I didn't have a gender criteria: 6 men and 1 woman participated in my study. This is also indicative of the disproportionate gender distribution of the Indian diaspora in NL. My participants were of age group between 25 and 40. Out of the 7, 5 are single and 2 are married. 6 of them are employed as highly skilled Indian migrants and are in different stages of obtaining permanent resident card and Dutch citizenship. 1 one of them is a half-Indian and holds a German citizenship. Their average period of stay in the Netherlands is 10 years.

During the month of August, I conducted in-depth semi structured interviews with seven participants. Due to the Covid19 restrictions, I was able conduct face-to-face interviews with three participants, and with the other four I carried out the interviews through online voice and video call using WhatsApp and Zoom. As I had a relatively smaller sample size, I had multiple follow-up conversations with my participants over phone to explore more on the topics of discussion. While building rapport over online calls was a challenge, I exchanged a number of texts before the interview call to break the ice and make my online participants comfortable. But as Deakin and Wakefield (2014) note online interviews also reconfigure the notions of rapport and interactions between the researcher and the research participants. This is true in my case, as video and voice calls made conversation flow freely and with less hesitation over sensitive topics.

My interview guide was focused on topics such as media practices, opinions and perspectives of my participants about CAA and anti-CAA protests, their communication channels with their family, topics of discussion and contentions within family and social networks, their opinions and experiences with Hindutva in the diaspora, and their lived experiences as migrants in the Netherlands (See Appendix 1). I recorded extensive fieldnotes after each interview and transcribed the interviews which majorly took place in English. I also noted my feelings and reactions during the interview process which allowed me to reflect on my own positionality.

3.3 Positionality

In qualitative research "subjectivity of the researcher and of those being studied becomes part of the research process" (Flick 2009:16). It demands researchers to examine their positionality in relation to their research which has a certain influence on the whole research process. My positionality is that of a middle-class, Indian Muslim woman who is privileged to pursue masters from a reputed foreign university. While I saw myself as a middle-class woman in India, by having the resources to travel to Netherlands to pursue higher education shows the privileged of mobility I have. Personally, coming from a Muslim family, I have experienced the pervasiveness of Hindutva ideology in everyday conversations with my family and friends. Particularly when media content becomes basis for beliefs and arguments. This is also a reason why I pursued this research. My beliefs to some extent are also shaped by my experience working in the development sector in India. I believe in secular values where freedom of expression and religion is equal for everyone. This reflection on where I come from and what I believe in is important as it accomplishes the "need to locate ourselves in our work and to reflect on how our location influences the questions we ask, how we conduct our research and how we write our research" (England 1994:87 cited in Crossa 2012:112). According to Crossa (2012), positionality is not a matter of how we interact with our participants in the field but also a question of how we access the literature, choose our research topic, and our theoretical lens.

By engaging with post-structuralist literature, my positionality is apparent in how I perceive identities. I agree with the approach of analysing identities as socially constructed, and contingent upon the power relations. My engagement with the literature on Indian diaspora, media, and Hindutva have also been influenced by this approach where I reject ideas of cause and effect phenomenon. Also, as a Muslim woman interviewing predominantly Hindu, male participants I acknowledge the discussions and conversations, and the subsequent knowledge produced is in relational to me. I could feel the insider-outsider tension during my interview process where, being an Indian I had a common bond to share like educational qualification, class, Indian etc. however I was also an outsider in understanding their lived experiences as diaspora in the Netherlands and experiences as religious majority in India.

3.4 Scope and Limitations

One of the limitations of the study could be the relatively small size. I have tried to overcome the limitation by broadening the topics of discussion and by having multiple conversations. Due to the Covid19 pandemic, most of my participants had new relationships with media, like following news regularly to check on Covid19 developments, or avoiding media due to the overload of same. This to certain extent has an influence on the responses I received. In terms of scope, social media practices particularly online engagement with Indian politics, online activities of Hindu organisations in NL to mobilise the diaspora can be interesting to enquire in this context.

Chapter 4 Analytical Framework

4.1 Conceptualising the Framework: Media – Culture – Political imagination of Diaspora

The theoretical approaches proposed in this section will be used to understand how media reporting of recent political events in India shape the political imagination of Indian Diaspora in the Netherlands. Both the representation theory and power/knowledge theory inform us that identity construction is part of a culture, and is done through production of meaning at different sites. Media is one of the sites. Different forms of media produce and circulate meanings which are then negotiated, contested, or reproduced at other sites such as consumption. However, we need frames of interpretation to exchange meanings. Here a system of representation which combines concepts and language is used. The representation used by media does not operate in void, they are symptomatic of the culture and socio-historic specific power relations (Hall 1997).

Meanings in a culture are produced and exchanged through identities. It is how we see ourselves belonging to a certain group while rejecting other identities. This always happens in relational to the 'other' and can never be fixed. The power/knowledge or the regime of truth tell us what is being considered as normal and abnormal. It delineates the norms and practices. This implies that the identities we choose to associate with also governs our behaviour and everyday practices (Hall 1997; Foucault cited in Hall 1997).

In terms of diaspora, there everyday practices including media practices can tell us about their connection with their home country. Diaspora is a contested term to define (Adamson 2016; Wagner 2012; Adamson and Demetriou 2007). Literature has predominantly focused on formation of diaspora identities, their internal mobilisations, and their political engagement with both the home and host country politics in specific contexts (Banaji 2018; Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Sokefeld 2006). However, for the scope of my research, I chose to engage with the term 'Diasporic' proposed by Wagner (2012) and Brubaker (2005). The diasporic activities are concerned with diasporic practices "that can be big and small, habitual and sporadic...could be enacted through cultural production, political involvement, memory, business, language use or return" (Wagner 2012: 5). For my research, this understanding of diaspora contextualises how my research participants practice their identities in their day-to-day life in Netherlands, and imagine themselves in relation to the political events happening in India through their media practices. This can reveal what factors enable the diasporic individuals to sympathise actively or passively with a collective cause and to what extent (Wagner 2012; Brubaker 2005).

