DAC donors, Chinese engagement and the effectiveness of democracy assistance

A covariational case study on the effectiveness of democracy assistance
in Sub-Saharan Africa

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Executive summary

This research aimed at determining whether Chinese engagement has an impact on the effectiveness of DAC donors' democracy assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Earlier studies have argued that Chinese development assistance undermines Western efforts in terms of good governance. Democracy assistance in this study is not considered as condition for aid, rather it is perceived as an objective of aid. Studying the effectiveness of democracy assistance is a complicated process. The establishment of a causal link between democracy activities of DAC donors and the improvement of the quality of democracies is limited by context-specific factors. Based on the examined literature, it was expected that the presence of Chinese development assistance would weaken the effectiveness of DAC democracy assistance.

A covariational case study method was applied to study the effectiveness of democracy assistance. To be included into the case study, a country should be a recipient of DAC democracy assistance and should either have a high or low level of Chinese engagement. Based on the literature review, economic performance, aid dependence, regime type, political stability and regional spill-over effects need to be considered to reduce the influence on the effectiveness of democracy assistance. DAC democracy assistance was defined as projects and programs aimed at improving the quality of democracy in the recipient country. Chinese engagement refers to Chinese development assistance based on the 2000-2014 AidData set. The level of Chinese engagement was related to the recipients GNI over a period from 2000 to 2014. The final sample consisted of Mozambique and Zambia with high-level Chinese engagement, and Malawi and Tanzania with low-level of Chinese engagement. After the case selection, the projects and programs from top DAC donors were selected. The project and program evaluation reports of these donors were the main source of data. The effectiveness of democracy assistance was measured based on the State of Democracy (SoD) framework from IDEA. The SoD framework from IDEA is a global approach to assess the state of democracy in a country. The final adopted framework consisted of the thematic areas: citizenship, law, and rights; responsive and accountable government; and civil society and popular participation.

The results of this study were mixed. It could not be concluded whether democracy assistance is more effective in countries with low Chinese development assistance than in countries with high Chinese development assistance. All countries did show some form of regression in terms of the space for civil society and political freedoms. This suggest that the effectiveness of DAC donors' democracy assistance was influenced by context-specific factors rather than Chinese engagement.

Preface

The process of writing this master's thesis has been informative, exciting and stressful. As for most graduating students this year, the changing study environment due to the corona crisis led to additional pressure. During this time, my part-time job in a nursing home quickly became a full-time job as many of my colleagues tested positive for Covid-19. While this may have caused a rocky start, I am truly proud of how far I have come with the final result.

First and foremost, I would like to thank Professor Dijkstra for her guidance and feedback throughout this process. Her patience and availability to answer my questions were of great importance for me to finish this study. In addition, I would like to thank Professor Haverland for his feedback that helped me finalize my thesis.

This process would not have been possible without the support from my environment. I would like to thank my parents for providing stability and guidance which allowed me to have come this far. To Larissa and Caley, thank you for taking the time to read my thesis and providing feedback. I would like to thank Marguise and Isia for bringing me cups of coffee and food and acknowledging the struggle. Omar, I am thankful for your substantive feedback, patience and support throughout this process. Luckily you can all support me again next year for my second master's thesis!

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1. Introduction

The 2011 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, showed the divide among actors on the right approach to development aid. The traditional donors argued that non Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members such as China, India, and Brazil should adopt measurable aid commitments. In contrast, emerging powers believed that South-South cooperation should not be governed by traditional Western aid principles (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange & Tierney, 2017). Similarly, the presence of China in Africa has sparked a debate on how development should be approached. On the one hand, Western donors emphasize the importance of democracy as part of development. On the other hand, emerging powers such as China, emphasize the need for non-conditional development assistance.

China emerged as a new player in the field of development and is considered to challenge Western powers. The development approach of China stems from the 'Five Point Proposal' of 1996. Former president Jiang Zemin described the relationship between developing countries and China as a reliable friendship built on sovereign integrity, non-intervention, and mutually beneficial development and cooperation (Galchu, 2018; Fijalkowski, 2011). Development assistance from China consists of grants, zero-interest loans and concessional loans (Bräutigam, 2011). Recipient governments are free to spend Chinese development assistance according to their own political, economic, and social needs (Aidoo & Hess, 2015).

During the early 1990s, the attachment of good governance principles to the disbursement of aid became a dominant path to development. DAC donors in Africa have increasingly focused on the promotion of democracy through conditionality (Jahier, 2020). Besides conditionality, donors have supported democratization by providing assistance through projects. For example, donors can provide support in the form of electoral assistance or parliamentary reform programs. More recently, civil society organizations have received greater attention as a bottom-up approach in the process of democratization. The spread of Chinese development assistance in Africa has been framed as a challenge to the impact of democracy assistance from DAC donors. One study into the conditions of World Bank loans in recipient countries with Chinese development projects found that in these cases the World Bank offers loans with fewer conditions. According to Hernandez (2017), this suggests that the World Bank does so to compete with the loans provided by emerging donors. Similarly, Brazys, Elkinink and Kelly (2017) studied the relationship between development flows from China and the World Bank and local corruption. Based on the evidence, there is only support for the claim that Chinese development projects are connected to increased experiences of corruption when its funded through Other Official Flows (OOF) rather than ODA-like flows.

Over the years, most research concerning the relationship between the West and Africa has focused on the general effectiveness of aid in sub-Saharan Africa. Studies that investigate the effectiveness of Western democracy assistance often concentrate on the implementation of democratic reforms at the level of national African governments (Fiedlschuster, 2018; Hackenesch, 2015; Börzel & Hackenesch, 2013). Similarly, research into Sino-Africa relations has centered on the effect of Chinese development assistance, and in particular on economic growth (Galchu, 2018; Dreher et al, 2017) Booth, 2012; Bräutigam, 2011). Few studies have looked into the impact of Chinese development assistance on African political regimes. Relationships between China, DAC donors, and Africa are often researched in terms of development related to trade, security, and economic growth. Despite the many studies conducted into Western and Chinese involvement in African development, hardly any research is done that investigates how Chinese development assistance influences the effectiveness of democracy assistance from DAC donors. Based on the gap in the literature, this thesis is guided by the following research question:

"What is the impact of China's engagement on the effectiveness of DAC donors' democracy assistance in sub-Saharan Africa?"

The purpose of this research is to analyze whether China's engagement on the African content influences the effectiveness of democracy assistance of DAC donors. The following sub questions have been developed:

1. *What has been the impact of democracy assistance of DAC donors and how can this be evaluated?*
2. *What is the impact of Chinese engagement on democracy promotion in aid recipient countries?*
3. *To what extent does China's engagement impact democracy assistance of DAC donors in sub-Saharan Africa?*

1.2 Research approach

A covariational case study method will be employed to investigate whether Chinese engagement has and effect on DAC donors' democracy assistance. The countries are selected in such way that they are all recipients of DAC democracy assistance but vary in the level of Chinese engagement. Empirical evidence will show whether China's engagement, as a moderator variable, influences the relationship between DAC donors' democracy assistance and the establishment of democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 1. Conceptual model

The high degree of entrenchment in development aid makes it difficult to assign the effects of democracy assistance to just one actor. For this reason, this study will select four DAC donors to represent DAC donors as a collective. The effectiveness of DAC donors' democracy assistance will be studied with Sub-Saharan countries of which two are a recipient of high Chinese development assistance and two will be a recipient of low Chinese development assistance.

1.3 Scientific relevance

The effectiveness of democracy assistance is an ongoing debate. This study adds to this scientific debate considering the impact of China on the effectiveness of democracy assistance by DAC donors. Few researches have addressed this exact phenomenon. Previous work has focused on the impact of Chinese engagement on World Bank projects (Hernandez, 2017; Brazys et al, 2017). However, the impact of Chinese development assistance on the effectiveness of democracy projects and programs of DAC donors has been overlooked. This study aims to contribute to closing this gap in the literature.

1.4 Societal relevance

Democracy assistance has been provided to sub-Saharan countries since the early 1990s. Although this study aims to investigate the impact of Chinese engagement on the effectiveness of democracy assistance, it will first assess whether democracy assistance is effective. Democracy projects and programs are designed to create a society in which power is shared and human rights are protected. These objectives directly impact the daily life of citizens. societal relevance is therefore derived from identifying possible limitations on the effectiveness of these projects and programs.

1.5 Structure of thesis

First, existing literature is examined concerning the effectiveness of DAC democracy assistance; how this can be evaluated; and how this may be affected by Chinese engagement. The conclusion of chapter two will define what is meant by Chinese engagement and DAC democracy and the expected findings of this research. Chapter three will elaborate on the operationalization and the case study design. Chapter four is guided by the final sub question and will expand on the results of analyzing the effectiveness of democracy projects and programs in Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania. Chapter five will reflect on the results and connect to the theoretical framework of chapter two. The final chapter will state the conclusions and limitations of this study as well as recommendations for future research.

2. Theoretical framework

This chapter is structured along the first two subquestions. Sub question one: "*What has been the impact of DAC donors' democracy assistance and how can this be evaluated?*" will be addressed in chapter 2.1.2. The second part of chapter two will concentrate on earlier work on the relationship between Chinese development assistance and the democracy of recipient countries. Chapter 2.2 expands on the following sub question: "*What is the impact of China's engagement on democracy promotion in aid recipient countries?".* The chapter ends with a conclusion that includes how concepts and existing theories will be used in this study.

2.1 Traditional donors and democracy

The focus on aid for democratization is rooted in the idea that democracy is both a goal and condition for development (Abdane & Berhan, 2015). Democracy is a concept that is not easily defined. The adoption of liberal democracy is common for the study of democracy promotion since it is both theoretically and empirically grounded (Babayan, 2012). The definition of liberal democracy consists of an institutional dimension and a rights dimension (Landman, 2005; Dahl, 1971). The institutional dimension includes the idea of popular sovereignty which refers to the protection of the right to vote and universal suffrage. In addition, this dimension emphasizes the belief of accountability, citizen representation, and universal participation. The rights dimension builds on the rule of law and the protection of minority, political, and property rights. However, this study also includes the social dimension of democracy which emphasizes the importance of citizen participation to create a democratic society (Landman, 2005).

From the 1990s, donors attach good governance to the disbursement of aid. Stokke (1995) defined good governance as an umbrella term which also includes human rights and democracy. Gradually, these elements were used as a criterion, objective, or instrument in the provision of aid (Hoebink, 2006). Following the distinction by Hoebink (2006), democracy assistance in this study refers to democratization as an objective through activities and programs (Pospieszna, 2018). Democracy assistance can target various levels. Carothers (1999) defines three levels of democracy promotion: state institutions, electoral process, and civil society. Democracy assistance on the level of state institutions is intended to improve the capacity of public authorities through institutional reforms. It relies on strengthening rule of law and local government to improve democratic governance (Babayan, 2012). On the level of electoral process, democracy assistance involves the support for political organizations and movements through party building or financial assistance (Babayan, 2012; Carothers, 1999). The types of democracy assistance on the level of civil society involves NGO building, civic education, media strengthening, and union building (Babayan, 2012; Carothers, 1999). This

definition of democracy assistance aligns with the broad definition of democracy adopted earlier in this section.

2.1.1 The effectiveness of DAC donors' democracy assistance

As stated in the previous section, democracy assistance can be provided in the form of activities and programs that target state institutions, electoral process and civil society. The panel data study by Finkel, Perez-Linan and Seligson (2006) was the first to assess the impact of democracy assistance on a large scale. The dataset included 165 countries that received US democracy assistance between 1990 and 2003. The impact of US democracy assistance was evaluated based on five indices that relate to the programs mentioned above. First, respect for human rights was analyzed to assess the strengthening of the rule of law. Second, the degree of free and fair elections was measured based on political rights, electoral competition, women's political rights, and competitiveness of participation. Third, the conditions for civil society were analyzed to map out whether US programs contributed to the development of an active political civil society. Fourth, democratic progress was assessed through freedom of press including both freedom of speech and restrictions on freedom of expression. Finally, the research included USAID activity in fostering government effectiveness. Finkel et al (2006) found a moderate but consistent worldwide impact of US democracy assistance. On average, countries that received USAID governance and democracy assistance showed higher Freedom House and Polity IV scores. In particular, support for the sectors of elections, civil society, and free media had the most effect on democratic performance.

Lührmann, McMann and Van Ham (2017) researched the effectiveness of democracy aid to different regime types and democracy sectors. Based on Schedler's (2002) typology, they define closed and electoral autocracies as regimes that do not adhere to the minimal democratic principles of freedom of expression, association, suffrage, an elected executive and clean elections. The difference between a closed autocracy and an electoral autocracy is that the latter holds multiparty elections for the head of executive. In electoral authoritarian regimes there has been a transition to regular elections but the overall regime remains autocratic. However, elections in these regimes are often paired with political violence and substantive uncertainty (Matlosa, 2017). These regimes aim to control media and civil society to reduce the risk of being removed from office. An electoral democracy is characterized by a transition from dictatorship to a multiparty system and a stabilizing political system. Democracy in these countries is restricted to holding regular elections and there is still a constrained civil society.

Lührmann et al (2017) argue that democracy aid is less likely to be effective when it threatens the survival of the current regime. In addition, they argue that democracy aid likely to be more effective when it is targeted at less democratic institutions or practices. When democracy aid is perceived a threat to the survival of the incumbent leader, it is likely that the effectiveness will be reduced. For example, when a strong civil society challenges the survival of the regime, a leader may decide to restrict them from promoting democracy. The quantitative findings confirm that democracy aid is more effective in countries where the threat to regime survival is low. More specifically, they find that in closed autocracies only election aid is effective; in electoral autocracies election and human rights aid are effective; in electoral democracies aid for civil society, human rights, and media are effective. Countries that classify as liberal democracies are governed through free and fair multiparty elections, and enjoy a strong rule of law and protected and promoted human rrights. The effectiveness of democracy aid in these countries is minimal because democratic deficiencies are low.

In the context of authoritarian regimes, donors have increasingly focused on civil society to enhance the effectiveness of democracy assistance. CSOs are perceived as an alternative path to development and democratization independent of the state (Hurt, 2017). It relies on the assumption that CSOs will stimulate good governance which in turn would promote overall development. However, democracy assistance programs in authoritarian regimes may interfere with other objectives of a donors' foreign policy. A similar trade-off is seen with EU's democracy assistance to African countries. The way in which Western countries approach migrant and refugee flows may undermine democracy support in the African region (Hackenesch, 2015). Cooperation with countries where migrants originate or pass through is an integral part of the EU's strategy to limit migration flows (Lundsgaarde, 2017). However, this may require the EU to cooperate with authoritarian regimes such as Ethiopia and Sudan. As a result, the cooperation on migration flows often conflicts with the development objectives of human rights and democracy support (Hackenesch, 2019). The EU risks losing credibility as they cannot pressure these regimes to make political reforms while simultaneously providing aid to stimulate return migration. Likewise, leverage of Western donors may be reduced when authoritarian powers are present that promote authoritarian regimes (Grimm, 2015; Burnell, 2006). Authoritarian regimes are able to offer financial, military and diplomatic support which may reduce the impact of western actors.

2.1.2 Evaluating the effectiveness of democracy assistance

In practice, the evaluation of the effectiveness of democracy assistance remains difficult. There is no global agreement on how to capture the impact of democracy assistance. The field of democracy assistance is multi-faceted with all sorts of actors. As a result, there is an incoherence in the goals, objectives, and indicators of democracy assistance (Burnell, 2006). The international Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) was one of the first to attempt to establish a global framework to assess the quality of a democracy. Even though this framework has not yet been used to evaluate democracy assistance, it provides useful guidelines for self-assessment of the state of democracy open for the use of the public (International IDEA, 2008). The State of Democracy (SoD) framework assesses the quality of democracy in four thematic areas: citizenship, law and rights; representative and accountable government; civil society and popular participation; and democracy beyond the state. Each thematic area is divided into two or three subthemes with questions that guide the user in the process of assessing the quality of democracy.