4.2 Representation Theory

According to Stuart Hall (1997) representation means to represent the world meaningfully to other people. We do this through a "system of representation" which is we carry individual concepts of objects and things along with different ways of organising, clustering, arranging, and classifying these concepts. Language is the second system of representation which allows us to "establish complex relations between the concepts" (Hall 1997:17). Meaning is produced when people or groups with same conceptual framework communicate through

their "shared codes" (Hall 1997:25). The systems of representation produces meaning through language by establishing similarities and differences most prevalently binary oppositions like white/black, man/women to establish membership to certain categories. In a constructivist approach the social power relations determine which identities we identify with and which ones we reject. This way identity becomes central to representation. Central to a constructivist approach is that idea that meanings are not fixed but are rather constructed by us. This does not imply that a material world doesn't exist, only that meanings are constructed by a system of social practices. This implies that meanings can never be fixed and that "all meanings produced are produced within history and culture" (Hall 1997:32).

If meanings are not fixed, then the reality portrayed by the media is only a mere "re-presentation" of events. However, what is unique to Hall's understanding of media representation is the importance he gives to the underlying power relations. This implies that ideologies are not imposed by the government or the ruling classes on the people through media. Rather shifts the locus of power from institutional power as the only and central locus of power to its myriad sites of contestation from production to consumption (ibid).

4.3 Power-Knowledge

According to Foucault, power is not to be imagined as negative or repressive or top-down. Power in Foucauldian sense is productive, and is found is all spheres of social life from private sphere of family to public sphere of politics, and is "everywhere" and "comes from everywhere" (Foucualt 1998:63 cites in Gaventa 2003).

For my particular research, power/knowledge becomes constitutive of media representation. Power produces "forms of knowledge" where he claims each society has its "regimes of truth" that are reinforced through "education system, the media, and the flux of political and economic ideologies". This implies two things what we consider as truth is produced through discourses, the rules, techniques and procedures which distinguish between true and false. Secondly, there is no absolute truth rather a battle for the rules through which truth is determined (Foucault cited in Gaventa 2003).

Therefore, what we know as truth at a certain period of time is an effective application of power/knowledge strategies. Language and the production of meaning through representation, then, begs multiple questions such as , who is represented and who is not, how are they portrayed, who is the producer who is the receiver, what adverbs, attitudes and emotions are used to describe actions, what is considered as normal, natural and so on. These are reflective of our everyday practices and conducts and specific to socio-historic context (Hall 1997). Here, representation strategies are useful to analyse these questions. In this particular case, I will engage with the representation strategies of production of difference, stereotyping and framing.

4.4 Tools for Analysis

According to hall, production of difference is central to representation and he classifies their production under linguistic, cultural, social and psychic forms. In linguistics, "meanings depend on the difference between opposites" which he calls binary oppositions, for example masculine/feminine upper class/lower class etc. However, the power relations between the binary is very rarely even. There is usually one pole/group which is dominant which conversely requires the "other" to sustain its dominance. In cultural difference meaning is produced by assigning things "to different positions within a classificatory system"(Hall 1997:236). However, it is culture specific and marked by "symbolic

boundaries that keep the categories 'pure', giving cultures their unique meaning and identity" (Hall 1997:237). In social form, difference is produced through dialogue. The meanings are present and produced through our interaction which implies that meanings can never be fixed and are "always being negotiated". In the psychic form, "The argument is that the 'other' is fundamental to the constitution of the self, to us as subjects, and to sexual identity" (ibid). This implies the self is constantly being imagined in relation to the changing other. Stereotyping and essentialisation are connected to this logic of producing difference. Stereotyping reduces an identity to a set of characteristics that are simplified, like Muslim women in Indian media are often stereotyped as subservient, veiled, need to be saved from the Muslim man etc. On the other hand, essentialising, fixes the simplified characteristics as natural or inherent (ibid). For instance, white people as civilised, evolved and black people as uncivilised, primitive.

In a regime of truth, similar representational practices of 'differences' and 'otherness' can be noticed across multiple sites. These similar representational practices accumulate meanings from across different sites and can be used to interpret other images and texts in other contexts, this Hall defines as 'inter-textuality' (Hall 1997:232).

Framing according to Entman (1993) is a process "to select some aspects of a perceived reality and to make them more salient" (cited in Schwalbe 2006:269). According to Papacharissi and Fatima Oliveira (2008), frames give us the ability to interpret complex realities by emphasising or dismissing certain elements. The framing process is present in our social culture, it can be conscious and subconscious, and many frames interact to form a news frame. The frames can not only tell us "what to think" but also "how to think about it" (Schwalbe 2006).

The representation theory will be used to analyse how the media reporting shapes the political identity construction of Indian diaspora in NL. Power-relations will be used to understand how political imagination of the diaspora is discursively constructed in relation to Indian politics under Modi's regime. The conceptual framework of diaspora will be used to explore how the Indian diaspora enacts political engagement in relation to home country politics.

Chapter 5 Media Events and Political Identities

5.1 Media Reporting of CAA

Due to the limited scope of this research, I want to focus on the media reporting of the events around CAA and the anti-CAA protests between the months of December 2019 and January 2020.

Within the national media, right-wing media houses like Republic TV, Zee News, Aaj Tak, Times Now, IndiaTV were focused on delegitimising the protests calling them "violent" and "attempt to hijack democracy" (Fayaz and Amin 2020). The prime time TV debates on these channels were around the allegations that "Shaheen Bagh is a paid protest", "protestors paid by Congress" and protestors were called "Pakistan supporting anti-nationals" (Amish and Tiwari 2020; Pande 2020). These news channels also carried out several "sting operations" to discredit the movement as a people's movement, calling it "sponsored" by circulating fabricated video footages of people claiming to have been paid money to protest (Amish and Tiwari 2020).

On the other hand, the leading news dailies, Times of India, and New Indian Express, carried out headlines such as "Protests spread to more campuses; PM warns of 'vested interests'" a day after the police broke into Jamia Millia University in Delhi and attacked the students (IndiaTV 2019). This was quoted from the Prime Minister Narendra Modi's series of tweets after the police action in the university. In his tweets, which was reported by several print and online newspapers, Modi said "No Indian has anything to worry regarding this Act. This Act is only for those who have faced years of persecution outside and have no other place to go except India" (*The Hindu* 2019).

The online news websites of liberal leaning carried out profile pieces on the women protesting at Shaheen Bagh. Over the days these sites covered various aspects of the Shaheen Bagh protest, such as court case against the protestors to evacuate the space, the protestors request to meet the PM, the police brutality at various protest sites across the country and so on (Venkataramakrishnan 2020).

The international media on the other hand, took a strong stance against the police brutality and CAA. For example, the CNN reported "Violent protests erupted in India over citizenship bill" showing video footage of police beating students in the JMU campus (*CNN* 2019). The day after this event, The Washington Post headline read "Protests over citizenship law continue grip India" with an image of the students protesting against the police in Lucknow, The New York Times using the same image wrote "India erupts in protests as Modi presses vision for Hindu Nation", The Wall Street Journal on its frontpage wrote "Muslim protests spread against India's New Citizenship Law" (*Deccan Herald* 2019).

Apart from these, several opinion pieces and reports calling out the authoritarian government were published online by the international media houses. For example, one New York Times editorial read "Modi Makes his Bigotry Even Clearer". Al Jazeera wrote "Indian police storm Jamia, AMU to break citizenship law protests" (Bhatia 2019; The Quint 2019).

Digital media played a key role during the anti-CAA protest. Videos of police brutality against the university students was widely circulated on social media platforms. The protestors, mainly students, took to the internet to share their experiences. Social media like Facebook and Twitter was used to send out information regarding local protests to mobilise people.

In sum, the media content produced by by all these different media sources - national[3], international, user-generated created contesting representations of the protests and the protestors.

5.2 Media Events and Political identity construction of the Indian Diaspora

In this section, I will explore how the media reporting of the anti-CAA protests shape the political identity construction of the Indian diaspora in the Netherlands.

According to Stuart Hall (1997) events do not have one true meaning, media re-presents the events as the reality. This implies that media images and visuals have multiple meanings, and the interaction between them and the viewer is created by social power relations.

Muslims as National

During the anti-CAA protests, media discourse was dominated by the images of Muslim women and students protesting against the discriminatory bill. While contesting claims were present in the media reporting, Muslim women were visible as the main protagonist of the protest (Ayoob 2020). For Ali, a filmmaker who has lived in the Netherlands for 10 years, the Shaheen Bagh protest was an important event. He stated: "When I saw the protests happening in India, I felt very Indian...I felt very Muslim." According to Hall (1997), identities are historically defined and not biological. Socially, Muslims are minorities in India who constitute to 14 percent of Indian population and mostly have been marginalised in accessing social, political and economic resources (Kinnvall and Svensson 2010). Since Modi government came to power in 2014, Muslims have been systematically targeted under the premise of being the "other" and not belonging to India. This narrative is deployed using selective history such as Muslims as invaders who came from outside of India, Muslims as responsible for India-Pakistan partition; hence subjected to proving their loyalty to India (ibid).

Ali's identity as a "Muslim" is constructed as a response to how the "Muslim" has been stereotyped by the majority in India, especially the media. In present times Muslims are stereotyped as "anti-national" as if being Muslim is not compatible with being Indian. This stereotype not only reduces the characteristics of a group but also homogenises them. This leads to the struggle over representation, where the dominant representation is contested or rejected. In case of Ali, he mentions how the Indian media is full of news which targets Muslims in particular as the perpetrators or the accused. He says "I think it is important to call myself a "Muslim" seeing what is happening in India, where "Muslim" has become political". So, he says, he decided to join the protests in the Netherlands, in solidarity with the Muslims protesting against CAA. But adding positive images to the stereotype, does not change the binary opposition in which the Muslims are framed in Indian media discourse, it adds diversity and increases the complexity of the group. Secondly, for Ali, the diasporic

[3] There are of course hundreds of regional media houses which may have covered the protests differently. The focus is on the national and international media houses due to my research participants preference.

imagination of his homeland where he grew up, is that of a secular India where religious freedom is practiced.

Identities, according to Hall (1997) are subject to change as new identities are presented, particularly in social movements. In case of CAA too, the protestors of the anti-CAA were predominantly Muslims, they mobilised around the secular symbols of India such as Indian constitution, Gandhi, Ambedkar, Indian Flag (Puranam 2020). Ali, commenting on Shaheen Bagh says "we have never seen anything like this in history. I wanted to go to India to join the protests". This shows how new representations can create a sense of community. Ali comes from an affluent family, born to a Kashmiri-Muslim father and a German mother. According to him, seeing his father leave Kashmir due to ongoing conflict made him more aware of his identity as "Muslim" and "Kashmiri". But he is particular about his "Muslim" identity. He says "I don't follow Islam as such, for me its political".