Assessing the effects of democracy assistance is further complicated by the possible influence of international and domestic factors. In broad terms, Lührmann et al (2017) identified that the type of regime influences the effectiveness of democracy aid. Leininger (2016) also links the effectiveness of democracy support to the state of a regime in relation to its fragility. State fragility may be driven by poor performance in terms of governance, political stability, economic development, security, environmental and demographic pressures. The legitimacy of authority and the capacity of the state to provide basic opportunities are weak in fragile states (Babayan, 2016). Especially in post-conflict states, the environment for democracy assistance and democratization may be challenging. Similarly, Matlosa (2017) argues that political stability is major factor for the quality of democracy. This may be positively or negatively affected by regional spill-over effects. It is assumed that regional powers have the ability to foster a smooth process of democratization, peace and political stability but can also be responsible for destabilizing the region. However, small states also play an important role in the political stabilization or destabilization of a region, particularly in an interdependent regional economy such as Southern Africa (Matlosa, 2017).

Finkel et al (2006) identify that economic performance may impact democratic development. Following Diamond (1999), economic performance plays a role in shaping citizens' satisfaction about democracy. For example, poor economic performance may have an impact on the legitimacy of political performance. This relates to Leiniger's (2016) argument about state fragility. According to Diamond (1999), states with economic instability are vulnerable to discontent among citizens concerning the state's capacity to deliver services.

Although this research focuses on democracy as an objective rather than a condition for aid, the effectiveness of democracy assistance may be influenced by aid conditionality. As mentioned before, Western donors attach political conditionality to the disbursement of aid to promote human rights, good governance and democracy. Conditionality involves the full or partial suspension of aid when donors perceive democratic regression or other violations i.e. corruption scandals or human rights breaches (Crawford & Kacarska, 2019). Crawford (2001) conducted a case study into aid sanctions and found that sanctions were applied more in aid-dependent countries in sub-Saharan Africa where economic and security interests of donors did not prevail. Moreover, in vulnerable states and aid-dependent countries, Western donors are able to exert more pressure through political conditionality to shape the process of democratization (Levtisky & Way, 2005).

As stated in the introduction of this chapter, the objective of this section was to assess the effectiveness of DAC democracy assistance and how this can be evaluated. Democracy assistance in this study is conceptualized as efforts by DAC donors that are destined to contribute to the process of democratization in SSA. Democracy assistance includes the programs and activities destined to promote democracy, this may be targeted at state institutions, electoral process, and civil society. The effectiveness of democracy assistance cannot be solely evaluated based on the outcomes. According to the presented literature, the effectiveness of democracy assistance may be influenced by regime type, state fragility, political stability, economic performance and aid dependency. Finally, possible spill-over effects have to be taken into account when assessing the effectiveness of democracy assistance.

2.2 Chinese development assistance

China's approach to development assistance is characterized by its non-conditionality. Traditional donors perceive Chinese engagement as a threat to their democracy efforts. Before delving into the literature on the relationship between Chinese development assistance and democracy, it is important to clarify what Chinese development assistance refers to in this thesis. As guided by sub question two, part 2.2.1 explores the effect of China's development assistance on DAC democracy promotion as stated in the literature.

The Chinese government states in the white paper of foreign aid that there are three types of financial resources for aid: grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans (State Council Information Office of the PCR, 2012). Similar as to ODA, Chinese aid flows in the form of grants, concessional loans, zero-interest loans, and debt relief. The 'aid' component of these loans is the subsidized portion of the interest rate by the Ministry of Finance (Martorano, Metzger & Sanfilippo, 2020).

2.2.1 Chinese development assistance and democracy promotion

Researchers have not yet focused on the effect of Chinese development assistance on DAC donors' efforts to promote democracy. Hernandez (2017) studied the effect of China's engagement on set conditions by the World Bank. An analysis of World Bank conditions in 54 African countries over a period from 1980 to 2013, revealed that World Bank conditions are influenced by the presence of new donors. When China is offering development assistance to a certain country, the World Bank offers loans with fewer conditions. According to Hernandez (2017), this suggests that the World Bank does so to compete with the loans provided by emerging donors. Similarly, Brazys, Elkinink and Kelly (2017) studied the relationship between development flows and local corruption. The study focused on Chinese development projects and World Bank projects in Tanzania. Based on the evidence, they link Chinese development projects to increased experiences of corruption. However, this only holds for projects that are funded through Other Official Flows (OOF) and not for the projects that are funded through financial flows similar to ODA. In addition, when Chinese and World Bank projects exist near each other both contribute to increased experiences of corruption.

One of the popular claims concerning China's engagement is that their non-conditional development assistance undermines Western development efforts. Kishi and Raleigh (2016) find that states that received a high level of Chinese financial assistance, demonstrated a higher level of state violence against citizens. The findings in this study reveal that there are differences in conflict patterns among countries that receive Chinese or traditional finance. Kishi and Raleigh (2016) link this to the different accountability and fungibility mechanisms that are associated with the type of finance. Sharshenove and Crawford (2017) argue that China indirectly undermines Western democracy efforts of normative suasion and democratic empowerment. Based on research into Chinese engagement in Central Asia, they find that China hinders Western democracy promotion in three ways. First, China provides alternative development assistance without political conditions, which is attractive for governments that struggle to meet democratic governance and human rights conditions of Western donors. Second, China enables an alternative normative framing of government. Western democracies frame the political system of China according to features of authoritarianism. However, political elites in developing countries do not necessarily share this perception. They may perceive the political system of China as able to facilitate stability and economic growth through unchallenged authority. Finally, Western democratic empowerment mechanisms are indirectly undermined by China's effort to steer the political culture away from civil society. Through regional institutions that prioritize security and stability over human rights and democracy, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China provides institutional support to local

government officials. According to Sharshenove and Crawford (2017), these three factors cause implications for the democracy agenda of Western donors.

Lammers (2007) argues that the principle of non-intervention of Chinese development policies leads to more cooperation with regimes that the West avoids. For example, Western oil companies retracted from Sudan due to sanctions imposed on the regime. China was able to fill this gap and provide development assistance and loans for the exploitation of oil fields in Sudan. However, Broich (2017) finds that Chinese development assistance does not flow more to authoritarian regimes.

This section aimed to answer whether Chinese development assistance has an impact on DAC donors' efforts to promote democracy. So far the evidence on the relationship between Chinese development assistance and DAC democracy promotion is limited. Based on the reviewed literature, it may be suggested that the presence of an alternative development partner decreases the leverage of DAC donors. The presence of Chinese development assistance offers a path to development without the required political reforms from DAC donors. However, what the presence of China means specifically for DAC democracy assistance remains unclear. The results of this thesis will contribute to closing this gap in the literature.

2.3 Conclusion

This chapter set out to review existing literature on the effectiveness of DAC democracy assistance and how this may be influenced by the engagement of China. This section will elaborate on theories that are relevant for the foundation of this research followed by theoretical expectations that will guide the process.

This study adopts a broad definition of democracy which consists of an institutional dimension, rights dimension and a social dimension (Landman, 2005; Dahl, 1971). Following the framework of Hoebink (2006), democratization in this thesis is considered as an objective of aid rather than a condition for the provision of aid. The definition of democracy assistance in this study is guided by Carothers' (1999) distinction of democracy promotion at three levels: state institutions, electoral process, and civil society. Democracy assistance refers to activities and programs with democratization as an objective. Assessing the effectiveness of democracy assistance is complicated process. This thesis considers IDEA's SoD framework useful for assessing the effectiveness of democracy assistance in the empirical analysis and will be further developed in the next chapter.

Lührmann, McMann and Van Ham (2017) researched the effectiveness of democracy aid to different regime types and democracy sectors. The results confirm that democracy aid is more effective in countries where the threat to regime survival is low and democratic deficit high. In terms of democracy sectors, they find that in closed autocracies only election aid is effective; in electoral autocracies election and human rights aid are effective; in electoral democracies aid for civil society, human rights, and media are effective. In closed and electoral authoritarian regimes there has been non to little democratic transformation. While electoral authoritarian regimes hold regular elections but the regime is still largely authoritarian, and political instability and civil and political freedoms remain low.

Leininger (2016) links the effectiveness of democracy support to state fragility. State fragility may be driven by poor performance in terms of governance, political stability, economic development, security, environmental and demographic pressures. Finkel et al (2006) identified economic performance as a possible negative or positive impact on the effectiveness of democracy assistance. Furthermore, in aid-dependent countries the process of democratization may be influenced by conditionality imposed by donors. In line with the fragility of states, Matlosa (2017) argues that political stability is an important factor for democratization. In addition, regional spill-over effects may influence the state of democracy for surrounding countries. For clarification purposes, the term regional stability will be used to refer to the possible influence of regional spill-over effects. As economic performance and political stability emerged in two different studies as factors that may influence the effectiveness of democracy assistance, this study will consider these two as separate factors rather than group them under the concept of state fragility.

Drawing on the literature, it may be expected that DAC democracy assistance would be less effective in countries that adopt either a closed authoritarian regime or an authoritarian electoral regime (Lührmann et al, 2017). In addition, the cooperation with authoritarian regimes on the basis of foreign policy issues such as security may limit the credibility of DAC donors' democracy assistance (Hackenesch, 2019; Lundsgaarde, 2017; Grimm, 2015; Burnell, 2006). In contrast, an electoral democracy has already been subject to democratic transition from a dictatorship to a multiparty system. This may suggest that democracy assistance is more effective in countries if it poses a low threat to the survival of leaders. Overall, this study recognizes five possible factors that may influence the effectiveness of democracy assistance: regime type, economic performance, political stability, regional spill-over effects and aid dependence.

To summarize, the literature suggests that the presence of China as a development partner offers an alternative path to development free from conditions imposed by the West. However, the impact of China's engagement on democracy promotion by Western donors remains unclear. Few studies are able to provide evidence for the claim that Chinese

development assistance undermines Western democracy promotion (Sharshenove & Crawford, 2017; Tseng & Krog, 2017). The study by Hernandez (2017) shows that China's presence affected the number of conditions for loans provided by the World Bank. The findings indicate that when countries have access to Chinese development assistance, the number of conditions for World Bank assistance decreased. Even though this study focuses on democratization as an objective instead of condition, the findings of Hernandez (2017) still provide useful insight into the possible effect of China on DAC democracy assistance. In context of the broader good governance agenda, China's engagement gives developing countries access to development assistance free from requirements to implement political reforms. With this in mind, it may be expected that Chinese engagement weakens the relationship between DAC democracy assistance and democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa.

3. Methodology

The aim of this paper is to assess whether the effectiveness of DAC democracy assistance is influenced by Chinese engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). To gain an in-depth understanding, a case study method will be applied. This chapter will elaborate on the type of case study design, operationalization, and the justification for the selected cases.

3.1 Case study design

A multiple case study design is the most feasible approach to test the effectiveness of DAC democracy assistance. This type of case study design enables to test the effectiveness of democracy assistance within each situation and across situations (Yin, 2012). In contrast to a single case study, researching the effectiveness of democracy assistance in multiple cases allowed for discovering patterns that go beyond the country-specific context. Furthermore, with a qualitative research approach complex processes such as democratization and democracy assistance can be thoroughly investigated.

To study the influence of China's engagement on the effectiveness of DAC democracy assistance was studied in a sample of Sub-Saharan countries. A co-variational design was applied to investigate whether the effectiveness of DAC donors' democracy assistance differs in countries with high Chinese engagement or low Chinese engagement (Yin, 2012). All selected countries must receive democracy assistance from DAC donors. Of the sample, two countries must have high level of Chinese engagement while two countries must have a low level of Chinese engagement. The case study focused on the covariation among cases rather

than finding direct evidence for the link between Chinese engagement and the effectiveness of DAC donors' democracy assistance. To strengthen the evidence for covariation between the effectiveness of democracy assistance and Chinese engagement, chapter 3.2 considers contextual factors that were identified in the previous chapter for selection of the countries (Blatter & Haverland, 2012).

As there are many DAC present in SSA, four core donors were selected based on their presence in the countries of the sample. Afterwards, donors' evaluation databases were used to select the reports for the data analysis. The effectiveness of democracy assistance was assessed based on 26 evaluation reports that were scored with the adapted State of Democracy framework (see Table 4). Analyzing project and program evaluations in different countries will help to identify what influences the effectiveness of democracy assistance. The potential differences between cases provides a way of understanding whether the effectiveness of democracy assistance is influenced by Chinese engagement or contextual factors.

3.1.2 Operationalization

First, it is necessary to establish how to measure the level of Chinese engagement. Chinese development assistance is not reported according to OECD standards but does share similarities with ODA. An ODA-like definition of Chinese development assistance consists of grants, medium to long term interest-free and concessional loans and a debt relief program (Martorano, Metzger & Sanfilippo, 2020). The AidData set provides data on the destination of Chinese development assistance in Africa as well as the amount and the type of assistance. To measure the level of Chinese engagement, the AidData set was used that provides Chinese aid flows from 2000-2014. More recent data on Chinese development assistance was preferred to discover trends in relation to the effectiveness of democracy assistance. However, the most recent AidData set only provides data on Chinese development assistance up until 2014. The total received development assistance in every year was calculated and related to the recipients' Gross National Income of that respective year. Subsequently, an average percentage of Chinese development assistance in relation to the recipients' GNI was established for the period 2000-2014.

Democracy assistance in this study includes projects and programs targeted at singular or multiple sectors. For example, democracy projects may target elections or local radio stations while democracy programs focus on enhancing the overall transparency through strengthening CSOs and the parliament. In line with the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, donors may provide assistance on the basis of pooled resources. Projects or programs must be directly or indirectly supported by DAC members or a joint initiative of DAC donors. As

democratization is an extensive process, the included projects are to be implemented and completed between 2000 and 2018.

In practice, donors evaluate the effectiveness of democracy assistance based on whether they have reached the targets that were established in the project design. However, as the overall goal of democracy assistance is to foster and advance democratization, effectiveness includes the extent to which projects and programs improve the state of democracy in in Sub-Saharan African countries. In order to do so, the effectiveness of projects and programs was measured based on the State of Democracy (SoD) framework from IDEA framework. The SoD framework from IDEA is a global approach to asses the state of democracy in a country. It provides a user-friendly tool destined for the public to engage with assessing democracies. The framework was built as a starting point to asses the state of a democracy at a national level and can be tailored to a country's context. The original framework is divided into four thematic areas which each have two to six subthemes. The first thematic area is citizenship, law and rights with the subthemes of nationhood and citizenship; rule of law and access to justice; civil and political rights; and economic and social rights. The second thematic area is representative and accountable government with the subthemes of free and fair elections; effective and responsive government; democratic effectiveness of parliament; civilian control of the military and police; and integrity in public life. The third thematic area is civil society and popular representation and consists of the subthemes: the media in a democratic society; political participation; and decentralization. The fourth thematic area is democracy beyond the states with the subthemes of the democratic impact of the country abroad; and external influences on the country's democracy.

As the SoD framework is adaptable to a specific context, the original framework was tailored towards democracy assistance. The fourth thematic area 'democracy beyond the state' focuses on the country's involvement in global agreements that contribute to strengthening democracy. It also includes how a country's participation in global institutions affects the domestic state of democracy. This thematic area was excluded as it is beyond the scope of this paper. The subthemes 'nationhood and citizenship; social and economic rights; and civilian control of the military and police were also excluded as they do not adhere to the adopted definition of democracy in this thesis. Over the years, civil society organizations have received more attention in donors' democracy assistance. However, the SoD framework does not include assessment questions that are specific to CSOs. This study includes a broad adoption of democracy assistance targeted at state institutions, electoral process, and civil society. To enhance the applicability of the SoD framework to the definition of democracy assistance of this study, six indicators from the USAID (1998) Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program were added. The six indicators address whether democracy assistance contributes to institutional viability of CSOs; financial viability of CSOs; a framework for civil society;

understanding of the political system among civil society actors; access to information on political system among citizens; and openness of public institutions to CSO involvement. The indicator 'increased access to information on political system among citizens' appears twice (3.1.6 and 3.3.6). In subtheme 3.1, access to information is specifically affected through media programs. In subtheme 3.3, access to information refers to local activities organized by CSOs, e.g. community debates with politicians. In addition, three USAID indicators were added to the thematic area of citizenship, rule, and law that addressed the strengthening of a human rights framework and access to legal services. Another three USAID indicators were added to the thematic area of representative and accountable government to assess the effectiveness of electoral process monitoring, improved capacity and increased government responsiveness at the local level. In the table of the final framework,' USAID' will appear next to each indicator that was borrowed from the USAID. The definitive framework is shown in Table 1 which can be found at the end of this section.