Regional Identities as Political Identity

According to Vikram, a research professional the anti-CAA protests were not pan-India and the protestors came from particular region. He stated "We can see the kind of people who were protesting were only from a certain region and the media was focused on them, which is why it made me think it is more political than religious". Historically, the Indian media landscape is divided between national and regional media houses, where the national media house speaks on behalf of national issues while the vernacular regional media focuses on regional politics (Rajagopal 2001). For Vikram, living in Netherlands, his access to Indian news is through online news websites, which are dominated by the national media houses. As anti-CAA protests at Shaheen Bagh was large in scale and size, it attracted 24x7 media coverage which banked on sensationalizing the protest. These factors determine the visibilities and invisibilities of the protestors. Secondly, the framing of the anti-CAA protestors as predominantly Muslims, establishes cultural hierarchies between identities such as Indian, Muslims, and Hindus. According to Hall (1997) production of difference/similarities is central to constructing identities. In this case, Vikram, who comes from an upper-class family from Maharashtra region, identifies himself as apolitical and atheist. The media images of hijab-clad Muslim women protesting against the citizenship bill, creates differences based on religion, political identity, and region. By perceiving the protests as "other" implies that CAA is a matter of concern for certain segments of Indian population. However, as educated individual who identifies as a liberal, he believes discrimination based on religion is wrong which creates similarities. This contestation causes ambivalence towards the anti-CAA protests as a matter of legitimate pan-national concern. The way I see it, there is contestation of national, regional and ethnic identities which are fostered by media reporting where certain protagonists are absent from the narrative.

Sathya, an engineering professional, also thought something similar. Coming from Bangalore, a city in the south of India, he perceived the anti-CAA protests as something that was happening in the north of India or particularly in Delhi. According to him, "We didn't hear much about the protests in my region. Of course, we had the protests, but people are more concerned with the local politics, they are not very worried with what is happening in the center". Sathya comes from an upper-caste Vaishnavite family, where his religious and ethnic identity is crucial to him as he puts it. In the Netherlands too, he prefers wearing his *tilak* a Hindu symbol of belief. Cultural differences are marked by symbolic boundaries like language. In this case, the Hindi-speaking north Indian protestors, who are visible in the media reporting are considered "other" from the "self" which is defined by language and ethnicity.

India as a Hindu nation

The mainstream media's narrative, including the speeches by PM Modi and the Home Minister Amit Shah, implied that CAA was aimed to curb the problem of illegal migrants entering the country and for providing shelter for persecuted minorities particularly Hindus fromneighbouring countries (*The Hindu* 2019). Such messages from the government implies that Muslims were considered as illegal migrant and India was considered as the land of Hindus. According to Vikram and Sathya the CAA had good intention which is giving citizenship to persecuted minorities from neighbouring countries. Sathya said "I think the intention of the government was right, but the way they carried out was wrong, and I think the media made it an issue of Hindu and Muslims".

Similarly, Vikram thought the matter of illegal citizens is of serious concern, and the government was trying to address this issue through CAA. In these instances, inter-textuality (1997) can be used to analyse how my participants made sense of the events around CAA. Inter-textuality implies reading of an image or a text in the context of others. That is, in a regime of representation, similar meanings are accumulated over a variety of texts and images. This accumulation of meaning is used as the context to make sense of current texts or images.

In this context, the perception of "illegal migrants" as a security threat is a regime of racialized Muslim found in a variety of sites. Post 9/11 securitization became a prime focus of the foreign policy agenda of Western countries mainly USA. Islamophobia is a prevalent problem across the western countries, including Netherlands, where the Muslims are considered as "outsiders" and "illegal migrants".

On the other hand, in India, there has been continued lamenting of the Hindutva organizations about Hindus as victims in India (Kinnvall 2019). In recent times, with cancellation of the special status of 370, the BJP's rhetoric claimed that Kashmiri Pundits (Hindus) who had to leave their state due to Muslim extremists can now return to their homeland. The BJP and its allies have similarly constructed an image of a victimized Hindu who was dominated by the Mughal invader and is now reclaiming his identity (ibid).

These meanings which appear over a variety of texts and images offer the context to understand the matter of CAA.

The myth of Hindu/Muslim conflict also shapes the individual belief system. For instance, Sathya thought that Hindu/Muslim conflict has been going on for decades in India and is not something that was communalized by the BJP, rather politicized. This perception of Hindu-Muslim conflict as typical to India can be attributed to the underlying social power relations in media representation practices. The media representations of the Hindu-Muslim conflict has reduced the complex nature of the conflict to primordialism, where the conflict is viewed as inherent nature of the community. While the Hindu/Muslim racial and religious differences were constructed by the orientalist project of the British coloniser, the partition of India/Pakistan attributed to this inherent difference made it substantial (Ludden 1996). This essentialisation of the Hindu/Muslim conflict as natural or inherent reduces the complexities of the problem. It also allows the stereotypes of Hindu/Muslim to be fixed. Sathya's perception of the Hindu/Muslim problem of India, is also his diasporic imagination of a homeland where he says "These things keep happening in India".

To summarise, based on my participant narratives it is evident that dominant ideology present in the media reporting of CAA is reproduced among the Indian diaspora in NL. Muslims are hyper visible in the CAA discourse in media which actively shapes the construction of self-identity. Identities such as nationality, ethnicity, religion, class interact with each other to create political identities as a response to political events in the homeland.

Chapter 6 Political Imaginations

In this section I will discuss how the social cultural and political images present in the media discursively construct the political imagination of the Indian diaspora in the Netherlands in relation to Indian politics under Modi.

Indian Media as Biased

In terms of media reporting of the recent political events, Sooraj said "I stopped actively consuming news in the last few years. The main reason is, the news only provides one perspective, either the right-wing supporting news like Republic is only supporting the current government, and on the other side, say maybe the NDTV is only criticizing the government. There is no balance. We cannot know everything from what they say in media so I don't form strong opinion (about political events)". Sooraj, comes from an upper-class north Indian Hindu family, he has lived in Netherlands for 10 years. In his opinion, over the last few years, since Modi came to power, he has drastically reduced watching Indian news, as it is full of arguments and counterarguments, with no objective truth. This sentiment was common in all my conversations. As a highly skilled professional, Sooraj values his educational qualification as something that implores him to discern truth on his own. So, he says when he comes across some political development, like CAA, he goes looking for information about it and reads up about it from both sides of the argument before he makes up a mind. In certain situations, like CAA, he decided that since there is a lot of history to be understood, making up his mind based on what the media says is foolish.