The effectiveness of democracy assistance will be measured through donors' evaluation reports. The evaluations stated what the objective as for each project or program. This objective will correspond to one or more subthemes of varying thematic areas. Each project will be scored based on the assessment questions for each subtheme. All assessment questions were applicable when a project objective corresponded to a subtheme. The effectiveness of a democracy project or program was scored from one to three based on the extent to which a project has contributed to improving the quality of democracy. For each assessment question, the project received three points if the evaluation was able to provide strong evidence for the impact; two points for a moderate contribution; and one for point for minor or no contribution. Afterwards, the total score of projects was determined for each relevant subtheme by adding scores for the assessment questions. This results in the possibility for one project or program to have multiple total scores across subthemes. Within each country, these scores were used to analyze which projects were effective in each subtheme. To compare the effectiveness of democracy across countries, an average score was calculated for each subtheme from the total scores of the projects or programs. This results in an average score for the subthemes in each country. The conclusion of the results section will compare the effectiveness of democracy assistance per subtheme across countries. Subsequently, the evaluation reports were used to find out which factors limited the effectiveness of the project or program according to the donors' evaluation reports. An overview of the scores can be found in Annex I-IV.

Table 1

Effectiveness framework

Thematic area 1: Citizenship, law, and rights						
1.1 Rule of law and access to justice	1.1.1 Transparent rules for public officials	1.1.2 Independency of courts and judiciary from executive	1.1.3 Equal and secure access of citizens to justice			
1.2 Civil and political rights	1.2.1 Equal protection of freedoms (e.g. movement, assembly)	1.2.2 Freedom from harassment for human rights groups/activists	1.2.3 Adherence to international human rights *(USAID)*	1.2.4 Government mechanisms for human rights *(USAID)*	1.2.5 Availability of legal services *(USAID)*	
Thematic area 2: Representative and accountable government						
2.1 Free and fair elections	2.1.1 Appointment of officials by popular competitive election	2.1.2 Accessible and inclusive voting procedures and registration	2.1.3 Fair procedure for party and candidate registration	2.1.4 Acceptance of election results	2.1.5 Effective electoral process monitoring *(USAID)*	
2.2 Effective and responsive government	2.2.1 Effective and open control of elected leaders over executive agencies	2.2.2 Procedures of public consultation on Government policies	2.2.3 Accessible and reliable access to public services	2.2.4 Confidence in government to solve societal issues	2.2.5 Responsiveness at local level *(USAID)*	2.2.6 Management and capacity *(USAID)*	2.2.7 Citizen perception of corruption among public and services
2.3 Democratic effectiveness of parliament	2.3.1 Independent parliament from executive	2.3.2 Powers to initiate and amend legislature	2.3.3 Power to oversee the executive	2.3.4 Accessibility of elected officials	2.3.5 Parliament as forum for public debate	
Thematic area 3: Civil society and popular participation						
3.1 The media	3.1.1 Independent media from state	3.1.2 Representative of different opinions	3.1.3 Accessible to everyone in society	3.1.4 Able to investigate the state	3.1.5 Free from restrictive laws	3.1.6 Access on political system for citizens *(USAID)*	3.1.7Institutional and financial viability of media platforms *(USAID)*
3.2 Political participation	3.2.1 Extensive range of voluntary associations	3.2.2 Citizen participation in voluntary associations	3.2.3 Participation of women in public office	3.2.4 Equal access for all social groups to public office		
3.3 CSOs (All USAID)	3.3.1 Financial viability	3.3.2 Institutional viability	3.3.3 Legal framework for civil society	3.3.4 Understanding of political system	3.3.5 Access to information on	3.3.6 Involvement in public decision-making

				among CSO actors	political system for citizens		
3.4 Decentralization	3.4.1 Independent sub-government levels	3.4.2 Power and resources of sub-levels to perform tasks	3.4.3 Transparency and accountability of sub-levels	3.4.4 Cooperation of sublevels with relevant partners			

Note. Author's adaptation of IDEA's (2008) SoD framework and USAID (1998) Handbook of Democracy and Governance Programs

3.2 Case selection

To study the effectiveness of democracy assistance in sub-Sahara Africa (SSA), country selection must be approached carefully. First countries must be recipients of DAC democracy assistance. As democracy assistance emerged in SSA during the 1990s, the selection process started with the assumption that all countries in SSA were recipients of DAC democracy assistance. However, in countries with established liberal democracies, it is likely that DAC donors have phased out of providing democracy assistance. Liberal democracies enjoy a constitutionalized party system and freedom in civil and political rights. Based on the Freedom House index, seven countries in SSA classify as free: South-Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Mauritius, Ghana, Cape Verde, and São Tomé and Príncipe. The seven countries were excluded from the total SSA sample of 46 countries. To ensure the potential relationship between Chinese engagement and the effectiveness of DAC democracy assistance, closed authoritarian and authoritarian electoral regimes were not selected as cases. Following Lührmann et al (2017) and Matlosa (2017), the threat of survival in these regimes reduces the effectiveness of democracy assistance. The Freedom House (2020a) classifies these regimes as 'not free'. Based on the Freedom House classification this excluded the following countries from the 39 remaining SSA countries: Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Uganda, Burundi, Chad, Sudan, South-Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda and eSwatini. This narrowed the sample down to 22 SSA countries.

The remaining 22 countries were for the majority located in either Western Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo) or Eastern/Southern Africa (Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Madagascar, Kenya; Lesotho; Somaliland). Political stability was considered as important factor for the effectiveness of democracy assistance. In addition, political instability may have had spill-over effects and negatively impacted the regional state of democracy. In comparison to Southern Africa, the countries located in West Africa have had recent experience with armed conflict. For example, the armed conflict from 2012 to 2013 in Mali destabilized parts of the country. In addition, active terrorist groups such as Boko Haram have led to acts of violence in Nigeria with spill-over effects to Niger and the already from the sample excluded Cameroon and Chad (Maiangwa, 2017). For this reason, the sample was narrowed down to Southern/Eastern Africa region.

The Southern/Eastern Africa sample consisted of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Madagascar, Kenya; Lesotho; Somaliland. However, Lesotho and Somaliland were excluded since they are autonomous regions which would complicate the comparison with countries. Compared to remaining countries, Zimbabwe's history of political instability may

influence the comparison of democracy assistance across countries. Table 2 provides an overview of the remaining sample in terms of economic development, aid dependency, and the level of Chinese engagement related to the country's GNI. The remaining countries are all lower-income countries but can be further divided into low-income countries (Mozambique, Malawi, and Madagascar) and lower-middle-income countries (Kenya, Zambia, and Tanzania). Of the low-income countries, Mozambique has a high level of Chinese development assistance in comparison to Malawi and Madagascar.

Table 2

Contextual factors Eastern and Southern Africa

Country	Population (2018, million)	Political stability index (average value 1998-2018)	GNI per capita (Atlas USD 2018)	Net ODA (%GNI 2017)	Chinese development assistance (Average %GNI 2000-2014)
Mozambique	29.9	-0.02	440	12.9	3.0
Malawi	18.1	-0.06	360	18	1.1
Zambia	17	0.25	1,430	3.8	7.0
Tanzania	56.3	-0.36	1,020	4.4	1.2
Kenya	51.4	-1.19	1,620	2.8	0.2
Madagascar	26.3	-0.24	510	5.1	0.4

Note. All data derived from the World Bank (2020), World Development Indicators.

Even though Madagascar has a lower level of Chinese engagement, Malawi was selected for three reasons. First, Madagascar is an island which may influence the effectiveness of democracy assistance compared to neighboring countries like Mozambique and Malawi. Second, Madagascar experienced a coup in 2009 and was governed by an unelected administration until 2013 (Freedom House, 2020). Third, Mozambique and Malawi have similar levels of political stability and aid-dependency (Table 2). Among the lower-middle income countries, Zambia received a high amount of Chinese development assistance in comparison with Tanzania and Kenya. Zambia and Kenya are more similar in terms of human development and GNI per capita. Tanzania ranks lower than Kenya in human development and its GNI per capita is just below the threshold of $1,026 to be classified as a lower-middle income country. However, the political stability value for Kenya differs greatly with the political stability value for

Tanzania. Based on this context, Tanzania was selected over Kenya. As follows, the final sample consisted of Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania.

3.3 Selection of donors and projects

As explained in the operationalization, the main sources of data included donor evaluations and reports. To narrow down the scope of DAC members, the top bilateral ODA donors were listed for each selected country based on the social infrastructure sector which includes 'government and civil society' (Table 3). The United States, the United Kingdom and Germany were present in all countries. Sweden was present in three countries except for Malawi.

Table 3

Top bilateral ODA donors for social infrastructure in 2017

Mozambique	Malawi	Zambia	Tanzania
United States	United States	United States	United States
United Kingdom	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	United Kingdom
Germany	Germany	Sweden	Sweden
Sweden	Norway	Germany	Canada
Canada	Japan	Norway	Denmark
Netherlands	Ireland	Ireland	Germany

Note. Compiled from OECD (2020). 'Aid statistics by donor, recipient, and sector'

The evaluation databases of the UK, US, Germany and Sweden were explored to discover whether the donors provided democracy assistance in the four selected countries. Although Germany was present in all countries, there were no publicly available evaluation reports, or the reports were written in German. All evaluation reports from Sweden were available and written in English which led to the selection of Sweden as a donor over Germany. Malawi did not have Sweden as one of the top donors. Instead, Norway was selected as a substitute for Sweden as Scandinavian countries are similar in development approaches. As a result of joint donor efforts, Ireland and Norway emerge as supporting donors in all cases.

The evaluation reports were identified as follows. For each case, the reports were collected from the donor's evaluation database. Next, the OECD evaluation database was used to ensure that all reports were included. To reduce the risk of selection bias, reports were not read beforehand but selected if the corresponding theme was democracy, good governance, anti-corruption, civil society. After all reports were collected, the evaluations were

organized in excel according to country. In total 26 reports were selected to be analyzed of which nine for Mozambique, four for Malawi, six for Zambia, and seven for Tanzania. Table 3 below provides an overview of the selected cases. Before the data analysis, the adopted SoD framework was converted into an excel file (See Table 1). The data was analyzed through a score-based approached as explained in chapter 3.1.2.

Table 4

Project overview

Country	Project number (P.no)	Thematic area and subtheme	Year	Donor	Project title
Mozambique					
	1	1.2, 2.1	2000-2003	SIDA	Program for human rights and democracy
	2	1.1, 2.2, 3.3, 3.4	2000-2005	SIDA	Support for the Development of Institutions
	3	1.2, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3	2010-2014	SIDA	Programa de Acções para uma Governação Inclusiva e Responsável (AGIR I)
	4	1.1, 1.2 2.1, 2.2, 3.1. 3.2, 3.3	2014-2018	SIDA	Programa de Acções para uma Governação Inclusiva e Responsável (AGIR II)
	5	2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3	2020-2017	DFID	Democratic Governance Support Programme(DIALOGO) - DIÁLOGO Local para a Boa Governação
	6	2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.4	2013-2015	DFID	Support to Mozambique's Municipal (2013) and general (2014) elections
	7	2.2, 2.3, 3.2, 3.3	2015-2018	DFID	Civil Society Support Mechanism: Mecanismo de Apoio a Sociadade Civil (MASC) Foundation
	8	2.1	2015-2019	USAID	Media strengthening project

	9	2.3	2015-2020	USAID	Parceria Cívica para Boa Governação (PCBG)
Malawi					
	10	1.1, 1.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4	2000-2004	Norad/Sida	Democracy Consolidation Program – phase II
	11	2.1, 2.2, 3.2, 3.3, 3.	2004-2008	Norad/UNDP	Democracy Consolidation Program – phase III
	12	2.1	2012-2016	DFID	Institutional Support to the Electoral Process in Malawi (ISEP)
	13	1.1, 1.2, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4	2012-2016	DFID/Norad /Irishaid	Tilitonse: accountable, responsive and inclusive governance in Malawi
Zambia					
	14	2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4	2009-2013	SIDA	BBC media project
	15	1.1, 2.3,	2008-2013	DFID	Parliamentary Reform III
	16	2.1	2010-2014	DFID	Deepening Democracy Program
	17	1.2, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3	2013-2019	DFID	Zambia Accountability Program
	18	2.1	2011-2017	USAID	Fostering Accountability and Transparency (FACT)
	19	2.1	2014-2016	USAID	Election Monitoring Program
Tanzania					

	20	1.1, 1.2, 2.2, 2.3, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4	2010-2014	SIDA	Social Accountability Program Tanzania (SAPT)
	21	2.3, 3.2	2010-2013	SIDA	Strengthening support to Association of Local Authorities in Tanzania (ALAT)
	22	3.1	2008-2015	DFID	Tanzania Media Fund (TMF)
	23	2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3	2009-2016	DFID	Accountability in Tanzania (AcT)
	24	1.1, 2.1, 2.3,	2013-2016	DFID	Institutions of Democratic Empowerment and Accountability (IDEA)
	25	2,3, 2.2, 2.3, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4	2009-2012	USAID	Strengthening Accountability and Transparency in Tanzania (STAR)
	26	1.2, 2.2, 3.3	2013-2017	USAID	Pamoja Twajenga – ''Together we build'

Note. Thematic area and subtheme refers to Table 1.

3.3 Validity

Validity must be considered to ensure the quality of research. First, internal validity in this study is connected to identifying whether Chinese engagement has an actual influence on the effectiveness of DAC donors' democracy assistance. The effectiveness of democracy assistance is context-specific and sensitive to domestic and international pressures. The case selection was a thorough process meant to select those countries with similar regimes, levels of economic development and political stability. Furthermore, the case selection was grounded in the theoretical expectations from the literature. This process strives to strengthen the internal validity of this study.

In regard to external validity, the generalizability of the results from the four selected countries onto a larger population may be of concern. Especially studies into the effectiveness of democracy assistance are influenced by the context-specific features. However, following Yin (2012), analytical generalizations can be made if the findings closely relate to the theoretical propositions of chapter 2.3. Blatter and Haverland (2012) propose that the results of a case study should contribute to the respective field of research. This is achieved as this research fills a gap in the literature by investigating the effect of Chinese engagement on the effectiveness of DAC democracy assistance.

3.4 Reliability

In comparison to the validity of this research, achieving reliability was more complicated. The data analysis relies on the scoring of evaluations based on the adapted SoD framework. The evaluations were scored based on the connected subtheme. The total score of a subtheme was based on whether the project had a low, moderate, or high contribution to each assessment question. This score-based approach to assessing the effectiveness of democracy projects and programs includes bias from the researcher. If a similar study was conducted with the same DAC donors and recipients, the effectiveness of democracy assistance is likely to be perceived similar as in this research. The replication of the analysis of the evaluation reports limits the overall reliability of this research.

4. Results

Chapter four elaborates on the results of the analysis of DAC democracy assistance as guided by sub question four: '*To what extent does China's engagement impact democracy assistance of DAC donors in sub-Saharan Africa?'.* Each country will start with setting the political context and provide insight into the diplomatic relations with China. After the country context, the effectiveness of democracy projects will be assessed following the order of Table 1 (pp. 21-22). Throughout the discussion of the results references will be made to the numbered subthemes in Table 1. The conclusion of this chapter will focus on the effectiveness of democracy assistance across countries and determine the influence of Chinese engagement.

4.1 Mozambique

Mozambique is located in the south east of Africa with approximately 31.9 million inhabitants in 2019. It has a coast line of over 2500 km and shares its land borders with Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Swaziland and South Africa (Tollenaere, 2006). Mozambique possesses essential natural resources such as land suited for agricultural, energy, mineral and water resources (World Bank, 2020b). Mozambique has shown strong economic growth over the past two decades with an average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of 6.8%. Mozambique's economic performance has been declining since 2016 due to corruption scandals. In 2019, economic growth slowed further down due to the impact of cyclones Idai and Kenneth (AFDB, 2020a). Poverty remains a societal issue as 46.1% of the population lives below the international poverty line (World Bank, 2020b).

Mozambique is one of the two countries in this sample with high Chinese engagement (Table 2). After Mozambique declared its independence on June 25th 1975, China established diplomatic relations the same day. When China declared war against Vietnam in 1979, Frelimo sided with the Hanoi regime which damaged the relationship (Chichava, 2008). The relations were rebuilt at the end of the civil war and the start of the liberalization of the Mozambican economy. Mozambique and China further solidified their relationship with the signing of the 'Partnership and Global Strategic Cooperation Agreement' (Robinson & Hale, 2017). This agreement made Mozambique the first African country to have such an agreement with China.

4.1.1 Political context

As a former colony of Portugal, Mozambique declared its independence in 1975 after a war launched by the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) (Tollenaere, 2006). The years following its independence, the Frelimo government adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology in the

formulation of policies. For example, re-education camps were established and the food production was shifted toward state farms. However, the shift towards a socialist regime was met with resistance from Mozambicans. During the same period, Renamo, a guerilla organization, was established as a resistance to the Marxist-Leninist discourse of the Frelimo government (Tollenaere, 2006). With the support of Rhodesia (former Zimbabwe) and later on South Africa, Renamo was able to engage in a civil war and destroy infrastructure and commit violent crimes against citizens.

In 1990, Frelimo distanced itself from the Marxist-Leninist ideology and adopted a new constitution including a multi-party democracy (Tollenaere, 2006). Peace negotiations mediated by the Italian government and the Catholic Community of Sant'Egidio led to the signed General Peace Accord (GPA) and end of the civil war in 1992 (Manning & Malbrough, 2012). The first elections were held in 1994, and the results were in favor of Frelimo both for parliament and presidency (Manning & Malbrough, 2012). The presidential election was won by Felipe Nyusi and the party received 56% of the votes in the legislative election thereby obtaining 144 seats (DIA, 2020). Even though Mozambique is considered as a democracy, it deals with growing problems of a lack of transparency and increasing power of the ruling party (Manning & Malbrough, 2012). The last elections upheld the unbroken incumbency of Frelimo and were criticized by Renamo as the largest opposition party. The country adopts a centralized presidential system of government in which the president appoints members of cabinet and provincial governors. In Mozambique, the president selects solely Frelimo members thereby limiting the choice of party for state officials which increases the power of the party over the administrative system (Virtanen, 2016). As a result, the ruling party and the state are closely intertwined which fosters a system of patronage instead of party competition.

4.1.3 Effectiveness of democracy assistance

4.1.3.1 Citizenship, law and rights

The 2000-2005 Support for Democratic Institutions program aimed to reform the public sector to create an environment that fosters transparency and good governance (P.no. 3). The effectiveness was reportedly limited by the lack of citizen inclusion. The project evaluation identifies that the lack of attention to a bottom-up approach strengthened the already powerful executive branch. The overall approach of SIDA was criticized as the emphasis was put on changing elements within the existing system while the system in place may be the root of the problem. In contrast, the AGIR programs (2010-2018) adopt a bottom-up approach and receive a higher score for its contribution to enhancing transparency and accountability of public agencies (1.1.1; 1.1.2). The analyzed projects also reflect the shift in donors' focus towards

local governance and civil society due to the strong one-party rule of Frelimo at the national level (Manning & Malbrough, 2012).

4.1.3.2 Representative and accountable government

The average score of the projects targeting *free and fair elections (2.1)* was 12 out of 18. Both the AGIR programs and the DFID electoral support project identified that the electoral system in its current state reinforces the power of Frelimo and elite citizens. Even though Renamo has maintained stability as an opposition party, the capacity to compete with Frelimo remains weak (Phiri & Macheve, 2014). Only 53% of Mozambicans perceive the elections as free and fair or with minor issues compared to an average of 61% of African countries (Afrobarometer, 2019). The DFID election support program provided support to the municipal elections of 2013 and the general elections of 2014. The evaluation describes that the political context during the implementation of the program was challenging. The political-military tension between the Frelimo and Renamo increased the mistrust in public institutions. As a result, Frelimo was accused to have rigged the election results of the general elections in 2014.

The projects that target the government in terms of *effective and responsive government* obtained 50-70% of the maximum points for subtheme 2.2, with an average score of 14 (P.no. 3, 4, 5, 6). All four projects were able to strengthen the relationship between public officials and citizens on a local level (2.2.5). The DIALOGA program contributed through increasing the participation of citizens at a municipal level. Citizens were more aware of the municipal plans and felt like local government officials were more open to community proposals. Both AGIR I and AGIR II reported a growing activism among CSOs in public financial management and public integrity. In addition, CSOs of both AGIR programs actively contributed to the advocacy for the Right to Information Law (RTIL). After a process of ten years, the RTIL was adopted by the parliament and council of ministers in 2015.

The evaluations report that the public confidence in the government's ability to act transparently is low (2.2.7). Similarly, data from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance indicates that the overall governance score for Mozambique is increasingly deteriorating (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020). The 'hidden debt scandal' of 2016 revealed the corruption issues in Mozambique. The government lent two billion dollars from European banks destined for state-owned companies that engaged in tuna-fishing, shipyards and maritime security but did not report any recent revenue (Nhamire & Hill, 2019). The loans were neither publicly disclosed nor approved by the parliaments. When the irregularities were discovered, donors froze General Budget Support (GBS) to Mozambique which accounted for 40% of the total government budget.

In relation to *democratic effectiveness of parliament (2.3),* all relevant projects scored low in their contribution with an average score of 7.8 out of 18 (P.no. 2,3,5,6,7,9). All projects received the lowest score for strengthening the independence of the parliament and its ability to hold the executive accountable (2.3.1; 2.3.3). The strong one-party rule of Frelimo was a reoccurring challenge in the project evaluations. The evaluations report to have made a bigger impact at lower government levels. The DIALOGA program evaluation concludes the following concerning the activities in Nampula:

> *"The municipal assembly approved the use of participatory budgeting which gave citizens more decision making power in the use of a portion of the budget. The Municipal Council also used other participatory tools, such as the community score card to evaluate how service delivery in municipalities was perceived (DFID, 2018, p.2; P.no.5)"*

As power is highly concentrated in the executive branch, the influence of citizens on a national level through elected officials is weak. Nonetheless, this quote indicates that on a lower level of government, citizens do experience some political freedoms and willingness of local officials to engage in policy dialogue (2.3.4).

4.1.3.3 Civil society and popular participation

The space for civil society and the media to freely operate is narrow in Mozambique. Projects targeted at media development reported to have contributed to the representation of a more diverse group of society (P.no. 3,4,5,7). The radio proved to be an important means for the creation of a space for civil society to discuss public issues. It remains difficult for independent media platforms to scrutinize the government due to a lack in capacity but also out of fear of the consequences. Even though AGIR I contributed to the adoption of the RTIL in 2015, journalists still risk harassment if they criticize the government. The projects seem to improve the overall independence of the media by supporting local radio stations and journalists.

Civil society organizations must adhere to the 1991 Law of Associations. An amendment to this law was proposed in 2009, but is still to be adopted by legislature (Musila, 2019). The evaluation of AGIR II stated that this law is outdated and limited the performance of CSOs in the field of access to justice. In addition, it restricts CSO activities to urban centers as they are met with bureaucratic hurdles when the scope is broadened. This is also reflected in the scores as projects receive the maximum points for their contribution to enhancing the range and civil participation in civil society organizations (3.2.1; 3.2.2; P.no. 3,4,8,9). However,

the same projects were not able to improve to increase the influence of CSOs in public decision-making (3.3.6). Financial viability is a common problem among civil society organizations and media platforms (3.3.1). Most CSOs in Mozambique are dependent on foreign funding. However, funding by international donor agencies has declined over past few years (P.no. 4). It is reported that international donors have been reluctant to disburse funds since the 2016 'hidden debt scandal' to CSO. The funds destined for GBS have not been directed towards other channels of development assistance. Due to the high dependence on foreign donors, CSOs operate in a vulnerable environment.

4.2 Malawi

Malawi is a landlocked country with 18.1 million citizens and is located in southern Africa where it shares its borders with Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. Malawi possesses over several natural resources from mineral deposits like uranium and coal (MITC, 2020). The economy of Malawi relies for a large part on tobacco, tea and sugar (IMF, 2017). Over the period 2000-2019, the economy grew with an annual average of 4.4% (World Bank, 2020c). Malawi depends on the seaports of Mozambique and Tanzania for external trade (ADFB, 2020b). While the country has shown promising economic development, poverty remains high as 51.5% of the population lives under the international poverty line.

In the sample of this study, Malawi is a country with low Chinese engagement (Table 2). Malawi established diplomatic relations with China in 2008, as one of the last African countries. President Banda recognized Taiwan in 1966 which became a major donor in Malawi. The relationship between Malawi and Taiwan continued but gradually decreased as China showed its power as a development partner (Banik, 2013). In December of 2007, the government of Malawi officially ended its 41-year-old relationship with Taiwan and signed a Memorandum of Understanding with China in 2008. The agreement committed both countries to enhance investment and trade ties and defined infrastructure, agriculture, education, and public health as areas of prioritized cooperation (Thwinda, 2014).

4.2.1 Political context

Malawi gained its independence in 1961 as a former colony of Great Britain. After the independence, the country transitioned into a dictatorship that lasted until 1991. State politics were under the sole control of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). Elections did take place in 1971, 1976, 1983, and 1992, however there was no democratic process involved (Chirwa, 2014). The incumbent president nominated and approved the candidate, a member of MCP, beforehand.

The transition in 1993 from dictatorship to a democracy was relatively peaceful. Activists supported by the international community strived to end the dictatorship of incumbent President Dr Banda. The multiparty system was introduced through a referendum vote on 15 June 1993. The first elections in 1994 were considered as free and fair and won by United Democratic Front (UDF) with 46.4% followed by the MCP (33.7%) and Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1994). The four presidential and parliamentary elections that followed (1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009) were considered a democratic success. However, the democratic trajectory of Malawi has experienced some regression since President Bingu wa Mutharika was elected in 2009. New laws were implemented that increased the power of government officials, i.e. police were the given right to search without a warrant. Additionally, Academic freedom was under risk after various incidents of police arresting professors (Chirwa, 2014). When President Bingu wa Mutharika died in 2012, Vice-president Joyce Banda was appointed to take over the presidency. During the rule of president Banda, the cash-gate corruption scandal was uncovered in 2013. Public funds were allegedly transferred to public officials to reimburse non-existent goods and services (Yi Dionne, 2014). As a response, donors suspended US$150 million in aid from 2013-2016. In 2019, President Peter Mushaira was re-elected for a second term with 38.6% of the votes. The difference between President Mutharika and Lazarus Chakwera, the second runner, was just under 159,000 votes (Harding, 2020). Chakwera accused President Mutharika of voting irregularities and the court ordered a re-election which will be held in June 2020.

4.2.2 Effectiveness of democracy assistance

4.2.2.1 Citizenship, law and rights

Projects that operated within the sector of citizenship, law, and rights tend to focus on creating awareness of existing rights among citizens. As a result, projects received a higher score for *civil and political rights (1.2)* compared to *the rule of law and access to justice (1.1)*. Both Democracy Consolidation Program II (DCP) and Tilitonse, targeted less powerful groups such as HIV-infected people, citizens with disabilities, and young people to become more aware of their civil and political rights (P.no. 10,14). Both project evaluations stated that citizens have become more knowledgeable of their rights which enabled them to engage more with the government (ITAD, p.34; UNDP, p. 28). The effectiveness of both projects was constrained by the lack of accountability between public officials and Malawians.

"It is the low understanding among politicians and public functionaries concerning downward accountability, however, which has most seriously affected the program results (Norad, 2010, p.30; P.no. 10)"

This quote indicates that there is a low level of responsiveness of duty bearers to citizens, which is particularly experienced at lower levels of government. This limitation is also identified in the other two analyzed projects and will be addressed later on. However, none of the projects actively contributed to establishing a system of more independent government branches. Interestingly, all projects emphasized a civic bottom-up approach to democratization. While this contributed to the effectiveness of understanding of civil and political rights, it may also be identified as a limitation for improving the quality of government accountability towards citizens.

4.2.2.2 Representative and accountable government

Democracy projects targeted in thematic area two were more effective when directed at *free and fair elections (2.1)* compared to *effective and responsive government (2.2)* or *democratic effectiveness of parliament (2.3).* The Institutional Support to the Electoral Process (ISEP) obtained more than 60% of the maximum total points of subtheme 2.1 and received a score of 11 out of 18 (P.no.13)**.** The project strived to make the registration of parties and candidates more equal by reviewing the Political Parties Registration and Regulation Act (PPRRA). The original law set a low threshold for party members which prevents cross-regional party support. In addition, the law did not require parties to be transparent about expenditure and sources of funding. The new Political Parties Act was adopted in 2018 (EISA, 2019).

The project moderately contributed to effective monitoring of the electoral process (2.1.5). For example, by offering training programs to monitor or through support for strengthening the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC). However, the effectiveness of electoral monitoring was limited by time and financial constraints. During the 2014 elections there were irregularities discovered in some polling centers concerning the total number of votes and the legitimacy of voting records (P.no.13). The following quote captures the shared notion among the evaluations of a relatively peaceful election period:

"The run-up to 2014 elections was generally smooth although the MEC had to deal with threats of strikes by registration clerks who wanted an increase in pay for the voter registration process. There were few cases of political violence during the entire duration of the electoral process and where violence occurred, this was quickly dealt with through the Multi-Party Liaison Committees (MPLCs) (DFID, 2017a, p. 2)"

In general, the first tripartite elections of 2014 were highly competitive and resulted in a change of power of incumbent President Joyce Banda to Peter Mutharika. The 2014 elections were for 40% funded by donors while the government was responsible for the remaining 60% of the election budget. This election cycle was the last one to be funded by donors. The recommendations of project 11 stated that after 25 years of donor assistance, the government is expected to finance the election budget in 2019. The decision of donors to retract from funding the election budget may indicate the phasing out of democracy assistance in terms of subtheme 2.1 '*free and fair elections'.*

The outcome of the second tripartite elections in 2019 was not accepted by running candidates which led to an annulment of the results by the Constitutional Court. Originally, President Peter Mutharika was elected with 38.6% of the votes compared to the runner up, Lazarus Chakwera, who received 35.4% of the votes. The annulment of an electoral victory is uncommon and does suggest that the court of Malawi operates with a strong rule of law. Along with the ruling of new elections in 2020, the court ordered electoral reform bills. However, the electoral reforms have been met by resistance from President Mutharika which has sparked political instability. The 2019 Afrobarometer survey revealed that only 32% of Malawians perceive the elections as free and fair. Against its current background it may be questioned whether this is the right time for donor to reduce electoral support*.*

The DCP III and Tilitonse made efforts to improve the quality of *effective and responsive government* through CSOs (P.no. 11, 14). The DCP III program received 54% of the maximum points for subtheme 2.2 with a score of 13. Tilitonse received 66% of the maximum points for subtheme 2.2 with a score of 16. The evaluations of both projects reported that their activities contributed to improving the quality and access to public services. Access to information is identified as important to foster an environment in which citizens are able to engage with the government. Both projects focused on building a strong civil society that would influence policies and governance. CSOs that partake in Tilitonse have influenced national policies through the promotion of the Access to Information (ATI) bill. However, the evaluation revealed that this was not necessarily a direct demand of citizens as self-censoring is common among Malawians out of fear for repercussions as well as respect for authorities (Itad, p. 39). Compared to the DCP II program, Tilitonse contributed more to establishing mechanisms to monitor government budget, policy, and service delivery but these mechanisms remain weak. Similar as in the other thematic areas, unresponsiveness between lower levels of government and the national government is identified as a challenge to the effectiveness of the project activities.