This questioning of media for its authenticity is the neoliberal rationality's way of delegating responsibility to the individual. When considering neoliberal rationality as the prevailing discourse, or regime of truth, it can be argued that, the responsibility to interpret the biased political news is transferred from the media to the individual. And an individual is not finding objective truth in the media for the greater public good but rather for their own individual rational choice. Thus, making them "rational" consumers whom the biased media production targets (Marinov 2020; Ohm 2015).

This is mirrored in the opinion of Renu, a filmmaker who identifies herself as a liberal and an activist. She stated: "For them (the media) it doesn't matter what is happening or what they should be doing. They are run by capitalist media companies which only wants to make money so they will sell any content that makes them money and in India what sells is "see a Muslim did this" or something like "Hindus are something superior. It is the trend now".

The underlying social power relations in Indian media's political economy should also be noted to understand the emergence of politically biased Indian media. The Indian media business is dominated by a handful of corporates and capitalist businesses which own multiple national and regional media houses. Since the economic liberalisation in the 1990s, the state has had little control over regulating the media ownership. The political affiliations of these media houses, Chakravartty and Roy (2015: 317) argue are "highly dynamic and contingent" and are shaped by "shifting alliances". Which means, while they are not directly controlled by the ruling party or the state, the network society of media businesses can have ranging relationships with political parties and their ideologies. Since Modi's rise to power in 2014, liberal media houses both Indian and international have experienced stringent censorship and regulation. This has mostly been in case of questioning the government, or presenting alternative facts that are against BJP's mandate (Goel and Gettleman 2020). Secondly, the private owned media companies, use sensationalised news events to receive

more ratings hence more business. Since 2014, Modi and BJP's constant presence in the public sphere has served the television ratings of media houses, which has increased the politically biased news production in Indian media landscape (Chakravartty and Roy 2015).

Renu and Sooraj, see themselves as "rational" individuals who can objectively interpret the biased news. Central to this construction of the self is the production of the other, a binary opposite. According to Renu, the political polarisation influenced by media affects only certain segments of Indian population. She said "Most people from rural India who suddenly have access to internet are exposed to all sorts of information, and when they see such news about Muslims doing this and that they believe it...also on the internet they can say whatever they want, so we have all this people supporting Modi and bickering online". The "irrational" other in this case is "rural" "angry" Indian who is not educated, emotional and cannot differentiate reality from fabrication as presented by the media. The binary opposites always have a dominant relationship, here the rational, urban individual (both Renu and Sooraj come from urban India) have a dominant position as compared to the other "irrational" who according to them are responsible for the polarisation. This also tells how the "irrational" other is expected to behave or not behave. The bickering and arguments online is a sign of the behaviour of the "irrational" while it is improper, it is also necessary to categorise them by reducing and over-simplifying the distinctions. However, this image of the "other" is not fixed and further distinctions are made. When talking about falling prey to the biased media, Sooraj talks about his own parents accessing the biased news. He said "My sister and I sometimes stress to our parents not to believe everything they read or see in the news or the internet, especially WhatsApp forwards, but their generation is newly exposed to the internet so it is difficult for them to identify what is true and what is not. We cannot blame them". In Indian cultural classificatory system, the older generation especially parents are considered to be wise and to be respected by the children and younger generation. According to this system, the irrational beliefs of his parents influenced by the news they consume is considered as not a problem of their education or class but rather of their generation.

Politics of Modi from Development to Security

Since Modi came to power in 2014 and his subsequent electoral win in 2019, several political events have taken media by storm. From demonetization and surgical strike in India-Pakistan border in 2016 to Resolution of Article 370 which stripped the special status of Kashmir and dissolved it to form a union territory; the Supreme court verdict of Babri Masjid dispute which came in favor of Hindus; and Citizenship Amendment Bill in 2019. These and many other events since 2014, has had larger implications on the democratic institutions of India. The Indian media too, has played a role in disseminating information or lack of it on these events.

When questioned about these recent mediated political events, Amish's first opinion was that of development under Modi's regime. He said "Since he came to power, there has been less corruption, his policies have been good for our economy". Coming from an upper-class Hindu Gujarati family, Amish's opinion is commonly voiced by many upper-class Indian diaspora who have benefitted from the privileges gained through class and caste positioning (Jaffrelot 2015). This image of Modi good for development has its origin primarily two places. The Indian media's complex relationship with capitalism has led to the media adopting a mandate of championing for economic development over questioning the abuse of civil and personal liberties (Chakravartty and Roy 2017). Under a neoliberal regime of truth where the Indian diaspora's economic freedom is championed, economic reforms in India are of more concern. Secondly, Modi's electoral campaign in 2014, promised the

middle-class and upper-class Indians, including the diaspora, a corruption free India where they can invest with confidence (Kaul 2017).

While these power relations interact with each other, at the micro level, families are microcosm of power relations where certain identities are inherited. For the Indian diaspora individuals' families are the primary source of information, when faced by a biased media. Indian families are close-knit hierarchical structures with gendered practices where political ideologies are transferred. Political information and knowledge in several families is also not equally distributed (Banaji and Al-Gabban 2006). In case of Amish, his regular communication with his family back home and the political information he receives is used to form certain belief system. Amish's father is a trade union leader who told him, how the traders and businessmen in cities in Gujarat claim to do business without any fear of corruption since Modi came to power. Frames are used to make sense of events by connecting information obtained from mediated communication and interpersonal communication to make "dynamic storytelling systems" (Cohen et al 2003 cited in Papacharissi and Oliveria 2008). In this case, the belief that Modi is good for the development of India is obtained through information received from media where this is one of the dominant narratives, the information obtained from family members whose opinions are valued and general perception of their own standard of living. Additionally, Amish feels his father has the political expertise to make a valid claim and so he believes him. In Indian families, often the father is the head of the family, who can make certain claims of truth, on the basis of his place in the patriarchal structure or profession. However, central to this claim, is the inclusion and exclusion. On the basis of this narrative, the development under Modi has benefitted certain segments of the population, while the minorities are invisible. Families are also closed groups where identities are inherited through establishing similarities. For Amish, his father's contentment with Modi's policies is inherited on the basis of the commonality with his family.