Two projects targeted the *democratic effectiveness of parliament*, albeit a less extensive focal point (P.no. 10, 14). In general, improving the quality of an effective parliament

did not receive much attention in comparison to the other two subthemes under representative and accountable governments which resulted in relatively low effectiveness scores. The DCP II program received a score of six which accounts for 40% of the maximum points of subtheme 2.3 (P.no. 10). Tilitonse performed better in terms of effectiveness and received 46% of the points with a total score of seven (P.no. 14). Both projects reported to have opened up the space for engagement between citizens and community leaders. However, the lack of power by the parliament to oversee the executive was perceived as a limitation. The evaluation of DCP III stated the following:

> *"Today (2010), bills are passed almost without debate, with the dubious record being six bills in two hours. Currently, speed is seen as a sign of effectiveness. The authority of the executive over the National Assembly is even stronger than it was ten years ago, since bills are passed with little debate (Norad, 2010; p.16)"*

Besides intra-parliamentary limitations, the lack of inter-organizational transparency and accountability limited the shift towards democratic governance of local officials. To improve the effectiveness and responsiveness of the government of Malawi, donors tend to focus more on empowering citizens through civil society organizations.

4.2.2.3 Civil society and popular participation

As mentioned in the previous section, donors predominantly focused on civil society to foster democratization from the bottom up. The DCP I, DCP II and Tilitonse were analyzed based on their contribution to improving the quality civil society and popular participation. DCP I and DCP II received 56% (P.no. 10,11) of the maximum points for all subthemes in thematic area three and Tilitonse 66% (P.no. 14). The media, especially the radio, was an important element in strengthening Malawi's civil society. For example, radio listening clubs provided a forum for discussion between right holders and duty bearers. These radio programs informed citizens on matters ranging from political violence to gender and HIV issues (P.no 10). The evaluation of DCP I reported some transfer of power between the community and public officials in the form of enhanced public consultation and adapted accountability roles. However, these changes generally took place on community levels between 'traditional chiefs' and citizens (Norad, p.18). Similarly, the Tilitonse evaluation stated that radio programs have contributed to improving citizens' understanding of development problems and have shown increased participation in forming demands from duty bearers (Itad, p.41). The lack of women that participate in citizen associations was identified as a reoccurring limitation across projects.

Overall, the evaluations indicated that the activities contributed to opening up the space for dialogue among civil society, citizens, and lower levels of government.

Although the evaluations were positive concerning the space in which civil society is able to operate, this may have changed over the past two years as the projects took place in the period of 2002-2016. At the start of 2018 the government of Malawi attempted to increase the obligated fees for local NGOs from 68 to 340 US dollars but was stopped by the high court. Later that year the parliament proposed an amendment to the NGO law adopted in 2000 that would establish a new NGO regulatory body selected by the cabinet minister (Musila, 2019). This regulatory body would supervise law breaches by NGOS and have the mandate to fine non-compliance ranging from 70 to 20,000 US dollars. The adoption of the amendment would be harmful for maintaining civil society, considering that the GDP per capita is 360 US dollars (Musila, 2019). The new legislation is currently under judicial review. Similar as in the sub-theme 'free and fair elections' the courts in Malawi are an important factor in maintaining democratic values.

4.3 Republic of Zambia

Zambia is a landlocked country in the core of southern Africa and shares its borders with Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Malawi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The population of approximately 16.1 million is concentrated around the capital of Lusaka and other surrounding urban areas (World Bank, 2020c). Over the past two decades, Zambia has been a relatively stable country with an average annual GDP growth of 5.9%. Due to Zambia's dependence on copper production, economic growth slowed down after the copper prices peaked in 2011 (ADFB, 2020c). The country was classified as a middle-income country in 2011. However, the increase of wealth did not trickle down to all levels of society as Zambia has one of the highest inequality rates (World Bank, 2020d). Poverty rates remain high, 58% of the population lives under the international poverty line of $1.90 a day.

Zambia is the second country of this sample with high Chinese engagement (Table 2). After Zambia gained its independence in 1964, China established diplomatic relationships with the government. The relationship was characterized by the exchange of loans, infrastructure projects, natural sources and mutual respect (Hartmann & Noessel, 2019). Zambia is a major copper producer which is beneficial for high demand copper country like China. China's investment in the copper belt allowed for increased engagement of Chinese companies in the production of copper. However, there has been increasing pressure on the government by Zambians to restrict the control of Chinese companies due to the maltreatment of Zambian workers. In addition, the influx of cheap Chinese products poses difficult competition for local producers and traders (Hartmann & Noessel, 2019).

4.3.1 Political context

Zambia was under imperial rule of the Northern Rhodesia government by the British South African Company from 1890-1924. The Northern Rhodesian government was taken over by British colonial office up until 1964 (EISA, 2006). After Zambia gained its independence, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) established a one-party state regime. In the early 1990s, economic conditions in Zambia worsened and citizens were demanding a change of regime. Zambia's democratization process started with a peaceful transition during the elections of 1991 (Faust, Leiderer & Schmitt, 2012). The Movement for Multi-Party Democracy won the elections from UNIP and the government of President Frederick Chiluba was installed. The new regime still showed authoritarian characteristics as there was little to no improvement of civil and political rights. Again, political power became increasingly concentrated in the executive branch.

Overall political development has shown a positive trend in Zambia compared to other sub-Saharan African countries. The political system is competitive but has its challenges in terms of weak institutionalization and capacity of political parties. The executive power lies with the president who is elected for a term of five years followed by a possible second term. It is in the power of the president to appoint the vice-president, ministers, deputy ministers and provincial ministers. The legislative power rests with the National Assembly, of which all 150 members are elected (EEAS, 2012**)**. The members of parliament are elected for five year terms based on a first-past-the-post electoral system. More recently Zambia has experienced a shift towards a more unstable political environment (Goldring & Wahman, 2016). The sudden death of President Sata in 2014 led to a sudden election in 2015 followed by the presidential elections again in 2016. The year in-between these elections was characterized by changes in the Zambian constitution concerning the electoral process (see subtheme 2.1 p. 44). This fueled further political unrest during the 2016 presidential elections. At the same time, Zambia experienced an increase in political violence.

4.3.2 Effectiveness of democracy assistance

4.3.2.1 Citizenship, law, and rights

Similar as to the previous two countries, citizenship, law, and rights is not a major target of democracy projects. Two projects were found to have made a contribution to strengthening *the rule of law (1.1) and civil and political rights (1.2)*. The project Parliamentary Reform (PR) III received a score of four which accounts for 33% of the total points for thematic area one (P.no. 15). The Zambia Accountability Program (ZAP) earned a score of eight for its contribution to improving *civil and political rights*, thereby obtaining 44% of the maximum points

for subtheme 1.2 (P.no.17). The contribution of the projects has mostly been targeted at protecting women's and girls' rights as well as their access to legal services (1.2.3; 1.2.5). For example, workshops were organized for women to enhance engagement and awareness of governance matters (P.no. 17). Besides gender stereotypes, no additional limitations were identified that may have influenced the effectiveness.

4.3.2.2 Representative and accountable government

Three projects aimed to improve the quality of the electoral system. First, the Deepening Democracy program was scored with a total of 11 which accounts for 45% of the maximum points for subtheme 2.1 (P.no. 17). Second, the Foster Accountability and Transparency (FACT) program received a score of 10, thereby obtaining 42% the maximum points for subtheme 2.1 (P.no. 18). Third, the Election Monitoring program received the lowest score of 9 which translates into 38% of the maximum points for subtheme 2.1 (P.no.19). Project 17 took place around the tripartite elections of 2011. Both projects 18 and 19 were in operation during the sudden presidential election of 2015 and the presidential and parliamentary election of 2016. All three projects contributed to making the election process more credible, e.g. through support for the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ); increasing the capacity of CSOs as monitors; and strengthening Parallel Voter Tabulation (PVT). The state of voter registration was identified as a limitation in both the election support evaluations of 2011 and 2015 (2.1.2). The voter roll had not been updated since 2010 which excluded a large part of the Zambian youth. Overall the evaluations stated that the elections of 2011 and 2015 could be considered as credible with some minor issues. Likewise, 59% of Zambians perceived the 2011 elections as completely free and fair (Afrobarometer, 2014). The evaluation of project 19, scored as least effective, reported that the political environment during the elections of 2016 challenged the effectiveness of the program:

> *"Perhaps most significantly, the electoral assistance strategy that was developed for the 2016 elections faced a very different set of contextual challenges at the time of program design than at the time of the election. (…) Unexpected constraints on political competition and the narrowing of civic space posed challenges for USAID and its partners (USAID, 2018, p.30) "*

The project was assessed to have moderately contributed to fostering a competitive election environment and had a low contribution on all other indicators (See annex III). There was only a 90-day period between the elections of 2015 and of 2016 in which major reforms of the electoral system were implemented without much opportunity for public debate. For example,

the government adopted an amendment to the Zambian constitution that required presidential candidates to win the elections with an absolute majority. A new educational threshold was implemented that required a grade twelve certificate of election candidates which disqualified many women from the 2016 election cycle. The educational requirement to register as a candidate was identified as a major challenge in project 19 since one of the objectives was to increase the number of women in public office. The newly created constitutional court would reassess the elections results if a petition was filed within seven days after the elections (USAID, 2018). Similarly, the ZAP evaluation reported that political instability linked to the new constitution led to a delay of program activities because of lacking capacity to meet demands of local staff. During the election period, the tensions and mutual accusations between the two most popular party leaders resulted in cases of political violence among constituents. The Lungu government was accused to have responded to the violence with the Public Order Act that was biased against constituents of the opposition party. The election was won with 50.31% of the votes by President Lungu after a flawed reassessment by the newly established constitutional court (USAID, 2018). The opposition leader Hakainda Hichilema filed a petition to the constitutional court for annulment of the election results. The court dismissed the case on a technicality which led to the arrest of Hichilema without any evidence (Afrobarometer, 2017).

Overall, the evaluations scores suggest that quality of the Zambian elections in 2016 decreased compared to previous two elections. This trend is also reflected in the results of the Afrobarometer (2019) survey, whereas in 2012 68% was very or fairly satisfied with the working of democracy, this percentage dropped in 2017 to merely 49%. In relation to the narrowing of the civic space, as identified as a challenge in project 19, Zambians' perception of having freedom of speech declined from 57% in 2005 to 41% in 2017.

Projects targeted at thematic area two focused more on the subtheme 2.1 and 2.3 than on *effective and responsive government (2.2)*. Furthermore, the selected projects in Zambia for subtheme 2.2 have shown to be closely related to subtheme 3.1 and 3.2. Two projects indirectly targeted the quality of effective and responsive government (P.no. 14,17). The BBC media project and the ZAP contributed to creating a space for public discussion on policy reform which empowered citizens to hold the government accountable for the delivery of public services (2.2.2; 2.2.3). However, the empowerment of citizens was achieved is intertwined through CSOs and will be further discussed in thematic area three.

Government branches are targeted directly with projects that are active within the electoral and parliamentary system. Two projects were found to have contributed to improving the *democratic effectiveness of the parliament* (P.no. 15,17). Both projects scored high on increased accessibility of citizens to elected officials by constituency offices and forums for debate (2.3.4). However, the main constraint identified in both evaluations is the parliament's

capacity to initiate new bills (2.3.2). This is mostly done by the executive without being thoroughly scrutinized by the members of parliament. The evaluation of project 17 stated that the relationship between the government and the opposition has regressed since the elections of 2016. A report from the Afrobarometer (2017) suggests that the independence and effectiveness of parliament has further declined in 2017. After the election results, the speaker of the National Assembly suspended 48 opposition parliamentarians for allegedly missing the state of the nation address from the president. During the suspension, the remaining parliamentarians of the majority party adopted the 90-state of emergency proposal from President Lungu. The evaluation of ZAP (17) concludes that effectiveness of the Zambian parliament is still weak but that the competitive political environment surrounding the elections does provide some opportunities for accountability.

4.3.2.3 Civil society and popular participation

The decline in freedom was also identified as a limitation in the projects that target civil society and popular participation. The BBC media project received 66% of the maximum points and obtained a final score of 14 (P.no.14)**.** The ZAP acquired 57% of the maximum points and ended up with a total score of 12 (P.no.17)**.** Both evaluations stated that the projects contributed to strengthening media platforms that voiced a variety of opinions independent from the state.

> *"The project gave communities the chance to voice their concerns and to hold duty bearers accountable. Audiences met, underscored the power of the new opportunity provided by the project. To them, the format of inviting duty bearers to discuss and answer questions was nothing less than revolutionary (SIDA, 2019; p.45; P.no.14)."*

Radio listening groups and public community debates contributed to the development of an engaged and critical civil society. More specifically, the evaluation of project 14 reported that it has contributed to enhancing the access to information among rural population predominantly dependent on state controlled media. The space for media freedom in Zambia has been decreasing since 2013 but was further restricted by the Lungu government during the 2016 elections. The electoral process aggravated harassments against journalists and shutdowns of smaller media outlets (USAID, 2018). As a response, the scope of project 14 expanded from non-commercial community radio stations to the inclusion of commercial radio stations (SIDA, p. 8). ZAP identified that political interference in the operations of some community radio stations has slowed down the implementation of the program. The freedom

of media in Zambia is currently rated a one out of four on the Freedom House Index (Freedomhouse, 2020b). The evaluation of project 14, stated that Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) became a collaborating partner in 2018 with the intention to avoid further deterioration of the freedom of the media and broader civil society.

4.4 United Republic of Tanzania

Tanzania is located in East-Africa and shares its borders with Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo-Kinshasha, Uganda and Kenia. With a population of 56 million, Tanzania is the largest country of this sample. Over the last decade, Tanzania has shown strong economic growth with a yearly average between 6-7% (World Bank, 2020e). Tanzania has an abundance of natural resources such as minerals, water, land, and recently discovered gas fields. The poverty rate has declined to 28.8%, however, due to a fast growing population this still translates into an absolute number of 13 million people living below the poverty line.

In the sample of this study, Tanzania is a country with low Chinese engagement (Table 2). The relationship between Tanzania and China dates back to ideological connection during the 1960s and 1970s. The relationship continued to develop from a political cooperation to an economic cooperation. Over the years, China has provided assistance to Tanzania in the form of military training, health care, and infrastructure (Cabestan & Chaponnière, 2016). China has supported Tanzania in large-scale infrastructure development projects such as the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway. Although, both countries emphasize a strong mutual relationship, it appears that the partnership has weakened over the years

4.4.1 Political context

As a former British colony, Tanzania gained its independence in 1961, and became a republic in 1964 after the independence of Zanzibar. The first presidential election was held in 1965 under a one-party system. The elections were won by Julius Nyerere from the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the only political party at that time. In 1977, TANU became Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party of Tanzania) (CCM) after merging with Zanzibar's ruling party (Seekings, 2003). After international and domestic pressures, the government amended the constitution to allow for a multi-party system with opposition parties. The first presidential and legislative actions were held in October of 1995 with 13 competing parties (The Commonwealth, 2020). President Benjamin Mkapa won the first presidential elections as a CCM representative (Hyden, 1999). Tanzania has performed relatively well in the democratic trajectory that followed. Under the one-party rule, the country was able to make progress in

terms of access to primary education and limiting internal conflict. While there are 120 different ethnic groups and languages, Tanzania has a strong national identity (Brown, 1998).

Currently, CCM is still the dominant party in Tanzania as the capacity of opposition parties remains weak because of a lack in resources. The presidential election of 2019 and local elections in 2015 were both won by the CCM. However, the elections of 2015 showed a strong opposition party and the opposition candidate, Edward Lowassa, lost with 40% of the votes from CCM candidate John Magufuli (Paget, 2017). Tanzania's democracy has shown regression on certain features. Since 2017, the opposition has increasingly been repressed by newspaper suspensions and restrictions on freedom of assembly and expression (Paget, 2017). The declining space for the media, opposition parties and civil society may indicate a shift towards authoritarianism by the current CCM administration.

4.4.2 Effectiveness of democracy assistance

4.4.2.1 Citizenship, law, and rights

Three projects included a focus on improving the rights for marginalized groups (P.no. 20, 24, 26). The Social Accountability Program in Tanzania (SAPT) approached this by empowering citizens to demand public authorities to uphold their political, social and economic rights. The Pamoja Twajenga (PT) evaluation reported that issue-based dialogues have contributed to increased awareness and understanding of rights among citizens, including women, disabled people and HIV-positive people. Similarly, the SAPT evaluation stated that citizens with disabilities experienced reduced stigmatization as a result of provided training. However, discrimination and abuse are still common against citizens with disabilities. The SAPT program was less effective in empowering women and girls because there were already established local women groups. Citizens did not perceive any change in the behavior of public officials. The evaluation confirmed this and concluded that behavior cannot be changed through a few trainings. The program did contribute to improving the access for marginalized groups to legal services, e.g. by training villagers to become paralegals.