But there is ambivalence in Amish's opinion too. He said he heard from his father that most high court judges in some states have been transferred and replaced with people who support the government. To which he says "the congress was also once powerful like this also but this government has been taking over institutions which is a little serious." He concluded these contradictory information as "we can't complain that the entire government is bad some aspects are good".

Like Amish, Vikram also has less engagement with the Indian media especially political news, but talking about article 370 issue, he said that most of the media presented limited information regarding the issue. His father who is an army officer posted in Kashmir, tells him the point of view of the military. He said "My father was posted in Kashmir when they cancelled the special status and he tells me a different side of the story. He has lost so many soldiers to the militants and jihadists and he is saying what the government doing is good.. I tend to believe him because of course he is talking from his experience and I think its valid to believe that". Like in case of Amish, Vikram also believes his father based on his validity to make claims to truth. Talking more on this, he added that to certain extent under Modi's rule Indian military and security has grown to prominence. He said "Military strength is important I think and under Modi our military has shown their strength". According to Das (2008), in representation of a nationalist identity "a particular configuration of territorial space" is essential. In this case, India's military strength is required in response to the "other" who is either Pakistan, Bangladesh or China. This articulation is also gendered. India is imagined as "civilized" as opposed to the "uncivilized" other. While Indian nationalism has been historically masculine, Modi and his Hindutva project created a militant nationalism. Modi positioned himself as "the man with 56-inch chest" (Srivastva 2015: 334) who is capable of defending the country from terrorist and anti-national forces. This image is

created against the "other" who is "hypermasculine", namely Pakistan (Kinvall 2019). The flooding of the media sphere with images and texts of aggression at the Pakistan border and the narrative of the patriotism and giving a befitting reply to the enemy has legitimized violence against those who are considered enemy of the nation. (ibid). According to Hall (1997) gender representations establishes forms of masculinity. The careful construction of Modi image, in the clothes he wears (sharp Indian suits), his "manly leadership" and his showmanship in public gatherings projected an image of masculine leader capable of leading the modern India (Srivastva 2015). This masculine representation of Modi, also enabled the perception that he is capable of representing the modern India on the global stage. As Sathya, noted "We have definitely seen a change in how India is being looked at other countries...we know how it was before, but there is a modern image now, things are becoming digital, so definitely there has been a change after Modi came to power". For the Indian diaspora in the Netherlands, cultural capital from India is crucial is for defining their self. A modern Indian image suits the aspirations of the diaspora for gaining mobility and respect in host countries.

No Opposition to Modi

In my conversations with Amish, Vikram, and Sathya, who seemed to be concerned with the ideas of development, security, and modern India, there was hesitation over discrimination of minorities and communal politics of BJP. These were largely seen as media exaggeration. But they commented that in the face of lack of opposition to Modi, accepting the current state of politics was the only way to go. Amish said "They seem to have the power now, and we don't know where the opposition is, we don't hear anything about them and they doesn't have a strong agenda". This was mirrored by Vikram too who said "What can we do? I don't know what is the future or what can be done, but we don't have any opposition that can change this order". To unpack these thoughts, first, the current Indian media landscape as discussed above is dominated by the capitalist media firms and their calculated support of right-wing politics of BJP. The BJP also dominates the social media space with their own IT cell and volunteers who make claims and counter claims to legitimatise their action and delegitimatize opposition (Udupa 2017). These power relations have led to the invisibility of the opposition on the mainstream media space. Also, the neoliberal rationality, which has emerged as the political rationality removes the individual from participating in the social sphere where questions like "What can we do?" is internalised. Secondly, as diaspora who enjoy relatively better economic and social position in Netherlands, they do not undergo the same experiences of those living in the homeland under such authoritative regimes. Plus, as upper-class upper-caste individuals their status-quo is not threatened under the current political climate. This affinity towards their social groups, as literature shows can lead to elite groups supporting exclusionary behaviour of fascist politics (Poruthiyil 2019).

To summarise, Indian media is a crucial tool is creating the imagination of homeland for the diaspora. In case of bi-partisan Indian media, contested representations of political events emerge. These representations are understood by the diaspora in terms of "rational" us and "irrational" other. In response to the collusion of neo-liberalism and authoritative politics of BJP visible in the Indian media practices, a self-regulating diaspora individual appears who is expected to discern truth and facts before making up his mind regarding Indian political situation. The disenchantment with Indian media is compensated by the strong presence of transnational social networks mainly families, where dominant narratives of Modi's policies are reproduced and sustained creating echo chambers that are stretched across transnational borders. As diaspora in Netherlands, where their identity is marked by their class and highly-skilled migrant status pragmatic ideas like development, masculine nationalism and global Indian image appeal more than normative notions of minority rights. This rationality of

individuals as self-regulating, enables the diaspora to sustain themselves in an environment of ambivalence regarding Modi and the current authoritative political climate in India.

Chapter 7 Political Engagement: From apolitical to activism

In this section, I will discuss the how the diaspora enacts their political engagement in relation to home country politics.

According to Wagner (2012) "diasporic" activities and how they are enacted can show how diasporas maintain their connection between their place of residence and the distant homeland. This idea allows us to see what "stances, projects, claims, practices" (Brubaker cited in Wagner 2012) are undertaken by the individuals in a diaspora that makes it uniquely diasporic and what motivates these actions. By doing so, we can also trace what circumstances facilitated such actions and to what extent these are enacted.

First, I want to discuss the engagement with political news media, as I consider it an important tool of political engagement, that is to stay informed on Indian politics. The lives of the diaspora individual in the Netherlands, is stretched between two homes – India and Netherlands. While India remains the homeland, their embeddedness in the Dutch society dictates the factors that enable the connection with India. In case of Basu, a banking professional who has lived in Netherlands for the last 8 years and in the process of getting his citizenship, his engagement with Indian media for political information is limited. While he does not follow the Indian politics actively, he says, he is interested in the economic news as it is his field of interest. He said "I check on the market news, see what the government is doing on that front what policies they are announcing and so on". Therefore, preference is given to media that is of personal or professional interest over politics. This is a stance widely reciprocated by the other respondents as well. In the Netherlands, the Indian highly-skilled migrants are defined by their temporary migrant status, and the knowledge capital they contribute to the economy. This is reflected among the diaspora individuals who chose to remain updated on the news relevant to their professions, such as oil market (Amish), robotics (Vikram) and so on.

Second, the popular stance adopted by the diasporic individual is that of "apolitical". For instance, Vikram claimed that he wasn't sure why I had wanted to interview him on topic related to politics, as he saw himself as someone "apolitical" who is not interested in politics or engages with it actively. This claim is repeated by Sathya, Sooraj, and Amish as well. Politically, the official channels offered to Indian diaspora to engage in Indian politics is limited. The Indian government does not offer dual citizenship to its transnational citizens. The OCI card holders can invest in India but cannot vote or have the right to run for office. The NRIs have to be registered and can vote in their respective hometowns but online voting facilities are not available therefore many do not vote (Kirk and Bal 2019). In this way, the Indian state government governs its transnational population by delineating the spaces of engagement. The diasporas are ambassadors of Indian culture but cannot easily participate in deciding the fate of the nation through democratic processes. Hence the diaspora views themselves as able to wield limited political engagement and not able to imagine alternative scenario as power to change the current scenario is seen as not within their grasp. This is reflected in Amish's comment where he says "What can we do? We are here and we visit India once a year or so and even when we do, we don't talk about politics much with our families, we are more concerned about their welfare". This can also be linked to the neoliberal rationality of the diaspora individuals in the above section. As Srivatsava (2015) notes, in India the neoliberal rationality operates taking into account the family structure of Indian

culture. While the individuals are concerned with their own lives in the Netherlands, they do so without absolving their ties and responsibilities to their families back home.

Within the diaspora, the internal mobilisation is also determined by political ideology. Amish says "We usually talk about food, festivals, and play cricket, we don't discuss politics". This view is mirrored by Sooraj and Sathya too, who are part of Indian groups where politics is deliberately avoided. This is reasoned by Sooraj as "I try to stay away from political discussion, I don't want to lose my mental peace over debates and arguments, if someone says something I usually listen but whenever I get time to hang out with my Indian friends we usually talk about our lives here not much about politics". In case of Sooraj who has lived in the Netherlands for the last 10 years, he sees himself as "individual" and not part of any Indian community. His life as he puts it revolves around his work and having a good time with his friends when he gets time, so he puts his "mental peace" first instead of engaging in public sphere activities like politics or protests. Inherent to this expression, is also the political ideology of questioning the reality presented by media discussed in the previous section. He says "There is so much I don't know. It's difficult to make up mind and take a stand".

On the other hand, there are spaces in the Netherlands for the diasporas to engage with their home country politics. In case of Renu and Ali who identify themselves as liberals, engaging with media reporting of political events is seen as important to sustain their identity. Ali commented that he follows Indian political news regularly now, since Modi came to power, as new and alarming developments keep happening. Similarly, for Renu, engaging with political news from India, keeps her updated as she sees herself as an activist. This conscious decision to involve in the politics of the homeland, is an expression of their identities when the particular identity is under threat in India. And Sokefeld (2006) argues that social movements can lead to construction of new identities within the diaspora, where mobilising around a particular identity can lead to the formation of a diaspora consciousness. Ali and Renu tell me that during the anti-CAA protests, they were actively participating in mobilising the Indians in the Netherlands, sharing the latest developments, and fundraising for the activists in India. This offers reflection to understand under what circumstances the diaspora engages in such activity and to what extent. According to both Renu and Ali, the CAA was threatening the fundamentals of the Indian constitution and seeing the images of police beating up students in universities had enraged the Indian communities living abroad including themselves. Secondly, like the protests in India, the protests in Netherlands too began organically with few groups of people getting together. This made them decide to join the protests to show solidarity with fellows Indians who are standing up against BJP's communal politics. When I questioned about what next on this front, Ali said "I don't know. Then Covid19 happened. And the government hasn't said anything about CAA but they will quietly implement it". There is a sense of time limit attached to events around CAA and the urgency it incited among the diaspora soon faded as media is taken over by other events. Ali notes this by saying "Now they are busy with corona and framing the Muslims for it, they have forgotten Shaheen Bagh".

But Ali continues to engage on social media by posting and commenting on political news. Of the 7 people I interviewed, he was the only one who used social media actively. During one of our chats, he shared his Instagram private chat messages with me where he had received messages from trollers who accuse him of being "Pakistani" and "Modi-hater". Ali, tells me he engaged with his trollers "to understand where they come from". In this case, digital media especially social media offers new forms of political participation to engage in long-distance nationalism (Webb 2020). Secondly, by engaging with his trollers, Ali engages in a dialogical process of constructing his own identity. For instance, he tells me that often people call him "Modi-hater" because he is vocal on the social media regarding his policies, and that he has to correct them by saying "I am not Modi-hater, I am just against

discrimination". He further justifies by saying that he is not against all of Modi's politics but the ones that are outright communal. Among the diaspora, this ambivalence regarding Modi and his political policies is a theme often repeated. This ambivalence and uncertainty and the varying ranges of it seems to be determinantal in shaping the political engagement of the diaspora with Indian politics.