4.4.2.2 Representative and accountable government

Within the thematic area of representative and accountable government, projects targeted at subtheme 2.1 supported the National Electoral Commission (NEC), Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) and civil society initiatives during the 2015 general elections. After a competitive election period, President John Magufuli was elected with 58% of the votes. Project 24 was carried out during the general elections 2015, and described the elections as

more credible on the main land than in Zanzibar. From 2005 to 2015, elections in Tanzania were generally perceived as high-quality, 85% of the adult population perceived the elections completely free and fair or with minor issues (Afrobarometer, 2019). However, the evaluation did report that there was a lack of willingness of the NEC to engage with the project. The effectiveness was limited by transparency issues in the operations of the NEC and a lack of responsiveness to the opposition party. The ZEC was perceived as more open to the project and willing to work on its technical progress. The ZEC has shown progress, however, the evaluation questioned the political independence from board members. As the evaluation only focused on the 2015 general elections it obtained 61% of the maximum points for subtheme 2.1. It should be noted that the project may have scored lower during the 2019 elections. A report from the Human Rights Watch (2019) stated that since the election of president Magufuli the freedom of expression, restriction and assembly has been restricted in Tanzania. Criticism on activities by authorities are met by repressive laws, harassments, and the risk of arrests. The restriction of freedoms does emerge in the evaluations of projects in the next section.

The majority of the projects in thematic area two, focused on subtheme *2.2 effective and responsive government*. All five projects are close together in total scores ranging from 58% to 66% of the maximum points for subtheme 2.2 (P.no. 20,23,26,26). The analysis of the evaluations showed a shared emphasis on the values of accountability and transparency. For example, the evaluation of Social Accountability Program reported to have contributed to improved accountability of Local Government Authorities (LGAs). Citizens' participation in community meetings increased which improved the dialogue with local government concerning policy and budget matters (P.no.20). Similarly, the evaluation of Strengthening, Transparency, Accountability, Responsibility (STAR) program, stated that citizens at the village level were able to monitor public expenditures and activities more effectively (P.no.26). All five projects scored low on improving the ability to oversee the executive government branch (2.2.1). While evaluations all reported to have made some improvement in terms of accountability and transparency on lower levels of government, this does not hold for the centralized government as described in the following quote:

> *"There is a lack of systematic consultation with LGAs when the Central Government is issuing directives and policy decisions. There are several instances where the Central Government has passed several policies with severe negative consequences for the LGAs. For example, the Central Government revoked the General Purpose Grants to LGAs in 2011, which nearly paralysed the operations of LGAs (SIDA, 2014b, p. 12; P.no. 20)"*

Besides the lack of consultation, the concentration of power in the central government created friction between district officials and elected local officials. As identified in the evaluation of project 21, budget proposals of LGAs developed in cooperation with citizens are often returned totally altered by the central government. District officials are appointed by the central government which affects decision-making processes. As a result of the lack of decentralization, the power of local leaders and thereby citizens is limited.

The projects aimed at subtheme 2.3 *democratic effectiveness of parliament* were perceived as moderately effective (P.no. 20, 24, 25). The Institutions for Democratic Empowerment and Accountability (IDEA) program received the highest score for its contribution with 53% of the maximum points for subtheme 2.3. The evaluation stated that the project has contributed to improved capacity of staff and members of parliament which has helped to fulfill their oversight function (P.no. 24). Since the 2015 Budget Act, parliament members have shown the most improvement in terms of capacity to scrutinize the budget. In practice, the proposed alterations made in the budget review in 2016 ended up to be largely ignored. Project 20 was able to enhance the accessibility of elected officials to constituents by its focus on local elected leaders. The access to parliament members was identified to be limited by the low level of accountability from parliament members to constituents (2.3.4; P.no. 24, 25).

4.4.2.3 Civil society and popular participation

As seen in the previous countries, the media proved to be an effective way for citizens to gain understanding of political matters and voice their opinion. Both projects have received similar scores ranging from 53% to 62% of the maximum points for subtheme 3.1. The evaluations stated to have contributed to supporting a media landscape that is representative of different opinions (P.no.22,23). In addition, project 22 has made efforts to increase the accessibility to independent media for people who live in rural areas. The projects have both contributed to enhancing the capacity of journalists to create quality content. However, the restrictions on media freedom are identified as constraints on the effectiveness of projects. The space for media freedom has narrowed over the years. In 2010, the government of Tanzania adopted the Electronic and Postal Communications Act. This act provides the mandate for the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) to license content that is uploaded to the internet (HRW, 2019). For example, the TRCA is able to regulate content from bloggers, online forums, and online radio and TV, if non-compliance is detected they are subject to fines up to 900 US dollars (GoT, 2018). Freedom of expression was further confined with the adoption of the 2015 Cybercrimes Act and Statistics act. Project 22 identified that the few large media

house owners are already regulating what smaller media outlets publish. These laws further foster an environment of self-censorship as it criminalizes the publishing of non-official state statistics.

All four projects contributed to improving citizen participation in public activities as the following quote from the SAPT program highlights:

"Respondents across all districts confirmed that citizens are increasingly informed about their rights and empowered to ask questions to leaders. Some respondents claimed that SAPT had contributed to this through organising of public meetings, using community radio and supporting social accountability monitoring assignments (SIDA, 2015a, p. 26; P.no.20)"

Even though the space for freedom of expression has been deteriorating over the years, the evaluations suggested that there is a vibrant civil society in Tanzania. However, a report by SIDA on the state of civil society in Tanzania revealed that self-censoring is becoming a common approach among civil society partners. SIDA described that the perception of civil society actors changed in 2015-2016. In 2015, most partners reported that there was space in Tanzania to pressure the government for change through collective action. However, in 2016, actors have become more nuanced and emphasize that the public needs to have the right information and mindset to challenge the government (SIDA, 2016).

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the effectiveness of democracy assistance by DAC donors in the four countries. After analyzing the effectiveness of democracy projects in Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania, the results revealed shared patterns across countries. As explained in the methodology, Mozambique and Malawi are comparable in terms of economic performance and political stability, this also counts for Zambia and Tanzania. Both Mozambique (3.0%) and Zambia (7.0%) are recipients of high Chinese development assistance in relation to its GNI. In contrast, Malawi (1.1%) and Tanzania (1.2%) receive low Chinese development assistance as part of the GNI. This section will elaborate on discovered patterns of democracy assistance across countries.

Most democracy projects did not focus directly on the thematic area of citizenship, law, and rights. Overall donors prioritize vulnerable groups such as women, girls, disabled people, and people with HIV. The projects were able to enhance awareness among these groups of their civil and political rights. The evaluations across cases reported that participants experienced less discrimination or harassment. However, it continues to negatively impact

their lives. As donors increasingly concentrated on democratization as a civic bottom-up approach, the quality of independent courts and judiciary continued to be overlooked.

Table 5

Effectiveness of democracy assistance in thematic area one

	High Chinese engagement	Low Chinese engagement	High Chinese engagement	Low Chinese engagement
1. **Citizenship, law, and rights**	Mozambique	Malawi	Zambia	Tanzania
1.1 The rule of law and access to justice Max 9	3.5	3.5	4	4
1.2 Civil and political rights Max 15	10	9.5	8	8.5

Note. Excerpt of SoD framework (Table 1).

The evaluations revealed that vulnerable groups perceived an overall improvement of the prejudice against them. However, in Malawi and Tanzania the evaluations specifically stated that there was no perceived change in behavior of public officials. Hence, this is reflected by the slightly lower average score in the second row of Table 5.

In terms the second thematic area (Table 6), the analysis showed an interesting pattern across countries. The political context in Mozambique was described as more challenging than in Malawi. However, projects in Mozambique were more effective when targeted at subtheme 2.1 and 2.3 than in Malawi. Projects in Mozambique were *not* effective in contributing to a change of leaders through elections (Table 4: 2.1.1). Frelimo has been the dominant party since the implementation of a multi-party system in 1994. During the 2016 elections, the opposition party Renamo was in close competition with Frelimo with 43% of the votes. However, the political-military tensions between the competing parties did also increase. In contrast, the elections in Malawi have been relatively peaceful and resulted in change of party rule. Compared to Mozambique, the evaluations described that public trust in the Electoral Monitoring Commission in Malawi has been declining. The annulment of the presidential election results in 2019 by the court suggests that the integrity has been compromised (Harding, 2020). The perceived unfairness of the elections in Malawi provides an explanation for the low average score compared to Mozambique.

In contrast, democracy assistance in subtheme 2.2 received a higher average score in Malawi. Compared to Mozambique, the evaluations in Malawi were identified to have contributed to better access and quality of public services. Both in Malawi and Mozambique citizens' access to information was improved. However, the effectiveness of projects was limited by the low level of accountability and transparency of government officials. Both countries have shown that corruption, i.e. Cash-Gate and Hidden Debts, continues to be a major issue.

Table 6

Effectiveness of democracy assistance in thematic area two

	High Chinese engagement	Low Chinese engagement	High Chinese engagement	Low Chinese engagement
2. Representative and accountable government	Mozambique	Malawi	Zambia	Tanzania
2.1 Free and fair elections Max 18	12	10.5	10	11
2.2 Effective and responsive government Max 24	13	14.5	13	14.6
2.3 Effective parliament Max 15	7.8	7	7.5	8

Note. Excerpt of SoD framework (Table 1).

As shown in Table 6, democracy assistance targeted at parliament was slightly less effective in Malawi than in Mozambique. In both cases there was a strong influence of the executive on the parliament identified. In comparison to Malawi, projects in Mozambique scored higher for increasing the accessibility to elected officials and public debate on a local level. However, it is important to note that the higher average score of Mozambique may be influenced by the kind of projects. The analyzed projects in Malawi focused on creating a space of engagement for leaders and constituents rather than improving the overall democratic effectiveness of parliament.

The effectiveness of democracy assistance in Zambia and Tanzania showed a more definitive pattern. Zambia received a lower average score than Tanzania for thematic area one and two. Both countries had a relatively stable track record over the years in terms of elections. The effectiveness of electoral assistance provided to Zambia was limited by the sudden election in 2015 after the death of the incumbent president. The evaluation of projects in place during the 2016 election reported the challenging political environment as a negative influence.

The projects targeted at parliament contributed to improving the relationship between members of parliaments and constituents through increased engagement at constituency offices. However, both in Zambia and Tanzania, the capacity of the parliament to initiate or amend legislation remains weak. In addition, the power of lower level government is restricted as the control is largely concentrated in the executive branch. The influence of the executive on the parliament was more evident in Zambia than in Tanzania as portrayed with the suspension of 48 opposition parliamentarians in 2017. However, since President Magufuli took office in 2015, the power has become increasingly concentrated in the executive branch of Tanzania.

A shared pattern emerged in terms of thematic area three. The space for media and civil society to operate freely was restricted across countries. Both Mozambique and Malawi have pending laws that will complicate the activities for CSOs. In Tanzania, bills have been passed in 2010 and 2015 that restrict online communication. The Zambian 2009 NGO act requires all NGOs to register, civil society is still pressuring the government to repeal the act as it allegedly restricts the freedom of assembly and association (Musila, 2019).

Table 7

Effectiveness of democracy assistance in thematic area three

	High Chinese engagement	Low Chinese engagement	High Chinese engagement	Low Chinese engagement
3. **Civil society and popular participation**	Mozambique	Malawi	Zambia	Tanzania
3.1 The media in a democratic society Max 21	13.5	13.5	13	12
3.2 Political participation Max 24	7.7	7	9.5	7
3.3 CSOs Max 18	10.8	11.6	10.5	10
3.4 Decentralization	4.5	5.3	7	6.5

Note. Excerpt of SoD framework (Table 1).

The radio proved to be an effective media platform to inform citizens on the political system. In addition, through radio listening clubs and organized debate, citizens felt more knowledgeable and empowered to confront public officials. However, these positive results were only found at the local level. The projects in countries with high Chinese engagement

were more effective in contributing to enhanced political participation. The projects in Zambia and Mozambique were more effective in providing radio programs in rural areas which increased the access to information that was not controlled by the state. The projects were able to reach more women and help them participate in public life.

Table 8

Overall effectiveness of democracy assistance

	High Chinese engagement	Low Chinese engagement	High Chinese engagement	Low Chinese engagement
Thematic area	Mozambique	Malawi	Zambia	Tanzania
1. Citizenship, law and rights	13.5	13	12	12.5
2. Representative and accountable government	32.8	32	30.5	33.6
3. Civil society and popular participation	36.3	37.4	40	35.5

Note. Excerpt of SoD framework (Table 1).

In general, it cannot be concluded whether democracy assistance is more effective in countries with low Chinese development assistance than in countries with high Chinese development assistance. Moreover, the difference in effectiveness scores between countries with high Chinese engagement and low Chinese engagement is quite small. First, democracy assistance targeted at thematic area one and two is slightly more effective in both a country with high Chinese engagement (Mozambique) and low Chinese engagement (Tanzania). Interestingly, democracy assistance provided for subtheme 2.1 *free and fair elections* is more effective in countries with a dominant party rule such as Frelimo in Mozambique and CCM in Tanzania. A strong pattern emerges in thematic area three concerning the shrinking of space for civil society and the media. There have been restrictions on freedom of press, assembly, and expression in all cases regardless of high or low Chinese development assistance. In conclusion, all countries have shown some form of democratic regression since 2015. This may suggest that the governments have adopted more authoritarian features, however, the cannot be linked to Chinese development assistance based on these analyzed countries.

5. Discussion

This thesis set out to investigate whether Chinese development assistance affected the effectiveness of DAC donors' democracy assistance. Some argued that the engagement of China may indirectly undermine democracy promotion. The access to Chinese development assistance may be attractive for governments that struggle to meet good governance principles of DAC donors (Sharshenove & Crawford, 2017). The findings from the study by Hernandez (2017) of the effect of China's engagement on World Bank conditions for loans showed that the World Bank offered loans against fewer conditions to compete with loans from emerging donors. Based on this theoretical context, it was expected that Chinese engagement would weaken the effectiveness of DAC donors' democracy assistance. This would translate in less effective democracy assistance in Mozambique and Zambia compared to Malawi and Tanzania.

Although this current study perceives democracy assistance as an objective of aid instead of condition, the study by Hernandez (2017) shows to be relevant for the aid dependent countries Mozambique and Malawi. Mozambique was dependent on General Budget Support (GBS) for 40% of the total government budget. The 'hidden debt scandal', which refers to unreported government loans to state-owned companies, was discovered in 2016 (Nhamire & Hill, 2019). Even though Mozambique has a high level of Chinese engagement, international donors did not compromise on their conditions and froze Mozambique's GBS. Two years earlier, Malawi's GBS was suspended as a response to the discovery of the cash-gate scandal. In Mozambique, it was reported that funds destined for GBS in Mozambique were not reallocated to support civil society (Sida, 2015a, p. 76).

The analyzed projects and programs in Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania, show very small differences in the effectiveness of democracy assistance which meant that no trend could be discovered. The countries show mixed results in terms of low Chinese engagement and high Chinese engagement. Democracy assistance in Tanzania was slightly more effective than in Zambia in thematic area one and two. However, democracy assistance in Malawi was less effective than Mozambique in thematic area one and three. Around 2015, a general trend among countries was discovered concerning the shrinking of space for civil society and political freedoms. This pattern cannot be linked to the recent trend in Chinese development assistance due to a lack in data. For this reason, the findings of this study point towards the influence of contextual factors on the effectiveness rather than Chinese engagement.

Based on the examined literature five possible factors were identified that may influence the effectiveness of democracy assistance: economic performance, aid dependence, regime type, political stability and regional spill-over effects. Finkel at al (2006) identified

economic performance as potential negative or positive influence on democratization. Economic performance and aid dependence may provide an alternative explanation for the effectiveness of democracy assistance in Mozambique and Malawi. More specifically, in Malawi, democracy assistance targeted at effective and responsive government received a higher score than in Mozambique. Western donors considered the corruption scandals in both countries as a breach of the political conditionality of GBS. Considering the high level of aid dependency, the suspension of funds is likely to have imposed a strain on the economy. In Malawi, the suspension in 2013 resulted in a change of party of the elected government. The government responded with economic reforms and GBS was continued in 2016. However, in Mozambique the suspension of GBS in 2016 did not lead to a change in government and the party-rule of Frelimo continued. GBS to Mozambique is yet to be resumed. In Mozambique, the worsening of the economic conditions may have had negative consequences for the effectiveness of democracy assistance. Mozambique's annual GDP growth rate fell from 7.4% in 2014 to of 3.4% in 2018 (World Bank, 2020). In both countries, CSOs are predominantly depend on foreign donors for sustaining their activities. This raises the question whether political conditionality can pose as counterproductive in the overall process towards democratization, particularly in aid dependent countries.

The findings of this research align with the study by Lührmann et al (2017) into the effectiveness of democracy aid in different regime types. They find that in electoral autocracies election and human rights aid are effective while in electoral democracies aid for civil society, human rights, and media are effective. Similarly, projects targeted at elections in Mozambique and Tanzania showed higher effectiveness scores for subtheme 2.1 *free and fair elections*. Both Malawi and Zambia have experienced an elected executive from different political parties. In contrast, Mozambique and Tanzania elections have been dominated by one party since the establishment of a multi-party system. Based on the findings of Lührmann et al (2017) that election aid is more effective in electoral autocracies than in electoral democracies, the results of this study suggest that the regime of Mozambique and Tanzania is skewed towards an electoral autocracy rather than electoral democracy. All countries experienced some form of regression in terms of the space for civil society and political freedoms. The environment for free media has seen similar challenges across countries. The countries share their borders and close economic relations, this may support the idea that democratic regression or progression may have a regional spill-over effect for the political stability in the region (Matlosa, 2017). Within the thematic area of civil society and popular participation one particular finding stands out: democracy assistance targeted at CSOs was more effective in Malawi and Zambia than in Mozambique and Tanzania. This may indicate that in countries with no alternation of power, civil society is perceived as a higher threat to the survival of the party. Lührmann et al (2017) argue that the effectiveness of democracy aid is likely to be reduced when it is perceived

a threat to the survival of the incumbent leader. A strong civil society may challenge the survival of a regime, which can lead to restrictions that prevent them from promoting democracy. DAC donors describe the changing environment for civil society as a major constraint to the effectiveness of projects and programs. More importantly, the focus of DAC donors' democracy projects and programs is skewed towards civil society compared to state institutions or the electoral process. If the trajectory of a shrinking space for civil society continues, the effectiveness of DAC democracy assistance may be further reduced in this area.

6. Conclusion

The current study aimed to answer the following central question: *What is the impact of China's engagement on the effectiveness of DAC donors' democracy assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa?* This chapter will answer the research question guided by the three subquestions. The first two subquestions, answered in chapter two, relate to earlier conducted research: *(1) What has been the impact of democracy assistance by DAC donors and how can this be evaluated; (2) What is the impact of Chinese engagement on democracy promotion in aid recipient countries?* Chapter four was guided by the third sub question: *To what extent does China's engagement impact democracy assistance of DAC donors in sub-Saharan Africa?* This concluding chapter will end with the study's implications and limitations will be discussed followed by suggestions for further research.

Democracy can be used by donors as criteria to provide aid or as an objective of aid. This thesis focused on the latter and defined democracy assistance as activities and programs with democratization as an objective. The effectiveness of democracy assistance is related to context-specific factors. Based on existing literature, regime type, economic performance, political stability, regional spill-over effects and aid dependence were considered as factors that potentially influence the effectiveness of democracy assistance. The State of Democracy framework was selected to evaluate the the effectiveness of DAC donors' democracy assistance.

In terms of sub question two, there was limited empirical evidence that showed whether Chinese development assistance has an impact on democracy assistance by traditional donors. In general, Chinese development assistance gives developing countries access to development assistance free from requirements to implement political reforms. As mentioned earlier, the findings of the study by Hernandez (2017) revealed that the World Bank offered loans with fewer conditions to compete with Chinese development assistance. Based on this context, this study was guided by the expectation that Chinese engagement weakens the relationship between DAC democracy assistance and democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa.

To answer sub question three, which is closely related to the central question of this research, a covariational case study method was applied. Two countries were selected with high Chinese development assistance (Mozambique and Zambia) and two countries with low Chinese development assistance (Malawi and Tanzania). The effectiveness of democracy projects and programs were assessed based on the adapted SoD framework (Table 1). Overall, democracy assistance in thematic area one and two was slightly more effective in Tanzania than in Zambia. However, only democracy assistance targeted at thematic are two was slightly more effective in Malawi effective than in Mozambique. A similar trend was discovered across countries in thematic area three, the space for civil society and media has been shrinking in all countries from 2015 on. However, this trend in regression cannot be related to the level of Chinese develop assistance as the AidData set only provides Chinese aid flows and locations up until 2014.

Based on the results of the case study, there is no definitive answer to the central question. It cannot be concluded that Chinese development assistance has had an impact on the effectiveness of democracy assistance. Instead, the findings seem to indicate that the effectiveness of democracy assistance was influenced by factors consistent with those of the theoretical framework. The findings support the idea that economic performance and regime type have had an influence on the effectiveness of democracy assistance (Finkel et al, 2006; Lührmann et al, 2017). Moreover, the case study results suggest that the effectiveness of DAC democracy assistance was likely influenced by a regional spillover effects in terms of political stability rather than Chinese engagement.

6.1 Limitations

Even though the current study has made a scientific contribution, it also has its limitations. First, the study is limited by the degree of subjectivity in the effectiveness measurement of democracy projects and programs. The score-based approach in evaluating the effectiveness of democracy program and projects points to a potential weakness in the reliability of this study. Second, the difference between Mozambique and Malawi in terms of the level of Chinese development assistance in relation to GNI was only 1.9 percentage points. The gap between Zambia and Tanzania was larger with 5.8 percentage points in relation to GNI. The modest difference in the level of Chinese development assistance may have contributed to the proximity of effectiveness scores across countries. Third, the lack of recent data concerning the amount and location of Chinese development assistances posed as limitation. Additionally, this study did not focus on finding direct empirical evidence for the interference of China in democracy projects and programs. Unfortunately, the discovered trend concerning the

regression of effectiveness in thematic area three could not be linked to recent trends of Chinese development assistance.

6.2 Implications and recommendations

This research made a scientific contribution by assessing whether Chinese engagement has an impact on the effectiveness of DAC donors' democracy assistance. To my knowledge, this has not been empirically studied before. Furthermore, the use of the State of Democracy framework shed light on a more contemporary approach to studying the effectiveness of democracy assistance. To strengthen the reliability, future research should aim to increase the objectivity in assessing the effectiveness of projects and programs. For example, reliability could be improved if projects were scored by separate researchers, followed by comparing the scores for effectiveness. Nevertheless, this study highlighted that the political environment in Southern Africa is changing. When more recent data on Chinese development assistance flows becomes available, studies should further investigate the effectiveness of democracy assistance in the region. Even though this work did not establish a causal link with Chinese development assistance, it is important for future research to investigate the causal mechanisms behind this trajectory. In conclusion, this study could be a starting point for research on the impact of emerging donors on democracy assistance provided by traditional donors.

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Annex I: Evaluation scores Mozambique

Donor		SIDA	SID A	SIDA	SIDA	DFID	DFID	DFID	USAID	USAID
Project		PHD	SDI	AGIR I	AGIR II	Dialog a	ES	MAS C	MS	PCBG
Year		2003	2005	2010 2014	2014 2018	2010 2017	2013 2015	20152 018	2015 2019	2016 2020
Project nr.		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Citizenship, Law, and Rights										
The rule of law and access to justice										
	Does the project contribute to the extent to which all public officials are subject to the rule of law and transparent rules in the performance of their functions		1		2					
	Does the project contribute to the independency of the courts and the judiciary from the executive, and how free are they from all kinds of interference?		1		1					
	Does the project contribute to equal and secure access of citizens to justice, to due process and to redress in the event of maladministration?		1		1					
Total			3		4					
Civil and political rights										
		PHD	SDI	AGIR I	AGIR II	Dialog a	ES	MAS C	MS	PCBG
	Does the project contribute to effective and equal protection of the freedoms of movement, expression, association and assembly?			1	2					

		PHD	SDI	AGIR I	AGIR II	Dialoga	ES	MASC	MS	PCBG
	Does the project contribute to the freedom from harassment and intimidation are individuals and groups working to improve human rights?			2	1					
US	Does the project contribute to effective advocacy for adherence to international human rights increased			2	2					
US	Does the project contribute to improved government mechanisms protecting human rights			2	2					
US	Does the project contribute to increased availability of legal services			3	3					
Total				10	10					

Representative and accountable government

Free and fair elections

		PHD	SDI	AGIR I	AGIR II	Dialoga	ES	MASC	MS	PCBG
	Does the project contribute to the appointment of governmental and legislative office determined by popular competitive election, how frequently do elections lead to change in the governing parties or personnel?	1			1		1			
	Does the project contribute to inclusive and accessible registration and voting procedures, and the independency of government and party control?	2			1		2			

		PHD	SDI	AGIR I	AGIR II	Dialoga	ES	MASC	MS	PCBG
	Does the project contribute to fair procedures for the registration of candidates and parties?	2			2		1			
	Does the project contribute to the legislature reflecting the social composition of the electorate?	2			1		1			
	Does the project contribute to the election results being accepted by all political forces in the country and outside?	3			1		1			
US	Does the project contribute to effective electoral process monitoring?	1			2		3			
Total		**14**			**8**		**11**			

Effective and responsive government

		PHD	SDI	AGIR I	AGIR II	Dialoga	ES	MASC	MS	PCBG
	Does the project contribute to effective and open scrutiny of the control exercised by elected leaders and their ministers over their administrative staff and other executive agencies?			1	1	1	1			
	Does the project contribute to open and systematic procedures for public consultation on government policy and legislation			2	2	2	2			
	Does the project contribute to accessible and reliable public services for those who need them, and how systematic is consultation with users over service delivery?			1	3	2	2			

		PHD	SDI	AGIR I	AGIR II	Dialoga	ES	MASC	MS	PCBG
	Does the project contribute to comprehensive and effective access for citizens to government information?			2	2	2	1			
	Does the project contribute to the confidence of people in the ability to influence the government to solve the main problems confronting society?			1	1	1	2			
US	Does the project contribute to increased government responsiveness to citizens at the local level			1	2	2	2			
US	Does the project contribute to improved management and administrative capacity			1	2	2	2			
	How much confidence do people have that public officials and public services are free from corruption?			1	1	1	1			
Total				**11**	**14**	**14**	**13**			

Effective parliament

		PHD	SDI	AGIR I	AGIR II	Dialoga	ES	MASC	MS	PCBG
	Does the project contribute to the independency of the parliament or legislature of the executive, and how freely are its members able to express their opinions?		1	1		1	1	1		1
	Does the project contribute to extensive and effective powers of the parliament or legislature to initiate, scrutinize and amend legislation?		1	1		2	1	1		2

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		PHD	SDI	AGIR I	AGIR II	Dialoga	ES	MASC	MS	PCBG
	Does the project contribute to extensive and effective powers of the parliament or legislature to oversee the executive and hold it to account?		1	1		1	1	1		1
	Does the project contribute to accessible elected representatives to their constituents?		1	1		3	3	2		2
	Does the project contribute to the ability of parliament or legislature to provide a forum for deliberation and debate on issues of public concern?		1	3		3	3	2		3
Total			**5**	**7**		**10**	**9**	**7**		**9**

Civil society and popular participation

The media in a democratic society

		PHD	SDI	AGIR I	AGIR II	Dialoga	ES	MASC	MS	PCBG
	Does the project contribute to the independency of the media from government?	2		3	3	2			2	
	Does the project contribute to media that are representative of different opinions?			3	3	2			2	
	Does the project contribute to media that are accessible to different sections of society?			1	1	3			3	
	Does the project contribute to effective media in investigating government and powerful corporations?			2	1	2			2	
	Does the project contribute to journalists free from restrictive laws, harassment and intimidation?			1	1	1			1	

		PHD	SDI	AGIR I	AGIR II	Dialoga	ES	MASC	MS	PCBG
US	Does the project contribute to increased access to information on political system?			2	2	2		2		
US	Does the project contribute to increased institutional and financial viability?			1	1	1		2		
Total				**13**	**12**	**13**		**16**		

Political participation

		PHD	SDI	AGIR I	AGIR II	Dialoga	ES	MASC	MS	PCBG
	Does the project contribute to an extensive range of voluntary associations, citizen groups, social movements etc. and how independent are they from government?	2		3	3	3		3		
	Does the project contribute to extensive citizen participation in voluntary associations and self-management organizations, and in other voluntary public activity?			2	3	3		2		
	Does the project contribute to increased women participate in CSOs and political life?			1	1	1	3	1		
	Does the project contribute to equal access for all social groups to public office, and how fairly are they represented?			1	1	1		2		
Total				**7**	**8**	**8**		**8**		

CSOs

		PHD	SDI	AGIR I	AGIR II	Dialoga	ES	MASC	MS	PCBG

		PHD	SDI	AGIR I	AGIR II	Dialoga	ES	MASC	MS	PCBG
US	Does the project contribute to increased financial viability of CSOs?			1	1	1		1		
US	Does the project contribute to increased institutional viability of CSOs?			2	2	1		3		
US	Does the project contribute to a strengthened legal framework to protect and promote civil society?			1	1	1		2		
US	Does the project contribute to increased understanding of the political system among civil society?			3	3	3		3		
US	Does the project contribute to increased access to information on political system?			1	1	3		3		
US	Does the project contribute to increased openness of public institutions to CSO involvement in the policy process?			1	1	2		2		
Total				**9**	**9**	**11**		**14**		
Decentralization										
		PHD	SDI	AGIR I	AGIR II	Dialoga	ES	MASC	MS	PCBG
	Does the project contribute to the independency of sub-central tiers of government from the centre?		1			1				
	Does the project contribute to the powers and resources of sub-central tiers of government to carry out their responsibilities?		1			1				

Does the project contribute to these levels of government being subject to the criteria of openness, accountability and responsiveness in their operation?		1				1				
Does the project contribute to extensive cooperation of government at the most local level with relevant partners, associations and communities in the formation and implementation of policy, and in service provision?		1				3				
Total		**4**				**5**				

Annex II: Evaluation scores Malawi

Donor	Norad/SIDA	Norad/UNDP	DFID	UK/NOR/IER
Project	DCP II	DCP III	ES	Tilitonse
Year				
Project nr.	10	11	12	13
Citizenship, Law, and Rights				
The rule of law and access to justice				
Does the project contribute to the extent to which all public officials are subject to the rule of law and transparent rules in the performance of their functions	1			1
Does the project contribute to the independency of the courts and the judiciary from the executive, and how free are they from all kinds of interference?	1			1
Does the project contribute to equal and secure access of citizens to justice, to due process and to redress in the event of maladministration?	1			2
Total	**3**			**4**
Civil and political rights				

		DCP II	DCP III	ES	Tilitonse
	Does the project contribute to effective and equal protection of the freedoms of movement, expression, association and assembly?	1			1
	Does the project contribute to the freedom from harassment and intimidation are individuals and groups working to improve human rights?	1			1
US	Does the project contribute to effective advocacy for adherence to international human rights increased	2			2
US	Does the project contribute to improved government mechanisms protecting human rights	2			3
US	Does the project contribute to increased availability of legal services	3			3
Total		**9**			**10**

Representative and accountable government

Free and fair elections

		DCP II	DCP III	ES	Tilitonse
	Does the project contribute to the appointment of governmental and legislative office determined by popular competitive election, how frequently do elections lead to change in the governing parties or personnel?		2	2	
	Does the project contribute to inclusive and accessible registration and voting procedures, and the independency of government and party control?		2	2	
	Does the project contribute to fair procedures for the registration of candidates and parties?		2	2	
	Does the project contribute to the legislature reflecting the social composition of the electorate?		2	3	
	Does the project contribute to the election results being accepted by all political forces in the country and outside?		1	1	
US	Does the project contribute to effective electoral process monitoring?		1	1	
Total			**10**	**11**	