In terms of the influence of Hindu religious organisations in the Netherlands, all of my research participants were aware of the presence of RSS affiliated organisations in the Netherlands but none of them have had direct contact with any. Ali commented that he has heard of Hindu summer camps conducted in the country, Amish said the same. My research participants form closed social groups within the diaspora based on their profession and qualification as highly skilled migrants who are in Netherlands for their self-actualisation. Social groups are formed based on regional identities, age, professional background etc, over religious identity. Unlike the literature on US and UK diaspora groups which shows mobilising around religious identities in response to racism in multicultural societies (Kurien 2004). In the Netherlands, the Indian diaspora enjoy relatively better status than other migrants. During the interviews, the participants quoted that they are usually respected and considered as "smart". While racism is not experienced in the Dutch society, integration is also not easy. Basu said even though he has got his Dutch citizenship, he has less contact with the Dutch. Similarly, Sooraj said "I have Dutch and international colleagues but it is difficult to become close friends with them". These conditions cause the Indians to form social circles that act as closed entities and less interaction is noted between the social groups. For instance, Basu said his closest social circle is that of Bengalis and he has less interaction with other Indians. These interactions when looked at from political engagement perspective, indicates that within the diaspora there are many heterogenous compositions which hinder mobilisation around a single national identity. Moreover, these composite groups act like migrant bubbles which limit the exchange of ideas and experiences which can limit political mobilisation.

7.1 Discussion and Conclusion

In this research I have attempted to understand how media reporting of recent political events in India discursively shapes the political imaginations of Indian diaspora in Netherlands. Using the narratives of seven participants I have tried to understand how media images are interpreted based on individual positioning and how the self is imagined.

In case of CAA, the dominant ideology present in the media reporting, namely contesting ideas of Indian nation, racialised Muslim is reproduced among the Indian diaspora in NL. The interaction between the media images of the anti-CAA protests and my participants show that political identities are articulated through intersection of national, ethnic, religious, and class identities. The hypervisibility of Muslim as main protagonist of the anti-CAA protests emerges in the media reporting. This is navigated by the Indian diaspora based on their religious and ethnic identities. Intertextuality is used to understand CAA in a larger meta narrative of illegal Muslim migrant and India as a nation of Hindus.

However, the interaction of the diaspora with such mediated political events is largely shaped by the overall interaction with the Indian media. The collusion of neo-liberal policies, capitalist businesses, and fascist BJP has given birth to bi-partisan media sphere with increasing censorship and regulation over content production. The social media landscape which is also effectively wielded by the BJP has resulted in contesting images and claims about Indian politics. This contested media landscape poses a challenge of discerning facts and truth from fake news which is navigated by diaspora individuals by imagining the self as "rational" as opposed to the "irrational" other who is manipulated by the media content.

This process of discerning facts from media creates disenchantment with media which is compensated by family networks.

The identities of diaspora individuals are embedded in transnational family networks. In case of changing political events in India, the individuals rely on their families to inform them on developments in the homeland. In this network, dominant ideologies such as Modi is good for development and corruption free India is sustained. As diasporas in Netherlands, the individuals are defined by their "highly-skilled" migrant status where self-actualisation becomes important. But they are dependent on their homeland to provide cultural capital and crucial identities such as nationality and ethnicity. In this framework, a global Indian image as promised by Modi becomes valuable to the diaspora. However, the media images of discrimination against the minorities such as in case of CAA creates ambivalence towards the authoritative policies of BJP. I believe, this ambivalence breeds complicity and silence among the diaspora and shapes their response to the fascist policies of the BJP government.

As Kaul (2017) notes, that BJP is supported largely by middle- and upper-class Indians, and the international community who have been "bought into the idea of "Brand India". This is evident among diaspora individuals as well but remain cautious by taking a "apolitical" stance. However, as diasporas are heterogenous groups, counter narratives are also present. Diaspora activism through social media and protests are evident, however, they are realised as counter arguments to religious nationalism. As Reddy (2011) and Udupa (2017) point out the counter narratives imagined vis-à-vis Hindutva rhetoric is precisely how Hindutva discourse finds its popularity. As diaspora groups in Netherlands are highly diverse and have different migration history, studying the internal compositions and contestations can shed more light into discursive practices of long-distance nationalism.

Appendices

Appendix 1 – Interview Guide

1. Background/demographic question

Name, age, occupation, citizenship status, years living in NL, Gender

Self identification – religion; Family status

2. Media

What kind of media do you consume? What interests you and why? (especially in regards to India)

What kind of social media do you use? (youtube channels etc)

Likes and dislikes about the Indian media (perceptions about Indian media)

3. CAA NRC

What were your initial and current opinions

What are the topics of discussion with family and friends

How does media affect family conversation about this topic (examples of contentions; different sources of information)

What was your participation?

Have you been participating in expressing your opinion via comments, likes on social media etc

What are the reactions received from others and back home?

How you feel about the CAA NRC, opinions on citizenship and how it affects you and your family here an back home?

Opinion about the protests in India and in NL

4. Family

How do you stay in touch with family back home? (channels and frequency)

News about home country, who consumes it, how it is discussed

WhatsApp family groups, what kind of discussions happen, type of content

Are the conversations turning contentious?

What kind of narratives or information is used in your argument/discussion with family surrounding CAA NRC

5. Hindutva

What do you think about its history, evolution, and current phase?

Do you know any organisations in NL or have you been part of such Hindutva organisations here?

What are the manifestations of such organisations in your community in the NL?

6. Integration

What kind of social circles are you part of?

On what basis do you connect with other Indians? What are the common interests and what are not?

Opinions on the Indians in the NL (how they organise, internal politics etc)

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