Effective and responsive government

		DCP II	DCP III	ES	Tilitonse
	Does the project contribute to effective and open scrutiny of the control exercised by elected leaders and their ministers over their administrative staff and other executive agencies?		1		1

		DCP II	DCP III	ES	Tilitonse
	Does the project contribute to open and systematic procedures for public consultation on government policy and legislation		2		2
	Does the project contribute to accessible and reliable public services for those who need them, and how systematic is consultation with users over service delivery?		3		2
	Does the project contribute to comprehensive and effective access for citizens to government information?		2		3
	Does the project contribute to the confidence of people in the ability of government to solve the main problems confronting society, and in their own ability to influence it?		2	1	3
US	Does the project contribute to increased government responsiveness to citizens at the local level		1		2
US	Improved management and administrative capacity		1	2	2
	How much confidence do people have that public officials and public services are free from corruption?		1		1
Total			**13**		**16**

Effective parliament

		DCP II	DCP III	ES	Tilitonse
	Does the project contribute to the independency of the parliament or legislature of the executive, and how freely are its members able to express their opinions?	1			1
	Does the project contribute to extensive and effective powers of the parliament or legislature to initiate, scrutinize and amend legislation?	2			1
	Does the project contribute to extensive and effective powers of the parliament or legislature to oversee the executive and hold it to account?	1			1
	Does the project contribute to accessible elected representatives to their constituents?	1			3
	Does the project contribute to the ability of parliament or legislature to provide a forum for deliberation and debate on issues of public concern?	1			2
Total		**6**			**8**

Civil society and popular participation

The media in a democratic society

		DCP II	DCP III	ES	Tilitonse
	Does the project contribute to the independency of the media from government?	3			3

	Does the project contribute to media that are representative of different opinions?	2	3
	Does the project contribute to media that are accessible to different sections of society?	2	2
	Does the project contribute to effective media in investigating government and powerful corporations?	1	3
	Does the project contribute to journalists free from restrictive laws, harassment and intimidation?	1	1
US	Does the project contribute to increased access to information on political system?	2	2
US	Does the project contribute to increased institutional and financial viability?	1	1
Total		**12**	**15**

Political participation

		DCP II	DCP III	ES	Tilitonse
	Does the project contribute to an extensive range of voluntary associations, citizen groups, social movements etc. and how independent are they from government?	2	2		2
	Does the project contribute to extensive citizen participation in voluntary associations and self-management organizations, and in other voluntary public activity?	2	2		3
	Does the project contribute to increased women participate in CSOs and political life?	1	1		1
	Does the project contribute to equal access for all social groups to public office, and how fairly are they represented?	1	2		2
Total		**6**	**7**		**8**

CSOs

		DCP II	DCP III	ES	Tilitonse
US	Does the project contribute to increased financial viability of CSOs?	1	1		1
US	Does the project contribute to increased institutional viability of CSOs?	1	1		1
US	Does the project contribute to a strengthened legal framework to protect and promote civil society?	1	2		2
US	Does the project contribute to increased understanding of the political system among civil society?	2	2		3
US	Does the project contribute to increased access to information on political system?	2	2		3

US	Does the project contribute to increased openness of public institutions to CSO involvement in the policy process?	3	2		2
Total		**10**	**10**		**12**

Decentralization

	DCP II	DCP III	ES	Tilitonse
Does the project contribute to the independency of sub-central tiers of government from the centre?	1	1		1
Does the project contribute to the powers and resources of sub-central tiers of government to carry out their responsibilities?	1	1		1
Does the project contribute to these levels of government being subject to the criteria of openness, accountability and responsiveness in their operation?	1	1		1
Does the project contribute to extensive cooperation of government at the most local level with relevant partners, associations and communities in the formation and implementation of policy, and in service provision?	3	2		2
Total	**6**	**5**		**5**

Annex III: Evaluation scores Zambia

Donor	SIDA	DFID	DFID	DFID	USAID	USAID
Project	BBC Media	PR III	DD	ZAP	FACT	EM
Year	2009-2013	2008-2013	2010-2014	2013-2019	2011-2017	2016
Project nr.	14	15	16	17	18	19

Citizenship, Law, and Rights

The rule of law and access to justice

	BBC Media	PR III	DD	ZAP	FACT	EM
Does the project contribute to the extent to which all public officials are subject to the rule of law and transparent rules in the performance of their functions		2				
Does the project contribute to the independency of the courts and the judiciary from the executive, and how free are they from all kinds of interference?		1				
Does the project contribute to equal and secure access of citizens to justice, to due process and to redress in the event of maladministration?		1				
Total		**4**				

Civil and political rights

		BBC Media	PR III	DD	ZAP	FACT	EM
	Does the project contribute to effective and equal protection of the freedoms of movement, expression, association and assembly?				1		
	Does the project contribute to the freedom from harassment and intimidation are individuals and groups working to improve human rights?				2		
US	Does the project contribute to effective advocacy for adherence to international human rights increased				1		
US	Does the project contribute to improved government mechanisms protecting human rights				1		
US	Does the project contribute to increased availability of legal services				3		
Total					**8**		

Representative and accountable government

Free and fair elections

		BBC Media	PR III	DD	ZAP	FACT	EM
	Does the project contribute to the appointment of governmental and legislative office determined by popular competitive election, how frequently do elections lead to change in the governing parties or personnel?			2		2	2
	Does the project contribute to inclusive and accessible registration and voting procedures, and the independency of government and party control?			2		3	2
	Does the project contribute to fair procedures for the registration of candidates and parties?			2	2	1	1
	Does the project contribute to the legislature reflecting the social composition of the electorate?			2		1	1
	Does the project contribute to the election results being accepted by all political forces in the country and outside?			1	2	2	2
US	Does the project contribute to effective electoral process monitoring	3		2	3	2	2
Total				**11**		**10**	**9**

Effective and responsive government

		BBC Media	PR III	DD	ZAP	FACT	EM
	Does the project contribute to effective and open scrutiny of the control exercised by elected leaders and their ministers over their administrative staff and other executive agencies?	1			1		
	Does the project contribute to open and systematic procedures for public consultation on government policy and legislation	2			2		
	Does the project contribute to accessible and reliable public services for those who need them, and how systematic is consultation with users over service delivery?	2			1		
	Does the project contribute to comprehensive and effective access for citizens to government information?	2			2		
	Does the project contribute to the confidence of people in the ability of government to solve the main problems confronting society, and in their own ability to influence it?	1			2		
US	Does the project contribute to increased government responsiveness to citizens at the local level	2			2		
US	Improved management and administrative capacity	2			2		
	How much confidence do people have that public officials and public services are free from corruption?	1			1		

		BBC Media	PR III	DD	ZAP	FACT	EM
	Total	13			13		

Effective parliament

		BBC Media	PR III	DD	ZAP	FACT	EM
	Does the project contribute to the independency of the parliament or legislature of the executive, and how freely are its members able to express their opinions?		1		1		
	Does the project contribute to extensive and effective powers of the parliament or legislature to initiate, scrutinize and amend legislation?		1		1		
	Does the project contribute to extensive and effective powers of the parliament or legislature to oversee the executive and hold it to account?		1		1		
	Does the project contribute to accessible elected representatives to their constituents?		2		2		
	Does the project contribute to the ability of parliament or legislature to provide a forum for deliberation and debate on issues of public concern?		2		3		
	Total		7		8		

Civil society and popular participation

The media in a democratic society

		BBC Media	PR III	DD	ZAP	FACT	EM
	Does the project contribute to the independency of the media from government?	2			2		
	Does the project contribute to media that are representative of different opinions?	2			3		
	Does the project contribute to media that are accessible to different sections of society?	3			2		
	Does the project contribute to effective media in investigating government and powerful corporations?	3			1		
	Does the project contribute to journalists free from restrictive laws, harassment and intimidation?	1			1		
US	Does the project contribute to increased access to information on political system?	2			2		
US	Does the project contribute to increased institutional and financial viability?	1			1		
	Total	14			12		

Political participation

		BBC Media	PR III	DD	ZAP	FACT	EM

		BBC Media					
	Does the project contribute to an extensive range of voluntary associations, citizen groups, social movements etc. and how independent are they from government?	3			3		
	Does the project contribute to extensive citizen participation in voluntary associations and self-management organizations, and in other voluntary public activity?	2			2		
	Does the project contribute to increased women participate in CSOs and political life?	1			3		
	Does the project contribute to equal access for all social groups to public office, and how fairly are they represented?	3			2		
Total		**9**			**10**		

CSOs

		BBC Media	PR III	DD	ZAP	FACT	EM
US	Does the project contribute to increased financial viability of CSOs?	1			1		
US	Does the project contribute to increased institutional viability of CSOs?	1			1		
US	Does the project contribute to a strengthened legal framework to protect and promote civil society?	2			1		
US	Does the project contribute to increased understanding of the political system among civil society?	3			3		
US	Does the project contribute to increased access to information on political system?	3			3		
US	Does the project contribute to increased openness of public institutions to CSO involvement in the policy process?	1			1		
Total		**11**			**10**		

Decentralization

		BBC Media	PR III	DD	ZAP	FACT	EM
	Does the project contribute to the independency of sub-central tiers of government from the centre?	1					
	Does the project contribute to the powers and resources of sub-central tiers of government to carry out their responsibilities?	1					
	Does the project contribute to these levels of government being subject to the criteria of openness, accountability and responsiveness in their operation?	2					
	Does the project contribute to extensive cooperation of government at the most local level with relevant partners, associations and communities in the	3					

		formation and implementation of policy, and in service provision?						
Total				**7**				

Annex IV: Evaluation scores Tanzania

Donor	**SIDA**	**SIDA**	**DFID**	**DFID**	**DFID**	**USAID**	**USAID**
Year	2010-2014	2010-2013	2008-2015	2009-2016	2013-2016	2009-2012	2013-2017
Project	SAPT	ALAT	TMF	AcT	IDEA	STAR	PT
Project nr.	20	21	22	23	24	25	26

Citizenship, Law, and Rights

The rule of law and access to justice

		SAPT	ALAT	TMF	AcT	IDEA	STAR	PT
	Does the project contribute to the extent to which all public officials are subject to the rule of law and transparent rules in the performance of their functions	1				1		
	Does the project contribute to the independency of the courts and the judiciary from the executive, and how free are they from all kinds of interference?	1				2		
	Does the project contribute to equal and secure access of citizens to justice, to due process and to redress in the event of maladministration?	2				1		
Total		**4**				**4**		

Civil and political rights

		SAPT	ALAT	TMF	AcT	IDEA	STAR	PT
	Does the project contribute to effective and equal protection of the freedoms of movement, expression, association and assembly?	1						1
	Does the project contribute to the freedom from harassment and intimidation are individuals and groups working to improve human rights?	2						2
US	Does the project contribute to effective advocacy for adherence to international human rights increased	2						1
US	Does the project contribute to improved government mechanisms protecting human rights	2						2

		SAPT	ALAT	TMF	AcT	IDEA	STAR	PT
US	Does the project contribute to increased availability of legal services	2						2
Total		9						8

Representative and accountable government

Free and fair elections

		SAPT	ALAT	TMF	AcT	IDEA	STAR	PT
	Does the project contribute to the appointment of governmental and legislative office determined by popular competitive election, how frequently do elections lead to change in the governing parties or personnel?					2		
	Does the project contribute to inclusive and accessible registration and voting procedures, and the independency of government and party control?					3		
	Does the project contribute to fair procedures for the registration of candidates and parties?					2		
	Does the project contribute to the legislature reflecting the social composition of the electorate?					2		
	Does the project contribute to the election results being accepted by all political forces in the country and outside?					1		
US	Does the project contribute to effective electoral process monitoring					1		
Total						11		

Effective and responsive government

		SAPT	ALAT	TMF	AcT	IDEA	STAR	PT
	Does the project contribute to effective and open scrutiny of the control exercised by elected leaders and their ministers over their administrative staff and other executive agencies?	1	1		1		1	1
	Does the project contribute to open and systematic procedures for public consultation on government policy and legislation	2	2		1		2	2
	Does the project contribute to accessible and reliable public services for those who need them, and how systematic is	2	2		2		2	3

		SAPT	ALAT	TMF	AcT	IDEA	STAR	PT
	consultation with users over service delivery?							
	Does the project contribute to comprehensive and effective access for citizens to government information?	3	2		2		1	2
	Does the project contribute to the confidence of people in the ability of government to solve the main problems confronting society, and in their own ability to influence it?	1			2		2	2
US	Does the project contribute to increased government responsiveness to citizens at the local level	2	2		2		2	3
US	Improved management and administrative capacity	2	2		2		2	2
	How much confidence do people have that public officials and public services are free from corruption?	1			2		2	1
Total		**16**			**14**		**14**	**16**

Effective parliament

		SAPT	ALAT	TMF	AcT	IDEA	STAR	PT
	Does the project contribute to the independency of the parliament or legislature of the executive, and how freely are its members able to express their opinions?	1				2	1	
	Does the project contribute to extensive and effective powers of the parliament or legislature to initiate, scrutinize and amend legislation?	1				2	1	
	Does the project contribute to extensive and effective powers of the parliament or legislature to oversee the executive and hold it to account?	1				2	1	
	Does the project contribute to accessible elected representatives to their constituents?	2				2	2	
	Does the project contribute to the ability of parliament or legislature to provide a forum for deliberation and debate on issues of public concern?	2				1	2	
Total		**7**				**9**	**7**	

Civil society and popular participation

The media in a democratic society

		SAPT	ALAT	TMF	AcT	IDEA	STAR	PT

		SAPT	ALAT	TMF	AcT	IDEA	STAR	PT
	Does the project contribute to the independency of the media from government?			1	1			
	Does the project contribute to media that are representative of different opinions?			1	2			
	Does the project contribute to media that are accessible to different sections of society?			3	2			
	Does the project contribute to effective media in investigating government and powerful corporations?			1	1			
	Does the project contribute to journalists free from restrictive laws, harassment and intimidation?			1	1			
US	Does the project contribute to increased access to information on political system?			2	3			
US	Does the project contribute to increased institutional and financial viability?			2	2			
Total				**13**	**11**			

Political participation

		SAPT	ALAT	TMF	AcT	IDEA	STAR	PT
	Does the project contribute to an extensive range of voluntary associations, citizen groups, social movements etc. and how independent are they from government?	2	2		3		2	
	Does the project contribute to extensive citizen participation in voluntary associations and self-management organizations, and in other voluntary public activity?	2			3		2	
	Does the project contribute to increased women participate in CSOs and political life?	2			1		1	
	Does the project contribute to equal access for all social groups to public office, and how fairly are they represented?	1			1		1	
Total		**7**			**8**		**6**	

CSOs

		SAPT	ALAT	TMF	AcT	IDEA	STAR	PT
US	Does the project contribute to increased financial viability of CSOs?	1			1		1	1
US	Does the project contribute to increased institutional viability of CSOs?	1			1		1	1

		SAPT	ALAT	TMF	AcT	IDEA	STAR	PT
US	Does the project contribute to a strengthened legal framework to protect and promote civil society?	1				1	1	1
US	Does the project contribute to increased understanding of the political system among civil society?	2				3	2	3
US	Does the project contribute to increased access to information on political system?	2				3	2	3
US	Does the project contribute to increased openness of public institutions to CSO involvement in the policy process?	2	2			2	2	2
Total		**9**				**11**	**9**	**11**

Decentralization

	SAPT	ALAT	TMF	AcT	IDEA	STAR	PT
Does the project contribute to the independency of sub-central tiers of government from the centre?	1					2	
Does the project contribute to the powers and resources of sub-central tiers of government to carry out their responsibilities?	1					1	
Does the project contribute to these levels of government being subject to the criteria of openness, accountability and responsiveness in their operation?	2					2	
Does the project contribute to extensive cooperation of government at the most local level with relevant partners, associations and communities in the formation and implementation of policy, and in service provision?	2					2	
Total	**6**					**7**	